UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ MERCEDES VIDANA VIDANA, Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 20-9614 (Petition for Review)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , KELLY , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Petitioner Mercedes Vidana Vidana filed applications for asylum, restriction on removal, 1 and protection under the Conventi on Against Torture (CAT). An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Restriction on removal used to be called “withholding of removal.” Neri-Garcia v. Holder , 696 F.3d 1003, 1006 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 14, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 12 dismissed her appeal of the IJ ’s order. She now seeks re view of the BIA’s order. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the petition for review.
BACKGROUND Petitioner first entered the United States illegally in 1999, without inspection. About twenty years later, sh e returned to Mexico with her United States citizen husband for a consular inte rview based on a visa appli cation he had filed on her behalf. At the interview, she admitted she and her husb and had paid a smuggler for her and her son to cross into the United States. As a resu lt, the officer told her she would need to obtain a waiver of inadmi ssibility. After the interview, Petitioner spoke to a person who said he was an attorn ey associated with the hotel in Juarez, Mexico, where she and her husband were stay ing. They gave him a $10,000 fee and documentation he said he needed to file the waiver application. Petitioner’s husband returned to the United States, and she went to Vera Cruz, Mexico to visit her mother. While ther e, cartel members who had previously threatened to kill her if she did not pay $50,000 ransom for he r son saw her arrive and left a note demanding the money. She went back to the hotel in Juarez to wait for the waiver. The cartel returned to th e mother’s house twice to look for Petitioner. Petitioner did not report these events to Mexican law enforcement. When Petitioner asked hotel representa tives for a receip t for the waiver application, she learned that the hotel was associated with a cartel (a di fferent cartel than the one that attempted to extort her in Vera Cruz), that no waiver application had been filed, and that she ha d to pay the cartel $1500 per month. Petitioner reported Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 23 these incidents to police. An officer said he would prepare a line-up for her to identify the perpetrators, but questioned whet her she wanted to make a report against the cartel, explaining that the police coul d “not guarantee[]” her safety because “these people are out of cont rol.” Admin. R., vol. I at 165. The officer advised her that “another option [was to] just flee” be cause “these people [are] going to end up killing you.” Id. She “tore up the report.” Id. at 166. Petitioner returned to the hotel and worked to pay the $1500 monthly extortion. She complied with the cartel’s demands because she was afraid that if she did not cooperate it would go after her fami ly. After several months, the power went off in her room. She thought the cartel was looking for her, so she hid under the bed. Two men, one of whom she recognized as the man who took he r $10,000 for the waiver application, came in th e room but left after remarki ng that she was not there. Petitioner fled to Tijuana, where her a unt lived. She could not remember her aunt’s address, so she went to a hotel. A man at the hot el said he knew she was not from there and told her to leav e because the hotel was run by the cartel. She went to a nearby restaurant where another man sat next to her and “said, I need you to follow me. It’s your choice. If you want to do it the hard way or the easy way.” Id. at 171. The man took her to a store where carte l members told her they were going to use her as a prostitute acr oss the border. They took her picture and prepared documents for her to use to cross the borde r. One of them “took out a weapon,” and they threatened to kill her if she resisted. Id. at 172. Two men eventually drove her to the border and directed her to a t unnel where they said she would find the Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 34 immigration officials th ey had “paid off.” Id. at 172-73. She ran and the men followed her. When she approached borde r officials and gave them the passport prepared by the cartel, th ey said she was not the person on the passport and handcuffed her. Once in another room, Pe titioner gave the offi cers information about her true identity and told them she had b een kidnapped. She recognized one of the United States Border Patrol agents in the room as “one of the kidnappers.” Id. at 175. She told the officers the men who took her to the border were “trafficking people,” “making women prostitute th emselves,” and “killing women.” Id. The man she recognized as one of the kidnappers told her to “shut up” and accused her of being a criminal. Id. at 175-76. Notwithstanding the kidnapper’s accusation, an asylum officer interviewed her and found she had a credible fear of re turning to Mexico. The Department of Homeland Security placed her in rem oval proceedings, charging her with removability as an individual not in possession of valid trav el or entry documents and as an individual who falsely represented herself as a Un ited States citizen for the purpose of obtaining an immigr ation benefit. After she admitted removability, the IJ sustained the first charge and held the sec ond in abeyance. Petitioner then filed her applications for asylum, rest riction on removal, and CAT protection. She alleged she was afraid that if she return s to Mexico, she will be targ eted and eventually killed by the men who threatened her previously, a nd she asserted that Mexican police cannot protect her and are largely corrupt. Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 45 The IJ found Petitioner credible but conc luded she did not qualify for asylum, restriction on removal, or CA T relief. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s order and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal.
DISCUSSION When, as here, a three-member panel re views the IJ decision, “the BIA opinion completely super[s]edes the IJ decision for purposes of our review.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales , 443 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10t h Cir. 2006). We review the BIA’s legal decisions de novo and its findings of fact under a substantial-evidence standard. Rodas-Orellana v. Holder , 780 F.3d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 2015). Under that standard, its “findings [are] conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion.” Aguilar v. Garland , 29 F.4th 1208, 12 11 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Asylum An applicant is eligible fo r asylum if she is a “ref ugee” within the meaning of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). An appli cant qualifies as a refugee if she is unable or unwilling to return to her country of nationality because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of” any of five protected grounds, including “membership in a particular social group.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). The applicant “bear[s] the burden of pe rsuasion and must pr ovide direct or circumstantial evidence of the persecutors’ motives.” Orellana-Reci nos v. Garland , 993 F.3d 851, 855 (10th Ci r. 2021) (internal citation omitted). Persecution is on account of a protected ground if the ground “was or will be at least one central reason Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 56 for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The Board has interpreted “‘one central reason’ to mean the protected ground cannot play a minor role in the alien’s past mistreatment or fears of future mistreatment.” Karki v. Holder , 715 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to satisfy the nexus requirement, the applicant must show that her past or feared future persecution is because of th e protected status and that the protected ground is not “incidental, ta ngential, superficial, or s ubordinate to” some other, unprotected reason for harm. Orellana-Recinos , 993 F.3d at 855 (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA has emphasized that “it is im portant to distinguish between the inquiry into whether a group is” a cognizabl e particular social group (PSG) and the “question whether a person is persecuted ‘on account of’ membership in a [PSG].” Matter of M-E-V-G- , 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (B.I.A. 2014). In other words, the existence of a social group and a nexus betw een that group and th e petitioner’s claim of persecution are independe nt requirements that the BIA assesses separately. Id. And because an applicant mu st satisfy both requirements to make a cognizable claim for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), he r failure to satisfy eith er is dispositive. Here, Petitioner’s asylum and restricti on on removal applications alleged that she suffered past persecution in Mexico and is likely to suffer future persecution if she returns to Mexico based on her membersh ip in one of three proposed PSGs that she defined as (1) Mexican women who are trafficked for prosti tution; (2) Mexican women who are by themselves; and (3) retu rning Mexicans with relatives in the Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 67 United States. The IJ denied her applicat ions, concluding she di d not establish past persecution and could not show a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground both because her proposed PSGs were not cognizable and because she did not establ ish a nexus between the ha rm she suffered and her membership in those groups. In support of the latter conclu sion, the IJ found that the people who victimized her were criminals motivated by greed, not by her gender, her aloneness, or the fact that sh e has American relatives. The BIA agreed that Petitioner’s propos ed groups are not cognizable because they are impermissibly defined by the fact of persecution (the first group) or lack the requisite particularity and social distinc tion (the second and th ird groups). And it found no clear error in the IJ’s finding regarding the reason for the cartels’ harassment of her, agreeing that she was “the victim of criminal extortion,” not persecution on account of a protected ground. Admin. R., vol. I at 4; see Matter of N-M- , 25 I. & N. Dec. 526, 532 (B.I.A. 2011) (explaining that an IJ’s finding regarding a persecutor’s motivation is a finding of fact that the BI A reviews for clear error). The BIA thus affirmed the IJ’s denial of Petitioner’s applic ations on two independ ent grounds: failure to establish her membership in a cognizable PSG, and failu re to show a nexus between her membership in her proposed groups and the persecution she suffered. When a tribunal rejects a claim on multiple independent grounds, the petitioner must challe nge each ground. Lebahn v. Nat’l Farmers Union Unif. Pension Plan , 828 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016). The failure to challenge a determination that is “by its elf, a sufficient basis for” denying relief forecloses Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 78 success on appeal. Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1994). Here, Petitioner raises several challenges to the BIA’s social-group ruling, but she does not separately challenge its determination that any harm she suffered or fears is due to criminal victimization and not on account of a protected ground. Her mention of the BIA’s nexus determination “i n passing in [the] opening brie f” is insufficient to challenge that determination. Kabba v. Mukasey , 530 F.3d 1239, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008). She has thus waived any challenge to the BIA’s dispositive nexus ruling. See
Krastev v. INS , 292 F.3d 1268, 1280 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Issues not raised on appeal are deemed to be waived.”). In any event, the record supports the BIA’s determin ation. It found no clear error in the IJ’s finding that the gangs had ordinary criminal motives for harassing Petitioner—they extorted her and attempte d to force her into prostitution because they wanted money. Petitioner points to no evidence that the ga ngs were motivated by the fact that she is Mexi can, a woman, alone, or has Am erican family members. And her evidence regarding sex trafficking of victims from different countries across the United States border, background documents descri bing organized crime and victims of cartel activity in Mexico, and a Department of State Human Rights Report describing discrimination and abuse against women in gene ral does not establish that the gangs targeted her on accoun t of a protected ground. See Orellana-Recinos , 993 F.3d at 856 (membership in a PSG “should not be considered a motive for persecution if the persecutors are simply pursuing their distinct objectives and a victim’s membership in the group is relevant only as a means to an end—that is, the Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 89 membership enables the persecu tors to effectuate their objectives”). We cannot say that a reasonable adjudicator would be compe lled to reject the BIA’s determination.
