alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Faith Copp

v. Case No. 05-cv-214-PB

Freudenberg-NOK General

Partnership, et al.

NOTICE OF RULING

Re: Document No. 23, Motion to Reconsider 

Ruling: Motion granted. When I ruled on the motion to

dismiss, I mistakenly assumed that Freudenberg & Company was a

partner in Freudenberg - NOK General Partnership. After

reviewing the affidavit submitted by Freudenberg & Company in

support of its motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction, I now understand that Freudenberg & Company is the

owner of two corporations that in turn are partners in a

partnership that is itself a partner in Freudenberg-NOK General

Partnership. Because Freudenberg & Company is a shareholder of

corporations that are partners in a chain of partnerships leading

to FNGP rather than a partner in FNGP, it is not entitled to

protection under the Workers’ Compensation immunity provision

unless it is the alter ego of the corporations it owns. See

Leeman v. Boylan, 134 N.H. 230, 233 (1991). This is an issue

that cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's

claim against Freudenberg & Company is reinstated. I will rule

on the personal jurisdiction issue in a separate order. 

Date: January 3, 2006

cc: Andrew D. Dunn, Esq.

 Matthew J. Lahey, Esq.

Case 1:05-cv-00214-PB Document 25 Filed 01/03/06 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 13.1



CERTIFICATION BY THE PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE
OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection
with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of StoneCo Ltd., or the “Company” for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018,
or the “Report”, I, Thiago dos Santos Piau, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: April 29, 2019



|/s/ Thiago dos Santos Piau    | 
|----------------------------- | 
|Chief Executive Officer       | 
|(Principal Executive Officer) |
<PAGE>   1





QUAKER STATE CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES                            EXHIBIT 11
Computation of Net Income Per Share
(in thousands except per share data, unaudited)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                          Quarter Ended        Nine Months Ended
                                                                       9/30/98     9/30/97     9/30/98     9/30/97
                                                                       -------     -------     -------     -------
<S>                                                                    <C>         <C>         <C>         <C>    
1.  Net income                                                         $   986     $ 5,309     $ 4,379     $21,018
                                                                       =======     =======     =======     =======

2.  Average number of shares of capital
    Stock outstanding--Basic                                            36,430      35,140      36,384      35,042

3.  Shares issuable upon exercise of dilutive
    stock options outstanding during the period,
    Based on average market prices                                         245         313         445         214

4. Average number of capital and capital equivalent
    shares outstanding--Diluted (2 + 3)                                 36,675      35,453      36,829      35,256

5. Net income per capital and capital equivalent
    Share - Basic  (1 divided by 2)                                    $  0.03     $  0.15     $  0.12     $  0.60
                                                                       =======     =======     =======     =======

6. Net income per capital share assuming full
    Dilution - Diluted (1 divided by 4)                                $  0.03     $  0.15     $  0.12     $  0.60
                                                                       =======     =======     =======     =======
</TABLE>




                                       19
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  financial  information  extracted  from  the
Statement  of  Financial  Condition  for  Princeton  Mining Company at March 31,
1999  (unaudited)  and  the Statement of Income for the three month period ended
March  31,  1999  (unaudited)  and  is  qualified  in  its entirety by reference
to  such financial  statements.

</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                              86
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    83
<PP&E>                                          25,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  25,083
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           26,506
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       956,334
<OTHER-SE>                                    (957,757)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    25,083
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,490
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 400
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (2,890)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (2,890)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (2,890)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.00)
        







</TABLE>
Opinion filed December 16, 2010



## In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________



### No. 11

- 10

- 00087

- CV

__________

MICHEAL RALSTON , Appellant

V.

DENISE UPFOLD ET AL , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 259th District Court

Jones County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No . 021970

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Micheal Ralston sued Denise M. Upfold, Roxann D. Martinez, and Janay B. Williams for

unlawfully appropriating seventy

- six photographs, eight role playing books, and one wireless

notebook. Ralston alleged that the taking occurred while he was confined in the French M.

Robertson Unit and while the defendants were employed as correctional officers. Ralston sought

$288.75 in actual damages as well as $1

, 000 in punitive damages from each defendant. The trial

court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE

A NN

. ch . 14 (Vernon 2002 ). We affirm.2

On appeal, Ralston contends that the trial court abused its discretio n by dismissing

without conducting a hearing first and by failing to enter specific findings on his allegations

concerning violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act, T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE

A NN

. ch. 134 (Vernon 2005 ). Ralston also argues that he has a cognizable claim under the Texas

Liability Act.

