NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ALEX JOSE TEJEDA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-30103 

D.C. No. 

3:15-cr-00066-TMB-SAO-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 9, 2022

Anchorage, Alaska

Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

Alex Jose Tejeda appeals the district court’s judgment sentencing him to a 

term of 140 months imprisonment followed by eight years of supervised release for 

the distribution of heroin. He argues that the district court erred by failing to 

vacate his conviction for distribution following the vacatur of his conviction for 

conspiracy. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

AUG 23 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Although the reversal of Tejeda’s conspiracy conviction “precludes the 

imposition of vicarious liability upon” Tejeda for the acts of his alleged coconspirator, United States v. Kaiser, 660 F.2d 724, 732 (9th Cir. 1981), Tejeda did 

not ask the district court to vacate his distribution conviction, and we therefore 

review only for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(d). “[T]he language of Rule 52(b) 

is permissive, not mandatory. . . .” United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1159 

(9th Cir. 2006). Even if error is plain and affects substantial rights, reversal for 

plain error is only appropriate where the error “seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (brackets and citation omitted). In determining whether this 

“final, discretionary prong” shows that the error “warrant[s] correction,” “we 

consider all circumstances at trial including the strength of the evidence against the 

defendant.” United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 847–48 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc) (citation omitted).

We decline to exercise our discretion to reverse Tejeda’s conviction on plain 

error review because the error, if any, did not “seriously affect the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 

(citation omitted). We have considered all the relevant circumstances, including 

the protracted and unusual procedural history of this case and the evidence 

presented at trial. We conclude that “the government’s ‘strong and convincing 
3 

evidence’ demonstrate[s] that a different decision by the jury would be ‘extremely 

unlikely.’” Alferahin, 433 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Perez, 116 F.3d at 848). Laura 

Johnson testified that she asked Tejeda to bring her heroin and he agreed to do so. 

This testimony is supported by Tejeda’s phone records, which show that he agreed 

to bring over “blk,” a coded reference to heroin. Police officers saw Tejeda arrive 

at Johnson’s apartment soon thereafter carrying a black gym bag, and Johnson

testified at trial that Tejeda said he left heroin in her bedroom. Police later 

recovered heroin from Johnson’s apartment and from the scene of Tejeda’s arrest. 

At this point, “the greater threat to the integrity and fairness of judicial proceedings 

would arise from the reversal of a conviction on flawed jury instructions rather 

than from affirming an imperfect verdict.” Id.

AFFIRMED.