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******************************************************DERMOTH H. BROWN v. CITY OF HARTFORD (AC 36360)
DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Mullins, Js. Argued May 18—officially released October 27, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Robaina, J. [motion to disqualify]; Hon. Richard M. Rittenband, judge trial referee [judgment].)
S. Zaid Hassan, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jonathan H. Beamon, senior assistant corporation counsel, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion LAVINE, J. This case pits two important legal principles against one another: the right of property owners to notice prior to the taking of their property and the imperative ofprotectingthepublicfromdangerous conditionsposedbydecrepitstructures. Theprincipalissue in this appeal is whether the defendant, the city of Hartford (city), violated the due process rights of the plaintiff, Dermoth H. Brown, when, without apredeprivation hearing, it demolished certain improvements to his real property that a city building inspector determined were in immediate danger of falling so as to endanger life. The United States Supreme Court has ‘‘recognized, on many occasions, that where a State must act quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause.’’ Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 138 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1997). Underthe circumstances of this case, we conclude that the city’s actions were constitutional given the threat of imminent harm to persons posed by the plaintiff’s property. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff appeals from the judgment rendered in favorofthecity, followingatrialtothecourt. Onappeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that § 9-54 of the Hartford Municipal Code is constitutional, (2) denied his motion to disqualify the city’s legal counsel, (3) denied him ajury trial, (4) concluded that his due process rights were not violated, (5) afforded improper deference to certain testimony, and (6) found that he had suffered no pecuniary damages. We disagree.
The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff, acting
on his own behalf, commenced the present action in May, 2011, and through counsel filed an eight count, second amended complaint on February 28, 2013.1 The plaintiff alleged that on May 22, 2009, without giving himactual orconstructive notice, the cityenteredproperty he owned at 3372-3374 Main Street and 3364-3366 Main Street (collectively, premises) in Hartford and demolished porches and a stairway that were appurtenant to the main structures.2 He also alleged that he operated businesses from the premises and that the demolition rendered the premises unusable. He further alleged that the demolition violated § 9-52 (a) of the Hartford Municipal Code (city code), which required that the city notify him of the dangerous condition on his propertypriorto demolition, and, therefore, he was denied his right to due process. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the premises were not in a dangerous or unsafe condition and that as a result ofthe demolition, he suffered pecuniary damages.The court, Hon. Richard M. Rittenband, judge trial referee, tried the case on five days in June and July, 2013. The parties agreedthatthe court shouldbifurcate the claims alleged in the second amended complaint by determining firstwhether § 9-54 ofthe city code was constitutional before adjudicating the plaintiff’s other claims. In a memorandum ofdecision issued onAugust 16, 2013, the court concluded that § 9-54 was constitutional and, consequently, rendered judgment in favor of the city on count eight. The parties then submitted posttrial briefs. The court rendered judgment in favor of the city on the remaining counts in a memorandum of decision issued on November 12, 2013. The plaintiff appealed to this court.
The court made the following findings of fact and conclusions oflaw in its memorandum of decision. On May 22, 2009, the plaintiff was the owner of 3364-3366 Main Street (3364-3366) and 3372-3374 Main Street (3372-3374). The courtfoundthatthe firstfloor of3364- 3366 contained an office for a liquor import business ownedbytheplaintiff, whilethe secondandthirdfloors each housed an unoccupied residential tenement. The first floor of 3372-3374 contained a florist shop owned and operated by the plaintiff, the second floor housed
ahairdresser, andthethirdflooraresidentialtenement. At approximately 10 a.m. on the day in question, Adrien Shepard, afield supervisorfor Connecticut Natural Gas went to the premises and observed that gas service was ‘‘going from one building to another.’’ Martin Jones, a lieutenant in the Hartford Fire Department who conducts investigations forcity code enforcement,
was called to the premises. Jones observed that gas and electric services were ‘‘going from one building to another.’’ He took numerous photographs ofthe premises that were admitted into evidence.
Michael Gompper, a city assistant building inspector licensed by the state, inspected the premises on May 22, 2009.3 Prior to joining the city building department inJune, 2008, hehadbeenabuildinginspectorinVernon for twenty-eight years. He had never previously been to the premises and was directed to go there by his supervisor. When he arrived at the premises, he found them in a dilapidated condition. He walked on the rear porch of 3364-3366 and 3372-3374 and noticed vibrations in the floorboards, guardrails, posts, and stair treads. The roof posts were spongy and not straight. Gompper felt nervous about walking on the back stairs
as the stairway and railings were rotted. The roof on thebackporchhadcollapsedandtheporchfloorboards went down when he walked on them. Gompper did not walk on the front porch of 3364-3366 because he believed that it was too dangerous to do so. On the basis oftheir testimony, the court found that Gompper andJoneshadexperience inspectingproperties, including buildings that had to be demolished. They observedrotted columns and other parts of the porches and the stairway that made them unsafe. The court concluded that the city had demolished the porches and stairway in good faith and that those structures were unsafefor human use

