In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-2420 

RAE MCCANN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

BADGER MINING CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 3:18-cv-00073 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 8, 2020 — DECIDED JULY 14, 2020 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Rae McCann brought this action 

against her former employer Badger Mining Company 

(“Badger”) under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, and the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634. She alleged that Badger discriminated against her on the basis of 

her age and disability when it failed to transfer her to a position in a different department and when it eliminated her 
2 No. 19-2420 

position as part of a reduction in force. After discovery, 

Badger moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted the motion. 

Before us, Ms. McCann maintains only that the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment to Badger on her 

disability claim related to the elimination of her position. 

Under the ADA, Ms. McCann was required to come forward 

with evidence that, but for her disability, Badger would not 

have eliminated her position. She did not meet that burden, 

and we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I 

BACKGROUND 

A. 

Ms. McCann began her employment with Badger’s predecessor, Atlas Resin Proppants (“Atlas”), at its Merrillan 

West facility1

 in September 2010. In early 2013, Ms. McCann 

applied for and obtained a laboratory technician position in 

the research and development (“R & D”) laboratory. At her 

year-end evaluation for 2013, she received an overall appraisal of “Right on Track.”2

 However, her supervisor noted 

some shortcomings in her ability to deal with conflict, work 

with others, communicate, and problem-solve with her 

coworkers. The review also noted some limitations in 

1 Atlas, which was a company that produced coated sand products for 

use in industrial applications, had three coating facilities: Taylor, Merrillan East, and Merrillan West. All of these facilities are located in Wisconsin. 

2 R.42-3 at 8. 
No. 19-2420 3

Ms. McCann’s ability to perform new tasks and in her ability 

to understand others’ roles in the department.3

Until May of 2014, Cathleen Hegge supervised 

Ms. McCann. Following Hegge’s departure, Erica Grant 

oversaw R & D, and Kimberly Breid became Ms. McCann’s 

direct supervisor. At the time, the R & D department consisted of Breid, Weston Lewis (an engineer), and three laboratory technicians: Ms. McCann, Penny Higley, and Kory 

Kowahl, who specialized in conductivity and calibration 

tests. While she was Ms. McCann’s supervisor, Breid (and 

other individuals on the management team) observed that 

Ms. McCann had difficulties getting along with others.4

Higley also had problems getting along with her coworkers. 

On March 16, 2015, Grant and Breid gave Ms. McCann 

her evaluation for calendar year 2014.5 Again, her overall rating was “Right on Track”;6

 however, her rating in a number 

of individual areas declined. For instance, she only “Sometimes” displayed mastery of “Ethics and Respect.”7

 In this 

3 See id. at 3 (noting that “[s]ome new things are alarming to Rae, 

[ ](changes in documentation and routine) but she does get there” and 

that “[Rae] does seek to understand others[’] jobs and challenges, but ... 

if an initial interaction does not go well on solving a conflict between the 

two, Rae often gives up and resorts to talking it up to others”). 

4 See R.57-1 ¶¶ 24–29. 

5 See R.42-4. 

6 Id. at 6. 

7 Id. at 2. 
4 No. 19-2420 

category, it was noted that Ms. McCann could be blunt, did 

not resolve disputes using the appropriate channels, and 

needed to stay out of others’ disputes.8

 Ms. McCann admits 

that she had problems getting along with Higley, but maintains that she no longer had interpersonal problems once 

Higley left Atlas sometime after June 2014.9

Ms. McCann also received a “Sometimes” rating with respect to “Communication.”10 The review noted that she had 

a difficult time understanding instructions: “if everything 

isn’t written down in the exact right order Rae will have 

questions and not proceed until they are answered.”11 The 

performance review also noted that she needed improvement in finding solutions to problems.12

In late 2014, there was a downturn in oil prices and, as a 

result, a downturn in the demand for Atlas’s products. As of 

March 15, 2015, Atlas reduced its production schedule and 

requested that associates limit overtime hours. In a further 

attempt to survive the downturn in business, Atlas merged 

with Badger on April 1, 2015. 

8 See id. 

9 See Appellant’s Br. 47–48 (admitting that “there was some friction in 

June of 2014 between Higley and McCann” and arguing that “Higley’s 

employment with Badger Mining ended in 2014, as did McCann’s perceived negativity”). 

10 R.42-4 at 2. 

11 Id. 

12 See id. at 3. 
No. 19-2420 5

Shortly after the merger, Ms. McCann began working on 

the night shift. According to Ms. McCann, she requested the 

change to avoid working with Kowahl.13 Kowahl had difficulty controlling his temper,14 and his ire sometimes was directed at Ms. McCann. 

