alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.29
                                  -------------

                             Escalade, Incorporated
                   Schedule of Executive Officer Compensation

         The compensation for the executive officers of Escalade, Incorporated
consists primarily of base salary, incentive profit sharing bonuses and stock
option grants.

Base Salary

         In general, base salaries are set at the beginning of each year based
upon the Company's income level generated in the prior year, any changes in
level of responsibility and the subjective individual performance review
conducted by the Company's Compensation Committee. The 2005 base salary for Mr.
Reed, the Company's Chief Executive Officer, is $244,000 and for Mr. Frandsen,
the Company's Chief Financial Officer, is $150,000.

Bonuses

         Each of the Company's subsidiaries has an incentive profit sharing plan
where bonuses are primarily based upon the subsidiary's earnings before
interest, taxes and amortization (EBITA) return on equity and EBITA return on
assets. The Company's Compensation Committee establishes target levels for each
of these components for each subsidiary, based upon suggested levels provided by
management. If the target level is met or exceeded, a bonus pool is established
for payment to the subsidiary's employees and an additional 20% is payable to
the Company. The Company in turn distributes such incentive compensation to the
Company's executive officers based upon a predetermined percentage.

Stock Options

         Executive officers of the Company are also eligible to receive grants
of stock options pursuant to the Company's 1997 Incentive Stock Option Plan,
which was approved by the Company's shareholders. The Company's Compensation
Committee makes annual discretionary awards of stock options after consideration
of the performance of both the individual and the Company.

Additional Benefits

         The Company's executive officers are also eligible to participate in
the Company's deferred compensation plan, and earn interest annually on amounts
deferred under that plan. Executive officers also receive Company contributions
to their 401(k) retirement plan and the Company pays group term life insurance
benefits on their behalf.

                                       62
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 19-0433V

UNPUBLISHED

KATIE M. MILLER,

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Chief Special Master Corcoran 

Filed: November 21, 2020

Special Processing Unit (SPU);

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Tetanus Diphtheria 

acellular Pertussis (Tdap) Vaccine;

Brachial Neuritis

David John Carney, Green & Schafle LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for petitioner.

Mallori Browne Openchowski, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for 

respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

On March 22, 2019, Katie Miller filed a petition for compensation under the 

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.

2 (the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that that she suffered a left Shoulder Injury Related to 

Vaccine Administration, or in the alternative, a “left brachial plexitis,” as a result of a Tdap

vaccination administered on April 25, 2016. Petition at Introduction. The case was 

assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On November 20, 2020, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he

concedes that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) 

Report at 1. In the report, Respondent “concluded that petitioner suffered a Table injury 

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required 

to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act 

of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government 

Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance 

with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, 

the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that 

the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease 

of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa 

(2012).
2

under the Vaccine Act” consistent with brachial neuritis, the onset of which occurred within 

two to twenty-eight days following her April 25, 2016 Tdap vaccination.3 Id. at 7-8. With 

respect to other statutory and jurisdictional issues, Respondent agrees that the records 

show that the case was timely filed, that the vaccine was received in the United States, 

and that Petitioner suffered the residual effects or complications of her injury for more 

than six months after vaccine administration. Id. at 8.

In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that 

Petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master

3 Respondent concludes that Petitioner has not met the Table requirements for SIRVA. ECF 35 at 8 n.7.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4801

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN NOL-TERRON, a/k/a Ariel Molina Hernandez,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:12-cr-00113-WO-2)

Submitted: April 29, 2013 Decided: May 24, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Todd Allen Smith, LAW OFFICE OF TODD ALLEN SMITH, Graham, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Nol-Terron, a/k/a Ariel Molina Hernandez, 

pled guilty to possessing five or more false identification 

documents in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1028(a)(3), (b)(2)(B) 

(West 2000 & Supp. 2012), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (Count 4), and to 

illegal reentry of an aggravated felon in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a) (2006) (Count 5). On appeal, Nol-Terron asks whether 

the district court erred at his sentencing hearing by ruling 

that the two offenses to which he pled guilty were not related 

counts under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3D1.2 

(2011). Nol-Terron argues that, because his two offenses should 

have been grouped under USSG § 3D1.2, he should not have 

received a two-level multiple count adjustment under USSG 

§ 3D1.4. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Grouping decisions are reviewed for clear error. As 

United States v. Pitts, 176 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1999). The 

Sentencing Guidelines provide that if a defendant is convicted 

of multiple counts “involving substantially the same harm,” the 

counts “shall be grouped together.” USSG § 3D1.2. Counts 

implicate substantially the same harm when they “involve the 

same victim and two or more acts or transactions connected by a 

common criminal objective or constituting part of a common 

scheme or plan.” USSG § 3D1.2(b). Here, the district court 

found that there were two different victims or goals to be 
3

protected, i.e. the immigration offense (Count 5) was intended 

to protect national borders whereas the identification offense 

(Count 4) was intended to protect society’s interest in the 

integrity of various identification documents. (J.A. 81-82). 

