2012 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

6-26-2012 

# Public I n t e r es t L a

w C e n t e r of v

. P o cono M t S ch D i s t

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al
D ock e t N o . 11-4096

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2012

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2012 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. F or mor e infor m a t ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du

. R e c omme nde d C it a t ion

" P ub l ic I n t e r e s t L a

w C e n t e r of v

. P oc ono M t S ch Di s t " (2012). 2012 D e cisio n s . P a pe r 829. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2012/829NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________ No. 11

- 4096

_________ THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant v. THE POCONO MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DISTRICT

________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3

- 09

- cv - 02326 ) District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo

_______ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 25, 2012 Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and JO RDAN , Circuit Judges
( Opinion Filed : June 26, 2012 )

_________ OPINION

_________2 SLOVITER, Circuit Judge

. This appeal arises out of a claim for counsel fees incurred by the Public Interest
Law Center of Philadelphia (“PILCOP”) while representing a parent in administrative appeals and proceedings against the Pocono Mountain School District (the “School
Di strict”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDE I A”). 1
I. Because we write primarily for the parties , we recite onl y those facts necessary to our decision. Michael Medici is the father of a child in the School District eligible for the protections of the IDE I A. The IDE I A grants parents a right to access their child’s education records as that term is defined in the Fe deral Education Records Privacy Act ( “ FERPA ” ). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4) ; 34 C.F.R. § 99 .3 (2012). Believing the School Dist rict was withholding records that he had a right to access, Medici requested an administrative hearing befor e a Pennsylvania Special Education Hearing Officer to compel the School District to release all education records, a term that Medici believed encompassed standardized test protocols and correspondence among teachers, parents, and staff regarding the child . Medici appeared at the hearing
pro se . In a written decision, the Hearing Officer ruled that neither standardized test

1 PILCOP is represented in this appeal by pro bono counsel Molly E. Flynn and David F. Abernathy of Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP. We thank them for their assistance in deciding this matter.3 protocols nor correspondence between teachers, staff, and parents was included in the
term “ education records. ” After the Hearing O fficer’s decision, Medici retained PILCOP to appeal the question of the definition of education records to the Special Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel (the “Review Panel”). 2

The School Distric t filed suit in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania challenging the Review Panel’s decision. Specifically, the School District argued that the Review Panel lacked authority to remand the matter to the H earing O fficer. Medici removed the matter to the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The District Court , inter alia, granted the School District’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the Review Panel did not have the power to remand to the Hearing Officer and directing the Revi ew Panel to conduct the document review itself. On remand the Review Panel determined that, while many of the documents requested by Medici , including the standardized test protocols requested , did not qualify as education records , Medici was entitled to access correspondence concerning the student that was shared The Review Panel ruled that the hearing officer had erred by excluding broad categories of documents without reviewing the individual documents to determine whether they constituted education records under the
IDE I A and FERPA and remanded to the Hearing Officer with instructions to conduct that review.

2 The prior appeal process for IDE I A claims from the hearing officer to a review panel has since been amended to permit parties to appeal the decision of a hear ing officer directly to a court. S ee J.A

. at 195 ; Derrick F. v. Red Lion Area Sch. Dist. , 586 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 2008).4 between teachers and staff that had been maintained . Significantly, however, this ruling did not lead the School District to produce any new documents. Rather the School District asserted that it had already turned over all qualifying corre spondence to Medici. Before the Review Panel issued a decision pursuant to the District Court’s remand , Medici filed a separate request for a due process hearing, alleging the School District failed to provid e the student with a free appropriate public education as required by the
IDE I A. Following negotiations, the School District and Medici entered into a settlement and release agreement that resolved all outstanding and potential claims involving the studen t except for the matter about the definition of “ education records ” pending before the Review Panel. Significantly, Medici also agreed not to file any further claims seeking access to or copies of the student’s education records. N otwithstanding that agr eement, after the R eview Panel issued its decision Medici initiated a new suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking to enforce the portion of the Review Panel’s decision granting him access to correspondence concerning the student and to appeal t he portion of the Review Panel’s decision ruling that he was not entitled to access standardized test protocols. The District Court granted summary judgment for the School District on the ground that Medici’s claims were precluded by the settlement agreem ent. See Medici v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. , No. 3:09

