alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6981

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RODNEY D. CRAWLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:16-cr-00037-JAG-RCY-1)

Submitted: December 21, 2021 Decided: December 27, 2021

Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rodney D. Crawley, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 21-6981 Doc: 5 Filed: 12/27/2021 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

Rodney D. Crawley appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for 

compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have reviewed the 

record on appeal and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Crawley’s motion. See United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.) (stating 

standard of review), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 383 (2021). Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 21-6981 Doc: 5 Filed: 12/27/2021 Pg: 2 of 2
#### Vigilant Insurance Company, Appellant-Respondent, v Federal Insurance Company et al., Defendants, and North River Insurance Company, Respondent-Appellant.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Myriam Altman, J.), entered July 14, 1989, denying plaintiff Vigilant Insurance Company’s motion and defendant North River Insurance Company’s cross motion for summary judgment and dismissing North River Insurance Company’s affirmative defenses, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this action plaintiff Vigilant Insurance Company seeks a declaratory judgment as to the rights and obligations of it and the defendant insurance companies to their mutual insured, Falgiano Construction Co., Inc. (Falgiano). In the underlying lawsuit Antonio Monteleone, an employee of Falgiano, sued Balling Construction, Inc. (Balling), the general contractor at the worksite where he was injured, premised upon negligence and violations of Labor Law § 241. Balling in turn commenced a third-party action against Falgiano, a subcontractor at the worksite, asserting common-law indemnification, breach of contract, contractual indemnification and full or partial contribution.

In the third-party action, the Supreme Court, Erie County (Flaherty, J. [entered Oct. 7, 1988]) granted summary judgment to Balling against Falgiano upon the contractual indemnification cause of action. That court did not, as Vigilant asserts, address the applicability of common-law indemnity since Balling had moved for summary judgment solely on the basis of contractual indemnification. Accordingly, the language in the Vigilant policy excluding coverage for "liability assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement”, and the fact that Falgiano was found liable to Balling solely on the contractual indemnity clause of their contract, does not preclude the existence of liability, independent of the contract, premised upon common-law indemnification. *(See, O’Dowd v American Sur. Co.,*3 NY2d 347, 352 [1957]; *Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,*136 AD2d 246, 247 [4th Dept 1988], *lv denied*73 NY2d 701 [1988].)

Based upon the foregoing, we find that the IAS court did not err in denying Vigilant’s and North River’s respective motions *203for summary judgment. The court correctly determined that "the question of whether Falgiano would have been liable to Balling under common law indemnification had not been resolved and remains as a question of fact in the present action.”

North River’s affirmative defenses, of Vigilant’s bad faith and failure to provide timely notice of disclaimer to Falgiano, were properly dismissed for lack of evidence of bad faith or of prejudice to North River caused by the absence of timely notice of Vigilant’s disclaimer. (Insurance Law § 3420 [d]; *Oppel v Empire Mut. Ins. Co.,*517 F Supp 1305, 1306 [SD NY 1981]; *Sukup v State of New York,*19 NY2d 519, 522 [1967]; *Western World Ins. Co. v Jean & Benny’s Rest.,*69 AD2d 260, 262 [2d Dept 1979], *appeal dismissed*48 NY2d 653 [1979].) Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Carro, Ellerin and Smith, JJ.
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 17-112V 

Filed: August 9, 2017

UNPUBLISHED

JEAN LALLENSACK, 

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Special Processing Unit (SPU); 

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Causation-In-Fact; Influenza (Flu) 

Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to 

Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)

Ronald Craig Homer, Conway, Homer, P.C., Boston, MA, for petitioner.

Christine Mary Becer, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

Dorsey, Chief Special Master:

On January 25, 2017, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the 

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,

2 (the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a right shoulder injury caused-in-fact 

by her October 23, 2014 influenza vaccination. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to 

the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On August 7, 2017, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case for an injury consistent with a 

shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”). Respondent’s Rule 4(c) 

Report at 1. Specifically, respondent “has concluded that a preponderance of evidence 

establishes that the injury to petitioner’s right shoulder was caused-in-fact by the 

 

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the 

undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with 

the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to 

identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits 

within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012).
administration of her October 23, 2014, flu vaccine, and that petitioner’s injury is not due 

to factors unrelated to the administration of the flu vaccine.” Id. at 3. Respondent 

further agrees that petitioner has met the statutory six month sequela requirement and 

that petitioner’s injury is compensable as a caused-in-fact injury under the Vaccine Act. 

Id.

In view of respondent’s position and the evidence of record, the 

undersigned finds that petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Nora Beth Dorsey

Nora Beth Dorsey

 Chief Special Master
#### Andre J. Melette, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Silverman, J.), entered October 16, 1989, which granted the State’s motion to dismiss the claim.

