### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON FE BR U A RY 20, 200 8 S es sio n
MA DISO N C OUN TY, TEN NES SEE v. TEN NES SEE S TAT E BOA RD OF EQUALI ZATI ON, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Madison Cou nty No. 63630 Jame s F. Butler, Chancellor

No. W2007-01121-C OA-R3-C V - Filed May 27, 2008

Se ve ra l taxpay e rs a

pp e a le d M a dis on

County ’s va luatio n o f t he taxpay e rs ’ l imi te d p art ne rs hip proper ty to the Tenne ssee State Boa rd of Equalization. The administrative law judg e sche duled a pr e -h e aring con feren c e , w ithno tic e be ingse nt t o th e taxpay e rs and Ma dis on Cou nty . So me confusion ar ose, and no r epres en t at i v e for Madison County attended the confe renc e. The
a dmi nis tr ativ e law j ud g e e nte re d a de fa ult jud g me nt a g a ins t Ma dis on County , a

nd Ma dis on County t i m el y fi l eda p et i t i o n

t o re co n s i d er

wi thth e a dm i n i s tra t i v e l aw j u d ge. T h e a dm i n i s tra t i v e l aw j u d ge took no action on the petition, and afte r twenty day s, the petition wa s deeme d denied by operation of law. Ma dison County

then fa iled to appea l the administrative law judg e’s denial of the petition to r e c on sid e r w ith in t

hir ty da y s to the As se ssm e nt A

pp e a ls C omm iss ion . T he As se ssm e nt A pp e a ls Commi ssion therea fter issued the Offic ial Certificates of Assessment. Ma dison C ounty filed a motion to reconsider the Offic ial Certificates with both the administrative law judg e and the Boa rd of Equalization, seekingrelief under Rule 60.02 of

the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Pr o ce du re

. The administrative law judg e denie d the motion, but the Boar d of Equ al i z at i o n g rante d relief and
rema nded the matter

to the admini strative law judge

. The taxpay er de fenda nts then filed a pe tition wi th t he B oa rd of Eq ua lizatio n, c ha lle ng ingthe B oa rd ’s ord er se tti nga sid e the de fa ult jud g me nt. The taxpay ers f

iled a petition for r eview in c hance ry court in Madison C ounty . There afte r, the B oard held a he ar i ng , reve rsed its prior orde r, and r einstated the de fault judg ment ag ainst Madison County

. Madison County filed a petition f or revie w in c hance ry court in Madison County pursuant to T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 -5 -3 22 , s e e kin gre vie w of the B oa rd ’s re ins tate me nt of the de fa ult jud g me nt. Th e c ha nc e ry c ourt g ra

nte d the taxpay e rs ’ mot ion fo r summa ry jud g me nt. Ma dis on

Cou nty a pp e a ls, and we aff

irm.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the C hancery Court Affir med

A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., delivered the opinio n of the c ourt, in which H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined, and W. F R ANK C RAW FORD , J., did not participate.

C. Jerome Te el, Jr., Jac kson, TN for A ppellantThe l i m i t ed pa r t ner s hi ps i nvol ved i n t hi s di s put e ar e J ac ks on Bond, L. P. ; M adi s on Pa r t ner s , L. P. ; a nd J ac ks on 1
P a rk w a y P a rtn e rs , L .P

.

T h e U n i fo rm A d m i n i st rati v e P ro ce d u res A ct p ro v i d es a s fo l l o w s co n ce rn i n g p re-h ea ring co n fere n ce s: 2
I n any act i on set for hear i ng , t he adm i ni s t r at i ve j ud ge or hea r i ng off i cer as s i gn ed t o he ar t he ca s e[ ]

. . . m ay di r ec t t he par t i es or t he at t or neys f or t he par t i es , or bot h, to a p p e a r b e fo re t h e a d m in istra tiv e ju d g e o r h e a rin g o ff ic e r fo r a c o n fe re n c e to
co n si d er: (A ) T h e sim p l i ficati o n o f i ssu es; (B ) T h e n ec essit y o r d esirab i l i t y o f am en d m en t s t o t h e p l ea d i n g s; (C ) T h e p o ssib ili ty o f o b ta in in g a d m issio n s o f fa c t an d o f d o c u m e n ts th a t w ill a v o id

u n n ecessar y pro o f; ( D ) The l i m i t at i on of

t he num ber of

e xper t w i t nes s es ; a nd ( E) Suc h ot her m at t er s a s m ay ai d i n t he di s pos i t i on of t he ac t i on.

