RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2454-19T2

IN THE MATTER OF THE

EXPUNGEMENT PETITION 

OF R.B.T.

_________________________

Argued September 14, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Messano, Hoffman and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Accusation No. 18-02-

0149.

Carey J. Huff, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for appellant State of New Jersey (Christopher J. 

Gramiccioni, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; 

Carey J. Huff, of counsel and on the brief). 

Charles J. Uliano argued the cause for respondent

R.B.T. (Chamlin, Uliano & Walsh, attorneys; Charles 

J. Uliano, of counsel; Andrew T. Walsh, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

R.B.T. was a municipal court judge in nine towns in Monmouth County: 

Union Beach, Oceanport, Colts Neck, Tinton Falls, Rumson, Neptune City, 

Bradley Beach, and Eatontown. R.B.T. pled guilty to committing numerous 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 14, 2020
2

A-2454-19T2

illegal acts on multiple occasions in his capacity as a judge. He converted all or 

part of municipal court defendants' suspended fines to contempt of court fines 

without a legal basis. He issued municipal defendants contempt of court fines

for being late without confirming if they were late, nor did he give "late"

defendants an opportunity to explain. Further, R.B.T. issued defendants 

contempt of court fines for disobeying prior court orders without confirming 

that such prior orders existed. He also suspended fines and converted them to 

contempt of court fines after defendants left court. Also, on some occasions,

when R.B.T. accepted an affidavit from attorneys on behalf of their client, he

would suspend the fine and convert it to contempt of court after the attorney left 

the room. On one occasion, he threatened a defendant who questioned a 

contempt assessment with jail when that defendant stated that he wanted a 

lawyer. 

R.B.T.'s converted fines did not go to him personally, but the improper 

fines helped him get appointed to various municipal judgeships. R.B.T. knew 

that Monmouth County and the towns he served shared fine money equally from 

motor vehicle tickets. He also knew 100% of the contempt of court fines go to 

the town and are not shared with the county. Thus, by suspending mandatory 
3

A-2454-19T2

fines and converting those fines to contempt of court sanctions, R.B.T. diverted 

money away from Monmouth County to the towns. 

As a result of his improper scheme, the towns received more than their 

fair share of fine revenue from fines. Thus, R.B.T. "guaranteed future 

appointments to the bench" by converting fines to contempt fines and securing 

more money for the towns than they otherwise would have received. R.B.T.'s 

illegal actions resulted in $1.2 million dollars of ticket-related revenue, 

$600,000 of which was improperly diverted to the towns. 

After investigating R.B.T.'s conduct, the Monmouth County Prosecutor's 

Office had him arrested and charged with falsifying records. In exchange for his

guilty plea, the prosecutor allowed R.B.T. to apply for Pre-Trial Intervention 

(PTI).

1 As part of his plea deal, R.B.T. also agreed to forfeit public office. After 

R.B.T. successfully completed PTI, the court dismissed the fourth-degree 

charge. R.B.T. then moved for an expungement of the criminal records relating 

1

 PTI is a diversionary program where certain offenders can avoid criminal 

prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected to deter future 

behavior. State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621 (2015). The Criminal Division 

Manager must recommend an offender and the prosecutor must give consent for 

an offender to be admitted into PTI. Ibid. 
4

A-2454-19T2

to the arrest and subsequent admission into PTI six months after completion of 

PTI as required by statute.2 

The State objected to the expungement petition. Judge Jill O'Malley heard 

oral argument and explained her reasons for ordering the expungement in a 

thorough written opinion. 

The State presents the following arguments on appeal: 

(1) The trial court erred in determining the State was 

precluded from objecting to the expungement because 

it did not object to PTI following a guilty plea.

(2) The trial court was incorrect that the investigation 

reports are not expunged; and 

(3) The State met its burden to show that the need for 

the records outweighed defendant's interest in relief. 

Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the trial 

court's order granting expungement. However, we remand for the limited 

purpose of identifying which records associated with R.B.T.'s arrest and 

subsequent admission into the PTI Program are to be expunged, and which 

records, if any, are to be excluded from the expungement order. 

