UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-1529

LUIS A. SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: February 22, 2018 Decided: March 28, 2018

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald D. Richey, LAW OFFICE OF RONALD D. RICHEY, Rockville, Maryland for 

Petitioner. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Cindy S. Ferrier, 

Assistant Director, Brendan P. Hogan, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Luis A. Sanchez, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of an order 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the immigration 

judge’s decision ordering him removed to Honduras. For the reasons set forth below, we 

deny the petition for review.

Sanchez first argues that the agency denied him an opportunity to pursue his 

application for asylum and withholding of removal and to argue the merits of his 

application for cancellation of removal in violation of his rights to due process. To succeed 

on a procedural due process claim, Sanchez must demonstrate “(1) that a defect in the 

proceeding rendered it fundamentally unfair and (2) that the defect prejudiced the outcome 

of the case.” Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008); accord Rusu v. INS, 296 

F.3d 316, 320-22 (4th Cir. 2002). A reviewing court may find prejudice only “when the 

rights of an alien have been transgressed in such a way as is likely to impact the results of 

the proceedings.” Rusu, 296 F.3d at 320 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); 

accord Nardea v. Sessions, 876 F.3d 675, 681 (4th Cir. 2017). 

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Sanchez cannot demonstrate a 

defect in the proceeding that rendered it fundamentally unfair where the record 

demonstrates that he had previously withdrawn his asylum application and he affirmatively 

stated that he had no pending applications at the time of his removal hearing. Additionally, 

Sanchez conceded at his removal hearing that his period of continuous physical presence 

in the United States ended on August 27, 1997, when he was served with a notice to appear. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2012) (“[A]ny period of . . . continuous physical presence in 
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the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear 

under section 1229(a) of this title.”); Urbina v. Holder, 745 F.3d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 2014). 

Thus, he is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal and the immigration judge had 

no need to consider his application on the merits.

Sanchez next argues that the immigration judge abused his discretion in denying his 

motion for a continuance to allow for the adjudication of his wife’s I-130 Petition for Alien 

Relative. An immigration judge “may grant a continuance for good cause shown.” 8 

C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2017). We review the denial of a motion for a continuance for abuse of 

discretion. Lendo v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 439, 441 (4th Cir. 2007); Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 

227, 231 (4th Cir. 1998). We “must uphold the [immigration judge]’s denial of a 

continuance ‘unless it was made without a rational explanation, it inexplicably departed 

from established policies, or it rested on an impermissible basis, e.g., invidious 

discrimination against a particular race or group.’” Lendo, 493 F.3d at 441 (quoting 

Onyeme, 146 F.3d at 231).

Upon review, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in upholding 

the denial of Sanchez’s request for a continuance. Considering the factors set forth in In 

re Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 790 (B.I.A. 2009), the agency properly noted that Sanchez 

has never provided evidence that an I-130 petition is pending or evidence of his prima facie 

eligibility for adjustment of status. We also find no abuse of discretion in the agency’s 

denial of Sanchez’s motion for administrative closure. See Gonzalez-Vega v. Lynch, 839 

F.3d 738, 741 (8th Cir. 2016) (setting forth standard of review). The record reveals that

Sanchez requested administrative closure to apply for a “stateside waiver,” also known as 
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a provisional unlawful presence waiver. Absent a showing that he is the beneficiary of an 

approved I-130 petition, Sanchez is ineligible for this type of waiver. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 212.7(e)(3)(iv)(A) (2017).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED