### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 3, 200 7

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. WILLIE P AU L WA TSON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Dyer County

No. C05-126 Lee Moore , Judge

No. W2007-00209-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Novem ber 1, 2007

The a ppellant, Will ie Paul Watson, was convicted by a jury in the Dy er County Circuit Court of two

c ounts of a ssa

ult , an d he re c e ive d a tota l ef fe c tiv e se nte nc e of e le ve n mo nth s a nd tw e nty -n ine da

y s, suspended a fter se rvice of ninety day s. On appeal, t he appellant argues t hat t he trial c ourt should not have r equire d him to serve nin et y d ay s o f his sentence . Upon our re view of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, w e af

firm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uitCo ur t a r e Affir m e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J
., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

J ames E. L anier

(on appe al) a

nd Patrick McGill (at trial a nd on appea l), Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee, f or the appe llant, Wi llie Paul W atson.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; L a c y

Wilb e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C. Phill ip Bivens, District Attorne y Gene ral; and L ance Webb, A ssistant District Attorne y Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The a ppellant was orig inally

char g ed with the ag g ravated assault of G era ldine Maupin and the a ssa ult of Che ry l D ild ine ; how e ve r, fo llo wi ng tr ia l, the a pp e lla nt wa s con vic te d of two c ounts of a ssa ult , a Cla ss Amis de me a no r. Al tho ug h th e tr ia l tr a ns c ri pt w a s n ot i nc lud e d in the a pp e llate

rec ord, at the se ntencing hear ing the trial court stated that during the assault Maupin was hit with a bo ttl e of be e r. Th e State re c ounte d th a t

Ms. Dildine, a lady about half his si ze was assa ulted on the throat a

nd chest[] are a. . . . B oth of these ladie s were beaten to the point that-2- they lost consciousness. Ms. Ma upin ha d g lass imbedded in he r hea d and in her

arm, a nd to this day , if y ou wi l l re m ember , she still has

scar s that relate[] to this incident.

. . . He smashe d a bottle ac ross one victim’s head, totally

to unc onsciousness. He stomped on the other lady ’s che st and throat until she was unc onscious, so Is ay he wa s pr e tty luc k[y ] an d s o [w e re ] the y . Bo th o f t he m c ou ld h a ve die d a s a result of this.

At the se nte nc inghe a ri ng , M a upin testif

ie d th a t a s a

re su lt o f t

he a ssa ult sh e c on tin

ue s to have pr oblems with her voice . She said that althoug h she was outgoing prior to the assault, she has become less sociable. Ma upin also said that her mother, Dildine, has bec ome “ve ry , very hermit like now” a nd is very reluc tant to leave he r house. Maupin explained that Dildine “shake s and her nerve s
are pretty shot. That’s why

she is very anti-social.” Maupin asser ted that she believe d the appe llant sh ou ld g e t the “ fu ll pe na lty” fo r his c ri me s a nd that sh e be lie ve d the a pp e lla nt ne e ded emo tiona l,

so c ia l, a nd dr ugc ouns e lin g . M a

up in s a id t

hat sh e ha d met the a

pp e lla nt a fe w t ime s o ve r t

he y e a rs , and he ha d n e ve r b e have d lik e he did duri ngthe a ssa

ult . M a up in s ta te d th a t in sura

nc e c ov e re d a ll of the e x penses r elating to the assault except an ambulance bill for $578.

The State pre sented proof of the a ppellant’s prior c onvictions: p o s s es s i on of coc aine, possession of marijuana , and contr ibuting to the delinquenc y of a minor.

The a ppellant made a

n allocution at the sentenc ing hear ing, saying that he wa s sorry about the “a ccide nt” and about “losing my temper like I did.” The appellant also said that he was willing to pay Maupin’s ambulanc e bill. The appe llant maintained that the drug s involved in his previous conviction wer e not his; he had mer ely boug ht them for “this other g irl.” The c ourt asked the appellant, “ Are y ou telling me that none of the pr ior cha rg es are y ou actua lly

g uilty ? ” The appellant responde d, “No.”

The a ppell an t s t at ed t h at he doe s not drink or g o to clubs beca use he is beingtreated for dia be te s. He sa id t

hat hi s w if

e le ft the ir so n w iththe a

pp e lla nt wh e n the so n wa s a y e a r a nd a ha lf old. The appe llant maintained that he wa s the sole support of the household and that if he wa s not working then he wa s home with his son.

