alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

James P. Hart

v. Civil No. 05-cv-148-JD

Performance Marketing, Inc.

PROCEDURAL ORDER

Performance Marketing, Inc., removed this case from state

court, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1331. The magistrate judge denied James P. Hart’s motion to

remand, relying on the grounds stated by Performance. Hart

objected to that decision. 

On review, the court concluded that subject matter

jurisdiction did not exist under § 1331 but that the declaration

included in the state court writ indicated that jurisdiction

based on diversity of citizenship might exist under 28 U.S.C. §

1332, although Hart asserted that the amount in controversy

requirement was not met. The court directed Performance to file

a memorandum in support of jurisdiction. In response,

Performance has filed a notice that it withdraws its objection to

Hart’s motion to remand.

Based on the present record, this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, the case must be remanded

to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Case 1:05-cv-00148-JD Document 12 Filed 06/16/05 Page 1 of 2
2

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the clerk of court shall remand

the action to Grafton County Superior Court and close the case in

this court.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

June 16, 2005

cc: K. William Clauson, Esquire

Debra Weiss Ford, Esquire

Case 1:05-cv-00148-JD Document 12 Filed 06/16/05 Page 2 of 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT ANDREW KUNDRATIC, Petitioner

v. SOPHIA CAROL KUNDRATIC, Respondent : : : : : : : : : : : No. 555 MAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 25th day of November, 2014, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2

    Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to
                 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Form 10Q of PVC Container Corporation ("PVCC") for the
period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jeffrey A. Shapiro, Senior Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer of PVC Container Corporation, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

3)       the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

4)       the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
         of PVCC.

/s/ Jeffrey A. Shapiro

Name: Jeffrey A. Shapiro
Title: Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Date: November 12, 2002
#### SUTHARDS et al. v. WAGGONER.

No. 4870.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Dec. 5, 1934.

Sam J. Waggoner, in pro. per.

R. V. Reeves, of Oak Grove, for appellee.

MILLS, Judge.

On March 11, 1931, defendant, S. J. Wag-goner, entered into a written agreement to purchase from plaintiffs 40 acres of land in the parish of West Carroll, for a consideration of $1,200, payable $150 yearly, the expenditure of not less than $300 in improvements, and the payment of taxes during the life of the agreement. It is further stipulated in the contract that the failure of the purchaser to comply with the terms of the contract shall render it null and void, the payments and improvements made and taxes paid to inure to plaintiffs as rent.

The petition sets out such a failure, in that the purchaser has not paid the consideration, the taxes, fenced the land, or paid for the lumber in the house erected by him on the place. The prayer is for the annulment of the contract, the ejectment of defendant, and the forfeiture as rental of the sums expended on the land by him.

A default was taken, duly confirmed, and judgment rendered for plaintiffs as prayed for.

Defendant in his own proper person has appealed. Plaintiffs answered the appeal, praying for damages in the sum of $150, attorney’s fees and rent for frivolous appeal.

Defendant personally appeared before the court, and complained of the failure of two attorneys to appear and represent him. He does not state that any fee was ever, paid them or any facts, which would constitute a successful defense to the action.

We think the appeal, though unfounded in. fact or law, was due to defendant’s ignorance of his rights and responsibilities, and was not willfully taken for the purpose of delay. The prayer for damages for frivolous appeal is therefore rejected, and the judgment appealed from affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 05-cr-260-01-JD

FNU LNU

a/k/a Jose Soler

O R D E R

The assented to motion to reschedule jury trial (document no.

13) filed by defendant is granted.

Defendant shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights within 10

days. The court finds that the ends of justice served by granting

a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the

defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), for the

reasons set forth in the motion.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

Date: May 13, 2008

cc: Jeffrey S. Levin , Esq.

Alfred J.T. Rubega, Esq.

U.S. Marshal

U.S. Probation

Case 1:05-cr-00260-JD Document 14 Filed 05/13/08 Page 1 of 1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Hector Garay, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), rendered December 21, 1988, convicting him of sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was legally sufficient to establish his guilt *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620). Although the defendant attacks the credibility of the complaining witness and claims that the jury should have credited his alibi defense, it is well settled that resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant also challenges the propriety of several of the trial court’s instructions. Initially, we note that all of the defendant’s claims in this regard are unpreserved for appellate review since the defendant failed to register objections to those portions of the charge at the time of trial *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245). In any event, we have examined the substance of the trial court’s instructions and conclude that reversal in the interest of justice is not warranted *(see, People v Lawrence,*143 AD2d 1045; *People v Davis,*140 AD2d 618; *People v Azzara,*138 AD2d 495).

The defendant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s summation is similarly unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, is devoid of merit. Brown, J. P., Kooper, Eiber and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
 

United States of America 

v. Criminal No. OS-cr-262-1-SM 

Maura Wylie 

ORDER 

On August 14, 2008, defendant appeared for a "probable 

cause" hearing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 on an alleged 

violation of conditions of supervision. Defendant Maura Wylie 

has been indicted on distribution of cocaine base crack. I 

therefore find probable cause to hold her for a revocation 

hearing. 