See Aguilar , 29 F.4th at 1211. Because the record supp orts the BIA’s unchallenged dispositive determination that Petitioner failed to establish a nexus between her persecution and her membership in her proposed PSGs, we need not address her challenges to its determination that those groups are not cognizable. See Lebahn , 828 F.3d at 1188 (stating that where a party argues one ground but gives the court “no basis to disturb” another of the underlying rulings, “we must affirm”); see also INS v. Bagamasbad , 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”); Griffin v. Davies , 929 F.2d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1991) (“We will not undertake to decide issues that do not affect the outcome of a dispute.”).
B. Restriction on Removal To qualify for restriction on removal, an applicant must show a “clear probability” of persecution on account of on e of the statutorily protected grounds. Rodas-Orellana , 780 F.3d at 987 (interna l quotation marks omitte d). This is a higher burden of proof than the sta ndard for asylum, which requi res the applicant to prove only that such persecution is a “reasonable possibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, Petitioner’s inability to meet the asylum burden necessarily forecloses meeting the great er restriction burden. See id. We thus deny her challenge to the BIA’s finding that she is not eligible for rest riction on removal. Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 910 C. CAT Relief The CAT “prohibits the return of an al ien to a country where it is more likely than not that he will be subject to torture by a public official, or at the instigation or with the acquiescence of such an official.” Karki , 715 F.3d at 806 (i nternal quotation marks omitted). The appli cant has the burden to estab lish her eligibility for CAT relief. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). “Acquiescence of a public official require s that the public offi cial, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent su ch activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). “[W]ill ful blindness suffices to prove acquiescence.” Karki , 715 F.3d at 806 (internal quotation marks omitte d). A government’s inability to offer complete protection does not demons trate governmental acquiescence. Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales , 447 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Ci r. 2006). Nor does general evidence of corruption and a lack of suffi cient resources for law enforcement to effectively combat crime. Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales , 406 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005). The BIA’s CAT “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Nasrallah v. Barr , 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The IJ denied Petitioner’s request fo r CAT protection, finding that the harm she suffered did not rise to the level of torture and th at there was no evidence the Mexican government was involved with her ha rmful experiences in Mexico or would acquiesce in any future torture. On ad ministrative appeal, she challenged both the Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 1011 torture and acquiescence dete rminations, but the BIA de nied her request for CAT relief solely on the ground that she failed to demonstrate the requisite state action. 2
Petitioner maintains that the Mexican government “is unable to control organized crime groups and their targeting of most vulnerable populations,” Pet’r’s Br. at 21, and that the cartels victimized her “at the instiga tion of or with the acquiescence of a public official or a pe rson acting in an official capacity,” id. at 22-23 (footnote omitted). But she presen ted no evidence supporting her assertion that the government participated in her vic timization. And the record supports the BIA’s conclusion that she failed to establis h that the government acquiesced in it. The police were willing to accept her report of threats and extortion and to engage in an investigation, but she decided not to file a report because the police could not guarantee her safety. The BIA concluded th at the warning that police may not be able to protect her if she opened an i nvestigation did not c onstitute governmental acquiescence. We find no error in that determination. See Ferry v. Gonzales , 457 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding agency’s determination that the government’s recognition of a threat and providing of a security grant used to reinforce Ferry’s property demonstrated that the government wa s not acquiescing in

2 Our review is limited to grounds relied on by the BIA. See Uanreroro , 443 F.3d at 1204. Because th e BIA did not address either whether Petitioner showed that her claims of past torture demonstrat e a clear probability of future torture or whether it is more likely than not that she will suffer harm amounting to torture if she returns to Mexico, we do not consider her ar guments that the harm she suffered in the past and will suffer if she re turns constitutes torture. Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 1112 torture). And Petitioner has identified no evidence that would compel a reasonable adjudicator to conclude that the Mexican government would acquies ce in her torture.
CONCLUSION We deny the petition for review.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 20-9614 Document: 010110710905 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 12