. The plaintiff claimed that the premises were safe. Although the court found the plaintiffto be credible as to how ‘‘he saw things,’’ the plaintiff’s view ofthe facts did not conform to ‘‘the reality ofthe facts.’’ The court also found that the plaintifffailed to prove that he had suffered any damages as a result ofthe demolition. The plaintiff had failed to prove the value of the porches and stairway or the value of the premises before and after the demolition. The plaintiff also failed to sustain his burden as to the loss of income via rental of the premises, the construction of new porches, or the loss of income from the florist business. The court, therefore, found in favor of the city on the counts alleging negligence andnuisance. See footnote 1 ofthis opinion.
The court also found in favor ofthe city on the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claims.4 The court found that the circumstances at the premises were determined to be unsafe and to present a danger to human life pursuant to Gompper’s observations and discretion. Section 9-54 of the city code and § 116.4 of the State Building Code granted Gompper such authority, and, therefore, his decision did not constitute a city policy constituting a due process violation pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dept. ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). See footnotes 4, 6 and 7 of this opinion. The court stated that in emergency circumstances it is not necessary for government to hold a predeprivation hearing, but that thepropertyowneris entitledto apostdeprivationhearing.5 The court concluded that the present action providedtheplaintiffthe requisitepostdeprivationhearing. See Danziger v. Demolition Board, 18 Conn. App. 40, 46, 556A.2d625 (personclaimingharmundermunicipal ordermayseekredressbycommencingplenaryaction), cert. denied, 211 Conn. 805, 559 A.2d 1139 (1989). The courtalso concludedthattheplaintiffsufferednopecuniary loss as a consequence of the demolition. Additional facts will be included as necessary. We now turn to the plaintiff’s claims on appeal.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly concluded that § 9-54 ofthe city code is constitutional.6 The plaintiff claims that § 9-54 and the city code are unconstitutionalbecausetheydo notprovideforapostdeprivation hearing or other avenue to challenge the demolition of his property. We disagree.
The standard ofreview ofachallenge to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment is well-known. ‘‘[A] partyattackingthe constitutionalityofavalidlyenacted[ordinance] bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . We will indulge in every presumption in favor of the [ordinance’s] constitutionality

. . . and, when called upon to interpret [an ordinance], we will search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably accords with the [town council’s] underlying intent.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 814, 761 A.2d 705 (2000). ‘‘[I]npassinguponthe constitutionality of a legislative act, we will make every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bottone v. Westport, 209 Conn. 652, 657, 553 A.2d 576 (1989). ‘‘[A] plaintiff claiming due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment must possess a property
or liberty interest that is somehowjeopardized by governmental action, necessitating a pre- or post-deprivation hearing as a safeguard.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 436, 673 A.2d 514 (1996).
In count eight ofthe second amended complaint, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that § 9-54 of the city code and § 116.4 of the State Building Code (state code)7 were unconstitutional under the federal constitution as applied to the states through the due process clause ofthe fourteenth amendment.8 In ruling
on the constitutionality of § 9-54 of the city code, the court found that the ordinance ‘‘bestows emergency powers to the city director of licenses and inspections to ‘order such structure orpartthereofto be torn down

. . . to render the structure safe until the proper proceedings can be taken as provided’ ’’ in § 9-51 of the citycode. Section 116.4ofthestatecodewasadoptedby the city pursuant to General Statutes § 29-253. Section 116.4 of the state code provides that when an unsafe condition exists, the building official may employ the labor necessary to render the premises safe ‘‘up to and including demolition.’’ (Emphasis added.)
The court found that Gompper and Jones concluded that the porches and stairway were unsafe for human
use. The court concluded, given the dangerous condition ofthe premises and Gompper’s concern forhuman safety, that it was proper for the city to demolish the porches and stairway at the premises without holding
a predeprivation hearing. In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized that due process is not fixed in form but noted its root requirement ‘‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived ofany significant property interest, exceptfor extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake thatjustifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’’ (Emphasis altered; footnote omitted.)Boddiev. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971). The United StatesSupreme Court has stated that ‘‘the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at
some time afterthe initialtaking can satisfythe requirements of procedural due process.’’ Parratt v. Taylor, supra, 451 U.S. 539.
The court in the present case found that efforts were madetonotifytheplaintiffoftheimpendingdemolition, but he could not be reached even at the telephone number ‘‘listed’’ on the property itself. The court found that due to safety concerns, it was proper for the city toproceedwiththe demolition andthatitwas impractical to provide any meaningful predeprivation process to the plaintiff, but there was available a meaningful
means by which to assess the propriety of the city’s action at some time after the initial taking. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied onDanzigerv. Demolition Board, supra, 18 Conn. App. 40, which held that
a postdeprivation hearing meets the constitutional requirements of due process. ‘‘It is not constitutionally necessary that a statute authorizing a local administrative board to make orders contain a provision for an appeal, in the technical sense, from the board’s action. If any person claims to be harmed by such an order, his constitutional right to due process is protected by the privilege to apply to a court.

