1

Filed 2/1/18

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) S237374

v. )

) Ct.App. 1/1 A144196

JODY CHATMAN, )

) Alameda County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. 140542

____________________________________)

Anyone convicted of a felony in California suffers consequences. Even 

long after a defendant completes a term of incarceration or probation, some of 

these consequences –– such as ineligibility for certain employment licenses ––

persist. To ease this ongoing burden, individuals can seek a certificate of 

rehabilitation. But not all convicted felons are eligible on an equal basis for such 

certificates. While former probationers and former prisoners are both eligible, 

former probationers face different eligibility criteria after they have been granted 

relief under Penal Code section 1203.4,1 which allows former probationers to 

move for their conviction to be dismissed upon successful completion of probation 

terms. Once former probationers receive the benefit of having their convictions 

dismissed under section 1203.4, another provision –– section 4852.01 –– renders 

them ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation if they are subsequently 

incarcerated. (See § 4852.01, subd. (b).) In contrast, former prisoners –– whether 

 

1 All unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2

subsequently incarcerated or not –– face no such restriction. (See id., subd. (a).)

The question in this case is whether these eligibility criteria survive an equal 

protection challenge under the federal and state constitutions, which in turn 

depends on whether the criteria survive rational basis review. The Court of 

Appeal held that section 4852.01’s separate requirements governing former 

probationers whose convictions were dismissed under section 1203.4 are

categorically irrational, and therefore deny petitioners equal protection of law. 

Bearing in mind that the scheme at issue is subject to neither heightened nor 

intermediate scrutiny, we conclude otherwise: section 4852.01’s eligibility criteria 

survive rational basis review. 

The Legislature’s decision to provide former probationers access to

certificates of rehabilitation serves the laudable goal of decreasing the unfortunate 

aftereffects of felony convictions on those who achieve rehabilitation. But while

certificates provide substantial benefits to rehabilitated felons, adjudicating 

eligibility for them depends on the state’s expenditure of significant judicial and 

executive branch resources. In providing this costly benefit only to former 

prisoners and former probationers who have not been subsequently incarcerated, 

the Legislature engaged in a line-drawing that –– while perhaps not emblematic of 

the ideal rehabilitative system –– embodies a sufficiently rational determination 

regarding distribution of resources. 

Distinctions between former probationers and former prisoners underscore

why. Former probationers, as opposed to former prisoners, can seek some relief 

from the effects of their convictions through section 1203.4, and so exhibit 

somewhat less relative need for certificate of rehabilitation relief. Moreover, 

when the Legislature first provided access to certificates of rehabilitation in 1943, 

it did so only for former prisoners. Only in 1976 was the benefit extended to 

former probationers not subsequently incarcerated. From the legislative history, it 
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appears that lawmakers at the time weighed the increased cost of extending relief. 

And instead of choosing an arbitrary means of limiting such access, legislators 

used subsequent incarceration as a means of determining which former 

probationers show the most promise for rehabilitation. If these justifications for 

the statute’s treatment of former probationers do not necessarily reflect the ideal 

distribution of certificates of rehabilitation, neither can we conclude they are

wholly irrational. What the framework enacted by the Legislature permits is for 

certain people to mitigate the effects of felony convictions in a world of limited 

resources. The basis for allocating those resources is sufficiently grounded in nonillusory distinctions between subsequently incarcerated former probationers and 

other classes of convicted felons to survive rational basis scrutiny under the equal 

protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 

I.

Jody Chatman was convicted of robbery in 2001. The trial judge sentenced 

him to a five-year term of felony probation with a 180-day term in jail. Two years 

later, Chatman was convicted of misdemeanor reckless driving with alcohol 

involved in violation of Vehicle Code section 23103, also called a “wet reckless.” 

