FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 27, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

FRANK HALLEY, as next friend of J.H., a minor child, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 16-7079 SARA HUCKABY, in her individual capacity, Defendant - Appellant. and STATE OF OKLAHOMA EX REL. THE OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; KEN GOLDEN, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Bryan County, Oklahoma; NATHAN CALLOWAY, in this individual capacity; JEFF GOERKE, in his individual capacity; BRYAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 4, sued as Independent School District No. 4 of Bryan County, also known as Colbert School District, Defendants.

--------------------------------------------- FRANK HALLEY, as next friend of J.H., a minor child, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 16-7080JEFF GOERKE, in his individual capacity, Defendant - Appellant. and SARA HUCKABY, in her individual capacity; STATE OF OKLAHOMA EX REL. THE OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; KEN GOLDEN, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Bryan County, Oklahoma; NATHAN CALLOWAY, in his individual capacity; BRYAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 4, sued as Independent School District No. 4 of Bryan County, also known as Colbert School District, Defendants.

--------------------------------------------- FRANK HALLEY, as next friend of J.H., a minor child, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 16-7081 NATHAN CALLOWAY, in his individual capacity, Defendant - Appellant. and

-2-SARA HUCKABY, in her individual capacity; STATE OF OKLAHOMA EX REL. THE OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; KEN GOLDEN, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Bryan County, Oklahoma; JEFF GOERKE, in his individual capacity; BRYAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 4, sued as Independent School District No. 4 of Bryan County, also known as Colbert School District, Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA (D.C. NO. CIV-0562-JHP)

Emily B. Fagan (John K.F. Langford with her on the briefs), Ass istant General Counsel, Oklahoma State Department of Human Services, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant Sara Huckaby. Clark W. Crapster (Mark E. Fileds with him on the briefs), Stei dley & Neal, P.L.L.C., McAlester, Oklahoma, for Appellant Jeff Goerke. Wellon B. Poe (Chris J. Collins with him on the briefs), Collin s, Zorn & Wagner, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant Nathan Calloway. J. Spencer Bryan (Steven J. Terrill with him on the brief), Bry an & Terrill Law, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellee Frank Halley.

Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, BALDOCK , andLUCERO , Circuit Judges.

-3-TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge.

J.H. is a minor child represented by his grandfather Frank Hall ey. J.H. claims a child welfare specialist at the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and two police officers wrongfully seized and questioned him ab out possible abuse by his father. Because of this conduct, J.H. argues thes e officials violated the Fourth Amendment, and that two of the three officials viola ted the Fourteenth Amendment by unduly interfering with J.H’s substantive due proc ess right of familial association. The officials moved for summary judgment—arguing, in part, thatqualified immunity shielded them from liability. The district court deni ed qualified immunity, and this interlocutory appeal followed. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The district court corr ectly determined that two of the three defendants were not entitled t o qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim. But w e reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for the officer w ho merely followed orders by transporting J.H. We also reverse the district court ’s denial of qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment interference with familial association claim since it was not clearly established that the officials’ conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

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### I. Background The Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) received an anonymous call voicing a concern for the safety of six-year-oldJ.H., alleging J.H.’s father used drugs and had a prior arrest record for poss essing drugs and a firearm. 1 DHS classified the call as a “Priority Two,” which is a low-p riority classification that gives DHS several days to respond. The morning after the anonymous call, February 13, 2014, Deputy Nathan Calloway, a defendant here, met with two DHS employees to discu ss how to respond to the call. Calloway, a deputy with the Bryan County Sheriff’s Department, already knew of allegations that J.H.’s father abus ed drugs. Deputy Calloway had learned this information when he interviewed the f ather’s ex-wife on January 23, 2014. Deputy Calloway also knew of pending char ges against the father’s ex-wife for filing a false report of domestic abuse an d that J.H.’s father had been acquitted once before of domestic abuse charges.

1 The district court noted the original Referral Information Rep ort only indicated that J.H.’s safety might be implicated because his fa ther “was a methamphetamine abuser who had been arrested in January 2014 fo r possession of meth, meth paraphernalia, and a firearm.” Aplt. App. 702 n.2. According to the district court, the original report did not mention anything ab out possible combative behavior between J.H.’s father and his ex-wife in the presence of the child. And the district court doubted the authenticity of a subsequent supplemental report containing such information because it was inconsistent with the first report. None of the defendants dispute the district court’s conclusion about the conflicting nature of the reports.
-5-At the meeting, Deputy Calloway agreed that J.H. should be take n into protective custody and interviewed, or at least acquiesced to the proposal. It is unclear from the summary judgment record whose idea it was to i nterview J.H. DHS investigator Kari Reed testified it was Deputy Calloway’s i dea, but Deputy Calloway disputes that assertion. In any event, according to the plan, Deputy Calloway would pick up J.H. from school on the following day, F ebruary 14, and drive him to a DHS safe-house for an interview. Once J.H. arri ved, DHS personnel would ask him structured questions in a forensic inte rview to determine whether he was being abused. The next day, Deputy Calloway told Reed that he would not be ab le to pick up J.H. from school. As Reed was leaving the office, Sara Huck aby, DHS child welfare specialist and defendant in this case, asked whether sh e could help. Reed asked Huckaby to arrange for J.H. to be picked up for the interview. Huckaby then called Chief of Police Jeff Goerke, the third defendant he re, and asked him to pick up J.H. There is a dispute in the record as to what Hu ckaby told Goerke. Goerke testified that Huckaby told him there was a verbal courtorder authorizing the seizure, but Huckaby disputes that fact. Whatever the case may be, Goerke transported J.H. to the safe-h ouse. J.H. told Goerke he did not want to leave school, but Goerke took hi m away from school and to the safe-house anyway. The safe-house was about thirteen miles away, and the ride took about fifteen minutes. On the way ther e, Goerke

-6-apparently told him he would be given “a better home, a safer h ome where there is no violence.” Aplt. App. 603–604; Aple. Br. at 5. Deputy Calloway arrived at the safe-house before the interview and helped set up the video-recording equipment. Huckaby conducted the fo rty-minute interview—exploring J.H.’s family life and relationship with hi s father. At the conclusion of the interview, Deputy Calloway transported J.H. b ack to school. The interview did not yield any evidence of abuse. Left with o nly the uncorroborated and anonymous tip, DHS did not proceed any furth er. Yet the interview did have consequences. J.H. purportedly suff ered stress and trauma as a result of the questioning. J.H.’s relationship with his father apparently suffered too, as J.H. has allegedly come to resent h im—believing that he was responsible for the trauma J.H. suffered from the interv iew. J.H. then brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. Among other c laims, J.H. has alleged Huckaby, Deputy Calloway, and Chief Goerke violatedJ.H.’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. He further claimed they conducted this unjustified interview with the intention of inte rfering with J.H.’s relationship with his father. They did this, J.H. claims, in r etaliation for not having been able to convict J.H.’s father of the domestic abuse allegations that his father’s ex-wife had made. The district court denied Huckaby’s, Calloway’s, and Goerke’s m otions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and they appealed.

