2021 IL App (1st) 191695-U

No. 1-19-1695 

Order filed May 19, 2021 

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RONALD BOUYER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 18 CR 16972

Honorable 

Thomas J. Hennelly, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE MCBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s convictions for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon are affirmed over 

his contention that the State failed to meet its burden to prove he possessed the 

contraband at issue. 

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Ronald Bouyer was found guilty of four counts of 

unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and sentenced to four concurrent terms 

of three years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues, the State failed to prove beyond a 
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reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed the weapons at issue. For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with four counts of UUWF, one count of possession 

with intent to deliver methamphetamine, one count of violation of the Firearm Owner’s 

Identification Card Act, and one count of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The State 

proceeded to trial on the UUWF and possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine counts. 

The four UUWF counts alleged that, on or about September 27, 2018, defendant knowingly 

possessed in his own abode a .38-caliber revolver, a .40-caliber semiautomatic handgun, .38-

caliber ammunition, and .40-caliber ammunition, after having been previously convicted of the 

felony offense of UUWF (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)). The possession with intent to 

deliver methamphetamine count alleged that, on or about September 27, 2018, defendant 

unlawfully and knowingly possessed with intent to deliver less than 5 grams of methamphetamine 

or a substance containing methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1), (2)(A) (West 2018)). 

¶ 4 Former Chicago police officer John Pudowski testified that around 7 p.m. on September 

27, 2018, while working as a Chicago police officer, he executed a search warrant at an apartment 

on the 2300 block of East 70th Place, along with Chicago police officers Kozlowski and Brown. 

Upon entering the apartment, Pudowski observed defendant in a bed in a bedroom, where he just 

woke up. No one else was in the apartment. Defendant was wearing underwear. The officers 

allowed him to put on pants, then detained him as they conducted a systematic search of the 

apartment. Pudowski stood close to defendant while Kozlowski removed a floorboard in the living 

room. Brown and Sergeant Boyle1 were also present. While Kozlowski searched underneath the 

1 Boyle’s first name does not appear in the report of proceedings.
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floorboards, defendant “uttered that there were only two guns down there and nothing else.” 

Weapons and narcotics were recovered in the apartment. 

¶ 5 Pudowski moved defendant to the kitchen and “Mirandize[d]” him in the presence of 

Boyle. Defendant agreed to speak to the officers and “stated that he only had the guns for protection 

because he had gotten shot before and that they were in the location they were because he didn’t 

want his son to get a hold of it.” Pudowski performed a pat-down of defendant, recovering keys to 

the apartment building. Pudowski confirmed that the keys opened the apartment door. 

¶ 6 From the kitchen counter, Pudowski recovered mail labeled “Peoples Gas” addressed to 

defendant at the apartment. Pudowski identified photographs of the “gas bills” he recovered. The 

officers brought defendant to the police station to be processed.

¶ 7 On cross-examination, Pudowski testified that he did not open the gas bills to see the date 

on them. Defense counsel then opened the bills in court. After viewing the bills in court, Pudowski 

stated they were dated July 21, 2015, and July 31, 2015, which was three years prior to the date of 

the search. When asked if Pudowski found any proof of residency within two years of the warrant, 

Pudowski testified, “Just that he told me he lived there.” Pudowski was not wearing a body-worn 

camera on the date of the search. Pudowski identified defendant’s “valid” Illinois identification 

card that listed an address on the 800 block of East 71st Street.

¶ 8 Pudowski recalled seeing children’s clothing in a dining room area, but could not recall 

whether it belonged to a boy or girl. He could not recall whether children’s toys were in the 

apartment, or if defendant’s name was on the apartment’s buzzer. Pudowski testified that 

surveillance was conducted on the apartment before the execution of the search warrant. No 

individuals entered the building during that time, but a woman, who the officers did not speak to, 
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left at one point. Two firearms were found under a floorboard and, without removing the 

floorboards, the firearms were not visible.

¶ 9 Officer Matthew Kozlowski testified that when he searched the living room, he noticed 

that a floorboard was discolored from the rest of the floorboards. He examined the discolored 

floorboard by stepping and walking on it. Kozlowski then stuck a knife between the discolored 

floorboard and an adjoining floorboard, “[a]t which time it was loose and easily popped up.” 