In 2006, the reckless driving conviction was dismissed under section 1203.4. In 

2007, the robbery conviction was also dismissed under section 1203.4. Then, in 

2008, Chatman was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence in 

violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to a 

three-year term of probation along with a 10-day term of imprisonment in county

jail. In 2014, Chatman was offered a job that required a community care license

from the Department of Social Services. Although Chatman’s robbery conviction 

generally bars him from obtaining a community care license, the Department of 

Social Services “may grant an exemption” to this bar “if the employee or 

prospective employee has received a certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to . . . 
4

Section 4852.01.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. (g)(1)(A)(ii).)2 Chatman

filed a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation under section 4852.01 in October 

2014. His petition acknowledged that he was “technically barred from a 

certificate of rehabilitation” but claimed that section 4852.01’s unequal treatment 

of former probationers whose convictions had been dismissed under section 

1203.4 was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the petition. 

The Court of Appeal reversed that ruling. The court acknowledged that 

People v. Jones (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 120 “was decided more than 30 years ago 

and addressed the identical question presented here.” (People v. Chatman (2016) 

2 Cal.App.5th 561, 571.) But it disagreed with Jones, which had upheld section 

4852.01’s eligibility criteria. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal in Chatman’s case then 

went on to observe that the “Attorney General in this appeal . . . fails to offer a 

rationale for the differential treatment, except to repeat the observations contained 

in Jones.” (Ibid.) The court held that “the statutory scheme governing eligibility 

for certificates of rehabilitation denies Chatman his rights to equal protection.” 

(Id. at p. 572.) It then remanded to the trial court “with directions to consider the 

 

2 Even if Chatman had satisfied the criteria for this exemption, he would 

have faced a second statutory hurdle. The Department of Social Services is barred 

from granting a community care license to applicants who were convicted of 

certain crimes, including robbery. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. 

(g)(1)(A)(i).) But “the department may grant an exemption” (id., subd. 

(g)(1)(A)(ii)) to that bar for “[a]ny felony in which the defendant inflicts great 

bodily injury on any person” or “uses a firearm” (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. 

(c)(8)). Felons who committed robbery using a firearm or involving great bodily 

harm to a victim thus have a pathway to obtaining a community care license, while 

felons who committed other forms of robbery do not. This unequal treatment of 

different types of robbery was held unconstitutional in Doe v. Saenz (2006) 140 

Cal.App.4th 960, 989-993. Chatman’s robbery conviction did not involve use of a 

firearm or great bodily harm to a victim. But the constitutionality of Health and 

Safety Code section 1522 is not before us in this case, so we do not address it.
5

merits of Chatman’s petition for a certificate of rehabilitation.” (Id. at p. 573.) 

We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review.

II.

Chatman claims it is unconstitutional for the Legislature to impose a 

disparate process for obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation through section

4852.01 on former probationers whose convictions were dismissed under section 

1203.4. In the history and procedures associated with these certificates –– along 

with the rules governing access to relief under section 1203.4 –– we find the 

context for our analysis. 

When the original certificate scheme was enacted, it was “an urgency 

measure” forged against the backdrop of World War II. (People v. Ansell (2001) 

25 Cal.4th 868, 874.) As demand for labor and military recruitment heightened,

the Governor’s office was deluged with pardon applications from ex-felons barred 

from serving in the military or working in defense-related industries. (Id. at pp. 

874-875.) The certificate of rehabilitation relieved pressure by creating a means 

for felons to apply for a pardon through which the merits of a particular 

application could be adjudicated, so that “ ‘the Governor [could], without any 

further investigation, issue a pardon to the person named therein.’ ” (Id. at p. 876; 

see also § 4852.16 [a certificate of rehabilitation “constitute[s] an application for a 

full pardon”].) Although an eventual pardon returns most of a convicted felon’s 

rights (see Ansell, at p. 877, fn. 16), the certificate itself also provides relief from 

certain effects of a felony conviction, such as ineligibility from certain 

employment licenses (id. at p. 877 & fn. 17; Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. 

