F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A B D A L R A H I M H U S S E I N A L

N A S H I R I , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

B R U C E M A C D O N

A L D ; P A U L O O S T B U R

G S A N Z , Defendant-Appellee

. N o. 12-35475

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05907- RJ B

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the W e stern District of W ashing ton Robert J

. B ry an, Senior District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J une 3, 2013—Seattle, W ashing ton

F iled December 20, 2013

B efore: Arthur L . Alarcón, M. Marg aret McKeown, and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e McKeownA L -N A S H I R I V

. M A C D O

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SUMMARY *

Military Com m issions Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s d i s missal of an action broug ht by a plaintiff non-citiz en “enemy combatant”

c h a lleng ing ong oing proceeding s ag ainst him before a military commission a t the U nited Stat e s Naval B ase in Guantanamo B ay , Cuba.

The p anel held that, pursuant to Hamad v. Gates, 732 F

. 3d 990 (9th C i r

. 2 0 1 3 ), Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2 0 0 6 deprived the district c ourt o f subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, which were non-habeas claims. The panel rejected pla i n t iff’s c laims challeng ing the constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act.

COUNSEL

Michel Paradis (arg

ued), O ffice of the Chief Defense Counsel, W ashing ton, D.C.; R ichard Kammen, Gilroy
, Kammen, Mary an & M oudy
, I ndianapolis, I ndiana; Robert Gombiner, L aw Offices of Robert Gombiner, Seattle, W a shing ton, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

S y d ney F o ster (arg

ued) and Robert M. L oeb, Attorney s, Appellate Staff, and Stuart F

. Delery
, Principal Deputy Assistant A ttorney General, United States Department o f

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.A L -N A S H I R I V

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J ustice, Civil Division, W ashing ton, D .C.; J enny A. Durkan, United States Attorney
, Seattle, W ashing ton, for D efendantAppellee.

J ames J . B rosnahan, Somnath Raj Chatterjee, and Meg an C. Kiefer, Morrison & F oerster L L P, San F rancisco, California, for Amici Curiae Retired M i l i t ary Admirals, Generals, a nd Colonels.

David H. Remes, Appeal for J usti c e , Silver Spring
, Mary land; J o h n T

. Parry
, Portland, Oreg on; W illiam J

. Aceves, San Dieg o, California, for Amicus Curiae Phy sicians for Human Rig hts.

OP INION

McKEOW

N, Circuit J udg e:

Abd Al Rahim Hussein Al-Nashiri is a noncitiz en “enemy comba t a n t” underg oing proceeding s before a military commission at the United States Naval B ase in Guantanamo B ay , Cuba. The charg es ag ainst Al-Nashiri arose f r o m his alleg ed role in three terrorist plots: the 2000 at t e mpted bombing o f t h e U.S.S. The Sullivans ; the 2000 bombing o f the U.S.S. Cole
, which killed seventeen U.S. military personnel; and the 2002 b ombing of the M /V Limburg
, which killed one c ivilian. Al-Nashiri seeks a declaratory

judg ment that the military c o mmission lacks jurisdiction to hear the charg es ag ainst him bec a use the alleg ed acts occurred in Yemen, where he arg ues no war or hostilities ex isted in 2000

or 2002. More specifically
, h e cl a i ms that Vice Admiral B ruce MacDonald (Ret.), then the Convening Authority for the Office of Military Comm i s s i ons, over-stepped hisA L -N A S H I R I V

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authority because “[ t ] h e President and Cong ress u niformly declined to confer [ war-time] status on even t s i n Y emen” during that period. Consistent wi t h o ur recent decision in Hamad v

. Gates
, 732 F .3d 990 ( 9 th Cir. 2013), we hold that S ection 7 of the Military Commissions Act ( “MCA § 7”) o f 2006 deprived the d istrict court o f subject matter jurisdiction over Al-Nashiri’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e).

