The Honor able Ave rn Cohn, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0576n.06 No. 07-6315 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

RO DN EY M AY S, Pe tit ion e r-

Ap pe lla nt,

v. LA RR Y C HA ND LER , W ar de n, Respondent-

Appellee

.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appea l from the United States District Court for the Easter n District of Ke ntucky

BEFORE: COLE an d COOK, Circ uit Jud ges; COHN, Distr ict Judge. * COHN, District

Judge. T h i s i s a

h a b e a s c a s e u n d e r

2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 2 5 4

. A C l ay C o u n t y, Kentucky , g rand jury indicted Petitioner-Appellant Rodney May s (Appellant) and Dona ld Sim mons for the shooting murder of Curtis S mith. T h ey we re t ri ed toge ther to a jury . Appellant wa s convicted a s the principal a ctor in Smith’s death and sente nced to life imprisonment. Simmons was convicted of

acc omplice liability

and sente nced to twe nty

y ear s in prison. Appellant cha lleng es Respondent-A ppellee L arr

y Chandler, Wa

r d e n ( A p p ellee) , on the three issues identified in Part I . The district cour t denied re l i ef o n al l i s s u es. As explained below, we AF F I RM. I. ISS UES ON APP EAL Ap pe lla nt r a ise s th re e iss ue s o n a pp e a l:Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

Remm er v. U

nited States , 347 U.S. 227 (1954). 1 - 2 - (1) Whether t he Kentucky Supreme Court’s holding on direc t appea l that the trial court did not err

in fail i n g t o conduct a Remm er hear ing a fter c ounsel for 1 Appellant informe d t h e judge that a juror ha d unauthorized communication wi th S mith’ s mo the r d

ur ingtr ia l is c on tr ary

to a nd /or an unrea so na

ble application of c lear ly

established fe dera l law; (2) Whether the Ke ntucky Court of Appeal ’s h o lding on c ollatera l appea l that Appellant wa s not preju d i ced by his trial counsel’s fa ilure to object to a detec tive’s testimony

that he believe d Simm ons’s v ersion of e vents over Ap pe lla nt’ s is c on tr ary

to a nd /or an unr e a so na

ble app li c a tio n o f c le arl y established fe dera l law; and (3) Whether the Ke ntucky Supreme Court’s h o l d ing on dir ect a ppeal that the Appellant wa s not prejudiced by the prosec utor’s re fer ring to him as a “lowlife c ow ard ” duri ngc los ingarguments is c on tr ary to a nd /or an unr e a so na

ble application of c lear ly

established fe dera l law. II. F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY A. The sho ot ing T h e a c c o u n to f

t h e s h o o t i n g i s a d a

p t e d f r o m t h e K e n tu c ky S u p r e m e C o u rt ’ s s u m m a r y,

su pp le me nte d b y

oth e r p art s o f t

he re c or d. On

the e ve nin g of

F e br uary 6, 19 97 , App e lla

nt, Simm on s, and

Smith w e nt to B ri tto n B ra nc h, a re mot e se c tio n o f C lay

County , w he re the y

bu ilt a fire a nd drank a lcohol. Shortly there afte r, S mith was shot and killed. The police found his body the following day

and questioned A

ppellant and Simmons about the death. B oth told the police that they left Smith on t he side of the road on the way to Britton B ranc h and had not se en him ag ain. One y ear later, on Fe bruar

y 26, 1998, while in jail for driving under the influence , Simm ons contac ted the police and g ave the m a re corde d statement of his ver sion of what happe ned to Smith. Si mm o n s s a id

h e , A p p e ll an t, an d Sm it

h h a d b e e n dr iv in g ar o u n d w h il e dr in k in g an d ta k in g X a n a x.Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

Simm on s to ld t

he po lic e he did

no t be lie ve Ap pe lla

nt. 2 - 3 - Th e y sto pp ed at Ste vie Col lin s’ s g a me ro om. Ap pe lla nt w e nt i ns ide wh ile Simm on s a nd Smith

wa ite d in the c ar. Up on

Ap pe lla nt’ s r e tur n, the thr e e dr ov e to a h ou se wh e re the y kn e w the y

c ou ld purcha se m ore liquor and drug s. As they wer e wa lking towa

rd the house, A

ppellant told Sim mons that Colli ns had off

ere d to pay

him $5,000 to kil l Smit h. There afte r, t he three m en went to Britton 2 Br anch. After building a fire by the roa d, Appellant we nt to the car and turne d on some music. When he re turned, he stood dire ctly behind Smit h, shot him i n the bac k of the he ad, and the n fired t h e r e m a i n i n g r o un d s f

r o m t h e g u ni n t o S m i t h ’ s b o dy. Ac c or din g to S imm on s, Ap pe lla nt the n re loa de d the pis tol and fo rc e d h im at g un

po int to h e lp

remove and destroy

some of Smith’s clothing and thr ow Smit h’s body over a hill. The two men then

re tur ne d to Col lin s’ s g a me ro om w he re Ap pe lla nt co lle c te d $5, 00 0, g a ve Simm on s $ 1, 00 0, and tol d him what he should tell the police if he was que stioned. On A p ri l 7 , 1998, the police inter rog ated Appe llant, who g ave a differ ent ver sion of the

e ve nts . In a re c or de d sta te me nt, Ap pe lla nt ad mit te d tha t Colli ns ha d off e re d to pay him

$5 ,0 00 to kill S mith. I nitially

Appellant agr eed, and Collins gave him a g un. Appellant said he then cha ng ed his min d, and

