COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Senior Judges Cole and Duff 

ROCCO FURTHER PROCESSING 

AND 

HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY 

v. Record No. 1618-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

BARBARA ELLEN NELSON DECEMBER 29, 1995 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Cathleen P. Welsh; Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, on 

brief), for appellants. 

 (A. Thomas Lane, Jr., on brief), for appellee. 

 Rocco Further Processing and its insurer (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission erred in finding that Barbara E. Nelson's 

bilateral de Quervain's tenosynovitis qualifies as a compensable 

occupational disease within the meaning of "disease" under the 

Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). Upon reviewing the record 

and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's 

decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 The facts are not in dispute. The parties stipulated that 

claimant's job as a line worker required repetitive use of her 

hands and arms. Claimant presented to Dr. Irvin E. Hess, an 

orthopedic surgeon, on July 22, 1994, complaining of bilateral 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

arm pain. Dr. Hess diagnosed bilateral de Quervain's 

tenosynovitis. The parties stipulated that claimant had no known 

exposure to this condition outside of the employment. Dr. Hess 

did not find the presence of any other disease which could cause 

claimant's condition. Based upon Dr. Hess' opinions and the 

medical records, the commission found that claimant's condition 

constituted a "disease" caused by her employment. 

 In Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438 

S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993), we defined "disease" as 

 any deviation from or interruption of the 

normal structure or function of any part, 

organ, or system (or combination thereof) of 

the body that is manifested by a 

characteristic set of symptoms and signs and 

whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis may 

be known or unknown. 

 "[T]he definition enunciated in Piedmont [has been 

recognized by this Court] as the general and accepted meaning of 

the term 'disease,' a term which is presumed to be known by the 

legislature and is employed by it without restriction in Code 

§§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401." Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan, 21 

Va. App. 65, 69, 461 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1995). In Piedmont, we 

cited the Sloane-Dorland Ann. Medical Legal Dictionary definition 

of de Quervain's disease. Piedmont, 17 Va. App. at 503-04, 438 

S.E.2d at 772. This general medical definition places 

de Quervain's tenosynovitis within the definition of disease set 

forth in Piedmont and approved of in Perdue. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 
 3 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). On 

appeal, this Court will uphold the commission's factual findings 

if supported by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel 

Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989). 

 Similar to the facts of the Perdue case, claimant's 

condition did not present an obvious, sudden, mechanical or 

structural change in her body. Based upon our holdings in 

Piedmont and Perdue, we conclude that credible evidence supports 

the commission's finding that claimant's bilateral de Quervain's 

tenosynovitis is a condition characterized as a "disease" within 

the meaning of the Act. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.