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07-4005-cr

USA v. Marcus

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2

3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

4

5 

6

7 August Term, 2010

8

9 (Argued: October 13, 2010 Decided: December 7, 2010)

10

11 Docket No. 07-4005-cr

12 

13

14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

15

16 Appellee,

17

18 –v.– 

19

20

21

22 GLENN MARCUS

23

24 Defendant-Appellant.

25

26 

27

28 Before:

29 CALABRESI, STRAUB, WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

30

31 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

32 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Ross, J.),

33 entered on September 18, 2007, convicting defendant of

34 violating the sex trafficking and forced labor provisions of

35 the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 

36

37 AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

38

39 

40 HERALD PRICE FAHRINGER (Erica T. Dubno, on the brief),
1

 Marcus’s claim is properly labeled a due process

claim because the potential retroactive application of the

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1 Fahringer & Dubno, New York, NY, for Defendant2 Appellant.

3

4 PAMELA CHEN, Assistant United States Attorney, for

5 Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the

6 Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn NY, for

7 Appellee. (Peter A. Norling, Assistant United

8 States Attorney, Benton J. Campbell, United States

9 Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn,

10 NY; Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Attorney

11 General, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Tovah R. Calderon,

12 Attorneys, Department of Justice, Civil Rights

13 Division, Appellate Section, on the brief in the

14 original appeal).

15 

16

17 WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

18 Defendant-Appellant was convicted following a jury

19 trial on charges of violating the forced labor and sex

20 trafficking provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection

21 Act (“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1591. In an opinion dated

22 August 14, 2008, this Court vacated the judgment and

23 remanded the case on the ground that, under plain error

24 review, Marcus’s convictions violated the Ex Post Facto

25 Clause. United States v. Marcus, 538 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2008)

26 (per curiam). 

27 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Noting that

Marcus’s contention implicated the Due Process Clause,1 28 the
TVPA to Marcus’s conduct was the result of an erroneous jury

instruction rather than an act of Congress. See United

States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2010).

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1 Supreme Court held that this Court’s standard for plain

2 error review, as applied to Marcus’s claim, was inconsistent

3 with the Supreme Court’s extant precedent. United States v.

4 Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2010). On remand, we must

5 address Marcus’s due process challenge to his sex

6 trafficking and forced labor convictions under the

7 appropriate plain error standard. For the reasons set forth

8 below, we affirm Marcus’s forced labor conviction and vacate

9 his sex trafficking conviction. The case is remanded to the

10 district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

11 I. BACKGROUND

12 The facts of this case are set forth in the district

13 court’s opinion, United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d

14 289, 292–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), and summarized in this Court’s

15 prior opinion, Marcus, 538 F.3d at 98—100. Because

16 familiarity with those opinions is presumed, we recite only

17 the facts and procedural history relevant to the issues on

18 remand.

19 From October 1998 through approximately June 1999,
2

 At trial, the district court granted the Government’s

motion to allow certain witnesses to testify using their

first names only. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 292 n.2.

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Marcus and the complaining witness, Jodi,2 1 engaged in a

2 consensual relationship that involved bondage,

3 dominance/discipline, submission/sadism, and masochism

4 (“BDSM”). After they met on the internet, Marcus convinced

5 Jodi to move from her home in the Midwest to Maryland, where

6 she lived in the apartment of a woman named Joanna. Jodi,

7 Joanna, and other women participated in various BDSM

8 activities with Marcus. This included being considered

9 Marcus’s “slaves” and being subjected to various physical

10 and sexual “punishments.” At Marcus’s direction, Joanna

11 maintained a membership BDSM website called “Subspace,”

12 which contained pictures of Jodi and other women

13 participating in BDSM activities and fantasy diary entries

14 written about these activities. 

15 By October 1999, the nature of this arrangement

16 changed. Because Jodi refused to recruit her younger sister

17 to become one of Marcus’s “slaves,” Marcus inflicted upon

18 Jodi a “punishment” that was the most physically severe that

19 she had experienced to date. Jodi testified that she cried
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1 throughout the incident and that thereafter her relationship

2 with Marcus became nonconsensual. According to Jodi, she

3 began to feel “trapped” and “full of terror.”

