## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

Harris v. Thom

pson , 2012 IL 112525

Caption in S upreme Court: J AM ES HARRI S, Appellee
, v. STEVEN W. THOMPSON et al

. , Appellants.

Docke t No. 112525

Filed
Rehea ringdenied J une 21, 2012

September 24, 2012

Held ( Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The Vehicle Code provisions on how drivers of private an d public

em er gen cy vehicles must ref rain from neg lige nce do not abrog ate the protec tion from neg lige nce claims provided by the Tort Immunity Act to drivers of public emer g ency vehicles and thei r employ ers—damag e verdic t overturne d and prospe ctive-only application re fused

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the Fifth District; hear d in that court

on appeal from the Circuit Court of Massac C ounty , the Hon. J ames R. Wil liamson, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed. Circuit court judg ment aff irmed in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t.Counsel on

Appea l Charles G. Roth, of Kavanagh, Scully
, Sudow, Whit e & Frede rick, P C, of Peoria, f

or appe llants.

Mark S. J ohnson, J ohn R. Schneider and Matthew B. Fe rre ll, of J ohnson & Schne ider, L .L .C., of Cape Gira rdea u, Missouri, for appe llee.

Ashley Niebur, Br ian Day and Roge r Huebne r, of Springf ield, for amicus curiaeI llinois Municipal L eague.

J ustices J USTI CE FREEMAN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Thomas, Gar

man, Kar meier, Bur

ke, and Theis concur

red in the judgme nt and opinion. Chief J ustice Kilbride dissented, w ith opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, J ames Har ris, broug ht a persona l injury action in the circ uit court of M assac County ag ainst defe ndants, Steven W. Thompson and Massac County Hospital District. The circ uit court enter ed judgme nt on a jury verdic t in favor of plaintiff, and the appellate court aff irmed. No. 5-09-0625 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 2 3 ). W e allowed defe ndants’ petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R

. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). We now

reve rse the judg ment of the a ppellate c ourt.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 Def

endant Massac County Hospital District employ ed defe ndant Steven W. Thompson

as an ambulance driver. Be tween 6:15 and 6:30 p.m. on J anuar y 26, 2004, Massac Memorial Hospital rec eived a diabetic emerg ency call from Southgate Nursing Home to pick up and transport a nursing hom e re s ident to another hospital for further car e. Thompson was instructed that this was an emer g ency

. J ulie Worthen, a hospital emer g ency medical technicia n (EMT), a ccompa

nied Thompson in the rea r of the a mbulance to se t up supplies fo r t he patient. The nursing home was located east of the intersec tion of Ninth Str ee t an d Butler Road in Metropolis. Thompson was driving east on Ninth Street toward Butler Road. ¶ 4 At that time, plaintiff, J ames Har ris, was driving his 2001 Dodg e Ca ra v an s o u t h on Butler Road toward Ninth Street. Plaintiff’s wife, Vashi, and daughter C h el s ea we re passeng ers. They wer e trave ling betwee n 20 and 25 miles per hour. The two vehicles collided in the intersec tion. Plaintiff never saw the ambul ance prior to the impact beca use he was looking to his left upon enter ing the intersec tion, which was awa y from the d i re ct i o n the eastbound ambulance was trave ling. Worthen did not witness any thing prior to the collision

-2-beca use the ba ck of the ambulance lacke d windows. ¶ 5 The front of plaintiff’s vehicle hit the cente r of the left side of the ambulance

. The impact knocked the ambulance over onto its rig ht side. The Ha rrises, Thompson, and Worthen a ll sustained injuries. ¶ 6 On J anuar

y 24, 2005, plaintiff, Vashi, and Chelsea b ro u gh t a persona l injury action
ag ainst defe ndants. The Har rises alleg ed that: M as s ac County Hospital District was a

mu n ic ip a l c orporation and Thompson was its employ ee; Thompson was neg lige nt; there fore
, he wa s l i able and the hospital district was vicar iously liable based on the theory of respondeat superior

. The Har rises separ ately alleg ed neg lige nce aga i n st defe ndants, and plaintiff and Vashi eac h additionally alleg ed loss of consortium. Their first amende d complaint added a

jury trial demand f

or ea ch count. ¶ 7 On J une 27, 2006, defe ndants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a )(9) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5 / 2 -6 1 9 (a )(9) (West 2002)) asser ting an aff irmative defe nse that defe ated the neg lige nce claims

. Acc ording to defe ndants, the complaint acknow ledg ed that the hospital district was a municipal corpor ation, and the complaint contained only claims of neg lige nce. There fore
, defe ndants argued that they wer e immune from liability based on neg lige nce pursuant to the L ocal Gover nmental and Gover nmental Employ ees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 I L CS 10/1- 101 to 10-101 (West 2002)). On Dec ember 8, 2006, the circ uit court denied the motion. On J une 18, 2009, the Har

rises filed the instant third am en d ed complaint, which added alternative counts all egi n g willful and wanton conduct in relation to plaintiff, Vashi, and Chelsea. Responding to eac h new pleading
, including the instant co m plaint, defe ndants raised the aff

irmative def

ense of the Tort Immunity

Act. ¶ 8 On September 11, 2009, p u rs u ant to the parties’ stipulation, the claims of Vashi and Chelsea wer e settled and the circ uit court dismiss ed them with prejudice