After the merger, Breid and Lewis (the R & D engineer) 

“were responsible for performing a multitude of functions 

within the R & D department,” including “mixing new 

lab-batches of resin-coated products (a task which Higley 

had performed before she resigned from her employment in 

August of 2014).”15 Given Breid’s and Lewis’s other responsibilities, Grant decided that someone else should be trained 

to perform this task and arranged for Breid to teach 

Ms. McCann batch mixing. According to Ms. McCann, this 

training consisted of “a single, two hour training session 

with Breid, during which Breid showed her how to mix a 

batch.”16 Ms. McCann recounts that, “[a]fter [she] observed 

Breid mixing a batch, McCann mixed a batch, alone, on her 

next night shift.”17 “Breid was not present when [she] mixed 

the batch and [she] did not ask Breid questions while mixing 

the batch on the night shift. McCann found mixing the batch 

to be easy and did not have any problems with mixing a 

13 See R.67 ¶ 229. 

14 See id. ¶¶ 216–18. 

15 R.57-1 ¶¶ 46, 49. 

16 R.67 ¶ 177. 

17 Id. ¶ 178. 
6 No. 19-2420 

batch.”18 She further notes that the one batch she mixed “was 

used by Badger,” and that she “was not informed of any 

problems with the batch ... or errors in the mixing procedure.”19 Ms. McCann later inquired if Breid wanted her to 

mix additional batches, but Breid told her “not to worry 

about the batches and that McCann needed to work on the 

ISO project.”20 Badger acknowledges that, “on one occasion 

McCann completed one of the assigned recipes,” but explains that Ms. McCann “had numerous questions regarding 

the timing, amounts, and chemicals used in the other recipes 

which ultimately prevented her from completing them during her shift.”21 Given this experience and “Breid’s past experiences with McCann, Breid concluded both that McCann 

could not competently and efficiently perform the mixing 

responsibilities and that it was too time consuming to keep 

repeating answers to the questions [she] raised.”22 Breid discussed the situation with Grant, and, “in approximately July 

of 2015, Breid and Grant began discussing options for having another laboratory technician—who could pick up the 

task quickly and perform it independently—assist with mixing batches, as well as performing other assigned tasks.”23

18 Id. ¶ 179. 

19 Id. ¶ 180. 

20 Id. ¶183. 

21 R.57-1 ¶ 55 (emphasis added). 

22 Id. ¶ 56. 

23 Id. ¶ 57. 
No. 19-2420 7

Grant and Breid approached lab coaches Lisa Rodriguez 

and Rhonda Miller to identify other employees who could 

move into the R & D department to perform batch mixing. 

Both Rodriguez and Miller recommended Nathan Coblentz.24 Coblentz had assisted in the R & D department on 

occasion, had expressed an interest in R & D, and could 

work independently.25 Acting on these recommendations, 

Grant met with Coblentz on or about September 14, 2015,26

to discuss his possible transfer. Grant wanted to transfer Coblentz immediately, but his present production team needed 

his help to complete a work-instruction project. 

Prior to Coblentz’s coming to the R & D department, 

Ms. McCann had been experiencing pain and numbness in 

her hands and, on September 2, 2015, sought treatment from 

Dr. Richard Rogge. Dr. Rogge diagnosed Ms. McCann with 

arthritis, ordered an x-ray, and confirmed changes in her 

hands. He also noted that “[t]his certainly could be just osteoarthritis from the repetitive motion and then it may be just 

warranted to treat this symptomatically.”27 Although 

Dr. Rogge prescribed medication, he did not place any restrictions on Ms. McCann’s activities at that time. 

Ms. McCann had a follow-up visit with a physician’s assis24 See id. ¶¶ 59–61. 

25 See id. ¶ 63. 

26 Coblentz testified that this conversation occurred approximately three 

weeks before he started in R & D. See R.29 at 4 (Coblentz Dep. 14). He 

began in R & D on October 5, 2015. 

27 R.69-1 at 1. 
8 No. 19-2420 

tant in the orthopedics department on September 18; the 

physician’s assistant noted “[b]ilateral hand degenerative 

joint disease ... and bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome, all 

most likely related to overuse and some things she does for 

work and occupation.”28 The physician’s assistant recommended, among other steps, some initial testing for carpal 

tunnel. 

On September 21, 2015, Ms. McCann sent an email to 

Breid and copied Grant and Julie Casperson from human 

resources. In the email, Ms. McCann reported that she had 

been diagnosed with arthritis and carpal tunnel syndrome 

and that she would need time off for follow-up tests, appointments, and possibly two surgeries. She specifically requested to take off three shifts for appointments between 

September 30 and October 16. Casperson responded to 

Ms. McCann, expressing regret Ms. McCann was having so 

much pain in her hands and advising that Ms. McCann 

probably should start some paperwork for family medical 

leave and short-term disability. Casperson indicated that another individual from human resources, Greta, would be in 

touch with paperwork. Breid responded that Ms. McCann 

could have the time off. Ms. McCann’s September 21 email 

was the first notice to anyone at Badger about Ms. McCann’s 

hand condition. 

After Ms. McCann informed Breid and Casperson of her 

hand condition, Casperson followed up with Breid to determine whether Ms. McCann’s condition could be 

28 R.69-2 at 2. 
No. 19-2420 9

work-related. Breid responded that Ms. McCann had indicated that her hands hurt worse after doing crush testing. 

