alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-6014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RAHSAAN JAMAR WATKINS, a/k/a Robert Leon Alexander, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, Chief District Judge. (2:99-cr-00189-2) Submitted: July 22, 2008 Decided: July 25, 2008 Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rahsaan Jamar Watkins, Appellant Pro Se. Kasey Warner, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Rahsaan Jamar Watkins appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress. He also challenges the denial of his second motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. Watkins , No. 2:99-cr-00189-2 (S.D.W. Va. July 5 & Oct. 25, 2007). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
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| (1)   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | Date:  September 28, 2010 | By: /s/ JEFFREY R. SMITH                                             |   |
|--------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |                                | Jeffrey R. Smith, President                                          |   |
|   |                                | (Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial  Officer) |   |
#### Carl D. Traina, Appellant, v Mawby’s Incorporated, Respondent. (Action No. 1.) Carl D. Traina, Appellant, v Mawby’s Inc., Respondent. (Action No. 2.) Patricia Bowman, as Executrix of John Grieco, Deceased, Plaintiff, v Carl Traina, Appellant, et al., Defendants. (Action No. 3.)

Order and judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly declared that the lease between the parties was valid and properly directed plaintiff to comply with the option to purchase contained in the lease. Defendant had the right to exercise the option at any time prior to the expiration of the lease *(see, Masset v Ruh, 235*NY 462) and defendant properly did so on February 27, 1989. Accordingly, defendant was entitled to summary judgment and specific performance against the plaintiff *(see,*74 NY Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 651; *Crocker v Page,*210 App Div 735, 736, *affd*240 NY 638). (Appeal from order and judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Flaherty, J.—declaratory judgment.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Denman, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.
#### Milnor Construction Corp., Appellant, v Board of Education of the City of New York, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Spodek, J.), dated July 1, 1988, which granted the defendant’s motion to change the venue of the action from Kings County to New York County and awarded the defendant costs.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion is denied, and, if the file has been transferred to New York County, the Clerk of the Supreme Court, New York County, is directed to deliver to the Clerk of *283the Supreme Court, Kings County, all papers filed in the action and certified copies of all minutes and entries (CPLR 511 [d]).

The forum clause in the parties’ contract provided, in relevant part, that they had agreed "that any and all claims asserted by or * * * against the City [of New York] arising under this Contract or related thereto shall be heard and determined * * * in the courts of the State of New York * * * located in the City and County of New York”.

In this breach of contract action, the plaintiff Milnor Construction Corp. only named the Board of Education of the City of New York (hereinafter the Board) as a party defendant and set venue in Kings County, the principal location of the Board. The Board successfully moved pursuant to CPLR 501 to change the venue of the action to New York County based upon the forum provision in the parties’ contract. We now reverse.

It is not disputed that the forum provision, as written, only applies to actions where the city is a party. Further, there is no claim by the Board, which drafted the contract, that the clause inadvertently left out reference to actions where the Board and not the city is a party. Rather, the Board merely argues that the clause was intended to cover the situation where it and not the city is a party. However, contrary to the Board’s contention, this intent cannot be ascertained from the record before the Supreme Court, which contains only certain provisions of the parties’ contract. The Board does not contend that the city could not be made a party to an action involving the instant contract. Thus, interpreting the clause as limited to actions against the Board in which the city is also a party does not render it without force or effect *(cf., Reape v New York News,*122 AD2d 29).

Therefore, the Board’s motion to change the venue of this action on the ground of the forum provision in the parties’ contract is denied. Brown, J. P., Lawrence, Kooper and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
#### United States Tube and Iron Company, Appellant, *v.*Maryland Casualty Company.

*Insurance*— Policy *of indemnity*— Satisfaction *of judgment*— Premature *action.*

Where a policy of indemnity contains a provision that no action shall lie against the indemnifying company, unless it shall be brought by the insured himself to reimburse him for loss actually sustained, and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment within sixty days from the date of such judgment, an action brought two days before the satisfaction of a judgment against the plaintiff, is prematurely brought, and the plaintiff cannot recover therein.

Argued Nov. 1, 1907.

Appeal, No. 101, Oct. T., 1907, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., April T., 1905, No. 366, for defendant non obstante veredicto in case of the United States Tube and Iron Company v. Maryland Casualty Company.

Before Fell, Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin and Stewart, JJ.

Affirmed.

Assumpsit on a policy of indemnity.

At the trial it appeared .that a policy of insurance, indemni-. fying the assured against liability for injuries to employees, provided that no action should lie against the instfrance company unless brought within sixty days, after final judgment against the assured and payment and satisfaction of the same upon the record. Judgment was entered against the assured (the plaintiff and appellant in this action), on December 8, 1904. On February 4,1905, and within sixty days from the date of the judgment, suit was brought by the assured against the insurance company, and on February 6, 1905, the judgment satisfied on the record. The court on a reserved question held that the suit was prematurely brought, and for that reason directed judgment to be entered for the defendant.

*Error assigned*was in entering judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto.

*A. C.*Johnston, with him *John F.*Cox, for appellant.

*43
      *O. P. Metcalf,\*with him *William M. Hall,*for appellee.