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 -5 -3 0 6 (a )( 1 ) (2 0 0 5 ).

T h e U n ifo rm A d m in istra tiv e P ro c e d u re s A c t p ro v id e s a s fo llo w s: 3
I f

a pa r t y f ai l s t o at t end or part i ci

pa t e i n a p r e- heari ng conf er ence , hear i ng or ot her sta g e o f a c o n te ste d c a se , t h e a d m in istra tiv e ju d g e o r h e a rin g o ff ic e r [ ]

. . . m ay h o ld th e p a rty in d e

fa u lt and e i t her adj ou r n t he procee di ng s or cond uct t hem

w i t ho ut t he part i ci pat i on o f t hat par t y, havi ng due re gard f or t he i nt er es t of j ust i ce
an d t h e o rd erly an d p ro m p t co n d u ct o f t h e p ro ce ed i n g s.
(c o n tin u e d ...)
-2- Lewis Cobb, Jackson, TN(Court of Appe als oral a rgument only), for

Appellant David C. Scruggs, Memphis, TN, for Appellee , Jackson Bond, et a l
OP IN ION

I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
Th e c a se be fore us ha s an unu su a l pr oc e dura l po sture tha t mu st b e e xami ne d in

de ta il. Severa l tax pay ers ( “taxpay er de fenda nts”) appe aled the pr operty tax valuations assesse d by Madison County , Tenne ssee. The taxpay er de fenda nts took iss ue with the 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2003
va luatio ns of pr op e rt

y owne d by the ir lim ite d part ne rs hip s. Th e loc a l board of e qu a lizatio n u ph e ld 1 the valuations, and the taxpay er defe ndants appea led to the Tenne ssee State Boa rd of Equalization (“the Boa rd”)

. The pa

rties agree d to hold the a

ppeal in a beyance pending the outcome of the Spring Hil l li ti g ati o n , w h ic h inv o lv e d a s im il ar qu e s ti o n o f v a lu ati o n

. T h e M id d le Se c ti o n o f this Court issued the opinion of Sprin g Hill, L.P. v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equaliz ation , No. M2001-02683-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 23099679 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003), and therea fter, the Administrative L aw Judge (“A L J ”) sc heduled a pre- hear ing c onfer ence for November 29, 2004. 2
At the pre -hea

ringconfe renc e held on No v ember 29, the AL J enter ed def ault judgme nt ag ainst Madison County

and in favor of the tax pay er de fenda nts. The orde r, ente red D ece mber 8, 3(

. . . cont i nued) 3
T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 -5 -3 0 9 (a ) (e m p h a sis a d d e d ).

“ A ny pa r t y, w i t hi n fi ft ee n (1 5 ) d ay s aft er e nt r y of a n i ni t i al or fi nal or der , m ay fi l e a pet i t i on f or 4

re c o n sid e ra tio n , statin g th e sp e c ific g ro u n d s u p o n w h ic h re lief is re q u e ste d

. . . . ” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 -5 -3 1 7 (a ).

The pet i t i o n g o es o n t o c l ar i fy t hat “ Couns el m ake s no a s s er t i on t hat he i s e nt i t l ed as a m at t er of l aw or 5
regu l at i o n , t o co u rt esy o f N o t i ce, w h en N o t i ce i s g i v en dir ec tly to h i s cl i en t , no r do es he d em an d ex t raord i n ary
com m un i cat i on s t o as s ure t here i s n o confus i on as t o a dock et ed m at t er

. ” (V o l 1 p 4 5 ). Rat her, M adi s on Co un t y ar gu ed t h at cu st o m ari l y , especial l y i n ci v i l co u rt s, “a co u rt esy cal l w i l l b e m ad e t o t h e secret ary o f cou n sel , by s t aff, t o i n q u i re
w het her or not coun s el has been det ai ned i n ano t her m at t er

. . . . Co un s el does no t s eek t o i m po s e r ul es or court es i es
o f t h e c iv il c o u rts u p o n th e A d m in istra tiv e Ju d g e , b u t re sp e c tfu lly su b m its t h e re is a r a tio n a l b a sis fo r g iv in g N o tice to
c o u n se l an d fo r o th e r c o u rte sie s.”

-3- 2004, indicated that “[a] copy of the notice [of the hear ing] was sent to the Madison County Assessor
on October 20, 2004. Pursuant to this notice, a prehe aring confe renc e was conducted

. [ ] T he Madison County

Assessor fa iled to attend or pa rticipate in the pr ehea

ringco n fe re n ce either persona lly

or by authorized repr esentative.” F inding Ma dison County i n defa ult, the AL J then de c ide d the a

pp e a l on the re c or d, wh ic h in c lud e d th e de fe nd ant t a xpay e rs ’ s wo rn fo rm s se tti ngfo rt

h the va lue of

the pr op e rt

y in q ue sti on : “ [b]a se d o n th e re c or d, the fa ir mark e t va lue of th e pr op e rt y should be set as c ontended by the taxpay er.”

On Dec ember

20, 2004, Madison County filed a pe tition t o rec onsider the AL J ’s dec ision. 4 Madison County

g ave the following acc ount a s to why a repr esentative was not pre sent at the pre

he ari ngc on fe re nc e :
Wil liam S. C arma n, Sr., attorney

for Ma dison County

did not
rec e iv e N o ti c e o f

th e p r e
- h e ar in gc o n f

e r e n c e b y th e A dmi n is tr ative J udg e. 5

. . . . . . [T] he Madison C o u n ty Assessor c ontacted c ounsel and briefe d him on the matter. The inf ere nce w as drawn by counsel . . . that the hea

ringof this matter set for

November

29, 2004 would be a formality , the findingin SPR I NG HI L L , L .P., et al. v. TENNESSEE STATE BO ARD OF EQUAL I Z ATI ON, et a l., beingdispositi ve. A fu rt he r i nf e re nc e draw n, in e rr or , w a s th at th e va ri ou s c ounti e s’ interest, includingMadison County ’s intere st, would be repr esente d by the Division of Property

Assessments.

. . . Th e re a ft e r, sta ff

fo r c ouns e l w a s in str

uc te d to pla c e a

c a ll t o counsel for

the Division of Property Assessments, the purpose be ing to confirm that the Divi sion of Property Assessments would repr esent Madison County ’s intere st in the hearingon November 29, 2004. For
rea sons impossi ble to deter mine, that call wa s never m ade a nd the“ I f no a ct i on ha s be en t ake n on t he pet i t i on w i t hi n t w ent y ( 20) da ys , t h e pet i t i on s hal l be de em ed t o ha ve 6 b e e n d e n ie d .” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 -5 -3 1 7 (c ).

“ A ppea l s f

r om i ni t i al d ec i s i ons of a dm i ni s t r at i ve j udges or he ar i ng e xam i ner s f or t he s t at e boar d of 7

e q u a li z a ti o n m u st b e filed w ith in th irty (3 0 ) d a y s fr o m th e d a te th e in iti a l d e c isio n is se n t.” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 6 7 -5 -1 5 0 1 (c ).

“ I n any s i t uat i on not s peci fi cal l y add r es s ed by t hes e r ul es , r ef er ence m ay be m ade t o t he T enness ee R ul es 8

o f C i v i l P ro ce d u re fo r g u i d an ce as to th e p ro p er p ro ce d u re to fo l l o w , w h ere ap p ro p riat e a n d t o w h atev er e x t en t w i l l b est
s er ve t he i nt er es t s of j ust i ce and t he s peedy and i nexp ens i ve det er m i nat i on of t he m at t er at hand

. ”

A m on g ot her i s s ues , t he t axpay er def endan t s al l eged t hat t he B oard vi ol at ed R ul e 060 0-1-

