NO. 12-17-00309-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

EX PARTE:

CALEB DALEY

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APPEAL FROM THE 7TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting an expunction of Caleb Daley’s 

arrest for online solicitation of a minor. In a single issue, the State contends the trial court erred 

by granting the expunction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Daley was arrested on October 28, 2010, and subsequently charged with online 

solicitation of a minor that allegedly occurred on or about October 7, 2010. Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Daley pleaded “guilty” and the court sentenced him to ten years deferred adjudication 

community supervision. While Daley was serving his community supervision, the Texas Court 

of Criminal Appeals held that Section 33.021(b) of the Texas Penal Code, the statute applicable 

to Daley’s arrest, was unconstitutionally overbroad. See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013). Daley was subsequently released from the conditions of his community 

supervision and his criminal case was dismissed. 

In May 2017, Daley filed a petition to expunge all criminal records and files relating to 

the October 28, 2010 arrest. In his motion, Daley alleged that he had been released and the 

charge did not result in a final conviction. He further contended that the indictment had been 

dismissed and that his case was vacated, set aside, and any and all orders in the case were 

dismissed. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Daley’s petition. This appeal followed.
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EXPUNCTION

In its only issue, the State contends Daley was not entitled to expunction of his arrest 

record because he served community supervision as a result of the arrest.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s order granting or denying a petition for expunction for abuse of 

discretion. See Heine v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 92 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2002, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts “without reference to any guiding 

rules or principles.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 

1995). If an expunction ruling turns on a question of law, we review it de novo because a “trial 

court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.” See

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). A trial court abuses its discretion if it 

misinterprets or misapplies the law. Id.

Governing Law

Although the law that governs expunctions is part of the code of criminal procedure, an 

expunction proceeding is civil in nature and is governed by the rules of civil procedure. See

Carson v. State, 65 S.W.3d 774, 784 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). Expunction is not 

a constitutional or common law right, but purely a statutory privilege. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety 

v. Nail, 305 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.). The trial court must strictly 

comply with statutory requirements, and has no equitable power to extend the clear meaning of 

the statute. Harris Cty. Dist. Attorney v. Lacafta, 965 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 55.01(a)(2) states, in relevant part, that a 

person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a 

felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if 

(1) the person has been released, (2) the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction, (3) 

the charge, if any, is no longer pending, and (4) there was no court-ordered community 

supervision under Article 42.12 for the offense, unless the offense is a Class C misdemeanor. 

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2) (West 2018). “The traditional and primary 

purpose of the expunction statute is to remove records of wrongful arrests.” S.J. v. State, 438 

S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.). Thus, the expunction statute is “arrestbased” and expunction is not available for less than all offenses arising from one arrest. Id. at 
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844; but see State v. T.S.N., No. 17-0323, 2018 WL 2169785, at *6 (Tex. March 1, 2018) 

(holding that Article 55.01 is not entirely arrest-based but declining to address the specifics of 

55.01(a)(2)); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116, 248, 1110 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an 

“arrest,” in pertinent part, as a “taking or keeping of a person in custody by legal authority, esp. 

in response to a criminal charge,” whereas a “charge” accuses someone of an offense, i.e., a 

“violation of the law”). In other words, a person is not entitled to have any arrest records 

expunged under Article 55.01(a)(2) when a charge is dismissed, but that dismissal results in a 

final conviction of any charge arising from the same arrest. See Tex. Dep’t of Public Safety v. 

G.B.E., 459 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex. App.–Austin 2014, pet. denied); In re A.G., 417 S.W.3d 652, 

655 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (reversing trial court’s grant of expunction of DWI 

charge, concluding petitioner failed to show charge had not resulted in final conviction under 

current version of Article 55.01 because petitioner pleaded guilty to reckless driving).

Analysis

To be entitled to an expunction under Article 55.02(a)(2), Daley had the burden of 

showing all of the following requirements: (1) he had been released; (2) the charge, if any, has 

not resulted in a final conviction; (3) the charge, if any, is no longer pending; and (4) there was 

no court-ordered community supervision for the offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

55.01(a)(2); Ex parte Green, 373 S.W.3d 111, 113 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). 

The State contends that Daley did not meet the fourth requirement for expunction. Specifically, 

the State argues that because Daley served community supervision, he is not entitled to an 

expunction under Article 55.01(a)(2). 

The record shows Daley was arrested on October 28, 2010, and charged with online 

solicitation of a minor. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years of deferred 

adjudication community supervision. It is undisputed, and the record shows, that the October 28, 

2010 arrest resulted in court-ordered community supervision. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. 

Moran, 949 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (deferred adjudication is 

court-ordered community supervision even if defendant not under any court-imposed conditions 

other than paying a fine and court costs). Consequently, it would appear that because the charge 

resulted in community supervision, Daley is not entitled to expunction of any records relating to 

his October 28, 2010 arrest. See Ex parte T.C., No. 12–13–00138–CV, 2014 WL 4104806, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (because court imposed deferred 
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adjudication, T.C. received “court ordered community supervision” under Article 42.12 for 

purposes of expunction statute, and was ineligible for expunction of her theft arrest records); see 

also Nail, 305 S.W.3d at 679–85 (defendant who successfully completed deferred adjudication 

not entitled to expunction).

However, in the trial court, Daley argued that he is entitled to an expunction because his 

case was vacated after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held a portion of the online 

solicitation statute unconstitutional. As a result of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’s 

decision in Ex parte Lo, Daley filed a motion to set aside his case and “vacate any and all 

orders” in his case. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and vacated any and 

all orders in Daley’s online solicitation of a minor case. This necessarily included the order of 

deferred adjudication which placed Daley on community supervision. As a result of the order 

being vacated, it is as if the trial court never ordered Daley to serve community supervision. See 

Vacate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“to nullify or cancel; make void; 

invalidate); Martinez v. State, 194 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th] no pet.) (when 

an original judgment imposing probation is void, there is no judgment imposing community 

supervision and therefore nothing to revoke). Therefore, Daley met all of the requirements of 

Article 55.01(a)(2). See Harris Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. D.W.B., 860 S.W.2d 719, 722 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding that order of deferred adjudication 

declared invalid when habeas relief granted, thus, appellee met all requirements of expunction 

statute).

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted 

Daley’s petition for expunction because the community supervision order was vacated. See id.

We overrule the State’s sole issue.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled the State’s single issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment granting 

expunction of Daley’s October 28, 2010 arrest.

BRIAN HOYLE

Justice

Opinion delivered June 20, 2018.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 20, 2018

NO. 12-17-00309-CV

EX PARTE: CALEB DALEY

Appeal from the 7th District Court 

of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 17-1109-A)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court 

below for observance.

Brian Hoyle, Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.