alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> UT
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      189,787
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                          0
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                          32,556
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        12,338
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 234,681
<COMMON>                                         1,244
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                       37,543
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                             48,616
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                  87,403
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      4,800
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                            84,994
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                    3,650
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                  53,834
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                  234,681
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      164,041
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                             6,684
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     138,935
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     145,619
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         18,422
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                                 523
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  18,945
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         5,675
<NET-INCOME>                                    13,270
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        383
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   12,887
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                         3,582
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                        4,688
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                          38,195
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    10.36
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    10.36
        

</TABLE>
Description of Danaher Corporation compensation arrangements



 Exhibit 10.18 
  
 Danaher Corporation 
 Description of Non-Management Director Compensation Arrangements 
  
 Following is a description of the compensation arrangements for each of the Company’s non-management directors. Non-management directors receive meeting attendance fees of $2,500 per board meeting (whether
telephonically or in person) and $1,000 per committee meeting (whether telephonically or in person), plus an annual cash retainer of $40,000. In addition, the non-management directors are eligible for grants of equity awards under the Amended and
Restated Danaher Corporation 1998 Stock Option Plan, which is attached as Exhibit 10.1 to Danaher’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004.
#### JAMES et ux. v. MONROE GROCER CO., Limited, et al.

No. 5528.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Jan. 3, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1938.

Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh, of Monroe, for appellants.

Harry V. Booth and Chas. B. Emery, both of Shreveport, for appellees.

DREW, Judge.

This is a companion case with that of Andrew R. Smith et ux. against the samé defendants, 179 So. 495, No. 5527 on the docket of this court and decided by us this day. The cases were consolidated for trial..

We have adopted the opinion of the lower court in case No. 5527, and, for the reasons assigned therein, we adopt the opinion of the lower court in this case. It is as follows:

> “The issues in this case being the same as those in the companion case, No. 10340 (No. 5527 in this court), and those issues having been duly discussed in the written opinion in that case, for the reasons as-•signed for judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in that case, the plaintiffs in this *506suit are entitled to recover judgment in their behalf and against the defendants, for all such damages as they sustained on account of the death of their son, Oscar James.

> “Plaintiffs itemize their damages as follows :

> For loss of love and companionship of their said son $ 3,000.00

> For loss of maintenance and support ■ 5,000.00

> For shock, grief and suffering caused by the news of his untimely and sudden death 3,000.00

> For funeral and burial expenses 250.00

> Total $11,250.00

> “Oscar James was 18 years, 9 months, and 5 days old at the time of his death. He had resided in the home of his parents all of his life and was greatly beloved by them. His character appears to have been above reproach and his conduct was such as to endear him to a large number of friends. JIe was a sturdy worker, and contributed of his earnings to the support of his parents and other members of his family. He was earning $30 per month- at the time of his death, and'was contributing $25 per month of said amount to the support of his family. Just how long this contribution would have continued nobody knows; but it is certain that his parents suffered a great financial loss when he died. And that is not all, they have suffered untold grief over his death. The same amount of damages will be allowed in this case as was allowed in suit No. 5527, that is, $8,000, with legal interest from judicial demand until paid, and all costs of (his suit.

> “Plaintiffs failed to make proof of the item of funeral and burial expenses, and their demand for such expenses will be rejected.

> “Therefore, for the reasons assigned, the plaintiffs, William E. James and Mrs. Daisy Fletcher James, should have judgment in their favor and against the defendants, Monroe Grocer Company, Limited, and the Trinity Universal Insurance Company, in solido, for the full sum of $8,000, with 5 per centum per annum interest thereon from judicial demand until paid, to be divided equally between them. The defendants to pay all costs of this suit.”

The judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 176 (Wednesday, September 10, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 52647]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-21109]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meetings

Agency Holding the Meeting:  Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

Time and Date: 11 a.m., Friday, September 26, 2008.

Place: 1155 21st St., NW., Washington, DC, 9th Floor Commission 
Conference Room.

Status: Closed.

Matters To Be Considered: Surveillance Matters.

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Sauntia S. Warfield, 202-418-5084.

Sauntia S. Warfield,
Staff Assistant.
[FR Doc. E8-21109 Filed 9-8-08; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 25 (Wednesday, February 6, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 6952]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-2115]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

 [Docket No. EL08-36-000]


Dominion Resources Services, Inc. Complainant, v. PJM 
Interconnection, LLC Respondent; Notice of Complaint, Request for Fast 
Track Processing

January 30, 2008.
    Take notice that on January 28, 2008, Dominion Resources Services, 
Inc. filed a complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act 
alleging that the PJM Interconnection, LLC is violating the generator 
interconnection provisions of its tariff.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must 
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of 
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. The Respondent's 
answer and all interventions, or protests must be filed on or before 
the comment date. The Respondent's answer, motions to intervene, and 
protests must be served on the Complainants.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of answers, 
protests and interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link 
at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should 
submit an original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' 
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail 
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For 
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c1878493828eafada8afa492b4b1b1aeb3b581a7a4b3a2efa6aeb7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="40060512030f2e2c292e25133530302f323400262532236e272f36">[email protected]</span></a>, or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.
Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on February 11, 2008.

