# FILED
June 26, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT NASHVILLE FEBRUARY

SESSION, 1997

STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) No. 01C01-9602-CR-00077 Appellee ) ) DAVIDSON COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. J. RANDALL WYA TT, JR., Judge RONNIE C. TURNER, ) ) (Aggrava

ted Rape) Appellant )
For the Appellant : For the Appellee : JOHN B. BLAIR, III CHARLES W. BU RSON 176 2nd Avenue, North Attorney General and Repor ter Suite 406 Nashville, TN 37201 PET ER C OUG HLAN Assistant Attorney Gener al Criminal Justice Div

ision 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN. 37243-0493 VICTOR S. (TORRY)

JOHNSON III District Attorney General WILLIAM R. R EED Asst. District Attor

ney General Washington Square, Suite 500 222-2nd Avenue, N Nashville, TN. 37201-16 49

OPINION FILED: AFFIRMED
David G. Hay

es Judge2 OPINION
The appellant, Ronnie C. Turner, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-convic

tion relief. The appellant w as indicted on six count s of aggravated rape by

a Davidson County Gr and Jury. Pursuant to a pl ea agreement, three of the counts w ere dismissed, with th e appellant pleading guil ty to the remaining three counts of aggravated rape. Un der the terms of the plea agreement, the appellant received an effective sente nce of fifteen years confinement in the Department of Correc tion. On April 4, 1995, the appellant filed for post-conviction relief alleging that hi s pleas were not vol untary and that his trial counsel w

as ineffective. The post-conv iction court conducted an evidentiary hearing

and denied relief. The appellant now appeals this denial alleging that trial

counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to subpoena a w itness at a suppression hearing; (2) failing to require the State to respond more specifically to his requested bill o

f particulars; and (3) faili ng to correctly i nform him as to the amount of time it would take to "flat ten his sentence."
In denying relief, the pos t-conviction court c

oncluded that the appellant had not m et his bur den of p roving tha t he had b een depr ived of th e effec tive assistance

of counsel and

that his gu ilty plea

s were vo luntarily

entered. To prove that he was denied the effective assistance of counse l, the appellant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, Taylor v. State , 875 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. 1994), first, that counsel's representation fell below the range of competence d emanded of attorneys in criminal

cases, Baxter v. Rose , 523 S.W.2d 930, 93 6 (Tenn. 1975), and, sec ond, tha t, but fo r these er rors, the result of the proce eding woul d have been different. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984); State v. Melson , 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn.), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 211 (1989) . On post-conviction r eview, there is a s

trong3

presumption of satisfactory r epresentation, Barr v. State , 910 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
First, the appellant contends that trial counsel failed to subpoena a potential witness in s upport of his defense. The appellant bears the burden of presenting that witness at the ev identiary hearing. Black v. State , 794 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)(emphasis added). The appellant failed to pr esent such witness, thus, he fails to establish the prejudic e prong mandated by Strickland v. Washington , supra . Black , 794 S.W.2d at 753. Second, the appellant argues that trial counsel’s failure to require the State to more specifically ans wer his bill of partic ulars, citing Burlison v. State , 501 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. 1973), constitutes deficient perf ormance. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that Burlison is applicable to guilty pleas, the appellant has failed to show prejudice resulting fro m trial counsel's failure to obtain a more specific bill of particulars. Third, the r ecord indicates that both the appellant's trial counsel and the trial court informed him as to the nature and consequences o f his guilty pleas including the fact that he would become "parole eligible at thirty percent." This issue is without meri

t.

When this court undertakes review of a lower court's deci sion on a petition for post-conviction rel ief, the lower court's findings of fact are given the weight of a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal absent a finding that the evidence preponderates against the ju dgment. Clenny v. State , 576 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied , 441 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2170 (1979 ). After reviewing the r

ecord, we cannot conclude that the evidence preponderates against the post-convi ction court's findings. Moreover, we find no e rror of law mandating reversal of the court's judgment. The post-conviction court's dismissal of the appellant's petition for post-convicti on relief is affirmed.4 ____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Jud ge

CONCUR:

________________________________________ GARY R. WADE , Judge

________________________________________ CURWOOD W ITT, Judge