. On September 28, 2009, the court g rante d plaintiff’s motion to voluntar ily dismiss his c onsortium c ount w ith prejudice
, and a jury trial beg an on plaintiff’s neg lige nce and willful and wanton counts. At the close of plaintiff’s case , the court enter ed a direc ted verdic t in favor of defe ndants on the willful and wanton count. Plaintiff’s case went to the jury solely on the neg lige nce count. On September 30, 2009, the jury returne d a verdic t in fa v o r o f p laintiff, and the circ uit court subsequently

enter ed judg ment on the ver dict in the amount of $667,216.30. 1 ¶ 9 Def

endants timely filed a posttrial motion pursuant to section 2-1202(b) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-1202(b) (West 2002)). Def endants reque sted a judgme nt non

o b s tante vere dicto ( n.o.v. ), asser ting that the Tort Immunity Act immuniz ed them fr o m liability for neg lige nce. Alternatively
, defe ndants reque sted a new trial solely on the issue of damag es, asse rtingthat the cour t errone ously

admitted into evidence the unpaid portion of plaintiff’s hospital bill. On October 30, 2009, the circ uit c ourt denied defe ndants’ posttrial motion. ¶ 10 The appellate court aff irmed the judgme nt of the circ uit court. First, the appellate court

T he j ury re tur ned a verdi ct in the amount of $665 ,000

. T he cou rt grant ed pla int if f’ s m oti on 1
to ass ess $2,2 16.3 0 i n co st s a gains t d ef end ant s.

-3-acknow ledg ed that the Tort Immunity Act immuniz ed defe ndants from liability in

neg lige nce, but conclude d that the Tort I mmunity Act did not apply to defe ndants in this

case

. Rather, the court held that the I llinois Vehicle Code (Ve hicle Code or Code) (625 I L CS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2002)) applied t o d efendants, and that the Code imposes a duty to ref rain from neg ligen ce

. Second, the appellate court held that defe ndants forf eited their contention reg arding the admission into evidenc e of plaintiff’s hospi t al bill by “fa iling to object on the rec ord to the nature of plaintiff’s prese ntation of medical bills.” No. 5-09-0625 (unpublished orde r under Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 11 Def

endants appea l to this court. We subsequently g rante d the I llinois Municipal L eague leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of defe ndants. I ll. S. Ct. R. 345 (ef f. Sept. 20, 2010). We will ref

er to additional pertinent background in the context of our analy sis of the issues.

¶ 12 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 13 We first addre ss (A) defe ndants’ contention that the Tort Immunity Act immuniz ed them from liability for neg lige nce. I f we conclude that the Tort Immunity Act controls in this case , plaintiff contends that (B ) our decision should apply only prospec tively ; and (C) the circ uit
court err ed in direc ting a verdic t in favor of defe ndants on plainti ff’s claim of willful and wanton conduc t.

¶ 14 A. Gover nmental Tort Immunity ¶ 15 T h i s matter is befor e us on the denial of defe ndants’ reque st for a judgm en t n

. o

. v. “[V]erdicts oug ht to be directed and judgme nts n.o.v. enter ed only in those case s in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspec t most favor able to the opponent, so

overwhelmingly favor s movant that no contra ry verdic t based on the evidenc e could ever stand.” Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co.
, 37 I ll. 2d 494, 5 1 0 (1 9 6 7 ). Where the

uncon tradicte d evidenc e, viewed in the light most favor able to the plaintiff, establishes a complete defe nse, a court is justified in granting the defe ndant’s motion for a judgme nt n.o.v. Merlo v. P ublic Servic e Co. of Northern I llinois
, 381 I ll. 300, 311 (1942); see
, e.g. , Ries v. City of Chicago
, 242 I ll. 2d 205, 215 (2011) (Tort Immunity Act). An adver se ruling on a motion for a direc ted verdict or a judgme nt n.o. v. i s re v i ewed de novo

. Evans v. Shannon
, 201 I ll. 2d 424, 427 (2002). In other words, the revie wing court applies the s ame Pedrick standard as did the circ uit court. See, e.g. , Schmidt v. Archer Iron W orks, Inc.
, 44 I ll. 2d 401, 405 (1970). ¶ 16 Def

endants contend that the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/1-101 to 1 0 -1 0 1 (W est 2002)) applies to the instant case and operates to bar plaintiff’s cause of action. Pursuant to the Act, I llinois adopted the g ener al principle that local g overnme ntal units are liable in tort, but limited this liability with a n extensive list of immunit ies based on spe cific g overnme nt functions. Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc.
, 196 I ll. 2d 484, 489 (2001); Barnett v. Zion Park District
, 171 I ll. 2d 378, 385-86 (1996). Also, article XI I I
, section 4, of the 1970 I llinois Constit ution provides: “Ex cept as the Genera l As s em b ly may provide by law, sovere ign immunit y in this State is abolished.” I ll. Const. 1970
, art. XI I I
, § 4. This

-4-constitutional provision “now makes t h e Ge nera l Assembly the ultimate authority in

det e r min in g wh e th e r lo c a l units of g overnme nt are immune from liability .” DeSme t v. County of R o ck Is l a n d
, 219 I ll. 2d 497, 506 (2006). “Ba sed on these developments, g overnme ntal units are liable in tort on the same basis as private tortfea sors unless a tort immunit y statute imposes conditions upon that liability .” In re Chicago Flood Liti gation
, 176 I ll. 2d 179, 192 (1997). ¶ 17 The purpos e o f t h e T o rt Immunity Act is to protec t local public entities and public employ ees from liability arising from the operation of g overnme nt. By providing immunit y , the Gene ral As s e mb ly soug ht to preve nt public funds from being diverted from their intended
purpose to the pay

ment of damag e claims. The Act g rants only immunit ies and defe nses. In other words, the Act does not cre ate duties. Rather, the Act mere ly codifies exis ting common law duties, to which the delineate d immunit ies apply

. Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15
, 198 I ll. 2d 475, 479-80 (2002); Village ofBloomingdale
, 196 I ll. 2d
at 490; 745 I L CS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 2002). There fore
, whether a local public entity owed

a duty of car e and whether that entity enjoy ed immunit y are separ at e issues. Once a court deter mines that a duty exis ts, it then addre sses whether the Act applies. Arteman
, 198 I ll. 2d at 480; Village of Bloomingdale , 196 I ll. 2d at 490. ¶ 18 In the ca se at bar, the parties do not dispute that Thompson w as a public e mploy ee a nd the hospital district was a municipal corpor ation and, there fore
, a local public entit y

. 7 4 5 I L CS 10/1-202, 1-206, 1-207 (West 2002). Def endants rely on two provisions of the Act. Section 2-109 provides: “A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act

or omission of its employ ee wher e the employ ee is not liable.” 745 I L CS 10/2-1 09 (West 2002). Also, sec tion 5-106 provides as f ollows:
“E x cept for willful or wanton conduct, neither a local public entity
, nor a publi c employ ee acting within the s cope of his empl oy ment, is liable for an inj ury cause d by the neg lige nt operation of a motor vehicle or firef ighting or resc ue equipment, when responding to an emer g ency call, including transporta tion of a person to a medical f acility .” 745 I L CS 10/ 5-106 (West 2002).
A rea son for this limit ed immunit y is that if an emer g ency vehicle operator wer e haunted by the possibili ty o f fac ing devastating persona l liability for actions taken in the course of responding to an emer g ency , driver perf ormanc e would be hamper ed. See Y oung v. Forgas
, 308 I ll. App. 3d 553, 559 (1999); Hampton v. Cashmore , 265 I ll. App. 3d 23, 29 (1994). ¶ 19 Def

endants contend that these provisions of the Tort Immunity Act immuniz e them from liability for neg lige nce, and that their application to the uncontra dicted ev id e n c e e nti tl e s th em to a judgme nt n.o.v. Howeve r, the circ uit court d en i ed defe ndants’ section 2-619(a )(9) motion to di smiss and their posttrial motion seeking a judgment n.o.v. based on Bradshaw

v. City of Metropolis
, 293 I ll. App. 3d 389 (1 9 9 7 ), a decision by the Fifth District of our appella t e co u rt

. Adher ing to Bradshaw
, the appellate court in the case at bar upheld the circ uit court. ¶ 20 In Bradshaw
, the circ uit court g rante d summary judgm en t i n fa v o r o f the def endant municipality based on the Tort Immunity Act. A divided panel of the appellate court reve rsed and rema nded, holding that the Act did not apply to immuniz e a municipality from liability

-5-for a police office r’s alleg ed neg lige nce. Br adshaw contende d “that the Act and the I llinois

Vehicle Code *** are in conflict and that wher e such conflict ex ists, the more specific statute, the Code, pree mpts the more g ener al provisions of the Act.” Bradshaw
, 293 I ll. App. 3d at 391. ¶ 21 Section 11-205 of the V ehicle Code provides in per tinent part: “(b) The driver of an authoriz ed emer g ency vehicle, when responding to an

emer g ency call *** may exercise the privileg es set forth in this Section, but subject to the conditions herein state d. (c) The drive r of a

n authorized emer g ency

vehicle ma

y : 1. Park or stand, irr espec tive of the provisions of this Chapter;
2. Procee d past a red or stop signa l or stop sign, but only afte r slowing down
as may be re quired a

nd nece ssary

for sa fe ope ration;
3. Ex cee d the maxi mum speed limit s so long as he does not endang er life or proper ty ; 4. Disreg ard regulations g overning direc tion of movement or turning in specifie d direc tions.

*** (e) The forgoing provisions do not relieve the driver of an authorized eme rgency vehic le from the duty of driving with due regardfor the safety of all persons , nor do such provisions protec t the driver from the conseque nces of his rec kless disreg ard for the safe ty of others.” (Emphasis adde d.) 625 I L CS 5/ 11-205 (West 2002). Section 11-907 of the Vehicle Code deals with the operation of vehicles upon the approa ch of an authorized emer g ency vehicle. Subsection (b) provides: “ This Section shall not operate
to relieve the driver of an authorized eme rgency vehic le f rom the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway .” (Emphasis added.) 625 I L CS 5/11- 907(b) (West 2002). The emphasized portions of sections 11-205 and 11-907 impose a duty

on emer g ency vehicle drivers to ref rain from neg lige n ce

. S ee Ca rter v. Du Page County Sheriff
, 304 I ll. App. 3d 44 3
, 4 4 8 (1999); Sundin v. Hughes
, 107 I ll. App. 2d 195, 200 (1969). ¶ 22 The Bradshaw court observe d that b o t h t h e Tort Immunity Act and the Vehicle Code

wer e applicable to the fac ts of that case

. The court opined that a conflict exis ted betwee n “the protec tions and duties imposed by” sections 11-205 and 11-907 of the Vehicle Code, and the relevant sections of the Tort Immunity Act. Bradshaw
, 293 I ll. App. 3d at 393. The cou rt explained that where t wo s tatutes exis t, one of which is g ener ally applicable and the other of which relates to only one subject, the particula r statute preva ils. The court viewed the Tort Immunity Act as a g ener al statute. Id. The c ourt held: “[T] he Code is a specific statute containing express provisi o n s es t abli shing a duty and standard of car e g overning the operation of emer g ency vehicles by police office rs. *** Consequently , a drive r of an eme rg ency vehicle c an be he ld liable for
neg lige nce arising out of the brea ch of the duty to use due car e in the opera tion of an

emer g ency

vehicle.” Id. at 395.

-6-The dissenting justice reje cted this holding. Id. (Maa g , J
., dissenting)

. Every other district of

our appellate court has reje cted this holding. Carter v. Du Page County Sheriff
, 304 I ll. App. 3d 443, 449-50 (2d Dist. 1999); Sanders v. City of Chicago , 306 I ll. App. 3d 356, 363 (1st Dist. 1999); Y

oung v. Forgas
, 308 I ll. App. 3d 553, 560 (4th Dist. 1999); Lanning v. Harris
, 342 I ll. App. 3d 965, 967-68 (3d Dist. 2003). We do likewise. ¶ 23 Refer ence to our decision in Henrich v. Libertyville High School
, 186 I ll. 2d 381 (1998), is useful. In Henrich , the plaintiff’s a ction arose out of the def endants’ f ailure to super

vise public school activities. T h is c o u r t c o n s id e r ed whether the immunit y provided by the rele vant sections of the School Code (105 I L CS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)), or the immunit y provided by section 3-108(a ) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/3-108(a) (We s t 1 9 9 4)) controlled in the plaintiff’s claim. Henrich
, 186 I ll. 2d at 383. The plaintiff in Henrich argued that the

more specific provisions of the School Code preva iled over the g ener al provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. However
, this court concluded t h at it need not decide whether the relevant sections of the Code wer e more specific than the rele vant section of the Act. Rather, the court conclude d that the plain languag e of section 3-108(a ) immuniz ed a school district from the failure to supervise an activity on or t he use of school property . This court, therefor e, held that section 3-108(a ) controlled the dispositi on of the plaintiff’s case

. Id. at 391. This court observe d that t h e i m munity in the S chool C ode and the Tort Immunity Act each stood “in its own sphere ,” with the School Code applying to both private and public schools, and the Tort Immunity

Act apply

ing only to public schools. Id. at 392. ¶ 24 R el y i n g o n Henrich
, the appellate court in Carter
, Sanders
, Y oung , an d L a mm i n g

rea soned that it need not decide whether sections 11-205 and 11-907 of the Vehicle Code are

more specific and, there fore
, preva il over the Tort Imm u n ity Act. Rather, those decisions held that the Ve hicle Code and the Tort Immunity Act ea ch stands “in its own spher e” a nd that “the statutes eac h addre ss differ ent actor s under differ ent circ umstances. *** Thus, the
statutes are not in conflict ***.” Lanning , 342 I ll. App. 3d at 968. ¶ 25 We ag ree and so hold. A court must construe statutes relating to the same subject matter with ref ere nce to one another so as to g ive eff ect to the provision s of eac h, if rea sonable. Henrich
, 186 I ll. 2d at 391-92. Sections 11-205 and 11-907 of the Ve h i cl e Code provide

cer tain privileg es both to public and private employ ees who operate emer g ency vehicles. In contra st, the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to private employees, but provides immunit y only to public employ ees absent willful and wanton conduct. There fore
, these sections of the Vehicle Code do not abrog ate the Tort Immunity Act. See Sanders
, 306 I ll. App. 3d at 363; 2 Carter
, 304 I ll. App. 3d at 450. Under the plain language o f section 5-106 of the Tort Immunity Act, the leg i s l at u re has chosen to g rant immunit y from neg lige nce liability to public employ ees l i k e T h o mpson. See Y oung , 308 I ll. App. 3d at 560. For the fore g oing

rea sons, Bradshaw v. City of Metropolis , 293 I ll. App. 3d 389 (1997), is here by overr uled.

Duri ng ora l argum ent , cou nse l for pla int if f con ced ed tha t if we hel d tha t the se sec ti ons of 2 the V ehi cl e Code pre vaile d in pla int if f’ s cau se of act ion
, the n we woul d ef fe ct i ve l y d el et e the
exp li ci t la nguage of sec ti on 5- 106 as it per ta ins to publ ic ambulan ces

. T his
, of cou rs e, we can not do. See Henr ic h , 186 I ll . 2d at 394

.