Kimberly D. Bose,
 Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-2115 Filed 2-5-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

MARSEL PETERSON

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee.

No. 4D2023

- 1836

[ June 27, 2024 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Bernard I. Bober

, Judge; L.T. Case No. 03

- 12651CF10B

.

Marsel Peterson, Arcadia, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed

.

K LINGENSMITH

, C.J., W ARNER and F ORST

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
EXHIBIT 35.1



World Omni Financial Corp.

Servicer Compliance Statement

Pursuant to Item 1123

of Regulation AB



I, Joseph A. Venezia,
do hereby certify that I am the Chief Financial Officer of World Omni Financial Corp., a Florida corporation, and further certify
on behalf of World Omni Financial Corp. in its capacity as servicer (the “Servicer”) under the Sale and Servicing Agreement,
dated as of August 1, 2018 (the “Agreement”), among World Omni Auto Receivables Trust 2018-C, as Issuing Entity, World
Omni Auto Receivables LLC, as Depositor, and the Servicer, as follows:



(i)        A
review of the activities of the Servicer during the period covered by the issuing entity’s Annual Report on form 10-K for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance under the Agreement, has been
made under my supervision.



(ii)       To
the best of my knowledge, based on the review described above, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement
in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto
set my hand as of March 8, 2019.



| | WORLD OMNI FINANCIAL CORP.
| | --------------------------



| | By: | /s/Joseph A. Venezia          
| | --- | ------------------------------
| |     | Name: Joseph A. Venezia       
| |     | Title: Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 173 (Friday, September 5, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 51798]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20591]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Navy


Notice of Open Meeting of the Board of Advisors (BOA) to The 
President, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the provisions of The Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (Pub. L. 92-463, as amended), notice is hereby given that the 
following meeting of the Board of Advisors to the President, Naval 
Postgraduate School will be held. This meeting will be open to the 
public.

DATES: The meeting will be held on Tuesday, October 21, 2008, from 8 
a.m. to 4 p.m. and on Wednesday, October 22, 2008, from 8 a.m. to 12 
p.m. Eastern Time Zone.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at the Office of Naval Research, 
875 N. Randolph Street, Suite 1435, Arlington, VA 22203.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Jaye Panza, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 93943-5001, telephone: 831-656-2514.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The purpose of the meeting is to elicit the 
advice of the Board on the Naval Service's Postgraduate Education 
Program and the collaborative exchange and partnership between NPS and 
the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). The board examines the 
effectiveness with which the NPS is accomplishing its mission. To this 
end, the board will inquire into the curricula; instruction; physical 
equipment; administration; state of morale of the student body, 
faculty, and staff; fiscal affairs; and any other matters relating to 
the operation of the NPS as the board considers pertinent. Individuals 
without a DoD government/CAC card require an escort at the meeting 
location.
    For access, information, or to send written comments regarding the 
NPS BOA contact Ms. Jaye Panza, Naval Postgraduate School, 1 University 
Circle, Monterey, CA 93943-5001 or by fax: 831-656-3145 by October 10, 
2008.

    Dated: August 28, 2008.
T. M. Cruz,
Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, 
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. E8-20591 Filed 9-4-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3810-FF-P
[No. 34523.

*En Banc.*

November 30, 1957.]

#### John Victor Hodges, *Plaintiff and Relator,*v. H. J. Lawrence, *as Chief of Police of the City of Seattle, Defendant,*The Superior Court for King County, *William J. Wilkins, Judge, Respondent.**1*

*McMicken, Rupp & Schweppe*and *Robert R. Beezer,*for plaintiff and relator.

*A. C. Van Soelen, Anthony Arntson,*and *Thomas J. Owens,*for defendant.

1

Reported in 318 P. (2d) 326.

Per Curiam.

The relator was convicted in the municipal police court of Seattle of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He appealed to the superior court and was admitted to bail pending the *357appeal, which came on for trial in the superior court on June 4, 1957. He was again convicted. The police department was not notified of the trial, and, the relator not being in custody, no police officer was present thereat. On September 6, 1957, the court imposed sentence upon him of imprisonment in jail for sixty days and a fine of one hundred dollars. His motor vehicle operator’s license was suspended for one hundred eighty days.

The relator immediately went to the clerk’s office in company with his own attorney and the city attorney, where he paid the fine. No one took him into custody or told him to report to jail.