(g)(1)(A)(ii) [stating that the Department of Social Services “may grant an 

exemption” to the bar on community care licenses “if the employee or prospective 

employee has received a certificate of rehabilitation”]; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 480, 

subd. (b) [“Notwithstanding any other provision of this [Business and Professions]
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code, a person shall not be denied a license solely on the basis that he or she has 

been convicted of a felony if he or she has obtained a certificate of 

rehabilitation.”]). 

To obtain a certificate of rehabilitation and benefit from the relief it 

provides, petitioners must satisfy a number of conditions. An eligible felon may 

only file a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation after a specified “period of 

rehabilitation,” which must last a minimum of five years from the petitioner’s 

release from prison or placement on probation. (§ 4852.03, subds. (a), (b); 

§ 4852.06.) During the period of rehabilitation, the petitioner must “live an honest 

and upright life, shall conduct himself or herself with sobriety and industry, shall 

exhibit a good moral character, and shall conform to and obey the laws of the 

land.” (§ 4852.05.) A potential petitioner is “entitled to receive counsel and 

assistance from all rehabilitative agencies, including the adult probation officer of 

the county and all state parole officers.” (§ 4852.04.) In the proceedings before 

the trial court, the petitioner is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel. 

(§ 4852.08.) The trial court “may require testimony as it deems necessary,” and 

may require, “without expense of any kind to the petitioner,” “the production . . . 

of all records and reports relating to the petitioner and the crime of which he or she 

was convicted.” (§ 4852.1, subd. (a).) The trial court may also order the district 

attorney to investigate the petitioner’s residence, criminal history, representations 

to the trial court, and conduct during the period of rehabilitation, as well as “any 

other information the court deems necessary in making its determination.” 

(§ 4852.12, subd. (a).) 

The trial court has discretion whether to grant a petition for a certificate of 

rehabilitation. (See People v. Lockwood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 222, 228 

[“Section 4852.13 . . . gives courts the express discretion to decide whether a 

petitioner has demonstrated [rehabilitation] to [the trial court’s] 
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satisfaction . . . .”].) In exercising its discretion, the trial court considers whether 

the petitioner has demonstrated “by his or her course of conduct his or her 

rehabilitation and his or her fitness to exercise all of the civil and political rights of 

citizenship.” (§ 4852.13, subd. (a).) If the trial court grants the petition, the clerk 

of the court must immediately forward the certificate of rehabilitation to the 

governor’s office so that the petitioner can be considered for a pardon. 

(§ 4852.14; § 4852.16.) But if the petitioner violates the law during the period of 

rehabilitation, “the court may deny the petition and determine a new period of 

rehabilitation not to exceed the original period of rehabilitation for the same 

crime.” (§ 4852.11.) 

Moreover, in order to even begin the process of applying for a certificate of 

rehabilitation, the petitioner must be eligible by satisfying the criteria set forth in 

section 4852.01. Felons “committed to a state prison or other institution or 

agency” are eligible to apply even if they have been incarcerated after serving 

their initial sentence. (§ 4852.01, subd. (a).) But felons for whom “the accusatory 

pleading” of the underlying felony conviction “has been dismissed pursuant to 

Section 1203.4” are eligible only if they (1) have “not been incarcerated in a 

prison, jail, detention facility, or other penal institution or agency since the 

dismissal of the accusatory pleading”; (2) “[are] not on probation for the 

commission of any other felony”; and (3) “present[] satisfactory evidence of five 

years’ residence in this state prior to the filing of the petition.” (Id., subd. (b).)

