Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 7, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-17-00148-CR

JEFFREY ALAN BRIDGES, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 212th District Court 

Galveston County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 14-CR-3549 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant Jeffrey Alan Bridges pled guilty to the felony offense of assault 

against a person with whom he had a dating relationship. The trial court deferred 

adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on community supervision for two years. 

Claiming appellant had violated numerous terms and conditions of his community 

supervision, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt. Following a hearing, the 

trial court adjudicated guilt and sentenced appellant to seven years in prison. 
2

Appellant brings two issues on appeal. Appellant argues in his first issue that 

the trial court committed structural error when it denied his motion to dismiss his 

appointed trial counsel and also when it allegedly refused his request to proceed pro 

se. We overrule this issue because appellant did not ask the trial court to permit him 

to proceed pro se and did not present adequate cause for the replacement of his 

appointed trial counsel. 

In his second issue, appellant contends his trial counsel was ineffective 

because she had the prosecutor confirm the State’s offered plea bargain on the record 

and had appellant confirm on the record that he had rejected the State’s offer. We 

overrule this issue because appellant has not demonstrated that this action by his trial 

counsel rendered her performance deficient. We therefore affirm the trial court’s 

judgment adjudicating guilt. 

BACKGROUND1

Appellant was charged with committing the felony offense of assault on a 

person with whom he had a dating relationship. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 (West 

2011). Appellant entered a plea of guilty in accordance with a plea bargain with the 

State. After finding that the evidence substantiated appellant’s guilt, the trial court 

deferred adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on community supervision for 

two years. The State eventually filed a motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt. The 

State alleged that appellant had violated numerous terms and conditions of his 

community supervision. Appellant pled true to several of those allegations, 

including use of marijuana in violation of the terms of his community supervision 

and failure to pay community supervision fees to the Galveston County Supervision 

 

1 Because appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

revocation of his community supervision, we include only those facts necessary to provide 

background for his issues on appeal.
3

Department. Following a hearing at which appellant and his court liaison officer 

testified, the trial court found numerous allegations in the State’s motion to be true, 

revoked appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced appellant to serve seven 

years in prison. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS

I. Appellant has not established that the trial court committed structural 

error when it denied his request to replace his appointed trial counsel.

 In his first issue, appellant makes two separate arguments that the trial court 

committed “structural” error during the hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate 

guilt. Appellant initially argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request 

to represent himself. The State responds that the trial court committed no error 

because appellant never asked to represent himself. We agree with the State. 

 To invoke the right to self-representation, a defendant must clearly, 

unequivocally, and timely assert his desire to represent himself. See Lathem v. State, 

514 S.W.3d 796, 811–12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (stating criminal 

defendant must assert right to self-representation for right to attach). Appellant has 

not pointed to any place in the record he asserted his right to represent himself or 

where the trial court denied the request. Further, our own review of the record has 

failed to reveal that appellant asserted his right to self-representation.2 Because 

appellant never clearly and unequivocally informed the trial court that he desired to 

represent himself, we conclude he has not shown that the trial court committed any 

error. 

 Appellant next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request to 

 

2 This includes appellant’s motion to dismiss his appointed trial counsel. In that motion, 

appellant specifically asked the trial court to dismiss his appointed trial counsel and to then appoint 

replacement counsel.
4

dismiss his appointed trial counsel and to appoint a replacement attorney. We review 

a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss appointed counsel for an abuse of 

discretion. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A criminal 

defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel of his choice. Perez v. State, 261 

S.W.3d 760, 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). Rather, the 

defendant is required to accept appointed counsel unless the defendant demonstrates 

an adequate reason to appoint substitute counsel. Carroll v. State, 176 S.W.3d 249, 

256 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). A criminal defendant bears 

the burden of proving he is entitled to a change of appointed counsel. Hill v. State, 

686 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). He must make the trial court aware 

of his dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel and substantiate his claim. Id. 

Personality conflicts and disagreements concerning trial strategy typically are not 

valid grounds for dismissal. King, 29 S.W.3d at 566. 

 During the hearing on his motion to dismiss his appointed counsel, appellant 

told the trial court he was concerned about the timely filing of “appropriate 

paperwork” verifying his compliance with the conditions of his community 

supervision. He also informed the trial court that his trial counsel had told him in a 

“threatening [and] yelling” manner that he must take the State’s three-year plea 

offer. When the trial court asked appellant if he had anything further to say regarding 

his motion to dismiss, appellant responded that he did not.3

 

With respect to appellant’s concerns regarding paperwork to establish his 

compliance with certain conditions of his community supervision, his trial counsel 

established during the hearing that she had copies of the referenced paperwork. As

 

3

In his motion to dismiss, appellant listed additional complaints, including allegations that 

there was an “open investigation with Attorneys [sic] State Bar of Texas,” that his trial counsel 

lied to him, and that counsel failed to represent his constitutional rights. Appellant offered no 

evidence in support of these allegations during the hearing on his motion.
5

to his remaining complaints, we conclude they reflect personality conflicts and 

appellant’s dissatisfaction with his counsel’s trial strategy, which normally are not 

valid grounds for dismissal of appointed counsel. See King, 29 S.W.3d at 566. On 

this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied appellant’s motion to dismiss his trial counsel. See Maes v. State, 275 S.W.3d 

68, 71–72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). 

