Filed 9/28/15 Tran v. Rogers CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

NEIL TRAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL ROGERS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 D066364

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00062758)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Randa Trapp, Judge. Affirmed.

Neil Tran, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lambert & Rogers and Michael Rogers, for Defendants and Respondents.
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INTRODUCTION

This is Neil Tran's fourth appeal in a series of lawsuits stemming from statements 

Tran made about Lieu Minh Quang1 in Tran's publication, Nang Moi, in 2002.2 In this 

case, Tran sued Quang, Michael Rogers (Quang's former attorney), Doan Dung, Nguoi 

Viet Today News, and Tri T. Nguyen, M.D. for allegedly conspiring to continue the trial 

in Tran's case against Quang by falsely representing that Quang was ill and to prevent 

Tran from presenting his case at trial. Tran appeals a judgment dismissing Rogers, Nguoi 

Viet Today News, and Dung (collectively Respondents) after the court sustained their 

demurrer to his first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend. The trial court 

sustained the demurrer on three grounds: (1) the conduct alleged is absolutely privileged 

under Civil Code3 section 47, subdivision (b); (2) the FAC is an improper collateral 

attack on a previous judgment; and (3) the FAC fails to allege a conspiracy claim.

 

1 Quang was sued in this case, and is sometimes referred to, as Quang Minh Lieu. 

Respondents inform us this is based on linguistic differences between English and 

Vietnamese regarding placement of the surname. For consistency, we refer to this 

individual as Quang.

2 Tran was the appellant in the following matters arising from the dispute with 

Quang: Quang v. Tran (Aug. 23, 2004, D041992) [nonpub. opn.]) affirmed an order 

denying Tran's special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 425.16); Quang v. Tran (Oct. 10, 2007, D048346) [nonpub. opn.]) affirmed judgment 

for Quang; and Tran v. Quang et al. (Sept. 18, 2013, D064038), dismissed as untimely. 

Tran was also the appellant in a similar case, Dinh v. Tran (Sept. 27, 2004, D042139) 

[nonpub. opn.]) affirmed an order denying Tran's special motion to strike under the antiSLAPP statute regarding statements in Nang Moi.

3 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
3

On appeal, Tran contends the litigation privilege should not apply to this case and 

this action does not constitute an improper collateral attack on a previous judgment. He 

also contends the court erred in sustaining the demurrer without granting him leave to 

amend. We conclude there is no merit to these contentions and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the first lawsuit, Quang v. Tran, supra, D048346, Quang obtained a money 

judgment against Tran for libel, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and punitive 

damages based on false statements Tran published in Nang Moi about Quang. We 

affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. 

In the second lawsuit, Tran v. Quang, supra, D064038, Tran sued Quang, Dung, 

Nguoi Viet Today News, and other parties, for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

and defamation. After a jury trial, Quang, Dung, and Nguoi Viet Today News obtained a 

defense judgment against Tran. Tran unsuccessfully moved for a new trial and failed to 

timely appeal the judgment. 

In this third lawsuit, Tran sued Respondents for conspiracy, fraud, unfair business 

practice, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.4 Tran's FAC

alleges Respondents conspired with Tran's former attorney during the Tran v. Quang,

supra, D064038 case: (1) to induce the court to continue the trial for three months by 

allegedly falsely representing Quang suffered a heart attack and was too ill to proceed 

 

4 Tran amended his original complaint prior to service. Therefore, the FAC is the 

operative complaint. 
4

with trial as scheduled; (2) to deny Tran's request for Quang to produce medical records;

(3) to use Tran's translator for Quang during trial without reimbursing Tran; and (4) to 

prevent Tran from calling witnesses (allegedly falsely representing a witness had been 

murdered) and presenting evidence of damage to his reputation.5 Tran contends the 

Respondents made false representations and conspired to deny him the opportunity to 

fairly present his defamation case.

Respondents demurred to the FAC contending its allegations are barred by section 

47, subdivision (b)'s litigation privilege and by section 1714.10's procedural requirements 

for filing a civil conspiracy action against an attorney. Additionally, Respondents 

contended this lawsuit is an impermissible counterattack on the prior adverse judgment 

against Tran. In opposition, Tran argued section 47, subdivision (b) is inapplicable to his

allegations and requested leave to amend. 

The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the grounds the FAC 

concerned absolutely privileged conduct under section 47, subdivision (b), it constitutes

an improper collateral attack on a previous judgment, and it fails to allege a conspiracy 

claim because it does not allege a wrongful act to support a conspiracy. The court denied 

leave to amend stating it did not appear Tran could state a cause of action.

 

5 Tran apparently has a separate lawsuit pending against his former attorney arising 

from the Tran v. Quang case. (Tran v. Kanter (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2013, No. 