-7-¶ 26 We conclude that section 5-106 of t h e T o rt Immunity Act controls the dispositi on of

plaintiff’s cause of action for ordinary n egl ige nce ag ainst defe ndants. We hold that the
uncontra dicted evidenc e, viewed in the light most favor able to plaintiff, establishes a complete defe nse under section 5-106, and that defe ndants are entitled to a judgme nt n.o.v. There fore
, the judgme nts of the appellate and circ uit courts are reve rsed. See Ries v. City of Chicago
, 396 I ll. App. 3d 418, 428 (2009), aff’d
, 242 I ll. 2d 205 (2011) (re viewing court will

reve rse verdic t without rema nd wher e circ uit court err oneously denied motion for judgme nt

n.o.v. ).

¶ 27 B. N onretroa ctive Application ¶ 28 In the event of our overru l i n g Bradshaw and reve rsing the judgme nt of the appe llate court, plaintiff reque sts that we apply our decision only prospec tively

. In other words, plaintiff argues that our opinion should apply only to cause s of action broug ht subsequent to the filingof this opinion. W e dec line plaintiff’s re quest. ¶ 29 Gene rally
, a judicial decision is presumed to apply both retroa ctively and prospec tively

. Tosado v. Mille r , 1 8 8 I ll. 2d 186, 196 (1999). Howeve r, a court may , under cer tain circ umstances, decide to apply a dec ision only

prospec tively . In decidingwhether to apply

a decision in a civil c ase only prospec tively
, a court utiliz es a three -fa ctor analy sis a dopted from Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). See Aleck son v. V i llage of Round Lake Park
, 176 I ll. 2d 82, 87-91 (1997); Board of Commissioners of the W ood Dale Public Library Distri ct v. County of Du Page , 103 I ll. 2d 422, 426-27 (1984). ¶ 30 First, the decision mu s t es t ab l i s h a new rule of law, either by overr uling clea

r past prec edent on which li tiga nts have relied, or by deciding an is sue of first impression wher e the resolution was not clea rly fore shadowe d. This initial fac tor is a threshold require ment for solely prospec tive application of a new decision. Tosado
, 1 8 8 I l l

. 2d at 197; Bogseth v. Emanuel
, 166 I ll. 2d 507, 515 (1995); see Hanove r Shoe, Inc. v. United S h o e Machine ry Corp.
, 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968) (obser ving that is s u e o f nonretroa ctive application of decision need be addre ssed only wher e there is a clea rly d ec lare d judicial doctrine upon which litigant relied, which was overr uled in favor of a new rule). I f t h is require ment is satisfied, the rema ining fac tors are : whether
, g iven the purpose and history of the new rule, its operation will be advanc ed or hamper ed by nonretroa ctive application; and whether
, afte r balanc ing the eq u i ties, injusti ce or hardship would result if the decision is applied
retroa ctively

. Bogseth
, 166 I ll. 2d at 515; Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n
, 132 I ll. 2d 304, 329 (1989); Elg v. W hittingt on , 119 I ll. 2d 344, 357 (1987). ¶ 31 Ou r decision i n the case at bar does not establish a new principle of law by ov er ru l i n g clea r past prec edent. Initially
, Bradshaw was hardly clea r past prec edent. No other panel of

our appellate court befor e or since Bradshaw has rea ched its conclusion. By the time plaintiff’s cause of action arose , the appellate court decisions reje cting Bradshaw constituted “the majority view.” Lanning
, 342 I ll. App. 3d at 968. Indeed, the appellate court in the case at bar was not bound to follow Bradshaw
, and could have disavowed Bradshaw and joined its colleagues from ever

y other appellate distri ct who have considere d this issue. In any event, resolving a conflict among the districts of our appellate court by choosing one

-8-appellate court decision over another does not constitute overr ul i n g clea

r past prec edent. Castaneda
, 132 I ll. 2d at 329-30. Rather, our decision today repr esents a clar ification of the law, and not a clea

n brea k with past prec edent. See Landahl v. PPG Industries, Inc.
, 746 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1984). ¶ 32 Also
, we d o not decide an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly fore shadowe d. Our holding, that neither the hospital district nor Thompson was liable for the injuries cause d by

the neg lige nt operation of his ambulance when he w as re sponding to a n

emer g ency call (see 745 I L CS 10/5-106 (West 2002)), sim ply applies sec tion 5-106 of t he Tort Immunity Act to the fa cts of this case . This is not a novel issue; innovative principles

are not nece ssary to resolve it; and thi s court had not resolved this issue in prior cases in a

manner contra

ry to our decision today

. This decision does not repr esent such an abrupt and fundame ntal shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule that repla ces an older one. See Hanove r Shoe
, 392 U.S. at 496-97. Rather, our decision today was fore shadowe d by the plain languag e of section 5-106. We simply adher e to the leg islative int en t expressed in section 5-106, whic h require s this result. See Tosado , 188 I ll. 2d at 197. ¶ 33 Be cause establishing a new principle of law is a threshold require ment for limit ing a new decision to only prospec tive application, and beca use our decision today does not cross that threshold, we have no need to consider the addit i o n al t wo fac tors. See Heastie v. Roberts
, 226 I ll. 2d 515, 536-37 (2007). ¶ 34 In light of the above holdings, we need not addre ss defe ndants’ alternative reque st for a new tria l solely

on the issue of damag es.