. . . This means that in such acase the aggrievedperson maybring aplenary action, ratherthan anadministrative appeal, againstthe appropriate officials or municipality in order to obtain judicialreviewoftheiractions.’’ (Citationomitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 46. The court concluded that the present action provided the plaintiff with a postdeprivation hearing.
On appeal, the plaintiffclaims that the court improperly relied on Danziger because it is factually distinguishable. We disagree that the due process principle forwhichDanzigerstands doesnotapplytothepresent case, butwe recognize thatDanzigeris distinguishable
on its procedural posture. Danziger concerned an impermissible administrative appeal from the Stamford Demolition Board, which had ordered the plaintiff’s property demolished on health and safety grounds. Id., 41–42. This court heldthat althoughthere was no statutory basis for the Danzigerplaintiffto appeal from the municipal board, the plaintiff was not prohibited from bringing aplenary action, ratherthan an administrative appeal. Id., 46. The plaintiffin the present case was not prohibited from bringing an action against the city. We, therefore, cannot conclude that the court improperly relied on Danziger

. Moreover, Danziger is not the only case in ourjurisprudence holding that in emergent circumstances a municipal building inspector may in his or her discre-tion declare premises unsafe for human occupancy without prior notice and a hearing. In Gorra Realty, Inc. v. Jetmore, 200 Conn. 151, 510 A.2d 440 (1986), the plaintiffcommenced an action againstthe New London building inspector who, pursuant to the state building code, had declared the interior stairs and ceilings ofan apartment building owned by the plaintiffto be in danger of collapse and posted a notice that the premises
were unsafe for residential occupancy. Id., 152. On appeal to our Supreme Court, the plaintiff claimed that ‘‘even under the emergency provisions of

. . . the state building code, it had adue process rightto priornotice, hearing and an opportunityto respondto claimedviolations, in advance of the posting of its property.’’ Id., 162. Our Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the due process claim foundered ‘‘on the well established constitutional principle permitting summary administrative action in situations of emergency’’; id.; and that the plaintiff’s due process rights were protected by its
access to judicial relief. Id.
In his appellate brief, the plaintiffin the present case has directed our attention to Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999), which provides a useful analysis ofdue process considerations raisedbymunicipal ordinances that provide for the demolition of property under emergent circumstances.9 In its analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reliedontheUnitedStates Supreme CourtcaseofHodel

v. Virginia Surface Mining & ReclamationAssn., 452 U.S. 264, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981), in which the Supreme Court considered ‘‘the constitutionality of
an emergency procedure which allowed the Secretary of the Interior, acting through government inspectors, to order the immediate cessation of mining activities when an inspector perceived an immediate danger to public safety. The Court held that [t]he relevant inquiry is not whether a cessation order should have been issued in a particular case, but whether the statutory procedure itselfis incapable ofaffording due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Catanzaro v. Weiden, supra, 188 F.3d 62.
In upholding the constitutionality of the inspection procedures, the Supreme Court stated that ‘‘the procedure afforded the inspectors discretion to determine whether or not there was an emergency, and that this discretion, even coupled with the inherent possibility of its misapplication, did not offend due process: [t]he possibilityofadministrative effortinheresinanyregulatory program; statutory programs authorizing emergency administrative action prior to a hearing are no exception.

. . . ‘‘Discretion of any official may be abused. Yet it is not a requirement of due process that there bejudicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised. It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, thatthere is at some state an opportunity for a hearing and
ajudicial determination.

. . . ‘‘[T]his discretion is not absolute, and

. . . if a patternofabuseandarbitraryactionwere discerniblefrom review ofan agency’s administration ofasummaryprocedure the application ofthe procedure may be unconstitutional.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Moreover, Hodel directs that a municipality’s decision that a structure constitutes a danger to the public is to be accorded ‘‘some deference, and not to engage in a hindsight analysis of whether the damage to the buildings actually created an immediate danger to the public. Under Hodel, the due process guarantee is offended only when a emergency procedure is invoked in an abusive and arbitrary manner; therefore, there is
no constitutionalviolationunlessthe decisiontoinvoke the emergency procedure amounts to an abuse of the constitutionally afforded discretion.’’ Id.
Hodel does not suggestthat ‘‘government may simply avoid affording due process to citizens by arbitrarily invoking emergency procedures