. 15 of t he R ul es 9 of t he St at e Bo ar d of Eq ual i zat i on by fai l i ng t o ho l d a hear i ng

. Th e t axpay er def endan t s al s o a r gu ed t hat t he B oard ac t ed in c o n tra v e n tio n o f th e O p e n M e e tin g A c t, T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 8 -4 4 -1 0 3 (b ).
-4- matter wa s not pla ced on counsel’s cale nder. Counsel did not appear at the hea ring

. Ma dis on Count y a

rgue d th at th e “ fa ilure to a pp e ar o n N ov e mbe r 2 9, 20 04 , is du e to e xcu sa ble neg lect for

failure s of communication an d not the fault [of] any person or

party , but, under the circ umstances, ne verthe less, excusable, for the re asons shown.”

Th e AL J did n ot a c t on

the pe tit ion

wi thi n tw e nty

day s, wh ic h h a d th e e ff

e c t of a de nia l. 6 M a d i s o nC o un ty

f a i l e d t o a p p e a l th e o r d e r s t o th e A s s e s s m e n t Ap p e a l s C o m m i s s i o n a f t e r th e A LJ denied the pe tition t o rec onsider. 7

The Asse ssment Appeal s Commi ssion issued the Officia l Certificate s of Assessment on Marc h 8, 2005. On Marc h 22, 2005, Madison County filed a motion to rec o n s i d er the offic ial
cer tificates with both the AL J and with the Board, seeking relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil P roce dure, a s embodi ed in sec tion 1360-4-1-.01(3) of Unifor m Rules of Procedur e for He aringContested Cases B efor e State Administrative Ag encie s. The AL J denied the motion 8 to set aside the de fault judg ment, and Madison County did not appea l this ruling

. The Boar d, on the other ha nd, g rante d Madison County ’s motion to s et as i d e the judgment and r emande d the matter to the AL J . The taxpay er de fenda nts then filed a pe tition wi th the Boa rd, askingthat the B oard
rec onsider its order

setting a side the defa

ult judg ment. The Ex ecutive Direc tor of the B oard se nt

9 a letter to the AL J which denie d the taxpay er de fenda nts’ motion to reconsider.

T h e t a x p aye r

d e f e n d an t s f i l e d a p e t i t i o nf o r r e v i e wi nc h an c e r

y c o urti nM a d i s o nC o un ty, challeng ing the fac t that the Boa rd ente red a

n order setting a side the origin al defa ult judgment wi tho ut h old inga

he ari ng . T he re a ft e r, the B oa rd he ld a he ari ng on De c e mbe r 7, 200 5, re ve rs ingits p r i o r o r d e r an d r e i n s t a t i n g th e d e f

a u l tj u d g m e n ta g a i n s tM a d i s o nC o un ty. The B oard’ s order reinstatingthe def

ault judgme nt rea ds, in releva nt part : “[ T]he Order

Setting Aside D efa

ult dated May 4, 2005, should be vac ated. [R] elief unde r to [si c] TRCP 60.02 i s n o t av ail able to Madison County pursuant to the Tenne ssee Supreme Court’s holding in Food Lion, In c. v. Washington Co.Th e or der i ncorporat ed C hancel l or B ut l er ’ s fi nd i ng s o f fact an d concl usi on s o f l aw , w hi ch w er e c on t ai ned 10 in a lette r to th e p a rtie s d a te d A p ril 1 3 , 2 0 0 7

. -5- Be e r Bo ard, e t al

. , 700 S.W .2d 893, 895 (Tenn. 1985) . [T] he fina l Officia l Certificate s entere d on Marc h 8, 2005, are reinstated.”

