If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re COLLINS/HARDY/ROMERO, Minors. February 10, 2022

No. 357157

St. Clair Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 20-000217-NA

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and MARKEY and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her 

five minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) (failure to prevent physical or sexual abuse)

and (j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter arose in November 2020 when petitioner, the Department of Health and Human 

Services (DHHS), filed a petition for temporary custody of the minor children, which was 

subsequently amended to seek permanent custody.

1

 The petition alleged that respondent’s 

boyfriend, Justin Redfield, sexually abused two of respondent’s children, KH and DR, while they 

were in her care, and that respondent failed to protect the children. The testimony of KH and DR 

at the adjudicative and termination hearings was consistent with the petition. Specifically, KH 

testified she reported Redfield’s first instance of sexual abuse to respondent, but respondent did 

not believe her and took no action against Redfield. Subsequently, Redfield again abused KH, and 

also abused DR. Respondent testified she continued to permit Redfield into the home and left the 

children in his care unsupervised, even after these allegations, because she did not believe KH and 

DR, despite knowing Redfield was a registered sex offender previously convicted of first-degree 

criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) with a victim under 13 years of age. Respondent also testified 

 

1 Respondent is the biological mother of DLC, DBC, KH, DR, and MH. KH and MH have no 

legal or putative fathers. DR’s legal father was not a respondent. Though petitioner also sought 

termination of the parental rights of DLC and DBC’s legal father, he is not a party to this appeal 

and he did not file a separate appeal.
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she took no action regarding KH’s and DR’s allegations because she wanted to maintain her 

relationship with Redfield.

Following a bench trial, a referee found MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) to be proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence, permitting the trial court to take jurisdiction over the minor 

children. The trial court adopted the referee’s findings. After a termination hearing, the referee 

found MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) to be proved by clear and convincing evidence and found 

termination to be in the minor children’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. The 

trial court agreed and entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights to the minor 

children. Respondent now appeals. 

II. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues (1) the trial court clearly erred when it found MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and 

(2) were proved by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) the trial court clearly erred when it found 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) were proved by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the trial 

court clearly erred when it found that it was in the best interests of the minor children to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights. We disagree.

A. JURISDICTION OVER THE MINOR CHILDREN

This Court reviews “the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction for clear error in light 

of the court’s findings of fact.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 295; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). “A 

finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe 

the witnesses.” Id. at 296-297.

DHHS may, after a preliminary investigation into allegations of child abuse or neglect, 

“petition the Family Division of the circuit court to take jurisdiction over the child” suspected of 

being abused or neglected. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 15; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). If the trial 

court authorizes the petition, it must hold an adjudicative hearing to determine “whether the trial 

court can exercise jurisdiction over the child (and the respondents-parents) under MCL 712A.2(b) 

so that it can enter dispositional orders, including an order terminating parental rights.” Id. “The 

adjudication divests the parent of her constitutional right to parent her child and gives the state that 

authority instead.” Id. at 16. A trial court may exercise jurisdiction over a minor child if it finds 

one or more statutory bases for jurisdiction have been established by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Id. at 15; In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 295; MCR 3.972(C)(1). In relevant part, MCL 

712A.2(b)2provides trial courts with jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile:

(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and 

maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide 

proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary 

for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or 

 

2 Amendments to MCL 712A.2 that took effect on October 1, 2021, did not alter the relevant 

portion of the statute that was in effect at the filing of the petition.
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her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other 

custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship. . . .

* * *

(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, 

drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent 

adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in. [MCL 

712A.2(b).]

The trial court did not clearly err in exercising jurisdiction over respondent’s minor 

children. The evidence established respondent put her relationship with Redfield above the safety 

of KH and DR by allowing Redfield to remain in the home after the girls alleged—multiple 

times—that he sexually abused them. Though respondent testified she took no action after KH’s

and DR’s allegations because she did not believe them, she could not substantiate her belief by 

providing examples of times either daughter lied about something so serious. Even after multiple 

allegations against—and an official police investigation into—Redfield, respondent allowed 

Redfield to continue staying in her home with her children, sometimes even leaving them in his 

unsupervised care. 