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### II. Analysis The defendants contend the district court erred in denying thei r motions for summary judgment. All three defendants argue they are entitledto qualified immunity on J.H.’s Fourth Amendment claims, and Huckaby and Dep uty Calloway argue the same for J.H.’s Fourteenth Amendment claims against them. A. Standard of Review We review the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qu alified immunity de novo, applying the same standard as the district co urt. Timmons v. White , 314 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003); Maestas v. Lujan , 351 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no g enuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a m atter of law. McCoy v. Meyers , 887 F.3d 1034, 1044 (10th Cir. 2018). In reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, we normallyresolve disputed facts in favor of the party resisting summary judgmentand grant that party all reasonable inferences. Id. But “if the nonmovant bears the burden of persuasion on a claim at trial, summary judgment may be warrant ed if the movant points out a lack of evidence to support an essential element o f that claim.” Id. Our “review of summary judgment orders in the qualified immunity context differs from that applicable to review of other summary judgmen t decisions.”

-8-Koch v. City of Del City , 660 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summ ary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defend ant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clear ly established.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If, and only if, the plaintiff meets thi s two-part test does a defendant then bear the traditional burden of the movant for summary judgment
. . . .” Id. (quotation omitted). In determining whether the plaintiff me ets this burden, we “ordinarily accept the plaintiff’s version of the fa cts—that is, ‘the facts alleged.’” A.M. v. Holmes , 830 F.3d 1123, 1136 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Riggins v. Goodman , 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009)). But “because at summary judgment we are beyond the pleading phase of the litiga tion, the plaintiff’s version of the facts must find support in the recor d.” Id. (alterations incorporated) (quoting Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty. , 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009)). Thus, if the nonmoving party’s version of the facts is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could be lieve it,” then we “should not adopt that version of the facts.” Thomson , 584 F.3d at 1312 (quotation omitted). Mindful of our standard of review, we turn to the law of qualif ied immunity. “[Q]ualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Mullenix v. Luna , 136 S. Ct. 305, 308

-9-(2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). To show defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that (1) “the facts that the district court ruled a reasonable jury could find woul d suffice to show a legal violation,” and (2) the “law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Roosevelt-Hennix v. Prickett , 717 F.3d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). A constitutional right is clearly established if it is “suffici ently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix , 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). A Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision onpoint or the weight of authority from other courts can clearly establish a r ight. Redmond v.
Crowther , 882 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 2018). Generally, “existing pre cedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyon d debate” to clearly establish a right. Id. (quoting Mullenix , 136 S. Ct. at 308). The question is not whether a “broad general proposition” was clearly establ ished, but “whether the violative nature of particular conduct [was] clearly establ ished.’” Id. (quoting
Mullenix , 136 S. Ct. at 308). If a plaintiff demonstrates the officials violated a clearly es tablished right, we consider a third question: “whether extraordinary circumstan ces—such as reliance on the advice of counsel or on a statute—so prevented the official from

-10-knowing that his or her actions were unconstitutional that he o r she should not be imputed with knowledge of a clearly established right.” Shero v. City of Grove , 510 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007). We apply this standard to J.H.’s unlawful seizure and interfere nce with familial relationship claims in turn. B. Fourth Amendment Claim—Unlawful Seizure J.H. first contends the defendants unlawfully seized J.H. by ta king him from school and interviewing him without his parents’ permissio n. He argues the officials did not have a legal basis for the detention, as ther e was no reasonable basis to think that J.H. was in imminent danger. We first consider whether J.H. has adequately shown a constitut ional violation—one of the requirements in the qualified immunity ana lysis. We turn next to the second question: whether the law was clearly establ ished at the time of the alleged violation. 1. Constitutional Violation The Fourth Amendment protects persons from “unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “‘The key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . . .’” Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (quoting Michigan v. Summers , 452 U.S. 692, 700, n.12 (1981)). Depending on the circumstances, a seizure must be supported by an arrest warrant , probable cause,

-11-or reasonable suspicion to detain and question an individual. See id. ; Jones v.
Hunt , 410 F.3d 1221, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2005); Storey v. Taylor , 696 F.3d 987, 992 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2012). A seizure occurs “within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment wh en ‘a reasonable person would believe that he or she is not free to l eave.’” Roska ex
rel. Roska v. Peterson , 328 F.3d 1230, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Florida v.
Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991)). “‘[W]hether the person being ques tioned is a child or an adult’ is ‘relevant’ to whether a person would have felt free to leave.”
Jones v. Hunt , 410 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Little , 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994)). A young child is s eized for Fourth Amendment purposes if “no reasonable child would have be lieved that he was free to leave.” Hunt , 410 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Doe v. Heck , 327 F.3d 492, 510 (7th Cir. 2003)). We have previously applied these principles to cases in which s ocial workers seized a child. 2 For example, in Roska , 328 F.3d at 1244, we held social workers violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized a child from his home

2 See, e.g. , Malik v. Arapahoe Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 191 F.3d 1306, 1316 (10th Cir. 1999) (it was clearly established that officers violated the Fourth Amendment by misrepresenting facts in order to obtain judicial authorization to seize the child); cf. Franz v. Lytle , 997 F.2d 784, 793 (10th Cir. 1993) (police officers are not “absolved of a warrant or probable cause requi rement” when investigating “claims of child abuse and neglect”). -12-without judicial authorization or exigent circumstances. There was no compelling reason or special need of the government that made obtaining a warrant impracticable. “Simply put, unless the child is in imminent danger, there is no reason that it is impracticable to obtain [judicial authorizati on] before social workers remove a child from the home.” Id. at 1242. Yet although there is clearly “no ‘social worker’ exception to the Fourth Amendment,” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc. , 336 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 2003), we have not definitively decided what Fourth Amendment standardgoverns when social workers seize a child at school , rather than at home. InHunt , we declined to decide precisely “what Fourth Amendment test is most appropr iate” when social workers seize a child at school. 410 F.3d at 1228 & n.4 . Nonetheless, we held it is “clearly established” that a seizure “must be reason able.” Id. at 1229. The social workers’ seizure in that case violated the Fourth Am endment because it transgressed even the minimal reasonable-suspicion standard from Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and was therefore unreasonable