Prosecutors enjoy wide discretion in making determinations on PTI 

applications under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12. State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 443 

2

 See 2C:52-6(c)(1).
5

A-2454-19T2

(1997). Courts will generally not overturn a prosecutor's decision to permit a 

criminal defendant's admission into PTI. Baynes, 148 N.J. at 443-44. Such 

prosecutorial discretion is afforded "enhanced deference" by our courts. State 

v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 443 (1997); State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 589 (1996);

State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 246 (1995) (citing State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 

106, 111-12 (1993)); see also State v. DeMarco, 107 N.J. 562 (1987).

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6(a) sets forth the criteria for expungement of arrest 

records not resulting in conviction, including under circumstances where a 

person has successfully completed PTI and the original charge has been 

dismissed. The relevant section of the statute reads as follows:

a. When a person has been arrested or held to answer

for a crime . . . under the laws of this State or of any

governmental entity thereof and proceedings against

the person were dismissed, the person was acquitted, or

the person was discharged without a conviction or

finding of guilt, the Superior Court shall, at the time of

dismissal, acquittal, or discharge, or, in any case set

forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection, order the

expungement of all records and information relating to

the arrest.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6(a)] 

After being admitted into and successfully completing a supervisory 

program, an applicant must wait six months after the entry of the order of 

dismissal to apply for expungement. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6(c)(1). Upon completion 
6

A-2454-19T2

of this waiting period the applicant is presumptively entitled to expungement. 

In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 570 (2012) (citing In re Expungement Petition of

D.H., 204 N.J. 7, 18 (2010)).

We consider de novo the trial court's interpretation of the expungement

statute. Kollman, 210 N.J. at 577-78 (2012) (applying de novo standard of review

to questions of interpretation of the statute governing expungement of criminal

records); In re Expungement of the Criminal Records of R.Z., 429 N.J. Super. 295,

300 (App. Div. 2013). However, we are obliged to give deference to the factual

findings of the trial court. See, e.g., In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152,

174-75 (2014). 

The initial burden of proof for an expungement is on the applicant. In re 

D.H., 204 N.J. at 18. The applicant "has the burden to satisfy the requirements 

of the expungement statute by a preponderance of the evidence." Ibid. Once 

the applicant has satisfied the requirements of the expungement statute, they are 

presumptively entitled to expungement and the burden then shifts to the State. 

Kollman, 210 N.J. at 570. "To meet its burden, the State ha[s] to demonstrate 

some cause for denial by a preponderance of the evidence." Ibid.

The Legislature has established multiple grounds for denial of a petition 

of expungement. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14, provides, in relevant part:
7

A-2454-19T2

A petition for expungement filed pursuant to this

chapter shall be denied when:

b. The need for the availability of the records 

outweighs the desirability of having a person 

freed from any disabilities as otherwise provided 

in this chapter. An application may be denied 

under this subsection only following objection of 

a party given notice pursuant to N.J.S.2C:52-

10 and the burden of asserting such grounds shall 

be on the objector.

Ibid.

The grounds for grant or denial of expungement set forth in the statute require 

proofs. Thus, we must defer to a trial court's factfinding with respect to whether

petitioner met his burden, establishing a case for expungement, and whether the

State met its burden in opposing the application. Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 577-

79 (applying abuse of discretion standard of review to public interest

determination for criminal expungements after five years); see also In re Appeal

of the Denial of the Application of Z.L., 440 N.J. Super. 351, 355-56 (App. Div.

2015) (applying deferential standard of review to trial court denial of firearms

purchaser identification card (FPIC) because "issuance would not be in the

interest of the public health, safety or welfare" under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

3(c)(5) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
8

A-2454-19T2

A judicial determination that expungement should be granted does not, 

however, end the inquiry. See In re D.H., 204 N.J. at 21. The next question is, 

what happens to the various records related to the expunged charge? Under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1, expungement is defined as "the extraction, sealing, 

impounding, or isolation of all records on file." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1(a). When the 

court orders an expungement, records are extracted and isolated, but not 

destroyed. Kollman, 210 N.J. at 568. Expunged records shall include 

complaints, warrants, arrests, commitments, processing records, fingerprints, 

photographs, index cards, "rap sheets," judicial dockets and related items. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1; Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 568-69.

