alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(173 La. 727)

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Obeliske BOURG, Evest Guidry, Governelle Bourg, and Ozeme Adams.

No. 31413.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 30, 1931.

Harris Gagne, of Houma, for appellants.

Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., J. A. O. Coignet, Dist. Atty., of Thibodaux, and E. R. Schowal-ter, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State. ■

O’NIELL, C. J.

The appellants were convicted of the crime of taking oysters from another’s bedding grounds and were sentenced to pay a fine of $100 each and to serve a term bf 30 days’ imprisonment in the parish jail. As the fine does not exceed $300, and the term of imprisonment does not exceed 6 months, .we are constrained to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the statute under which the appellants were prosecuted, Act 258 of 1926, p. 435, prescribes the penalty of fine or imprisonment, or both fine and imprisonment, in the parish jail. The defendants pleaded, by way of a motion in arrest of judgment, that the act of 1926 was unconstitutional, but, by overruling the motion, the judge pronounced the statute constitutional. The appellate jurisdiction of this court in criminal cases is confined to cases where the penalty of death Or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed, or where a fine exceeding $300 or imprisonment for a term exceeding 6 months is actually imposed. The only exception to that rule is that, in any ease where the con*523stitutionality or legality of a fine or other penalty imposed by a parish, municipality, or other subdivision of the state, or by any board, is in contest, this court has jurisdiction over the question of constitutionality or legality of the ordinance imposing the penalty; but, on the question of constitutionality of a state statute, in criminal as in civil eases, the court has appellate jurisdiction only when the statute has been adjudged unconstitutional, not when it has been adjudged constitutional. Const, art. 7, § 10.

The appeal is dismissed.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 15.1
                                                                               
 
Board of Trustees and Shareholders
Archstone Communities Trust

Gentlemen:

Re:  Registration Statements Nos. 333-43723, 333-44639, 333-51139, 333-60815,
333-60817, 333-60847 and 333-68591.

With respect to the subject registration statements, we acknowledge our
awareness of the use therein of our report dated April 16, 1999 related to our
review of interim financial information.

Pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, such report is not
considered a part of a registration statement prepared or certified by an
accountant, or a report prepared by an accountant within the meaning of sections
7 and 11 of the Act.

KPMG LLP

Chicago, Illinois
May 14, 1999
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-41410 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus REGINALD TROY WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. V-00-CR-7-1

- - - - - - - - - - December 12, 2001 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Reginald Troy Walker has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Walker has received a copy of counsel’s motion and brief but has not filed a response. Our independent review of the brief and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
Order entered August 14, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01366-CV

HELEN CLARK, Appellant

V.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-12-04514-B

ORDER

On July 29, 2013, appellant filed an affidavit of indigence in the trial court. The Dallas 

County Clerk filed a contest to the affidavit. The trial court held a hearing and signed an order 

on August 9, 2013 denying the contest. Accordingly, appellant is allowed to proceed without 

advance payment of costs.

We order John Warren, County Clerk of Dallas County, Texas, to file the clerk’s record, 

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. We order Lanetta Williams, Official Court 

Reporter for County Court at Law. No. 2 of Dallas County, Texas, to file, WITHIN THIRTY 

DAYS of the date of this order, either: (1) the reporter’s record; or (2) written verification that 

appellant has not requested the reporter’s record. We notify appellant that if we receive 

notification of no request, the appeal will be submitted without a reporter’s record.
We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send a copy of this order by first-class mail to 

appellant and by electronic transmission, to John Warren, Lanetta Williams, and counsel for 

appellee.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
189 La. 720

#### PORTERFIELD et al. v. PARKER et al.

No. 34744.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 4, 1938.

Dickson & Denny, of Shreveport, for appellants.

T. M. Milling, of New Orleans, Cecil Morgan, of Shreveport, P. A. Casey, of New Orleans, C. L. Yancey, and Tucker & Mason, all of Shreveport, for appellees.

ODOM, Justice.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment dismissing their suit on exception of no cause of action.

They allege that they are children and sole heirs of their mother, Mrs. Margaret Porterfield Plinson; that their father, Joseph Porterfield, died “many years ago,” that their mother married William T. Hin-son in 1879, and that there were no children of that marriage; that, in the year 1889, their mother and their stepfather acquired by homestead a forty-acre tract of land, which was sold by their stepfather on April 18, 1891, while their mother was living; and that the deed was not recorded until after their mother’s death. They allege that, because the deed was not recorded until after their mother’s death, it had no effect as to them; they being “third persons” in the sense that term is used in articles 2246, 2264, 2266, and 2442 of the Revised Civil Code, which provide that sales and contracts affecting immovable property shall not affect third persons unless recorded as provided by law.

