Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 10, 2022.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00427-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.U.D., S.L.D., A/K/A S.D., J.P.J.D., K.K.J.D., 

A.E.D., II, CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 308th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2018-37155

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant R.J. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her

parental rights to her children C.U.D., S.L.D. A/K/A S.D., J.P.J.D., K.K.J.D., and 

A.E.D., II.1 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (b)(2). In three issues, 

Mother argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying her motion for mistrial, (2) 

admitting into evidence a police report containing inadmissible hearsay, and (3) 

entering an order terminating Mother’s parental rights based on Family Code 

§ 161.001(b)(1)(O). See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). We affirm. 

1 C.U.D. was born in 2013, S.L.D. was born in 2014, twins K.K.J.D. and J.P.J.D. were 

born in 2016, and A.E.D., II was born in 2017.
2

I. BACKGROUND2

On August 13, 2019, the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the 

Department”) filed its first amended petition for conservatorship and termination 

of the parent-child relationship between Mother and Father and their five children:

C.U.D., S.L.D. A/K/A S.D., J.P.J.D., K.K.J.D., and A.E.D., II. On June 7, 2021, 

the Department filed its third amended petition, stating that Mother’s parental

rights should be terminated under Chapter 161 of the Family Code because Mother 

committed one or more of the following acts or omissions: (1) knowingly placed or 

allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger their 

physical or emotional well-being; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the 

children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s 

physical or emotional well-being; (3) executed before or after the lawsuit was filed 

an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by Family Code 

Chapter 161; (4) was convicted or placed on community supervision for the death 

or serious injury of a child under specified sections of the Penal Code; (5) 

constructively abandoned the children who had been in permanent or temporary 

managing conservatorship of the Department for at least six months, and the 

Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent, the parent has 

not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child, and the parent 

has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment; (6)

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established 

the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the children who have 

been in permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for 

2 The facts of this case, as well as its procedural history, are well known to the parties; 

therefore, we will discuss the facts of the case only to the extent they are relevant to the issues on 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is 

as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of

the appeal.”).
3

at least nine months as a result of the children’s removal from the parent under 

Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child; and (7) used a controlled 

substance, as defined in Health and Safety Code Chapter 481, in a manner that 

endangered the children, and the parent failed to complete a court-ordered abuse 

treatment program or continued to use a controlled substance after the treatment 

program. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (K), (L), (N), (O),

(P).

On June 22, 2021, trial began on the Department’s petition for termination

of Mother and Father’s parental rights. The jury heard testimony from Mother;

Deputies Jonathan Ajayi and Christopher Cano of the Harris County Sheriff’s 

Office; the Department’s case worker assigned to the Department’s case, Amanda

Bermudez; the Department’s case worker for a different case concerning a child 

not subject to the underlying lawsuit, Jessica Espaillat; two psychologists, Dr. 

Charles Cleveland and Dr. Ebony Butler; the senior pastor of a church and the 

operator of a shelter connected with the church, where Mother and Father 

attempted to obtain housing, Dr. Edward Buford; and the children’s guardian ad 

litem, Claudia Canales.

At the end of the presentation of evidence at trial, the Department abandoned 

its requests for termination of Mother’s parental rights based on its allegations that

Mother: (1) executed before or after the lawsuit was filed an affidavit of 

relinquishment of parental rights as provided by Family Code Chapter 161, and (2) 

was convicted or placed on community supervision for the death or serious injury 

of a child under certain sections of the Penal Code. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(K), (L).

Mother moved for a directed verdict as to all other predicate grounds for 

termination alleged by the Department. The trial court denied Mother’s requests. 

The trial court submitted the case to the jury with instructions as to four of the 
4

predicate statutory grounds relied on by the Department.

3 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)

(D), (E), (N), (O). 

The jury found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was proper based 

on all four grounds submitted and that termination was in the best interest of the

children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (N), (O). On September 14, 2021, the

trial court signed an order incorporating the jury’s findings and terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to all five children pursuant to Family Code 

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (K), (N), and (O).

4 See id. § 161.001(b)(1). Mother timely 

appealed.

II. MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

In her first issue, Mother argues the trial court erred when it denied Father’s

motion for mistrial.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse of

discretion. Schlafly v. Schlafly ̧ 33 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); City of Jersey Village v. Campbell, 920 S.W.2d 694, 698 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied); see Tex. Turnpike Auth. v.

McCraw, 458 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. 1970). A trial court abuses its discretion 

when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or without reference to guiding rules or 

3 The trial court did not submit to the jury the question of whether termination was proper

based on Mother’s alleged used of a controlled substance, as defined in Health and Safety Code 

Chapter 481, in a manner that endangered the child, and Mother’s alleged failure to complete a 

court-ordered abuse treatment program or continued to abuse a controlled substance after the

treatment program. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(P). At the charge conference, 

Mother’s counsel argued that this predicate ground for termination “was not pled as to mother,”

and the trial court agreed. However, we note that the Department’s live pleading contained this

allegation. 

4 The trial court’s order terminated Father’s parental rights based on § 161.001(b)(1)(D), 

(E), (N), (O), and (P), consistent with the jury’s findings. See id. § 161.001(b)(1).
5

principles. Bowie Mem. Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). 

B. ANALYSIS

During Mother’s testimony, the following exchange occurred: 

[The Department]: Okay. And were you aware if a CPS 

investigator attempted to come and see you 

and [Father] at the Extended Stay in 

Webster?

[Mother]: Nobody tried to come see us.

[The Department]: Okay. And are you aware of whether or not

[Father] made a statement to the 

investigative caseworker, “That she could 

come -- ”

[Mother’s counsel]: Objection.

[The Department]: If I can finish my statement, please.

[Mother’s counsel]: It’s hearsay on hearsay, Judge.

[Trial Court]: She needs to finish her question and then 

you can certainly object before the witness

responds.

[The Department]: Are you aware of whether or not [Father]

made a statement to the investigative

caseworker, “That she could come to that 

motel room in Webster, Texas, but if she 

did, he would shoot her in the face”?

[Father’s counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going to object to hearsay.

[Trial Court]: Sustained.

[Father’s counsel]: And I’d ask that the jury be asked to 

disregard that question.

[Trial Court]: Okay. Being that that objection was 

sustained, the jurors are specifically 

instructed to disregard and not carry any 

weight in to the asked question.

[Father’s counsel]: Your Honor, at this time I’d move for a 

mistrial.
6

[Trial Court]: Okay. The jurors, we’re going to excuse 

them and we will have argument as to your

request for a mistrial. Go ahead. All rise.

(OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY)

[Trial Court]: Now that the jurors are no longer in the 

presence of the court, [Father’s counsel],

make your argument for your request or

motion for a mistrial.

[Father’s counsel]: Your Honor, I would ask for a mistrial at 

this point because the question in and of 

itself the jury hearing it, it’s highly

prejudicial. It’s a bell that can’t be, you can’t 

unring that bell, despite the fact that you’re 

going to give -- you gave them the 

instruction or will give them the instruction 

to disregard it. I think also asking for it to be 

struck, the problem is you’ve got 12 people 

who they’ve heard it. The damage is done. 

And so, your Honor, for this point, 

especially as to my client, I think that this 

Court has got to grant a mistrial.

[Trial Court]: Any response?

[The Department]: My response would be that, my argument, 

number one, as far as the hearsay, it’s 

definitely a statement against interest as far 

as [Father] is concerned, so that would be 

my argument as to whether or not it’s even 

hearsay; that’s the first thing. The second 

thing is, I don’t believe that based on the 

Court’s instructions that they’ll have any 

issue with determining that that’s not a piece 

of information or evidence that they’re 

supposed to weigh in order to make a 

decision, in order to make a decision in this 

case, so I would ask that the mistrial be, the 

request for mistrial be denied.

[Trial Court]: Are there any additional statements or 

responses that the additional Attorney Ad
7

Litems would like to make on the record? 

I’ll begin by asking [Mother’s counsel] first.

[Mother’s counsel]: I’m sorry, I don’t understand any additional 

statements about this.

[Trial Court]: Yeah.

[Mother’s counsel]: Well, your Honor, for one thing, I think that 

there are going to be other instances when 

we think that the Petitioner is back dooring

information, just defamatory information 

that is not relevant to this proceeding that --

[Trial Court]: That’s not relevant to the request for a 

mistrial.

[Mother’s counsel]: I understand that. But I’m saying there are 

going to be other instances, and I just want 

you to understand that this might be a 

recurring issue. The problem is, this is 

defamatory against my client allowing -- or 

allowing the jury to hear this, an allegation

that the father of her children has threatened, 

has allegedly threatened to shoot another 

person is defamatory against her [sic]. And 

asking her, are you aware he said this, it’s 

not even established yet. They’re just trying 

to back door this information to inflame the 

minds of the jury, and I don’t think that bell

can be unrung.

[Trial Court]: Anything else, [children’s ad litem]?

[Children’s ad litem]: Your Honor, if I may, I don’t believe that 

the statement was inflammatory, and 

certainly they can call a rebuttal witness to 

back up what they’ve said. It’s not like it’s 

something that was never said. I don’t think 

it rises to the level of a mistrial.

. . . .

[Trial Court]: After break and I believe the question before 

the Court and the motion, I guess better 
8

stated, by [Father’s counsel] on behalf of her 

client as to the request for a mistrial, the

Court is denying that request. The Court 

believes that under 403 as stated by 

[Father’s counsel], that I do not believe and

the Court specifically finds that the 

statement would substantially outweigh by a 

danger of one or more of the following, of 

possibly being unfairly prejudicial or

possibly confusing an issue or misleading 

the jury is not what would happen and, 

therefore, would not be cause to grant a 

mistrial at this time, and, specifically, based 

upon the question that was asked by the 

State’s attorney.

Mother argues that the trial court erred when it denied Father’s motion for 

mistrial. However, “in trials involving multiple defendants, a party must make its 

own objection to the evidence if it wishes to preserve error for appeal.” OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 1996), aff’d, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998); Bohls v. Oakes, 75 S.W.3d 

473, 478 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied); Beutel v. Dall. Cnty. Flood 

Control Dist., No. 1, 916 S.W.3d 685, 694 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, writ denied);

Celotex Corp. v. Tate, 797 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 

1990, writ dism’d); Howard v. Phillips, 728 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 1987, no writ); see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Wolfe v. E. Tex. Seed Co., 583 

S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ dism’d) (“[A] party 

must make his own objection to the evidence, or an exception to the ruling of the 

court regarding the objection, if he wishes to preserve any error for appeal.”). Here, 

Mother did not make a motion for mistrial, nor does the record reveal that the trial 

court granted a request by Mother or Father to have a single objection preserve 

error for both parties. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 916 S.W.2d at 556–57
9

(concluding that appellant could rely on another defendant’s objection when the 

trial court “required that an objection made by one defendant would be made on 

behalf of all defendants”). Thus, we conclude that Mother has failed to preserve 

this issue for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Owens-Corning Fiberglas 

Corp., 916 S.W.2d at 556; see also Kaminetzky v. Richardson, No. 01-00-00575-

CV, 2003 WL 21470396, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 26, 2003, 

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“IPC cannot rely on the motions and objections made by 

other defendants to preserve error . . . .”).

We overrule Mother’s first issue. 

III. HEARSAY

In her second issue, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when 

it “admitted inadmissible hearsay through a Houston Police Department offense 

report riddled with out-of-court statements asserted for the truth of the matter that 

were highly prejudicial . . . .”

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s admission of evidence under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). A 

trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or without 

reference to guiding rules or principles. Bowie Mem. Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 52.

We will not reverse a trial court’s judgment based on the erroneous 

admission of evidence unless we conclude that the error probably caused the 

rendition of an improper judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. 

Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 136 (Tex. 2012); Interstate Northborough P’ship v. 

State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001). In determining whether the erroneous 

admission of evidence was harmful, we review the entire record. Interstate 
10

Northborough, 66 S.W.3d at 220. “Typically, a successful challenge to a trial 

court’s evidentiary rulings requires the complaining party to demonstrate that the 

judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admitted.” Id. The erroneous 

admission of evidence that is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence is 

harmless. Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. 2004).

