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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

September 10, 2015 

v No. 321895 

Oakland Circuit Court 

DANIEL EDWARD SAFRONENKO, LC No. 2013-247831-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and WILDER and FORT HOOD, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Daniel Edward Safronenko appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of first-degree 

retail fraud.1 The trial court sentenced Safronenko, a third habitual offender,2 to one year in jail, 

with the sentence to be suspended after 30 days upon entry into a zero tolerance program. We 

affirm. 

 Safronenko argues that he was denied the right to a meaningful allocution at sentencing. 

We disagree. Because Safronenko did not preserve this argument by raising it below, our review 

is for plain error.3 To be entitled to relief, Safronenko must demonstrate that (1) an error 

occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected his 

substantial rights.4

 If Safronenko satisfies these three requirements, this Court “must exercise its 

discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited 

error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously 

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the 

defendant’s innocence.”5

 

1

 MCL 750.356c. 

2

 MCL 769.11. 

3 People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

4 Id. at 763. 

5 Id. at 763-764 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). 
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 At sentencing, a trial court must, on the record, “give the defendant, the defendant’s 

lawyer, the prosecutor, and the victim an opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances 

they believe the court should consider in imposing sentence[.]”6

 The record shows that the trial 

court followed this mandate. Perhaps the most loquacious speaker was Safronenko himself, who 

engaged in a thorough discussion with the trial court regarding his employment, housing, family, 

past criminal activity, substance abuse, mental health issues, and treatments. Despite this 

discussion, Safronenko now argues that he was incompetent at the time of sentencing, and thus, 

was denied the right to a meaningful allocution. 

 A criminal defendant is presumed competent unless it is determined that “ ‘he is 

incapable because of his mental condition of understanding the nature and object of the 

proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense in a rational manner.’ ”7

 The issue of a 

defendant’s competence may be raised by the prosecution, the defense, or the trial court.8

 A trial 

court is obligated to raise the issue of incompetence sua sponte if facts are brought to its 

attention that raise a bona fide doubt regarding whether the defendant is competent.9

 “The test 

for such a bona fide doubt is whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge 

whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced 

doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.”10 “Evidence of a defendant’s irrational 

behavior, a defendant’s demeanor, and a defendant’s prior medical record relative to competence 

are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry in regard to competency is required.”11 

 At sentencing, Safronenko engaged in a coherent and logical discussion with the trial 

court. His discussion demonstrated that he was well aware of his past history and his present 

circumstances. He expressed his understanding of the charge for which he stood to be sentenced. 

He discussed his family, housing, and employment, as well as the effect a jail sentence would 

likely have on these areas of his life. Overall, Safronenko’s allocution was a logical and 

reasoned discussion of why a lesser sentence would be appropriate. Nothing from Safronenko’s 

discussion with the trial court provides the slightest indication that he was incompetent. 

 Safronenko argues that, due to his psychiatric history, there was a bona fide doubt with 

regard to his competency. This psychiatric history consists of diagnoses of attention deficit 

disorder in 1995 and bipolar disorder in 1997. Safronenko was born in 1985, meaning that these 

diagnoses were made when he was 10 and 12 years old, respectively. Given that these diagnoses 

were made when Safronenko was a child, it is doubtful that the diagnoses are of much relevance 

 

6

 MCR 6.425(E)(1)(c). See also People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 627; 648 NW2d 193 (2002). 

7 People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98, 137; 858 NW2d 490 (2014), quoting MCL 

330.2020(1). 

8 Id. at 138. 

9 Id. 

10 Id. at 138-139 (quotation and brackets omitted). 

11 Id. at 139. 
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to his competency as an adult.12 Given Safronenko’s clear and cogent discussion with the trial

court at sentencing, the mere existence of these past diagnoses does not raise a bona fide doubt 

regarding Safronenko’s competency.13 Accordingly, Safronenko has not demonstrated error. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

 

12 Nor does Safronenko offer any explanation of how these conditions would cause him to be 

incompetent to speak on his own behalf. 

13 It is worth noting that Safronenko discussed his mental health history with the trial court and 

indicated that while he was not currently taking medications on the advice of a counselor, his 

treatment with this counselor had “proven to be very helpful.” That Safronenko was aware of his 

mental health issues and was actively treating these issues further demonstrates that he was 

competent at the time of sentencing.