They allege that they acquired an undivided one-half interest in the land by inheritance from their mother and pi;ay that they be recognized as owners and sent into possession.

*499The judgment sustaining defendants’ exception of no cause of action is correct. The reason is plain. The property belonged to the community which existed between plaintiffs’ mother and their stepfather, Hin-son. Hinson sold it while plaintiffs’ mother was living. Under article 2404 of the Revised Civil *Code,*the husband may alienate community property by onerous title “without the consent and permission of his wife.”

By making .the sale, Hinson divested both himself and his wife of all title to the property. Therefore, when plaintiffs’ mother died, she owned no interest in the land and could transmit none to her heirs.

Counsel for plaintiffs argue that, because the deed was not recorded until after the death of their mother, it had no effect as to them. There is no merit in the argument. The articles of the Code cited above plainly state that, whereas unrecorded acts conveying immovable property do not affect third persons, they do affect, and are binding upon, the parties to them. Plaintiffs’ mother was bound by the deed made by her hus--band, although unrecorded, up to the moment of her death, arid plaintiffs’ rights as heirs arose and were fixed at that moment. Plaintiffs are' not “third persons,” as that term is used in the Code.

But, aside from this, article 2442 of the Revised Civil Code says that want of registry cannot be pleaded either by the parties to the acts or by their heirs.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### In the Matter of New York City Department of Correction, Petitioner, v Douglas H. White, as Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights, et al., Respondents.

In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, transferred to this court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered April 24, 1989, to review the determination of respondent Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights, dated December 21, 1988, which found that petitioner, the Department of Correction, discriminated against the complainant on the basis of his arrest record in *251violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [16]); ordered petitioner to cease and desist from discriminating against any person because of his or her arrest record; ordered that petitioner reconsider complainant for the next available position of correction officer without any consideration of his arrest record; and awarded him $1,000 in compensatory damages for hurt, humiliation and mental anguish, unanimously annulled to the extent that it ordered that petitioner cease and desist from inquiring about an applicant’s arrest record, ordered that complainant be reconsidered for the next available position of correction officer and awarded him $1,000 in compensatory damages, and otherwise confirmed, without costs.

Although it has since been amended to permit inquiry regarding any arrest or criminal accusation, not then pending, which was terminated in favor of an applicant for employment as a police officer or peace officer (L 1985, ch 208), Executive Law § 296 (16), in effect at the time, prohibited such inquiry and there is substantial evidence in the record that the complainant’s arrest record and petitioner’s misconception that he had been convicted were the primary reasons for petitioner’s nonselection of complainant for the position of correction officer. However, the civil service eligibility list in question expired almost one year prior to respondent’s determination. In *Matter of Deas v Levitt*(73 NY2d 525, *cert denied*— US —, 110 S Ct 324), the court held that a civil service applicant cannot be hired from an expired list unless the applicant commences a judicial or administrative proceeding prior to the expiration of the list and also challenges the list itself. The complainant here has made no such challenge. There is also an insufficient basis for respondent’s award of compensatory damages for hurt, humiliation and mental anguish, since there was no evidence supporting the complainant’s claims of mental anguish other than his statement that he was very upset. *(See, Matter of City of New York v State Div. of Human Rights,*154 AD2d 56.) Finally, the cease and desist order should be annulled in light of the 1985 amendment to section 296 (16), which permits such inquiry of applicants for employment as peace officers, which includes correction officers (CPL 1.20 [33]; 2.10 [25]). Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Ellerin and Smith, JJ.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                                     FORM 15

                    Certification and Notice of Termination of Registration
      under 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Suspension of Duty
      to File Reports Under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the
                        Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

                        Commission File Number 333-43167

                       CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC.
           (Issuer in respect of the REMIC Pass-Through Certificates)
             (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

                          909 Third Avenue, 30th Floor
                            New York, New York 10043
                                 (212) 559-6727
   (Address, including zip code, and telephone number, including area code, of
                    registrant's principal executive offices)

                     REMIC Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-5
            (Title of each class of securities covered by this Form)

                                 Not Applicable
   (Titles of all other classes of securities for which a duty to file reports
                      under Section 13(a) or 15(d)remains)

         Please place an X in the box(es) to designate the appropriate rule
provision(s) relied upon to terminate or suspend the duty to file reports:

    Rule 12g-4(a)(1)(i)       [ ]          Rule 12h-3(b)(1)(ii)      [ ]
    Rule 12g-4(a)(1)(ii)      [ ]          Rule 12h-3(b)(2)(i)       [ ]
    Rule 12g-4(a)(2)(i)       [ ]          Rule 12h-3(b)(2)(ii)      [ ]
    Rule 12g-4(a)(2)(ii)      [ ]          Rule 15d-6                [x]
    Rule 12h-3(b)(1)(i)       [ ]

Approximate number of holders of record as of the certification or
notice date:  10

      Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. has caused this certification/notice to be
signed on its behalf by the undersigned duly authorized person.


