alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
207 La. 992

#### THOMPSON v. THOMPSON.

No. 37643.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 30, 1945.

A. A. Moss and Eugene Beck, both of Winnfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

W. T. Holloway, of Jonesboro, for defendant-appellee.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

Henry Lawson Thompson sued for a judgment of separation from bed and board on the ground that his wife had abandoned or deserted him. He prayed also that the care and custody of the three minor children, issue of his marriage with the defendant, should be entrusted to his parents. The defendant averred in her answer that her leaving her husband was compelled by his habitual intemperance and cruel treatment. She set up in her answer a reconventional demand for a divorce on the ground of adultery, and prayed that the care and custody of the three children should be entrusted to her, or if not to her to her parents. The court after a hearing of the case on its merits gave the wife an absolute divorce. The judge ordered that two of the children, who were then residing with their father’s parents, should remain with them and that the other child, who was residing with his mother’s parents, should remain with them, until the judge could give further consideration to the conflicting claims for the care and custody of the children. The judge directed that an investigation should be made by the Department of Public Welfare as to whom the care and custody of the children should be entrusted.

Thereafter, on the report and recommendation of the Department of Public Welfare, the judge rendered judgment entrusting the custody and care of the children to their mother, but ordered that they should be kept in the home of her parents and under the observation of the Department of Public Welfare. The judge ordered the father to pay to the maternal grandparents of the children $20 a week for their sup*406port and maintenance until the further orders of the court.

The father ' of the children appealed, complaining only of that part of the judgment which gave the custody and care of the children to their mother and which ordered that they should he kept in the home of her parents. The appellant says in his brief that neither he nor the mother of the children is fit to have the care and custody of them; and he asks that this responsibility be entrusted to his parents.

There is nothing in the record that casts doubt upon the wisdom of the judge in entrusting the care and keeping of the three children to their mother in the home of her parents. His decision in that respect, having been reached after thorough consideration and after taking the precaution of having an investigation and report made by the Department of Public Welfare, is entitled to great faith. The judgment is subject to revision or rescission by the judge at any time if changing conditions should call for a revision or rescission of the judgment. Our conclusion is that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32

Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 
of the United States Code

I, Ralph Izzo, Chief Executive Officer of Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated, to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the Quarterly Report of Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated on Form 10-Q for the
period ended March 31, 2009 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated.



| | /s/ Ralph Izzo                                                                          
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | Ralph IzzoPublic Service Enterprise Group IncorporatedChief Executive OfficerMay 5, 2009



---
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 04-cr-227-01-PB

Kelley Hardy

O R D E R

The defendant has moved to continue the November 1, 2005

trial in the above case, citing the need for additional time to 

finalize a plea agreement. The government does not object to a

continuance of the trial date.

Accordingly, in order to allow the parties additional time

to negotiate a plea agreement or properly prepare for trial, the

court will continue the trial from November 1, 2005 to December

6, 2005. In agreeing to continue the trial, the court finds

pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8)(A) that for the above-stated

reasons, the ends of justice served in granting a continuance

outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial.

Case 1:04-cr-00227-PB Document 19 Filed 10/18/05 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro 

Paul Barbadoro

United States District Judge

October 18, 2005

cc: Sven Wiberg, Esq.

Robert Veiga, AUSA

United States Probation

United States Marshal

Case 1:04-cr-00227-PB Document 19 Filed 10/18/05 Page 2 of 2
<PAGE>

                                                                  Exhibit 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350*

In connection with the Quarterly Report of PGI Incorporated (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Laurence A. Schiffer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.