By respondent’s own admission, her desire to maintain a relationship with Redfield 

clouded her judgment and led her to make bad decisions regarding the care of her children. Though 

respondent testified she regretted mistrusting KH and DR, and that she was no longer guided by 

her desire to be in a relationship, the evidence demonstrated she was continuing her relationship 

with Redfield at the time of the adjudicative hearing—while he was incarcerated for multiple 

counts of CSC against KH and DR. Respondent’s conduct resulted in KH feeling angry and unsafe 

in her own home, feelings that amplified each time respondent ignored KH’s and DR’s allegations 

against Redfield. Thus, by continuously subjecting KH and DR to sexual abuse, respondent 

neglected to provide the proper care necessary for KH’s and DR’s physical health and substantially 

risked harm to their mental well-being. MCL 712A.2(b)(1). Moreover, although “[t]he fact that 

there are statutory grounds to assume jurisdiction over one minor child does not automatically 

mean that there are statutory grounds to assume jurisdiction over a second minor child,” the way 

“a parent treats one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re 

Kellogg, 331 Mich App 249, 254, 259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Respondent’s conduct toward KH and DR is probative of how she treats her other 

children. By leaving her children in the unsupervised care of Redfield and ignoring the needs of 

her children, respondent neglected to provide proper or necessary support and care for all of her 

children and created a home that was unfit for each of them. MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).

Because a preponderance of the evidence supports at least one statutory basis for 

jurisdiction over respondent’s minor children, this Court is not left with a definite and firm 

conviction the trial court made a mistake in exercising jurisdiction. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich at 

15; In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296. As such, the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over 

respondent’s minor children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).
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B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

This Court reviews “for clear error a trial court’s finding of whether a statutory ground for 

termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 

80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). See also In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 406; 852 NW2d 524 (2014) 

(stating dispositional orders “are afforded considerable deference on appellate review”). “A 

finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe 

the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297.

A parent’s “fundamental right” to “control the custody and care of her children is not 

absolute, as the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the moral, emotional, mental, and 

physical welfare of the minor and in some circumstances neglectful parents may be separated from 

their children.” In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 409-410 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Once 

a trial court’s jurisdiction over a minor child is established, “the trial court has broad authority to 

enter orders that are appropriate for the welfare of the juvenile and society in view of the facts 

proven and ascertained.” In re Ferranti, 504 Mich at 16 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

However, a parent’s right to manage the care of his or her child “does not evaporate simply because 

they have not been model parents,” and “all parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on 

their fitness before their children are removed from their custody.” In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 

410, 412 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

If DHHS files a termination petition, the trial court must hold a termination hearing to 

determine whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that “one or more statutory grounds 

for termination exist.” In re Ferranti, 504 Mich at 16. See also In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 

817 NW2d 111 (2011) (“Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing 

evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights, even if the court erroneously found sufficient 

evidence under other statutory grounds.”). Termination is appropriate under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) if “[t]he child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical 

or sexual abuse” and “[t]he parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical injury or 

physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that 

the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.” 

Termination is appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based 

on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned 

to the home of the parent.” Mere conjecture about future harm is insufficient to establish a 

reasonable likelihood of future harm and is, therefore, insufficient to support termination. In re 

Sours, 459 Mich 624, 636; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).