. . . [it] clearly declares such actions unconstitutional. However, where there is competent evidence allowing the official to reasonably believe that an emergency does in fact exist, or that affording predeprivation process would be otherwise impractical, the discretionary invocation of an emergency procedure results in a constitutional violation only where such invocation is arbitrary or amounts to an abuse of discretion.’’ Id., 63.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that Hodel’s deferential standard ‘‘finds strong support in policy considerations. The law should not discourage officials from taking prompt action to insure the public safety. Bysubjecting adecisionto invoke an emergency procedure to an exacting hindsight analysis, where every mistake, even if made in good faith, becomes a constitutional violation, we encourage delay and thereby potentially increase the public’s exposure to dangerous conditions. This quandary is exactly what these emergency procedures are designed to prevent, and is the primary reason they are constitutionally acceptable. ‘‘Ifan official believes that the public is in immediate danger, he orshe shouldnothesitateto invoke an emergencyprocedure forfear ofbeing sued, andbeing liable for damages should his or her decision turn out to be incorrect in hindsight.’’ Id., 63.
On the basis of our review ofthe record, which contains competent evidence by which the court could conclude that an emergencyexisted, andthe applicable law; see, e.g.,Parratt v. Taylor, supra, 451 U.S. 527, and its progeny; we conclude that the trial court properly determinedthat § 9-54ofthe citycodeisnotunconstitu-tional because it does not contain an appeal provision. Asthecourtfoundinthiscase, whichconcernsproperty rights, the plaintiff was afforded postdeprivation due process by means of the present action. The court, therefore, properly rendered judgment in favor of the city on count eight.
II
The plaintiffnext claims that it was improper for the court to deny his motion to disqualify the city’s office of corporation counsel given an imputed conflict of interest. We disagree.
The following facts are relevant to this claim. Prior to commencing the present action, the plaintiff had been represented by Attorney Saundra Kee Borges. Borges, in fact, had written letters on his behalf in an effort to settle the plaintiff’s claim against the city. In July, 2010, Borges was appointed to the position ofcity corporation counsel. In May, 2011, the plaintiff commenced the present action as a self-represented party. One month later, Attorney Jonathan Hayes Beamon, senior assistant corporation counsel, filed an appearance on behalf ofthe city. The city filed its answer and special defenses on December 20, 2011.
On December 21, 2011, the plaintifffiled a motion to disqualifythe city’s office ofcorporation counsel onthe ground that Borges had represented him with respect to his claim against the city prior to being appointed corporation counsel, and Borges’ disqualification was imputedto the office ofcorporation counsel. The plaintiff did not request oral argument or a hearing on his motion to disqualify. The city objected to the motion to disqualify and attached an affidavit from Borges.10 The court,Robaina, J., sustainedthe defendant’s objection to the motion to disqualify. On March 14, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation, asking Judge Robaina to state the basis of his ruling sustaining the city’s objection to the motion to disqualify. On September 30, 2014, Judge Robaina issued an order on the motion for articulation stating ‘‘NO ACTION NECESSARY appeal pending.’’ The plaintiff did not file a motionforreview. See Practice Book §§ 66-5 and 66-7.11
On appeal, the plaintiffclaims that Borges’ disqualification as his prior counsel should have been imputed to all of the lawyers in the city’s office of corporation counselpursuantto rule 1.9 ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct. In his brief, the plaintiffcites numerous cases pertaining to the disqualification of a private law firm when one of its lawyers previously had represented a client. We disagree with the plaintiff’s position because rule 1.11 is the governing Rule ofProfessional Conduct. ‘‘The standard ofreview for determining whetherthe court properly denied a motion to disqualify counsel is
an abuse of discretion standard. The Superior Court has inherent and statutory authority to regulate theconduct ofattorneys who are officers ofthe court.

. . . In its execution of this duty, the Superior Court has broad discretionary power to determine whether an attorney should be disqualified for an alleged breach of confidentiality or conflict of interest.

. . . In determining whether the Superior Court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify, this court must accord every reasonable presumption in favor of its decision. Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smigelski v. Kosiorek, 138 Conn. App. 728, 739–40, 54 A.3d 584 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 901, 60 A.3d 287 (2013).
The plaintiff claims that rule 1.9 ofthe Rules of Professional Conduct controls this claim. Rule 1.9 (a) provides: ‘‘A lawyer who has formerly represented a client inamattershallnotthereafterrepresentanotherperson in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.’’ Rule 1.10 ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct concerns the ‘‘ImputationofConflictsofInterest: GeneralRule.’’ Rule 1.10 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none ofthem shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9

. . . . (d) The disqualification of lawyers associated in
a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11.’’
Rule 1.11 (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct providesinrelevantpart: ‘‘Exceptaslawmayotherwise expresslypermit, a lawyer currently serving as apublic officer or employee: (1) Is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and (2) Shall not: (i) Participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing

. . . .’’
The commentary to rule 1.11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that ‘‘subsection (d) does not impute the conflicts ofa lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee ofthe government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.’’ Rule 1.11 represents a balancing of interests. ‘‘The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers
as well as to maintain high ethical standards.

. . . The limitation of disqualification in subsections

. . . (d) (2) to matters involving a specific party or parties, ratherthan extending disqualificationto all substantive issues on which the lawyer worked, serves a similar function.’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.11, commentary.In the present case, Borges attested that she represented the plaintiff with respect to the demolition of the premises in 2009. She became corporation counsel in July, 2010, and the plaintiff commenced the present litigation in May, 2011. Borges also attested that she had not participated in the present litigation being defended by the office of corporation counsel and that she has not divulged confidences of the plaintiff. Beamon representedthe citythroughoutthe litigation. Pursuant to rules 1.10 (d) and 1.11 (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, under the circumstances of this case, Borges’ disqualification as the plaintiff’s prior counsel need not be imputed to Beamon. The plaintiff provided no evidence to Judge Robaina to contradict Borges’ affidavit. We, therefore, conclude thatthe court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify.
III
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly deniedhis claimforajurytrialafterhefiledanamended complaint that alleged new facts, a new claim, and a
newtimeline. Heasksthiscourttoreversethejudgment and to remand the case for ajury trial. We decline the plaintiff’s request as he waived his right to ajury trial.
The following procedural history is relevant to this claim. TheplaintiffcommencedthisactioninMay, 2011, amended his complaint in September, 2011, and filed
a certificate of closed pleadings and a claim for the trial list on March 8, 2012. On February 28, 2013, the plaintiff filed a request to amend his complaint along with a second amended complaint. The city filed its
answer and special defense on April 5, 2013. On April 12, 2013, the plaintiff filed a claim for ajury trial. The parties appeared before Judge Rittenband on June 25, 2013, to begin what the court understood to be a trial to the court.
The city’s assistant corporation counsel addressed the court stating that the case had been on the trial list until the plaintiff recently filed an amended complaint and jury trial claim. The plaintiff’s counsel stated that the plaintiff had not filed a claim for a jury trial with respect to his § 1983 claims in 2012, but his second amended complaint alleged an equal protection class ofoneclaimthatraisednewquestionsoffact. Heargued that, pursuantto General Statutes § 52-215, the plaintiff
was entitled to file ajury claim within ten days of the factual issues beingjoined. He also argued that the city hadnotfiled amotionto strike thejury claim. The city’s counsel respondedthatthe case had neverbeen moved from the court trial list to the jury docket and that it was his understanding, given the trial management schedule, that the case was to be tried to the court. Judge Rittenband stated that § 52-215 provides that when the issue is joined, or the pleadings are closed,ajury claim must be filed within ten days; the issue in the present case wasjoined; and the plaintiff could not revive a dispute by filing an amended complaint. Judge Rittenband denied the plaintiff’s request for ajury trial, stating that the case had been set down for a court trial. Judge Robaina12 had instructed Judge Rittenband that if Judge Rittenband denied the request for a jury trial, evidence was to begin that day. Moreover, speaking to the plaintiff’s counsel, Judge Rittenband stated ‘‘ifyou don’t agree with that, and you want apostponement, then you have to see Judge Robaina. That’s up to you, or we can start evidence now.’’13 Without interruption and without seeing Judge Robaina, the plaintiff’s counselcommencedtopresentevidencebycalling the plaintiff to testify.
Section 52-215 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When