We find no clear error in the district court’s above finding. 

Pitts, 176 F.3d at 244. 

Accordingly, we affirm Nol-Terron’s sentence. We 

dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
213 La. 650

#### David THOMAS v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY.

No. 38887.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 26, 1948.

Samuel M. Robertson, of Baton Rouge, ■for applicant.

Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Fuller, of Baton Rouge,' for' respondent. : • '

McCALEB, Justice.

The facts upon which the' rule was' issued in this case á're, identical with those in the matter of Trimble v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., - La. -, 35 So.2d 416, and it was consolidated and submitted for our decision with that case.

■For the reasons given in the Trimble case, the rule issued herein is discharged at applicant’s cost.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with PVC Container Corporation (the "Company") Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned officers
of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such
officer's knowledge:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.

Date: November 15, 2004

                                    /s/ William J. Bergen
                                    ------------------------------------------
                                    Name: William J. Bergen
                                    Title: President & Chief Executive Officer

                                    /s/ Jeffrey Shapiro
                                    ------------------------------------------
                                    Name: Jeffrey Shapiro
                                    Title: Chief Financial Officer

      The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a
separate disclosure document.
#### Kenneth Alvin HENDERSHOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David COOK, Director, ODOC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-36068. D.C. No. CV-02-00083-HO.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 28, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Kenneth Alvin Hendershott, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force, insufficient medical care, and due process violations. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Jackson v. City of Bremerton,*268 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir.2001); *Wyatt v. Terhune,*315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003), and we affirm.

Summary judgment was proper on Hendershott’s medical negligence claim and due process claim because Hendershott failed to exhaust administrative grievance procedures. *See*42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); *Porter v. Nussle,*534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hendershott’s Eighth Amendment claim finding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Hendershott failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants’ use of force to restore discipline and quell a fight between Hendershott and his cellmate was excessive. *See Saucier v. Katz,*533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

All pending motions are denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 23.1





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-178075 on Form S-8 of our report dated June 20, 2023, relating to the financial statements and supplemental schedule of the Cincinnati Financial Corporation Tax-Qualified Savings Plan appearing in this Annual Report on Form 11-K for the year ended December 31, 2022.





/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP





Cincinnati, Ohio


June 20, 2023
EXHIBIT 10.5                 


     Employment Agreements have been executed by the Company
and the indicated employees, substantially identical in all material
respects to the form of employment agreement filed as Exhibit 10.5 to the
Company's 2001 Annual Report on Form 10-K except as noted below. Each Employment
Agreement was executed by Mr. Saueracker for the Company, except the agreement
with Mr. Saueracker, which was executed by Mr. John Curcio for the Company.


 

	
EMPLOYEE 

 AND POSITION

          
	
BASE 

 SALARY

          
	
DATE OF AGREEMENT

          
	
TERMINATION DATE OF AGREEMENT

[IF NOT
EXTENDED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1(a)]

          

	


          	


          	


          	


          










	
   Gordon S. Borteck

      Vice President,Organization

      and Human Resources
          
	
$
	
200,000 
	
January 1, 2002
	
June 30, 2003

	
   Alain Bouruet-Aubertot

      Senior Vice President,

      Managing Director, Minteq
          
	
$
	
250,000
	
November 25, 2002
	
May 31, 2004

	



   Michael A. Cipolla

     Vice President - Controller 

     and Chief
Accounting Officer	
$
 
	
160,000
	

March 1, 2001

 
	
February 28, 2002

	

   Kirk G. Forrest

      Vice President, General Counsel

      and Secretary
	

$
	

270,000
	

December 1, 2004
	

May 31, 2006

	
   D. Randy Harrison

      Vice President and Managing 

       Director, Performance Minerals	

$

  	
200,000 
	
January 1, 2002
	
June 30, 2003

	
   William Kromberg 

        Vice President - Taxes
          	

$

   
	
200,000
	

March 1, 2001
	
 February 28, 2002

	

   Kenneth Massimine

      Senior Vice President, 

      and Managing
 Director

      Paper PCC
          
	

$
	

240,000 
	
January 1, 2002
	
June 30, 2003

	
   Paul R. Saueracker

     Chairman, President and 

     Chief Executive Officer
          	

$
	
550,000 
	
January 1, 2002
	
December 31, 2003

	

   John A. Sorel

      Senior Vice President - 

       Chief Financial Officer
	

$
	

265,000 
	
January 1, 2002 (amended on 

November 25, 2002)
	
June 30, 2003
EXHIBIT 32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March
31, 2009 (the “Report”) by Porta Systems Corp. (the “Company”), I, Edward B.
Kornfeld, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, Leslie K. Brand,
the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as added by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that,
based on my knowledge:




1.  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and




2.  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:  May
      14, 2009
              By:
              /s/
      Edward B. KornfeldEdward
      B. Kornfeld
                Chief
      Executive OfficerBy:
              /s/ Leslie K. BrandLeslie
      K. Brand
                Chief
      Financial Officer




This
certification accompanies each Report pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.