Col lin s th e n thr e a te ne d to kil l him

. Ap pe lla nt fu rt he r c la ime d that be fo re the dr ive to B ri tto n B ra

nc h h e tol d Si mmo ns a

bo ut h is c on ve rs a tio n w ithCol lin s. At this point the stories diverg ed. Appellant told the police that Simmons shot S mith, then g ave the g un to Appellant and or d ere d him to shoot Smit h as we ll. Appellant denied throw ingMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 4 - Smit h’s body

over the hill. Accordingto Appellant , h e an d Simm ons returne d to the g ame r oom wher e Appe llant collected the $5,000 and g ave Simmons $2,000. Appellant told a diffe rent story at trial. He testified that Simmons and Smith had been

arguin g thr ou gh ou t th e nig ht. Ac c or din g to A pp e lla nt, Simm on s h a d b e e n h a vin g an a ff a ir wi th Smit h’s wife and wa s ang ry at Smith for having hit her; further, Sm ith owed Si mmons a substantial

su m of mon e y . App e lla

nt s a id t hat a ft er th e th ree arri ved a t B ri tto n B ra

nc h, he we nt t o th e c a r t o play some music. He he ard gun shots and when h e returne d he found Smith slumped over dea d. Simm ons then forc ed Appellant to shoot Smith’s dead body and thre atene d him not to t ell the police. B. The trial 1. Juror contact with Smith’s mother During trial, the following colloquy took place at the bench: [Ap pe lla nt’ s C ou ns el] : B e fo re we g e t st art e d o n s ome thi nge lse . I t’ s c ome to my a tte nti on tha t the re wa s a con ve rs a tio n in the ha llw ay be tw e e n th e la dy

y ou jus t spoke to [juror] and the blond heade d lady and the two women in the re d back the re in the back. I

believe one of them is Mr. Smith’s mot her. [P rosec utor]: W ho . . .? [Appellant’s Counsel] : T he blond he aded lady that just spoke up a nd the two ladies there dresse d in red. By the Court: I ’ll inquire into that at some point in ti me. L et’s proc eed. Th e c ourt ne ve r a dd

re sse d th e iss ue a g a in d

ur ingtr ia l. 2. Detec tive Hopk

ins’s testimony Detec tive Hopkins testified that he be lieved Simmons’s 1998 account of w hat had happene d:Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 5 -

Q: So y ou felt at that point, reg ardle ss of the statement he ’d g iven y ou back F ebrua

ry 7th [ 1997], y ou felt he w as telling y ou the truth now, is that c or re c t? A: Th a t’ s r ig ht.

. . . . Q: Now, whe n he made the pre rec orded state ment to y ou on Fe bruar y 26th, the one that led you to make the tape rec orded state ment, did y ou fee l that he wa s b e inge va siv e a t th a t po int ? A: No. Q: When he g ave you the tape r ecor ded stateme nt itself, did y ou fee l he wa s b ei n g ev as i v e ab o u tan y t h i n g? A : N o , n o tr e a l l y.

. . . . Q: And y ou felt he w as telling y ou the truth? A: Idid. Detec tive Hopkins then testified that he be lieved Appe llant was not being truthful in his 1998 state me nt: Q: During the time that y ou actua lly rec orded the statement, y ou continually

asked Ma

y s we just want y ou to be honest; we just want you to tell the tr uth . Wh y did y ou ke e p a sk inghim

that or te lli nghim

that. A: Well, jus t to, just to impress upon him that’s what we w ant, g ood or bad, y ou know I

don’t ca re w hat it is, just tell us the truth; that’s what we de al with. We deal with the truth. Q: And when you would say this to hi m during those times, did y ou fee l that some of the state ments he wa s g iving you wer e still not t he truth? A: Som e tim e s.Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 6 -

Q: Okay did y ou fee l when he w as telling y ou he didn’t have any memory of what was g oing on, the y just went out there, ne x t thing he know s they are back a t Ste vie Col lin s’ po ol h a ll that th a t w a sn ’t be ingtr uth fu l. A: Ye s, Idid

fe e l th a t th a t w a sn ’t

be ingtr uth fu l. Appellant’s c ounsel did not object to this testi mony , althoug h he did object to re lated questions

on a t le a st two oc c a sio ns duri ngthe pr os e c uto r’ s e xami natio n o f D e te c tiv e Ho pk ins

. 3. The prosecutor’s c omment Th e pr os e c uto r i nc lud e d th e fo llo wi ngin h is c los ingargume nt: L adies a nd g entlemen m u rd er is crying out in this Courtroom rig ht here today and to ni ght; it ’s cry

ingou t. T hat’ s w hat th e y did to C ur tis Smith in

the wo rs t of

a ll po ss ible fo rm s. Take mon e y , to take a fr ie nd un de r t he pr e te ns e of

g oin g to p art

y with him and exe c u te h im

. H e d id n ’ t e v e nh a v e a

c h an c e . Wh a t a

c o w ar d ! Wh at cowa rds, what lowlife cowa

rds; they can’ t stand up and fa ce somebody man t o man. 4. Appellant’s motion for a new trial After the j ury returne d a guilty verdic t, Appellant moved for a new tria l but did not s tate as a g round the c ourt’s failure to hold a hea ring on the alleg ed conta ct betwe en a jur or and Smith’s mother as de scribed a

bove. C. The appe als 1. Sta te ap

pe als

a. Direct appe al Th e Sup re me Cou

rt of Ke ntu c ky

a ff ir me d App e lla

nt’ s c on vic tio n o n d ir e c t app e a l. Concerningthe alleg ed juror misconduc t, the state supre me cour t said: During the cour se of the trial, counsel for May s approa ched the trial judg e and advised that it “ha d come to [ h i s ] attention” that one of the jurors ha d beenMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 7 - conver sing w ith two women dresse d in red, one of whom wa s believed to be the vic tim ’s mot

he r. Th e tr ia l judg e re sp on de d th a t he wo uld inq uir e int o th a t a t so me point in ti me. Def

ense c ounsel did not request a hear ing, a

n ad m o n i t ion, or a mistrial. I f a pa

rty desires a ruling or some other aff irmative action on the par t of the trial judg e, it is his duty to insist on a ruling and failure to do so constitutes waiver of the issue. B e l l

v . C om mo nwe alth , Ky ., 473 S.W .2d 820 (1971). I t was neve r confirme d that either of the two women in red a ctually spoke to a juror ; or, if so, that one of the m w as the victim’s mother ; or , if so, that they wer e conve rsingabout the tr ia l. Th e tr ia l ju dg e a dmo nis he d the jur y be fo re e a c h re c e ss that the y we re no t to ta lk to an y o n e a

b o u t th e c a s e . I n th e a

b s e n c e o f an y c o n tr ar

y e v id e n c e , jur ors ar e presumed to a dhere to that admonition. Tam me v . Co mm on we wal th , Ky . 973 S.W .2d 13, 26 (1998), cert. de nied , 525 U.S. 1153 (1999). Concerningthe prosec utor’s closing argument, the cour t said: [W ]e are unpe rsuade d that the prosec utor’s use of the term “ l o w life c owar d” war rants re versa l for a ne w trial. While we have condemne d prosec utorial ref ere nces to an ac cused in scurr ilous a nd deg radingterms, Sla ug hte r v . Co mm on we alt

