THIRD DIVISION

									jUNJune 29, 2001

No. 1--98--2343

BEVERLY B. MANN, 

		Plaintiff-Appellant and

		Cross-Appellee,

	v.

THE UPJOHN COMPANY, 

		Defendant-Appellee and

		Cross-Appellant.

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

Honorable

Susan Zwick, 

Jacqueline Cox,

Robert Bastone,

Lynn Egan,

Donald O'Connell,

Judges Presiding.

	JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

	Plaintiff Beverly Mann appeals from numerous orders of the

circuit court granting summary judgment to defendant The Upjohn

Company on counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint, granting

summary judgment to defendant on count IV of plaintiff's amendments

to her complaint, granting defendant's motion to dismiss count VII

of plaintiff's amendments to her complaint, denying plaintiff's

motion to amend her complaint, denying plaintiff's motions for

continuance of the trial date, and denying plaintiff's motion to

vacate the dismissal of her complaint for want of prosecution

(DWP).  Defendant cross-appeals from orders of the circuit court

granting plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint following

summary judgment on counts I and II, denying defendant's motion for 3

3summary judgment based on lack of expert testimony on causation,

and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's

economic loss claims.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

	STATEMENT OF FACTS

	Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a pro se complaint against defendant alleging that she suffered physical and psychological

injuries as a result of her ingestion of a prescription drug,

Halcion, from January 1988 to January 1990.  Halcion, also known as

triazolam, is a member of the benzodiazepine drug class and is a

sleep aid used to treat insomnia.  Defendant manufactures Halcion

and the drug received the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)

approval and licensing in 1982.  Numerous complaints similar to

plaintiff's were filed against defendant across the country

following various news magazine and newspaper articles, as well as

a "20/20 Report" detailing adverse side effects of Halcion.

	Plaintiff's complaint against defendant was based on claims of

negligence (count I) and products liability (count II), and alleged

that defendant failed to adequately warn her of the detrimental

effects of Halcion.  Plaintiff's complaint was subsequently removed

to the federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff was ordered two times by the district court to answer

outstanding discovery and to sign medical authorizations.  In

August 1992, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her federal complaint,

but plaintiff was granted leave to refile it in state court.  In October 1992, plaintiff retained an attorney who refiled

plaintiff's complaint in the circuit court of Cook County.  In

addition to the claims against defendant, plaintiff added as

defendants Dr. John Karesh, the doctor who prescribed Halcion for

her, and NorthCare Medical Group, where Karesh worked, alleging

medical malpractice (count III).  In February 1996, the court

granted summary judgment in favor of Karesh and NorthCare based on

its determination that the claims against them were time barred by

the applicable statute of limitations, and they are not parties to

this appeal.  

	In early 1993, the trial court ordered plaintiff to answer

interrogatories on two occasions.  In November 1993, defendant

filed a motion for sanctions based on plaintiff's failure to comply

with discovery.  Although the trial court denied the motion for

sanctions, the court ordered plaintiff to answer discovery.  In the

summer or autumn of 1994, defendant filed a motion to compel

answers to interrogatories.  The trial court's ruling on this

motion is not contained in the record.

	In May 1996, defendant filed three motions for summary

judgment with respect to counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint;

one based on lack of evidence of causation, one based on lack of

evidence of loss of income claim, and one based on adequacy of

warnings.  On June 18, plaintiff's attorney was granted leave to

withdraw as plaintiff's counsel.  During the summer of 1996,

defendant filed a motion for relief from plaintiff's personal attacks on counsel.  Neither the motion itself, nor the trial

court's decision, is in the record.  

	Plaintiff filed her first motion for a continuance of the

trial date on October 22 in order to retain new counsel and to

obtain defendant's Halcion database.  Plaintiff was ordered on this

date to answer Supreme Court Rule 213 interrogatories.  177 Ill. 2d

R. 213.  Thereafter, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for

continuance.  At the hearing on this motion, the court questioned

plaintiff about her discovery efforts and expressed its concern

with respect to her diligence in prosecuting the case.  The court

stated that it had serious problems with whether plaintiff had done

discovery and advised plaintiff that this was her "last chance." 