The trial court did not clearly err in finding MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) had been 

proven by clear and convincing evidence. The testimony at the adjudicative and termination 

hearings established Redfield sexually abused KH and DR on numerous occasions.3 Respondent 

took no action against Redfield after KH brought these incidents to her attention even though she 

 

3 A trial court may consider and rely on evidence admitted at the adjudication hearing to support 

its decision to terminate parental rights. In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 315; 964 NW2d 881 

(2020).
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knew he was a registered sex offender, and she allowed Redfield to remain around the minor 

children even after the investigation into Redfield began. As a result of respondent’s inaction after 

KH’s first allegation against Redfield, Redfield not only sexually abused KH again, causing KH 

immense emotional distress, but he also sexually abused DR. Moreover, respondent’s handling of 

KH’s and DR’s allegations led DLC and DBC to disbelieve KH and to blame KH and DR for 

causing them to be removed from respondent’s care. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 

817 NW2d 115 (2011) (reasoning there was a continuing risk of emotional harm when a mother’s 

ongoing denial that she sexually abused her child turned the child’s siblings against the child).

Respondent claimed she would no longer make bad parenting decisions because she no 

longer prioritized maintaining a relationship with Redfield, but she continued to pursue a 

relationship with Redfield at the time of the termination hearing, after Redfield was incarcerated 

for abusing her daughters. Additionally, it is telling that respondent never willingly removed 

Redfield from her or her children’s lives. Rather, respondent still allowed Redfield to be around 

the minor children until he was incarcerated. Though Redfield may be physically separated from 

the children while he is incarcerated, respondent’s continued relationship with him demonstrates 

she prioritizes her own wants above her children’s needs. Cf. In re Laster, 303 Mich App 485, 

492; 845 NW2d 540 (2013) (finding there was not clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable 

likelihood of future abuse when the respondent willingly ended her relationship with the mother 

of a girl who sexually abused one of the respondent’s children, moved out of the house before 

adjudication occurred, and was not associated with other known abusers).

Moreover, despite respondent’s claims that she would be able to respond appropriately to 

sexual abuse in the future, her conduct demonstrates otherwise. When KH was sexually abused 

by her brothers’ friend in 2018, respondent did not contact the authorities, nor did she bring KH to 

the hospital until she was instructed to do so by a counselor KH had told about the incident. When 

Redfield sexually abused KH, respondent repeatedly ignored the situation, did not contact the 

police, and did not remove Redfield from the home. When Redfield sexually abused DR, 

respondent again took no action against Redfield, nor did she inform DR’s father about the incident 

until after DR brought it to his attention. Respondent’s conduct demonstrates she lacks either the 

ability or the desire to respond appropriately when one of her children raises allegations of sexual 

abuse. See In re Laster, 303 Mich App at 494 (finding there was clear and convincing evidence 

that the children would be harmed if returned to the respondent-mother when she neglected to 

contact police after allegations of sexual abuse). Respondent’s comfortability leaving her children 

in the unsupervised care of a known sex offender whom her children alleged abused them 

represented a concerning lack of judgment that endangered—and posed a continuing risk of 

endangering—all her children.

For those reasons, clear and convincing evidence demonstrated respondent failed to 

prevent sexual abuse against KH and DR. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). Moreover, respondent’s 

failure to respond to the sexual abuse and her continued relationship with Redfield demonstrated 

clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable likelihood, apart from mere conjecture, that her 

children would suffer further injury in the foreseeable future if they were returned to respondent. 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j); In re Sours, 459 Mich at 636. Because clear and convincing 

evidence supports at least one statutory ground for termination, this Court is not left with a definite 

and firm conviction the trial court made a mistake. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich at 16; In re Moss, 

301 Mich App at 80; In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296. Consequently, the trial court properly 
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concluded statutory grounds existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights. 

C. CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS

This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights 

is in the best interests of the children. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App at 268. See also In re Sanders, 

495 Mich at 406 (stating dispositional orders “are afforded considerable deference on appellate 

review”). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special 

opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297.

Once a statutory ground for termination is established by clear and convincing evidence, 

the trial court must terminate a respondent’s parental rights if a preponderance of the evidence 

demonstrates termination is in the best interests of the children. In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 

320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020); MCL 712A.19b(5). A trial court must “focus on the child rather than 

the parent” when determining a child’s best interests. In re Mota, 334 Mich App at 321. 