4 In January 2000, Marcus instructed Jodi to move to New

5 York, where she lived with Rona, another one of Marcus’s

6 “slaves.” Jodi testified that upon her move to New York,

7 Marcus directed her to create and maintain a new commercial

8 BDSM website called “Slavespace.” Jodi indicated that she

9 worked on the site for approximately eight to nine hours per

10 day, updating photographs and diary entries and clicking on

11 banner advertisements to increase revenue and enhance the

12 site’s visibility on the internet. She testified that she

13 continued to work on the website in this manner after she

14 obtained a full-time job in November 2000. Marcus received

15 all revenues from the website, consisting primarily of

16 membership fees and advertising. 

17 Although Jodi did not want to work on the website as

18 Marcus instructed, she did so because she feared the

19 consequences of her refusal. Marcus created and fueled

20 Jodi’s fear by physically and sexually “punishing” her when

21 he was unhappy with her work on the website. Punishment
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1 would occur when Jodi did not post pictures or diary entries

2 quickly enough or when the website was not making as much

3 money as Marcus expected. These punishments were

4 photographed, and the pictures were posted on Slavespace. 

5 Additionally, Marcus required Jodi to write diary entries

6 about these punishments, which, at his direction, indicated

7 her satisfaction in receiving them. 

8 One of the most severe punishments Marcus imposed on

9 Jodi occurred in Rona’s apartment in April 2001. Marcus

10 tied Jodi’s hands together with rope, made Jodi lie down on

11 a coffee table, and told Jodi he was going to put a safety

12 pin through her labia. Because she began to scream and cry,

13 Marcus put a washcloth in Jodi’s mouth and whipped her with

14 a kitchen knife in an unsuccessful attempt to force her to

15 stop crying. Marcus proceeded to put the safety pin through

16 Jodi’s labia and attached a padlock to it, closing her

17 vagina. Marcus photographed this incident, and the pictures

18 were posted on the Slavespace website. He also directed

19 Jodi to write a diary entry about this incident for the

20 website. 

21 Although Jodi’s relationship with Marcus had become

22 nonconsensual, she remained with Marcus out of fear of his
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1 reaction if she left. Specifically, at one point, when Jodi

2 told Marcus that she was unhappy and could not continue with

3 the arrangement, Marcus threatened to send pictures of Jodi

4 to her family and the media. 

5 In March 2001, Jodi told Marcus that she wanted to

6 leave. In response, Marcus told Jodi that she had to endure

7 one final punishment. In the basement of a Long Island

8 residence, Marcus inflicted a severe punishment on Jodi,

9 including banging her head against a basement ceiling beam,

10 tying her hands and ankles to the beam, beating her and

11 whipping her while she was hanging from the beam, drugging

12 her with Valium, and inserting a large surgical needle

13 through her tongue. After inflicting this beating, Marcus

14 let Jodi off the beam, took her to a bedroom, and had sexual

15 intercourse with her. Marcus photographed Jodi throughout

16 the punishment and instructed her to write and post on the

17 website a diary entry about the incident. 

18 Jodi testified that, after this incident, she felt

19 broken, surrounded by fear and terror, and trapped in this

20 relationship with Marcus. She continued to live in Rona’s

21 apartment until August 2001, at which point Rona told Marcus

22 that she no longer wanted Jodi to live with her. Jodi then
3

 The indictment also charged Marcus with obscenity in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462, but the jury acquitted him of

that count. 

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1 moved into her own apartment, and her interactions with

2 Marcus became less frequent and less extreme, although she

3 remained in contact with him until 2003.

4 On February 9, 2007, the Government obtained a

5 superseding indictment charging Marcus with violating the

6 sex trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), and the

7 forced labor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, of the TVPA “[i]n or

8 about and between January 1999 and October 2001.” After a

jury trial, Marcus was convicted on both counts.3 9

10 Although the TVPA was not enacted until October 28,

11 2000, the Government presented evidence with respect to the

12 entire period charged in the superseding indictment, and the

13 district court did not instruct the jury with respect to the

14 TVPA’s enactment date. At trial, Marcus did not object to

15 the jury instructions on this ground, nor did he raise the

16 argument in his motion for a judgment of acquittal under

17 Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

18 Marcus’s post-conviction motions for judgment of acquittal,

19 Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, and for a new trial, Fed. R. Crim. P.
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1 33, were denied by the district court. See Marcus, 487 F.

