alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 6, 2018

No. 04-17-00780-CR

Clint Harrison ELLER,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. A15100

Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

By order dated February 28, 2018, these appeals were abated to the trial court for an 

indigency hearing. The trial court conducted a hearing and determined appellant is not indigent. 

The appeals are REINSTATED on the docket of the court. During the abatement of the appeals, 

the court reporter responsible for preparing the reporter’s record in these appeals filed a 

notification of late record requesting an extension of time to file the reporter’s record to April 30, 

2018. The request is GRANTED. The reporter’s record must be filed in these appeals no later 

than April 30, 2018.

_________________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 6th day of April, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
#### VORHEES v. CITY OF MOORE HAVEN et al.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Aug. 3, 1936.

B. A. Bales, of Moore Haven, for appellant.

J. M. Couse, of Moore Haven, for appel-lees.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill of complaint seeking to enjoin the issue of $19,000 “Waterworks Revenue Certificates” by the city of Moore Haven, Fla., without an approving vote of the freeholder electors of the city, as required by section 6, article 9, Constitution, as amended in 1930; the purpose of the issue being for improvements and additions to the existing municipal waterworks- system of the city of Moore Haven.

The waterworks revenue certificates are to be paid solely from the revenue derived from the operation of the said waterworks system and not otherwise.

The decree dismissing the bill of complaint should be affirmed upon the authority of State ex rel. v. City of Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6, and other similar cases. See, also, Williams v. Town of Dunnellon (Fla.) 169 So. 631, and Bradley v. City of Homestead (Fla.) 169 So. 639, Boykin v. Town of River Junction (Fla.) 169 So. 492, decided at this term.

Affirmed.

WHITFIELD, C. J., and TERRELL, BROWN, BUFORD, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

ELLIS, P. J.,

concurs upon the principle announced in his specially concurring opinion in the case of State ex rel. City of Vero Beach v. MacConnell (Fla.) 169 So. 628, this day filed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40267 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v. JOSE ANTONIO SANTOS-MORENO

Defendant - Appellant

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-01-CR-1073-ALL

-------------------- January 27, 2003 Before KING, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *Jose Antonio Santos-Moreno (“Santos”) appeals his guiltyplea conviction and sentence for being an alien unlawfully found in the United States after deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea, that his indictment was defective under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and that hisNo. 02-40267 -2- prior cocaine-possession conviction was not an aggravated felony for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)(2001). Santos consented to entry of his plea by a magistrate judge and did not object in the district court; he therefore waived any procedural error in that regard. See United States v. BolivarMunoz , 313 F.3d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 2002). Santos concedes that his Apprendi argument is foreclosed by United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo , 263 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2001), and states that he raises the issue only to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. The issue is foreclosed. Santos’ challenge to the adjustment of his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)(2001) is without merit. See United States v. Caicedo-Cuero , 312 F.3d 697, 706-11 (5th Cir. 2002).
AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code**

     I, Ralph Izzo, Chief Executive Officer of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the Quarterly Report of Public Service Electric and Gas Companyon Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Public Service Electric and Gas Company. 

/s/ Ralph Izzo
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice 6341]

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681,                         *et seq.*; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note,                         *et seq.*), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236 of October 19, 1999, as amended, and Delegation of Authority No. 257 of April 15, 2003 [68 FR 19875], I hereby determine that the objects to be included in the exhibition “Benjamin West and the Venetian Secret,” imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to a loan agreement with the foreign owner or custodian. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at the Yale Center for British Art, New Haven, CT, from on or about September 18, 2008, until on or about January 4, 2009, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. Public Notice of these Determinations is ordered to be published in the                         **Federal Register**                        .                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For further information, including a list of the exhibit objects, contact Julie Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: (202) 453-8050). The address is U.S. Department of State, SA-44, 301 4th Street, SW., Room 700, Washington, DC 20547-0001.

Dated: August 29, 2008.

C. Miller Crouch,

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

[FR Doc. E8-20629 Filed 9-4-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RAYMOND E. BRADLEY

,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee. §

§

§ No. 310 , 2017

§

§ Court Below

— Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§

§ Cr. ID No. 92S 05720DI (S )

§

§

§

Submitted: October 19 , 2017

Decided: December 1 , 2017

Before STRINE , Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN

, Justices.

