IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 93-KA-01374-SCT

JEFF DOUGLAS

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED,

PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-A

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/24/93

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN LESLIE HATCHER

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: QUITMAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ALLAN D. SHACKELFORD

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

BY: PAT FLYNN

DISTRICT ATTORNEY

NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 2/6/97

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE PRATHER, P.J., PITTMAN AND McRAE, JJ.

PITTMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

Jeff Douglas ("Douglas") was convicted in Quitman County Circuit Court of sexual battery. He was

sentenced to twenty years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections with five years suspended.

A jury convicted Douglas for the sexual battery of Angela Jones, the daughter of his former wife and

sister of his son, Marquis Douglas. On August 8, 1992, Douglas gave Marquis, Angela, and two of

their cousins a ride home from their aunt's house. Marquis and Angela both testified that when he let

the children out, he grabbed Angela by the arm and held her in the car, driving off with her. Angela

testified that Douglas drove into the country and parked the car; Douglas then tried to have sex with

her. She fought him off to some extent, and he told her to perform oral sex. She complied because

she was scared of Douglas. Douglas drove Angela back to town and let her out at the post office.
Angela ran home and told her brother what had happened. Angela's mother subsequently took her to

the sheriff's department and then to see Dr. Petilos. The doctor testified that there was no vaginal

bruising or other physical evidence of intercourse. He further testified that he could not substantiate

her complaint concerning the oral sex.

Other evidence at trial included eyewitness James Jones, who saw Douglas's car on the road where

Angela said he took her that night. Seven members of Douglas's family testified that Douglas was

getting a haircut by his brother-in-law when the alleged act was going on. Douglas took the stand in

his defense and stated that he let Angela out when he let the other children out and did not see her

again that night.

Douglas assigns three errors for the Court's review. He asserts that the jury's verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. Specifically, he claims that the only evidence against him -- the testimony of

the fourteen-year-old victim -- was uncorroborated. He also contends that the jury's lack of males,

particularly black males, violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and trial by jury. He

further claims that the sentence for the crime was too harsh.

A N A L Y S I S

Douglas claims that his conviction is based solely on the testimony of Angela, because no one else

saw the alleged event and there was no physical evidence of the event. He asserts that this conviction

is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence based on the fact that Angela's testimony of the

events was so inconsistent and contradictory as to render her unbelievable.

Douglas points to testimony by Angela in which she said that after the incident Douglas offered her

five dollars. However, immediately after the incident, she told her mother Douglas had offered her

five hundred dollars not to tell.

Douglas also directs the Court's attention to testimony in which Angela stated that Douglas stopped

at a trailer home. The man he spoke to in the trailer testified that it looked like somebody was in the

car, but he could not swear to that.

In Killingsworth v. State, 374 So. 2d 221, 223 (Miss. 1979), the Court stated that the unsupported

word of a prosecutrix must be scrutinized with caution. Killingsworth involved the rape of an adult

by an acquaintance and the issue was consent. The Court found that both versions of the night's

events were plausible. The conviction was affirmed based on the longstanding principle that resolving

a conflict in the testimony of the witnesses was the job of the jury. Id. at 223; see also Billiot v.

State, 454 So. 2d 445, 463 (Miss. 1984). Further, the Court has held that in the case of rape, the

victim's uncorroborated testimony alone is sufficient where it is consistent with the circumstances.

Allman v. State, 571 So. 2d 244, 250 (Miss. 1990).

There were no eyewitnesses to the actual crime. However, Angela's testimony -- that Douglas held

her in the car after letting the others out -- was corroborated by Marquis Douglas, the defendant's

own son. Douglas's story -- that he let all the children out at one time -- is the uncorroborated one.

Additionally, Angela's mother and aunt testified to her emotional condition that night. The record

provides substantial and believable evidence supporting the jury's verdict notwithstanding the

conflicting testimony of Angela and Douglas as to the actual incident.
When the venire was called for the present case, only seven men were included in the first thirty

prospective jurors called. The defense moved to quash the panel as not being a "fair representation"

from both sexes. Douglas argues that the jury as drawn had a limited number of males, especially

black males, resulting in none being on the jury. Douglas contends that, even though the jury was

randomly drawn in accordance with the law, the resulting proportion constituted a prima facie of

unconstitutionality.

Douglas has not shown that his right to a fair cross-section of the community on the venire was

violated. This Court has previously delineated the elements that must be shown for a prima facie

violation of the fair cross-sectional requirement for an impartial jury in as:

1. the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community;

2. the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and

reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and

3. this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection

process.

Lanier v. State, 533 So. 2d 473, 477 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364,

99 S.Ct. 664, 658, 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 587 (1979)); Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d 407, 412 (Miss. 1993).

Douglas does not offer any evidence to show that the venire did not reflect a fair cross-section of the

population of Quitman County. In fact, the circuit clerk testified that the venire was randomly drawn.

Contrary to Douglas's argument, proportion of the venire alone does not constitute a prima facie case

of unconstitutionality. This issue is without merit.

The trial court sentenced Douglas to twenty years with five years suspended in the Mississippi

Department of Corrections. Douglas had no prior convictions. He asserts that the severity of the

sentence far exceeds the circumstance of the alleged act.

The Court has held that the sentencing of a convicted criminal is within the discretion of the trial

court. The Court will not review the sentence if it is within the limits prescribed by statute. Reynolds

v. State, 585 So. 2d 753, 756 (Miss. 1991).

Miss. Code Annotated § 97-3-101 provides that every person convicted of sexual battery shall be

imprisoned for a period of not more than thirty years. The sentence imposed on Douglas was within

the limits prescribed by statute.

CONVICTION OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE TO TWENTY (20) YEARS IN

THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FIVE (5) YEARS SUSPENDED

AFTER THE APPELLANT HAS SERVED FIFTEEN (15) YEARS IN THE MISSISSIPPI

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., PRATHER AND SULLIVAN, P.JJ., BANKS, McRAE, ROBERTS, SMITH AND

MILLS, JJ., CONCUR.