B A C K G R O U N D

I. M I L I T A R

Y C O M M I S S I O N A U T H O R I T Y

C o ng ress, by authoriz ing the use of military fo r c e following th e September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, g ave the President the power t o detain certain individuals as a “fundamental and accepted

. . . incident to war.” Boumediene

v

. Bush
, 5 53 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
, 5 42 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) ( p l urality o pinion)). Shortly thereafter, President B ush issued an or der providing for military commission trials of noncitiz ens he h ad reason to believe had been or currently were membe r s o f al-Qaida o r had otherwise p articipated in terrorist a ctivities directed a t the United States. Detention, Treatmen t , a n d Trial of Certain Non-Citiz e ns i n the W ar Ag ainst Terrorism, 66 F ed. Reg

. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). A 2004 D epartment of Defense order creat e d t h e Combatant Status Review Tribunal to determine whether the Ex e cutive B ranch had properly de s ig nated n oncitiz en detainees as “ e nemy combatants.” Memorandum from Deput y S e cretary of Defense Paul W o lfowitz re O rder Establishing Combatant S t a t us Review T r i b u n a l § a ( J u l y 7
, 2 0 0 4 )
, a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p : / / w w w

. d e f e n s e

. g o v / n e w s / J u l 2 0 0 4 / d 2 0 0 4 0 7 0 7 r e v i e w

. p d f

. Absent such a desig nation, military commissions lack

a u t h o rity over detainees. 10 U.S.C. § 948b (providing t h atA L -N A S H I R I V

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the MCA’s p urpose is t o “establish[ ] procedures g overning the use of military c ommissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants eng ag e d in hostilities ag a inst the United States”); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (stating that

“ a citiz e n held in the United States as an enemy c omb a t a n t [ must] be g iven a meaning ful opp ortunity to contest the factual basis fo r t hat detention,” i.e. his desig nation as an enemy combatant).

A f ter leg al challeng es on multiple fronts, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
, the Supreme Court invalidated, as violations o f the Uniform Code of Military J u stice and t h e G eneva C onventions, a number of the commission procedu r e s authoriz ed by statute and ex ecutive order. 548 U.S. 5 57, 625 (2006). I n respons e to Hamdan
, Cong ress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Pub. L

. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (“2006 MCA ” )
, 2 8 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006); see Boumediene
, 553 U.S. at 735. The 2006 MCA authoriz ed trial by military c ommission fo r “alien unlawful
enemy combatant[ s] .” 2006 MCA § 3.

I n 2 009, Cong ress larg ely superseded the 2006 MCA a nd provided detainees certain additional procedural safeg uards. Military Commissions Act of 2 009, Pub. L

. No. 111–84, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009) (“2009 MCA”), 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a et seq

. Relevant to these proceeding s, the 2009 MCA authoriz ed the President to establish military commissions to t ry “alien unprivileg ed en e m y bellig erents,” a s opposed to the earlier desig nation, “enemy c ombatants,” for violations of the law o f

war and other offenses triable by military c o m m issions. 10 U.S.C. §§ 9 48b(a)–(b), 9 4 8 c

. The offenses specified in the 2009 MCA are “triable by military commission

. . . only if the offense is c ommitted in the co n t e x t of a nd associated with h o s t i l i ties.” Id. § 950p(c). Under the 2009 MCA,A L -N A S H I R I V

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hostilities are “any c o n flict subject to the laws o f war.” Id. § 948a(9).

II. A L -N A S H I R

I ’ S P R O C E E D I N G S 1

Al-Nashiri
, a Saudi national, was a rrested in Dubai in 2002 and held in U

. S

. c u s tody

. I n September 2006, AlNashiri was transferred to G uantanamo B a y , where he remains in detention. The f ollowing y ear, a Combatant Status Review Tribunal determined that Al-Nashiri was an “enemy combatant.” 2 C h arg es ag ainst Al-Nashiri alleg ing n ine violations of the MCA were referre d t o the Military Commission Convening Authority in 2011. The charg e s included the thre e re ferenced al-Qaida terrorist p lots, conspiring with Osama b i n L aden and others between 1996 and 2002 to “commit Terrorism a n d Murder in Violation o f the L aw of W ar,” and other related charg es.

F ollowing referral of these charg es, Al

- Nashiri formally requested that Mac D o nald not convene a military commission. Al-Nashiri p rincipally arg ued that the commission could not try him f o r the alleg ed o ffenses because they “did not occur in the contex t o f and were not associated with hostilities

. ” This arg ument was based on a statement by President Clinton in response to the U.S.S. Cole bombing sug g esting that it was a peacetime at t a ck; Cong r ess’s failure to dec l ar e war o r pass any other

1 In rev iew in g d e n o v o th e g o v ern m en t’ s m o tio n t o d ism iss, w e accep t

as tru e th e f

actu al alleg atio n s in A l- Nash iri’ s C o m p lain t. See Ash cro

ft v. Iq b a l , 5 5 6 U.S. 6 6 2 , 6 7 8 (2 0 0 9 ).