On J anuar y 10, 2006, Madison County filed a petition for review in c hance ry court pursua

nt to T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 -5 -3 22 , see kin g re vie w of the B oa rd ’s re ins tate me nt o f t

he de fa ult jud g me nt. ( V o l 1 p1). T he B oard f

iled an answ er a

nd both sides filed motions for summary judgme nt. The chanc ery court he ld a hea

ringon both motions for summary judgme nt on J anuary

10, 2007. The
c ourt too k t he mat ter un de r a dv ise me nt, and on Ap ri l 30 , 2 00 7, g ra

nte d th e taxpay e r d e fe nd ants ’ motion for summary judgme nt. The chanc ery court summarized the matter befor e it as “whether 10 or not there are g en u i n e i s s u es of mater ial fac t which would mandate a hea ringon [Madison County ’s] P etition for Review. I f there are , then the hea ringwould proce ed w h er eb y t h e B oard’ s a c tio n in re ins tatin gthe de fa

ult jud g me nt w ou ld b e re viewed us in g t he st and ard se t f or [th] in Tenne ssee Code Annotated §4-5- 322 (h)( 1-5).” The c ourt went on to point out that “[w]hi le the County would have the Court focus on the pe rce ived unjust and inappropri at e def ault judgme nt rende red by

the AL J on November 29, 2004, that issue is not befor e thi s Court.” The c hance ry court deter mi n e d th at th e “ ma in d is p u te d ‘ f a c t’ is w h e th e r o r n o t th e s ta f f att o r n e y s f o r th e D iv is io nof Property Assessments w[ere] repr esentingthe County at t he Nove mber 29, 2004 [pre-c onfer ence ] hear ing.” The c ourt pointed out that the issue “ha s been r eviewe d by the ALJ t wo t i m es and the Boa rd one time. All have denied r elief a fter f ull consideration of this cor e issue.”

The c han cer

y court proc eede d to analy

ze whether

Madison County

had off ere d any proof that the B oard a

rbitrar ily or ca priciously denied its motion for Rule 60 relief . The chance ry

court found that “[t] he B oard obviously considere d these a

rguments at the full hea

ringon Dec ember

7, 2005 and
re nd e re d a

c on c lus ion

that be c a us e th e Co unty

fa ile d to pr e se nt a

n a de qu ate e xcu se fo r f

a ili ngto appea l the adver se ruling s of the AL J , that it wa s not e ntitled to Rule 60 relief .” The c ourt conc luded that Madison County “has failed to pr esent a ny admissible evidence that the B oard, in makingit’s de c isi on , [si c ] vio late d a ny of the sta nd ard s unde r whic h th e ir a c tio ns are to b e jud g e d. Whil e re a so na ble min ds might d isa g re e a s to the c or re c tne ss of the ru lin g , the Court sh ou ld n ot s ub sti tut e it ’ s ju d g me n t [s ic ] f

o r th at o f th e B o ar d [. ]

. . .” I t is from this ruling that Madison County now timely appea ls to thi s Court.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED
Madison County contends that the chancer y court erre d in g ranting the Board’ s motion for
summa ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e the B oa

rd arb itr ari ly and c a

pr ic iou sly de nie d M a dis on County ’s Rul e 60.02 motion to s et aside the defa ult judgment. We af

firm the dec ision of the chanc ery court.-6- III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW
Whe n d e a lin gwi th a

de c isi on ma de by an admin ist

rativ e a g e nc y

fo llo wi nga

c on te ste d c a se pro ceed ing , th is C ourt

a pp lie s th e same sta

nd ard of re vie w a s th at a

pp lie d b y the c ha nc e ry c ourt

. Terminix In tern. Co., L.P. v. Tennessee Dept. of Labor , 77 S.W .3d 185, 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (c i t i n g W are v. G reene , 984 S.W .2d 610, 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). Thus, we a re guided by

the standards se t forth in Tenn. Code Ann.§ 4- 5-322(h) :

Th e c ourt may a ff ir m the de c isi on of

the a g e nc y

or re mand the c a se for f urther pr ocee dings. The court may reve rse or modify the dec ision if t h e ri ghts of the petitioner have bee n prejudice d beca use the administrative finding s, infere nces, c onclusions or dec isions are (1 ) I n v iol atio n o f c on sti tut ion a l or statut or y pr ov isi on s; ( 2 ) In e x c e s s o f

th e s t atu t o r

y a u th o r i ty o f

th e a g e n c y; (3) Ma de upon unlawf

ul proce dure; (4) Ar bitrary or ca pricious or char acte rized by abuse of discretion or clea rly unwar rante d exercise of

discretion; or (5)( A) Unsuppor

ted by evidenc e that is both substantial and mater ial in the light of the entire r ecor d.

