NO. 07-09-0144-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEA LS FOR THE SEV ENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMAR ILLO PANELB DECEMBE R 17, 2 009

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___ DA VI D O. ME EK IN S, Appell ant
v. TH E STAT E OF T EX

AS , Appell ee

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______ FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF LU BBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2007-443160 ; HON. DRU E FAR MER, PRE SIDING

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____ Opinion

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____ Before QUINN, C .J., and CAMPB ELL an d HAN COCK, JJ. David O. Meekins ple d guilty to and was convicted of possessi ng two or less o unces of ma rijua naa fte r t hetr ia l co urt d en ie d hi s m ot io n tosu pp re ss
. Wh et he r t hetr ia l co urt acted properly in so acting is now be fore us. Meekin s beli eves that the motion shoul d have been granted because 1) the arresting officer unreasonably prolonged his detention, and 2) his co nsent to search his vehi cle wa s neither p ositive or unequivoca l. We reverse the jud gm en t.2

Background On January 12 , 2007, at a pproximately 11:00 p.m., Off icer Tony Williams observed appella nt and h is compani on depa rt from a house p urportedly known for drug activi ty. Wh en th eyarrived a t t heh ou se , h owl on g th ey st ay ed , a nd th ei r rea so n fo r b ei ng th ere were unknown to the officer, an d are un known to us. N onetheless, up on seei ng them leave the abode a nd wal k to a vehicle parked down t he blo ck, the officer and hi s recruit de ci de d tofo ll owth em
. After driving a way, appel lant made a turn wi thout signal ing. T his re su lt ed in the initiation of a traffic stop an d the officers approaching the vehicl e. Accordi ng to Wil liams, both of the vehicle’ s occupants appeared n ervous. Thi s conclusi on was derived from appella nt moving a round in his seat while the pas senger remained still . None theless, Wi ll ia ms ac qu ired a pp el la nt ’sd ri ve r’ s li ce ns e, c he ck ed i t fo r ou tst an di ng war rants, and returned to the ve hicle. N othing of record discloses whether appe llant was the sub ject of any arrest warrant. N or do es t he record illustrate what i nformation, if any, the officer ob ta in ed a s are su lto f r un ni ng a pp el la nt ’sl ic en se
. Ye t, iti s c le ar th atu po n re tu rn in g to appella nt’s car, he solicited consent to search it. That solici tation continue d over a period of ab out amin ute a nd included a pproximately six requests. The officer asked that many times because appella nt would not commit one way or the other. Indeed, captured on the video o f the event was the o fficer informing appella nt that h e was being asked a “yes or no” qu es ti on
. Fu rth er mo re , t hel as t req ue st prop ou nd ed toa pp el lant consi ste d of Wi ll ia ms as ki ng : “ Doyo u mi nd i f I l oo k? ” T o it , a pp el la nta nswe re d “ye s,” a cc ordi ng toth e of fi ce r. Up on sore pl yi ng , a pp el la ntw aso rd ered toe x itth e ca r.3

As he left the vehi cle, appel lant appeared to place ahand in hi s pocket. This resulted in Williams grabbing appel lant’s hand and askin g permission to search the content of h isp oc ke t. T he re in w asfo un d th e ma rijua nafo r w hi ch a pp el la ntw asp ro se cu te d. Law The applicable stand ard of review is d iscussed i n Fo rd

v. S ta te , 158 S.W.3d 4 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). It requires u s to givegreat deference to the trial court’s in te rp re ta ti on o f h is to ri ca l fa ct an d as se ss me nto f aw it ne ss ’ cre di bi li ty. Id

. at 493. However, we n eed not gi ve such deference to i ts applica tion of the law to the facts,
es pe ci al lyw he n th os e fa ctsa re u nd is pu te d. Ne al v. S ta te , 2 5 6 S .W .3 d 26 4, 281 (Te x. Cr im . A pp . 2 00 8)

