IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0783

Filed July 13, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF Y.R.,

Minor Child,

M.R., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, District 

Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Lynn Vogan of the Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney for 

appellant mother.

Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Pleasant Hill, guardian ad 

litem for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Barbara Davis of Barbara Durden Davis, P.C., West Des Moines, attorney 

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Scott Bandstra of The Bandstra Law Firm PC, Des Moines, for intervenors 

M.A. and J.A.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Scott, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
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SCOTT, Senior Judge.

The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to Y.R. pursuant 

to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2022). Under section 232.116(1)(h), the court 

may terminate a parent’s rights when there is clear and convincing evidence the 

child is three years of age or younger, has been adjudicated a child in need of 

assistance (CINA), has been removed from the parent’s physical custody for at 

least six of the last twelve months without a trial period at home longer than thirty 

days, and there is clear and convincing evidence the child could not be returned 

to the home at the present time. There is no dispute that Y.R. is three years of 

age or younger, has been adjudicated a CINA, and has been out of parental care 

for the requisite period. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(1)-(3). But the mother 

claims the State failed to make “specialized reasonable efforts” and, thus, there is 

insufficient proof to support termination or conclude termination of her rights is in 

the child’s best interest. 

“We review proceedings to terminate parental rights de novo. We give 

weight to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when considering the 

credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 

764, 773 (Iowa 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In In re G.J., No. 19-0282, 2019 WL 1934003, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 

1, 2019), a parent raised the issue of reasonable accommodations under the 

American with Disabilities Act (ADA). In that case, we noted, “The purpose 

underlying the reasonable-efforts requirement is to help the parent to make the 

changes necessary for the child to return.” G.J., 2019 WL 1934003, at *3. There, 

the mother argued she was denied reasonable effort accommodations—"picture 
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books to help her comprehend the parenting curriculum, the provision of an alert 

system for when the child cries, an ‘appropriate’ psychological evaluator, and 

providing adequate communications.” Id. at *4. We concluded:

We find [the department of human services1] made 

reasonable efforts to facilitate the reunification of the mother and the 

child. [H]HS provided reasonable accommodations in compliance 

with the ADA to the extent possible given the mother’s refusal to 

actively participate in ordered services. The mother has failed to 

show she requested a reasonable service that was not offered to her. 

[H]HS can offer the services, but the parent must make the effort if 

the services are to remedy deficiencies and help return the child to 

the home.

Id. at *5. 

Here, the mother asserts, “The case turns on whether, due to the lack of 

reasonable effort provided, the [S]tate has proven that the child cannot be safely 

returned to the parent’s care at this time.” The only deficiency in service the mother

identifies on appeal is not a service to be provided to her; rather, she asserts HHS 

did not consistently provide language interpreters to her parents.

2

 The juvenile

court addressed this claim in its October 2022 permanency order:

[The mother] speaks English fluently and does not need 

interpretation services.

Counsel raises the issues of whether interpretation services 

have been provided at [the mother]’s professionally supervised visits 

with [Y.R.] when [the mother]’s parents attend.

On February 1, 2022, the court ordered as follows: “[H]HS 

shall explore options for bilingual FCS and Safe Care services for 

this family; and alternatively, all providers shall use interpretation 

services during interactions with [the mother]’s parents including 

1 The agency is now the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 

2 To the extent she asserts these claims for her parents—who were allowed to 

intervene in the juvenile proceedings—she has no standing to make claims for 

them. See In re K.R., 737 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (“[The father] did 

not have standing to assert that argument on [the mother’s] behalf in an effort to 

ultimately gain a benefit for himself, that is, the reversal of the termination of his

parental rights.”).
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visits when [the mother]’s parents are present and Safe Care. [H]HS 

shall engage the grandparents in visits with [Y.R.] to explain safety 

concerns and provide education. [H]HS shall use these services to 

make efforts toward concurrent planning of placement of [Y.R.] with 

a family member.” It is necessary to consider the family 

circumstances in February, 2022, and the full context of that order.

As of the February 1, 2022 hearing, [Y.R.] was in foster care. 

[The mother] was living with her parents. Reunification at that time 

would include [the mother] living with her parents, and her parents 

being involved in caring for [Y.R.]. Alternatively, relative placements 

such as [the mother]’s parents would be considered. Neither [the 

mother] nor her parents were able to safely care for [Y.R.] at that 

time. It was reasonable at that time for FCS services and Safe Care 

services to include education for [the mother]’s parents to 

understand [the mother]’s abilities and how to support her parenting, 

or fill in where [the mother]’s parenting was inadequate. These 

measures would support reunification or, alternatively, relative

placement. The purpose was not for [the mother]’s parents to act as 

interpreters for [the mother]. The court wrote “The situation is 

atypical in that [the mother]’s parents are acting as caregivers for [the 

mother] and also learning to act as simultaneous caregivers for 

[Y.R.], and services must be tailored to meet the family’s 

circumstances.”