“F actua l issues are r eviewe d upon a standa rd of substantial and material evidence , and not upon a broad, de novo revie w.” Sout hern Ry. Co. v. St

ate Bd. of Equali

zation , 682 S.W .2d 196, 199 (Tenn. 1 9 8 4 ) ( ci t i n g CF Industries v. Tennesse e Public Se rviceCommission , 599 S.W .2d 536, 540 (Tenn. 1 9 8 0 )) ; s ee also Mo sle

y v . T e nne sse eDe pt. of Commerc eand

Ins
. , 167 S.W .3d 308, 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]his Court’s revie w of the facts is limit ed to a dete rmination of whethe r or not there is substantial and material e vidence in the rec ord to support the dec ision of the administrative
a g e nc y .” ); Wayne Count

y v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Con trol Bd. , 756 S.W .2d 274, 279 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 98 8) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . We mus t up ho ld t he a gen c y ’s fa c tua l de te rm inatio n if there exis ts “ s u c hr e le v an t e v id e n c e a s a r e a s o n a b le mi n d mi g h t a c c e p t t o s u

p p o rt a r ati o n al conclusion and suc h as to furnish a rea sonably sound basis for the action under consideration.” Id. at 279–80 (quotation omitted). Substantial a nd materia l e vidence means something more than a scintilla or glimmer, but something le ss than a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Mosley , 167 S.W .3d at3 1 6 (qu o t i n g W

ayne County v. Tennesse e Solid W aste Disposal Contr ol Bd. , 756 S.W .2d 274, 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988))

. An ag ency decision i s considere d arbitra ry and ca pricious if it is not supported by substantial and mater ial evidenc e, or if the decision re ndere d was “ca u s ed b y a clear e rror in judgment.” Jackson Mobilph one Co., Inc. v. Tenn essee Public Service Com m ’n , 876 S.W .2d 106, 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). “An a rbitrar y decision is one that is not based on a ny course of
re a so nin gor

e xer c ise of

jud g me nt, or

on e that dis re g ard s th e fa c ts o r c ir c ums tanc e s o f t he c a se without some basis that would lead a rea sonable person to rea ch the same conclusion.” Id. at 111 (interna l citations omit ted).M adi s on Co un t y s t at es i n i t s bri ef t hat t he B oard’ s deci s i on was un s uppo rted b y subs t ant i al an d m at er i al 11

e v id e n c e , an d thu s, is ar b itra ry a n d c a p ric io u s. M adi s on Count y f ai l s t o s u p p o r t t he cont ent i on or m ent i on t he i s s ue
a g a in . T h u s, w e w ill n o t ad d re ss it. See Bean v

. Bean , 4 0 S .W .3 d 5 2 , 5 6 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 0 ).

A s t o t he cas es ci t ed by M adi s on Co un t y i n s up po r t of i t s ar gu m ent , w e agree w i t h t he B oard t hat t he cas es 12 are dis t i n g u i shab l e i n t h at t h ey al l de al t w i t h l ack of n o t i ce. I n t h i s case, t h ere i s n o dis p u t e t h at M ad i son C o u n ty
re c e iv e d n o tice o f th e p re -h e a rin g c o n fe re n c e

. -7- IV. D I S CUS S I ON First, Madison County

argues t hat t he Board acted arbitrar ily and ca priciously by upholding th e d e f a u lt ju d g ment ag a in s t i t b e c a u s e th e A L J “ u s e d

p r o c e d ur e n o t i na c c o r d

w it hth e la w [. ]” 11 L ate r i n it s b ri e f, Ma dis on County argue s that “in g ra

nti ngthe de fa

ult jud g me nt, the AL J fa ile d to hear proof on the va luation of proper ties and fa iled to apply