B. APPLICABLE LAW

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that a party offers into evidence to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). 

Generally, hearsay is not admissible unless provided for by the Texas Rules of 

Evidence, a statute, or other rule. Tex. R. Evid. 802.

The rule against hearsay does not exclude a record or statement of a public 

office if: 

(A) it sets out: 

(i) the office’s activities; 

(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not 

including, in a criminal a criminal case, a matter 

observed by law-enforcement personnel; or 

(iii) in a civil case . . . factual findings from a legally authorized 

investigation; and 

(B) the opponent fails to demonstrate that the source of the 

information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Tex. R. Evid. 803(8). Hearsay within hearsay is not admissible unless each part of 

the combined statements conforms with an exception to the general rule excluding 

hearsay. Benson v. Chalk, 536 S.W.3d 886, 895 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2017, pet. denied); see Tex. R. Evid. 805; Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 64 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). “When a police report contains a 

hearsay statement, the statement must fall under some hearsay exception of its own
11

because neither the public records and reports exception, nor the records of 

regularly conducted activities exception, protects hearsay within hearsay.” Benson,

536 S.W.3d at 895.

C. ANALYSIS

Here, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 

exhibit thirteen, which contains two police reports regarding the February 10, 2020

incident. One of the reports is written by Officer “Aguilar, R” and a supplemental 

report is written by Officer “Pham, T T[.]” Officer Aguilar’s police report covers 

events that occurred the day Mother and Father visited the children while they 

were in the Department’s care. 

The relevant portions of Officer Aguilar’s report provide: 

I, Officer R. Aguilar was riding 22834E and was dispatched to a child 

custody situation at 3 Northpoint Dr on Monday 02-10-2020 at 1611 

Hrs.

I arrived at 1628 Hrs and made contact with the compl[ainant] and the 

suspects, the suspects provided fictitious court documents demanding 

that police remove the children from CPS. The children were left in 

the custody of CPS and the parents/suspects were provided a case 

number.

Officers with BWC:

Sgt. A. Anderson Pr# 140497

Officer Rangel Pr# 161125

Officer Aquino Pr# 160122

COMPLAINANT STATEMENTS:

Bermudez, Amanda

CPS Specialist

. . . .

She stated that she worked for CPS and that she has temporary 

custody of the children that was granted by Judge Gloria Lopez out of 
12

Court 308. With that court order she (CPS) has custody of the children 

and wanted police to assist in her in taking the additional 2 children 

from the suspects. She then stated that the suspects did have a court

[sic] to have the children returned to them on Oct 3, 2019 but when 

they went to drop off the children. The address the suspects provided

was fake and could not release the children to them if they were still 

homeless and did not have a [sic] actual place of residence.

. . . .

Upon arrival to the scene I made contact with the suspects #1 and #2, 

I then gathered their statement to why they called. The suspect #2 then 

provide a ripped single document regarding her case and how it was a 

official court document signed by the judge (paper did not have any 

official stamp by the judge). I then spoke to the compl[ainant] and

gathered her side of the incident , I then advised the suspects that the 

children were not going to be released. The suspects then demanded a 

captain to make the scene, I advised them that he would not make the 

scene. I then advised them that I was going to get a Sgt to make the

scene.

Moments later Sgt. Anderson made the scene and further explained to 

the suspects that CPS was going to maintain custody of the children, 

and that he needed to go to court to get another court order. After 

several attempts of providing his legal documents, calling 911 and 

requesting a chief, threatening police with being arrested by the Feds 

for hindering justice suspect #1 made an outcry that his daughter was 

being sexually assaulted. Because of this the suspect #1 did not feel 

comfortable in leaving the child in CPS custody, but did not provide 

any further details to the incident. Based on the entire interaction with

the suspects regarding the custody their children, and how they 

exhausted hoe [sic] avenues of trying to have police assist them in 

getting their kids back. I could not find his out cry credible at this 

time, based on the totally of the circumstances and how after 45-50 

min of arguing with police regarding the courts & and child custody. 