Kozlowski recovered a Smith and Wesson Model 36 revolver from underneath the floorboard. The 

revolver was a .38 Special loaded with four live rounds. From the same compartment, Kozlowski 

also recovered an unloaded Smith and Wesson SD40 and, next to it, a magazine loaded with live

.40-caliber rounds. Kozlowski testified that the magazine would fit the recovered Smith and 

Wesson SD40. 

¶ 10 On cross-examination, Kozlowski testified that defendant was detained approximately 10 

to 12 feet from where the firearms were recovered, but Kozlowski did not hear defendant say 

anything while Kozlowski investigated the floorboards. Kozlowski did not know if the firearms

were checked for fingerprints or DNA evidence.

¶ 11 Officer Daniel Brown testified that upon entering the apartment, defendant was in bed in a 

bedroom in his underwear and appeared to have just woken up. Defendant dressed in pants that 

were in the bedroom and was led to the living room. Brown then searched the “immediate area 

where [defendant] was sitting on the bed” and “went through the entire bedroom.” He recovered 

“a clear knotted bag containing eight smaller bags and each containing a pill,” and a small “bundle” 

of United States currency on a television stand “in plain sight,” and another bundle of United States 

currency on the bed. The bed defendant was sleeping in was one to two feet from the television 
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stand. On cross-examination, Brown testified that he could not recall whether there were women’s 

clothes in the bedroom closet, or whether any pictures were taken of the bedroom closet.

¶ 12 The State entered two stipulations. The first stipulation provided that defendant had a prior 

conviction for UUWF. The second stipulation provided that, if called, a forensic scientist would 

testify that one of the recovered pills tested positive for methamphetamine.

¶ 13 The State also entered several exhibits, including photographs of the bedroom in which 

defendant was sleeping, the discolored floorboard, the weapons recovered under the floor, the keys 

to the apartment found on defendant, and the bills addressed to defendant at the apartment. 

¶ 14 Defendant testified that in September of 2018, he lived on the 800 block of 71st Street, and 

identified his Illinois identification card as accurately indicating his address at that time. Around 

5 p.m. on September 27, 2018, defendant went to an apartment on the 2300 block of 70th Place 

with Jeannette Rush, his on-and-off girlfriend. Rush lived in the apartment and defendant had 

previously been there “a few times.” Defendant believed that, at that time, Rush’s former boyfriend 

lived with her, but Rush’s name was the only name on the apartment’s buzzer. No children lived 

there. When Rush left the apartment around 6:30 p.m., defendant took a nap. 

¶ 15 Defendant awoke to a “loud boom” and went to the front door. Police then kicked in the 

front door, detained defendant, and searched the apartment. Defendant testified the officers 

“destroyed” the apartment and recovered marijuana and a “pill” from in front of the television in 

his room, but “[t]hat was there already.” The officers continuously asked defendant what was there, 

but defendant did not know anything.

¶ 16 One officer walked to the back of the house, got on his cellphone, and when he returned, 

went “directly to the floor.” The officer used a knife to pry open the floorboard, where he recovered 
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a firearm. Officers then retrieved a large tool and “tore the floor up,” finding another firearm. 

Defendant denied telling police that the firearms were his, testifying that he “was just as shocked 

as them.”

¶ 17 On cross-examination, defendant testified he was in an on-and-off relationship with Rush 

for four or five years. He denied ever living at her apartment, but he helped her pay the bills “[a] 

few times.” Defendant testified that he has four children, but does not have any with Rush. 

Defendant admitted he felt comfortable to get in the bed, take off his clothes, and go to sleep. The 

keys defendant had were ones Rush had left him in case he wanted to leave while she was out. 

Defendant denied that the keys were in his pants pocket, stating that they were sitting on the “front 

room table.” 

¶ 18 Defense counsel entered a photograph of defendant’s Illinois identification card, which 

lists an address on the 800 block of 71st Street. 

¶ 19 The trial court acquitted defendant of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, 

finding that while there was evidence that defendant “was in the vicinity of where the narcotics 

were recovered,” there was not “any proof that he resided there other than the fact that he was on 

again and off again with *** Rush.” The court continued, “Other than that, I don’t think there’s 

been a nexus sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to establish that he possessed the amphetamines 

at the time in the apartment and so there will be a finding of not guilty as to that count.”

