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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket No. 34696

PAUL E. FRANK, 

 

 Claimant-Appellant, 

 

v. 

 

THE BUNKER HILL COMPANY, 

Employer/Self-Insured, BUNKER LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP, Self-Insured,

 

 Defendants-Respondents. 

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Coeur d’Alene, November 2010

2010 Opinion No. 124

Filed: November 29, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the Industrial Commission.

Industrial Commission decision, affirmed.

John J. Rose, Jr., Kellogg, argued for appellant.

Ramsden & Lyons, LLP., Coeur d’Alene, for respondent, Bunker Limited 

Partnerhsip. William F. Boyd argued.

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BURDICK, Justice

This matter comes before this Court on an appeal from the Industrial Commission’s (“the 

Commission”) order entered on remand from the case of Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 142 Idaho 

126, 124 P.3d 1002 (2005). On appeal Paul Frank argues that the Commission erred in failing to 

award him reimbursement for the cost of past and future medical insurance, which he claims is

required to pay for his medical expenses incurred as the result of his industrial injury. Frank also 

appeals the denial of attorney fees for the proceedings held before the Commission. We affirm 

the Commission.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Frank was injured in a mining accident in November of 1980 while working for the 

Bunker Hill Company (“Bunker Hill”). Frank, 142 Idaho at 127, 124 P.3d at 1003. Frank filed 

a worker’s compensation claim and was awarded total permanent disability in 1984. Id. Bunker 

Hill requested a rehearing and the award was reduced to 55% total and permanent disability. Id. 
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Frank appealed that reduction, which was affirmed by this Court in 1988. Id. See also Frank v. 

Bunker Hill Co., 117 Idaho 790, 792 P.2d 815 (1988), addendum filed (1990).

On May 22, 1991, Frank filed an application requesting a hearing for redetermination of 

his disability rating. Id. at 128, 124 P.3d at 1004. The next thirteen years brought a complex and 

confusing procedural history involving multiple bankruptcies, which it is unnecessary to reiterate 

here.1 On March 24, 2004, the Commission entered an order denying reconsideration. Id. at 

129, 124 P.3d at 1005. Frank appealed to this Court, and on November 23, 2005, this Court 

affirmed the Commission’s dismissal of Frank’s claim for additional disability compensation, 

while remanding for a determination of whether the amount Frank had been overpaid (during the 

period he had been awarded total permanent disability) could be offset against his subsequent 

medical costs that should have been paid by his employer, and for a determination of whether 

Frank was entitled to additional medical benefits. Id. at 132, 124 P.3d at 1008.

On remand the Commission found that the $10,633.25 that had been overpaid to Frank 

could be offset against Frank’s subsequent reasonable medical expenses that his employer was 

liable for.2 On September 12, 2007, the Commission issued its Order on Remand Re: Additional 

Medical Benefits, finding that Frank’s employer was not liable for Frank’s past or future medical 

insurance premiums, that Frank had incurred $15,412.66 in medical care costs which his 

employer was responsible for and that offsetting the amount Frank had been overpaid resulted in 

a balance owing to Frank in the amount of $4,779.41. The Commission denied Frank’s 

requested attorney fees. Frank filed his notice of appeal before this Court on October 23, 2007.

Bunker Hill History

On January 14, 2010, the Commission issued its Order on Remand Re: Determination of 

Proper Parties, adding Bunker Limited Partnership (“BLP”) to the captioning of the case. This 

was in resolution of long-standing confusion as to which entity owed Frank a duty as to his 

workers’ compensation claims.

The Bunker Hill Company began doing business near Kellogg, Idaho, in the early 1900s 

and was acquired by Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation (“Gulf”) in a hostile takeover in 

1968. Following the takeover, Bunker Hill was a wholly owned subsidiary of Gulf; this was the 

state of affairs at the time Frank’s accident occurred.

 

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For more on this history see Frank v. Bunker Hill, 142 Idaho 126, 128–29, 124 P.3d 1002, 1004–05 (2005).

2 The Commission also dismissed Gulf USA Corporation and Pintlar Corporation with prejudice, finding that they 

had never properly been parties in the matter.
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In 1981, Bunker Hill shut down its Kellogg operations, and on November 1, 1982, BLP 

purchased substantially all of Bunker Hill’s assets, including the name “The Bunker Hill 

Company” through an Asset Purchase Agreement. Part of the Asset Purchase Agreement 

included the assumption of workers’ compensation claim liabilities, subject to a limiting 

provision that is not applicable here. Although BLP acquired the name and nearly all the assets 

of Bunker Hill, it did not obtain the company itself, which changed its name to Pintlar 

Corporation (“Pintlar”), and continued to be a wholly owned subsidiary of Gulf. Gulf, Pintlar

and BLP all filed petitions in bankruptcy in the early 1990s. BLP’s Plan of Reorganization was 

approved by the bankruptcy court in 1991. That plan included the establishment of a $40,000 

reversionary trust, the income from which would be available to fund the medical claims of 

former Bunker Hill employees.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this Court stated in Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor:

On appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free 

review of the Commission's legal conclusions, but will not disturb findings of fact 

if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Substantial and 

competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 

support a conclusion. The conclusions reached by the Industrial Commission 

regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the 

conclusions are clearly erroneous. We will not re-weigh the evidence or consider 

whether we would have drawn a different conclusion from the evidence 

presented.