. In th e la tte r s it ua ti on , w e co ns id er th e ma tte r den ov

o. Id. Next, noone contests the validity of the initial detention. S imply put, Willia ms had the a ut ho ri ty tostopa pp el la ntw he n hew it ne ss ed th e tra ffi c v io la ti on
. Wh re n v. United States , 517 U .S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 17 69, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) . No one den ies that the directiv e t o e xitt he car was tantamount to a contin uation of the detention. Nor does anyo ne disp ute that th e o ff ice r’ s directive to ex it arose from wha t he bel ieved to be appella nt ’s consent to search. S imilarly a bsent is any disp ute regarding whether justification for, or the pu rpose of, the i nitial stop had ended b y the time the officer sought
co ns en t t o se arch th e ve hi cl e. See K othe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54 , 63-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that in a routine traffic stop, police officers may requ est certain in formation from a driver, such as a driver's license and car registration, and may conduct a computer check on that information, but after this computer check is completed, and the o fficer knows that this driver h as a cu rrently valid license, n o ou tst anding warrants, and the car is no t sto le n, th e tra ffi c-s to p in ve sti ga ti on i s fu ll y re so lv ed a nd t hed et en ti on m us t en d)

. Ra th er ,4

the controversy before us involves wh ether appellant consented to the search, and that is th e qu es ti on w e ad dres s h ere. When relyin g upon consent to just if y t he lawfulness of asearch, the S tate must prove by clear and convincing eviden ce that the co nsent was freely and voluntarily given. Bumper v. North Carolin a , 3 91 U .S . 5 43 , 5 48 , 8 8 S. Ct . 1 78 8, 1 79 2, 2 0 L. Ed .2 d 79 7 (1 96 8) ; Jo hn so n v. St

ate , 226 S .W.3 d 4 39, 443 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2007) ; B ro wnv. S ta te , 212 S.W.3d 85 1, 869 (Tex. App .–Houston [1 Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). In meeting the burden, st itmu st al sosh ow

th atth e co ns en t w asp os it iv e an d un eq ui vo ca l. Me ek s v . S ta te , 692 S. W.2 d 50 4, 5 09 ( Te x . Cr im

. Ap p. 1 98 5) ; Br ow n v. St ate , 212 S.W.3d at 869. Inci dentally, consent is not of that il k if it amounts to no more than acqui escence t o a cl aim of lawful
au th or ity. Br

ow n v. St ate , 212 S .W.3d at 869. Final ly, the ex istence of l egitimate consen t is a question of fact to bed etermined from the totality o f circumstances appeari ng of record, a nd, unless the trial cou rt abuses its discretion, its d ecision must be affirmed. Jo hn so n v

. S ta te , 226 S.W.3d at 44 3 (holdi ng that the applicab le standard of review is one of a bu se d di sc re ti on ). Applica tion of La w As prev io us lyd es cri be d, t hev id eoo f th e sto p re ve al ed t ha t Wi ll ia ms asked for consent abou t six times. Appell ant’s first five replies to those solicitations were evasi ve and so much so that they resulted in the officer informing hi m that the inq uiry was a “yes or n o question.” Th e officer’s de sire to hea r a “yes” or “no” answer continued until appella nt said “ye s” or “I g ue ss ” t o th e la st so li citat io n. B ec au seth atu tte ra nc e al le ge dl y e vi nc ed to Williams “clearan d unequivocal ” consent, he ordered appel lant to ex it the vehi cle. Th e5