/s/ Laurence A. Schiffer
----------------------------------------------
 Laurence A. Schiffer
 Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)      November 14, 2007


<FN>
*A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company
  and will be retained by the Company and will be furnished to the Securities
  and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
| (logo)  **ncb**  National Cooperative Bank    | 2011  Crystal  Drive  Suite, 8oo  Arlington, VA 22202 |
|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL COMPLIANCE STATEMENT**

 

CERTIFICATION

 

BANK 2018-BNK13, Commercial Mortgage Pass-ThroughCertificates, Series 2018-BNK13 (the “Trust”)

 

I, Karyn Mann, on behalf ofNational Cooperative Bank, N.A., as NCB Special Servicer (the “CertifyingServicer”), certify to Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. andits officers, directors and affiliates, and with the knowledge and intent thatthey will rely upon this certification, that:

 

1.        I (or Servicing Officers under mysupervision) have reviewed the Certifying Servicer’s activities during thepreceding calendar year between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018 (the “ReportingPeriod”) and the Certifying Servicer’s performance under the Pooling andServicing Agreement; and

 

2.       Tothe best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Certifying Servicer hasfulfilled all of its obligations under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement inall material respects during the Reporting Period.

 

 

Date:February 4, 2019

 

 

NATIONALCOOPERATIVE BANK, N.A.,

asNCB Special Servicer

By:/s/ Karyn Mann

Name:Karyn Mann

Title:Senior Vice President
V 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6910 

For the relief of Igor Klyuchenko. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 2, 2022 

Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Igor Klyuchenko. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR IGOR 

4 KLYUCHENKO. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsections (a) 

6 and (b) of section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality 

7 Act, Igor Klyuchenko shall be eligible for issuance of an 

8 immigrant visa or for adjustment of status to that of an 

9 alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence upon fil10 ing an application for issuance of an immigrant visa under 

11 section 204 of such Act or for adjustment of status to 

12 lawful permanent resident. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6910 IH

1 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—If Igor Klyuchenko 

2 enters the United States before the filing deadline speci3 fied in subsection (c), he shall be considered to have en4 tered and remained lawfully and shall, if otherwise eligible, 

5 be eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of 

6 the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of the 

7 enactment of this Act. 

8 (c) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

9 FEES.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if the ap10 plication for issuance of an immigrant visa or the applica11 tion for adjustment of status is filed with appropriate fees 

12 within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

13 (d) REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT VISA NUMBER.— 

14 Upon the granting of an immigrant visa or permanent res15 idence to Igor Klyuchenko, the Secretary of State shall 

16 instruct the proper officer to reduce by 2, during the cur17 rent or next following fiscal year, the total number of im18 migrant visas that are made available to natives of the 

19 country of the aliens’ birth under section 203(a) of the 

20 Immigration and Nationality Act or, if applicable, the 

21 total number of immigrant visas that are made available 

22 to natives of the country of the aliens’ birth under section 

23 202(e) of such Act. 

24 (e) DENIAL OF PREFERENTIAL IMMIGRATION

25 TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN RELATIVES.—The natural 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6910 IH

1 parents, brothers, and sisters of Igor Klyuchenko shall 

2 not, by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any right, 

3 privilege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality 

4 Act. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Carlos RODRIGUEZ-RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-40114.

Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 18, 2003.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Juan Carlos Rodriguez-Ruiz (Rodriguez) appeals the sentence he received following his guilty-plea conviction to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He asserts that the district court erred in denying him a downward adjustment pursuant to the safety valve provision, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Rodriguez has not met his burden of establishing that he provided truthful and complete information to the Government. *See*§ 5C1.2(a)(5); *United States v. Flanagan,*80 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir.1996). He has not shown that the district court clearly erred in denying the adjustment. *See United States v. Miller,*179 F.3d 961, 963-64 (5th Cir.1999).

Rodriguez also asserts that the district court erred in denying him an adjustment for his minor role in the offense. Typically this court reviews such claims for clear error. *United States v. Gallegos,*868 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir.1989). However, because Rodriguez moved in the district court for an adjustment based upon his *minimal*role, this court should review for plain error. *See United States v. Leonard,*157 F.3d 343, 345 (5th Cir.1998). Regardless which standard we use, Rodriguez has not established that he was “substantially less culpable than the average participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3(A)); *United States v. Lokey,*945 F.2d 825, 840 (5th Cir.1991). The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
H. J. Res. 113

One Hundred Seventh Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the twenty-third day of January, two thousand and two

Joint Resolution

Recognizing the contributions of Patsy Takemoto Mink.

