F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

C O N T E S T P R

O M O T I O N S , L L C, Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

C I T Y A N D C O U N T Y O F S A

N F R A N C I S C O , Defendant-Appellee. N o. 17-15909

D.C. No. 3:16-cv-06539-SI

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan I llston, Senior District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J uly 12, 2017 San F rancisco, California

F iled Aug ust 16, 2017 A mended October 23, 2017

B efore: Susan P. Graber and Michelle T. F riedland, Circuit J udg es, and Consuelo B . Marshall, * District J udg e.

Order; Opinion by

J udg e Graber

* T h e Ho n o rab le Co n su elo B. Marsh all, Sen i o r U n ited States District J u d g e f o r th e Cen tral District o f

Calif o rn ia, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 2

SUMMARY * *

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of an action broug ht pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 1983 challeng ing San F rancisco’s sig n-related reg ulations.

Throug h its Planning Code, San F rancisco prohibits new billboard s b u t a llows o nsite business sig ns r elating to activities undertaken on the premises, subject to various r u les. Noncommercial sig ns are ex empt from the rules. Plaintiff, an advertiser that rents the rig h t to post sig ns on the premises o f third-party b usinesses, alleg ed that the City ’s Planning Code violates the F irst Amendment by ex empting noncommercial sig ns from its reg ulatory

ambit.

The p anel h e l d that the distinction drawn b etween commercial and noncommercial sig n s in the City ’s Planning Code survived intermediate scrutiny under Central Hu d s on Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
, 4 4 7 U.S. 557 (1980). The panel held that the disti n c tions directly advanced the City ’s substantial interests in safety a nd aesthetics and was not impermissibly underinclusive.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 3

COUNSEL

Michael F

. W rig ht ( arg u ed), L os A ng eles, Califo r n ia, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

J ames M. E mery (arg

ued) and Victoria W ong , Deputy City Attorney s; Dennis J

. Herrera, City Attorney ; Office of the City Attorney
, San F rancisco, California; for D efendantAppellee.

ORDER

The opinion filed o n Aug ust 16, 2017, and published at 867 F .3d 1171, is amended by the opinion f iled concurrently with this order, as follows:

On slip o p i n i o n pag e 14, footnote 4, delete the last
sentence: “ F or the reasons g iven by the district cour t, see Contest Promotions, LLC v

. City of San Francis c o , No. 16- cv-0 6 5 39-SI
, 2017 W L 1 493277, at *5 (N.D. Cal. A pr. 26, 2017) (order), we affirm the dismissal of that claim a s well.” Substitute the following f

or the deleted sentence: “This claim is moot because no penalties ever were assessed.”

W ith this amendment
, the panel has voted to deny Appellant’s petition for rehearing

. J udg es Graber a nd F riedland have voted to d eny Appella n t ’s petition for rehearing en banc, and J udg e Marshall has so recommended.

The full court h as been advised o f the petition for rehearing e n banc, and no judg e of the court has requested a vote on it.C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 4

Appellant’s petition for rehearing and re h e a r ing e n banc is DENIED

. No further p etitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc may

be filed.

OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:

Plaintiff Contest Promotions, L L C, rents ad vertising
space from businesses in cities around the country , including San F r ancisco, and places third-party advertising sig ns in that
space, framed b y tex t inviting passersby to enter the business and win a priz e related to the sig n. Throug h its Planning Code, San F rancisco p rohibits new billboar ds b ut a llows

o n s i t e b u s i n e s s s i g n s s u b j e c t t o v a r i o u s r u l e s

. Noncommercial sig ns a

re ex e mpt from the r

ules. I n this, the latest of several challeng es that Plaintiff has mounted to San F rancisco’s sig n-related reg ulations, Plaintiff arg ues that the distinction between co m m e r cial and noncommercial sig ns violates the F irst Amendment. The district court dismissed
t h e c o m plaint. Reviewing the o rder of dismissal de novo, Friedman v. A ARP, Inc.
, 855 F .3d 1 047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017), we affirm.

