NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MEGAN E.,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, H.E.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0466 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD34479

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee DCS

FILED 6-13-2019
MEGAN E. v. DCS, H.E.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Megan E. ("Mother") appeals the superior court order 

severing her parental rights to her son ("Child"), who was born in March 

2014. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother, who was born in 1993, began using heroin at age 15. 

She testified in these proceedings that she used heroin daily until 2010,

when she began taking Suboxone without a prescription.

1 According to 

other accounts she gave, she did not switch to Suboxone from heroin until 

2012 or 2013. Mother eventually developed a volatile relationship with 

Child's father.

¶3 The Department of Child Safety ("DCS") took Child into 

custody in June 2017 and filed a dependency petition alleging Mother was 

unable to parent due to substance abuse and mental health issues.2 The 

superior court found Child dependent as to Mother in September 2017.

 

1 Suboxone is a prescription drug approved by the Food and Drug 

Administration for treatment of people with opioid-use disorders. It 

produces effects such as euphoria or respiratory depression, but at much 

lower and safer levels than produced by opioids. It is prescribed to reduce

withdrawal symptoms and cravings associated with opioids, but has its 

own side effects, including cravings, inability to sleep, distress and 

irritability. Because of its opioid-like effects, it can be misused and can lead 

to dependence. See Buprenorphine, Substance Abuse and Mental Health 

Services Administration (May 7, 2019),

https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assistedtreatment/treatment/buprenorphine.

2 DCS also filed a dependency petition against Child's father, but his 

parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.
MEGAN E. v. DCS, H.E.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 The court adopted a case plan of reunification, and DCS 

offered Mother case management, a psychological evaluation, substanceabuse assessment and treatment, drug testing, and supervised visitation. 

Mother completed a substance-abuse assessment with TERROS in July 

2017, where an evaluator recommended that she complete a medically

supervised detoxification, then participate in intensive outpatient 

treatment.

¶5 Mother did not follow the TERROS recommendations, but 

instead sought services from Community Bridges, Inc., ("CBI"), where she 

presented with symptoms of substance abuse that included homelessness 

and inability to fulfill home and work obligations. Mother reported to CBI 

that she had been buying Suboxone "off the streets," and CBI diagnosed her 

with opioid-use disorder. She agreed to a treatment plan that included a 

psychological evaluation, medically managed Suboxone treatments, 

nursing services, drug and alcohol screening, intensive outpatient therapy, 

case management, peer support services, and individual counseling. As 

part of her Suboxone treatment program, Mother signed a patient

agreement affirming that she understood the program would be a 

"detoxification program rather than a maintenance program, and is 

designed to appropriately wean me off of all prescribed and illicit 

substances."

¶6 Through CBI, Mother received prescriptions for Suboxone for 

most of July 2017 through September 2018. At the start of her treatment in 

July 2017, CBI prescribed her 2 mg of Suboxone per day. In September 2017, 

she told CBI that she was not then "ready to detox," and by early October 

2017, her dosage had increased to 4 mg and then to 8 mg per day by the end 

of October. According to a treatment note dated November 22, 2017, CBI 

"[d]iscussed a taper schedule over the next two months" with Mother. 

Further: "Patient is aware of risk of being on Suboxone as well as the risk of 

dependence and addiction." In December 2017, Mother reported to CBI that 

her health insurance had lapsed and she was no longer able to pay for her 

Suboxone prescriptions. In January 2018, she reported to CBI that she had

been buying Suboxone off the street. She also reportedly told CBI she had 

used heroin as recently as August 2017 and that she had spent a lot of time 

craving opioids, which interfered with her work and home obligations. 

Mother resumed her prescription Suboxone treatment through CBI later in 

January 2018, at which point her dosage was 8 mg. As of March 2018, her 

dosage had increased to 12 mg, but Mother expressed a willingness to 

decrease her dosage because a prior problem with tooth pain had subsided. 

In May 2018, when her dosage was 10 mg, a medical provider discussed

with Mother a "taper schedule" as well as the risk of dependence and 
MEGAN E. v. DCS, H.E.

Decision of the Court

4

addiction associated with being on Suboxone, but as of September 2018, 

Mother's dosage remained at 10 mg.

¶7 As part of her CBI program, Mother was supposed to attend 

intensive outpatient therapy three times per week. Although she generally 

complied with therapy attendance requirements, she attended only one 

session in July 2017, three sessions in November 2017 and three sessions in 

December 2017. Ultimately, however, Mother successfully graduated from

CBI's intensive outpatient substance-abuse program. She then began a 

standard program of outpatient therapy that met once a week, but she 

missed many of the sessions – for example, she attended just once in March 

and once in April 2018. In the meantime, Mother struggled to find stable 

housing and remained homeless for an extended period during the 

dependency.

¶8 In June 2018, the superior court granted DCS's request to 

change the case plan to severance and adoption, and DCS moved to sever 

Mother's parental rights.

¶9 At the severance hearing, the court heard testimony from 

Mother, the DCS specialist and Mother's counselor. Mother testified she 

was currently receiving Suboxone through CBI and that it had been six 

months since she last bought the medication off the street. Although CBI 

records contained a report that Mother had said she last used heroin in 

August 2017, Mother testified she had not used heroin for seven or eight 

years. She admitted that TERROS recommended that she undergo

detoxification from Suboxone, but testified she did not need to do so.

¶10 The DCS specialist testified that Mother behaves 

appropriately during her visits with Child and that Child had lived with 

his maternal grandfather since the beginning of the dependency. The DCS 

specialist testified the grandfather can meet Child's needs and was willing 

to adopt him. She also testified the grandfather would agree to continue to 

supervise contact between Mother and Child.