At this hearing, plaintiff accused defense counsel of being

notorious for harassing plaintiffs.  Plaintiff filed a motion to

reconsider, which the trial court granted.  The trial was continued

from December 9, 1996, to August 21, 1997.  Plaintiff was also

ordered to answer Rule 213(g) interrogatories by January 3, 1997.

	In December 1996, plaintiff replied to defendant's motions for

summary judgment, relying on various documentary evidence.  In

January 1997, defendant filed a motion to bar plaintiff from

presenting expert testimony based on her failure to comply with the

court's order requiring her to answer Rule 213(g) interrogatories. 

On February 25, the trial court granted defendant's motion for

summary judgment on counts I and II, and on March 25, it denied

plaintiff's motion to reconsider its February 25 order granting summary judgment.

	On April 22, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to

amend her complaint, allowing her to add claims for fraud (count

IV), negligence (count V), products liability (count VI), and

battery (count VII) based on alleged misrepresentations made by

defendant.  Defendant's subsequent motion to reconsider the order

allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint was denied.  Defendant

thereafter filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's amendments to her

complaint.

	On June 18, the trial court granted defendant's motion to

require plaintiff to submit to an independent medical examination

(IME).  This motion had apparently been pending for over a year. 

On June 20, plaintiff filed a motion to continue the trial date,

contending that the case had been in suspension from February 25

(when summary judgment was granted on counts I and II of her

complaint) until April 22 (when she was allowed to amend her

complaint).  In June, plaintiff filed a motion to compel production

of the Halcion database, which the trial court subsequently granted

on September 23.  On July 1, plaintiff filed a motion to continue

the trial date to retain counsel, which the trial court denied

based on its determination that plaintiff had not been diligent in

prosecuting her case and had not demonstrated good cause for a

continuance.  At the hearing, the court expressed to plaintiff its

concern with her discovery efforts over the previous five years. 

Rather than answer the court's questions with respect to what discovery remained, plaintiff engaged in an outburst and verbally

attacked defendant.  The court admonished plaintiff that it would

not tolerate such conduct.  Because of plaintiff's outburst, the

court continued the matter to later that day.  When the hearing

resumed, the court indicated to plaintiff that her case was in

jeopardy and that she had not answered Rule 213 interrogatories

even though she had been ordered to do so.  It then denied

plaintiff's motion to continue.

	Sometime during the summer of 1997, the FDA commissioned the

National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine (IOM) to

conduct an independent review of Halcion.  On July 9, the trial

court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's battery

claim, but denied its motion to dismiss the negligence, fraud, and

products liability claims.  On July 10, the trial court granted

plaintiff's motion to reconsider its order of June 18, requiring

plaintiff to submit to an IME.  However, on July 22, the trial

court again granted defendant's motion for an IME.  Plaintiff's

motion to reconsider was denied and she underwent psychiatric and

psychological examinations in August 1997.  Thereafter, in an

emergency motion for an extension of time to file a brief on her

motion to compel production, plaintiff accused one of defendant's

counsel of faking surgery for the purpose of delay.

	On July 23, the trial court continued the trial date from

August 21 to October 21, 1997, although the court did question

plaintiff as to what discovery she had done and admonished her to answer the court's questions and cease being unresponsive.  The

court further indicated that plaintiff was in the position she was

in with respect to discovery of defendant's documents due to her

"own doings," e.g., her failure to review the documents when they were produced in 1992.  The court struck those portions of

plaintiff's motion for an extension of time that dealt with attacks

upon defense counsel.  During the hearing, plaintiff also accused

defense counsel of lying to the court both at this hearing and on

previous occasions and demanded a transcript of the hearing so she

could respond in writing.  

	On September 13, the trial court entered an order barring

plaintiff from presenting any opinion witnesses except those

previously disclosed and deposed, e.g., plaintiff's treating physicians.  On September 18, plaintiff filed a motion to continue

the trial date based on her need to obtain the IOM report as well

as defendant's 8,500 patient study of Halcion.  On September 23,

plaintiff filed another motion to continue the trial date based on

the soon-to-be-released IOM report.  At a hearing on this date,

plaintiff accused defense counsel of lying to the court.  The court

warned plaintiff that it would censure her and told her there were

to be no more attacks in her written memorandum on "how bad"

defendant and defense counsel were.  Plaintiff was further

instructed that she was to cease her accusations that defense

counsel was lying.  The court advised plaintiff that it would

strike her briefs in their entirety if she continued her conduct.  On September 29, plaintiff amended her motion to continue. 