¶ 20 The trial court found defendant guilty on all counts of UUWF. In ruling, the court stated: 

“as to the remaining counts, ***, it’s a different standard here and that standard is as to 

whether or not I believe the testimony of *** Officer Pudowski, a veteran police officer 

***. He testified clearly and convincingly that after fully advising the defendant of Miranda 
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that the defendant admitted that the guns were his and that he possessed them and 

he possessed them because he had been shot before and that he had kept them under the 

floorboards because he didn’t want his children which he acknowledges he has at some 

point to have them. Now, I realize that he doesn’t reside there *** but it certainly seems 

that he frequents the area and it certainly seems that he and Ms. Rush, at the time, had some 

sort of a relationship that allowed him to come and go at that apartment. He was 

comfortable enough to take a nap in the middle of the day or later in the day and so for all 

those reasons – I’m just deposing the testimony of a veteran police officer against the 

testimony of a convicted felon and I believe that Officer Pudowski told a correct recitation 

of what Mr. Bouyer said after he was fully advised of his Miranda and, for all those reasons, 

there will be a finding of guilty as to Counts 1 through 4 and judgment on the finding.”

¶ 21 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, or in the alternative, for a new trial. At the hearing 

on defendant’s motion, defense counsel argued that the “residency evidence” was insufficient, and 

the court noted that it “kind of agree[d],” which is why it acquitted defendant of the drug charge. 

Defense counsel then argued that defendant’s confession to police was insufficient to prove his 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the statement was “unrecorded” as the officers were not 

wearing body-worn cameras. The State responded that it was the court’s responsibility to assess

credibility. The court held: 

“I remember the case very well, and it really came down to credibility. And, as I indicated, 

I didn’t think the State proved him guilty of the narcotics aspect of the case, but I did 

believe the officer. I found him to be credible. And for all those reasons, there’s nothing in 

your motion that would cause me to disturb that finding. 
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So I believe he said what he said to the officer. I’m not going to disturb my finding. 

So your motion to reconsider or new trial, in the alternative, is considered but is, 

respectfully, denied.” 

¶ 22 Following a hearing, the trial court stated the counts merged, but then sentenced defendant 

to three years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently.

2 The court denied 

defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence.

¶ 23 Defendant argues on appeal that the State failed to prove him guilty of UUWF beyond a 

reasonable doubt as it failed to prove that he constructively possessed the weapons found in Rush’s 

apartment. He points out the only proof of residency was gas bills from three years prior to the 

search, and there was no camera footage to corroborate any alleged incriminating statements he 

made.

¶ 24 A person may not be convicted in state court without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 

every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which he is charged. People v. Spencer, 2012 IL 

App (1st) 102094, ¶ 16. On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction, the 

standard of review is “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 43 

(2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). It is the trier of fact’s 

responsibility to determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts within it, 

and to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Scott, 2020 IL App (1st) 

180200, ¶ 39. All reasonable inferences are allowed in favor of the State, and in determining 

2 The mittimus reflects the four concurrent sentences. 
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whether an inference is reasonable, the trier of fact need not seek out “all possible explanations 

consistent with innocence.” Id. We do not retry the defendant. Id. Thus, “we will not overturn a 

conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it raises a 

reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. 

¶ 25 To sustain a conviction for UUWF, the State was required to prove that defendant

“knowingly possess[ed] on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place 

of business *** any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a felony 

under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018). 

Defendant challenges only the knowing possession element of the offense. He contends that the 

State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had constructive possession of the 

“weapons,” i.e., the firearms and ammunition, recovered from under the floorboard of the 

apartment in which he was found. 

¶ 26 Where the defendant was not found in actual possession of a firearm or ammunition, the 

State must prove the defendant constructively possessed them. People v. Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 

121431, ¶ 10. Constructive possession is proved where the defendant had (1) knowledge of the 

presence of the contraband, and (2) immediate and exclusive control over the area where the 

contraband was found. Id. Knowledge may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, including 

the defendant’s actions, declarations, or other conduct, which indicate that he knew of the 

contraband’s presence in the place it was found. Id. 