2 Supp. 2d at 313. 

3 Marcus brought a timely appeal in which he argued, in

4 relevant part, that the TVPA was applied retroactively in

5 his case in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the

6 United States Constitution. Because Marcus failed to raise

7 this argument before the district court, we reviewed for

8 plain error only. 

9 We vacated Marcus’s convictions, holding that under

10 United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1990), on

11 plain error review, an error implicating the Ex Post Facto

12 Clause requires a new trial if, as was the case here, “there

13 is any possibility, no matter how unlikely” that an

14 uninstructed jury could have convicted the defendant based

15 exclusively on pre-enactment conduct. Marcus, 538 F.3d at

16 102.

17 Though joining in the judgment because our then

18 precedent compelled the result, two members of the panel

19 noted that the standard in Torres was inconsistent with

20 Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 102–03 (Sotomayor, J.,

21 concurring). Looking to United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.
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1 625 (2002), and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461

2 (1997), the concurrence concluded that “where there is no

3 reasonable possibility than an error not objected to at

4 trial had an effect on the judgment, the Supreme Court

5 counsels us against exercising our discretion to notice that

6 error.” Marcus, 538 F.3d at 104. Applying this principle

7 to the context of an ex post facto violation under a plain

8 error standard of review, the concurrence reasoned:

9 [W]here the evidence is “overwhelming” or

10 “essentially uncontroverted” that the

11 defendant’s relevant pre- and post-enactment

12 conduct is materially indistinguishable, such

13 that a reasonable jury would not have

14 convicted the defendant based solely on pre15 enactment conduct, a retrial is unwarranted. 

16 In other words, the defendant must meet the

17 low threshold of offering a plausible

18 explanation as to how relevant pre- and post19 enactment conduct differed, thereby

20 demonstrating a reasonable possibility that

21 the jury might have convicted him or her based

22 exclusively on pre-enactment conduct. When

23 this requirement is not met, the error does

24 not seriously affect the fairness, integrity,

25 or public reputation of the judicial

26 proceedings. 

27

28 Id. 

29

30 The concurrence concluded that Marcus’s sex trafficking

31 conviction should be vacated, but his forced labor

32 conviction affirmed, because with respect to the forced
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1 labor charge, Marcus offered “no plausible argument as to

2 why the jury would have differentiated between his conduct

3 before and after the enactment of the statute.” Id. at 106. 

4 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that

5 the “any possibility, however remote” standard was

6 inconsistent with its plain error review precedents. 

7 Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164. On remand, we must decide

8 whether the error in this case affected Marcus’s substantial

9 rights and the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

10 his judicial proceeding. 

11 II. DISCUSSION

12 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) permits an

13 appellate court to recognize a “plain error that affects

14 substantial rights,” even if the claim of error was not

15 brought to the district court’s attention. Marcus, 130 S.

16 Ct. at 2164. We will exercise our discretion to correct an

17 error not raised at trial only where an appellant

18 demonstrates that: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is

19 plain, that is, the error is “clear or obvious, rather than

20 subject to reasonable dispute;” (3) the error “affected the

21 appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case

22 means” it “affected the outcome of the district court
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1 proceedings;” and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the

2 fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

3 proceedings.” Id. (brackets in original). Here, only the

4 third and fourth requirements are in dispute.

5 To satisfy the third requirement, an appellant must

6 demonstrate that the error was prejudicial. In the ordinary

7 case, an error is prejudicial where there is a “reasonable

8 probability that the error affected the outcome of the

9 trial.” Id. Regarding the fourth requirement, “in most

10 circumstances, an error that does not affect the jury’s

11 verdict does not significantly impugn the fairness,

12 integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process.” 

13 Id. at 2166 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,

14 to have impacted Marcus’s substantial rights and the

15 fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial

16 proceedings, the overall effect of the due process error

17 must have been sufficiently great such that there is a

18 reasonable probability that the jury would not have

19 convicted him absent the error.