The suspect #1 then made the outcry in order to attempt to maintain 

custody of the child. After several more moments of explaining to the 

suspects that the children were going to stay with CPS, the suspects

finally left the lobby of the CPS office.

Office Pham’s report, dated February 11, 2020, provides: 

On this date, I, Detective TT Pham , payroll #103881 reviewed this 
13

case for follow up. According to the report, the officers settled the 

case at scene. There is no Interference with Child Custody had 

occurred at this time and the suspects were advised to go back to court 

and update the order. I closed this case from MPU's case management.

Case closed.

When exhibit thirteen was offered for admission, the following exchange 

occurred: 

[Trial Court]: Okay. And this is the State’s Exhibit 13; 

correct?

[The Department]: Yes, Judge.

[Trial Court]: And I’m assuming there’s objections, and if 

so, what are those?

[Father’s counsel]: Your Honor, my objection to No. 13 coming 

in is that it is simply a, I guess it’s an

offense report. It’s not an actual charge. I 

would argue that under 401, 403, it’s 

prejudicial. In addition to that, your Honor, 

it has hearsay within it. It’s written by an

Officer Aguilar, who is not present to 

testify. Under 803 in addition to that, there is 

statements made by Amanda Bermudez, 

excuse me, on Page 5 at the bottom where

she’s listed as a complainant. There is, there 

is hearsay listed on Page 6 statements made 

a Sergeant Anderson, which would be the 

second paragraph under “Officer’s Actions,”

and there is also a statement made a T. Pham 

on the last page. That’s on Page 1 of 1, but 

it’s the last page, Page 9 for the purpose of 

the exhibit. And so, your Honor, for those 

reasons, I would ask that it be excluded.

[Trial Court]: All right. Thank you.

[Mother’s counsel]: Judge, I would also like to add that there has 

been extensive testimony about that

incident, and so -- and that the police were 
14

called out and this is needlessly cumulative 

of evidence already before the Court and the 

jury.

[Trial Court]: Thank you. Any response?

[The Department]: The only response would be that, the

document is a certified document and, 

although, there has been testimony from at 

least two witnesses about the incident, there 

are clearer differences in perspective about

what occurred; and so I would ask that the 

document be entered specifically for the

purpose of rebuttal.

[Mother’s counsel]: Judge.

[Trial Court]: Yes.

[Mother’s counsel]: The problem with allowing hearsay in, if it’s 

going to be allowed in to prove the matters 

asserted therein, that is such a violation of 

the Rules of Evidence. They certainly had

subpoena power. They could subpoena the 

officers. They could subpoena these people 

if they want to have additional proof, 

reliable admissible proof before the jury.

But allowing this in for any other purpose 

than to show that an offense report was

made is in violation of 803.

[Trial Court]: I believe there is -- 803 has exceptions and 

this is a public record, so there is an

exception so I’m not worried about Officer

or Deputy Aguilar.

. . . .

[Trial Court]: Okay. As to Officer Aguilar, I believe that 

any statements made by this deputy or 

officer in the report would fall under the 

exception under 803. As to Amanda 

Bermudez, I don’t believe that would apply 

here. I am concerned and I hear the 

objection in regards to any statements within 
15

the report as to T. Pham, so I would like a 

response to the hearsay objections, 

specifically on Page 9 of the exhibit that 

relate to T. Pham’s statements or quotes and 

that’s being specifically hearsay.

[The Department]: As far as T. Pham is concerned, that’s also, 

that person is also listed as a detective, so I

believe it would fall under the same purview 

the Court just listed as far as the same with 

Officer Aguilar, so I believe that it would 

meet the exceptions previously stated by the

Court, Judge.

[Trial Court]: As to the objections of cumulative, that’s 

overruled. As to hearsay, that’s overruled. 

As to 401 and 403, that’s overruled.

[Father’s counsel]: Thank you, your Honor.

[Trial Court]: 13 is admitted.

As noted above, a party may not rely on another defendant’s objection to 

preserve error for appeal. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 916 S.W.2d at 556. 