¶11 The superior court granted DCS's motion, severing Mother's 

parental rights under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 

8-533(B)(3) (2019) (prolonged drug abuse) and -533(B)(8)(c) (15 months' 

time in care).

3 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) (2019), 

 

3 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of a statute or rule.
MEGAN E. v. DCS, H.E.

Decision of the Court

5

12-120.21(A)(1) (2019), -2101(A)(1) (2019) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for 

the Juvenile Court 103(A).

DISCUSSION

¶12 The right to custody of one's child is fundamental but not 

absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 

(2000). The superior court may terminate a parent-child relationship upon 

clear and convincing evidence of at least one of the statutory grounds set 

out in § 8-533(B). Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12. Additionally, the court 

must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the 

child's best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). 

"Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and 

assess witness credibility, we accept [that] court's findings of fact if 

reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a 

severance order unless it is clearly erroneous." Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 

239 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2016).

¶13 Under § 8-533(B)(3), termination of parental rights may be 

ordered when "the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities 

because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of . . . controlled substances . . . and 

there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for 

a prolonged indeterminate period." DCS also must show that it made 

"reasonable efforts to reunify the family or that such efforts would have 

been futile." Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 

(App. 2005). "Chronic" substance abuse is long lasting, but not necessarily 

continuous. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 16 

(App. 2010). Temporary abstinence from a controlled substance does not 

generally outweigh a parent's "significant history of abuse" or "consistent 

inability to abstain during [the] case," and "a child's interest in permanency 

must prevail over a parent's uncertain battle with" substance abuse. Jennifer 

S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016) (quotation 

omitted).

¶14 Mother does not challenge the superior court's finding that 

DCS made reasonable efforts to provide her with rehabilitative services. 

Instead, she contests the court's findings that she is unable to discharge her

parental responsibilities because of her substance abuse and that her 

substance abuse will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period. 

Specifically, Mother argues the court misunderstood her Suboxone 

treatment and therefore failed to adequately assess her recovery progress. 

In making this argument, Mother contends that by the time of the severance 

hearing, her drug dependency had been in remission for "some time."
MEGAN E. v. DCS, H.E.

Decision of the Court

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¶15 Mother's use of Suboxone was not in remission, however. 

According to the record before the superior court, Mother's Suboxone 

treatment was supposed to be part of a "detoxification program rather than 

a maintenance program," and Mother's medical records included repeated 

concerns about her prolonged use of the drug. But during her year of 

intensive treatment, her daily dose of Suboxone increased. In support of

her contention about remission, Mother points to treatment protocols that 

she asserts permit use of Suboxone indefinitely (even over a patient's 

lifetime) as an effective means of treating opioid addiction and that warn

against assessing a patient's recovery progress based merely on Suboxone 

dosage or length of treatment. Mother, however, did not put these 

materials before the superior court. See Conant v. Whitney, 190 Ariz. 290, 293

(1997) (waiver of argument not raised in superior court). In any event, 

Mother's argument is effectively a request that this court reweigh the 

evidence, which we will not do. See Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 

Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

¶16 The record contains substantial evidence supporting the 

superior court's decision to sever Mother's rights. Mother has a significant 

history of using heroin and Suboxone. Nevertheless, she refused to 

undergo detoxification from Suboxone as TERROS recommended. Instead, 

she engaged in medication-assisted Suboxone treatments off and on for 

more than a year, even though the treatment was supposed to be temporary

and was designed to allow her to taper off all medication.

¶17 At trial, Mother testified that under the CBI program, whether 

she would taper off Suboxone was "up to" her. She conceded that CBI 

raised a "taper schedule" with her in July 2018, after about a year of 

treatment, but asserted that she was not ready to "taper" and did not know 

when she would be able to do so. Mother also acknowledged having an 

anger problem and admitted that she did not complete a recommended 

"domestic violence component" of counseling and that she punched her 

stepmother during an altercation in January 2017. The record shows that in 

a counseling session, she reported experiencing cravings for opioids and

that certain situations triggered her desire to use drugs. She also reported 

issues with controlling her anger, anxiety and negative emotions, as well as 

issues with coping with stress. This evidence sufficiently supported the 

superior court's finding that Mother's continued drug use impaired her 

ability to parent.

¶18 Mother also argues DCS failed to prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that severance was in Child's best interests. Mother points 

to evidence that she is bonded with Child and that she was engaging in 
MEGAN E. v. DCS, H.E.

Decision of the Court

7

services. She also argues that severing her rights would not change Child's 

circumstances because he would continue living with the maternal 

grandfather, who would permit Child to continue his relationship with 

Mother.

¶19 Termination of a parent's rights "is in the child's best interests 

if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be 

harmed if severance is denied." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 

146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018). One of the factors that may favor termination "is the 

immediate availability of an adoptive placement." Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of 

Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377 (App. 1998).

¶20 The record shows that Mother struggled to find stable 

housing and remained homeless for an extended period during the 

dependency. At the time of the severance hearing in November 2018, she 

was living rent-free in a home owned by her grandparents that contained

piles of boxes that created an environment that would not be safe for Child. 

She reported to CBI in January 2018 that she had craved opioids much of 

the time and that those cravings interfered with her obligations at work and 

at home. At the same time, the court found Child was in an adoptive 

placement that was meeting all his needs and that severance would benefit 

Child by providing him with permanency and stability. See Jennifer S., 240 

Ariz. at 287, ¶ 17.
MEGAN E. v. DCS, H.E.

Decision of the Court

8

¶21 The evidence recited above supports the superior court's 

findings that DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in Child's best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶22 The record fully supports the superior court's findings and 

conclusions. We affirm its order severing Mother's parental rights.4

 

4 Because substantial evidence supports the court's decision to sever 

Mother's rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), we need not address Mother's 

arguments relating to the 15 months' out-of-home placement ground for 

severance. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 

2002).