The clerk issued the customary warrant of commitment in due course, but there was an unusual delay in attempting to execute the warrant for the reason that the officer charged with that duty was on a hunting trip. During the week of October 8, 1957, an attempt was made to take the relator into custody, but he no longer lived at the address he had given at the time of his arrest. He was eventually located and taken to jail on November 1, 1957.

Sixty days after the date of his sentence, he initiated this proceeding, and, at its conclusion, the court issued an order discharging the writ of *habeas corpus.*That order is brought here for review upon a writ of certiorari.

, The relator admits that he was not taken into custody at the time of his sentence, but contends, nevertheless, that under the terms of RCW 9.95.060 *[cf.*Rem. Supp. 1947, § 10249-2, part] his sentence began to run at the time he was sentenced, and, consequently, it had expired at the time of the *habeas corpus*proceeding.

The section of the statute relied upon is part of the Laws of 1935, chapter 114, p. 308. The chapter is entitled:

> “An Act relating to the provision for the adequate punishment of persons convicted of certain felonies, . . . defining the duties of the Board of Prison, Terms and Paroles with relation thereto; . . . ”

The section is inapplicable to this case, which involves a jail sentence for an offense which is not a felony.

In *In re Wright,*31 Wn. (2d) 905, 200 P. (2d) 478, *358we held that a county jail sentence does not begin to run until a defendant is in custody, and the period during which there is a delay in taking him into custody does not count as service of the sentence. The same rule should apply to imprisonment in a city jail, and we so hold.

The order discharging the writ of *habeas corpus*is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-02-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-13-1997
<CASH>                                             239
<SECURITIES>                                        11
<RECEIVABLES>                                    26845
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      39531
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 71679
<PP&E>                                           90829
<DEPRECIATION>                                   53871
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  109162
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            23740
<BONDS>                                          26896
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          4990
<OTHER-SE>                                       46849
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    109162
<SALES>                                         100798
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                100798
<CGS>                                            89640
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   105856
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    50
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                1579
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (6619)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (2390)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (4229)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (4229)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.50)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.50)
        

</TABLE>
[No. 34216.

Department Two.

October 3, 1957.]

#### *In the Matter of the Estate of*Blanche Funk Miller, *Deceased.*The State of Washington, *Appellant,*v. Martha I. Parshall *et al., Respondents.**1*

*The Attorney General*and *Henry W. Wager, Assistant,*for appellant.

*Metzger, Blair & Gardner,*for respondent.

1

Reported in 316 P. (2d) 124.

Per Curiam.

The question here for our decision is whether the Federal estate tax on the decedent’s estate, which was subject to both the Federal estate tax and the state inheritance tax, is to be paid from the residue of the estate or from specific bequests as directed by the will. *88There is no contest between the beneficiaries, who are in classes B and C (RCW 83.08.030, 83.08.040). The inheritance tax division alone appeals.

RCW 83.40.050 provides in part as follows:

> “In all estates the amount of the federal estate tax, as paid by the estate, shall be deducted as a claim or indebtedness against the estate: . . .”

The attorney general contends that the entire Federal estate tax is deductible from the residue, which results in a larger state inheritance tax. His argument is:

> “This statute by its plain terms means that the Federal estate tax must be deducted from the residue as is any other debt of the decedent and a testator cannot by the terms of his will change that, as was attempted in this case by paragraph ‘tenth’ of the will.”

Paragraph No. 10 of the will provides:

> “I herewith provide that the Inheritance Tax due and payable either to the State of Washington or Federal Government shall be deducted from the respective bequests except those amounts received as devisees of Insurance Policies;”

Respondent, on the other hand, argues, and the trial court decided, that the will controls. We agree.

We find nothing in the statute to sustain the argument that the quoted statute prohibits testamentary direction for payment of the Federal estate tax from anything but the residual estate. We said in *Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Macomber,*32 Wn. (2d) 696, 203 P. (2d) 1078:

> “Our state has no apportionment statute with regard to the Federal estate tax, although there is direction as to the incidence of our inheritance tax in Rem. Supp. 1943, § 11202 and Rem. Rev. Stat., § 11209 [P.P.C. §§ 974-21, -45].”

We there held:

> “The wishes and intention of the testator must govern. Here is language which is clear and specific. He wanted the stock to go to the legatee free and clear. This court has held that such a provision will be given effect. *In re Belknap’s Estate,*12 Wn. (2d) 643, 123 P. (2d) 358. It was his own property and he could dispose of it as he saw fit.”

*89We have no statute which precludes a person by will from requiring each beneficiary to pay his share of the Federal estate tax, and the supreme court of New Mexico recently held in *In re Gallagher’s Will,*57 N. M. 112, 255 P. (2d) 317, 37 A. L. R. (2d) 149:

> “It is universally recognized the testator has the right by his direction to make the federal estate tax payable from any portion of his estate he may designate.”

■ The judgment is affirmed.