Because Ms. McCann was going to miss several days of 

work in the upcoming weeks, and may have been out for 

more extended periods of time, Grant believed that she 

needed to transfer Coblentz to R & D on a more expedited 

basis.29 On September 22, 2015, Grant sent an email to Breid 

updating her on a conversation that she had had with Coblentz concerning his transfer; it states: 

Nate was at Taylor today and I mentioned to 

him that Rae would be in and out for the next 

few months (I didn’t say why) and we might 

need some help. I told him I didn’t want to 

step on your toes and that I hadn’t officially 

talked to you on this yet but that you would be 

around tomorrow and we would discuss further. He was very interested and just ask[ed] 

that we keep Rhonda and Lisa in the loop if 

this is something you decide would make 

sense. 

Hopefully I didn’t overstep my bounds here. 

We can discuss further in the morning.30

On October 5, 2015, Breid sent an email to McCann notifying 

her that Coblentz had been formally transferred to R & D 

and would be performing batch-mixing responsibilities. 

29 See R.22 at 14 (Grant Dep. 55–56). 

30 R.69-7. 
10 No. 19-2420 

Also in the late summer and early fall of 2015, management at Badger continued to explore ways that it could cut 

costs and increase efficiencies. Sometime in late August or 

early September, a meeting was held during which members 

of the leadership team discussed the possibility of layoffs 

and had preliminary discussions about who might be laid 

off. At that time, there was no formal list and “very limited” 

discussions of individuals who eventually might have to be 

laid off;31 Beth Nighbor, who was in charge of human resources for Badger, does not recall Ms. McCann being mentioned.32 On September 2, Lori Phillipi, Co-President of the 

Badger Advisory (leadership) Team, sent an email to other 

members of management outlining the timeline for costcutting measures. It read: 

1) Have all cost cutting items to me by September 

16. The Advisory team will be reviewing these 

on September 17th. 

2) Don’t wait to start implementing. Start knocking off low hanging fruit. 

3) Be ready to share your cost cutting ideas at the 

next Advisory/Leader meeting on Oct 20. Also 

share any ideas that you already implemented. 

4) Any staff changes will be handle[d] with the 

following timeline: 

31 See R.48 at 7 (Nighbor Dep. 22–23). 

32 See id. at 9 (Nighbor Dep. 32). 
No. 19-2420 11

a. Have any staff reductions to Beth and 

Lori by September 16th. 

b. First consideration will be given to people interested in early retirement. Those 

will be defined by October 1st, so adjustments can be made on teams that 

need to reduce staff. As always low performers will be the ones let go if teams 

have to reduce. 

C. Packages will be developed for those losing 

their jobs. All terminations will be announced on one day at the end of October. 

Please keep this confidential! 33

On September 29, all Badger employees over the age of sixty, 

including Ms. McCann, were offered an early retirement 

package. The employees had two weeks to act on the offer.34

33 R.42-18. 

34 At the meeting in which Ms. McCann was offered early retirement, 

she advised Casperson and Nighbor that she was having trouble with 

her hands and told them that she had requested that Dave Goplin, in 

Safety Personnel, raise the height of her work table. Casperson immediately followed up with an email to Goplin asking if Ms. McCann had had 

“a conversation with you about some safety and ergonomic issues/concerns a few weeks ago? If so, have you looked into them and 

what is the status?” R.42-16. Goplin informed Casperson that he had assigned it to a subordinate who had failed to follow up. That same afternoon, Goplin gave instructions for Ms. McCann’s table to be raised, and, 

the following day, he informed Casperson that the task had been completed. 
12 No. 19-2420 

Ms. McCann initially indicated to Breid that Coblentz 

would be “a great addition to the R & D group” and that she 

“look[ed] forward to working with him!”35 However, the 

day after Ms. McCann received the news of Coblentz’s transfer (October 5), she went to Breid and asked if Coblentz was 

replacing her. Breid informed Ms. McCann that the decision 

to transfer Coblentz to R & D had been made earlier. The 

timing of his transfer was designed “to ensure sufficient 

coverage in the event McCann had to be away from work for 

medical appointments.”36 

After this discussion, Ms. McCann went to speak to Casperson in human resources. Ms. McCann told Casperson 

about the discussion she had had with Breid and asked Casperson if Coblentz was being brought in to replace her. Casperson told Ms. McCann that she did not know what was 

going to happen with the R & D department and that she 

(Ms. McCann) would need to discuss that with Grant. Casperson also inquired whether Ms. McCann might be interested in transferring back to production, where she had 

worked before taking the position in R & D. Ms. McCann indicated that she would be. 