B ACKGROUND

L ike other local g overnments, the City and County of San F rancisco, Defendant here, uses its Planning Code to reg ulate outdoor advertising
, i ncluding billboards. The purposes o f Planning Code Article 6, which contains the advertising r u les, include “promot[ ing ] the aesthetic and environmental values of San F rancisco,” “ protect[ ing ] public investment in and theC O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 5

character and dig nity of public building s, streets, and open spaces,” “protect[ ing ] the distinctive appearance of San F rancisco,” a

nd “ reduc[ ing ] haz ards to motor i s ts, bicy clists, and pedestrians.” S.F., Cal., Planning Code (“Planning Code”) § 601.

The Planning Code draws two distinctions that a re relevant h ere. F irst, the Planning Code disting uishes b etween “g eneral advertising sig ns” and “ business sig ns.” A g eneral advertising sig n is

[ a] Sig n, leg ally erected prior to the effective date o f Sec tion 611 of this Code, which directs attention to a business, commodity
, industry or o ther activity which is sold, offered o r c onducted elsewhere than on the premises upon w hich the Sig n is located, or to which it is affix ed, and which is sold, offered

or conducted on s u ch premises only incidentally

if at all.

Id. § 6 02 ( emphasis added). B y c ontrast, a business sig n is defined in part as

[ a] Sig n which directs attention to the primary busin e s s, c ommodity
, service, industry o r

o ther activity which is sold, offered, o r conducted on the premises upon which such Sig n is located, or to which it is affix ed.

Id. (emphasis added). I n o t h e r words, g eneral advertising sig ns, l ike traditional billboards, refer primarily to offsite activities, w hereas busin e s s sig n s r efer to the activities undertaken on the same p remises as the sig n. T h e CodeC O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 6

decrees that “[ n] o n ew ge n eral advertising sig ns shall be permitted at any location w ithin the City as o f March 5, 2002.” Id. § 611(a). B y contrast, busines s s i gn s a re permitted, subject to o ther limitations related to n e i g h b o r h o od and development ty

pe.

Second, the Planning Code d i s t ing uishes b etween commercial and noncommercial sig n s

. The latter a re

ex e mpted from Article 6 a ltog et h e r. See Planning Code § 603(a) (ex plaining that “[ n] ot h i n g in this Article 6 shall apply to

. . . Noncommercia l S i gn s ”). 1 Article 6 d oes not define “noncommercial” ex cept by refer e n c e to a nonex h austive list that includes “[ o] fficial pub l i c notices,” “[ g ] overnmen tal sig ns,” “[ t] emporary display posters,” “[ f] lag s, emblems, insig nia, a nd p o s t e r s of any nation o r political subdivision,” and “[ h] o u se numbers.” Id.

P l a intiff is an advertiser that r ents the rig h t to post sig ns

on the p remises o f third-party businesses. Tak ing the alleg ations in the complaint as true, Plaintiff’s sig ns advertise
contests in w hich passing customers can participate by g oing inside the business and filling out a f o r m

. Plaintiff alleg e s

1 A n e a r l i e r v ersio n o f th e sig n o rd in an ce ex em p ted a lo n g list of
t y p es o f n o n co m

m ercial sig n s w ith o u t categ o rically ex em p tin g th em al l

. In resp o n se to s t a t e an d f ed eral co u rt d ecisio n s th at in terp reted th e

o rd in an ce to ex em

p t all n o n co m

m erci a l sig n s in o rd er to p reserv e its

co n stitu tio n ality
, see Metro Fu el LLC v. City o f S a n Fra ncisco
, No

. C 07

- 6 0 6 7 P J H, 20 1 1 W L 9 0 0 31 8
, at * 9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1 5
, 2 0 1 1 ) (so h o ld in g ); City o

f S a n Fra n cisco v. Eller Ou td oo r Ad vert. , 2 3 7 Cal. Rp tr. 8 1 5
, 82 8 (Ct. A