At the conclusion of t he sentencing hear ing, the court found that two enhanc ement fa ctors applied t o t h e appellant. F irst, the court found that the appellant ha d a history of prior c riminal convictions. Second, the court found that the of fense s were committed under c ircumstance s where the risk for bodily injury was gre at. The court noted t hat t he appellant “take [s] the s ame position on

a ll [h is] c ha

rg e s, ” name ly

he de nie s g uil t. T he c ourt state d th a t th e a

pp e lla nt d oe s n ot

accept r e sp on sib ili ty

fo r a ny thi ng . Y our d e fe ns e in t his c a se a s I

re c a ll w a s se lf

de fe ns e , a

nd Mr . Wa tso n, thi s [is ] not a c a se of s e lf defe nse. This was a

case for some r ea s o n , we m ay not know the pa rt ic ula r r e a so n, y ou

tot a lly los t y our t e mpe r a

nd y ou po pp e d th is-3- g irl – one lady

with a bottle and did hit Ms. D ildine in the neck or on the c he st w ithy our f

e e t.

The c ourt found that alter native sente ncing was not appropr iate, larg ely beca use the a ppellant was not willing to acc ept responsibil ity for his actions. The court said, “Reha bilitation does not appear to [ be] something that y ou will be particula rly succe ssful with.”

For the assault of Ma

upin, the tr i al co u rt s entenced the a ppellant to eleve n months and twenty -nine da

y s, with the sentence suspended a fter serv i ce o f ninety day s. For the assault of Dildine, the trial cour

t sent ence d the appe llant to six months, with t he sente nce suspe nded af ter service of six ty

day s. The trial c ourt furthe r orde red that the sentenc es be se rved c oncurr ently for

a tot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

e le ve n mo nth s a

nd tw e nty -n ine da

y s, su sp e nd e d a ft e r n ine ty da y s.

On a pp e a l, t he a pp e lla nt “ c on te nd s th a t he wa s arb itr a ri ly se nte nc e d to an e ff

e c tiv e nin e ty day s and that the sentenc e was excessive under the circ umstances.” The a ppellant claims that the court fa iled to consider that he had apolog ized f or the off enses a nd that he wa s a sing le par ent who was the “ sole provider

for his son.” The appell an t ar gues that “the court should have fashioned a

reme dy that would allow the [appellant] to maintain a job and car e for his son.”

II. Ana lys is

App e ll a te r e v ie w o f th e le n g th
, r a n g e o r ma n n e r o f s e r

v ic e o f a s e n te n c e is de novo. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2006). I n conducting its de novo revie w, this court consider s the following fac tors: (1) the e v i d ence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the se ntencing hear ing; ( 2) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; ( 3) the pr inc ipl e s of se nte nc ing a nd a rgume nts a s to s e nte nc inga lte rn a tiv e s; (4) the nature a

nd char acte ristics of the cr iminal conduct involved; (5) ev i d ence and information of fe re d b y the pa rt ie s o n e nh a nc e me nt a

nd mit ig a tin g fa c tor s; ( 6) a ny state me nt by

the a pp e lla nt i n his own behalf; a

nd (7) the pote ntial for re habilitation or treatment. See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 10 2, -1 03 , - 21 0 ( 20 06 ); se e a lso State v. As hb y , 8 23 S.W. 2d 16 6, 16 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . T he burd e n is on the appe llant to demonstrate the improprie ty of his sentenc e(s) . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401, Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments. Moreove r, if the r ecor d reve al s t h at the trial c ourt

a de qu a te ly

c on sid e re d s e nte nc ingpr inc ipl e s a nd a ll r e le va nt f a c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s, thi s c ourt wi ll

acc ord the trial court’s deter minations a

presumption of cor

rec tness. I d. at (d); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. Howe ver, in sentenc ing on misdemeanor convictions, the “trial court need onl y consider the principles of se ntencing and e n h an ceme nt and mitigating fac tors in order to c omply with the leg islative mandates of

the misdemeanor sentenc ing statute.” State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tenn. 1998)

. Assault, as cha

rg ed in the instant ca se, i s a C lass A m isdemeanor

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 101(a) (3) a

nd (b) ( 2006). Ge nera lly
, a mi sdemea nant is not entitled to a presumptive minimum sentenc e. S ee State v. Cre asy , 885 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . An individual convicted of a Class A misdemeanor may rec eive a statutory maxi mum se ntence of eleve n months and twenty -nine da

y s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-111( e)( 1) (2006). The appe llant does not argue-4-

that the l eng th of the sentenc es we re imprope r. Instead, the a ppellant ar g ues that his “ninety day

se nte nc e ” wa s arb itr a ry

a nd un fa ir ; in oth e r w or ds , th e a

pp e lla nt es se nti a lly c on te nd s tha t he sh ou ld have r ece ived full probation.