. Hunt , 410 F.3d at 1228. Here, the officials took J.H. from school to a safe-house. The y did not take J.H. from his home. As explained in Hunt , it has long been clearly established that any seizure at school without judicial authorization had t o at least be reasonable under the minimal Terry reasonable-suspicion standard. In other

-13-words, the officials at least needed to have a reasonable suspi cion of an imminent threat to the safety of the child. The parties agree the Fourth Amendment required the officials i n this case to have reasonable suspicion of imminent abuse in order to seiz e J.H. 3 We therefore consider whether the evidence at this stage would all ow a reasonable jury to find that (1) the officials seized J.H., and (2) the de fendants did not have reasonable suspicion that J.H. faced a threat of imminent abuse

. To begin, we think it is clear the officials seized J.H. withinthe meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the defendants do not contest this po int. J.H. would not have “felt free to terminate the encounter” with Chief Goerke, who picked him up from school, or later with Deputy Calloway or Huckaby on ce he had been transported. See Hunt , 410 F.3d at 1226. For several reasons, based on this record it is equally clear that a reasonable officer in possession of the facts could not have ha d reasonable suspicion that J.H. was in imminent danger.

3 Some of the parties cite to Gomes v. Wood , 451 F.3d 1122, 1130 (10th Cir. 2006), as the source of this standard, but Gomes is not a Fourth Amendment case. In Gomes , we held that procedural due process (not the Fourth Amendment) requires social workers to have “reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat to the safety of the child” in order to seize a child without judicial authorization. Id. at 1130; see Arredondo v. Locklear , 462 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying this rule). But even though Gomes did not establish a Fourth Amendment rule, its holding hews close to Fo urth Amendment doctrine, and is therefore instructive. -14-First, the phone call to DHS was anonymous and lacked detail. It is, of course, possible for an anonymous call to support a reasonable suspicion of an imminent threat. 4 But the call here was too vague to do so. The caller did notsay that J.H. was suffering abuse at the hands of his father, or th at abuse was likely to happen soon. Instead, the caller only expressed concern becaus e J.H.’s father was a drug abuser who had been arrested for possessing drugs and a firearm. This was not enough for a reasonable officer to suspect J.H. was in immi nent danger. 5 Second, DHS itself classified the call as a Priority 2, which i s a low-priority designation. 6 According to the evidence, matters on the Priority 2 list rarely lead DHS to detain a child for protective reasons. Reed testified that only “[f]ive or less” of the “several hundred priority twos tha t [she had seen]

4 See, e.g. , Navarette v. California , 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (2014) (“[U]nder appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate ‘su fficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make [an] inv estigatory stop.’” (quoting Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)).

5 As previously mentioned, a supplemental report states that th e caller also alleged that J.H.’s father had abused his mother in front of hi m, but the authenticity of that evidence is in dispute, see Aplt. App. 702 n.2.—and even if true, this would not be enough to create reasonable suspicion that J.H. himself was in imminent danger.

6 According to Reed’s deposition, “[a] priority one indicates that a child is actually in immediate danger. It gives us less than 24 hours t o respond. . . . A priority two can be set out two to five days depending on the h otline’s risk assessment.” Aplt. App. 1017. And DHS has up to “60 days” to complete the investigation on a Priority 2. Id . at 1024. -15-involved a child placed in protective custody.” See Aplt. App. 808. What is more, DHS itself considers a Priority 2 situation to be one whe re no imminent safety threat or emergency circumstances are present. Id. at 1666–67, 1672. Third, the delay between the phone call and the seizure suggest s the officials themselves did not believe there was an imminent thre at. Two days elapsed from the time of the anonymous phone call DHS received on February 12 to the time the interview actually took place. During those tw o days, DHS placed the matter on its low-priority list. And even when Deputy Call oway and DHS employees discussed the matter on February 13, they concluded the interview was not necessary until the next day. If the officials truly had r easonable suspicion that J.H. was in imminent danger, they would have acted with mo re urgency. Given (1) the vagueness of the call, (2) the low-priority desig nation the call received, and (3) the delayed response, a reasonable jury couldfind a Fourth Amendment violation occurred by seizing J.H. for an interview w ithout judicial authorization. Indeed, there was ample time to obtain judicial authorization for protective custody as provided for by Oklahoma’s statute. 7 That the father’s exwife had made domestic abuse allegations in the past does not c hange this

7 As other circuits have held, a court order permitting seizure of a child for an interview is the equivalent of a warrant for Fourth Amendmen t purposes. See Greene v. Camreta , 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases), vacated in part on mootness grounds , 563 U.S. 692 (2011), and vacated in part , 661 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011). -16-conclusion, as J.H.’s father was acquitted and those past alleg ations of abuse against his ex-wife did not indicate J.H. was in danger in the present

. The defendants emphasize that it is reasonable to conduct an in terview at the safe-house rather than the home in order to avoid greater d anger for J.H. They also explain it was also reasonable to take J.H. away fromschool because DHS could not conduct the forensic interview at the school. Th ese assertions, however, miss the point. It may very well constitute a best pr actice to interview a child at the safe-house during school hours once seizing the child is justified in the first place . Unless officials have judicial authorization, however, they cannot seize a child without at least having reasonable suspicion of i mminent danger. Yet even if a reasonable officer in possession of the facts cou ld not have had reasonable suspicion that J.H. was in danger, the defendant s argue they are not liable for the Fourth Amendment violation. The arguments v ary by defendant, but they generally claim the evidence shows that (1) they did n ot know the facts, (2) their own actions were reasonable (even if the actions of others were not ), or (3) they did not cause the violation. We assess these arguments one defendant at a time. 8

8 The defendants also argue that even if they violated the Fourth Amendment, they are entitled to a good faith exception to the w arrant requirement. But the good-faith exception is subsumed by the c learly-established prong of qualified immunity, which we discuss below. See Groh v. Ramirez , 540 (continued...) -17-a. Huckaby We first consider whether Huckaby’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Huckaby had intimate knowledge about the basis for J.H.’s detention. She was the one who told Goerke to seize J.H. And she conducted the interview herself. A reasonable official in her position shoul d have known there was no reasonable suspicion that J.H. was in imminent danger. Huckaby nonetheless argues she merely arranged transportation and followed orders. Because she did not make the decision to seiz e J.H. herself, nor participate in physically taking him from school, she claims sh e cannot be liable for the Fourth Amendment violation. That is not so. As we exp lained in Snell v.
Tunnell , “direct participation is not necessary” for liability under § 1983. 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Conner v. Reinhard , 847 F.2d 384, 396–97 (7th Cir. 1988)). “The requisite causal connection is s atisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff o f her constitutional rights.” Id. A reasonable jury could find Huckaby set in motion a series of events that she should have known would cause others to violate J.H.’s Fourth Amendment rights.