However, the motion was withdrawn based on plaintiff's pending

motion to recuse Judge Cox for cause.

  	On October 3, plaintiff filed an amended motion to continue the trial date based on the forthcoming IOM report.  Plaintiff

supplemented this motion on October 7, alleging a history of

unethical conduct on the part of defendant's attorney, including

fabrication of data for defendant.  The trial court granted

plaintiff's motion to continue based on the recent disclosure by

defendant of the IME reports and continued the trial from October

21 to November 4.  On October 17, the trial court denied

plaintiff's "Motion for Substitution of Judge."  On October 24,

plaintiff filed an emergency motion to continue the trial date

based on the imminent release of the IOM, which the trial court

denied.  At this hearing, plaintiff again accused defense counsel

of making false statements to the court.  Plaintiff was admonished

about this as well as the fact that what occurred in other Halcion

cases in Cook County and the fact that continuances were granted in

other cases, as plaintiff argued, were irrelevant because each case

was to be considered individually.  The trial court also denied

plaintiff's subsequent October 27 motion to continue the trial.  On

October 30, plaintiff advised defendant that she would not proceed

to trial on November 4 and would allow the court to DWP her case. 

	On November 4, plaintiff renewed her motion to continue the

trial date, which the court granted; however, the court noted that plaintiff had done little affirmatively to work up her case, in

particular, to disclose witnesses to prove up liability.  The court

also transferred the case to Judge Zwick for all further

proceedings.  On November 13, the IOM report was released.  On

November 20, a status hearing was held at which time trial was set

for February 23, 1998, and discovery was cut off as of December 23,

1997.  At this hearing, plaintiff again accused defense counsel of

making misrepresentations to the court and distorting the truth. 

Plaintiff demanded that she be allowed to respond in writing.  On

November 21, plaintiff was allowed to amend her complaint to add

punitive damages claims.

	Sometime in December, defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment on plaintiff's fraud claim, apparently on the basis of

preemption by federal law.  Defendant also filed a motion for

sanctions against plaintiff based on its contention that she

violated a protective order entered in the case by sending

defendant's Halcion database to an attorney in Texas.  On December

27, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's amendments to

her complaint.  On December 31, defendant filed a motion to bar

plaintiff's fact witnesses because they were identified after the

discovery cut off date, their testimony was not disclosed by

plaintiff, or they were opinion witnesses.

	In December 1997 or January 1998, plaintiff had apparently

arranged for two different attorneys to act as her counsel. 

However, both counsel later declined to represent plaintiff based on time constraints and the state of the record.

	On January 9, 1998, defendant filed another motion for summary

judgment on the fraud count, alleging that plaintiff had no

evidence to establish reliance by the FDA on any alleged

misrepresentations by defendant.  On the same day, the trial court

denied plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint, concluding that

her proposed claims were based on failure to warn, a claim upon

which defendant had been previously granted summary judgment.  

	On January 28, defendant filed a motion to have facts deemed

admitted based on plaintiff's failure to answer defendant's request

for admissions.  On February 13, plaintiff filed an emergency

motion to designate an opinion witness on causation, which

plaintiff was later allowed to withdraw.  On February 19, the trial

court granted defendant's motion to bar fact witnesses.  On

February 23, the trial court continued the trial date to April 23. 

On March 3, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss

counts IV and V of plaintiff's complaint, but granted defendant's

motion for a bill of particulars as to count IV.  On March 6,

plaintiff moved to supplement her response to one of defendant's

motions for summary judgment with the November 13, 1997, IOM

report.  This request was denied on March 17.  On March 27, the

trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff's fraud count.  Plaintiff filed an emergency motion to

reconsider the grant of summary judgment to which she attached

various documents.  The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider.