h , Ky ., 744 S.W .2d 407, 412 (1987), cert. de nied , 490 U.S. 1113 (1989), the focus on appea l is on “the over all fairn es s o f t he trial.” Id. Courts have a llowed re fer ence s to the d ef en d an t as a “ cra zed animal,” De an v . Co mm on we alt h , Ky ., 844 S.W .2d 417 (1992), cert. de nied , 512 U.S. 1234 (1994), a “ beast,” Koo nc e v . Co mm on we alt h , Ky ., 45 2 S. W.2 d 82 2 (1 97 0) , and “ wo rs e tha n a ll of the ‘c ri min a ls’ and ‘t ra ito rs ’ i n hell.” Cook v. Borde nkirche r , 602 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. de nied , 444 U.S. 936 (1979). Rec og nizi ng the broa d latitude which is af forde d counsel during closing argument, we a

re u n ab l e t o conclude that this isol ated r emar k by the prosec utor denied Ma

y s his right to a f

air trial. b. Collat eral appeal Appellant then f

iled a mot ion to vacate in a collate ral proc eedingin Clay Circuit Court under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Proc edure 11.42. He argued eig ht c laims of err or, including ineffe ctive assistance of counse l based on the f ailure to re quest a he aringon the alleg ed extran eo u s juror

c on ta c t; a pp oin te d c ouns e l su

pp le me nte d h is pr o s e pleading s. After an ev i d en tiary hear ing, the circ uit court denied the motion by written orde r without an opinion. Appellant appe aled the de nialMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 8 - to the Kentucky

Court of Appea ls on the sole issue that he was denied effe ctive assist ance of counse l due to his trial counsel’s failure to obje ct to D etec tive Hopkins’s testimony that h e b eli eved Simm on s’ s v e rs ion

of the mur de r o ve r A

pp e lla nt’ s. Th e Ke ntu c ky Court of Ap pe a ls fo un d tha t D e te c tiv e Ho pk ins ’s te sti mony wa s in a dmi ssi ble and should have been obje cted to: “Ge nera lly , a witness may not v o u ch for the tr

uthfulness of another witness.” The court we nt on to note that afte r a he aring , Appellant’s tria l counsel appe are d to r e c og nize the “ fl a g ra

nt i na dmi ssi bil ity” of

De te c tiv e Ho pk ins ’s te sti mony a n d a c kn ow le dg e d th a t, in hindsight, he should have been mor e ag g ressive in objec ting to the testimony

. Howeve r, the state a

ppellate c ourt rea soned t hat Appellant had not met the sec ond, prejudice prong of Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984): F o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s t h e r e c o r d d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a tt h e r e i s n o ta r e a s o n a b le probability

that but for De t. Hopkins’s impermissible testimony the jury would have believed Ma

y s’s version of e vents conc erningwho shot Smi th or Simm ons’s version. First, thoug h it had been over a y ear since the murder a nd it appear s that May s and Simm ons were n o longe r under active inve stigation for the cr ime, Simm ons v o l u n t arily

came forwa

rd and g ave a

statement to the police in whic h he admitted being prese nt at the time of the c rime and rece iving a portion of the alleg ed payoff by Colli ns. Simm ons’s trial testimony was consistent with hi s police statement. He acc ounted for c oming f

orwa rd whe n he did to remorse over his involvement in the c ri me , an d ac c ounte d for his de lay in co min g fo rw ard to his fe ar of May s and Col lin s. May s, on the other hand, did not voluntarily come f orwa rd with a stateme nt to police. His April 7, 1998, statement to police w as a pr oduct of Simmons’s c o n f e s s i o nt o i n v o l v e m e n ti nt h e c r i m e . In h i s A p r i l 7 , 1 9 9 8 , s t a t e m e n t , M ays co rr o b o ra t ed

S i m m o n s i nal m o s tal l re s p ec t s ex ce p t conce rning who d i d t h e s h o o t i n g. May s admitted that Colli ns made the pr oposal to him, that Col lins g ave him the gun to car ry out the killing, that he r ece ived the pay off for the killing, and that he kept the g reater shar e of the $5,000.00 pay off. The only signific ant deviations fr om Simm ons’s ac count was that May s chang ed his mind about going throug h with the k i l l i n g, an d

t h at S i m m o n s h i m s el f t h en , t o M ay s ’s d i s t re s s , ca rr i edo u tt h e k i l l i n g.Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 9 -

Perhaps be cause he re alized the inculpatory nature of his Ap ri l 7 , 1998, state me nt a

nd its fa ilure to ac c ount fo r a m oti ve fo r S imm on s to fo llo w- thr ou g h w ith the killing af

ter May s had cha

ng ed his mind, at trial May s ren o unced his Apr il 7, 19 98 , s ta te me nt a

nd fo r the fi rs t ti me a ttr ibu te d Si mmo ns ’s mot ive fo r k ill ingSmith to an alleg ed af

fair be tween Simm o n s and Brenda Smit h, to Sim mons’s distress at Smit h having alleg edly

beate n Br enda a

nd scar red he r fa ce, a

nd to the substantial dr ugde bt S mith a lle g e dly

ow e d to Simm on s. At

tr ia l Simm on s and B re nd a Smith both denied havingeng ag ed in an a ffa ir. May s attributed his A

pril 7, 1998, statement to police coe rcion. May s alleg ed that police told him what to say i n h i s s t atement, and even stoppe d, rew ound, and pa us e d th e ta

pe re c or de r t o g e t th e state me nt t he y wa nte d. Ac c or din g to May s, in order to g et him to say what they wanted, police deprive d him of foo d an d wa t er, deprive d him of bathroom privileg es, made promises to him tha t h e wo uld be rele ased if he g ave the statement they wanted, and made threats conce rning his wife and fa mily . May s further

alleg ed that Det. Hopkins phy sically choked him in orde r to obtain the s tatement. Despite these alleg ations of coercion, howe ver, w e note that May s does not cite us to or re fer ence any motion t o s u p p re s s the statement on the ba sis of thi s c oe rc ive c on du c t. Ba sed on the fore g oing, in or der for the jur y to have a cce pted May s’s version of eve nts, it would have had to have discounte d that Simm ons was re morseful ove r the cr ime; it would have had to have believe d that Simm ons concoc ted his entire story , which implicated a