¶ 35 C. W illful and Wanton Conduct ¶ 36 In the event of the above holdings, plaintiff seeks cross-r elief. The circ uit court dire cted

a verdic t in favor of defe ndants on plaintiff’s claim of willful and wanton conduct. Plaintiff contends that this issue should have been submitt ed to a jury

. Although motions for direc ted verdic ts and motions for judgme nts n

. o

. v. are made at differ ent times, they raise the same questions and are gove rned b y t h e s ame rules of l aw. Maple v. Gustafson
, 151 I ll. 2d 445, 453 n.1 (1992); Pedrick, 37 I ll. 2d at 498-99. ¶ 37 The following evidenc e was adduce d in plaintiff’s case in chief

. Consist ent with Pedrick
, we have taken car e to include all arguably rele vant evidenc e that is even marg inally favor able
to plaintiff. S ee Evans v. Shannon
, 201 I ll. 2d 424, 428 (2002). Base d on pri o r emerg ency response s, Thompson estimated the trave l time from the hospital to the nursing home at five minutes. Thompson beg an his drive to the nu rsi ng home with siren and emer g ency lights activate d. The siren was continuously activate d when Thompson left the hospital, took J on Street to U.S. Route 45 (Tenth Street), and drove east to Fe rry Street, which he took to Ninth Street. Howeve r, once Thompson turned onto Ninth Street and proce eded east, he turned off the siren and activate d it only as he approa ched ever y intersec tion f

rom approximately 100
to 150 fee t awa

y

. This continued for the approximately six blocks up to and including Butler Road. Thompson testified that as he approa ched Butler Road: “I hit a couple of quick blasts befor e I came up to the intersec tion.” Thompson believed that it was within his discretion as driver to use the siren.

-9-¶ 38 Also, as Thompson pr ocee ded east on Ninth Stre et, he did not make a complete stop at

all intersec tions, including those with s t o p signs. Rather, Thompson slowed down at eac h intersec tion. He stopped if an intersec tion was not clea r. Howeve r, he d id not come to a complete stop if an intersec tion was clea r. The intersec tion of Ninth Street and Butler Road is controlled by a st op sign on N inth St ree t. Drivers on Ninth Street are required to stop at the intersec tion, but drivers on Butler Road are not require d to stop. Thompson did not make

a complete stop at the stop sign at Butler Road. Rather, Thompson ease d into the intersec tion with his foot on the brake t o make a complete stop if nece ssary

. Tree s on the corner to his left obstructed his view, so Thompson had to proce ed past the point of the stop sign to look both way s. He saw

no oncomingvehicles. ¶ 39 Thompso n es t i m ated his speed at 10 miles per hour. Howeve r, Vashi, who was sitt ing in the front passe ng er se at of the Har ris vehicle, testified that she saw the ambulance prior
to the impact: “He [Thomps on] was coming very quickly

. I would say 40-plus miles an hour. I t was just very

quickly , beca

use it was just like a strea k of lig ht.” ¶ 40 At the close of plaintiff’s case , defe ndants moved for a d i re ct ed verdic t on plaintiff’s claim of willful and wanton conduct. The circ uit court enter ed a direc ted verdic t in favor of defe ndants. Plaintiff filed a cross-a ppeal from the direc ted verdic t. The appellate court held that its aff irmance of the judgme nt on the neg lige nce count rende red plaintiff’s cross-a ppeal
moot. No. 5-09-0625 (unpubli s h e d o r d e r u n d e r Su preme Court Rule 23). Seeking cross-r elief befor e this cou rt , plaintiff contends that there was sufficie nt evidenc e from which a jury could find willful and wa nton conduct. ¶ 41 Section 1-210 of the Tort Immunity Act define s willful and wanton conduct as follows:

“ ‘W illful and wa

nton conduct’ a s used in this Act means a course of action which shows an actua l or deliberate intention to cause harm o r wh i ch
, i f not intentional, shows an utter indiffer ence to or conscious disreg ard for the safe ty of others or their
proper ty

. This definition shall apply in any case wher e a ‘willful and wanton’ exception is incorpora

ted into any immunit y under this Act.” 745 I L C S 10/1-210 (West 2002). The term “willful and wanton” i ncludes a rang e of mental states, fr om actua l or deliberate intent to cause harm, to conscious disreg ard for the safe ty of others or their proper ty , to utter indiffer ence for the safe ty or property of ot hers. Murray v. Chic a g o Y outh Center
, 224 I ll. 2d 213, 235 (2007). Fur ther, this definition of willful and wanton conduct is entirely consistent with this court’s long-sta nding c ase la

w. Id. at 235-42; ac cord Pfister v. Shusta
, 167 I ll. 2d 417, 421 (1995); I llinois Pattern J ury Instructions, Civil
, No. 14.01 (3d ed. 1993). Whether conduct is willful and wanton depends on the circ umstances of eac h case

. Murray
, 224 I ll. 2d at 238. ¶ 42 Although the issue of willfu l an d wa n ton conduct is usually a question of fac t for the jury
, a verdic t may be direc ted on this issue if the evidenc e, viewed in its light most favor able
to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favor s the movant that no contra ry verdic t based on that evidenc e could ever stand. See Pedrick
, 37 I ll. 2d at 510; St a mat v. Merry
, 78 I ll. App. 3d 445, 449-50 (1979) ; Lewandowski v. Bakey
, 32 I ll. App. 3d 26, 29 (1975). Our standard of revie w is de novo

. Evans , 201 I ll. 2d at 427.