On October 12, Ms. McCann still had not responded to 

Badger’s early retirement offer. Consequently, Casperson 

emailed Ms. McCann to inquire whether she had made a decision regarding the offer; Casperson also asked 

Ms. McCann about her hands. Ms. McCann responded that 

35 R.42-13. 

36 See R.35 ¶ 13. 
No. 19-2420 13

she had decided not to take the offer, reiterated that she was 

interested in transferring out of R & D, and informed Casperson that “[m]y hands are feeling great since I got the injections in them, so maybe that did the trick!!!”37

In the end, only six individuals accepted the early retirement packages, and involuntary staff reductions became 

necessary. Badger management determined that thirty-three 

positions across three facilities needed to be eliminated; this 

number included one position in R & D. Grant made the decision regarding the position to eliminate.38 In doing so, she 

considered each R & D employee’s 2013 and 2014 performance reviews,39 her own knowledge and observations, and 

feedback from the team coaches.40 The layoff criteria in 

Badger’s employee handbook dictated that she apply the following criteria in order of importance: 

 required job functions for production 

 voluntary layoffs 

 work habits and attitude 

 prior work performance[.]41 

Grant, determined, and Ms. McCann admits, that Breid 

and Lewis (the engineer) had experience that was critical to 

37 R.36-3 at 1. 

38 See R.22 at 10 (Grant Dep. 39). 

39 See id. at 12 (Grant Dep. 46–48). 

40 See id. at 10 (Grant Dep. 39–40). 

41 R.37-4. 
14 No. 19-2420 

the R & D department and that they possessed skills that 

Ms. McCann did not have. Grant also determined that 

Kowahl’s services were necessary because he was responsible for performing conductivity testing, a task that 

Ms. McCann never had performed by herself.42 Thus, Grant’s 

ultimate decision was whether Ms. McCann or Coblentz 

should be let go. 

According to Grant, she considered each of their technical skills and concluded that Ms. McCann and Coblentz 

were equally skilled with respect to lab testing, but that Coblentz was more skilled at batch mixing. She also believed 

that, based on her past performance, Ms. McCann would not 

be able either to adapt to the changes in Badger’s workforce 

or to work with limited direction and instruction; Coblentz, 

on the other hand, could “adapt to change, troubleshoot on 

the fly, and work with limited direction.”43 Grant also relied 

on the recommendation of Breid in making the decision. 

Ms. McCann was notified on October 26, 2015, that her position was being eliminated. Upon her separation, Badger 

provided Ms. McCann a letter of reference; the letter described Ms. McCann as “willing to learn and ... a valuable 

member of her team” and as “flexible, prompt and reliable 

and quality focused.”44 

42 See R.30 at 25–26 (McCann Dep. 100–02). 

43 R.37 ¶ 20. 

44 R.67 ¶ 277. 
No. 19-2420 15

B. 

Ms. McCann filed the present action on February 2, 2018. 

She alleged that Badger had discriminated against her based 

on her disability and age when it eliminated her position 

and failed to accommodate her. Following extensive discovery, Badger moved for summary judgment on all claims. The 

district court granted Badger’s motion. 

Pertinent to the issues on appeal, the district court observed that, to establish that she had suffered disability discrimination, Ms. McCann had to show that she was disabled 

within the meaning of the ADA, that she was otherwise 

qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or 

without reasonable accommodation, and that her disability 

caused the adverse job action. 

Turning to the first element—whether Ms. McCann was 

disabled—the district court noted that Ms. McCann had argued both that she was disabled and that Badger perceived 

her as disabled. It concluded, however, that it did not need 

to resolve this issue because Ms. McCann had not shown 

that her disability was the reason Badger had eliminated her 

position. 

In reaching this conclusion, the district court considered 

the evidence upon which Ms. McCann relied to establish 

disability discrimination and concluded that it would not 

support a finding of discrimination. This evidence included: 

“suspicious timing,” with her departure following closely on 

the heels of her revelation that she may need surgery; Badger management’s discussion of how to handle Ms. McCann’s 

hand issues; and evidence that Badger’s purported reasons 

for retaining Coblentz were pretextual. With respect to pre-
16 No. 19-2420 

text, the district court noted that, “[t]o create a genuine issue 

of material fact on the issue of intent, McCann must demonstrate that all of Badger Mining’s reasons are pretextual.”45

Consequently, although the district court believed that there 

was a genuine dispute of material fact whether Coblentz 

possessed superior batch-mixing abilities, this disagreement 

did not defeat summary judgment because Ms. McCann had 

not come forward with evidence that Badger’s other reasons 

for eliminating here position were pretextual. The district 

court therefore granted Badger’s motion for summary judgment. 

Ms. McCann timely appealed. 

II 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Ms. McCann pursues only her claim that 

Badger eliminated her position because she was disabled. 

“To prove a violation of § 12112(a), a plaintiff must show 

that: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) the adverse job action was 

caused by his disability.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 

F.3d 495, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Roberts v. City of 

Chi., 817 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2016)). Although the parties 

devote a significant portion of their submissions to the question whether Ms. McCann is disabled, we need not resolve 

that issue. Here, we agree with the district court that, even 

45 R.96 at 24 (citing Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 754 F.3d 428, 439 (7th

Cir. 2014)). 
No. 19-2420 17

assuming she is disabled, her disability was not the cause of 

the adverse job action. 

To establish causation, Ms. McCann concedes that she 

“must show that ... her employer would not have fired h[er] 

but for h[er] actual or perceived disability.”46 “Under Ortiz v. 