20 Here, there is no reasonable probability that the jury

21 would have acquitted Marcus absent the error. First, the

22 Government presented post-enactment evidence sufficient to
4

 18 U.S.C. § 1589 provided, in relevant part: “Whoever

knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a

person . . . by threats of serious harm to, or physical

restraint against, that person or another person; . . . by

means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the

person to believe that, if the person did not perform such

labor or services, that person or another person would

suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or . . . by

means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal

process, shall be [punished].” 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000). We

note that the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 was amended in

2008. We apply the version of the statute in effect at the

time of Marcus’s conduct. 

5 Marcus argues that the fact that Jodi acquired a

full time job in November 2000 undermines the credibility of

her testimony that she worked on the website eight to nine

hours a day post-enactment. He also points out that Rona

testified that Jodi did not work on the website after she

acquired the full time job. These arguments, however, do

not compel the conclusion that the jury believed that Jodi

provided website related services to Marcus pre-enactment

rather than post-enactment. First, it is not impossible for

Jodi to have worked an eight-hour day, commuted from Queens,

NY, and still worked eight hours on the website. Second, it

is undisputed that Jodi was required, under threat of

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satisfy the elements of the forced labor statute.4 1 From

2 January 2000 until at least the spring of 2001, Marcus

3 forced Jodi, through the persistent threat of serious

4 physical harm and actual physical harm, to create and

5 maintain a commercial BDSM website from which only Marcus

6 derived pecuniary gain. Jodi testified that she worked on

7 Marcus’s website for eight to nine hours a day including

while she had a full time job.5 8 During this time period,
punishment, to write diary entries for Slavespace expressing

her enjoyment of the March and April 2001 punishments. 

6

 This conclusion likewise disposes of Marcus’s argument

that the evidence of his post-enactment conduct is

insufficient to sustain the forced labor conviction. 

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1 Jodi was motivated to work on the website out of fear of

2 future physical and sexual abuse from Marcus. One of the

3 most severe punishments, the April 2001 coffee table

4 incident, occurred post-enactment. Jodi testified that this

5 punishment was due to her unsatisfactory work on the

6 website. Based on this evidence, a jury could find that

7 Marcus obtained Jodi’s labor through threat of serious

physical harm and actual physical harm after October 2000.6 8

9 Second, we find no reasoned basis to differentiate

10 between Marcus’s pre- and post-enactment conduct, and we

11 find no reason to presume that the jury did so. Although

12 the Government presented evidence that Jodi wrote diary

13 entries about her BDSM activities for Marcus’s old BDSM

14 website dating back to 1999, the substantial evidence of

15 forced labor begins in January 2000, when Marcus directed

16 Jodi to move from Maryland to New York and instructed her to

17 create and manage his new commercial BDSM website. From

18 January 2000, continuing through the effective date of the
7

 On appeal, the parties originally disputed whether

forced labor and sex trafficking constituted continuing

offenses. “A conviction for a continuing offense straddling

enactment of a statute will not run afoul of the Ex Post

Facto clause unless it was possible for the jury . . . to

convict exclusively on pre-enactment conduct.” United

States v. Monaco, 194 F.3d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Prior to the Supreme Court’s

opinion in this case, under Torres, the same analysis

applied under plain error review. See Torres, 901 F.2d at

229. In our prior opinion, we did not decide whether

violations of the forced labor and sex trafficking statutes

constitute continuing offenses because, in any event, it was

possible that Marcus had been convicted solely on the basis

of pre-enactment conduct and thus a new trial was necessary. 

Marcus, 538 F.3d at 101. Although we now affirm Marcus’s

forced labor conviction, we again have no need to decide

whether forced labor constitutes a continuing offense. Even

assuming it does not, a new trial is not warranted because

neither the third nor fourth requirements of the plain error

standard are satisfied.

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1 TVPA in October 2000, and into April 2001, Marcus’s conduct

2 supporting the forced labor conviction is essentially the

3 same. If anything, Marcus’s use of force against Jodi

4 increased post-enactment, with two of the most severely

5 violent incidents occurring in March and April of 2001. 