prominent Clay

County businessman, conc erninga murde r for hire ; it would have had to have believed that Sim mons and Br enda Smith were having an af

fair a nd that Smit h owed Si mmons a substantial drugdebt; it would have had to have believed th at t h e af fa ir and drugdebt wer e a suf ficient motive for Simm ons to ha

ve killed Smith; a

nd it would have had to ha ve believed that the police c oe rc e d M a

y s’ s Apr il 7 , 1 99 8, state me nt, e ve n to the po int of ph y sic a lly

c ho kin g him int o ma kin g the state me nt. B e c a us e of his c ha

ng ingand inc on sis te nt s tor ie s and

his a tte mpt

to attr ibute his April 7, 1998, statement to eg regio u s p olice coe rcion, May s’s cre dibilit y was se ve re ly c ha lle ng e d e ve n w ith ou t D e t. H op kin s’ s im pr op e r t e sti mony . W hile it i s possible that Det. Hopkins’s testimony vouching for the c redibility of Simmons over May s may

have sw ay ed the jury

to believe Sim mons’s version of events in favor of May s’ s v e rs ion

of e ve nts , w e do no t be lie ve that th is p os sib ili ty is a pr ob a bil ity sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome of the proce eding consideringthe tot a lity of the e vid e nc e be fo re the jur y . A s su c h, May s h a s f a ile d to e sta

bli sh pre ju d ic e f r o m t r ia l c o u n s e l’ s f

a il u r e to o b

je c t t o D e t. H o p k in s ’ s te s ti mony conce rning the truthfulness of the two defe ndants.Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 10 - Thus, the Kentuc ky

Court of Appea ls affirme d the denial of Appellant’s post-conviction cha lleng e. The Supreme Court of Kentuc ky denied discr etionary

revie w. 2. Petition for w rit of habeas corpus Appellant then f

iled a pro s e petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of K entucky

. He c laimed seve n err ors, including the three at issue in this appeal. A ma g istrate judg e re co mmended that the district cour t deny Ap p el l an t ’s ap p l i ca t i o nfo r t h e w ri tan d gra n tAp p el l ee ’s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s . T h e m agi s t ra t e j u d ge further rec ommended that the di strict court refuse a cer tificate of appea lability

on all issues except the Remm er

hear ing. T he cour

t acc epted the ma g i s t ra t e j udg e’s r ecommendations and denied Appellant’s pe tition. III . BA SIS F OR AP P ELLA TE J URISD IC TIO N The district cour

t exercised jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § 2254. This court ha s jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § 2253(c), expanded the district court’s ce rtificate of appe alability to the three issues ide nti fi e d in

Part Ia bo ve , a nd a pp oin te d c ouns e l f

or Ap pe lla nt. IV . A NA LY SIS A. Stand ard of review Fe dera l habea s review

of a state court de cision is g o v e r ned by the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ( AEDPA). Dye r v. Bowlen , 465 F.3d 280, 284 (6th Cir. 2006). Under the AE DPA , a wr it of ha

be a s cor pu s sha ll not iss ue on any c la im that wa s trie d on the me ri ts i n St a te court proc eeding s, unless adjudication:Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 11 - (1 ) re su lte d in a de c isi on that wa s c on tr ary to, or inv olv e d an u nrea sona ble a pp lic a tio n o f, c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d F e de ra l law, a s d e te rm ine d b y the Sup re me Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unrea sonable deter mination of the fa ct s i nl i gh to f t h e e v i d en ce p re s en t edi nt h e S t at e c o u rt p ro ce ed i n g. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This court must g ive def ere nce to que stions of fact, while que stions of law are revie wed de novo . § 22 54 (e )( 1) ; Dye r , 4 65 F .3 d at 28 4; Hodge v . Hurley , 4 26 F .3 d 3 68 , 3 75 –7 6 ( 6th Cir

. 20 05 ). Un de r the “ c on tr ary to” pr on g , thi s c ourt mus t g ra nt Ap pe lla

nt’ s a pp lic a tio n fo r a

wr it of ha be a s c or pu s if “ the state c ourt arr ive s a t a c on c lus ion op po sit e to that re a c he d by [the Sup re me Court ] on a

qu e sti on of law o r i f t

he state c ourt

de c ide s a c a se dif fe re ntl y tha n [the Sup re me Court ] has on a se t of materia lly indisti ng uishable fa cts.” W illiams v. Taylor , 5 2 9 U. S

. 3 62, 413 (2000). Under the “un re asonable application” pr ong , this court must gra nt habea s relief

if “the state court identifies the c orre ct g overningleg al principle f rom [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but

unrea sonably

applies that principle to f acts o f t h e p risoner’ s case .” Id. Unre asonable application includes improper ly

re fu s i n g to apply

clea rly establish fede ral lawwher e cir cumstance s demand. Id. Howeve r, this court may not i s s u e a writ simply beca use it conclude s in its i ndepende nt judgme nt that the state cour t decision applied a

Supreme Court ca se incorr ectly

. Price v . Vincent , 538 U.S. 634, 641 (2003). Rather , it is Appellant’s burden to show that the state c ourt applied the Supreme Court ca se in an objec tively unrea sonable manne r. See id. B. The trial court’ s fai lure to c ondu ct a Rem m er hearing Du e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s th a t a de fe nd ant i n a

c ri min a l c a se be tr ie d f

a ir ly by a pa

ne l of imp a rt ia l, “indiffe rent” jurors. Irvin v. D owd , 3 66 U. S. 7 17 , 7 22 (1 96 1) ; United States v. W alker , 160 F.3dMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 12 - 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1998). W hen a party alleg es t hat a jury has bee n subjected to outside influenc e, the trial court should hold a he aringwith all interested pa rties. Remm er v. United States , 3 47 U. S. 22 7, 22 9– 30 (1 95 4) ; W

alker , 160 F.3d at 1083. This court “require [s] a Remm er hear ing in a ll cases inv olv ingan un aut ho ri z ed c omm un ic a tio n w itha

jur or . . . f ro m an o uts ide so ur c e that pr e se nts a likelihood of aff

ectingthe ver dict.” United States v. Rigsby , 45 F.3d 120, 123 (6th Cir. 1995). A tr ia l c ourt has a

du ty to i nv e sti g a te a

c re dib le a lle g a tio n o f e xtra ne ou s in fl ue nc e “ su ff

ic ie ntl y to

assure itself that constitutional rig hts of the criminal defe ndant have not bee n v i o l at ed .” Id. at 124–25. This duty