O R D E R

This 1 st day of December 2017 , after careful consideration of the opening

brief, the motion to affirm, and the record below, we conclude that the July 12, 2017

Superior Court order denying the appellant’s fourth motion for postconviction relief

and motion for appointment of counsel un der Superior Court Criminal Rule 61

should be affirmed

. The appellant’s restatement of his previous ineffective

assistance of counsel claims and contention that his sexual relationship with the

murder victim’s girlfriend began when he was underage do not constitute “ new

evidence ” creating “a strong inference ” that he “ is actually innocent in fact of the2

acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted.” 1 We also note that this is

the appellant’s fourth postconviction motion. We will not continue to invest scare

judicial resources to address untimely claims. We encourage the appellant to be

mindful of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(j). 2

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice

1 Super. Ct. Crim. 61(d)(2)(i) (providing second or subsequent motion for motion postconviction

relief is not subject to summary dismissal if the movant satisfies this standard)

. 2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(j) (“If a motion is denied, the state may move for an order requiring the

movant to reimburse the state for costs and expenses paid for the movant from public funds.”).
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-2381
JOSEPH BURCH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus PHILIP MORRIS USA, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee.
No. 05-2382
JOSEPH BURCH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus PHILIP MORRIS USA, INCORPORATED, a corporation, Defendant - Appellee. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, District Judge. (CA-04-1032-1-WLO; CA-02-1124-1) Submitted: May 19, 2006 Decided: June 29, 2006 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.- 2 - Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Joseph Burch, Appellant Pro Se. Wood Walter Lay, Eric Michael David Zion, Jacqueline M. Yount, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).*The district court subsequently granted Philip Morris’s motion for sanctions in September 2005. Burch moved to pay the sanctions in installments, and by order dated November 18, 2005, the district court directed Burch to provide proof of indigency by December 5, 2005, and provided that the sanction would be payable in full on December 15, 2005, if Burch did not comply. Burch never responded to the district court’s November 18 order to provide an affidavit in support of his need for an installment payment plan, and therefore, pursuant to its terms, the order was reduced to a judgment for the full amount of the sanction on December 15, 2005. Burch does not challenge the sanctions order in his informal brief on appeal, so he has waived appellate review of that order. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). - 3 - PER CURIAM: Joseph Burch filed two civil actions against Philip Morris USA, Inc. In Burch’s first lawsuit, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and denied relief in January 2004. Burch moved to rescind the district court’s order, but that motion was denied in June 2005. Burch’s appeal was assigned No. 05-2382. In Burch’s second action, the district court denied relief in June 2005. *Burch’s appeal was assigned No. 05-2381. Both notices of appeal were filed on December 5, 2005. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)).- 4 - Because Burch failed to file a timely notice of appeal or obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period in either case, we dismiss the appeals. We deny his motions for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not assist in the decisional process.

DISMISSED
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 9, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52261-52262]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20746]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Forest Service


Dry Fork Vegetative Restoration Project, Lewis and Clark National 
Forest, Cascade and Judith Basin Counties, MT

AGENCY: Forest Service, USDA.

ACTION: Withdrawal of Notice of Intent to prepare a Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The USDA Forest Service is withdrawing the Notice of Intent to 
prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Dry Fork

[[Page 52262]]

Vegetative Restoration project on the Belt Creek Ranger District of the 
Lewis and Clark National Forest. A Notice of Intent to prepare a 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement was published in the 
Federal Register on October 27, 2005 (pages 60274-60275).

    Dated: August 27, 2008.
Lesley W. Thompson,
Forest Supervisor.
[FR Doc. E8-20746 Filed 9-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-11-M
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 12


QUAKER STATE CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
Statement re Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31
(in thousands)                                                             1998             1997
=================================================================     ============     ============
<S>                                                                   <C>              <C>         
Interest expense                                                      $      6,959     $      6,326
Interest factor of rental expense                                            2,648            2,324
                                                                      ------------     ------------
Total fixed charges                                                   $      9,607     $      8,650
                                                                      ============     ============

Income from continuing operations before income taxes                 $      2,843     $      9,746
Fixed charges                                                                9,607            8,650
                                                                      ------------     ------------
Total earnings                                                        $     12,450     $     18,396
                                                                      ============     ============

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                                             1.3              2.1
                                                                      ============     ============
</TABLE>

(1)     Interest factor of rental expense computed based on: (a) average
        interest factor from a sample of leases for operations representing in
        excess of 50% of rentals from continuing operations, and (b) one-third
        factor of rentals for other operations.

                                       19
#### Victor BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D.C. WILLIAMS; J. Williams, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-40625

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 7, 2003.