January 6, 1908 :

Per Curiam,

Judgment was properly entered for the defendant non obstante veredicto for the reason that no cause of action had arisen at the time tbe writ was issued. The policy of indemnity contains a provision that no action shall lie against the company as respects any loss under it unless it shall be brought by the insured himself to reimburse him for loss actually sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment within sixty days from the date of such judgment. This action was brought two days before the satisfaction of the judgment obtained in an action against the plaintiff, and it was prematurely brought.

The judgment is affirmed.
**
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

**Pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906**

**Of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersignedofficers of Rand Capital Corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that: 

TheQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2019 (the “Form 10-Q”) of the Company fully complies with the requirement ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company. 

Dated: May 2, 2019 

 
/s/ Allen F. GrumAllen F. Grum, President(Chief Executive Officer)
Dated:May 2, 2019 

 
/s/ Daniel P. PenberthyDaniel P. Penberthy, Treasurer(Chief Financial Officer)**
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40314 Conference Calendar

MARCO ANTONIO ZAPATA-RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus MICHAEL PURDY, Respondent-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-01-CV-205

-------------------- December 12, 2002 Before JOLLY, JONES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Marco Antonio Zapata-Rodriguez, who was convicted of several drug-related charges, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. He argued that his conviction and sentence were invalid under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, and an Apprendi claim does not satisfy the test for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2241No. 02-40314 -2- petition under the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Wesson v. U.S. Penitentiary, Beaumont, TX , 305 F.3d 343, 347-48 (5th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Dorothy N. McKay, Appellant, v H.I.P. of Greater New York et al., Defendants, and Rochdale Center, Respondent.

In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joy, J.), dated June 24, 1988, which denied her motion for reargument, denominated as, a motion to renew her motion to vacate her default in opposing the motion of the defendant Rochdale Center for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, with costs.

In the instant case, the plaintiff did not proffer any explanation as to her failure to submit an affidavit from a medical expert establishing a meritorious cause of action on her original motion to vacate her default. Therefore, her motion, denominated a motion to renew, is, in actuality, a motion for reargument, and no appeal lies from the denial of that motion *(see, DeFreitas v Board of Educ.,*129 AD2d 672).

While under certain circumstances, a court may, in the exercise of discretion, treat such a motion as a motion to renew despite the fact that movant was aware of the additional facts at the time of the earlier application *(see, Oremland v Miller Minutemen Constr. Corp.,*133 AD2d 816, 818), there were no factors in this case which would suggest that the Supreme Court should have exercised that discretion *(see, McRory v Craft Architectural Metals Corp.,*112 AD2d 358, 359).

In any event, even if the plaintiff might have been entitled to renewal, she would not have been entitled to vacatur of her default. The affidavits of her medical expert were couched in only the most conclusory terms and failed to establish any causal connection between any alleged malpractice and the plaintiff’s injuries. Indeed, they failed to even implicate the defendant Rochdale Center in any of the negligent acts. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to show that her cause of action against Rochdale Center was not time barred by the Statute of Limitations *(see,*CPLR 214-a). Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish that she had a meritorious cause of action, a necessary requirement for vacatur *(see, Cohen v TLC Women's Servs.,*157 AD2d 764). Fiber, J. P., Sullivan, Balletta and Miller, JJ., concur.
FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOE R. TODECHEENE, as the

surviving natural parent of Esther

Todecheene, deceased; MARY No. 02-17048

TODECHEENE, as the surviving  D.C. No. natural parent of Esther

CV-02-01100-PGR Todecheene, deceased,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

NAVAJO NATION DISTRICT COURT;

LEROY S. BEDONIE, The Honorable,

Defendants. 

6669
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOE R. TODECHEENE, as the

surviving natural parent of Esther No. 02-17165

Todecheene, deceased; MARY D.C. No. TODECHEENE, as the surviving  CV-02-01100-PGR natural parent of Esther

Todecheene, deceased, AMENDED

Defendants, ORDER

and

NAVAJO NATION DISTRICT COURT;

LEROY S. BEDONIE, The Honorable,

Defendants-Appellants. 

Filed June 4, 2007

Before: Barry G. Silverman, William A. Fletcher, and

Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The order filed February 1, 2007, is hereby amended. The

entire text shall be replaced with the following text. 

Joe and Mary Todecheene’s Petition for Rehearing is

GRANTED in part. 

The opinion in this case, Ford Motor Company v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) is WITHDRAWN. 

The tribal court did not “plainly” lack jurisdiction under the

second exception, recognized in Montana v. United States,

6670 FORD MOTOR CO. v. TODECHEENE
450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), to the general rule that tribes do not

have jurisdiction over non-members. See Boozer v. Wilder,

381 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring exhaustion

unless the tribal courts plainly lack jurisdiction). As such, the

appeal is stayed until Ford exhausts its appeals in the tribal

courts. The panel retains jurisdiction over the appeal. Ford

will be deemed to have exhausted its tribal remedies once the

Navajo Nation Supreme Court either resolves the jurisdictional issue or denies a petition for discretionary interlocutory

review pursuant to Navajo Nation Code tit. 7, § 303 (“The

Supreme Court [of the Navajo Nation] shall have the power

to issue any writs or orders . . . [t]o prevent or remedy any act

of any Court which is beyond such Court’s jurisdiction.”).