holds even wh en a d efendant does not expressly reque st a Remm er

hear ing at trial. See United States v. Corrado , 227 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2000) . The trial c ourt has discre tion in deciding the ty

pe of inve stigati o n n ece ssary to determine juror

bias but “must provide the defe ndant a meaning ful opportunity to prove the same.” United States v. He rndon , 156 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 1998). Th e re c or d s ho ws that w hil e a c on c e rn a bo ut t he jur or c on ta c t w a s r a ise d at tri a l, M ay s d id not requ est a hea

ring , admonishment, or mistrial. The Ke ntucky Supreme Court conf

irmed that Appellant did not reque st a ny action from the trial court and observe d that failure to insist on a ruling is a waiver unde r Ke ntucky law. Bell v. Kentuck

y , 47 3 S.W. 2d 82 0, 82 1 ( Ky . 1 97 1) . We a g re e wi th Appellee that the Kentuc ky Supreme Court held that Appellant waived his r ight to a ppeal this issue by failing to expl icitly

reque st a Remm er he ari ng . Mo re ov e r, we no te that A pp e lla nt d id n ot r a ise the issue of c ounsel’s fa ilure to reque st a hea ring on his collatera l appea l to the Kentucky Court of Appea ls, an appe al that was ba sed on ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel.Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 13 - Even if the K entucky

Supreme Court stopped just short of expli citly stating that Appellant waived the issue under K entucky law, as the mag istrate judg e and district c ourt found, the f acts he re

are very differ ent from those in Remm er , Herndon , and Corrado , upon which Appe llant relies. I n Remm er , a juror w ho later be came the jury fo re m an repor ted to the trial judg e that someone tried to br ibe him to return a ve rdict favorab l e t o t h e defenda nt. 347 U.S. at 228. The judge informed the prosec utor and reque sted an investigation by the Fe dera l Bure au of I nvestig ation; toge ther they

later concluded the statement was made in jest. Id. The de fenda nt did not learn of the extraneous juror contac t until after the jury convicted him. Id. The Supreme Court observed that

“ [t ]h e s e n d i n g o f an F

. B

. I

. a g e n t i n t h e m i d s t o f a t r i a l t o i n v e s t i g a t e a j u r o r a s to h is c on du c t is bound to impress the juror . . . unduly . A j uror must fee l fre e to exercise his func tions without the F.B .I . or anyone else looking ove r his shoulder.” Id. a t 22 9. Th e Court we nt o n to ho ld t

hat e x pa rt e final ac tion by the trial court was inappr opriate “ on information such a s was re ceive d in this case,” id. at 229–30, and that the tr ial court should have held a he aring“with all intere sted parties pe rmitted to participate ,” id. at 230. During jury

deliberations in Herndon , the jury fore man sent a note to the judge stating that

a jur or be lie ve d h e may

have ha d b us ine ss d e a lin g s w iththe de fe nd ant i n th e pa st b ut t he jur or did

no t th ink thi s w ou ld a ff

e c t hi s a bil ity to a c t a s a

jur or . 156 F .3 d at 632 . T he tr ia l ju dg e re pli e d w ith a note r equesting that the jury continue deliber ating

. Id. De fe ns e c ouns e l ob je c te d a nd a sk e d to interview the juror; the judg e denie d the re quest. Id. The ne x t day defe nse counse l told the court that the def

endant ha d decide d not to move for a mistrial. Id. The jury returne d a g uilty

verdic t and the trial cour

t denied def

endant’ s motion for a new trial. Id. The de fenda nt rene wed his motion forMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 14 - a new trial at a se ntencinghear ing. Id. a t 633. Th e tr ia l c ourt pe rm itt e d th e de fe nd ant a nd a bu sin e ss associate to make a rec ord of their recollections of business dealing s with the juror. Id. Th e y sa id the juror c ame into their ba r five y ear s ear l i er an d tried to sell them a sec urity sy stem but they declined beca

use the sy stem was over

price d. Id. They said the juror stay ed in the bar and g ot drunk, and they as k ed h i m t o leave beca use of his bellig ere nt conduct. Id. The c ourt then denie d the de fe nd ant’ s o ra l r e qu e st f or a ne w tri a l, part ly be c a

us e the c ourt

tho ug ht t he e arl ie r d e c isi on

no t to move for a mi strial was a trial strateg y . Id. The g overnme nt argued that the tria l judge provided a Remm er hear ing w hen it permitted the de fenda nt and his business associate to testify

. Id. at 637. A p ane l of

thi s cou rt re je c te d the g ov e rnme nt’ s ar g ume nt a nd he ld t hat “ [p]e rm itt ingthe de fe ns e to make a rec ord for

appea l does not discharg e the district court’s duty to investigate claims of juror misconduct.” Id. I n Corrado , someone a

pproac hed the de fenda

nt t wo day s befor e closing arguments and offe red to influenc e a “ friend” on the jury in ex chang e for

money . 227 F.3d at 532–33. The man said he c ould gua

rante e a hung jury

and his frie nd was sure he could br ing two or three other juror s along wi t h h i m. Id. at 533. Def ense c ounsel immediately informed the district c ourt and the g overnme nt. Id. The de fenda nt met with the individual at the behest of f ed er al age n t s and tried,

unsucce ssfully , to elicit the name of the juror. Id. The judg e dec ided to ask the jury three “y es/no” questions in open court conce rning attempts to influence the m and their impartiality , and allow them to retire f or fifte en minutes to “re flec t.” Id. at 534. I f the a nswer to a ny question was “y es,” the juror

wo u l d b e i n s t ru ct edt o s en d

t h e j u d ge an o t e a n d

t h en b e c al l edi nt o an s we r qu es t i o n s fr o m t h e j u d ge

an d b o th p arti es. Id. Def ense c ounsel objecte d to the proposal and sug g ested he would move forMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 15 - a mistrial; the judge said he would not g rant the motion based on the i nformation pre sently known. Id. The court proce eded with the plan and no juror sent a note to the judg e. Id. The jury returne d

a g uilty verdic t and the def endant moved f

or a ne w trial. Id. This court held that, despite the fa ct that the def

endant did not expressly

reque st a Remm er he ari ng , the dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld h a ve he ld