In assessing a child’s best interests, a trial court may consider such factors as a 

child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for 

permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the 

parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic 

violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s 

visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the 

possibility of adoption. The trial court may also consider how long the child was 

in foster care or placed with relatives, along with the likelihood that the child could 

be returned to [the] parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all. [Id. 

(quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).]

Additionally, “[a] child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to 

consider . . . .” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original).

The trial court did not clearly err in finding termination was in the minor children’s best 

interests. Notably, there seemed to have been a lack of a meaningful bond between respondent 

and her children. The evidence demonstrated respondent had spent little-to-no time with the 

children since they were removed from her care and she only once inquired about DR’s adjustment 

outside of her care.4 Despite their lack of contact with respondent, the children were all doing well 

in the care of relatives. In fact, KH entered therapy once removed from respondent’s care, a step 

respondent never took despite having knowledge of numerous sexual assaults against KH over two 

years. Respondent’s repeated failure to respond appropriately to her daughters’ allegations of 

sexual abuse, her failure to prevent additional abuse, and her continued relationship with Redfield 

all demonstrated a concerning pattern about respondent’s parenting ability. See id. at 323 (stating 

 

4 During the termination proceedings, DLC, DBC, KH, and MH were placed in the care of 

respondent’s mother and DR was placed in the care of her father.
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that even a single act of sexual abuse by a parental figure represents a serious danger to a minor 

child). 

Moreover, respondent’s behavior demonstrates she lacked insight regarding how her 

conduct has negatively impacted her children. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App at 268 (reasoning 

the respondent’s “failure to fully appreciate her conduct set a poor example for the children” and 

supported a finding that termination was in the children’s best interests). Respondent’s conduct 

not only caused KH significant mental distress, but it also resulted in DLC and DBC distrusting 

KH and DR and blaming them for the children’s removal from respondent, further damaging the 

psychological and emotional well-being of her children. A preponderance of the evidence proved 

respondent repeatedly put her wants above her children’s needs, indicating a lack of a meaningful 

bond between respondent and her children, and demonstrating the children’s well-being was 

significantly at risk while in respondent’s care.

Additionally, the trial court explicitly considered placement of the children in the care of 

relatives. It weighed the willingness of DLC, DBC, KH, and MH’s grandparents to adopt the 

children, and the fact that DR was in the care of her father, against the minor children’s need for 

stability and safety in their home environments. This Court has held a trial court did not clearly 

err in determining termination of a respondent’s parental rights was not contrary to the best 

interests of the respondent’s children when the respondent had minimal meaningful contact with 

her children, all of the respondent’s children flourished in the care of their guardians, and relatives 

expressed interest in adopting the respondent’s children. In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 301. Similarly 

here, respondent’s minimal contact with the children and the children’s positive adjustment with 

relatives, who are interested in adopting them, support the trial court’s finding that termination 

was in the children’s best interests.

Finally, respondent’s argument that reunification and rehabilitation efforts should have 

been made in her case is unpersuasive because once a trial court has found statutory grounds for 

termination, the focus shifts to the child, rather than the parent, to assess the child’s best interests. 

In re Mota, 334 Mich App at 320-321. That respondent may have been able to better parent her 

children if such efforts were made is an argument she should have, but failed, to make before the 

trial court. Respondent’s parenting ability was just one factor the trial court could consider in 

assessing the minor children’s best interests, and it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to 

conclude other relevant factors, such as the children’s need for stability and safety, outweighed 

this factor. 

Because a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that termination 

was in the best interests of the minor children, this Court is not left with a definite and firm 

conviction the trial court made a mistake. Id. at 320; In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296. 

Consequently, the trial court properly determined termination of respondent’s parental rights was 

in the best interests of the minor children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Christopher M. Murray