Since claimant seeks to recover damages for wrongful confinement imposed as the result of a prison disciplinary proceeding, the claim was properly dismissed on the ground of absolute immunity *(see, Arteaga v State of New York,*72 NY2d 212).

Order affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Casey, Weiss, Mikoll and Harvey, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-25-1998
<CASH>                                            6585
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    24966
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      29335
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 62625
<PP&E>                                           90248
<DEPRECIATION>                                   55607
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   98500
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            12578
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          5408
<OTHER-SE>                                       48828
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     98500
<SALES>                                          36310
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 36310
<CGS>                                            29215
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    34313
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 446
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   1555
<INCOME-TAX>                                       555
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               1000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      1000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.36
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.35
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Eric R. Searles

v. Civil No. 05-cv-184-PB

State of New Hampshire, et al.

O R D E R

 In Searles’ new suit he alleges that on 6/2/2005 between

4:45 and 5:00 p.m. in Unit 2D cell 2270, he was attacked by

correctional officers. He moves ex parte (and before preliminary

review) to preserve the video camera images of that area for that

time. 

He also asks that all footage of his “tier time” 2 days

before and 2 days after be preserved. He provides no basis for

this. 

The motion (document no. 7) is granted as to 6/2/2005 and

otherwise is denied. 

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

James R. Muirhead

United States Magistrate Judge

Date: July 14, 2005

cc: Eric R. Searles, pro se

 Carolyn Kirby, Esq.

 Hillsborough County Department of Corrections

Case 1:05-cv-00184-PB Document 8 Filed 07/14/05 Page 1 of 1
|                                      |
|--------------------------------------|
|                                      |  |
| Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas | BNY Mellon Trust of Delaware |
| As Indenture Trustee                 | As Owner Trustee |
| Attn:  Michelle H.Y. Voon  | Attn: Robert Castle / Kristine Gullo |
| 100 Plaza One 6th Floor         | 301 Bellevue Parkway, 3rd Floor |
| Jersey City, NJ 07311                | Wilmington, DE 19809 |

|                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------------|
|                                                 |  |
| The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. | Ally Auto Assets LLC |
| Attn:  Alvin Courts                   | Ally Bank |
| 2 North LaSalle Street, Suite 700               | Attn:  Martha Tate |
| Chicago, IL  60602                    | 200 West Civic Center Drive |
|                                            | Sandy, UT 84070 |

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |
| Re:    | Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2018-3 |
|   | Annual Statement as to Compliance |

|    |
|----|
|    |  |
| a. | A review of the activities of the Servicer during the period of June 27, 2018 through December 31, 2018, and of its performance under the Servicing Agreement has been made under his supervision, and |

|    |
|----|
|    |  |
| b. | To the best of his knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement throughout such period. |

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |  |
|   | Very truly yours, |
|   |   |
|   | /s/ David J. DeBrunner |   |
|   | David J. DeBrunner |
|   | Vice President, Controller & Chief Accounting Officer |
|   |   |
The State of TexasAppellee/s



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

Augus t 21, 2014

N o. 04

- 08

- 00358

- CR

Adam Jay GONZALES

, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. A05

- 467

Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

The Panel has considered the Appellant ’ s Motion for Reconsideration , and the motion is

DENIED.

It is so ORDERED on the 21s t day of August , 201 4

.



### PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO:

____________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Prime Hospitality Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, A.F.
Petrocelli, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

-----------------------
A.F. Petrocelli
President and Chief Executive Officer

August 6, 2004
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Keith Russell Judd

v. Civil No. 05-cv-173-JD

USA

O R D E R

After due consideration of the objection filed, I herewith approve the Report

and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Muirhead dated July 13, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

July 26, 2005 _________________________________

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

cc: Keith Russell Judd, pro se

Case 1:05-cv-00173-JD Document 12 Filed 07/26/05 Page 1 of 1
#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patricia RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-50550. D.C. No. CR-02-00740-TJW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 17, 2003.*

Decided Aug. 13, 2003.