The family’s circumstances are different now. [Y.R.] is in 

relative care. [Y.R.] was placed in relative placement in April, 2022. 

[The mother] lives with her brother. [The mother] moved in with her 

brother in mid-July, 2022 by her and her family’s own choosing. 

Reunification with [the mother] would no longer include [the mother]’s 

parents living with [the mother] and [Y.R.] [H]HS is under no 

obligation to make efforts to place [Y.R.] with [the mother]’s parents.

A review hearing was held in April, 2022 and the court found that 

reasonable efforts had been provided toward reunification.

The mother did not appeal the October 2022 permanency order.3 See In re 

D.S., 563 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (noting principles of res judicata 

3 We note our supreme court has held:

[H]HS’s obligation to provide reasonable efforts until a final written 

termination order does not necessarily require [H]HS to provide 

reasonable efforts toward reunification. The legislature instructed 

that “the paramount concern[s] in making reasonable efforts” are “[a] 

child’s health and safety.” Iowa Code § 232.102(10)(a). Where it is 

inappropriate to return a child to the family home, the legislature 

specified that “reasonable efforts shall include the efforts made in a 

timely manner to finalize a permanency plan for the child.” Id. “If it 
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preclude the court from relitigating issues that have already been decided and 

reiterating the parent’s obligation to timely challenge the services offered). 

The juvenile court’s termination order noted the services the mother was 

provided, including supervised visits with parenting training, mental-health care, 

parenting evaluation, and Integrated Health Home (IHH) services. The court also 

noted the mother’s failure to engage with a number of the services: 

[The mother] continues to be unable to respond to [Y.R.]’s cues and

continues to show a lack of connection to and interest in [Y.R.] [The 

mother] is not willing to participate in additional services, such as 

IHH. [The mother] is not interested in fully participating in the 

services that are offered such as supervised visits where she would 

have additional support and instruction about parenting. [The 

mother]’s insight into her mental health needs and mental health care 

is limited, as shown by her uncertainty about her need for mental 

health care. [The mother]’s mental health has improved since the

winter for 2021/2022, but only to the extent that she is better able to 

take care of herself.

No specific services were requested to address [the mother]’s 

disability—her mental illness. [She] was provided services to 

address her mental health. [She] was also provided parenting 

education through FCS and a parenting assessment. There was no 

evidence how a different service to accommodate [her] disability 

would have changed the outcome.

We conclude HHS offered reasonable services designed to address the 

concerns that resulted in the removal of the child. See G.J., 2019 WL 1934003, at 

*4. The mother is unable to meet the child’s basic needs without prompting and 

cues from others and thus the child cannot safely be returned to her custody. 

has been determined that the child cannot return to the child’s home,” 

the child’s “case permanency plan” must include “documentation of 

the steps taken to make and finalize an adoption or other permanent 

placement.” Id. § 232.2(4)(j). Therefore, the statute provides for 

situations in which reunification need not be a goal or component of 

[H]HS’s reasonable efforts.

In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528–29 (Iowa 2019) (third and fourth alterations in 

original).
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There is clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the mother’s 

parental rights. 

Because a statutory ground for termination exists, we must next determine 

whether termination is in the child’s best interests. A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 776. We 

“give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for 

furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, 

mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); 

see In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially) 

(stating that a child’s safety and the child’s need for a permanent home are the 

“defining elements” in determining a child’s best interests).

The mother’s guardian ad litem argued Y.R.’s best interests would be 

served by allowing the child to remain in her current placement with a relative under 

a guardianship. Although transfer of guardianship and custody to a suitable person 

or an adult relative is a permanency option, Iowa Code section 232.104(4)(a) 

requires a showing by convincing evidence that termination would be contrary to 

the child’s best interests. And our courts have noted “a guardianship is not a legally

preferable alternative to termination.” In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2017). Here, the juvenile court rejected guardianship: 

A guardianship is not in [Y.R.]’s best interest. [Y.R.] is only one year 

old. A guardianship does not provide the same level of permanency 

as termination of parental rights and adoption as a guardianship can

be litigated repeatedly and even terminated. [Y.R.] deserves to have 

the chance to be adopted and have permanent parents and stability 

for the rest of her childhood.

Accord In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2019) (discussing age of child, 

guardianship, and lack of permanency). The child is in a stable and suitable pre-
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adoptive placement with relatives. Termination of the mother’s parental rights and 

adoption will best further the child’s long-term nurturing and growth. 

There is no permissive factor in Iowa Code section 232.116(3) applicable 

here. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.