8 (...continued) U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004); United States v. Dunn , 719 F. App’x 746, 752 n.5 (10th Cir. 2017). -18-Additionally, Chief Goerke testified that Huckaby falsely told him there was a verbal court order authorizing the interview. If the jury found this to be true, it could find Huckaby violated the Fourth Amendment. Sin ce there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Huckaby did so, the distr ict court correctly denied summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. b. Deputy Calloway In light of the evidence at summary judgment, a reasonable juryalso could find Deputy Calloway violated the Fourth Amendment. It is undi sputed that Deputy Calloway participated in the discussions leading to J.H. ’s seizure and at least acquiesced in the decision to seize J.H. His involvementgave him knowledge about J.H.’s specific circumstances. On the day of the seizure, Deputy Calloway’s court duties were lasting longer than expected and he was no longer sure he could timely transport J.H. to the interview. He therefore instructed Reed to contact Chief G oerke to arrange alternate transportation. A jury could find this instruction s et in motion a series of events that caused the seizure to occur. Deputy Calloway al so set up recording equipment for the interview and transported J.H. back to school after it was over. These facts would allow a reasonable jury to find Deputy Callow ay violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing J.H. without the necessary reasonab le suspicion. Summary judgment is also inappropriate for Deputy Calloway fo r a

-19-second, independent reason. As the district court explained, there is a material fact in dispute. DHS investigator Reed testified that it was C alloway’s idea to seize J.H. If the jury found this testimony to be true, Callow ay would be responsible for J.H.’s seizure. c. Chief Goerke As for Chief Goerke, we find it unnecessary to decide whether o r not there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Even if the jury found his actions unconstitutional , the violation would not have been clearly established. We explain this in mo re detail below. 2. Clearly Established Law We now turn to the second part of our qualified immunity analys is. Even if the officials here “violated the Fourth Amendment, they are ent itled to immunity if no clearly established law would have informed them that [th eir conduct] was improper” and violated a constitutional right. Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc.
v. Rhodes , 843 F.3d 853, 867 (10th Cir. 2016). As explained above, “in order for the law to be clearly establi shed, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have fou nd the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Klen v. City of Loveland , 661 F.3d 498, 511 (10th Cir. 2011). But a prior case need not be exactly parallel to the co nduct here for the

-20-officials to have been on notice of clearly established law. “ [G]eneral statements of the law” can clearly establish a right for qualified immunity purposes if they apply “with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question .” Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (quoting United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). As before, we analyze this question separately for each defenda nt. a. Huckaby It was clearly established at the time of the seizure in this c ase that a social worker needs at least reasonable suspicion of abuse in order to seize a child at school. See Hunt , 410 F.3d at 1230. This rule is sufficiently specific to constitute clearly established law placing officials on notice that the seizure here violated the Fourth Amendment. See Fuerschbach v. Sw. Airlines Co. , 439 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2006). And even if it is a general rule of law, it applies here with obvious clarity. See United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997). The thrust of the claim against Huckaby is that she did not hav e reasonable suspicion when directing and effecting the seizure of J.H. If a jury were to find this fact, it would constitute a violation of clearly establish ed law. Because this requirement should have put Huckaby on notice that seizing with out reasonable suspicion would violate J.H.’s constitutional rights, we find c learly established law applies to Huckaby’s purported conduct.

-21-Indeed, we note that Oklahoma law tracks this Fourth Amendment standard, requiring “reasonable suspicion” that a child is in need of imm ediate protection due to an “imminent safety threat” before an officer may take achild into custody without a court order. Okla. Stat. tit. 10A, § 1-4-201(A)(1). “[W]hile we do not look to state law in determining the scope of federal rights, the fact that [state law] limited the power of police . . . in precisely the manner the Fourth Amendment would limit such power is indicative of the degree to which the Fourth Amendment limit was established.” Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc. , 195 F.3d 584, 595 (10th Cir. 1999). Oklahoma law also shouldhave put Huckaby on notice that her conduct would violate J.H.’s con stitutional rights. b. Deputy Calloway As noted earlier in our discussion of Hunt , the minimum standard for a seizure of a child under Terry has been reasonable suspicion. Because the allegations against Deputy Calloway are similar to those agains t Huckaby—that he planned and effected the seizure of J.H. without the requisi te reasonable suspicion—he also should have been on notice that his conduct w ould violate J.H.’s constitutional rights. c. Chief Goerke Whether Chief Goerke’s actions violated clearly established law is a different story. After Deputy Calloway was unable to pick up J .H. at school,

-22-Huckaby asked Chief Goerke to transport J.H. to the safe-house. Goerke testified that Huckaby told him a court had authorized the seizure. Huck aby contests this claim, but she does not disagree that Goerke was ignorant of th e specific facts leading to J.H.’s seizure. Rather, the evidence at summary jud gment supports Goerke’s claim that he relied on the direction of DHS officials without knowing specifics. Goerke argues he was entitled to assume that if DHS officials asked him to pick up J.H., they must have had good reasons to suspectJ.H. was in danger. 9 Since the undisputed evidence at this stage supports Chief Goerke’s claim that he merely relied on the DHS officials’ directions, we conc lude Chief Goerke is entitled to qualified immunity. Generally, “[a] police offi cer who acts ‘in reliance on what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fello w police officer may nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity as long as th e officer’s reliance was objectively reasonable.’” Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom , 755 F.3d 870, 882 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Stearns v. Clarkson , 615 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir.