a he a ri ng becau se it was fu lly awa re of the natur e of

the c la ims of

jur or tampe ri ngand

de fe ns e counsel stated obje ctions to the court’s thre e-que stion proposal. Id. at 536. Her e, unli ke in Remm er , Appellant was awa re of the possible juror conta ct during trial. And althoug h he broug ht the situation to the court’s attention during trial, he did not reque st a hea ring or mistrial. I n contra st to Herndon and Corrado , Ap p el l an th adn o p r i o rn ega t i v e b u s i n es s d ea l i n gs with a juror or

a colorable claim of j ury tampering resulting in an FBI investigation—nor did he offe r

any oth e r s imi lar c la im o f p re jud ic e . Rathe r, Ap pe ll ant ’s c ouns e l r e po rt e d to the tr ia l c ourt that a jur o r ma y h a v e h a d c o n ta c t i nth e h a ll w ay

w it h s o me o n e w h o mi g h t h a v e b e e nSm it h ’ s mo the r. Suc h a va g ue a lle g a tio n d oe s n ot c on sti tut e a c olo ra ble c la im o f e xtra

ne ou s ju ro r c on ta c t li ke tho se in Remm er , Herndon , and Corrado —and Appe llant’s failure to raise the iss u e ag ain at trial undersc ores this fac t. Under the se circumstance s, we c annot say that the Kentuc ky

Supreme Court

un re a so na

bly a pp lie d c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d U nit e d St a te s Su

pr e me Court

pr e c e de nt. C. The te st im onyof D e te c ti ve Hop kins The Six th A mendment g uara ntees a criminal def

endant the r ight to ef

fec tive assistance of counsel. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 7; W ashington v. Hofbauer , 228 F.3d 689, 702 (6th Cir. 2000). A cr iminal defenda

nt is entitled to a new trial due to ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel wher e (1) trial counsel’s pe rfor

mance was de ficient a

nd (2) the re i s a rea sonable proba bility that the def

iciencyMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 16 - adver sely impacted the outc ome of t h e t ri al. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 7, 69 4. “ A r e a so na ble probability

is a probability

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. There is no dispute that Appellant’s trial counsel was objectively defic ient. The Ke ntucky Court of Ap pe a ls d e te rm ine d th a t D e te c ti ve Hopk ins ’s te sti mony wa s in a dmi ssi ble te sti mony to which Appe ll an t’ s c o u n s e l s h o u ld h a v e o b je c te d

. A lt

h o u g h A p p e ll an t m e e ts th e f ir s t p r o n g of Strickland , howeve r, w e ca nnot say that the state a

ppellate c ourt applied the se cond prong

unrea sonably

to the fac ts of this c ase. The state court of appea ls c oncluded that Appellant wa s not prejudice d beca

use the jury

would not have be lieved his testimo n y ev en in the absenc e of the imp ro pe r t e sti mony

by De te c tiv e Ho pk ins . Sp e c if ic a lly , th e a

pp e llate c ourt

po int e d o ut t

hat: ( 1 ) S i m m o n s c a m e f

o r w ar d v o l u n t ar i l y; (2) His trial testimony

was the same as in his pre- trial statement to the police; (3) He explained his delay in coming f

orwa rd as f ear of Appe llant and Collins; and (4) Appe llant’s trial testimony was inconsistent with his pre-tr ial statement to the police. F ur the r, the c ourt

re a so ne d, in or de r to have a c c e pte d Ap pe lla nt’ s ve rs ion of e ve nts , th e jur y wo uld have ha d to believe: (5) Simmons owed a drugdebt to Smit h; (6) Simmons was having an af fair w ith Sm ith’s wife; and (7) Appe llant’s first statement wa s the result of police coer cion. Appellant cites se vera l case s for the pr oposition t hat c l ea r prejudice occ urs wher e the ke y iss ue is the c re dib ili ty

of the wi tne sse s a

nd the re is n o s ig nif

ic ant e vid e nc e . A ll a

re dis tin g uis ha

ble from the f

acts he re. Hodge v . Hurley was a cas e o f al l ege d rape of a thre e-y ear -old in which theMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 17 - pr os e c uto r “r e pe a te dly

c omm e nte d o n th e c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s” thr ou g ho ut c los ingargume nts
. 42 6 F .3 d 369 , 372 , 377 (6 th Cir . 200 5)

. Th is co ur t note d tha t “th e pr os e c uto r’ s o pin ion c arr ie s w ith it the imprimatur of t he Government and may induce the jury to trust the Governme nt’s judgme nt rathe r than its own view of the evidenc e.” Id. at 378 (interna l quotation mar ks omit t ed ) ( q uoting United States v. Y

oung , 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985)) . Her e, it is Detec tive Hopkins’s opinion, not the prosec utor’s, that is at issue. Fur ther, the Hodge prosec utor compounded his mis co n duct by “re peate dly ” and “ blatantly ” misrepr esenting the evidenc e. Id. at 380. No such misre prese ntation is alleg ed her e. I n Coo pe r v . S owd e rs , a c a se inv olv ingthe sta

bb ing mur de r of a ta xi dr ive r, a po lic e wi tne ss

ex p re s s l y s t at edt h at al l o f t h e e v i d en ce p o i n t ed t o t h e d ef

en d an tas t h e p er

p et ra t o r; t h e t ri al j u d ge

re fe rr e d to the po lic e wi tne ss a s an “ e xpe rt ” in w he the r or no t to arr e st s ome on e ; and ano the r w itn e ss testified to his own cre dibilit y . 837 F.2d 284, 285, 287–88 ( 6th Cir. 1988). This court held that the cumulative ef

fec t of the three err ors re sulted in a trial that was f undamentally

unfair. Id. at 286. The testimony of De tective Hopkins a s to whether he believed Simmons and Appellant whe n they wer e g iving t heir 1998 stateme nts, while inadmissibl e, wa s far less eg reg ious than the point-blank testimony —decla red “ expe r

t” b y th e tria l j u d g e—of the detec tive in Cooper that “[t] he only

evidenc e we f ound that would link any one to this crime would be Mr . Cooper.” Id. at 287. I n Br ow n v. S

mi th , this court held that the def endant wa s prejudice d by his trial counsel’s failure to in

v e s ti g a te a n d o b ta in rec ords re lated to his teena g ed daug hter’s c ounseling sessions, where the re cords would have undermined her cre dibilit y as a w itness in his t rial for sexually molesting he r

and the re wa s n o o the r e vid e nc e a g a ins t hi m. 5 51 F .3 d 42 4, 42 5 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) . H e re , in c on tr a st,Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 18 - ke y e v i d e n c e , a s e l u c i d a t e d b y t h e K e n tu c ky C o u rt o f A p p e a l s , w a s i n t r o d u c e d i n a d d iti on to Detec tive Hopkins’s testimony