Defendant sought bail conditions under Rule 32.1(al (6). 

Under Rule 32.1(a) (6) defendant bears the burden of establishing 

by clear and convincing evidence that she will not flee and that 

she poses no danger to any other person or to the community. 

There are no conditions which are likely to assure her presence 

and the safety of the community. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant be detained 

pending trial. Defendant shall enroll and participate in the 

Therapeutic Community (T.C.) Program at the Strafford County 

Department of Corrections. 

Case 1:05-cr-00262-SM Document 29 Filed 08/15/08 Page 1 of 2
Aug, 18, 2008 4: 12PM JUSTO ARENAS CHAMBERS	 No,0164 P, 1, 

The defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney 

General or her designated representative for confinement in a 

corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from 

persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody 

pending appeal. The defendant shall be afforded a reasonable 

opportunity for private consultation with defense counsel. On 

order of a court of the United States or on request of an 

attorney for the government, the person in charge of the 

corrections facility shall deliver the defendant to the United 

States Marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection 

with a court proceeding. 

SO ORDZREIl. 

Magistrate Judge 

Date: August 15, 2008 

cc:	 Bjorn R. Lange, Esq. 

Paul J. Haley, Esq. 

Robert M. Kinsella, Esq. 

Aixa Maldonado-Quinones, Esq. 

U.S.	 Marshal 

U.S.	 Probation 

2
 

Case 1:05-cr-00262-SM Document 29 Filed 08/15/08 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 05-cr-194-01-JD

Alexander Matiz

O R D E R

Defendant appeared for a bail revocation hearing pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3148. Defendant, who has a history of driving under

the influence convictions, was stopped at 10:00 p.m. on October

27, 2005 for operating without headlights. In addition to that

offense, he lied to the officer about his identity and was

operating after revocation for being an habitual offender. There

simply are no conditions to assure he will not be a danger to the

community and I find that the defendant is unlikely to abide by

any condition or combination of conditions. The conditions of

release are revoked.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant be detained

pending trial. 

The defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney

General or his designated representative for confinement in a

corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from

persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody

Case 1:05-cr-00194-JD Document 9 Filed 11/02/05 Page 1 of 2
2

pending appeal. The defendant shall be afforded a reasonable

opportunity for private consultation with defense counsel. On

order of a court of the United States or on request of an

attorney for the government, the person in charge of the

corrections facility shall deliver the defendant to the United

States Marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection

with a court proceeding. 

SO ORDERED.

___________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: November 2, 2005 

cc: Arnold H. Huftalen, AUSA

 Michael Iacopino, Esq.

 U.S. Marshal

 U.S. Probation

Case 1:05-cr-00194-JD Document 9 Filed 11/02/05 Page 2 of 2
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kenneth Pavel, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: None of the issues raised by defendant requires reversal of his conviction or modification of his sentences. The sentences were not harsh and excessive. The court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the infant witness to be sworn, inasmuch as the court’s inquiry of the witness indicated that he understood the nature of an oath *(see,*CPL 60.20 [2]). The court did not excessively interject

*835itself into the trial *(see, People v Jamison,*47 NY2d 882, 883) and, because this was a nonjury trial, there was no danger that the court, by its questioning of the witnesses, would influence the jury *(cf., People v Jacobsen,*140 AD2d 938). The evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. The testimony of the unsworn child was corroborated not only by the testimony of the child who was sworn, but also by the physical examination of the victim. The record does not support defendant’s contention that inadmissible evidence tainted the verdict. Defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel. And, finally, the record is insufficient to sustain defendant’s assertion that the court talked to the prosecution witnesses in the absence of defense counsel. (Appeal from judgment of Onondaga County Court, Brandt, J.—sodomy, first degree.) Present—Boomer, J. P., Green, Pine and Davis, JJ.
[No. 34292.

Department One.

November 21, 1957.]

#### General Electric Company, *Appellant,*v. Clifford T. Scofield *et al., Respondents.**1*

■ *Allen, DeGarmo & Leedy,*for appellant.

*Critchlow & Williams,*for respondent Scofield.

1

Reported in 317 P. (2d) 1058.

Per Curiam.

Clifford T. Scofield filed a claim for compensation with the department of labor and industries, alleging that he had suffered a loss of hearing due to excess noise in connection with his employment. The supervisor rejected the claim. Claimant appealed to the board of industrial insurance appeals.

After taking evidence, the board made no determination as to the amount of disability and, by order, remanded the claim to the department “with direction to allow the same and to take such other and further action in connection therewith as may be authorized or required by law.”

. The employer appealed to the superior court. From the judgment of the superior court affirming the order of the board, the employer appeals.

The statute provides that it is only from a final decision *337and order of the board that an appeal to the superior court lies. RCW 51.52.110 provides in part:

> “Within thirty days after the final decision and order of the board . . . [the] employer or other person aggrieved . . . may appeal to the superior court.”