p p

. 1 9 8 7 ) (sam e), Def

en d a n t recen tly am en d ed th e

o rd in an ce t o f

o rm ally ex em

p t n on co m

m ercial sig n s, f

u ll- sto p

. S

ee En actm en t No

. 2 1 8

- 16
, File N o

. 1 60 5 53
, San Fran cisco B o ard of Su p erv iso rs, ef

f

. D ec. 10
, 2 0 1 6 (ex em

p tin g all n o n co m

m ercial s ig n s f

ro m A rticle 6 ).C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 7

that the sig ns depict priz es t hat customers may win in Plaintiff ’ s c o ntests. No party disputes that Plaintiff’s sig ns

are “commercial” under A rticle 6. I n September and October of 2016, and in J anuary of 2 017, Defendant issued several Notices of Enforcement, accusing P l a i ntiff’s sig ns o f violating various requirements of Article 6.

Althou g h the San F rancisco Charter sets forth an administrative process for challeng in g t he denial o f permits for sig n s, see S.F
., Cal., Charter § 4.106(b), Plaintiff did not avail itsel f o f that p rocess. I nstead, Plaintiff responded b y filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleg in g , i nter alia, that Article 6 of the Planning Code violates the F irst A mendment by ex empting noncommercial sig ns from its reg ulatory ambit. 2 Plaintiff moved for a prel i m inary injunction, which the d istrict court denied. Plaintiff then filed the operative first amended complaint, a

nd Defendant mov e d to dismiss the action u n der F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ). The district court g ranted Defendant’s motion a n d entered a judg ment of dismissal, and Plaintiff timely appeals.

D I SCUSSI ON

A. Level of Scrutiny

Our F irst Amendment analy sis beg ins by determining the l e vel of scrutiny that applies to the Planning Code’s Artic l e

2 T h is i s o n e o f sev eral a c t i o n s t h at P lain tif f h as f iled ag ain st Def en d an t, ch alle n g in g v ario u s asp ects o f its billb o ard reg u latio n s. In a sep arate m em o ran d u m

d i sp o sitio n , w e af

f irm th e d ism issal o f

an earlierf iled su it raisin g d if

f eren t First Am en d m en t issu es u n d er th e Plan n in g Co d e. A n d in a seco n d m em o ran d u m d isp o sitio n , also f iled th is d ate, w e d ism iss as m o o t P l a in tif

f ’ s ap p eal f

ro m th e d en ial o f its m otio n f o r a p relim i n ary

in j u n ctio n in th is case.C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 8

6. B ecause noncommercial sig n s are ex empted f rom i ts reg ulatory framework, Article 6 is a reg ulation o f commercial speech. Restrictions o n c o mmercial speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny u n d e r Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v

. Public Service Commission
, 447 U.S. 557 (198 0). Citing Sorrell v. IMS H

e a l th Inc.
, 564 U.S. 552 (2011), a nd Reed v. Town of Gilbert
, 1 35 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), Pl a i n t i f f
arg ues that review more searching than Central H udson ’s intermediate scrutiny standard should g overn o ur analy sis o f Defendant’s billboard laws. B ut we re c e n tly held that

“ Sorrell did not mark a fundamental departure from Central Hudson ’s four-factor test, and Central Hudson c o n tinues to apply .” Retail Dig. Network, LLC v

. Prieto ( “RDN ” )
, 861 F .3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

I n RDN
, we rejected the p laintiff’s arg ument that a liquor advertising rule “imposed a content- o r speaker-based burden” and therefore merited “heig htened scrutiny

. ” I d

. at 847. W e held that the speaker- or content-base d n a t ure of a reg ulation merely meant that such a r e gu l ation “implicates the F irst Amendment, which r equires scrutiny g reater than rational b asis review.” Id. (citing Sorr e l l
, 564 U.S. at 567). I n those situations, the proper level o f s c r utiny was the long standing commercial speech doctrine, which calls f o r intermediate review. Id. at 848.