A signed
original of this written statement required by §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished upon request.
#### Harold Reape, Appellant, v New York News, Inc., Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (G. Aronin, J.), entered August 16, 1988, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Summary judgment was granted to the defendant in a prior action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for breach of an employment contract *(see, Reape v New York News,*122 AD2d 29). The plaintiff then brought the instant action to recover damages for fraud, alleging that he had been fraudulently induced to enter into the employment contract by the defendant’s contemporaneous representations concerning the meaning of an allegedly ambiguous term in the contract. The dispute over the meaning of that term was settled in the defendant’s favor in the prior action *(see, Reape v New York News, supra,*at 30). The instant action is therefore nothing more than an attempt to relitigate an issue which was finally determined in the prior action in the defendant’s favor. Thus, the present action was properly dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata *(see,*9 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac §§ 63:196, 63:201).

*288The plaintiffs present attempt to frame a cause of action sounding in fraud must fail in any event. The gravamen of the plaintiffs allegations sounds in breach of contract *(see, Propoco, Inc. v Ostreicher,*134 AD2d 580, 581; *Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v Holborn Oil Co.,*108 AD2d 607). Eiber, J. P., Sullivan, Balletta and Miller, JJ., concur.
(logo)Rialto

CAPITAL

 

 

**2018 Annual Statement of Servicer Compliance (Item1123)**

 

 

Poolingand Servicing Agreement (the "Pooling and Servicing Agreement") datedas of October 1, 2018 by and among Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporationas Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Master Servicer, RialtoCapital Advisors, LLC as Special Servicer, Wilmington Trust, NationalAssociation as Trustee, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as CertificateAdministrator, Paying Agent and Custodian and Park Bridge Lender Services, LLCas Operating Advisor and Asset Representations Reviewer relating to theDeutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation, DBGS 2018-C1 MortgageTrust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-C1 **(DBGS2018-Cl)**

 

Theundersigned, a duly authorized officer of Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, asspecial servicer (the “Special Servicer”) herein certifies to the following:

 

1.       All servicing activities and performanceof such servicing activities under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement areperformed on behalf of the Special Servicer.

 

2.     A review of the servicingactivities and performance by the Special Servicer for the period of October30, 2018 to December 31, 2018 (the “Reporting Period”) in accordance with thePooling and Servicing Agreement has been conducted under my supervision.

 

3.     To the best of my knowledge,based on such review, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligationsunder the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, in all materialrespects for the Reporting Period and if there has been a failure to fulfillany such obligations in any material respect, each failure and the nature andstatus thereof has been specifically identified herein.

 

 

Certifiedby: /s/ Adam Singer

AdamSinger, Managing Director 

 

Date:March 1, 2019
#### BRESHERS v. NINETEENTH LOUISIANA LEVEE DIST.

No. 5083.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Feb. 5, 1936.

Joel L.. Fletcher, of Colfax, for appellant.

Harry Fuller, of Winnfield, for appel-lee.

DREW; Judge.

Plaintiff instituted this suit for himself and as assignee of the other three plaintiffs against the Nineteenth Louisiana Levee District for damages alleged to have been caused to his and his assignors’ growing crops, due to the alleged wrongful' stopping up of drains on the lands which-he and his assignors had leased. He further alleged that the drains were stopped when a levee was constructed across the-lands of his and his assignors’ lessor. There is no other allegation or claim for damages.

To the petition defendant filed an exception of no right or cause of action, and also an exception of lis pendens.

The lower court sustained both exceptions and dismissed plaintiffs’ suit, and the case has been appealed to this court.

The only question involved in the case was presented .to this court in the case of Lacour v. Red River, Atchafalaya & Bayou Bœuf Levee District, 158 La. 737, 104 So. 636. This court applied to the Supreme Court of the state for instructions, and propounded, among others, this: question: Does the law of Louisiana which allows compensation for lands and improvements actually used or destroyed; for levee purposes, allow compensation-also for the destruction of growing crops?' The Supreme Court answered. the question in the negative and held that under-article 16, section 6 of the Constitution-, of the state of Louisiana, relating to payment for property used or destroyed for levee purposes, no recovery can be had' for the destruction of growing crops. Lacour v. Red River, Atchafalaya & Bayou. Bœuf Levee District, supra.

Also see the case of Wm. E. Weeks v. Nineteenth Louisiana Levee District (La.App.) 165 So. 491, decided this day.

> It therefore follows that the exception-of no right or cause of action was properly sustained by the lower court, and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the-other exception.

The judgment of the lower court is .therefore affirmed, with costs.