Pursuant to Section 14.008(a), the trial court may but is not required to conduct a hearing.

In its order, the trial court stated that appellant had failed to comply with the requirements of

Chapter 14. The record supports the trial court’s findings. Moreover, the record does not

support Ralston’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion or that he alleged a cause of

action under Section 134.001. All of Ralston’s contentions have been consi dered, and each is

overruled.

The order of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

December 16, 2010

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., McCall, J., and Strange, J.
August 16, 1978



## Civil Service Reform Act (5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq .)— Director of Office of Personnel Management

This responds to your request for this Office’s opinion on the constitutionality of § 1102(a) (2) of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs’ version of S. 2640, the Civil Service Reform bill. Section 1102(a) (2) states that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) “ may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” * This provision raises a question that we have frequently addressed in a number of different contexts. The question, stated simply, is whether an official within the Executive branch who is charged with carrying out functions of the type assigned to the Director of OPM may be in any significant way insulated from the President’s direction and control. The question here is squarely controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in M yers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). That case stands for the proposition that officials within the Executive branch who perform primarily executive functions must be removable at the will of the President if the President is to perform his constitutional function “ faithfully to execute the laws.” While it is true that officials who perform quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions may properly be insulated from removal (see, Humphrey’s E xecu tors. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)), the President’s removal power must not be constricted where he is dealing with those who are assigned clearly executive functions. The catalogue of responsibilities of the OPM Director set forth in § 1103 of the bill constitutes a rather complete description of functions which may only be characterized as executive in nature. Among his responsibilities, for instance, is the duty to aid the President in preparing rules for the civil service and in providing him with advice on “ actions which may be taken to promote an 

## 78-95 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

*See S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 25. It should be noted that the language does not appear in the bill as enacted. See Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1119, 5 U .S.C . § 1102.

413efficient civil service.” In § 1103(a) (1) he is also directly charged with

‘‘executing, administering, and enforcing” civil service rules and regulations. By their terms, these functions can only be regarded as executive in nature. As the Court made clear in its recent decision in Buckley v. Valeo. 422 U.S. 1, 138 (1976), the enforcement of the laws is a function vested in the President. Given the case law, we think there is no satisfactory basis on which to contend that the President’s necessary removal power can be circumscribed in the manner contemplated by § 1102(a) (2) of this bill.

L a rr y A. H a m m o n d D eputy Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

414
| (logo)  **ncb**  National Cooperative Bank    | 2011  Crystal  Drive  Suite, 8oo  Arlington, VA 22202 |
|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**FORM OF ANNUAL COMPLIANCE STATEMENT**

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

BANK 2018-BNK13, Commercial Mortgage Pass-ThroughCertificates, Series 2018-BNK13 (the “Trust”)

 

I, Karyn Mann, on behalf of National Cooperative Bank,N.A., as NCB Master Servicer (the “Certifying Servicer”), certify toWells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. and its officers, directorsand affiliates, and with the knowledge and intent that they will rely upon thiscertification, that:

 

1.      I (or Servicing Officers under mysupervision) have reviewed the Certifying Servicer’s activities during thepreceding calendar year between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018 (the “ReportingPeriod”) and the Certifying Servicer’s performance under the Pooling andServicing Agreement; and

 

2.      To the best of my knowledge, based on suchreview, the Certifying Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under thePooling and Servicing Agreement in all material respects during the ReportingPeriod.

 

 

Date:February 4, 2019

 

 

NATIONALCOOPERATIVE BANK, N.A.,

asNCB Master Servicer

By:/s/ Karyn Mann

Name:Karyn Mann

Title:Senior Vice President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1996
<CASH>                                          13,242
<SECURITIES>                                   190,460
<RECEIVABLES>                                   62,128
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    344,255
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,922,941
<PP&E>                                       3,064,773
<DEPRECIATION>                                 282,881
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,720,556
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,237,446
<BONDS>                                      2,305,600
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  2,258,024
<COMMON>                                    17,704,036
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,282,205
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,720,556
<SALES>                                         37,431
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               286,721
<CGS>                                           18,178
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,597,843
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              64,292
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,345,728)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,345,728)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.073)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Christopher M. Power, Appellant, v Department of Personnel of the City of New York et al., Respondents.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Diane Lebedeff, J.), entered August 30, 1989, dismissing a petition brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to annul respondents’ determination denying petitioner permission to complete a competitive examination for the position of police lieutenant, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner, a New York City police officer since 1981, took the first three parts of a competitive civil service examination for promotion to lieutenant on June 18, 1988. He was ranked *157277 out of 2,600 applicants. The fourth part of the examination was administered from December 28th through December 30th, 1988, but petitioner was unable to take it because he was hospitalized due to a non-work-related injury.