6 Marcus offers no explanation for how his pre-enactment

7 conduct differed from his post-enactment conduct in a manner

8 that would lead us to conclude that there is a reasonable

9 probability that the jury would not have convicted him

absent the due process error.7 10
8

 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:

“Whoever knowingly . . . in or affecting interstate or

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1 For substantially similar reasons, we reject Marcus’s

2 additional argument that he was prejudiced, not because of

3 the potential retroactive application of the TVPA to his

4 pre-enactment conduct, but because the proceedings were

5 “swamped by highly prejudicial evidence – spanning 22 months

6 – that, although charged as criminal, violated no law at the

7 time.” The Government presented substantial evidence of

8 Marcus’s post-enactment conduct, and nothing about the

9 nature or quantity of the evidence of Marcus’s pre-enactment

10 conduct leads us to conclude that it is reasonably probable

11 that the jury would have acquitted Marcus but for the

12 evidence of Marcus’s pre-enactment conduct.

13 Therefore, because the erroneous jury instruction

14 neither prejudiced Marcus nor called into question the

15 “fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial

16 system,” we will not set aside Marcus’s forced labor

17 conviction. See Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164.

18 By contrast, with regard to Marcus’s sex trafficking

19 conviction, the Government concedes that the erroneous jury

instruction constituted plain error.8 20 The Government
foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and

territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits,

entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any

means a person . . . knowing that force, fraud, or coercion

. . . will be used to cause the person to engage in a

commercial sex act . . . shall be punished . . . .” 18

U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1).

9 In our prior opinion we held that “for substantially

the same reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion,

. . . the totality of the evidence presented at trial was

sufficient to support the convictions.” Marcus, 538 F.3d at

102 n.6. With respect to Marcus’s sex trafficking

conviction, we reaffirm that holding today. We need not

decide whether only the post-enactment evidence was

sufficient to sustain the sex trafficking conviction

because, even assuming it was not, double jeopardy would not

bar retrial. Id. (citing United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d

1347, 1371–74, rev’d en banc on other grounds, 602 F.2d 653

(4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Harmon, 632 F.2d 812, 814

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1 produced evidence that Marcus knowingly recruited and

2 enticed Jodi in 1998; transported Jodi from Maryland to New

3 York in early 2000; and harbored her from 1999 until 2001. 

4 Unlike with the forced labor charge, the conduct supporting

5 the sex trafficking charge differed materially before and

6 after October 2000, such that there is a reasonable

7 probability that the erroneous jury charge affected the

8 outcome of the trial and affected the fairness, integrity or

9 public reputation of the proceedings. Consequently, we

10 again vacate Marcus’s sex trafficking conviction and remand

the case for retrial on this charge.9 11 What remains are
(9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)). 

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1 Marcus’s other challenges to his forced labor conviction.

2 Marcus argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1589 does not apply to

3 his conduct. He contends that Jodi and he engaged in an

4 “intimate domestic relationship” based upon a shared BDSM

5 lifestyle. Further, he contends that the forced labor

6 statute’s phrase “labor and services” is ambiguous as

7 applied to his conduct, and that the district court erred in

8 refusing to apply the rule of lenity to narrowly construe

9 the statute in his favor. We agree with the district

10 court’s well-reasoned opinion that these arguments are

11 without merit.

12 In relevant part, the forced labor statute punishes

13 anyone who “knowingly provides or obtains the labor or

14 services of a person . . . by threats of serious harm to, or

15 physical restraint against, that person or another person.” 

16 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000). The term “labor or services,”

17 which is not defined by the statute, is viewed in accord

18 with its ordinary meaning. See Smith v. United States, 508

19 U.S. 223, 228 (1993); Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265

20 (2d Cir. 1992). Absent ambiguity in the statutory text,
10 Webster’s Dictionary defines “labor” as the

“expenditure of physical or mental effort especially when

fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory.” Merriam-Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (2002)

available at http://www.mwu.eb.com/mwu. “Service” is defined

as “the performance of work commanded or paid for by

another.” Id. 

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1 “[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary

2 intentions in the legislative history will justify a

3 departure from [the statutory] language.” United States v.

4 Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985) (internal quotation

5 marks omitted). We will only look to legislative history to

6 interpret unambiguous statutes in “rare and exceptional

7 circumstances.” Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75

8 (1984). Moreover, we will not apply the rule of lenity to

9 narrowly construe a statute where the applicable text is

10 unambiguous. See United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 40

11 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Salina v. United States, 522 U.S. 52,

12 66 (1997)). 