Werner Enterprises, Inc., the ultimate question in a discriminatory employment termination case is ‘[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plaintiff] would have 

kept his job if he [was not disabled], and everything else had 

46 Appellant’s Br. 30 (citing Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 

F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010)). Prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 

(“ADAAA”), Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, employers were liable for 

their discriminatory acts taken “because of” an employee’s disability, 

and we interpreted this language to require “but for” causation. See Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2017). “One of the 

changes made to the statute under the ADAAA was to change the language from prohibiting employers from discriminating ‘because of’ a 

disability to prohibiting employers from discriminating ‘on the basis of’ 

a disability.” Id. Several of our sister circuits have determined that this 

change in language has not altered the substantive standard, see Murray 

v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1106 n.6 (9th Cir. 2019); Natofsky v. City of 

New York, 921 F.3d 337, 349–50 (2d Cir. 2019); Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club 

Mgmt. Co., Inc., 816 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2016); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012), but the question is still 

technically an “open” one in our circuit, see Monroe, 871 F.3d at 504. 

There seems little doubt that our sister circuits’ approach is the correct 

one, see Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 2020 WL 3146686, at *4 (U.S. June 15, 2020) 

(quoting University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 

338, 350 (2013), for the proposition that “the ordinary meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of’”), however, we do not need 

to resolve the issue. Here, “the parties ... have not argued that another 

causation standard should apply, so we will continue to apply the ‘but 

for’ causation standard.” Monroe, 871 F.3d at 504. 
18 No. 19-2420 

remained the same.’” Graham v. Arctic Zone Iceplex, LLC, 930 

F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Ortiz v. Werner Enters. Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016)). 

One way to meet this burden—and one method Ms. McCann 

pursues—is for the plaintiff to “show[] that the stated reasons for the firing were pretextual.” Id.

A. 

“In evaluating pretext, ‘the question is not whether the 

employer’s stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but 

whether the employer honestly believed the reason it has 

offered to explain the discharge.’” Id. (quoting Monroe, 871 

F.3d at 505). Pretext therefore “requires more than just 

‘faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the 

employer’”; rather the plaintiff must show that the reason 

given “is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” 

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe, 871 F.3d at 505).

With this standard in mind, we evaluate each of Badger’s 

stated reasons,47 mindful that its reasons may be interrelated 

or that one may be “so ... suspicious” as to raise an inference 

of discrimination. Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 70 

(7th Cir. 1995). 

1. 

Ms. McCann first submits that Badger’s assertion that 

“she refused to or struggled to mix batches” is a “deliberate 

47 Because we evaluate each of Badger’s reasons, we need not decide 

definitively whether the district court took too crabbed a view of the evidence by relying on Garofalo, 754 F.3d at 439. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
No. 19-2420 19

falsehood.”48 According to Ms. McCann, Badger has changed 

its rationale with respect to her batch-mixing skills. She 

submits that Badger initially maintained that she “refused to 

perform mixing tasks absent extremely detailed instructions 

and constant guidance from her leaders”;49 however, it later 

defended its actions on the ground that Ms. McCann had 

“struggled” with batch mixing.50 She maintains that Badger’s 

changing rationale constitutes evidence of pretext. 

“Shifting and inconsistent explanations can provide a basis for a finding of pretext. But the explanations must actually be shifting and inconsistent to permit an inference of 

mendacity.” Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d 569, 577 

(7th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). It is not enough 

that an employer’s word choice or phraseology change over 

time. See id. Here, Badger never argued that Ms. McCann 

“refused” to do any task in an insubordinate manner. Its argument always has been that she could not perform batch 

mixing “absent extremely detailed instructions and constant 

guidance from her leaders.”51 Therefore, Badger’s rationale 

did not shift in a way to suggest it was a pretext. 

Ms. McCann also claims that she has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to Badger’s conclusion that she “had 

48 Appellant’s Br. 39. 

49 See R.69-19 at 8 (response of Badger’s counsel to Ms. McCann’s charge 

of discrimination). 

50 See Appellant’s Br. 39. 

51 R.69-19 at 8. 
20 No. 19-2420 

difficulty learning batch mixing responsibilities.”52 However, 

Ms. McCann’s argument misses the mark. Pretext is not 

shown when an employer is “wrong about its employee’s 

performance, or [is] too hard on its employee,” but when the 

employer’s proffered reason is “a lie.” Ineichen v. Ameritech, 

410 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ransom v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 217 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, after 

Breid trained Ms. McCann in batch mixing, Breid concluded 

that Ms. McCann could not perform this task efficiently and 

did not ask Ms. McCann to perform this task again.53 Indeed, 

Breid began to look for a lab technician who could perform 

batch mixing, and Coblentz was recruited to perform that 

function. Once in R & D, Coblentz spent twelve to sixteen 

hours per week performing that task and considered himself 

“the batch mixer.”54 Consequently, regardless whether 

Breid’s assessment of Ms. McCann’s batch-mixing skills was 

accurate, Breid’s subsequent actions establish that her belief 

was genuinely held: Breid did not believe Ms. McCann 

could fulfill those responsibilities and sought out another lab 

technician to do so.55

52 Appellant’s Br. 39–40. 

53 R.67 ¶¶ 182–83 (“After mixing a batch in July, 2015, McCann asked if 

they wanted her to mix any more batches. ... In response to McCann’s 

question, Breid told McCann no, not to worry about the batches ... .”). 