The determination of the Department of Personnel denying petitioner permission to take a make-up examination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Rule 4.4.5 (c) of the Rules and Regulations of the City Personnel Director provides that no candidate shall be given a second chance or special competitive test in connection with a previously held examination unless the failure "to take or complete” such test was due to a job-related illness *(see also,*General Examination Regulations § E.11.4). Contrary to petitioner’s argument, the foregoing regulations expressly preclude candidates suffering from non-line-of-duty injuries from seeking permission to make up a missed examination. The determination of the Department of Personnel to deny petitioner permission to complete the test by means of a make-up examination was neither arbitrary nor capricious *(see generally, Matter of Department of Personnel v City Civ. Serv. Commn.,*94 AD2d 5).

Petitioner’s additional argument that the construction placed on rule 4.4.5 (c) by the Department violated the merit and fitness requirement found in article V, §6 of the NY Constitution is without merit. Article V, § 6 provides that "Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state * * * shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination”. By not allowing him to take a make-up examination, petitioner argues, the city might promote someone with a lower score in his stead which, he maintains, would not be consonant with the merit and fitness requirement.

Petitioner’s merit and fitness argument is speculative and unpersuasive. There is no certainty that a lesser candidate would be promoted in petitioner’s stead since there is no guarantee petitioner would have passed the final test segment to earn a promotion to lieutenant. Thus, the denial of petitioner’s request for a make-up examination in no way impedes, hampers or violates the purpose of the constitutional merit and fitness requirement. Concur—Ross, J. P., Carro, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

          - [Project No. 13108-002] 

                    Take notice that FFP Detroit 1, LLC, permittee for the proposed Detroit River Project, has requested that its preliminary permit be terminated. The permit was issued on July 17, 2008, and would have expired on June 30, 2011.[1]                                          The project would have been located on the Detroit River in Wayne County, Michigan.                 

The permittee filed the request on August 21, 2008, and the preliminary permit for Project No. 13108 shall remain in effect through the thirtieth day after issuance of this notice unless that day is a Saturday, Sunday, part-day holiday that affects the Commission, or legal holiday as described in section 18 CFR 385.2007, in which case the effective date is the first business day following that day. New applications involving this project site, to the extent provided for under 18 CFR Part 4, may be filed on the next business day. 

Kimberly D. Bose, 

Secretary.

# Footnotes

1.                             124 FERC ¶ 62,047.                     
        Back to Citation      

[FR Doc. E8-20803 Filed 9-8-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-17-00374-CV

JOSEPH LAMBERT AND SUSAN 

LAMBERT, Appellants

V.

STATE FARM LLOYDS AND TEVIN 

SENNE, Appellees

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 415th District Court

of Parker County (CV16-0048)

November 7, 2019

Opinion by Justice Kerr

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was error in part of the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We affirm the portion of the trial 

court’s summary judgment for Appellees State Farm Lloyds and Tevin Senne on all of 

the Appellants Joseph Lambert’s and Susan Lambert’s claims except their Texas 

Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA) claim. We reverse the portion of the trial 

court’s summary judgment for State Farm on the Lamberts’ TPPCA claim and 
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

It is further ordered that each party shall bear their own costs of this appeal, for 

which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _/s/ Elizabeth Kerr__________________

 Justice Elizabeth Kerr
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>      5
<LEGEND>       THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL
               INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE REGISTRANT'S
               UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF
               SEPTEMBER 30, 1995 AND UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED
               STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NINE MONTHS
               THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
               REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
<MULTIPLIER>   1
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                  SEP-30-1995
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 9-MOS
<CASH>                             95,652
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                     563,366
<ALLOWANCES>                      (24,000)
<INVENTORY>                             0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  687,649
<PP&E>                         14,885,839
<DEPRECIATION>                  8,022,562
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  7,743,691
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           1,385,792
<BONDS>                         2,159,529
<COMMON>                           86,154
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                             0
<OTHER-SE>                     16,013,900
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    7,743,691
<SALES>                         3,226,007
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                3,226,007
<CGS>                           2,134,565
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   3,349,031
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                 (172,268)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>               (196,900)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (336,326)
<INCOME-TAX>                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (336,326)
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                     (336,326)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                        (.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                        (.31)

</TABLE>