The aforementioned section 1203.4 requires, meanwhile, for the underlying 

conviction to be dismissed “[i]n any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the

conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged 

prior to the termination of the period of probation.” (§ 1203.4, subd. (a)(1).) The 

trial court may also dismiss a conviction under section 1203.4 where a probationer 

has not satisfied the terms of probation if it is in “the interests of justice.” (Ibid.) 
8

Although section 1203.4 provides that a dismissal releases the defendant “from all 

penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense,” dismissal does not ease all 

the burdens of a felony conviction. (Ibid.) To the contrary: the felon remains

“obligat[ed] to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question contained 

in any questionnaire or application for public office [or] for licensure by any state 

or local agency.” (Ibid.) Section 1203.4 dismissal also does not restore the ability 

to hold public offices that the felony barred (see id., subd. (a)(3)) or “to own, 

possess, or have in his or her custody or control any firearm” (id., subd. (a)(2)). 

Licensing boards remain free to suspend or revoke professional licenses

“irrespective of a subsequent order under the provisions of Section 1203.4.” (Bus. 

& Prof. Code, § 490, subd. (c); see also id., § 6102, subd. (c) [providing for 

summary disbarment of attorneys “irrespective of any subsequent order under 

Section 1203.4”]; id., § 2236.1, subd. (d) [same for suspension of medical 

licenses]; Ed. Code, §§ 44008, subd. (a), 44009, subds. (a) & (c) [same for certain 

provisions concerning educational employment].) Section 1203.4 dismissal also 

does not affect sex offender registration (see § 290.007) or “any revocation or 

suspension of the privilege of the person convicted to drive a motor vehicle” (Veh. 

Code, § 13555).

Nonetheless, dismissal under section 1203.4 provides at least some relief. 

Among other benefits, Labor Code section 432.7 prohibits an “employer, whether 

a public agency or private individual or corporation” from “ask[ing] an applicant 

for employment to disclose . . . information . . . concerning a conviction that has 

been judicially dismissed or ordered sealed pursuant to law, including . . . 

Section[] 1203.4.” (Lab. Code, § 432.7, subd. (a)(1).) Moreover, Business and 

Professions Code section 480, subdivision (c) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any 

other provisions of this [Business and Professions] code, a person shall not be 
9

denied a license solely on the basis of a conviction that has been dismissed 

pursuant to Section 1203.4.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 480, subd. (c).)

III.

Chatman is a subsequently incarcerated former probationer. Because of 

this status, Chatman claims he is part of a group that is unconstitutionally subject 

to unequal treatment because felons are ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation 

if they are incarcerated after a section 1203.4 dismissal. Both the state and federal 

constitutions extend to persons the equal protection of law. (See U.S. Const., 14th 

Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a); see also In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 

296, 303 [“ ‘The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition 

of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate 

purpose of the law receive like treatment.’ [Citation.]”].) Though this court’s 

analysis of state constitutional requirements sometimes deviates from how 

comparable federal requirements are analyzed, our precedent has not distinguished 

the state and federal guarantees of equal protection for claims arising from 

allegedly unequal consequences associated with different types of criminal 

offenses. (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 

(Johnson); People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1199-1201.) 

Our most recent case addressing claims of this kind is Johnson. The case 

upheld as rational a statute establishing discretionary sex offender registration for 

persons convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, but making it 

mandatory for individuals convicted of offenses involving other types of sexual 

activity with a minor. (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 874.) What we reiterated 

is that we had “authority to construe our state Constitution independently” but saw

no reason to bifurcate state and federal analysis in that context. (Id. at p. 881; see 

also Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 571-572.) Relying on 

Johnson, the Court of Appeal in Chatman’s case also saw “no reason to suppose” 
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that federal equal protection analysis would yield a result different from what 

would emerge from analysis of the state Constitution. (See People v. Chatman, 

supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 568, fn. 3.) We see no reason to suppose so either. 

At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government 

does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification. (People v. 

McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1207) [“[E]qual protection safeguards against the 

arbitrary denial of benefits to a certain defined class of individuals.”].) The extent 

of justification required to survive equal protection scrutiny in a specific context 

depends on the nature or effect of the classification at issue. Unequal treatment 

based on a suspect classification such as race is subject to “ ‘the most exacting 

scrutiny.’ ” (People v. Wilkinson (2012) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836.) So is treatment 

affecting a fundamental right. (See Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 

641 [“ ‘[I]n cases involving “suspect classifications” or touching on “fundamental 

interests” . . . courts adopt “an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting 

the classifications to strict scrutiny. [Citations.] Under the strict standard applied 

in such cases, the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a 

compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the 

law are necessary to further its purpose.” [Citation.]’ ”].) In the high court, 

certain other classifications, such as gender and illegitimacy, trigger “intermediate 

scrutiny” under the federal constitution. (Hernandez v. City of Hanford (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 279, 299, fn. 12 [“In applying the federal equal protection clause, the 

United States Supreme Court has applied a third standard — ‘intermediate 

scrutiny’ — ‘to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.’ ”]. 

But see Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 527, 564 [“We long ago concluded that discrimination based on gender 

violates the equal protection clause of the California Constitution (art. I, § 7, subd. 

(a)) and triggers the highest level of scrutiny.”].) 
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Yet where the law challenged neither draws a suspect classification nor 

burdens fundamental rights, the question we ask is different. We find a denial of 

equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in 

treatment and some legitimate government purpose. (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 

Cal.4th 62, 74.) This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law

is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive

constitutional scrutiny. Coupled with a rebuttable presumption that legislation is

constitutional, this high bar helps ensure that democratically enacted laws are not 

invalidated merely based on a court’s cursory conclusion that a statute’s trade-offs 

seem unwise or unfair. (See Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 319 [“[R]ationalbasis review . . . ‘is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic 

of legislative choices.’ [Citations.] Nor does it authorize ‘the judiciary [to] sit as 

a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy 

determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed 

along suspect lines.’ ”]; see also Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 880, fn. 5.) 

In order to decide whether a statutory distinction is so devoid of even 

minimal rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection, we 

typically ask two questions. We first ask whether the state adopted a classification 

affecting two or more groups that are similarly situated in an unequal manner. 

(People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202.) If we deem the groups at issue

similarly situated in all material respects, we consider whether the challenged 

classification ultimately bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.

(Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881.) A classification in a statute is presumed 

rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment 

is reasonably conceivable. (See ibid.; see also Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. 

Agricultural Labor Relations Board (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1140] [holding that 

“ ‘ “a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes 
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fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection 

challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 

rational basis for the classification.” ’ [Citation.]”].) The underlying rationale for 

a statutory classification need not have been “ever actually articulated” by 

lawmakers, and it does not need to “be empirically substantiated.” (Johnson, at p. 

881.) Nor does the logic behind a potential justification need to be persuasive or

sensible — rather than simply rational. (See ibid.) 

IV.

Chatman contends that he and other former probationers incarcerated after 

their convictions were dismissed share a characteristic pivotal to the outcome of 

this case –– they are, in all material respects, similarly situated to formerly 

incarcerated former prisoners, who remain eligible to apply for a certificate of 

rehabilitation even if subsequently incarcerated. We assume without deciding that 

Chatman is correct regarding the similarly situated nature of these two groups, so 

we may consider the more fundamental question of whether section 4852.01’s

unequal treatment of the groups bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose. What the Attorney General maintains is that the answer to this question 

is straightforward: the current statutory scheme is rational, among other reasons,

because it “conserves judicial resources by reserving certificate of [rehabilitation] 

proceedings to only those former felons who are likely to be able to demonstrate 

rehabilitation.” 

The Legislature’s decision to provide certificates of rehabilitation to 

former probationers and former prisoners serves the laudable goal of decreasing 

the negative effects of felony convictions for those convicted felons who have 

achieved rehabilitation. However laudable the goal, processing certificates of 

rehabilitation –– once conceived as a means of relieving a burden on gubernatorial 

clemency decisions –– nonetheless requires the expenditure of significant 
13

resources. The Penal Code provides eligible petitioners access to rehabilitative 

services and counsel during the five-year period of rehabilitation and appointed 

counsel for the certificate of rehabilitation proceedings. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a);

§ 4852.04; § 4852.08.) The trial court must determine whether the petitioner has 

“demonstrated by his or her course of conduct his or her rehabilitation and his or 

her fitness to exercise all of the civil and political rights of citizenship.” 

