alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Susser Holdings Corporation (the Company) for the fiscal year ended December 31,
2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Sam L. Susser, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |                             |  |                                                    
|------------------- |  | --------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------
|Date: April 2, 2007 |  | SUSSER HOLDINGS CORPORATION
|                    |  |                            
|                    |  | By                          |  | /s/    SAM L.
SUSSER                               
|                    |  |                             |  | Sam L. Susser President and Chief Executive Officer

This certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 05-cr-057-JD

Gordon Reid

SEALED ORDER

Gordon Reid moves ex parte for reconsideration of the

court’s previous ruling denying his motion for subpoenas to two

detectives and two other individuals involved in an unrelated

robbery. Reid argues that because one of the individuals

involved in the alleged robbery is Renee King’s brother-in-law,

because both suspects were found in King’s house, and because

stolen property was found there as well, that evidence is

admissible against King under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2). 

He argues that King was the victim of the robbery at the Hess

Store, which is the subject of the charge alleged against him,

and that evidence about the robbery involving her brother-in-law

and another individual is evidence of a “pertinent trait of

character” about King. 

Reid’s theory is that King, rather than Reid, robbed the

Hess store. He contends that the evidence of the robbery

allegedly committed by King’s brother-in-law and another

individual is pertinent to her character to commit robbery

Case 1:05-cr-00057-SM Document 140 Filed 02/10/06 Page 1 of 2
2

herself. 

The robbery evidence offers little or nothing about King’s

character. There is no evidence that she was complicit in the

crime other than living in the house where her husband’s brother

kept stolen property. In addition, if the evidence showed that

she had committed a crime or a wrongful act in connection with

the alleged robbery, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) would

preclude use of such evidence to show her character to commit

robbery at the Hess store. Further, such evidence is collateral

to the matter at hand and is unfairly prejudicial under Federal

Rule of Evidence 403.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to

reconsider (doc. no. 137) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.

United States District Judge

February 10, 2006

cc: Gordon Reid, pro se

Michael J. Iacopino, Esquire

Case 1:05-cr-00057-SM Document 140 Filed 02/10/06 Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 32.2

     CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
     SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with this quarterly report of Possis Medical, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10Q for the period ended October 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Eapen Chacko,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     1.  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.  The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


Date: December 9, 2004                    /s/ Eapen Chacko
                                          ----------------------------------
                                              Eapen Chacko
                                              Chief Financial Officer


                                       27
#### Sarah B. OSBORNE v. MOSSLER ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION et al.

No. 2903.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit

June 30, 1947.

J. S. Pickett, of Many, for appellant.

S. I. Foster, of Leesville, for appellees.

DORE, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in the opinion this day handed down in the consolidated cases of Sarah B. Osborne and Thelbert E. Osborne against the Mossier Acceptance Corporation et ah, it is ordered that the judgment in the above entitled case be and the same is hereby affirmed, all at the costs of plaintiff herein.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

 v. Case No. 05-cr-99-01-SM

Marcelo Moraes

O R D E R

Defendant's assented-to motion to continue the trial (document no. 16) is granted.

Trial has been rescheduled for the June 2007 trial period. Defendant shall file a Waiver of

Speedy Trial Rights not later than March 26, 2007. On the filing of such waiver, his

continuance shall be effective.

The court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh

the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), in that failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the

defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation taking into account the

Case 1:05-cr-00099-SM Document 17 Filed 03/20/07 Page 1 of 2
2

exercise of due diligence under the circumstances.

Final Pretrial Conference: May 24, 2007 at 9:30 AM 

Jury Selection: June 5, 2007 at 9:30 AM

SO ORDERED.

March 19, 2007 _________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

cc: Robert Kinsella, Esq.

 Jeffrey Levin, Esq.

 U. S. Probation

 U. S. Marshal

Case 1:05-cr-00099-SM Document 17 Filed 03/20/07 Page 2 of 2
Order entered September 26, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00698-CV

MICHAEL SUTKER, M.D., ET AL., Appellants

V.

