1

Filed 4/29/22 P. v. Jiron CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(El Dorado)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VINCENT ANGELO JIRON,

Defendant and Appellant.

C094031

(Super. Ct. No. P19CRF0498)

Following three probation violations, the trial court revoked defendant Vincent 

Angelo Jiron’s probation and sentenced him to the midterm of three years. Defendant 

appeals the sentence imposed contending the trial court abused its discretion. 

Specifically, he claims the trial court misunderstood the law when it determined there 

was insufficient time left for defendant to complete rehabilitative programming, given the 

shortened probationary term mandated by Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. 

Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2). We disagree and affirm.
2

BACKGROUND

As the facts of defendant’s convictions and probation violations do not bear on our

decision, they are not recounted here in any detail. In relevant part, defendant pleaded no 

contest to felony assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury and misdemeanor

shoplifting. The court suspended imposition of his sentence and placed him on five years 

of formal probation. One month into probation, the probation department filed a petition 

for revocation of probation alleging defendant’s whereabouts were unknown. Two 

months later, the probation department filed a second petition alleging defendant was 

convicted of vandalism and resisting an officer in Sacramento County. Defendant 

admitted the two probation violations and the court reinstated probation. Later in his first 

year of probation, defendant failed to report to his probation officer on three occasions 

and he was no longer living at his reported address. 

Following these convictions and probation violations, the probation report 

recommended defendant serve 180 days in county jail and participate in a behavioral

modification program. In rejecting the probation report’s recommendation, the court 

noted that “[d]efendant’s performance on probation has been abysmal.” The trial court 

concluded defendant’s recent failures to report coupled with his prior crimes and 

violations while on probation demonstrated that probation would not be beneficial. The 

court also acknowledged that considering Assembly Bill No. 1950, defendant’s five-year 

probation term would be reduced to two years, thus limiting the effectiveness of a

potential 15-month behavioral modification program for a defendant with 13 months 

remaining on probation. Defendant’s probation officer recalled defendant did not want to 

participate in the behavioral modification program. The probation officer also expressed 

uncertainty as to how long it would take defendant to complete the program. The court 

permitted the parties to question the probation officer before proceeding to the statement 

of reasons, but no questions were asked. Once the court stated its reasoning, it asked 
3

whether there was “anything further” from the parties. Defense counsel did not object to 

the sentence or statement of reasons, but instead argued that defendant’s violations were 

the result of behavioral misconduct and thus a modification program was the proper 

remedy. 

The court terminated probation and imposed a three-year prison term. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the court abused its discretion because there was not sufficient 

evidence that defendant could not complete the recommended behavioral modification 

program within the two years of probation authorized by Assembly Bill No. 1950. The 

People answer that the claim is forfeited and, alternatively, the record shows that the 

court appropriately revoked probation given the seriousness of defendant’s offenses and 

violations in a short timeframe. Assuming the claim is not forfeited, we address 

defendant’s claim on the merits.

We review sentencing dispositions for abuse of discretion. (People v. Downey

(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909.) A court may exercise its discretion to revoke probation 

if it has reason to believe defendant has violated the terms of probation or committed 

other offenses. (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a); People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 

437, 443.) Facts supporting probation revocation may be proven by preponderance of the 

evidence. (Rodriguez, at p. 442.) “Only in a very extreme case should an appellate court 

interfere with the discretion of the trial court” in revoking probation. (People v. Lippner

(1933) 219 Cal. 395, 400.)

Generally, a trial court’s failure to exercise discretion may constitute an abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) Indeed, a court unaware of 

its discretionary powers can no better exercise their informed discretion than one whose 

sentence is premised on misinformation. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 

1391.) At sentencing, the court is required to clearly articulate its reasoning for 
4

disposition, which decreases the risk of error and allows the parties to immediately seek 

clarification or modification. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.) 

Defendant’s argument is predicated on the erroneous assumption that the court 

denied him probation because there was insufficient time remaining in his term to 

complete the behavioral modification program within the probationary bounds set by

Assembly Bill No. 1950. The evidence is to the contrary. At the outset, defendant’s 

probation officer stated he did not think defendant “wished” to participate in the 

rehabilitation program. Irrespective of time to complete the program, it is reasonable to 

infer from the stated lack of interest, that the court thought assigning defendant to the 

behavioral modification program was futile. In addition to contemplating the remainder 

of defendant’s probationary term and ability to complete the program, the court relied on 

defendant’s poor probationary performance, including multiple probation violations; each

of which were committed within the first year of probation. Defendant also stood

convicted of vandalism and resisting a peace officer merely three months after beginning 

probation. Each of these facts show that the court considered the totality of defendant’s 

performance on probation, rather than only his ability to complete the behavioral

modification program in Assembly Bill No. 1950’s allotted timeframe. There is nothing 

to demonstrate that the court misunderstood its discretion, failed to provide an adequate 

statement of reasons, or misapplied the law. 

Defendant relies on People v. Zaring (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 362 to do its heavy 

lifting but the case is distinguishable. In Zaring, the defendant arrived 22 minutes late to 

a court appearance because her babysitter unexpectedly got sick and her ride to court had 

to take defendant’s children to school. (Id. at p. 376.) The trial court found that by 

arriving late the defendant willfully violated a condition of her probation and sentenced 

her to prison. (Id. at p. 367.) The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its 

discretion, as it was an isolated, untimely appearance and the violation was not willful, 

but rather the product of “a last minute unforeseen circumstance as well as a parental 
5

responsibility common to virtually every family.” (Id. at p. 379.) As discussed ante, and 

belying a conclusion that his violations were unavoidable or isolated incidents as in 

Zaring, defendant in this case committed additional crimes while on probation. 

Moreover, defendant violated a term of probation when he failed to report to his 

probation officer on three separate occasions. Finally, defendant was no longer living at 

his reported address and for a period of time his whereabouts were unknown. 

Defendant’s reliance on Zaring is misplaced. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

 

HULL, J.

We concur:

 

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

 

HOCH, J.