prob le m c om es , h ow ev er , i n th e na tu re o f th e qu es ti on tow hi ch a pp el la ntsa id “y es ” o r “ I gu es s.” The officer ha d not aske d “may I search” bu t rather “would you mind if I look? ” Answering “yes” to the latter meant that appellant did mind . Answ ering “I guess” also ha d and has like connotation; that is, saying “I guess” in response to being asked if one minds whether something happens can wel l ind icate th athe d oes. To this we add app ellant’s prior evasiven ess in response to the officer’s persistence in asking for co nsent. When combined, the circumstances paint not a pi cture of clarity or un equivocation b ut rather one of vaci llation and hesi tance. More importantly, to somehow con clude from the entirety of the scenario that saying “yes” or “I guess” meant that a ppellan t fina lly acquiesced to the search invi tes speculatio n into various matters. Those matt ers consist of whether appel lant failed to listen to the specific question a sked by Williams, w hether he i gnored the last question a nd opted to answer those p re viously propound ed, or whe ther he reinterpreted th e qu es ti on from o nea sk in g “w ou ld yo u mi nd ” too nea sk in g “ma y I se arch .” Y et , a ut ho ri ty denies both this co urt and the initial factfinder from en gag ing i n specul ation gi ven the ab se nc e of

su pp orti ng e vi de nc e. Simply p ut, the situation before us i s not onein which the historical fa cts are in dispute, for they a re not. The y were put to rest by bo th the vide o and Williams’ confirmation of wh at ap peared on the vi deo. Wha t wa s sa id and done was said and don e, neither can be que st ioned nor changed . Thus, we merely are left with a pplying the undisputed facts to the law regarding consen t, and that is a task und ertaken de novo . And, upon un dertaking that task, we hold, a s a matter of la w, the State failed to clearly an dI n so concl udi ng, w e l eave foranot herday answ er s t o que st i ons such as 1) w het hera det ai nee m ust 1 re s p o n d “y e s ” o r “n o ” to a re q u e s t to s e a rc h , 2 ) w h e th e r a n o ffic e r m a y re q u ire a d e ta in e e to re s p o n d a t a ll, 3) w het her a det ai nee’ s r el uct anc e t o say y es or di r ect l y r esp ond t o an of f i cer ’ s sol i ci t at i on e quat es t o a r ef usa l t o c ons ent , and 4) w het heran off i cerm ay c ont i nue a t em por ary det ent i on u nt i l t he d et ai nee r esp onds t o a re q u e s t t o s e a rc h i n a n a c c e p ta b le m a n n e r. 6 co nv in ci ng lyp ro veth ata pp el la ntg ra nt ed th e of fi ce r p os it iv e, u ne qu iv oc al , a nd vo lu nt ar y co ns en t t o se arch h isca r. 1 De sp it e ou r c on cl us io n th atth e issue be fo re u s i nv ol ve d co ns en t, th ere isso me al lu si on i n th e Stat e’ s b ri ef re ga rd in g wh et he r t heofficer had re as on ab lesu sp ic io n to be li ev e ap pe ll an t e ng ag ed i n so me d ru g crime. Th e St at e’ s a pp el la te co un se l te nd ed to down pl ayt ha t prop os it io n du ri ng o ra l argu me ntb utto th e exte ntt hem atter was not conceded, we wil l address it briefly. First, we know of no authority holdi ng that simpl y seeing som eo nel ea vea“ na rco ti csh ou se ” at1 1 p. m. an d en te r a ca r pa rke d down the block gi ves rise to reasonable suspici on to believe that criminal a ctivity is a foot. Nor di d
wefin d an y. I nd ee d, i t ap pe ars th att heo pp os it e ist ru e fo r be in g in a n areak nown fo r i ts hi gh cr im e atni gh t do esno t al on e p er mi t an offic er to d et ai n th e tra ve le r. Se e e. g. K la re
v. St ate, 76 S.W.3d 68 , 73-74 (Tex . App.–Houston [14 Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d)

. th Furthermore, Williams havi ng characterized appella nt’s conduct as akin to “almost like they were trying to sneak dow n the bl ock” is of no moment. This i s so si nce es ta bl is hi ng rea so na bl e s us pi ci on req ui re d th e p re se nt at io n o f a rti cu la bl e “fa cts .” Scott v. St ate, 549 S.W.2d 1 70, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Lab eling the conduct o f appell ant and his c oll eag ue as sneaky or sne aking i s an o pinion founded on fact, but in so opin ing the officer failed to disclosethe facts which permitted him to reason ably de velop the opinion