DORCAS SIMMONS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-13851

ORDER

Before the Court is appellee’s September 24, 2018 unopposed second motion for an 

extension of time to file a brief. We GRANT the motion and extend the time to October 15, 

2018. We caution appellee that further extension requests in this accelerated appeal will be 

disfavored.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
#### The State, ex rel. Bricker, Atty. Genl., *v.*Doe, alias Bolasny.

(No. 24532

Decided January 11, 1934.)

*Mr. John W. Bricker,*attorney general, *Mr. Joseph Godown*and *Mr. Isadore Topper,*for relator.

*Mr. William L. Day,*for respondent.

The court finds the defendant, John Doe, alias S. E. Bolasny, given name unknown, guilty as charged in the information. And the said defendant being now before the court for sentence and having nothing further to say, it is ordered and adjudged that said defendant pay to the clerk of this court a fine of one hundred and fifty ($150.00) dollars, and that he pay the costs of this case to be taxed, and that he stand committed to the jail of the County of Franklin in the State of Ohio, at Columbus, Ohio, for the period of ten days, and for such period of time thereafter until the costs and fine assessed herein are paid, or until otherwise discharged by law.

*593It is therefore ordered that the marshal of this court be charged with the custody of said defendant and that said marshal shall deliver said defendant in person to the custody of the sheriff of said Franklin county, at the county jail for service of said sentence.

*Finding of guilty.*

Weygandt, C. J., Arden, Stephenson, Jones, Matthias, Bevis and Zimmerman, JJ., concur. •
**ANNUAL
        STATEMENT AS TO COMPLIANCE**
 **OFFICER'S
        CERTIFICATE**
 
 Re:
            Morgan Stanley Capital I, Inc., Commercial Mortgage  Pass-Through
            Certificates, Series 2006-IQ11.
  In
            accordance with Section 13.9 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
            (the
“Agreement”) dated June 1, 2006, executed by and  between
            Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. (as “Depositor”), Wells Fargo  Bank,
            National Association (as “General Master Servicer“), LNR Partners, Inc. (as
“General Special Servicer”), NCB, FSB (as "NCB Master Servicer"), National
            Consumer Cooperative Bank ("as Co-op Special Servicer") and LaSalle Bank
            National Association (as "Trustee", “Paying Agent", and "Certificate
            Registrar”), as authorized officer of the Master Servicer I certify that (A) a
            review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
            calendar
            year or portion thereof and of the performance of the Master Servicer
            under this
            Agreement has been made under such officer’s supervision and (B) to the best of
            such officer’s knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has
            fulfilled all its obligations under this Agreement
            in all material respects throughout such year or portion  thereof,
            or, if there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligation in any
            material
            respect, specifying each such failure known to such officer and the nature
            and
            status thereof.
  Wells
        Fargo Bank, National Association
 “Master
        Servicer"
  /s/
        James
        B. Scanlon
  James
        B.
        Scanlon
 Vice
        President
 Wells
        Fargo Bank National Association
 
 March
        2007 -569
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

K.R., by and through her

parents and next best friend,

M.R. and C.B.,

Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 05-cv-292-SM

Brookline School District,

Defendant

O R D E R

Kasenia R., through her parents, brings this civil action

against the Brookline School District, pursuant to the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.

§ 1400, et seq. Specifically, plaintiffs appeal an

administrative decision issued by the New Hampshire Department of

Education denying their request for reimbursement of the costs

associated with their unilateral placement of Kasenia in a

private school. 

The School District moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended

complaint, asserting that it has been prejudiced by plaintiffs’

inexcusable delay in filing that pleading (plaintiffs waited more

than six months after the court granted them leave to amend

before filing the amended complaint). Additionally, the School

Case 1:05-cv-00292-JL Document 66 Filed 08/22/07 Page 1 of 3
2

District says the amended complaint fails to comply with the

court’s order granting plaintiffs leave to amend. See Order

dated May 15, 2006 (document no. 20) (granting plaintiffs

“permission to amend the complaint only as it relates to matters

addressed in the January 2006 proceeding but [denying] permission

to introduce other new issues not raised at either hearing.”). 