*343Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Victor Renard Brown, Texas prisoner # 850627, appeals, *pro se,*the dismissal, following a bench trial before a magistrate judge, of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Brown claims the magistrate judge: (1) abused his discretion by denying Brown’s motion for sanctions; (2) erred by refusing to allow Brown to testify; (3) abused his discretion by not allowing Brown to call six of his 11 listed potential witnesses; and (4) clearly erred in his factual findings underlying the dismissal of Brown’s claim.

Brown has not shown that the magistrate judge abused his discretion by denying sanctions. *See Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc.,*99 F.3d 775, 777 (5th Cir. 1996), *further proceedings at 282*F.3d 864 (5th Cir.2002). Although Brown’s brief is construed liberally in the light of his *pro se*status, Brown has not adequately briefed his claims concerning his participation at trial. *See Yohey v. Collins,*985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993) (issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned). Nor has Brown shown that the magistrate judge abused his discretion by not allowing the six witnesses to testify (Brown was allowed to call four). *See Gibbs v. King,*779 F.2d 1040, 1047 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*476 U.S. 1117, 106 S.Ct. 1975, 90 L.Ed.2d 659 (1986); *Harvey v. Andrist,*754 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*471 U.S. 1126, 105 S.Ct. 2659, 86 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985). Finally, we cannot reweigh the evidence and credibility determinations of the magistrate judge. *See Martin v. Thomas,*973 F.2d 449, 453 n. 3 (5th Cir.1992). The challenged findings are not clearly erroneous.

Brown has also filed in this court a motion for summary judgment and two motions for appointment of counsel. Motions for summary judgment are not authorized by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, that motion is DENIED. In light of the disposition of this case, Brown’s motions for appointment of counsel are also DENIED.

*AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED*

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

May 30, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
132873 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 132873 COA: 262956 Wayne CC: 04-011943-01 KANYAMA HAMPTON, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the November 21, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Wa yne Circuit Court for correction of the judgment of sentence to reflect the sentence and restitution actually imposed by the court at sentencing. The tr ial court sentenced the defendant to serve a prison term of 40 to 120 months for his conv iction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; however, the judgment of sentence indicates that the sentence for th is offense is one to five years. In addition, the judgment of sentence fails to reflect that the trial cour t ordered the defendant to pay restitution of $9,115. The trial court is further ORDERED to ensure that the co rrected judgment of sentence is transmitted to the Department of Corrections. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persua ded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

d0521 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 30, 2007

Clerk
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          11,142
<SECURITIES>                                     6,270
<RECEIVABLES>                                   27,662
<ALLOWANCES>                                       730
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                65,160
<PP&E>                                       1,406,498
<DEPRECIATION>                                 116,953
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,395,232
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          103,126
<BONDS>                                        566,174
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           557
<OTHER-SE>                                     643,920
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,395,232
<SALES>                                        279,320
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               279,320
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  218,551
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              19,383
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 45,541
<INCOME-TAX>                                    17,761
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             27,780
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                      (5,315)
<NET-INCOME>                                    22,465
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .44
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .42


</TABLE>
Amendment No. 3 to 1999 Omnibus Stock Incentive Plan



 Exhibit 10.3 
  
 AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO 
 STANCORP FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 
 1999 OMNIBUS STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN 
  
 In accordance with Section 17 of the StanCorp Financial Group, Inc. 1999 Omnibus Stock
Incentive Plan as amended (the “Plan”), the Board of Directors of StanCorp Financial Group, Inc. (the “Company”) has approved and the Company hereby adopts the following amendment to the Plan: 
  
 Section 7.1.4.6 of the Plan is amended to provide in its entirety as follows: 
  

	 	7.1.4.6 	Termination by Reason of Retirement. Unless otherwise determined by the Board of Directors and except as provided in Section 7.2.6, if an optionee terminates employment by or
service with the Company by reason of “Retirement”, such optionee may exercise his or her option(s) at any time prior to the expiration date of the option(s) or the expiration of 60 months after the date of termination, whichever is the
shorter period, provided that with respect to Incentive Stock Options, the period during which an option may be exercised after the date of retirement shall not exceed that permitted with respect to Incentive Stock Options under the Code.


  
 Dated: February 11, 2002 
  

			
	 STANCORP FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.,
 An Oregon
corporation

		
	By:	 	 /s/ Ronald E. Timpe

	 	 	 Ronald E. Timpe
 Chairman, President and
 Chief Executive Officer