-10-¶ 43 I n re s p o n se to defe ndants’ motion for a direc ted verdic t, plaint i ff co n ce d ed t h at

Thompson did not intend to harm p l ai n t iff. Rather, plaintiff contende d that Thompson exhibi ted a conscious dis re gar d fo r the safe ty of others. The circ uit court found that Thompson did not act with utter i ndiffer ence to, or a c onscious disreg ard f or, the safety of others. We agree with the circ uit court on this issue. ¶ 44 The jury found that Thompson’s conduct was n egl i gen t

. Al though the siren was not conti n u o u sly activate d, the failure to activate emer g ency equipment does not by itself constitute wil l ful and wanton conduct. W illiams v. C ity of Evanston
, 378 I ll. App. 3d 590, 600 (2007). The evidenc e, viewed i n the l ight most favor able to plaintiff, shows that at all times Thompson had his emer g ency lights activate d. Fur ther, approa ching ever

y intersec tion

on Ninth Street, including the intersec tion at Butler Road, Thompson blasted his siren from approximately 100 fee t awa y , and slowed down and looked for traff ic. This conduct falls far short of establishi ng that Thompson consciously disreg arde d, or wa s utterly indiffer ent t o, the safe ty of others. ¶ 45 As additional evidenc e of willful and want o n co n du ct , p l ai n t i ff re fe rs to Vashi’s testimony that Thompson enter ed the intersec tion driving in excess of 40 miles per hour. The circ uit court may not enter a direc ted verdic t “if t h ere is any evidenc e, toge ther with

rea sonable infere nces to be drawn there from, demonstrating a substantial fac tual dispute, or wher e the assessment of cre dibilit y of the witnesses or the deter mination reg arding conflicting evidenc e is decisive to the outcome.” Maple
, 151 I ll. 2d at 454. Howeve r, driving
at an excessive rate of speed alone is not decisive as to the issue of willful and want o n conduct. Rather, speed is only a single circ umstance in the totality of the evidenc e prese nted
to establish willful and wa nton conduct. Bartolucci v. Falleti , 382 I ll. 168, 175-76 (1943);

see Murphy v. Vodden
, 109 I ll. App. 2d 141, 149-50 (1969). Courts have held that althoug h

emer g ency vehicle drivers enter ed intersec tions at excessive speeds, the t o t al i t y o f the circ umstances nonetheless failed to show that the dri v er s co n sciously disreg arde d or were utterly indi ff

er en t to the safe ty of others. See, e.g. , Hampton
, 265 I ll. App. 3d at 31 (ambulanc e); B o s en v. City of Colli nsville
, 166 I ll. App. 3d 848, 850 (1987) (police) ; Lipscomb v. Lewis , 619 N.E.2d 102, 105-06 ( Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (ambulanc e). ¶ 46 I f t here is insu fficient evidenc e to sustain an allega tion of wil lful and wanton conduct, the circ uit court oug ht to withdraw that issue from the jury ’s consideration. Robertson v. New Y ork Central R.R. Co.
, 388 I ll. 580, 586 (1944); Bartolucci , 382 I ll. at 176. After car efully revie wing the rec ord, we uphold the circ uit court’s direc ted verdic t in favor of defe ndants on plaintiff’s willful and wanton count. Howeve r, beca use the circ uit court err oneously denied defe ndants’ motion for a judg ment n.o.v. , we r ever se its judgment in fa vor of plaintiff.

¶ 47 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 48 Fo r t h e fo re go i ng rea sons, the judgme nt of the appellate court is reve rsed an d t h e judgme nt of the circ uit court of Massa c County is affirme d in part and r ever sed in part.

¶ 49 Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed. ¶ 50 Circuit court judg ment aff irmed in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t.

-11-¶ 51 CHI EF JUSTI CE KI L BRI DE, dissenting :

¶ 52 I believe that the trial and appellate courts’ respe ctive judgme nts, r elying on Bradshaw

v. City of Metropolis
, 293 I ll. App. 3d 389 (1997), wer e corr ect and should be aff irmed. Acc ording ly , Irespe ctfully dissent. ¶ 53 At issue in this case is the proper construction of the respe cti v e p ro visions of the Tort Immunity Act and the Ve h i cl e C ode perta ining to the operation of emer g ency vehicles. Sections 11-205 and 11-907 of the Vehicle Code impose a duty o n emer g ency vehicle
operators to operate their vehicles with “due reg ard for the safe ty of all persons.” 625 I L CS 5/11-205(e)
, 11-907(b) (West 2002). Moreove r, in pertinent part, section 11-205 authorizes

emer g ency vehicle operators to “[p] roce ed past a red or s t o p signa l or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be required and nece ssary for safe operation ,” and to “[e]x cee d the maxi mum speed lim i t s so long as he does not endanger life or property .” (Emphase s added.) 625 I L CS 5/11-205(c) (West 2002). Sect i o n 11-205 further require s emer g ency vehicles, when not observing usual rules of road use, to employ an “audible signa l when in

m otion or visual signa ls.” 625 I L CS 5/11-205(d) (West 2002). Consist ent wi t h t h es e provisions, our appellate court has construed sections 11-205 and 11- 907 to impose a duty