13 The parties do not dispute that the ordinary meaning of

the phrase “labor or services”10 14 encompasses Jodi’s various

15 contributions to the Slavespace website from which only

16 Marcus derived pecuniary gain. Marcus, however, contends

17 that Jodi’s work on the Slavespace website was volunteered
11 With respect to the sex trafficking charge, the court

instructed:

Throughout the trial, you have heard

evidence about sexual practices called

Bondage, Discipline/Domination,

Submission/Sadism, Masochism, or “BDSM,” that

may involve actual physical restraint, such as

being tied up or placed in a cage. The mere

fact that a person was physically restrained

during the course of such acts does not

necessarily mean that the statute was

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1 to Marcus in a manner similar to unpaid domestic chores

2 performed by any co-habitating couple, and the “punishments”

3 Marcus inflicted upon Jodi are inseparable from the BDSM

4 activities that were a long standing part of their intimate

5 relationship. Marcus argues that by applying the statute’s

6 plain meaning to this relationship, the forced labor statute

7 is susceptible to application in the context of “purely

8 domestic chores” performed, for example, at the behest of an

9 abusive spouse. Marcus presses that this is an incorrect

10 application of a statute that was intended to proscribe

11 international trafficking in slave labor and prostitution. 

12 Marcus’s argument is unpersuasive. The jury was

13 properly instructed that consensual BDSM activities alone

14 could not constitute the basis for a conviction under the

sex trafficking charge,11 15 and there is no reason to believe
violated. For example, if the physical

restraint was consensual, then it would not

constitute a violation of the statute.

It is for you to decide, based on a

careful consideration of all the facts and

surrounding circumstances, whether the acts of

physical restraint violated the statute. 

Trial Tr. 1261: 3–18.

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1 that the jury did not understand this instruction to be

2 equally true with respect to the forced labor charge. The

3 jury rejected Marcus’s view of the affair, namely, that

4 Jodi’s work on the website and punishments relating thereto

5 were all part of her long-time intimate relationship with

6 Marcus and their broad participation in BDSM. Moreover, the

7 evidence fully supports the Government’s theory that, over

8 time, the violence Marcus inflicted upon Jodi became

9 nonconsensual, the punishments became more severe, and that

10 Jodi would not have performed services for Marcus’s website

11 had she not feared that noncompliance would result in future

12 physical and sexual abuse. The fact that Jodi’s enslavement

13 arose from her initial participation in consensual BDSM

14 activities does not require a contrary conclusion. 

15 Therefore, we conclude that the plain meaning of the

16 forced labor statute unambiguously applies to Marcus’s
12 Because we conclude that the forced labor statute

unambiguously applies to Marcus’s conduct, we reject his asapplied vagueness argument. “[O]ne whose conduct is clearly

proscribed by the statute cannot successfully challenge it

for vagueness.” United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 550

(2d Cir. 1993). In any event, this argument was raised for

the first time on appeal, and Marcus does not contend that

the district court committed plain error by not addressing

it. Consequently it is deemed waived. See United States v.

Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 125 (2d Cir. 2000). 

Marcus also argues (1) that the district court’s

decision permitting two of the Government’s witnesses to

testify using only their first names and not to disclose

their addresses or employment violated his due process

rights; and (2) that the district court improperly denied

Marcus’s motion to suppress certain evidence. We have

considered both arguments and find them to be without merit. 

 

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1 conduct. Thus, we do not address the statute’s legislative

history. See Giordano, 442 F.3d at 40.12 2 

3 For the reasons discussed above, we affirm Marcus’s

4 conviction with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1589, vacate his

5 conviction with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1591, and remand the

6 case to the district court for further proceedings

7 consistent with this opinion. Should the Government

8 determine that it will not retry Marcus on the sex

9 trafficking charge, we direct the district court to

10 reconsider Marcus’s sentence. At this time, review of the

11 reasonableness of his sentence is premature. 
Page 23 of 23

1 III. CONCLUSION

2 The district court’s September 18, 2007 judgment of

3 conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part. 

4 The case is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings

5 consistent with this opinion.

6

7

8

9