the Sp ring H

ill decision which w as the l awo f th e S t at e o f

T e n n e s s e e

. ” I f

M a d i s o nC o un ty

d i s p u t e d th e v a l u at i o ne mp l o y e d b y th e A L J, the n i t cou ld have pr oc e e de d v ia the pr op e r a

ve nu e s o f a

pp e a l. L ike wi se , if

Ma dis on County believed that the Division of Property Assessments appe are d on its behalf at the he aring , it had the op po rt un ity to a pp e a l th e AL J’s d e c isi on . It is un dis puted th at the Ma dis on County Pr op e rt y Assessor fa iled to appea

r at the pre- hear ing confe renc e. Madison County contends, howe ver, that the Division of Property

Assessments ag ree d to appea r on its behalf, a

nd an attorne y from the Di vis ion of Prop ert y Asse ssm e nts wa s p re se nt at th e he ari ng . Wh e the r t he Di vis ion

of Pr op e rt y As se ssm e nt s was in fac t a c tin gon be ha lf of Ma dis on County is a qu e sti on of fa c t, a nd the re is substantial and material evidenc e in the record to support the B oard’ s conclusion that the Division of Proper ty Assessments wa s n o t representingMadison County . But in any event, this is not the issue at hand. We find Madison County ’s ar g ument somewhat c ircular , leading back to the fac t that they failed to a ppeal the A L J ’s denial of their petition to rec onsider. Thus, the issue be fore the B oard was whe ther Madison County ’s “ig noranc e of the law” in f ailing to a ppeal was excusable er

ror or fell under some other pr ovision under Rule 60.02 which would e ntitle them to relief.

As to this issue, Madison County argues that Rule 60 should be g iven libera l construction. 12 Ag ain, Madison County ignor es t he fact that they failed to a

ppeal, a nd that failure , admittedly , was due to its attorney ’s unfamili arity with the l aw. The case law is clea r that “mistake” as conte mplated in Rule 60.02 does not inc lude a mistake in la w. Se e ge ne ra lly Kilby v. Sivley , 745 S.W .2d 284, 287 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) ( “The mere fac t that a lawyer is ig norant of the rules or mistakenly rea ds the rules is not within i tself re ason to invoke Rule 60.02(1), T enn. R. Civ. P. To gra nt relief in e very c a se wh e re a

lawye r i s mi sta

ke n a bo ut t he ru le s o r is ne g lig e nt in r e a din gthe ru le s w ou ld e ma sc ulate the rules pe rtainingto filing of notice of appeal.”) . As our Supreme Court expl ained in Foo d L ion , Inc . v . W as hing ton Coun ty

Be e r Bo ard , 700 S.W .2d 893, 896 (Tenn. 1985), “[i] f this Court were to hold that ignora

nce of the law is a proper ground f or re lief under

Rule 60.02, Tennesse e Rules of Civil Procedur e, it is hard to conce ive how any judgme nt could be saf

e fr om assault on that g round.”-8-

F in a ll y , M a d is o n Co un ty ar g u e s th at th e d e f e n d an t taxp ay e r s r e c e iv e d an in e quitable tax br e ak, and that “ [u]ne qu a l tr e atme nt u nd e r t he law b y the g ov e rnme nt i s an in

jus tic e .” Re g ard le ss of wh e the r t his argume nt ha s any me ri t, the fa c t of the matte r i s th at w e are no t g oin gto s ub sti tut e ou r ju dgmen t for

that of the B oa rd ’s , a s w e fi nd

su bs tanti a l and

mate ri a l e vid e nc e to s up po rt its decision to deny

Rule 60.02 relief

. In sum, we find that t h e Boa rd did not act a

rbitrar ily and
c a pr ic iou sly , a

nd thu s w e a ff

ir m th e de c isi on

of the c ha nc e ry c ourt

.

V. C ONCL US I ON

F or the a fo re me nti on e d re a so ns , we a ff ir m the de c isi on of the c ha

nc e ry c ourt

. Cos ts of

thi s a p p e a l ar e t a x e d

t o Ap p e l l an t , M a d i s o nC o un ty, f o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AL ANE. HI GH ERS , P. J. , W .S.