. So, the officer’s opinion had no probative valu e in the overall equation. As repeatedl y utte re d byS arge ntJo e Fr id ay , “ jus t t hefa ctsp le as e
. . . jus t t hefa cts .”7

That the officer al so characterized appella nt’s parking down the block as suspicious is alsoof li ttle val ue. This is so because h e thought that one eng aging in in nocent condu ct would have parked in the empty driveway given the inclement w eat her

. Ye t, defense counsel had hi m admit that he did no t know when appellant arrived at the house , did n ot see him enter it, did not know how l ong he remained in the hou se, and d id not know whether t he driveway was empty when appella nt arrived. Indee d, the officer al so co nc lu de d th ath e wa s m erel y “ sp ec ul at in g. ” As for the a llegation that the l ocation from whi ch appel lant ex ited was a “narcotics house,” Willi ams based that upon 1) a “sheet” that the narcotic’s d epartment “put’s [sic] out everysix months, so metimes longer” and 2) his having “worked the ho use before” and “w or ke d wi th o ffi ce rs atth ath ou se
. . . [wh o] ma den arco ti csa rre sts

. . . from th ath ou se .” But, the record contains no evidence illustrating when the house was “worked” or w hen the
ar re sts we re made. B ot h ev en ts co ul d ha veh ap pe ne d da ys , w ee ks , m on th s, or ye ars earlier. N or does the record discloseeither w hen the n ar co ti cs department issued the “sheet” used by Williams or when he actuall y acquired it. Thus, the information in it could well have bee n stale especiall y since it was disbursed ev ery s ix months or “sometimes longer.” We se e no reason why the timel iness of the data on which the poli ce rely sh ould be of l ess importance i n the reason able su spicion equation than it i s when determining the
ex is te nc e of

p ro ba bl e c au sefor

pu rp os esof se cu ri ng a se arch w ar ra nt

. S ee e.g. Blake v. St ate, 125 S.W.3d 71 7, 72 5 (Tex. App.–Houston [1 D ist.] 2003, no pet.) (no ti ng t he st timeliness o f the information a s a factor to co nsider when issui ng a warrant). Time has the effect of making the information stale in both si tuations. So , without ou r knowing the age8

of the “facts” underlying the obse rvation that the a bode was a “narcotics house,” the la bel iso f l ittl e he lp

. Finall y, we ad dress the obse rvat ion that further detention was al so permissibl e because a ppellan t and h is passen ger appeared nervous. Agai n, Willi ams so testified. He also disclose d the facts upon which he derived that opin ion. T hey consi sted of appe llant moving around whil e his passenger remaine d still. Though nervousness can be arelevant in di ci a, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 1 20 S.Ct. 673 , 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (s o h ol di ng ), th atisno t ne ce ss ar il y tr uehe re . Th isi s s o be ca us e of th e “C at ch 2 2" n at ure of the condu ct being observed. Irrespective o f whether those in the ca r sat still or moved around, either modeof condu ct depicted nervousness acco rding to the officer. As Mrs. Qu in n on cesa id ye ars a go , “yo u ca n’ t ha vei t bo th ways.” Wh il e wed o no t w an t t o nu ll if y the probative value a n officer may pl ace on the indicia of nervousness, i t is rather common, and natural, for most everyone to ex hibit it when stopped by p olice officers. This may be du e toso me re sp ect a cc orde d th em o r t herea li za ti on tha t th eyha vepowe r a nd a ut ho ri ty beyond that availabl e to an ordinary citizen , but whatever the reason, detention at the hands of law e nforcement personnel oft en instil ls a bit of dread even in the hea rts of the inno ce nt

. Th is, coupled w ith the po ssibili ty that most any con duct now can be deemed nervous, tends to discredit the value o f the factor. And, as the i ndicia appeared h ere, we hesitate to en gage i n the spe culation needed to view contrasting or opp osite conduct as in di ca ti veo f t hesa me th in g wi th ou t a nye x pl an at io n astow hyth ati s. In sum, t he re co rd before us does not permit one to objectively co nclude that ap pe ll an t’ s l ea vi ng th e “n arco ti csh ou se ” a nd a pp ea ri ng n er vo usp ro vi de d Offic er