	On April 21, plaintiff filed an emergency motion to continue

the trial date to retain counsel, which the trial court denied.  At

this hearing, plaintiff accused defense counsel of engaging in

tactics to keep her from obtaining the assistance of counsel that

she needed, i.e., that defense counsel had persuaded an attorney who had agreed to represent plaintiff from representing her. 

Plaintiff also accused defense counsel of making substantial

misrepresentations to the court.  The trial court admonished

plaintiff, warning her to stop her repeated interruptions of the

proceedings and interruptions when others were talking, and to stop

with her outbursts.  Plaintiff renewed her motion to continue on

April 23, which the trial court again denied.  The following

colloquy then occurred:

			"MS. MANN:  *** I am not prepared to

proceed to trial.  So I would assume that that

means you will enter a dismissal for want of

prosecution.

			THE COURT:  I guess I should make this

more formal because I assumed something that

was not true.  For the record, is the

defendant ready to proceed to trial?

			MS. WOODBURY [defense counsel]: Yes, your

Honor.

			MS. SCHEVE [defense counsel]:  Yes, your Honor.

			THE COURT:  For the record, is the

plaintiff prepared to proceed to trial?

			MS. MANN:  No, I am not.

			THE COURT:  Will you be prepared to

proceed to trial any time this afternoon?

			MS. MANN:  No.

			THE COURT:  This court then has no other

recourse then if the plaintiff is [un]prepared

and unwilling to proceed at trial to dismiss

the case.

			***

			The case is dismissed for want of

prosecution."

Thereafter, the trial court granted defendant's motion for costs. 

Plaintiff then filed a handwritten motion to vacate the DWP, which

the trial court denied, stating it would not vacate an order it had

entered just five minutes previously.  On May 8, plaintiff filed a

motion to vacate the DWP pursuant to section 2--1301 of the Code of

Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1301 (West 1998)) and an emergency

motion to withdraw the motion to vacate the DWP she had earlier

filed.  On May 22, plaintiff amended her motion to vacate and, on

May 26, she filed a second amended motion to vacate as well as a

motion to reconsider the trial court's order denying her motion to

continue the trial date.  On June 8, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate the DWP.  The next day plaintiff filed

a motion to reconsider the June 8 order and, on June 16, she filed

an amended motion to reconsider.  On June 17, plaintiff filed a

corrected amended motion to reconsider, which was denied on June

18.  On June 19, plaintiff filed a second amended motion to

reconsider the order denying her motion to vacate the DWP and,

sometime thereafter, she filed a third amended motion.  On June 26,

the trial court declined to hear plaintiff's third amended motion

to reconsider.  Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on July 1, which

she amended on July 7.  On July 7, plaintiff again requested that

the court hear argument on her third amended motion to reconsider,

and the trial court again declined to conduct a hearing on it.  On

July 14, defendant filed its cross-appeal.

	ANALYSIS

	Generally, dismissal of a case for want of prosecution is not

a final order which can be appealed since a plaintiff has an

absolute right to refile the case within one year of the dismissal. 

Wilson v. Evanston Hospital, 257 Ill. App. 3d 837, 839, 629 N.E.2d 589 (1994).  Pursuant to section 12--317 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12--317 (West 1998)), where a plaintiff's

action is dismissed for want of prosecution, the plaintiff has the

option "to refile the action within one year of the entry of the

DWP order or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever

is greater."  S.C. Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 181 Ill. 2d 489, 497, 693 N.E.2d 338 (1998).  A "trial court's

order denying the vacature of [a] DWP must also be nonfinal and

nonappealable since there is an absolute right to refile following

that order."  Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 840.  Similarly, a timely motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to vacate does not

transform the DWP into a final and appealable order--this is simply

a reaffirmation by the trial court of its earlier decision which in

no way affects finality of the DWP.  Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 840.  Only after the one-year period for refiling has expired does

a DWP become final and appealable.  Vaughan, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 502.  Plaintiffs, however, are only entitled to one refiling of a

cause of action under section 13--217 following a voluntary

dismissal.  Timberlake v. Illini Hospital, 175 Ill. 2d 159, 164, 676 N.E.2d 634 (1997). 