W e have likewise rejected the notion that Reed al t e r e d Central Hudson ’s long standing intermed i ate scrutiny framework. S

e e Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
, 8 2 7 F .3d 1 192, 1198 n.3 (9th Cir. 2 016) (“[ A] lthoug h laws that rest r i c t only commercial speech a re content b ased, such restrictions n eed o nly withsta nd intermediate scrutiny .” ( c i t ing Reed a nd Central Hudson )).C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 9

W e thus reject Plaint i ff’s arg ument that review more searching than intermediate scrutiny applies here.

Under that standard, we undertake our analy sis in f o u r steps. F irst, the speech “must concern lawful a ctivity and not be misleading .” Central Hudson
, 447 U.S. at 566. S e cond, “we a sk whether the asserted g overnmental interest is substanti a l

. ” I

d. T h en, “[ i] f both inquiries y ield positive
answers, w e must determine whether the reg ulation d i r e ctly advances t he g overnmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more ex tensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Id.

B

. Central Hudson Analysis

“Apply ing the Central Hudson test in the contex t o f billboard reg ulations is not new f or the Supreme Court or u s.” Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa
, 997 F. 2 d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1993). At the first step, neither party disputes that, a s alleg ed, Plaintiff’s advertisements concer n lawful, nonmisleading activity

. And at the second step, the Supreme Court and this court have long held—and today
, we reaffirm—that a locality ’s ass e rt ed interests in safety a nd aesthetics, see Planning Code § 601 (describing the purpose of Defendant’s sig n contr o l s )
, are substantial. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
, 453 U.S. 490, 507–08 ( 1 9 81) ( plurality) ( ex plaining that there was no “substanti al doubt that the twin g o als tha t t he ordinance seeks to further—traffic safety and the appearance of the c i t y —are substantial g ove r nmental g oals”); accord Metro Lights, L.L.C. v. City of Los Angel e s , 551 F .3d 898, 9 0 4 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[ i] t is well-established t hat traffic safety and aesthetics co n stitute substantial g o vernment interests”); Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v

. City of Beaumont
, 506 F .3d 895,C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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905 (9th Cir. 2 007) (noting that “both the Supreme Court a nd

our circuit have endo r s ed these rationales as substantial
g overnmental interests”); Ackerley Commc’ns of Nw. I nc. v

. Krochalis
, 108 F .3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming tha t “ a c ity ’s interest in avoiding v isual clutter suffices to justify a p rohibition of billboards”); Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of O r ange , 861 F .2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). W e therefore proceed to the last two steps of Central Hudson

.

“T h e l ast two steps o f the Central H udson analy sis basically involve a c onsideration of the ‘fit’ between the leg islature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.” 3 United States v. Edge Broad. Co.
, 5 0 9 U

. S

. 418, 427–28 ( 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The third Central Hudson step asks whether “the restriction

. . . directly advance[ s] the state interest involved.” Valle Del Sol Inc. v. W hiting
, 709 F .3d 808, 821 (9th Cir. 2 013) (internal quotation marks omitted). I n considering that question, “we must look
at whether the City ’s ban advances its interest in its g eneral application, not specifically with respect to [ the d efendant]

. ” Metro Lights
, 551 F .3d at 904. The reg u lation also must not be underinclusive, such that it “‘ undermine[ s] a nd counteract[ s] ’ the interest the g overnment claims it adopted the law to further.” Id. at 905 (quoting Rubin v

. Coors B r e w i n g Co.
, 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995)). The fourth step

“ g u a r d s a g a i n s t o v er-reg

ulation rather than under-reg u lation.” Id. at 9 11. I t “does not require that the reg ulation be the

3 A s w e h av e o bserv ed b ef o re, “ [i]t h as n o t alw ay s b een c l e a r h o w th is b asic in q u iry

d if f ers w ith resp ect to th e last tw o step s o f th e Cen t r a l Hu d so n an aly sis, an d i n d eed th e Su p rem e Co u rt h as o b serv ed th at th e step s o f th e an aly sis are ‘ n o t en tirely d iscrete.’ ” Metro Lig h ts , 55 1 F.3 d at 9 0 4 (q u o ti n g G r e a ter N ew Orlea n s Bro ad