Plaintiffs have not objected. 

The School District is correct in claiming that the amended

complaint fails to comply with the court’s order. Specifically,

it references matters that were not within the scope of the

original administrative hearing or the rehearing. The School

District’s motion is, therefore, granted to the extent it moves

the court to strike plaintiffs’ amended complaint. 

The School District also moves to strike plaintiffs’

response to its decision memorandum as untimely. While

plaintiffs seem to have waited an undue amount of time before

filing that response, their delay does not appear to have

prejudiced the School District in any way. That motion is, then,

denied. 

Case 1:05-cv-00292-JL Document 66 Filed 08/22/07 Page 2 of 3
3

Conclusion

The School District’s unopposed motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ amended complaint (document no. 57) is granted to the

extent it moves the court to strike that pleading. Plaintiffs’

amended complaint (document no. 55) shall be stricken. The

School District’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ response to its

decision memorandum (document no. 64) is denied. 

SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Steven J. McAuliffe

Chief Judge

August 22, 2007

cc: Theresa Kraft, Esq.

Dean B. Eggert, Esq.

Case 1:05-cv-00292-JL Document 66 Filed 08/22/07 Page 3 of 3
[No. 34341.

Department One.

November 29, 1957.]

#### Raymond E. Knight, *Respondent,*v. Ed Bishop *et al., Appellants.**1*

*Bennett Hoffman,*for appellants.

*Rummens, Griffin, Short & Cressman*and *R. M. Oswald,*for respondent.

1

Reported in 318 P. (2d) 323.

Per Curiam.

This action for damages arises out of a wrongful garnishment. The court entered findings of fact, conclusions of' law, and judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appeal.

Appellants do not assign error to the findings of fact. They therefore become the established facts of the case. Rule on Appeal 43, 34A Wn. (2d) 47, as amended, effective January 2, 1953.

The question is, do the findings support the judgment? *In re Youngkin’s Estate,*48 Wn. (2d) 432, 294 P. (2d) 426 (1956); *Union Electric & Plumbing Supply v.**354*United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States & Canada, Local Union 32,*45 Wn. (2d) 17, 272 P. (2d) 144 (1954).

The court found, in findings Nos. 8, 9, and 10, that the writ of garnishment which was served upon the garnishee defendant was wrongfully issued, for the reason that the judgment which was the basis for the writ of garnishment was void. The court entered judgment awarding damages for the amount it determined to be reasonable to reimburse the respondent for attorneys’ fees and costs expended in quashing the writ. Where, as here, the writ of garnishment is regular on its face, such items are proper elements of damage. *Maib v. Maryland Cas. Co.,*17 Wn. (2d) 47, 135 P. (2d) 71 (1943); *Olsen v. National Grocery Co.,*15 Wn. (2d) 164, 130 P. (2d) 78 (1942). The findings support the judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with this quarterly report of Possis Medical, Inc. on Form 10-Q
for the period ended October 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Robert G. Dutcher, Chief
Executive Officer of Possis Medical, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

1.   The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in this report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Possis
     Medical, Inc.




December 12, 2003                                       /s/
                                                        ------------------------
                                                        Robert G. Dutcher
                                                        Chairman, President and
                                                        Chief Executive Officer


                                       24
189 La. 339

#### Millard F. BRADFORD v. LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and the Silver Fleet of Memphis, Inc.

No. 34419.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 7, 1938.

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1938.

Breazeale & Sachse, of Baton Rouge, and Lemle, Moreno & Lemle and Posey R. Bowers, all of New Orleans, for appellants.

Gaston L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., and Milo B. Williams, Asst, to Atty. Gen., for appel-lee Louisiana Public Service Commission.

PONDER, Justice.