145 Idaho 415, 418, 179 P.3d 1071, 1074 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Frank argues that the Commission erred: (1) in denying him reimbursement for his past 

and future insurance premiums (where insurance is required in order to pay for his continuing 

reasonable medical expenses); and (2) in failing to award him attorney fees for the proceedings

before the Commission. These issues shall be addressed in turn.

A. The Commission did not err in determining that Frank was not entitled to 

reimbursement for insurance premiums.

The Industrial Commission ruled that Frank could not recover the cost of his insurance 

premiums because I.C. § 72-432 provides only for the cost of medical care, not the cost of 

insurance. Frank argues that he had to get insurance in order to pay for his medical care and, 

therefore, those costs should be paid by Bunker Hill.
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Idaho Code § 72-432 provides, in relevant part:

(1) [T]he employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable 

medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital services, 

medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be reasonably required by the 

employee’s physician or needed immediately after an injury or manifestation of 

an occupational disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter. If the employer 

fails to provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the expense of the 

employer.

Frank is not only seeking reimbursement for his past insurance premiums, but also for the 

projected costs of that continuing insurance for the projected remainder of his life. 

BLP argues that Frank has failed to provide legal authority to support his argument that 

he is entitled to reimbursement for past and future insurance costs. Idaho Appellate Rule 35

controls the content and arrangement of appellate briefs. Section (a)(6) of I.A.R. 35 states that, 

“[t]he argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented 

on appeal, the reasons therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 

transcript and record relied upon.” In Wheeler v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, this 

Court held that “issues on appeal that are not supported by propositions of law or authority are 

deemed waived and will not be considered.” 147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 P.3d 988, 997 (2009).

The record demonstrates, and counsel for BLP admitted at oral argument, that the 

reversionary trust had been set up for the benefit of parties in Frank’s position. Inexplicably, 

Frank has never applied for benefits from the residual trust. Neither did Frank seek to intervene 

in the bankruptcy proceedings of Gulf, Pintlar or BLP in order to assert his claim for benefits. 

Having failed to pursue those more likely avenues of recovery, Frank cites to I.C. § 72-432 as 

authority, arguing that although that statute does not expressly provide for an injured employee 

to recover insurance costs from an employer, it does provide that “[i]f the employer fails to 

provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the expense of the employer.” Frank’s 

argument is that his employer refused to pay for his continuing medical expenses in accordance 

with I.C. § 72-432, noting that Gulf and Pintlar refused to pay for his medical expenses 

following the bankruptcies of those corporations, and that Frank had no other means to pay for 

his medical expenses other than by obtaining insurance. It should be noted that Frank had been 

overpaid by his employer due to the initial determination by the Commission that Frank suffered 

from total permanent disability, and the issue of overpayment had not been resolved when these 

costs were incurred. 
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Although we are skeptical that insurance premiums could be rendered under I.C. § 73-

432, assuming arguendo that they could be Frank did not offer evidence that his insurance 

coverage only paid for those costs which his employer was liable for under I.C. § 73-432, and no 

evidence was offered as to the portion of Frank’s insurance premiums attributable to those costs.

Nor has Frank made a showing as to the amount his insurance company paid for him to receive 

such medical care. Absent evidence in the record to support a specific award the Commission 

could not grant Frank his requested relief. There is no basis in the law to support Frank’s request 

for damages in order to pay for insurance premiums for the projected remainder of his life. The 

Commission correctly denied Frank’s claim for past insurance premiums based on the evidence 

submitted, and for future insurance premiums as there is no support in law for such an award.

B. The Commission did not err in denying Frank attorney fees.

Frank also contends that the Commission erred in denying his request for attorney fees, 

under I.C. § 72-804, for the proceedings before the Commission on remand. In its Order on 

Remand Re: Additional Medical Benefits, the Commission found that Frank had failed to present 

a sufficient argument to support an award of attorney fees.

Idaho Code § 72-804 states:

If the commission or any court before whom any proceedings are brought under 

this law determines that the employer or his surety contested a claim for 

compensation made by an injured employee or dependent of a deceased employee 

without reasonable ground, or that an employer or his surety neglected or refused 

within a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay 

to the injured employee or his dependents the compensation provided by law, or 

without reasonable grounds discontinued payment of compensation as provided 

by law justly due and owing to the employee or his dependents, the employer 

shall pay reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by 

this law. In all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by injured employees or 

their dependents shall be fixed by the commission.

In Frank’s initial brief he argues that attorney fees should be awarded because Gulf and 

Pintlar did not inform the Commission of the conclusion of their respective bankruptcy 

proceedings. After Frank’s initial brief was filed, the Industrial Commission determined on 

remand that BLP, not Gulf or Pintlar, was liable as Frank’s employer, and Frank has not 

challenged that determination here. Therefore, Frank’s argument concerning those companies 

shall not be examined. 

In Frank’s Reply Brief he argues that BLP, Gulf and Pintlar engaged in a course of 

conduct designed to deceive Frank, the Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court, and should 
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therefore be required to pay Frank’s attorney fees. Frank cites no legal authority for this 

argument. This Court “will not consider a request for attorney fees on appeal that is not 

supported by legal authority or argument.” Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 

723, 728 (2003). Therefore, we affirm the Commission’s denial of attorney fees.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the Industrial Commission’s holding that Frank is not entitled to the costs of 

his past and future insurance premiums, nor attorney fees for his proceedings before the 

Commission. Costs to Respondent, Bunker Limited Partnership.

Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, HORTON and TROUT, Pro Tem, 

CONCUR.