. Moreove r, and quite sig nificantly , in neither Hodge nor Cooper nor Br own did the defe ndant g ive tr ia l te sti mony

that c on fl ic te d w ithhis ow n e arl ie r s ta te me nt t o p oli c e , a s d id A pp e lla nt. A p p e l l an t s ays t h a t w i t h o u t a p o l i c e d e t e c t i v e ’ s r e p e a t e d l y v o u c h i n g f o r S i m m o n s ’ s v e r a c i t y, there is a rea sonable probability that a juror would have found Appellant guilty of the lesse r off

ense, as the jury

was permitted to f

ind both defe ndants g uilty without naming one as the princ ipal if they

c ou ld n ot d e te rm ine wh o wa s te lli ng the tr uth

. Ap pe lla

nt ig no re s the e xiste nc e , le t a lon e the we ig ht,

o f t h e o t h e r e v i d e n c e t h a tt h e s t a t e a

p p e l l a t e c o u rth i g h l i g h t e d : S i m m o n s c a m e f o r w ar d v o l u n t a r i l y; his tr ia l te sti mony

wa s c on sis te nt w ithhis 19 98 state me nt t o th e po lic e ; he e xpla ine d h is delay in coming forwa

rd as f ear of Appe llant and Collins; and Appe llant’s trial testimony was inconsistent with his 1998 statement to the police. We a g re e wi th t

he ma g istrate jud g e and

dis tr ic t c ourt

that th e Ken tu cky Cour

t of Ap pe a ls id e n t i f i e d t h e c o r r e c tf e d e r a l s t an d ar d

r e g ar d i n g p r e

j u d i c e an d

a p p l i e d i tr e a s o n a

b l y i nanan a l y s is that was “ thoroug h, well-supporte d, and convinc ing.” D. The pr os e c ut or ’s c om m e nt The re levant q u es t ion conce rning the prosec utor’s re fer ring to Appellant and Simmons as

“ low lif e c ow ard s” duri ngc los ing ar gument is w he the r t

he c omm e nt “ so inf

e c te d th e tr ia l w ith unfairne ss as to make the r esulting c onviction a denial of due pr ocess.” Darden v . W ainwright , 477 U. S

. 1 6 8 , 1 8 1 (1 9 8 6 ) ( i n t ern al qu o t at i o nm ar k s o m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g Do nn e lly v . D e Chr istofo ro , 416 U. S. 6 37 , 6 43 (1 97 4) ). We a g re e wi th the state and dis tr ic t c ourt s th a t th is “ iso la te d c omm e nt” didMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 19 - not. And, even a side from the f act that “ the ac cumulation of non-er rors cannot collectively

amount to a violation of due proc ess,” Campbell v. United States , 364 F.3d 727, 736 (6th Cir. 2004) (interna l quotation marks omitted) (quoting a mag istrate judg e’s r eport a nd rec ommendation), in light of the evidentiar y rec ord as discusse d in Part I V.C, the cumulative eff ect of Detec tive Hopkins’s testimony

and the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nt d id n ot r e su lt i n a tr ia l th a t w a s f

un da me nta lly un fa ir to A pp e lla nt. V. CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m the dis tr ic t court ’s de nia l of ha be a s r e lie f t o App e lla

nt.Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 20 - CO LE, Ci r c uit Judg e , c onc ur r ing

. Thoug h the t rial court could have be en cle are r, I ag ree with the majority ’s conc lusion that the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Appe llant waived his rig ht to a ppeal this issue by failing to insist that the trial court take any further action af ter c ounsel raise d the spec ter of ex t ra n eo u s juror influenc e. See Sc ott v . M itc he ll , 209 F.3d 854, 864- 65 (6th Cir. 20 00 ). Ap pe lla

nt d oe s n ot ar g ue that his co un se l re nd e re d ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e by fa ili ngto r e qu e st

a Remm er h e ar i n g , a d m o n i s h m e n t , m i s t r i a l , n e w t r i a l , o r o t h e r w i s e o b j e c t i n g t o t h e i mp an e l e d

j u r y. Rather, Appe llant asserts that the trial court’s failure to addre ss the issue was a structura l error , and that no Ke ntu c ky

pr oc e dura l r

ule c an r e lie ve the tr ial cou rt of it s f e de ra l c on sti tut ion a l duty to investigate. B eca

use we have held that appellants waived their rig ht to appea l a trial cour t’s failure t o h o l d a Remm er hear ing by failing reque st a hear ing, admonishment, mistrial, or new trial, I disag ree . See Un ite d S

tat es v . P e rry , 438 F.3d 642, 651( 6th Cir. 2006); United States v. W alker , 160 F .3 d 1 07 8, 10 83 -8 4 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 8) ; see also United States v . Vining , 2 24 F . App ’x. 4 87 , 4 93 -9 4 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ; United States v. Re eve s , No. 99-1248, 2000 WL687649, at *2 (6th Cir. May 19, 2000). I t is fo r t his re a so n th a t I

be lie ve Ap pe lla

nt h a s p ro c e dura lly

de fa ult e d th is c la im. Howeve r, I

write sepa

rate ly beca use I disag ree with the majority ’s conc lusion that Ap pe lla nt’ s a lle g a tio n o f e xtra

ne ou s jur or c on ta c t wa s so vague that it did no t con sti tut e a c olo ra ble claim re quiring a Remm e r hea ring . I n my

v i ew , h ad co unsel prese rved f eder al habe as re view, Appellant ra ised a c olorable c laim of extraneous juror c ontact re quiring a Remm er h ea ri n g. A tri a l c ourt

c on fr on te d w ithan a lle g a tio n o f e xtra ne ou s juro r i nf

lue nc e mus t c on du c t a Remm er hear ing. United States v. Rigsby , 45 F.3d 120, 124- 25 (6th Cir. 1995). A defe ndant is not automatically

entitled to such a he aring , and he or s h e m ust first “ra ise[] a ‘c olorable c laim ofMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 21 - extraneous influenc e.’” United States v. Owens , 4 2 6 F. 3 d 8 0 0 , 8 0 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United Sta te s v . D av is , 177 F.3d 552, 557 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). An “ex trane ous influence ” is “one derive d from specific knowledg e about or a relationship with either the pa rties or their w itnesses.” Vining , 224 F. Ap p ’x