. . . an issue offact isjoined, the case may, within ten days after such issue of fact is joined, be entered in the docket as ajury case upon the request of either party

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Therefore, ‘‘[w]hen an amended complaint raises a new issue of fact, a new ten day period arises within which to claim the matter to the jury.’’ Flint v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 37 Conn. App. 162, 164–65, 655 A.2d 266 (1995), aff’d, 238 Conn. 282, 679 A.2d 352 (1996).
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court should have permitted the case to be tried to a jury because the second amended complaint enlarged the factual issues to be tried.14Although we agree that count seven ofthe second amended complaint alleged facts beyond those alleged in the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claims, we conclude that the plaintiff waived his right to ajury trial.
This court addressed the issue ofwaiver ofthe right to a jury trial quite recently in the case of Delahunty

v. Targonski, 158 Conn. App. 741, A.3d (2015). ‘‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment ofa known right orprivilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MSO, LLCv. DeSimone, 313 Conn. 54, 64, 94 A.3d 1189 (2014). ‘‘[W ]aiver may be effected by action ofcounsel.

. . . When apartyconsentsto orexpresses satisfactionwith
an issue at trial, claims arising from that issue are deemed waived and may not be reviewed on appeal.

. . . Thus, [w]aiver

. . . involves the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding.

. . . ‘‘It is well established that implied waiver

. . . arises from an inferencethat [aparty] knowingly andvoluntarily relinquished the right in question.

. . . Waiver does not have to be express

. . . but may consist of acts or conduct from which waiver may be implied.

. . . In other words, waiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do so.

. . . It also is well established than any such inference must be based ona course of conduct.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Delahunty v. Targonski, supra, 158 Conn. App. 748; see also Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 58, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom. BridgeportRoman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., 558 U.S. 991, 130 S. Ct. 500, 175 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2009).
‘‘A party may forfeit the right to ajury trial in a civil
case ifthe right is not asserted in atimely manner, may abandon the right to ajury trial if he or she chooses a forum that does not afford the right to a jury trial,
or may waive the right to a jury trial.’’ Delahunty v. Targonski, supra, 158 Conn. App. 749; see also L & R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank, 246 Conn. 1, 14, 715 A.2d 748 (1998) (distinguishing standards ofwaiver in criminal and civil proceedings).
Given the circumstances inthe present case, we conclude that the plaintiff, through counsel, waived his rightto ajurytrialwhen counsel declinedJudge Rittenband’s invitation to consult Judge Robaina, acquiesced in Judge Rittenband’s proposal that he commence evidence that day and schedule his remaining witnesses for the following week, failed to object to trying the
case before Judge Rittenband the day the case was called for trial, and called the plaintiff to testify on his own behalf. The plaintiff, therefore, by implication, waived his right to ajury trial.
IV
The plaintiff’s fourth claim is that the court erred by concludingthathisrighttodueprocesswasnotviolated by the city’s failure to provide notice and a hearing before it demolished the porches and stairway at the premises and that the present action met due process requirements by providing a postdeprivation hearing. We disagree.
On appeal, the plaintiffargues that his right to notice andapredeprivationhearingshouldbe determinedpursuant to the test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). ‘‘Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the

. . . Fourteenth Amendment.’’ Id., 332. Under Mathews, a reviewing court ‘‘applies a three part test that requires consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, ifany, ofadditional orsubstituteproceduralsafeguards

. . . and

. . . the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens thatthe additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greater New Haven PropertyOwners Assn. v. New Haven, 288 Conn. 181, 198, 951 A.2d 551 (2008).
TheMathews balancing test that the plaintiffasks us to utilize in the present case essentially was used by the United States Supreme Court in Parrat v. Taylor, supra, 451 U.S. 527,Hodelv. VirginiaSurfaceMining& ReclamationAssn., supra, 452 U.S. 299–301, and other progeny. See part I of this opinion. There is a ‘‘well established constitutional principle permitting summary administrative action in situations ofemergency.’’ Gorra Realty, Inc. v. Jetmore, supra, 200 Conn. 162, citingHodelv. VirginiaSurfaceMining&Reclamation Assn., supra, 299–301. ‘‘Itisbynowwellestablishedthat due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.