Whereas Patsy Takemoto Mink was one of the country’s leading

voices for women’s rights, civil rights, and working families and

was devoted to raising living standards and providing economic

and educational opportunity to all Americans;

Whereas Patsy Takemoto Mink was a passionate and persistent

fighter against economic and social injustices in Hawaii and

across America;

Whereas Patsy Takemoto Mink was one of the first women of

color to win national office in 1964 and opened doors of opportunity to millions of women and people of color across America;

Whereas Patsy Takemoto Mink won unprecedented legislative

accomplishments on issues affecting women’s health, children,

students, and working families; and

Whereas Patsy Takemoto Mink’s heroic, visionary, and tireless

leadership to win the landmark passage of title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 opened doors to women’s academic

and athletic achievements and redefined what is possible for

a generation of women and for future generations our Nation’s

daughters: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That title IX

of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.;
H. J. Res. 113—2

Public Law 92–318) may be cited as the ‘‘Patsy Takemoto Mink

Equal Opportunity in Education Act’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 36 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

                                                        Calendar No. 92

107th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                             H. J. RES. 36

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 authorizing the Congress to prohibit the physical desecration of the 
                       flag of the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             July 18, 2001

                          Read the first time

                             July 19, 2001

            Read the second time and placed on the calendar
                                                        Calendar No. 92
107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 36

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 18, 2001

                    Received and read the first time

                             July 19, 2001

            Read the second time and placed on the calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 authorizing the Congress to prohibit the physical desecration of the 
                       flag of the United States.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein),

SECTION 1. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

    The following article is proposed as an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents 
and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the 
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years 
after the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article--

    ``The Congress shall have power to prohibit the physical 
desecration of the flag of the United States.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 17, 2001.

            Attest:

                                                 JEFF TRANDAHL,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### APPEAL 

### O F 

### F LORIDA 

### S ECOND 

### D ISTRICT RIGOBERTO RAMIREZ-GONZALEZ,

Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. Case No. 2D21-277 September 24, 2021 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; Margaret O. Steinbeck, Judge. Christopher E. Cosden of Law Office of Christopher E. Cosden, Fort Myers, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ryan Michael Edmiston, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. KELLY, BLACK, and STARGEL, JJ., Concur.2

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
181 La. 74,

#### CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. Ben SAKOVITZ.

No. 33045.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 7, 1935.

Richard A. Dowling, of New Orleans, for appellant.

E. M. Robbert, City Atty., and W. Sommer Benedict, Asst. City Atty., both of New Orleans, for appellee.

BRUNOT, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence on two counts: One for disturbing the peace, and the other for distributing circulars without a permit, in violation of Ordinances N'os. 3121 and 8080, C. C. S., of the city of New Orleans.

The same proceedings, including the filing of the demurrer and the failure of counsel to have the same submitted to the court, from the inception of the trial to the entry of the order of appeal, were had in this case as were had in City of New Orleans v. Charles Ford (La. Sup.) 158 So. 624, this day decided.

Therefore, for the reasons assigned in said case, the appeal herein is dismissed.
Exhibit 32.1





Pyramid Oil Company





Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906


Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Pyramid Oil Company (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, John H. Alexander, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:





(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated: May 13, 2011





JOHN H. ALEXANDERJohn H. AlexanderChief Executive Officer
#### In the Matter of Insurance Company of North America, Appellant, v Jessica Castro et al., Respondents.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, *inter alia,*to stay arbitration, the petitioner appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Collins, J.), entered December 9, 1987, which, after a hearing, *inter alia,*denied the application and determined that on the date of the accident the respondent insurance carrier did not have a policy of automobile liability insurance in full force and effect with regard to the vehicle owned by Daniel P. O’Brien.

Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the application to permanently stay arbitration is granted.

Where a hearing is required to determine whether an offending vehicle was insured at the time of an accident, the initial burden is on the claimant’s insurer to come forward with proof that the offending vehicle was insured *(see, Matter of Wausau Ins. Co. v Predestin,*114 AD2d 900, 901; *Matter of State Wide Ins. Co. v Libecci,*104 AD2d 893, 895; *Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Yeglinski,*79 AD2d 1029; *Matter of Safeco Ins. Co. [Testagrossa],*67 AD2d 979, 981). The petitioner submitted a Department of Motor Vehicles form indicating that the vehicle had been insured *(see, Matter of Safeco Ins. Co. [Testagrossa], supra).*That evidence shifted the burden to the respondents to prove that the vehicle was never insured *(see, Nassau Ins. Co. v Minor,*72 AD2d 576, 577) or that the insurance had been canceled *(see, Matter of Safeco Ins. Co. [Testagrossa], supra,*at 981). The respondents, however, failed to meet their burden. Consequently, the judgment appealed from must be reversed.

At bar, the respondents attempted to meet their burden by proving that the offending vehicle’s insurance had been canceled. Their attempt failed for two reasons. First, the language of the respondent insurer’s notice of cancellation did not comply with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 and its implementing regulations *(see, Barile v Kavanaugh,*67 NY2d 392, 396-399). Second, the respondents did not make a sufficient showing that the notice of cancellation had been mailed in compliance with the requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313. There was no showing that the notice was duly addressed and mailed or that there existed an office practice and procedure used in the regular course of business that ensured the likelihood that such a notice was addressed and mailed *(cf.,*
      *314
      *Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray,*46 NY2d 828, 829-830). Kunzeman, J. P., Kooper, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
#### WATSON v. CARTER.

3 Div. 747.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

May 14, 1935.

Warren S. Reese, Jr., of Montgomery, for appellant.

John B. Scott, of Montgomery, for appel-lee.

RICE, Judge.

Appellant, a member of the order, possessed an “endowment policy” of insurance issued to him by appellee “the Grand Lodge *549Knights of Pythias, of Alabama, under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias of North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia.”

His suit is for damages occasioned by the claimed breach on the part of appellee with the high-sounding name, of the terms of this “contract of insurance.”

The ease was tried in a rather unusual manner. No questions were raised by rulings on the pleadings; nor by rulings on the taking of testimony.

Without objection, appellant was allowed to prove a “cash surrender value” of the policy in question; whether it, legally, had one, or not, we are not called upon in any way to say.

Our duties, as we understand, are to simply review any ruling made, due exception to which was reserved, and which, is presented to us in the prescribed method.

Accordingly, we find ourselves called to do but a single thing; say whether or not exception was well taken to the following portion of the trial court’s oral charge, viz.: “It is the law and the court so charges you that if there is a breach in this case all that the plaintiff could recover would be for the amount for which he did not receive insurance. In other words, if the defendant had been guilty of breaching a contract it would be its duty to pay him back every cent of money for the length of that breach and that would be $1.50 per month.” .

As the ease was tried, all, as above indicated, m a manner by tacit consent, the quoted excerpt from the trial judge’s oral charge was erroneous. In fact, we are not advised.as to the principles upon whicli he conceived his theory.

The law would seem to be, assuming the facts in evidence were legally in evidence (about which we in no manner intimate an opinion), as follows, to wit: “The legal measure of such damages [for the breach by an insurer of a policy of life insurance, we interpolate] is the surrender or equitable value of the policy, calculated on the basis of the ‘American Tables of Mortality.’ ” McDonnell v. Alabama Gold Life Insurance Co. 85 Ala. 401, 5 So. 120, 122. Of course, if the policy has no such “equitable or surrender value,” there could be no recovery.

For the error indicated, the judgment is reversed, and' the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.