Before KLEINFELD and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and POGUE, Judge.**

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 Honorable Donald C. Pogue, United States Court of International Trade Judge, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Appellant Patricia Rodriguez challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the indictment against her, arguing that the grand jury instructions improperly limited the scope of the grand jury’s inquiry in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Appellant’s claim is foreclosed by this Court’s decision in *United States v. Marcucci,*299 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 *759(9th Cir.2002), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1600, 155 L.Ed.2d 334 (2003). *See also United States v. Cedano-Arellano,*332 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir.2003). We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the motion.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
| (logo) WELLS  FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334

 

  |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

 

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as ofAugust 1, 2018, by and among WELLS FARGO COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., asDepositor, WELLSFARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, LNR PARTNERS, LLC, as SpecialServicer, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Certificate Administrator, WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONALASSOCIATION, as Trustee and PENTALPHA SURVEILLANCE LLC, as Operating Advisorand as Asset Representations Reviewer with respect to Commercial MortgagePass-Through Certificates Series 2018-C46 (the "Agreement").Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meaningsassigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 11.09of this Agreement, I, Leslie Hayton, Managing Director of Commercial MortgageServices do hereby certify that:

 

1.             Areview of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from August1, 2018 through December 31, 2018 (the “Reporting Period”), andof its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and 

 

2.             Tothe best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer hasfulfilled all of its obligations under this Agreement in all material respectsthroughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned hasexecuted this Certificate as of the 28th day of February 2019.

 

 

/s/Leslie Hayton

LeslieHayton

ManagingDirector

WellsFargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank,  N.A. | (logo) Together  we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
#### The State, ex rel. Tharp, *v.*Industrial Commission of Ohio.

(No. 24401

Decided December 20, 1933.)

*579*Messrs. Harrison & MarsTvman*and *Mr. Joseph Pilmer,*for relator.

*Mr. John W. Bricker,*attorney general, *Mr. R. R. Zurmehly*and *Messrs. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey,*for respondent.

(Decided January 17, 1934.)

This cause came on to be heard upon the demurrer of the relator to the answer filed by the respondent herein, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged that said demurrer be, and the same hereby is, overruled on authority of *State, ex rel. Butram,*v. *Industrial Commission,*124 Ohio St., 589, and *State, ex rel. Cezkovsky,*v. *Industrial Commission,*126 Ohio St., 434. Eelator is granted twenty days to further plead.

*Demurrer overruled.*

Weygandt, O. J., Stephenson, Jones, Matthias, Bevis and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.

It appearing to the court that demurrer to the answer filed herein was overruled on December 20, 1933, and relator given twenty days to plead, and said relator having advised the court he does not desire to plead further, it is ordered and adjudged that the writ of mandamus prayed for in the petition be, and the same hereby is, denied.

*Writ denied.*

Weygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Jones, Matthias, Beyes and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00451-CR

Harold Dewayne Ferguson

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From the 43rd District Court

of Parker County (CR16-0101)

December 7, 2017

Opinion by Justice Gabriel

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Lee Gabriel

 Justice Lee Gabriel
# EXHIBIT 12.1

# ARCHSTONE COMMUNITIES TRUST
                                  COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

                                            (Dollar amounts in thousands)

                                                     (Unaudited)

`Three Months Ended
                                     March 31,                     Twelve Months Ended December 31,
                              ----------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------
                                 2001         2000       2000        1999       1998        1997(1)      1996
                              ----------- ----------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Earnings from operations....  $   37,600  $   43,197  $  176,466  $ 169,339  $  134,571  $   24,686  $   94,089
Add:
   Interest expense.........      34,646      34,202     145,173    121,494      83,350      61,153      35,288
                              ----------- ----------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Earnings as adjusted........  $   72,246  $   77,399  $  321,639  $ 290,833  $  217,921  $   85,839  $  129,377
                              =========== =========== =========== ========== =========== =========== ===========

Fixed charges:
   Interest expense.........  $   34,646  $   34,202  $  145,173  $ 121,494  $   83,350  $   61,153  $   35,288
   Capitalized interest.....       5,318       6,570      24,317     31,912      29,942      17,606      16,941
                              ----------- ----------- ----------- ---------- ----------- ----------- -----------
     Total fixed charges....  $   39,964  $   40,772  $  169,490  $ 153,406  $  113,292  $   78,759  $   52,229
                              =========== =========== =========== ========== =========== =========== ===========

Ratio of earnings to fixed
charges.....................         1.8         1.9         1.9        1.9         1.9         1.1         2.5
                              =========== =========== =========== ========== =========== =========== ===========

(1)    Earnings from operations for 1997 includes a one-time,  non-cash  charge of $71.7 million  associated with costs
       incurred in acquiring  Archstone's REIT and property management  companies from Security Capital.  Excluding the
       charge, the ratio of earnings to fixed charges for the year ended December 31, 1997 would be 2.0.`
Exhibit 32.1











CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In  connection  with the quarterly Report of Frontier  Communications  Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, Mary Agnes Wilderotter, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations of the Company.











/s/ Mary Agnes Wilderotter_______


Mary Agnes Wilderotter


Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


May 9, 2012











This certification is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.





A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement required by Section 906, has been  provided to Frontier  Communications  Corporation and will be retained by Frontier  Communications  Corporation and  furnished  to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.