. . . [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.

. . . This Court has recognized, on many occasions, thatwhere a State must act quickly, or whereitwouldbeimpracticaltoprovidepredeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause.

. . . Indeed in Parratt

. . . we specifically noted we have rejected the propositionthat [dueprocess] alwaysrequiresthe State to provide a hearing prior to the initial deprivation of property.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gilbert v. Homar, supra, 520 U.S 929.
As ourSupreme CourtstatedinGorra, whenanemergency exists and it is impractical to provide notice and
a predeprivation hearing, none is required.15 We, therefore, decline to undertake a Mathews analysis in the present case, as we are constrainedto followthe precedent of the United States Supreme Court and our own Supreme Court.
V
The plaintiffnext claims that the court failed to give the proper deference to the testimony of certain witnesses. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) failed to defer to the testimony of Edward Perez, who was mayorofthe cityatthe time ofthe demolition, but (2) gave deference to the testimonyoflaywitnesses that was akin to expert testimony. The plaintiff, therefore, implies that the court’s finding that the porches and stairway were unsafe for human use was clearly
erroneous. We disagree that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous. ‘‘To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beeman v. Stratford, 157 Conn. App. 528, 533, A.3d (2015). As the finder of fact, the court is responsible for weighing the evidence. ‘‘It is the [fact finder’s] right to accept some, none or all ofthe evidence presented.

. . . Moreover, [e]vidence is not insufficient

. . . because it is conflicting or inconsistent. [The court] is free tojuxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible.

. . . It is the [finder of fact’s] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marcisz, 99 Conn. App. 31, 36, 913 A.2d 436, cert. denied, 281 Conn. 922, 918 A.2d 273 (2007).
A
The plaintiffclaims thatthe courtfailedto give deference to the testimony of Perez, who was the mayor of Hartford in May, 2009. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that because Perez was the mayor of the city at the time ofthe demolition, he was familiar with the proceduresthe cityusedwhen demolishingpropertyandthat the court should have construed his testimony that the plaintiff’s right to due process had been violated as a judicialadmissionagainstthe city. We disagreewiththe argument that Perez’ testimony constituted a judicial admission and that the court was required to accept his testimony.
The court found that Perez was a credible witness but that he had no knowledge of the condition of the porches and stairway on the day Gompper inspected the premises. Perez, instead, opined that the city violated the plaintiff’s right to due process by moving too fast to demolish the porches and stairway. Perez believed that the city should have entered into negotiations with the plaintiffbefore the demolition occurred. But see footnote 15 of this opinion. ‘‘Ajudicial admission dispenses with the production of evidence by the opposing party as to thefact admitted, and is conclusive upon the party making it.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Birchard v. New Britain, 103 Conn. App. 79, 85, 927 A.2d 985, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 920, 933 A.2d 721 (2007). ‘‘Judicial admissions arevoluntary and knowing concessions of fact by a party or a party’s attorney occurring during judicial proceedings.

. . . They
excuse the otherpartyfrom the necessity ofpresenting evidence onthe fact admitted and are conclusive onthe party making them.

. . . Whether a party’s statement is
a judicial admission or an evidentiary admission is a factual determination to be made by the trial court.

. . . The distinction between judicial admissions and
mere evidentiary admissions is a significant one that should not be blurred by imprecise usage.

. . . While both types are admissible, their legal effect is markedly different;judicialadmissions are conclusive onthetrier of fact, whereas evidentiary admissions are only evidence to be accepted or rejected by the trier

. . . . ‘‘In contrast with ajudicial admission, which prohib-its any further dispute of a party’s factual allegation contained in its pleadings on which the case is tried, [a]n evidential admission is subject to explanation by the partymaking it so thatthe triermayproperly evaluate it.

. . . Thus, an evidential admission, while relevant as proof of the matter stated

. . . [is] not conclusive.

. . . Because the probative value of an admission depends on the surrounding circumstances, it raises a question for the trier of fact.