Here, Father objected to exhibit thirteen on the basis of hearsay and identified the 

statements in the exhibit he was challenging. Mother, however, did not object on 

the basis of hearsay, although she did articulate the word “hearsay” to the trial 

court during the discussion pertaining to exhibit thirteen’s admissibility. Assuming,

without deciding, that Mother objected to exhibit thirteen on the basis of hearsay, 

she failed to identify the statements that she was challenging as hearsay. A blanket 

hearsay objection that does not identify the statements being challenged in a 

document preserves nothing for our review. See In re L.M., 572 S.W.2d 823, 832–

33 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“A hearsay objection that 

does not identify which parts of a document contain hearsay is not sufficiently

specific to preserve error with respect to those parts.”). Therefore, this issue has 

been waived. 
16

Nevertheless, even if Mother challenged the same statements in exhibit 

thirteen that Father identified for the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by admitting exhibit thirteen into the record. Officers Pham 

and Aguilar’s statements in the police report are admissible under the exception to

the rule against hearsay provided in Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8) because the 

reports are records of a public office (the Houston Police Department) setting out 

the office’s activities, factual findings, and matters observed while under a legal 

duty to report. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(8)(A); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. 

Caruana, 363 S.W.3d 558, 564 (Tex. 2012) (“Law enforcement investigation 

reports are commonly admitted in civil cases . . . .”); McRae v. Echols, 8 S.W.3d 

797, 799–800 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied) (concluding police officer’s

report was admissible under 803(8)). Furthermore, Mother did not argue at the trial 

court that the source of the report or other circumstances indicated a lack of 

trustworthiness. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Tex. R. Evid. 803(8)(B). 

As to the statements in the report by Bermudez and Sergeant Anderson5that 

were challenged in the trial court, Bermudez testified at trial without objection 

regarding the same information. Bermudez is the Department’s case worder 

assigned to the underlying case. According to Bermudez, on the day of the

visitation in question, Mother and Father “called the cops to come to the CPS 

office, because [Father] was alleging that CPS did not follow a court order and that 

this case is fraud and that [CPS] kidnapped his children.” When the visitation was 

ended, Mother and Father seized S.L.D. and J.P.J.D., prevented them from going

behind the locked door with Bermudez, took the children to the lobby, and Father 

5 We note that the only hearsay statement by Sergeant Anderson in the police report is the 

first sentence of the paragraph identified by Father to the trial court, which provides “Moments 

later Sgt. Anderson made the scene and further explained to the suspects that CPS was going to

maintain custody of the children, and that he needed to go to court to get another court order.”

The remainder of the paragraph is Officer Aguilar’s narrative. 
17

shielded the children from Bermudez. Father was aggressive and threatening and 

used obscenities, and Mother “was also very loud and yelling and cursing and 

threatening to sue and to call the cops and have everyone arrested.” When law 

enforcement arrived, Mother and Father told the officers “[t]hat CPS had 

kidnapped their children.”

Bermudez testified that Mother and Father presented the police officer with 

an outdated court order in which the trial court ordered the Department to return 

the children home. Mother and Father, however, failed to mention to the officer 

that the trial court held another hearing and a subsequent order was entered. 

Bermudez “had to find the court order where CPS granted [temporary managing 

conservatorship] of the children to prove to the cops that CPS did, in fact, have 

Temporary Managing Conservatorship of the children.” Bermudez presented the 

police with the order naming the Department as the children’s temporary managing 

conservator, and then Bermudez “was able to take the children and return them 

home.”

Because the same evidence complained of in exhibit thirteen attributed to the 

statements of Bermudez and Sergeant Anderson was also admitted during 

Bermudez’s testimony without objection, any error in the admission of Bermudez

and Sergeant Anderson’s statements in exhibit thirteen is harmless. See Nissan 

Motor Co., 145 S.W.3d at 144. Furthermore, to the extent Mother complains on

appeal of statements in exhibit thirteen that were not brought to the court’s 

attention, we conclude that those complaints are waived because they were not 

raised in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. 33.1(a). 