. at 4 9 3 (q u o t i n g United States v. He rndon , 156 F.3d 629, 636 ( 6th Cir. 1998)). At tr ia l, A pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l in fo rm e d th e tr ia l c ourt : I t’s come to my

attenti o n t h at t h ere was a conver sation in the hallway betwee n the lady y ou just spoke to [

juror] and the blond he aded lady and the two women in the red ba ck ther e in the bac k. Ibelieve one of them is Mr. Smith’s mot her. (Joi nt Appendix (“J A”) 148-49.) As Appellant notes, c ounsel g ave the trial court a ll the information wi thin h is k

no wl e dg e tha

t an im pr op e r c omm

un ic a tio n li ke ly

ha d o c c ur

re d. Spe c if

ic a lly , d e fe ns e counsel provide d: (1) “the identity of the juror

at issue;” (2) “a phy sical descr iption of the women” involved; (3) “a

n asser tion that one of these women was the victim’s mother ;” and (4) “the location of the c ommunication.” (Reply Br . of Petitioner-Appe llant 7.) Moreove r, counsel notified the cour t of this ext rane ous contac t immediately afte r it occur

red. D efe nse counse l did what it could, it alerte d the trial court almost immediately of jurors’ possibl e contact wit h the victim’s mother. Ther e ca n be little doubt that a conver sation betwee n the victim’s mother and a juror is the ty

pe of inappropriate communication that ra ises the spec ter of e x trane ous juror influence. See United States

v . H all , 4 55 F .3 d 5 08 , 5 21 -2 2 ( 5th Cir . 2 00 6) ; Jones v . Kassulke , No. 95-6459, 1997 WL 664774, *2 (6 th C ir . O c t. 2 3, 19 97 ); Com mo nwe alt h v . S ilv ia , N o. 07 -P -940 , 2 00 9 WL 77 09 , at *2 (M a ss. App. Ct. J an. 2, 2009)

. T h is is especially true whe re, a s was the c ase he re, the trial occ urre d in a small town where those associated with the t rial were likely to know one a nother. Althoug h the trialMays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 22 - judge said he wou l d i n q u i re i nto the matter late r, he ne ver did so, and only the judg e wa s in a position t o make suc h an inquiry

. Th e ma jor ity be lie ve s, ho we ve r, that App e lla nt s ho uld have do ne mor e . In s up port of its decision that Appe llant was re quired to provide mor e information to raise a c olorable c laim of

ex tr aneou s juro r c on ta c t, t he ma jor ity a tte mpt s to dis tin g uis h App e lla nt’ s c a se fr om Remm er , Herndon , and Corrado , wher e courts conclude d that the t rial court err ed in fa iling to hold a Remm er hear ing. I

n my view, t h e m aj o ri t y ’s pos ition is not well taken. Nota bly , in eac h of the afor ementioned cases, someone privy to the ex trane ous juror communication came f orwa rd to repor

t the details of the enc ounter to the c ourt. I n United States v. Re mmer , the jury fore man told the trial j u d g e t h a ts o m e o n e t r i e d t o b r i b e h i m t o a c qu i tt h e d e f e n d an t
. 3 4 7 U

. S

. 2 2 7 , 2 2 8 ( 1 9 5 4 )

. In Herndon , th e jur

y fo re man s e nt a

no te to t he jud g e dis c los ingthat he may have ha d p ri or bu sin e ss d ea l ings w ith the defe ndant. 156 F.3d at 632. I n United States v. Corrado , d e f e n s e c ounsel informed both the pr osecution and the district court that someone a pproac hed the de fenda

nt indicating he could influe nce a juror. 227 F .3d 528, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2000). Her e, no one who was privy to the conver sation betwee n the victim’s mother and a juror, and possible two other per sons, came forwa rd. Put simply , only

the trial cour

t was in a position to gather more infor

mation; we should not p en ali ze Appellant for the court’s f ailure to de velop the re cord when it was the co u rt , n o t t h e counsel, who were in a position and had a duty to inquire furthe r. Additionally , requiringAppellant to provide information detailing the communi cation, whe re suc h information was not at his disposal, is tantamount to r equiring him to p ro v e p rejudice be for e obtaining a Remm er

hear ing. T his certa inly

cannot b e the de sired rule in a situation like this one.Mays v . Chandler

No. 07-6315

- 23 - Finally , to hold a defe ndant to such a hig h standard r uns afoul of the trial court’ s duty to ensure that a def endant ha s an impartial and f air jury

. A tri a l c ourt , in

its dis c re tio n, mus t de te rm ine wh a t st e ps , if any , a re re qu ir e d to make c e rt a in that a jury ’s impartiality

has not bee n compromised. Rigsby , 45 F .3 d a t 12 4. Impr op e r c on ta c t w ith a juror a bout a matter pe nding be fore the jury is pres u m p t i v ely

prejudicia l. Remm er , 347 U.S. at 22 9. “ Whe n th e re is a c re dib le a lle g a tio n o f e xtra ne ou s in fl ue nc e s, the [tr ia l] c ourt mus t in ve sti g a te sufficie ntly

to assure itself that constituti onal rig hts of the cr imina l d efendant have not been violated.” Rigsby , 45 F.3d at 124-25. I n this case, ther e is no sug g estion that t ri al counse l’s

asser tions lac ked cre dibilit y . Thus, a hear ing was nece ssary to de termine the exact natur e o f t he contac t before the trial court could deter mine whether the jurors’ contac t w ith the victim’s mother had the potential to cr eate a bias. We a re no t in a po sit ion to re vie w wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y e xer c ise d it s d isc re tio n in this case because even that court did not know t he nature of the communi cation. Moreover, w ithout

su ff ic ie nt d e ta ils a

bo ut t he c omm un ic a tio n, we ca

nn ot r e vie w w he the r t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s re me dy , if any , was a ppropriate

. See Da v is , 177 F.3d at 557 (noting that without the benef it of a hea ring delving into the ext ent to which an extraneous comment aff ecte d the juror’s deliberations, ne ither the district court n o r this court has any

basis for c oncluding that the extraneous communications were ha rmless).