. Ass’n v. Un ited Sta tes , 5 2 7 U.S. 1 7 3 , 1 8 3 (1 9 9 9 )).C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 11

least-restrictive means to accomplish the g overnment’s g oal. Rather, what is required is a reasonable fit between the ends and the m e a n s , a f

it ‘that employ s not necessarily the least restrictive means, but a mea n s narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.’” O u t d o o r Sys.
, 997 F

. 2 d a t 610 (alteration omitted) (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox
, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).

Rely ing o n City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.
, 507 U.S. 410 ( 1993), Plaintiff arg u es that Article 6 falters at the last two steps of the C en t r a l Hudson analy sis because it

e x empts noncommercial sig ns for reasons unconnected t o Defendant’s asser t ed interests in safety and aesthetics. W e disag ree for two reasons.

F irst, Discovery Network is materially disting uishable. There, the Supreme Court considered a Fi rst A mendment challeng e to a city ’s ordinance that “completely prohibit[ ed] the d istribution of commercial handbills on the public rig ht o f
way ” u sing newsracks, while leaving unaffected a f ar g reater number of newsrac k s that distributed noncommercial material. I

d. at 414. I n particular, the record showed that “the number of newsracks dispensing commercial hand b i l ls

was ‘minute’ c ompared with the total number (1,500–2,000)

on the public rig ht of way .” Id. Th e C o urt held that the

o r d i n a n c e ’ s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o m m e r c i a l a n d noncommercial speech “b[ o re] no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted,” making the ordinance “an impermissible means of r e s ponding to” the city ’s “ admitted l y l eg itimate interests” in safety a nd aesthetics. Id. at 424; see also id. at 428 (concluding that “the distinction [ the city ] has drawn h as a b solutely no bearing

on the interests it has asserted”).C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 12

The Court’s conclusion rested in sig nificant part on the details o f the record before it an d o n t h e empirically poor connection between the ordinance and the asserted problem. F or ex ample, the Court n oted that, “[ w] hile there was some testimony in the District Court that commercial publications

are distinct from noncommercial publication s i n their capacity to proliferate, the e v idence of such was ex ceeding ly weak,” id. a t 425, and that if the “ ag g rega t e n u m b er o f

newsr acks on its streets” was the real concern, then “newspapers are arg uably the g r eater c ulprit because of their

su p e r i o r number,” id. at 426. Thus, “the fact that the
reg ulation ‘provid e [ d ] only the most limited incremental

s u p p o r t for the interest a sserted,’—that it achieved o nly a ‘marg inal deg ree of protection,’ for that interest—supported [ the Court’s] holding that the prohibition was invalid.” Id. at 42 7 ( first alteration in orig inal) (quoting B o lger v. Y oungs Drug Prods. Corp.
, 4 63 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)). As the Court emphasiz ed: “Our holding
, however, i s n a r r o w. As should be clear f

rom the above discussion, we do n o t r each the question w hether, g iven certain facts and under c ertain

c i r c umstances, a community mig ht be able to justi f y differential t reatment of commercial a nd noncommercial newsracks. W e simply hold that on this record [ the city ] has failed to make such a showing .” Id. at 428.