9 J.H. argues that Goerke forfeited this argument by failing to raise it before the district court, but Goerke raised this argument in h is brief in support of summary judgment. See Aplt. App. 142 (“These facts certainly indicate a reasonable officer, having been called by a member of the ChildAbuse Task Force, for the very purpose of protecting a child, would transp ort the child to ABC House for a forensic interview.”); id. at 143 (“Defendant Goerke’s limited role in transporting J.H. for an interview consistent with DHS investigations was certainly reasonable.”). -23-2010)). And J.H. provides no cases clearly establishing that o fficers cannot rely on DHS officials just as much as on fellow officers. Chief Goe rke thus did not violate clearly established law by relying on DHS officials’ in structions without conducting his own investigation. J.H. disagrees. He contends that (1) there is evidence to sugg est that Chief Goerke did not simply rely on the assessment of others, (2) Chief Goerke had a duty to independently assess reasonable suspicion himself, and (3) Chief Goerke’s reliance was unreasonable. We are unpersuaded. First, there is no evidence that Chief Goerke did more than ful fill a DHS official’s request that he assumed to be justified. The only evidence J.H. produces to the contrary is the statement Chief Goerke made to J.H. while driving him to the safe-house: that “they were taking him to meet some people that [were] going to get him to a better home, a safer home where there’s n o violence.” Aplt. App. 603–604. Contrary to J.H.’s assertions, this is not enoug h for a reasonable jury to conclude Chief Goerke was aware of a plan to unconstitu tionally seize J.H. Rather, it fits Chief Goerke’s otherwise undisputed story : he did not know the particular facts, but assumed DHS officials requested an in terview with J.H. because they suspected he was being abused. The record, then, shows Chief Goerke simply relied on the request of a DHS official. J.H. po ints us to no

-24-evidence placing this fact in genuine dispute. 10 See Dullmaier v. Xanterra Parks
& Resorts , 883 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[N]ot every factual di spute will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment; the dispu te must be genuine . . . .” (quotation omitted)). Second, it was not clearly established that Goerke had a duty t o independently investigate the facts of the case prior to seizin g the child—especially on matters related to purportedly exigent circ umstances involving the safety of a child. J.H. provides no case establi shing such a duty. Third, Chief Goerke’s reliance was reasonable. J.H. argues tha t when Chief Goerke picked him up at school, he clearly saw there was no emergency. Under J.H.’s line of reasoning, Chief Goerke should have then r ealized that DHS did not have reasonable suspicion of danger, or else should hav e called to verify the basis for the seizure. This argument fails to take into ac count an obvious fact: Chief Goerke could have reasonably assumed the danger did not l ie at school, but at home. If a child faces an imminent threat of abuse upon returning home from school, a DHS official would likely have grounds to request the child’s seizure while still at school.

10 Indeed, J.H. himself sometimes paints Chief Goerke as an unkn owing pawn. For instance, his own complaint alleged that “Calloway a nd/or Huckaby used Goerke to intentionally circumvent state law to seize J.H. without warrant or probable cause.” Aplt. App. 68–69 ¶ 24 (emphasis added). -25-With no clearly established law to the contrary, we conclude Go erke’s actions were a reasonable response to what he could have assume d to be an adequately supported child welfare investigation. Cf. Sjurset v. Button , 810 F.3d 609, 618 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding officers did not violate c learly established law by relying on an erroneous determination by the Oregon Depa rtment of Human Services that a child should be removed from home). Chie f Goerke was not “plainly incompetent.” Mullenix v. Luna , 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Nor did he “knowingly violate the law.” Id. * * * We therefore conclude only Huckaby and Deputy Calloway violatedclearly established Fourth Amendment law. Chief Goerke did not, and he is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. 3. Objectively Reasonable Even if their actions violated clearly established law, Huckabyand Deputy Calloway nonetheless contend they are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were objectively reasonable. Huckaby and Deputy Calloway claim they acted in reliance on the Oklahoma Children’s Code, which they argue authorizes the detention of a child under these circumstances.

-26-Once a plaintiff shows a constitutional violation and that it w as clearly established, “it becomes defendant’s burden to prove that her c onduct was nonetheless objectively reasonable.” Roska , 328 F.3d at 1251. “Of course, an officer’s reliance on an authorizing statute does not render th e conduct per se reasonable.” Id. “Rather, ‘the existence of a statute or ordinance authorizing particular conduct is a factor which militates in favor of the conclusion that a reasonable official would find that conduct constitutional.’” Id. at 1252 (quoting Grossman v. City of Portland , 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994)). To determine whether statutory authorization renders an official’s unconstitutional conduct objectively reasonable, we consider “(1) the degree of specific ity with which the statute authorized the conduct in question; (2) whether the off icer in fact complied with the statute; (3) whether the statute has fallen i nto desuetude; and (4) whether the officer could have reasonably concluded that th e statute was constitutional.” Id. at 1253. Because the statute cannot reasonably be read to authorize the conduct in question, we conclude Deputy Calloway’s actions were not object ively reasonable; we also conclude for this reason that Huckaby’s act ions were not objectively reasonable. Under Oklahoma law, when DHS receives a report of “child abuse or neglect,” it must “promptly respond to the report by initiating an investigation.”

-27-Okla. Stat. tit. 10A, § 1-2-105(A)(1). The investigation “shal l include” a visit and interview with the child. Id. § 1-2-105(B)(1). The visit “may be conducted at any reasonable time and at any place including, but not limited to, the child’s school.” Id. (emphasis added)

. Huckaby and Deputy Calloway argue that because the statute allo ws social service personnel to interview a child “at any place,” id. (emphasis added), they could reasonably conclude it authorized them to detain and tran sport a child to a forensic interview facility. But Huckaby and Deputy Calloway ignore that a different section of the code provides the requirements for taking a child into custody without a court order. That section—titled “Circumstances authorizing taking achild into custody”—requires “reasonable suspicion” that the child is in n eed of immediate protection due to an “imminent safety threat.” Id. § 1-4-201(A)(1). It makes little sense to interpret an authorization to interview “at anyplace” as a loophole allowing officers to detain children anywhere without consent, a court order, or reasonable suspicion of an imminent threat. Furthermore, that the Code authorizes interviews “at any place” does not authorize DHS to take a child into custody anywhere and everywhere. The authorization to interview “at any place” is certainly not the same as authorization to take the child into custody. In fact, this same section acknowledges that DHS