(§ 4852.13, subd. (a).) To assist in this determination, the court may order 

testimony and the production of evidence at the government’s expense and may

require the district attorney to perform an investigation. (§ 4852.1, subd. (a); 

§ 4852.12, subd. (a).) And once a certificate of rehabilitation has been granted, 

the certificate is immediately forwarded to the governor’s office, which then 

evaluates the petitioner for a pardon. (§ 4852.14; § 4852.16.) Irrespective of the 

outcome relative to any individual petitioner, this sequence involves the 

expenditure of significant judicial and executive branch resources.

Preserving the government’s financial integrity and resources is a 

legitimate state interest. (See Ortwein v. Schwab (1973) 410 U.S. 656, 660 

[holding appellate filing fee of $25 was rationally related to offsetting court 

system’s costs]; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 

Cal.3d 359, 374 [holding that “administrative costs” rationale defeats equal 

protection claim against statute authorizing periodic payment procedure for 

medical malpractice victims].) Moreover, equal protection does not require a 

perfect fit between a statute’s means and the legitimate state ends those means can 

serve. (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 887 [“ ‘A classification is not arbitrary or 

irrational simply because there is an “imperfect fit between means and ends” ’

[citation], or ‘because it may be “to some extent both underinclusive and 

overinclusive” ’ [Citation].”].) What we require is for the relationship between 

means and ends to be rational. (See id. at p. 898 [“[W]hile the Legislature may 
14

rationally address a problem ‘ “in less than comprehensive fashion by ‘striking the 

evil where it is felt most’ [citation], its decision as to where to ‘strike’ must have a 

rational basis in light of the legislative objectives” ’ ”].) 

On the other hand, an entirely arbitrary decision to withhold a benefit from 

one subset of people, devoid of any conceivable degree of coherent justification,

might not pass rational basis review merely because it decreases the expenditure of 

resources. (Cf. Plyler v. Doe (1982) 457 U.S. 202, 227 [holding, albeit in an 

intermediate scrutiny context, that “a concern for the preservation of resources 

standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those 

resources”].) The question then is whether the classification at issue in this case, 

which bars subsequently incarcerated former probationers from certificate of 

rehabilitation relief, is a rational means of preserving government resources. 

We answer yes. The Legislature has chosen to extend certificate of 

rehabilitation relief to only a subset of former probationers based on rational 

distinctions between subsequently incarcerated former probationers and other 

convicted felons. First of all, former prisoners have a higher relative need for 

certificate of rehabilitation relief than former probationers. Former probationers 

who have successfully completed their terms of probation have a right to dismissal 

of their conviction under section 1203.4. (§ 1203.4(a)(1).) Such a dismissal does 

not eliminate all of the negative consequences of the former probationer’s 

conviction — for example, as Chatman contends here, former probationers who do 

not obtain a certificate of rehabilitation have more difficulty in obtaining a 

community care license — but section 1203.4 certainly provides at least some 

relief from the consequences of conviction. (See Lab. Code, § 432.7, subd. (a)(1)

[prohibiting employers from asking about convictions dismissed under section 

1203.4]; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 480, subd. (c) [prohibiting denial of application for 

license under the Business and Professions Code solely on the basis of a 
15

conviction dismissed under section 1203.4].) Contrasting with what’s available to 

former probationers, relief under section 1203.4 is not available to former 

prisoners, who are instead limited to seeking relief through the certificate of 

rehabilitation process. The Legislature rationally could have taken into account 

former probationers’ lower relative need for certificate of rehabilitation relief 

when determining which group of petitioners to disqualify from such relief for the 

sake of preserving government resources.