Unlike in Discovery Network
, Article 6 is not impermissibly under-inclusive. The tex t of Article 6 ex plains why such a r

ule is n ecessary

. I t ex plains that
, w h en the ordinance was adopted, the “increased siz e and number o f
g eneral advertising sig ns” in particular were “cr e a t i ng a public safety haz ard,” that such sig ns “contrib u te to b lig ht and visual clutter as well as the commercializ a tion of public spaces,” that there w as a “proliferation” of such sig ns in “open spaces all over the City ,” and that there was “currentlyC O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 13

an ample supply of g eneral advertising sig ns within the City

. ” Planning Cod e § 611(f). These are statements of leg islative
purpose specific to commercial sig ns. I n contrast to a ban on commercial sidewalk newsracks affecting only a tiny fraction of the overall number of newsracks, Defendant’s choice to reg ulate commercial sig ns (but not noncommercial sig ns) has

a substantial eff

e c t o n its interests in safety and aesthetics. According ly
, Article 6 is not constitutionally underinclusive. I ts ex c eptions ensure that the reg ulation will achieve its end, and the d istinctions that it makes among different kinds o f speech relate empirically to the interests that the g overnment seeks to advance. Metro Lights , 551 F .3d at 906.

Outdoor Systems is not to the contrary

. Defendant relies

on that case to arg ue that Defendant impermissibly “discriminate[ s] ag ainst comme r cial speech solely on the
g round that it deserves less protection t h a n noncommercial speech.” 997 F .2d at 610. A s e x plained above, that is not the

reason for the distinction drawn by Article 6, w h i ch focuses instead on the unique r isks to D efendan t ’s interests that commercial sig ns pose. Plaintiff als o c o n t ends that, unlike the billboard reg ulations that survived intermediate scrutiny in Outdoor Systems
, the ones at issue here are not neutral a s between commercial and noncommercial speech. B ut neither

were the reg ulations that we approved in Out d o o r S ystems

. As we observed—in a factual recitation that is admittedly in

some tension with o ther analy sis in the opinion—M e s a’s
reg ulation s “contain[ e d] a provision that e x cept[ ed] all noncommercial sig ns f

rom the Code’s definition o f offsite sig ns.” Id. at 608–09.

More g enerally
, a second p rinciple s upports our conclusion. I t is well established t h at a law need not deal
p e r fectly and fully with an identified problem to sur v i v eC O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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intermediate scrutiny

. The Supreme Court long ag o rejected the notion “that a prohibition a ga inst the use of unattractive sig ns cannot be justified on [ a ] esthetic g rounds if it fails t o apply to all equally unattractive sig ns.” Members o f City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent
, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984) (noting that “[ a] comparable argu m e n t was categ orically rejected in Metromedia ”). I nstead, for ex ample, “the validity of the [ a] esthetic interest in the elimination of sig ns o n public property is not compromised by failing to ex tend the ban to p r i v a t e property .” I

d. a t 8 11. And in Metromedia
, t h e Supreme Court noted with approval that the city “ha[ d] g o ne no further than necessary in seeking to meet its ends,” when it declined to ban all billboards and instead “allow[ ed] onsite advertising a

nd some oth e r specifically ex empted sig n s.” 453 U.S. at 508.

W e therefore hold that the d istinctions drawn in Article 6 b e t ween commercial a

n d noncommercial speech directly advance Defendant’s substantial interests. W e f ind no constitutional infirmity in the ordinance’s failure to reg ulate
every sig n that it mig ht have reached
, h a d D efendant (or its voters) instead enacted a nother l aw that ex hausted the full breadth of its leg al authority

.

CONCL USI ON

The distinction drawn betwe e n commercial a nd noncommercial sig ns in A rticl e 6 o f the Planning Code survives intermediate scrutiny under Central H udson

.C O N T E S T P R O M O T I O N S V

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N F R A N C I S C O 15

According ly
, w e affi r m the dismissal of Plaintiff’s F irst Amendment claims. 4

AF F IRMED.

4 P lain tif f also arg u es th at th e d istrict co u rt erred by ref u sin g to en

j o in th e accru al of p en alties w h ile th i s litig atio n is p en d in g , i n v io latio n o f th e d u e p ro cess p rin cip l e set f orth in Ex Pa rte Y

o u n g , 2 0 9 U.S. 1 2 3
, 1 4 7

– 4 8 (1 9 0 8). T h is claim

is m o o t b ecau s e n o p en alties ev er w ere assessed

.