2 Un d er th e 2 0 0 9 MCA
, A l- Nash iri i s n o w classif ied as an “ alien

u n p riv i leg ed en em

y b ellig eren t.” 1 0 U.S.C. § 9 4 8 c.A L -N A S H I R I V

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authoriz ation for the use of military f o r ce in response to the U.S.S. Cole bombing ; President B ush’s failure to certify the

ex istence of hostilities in Yemen until his W a r Powers Resolution report to Cong ress in September 2003; and the f a c t that Cong ress first r ecog niz ed an armed conflict i n Yemen in a 2009 Senate resolution. 3

MacDonald issued orders convening a commission to try Al-Nashiri for the charg es associated w ith the three terrorist plots. I n response, Al-Nashi r i filed suit in the W estern District of W ashing ton naming MacDonald, the sole defendant, in his individual capacity

. The Complaint alleg e s that MacDonald’s military c ommission referral v iolated 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c); Article I I I § 2 of the Constitution; a nd the F ifth, Six th, and Eig hth Amendments because the alleg ed offenses did n o t “ o c cur,” as a matter o f law, “in the c ontex t of and [ w e r e] not associated with h ostilities.” He requested

a declaratory judg ment stating that “neither the President nor Cong r ess certified the e x istence of an armed conflict subject
to the laws of war in Yemen prior to Septe m ber 2003” a nd

3 S ee , e.g

. , Th e Presid

en t’s Ra d io Ad

dress
, 3 6 W eek ly Co m

p

. P res. Do c. 2 1 7 6
, 21 7 7 (Oct. 1 4
, 2 0 0 0) (co n tain in g P resid e n t C l in to n ’ s rem ark s in
resp on s e to th e U .S.S. Co le b o m b i n g in w h ich h e stated th at “ ev en

w h en A m erica is n o t at w ar, th e m en an d w o m en o f o u r m ilitary risk th eir liv es

ev ery d ay ” an d th at “ [n ]o o n e s h o u ld th in k f o r a m o m en t th at th e stren g th

o f o u r m ilitary is less im p o rtan t in tim es o f p eace”); Letter t o Co n gressio na l Lea ders Rep o rtin g o n E f f o r t s in th e Glo b al W

a r o n T e r ro rism
, 3 9 W eek ly Co m p

. P res. Do c. 1 24 7
, 1 2 4 7 (Sep t. 19
, 2 0 0 3 ) (p ro v id in g P resid en t B u s h ’ s 2 0 0 3 W ar Po w ers Reso lu tio n rep o rt to Co n g ress in w

h ich h e s tated th at th e Un ited States h ad u n d e r t a ken

“ m ilitary o p eratio n s ag ain st al- Q aid a an d o th er in tern atio n al terro rists in th e Ho rn o f

A f rica reg io n , in clu din g Yem en ”); S. Res. 3 4 1, 1 1 1 t h Co n g

. (2 0 0 9) (en acted ) (ex p ressin g co n cern ab o u t co n f lict b etw een reb el f

o rces

an d th e Go v ern m en t o f Y e m e n resu ltin g in civ i lian d isp lacem en t “ sin ce 2 0 0 4 ”).A L -N A S H I R I V

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that MacDonald “acted bey ond his authority and in violation of the constitution by issuing ord ers to convene a military commission w ith the power to r ecommend the s e n t e nce o f death for alleg ations r elating to” the three bombing incidents.

The district court dismissed Al-Nashiri’s suit for lack o f subject matter jurisdiction on the g rounds that MCA § 7 a nd sovereig n immunity barred the claims. I n the alternative, the court reasoned that even if it had subject matter jurisdiction, principles of restraint ar t i c u lated in Schlesinger v

. Councilman
, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), counseled in favor of the court’s abstention from ex ercising equitable jurisdiction.

D ISCUSSION

I. M I L I T A R

Y C O M M I S S I O N S A C T § 7

W e first c onsider the threshold question of whether MCA § 7 s t r i pped the district c o urt of subject matter jurisdiction over Al-Nashiri’s a ction. The answer, according to Hamad
, is y e s.

Section 7 of the Military

Commissions Act provides:

(1) No court, justice, or jud g e shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider a n application for a writ o f habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained b y the United States w ho has been determined by the United States to have been properly d etaine d a s an enemy c ombatant or is awaiting such determination.A L -N A S H I R I V

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(2) Ex cept as provided in par a gr a phs (2) a nd ( 3 ) of section 1005(e) of the Detain e e Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note),

n o c ourt, justice, or judg e shall have jur i s d iction to hear or consider any other action ag ainst the Uni t ed S tates or its ag ents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or c onditions o f confinement of an alien w ho is o r wa s detained by the U nited States an d has been determined by the United States to have been properly d etained as a

n enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.