Second, the timeline by which former probationers obtained the ability to 

seek certificates of rehabilitation and the larger population of former probationers 

also distinguish former probationers from former prisoners. The Legislature 

created certificates of rehabilitation in 1943, but only for former prisoners. (Stats. 

1943, ch. 400, § 1, p. 1922.) In 1976, the Legislature extended access to 

certificates of rehabilitation to former probationers, but only those who are not 

subsequently incarcerated. (Stats. 1976, ch. 434, § 2, p. 1111.) The cost 

associated with the Legislature’s decision to extend the benefit of certificates of 

rehabilitation to an entirely new group of convicted felons rationally could have 

driven a decision limiting the expansion of the benefit to only a subset of former 

probationers –– a subset at least marginally more likely to achieve rehabilitation. 

This limited extension accomplished the goal of increasing the number of people 

who can receive relief from the effects of their convictions, while avoiding, in a 

manner not inconsistent with rationality, high costs by not extending that relief to 

all former probationers. 

The legislative history for the 1976 bill and a predecessor bill provide at 

least some indication that this cost concern figured in legislative deliberations. 

Two years before former probationers not subsequently incarcerated gained access 

to certificates of rehabilitation, the Legislature enacted a bill extending this benefit 

to all former probationers. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1365, § 1.5, p. 2955). But that bill 
16

never became law because the governor vetoed a companion Senate Bill. (Stats. 

1974, ch. 1365, § 10, p. 2958 [expressly conditioning the Assembly Bill’s effect 

on passage of Senate Bill].) While vetoing the Senate Bill, the governor made the 

following statement: “This bill would add considerable unnecessary cost to the 

state because of the required processing of requests for certificates of 

rehabilitation and subsequent Governor’s pardons by probationers. [¶] The 

provisions of Section 1203.4 of the Penal Code permit the court to enter a not 

guilty plea upon the successful completion of probation by an individual and 

dismiss the information. This is a much simpler method than the costly and timeconsuming processing of certificates of rehabilitation and pardons which is used in 

the case of persons who have been committed to state prison and who have 

subsequently become law-abiding citizens of our community.” (Governor’s veto 

message to Sen. on Sen. Bill No. 2222 (Sept. 27, 1974) 6 Sen. J. (1973-1974 2d 

Ex. Sess.) p. 14786.) The Legislature then, in 1976, extended the right to obtain 

certificates of rehabilitation to former probationers, but only those not 

subsequently incarcerated. (Stats. 1976, ch. 434, § 2, p. 1111.) Although not 

explicit in this history, costs were likely on the mind of the Legislature when it 

selectively extended the right to obtain certificates of rehabilitation to some former 

probationers. (See also Cal. Adult Authority, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill 

No. 2403 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) July 1, 1976, pp. 2-3 [recommending governor 

veto of the 1976 bill extending certificate of rehabilitation to former probationers 

not subsequently incarcerated because “[t]he measure greatly expands the 

eligibility for obtaining certificates of rehabilitation and pardon by including 

persons who have accusatory pleadings dismissed and persons convicted of a 

felony, but not sent to state prison. . . . Increased workload generated by this 

expansion is unknown, but could include many persons from the county level who 

would become eligible to file with the respective counties and the Governor’s 
17

Office, a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon.”].) We do not 

imply that rational basis review requires the Legislature to rely on the rational 

basis we discuss here. But we find it relevant that administrative costs may have 

been one driving force for the limitation on subsequently incarcerated former 

probationers. 