The trial c ourt has the a

uthority to place a misdemeana

nt on probation either a fter se rvice of a portion of the se ntence in confineme nt or immediately afte r sentencing

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 302(e) (1)( 2) (2006) . Howeve r, we note that, wh i l e certain Class C, D, or E off ender s are entitled to a pre s u m p t i o n i n favor of probation, an offe nder is entitled to no such pre sumption reg arding misdemeanor se ntence s. See State v. Willi a ms , 914 S.W .2d 940, 949 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Our supreme c ourt has obser

ved that “[i] n addition to the statutory considerations for issuing sente nces of confine ment, the misdemeanor sentenc ing statute mere ly require s a trial judge to co n sider

e nh anc e me nt a nd mit ig a tin g fa c tor s wh e n c a lc ulatin g the pe rc e nta g e of a mis de me a no r s e nte nc e to be ser ved in conf

inement.” Tr outman, 979 S.W .2d at 274.

I n the ins t an t ca s e, the trial court imposed a sente nce of split confinement, which is an alternative sentenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-306(a ) (2 0 0 6 ); S t ate v. Williams, 52 S .W.3d 10 9, 12 0 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ). Ho we ve r, “ [t]he de termi nat io n of w he the r t he a pp e lla nt i s entitled to a

n alternative sentenc e and whe ther the a ppellant is entitled to full probation are differ ent inquiries.” State v. B og g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). There fore , an appe llant

se e kin g fu ll p ro batio n b e a rs the burd e n o f e sta bli sh inghis su ita

bil ity fo r f ull pr ob a tio n, re g a rd le ss of whe ther he is entitled to the statutory presumption favor ing alternative sentenc ing. I d.; se e a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-303(b) (2006). To prove his suitabili ty , the appe llant must establish t hat g ranting full probation wil l “‘subse rve the ends of justice and the best interest of both the public and the [appellant].’” State v. Dy kes, 803 S.W .2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) , overr uled on other g rounds by State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1 (Tenn. 2000) . Moreove r,

[i ]n determ i ning one ’s suitability for f ull probation, the court may consider the circ umstances of the offe nse, the [appellant’s] potential

or la c k o f p ote nti a l f

or re ha bil itati on , w he the r f

ull pr ob a tio n w ill unduly depre ciate the seri ousness of the of fense , and whe ther a sentenc e o ther than f

ull probation would provide an e ffe ctive deter rent to others likely

to commit si milar crimes.

Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d at 477.

I nit ia lly , w e no te that alt ho ug h th e a pp e lla nt c on te nd s o n a

pp e a l “ that he wa s arb itr a ri ly sentenc ed to an e ffe ctive ninety day s and that the sente nce w as excessive unde r the c ircumstance s,” the a pp e lla nt f a ile d to inc lud e the tr ia l trans c ri pt wit h the a pp e llate re c or d. Th is c ourt ha s p re vio us ly

e xpla ine d th a t

a par

ty complaining about a sentence has t he burden of esta blishing that the trial cour

t imposed an improper one . I n this respec t, failure to i nc lud e a

tr a ns c ri pt o f t

he tr ia l make s it

imp os sibl e for us to-5- c on du c t an a

pp ro pr ia te de no vo c on si dera tion o f t he c a se or

to deter mine whether

the trial cour

t erre d relative to its dete rminations which we re ba sed in any

part on that e vidence

. State v. Hay es, 894 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Reg ardle ss, we are able, base d upon the limited recor d befor e us, to addre ss the appellant’ s conce rn.

I n the instant case , the appe llant contends on appe al that the trial court fa iled to consider that he had apo l og ized for the off enses a nd that he wa s a sing le par ent who wa s the “sole pr ovider for his son.” The appellant maintains that “the c ourt should have f ashioned a

reme dy that would allow the [appellant] to m aintain a job and c are for his son.” All of the fore g oing a rg uments were made at t he sentencing hear ing. Howeve r, t he trial court found that the appellant did not ac cept guilt for his crimes, esse ntially

disbelieving the appellant’s claim of remorse . Moreove r, the c ourt noted that the appe llant’s v er s ion of eve nts was incre dulous. Failure to acc ept re sponsibili ty is a g erma

ne consideration for deter

mining re habilitative potential. State v. Z eolia, 928 S.W .2d 457, 463 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). Th e c ou rt deter min e d r e ha

bil itatio n w ou ld l ike ly

be un su c c e ssf

ul, wh ic h is a valid conce rn in deter

mining whether

full probation is appropr iate. B ased upon the rec ord bef ore us, we c onclude that the tr ial court did not err in refusingto gr ant full probation.

III. Conclusi on
Finding no err or, we aff

irm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGL E, J UDGE