-28-officials might not be able to interview the child because theyare not allowed to enter the “place where the child may be located.” Okla. Stat. tit. 10A, § 1-2-105(B)(2). In that situation, the Code provides that off icials may seek a court order allowing them to enter and interview the child. Id. The authorization to interview a child therefore cannot be read as carte blanche authorization to take custody of a child “at any place.” Oklahoma law therefore did not make Huckaby’s actions objective ly reasonable, nor did it make Deputy Calloway’s actions objective ly reasonable. 11 Deputy Calloway also argues his actions are objectively reasonable because he reasonably relied on DHS’s determinations that J.H.’s seizur e was justified. There is evidence that it was Deputy Calloway’s idea to seize J .H., so there is a genuine dispute of fact that would preclude summary judgment onthis basis. Even if we did not deny summary judgment because of the factual dispute, Deputy Calloway’s argument that he was objectively reasonable i n relying on DHS would still fail. It is true that “[a] police officer who acts ‘in reliance on what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fellow police off icer may nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity.’” Felders , 755 F.3d at 882 (quoting Stearns v. Clarkson , 615 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2010)). But that

11 Since we find Oklahoma law clearly did not authorize J.H.’s d etention, we find it unnecessary to address J.H.’s argument that Deputy C alloway forfeited this argument. -29-only holds “as long as the officer’s reliance was objectively r easonable.” Id. Since Deputy Calloway knew the facts surrounding J.H.’s case, i t was not objectively reasonable for him to go along with DHS’s patently erroneous determination. * * * In sum, we hold that Chief Goerke is entitled to summary judgme nt on the basis of qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. On the other hand, we hold a reasonable jury could, based on th e evidence at this stage, find that Deputy Calloway and Huckaby violated clearly e stablished Fourth Amendment law. There are surely situations in which exigent circumstances coul d justify an interview of the sort Deputy Calloway and Huckaby helped arrang e, and we would not want the fear of “lawsuits [to] distract from the per formance of public duties” in those circumstances. See Gomes , 451 F.3d at 1134. But the circumstances here do not create this risk. Neither Deputy Cal loway’s conduct nor Huckaby’s conduct reflected the sort of behavior one would expect if there had truly been an imminent threat. Had the officials held an i ncorrect but objectively reasonable suspicion that J.H. was subject to an imminent threat, qualified immunity would apply. But in the absence of reasonab le suspicion, we

-30-agree with the district court that a reasonable jury can find H uckaby and Deputy Calloway violated the Fourth Amendment. C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim—Interference with Familial Association Huckaby and Deputy Calloway also contend they are entitled to qualified immunity on J.H.’s Fourteenth Amendment familial association cl aim. They argue J.H. has failed to make the requisite showing of a clearl y established interference with familial association. 1. Legal Standard Before addressing the specifics of J.H.’s claim, we explain ourcircuit’s somewhat confusing law on familial association claims. We have explained that the “familial right of association” is a substantive due proces s right. See Griffin v. Strong , 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993). We have therefore allo wed constitutional tort claims alleging infringements of this right . And, naturally, we have elucidated a test to govern our analysis of these claims. See Thomas v.
Kaven , 765 F.3d 1183, 1196 (10th Cir. 2014). Our circuit, however, has not fully explained the relationship between this test and the general substantive due process frameworks the Sup reme Court has devised. See Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs , 732 F. App’x 624, at 632–35 (10th Cir., 2018) (Tymkovich, J., concurring), petition for cert. filed(U.S. Aug. 6, 2018) (No. 18-177). The Supreme Court has identified substanti ve due process
-31-cases that turn on whether the government has infringed a rightthat is “fundamental.” Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702, 721–722 (1997) (examining an asserted right to assistance in committing suicid e). Other times, the legal test simply asks if the government action deprives a person of life, liberty, or property in a manner so arbitrary it shocks the jud icial conscience. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (examining a high-speed police chase). There is uncertainty about when we apply these various tests, see Moya v. Garcia , 887 F.3d 1161, 1174 (10th Cir. 2018) (McHugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but as explained in recent cases, our circuit has coalesced around a solution: we apply the fundamental-rights ap proach when the plaintiff challenges legislative action , and the shocks-the-conscience approach when the plaintiff seeks relief for tortious executive action

. See Browder v. City of Albuquerque , 787 F.3d 1076, 1079 (10th Cir. 2015); Dias v. City & Cty. of
Denver , 567 F.3d 1169, 1182 (10th Cir. 2009); Dawson , at *10–11 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). The question is: where do substantive due process familial asso ciation claims fit into this framework? Our cases have not clearly ans wered that. Most often, the issue has gone unnoticed. See, e.g. , Thomas , 765 F.3d at 1195–96; Lowery v. Cty. of Riley , 522 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 2008); J.B. v. Washington Cty. , 127 F.3d 919, 928 (10th Cir. 1997). In our cases, we have ex plained a

-32-constitutional claim of interference with the right to familial association requires two showings: (1) that the “defendants intended to deprive [the plaintiffs] of their protected relationship” with a family member, and (2) that “bal ancing the [plaintiffs’] interest in their protected relationship . . . ag ainst the state’s interest in [the family member’s] health and safety, defendants either unduly burdened plaintiffs’ protected relationship or effected an unwarranted i ntrusion into that relationship.” Thomas , 765 F.3d at 1196 (internal quotations and citations omitted). But those cases were silent on whether we were using the fundamentalrights or shocks-the-conscience approaches. Our silence on the requisite approach does not mean familial as sociation claims comprise a third, separate, and solitary branch of subst antive due process doctrine. No good reason exists for our analysis of a claim as serting interference with familial association to be any different from our analysis of a claim asserting other government interference—for instance, gross intrusions in to bodily integrity or personal safety. 12

12 See, e.g. , Moore v. Guthrie , 438 F.3d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “[t]he ultimate standard for determining wheth er there has been a substantive due process violation is whether the challenged gov ernment action shocks the conscience of federal judges” in a case involving th e right to bodily integrity (quotation omitted)); Perez v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty./Kansas City , 432 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[o]nlygovernment conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ can give rise to a substan tive due process claim” in a case involving a fire truck collision). -33-Instead, familial association claims—properly understood—fit ne atly within the two-approach scheme our cases elaborate. Typically, a plai ntiff pressing this claim alleges that an official interfered with the right to fam ilial association in some way. Since such allegations challenge executive action , the shocks-theconscience approach applies. 13 The legal test our cases use, then, simply describes the kind of behavior we find to shock the conscience in this context. Namely, it shocks the conscience when: (1) the officials intend ed to deprive the plaintiff of a protected relationship with a family member, and(2) the officials’ intrusion into the relationship was not warranted by state inte rests in the health and safety of the family member. Thomas , 765 F.3d at 1196. 14 Together, the

13 It is possible that a plaintiff might sue a government entityfor a legislative rule that unduly interferes with familial associati on. Under the approach explained here, we would review such a claim under the “fundamental rights” approach—asking whether the right to familial associati on is a “fundamental” right in order to determine what level of scrutin y to apply to that legislative action. Indeed, it would not make sense to try to apply our normal two-pronged test to general legislation, as our test requires intent to interfere with the plaintiff’s particular family relationship.