The Supreme Court in In re D.H. found that the legislature "foresaw instances 

where expungement could be granted, but in the exercise of legislatively guided 

judicial discretion, something less than all of the records resulting from petitioner's 

arrest and conviction would be subject to the expungement order." 204 N.J. at 21. 

The State's initial argument, that it was precluded by the trial judge from 

objecting to expungement because it consented to PTI, misreads the trial judge's 

well written opinion. Prosecutors enjoy wide discretion on PTI admissions, and 

the trial judge noted that the State did not object to this PTI application. The 

State's authority to consent to an applicant’s admission into PTI and pave the 
9

A-2454-19T2

way for later dismissal of the charges is given enhanced deference by our courts. 

Baynes, 148 N.J. at 443-44. A thorough review of Judge O'Malley's opinion 

reveals no language barring the State from objecting to expungement. The judge 

simply noted that the State elected to exercise its prosecutorial discretion and 

consent to R.B.T.'s entry into PTI.3 Having done so, the State is charged with 

understanding that a presumption exists in favor of expungement where there 

has been dismissal of criminal charges. See Kollman, 210 N.J. at 570. The trial 

judge found that R.B.T. met his initial burden on expungement. The judge then 

gave the State full and fair opportunity to oppose expungement. We see nothing 

in the record to suggest otherwise.

Once R.B.T. met his burden of proof on expungement, the burden shifted 

to the State to overcome the presumption in favor of expungement by a 

preponderance of the evidence. The State did not do so; consequently, point 

three of its argument on appeal fails. The State's opposition to the expungement 

was primarily grounded in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(b). It argued that public 

3

Judge O’Malley wrote: " [I]f the State was concerned with preserving 

Petitioner's matter for posterity than(sic) it should not have offered or granted 

admission into PTI in the first place. By doing so, the State all but guaranteed 

expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6(a), which was in place at the time PTI was 

offered to Petitioner. The State cannot cry foul on a situation of their own 

doing." 
10 A-2454-19T2

availability of the records associated with R.B.T.'s criminal case "would help 

clarify" individual municipal court cases "mishandled" by R.B.T. It further 

argued that this interest outweighed the desirability of having R.B.T. freed from 

the disabilities of having a criminal record. The trial judge rejected the 2C:52-

14(b) argument, noting that the State offered no specific evidence of any 

ongoing litigation or investigation regarding the municipal court cases affected 

by R.B.T.'s illegal acts. Finally, the State argued that the public "has a right to 

know" how the justice system handled R.B.T.'s crimes.

The court did not find the public interest "right to know" argument

persuasive, noting that the wide media coverage of R.B.T.'s arrest and court 

appearances and the digital public record attached to R.B.T.'s name would 

satisfy the public's "right to know". We will not substitute our judgement for 

the trial court's if the ruling was within a range of acceptable decisions. 

Kollman, 210 N.J. at 577. 

"The question of whether expungement should be granted is different in 

both form and substance from the separate but related question as to the reach 

of any resulting order of expungement." In re D.H., 204 N.J. at 20-21. Although 

the trial court stated that "the underlying reports or evidence secured during the 

investigation "were not sought to be expunged," presumably by R.B.T., it is 
11 A-2454-19T2

unclear precisely what reports or evidence are being referred to on the record 

presented. When a court grants expungement, there can be circumstances where 

less than all records should be extracted, sealed, isolated, or impounded. In re 

D.H., 204 N.J. at 21. 

We remand the matter to the judge to conduct a hearing to clarify with 

specificity which records will and will not be expunged. We leave the conduct 

of the hearing to the sound discretion of the judge. Such a hearing is consistent 

with the principles espoused by the Supreme Court in In re D.H.

Affirmed as to the order granting expungement. Remanded to the trial 

court for a hearing on what records relating to R.B.T.'s case, if any, are to be 

exempt from the expungement order. 

Affirmed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.