alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                         Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with PVC Container Corporation (the "Company") Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned officers
of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such
officer's knowledge:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods
                  expressed in the Report.

Date: November 19, 2003
                                                  s/Phillip L. Friedman
                                                  -----------------------------
                                                  Name: Phillip L. Friedman
                                                  Title: Chief Executive Officer

                                                  s/Jeffrey Shapiro
                                                  -----------------------------
                                                  Name: Jeffrey Shapiro
                                                  Title: Chief Financial Officer

         The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a
separate disclosure document.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bernard Nichols, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Appelman, J.), rendered February 23, 1988, convicting him of assault in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

*590Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention with respect to the factual sufficiency of his plea allocution is unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662; *People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636) and is, in any event, without merit. The court did not err in imposing a more severe sentence where the promise of a lesser sentence was clearly conditioned on the defendant’s appearance for sentencing on the scheduled date and his cooperation with the Probation Department *(see, People v Asencio,*143 AD2d 917). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Balletta and Miller, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7082 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7082

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 2200 North George Mason Drive in Arlington, Virginia, as the ``Jesus 
                Antonio Collazos Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. JESUS ANTONIO COLLAZOS POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 2200 North George Mason Drive in Arlington, Virginia, shall 
be known and designated as the ``Jesus Antonio Collazos Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Jesus 
Antonio Collazos Post Office Building''.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 12, 2022.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
117th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 7082

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 2200 North George Mason Drive in Arlington, Virginia, as the ``Jesus 
                Antonio Collazos Post Office Building''.
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Paul R. Roberts, Appellant.

Kane, J. P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (Hanofee, J.), rendered April 6, 1989, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree.

In 1986, defendant was found guilty of first degree manslaughter and second degree grand larceny stemming from the strangulation death of Blanche Mironov. This court reversed the manslaughter conviction in 1987 because, although the indictment was predicated on defendant’s striking of Mironov in the neck area with intent to cause serious injury, the prosecution proceeded at trial on a theory that defendant intended to kill Mironov by strangulation (135 AD2d 1026, 1029). The Court of Appeals affirmed in October 1988 (72 NY2d 489) and the People then moved in November 1988 for an order amending the indictment, essentially to include asphyxia by strangulation as a cause of death. County Court granted the motion in 1989 (142 Misc 2d 189) and defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the amended charge and was sentenced to 9 to 18 years’ imprisonment to run concurrently with the term being served on the grand larceny conviction. Defendant now appeals.

We affirm. Defendant argues that the amended indictment would impermissibly allow the People to try defendant on a crime different from that intended by the Grand Jury. We disagree. CPL 200.70 (1) allows amendment to an indictment that "does not change the theory or theories of the prosecution as reflected in the evidence before the grand jury” *(see, People v Spann,*56 NY2d 469). The evidence before the Grand Jury demonstrated that the victim died from asphyxia caused by "traumatic compression” of the neck brought about by either compression of the windpipe or arteries or a direct blow to the neck. It is clear, therefore, that the amendment did not constitute a change in the People’s theory of the case as presented to the Grand Jury and, accordingly, County Court properly granted the motion. Our conclusion is consistent with this court’s earlier reversal of defendant’s manslaughter conviction (135 AD2d 1026, *supra).*There, the prosecution imper*691missibly altered their theory of the case at trial from that charged in the indictment and thereby deprived defendant of sufficient notice thereof. The amendment here, well within the People’s theory of the case and the evidence presented to the Grand Jury, would have avoided the very prejudice that defendant originally encountered at trial *(see, supra,*at 1029).

Judgment affirmed. Kane, J. P., Casey, Levine, Mercure and Harvey, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<SECURITIES>                                 2,387,949
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<PP&E>                                           1,486
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           45,984
<BONDS>                                        100,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           303
<OTHER-SE>                                     410,206
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,814,078
<SALES>                                         30,395
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<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               110,733
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,164
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<INCOME-TAX>                                     9,873
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             21,060
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                    21,060
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .69
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</TABLE>
230 La. 853

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Priscilla Lee RICHARD.

No. 42985.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 29, 1956.

*368Rolfe H. McCollister,' Jack N. Rogers, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard Kil-bourne, Dist. Atty., Clinton, for appellee.

SIMON, Justice.

The defendant was charged in a bill of information with being an accessory after the fact in that she aided her husband to escape from justice, knowing, or having reason to know, that he had committed a felony.

On March 20, 1956, the defendant waived a trial by Jury and was tried and adjudged guilty as charged by the judge of the district court. Whereupon, the defendant, through counsel, moved for a new trial on the basis that the evidence adduced at the trial was insufficient to convict her of the crime charged. The motion was denied and a bill of exception reserved to the said ruling.

On the same day, the 24-hour delay prior to sentence accorded the defendant by law being waived, the trial judge sentenced her to two years’ imprisonment at hard labor in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. Upon sentence being pronounced, the defendant, through counsel, without having perfected the single bill of exception reserved, moved for an appeal, which was granted.

On April 5, 1956, the defendant, through counsel, submitted her bill of exception to the trial judge, who signed it and attached his per curiam. It is upon this bill of exception that defendant relies for reversal of her conviction and sentence.