14 Other circuits also recognize that familial association claim s are governed by the shocks-the-conscience standard. See Martinez v. Cui , 608 F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2010) (“ Lewis clarified that the shocks-the-conscience test, first articulated in Rochin v. California , 342 U.S. 165 (1952), governs all substantive due process claims based on executive, as opposed to legislativ e, action”—including familial association claims); Anthony v. City of New York , 339 F.3d 129, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (to prevail on a familial associat ion claim, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that her separation from [her child] was so s hocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due Process Clause would not countenance it” (internal (continued...) -34-facts alleged by the plaintiff on these points must meet the sh ocks-the-conscience standard. A comparison between our two-pronged test for familial associat ion claims and our case law on the shocks-the-conscience test reveals how close the two really are. For executive action to shock the conscience requi res much more than mere negligence. E.g. , Moore , 438 F.3d at 1040. Indeed, even the actions of a

14 (...continued) quotations omitted)); see also United States v. Hollingsworth , 495 F.3d 795, 802 (7th Cir. 2007) (implying that a claim for violation of familia l association must show the government conduct shocks the conscience). Not all circuits agree. Compare Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs. , 725 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining the shocks-the-conscience standard only applies when a claim does not have to do with a specific substa ntive due process right, and concluding the shocks-the-conscience standard theref ore does not apply to familial association claims), with Kottmyer v. Maas , 436 F.3d 684, 691 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006) (suggesting a plaintiff could prevail on a familial association claim if the conduct shocked the conscience), and Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty. , 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (for a familial association claim “[ t]o amount to a violation of substantive due process . . . the harmful conduct must shock the conscience or offend the community’s sense of fair play and dec ency” (alterations incorporated) (internal quotations omitted)); with Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego , 608 F.3d 406, 441 n.23 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding the shocks-the-c onscience standard does not apply to familial association claims); see also Morris v. Dearborne , 181 F.3d 657, 667 (5th Cir. 1999) (apparently treating the sh ocks-theconscience standard as one of multiple ways in which a plaintif f could assert a familial association claim). To be sure, though, many other circuits’ cases—like many of our own—simply do not mention the issue. See, e.g. , Brokaw v. Mercer Cty. , 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc. , 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1996). -35-reckless official or one bent on injuring a person do not neces sarily shock the judicial conscience. Id. “Conduct that shocks the judicial conscience” is “deliberate government action that is arbitrary and unrestraine d by the established principles of private right and distributive justice.” Hernandez v. Ridley , 734 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City , 528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2008)). “To show a defendant’s conduct is conscience shocking, a plaintiff must prove a government actor arbitrarilyabused his authority or ‘employed it as an instrument of oppression.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Berney , 519 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2008) (alterations incorporate d)). “The behavior complained of must be egregious and outrageous.” Id. ; see Lewis , 523 U.S. at 847; Breithaupt v. Abram , 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (“We set aside the conviction because such conduct ‘shocked the conscience’ and wa s so ‘brutal’ and ‘offensive’ that it did not comport with traditional ideas of f air play and decency.”). Our two-pronged test for familial association claims reflects these principles. The plaintiff must show that the officials “ unduly burdened” or created an “unwarranted intrusion” on the plaintiff’s right to familial association.
Thomas , 765 F.3d at 1196 (emphasis added). And whether the officials unduly burdened the family relationship depends on “the severity of the infringement on the protected relationship, the need for defendants’ conduct, and possible

-36-alternative courses of action,” id. (emphasis added)—as would all applications of the shocks-the-conscience standard. The test’s intent requirement is even greater proof of its shoc k-theconscience heritage. Under our cases, merely negligent interfe rence with a family relationship will not do: the officials must have intended to burden the relationship. That is just like the shocks-the-conscience stan dard. See Lewis , 523 U.S. at 863–864. Indeed, when our court first applied this int ent requirement in Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners , 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985), we did so to prevent this doctrine from turning all negligent tort s leading to the death of a child into constitutional violations. Id. at 1190. Some degree of severity was required, we explained, to “provide a logical stopping place fo r such claims.” Id. In short, we clarify that familial association claims are groun ded in the shocks-the-conscience approach to substantive due process claim s challenging executive action. We have not always mentioned the shocks-the- conscience formulation, but a close look reveals our two-pronged test for these claims has been a manifestation of the shocks-the-conscience standard all along. See Griffin , 983 F.2d at 1548–49 (“[T]here is no evidence or allegation thatthe conduct going to Dorothy Griffin’s familial rights of association claims invo lved . . . conduct
that shocks the conscience .” (emphasis added)). When a plaintiff meets our twopronged test, the plaintiff has shown an official’s actions sho ck the judicial

-37-conscience. But in applying our test, and in particular the ba lancing it requires, we must keep in mind our ultimate inquiry is whether each defen dant’s conduct shocks the judicial conscience. 2. Application Having clarified this confusion in our prior cases, we turn to the claim at issue here. To make a threshold showing that the officers viol ated J.H.’s substantive due process right to familial association—that is, their actions shocked the judicial conscience—J.H. must provide evidence as t o both requirements outlined above: (1) intent to interfere with the f amily relationship and (2) an unwarranted and severe intrusion. Together, the evi dence with respect to these elements must show executive action by government offi cials so arbitrary and capricious that it amounts to conduct that shocks the consc ience. The district court here did not err in this regard: it considered the famili al association test part of the shocks-the-conscience inquiry. See App. 659. J.H. contends this case satisfies these requirements. In his v iew, he has provided evidence that these officials had a personal vendetta against his father and intentionally set out to destroy his father’s relationship with J.H. Additionally, J.H. argues the evidence shows the interference w ith his family relationship was unwarranted. J.H. claims that removing him fr om school for a forty-minute interview was such a severe interference with his family