Wi ll ia ms with reasona ble susp icion to detain appella nt. So, that ca nnot be a ba sis for justifying9

detention on ce the pu rpose for the original stop ( i.e. investiga ting the traffic vio lation)
en de d. Dissent Co nc er ni ng thedi ss en t of Ju sti ceC am pb el l, w e re sp ectfu ll y s ayth e fo ll ow in g. F irst, it is cl ear that an officer may ask on e for permission to search a vehicle after the purpose of th e in it ia l sto p en ds

. St ra uss v . S ta te , 121 S.W.3d 486, 4 91 (Tex . App.–Amarill o 2003, pet. ref'd). Yet, we have not found authority permitting law enforcement personne l to ho ld the detaineeuntil the latter gives consent to search. Again, the justification for continui ng the detention is goneand any further delay must necessarily be consensua l. A police of fi ce r d irecti ng th e pe rso n toa nswe r h isq ue sti on i s h ardl y aco ns en su al e x ch an ge
. Se co nd , w hi lea n of

fi ce r m ayb e a bl e toas k a de ta in eetost epo uto f t heve hi cl e, id. , th e di ss en t c it esn o au th or ity p er mi tti ng su ch re qu es t once the reason for thestop has ended , w hi ch i nc lu de s t hetwo ca se s c it ed b y t hed is se nt

. Th atma y b e be ca us e ou r C ou rt of Criminal Appeals has hel d that once that point ha s been reached, the susp ect must be
re le as ed

. Ko th e v. St

ate , 152 S .W.3d at 63-64. Asking someon e who has faile d to grant consent to sea rch to ex it the car or repeatedly soliciting co nsent is nothing more than doin g that prohibited in Kothe . Once the basis for a stop no long er exists and the detainee has not co ns en te d toa se arch , h e mu st bere le as ed u nl es s t he re e x is ts ot he r c ircu mst an ces ev in ci ng p ro ba bl e ca us e or re as on ab lesu sp ic io n toco nt in ueth e de te nt io n. Nor do we find succor i n the d issent’s suggestion that di scovery o f the contraband was la wful merely because a ppellan t consented to the search of his pocke t. By that time, the initial j us ti fi ca tion for the stop had cease d. By that time, appell ant had already be en subjected to repeated requests for leave to search by one officer w hile another armed10

of fi ce r s to od n ea rb y. B y t ha t t im e, a pp el la nth ad i ll us tra te d hi s rel ucta nc e if n otre fu sa l to permit a consen sual sea rch. B y that time, he had been ordered to ex it the car b y an o fficer who l acked une quivocal permission to search. By that time, one cou ld reasona bly in terpret the officers’ cond uct as in dicative o f their intent to continue the detention u ntil app ellant answered i n an acceptable way. B ut, by that time, only seconds ha d passed between the pressure being appli ed by the officer, the latter’s u nfounded o rder to get out of the car, and appella nt’s “consent” to sea rch the pocket. These ci rcumstances negate the existenceof opportunity for reflecti ve t hin king necessary for there to be an y attenuation between the officer’s improper cond uct and h is rece iptof consent to sea rch the pocket. And, wi thout satisfying the prerequisi te of attenuation, a ppellan t’s consent i s not vol untary. Stone v. St ate , 279 S .W.3d 688, 693 (Tex. Ap p.–Amarillo 2006, pet. ref’d) (holding that consent may bev al id a fte r an u nl awfu l sto p if t he re i s su ffi ci en t atte nu at io n be tw ee n th e stop an d consent). This latter observation also negates the dissent’s su ggestion that we found the search of app ellant’s pocket to be consensual. Ac co rd in gl y, th e jud gm en t i s rev erse d, a nd t hec au sei s re ma nd ed to th e tri al co urt.

Brian Quin n Chie f Justice Campbell, J., dissents. Publish

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