Dated as of: January 26, 1999                      BY:      /s/ Carol Koch
                                                            --------------
                                                            Carol Koch
                                                            Assistant Secretary

Instruction: This form is required by Rules 12g-4, 12h-3 and 15d-6 of the
General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
registrant shall file with the Commission three copies of Form 15, one of which
shall be manually signed. It may be signed by an officer of the registrant, by
counsel or by any other duly authorized person. The name and title of the person
signing the form shall be typed or printed under the signature.
Opinion issued May 23, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-19-00131-CV

———————————

GOODE DELIVERY LLC AND JAMES GOODE, Appellants

V.

ARCARIUS LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1124166

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Goode Delivery LLC and James Goode, have neither paid nor 

made arrangements to pay the fee for preparing the clerk’s record and have not 

established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1, 

37.3(b). After being notified by the Clerk of this Court’s March 26, 2019 notice that 
2

this appeal was subject to dismissal for failure to pay the required clerk’s record fee, 

appellants failed to timely respond. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b), 42.3(b), (c).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution for failure to pay 

the required clerk’s record fee. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b), 42.3(b), (c).

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Hightower.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-02-1998
<CASH>                                             121
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,539
<ALLOWANCES>                                       778
<INVENTORY>                                      8,524
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                13,455
<PP&E>                                           4,498
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,121
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  21,914
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,050
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            5,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,502
<OTHER-SE>                                     (16,873)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    21,914
<SALES>                                          3,987
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,987
<CGS>                                            3,471
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,471
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,835
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 629
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (3,218)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (3,218)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (3,218)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   $(1.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   $(1.07)
        

</TABLE>
The Honorable H. Franklin Waters, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable

Beverly R. Stites, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-1469

___________

Judy D. Pilgrim *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of *

Social Security Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: December 3, 1998

 Filed: December 8, 1998

___________

Before FAGG, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Judy D. Pilgrim appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Social

1

Security Commissioner’s decision to deny Pilgrim’s application for disability insurance

benefits. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties& briefs, we conclude that

substantial evidence supports the findings of the administrative law judge, and the
-2-

administrative law judge did not otherwise err. Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir.

R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.6

        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18
                            OF THE UNITED STATES CODE


      I, E. James Ferland, Chief Executive Officer of PSEG Energy Holdings
L.L.C., to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the Quarterly Report of
PSEG Energy Holdings L.L.C. on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005
(the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of PSEG Energy Holdings L.L.C.


                                    /s/ E. James Ferland
                                  -----------------------------------------
                                    E. JAMES FERLAND
                                    PSEG Energy Holdings L.L.C.
                                    Chief Executive Officer
                                    October 28, 2005
#### Carlos Franco Associates, Inc., Plaintiff, *v.*Seaboard Drug Company, Inc., et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

December 20, 1956.

*795
      *Franklin M. Desser*for plaintiff.

*Milton A. Bass*for Seaboard Drug Company, Inc., defendant.

Irving H. Saypol, J.

Motion to increase plaintiff’s undertaking filed in support of a warrant of attachment is denied. Defendant fails to set forth any facts to show that the undertaking already filed will not be sufficient for its purpose. The mere conclusory statement that the attachment has caused damage to defendant’s business reputation does not justify such relief. That is much too abstract a premise upon which to claim additional security in the absence of supporting facts. The damages against which defendant is entitled to protection by the undertaking on an attachment, within the purview of section *907*of the Civil Practice Act, are those which materially and proximately result from the attachment *(Plessner*v. *Continental Cas. Co.,*82 N. Y. S. 2d 540, 544). Defendant makes no showing that the alleged damage claimed falls within that category.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S.DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           1,626
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  146,148
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,978
<INVENTORY>                                     42,631
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               202,781
<PP&E>                                       2,220,157
<DEPRECIATION>                                 894,300
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,686,705
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           89,721
<BONDS>                                        628,202
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     16,378
<COMMON>                                       447,700
<OTHER-SE>                                     262,565
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,686,705
<SALES>                                        369,217
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               369,217
<CGS>                                          213,539
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  275,968
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              24,009
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 74,017
<INCOME-TAX>                                    25,591
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             48,426
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    48,426
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.00<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00<F1>
<FN>
<F1>*All common stock is owned by parent, no EPS required.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>