 Having addressed and rejected both arguments raised in appellant’s first issue, 

we overrule that issue. 

II. Appellant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Appellant argues in his second issue that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel because she informed the trial court of the State’s offered plea 

bargain. Appellant also asserts that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s allegedly 

deficient performance because it prejudiced the trial court against him. 

A. Standard of review and applicable law 

In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply a two-part

test. See Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, an appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that (1) his trial counsel’s representation was deficient in that it fell below the 

standard of prevailing professional norms, and (2) there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. 

Id.

 An accused is entitled to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. King v. 

State, 649 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Bradley v. State, 359 S.W.3d 912,

916 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). Reasonably effective 
6

assistance of counsel does not mean error-free representation, however. Ex parte 

Felton, 815 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Isolated instances in the 

record reflecting errors of omission or commission do not render counsel’s 

performance ineffective, nor can ineffective assistance of counsel be established by 

isolating one portion of trial counsel’s performance for examination. Wert v. State, 

383 S.W.3d 747, 753 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Therefore, 

when evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance, we consider the totality of the 

representation and the particular circumstances of the case. Lopez v. State, 343 

S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s actions and decisions were 

reasonably professional and were motivated by sound trial strategy. Salinas, 163 

S.W.3d at 740. It is not sufficient that an appellant show, with the benefit of 

hindsight, that his counsel’s actions or omissions during trial were merely of 

questionable competence. Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143. Instead, for an appellate court 

to conclude that counsel was ineffective, counsel’s deficiency must be affirmatively 

demonstrated in the trial record and the court must not engage in retrospective 

speculation. Id. at 142. When such direct evidence is not available, we will assume 

trial counsel had a strategy if any reasonably sound strategic motivation can be 

imagined. Id. at 143.

Trial counsel ordinarily should be afforded an opportunity to explain her

actions before being denounced as ineffective. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 

593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Unless trial counsel has had an opportunity to give 

specific explanations for her decisions, a record on direct appeal will rarely contain 

sufficient information to evaluate an ineffective-assistance claim. Bone v. State, 77 

S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When no reasonable trial strategy could 
7

justify trial counsel’s conduct, however, trial counsel’s performance falls below an 

objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the 

record adequately reflects trial counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as she did. 

Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In other words, when 

trial counsel has not had an opportunity to explain his or her actions or inactions, an 

appellate court cannot find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was 

“so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Goodspeed 

v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

B. Appellant has not established that his trial counsel performed 

deficiently by placing appellant’s rejection of the State’s plea offer 

on the record.

Appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging, among other things, that his 

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance as a result of her informing the trial court 

of the State’s offered plea bargain. Appellant did not, however, attach an affidavit 

to his motion. The record does not establish that the motion was timely presented to 

the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 21.6; see generally Carranza v. State, 960 S.W.2d 

76, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (stating “there is nothing in the record to show 

appellant delivered his new trial motion to the trial court or otherwise brought the 

motion to the attention or actual notice of the trial court.”). As a result, appellant’s 

trial counsel was not provided an opportunity to explain her actions. 

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that as a general rule, defense 

counsel has the duty to communicate a formal offer of a plea bargain from the 

prosecution to the accused. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) (holding 

trial counsel’s failure to communicate formal plea offer to defendant constituted 

deficient performance under Strickland). The Court also stated that defense counsel 

could document compliance with this duty by making formal offers part of the 

record. Id. at 146. We conclude that appellant’s trial counsel’s decision to document 
8

her compliance with the affirmative duty to inform appellant of the State’s plea 

bargain offer does not constitute an act “so outrageous that no competent attorney 

would have engaged in it.” Because we have determined appellant has not shown 

that his trial counsel’s representation was deficient, we need not address the second 

part of the Strickland test.

4

 We overrule appellant’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

 Having overruled appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

 

 /s/ J. Brett Busby

 Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Busby and Wise. 

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

 

4 To the extent appellant argues in his second issue that his trial counsel’s decision to place 

the State’s offered plea bargain on the record rendered the trial judge biased or prejudiced against 

him, he has offered no authority supporting such a proposition. Nor has he offered authority for 

the proposition that the trial court’s decision to impose a punishment on appellant that is within 

the statutory punishment range, but greater than the punishment offered in a rejected plea bargain, 

establishes that the trial judge is biased or prejudiced against him. As a result, to the extent 

appellant makes such arguments, we reject them. See Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006) (“Absent a clear showing of bias, a trial court’s actions will be presumed to have 

been correct.”); Barfield v. State, 464 S.W.3d 67, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. 

ref’d) (“Our review of the record, including the pages appellant cites, does not reveal obvious 

bias.”).