54 R.29 at 7, 10 (Coblentz Dep. 25, 40). 

55 In her reply, Ms. McCann acknowledges that a mere disagreement 

regarding her performance “would not be sufficient to support a finding 

of pretext.” Reply Br. 12. She claims, however, that “the factual assertions” on which Badger based its assessment “are untrue and represent 

(continued ... ) 
No. 19-2420 21

2. 

Ms. McCann also claims that Badger’s other reasons for 

choosing to eliminate her position instead of Coblentz’s —

that she lacked self-direction and troubleshooting skills—

were “implausible and unworthy of credence.”56 With respect to the first, she admits that, when she first started with 

R & D, “she had a learning curve.”57 Nevertheless, she sub-

( ... continued) 

things that did not happen, which can properly support a finding of pretext.” Id. With respect to batch mixing, Ms. McCann states that she “was 

asked to and did mix a single batch, alone, on her night shift. McCann 

did not ask any questions while mixing the batch. McCann found the 

batch mixing to be easy and performed it without any problem.” Appellant’s Br. 40 (internal citations omitted). She claims this is “directly contrary to what Breid said—that McCann had multiple questions while 

mixing a batch on her own and could not complete other batch mixing 

assignments.” Id. However, looking closely at the parties’ statements, 

there is no inconsistency. Ms. McCann’s statement focuses on her successful completion of a single batch. Breid acknowledges that 

Ms. McCann successfully mixed a single batch. R.57-1 ¶ 55 (noting that 

“on one occasion McCann completed one of the assigned recipes”). Breid 

asserts that Ms. McCann, however, had numerous questions regarding 

the timing, amounts, and chemicals used in the other recipes. Id.

Ms. McCann asserts that she “did not ask Breid questions while mixing 

the batch on night shift.” R.67 ¶ 179. However, Breid does not assert that 

Ms. McCann asked her (Breid) questions while on the night shift. Instead, 

Breid states that Ms. McCann had questions that could not be answered 

during Ms. McCann’s night shift (because Ms. McCann worked alone) 

and that these lingering questions “prevented her from completing [the 

other batches] during her shift.” R.57-1 ¶ 55. 

56 Appellant’s Br. 41. 

57 Id. 
22 No. 19-2420 

mits that, if she had lingering problems in this area, Badger 

would not have allowed her to transfer to the night shift 

where she was “unsupervised and without any assistance 

available.”58 

Badger’s acquiescence to Ms. McCann’s transfer request, 

however, does not raise a material fact regarding the veracity of its belief that Ms. McCann had difficulties with 

self-direction or troubleshooting. In her review for 2014, 

which was given to Ms. McCann in March 2015, Breid noted 

that, “if everything isn’t written down in the exact right order[,] Rae will have questions and not proceed until they are 

answered.”59 The performance review also noted that she 

needed improvement in finding solutions to problems.60

Moreover, in her deposition, Ms. McCann acknowledged 

that, as of March 15, 2015, she understood that Breid had 

concerns about her ability to take initiative and to complete 

tasks without detailed instructions.61 If she were provided 

with detailed instructions and confined to known tasks, she 

could do those alone without supervision. Indeed, as of 

summer 2015, Ms. McCann was doing almost exclusively 

crush-testing, a task that she was able to perform on her 

own, without direct supervision. 

58 Id. 

59 R.42-4 at 2. 

60 See id. at 3. 

61 See R.30 at 25 (McCann Dep. 99). 
No. 19-2420 23

3. 

Ms. McCann not only maintains that the reasons given 

for the elimination of her position were pretextual, she also 

contends that Badger lied concerning the criteria that it employed in reducing its workforce. She notes that “work habits and attitude” were among the stated criteria employed to 

determine who would be retained and who would be let 

go.

62 Ms. McCann submits, however, that if Badger truly had 

been concerned with employees’ attitudes, Kowahl and Coblentz, who had issues with their coworkers, should have 

been laid off before her.63 Again, however, Ms. McCann’s argument is not supported by the record. 

In making layoff determinations, Grant “adhered to the 

layoff criteria as identified in [Badger’s] Associate Handbook.”64 The Handbook identifies “the following criteria in 

order of importance: [r]equired job functions for production[,] 

voluntary layoffs[,] work habits and attitude[, and] prior 

work performance.”65 Looking at “required job functions for 

production” or expertise, it is undisputed that Kowahl performed all of the conductivity and calibration tests for the 

R & D department.66 Ms. McCann admits that Kowahl was 

62 R.37-4. 

63 See Appellant’s Br. 45–46. 

64 R.37 ¶ 15. 

65 R.37-4 (emphasis added). 

66 See R.57-1 ¶¶ 118–20. 
24 No. 19-2420 

“more proficient” in these areas67 and that she never had 

performed conductivity testing on her own.68 Thus, unlike 

Ms. McCann, Kowahl “possessed unique areas of expertise, 

which were required in the R & D Department.”69 

Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that 

Grant was aware of Coblentz’s interpersonal problems. Although other individuals at Badger—specifically Julie Casperson in human resources and Lisa Rodriguez—knew that 

Coblentz had encountered difficulties working with a 

coworker, Judy Thronson, Grant testified that, at the time 

she made the layoff decision, she had not been made aware 

of these difficulties. 