We overrule Mother’s second issue. 
18

IV. TEXAS FAMILY CODE § 161.001(b)(1)

In her third issue, Mother argues “[t]he trial court improperly entered an

order to terminate the parental rights of [Mother] in this case pursuant to”

§ 161.001(b)(1)(O) “because the children in this case were not removed for ‘abuse 

or neglect’ . . . .” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). Mother argues 

that “the jury heard that [Mother] struggled with housing and finances, but did not 

heard [sic] evidence that would support any notion other than that she loved and 

cared for her children the best she could.” We construe Mother’s argument as a 

challenge to the legal sufficiency underlying the jury’s finding that termination was 

proper under § 161.001(b)(1)(O).

6

A. APPLICABLE LAW

“Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b) allows for involuntary termination

of parental rights if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence both that a 

parent engaged in one or more enumerated predicate grounds for termination and 

that termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re M.P., No. 21-0360, __

S.W.3d __, __, 2022 WL 333363, *1 (Tex. Feb. 4, 2022) (per curiam) (citing Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U), (b)(2)). Thus, a single predicate finding 

under § 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code is sufficient to support a judgment of 

termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). If multiple predicate 

grounds are found, then we may affirm on any one ground because only one is 

necessary for termination of parental rights. See In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 13 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). However, 

because prior termination for endangerment is a predicate ground for a 

6 Mother concedes in her brief that she did not file a motion for new trial, and thus, failed 

to preserve a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2).
19

future termination, due process and due course of law require that [a] 

court of appeals review the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting a trial court’s order of termination under 

Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) when challenged on appeal.

In re M.P., __ S.W.3d at __, 2022 WL 333363, at *3 (emphasis added); see In re 

Z.M.M., 577 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 

230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).

Under § 161.001(b)(1)(O), the trial court may order termination of the 

parent-child relationship if there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent 

has:

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically 

established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of 

the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing 

conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services 

for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from 

the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child[.] 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(O) (emphasis added); see id. § 262.001(a)

(“A governmental entity with an interest in the child may file a suit affecting the 

parent-child relationship requesting an order or take possession of a child without a

court order as provided by this chapter.”); id. § 262.104 (providing that the 

Department may take possession of a child in an emergency without a court order);

see also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. 2013) (“[W]hile subsection O 

requires removal under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect, those words are used 

broadly.”); In re A.A.A., 265 S.W.3d 507, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2008, pet. denied) (concluding that child in care of a shelter at the time of removal 

was removed from the parent under chapter 262 for abuse or neglect); In re A.P., 

No. 13-19-00342-CV, 2019 WL 6315429, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (“[c]hildren are removed from their parents under Chapter 

262 for the abuse or neglect of a child [even] where the children may have been 
20

physically in the care of a relative, a medical or social services institution, or the 

Department.”); In re J.H., No. 09-14-00171-CV, 2015 WL 5093400, at * 4–5 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Aug. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting mother’s argument 

that child was not removed from her care when child was removed from relatives

appointed as managing conservators because the child “was originally removed 

from Mother’s care pursuant to Chapter 262”).

B. ANALYSIS

Mother argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s 

finding of predicate grounds for termination under part (O) of Family Code 

§ 161.001(b)(1). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). However, she does 

not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of grounds 

for termination under part (D), (E), and (N) of the statute. Furthermore, Mother 

does not argue that termination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best

interest.

To succeed on appeal from a termination decree, an appellant must establish 

that the findings on all of the termination grounds found by the factfinder are 

unsupported by the evidence. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 (holding that father’s 

failure to challenge sufficiency of evidence to support finding under one subsection 

of § 161.001(1) made it unnecessary to address father’s challenges to other 

grounds for termination); In re G.S., No. 14-14-00477-CV, 2014 WL 4699480, at 

*5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re 

B.K.D., 131 S.W.3d 10, 16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (holding 

that because the jury found four grounds for termination under § 161.001(1) and 

the father challenged only three of those grounds, appellate court was not required 

to address his argument that the evidence was insufficient on the three challenged 

grounds). Here, the jury found that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated 
21

on four grounds under § 161.001(b)(1). On appeal, Mother challenges only one of 

those grounds. Because Mother does not challenge three other grounds supportive 

of the judgment, we need not address her argument that the evidence is insufficient 

to support the jury’s finding on the one ground she challenges on appeal. 

Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s third issue.

V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of Mother’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s 

order. 

/s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Poissant.