. . . The trier offact is free to give as much weight to such an admission as, in the trier’s judgment, it merits, and need not believe the arguments made regarding the statement by one side or the other.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internalquotationmarks omitted.) O & GIndustries, Inc. v.AllPhaseEnterprises, Inc., 112 Conn. App. 511, 523 n.5, 963 A.2d 676 (2009).
Perez is not apartyto this action. Moreover, whether the city violated the plaintiff’s right to due process by demolishing the porches and stairway without giving him notice and apredeprivationhearing is aquestion of lawtobedecidedbythe court. SeeBeemanv.Stratford, supra, 157 Conn. App. 534 (whetherpropernotice given is question of law). In any event, the court was not bound to accept Perez’ testimony. The court found that Perez did not see the condition of the porches and stairway on May 22, 2009, and, therefore, he was in
no position to determine whether the structures were unsafe for human use. There also is no evidence in the record that Perez is a licensed building inspector capable of determining whether the porches and stairwayweresafeforhumanuse. Fortheforegoingreasons,
we conclude that the court did not err by failing to give preclusive effect to Perez’ testimony.
B
The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly considered the testimony of Gompper and Jones because they had not been disclosed as expert witnesses. We disagree that they testified as expert witnesses. When the court found that the porches and stairway at the premises were unsafe for human use, it stated thatitwasmoreimpressedwiththetestimonyofGompper andJones, who pointed out the rotted columns and otherparts ofthe porches and stairwaythat made them unsafe. Gompper testified to the sensory observations he made while he was walking on the porches and stairway, including that the floorboards ofthe porches, the guardrails, posts, and stair treads vibrated when he stepped on them. He also testified that the posts were not straight. Gompper used photographic evidence to point out that the stairway was rotted, and that the floorboards ofthe porches, which were covered in plywood, gave way ‘‘more than a little bit.’’ Gompper observed that the second floor porch at 3372-3374 was demolished because it was supported by the first floorporch and was in similar condition to the first floor porch. Gompperdidnotwalkonthefrontporchof3364- 3366 because he believed that it was too dangerous. Gompper had inspected porches for demolition in the past.
Jones had seen many buildings that were in ‘‘insufficient shape so they had to be demolished.’’ Although Jones’ observations mayhave been made afterafire, he nonethelesshadmadefrequentobservations ofporches and other parts of buildings.
The court stated that it had given preference to the observations of witnesses who had experience in inspecting properties. Although Gompper and Jones had not been disclosed as experts, their observations
were sufficiently accurate to allow the court, on the basis oftheir factual observations, to conclude that the city demolished the porches and stairway because it had a good faith belief that the structures were unsafe for human use. On the basis of our review of the record, including the photographs of the porches and stairway in evidence, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretionbypermitting GompperandJones, who were buildinginspectors, to testifyastotheirobservations of thepremises. Section 116.4ofthestate codespecifically empowers a building inspector to demolish property that in his sole opinion is in immediate danger offalling
so as to endanger life or property. Moreover, pursuant to Hodel, it is not the role of the court to engage in a hindsight analysis of the condition of the porches and stairwayto determine whetherthey actually created an immediate danger to the public. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., supra, 452 U.S. 302–303. We conclude, therefore, that the court’s finding that the porches and stairway were unsafe for human use was not clearly erroneous. VI
The plaintiff’s final claim is that the court’s finding that he failed to prove pecuniary damages was clearly
erroneous. We do not agree. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that there was no credible evidence before it as to the value of the porches and stairway or the premises before demolition and after demolition. Also, the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof as to the loss of income via rental of the premises, the cost of constructing new porches and a stairway, or the loss of business income from the florist business. The plaintiff offeredanestimate ofthe costofnewporchesprepared by a contractor who did not testify. The estimated cost ofthe new porches was $99,000, which the court found
was not far from the present value of the premises. Moreover, the plaintiff was entitled to the cost of the porches and stairway that were demolished, not newporches. ‘‘[W]e review [a] trial court’s damages award under the clearly erroneous standard, under which we overturn a finding of fact when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to supportit, the reviewing court onthe entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction thatamistakehasbeencommitted.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Naples v. KeystoneBuilding & Development Corp., 295 Conn. 214, 225, 990 A.2d 326 (2010).
The essence of the plaintiff’s claim is that the court did not find his testimony or the testimony of his witnesses credible. He acknowledges, however, that ‘‘the trial court isprivilegedto adoptwhatevertestimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Tilcon Minerals, Inc., 284 Conn. 55, 65, 931 A.2d237 (2007). Specifically, theplaintiff claims that the court should have credited the uncontradicted testimony of his expert witness, Christopher Zajda, a structural engineer.
With respect to Zajada’s testimony, the court found that he never saw the premises until 2012, three years after the demolition had taken place. Zajada testified that the porches should not have been demolished because the top of the porches where they were attached to the building were structurally sound. The court found this testimony problematic because it did not focus on the safety ofthe floors ofthe porches and the columns holding them up. It is well-known that the finder of fact may believe some, none, or all of an expert’stestimony. SeeSilvav. WalgreenCo., 120 Conn. App. 544, 557–58, 992 A.2d 1190 (2010). Following our review of the record and the court’s memorandum of decision, we are not left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The firsttwo counts ofthe secondamended complaintsoundinstatutory negligence pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n (a) and (b) (8), respectively. Count three alleged nuisance pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (1) (C); counts four, five, and six alleged claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural due process, substantive due process, and loss of property violations, respectively; count seven alleged a class of one equal protection violation; and count eight sought a declaratory judgment that § 9-54 ofthe Hartford Municipal Code and § 116.4 ofthe State Building Code

are unconstitutional. The city denied the material allegations of the operative complaint and alleged two special defenses: as to the negligence alleged in counts one and two, the plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by his own negligence; and as to counts one throughthree, the claims were barredby governmental immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n.

2 The plaintiff alleged that he resides in Manchester, not at the premises.

3 The city did not disclose Gompper as an expert witness. The court permitted him to testify only as to his observations of the premises.

4 Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides in relevant part: ‘‘Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by theConstitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

. . . .’’ The plaintiff alleged, pursuant to Monell v. New York CityDept. ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), that his rights to due process were violated. In Monell, ‘‘the United States Supreme Court

. . . held that [l]ocal governing bodies

. . . can be sued directly under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive reliefwhere

. . . the actionthat is allegedto be unconstitutional implements or executes apolicy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgatedbythatbody’s officers. [I]t is when execution ofagovernment’s policy

or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pane v. Danbury, 267 Conn. 669, 681–82, 841 A.2d 684 (2004).