28 U.S.C. § 2241(e).

Subsection (1) is not a

pplicable because Al-Nashiri is not seeking a w rit of habeas corpus. Subsec tion (2), however, plainly applies to Al-Nashiri’s action. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Se r vs., Inc.
, 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (“Statutory construction must b eg in w ith the lang uag e employ ed b y Cong r ess and the assumption that the o rdinary me a n ing o f that lang uag e accurately e x presses the leg islative purpose.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To beg in, Al-Nashiri seeks equitable relief based upon a non-habeas action ag ainst

an ag ent of the United States, MacDonald as t h e Convening Authority

. Al-Nashiri, a Saudi national, does not contest his desig nation as an “enemy combatant.” I n stead, he c halleng e s the g o vernment’s authority to proceed w i t h his military commission trial, arg uing that the alleg ed o ffenses did not

occur in the cont ex t of hostilities. F inally
, Al-Nashiri does
not fall under any of the e x ceptions in subsection (2) permitting c ourts to hear c ertain cases under the Detainee Treatment Act. S

ee Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L

.A L -N A S H I R I V

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No. 109

– 1 4 8
, d i v. A
, title X, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680 (providing the D.C. Circuit with jurisdiction over limit ed challeng es, such as contesting combatant st a t u s r eview

s t andards and procedures and f inal decisions of a mili t a r y commission). B a sed on the a lleg ations in the Complaint a nd under the plain terms of § 2241(e)(2), MCA § 7 bars the district court f

rom ex ercising jurisdiction over Al-Nashiri’s claims.

Re c og niz ing the difficulty of overcoming the plain lang uag e of MCA § 7, Al-Nashiri nonetheless arg ues that MCA § 7 did not strip the district court of su b j e c t matter jurisdiction because the Supreme Court in Boumediene struck down MCA § 7 in its entirety
, MCA § 7 does not apply to the claims in this suit, and MCA § 7 is unconstitutional. 4

A. M I L I T A R

Y C O M M I S S I O N S A C T § 7 A F T E R B O U M E D I E N E

I n B o u m e d iene
, the Supreme Court held that MCA § 7 “operate[ d] as an unconstitutional suspension of the w rit” o f ha b eas corpus for military d etainees held in Guantanamo B ay

. 5 53 U.S. at 733. A c c o r d i n g to the Court, the Suspension Clause had “full effect at Guantanamo B ay ” a nd MCA § 7 did not “purport to b e a formal susp e n s ion of the writ.” I d. at 7 71. I n so holding
, the Court did not specify that

a particular subsection of MCA § 7 was unconstitutional. Id.

4 In lig h t o f o u r d e c i s i o n , w e n eed n o t reach A l- Nash iri’ s o th er arg u m en ts reg ard in g ab sten tio n u n d er Sch lesin g er v. Co u n c i lma n or

w h eth er MacDo n ald can assert so v ereig n im m u n ity

. S ee S i n och em In t’l Co

. Ltd

. v. Ma la ysia In t’l S

h ip p in g Co rp

. , 5 4 9 U.S. 4 2 2
, 4 3 1 (2 0 0 7 ) (“ [A ] f ed eral co u rt h as l eew ay to ch o ose am o n g t h resh o ld g ro u n d s f

o r d en y in g

au d ien ce to a case o n

th e m erits.” (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s an d citatio n

o m itted )).A L -N A S H I R I V

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at 795. The Court of A ppeals for the D .C. Circuit later held that Boumediene “applied only to the strippi n g o f h abeas jurisdiction,” the first section of the statute, leaving in force § 2241(e)(2). Al-Zahra n i v

. Rodriguez
, 669 F .3d 315, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

I n Hamad , we ag reed with the D.C. Circuit, holding that “the log ic and contex t of [ Boumediene ] make clear that the Supreme Court was addressing only § 2241(e)(1).” 732 F .3d
at 1000. Reasoning that “§ 2 241(e)(2) is capable o f ‘functioning independ ently ,’ and is consistent with Cong r ess’s basic objectives in enactin g t h e MCA,” we concluded that § 2241(e)(2) is severable from § 2241(e)(1) and “remains in e ffect, provided that it is constitutional.” Id.
at 1003. Hamad f

o r ecloses Al-Nashiri’s arg ument that Boumediene struck down MCA § 7 as a whole.