	In the instant case, the general rule with respect to the

nonfinality of DWPs is not applicable because after the trial court

dismissed plaintiff's case for want of prosecution, plaintiff had

no right to refile her cause of action since she had already had

her one refiling under section 13--217 when she refiled her

complaint in the circuit court in October 1992 following her

voluntary dismissal of her complaint in the federal court.  See

Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 105, 672 N.E.2d 1207 (1996).  Accordingly, when the trial court dismissed

plaintiff's entire complaint for want of prosecution on April 23,

1998, at plaintiff's voluntary request, and denied her motion to vacate the DWP on June 8, 1998, the dismissal was with prejudice

and rendered the DWP order final.  See Danaher v. Knightsbridge Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 977, 980, 372 N.E.2d 862 (1978) (order denying motion to vacate is final and appealable).  In addition, because

the rights of the parties were ascertained and absolutely fixed at

the time the trial court denied the motion to vacate on June 8, the

prior court orders granting summary judgment, dismissing count IV

of plaintiff's complaint, and denying plaintiff's various requests

for continuances, all of which were nonfinal orders that did not

contain Rule 304(a) language, then became final orders.  It was on

June 8 that the litigation was terminated upon the denial of

plaintiff's motion to vacate.  Thus, all prior orders were subject

to appeal and plaintiff's notice of appeal filed on July 1, 1998,

was timely.

	Because plaintiff's entire cause of action was dismissed for

want of prosecution, the sole issue before this court is whether

the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying

plaintiff's motion to vacate the dismissal of her complaint for

want of prosecution.  If the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion to vacate, the remaining issues

raised by plaintiff are rendered moot since the DWP order disposed

of the entire cause of action.

	Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying her motions to vacate the DWP order by failing to

consider the requisite criteria pursuant to section 2--1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  According to plaintiff, a review of the

transcripts of proceedings demonstrate that the trial court failed

to analyze or state findings upon the required criteria for

vacating an order.  It is her contention that the overriding

criteria is whether substantial justice was done and that section

2--1301, unlike section 2--1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735

ILCS 5/2--1401 (West 1998)), forbids consideration of due

diligence.  Plaintiff claims that the only thing she could do was

let the trial court dismiss her case because she could not have

proceeded to trial pro se.  She contends that she prosecuted her case to the fullest extent of her abilities.

	Pursuant to section 2--1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

"[t]he court may *** on motion filed within 30 days after entry

thereof set aside any final order or judgment upon any terms and

conditions that shall be reasonable."  735 ILCS 5/2--1301 (West

1998).  The plaintiff, as the moving party, has the burden of

establishing sufficient grounds for vacating the judgment.  In re Marriage of Ward, 282 Ill. App. 3d 423, 432, 668 N.E.2d 149 (1996).  "The primary concern in ruling on a motion to vacate is whether

substantial justice is being done between the litigants and whether

it is reasonable under the circumstances to proceed to trial on the

merits."  Marren Builders, Inc. v. Lampert, 307 Ill. App. 3d 937, 941, 719 N.E.2d 117 (1999).  However, the court may also consider

whether a meritorious defense exists, due diligence, the severity

of the penalty as a result of the judgment, and the hardship to the nonmovant if required to proceed to trial.  Marren Builders, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 941-42.  The trial court should consider all events

leading up to the judgment.  Marren Builders, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 943.  " 'What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of

each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations

regardless of the outcome.' "  Merchants Bank v. Roberts, 292 Ill. App. 3d 925, 932, 686 N.E.2d 1202 (1997), quoting Widucus v. Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 102, 108, 167 N.E.2d 799 (1960).  The guiding principle is to prevent

dismissal when it would be unfair, unjust, and inequitable.  Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center, 275 Ill. App. 3d 170, 173, 655 N.E.2d 933 (1995).  