5 The court cited Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 68 L. Ed. 2d420 (1981) (necessity ofquick state action coupledwithmeaningful postdeprivation means to assess propriety of state action satisfies requirements of procedural due process), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986).

6 Section 9-54 of the Hartford Municipal Code provides in relevant part: ‘‘If, in the opinion of the Director of Licenses and Inspections, there exists actualandimmediatedangerofthefailingofanystructureorpart thereof,

so as to endanger life or property, he shall order such structure or part thereofto be torndownorshallcausetheworktobe donewhichisnecessary to render the structure temporarily safe until the proper proceedings can be taken as provided in section 9-51. He may in such cases and in any case where any building or part thereof has fallen and life is endangered by the occupation thereof, order the inmates and occupants of such building or part thereof to vacate forthwith.

. . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

7 Section 116.4 of the State Building Code provides: ‘‘Emergency work. When imminent danger or an unsafe condition requiring immediate action exists and the owner of the building or structure cannot be located, or refuses or is unable to expeditiously render the premises safe, the building official shall order the employment ofthe necessary labor and materials to perform the required work as expeditiously as possible. Such work shall include that required, in the building official’s sole opinion, to make the premises temporarily safe, up to and including demolition.’’

8 Although the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that § 116.4 of the state codeisunconstitutional, hehasnotchallengedthetrialcourt’sdetermination that that section of the state code is constitutional.

9 The factual circumstances ofCatanzaro are somewhat analogous to the circumstances in this case as the conditions of the premises were brought to the attention of the cities by third parties. In that case, an automobile

was accidentally driven into the front of a multistory building and severely compromised the front wall of the building, which could have fallen into the street. Catanzaro v. Weiden, supra, 188 F.3d 58. The city officials determinedthat forpublic safety, the building hadto be demolished. Id. Although the owner ofthe premises was called to the scene, there was disagreement

as to whether he acquiesced in the demolition. Id. Subsequently, the owner brought an action allegingviolations of42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming aviolation of his right to due process; id., 61; that the building was not in danger of falling, and that the city had an ulterior motive to demolish the building. Id., 59. Theownerclaimedthatheshouldhavebeenprovidedapredemolition hearing to demonstrate that the building was not in danger of falling. The District Court granted the city’s motion for summaryjudgment, which was affirmedbythe United States CourtofAppeals forthe Second Circuit, which identifiedthequestionas ‘‘whethertheParrattexceptionapplies, andisthus whether there was an emergency and whether adequate postdeprevation remedies were available.’’ Id., 62.

10 In the affidavit, Borges attested that as a private attorney she had represented the plaintiff with regard to the demolition of the premises starting in 2009, she did not commence any legal action on behalf of the plaintiff with respect to the premises, she has not represented the plaintiff since 2009, she became corporation counsel in July, 2010, since becoming corporation counsel, she has taken no role in the present litigation commenced by the plaintiff in May, 2011, and she has not discussed any confidences the plaintiff gave to her regarding the premises.

11 In his appellate brief, the plaintiff claims that he raised the issue of disqualifying the corporation counsel’s office during trial. He did not, how-ever, identify where in the record or transcript we could find the incident to which he refers. We therefore decline to review any claim relatedthereto.

12 At the time of trial, Judge Robaina was the presiding judge for civil matters in the judicial district of Hartford.

13 Inpursuitofhisrequestforajurytrial, theplaintiff’s counselrepresented that he did not have witnesses available that day because he believed that he would have two or three days to line up his witnesses while he picked

ajury. The court offered to postpone the court trial to permit the plaintiff to organize his witnesses; the city had no objection to the court’s proposal. The court further stated that it did not know how long the plaintiff’s case
was expected to take, but that the court was scheduled to start ajury trial the following day. Due to the court’s scheduledjury trial, the court offered to let the plaintiff begin his evidence that day and schedule the remaining witnesses to testify the following week.

14 The plaintiff agrees that count eight of the second amended complaint concerning the constitutionality of § 9-54 ofthe city code and § 116.4 ofthe state code are legal questions that may only be tried to the court.
15 The plaintiff complains that the city did not make a greater effort to locate him before it demolished the porches. Perhaps the city could have done more to locate the plaintiff, but that question is not determinative of

our analysis. There are public policy considerations that come into play. ‘‘The law shouldnot discourage officials fromtakingpromptactionto insure thepublicsafety. Bysubjectingadecisiontoinvoke anemergencyprocedure to an exacting hindsight analysis, where every mistake, even if made in good faith, becomes a constitutional violation, we encourage delay and thereby potentially increase the public’s exposure to dangerous conditions. This quandary is exactly what these emergency procedures are designed to prevent, and is the primary reason they are constitutional acceptable.’’ Catanzaro v. Weiden, supra, 188 F.3d 63. In the present case, the court found thatthe city officials believed in good faithbeliefthat an emergency endangeringpublic safety existed. The record contains competent evidence in the form of photographs of the premises that supports the court’s good faith determination. Moreover, as Hodel establishes, in cases ofemergency, municipal authorities are endowed with discretion, and it is not the role ofthe court to second guess the authorities’ evaluation ofthe situation. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., supra, 452 U.S. 302.