The parties shall notify this court no later than 15 days from

the date the Navajo Nation Supreme Court either denies a

petition for discretionary review, or, if the Navajo Nation

Supreme Court grants such a petition, the issuance of its opinion resolving the jurisdictional question. 

The petitions for rehearing en banc filed by Joe and Mary

Todecheene and the Navajo Nation are DENIED as moot,

and the petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc filed by

Ford Motor Company are DENIED.

FORD MOTOR CO. v. TODECHEENE 6671
PRINTED FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS

BY THOMSON/WEST—SAN FRANCISCO

The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted

© 2007 Thomson/West.
Case 1:05-cv-00211-SM Document 18 Filed 07/25/05 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 05-cr-161-01-SM

Gregory Macey

O R D E R

Defendant Macey’s motion to continue the final pretrial conference and

trial is granted (document 11). Trial has been rescheduled for the February

2006 trial period. Defendant Macey shall file a waiver of speedy trial rights not

later than October 28, 2005. On the filing of such waiver, his continuance shall

be effective. 

The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would

unreasonably deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective

preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence under the

circumstances. 

Final Pretrial Conference: January 30, 2006 at 4:00 p.m.

Jury Selection: February 7, 2006 at 9:30 a.m.

Case 1:05-cr-00161-SM Document 12 Filed 10/20/05 Page 1 of 2
2

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

 Chief Judge

October 20, 2005

cc: Jonathan Saxe, Esq.

Helen Fitzgibbon, AUSA

US Probation

US Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00161-SM Document 12 Filed 10/20/05 Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-2112

BUDI WIJAJA, Petitioner,
versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A78-728-196) Submitted: March 14, 2005 Decided: March 28, 2005 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Howard T. Mei, LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD T. MEI, ESQUIRE, Bethesda, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Assistant Director, Jerome W. MacLaughlin, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Budi Wijaja, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. By prior order, we dismissed the portion of Wijaja’s appeal pertaining to his request for asylum. While we lack jurisdiction to consider the denial of Wijaja’s asylum claim, we retain jurisdiction to consider the denial of his request for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a) (2004). “To qualify for withholding of removal, a petitioner must show that he faces a clear probability of persecution because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Rusu v. INS , 296 F.3d 316, 324 n.13 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing INS v. Stevic , 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)). Based on our review of the record, we find that Wijaja failed to meet these standards. We also find that Wijaja failed to meet the standard for relief under the Convention Against Torture. To obtain such relief, an applicant must “establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed- 3 - country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2 004). We find that Wijaja fails to make the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
107TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 6

JOINT RESOLUTION

Recognizing Commodore John Barry as the first

flag officer of the United States Navy.

107TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 6

JOINT RESOLUTION

Recognizing Commodore John Barry as the first flag officer

of the United States Navy.

Whereas John Barry, American merchant marine captain and

native of County Wexford, Ireland, volunteered his services to the Continental Navy during the American War

for Independence and was assigned by the Continental

Congress as captain of the Lexington, taking command
2

•HJ 6 EH

of that vessel on March 14, 1776, and later participating

in the victorious Trenton campaign;

Whereas the quality and effectiveness of Captain John Barry’s service to the American war effort was recognized

not only by George Washington but also by the enemies

of the new Nation;

Whereas Captain John Barry rejected British General Lord

Howe’s flattering offer to desert Washington and the patriot cause, stating: ‘‘Not the value and command of the

whole British fleet can lure me from the cause of my

country.’’;

Whereas Captain John Barry, while in command of the frigate Alliance, successfully transported French gold to

America to help finance the American War for Independence and also won numerous victories at sea;

Whereas when the First Congress, acting under the new Constitution of the United States, authorized the raising and

construction of the United States Navy, it was to Captain

John Barry that President George Washington turned to

build and lead the new Nation’s infant Navy, the successor to the Continental Navy of the War for Independence;

Whereas Captain John Barry supervised the building of his

flagship, the U.S.S. United States;

Whereas on February 22, 1797, President Washington personally conferred upon Captain John Barry, by and with

the advice and consent of the Senate, the rank of Captain, with ‘‘Commission No. 1’’, United States Navy,

dated June 7, 1794;

Whereas John Barry served as the senior officer of the

United States Navy, with the title of ‘‘Commodore’’ (in
3

•HJ 6 EH

official correspondence), under Presidents Washington,

John Adams, and Jefferson;

Whereas as commander of the first United States naval

squadron under the Constitution of the United States,

which included the U.S.S. Constitution (‘‘Old Ironsides’’),

John Barry was a Commodore, with the right to fly a

broad pendant, which made him a flag officer; and

Whereas in this sense it can be said that Commodore John

Barry was the first flag officer of the United States

Navy: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That Commodore John Barry is recognized, and is hereby

4 honored, as the first flag officer of the United States

5 Navy.

Passed the House of Representatives October 7,

2002.

Attest:

Clerk.