on emer g ency vehicle drivers to ref rain from neg lige nce. Carter v. Du Page County Sheriff
, 304 I ll. App. 3d 443, 448 (1999) (citing Bradshaw
, 293 I ll. App. 3d at 395); see also Sundin v. Hughe s , 107 I ll. App. 2d 195, 200 (1969). ¶ 54 Nonethele ss, section 5-106 of the Tort Immunity Act provide s as follows: “Except for willful or wanton conduct, neither a local public en t i t y , nor a public employ ee acting within the s cope of his employ ment, is liable for an inj ury cause d by the neg lige nt operation of a motor vehicle or firef ighting or resc ue equipment, when responding to an emer g ency call, including transporta tion of a person to a medical f acility .” 745 I L CS 10/ 5-106 (West 2002). Thus, in sta

rk contra st w ith the provisions of the Vehicle Code discussed above, section 5- 1 06 of t he Tort Immunity Act im muniz es emerg ency vehicle opera tors from the n egl i gen t operation of their vehicle s. ¶ 55 In my opinion, this i s an o b v i o u s an d u n d en i able conflict betwee n the re spective provisi o n s o f t he Vehicle Code and the Tort Immunity Act addre ssing the opera tion of

emer g ency vehicles. Con s eq u entl y , I disagree with the majority ’s deter mination that the statutes do not conflict. ¶ 56 The majo rity rea sons that there is no conflict between the statutes beca use t he Ve hicle Code and the To rt I mmunity Act eac h stands “in its own sphere ” and “the statutes eac h addre ss differ ent actor s under differ ent circ umstances.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Supra ¶ 24. The majority ’s conclusion, howeve r, is not supported by the undisputed fac ts of this case

. Specifica lly
, there is no question that the defe ndant driver of the emer g ency vehicle in this case was operating an authorized emer g ency vehicle in response to an emer g ency call
at t he ti me of his traff

ic accident with plaintiff’s vehicle. These fac ts involve both statutes at issue in this case beca

use it implicates the duty of emer g ency vehicle opera tors to ref rain from neg lige nce found in the Vehicle Code and the immunit y from neg lige nce gra n t ed to

-12-those same actor s by the Tort Immunity Act. Thus, contra ry to the majority ’s conclusion, this

case prese nts a scena

rio wher e the sphere s, actor s, and circ umstances overla p. Simpl y stated, the Vehicle Code’s clea

r and unambiguous impos i t i on of a duty to operate an emer g ency

v eh i cle with “due reg ard to the safe ty of all persons” cannot be rec onciled with t h e T o rt Imm u n ity Act’s blanket immunit y aff orded to emer g ency vehicle operators ag ainst claims of neg lige nce. ¶ 57 When, as here
, there are appar ent conflicts betwee n two statutes, this court will attempt to construe them toge ther, in pari materia , if such an inter pretation is reasonable

. Abruzzo

v. City of Park Ridge
, 231 I ll. 2d 324, 3 32 (2008). As in all case s involving statutory interpre tation, howeve r, leg islative intent is the most important consideration. Abruzzo
, 231 I ll. 2d at 332. Ultimately
, “[w]hen a gen er al statutory provision and a more specific one relat e t o t h e same subject, we will presume that the leg islature intended the more specific
statute to g overn.” Abruzzo
, 231 I ll. 2d at 346; see also Moore v. Gree n , 219 I ll. 2d 470, 480 (2006) ( citing Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harm s , 202 I ll. 2d 450, 459 (2002)). ¶ 58 Her e, the provisions of the Ve h i cl e C o d e i m p o s i n g a duty on emer g ency vehicle
operators to re fr ai n from neg lige nce cannot be rea sonably construed toge ther with the provisions of the Tort Immunity Act g ranting i m m u n ity from neg lige nce for emer g ency vehicle opera

tors. Moreove r, the Vehicle Code is much more specific than the Tort Immunity Act on emer g ency vehicles. For example, while the Tort Immunity Act g ener ally ref ere nces

emer g ency vehicles i n t h e co n t ex t of immunit y , the Vehicle Code details a varie ty of exemptions from the normal road rules, including permitting emer g ency vehicles to proce ed past a stop sign or signa l after s l o wi n g down as may be require d and nece ssary for safe
operation, exceeding the posted speed limit so long as no life or proper ty is endang ere d, and employing audible or visual signa ls when in motion. 625 I L CS 5/11-205(c)
, (d) (West 2002). The Vehicle Code also expressly imposes a duty on emer g ency vehicles to operate with “due
reg ard for the safe ty of all persons.” 625 I L CS 5/11-205(e)
, 11-907(b) (West 2002). In

acc orda n ce wi t h t h e clea r leg islative intent in the Vehicle Code to impose a duty on

emer g ency veh i cle opera tors to ref

rain from neg lige nce, I believe, as the lower courts simil arly conclude d, that the Vehicle Code’s specific provisions detailing the duty and obligation of emergen cy v ehicle operators to the public should control over the g ener al immunit y contained in the Tort Immunity Act. See, e.g. , Abruzzo
, 231 I ll. 2d at 3 4 6

. For these rea sons, I believe that the judgme nts of the trial and appellate courts sh ould be aff irmed.

-13-