- cv - 2344 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011), ECF No. 32. Medici assigned to PILCOP his right to recover attorney fees incurred during the administrative action against the School District about the definition o f “ education records. ” Shortly thereafter, PILCOP filed suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania5 seeking attorney fees of $42,255 for 93.9 hours of attorney time and $424.55 for
expenses. The Sch ool District filed an answer and later a motion for summ ary judgment objecting to an award of fees on the ground that Medici was not a prevailing party in the underlying litigation. The District Court ruled that Medici was in fact a prevailin g party before the Review Panel but declined to award fees on the gro und that Medici had achieved only partial and limited success. As such, the District Court granted summary judgment to the School District. PILCOP filed this timely appeal.
II. This court exercises plenary review over a district court’s application of l egal standards in determining a fee award. McKenna v. City of Phil a. , 582 F.3d 447, 455 (3d Cir. 2009). The reasonableness of a fee award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 3
III.
In r uling on a request for attorney fees under the IDE I A, a court mu st first determine whether the party prevailed in the underlying litigation. If so, the District
Court must then apply its discretion to fashion a reasonable award of attorney fees. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)

. “‘[A] plaintiff ‘ prevails ’ when act ual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.6 a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.’” P. N. v. Clementon Bd. O f Educ. , 44 2 F.3d 848, 855 (3d. Cir 2006) (qu oting Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 111

- 12 (1992)). Medici fails to meet that standard for a prevailing party because he produced no evidence that the School District’s behavior was modified in a way that benefitted Medici. Although the order was nomina lly in Me dici’s favor, the District Court held in a separate action that
Me dici was preclude d from enforcing that order by the voluntary settlement agreement.
T he Supreme Court and this court have noted that prevailing party status is to be understood ge nerously. See P.N. , 442 F.3d at 855 (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Ind ep . Sch. Dist , 489 U.S. 782, 79 2 (1989) ) . However, both courts have also noted that the relief must directly benefit plaintiff in at least a de minimis way. For example, in Farra r , the Supreme Court stated that a party does not have prevailing status where it wins a declaratory judgment but is unable to alter the opposing party’s behavior. 506 U.S. at 111 (“[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff mus t obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. . . . Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement.”) (emphasis added); id. at 113 (“No material alteration of the legal relationship be tween the parties occurs until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant.”); see also P.N. , 442 F.3d at 855 (discussing Farrar ). The parties agree that no new records were turned over to Medic i as a result of the Review Panel’s order. Likewise, the District Court noted as part of its reasonable fee analysis that “Mr. Medici’s success did not result in any real tangible change in his circumstances given that he received no additional records fr om [the School District]

.7 Rather, it represented more of a symbolic victory of his interpretation of the term ‘educational records’ in FERPA and [ IDE I A ] .” J.A . at 12

- 13. PILCOP contends that the Review Panel’s decision afforded Medici practical relief b ecause “it gave [him] the right to demand additional documents in the future.” Reply Br. at 4. This contention , however, is contradicted by the record: first, the Review Panel’s decision was limited to records identified in the original July 2007 hearing and, second, the District Court held in a separate action that Medici had signed away his right to bring an action to enforce the Review Panel’s decision as part of the settlement agreement he entered into while the matter was still pending before the Rev iew Panel. Medici i s thus not a prevailing party under the standard applied in Farrar and its progeny because he did not obtain any actual relief in that the School District did not provide any new documents and he was unable to enforce the Review Panel’s order. It follows that Medic i was not entitled to attorney fees, and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.