Ms. McCann maintains that Grant’s statement simply is 

not credible, that Casperson and Rodriguez must have provided this information to Grant, and that the district court 

made an improper credibility determination in concluding 

otherwise. At the summary judgment stage, however, it is 

not sufficient for a plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden 

of proof at trial, simply to assert that a jury may disbelieve 

the defendant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

256–57 (1986) (“We do not understand [our caselaw], however, to hold that a plaintiff may defeat a defendant’s 

properly supported motion for summary judgment ... without offering any concrete evidence from which a reasonable 

juror could return a verdict in his favor and by merely as67 See Appellant’s Br. 46. 

68 See R.30 at 25 (McCann Dep. 100). 

69 R.37 ¶ 16. 
No. 19-2420 25

serting that the jury might, and legally could, disbelieve the 

defendant’s denial ... .”). “Instead, the plaintiff must present 

affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported 

motion for summary judgment. This is true even where the 

evidence is likely to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to 

conduct discovery.” Id. at 257. Ms. McCann does not come 

forward with any testimony from Casperson or Rodriguez, 

both of whom she deposed, that calls Grant’s testimony into 

doubt. Indeed, Rodriguez testified that, when Breid and 

Grant approached her about finding a lab technician that 

would be a “good fit” in R & D, she recommended Coblentz.70 The undisputed evidence in the record is that Grant 

had no knowledge that Coblentz had any of the interpersonal problems that Ms. McCann had evidenced in her years 

with Badger.71 Consequently, there is no basis on which to 

conclude that Badger’s application of its layoff criteria was 

pretextual or that its proffered reasons for eliminating 

Ms. McCann’s position were pretextual. 

B. 

In addition to arguing that Badger’s reasons were pretextual, Ms. McCann maintains that the timing in her case is 

70 See R.28 at 7 (Rodriguez Dep. 27–28). 

71 Moreover, even if Ms. McCann were able to establish that Grant was 

aware of Coblentz’s interpersonal problems, that evidence would not 

undermine Grant’s conclusion, supported by Breid, that Coblentz would 

be better able to fill the needs of the R & D department because he was 

self-directed and could perform a greater range of tasks than 

Ms. McCann without constant supervision. 
26 No. 19-2420 

suspicious and therefore supports an inference that her position was eliminated because of her disability. We have held, 

repeatedly, that “‘suspicious timing alone is rarely enough 

to survive summary judgment’ particularly when ‘there are 

reasonable, non-suspicious explanations for the timing of 

[the] termination.’” Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 

711 (7th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Morgan v. 

SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 998 (7th Cir. 2013)).72 

72 As an initial matter, Ms. McCann quotes Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 

LLC, 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011), for the proposition that whether 

timing is suspicious and allows an inference of discrimination is a question for “[a] jury, not a judge.” However, in making this assertion, 

Ms. McCann takes the Loudermilk quote out of context. In that case, 

Loudermilk had handed his supervisor a note complaining about discrimination, and his supervisor had fired him on the spot. In discussing 

whether the timing of the termination was suspicious, this court stated: 

The discharge’s timing also could support an adverse inference by a reasonable trier of fact. Suspicious timing 

may be just that—suspicious—and a suspicion is not 

enough to get past a motion for summary judgment. See

Lewis v. Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007). Occasionally, however, an adverse action comes so close on 

the heels of a protected act that an inference of causation 

is sensible. See, e.g., Clark County School District v. 

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (“very close” temporal 

proximity can suffice); Casna v. Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 

427 (7th Cir. 2009); Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 943 (7th 

Cir. 2004); McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 

796–97 (7th Cir. 1997). Deciding when the inference is 

appropriate cannot be resolved by a legal rule; the answer depends on context, just as an evaluation of context 

is essential to determine whether an employer’s explanation is fishy enough to support an inference that the real 

(continued ... ) 
No. 19-2420 27

Here, Ms. McCann’s revelation of her hand condition 

must be considered against the background of the reduction 

in force, the early retirement program, and the search for a 

lab tech who could perform batch mixing. Turning first to 

the reduction in force, it is undisputed that, by September 2, 

2015, a preliminary plan and timeline had been established 

for staffing reductions: first early retirement packages would 

be offered and then further reductions would be made based 

on performance; team leaders were asked to provide costcutting measures by September 16. Grant provided her proposed measures for the R & D department on September 10. 

