UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Jack Vaughn

v. Civil No. 05-cv-223-JD

Bernice A. Ray Elementary

School, et al.

O R D E R

Jack Vaughn, proceeding pro se, brought suit against the

school where he worked as a teacher’s aide, the superintendent,

the principal, and the assistant principal, alleging that he was

subjected to discrimination based on his gender, that he was

terminated in violation of the applicable collective bargaining

agreement, and that he was defamed. The defendants move to

dismiss, contending that Vaughn failed to file his discrimination

claim, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq., within the time allowed and failed to

exhaust administrative remedies with respect to that claim, that

the court lacks jurisdiction to hear his collective bargaining

agreement claim, and that the court should decline supplemental

jurisdiction as to the defamation claim. Vaughn filed an

objection to the motion to dismiss and a motion to amend his

objection. The defendants filed a reply.

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Standard of Review

In considering a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court accepts the facts alleged

in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff. Citibank v. Grupo Cupey, Inc., 382 F.3d

29, 31 (1st Cir. 2004). The court must determine whether the

complaint, construed in the proper light, “alleges facts

sufficient to make out a cognizable claim.” Carroll v. Xerox

Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 241 (1st Cir. 2002). All that is required

is a short and plain statement of the claim. See Gorski v. N.H.

Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 473 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)).

The defendants submitted materials that are extrinsic to the

complaint without addressing the question of whether the court

may consider those materials in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Rubert-Torres v. Hosp. San

Pablo, Inc., 205 F.3d 472, 475 (1st Cir. 2000). Vaughn responded

by including extrinsic materials with his objection. Because the

extrinsic materials are not necessary to resolve the issues

raised in the motion to dismiss, the motion will not be converted

to one for summary judgment.

 

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Discussion

Although Vaughn did not label his causes of action in the

complaint, he appears to intend to bring a Title VII claim for

gender discrimination, a claim that the defendants breached the

collective bargaining agreement, and a defamation claim. If

those are not the claims he intended to assert, he may file an

amended complaint or move to amend his complaint as allowed under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The issues raised in the

defendants’ motion to dismiss are resolved as follows.

A. Title VII

“Title VII requires, as a predicate to a civil action, that

the complainant first file an administrative charge with the EEOC

within a specified and relatively short time period . . . and

that the lawsuit be brought within an even shorter period (90

days) after notice that the administrative charge is dismissed or

after the agency instead issues a right-to-sue letter . . . .” 

Clockedile v. N.H. Dep’t of Corrections, 245 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.

2001). “[T]his is basically an exhaustion requirement coupled

with a short statute of limitations . . . .” Id. at 3-4.

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1The defendants rely on the rule that generally, before an

employee may file a federal suit to enforce contractual rights,

he must first attempt to exhaust the remedies provided in the

contract. See Rep. Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53

(1965).

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1. Timeliness.

An action is commenced for purposes of a federal limitations

period when the complaint is filed with the court. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 3; McIntosh v. Antonino, 71 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 1995). The

parties agree that the EEOC issued its right to sue letter on

March 21, 2005, and that Vaughn had until June 20, 2005, to bring

suit. Vaughn filed his complaint on June 20, 2005. The

defendants, who are represented by counsel, argue that the suit

is untimely based on the date of the summons, which they

represent was September 20, 2005. That argument is meritless.

2. Exhaustion.

The defendants concede that Vaughn exhausted the

administrative remedies required by Title VII but argue that he

was also required to exhaust the remedies provided by the

collective bargaining agreement before filing his Title VII

action. Again, the defendants are mistaken.1 The contractural

rights and procedures provided under a collective bargaining

agreement are independent from rights and procedures under Title

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VII, so that administrative procedures under such an agreement

have no effect on a Title VII claim. Int’l Union of Elec.,

Radio, & Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229,

236 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48

(1974); Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir.

2003). 

B. Collective Bargaining Agreement Claim

To the extent Vaughn alleges that the defendants breached

the collective bargaining agreement, that claim is governed by

New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 273-A:5. The

public employees labor relations board has jurisdiction over such

claims. See RSA 273-A:6, I; Sch. Dist. #42, Nashua v. Murray,

128 N.H. 417, 419-20 (1986). If he intended to allege a

wrongful termination claim that is entirely unrelated to the

collective bargaining agreement, that claim is not sufficiently

stated in the complaint to support such a cause of action. 

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Because the Title VII claim is not dismissed, the defendants

have not shown that grounds exists to decline supplemental

jurisdiction.

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss

(document no. 11) is granted as to the plaintiff’s claim of

breach of the collective bargaining agreement and is otherwise

denied. The plaintiff’s motion to amend his objection (document

no. 20) is granted. 

SO ORDERED.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

January 9, 2006

cc: Jack Vaughan, pro se

Debra Weiss Ford, Esquire

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