In cases involving injured workmen, such appealable final decisions and orders must contain specific findings and determinations. RCW 51.52.106 provides in part:

> “Every final decision and order rendered by the board shall be in writing and shall contain findings and conclusions as to each contested issue of fact and law, as well as the board’s order based thereon. In cases involving injured workmen the findings and conclusions shall contain a concise statement of the board’s jurisdiction, the nature of the workman’s injury, the pathological condition, if any, resulting therefrom, the physiological disability, if any, resulting from such pathological condition, and any other material facts pertinent to the case, as well as the relief, *including the statutory percentage of disability,*if any, to which the workman or beneficiary is entitled.” (Italics ours.)

The order of the board from which an appeal was taken was an interim order. The board has made no final decision and order in which the claimant was granted relief, “including the statutory percentage of disability.” Until some future determination adverse to the appellant is made, the appellant is not aggrieved. Under RCW 51.52.106 and 51.52.110, neither the superior court nor this court has jurisdiction.to consider interim orders. *Bergman v. Department of*Labor *& Industries,*44 Wn. (2d) 117, 265 P. (2d) 293 (1954); Wiles *v. Department of Labor & Industries,*34 Wn. (2d) 714, 209 P. (2d) 462 (1949); 42 Am. Jur. 577, § 196; 73 C. J. S. 536, § 189.

Finally, appellant contends that RCW 51:52.106 requires that the board make a “final decision and order.” Assuming (but not deciding) that the statute is mandatory, if appellant seeks to compel the board to act, such relief cannot be accomplished by this appeal.

For the reasons stated, the appeal is dismissed.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7036 

To prohibit the Federal Government from compiling or maintaining any 

list or other record of Federal employees who have requested or been 

granted a religious exemption or accommodation to any Federal requirement for any Federal employee to be vaccinated against COVID–19, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 9, 2022 

Mrs. MCCLAIN (for herself, Mr. PERRY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. RUTHERFORD, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. GOODEN

of Texas, and Mr. HUIZENGA) introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Oversight and Reform 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Federal Government from compiling or maintaining any list or other record of Federal employees 

who have requested or been granted a religious exemption or accommodation to any Federal requirement for 

any Federal employee to be vaccinated against COVID– 

19, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Preventing Abusive 

5 Government Efforts Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7036 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST LIST OF RELIGIOUS EXEMP2 TIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS TO FEDERAL 

3 EMPLOYEE COVID–19 VACCINATION MAN4 DATE. 

5 (a) PROHIBITION.—No Federal funds may be used 

6 to compile or maintain any list or other record of Federal 

7 employees who have requested or been granted a religious 

8 exemption or accommodation to— 

9 (1) the vaccination mandate under Executive 

10 Order 14043 (requiring coronavirus disease 2019 

11 vaccination for Federal employees, dated September 

12 9, 2021); or 

13 (2) any other Federal requirement for any Fed14 eral employee to be vaccinated against COVID–19. 

15 (b) DESTRUCTION OF ANY EXISTING LIST.—The 

16 President shall permanently destroy any Federal list or 

17 other record that is described in subsection (a) and in ex18 istence as of the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
H. J. Res. 7

One Hundred Seventh Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the third day of January, two thousand and one

Joint Resolution

Recognizing the 90th birthday of Ronald Reagan.

Whereas February 6, 2001, is the 90th birthday of Ronald Wilson

Reagan;

Whereas both Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy Reagan have

distinguished records of public service to the United States, the

American people, and the international community;

Whereas Ronald Reagan was twice elected by overwhelming margins as President of the United States;

Whereas Ronald Reagan fulfilled his pledge to help restore ‘‘the

great, confident roar of American progress, growth, and optimism’’

and ensure renewed economic prosperity;

Whereas Ronald Reagan’s leadership was instrumental in extending

freedom and democracy around the globe and uniting a world

divided by the Cold War;

Whereas Ronald Reagan is loved and admired by millions of Americans, and by countless others around the world;

Whereas Ronald Reagan’s eloquence united Americans in times

of triumph and tragedy;

Whereas Nancy Reagan not only served as a gracious First Lady

but also led a national crusade against illegal drug use;

Whereas together Ronald and Nancy Reagan dedicated their lives

to promoting national pride and to bettering the quality of life

in the United States and throughout the world; and

Whereas the thoughts and prayers of the Congress and the country

are with Ronald Reagan in his courageous battle with Alzheimer’s

disease: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress,
H. J. Res. 7—2

on behalf of the American people, extends its birthday greetings

and best wishes to Ronald Reagan on his 90th birthday.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with PVC Container Corporation (the "Company") Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned officers
of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such
officer's knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of
the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.

Date: February 14, 2005

                                    /s/ William J. Bergen
                                    -----------------------------------------
                                    Name: William J. Bergen
                                    Title: President & Chief Executive Officer

                                    /s/ Jeffrey Shapiro
                                    ------------------------------------------
                                    Name: Jeffrey Shapiro
                                    Title: Chief Financial Officer

      The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a
separate disclosure document.