This case was consolidated with the case of Millard F. Bradford v. Louisiana. Public Service Commission and Herrin Motor Lines, Inc., La.Sup., 179 So. 442, and sub*447mitted on the same agreed statement of facts. •

For the reasons assigned in the opinion this day handed down by this court in the case of Millard F. Bradford v. Louisiana Public Service Commission and Herrin Motor Lines, Inc., supra, the judgment is affirmed at appellant’s cost.

O’NIELL, C. J., concurs in the decree.

ODOM, J., dissents.

HIGGINS, J., absent.
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18of the United States Code

I, Thomas M. OFlynn, Chief Financial Officer of Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated, to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the Quarterly Report of Public Service
Enterprise Group Incorporated on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated.



| | /s/
    Thomas M. OFlynn                                                                      
| | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | Thomas M. OFlynnPublic Service Enterprise Group IncorporatedChief Financial OfficerMay 6, 2008

---
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 15

- 00345

- CR

Spergel Polk

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From 396th District Court

o f Tarrant County (1383939D )

May 12, 2016

Opinion by Justice Sudderth

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT C OURT OF APPEALS

By

__ /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

_______________ Justice Bonnie Sudderth
#### Ex parte Daniel RAMIREZ.

No. 45904.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

July 28, 1972.

Vincent W. Perini, Dallas, for petitioner.

Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge.

This is a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding under Article 11.07, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.

The applicant was convicted for rape May 13, 1960. The punishment was assessed by the jury at fifty years.

The applicant filed his application for writ of habeas corpus in Criminal District Court No. 2 of Dallas County, the convicting court. He alleged, among other things, that his court-appointed counsel did not advise him of his right of appeal and did not take the necessary steps to preserve such right.

The judge of the court at the time of the conviction had died before the hearing on the application for habeas corpus. Trial counsel who had been appointed testified and recalled only parts of the trial. He did not remember anything about advising the applicant of his right to appeal.

The judge who conducted the hearing on the application found that the applicant was not informed that he had a right to appeal his conviction at no expense to him*260self and that if he were too poor to pay for a record or an attorney they would be provided. He also found that the applicant was denied his constitutional right to appeal.

Since the trial court found from the evidence that the indigent applicant was denied his right to appeal, he is entitled to an out-of-time appeal. However, the record shows that it is not possible to obtain a statement of facts for that purpose. He is entitled to a retrial. See Ex parte Perez, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 283, and Ex parte Gaines, Tex.Cr.App., 455 S.W.2d 210.

Applicant is ordered released from confinement in the Department of Corrections and delivered to the sheriff of Dallas County to answer to the indictment pending against him.

ROBERTS, J., not participating.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906

Of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned
officers of Rand Capital Corporation (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:

The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2014 (the Form10-Q) of the Company fully complies with the requirement of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-Q
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: August 1, 2014



/s/ Allen F. GrumAllen F. Grum, President(Chief Executive Officer)


Dated: August 1, 2014



/s/ Daniel P. PenberthyDaniel P. Penberthy, Treasurer(Chief Financial Officer)
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1032 Introduced in House (IH)]

107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1032

          To prohibit oil and gas drilling in the Great Lakes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 14, 2001

     Mr. Stupak (for himself, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Barrett, Ms. 
    Kilpatrick, Ms. Rivers, Mr. Kind, Mr. Bonior, Mr. Conyers, Mr. 
Kucinich, Mr. Obey, Mr. Luther, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Kildee, Mr. Dingell, Mr. 
     Barcia, Mr. Levin, Ms. Baldwin, Mr. Markey, and Mrs. Thurman) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                               Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
          To prohibit oil and gas drilling in the Great Lakes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION.

    After the enactment of this Act no person may commence any drilling 
activity (including any slant or directional drilling) to extract oil 
or gas from lands beneath waters under the jurisdiction of the United 
States in any of the Great Lakes. The Attorney General of the United 
States may bring an action in the appropriate United States district 
court to enforce the prohibition contained in this section. As used in 
this Act, the term ``Great Lakes'' has the same meaning as provided by 
section 2 of the Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. 931; 70 
Stat. 242).
                                 <all>
```