37-2013-0053420-CU-PN-CTL).)
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DISCUSSION

I

Demurrer

"A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] Therefore, we 

review the [FAC] de novo to determine whether it contains sufficient facts to state a 

cause of action. [Citation.] 'We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts 

properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.' " (Grinzi 

v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78; see Flannery v. VW Credit, 

Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 606, 613.)

We conclude the court properly sustained Respondents' demurrer because all of 

Tran's allegations and causes of action concern absolutely privileged conduct. "The 

litigation privilege, codified at ... section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a 'publication 

or broadcast' made as part of a 'judicial proceeding' is privileged. This privilege is 

absolute in nature, applying 'to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.'

[Citation.] ... The privilege 'is not limited to statements made during a trial or other 

proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.' " (Action 

Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) The 

purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford " 'the utmost freedom of access to the courts 

without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.' " (Ibid.) 

" '[T]he privilege is "an 'absolute' privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action 

except a claim of malicious prosecution." [Citation.] The litigation privilege has been 
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applied in "numerous cases" involving "fraudulent communication or perjured 

testimony." ' " (Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 965, italics omitted.)

Tran's allegations all concern communications during the Tran v. Quang, supra, 

D064038 judicial proceeding. Tran alleges Respondents and Tran's former attorney 

made statements to the court concerning Quang's health and the availability of witnesses. 

Tran alleges Rogers used Tran's translator for Quang during trial. Tran alleges the 

Respondents, along with Tran's former attorney, "acted in concert ... to conclude the case 

after the first day of trial," which he alleges prevented him from presenting evidence of 

damage. Each of these communicative acts made during the course of litigation falls

within section 47, subdivision (b)'s purview. 

Tran contends the litigation privilege should not apply in this case because he 

believes the conduct alleged amounts to perjury. It is true the litigation privilege does not 

apply to prevent criminal prosecution for perjury or subornation of perjury. (Action 

Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) However, it 

is well established the litigation privilege applies to civil actions based on perjury or other 

fraudulent communications. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322.) The 

Supreme Court has explained, " ' "[t]he resulting lack of any really effective civil remedy 

against perjurers is simply part of the price that is paid for witnesses who are free from 
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intimidation by the possibility of civil liability for what they say." ' " (Jacob B. v. County 

of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 956.)6 

Additionally, the FAC is an impermissible collateral attack on the adverse 

judgment Tran received in his prior lawsuit. Although Tran does not explicitly seek to 

reverse or set aside that judgment, he seeks damages for fraud he alleges Respondents 

committed during trial. Even assuming Tran's allegations to be true, such an attack on 

intrinsic fraud by way of a subsequent lawsuit is improper. (Mullen v. Dep't of Real 

Estate (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 295, 301 ["[W]here the fraud was committed within the 

trial there can be no relief. '[I]t is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be 

vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony.' "].) 

Therefore, Tran's causes of action are barred and the trial court correctly sustained the 

demurrer to the FAC.

II

Leave to Amend

Tran also contends the court abused its discretion in denying him leave to amend. 

"The trial court exercises its discretion in declining to grant leave to amend. [Citation.]

If it is reasonably possible the pleading can be cured by amendment, the trial court abuses 

its discretion by not granting leave to amend." (Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp.

 

6 Tran's reliance on Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299 is misplaced. In that 

case, the court discussed the litigation privilege, recognizing its broad application even to 

fraudulent or perjured statements. (Id. at p. 322.) It held, however, the anti-SLAPP 

statute, which is substantively different from section 47, did not apply to criminal 

extortion because such conduct is not constitutionally protected speech. (Id. at pp. 328, 

333.)
8

(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78.) Tran "has the burden of proving the possibility of cure 

by amendment." (Ibid.) 

In opposing Respondents' demurer, Tran claimed he could plead more facts about 

the motivations for Respondents' actions, but did not specify how such facts would cure 

the pleading defects or overcome the litigation privilege or the bar against a collateral 

attack on a prior judgment.

Tran contends we should grant leave to amend because he is representing himself.

Tran also contends because he is not an attorney he should have an opportunity on 

remand to file a petition under section 1714.10 to permit him to state a claim for civil 

conspiracy against attorney Rogers, who properly raised this failure as a defense in 

Respondents' demurrer. (§ 1714.10, subds. (a), (b); Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. 

Sherwood Partners, Inc. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 815.) A self-represented litigant 

must " 'be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater 

consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Thus, as is the 

case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct rules of procedure." (Nwosu v. 

Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) Tran has not met his burden of demonstrating 

how he could cure the FAC's fatal deficiencies or how he could avoid the application of 

section 1714.10. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tran 

leave to amend.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

AARON, J.

PRAGER, J.*

 

* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.