Consistent with the guidelines set forth on September 2—

that early retirement would be offered before determining 

performance-based reductions—Grant noted that 

Ms. McCann “could be an option for early retirement.”73

Thus, the potential elimination of Ms. McCann’s position 

was on the table prior to her giving notice of her hand issues; 

however, it was tied to the first stage of Badger’s reduction 

plan—early retirement—as opposed to the second stage—

( ... continued) 

reason must be discriminatory. The district court’s apparent belief that timing never supports an inference of 

causation is untenable. The closer two events are, the 

more likely that the first caused the second. We think that 

an inference of causation would be reasonable here. A jury, 

not a judge, should decide whether the inference is appropriate. 

Id. (second emphasis added) (parallel citations omitted). Thus, it was the 

unique facts of Loudermilk that made submission to the jury appropriate. 

73 R.42-19 at 2. 
28 No. 19-2420 

performance-based staffing reductions. On September 29, 

early retirement packages were extended to qualifying employees, including Ms. McCann. When Badger received the 

tepid response to its offers, it became necessary to consider 

more reductions on other bases. It therefore is not “suspicious” that Ms. McCann’s position—and those of other employees—were identified for elimination in early October. 

Ms. McCann also claims that Coblentz’s transfer to 

R & D, which came close on the heels of her announcement 

of her hand problems, evinces Badger’s motive to replace 

her because of her disability. However, Grant, Rodriguez, 

and Coblentz all testified that the process for hiring him into 

the R & D department was prompted by the department’s 

need for a batch mixer, that the process began in the summer 

of 2015, and that it was completed prior to Ms. McCann’s 

announcement that she was experiencing problems with her 

hands.74 The transfer was delayed because of an on-going 

project with which Coblentz was involved in his current position. However, when Badger was made aware of 

Ms. McCann’s need to miss work for appointments and possible surgeries, the timeline for the transfer was expedited as 

74 See R.22 at 8–9 (Grant Dep. 32–33) (describing a process of recruiting a 

lab technician that began in “the summer of 2015,” receiving Rodriguez’s 

recommendation of Coblentz “in August” of 2015, but initially delaying 

his transfer to R & D until a work-instruction project was finished); R.28 

at 7 (Rodriguez Dep. 28) (stating that she recommended Coblentz “a few 

months before he actually got that position”); R.29 at 3–4 (Coblentz Dep. 

12–14) (describing an interview with Grant three weeks before he was 

transferred “in late September or the beginning of October”).
No. 19-2420 29

Grant explains in an email to Breid on September 22, 2015; it 

states: 

Nate was at Taylor today and I mentioned to 

him that Rae would be in and out for the next 

few months (I didn’t say why) and we might 

need some help. I told him I didn’t want to 

step on your toes and that I hadn’t officially 

talked to you on this yet but that you would be 

around tomorrow and we would discuss further. He was very interested and just ask[ed] 

that we keep Rhonda and Lisa in the loop if 

this is something you decide would make 

sense. 

Hopefully I didn’t overstep my bounds here. 

We can discuss further in the morning.75

Ms. McCann reads this email differently; she maintains 

that it establishes that Coblentz’s transfer was conceived of, 

as opposed to merely effectuated, after her announcement. 

As the nonmoving party, she believes that she is entitled to 

this inference and that the inference raises a jury question. 

However, a plaintiff is entitled to “reasonable inferences” from 

the evidence, not those “supported by only speculation or 

conjecture.” King v. Hendricks Cty. Comm’rs, 954 F.3d 981, 984 

(7th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). Reading the email as expediting the transfer process is consistent with the testimony 

of every witness who was personally involved with Coblentz’s transfer; Ms. McCann’s reading, on the other hand, 

75 R.69-7. 
30 No. 19-2420 

is based solely on “speculation and conjecture.” It does not 

raise a question to be resolved by a jury. 

C. 

Finally, Ms. McCann maintains that there are “ambiguous statements of animus” from which disability discrimination can be inferred.76 Specifically, she invites our attention 

to a number of emails between Badger human resources and 

management personnel discussing her hand condition. 

These reveal, for instance, that Casperson (from human resources) asked Breid whether Ms. McCann’s condition might 

be work-related,77 that Casperson attempted to replicate the 

crush test to determine if the repetitive motion caused 

Ms. McCann’s injury,78 and that Breid was trying to ensure 

coverage in the R & D department during the time that 

Ms. McCann was out for her medical appointments.79 These 

emails, however, reveal nothing more than knowledge of 

Ms. McCann’s health condition, a concern for the origin of 

her injury, and an attempt to cover any labor shortages resulting from her absences. An employer’s knowledge of, and 

conscientious responses to, an employee’s disability are not 

evidence of discrimination. 

76 Appellant’s Br. 55. 

77 R.67 ¶ 98. 

78 Id. ¶ 114. 

79 Id. ¶ 123. 
No. 19-2420 31

Conclusion 

Ms. McCann has not come forward with evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could conclude that “but for” her 

disability, her position would not have been eliminated. 

Summary judgment in favor of Badger was appropriate, and 

we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

AFFIRMED