¶ 27 Control, on the other hand, is shown where the defendant had the “ ‘intent and capability 

to maintain control and dominion’ ” over the contraband, “even if he lacks personal present 

dominion over it.” Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17 (quoting People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 
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2d 326, 361 (1992)). “Generally, habitation of the location where contraband is found is sufficient 

evidence of control constituting constructive possession.” People v. Terrell, 2017 IL App (1st) 

142726, ¶ 19. “Evidence of residency or habitation often takes the form of rent receipts, utility 

bills, or mail.” People v. Fernandez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141667, ¶ 19. 

¶ 28 In this case, the evidence presented at trial established defendant’s constructive possession 

of the two firearms and corresponding ammunition found underneath a floorboard. Defendant’s 

statements to police demonstrate his knowledge that these weapons were present. While 

Kozlowski was still prying up the discolored living room floorboard, defendant told Pudowski that 

there were “only two guns down there and nothing else.” His statement was corroborated when 

Kozlowski then recovered a loaded firearm and a second firearm with corresponding ammunition 

under the floorboard. After the weapons were recovered and defendant was read the Miranda

warnings, he told the officers he “only had the guns for protection because he had gotten shot 

before and that they were in the location they were because he didn’t want his son to get a hold of 

it.” Thus defendant acknowledged the weapons under the living room floor were his. They were 

well-hidden from view and children’s clothing was seen in the apartment, supporting defendant’s 

statement that he hid his weapons under the floor in order to protect his son from contact with 

those weapons. 

¶ 29 Defendant’s immediate and exclusive control over the weapons is shown by the fact that 

he was in the apartment alone, felt comfortable enough to sleep there in his underwear, and had a 

key to the apartment. He told Pudowski he lived in the apartment, bills addressed to him were 

found in the apartment, and he knew the weapons were underneath the floor even before Kozlowski 

found them, later admitting he had hidden them there. See Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 
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18 (noting that defendant’s statements to police regarding the recovered contraband “linked” him 

to it). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational trier 

of fact could have found that defendant constructively possessed the recovered weapons, and thus, 

that the State met its burden to prove the essential elements of UUWF beyond a reasonable doubt. 

¶ 30 Still, defendant argues the trial court’s guilty findings on the UUWF counts were 

inconsistent with its acquittal on the drug charge because the court found insufficient evidence of 

residency to support the drug charge. We disagree that the findings are inconsistent. In acquitting 

defendant of the drug charge, the court did note that there was not “any proof” that defendant 

resided in the apartment. However, in finding defendant guilty of UUWF, the court also expressly 

recognized the lack of proof of defendant’s residency. Its findings that defendant possessed the 

firearm were premised on defendant frequenting the apartment based on his relationship with 

Rush, the fact that he felt comfortable enough to nap there in the middle of the day, and Pudowski’s 

testimony that defendant admitted the weapons were his; they were not premised on his residency. 

Defendant denied making the statements, but the court stated it believed Pudowski’s testimony 

that defendant admitted that the weapons were his. The testimony of a single witness, if positive 

and credible, is sufficient to convict (People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36), and we defer to the 

court’s credibility determination (see People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114-15 (2007)). 

¶ 31 Defendant contests the credibility of Pudowski’s testimony, emphasizing the fact that his 

statements were not recorded by body camera footage or in reports. He argues defendant’s children 

did not live with Rush and she was not their mother, which contradicted what defendant allegedly 

said to Pudowski about keeping the firearms out of his son’s reach. He also argues there is no 
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physical evidence corroborating defendant’s statements as the weapons were not checked for 

fingerprints or DNA evidence. 

¶ 32 We reiterate that it is the trier of fact’s duty to determine witness credibility. Scott, 2020 

IL App (1st) 180200, ¶ 39. As such, we will not reverse a conviction where a defendant merely 

asserts that a witness is not credible. In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60. The trial court

found Pudowski’s testimony to be credible, and we must defer to that determination. See Wheeler, 

226 Ill. 2d at 114-15. Further, defendant’s initial statement was corroborated when, after he told 

Pudowski there were two firearms under the floor, Kozlowski then recovered two firearms from 

under the floor. Defendant’s second statement that he hid the weapons under the floor to keep them 

from his son was corroborated by the fact that children’s clothes were found in the apartment. 

Because defendant’s statements established his knowledge and control over the recovered 

weapons, the State proved he constructively possessed them as required for a UUWF conviction. 

See Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. 

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 34 Affirmed.