	"The decision to grant or deny a motion to vacate *** lies

within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse

only if the trial court abused its discretion."  Marren Builders, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 941.  A trial court abuses its discretion "when it acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious

judgment or if its decision exceeds the bounds of reason and

ignores principles of law such that substantial prejudice has

resulted."  Marren Builders, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 941.  "If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the trial

court's actions, then the trial court cannot be said to have

exceeded its discretion."  Merchants Bank, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 930.  	In the instant case, we find that while dismissal is a severe

penalty, under the circumstances of this case, existing from the beginning of the litigation, dismissal was a fair and just result,

which did not deny plaintiff substantial justice.  The record

clearly reflects a lack of due diligence on the part of plaintiff,

a complete refusal to follow established litigation procedures, and

that plaintiff was certainly on notice as early as 1996 that her

case was in jeopardy.  From very early on, plaintiff refused to

cooperate with discovery.  She refused to answer interrogatories

and requests for production of documents, she refused to sign

medical authorizations although ordered to do so at least twice by

the federal district court, and she refused to provide her medical

information and records to defendant even though such information

was crucial to the issues in the case.  Defendant was forced to

bring several motions to compel as well as motions for sanctions

against plaintiff based on her refusal to cooperate with discovery. 

In fact, plaintiff was ultimately barred from presenting any

opinion witnesses except for her own treating physicians because of

her refusal to answer Rule 213 interrogatories.

	Plaintiff's refusal to follow established procedures for

presenting, preparing, and trying her case also supports the trial

court's decision.  Plaintiff advised the court several times that

it was her intent to have the case litigated in a manner that was

different than most products liability cases were litigated. 

Plaintiff repeatedly refused to answer the trial court's questions

during oral arguments.  Plaintiff ignored the court's comments from

early on that it was concerned with what efforts she was taking to move the case forward and that her position was in jeopardy.  As

early as October 1996, the trial court questioned plaintiff's

diligence and discovery efforts.  Such questioning was continued

throughout the case by the various judges hearing plaintiff's

motions when they expressed their concerns with her discovery

efforts and manner of prosecution of her case.  The judges'

comments at the various hearings clearly made their concerns known

to plaintiff with respect to the adequacy of her evidence and

discovery efforts.  Additionally, although the trial court

attempted to apprise plaintiff of the procedures she needed to

follow, plaintiff did not follow its suggestions and continued to

argue to the trial court that she intended to try this case

differently than other cases.

	The numerous continuances and delays occasioned by plaintiff's

conduct provide additional support for the trial court's decision. 

Although several of plaintiff's motions for continuances were based

on her request to obtain counsel, we note that plaintiff herself

chose to proceed pro se to protect her own interests and privacy.  While we are not saying that plaintiff was not entitled to have

counsel represent her, she voluntarily made the decision to

initially proceed pro se and the case should not be further delayed in light of her insistence that she proceed pro se.  See Clewell v. The Upjohn Co., No. 94--2383 (E.D. Pa. November 21, 1995).

	Lastly, we find plaintiff's repeated attacks upon defendant's

counsel, both during oral argument and in her written documents before the trial court, very disturbing.  Plaintiff was advised by

the trial court that her conduct was improper and she was

admonished on numerous occasions to cease her conduct.  Plaintiff

ignored the court's admonishments and continued her attacks upon

defense counsel.  We also admonish plaintiff that such conduct was

improper, as well as inexcusable.

	In summary, the record in this case discloses a lack of

cooperation by the plaintiff in obeying court orders, indifference

to the trial court's advice and admonishments, repeated attempts to

delay the proceedings, and a failure to follow the rules of proper

procedure.  Plaintiff was the architect of her own predicament, and

her complaint now that she was denied substantial justice will not

be heard by this court.  Francone v. Weigel Broadcasting Co., Inc., 79 Ill. App. 3d 991, 993, 398 N.E.2d 1114 (1979).  The trial court

indulged plaintiff and gave her many opportunities to proceed with

her case, yet plaintiff did not avail herself of the court's

indulgence.  This case has lingered in the circuit court for six

years and, after all the delays, refusals, and lack of cooperation

by plaintiff, it would not be reasonable to force defendant to

proceed to trial.  The trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's

motion to vacate its DWP order was reasonably made to prevent

further delays and expenses and to reach an end to this litigation. 

We conclude that substantial justice was done and that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to

vacate the DWP order.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion and because all claims were dismissed by the court's DWP

order, the remaining issues raised in this appeal are moot, as are

those raised in defendant's cross-appeal.

	CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit

court of Cook County.

	Affirmed.

	HALL, P.J., and WOLFSON, J., concur.