Under our Code of Criminal Procedure1 an accused shall make in open court a verbal or written motion for an appeal within ten judicial days after the rendition of the judgment complained of; provided, however, that if the trial judge has not acted upon the bills of exception before the expiration of the last day of said ten-day period, a defendant shall be entitled to an additional delay prescribed therein. In applying this rule we have consistently held that after an appeal has been granted, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction, and bills of exception thereafter presented for the judge’s signature and per curiam come too late. Such bills are considered invalid before this court and present nothing for review, unless there are errors patent on the face of the record, which are totally absent in the instant case. See State v. Hauser, 112 La. 313, 36 So. 396; State v. Ruffin, 117 La. 357, 41 So. 647; State v. Griggsby, 117 La. 1046, 42 So. 497; State v. Barrett, 137 La. 535, 68 So. 945; State v. Young, 153 La. 605, 96 So. 275; State v. Cole, 161 La. 827, 109 So. 505; State v. Allen, 167 La. 798, 120 So. 372; State v. Carlson, 192 La. 501, 188 So. 155; State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 24 So.2d 467; State v. Brown, 214 La. 18, 36 So.2d 624; State v. Honeycutt, 218 La. 362, 49 So.2d 610; State v. Dartez, 222 La. 9, 62 So.2d 83; State v. Ware, 228 La. 713, 84 So.2d 56.

Accordingly, for the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

1

. L.S.A.-R.S. 15:542.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 172 (Thursday, September 4, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 51640]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20324]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Dental & Craniofacial Research; Notice of 
Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial 
Research Special Emphasis Panel; Review of R21s.
    Date: November 14, 2008.
    Time: 2:30 p.m. to 5 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD 20892, 
(Telephone Conference Call).
    Contact Person: Marilyn Moore-Hoon, PhD, Scientific Review 
Officer, Scientific Review Branch, National Institute of Dental and 
Craniofacial Research, 6701 Democracy Blvd., Rm. 676, Bethesda, MD 
20892-4878, 301-594-4861, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5e3331312c3b333f2c1e30373a3d2c7030373670393128"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ef8280809d8a828e9daf81868b8c9dc1818687c1888099">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.121, Oral 
Diseases and Disorders Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: August 26, 2008.
Jennifer Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. E8-20324 Filed 9-3-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


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**EXHIBIT 99.14**

**Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18****of the United States Code**

I, E. James Ferland, Chief Executive Officer of PSEG Energy Holdings LLC, to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the Quarterly Report of PSEG Energy Holdings LLC on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2003 (the “Periodic Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the PSEG Energy Holdings LLC.

 

|   |   |   |   |                                                                       |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |        |   |   | /s/ E. James Ferland                                                       |
|   |   |   |   |                                                                            |
|   |   |   |   | E. James FerlandPSEG Energy Holdings LLCChief Executive OfficerMay 2, 2003 |
#### Industrial Commission of Ohio *v.*Boyles.

(No. 24015

Decided June 7, 1933.)

*Mr. John W. Bricker,*attorney general, *Mr. R. R. Zurmehly*and *Mr. F. E.*Galkins, for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. John P. Delphey,*for defendant in error.

By the Court

(Weygandt, C. J.).

The single assignment of error urged by the Industrial Commission is that the charge of the trial court was prejudicially erroneous in a number of respects.

One statement complained of reads as follows: “Now, ladies and gentlemen, as I have said to you, the law provides that if a working man is, while working for his employer, and. while in the course of his employment, if while so doing he is injured, and sickness or bodily harm comes to him, and as a direct and proximate result of that injury, then, ladies and gentlemen, he is entitled to compensation if that'injury causes him to be out of employment.”

This clearly overlooks the requirement of the law *21(Section 1465-78, General Code) that the disability must be of more than seven days duration.

Similarly in another paragraph appears the following statement: “Now, ladies and gentlemen, therefore, you have this question; was the plaintiff injured while he was working for The Great Atlantic *&*Pacific Tea Company, and did the injury as described in the petition follow as a direct and proximate result of being so hurt while so engaged. That, ladies and gentlemen, is the problem for you to determine. ’ ’

Still another statement is as follows: “Now, ladies and gentlemen, I want to say to you it is not a question of *negligence;*it is simply a question of whether or not he was hurt in the course of his employment. If men are so hurt they are entitled to compensation * *

Several other obvious inaccuracies appear, but they are of less moment.

This court is mindful of the well-recognized rule that the charge of a trial court must be considered in its entirety. However, a careful study of the context makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the members of the jury were in all probability confused and misled by the unfortunate statements mentioned. It is therefore the view of this court that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and the cause remanded for retrial.

*Judgment reversed and cause remanded.*

Day, Allen, Stephenson, Jones and Matthias, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 (as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), I, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of National Presto Industries, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended October 3, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.




Date: November 12, 2010
By:
/s/ Maryjo CohenMaryjo CohenChief Executive Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                Exhibit 32.1

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                          18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350*


In connection with the Quarterly Report of PGI Incorporated (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Laurence A. Schiffer, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:


(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of
         operations of the Company.



/s/ Laurence A. Schiffer
----------------------------------------------
    Laurence A. Schiffer
    Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)    November 14, 2005


<FN>
*A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the
  Company and will be retained by the Company and will be furnished to the
  Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 35
                                  ----------


                      COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP


                             OFFICERS' CERTIFICATE
                    ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE MASTER SERVICER


                                  CWALT, INC.
                        ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC3
              MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC3


     The undersigned does hereby certify that the undersigned is an officer of
Countrywide GP, Inc., general partner of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP
(the "Master Servicer"), and does hereby further certify pursuant to Section
3.16 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the above-captioned Series
(the "Agreement") that:

(i) A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
calendar year and of the performance of the Master Servicer under the
Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

(ii) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer
has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material
respects throughout such calendar year.




/s/ Craig Baingo                                   Dated: March 14, 2007
-----------------

Craig Baingo
Executive Vice President, Finance