-38-relationship, and so far removed from any reasonable concern fo r his safety, that the seizure and interview are the kind of unwarranted interfere nce with family relationships that shock the conscience. This evidence, J.H. a rgues, demonstrates a violation of clearly established law, and allows him to survi ve the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We need not decide whether the record here demonstrates a const itutional violation. Even if the officials did violate J.H.’s substantive due process rights, we conclude the right was not clearly established, and so the d efendants are entitled to qualified immunity. In particular, we find J.H. ha s not shown that reasonable officials would have known that the short seizure he re would constitute an unwarranted interference with a family relationsh ip—the second part of our test for substantive due process familial association cl aims. 15 As earlier explained, “[t]o determine whether the right was cle arly established, we ask whether ‘the contours of a right are suffic iently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Henderson v. Glanz , 813 F.3d 938, 951 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “[E]xisting precedent must have

15 We do not decide whether J.H. presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find Huckaby and Deputy Calloway intended to interfere with J.H.’s relationship with his father—the first element. -39-placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft , 563 U.S.
at 741. In making this determination, we are mindful of two pitfalls. We can neither require too much factual similarity between an existing case and the case at hand, nor too little . There “need not be a case precisely on point.” Redmond v.
Crowther , 882 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 2018). But at the same time, “i t is a ‘longstanding principle that clearly established law should notbe defined at a high level of generality.’” Id. (quoting White v. Pauly , 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam)). And while general statements of law can sometim es provide fair warning that certain conduct is unconstitutional, they only do so if they “apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.” United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997). “General legal standards therefore r arely clearly establish rights.” Redmond , 882 F.3d at 939. The facts here do not meet this high bar. Even if the official s had the requisite intent—thus satisfying the first part of our test—the ir actions still must constitute an undue burden on J.H.’s right of familial associat ion. We are not aware of a case from our court or the Supreme Court clearly est ablishing that the short seizure and interview here would unduly burden J.H.’s rel ationship with his family members.

-40-J.H. points to Roska , 328 F.3d at 1250, and Malik , 191 F.3d at 1315, as support, but these cases fall short of what we require for righ ts to have been clearly established. In each, we applied the general rule thatparents have “a liberty interest in familial association and privacy that canno t be violated without adequate pre-deprivation procedures.” Roska , 328 F.3d at 1250 (quoting Malik , 191 F.3d at 1315). And in each, we found the procedures used t o remove a child from the family home or terminate parental custody fell below the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Roska , 328 F.3d at 1246; Malik , 191 F.3d at 1316. But these cases do not help J.H. To begin, both Roska and Malik , are procedural due process cases—not substantive due process familial association

cases. See also Hollingsworth v. Hill , 110 F.3d 733, 738–740 (10th Cir. 1997) (examining a procedural due process claim stemming from a childseizure). J.H. has only pleaded and argued a violation under our two-part subs tantive due process test for interference with familial association, not pr ocedural due process.
See Aplt. App. 70; Aple. Br. at 35–36. Yet even if J.H. had argued a procedural due process claim here , those cases would not have established a violation of his rights. Th e officials in Malik obtained judicial authorization to remove a child from her home by misrepresenting the facts to a magistrate judge. 191 F.3d at 1 312, 1316. And the defendants in Roska seized the child from his home without judicial authorization

-41-and temporarily terminated parental custody. 328 F.3d at 1238, 1246. The case here did not involve a seizure from the child’s home—much less a termination of parental rights. Rather, the officials here only took J.H. fro m school and interviewed him for less than an hour. Aside from Roska and Malik , J.H. has not pointed to any other cases that could clearly establish the right at issue here. J.H. need notprovide a case with exactly the same facts, of course. But he has not provided a c ase with even remotely similar facts. Nor has he shown that our general stat ements of law in this area demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the officials’ actions here with “obvious clarity.” Lanier , 520 U.S. at 271. Indeed, our general rule that interference with family relation ships cannot be “unduly burdened” is too general a proposition to have clear ly established the alleged violation here. The officials would not have known tha t taking J.H. from school for a short interview would necessarily constitute an “undue burden” or “unwarranted intrusion” into a family relationship. To determi ne when an official’s action unduly burdens the plaintiff’s right to famil ial association, we look at several factors—including “the severity of the infringe ment on the protected relationship, the need for defendants’ conduct, and p ossible alternative courses of action.” Thomas , 765 F.3d at 1196. And when a rule of law requires that competing interests be balanced, “the law is less likely t o be well established

-42-than in other areas.” See Melton v. City of Okla. City , 879 F.2d 706, 729 (10th Cir. 1989). It was not “beyond debate” that the balance of the se considerations would necessarily make the interview an undue burden on J.H.’s familial association rights. Ashcroft , 563 U.S. at 741. Even if the officials did not have reasons to suspect J.H. was in imminent danger, the referral sh ows they did have

some basis to be concerned J.H. might have suffered abuse. And the intrusion here was certainly not as severe as those in our prior cases. The seizure’s brevity, the fact J.H. was taken from school and not home, and the fact that parental rights were not being terminated could have led a reasonable official to conclude the interference was simply too insignificant to be an “undue burde n” on a family relationship that shocks the judicial conscience. J.H. appears to acknowledge the facts here are “[u]nlike cases where a child is temporarily removed from the home”—the only kinds of cases h e has pointed to for support. Aple. Br. at 42. Yet he argues it was neverthele ss clearly established that the severity of the interference here could constitute an unwarranted intrusion into family life because “psychological harm can be far more damaging precisely because of the confusion and distrust it sows in children who l ack the emotional development to properly allocate responsibility for what happen ed to them.” Id. Perhaps it is true that short interviews like the one here can inflict great damage to family relationships, but we think the point neither obvious nor clearly

-43-established by our case law at the time of the events in questi on. It does not seem obvious that questioning a child about possible abuse would gre atly burden the child’s relationship with his parents—even if we accept that ph ysical removal can sometimes be traumatic for the child. 16 Having found that “existing precedent” did not place the “const itutional question beyond debate,” we hold that Huckaby and Deputy Callow ay are entitled to qualified immunity for the Fourteenth Amendment claims again st them. Ashcroft , 563 U.S. at 741. It would not have been clear at the time th at the balance between the interview’s interference in J.H.’s family r elationship and the officials’ health and safety concerns made their actions so bur densome to the family relationship as to violate substantive due process right s. 

### III. Conclusion
We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order denying qualified immunity to Huckaby and Deputy Calloway on the Fourth Amendmentclaims against them. We REVERSE the district court’s order denying qualified immunity to Chief Goerke on the Fourth Amendment claim against him. And we
REVERSE the court’s order denying Huckaby and Deputy Calloway qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claims against them.

16 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Law Enforcement Response to Child Abuse 11 (July 2014), https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/243907.pdf. -44-