B. A P P L I C A B I L I T Y O F MCA § 7 T O T H I S S U I T

Even if MCA § 7 survives Boumediene
, Al-Nashiri arg ues that MCA § 7 does not apply to this suit for three reasons: he is suing MacDonald “in his individua l capacity ,” not as an “ag ent” of the United States; he is not objecting to “any aspect of

. . . trial,” but rather t o t h e c r e ation of the military commission itself; and the leg isl a t i ve history of the 2009 MCA c ounsels ag ainst reading MCA § 7 to apply to his suit. W e disag ree.

W e are unpersuaded by Al-Nashiri’s claim that his suit is
ag ainst MacDonald as an individual a nd not as an ag ent of the United States in his official capacity

. The la n gu ag e of the Complaint belies this as s e rtion. T he declaratory relief that Al-Nashiri seeks is only m e a ning ful if it binds the U.S.
g overnm e n t a

nd its ag e nts. He seeks a declaration thatA L -N A S H I R I V

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“neither the President nor Cong ress certified the ex istence o f

an armed c onflict subject to the l a w s o f war in Y emen prior
to September 2003” a

n d that MacDonald “acted bey o nd his authority and in v iolation of the constitution by issuing orders
to convene a military commi ssion w ith the power to recommend the sentence of death for alleg ations relating to” the three bombing incidents. This requested re l i e f is aimed either at invalidating the referral order or convincing the Convening Aut h o r i t y that it does not have jurisdiction over Al-Nashiri, and would be futile i f n ot directed “ag ainst the United States or its ag ents” within the meaning of MCA § 7. Cf. W olfe v. Strankman
, 392 F .3d 358, 3 67 n.2 ( 9th Cir. 2 004) (holding in a 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 action that the plaintiff soug ht declaratory and injunctive relief only available ag ainst defendants in their official capacities).

B e cause this is a

n official capa c i t y suit, we g rant the
g overnment’s motion to substitute MacDonald w i t h Paul Oostburg Sanz
, who replaced MacDonald as the Co n v e ning A u thority in March 2013. See F ed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) (“W hen a public officer w ho is a p arty to an appeal

. . . in an official capacity

. . . ceases to hold office

. . . [ t ] h e public officer’s successor is automat ically substituted a s a party .”).

Al-Nashiri’s c itation to Larson v. D o m e s tic & F o reign Commerce Corporation
, 337 U .S. 682 (1949), is unavailing

. I n Larson
, the Supreme Court held that soverei g n immunity does not b ar suit f

or specific relief ag ainst a g overnment official when, for ex a mple, the off i c i a l purports to act as an individual and acts ultra v i r e s , or if the official commits an unconstitutional act because th e “statute or order conferring
power upon the officer to take action

. . . i s claimed to be

un co n s t i t u t ional.” Id

. at 689–90. Not only is MCA § 7 constitutional, the only action MacDonald to o k—issuingA L -N A S H I R I V

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orders to c onvene a military commission—was in his official capacity

. Cong ress also impliedly s o ug ht to limit judicial review here by

enactingan alternative remedial scheme. As the Supreme Court e x plained, “[ individual] relief c an b e g ranted, without impleading the sovereig n, only becau s e o f the officer’s lack of deleg ated power. A claim of error in the

ex e r cise of that power is therefore not sufficient.” Id. at 690. Al-Nashiri cannot simply convert his suit t o an “ individual” action by i n voking that mag ic word in his Complaint. W e need not add ress whether his suit is barred by sovereig n immunit y because it falls squarely within the jurisdictionstripping provisions of MCA § 7.

Al-Nashiri’s effort to sidestep the jurisdictional bar on the
g round that he is not objecting to the creation of the military commission itself fares no better. H e urg es that his challeng e to the military commission’s a ut h o ri t y over the charg e s ag ainst h im d oes not constitute “any aspect of

. . . trial.” The broad phrase—“relating to any aspect o f

. . . trial”—naturally includes the threshold question whether th e t ribunal has jurisdi ct ion over the parties and c laims. MCA § 7(2). In d e e d
, C o n gr e s s e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d t h e m i l i t a r y commissions with this authority
, stating t h a t a “military commission is a c ompetent tribunal to make a finding sufficient for jurisdiction.” 10 U.S.C. § 948d. W e note that after briefing in this appeal, the Military Commissions Trial J udiciary
, Guantanamo B ay , Cuba, d enied without prejudice Al-Nashiri’s motion to dismiss b ased o n his claim that the Convening Authority ex ceeded his a uthority

. Order, No. AE104 F (J an. 13
, 2 0 13). The military judg e h eld that ‘[ w] hether hostilities ex isted between Al Qaeda and the United States on the dat e s o f t h e accused’s alleg e d a cts is a qu es t i o n of fact and an element of p roof, which must be carried b y the g overnment.” Order at 5. The tribunal f urtherA L -N A S H I R I V

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held that, as a matter of law, it owed “ j u d i ci a l deference” to the p olitical branches’ collective determination as to t he

ex istence of hostilities. Ord er at 6.

