SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1386 

CA 10-01557 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

WENDY A. COOK, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

OSWEGO COUNTY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, 

ET AL., DEFENDANTS. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

 

LONGSTREET & BERRY, LLP, SYRACUSE (MARTHA L. BERRY OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

PETRONE & PETRONE, P.C., UTICA (DAVID BLOCK OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Oswego County

(Norman W. Seiter, Jr., J.), entered September 24, 2009 in a personal

injury action. The judgment dismissed the complaint against defendant

Oswego County upon a verdict of no cause for action. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for

injuries she sustained when a vehicle driven by defendant Steven E.

Gleason, Sr. struck her while it was backing into a waste management

facility owned and operated by defendant Oswego County (County). 

Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of no cause for action. 

On appeal, plaintiff contends that Supreme Court erred in denying her

motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence,

for judgment determining that Gleason was negligent as a matter of law

and for a new trial pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) on the remaining issues

or, in the alternative, a new trial on all issues. 

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the verdict in favor of

Gleason is not against the weight of the evidence. “A motion to set

aside a jury verdict of no cause [for] action should not be granted

unless the preponderance of the evidence in favor of the moving party

is so great that the verdict could not have been reached upon any fair

interpretation of the evidence” (Dannick v County of Onondaga, 191

AD2d 963, 964). Here, the jury was entitled to credit Gleason’s

testimony that he was backing up very slowly and using his mirrors

appropriately in order to see what was behind him. The mere fact that

Gleason was backing up when he struck plaintiff and did not look over

his shoulder does not necessitate the conclusion that he was negligent
-2- 1386 

CA 10-01557 

as a matter of law. Rather, viewing the record as a whole, we

conclude that “the verdict is one that reasonable persons could have

rendered,” and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the

jury (Ruddock v Happell, 307 AD2d 719, 720). 

We also reject plaintiff’s contention that the court committed

reversible error by allowing a State Trooper who investigated the

incident to testify that plaintiff’s version of events was

inconsistent with his own investigation. As plaintiff correctly

contends, the State Trooper’s investigation was based in part on

hearsay statements of witnesses who did not testify at trial, and we

thus conclude that the court properly ruled that the Trooper’s

conclusions from the report were inadmissible when Gleason attempted

to offer them during his direct examination of the Trooper at trial

(see Conners v Duck’s Cesspool Serv., 144 AD2d 329, 329-330). The

Trooper thereafter testified that he changed his report at plaintiff’s

request by adding an addendum to reflect plaintiff’s version of the

manner in which the accident occurred. The Trooper was then allowed,

over plaintiff’s objection, to testify that plaintiff’s version of

events were not consistent with his own findings as to the manner in

which the accident occurred. Even assuming, arguendo, that the court

erred in admitting that testimony of the Trooper, we conclude that the

error “would not have affected the result” and that any such error

therefore is harmless (Palmer v Wright & Kremers, 62 AD2d 1170, 1170).

Finally, we reject plaintiff’s contention that the court erred in

limiting her theories of liability against the County by instructing

the jury that it could find the County liable only if the County

failed to ensure, pursuant to its internal rules, that Gleason stopped

at the transfer bay entrance and only if that failure proximately

caused the accident. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that

the court’s charge was consistent with the only viable theory of

negligence asserted at trial against the County, and thus that the

court did not limit plaintiff’s theories of liability against the

County. Under the circumstances, the court’s charge “appropriately

conveyed the applicable legal principles and applied them to the facts

adduced in view of the issues raised” at trial (Espriel v New York

Downtown Hosp., 298 AD2d 165, 166). 

Entered: December 30, 2011 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court