A l

- N ashiri also points to the leg islative history of t h e 2 0 0 9 MCA, claiming that it u ndermines the application of MCA § 7 to his claims. The 2009 MC A o m i t s 10 U .S.C. § 950j(b), a statutory provision from the 2 0 0 6 M C A that barred co u rts from hearing “any claim or cause of action whatsoever

. . . relating to the p rosecution, trial, or judg ment of a mi l i tary commission.” Al-Nashiri thus arg ues that, in effectively repealing this provision, Cong ress could not have inten d e d to maintain such broad jurisdiction-stripping lang uag e in MCA § 7 for non-habeas claims.

W e r eturn to the “plain la n guag e of the statute, which controls unless its application l e ad s to unreasonable o r impracticable results.” Valladolid v

. P a c

. Operations Offshore, LLP
, 604 F .3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed ab o v e , t he plain lang uag e of MCA § 7 controls—all judicia l j u r isdiction is barred for a non-habeas action. T his result is both reasonable and p r a c t i cable. The h istory of § 950j(b) points to no

ex c e ption for non-habeas claims. Nor w as the section sing led
out for omission. R a ther, Cong ress replaced the entire chapter of which it was a part. See Pub. L

. No. 111–84, div. A, tit. XVI I I
, § 1802, 123 Stat. at 2574–612. I t revised the lang uag e g overning military comm i s s ions and g ranted the D.C. Circuit ex clusive a

u thority to “determine the v alidity o f

a final judg ment rendered by a military commission” when other review procedures had been ex hausted. 10 U .S.C. § 950g (a). Nothing in the tex t sug g ests that Cong ress intended to ex empt non-habeas claims from the requirements of MCA § 7.A L -N A S H I R I V

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C. C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I T Y O F MCA § 7

Al-Nashiri also claims that MCA § 7 violates his rig ht to equal protection under the F ifth A mendment 5 and constitutes a bill of attainder. B o th arg uments were rejected in Hamad
, where we held that “Cong ress’s decision in § 2241(e) ( 2 ) t o preclude only alien detainees captured as part o f the war on terror from brin gi ng damag es actions easily passes rational basis rev i e w

. ” 732 F .3d at 1006. W e concluded that the classification served a “leg itimate foreig n policy c oncern[ ] b y ensuring that m e m b e rs o f the armed forces are not unduly chilled in conducting the war on terror by concerns about f o r eig n nationals targ eting them with damag es c laims.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Hamad also addressed an identical b i l l o f attainder challen ge

. Our rejection was swift: § 7 does not v iolate the B ill of Attainder Clause, U.S. Const. art. I
, § 9, cl. 3, “because it does not inflict leg islative p u n i shment” a s hi s t o r i cally u nderstood. Hamad
, 732 F .3d a t 1004. “Cong ress enacted § 2 241(e) to limit and chan n e l federal
court r eview of detention and military c ommission d ecisions,

5 A l th ou g h A l- Nash iri did n o t raise th is Fif th A m en d m en t arg u m en t in th e d i st r i c t c o u rt, w e co n sid er it h ere b ecau se it is a qu estio n o f law th at easily is d i sp o sed o f b y Ha ma d. Un ited S ta tes v. Flo res-Mo n ta n o , 4 2 4 F.3 d 10 4 4
, 1 0 4 7 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 05 ) (“ W h ile issu e s n o t raised to th e d istrict co u r t n o rm ally are d eem ed w aiv ed
, w e h av e reco g n ized th ree

n arro w ex cep t io n s to th is g en eral ru le, ” in clu d in g w h ere “ t h e issu e p resen t ed is pu rely o n e o f law an d th e o p p o sin g p arty w ill su f f e r n o p rej u d ice as a resu lt of th e f ailu re to raise t h e i s s u e i n th e t rial co u rt”) (in t ern al q u o tatio n

m ark s o m i tted )).A L -N A S H I R I V

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not to impose any particular punishment on m i l i tary detainees.” Id.

AF F IRMED.