Such concerns over preservation of resources proved prescient. Probation 

is currently the most used criminal sentencing tool for felony convictions in 

California. In 2014, for example, California courts sentenced approximately 59.5

percent of convicted felons to probation or probation with jail, and only 22.7

percent to confinement in prison or jail alone. (See Criminal Justice Statistics 

Center, Crime in California (2014) Cal. Dept. of Justice, pp. 51 <https://

oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/candd/cd14/cd14.pdf> [as 

of Feb. 1, 2018].) In the same year, approximately 244,122 felons were on active 

probation. (Id. at p. 54.) In contrast, prisons and jails together had an average 

daily population of 165,025. (See CDCR Office of Research, Fall 2014 

Population Projections (Nov. 2014) Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

p. 9 <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_

Branch/Projections/F14Pub.pdf> [as of Feb. 1, 2018] [in 2014, 135,484 adults in 

institutions]; Cal. Board of State and Community Corrections, Jail Profile Survey: 

Fourth Quarter Calendar Year 2014 Survey Results (4th Quarter 2014) p. 2

<http://www.bscc.ca.gov/downloads/2014_4th_Qtr_JPS_Full_Report.pdf> [as of 

Feb. 1, 2018] [in 2014, 25,005 sentenced males and 4,536 sentenced females in 

county jails].) These data are at least consistent with the conclusion that more

former probationers exist in California than former prisoners. The larger number 

of former probationers creates a higher relative burden on judicial and executive
18

branch resources that the Legislature rationally could have sought to decrease by 

limiting former probationers’ access to certificates of rehabilitation.3

Not only was it within the realm of the term “rational” for the Legislature to 

limit the number of former probationers who have access to certificates of 

rehabilitation, but the statutory framework taking account of subsequent 

incarceration was also rational. As legislators grasped the resource implications of 

extending eligibility for certificates of rehabilitation, they conceivably recognized 

the value of a scheme to manage demand for such certificates. Through section 

4852.01’s bar on eligibility for subsequently incarcerated former probationers, the 

Legislature extended the possibility of obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation only 

to those former probationers that could rationally be seen as showing the most 

promise for rehabilitation. Incarceration may result from a conviction 

representing a probationer’s recidivist behavior, or may result from activity that 

has little or no bearing on the former probationer’s ultimate capacity for

rehabilitation. But it would have been at least rational for the Legislature to 

presume that subsequently incarcerated former probationers are less likely to 

rehabilitate than those who avoid subsequent incarceration. And it is a simple 

matter for courts to determine whether a petitioner for a certificate of rehabilitation 

 

3 To be sure, we are not aware of the 1976 Legislature expressing any 

expectations about the modern ratio of former probationers and former prisoners. 

But this does not affect the current rationality of the scheme because the 

Legislature modified section 4852.01 in 2014 and 2015 and took no action to 

modify the bar on subsequently incarcerated former probationers. (See Stats.

2014, ch. 280, § 3; Stats. 2015, ch. 378, § 6.) Moreover, even if the ratio differed 

in 1976, the addition of former probationers represented a substantial increase in 

the number of potential certificate of rehabilitation petitioners that rationally could 

have caused the Legislature to look for ways of limiting costs. (See Adult 

Authority Chairman Raymond C. Brown, letter to Herbert E. Ellingwood, Legal 

Affairs Secretary in Governor’s Office, re Assem. Bill No. 3265 (1973-1974 Reg. 

Sess.) Sept. 4, 1974 [stating that there were “[t]hirty-five thousand (approximate) 

felony probation grants per year”].)
19

has been subsequently incarcerated. Although not a perfect proxy for 

rehabilitation, the “subsequent incarceration” bar at least bears a rational 

connection to rehabilitation and the preservation of resources. 

Section 4852.01’s eligibility criteria might not reflect the ideal 

rehabilitative system. But we cannot cast aside the deferential nature of our 

inquiry. (People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 77.) The question we must 

resolve in this case is whether the Legislature’s choices survive rational basis 

scrutiny. When we analyze this question, we treat the statute’s potential logic and 

assumptions far more permissively than with other standards of constitutional or 

regulatory review. (Ibid. [“When conducting rational basis review, we must 

accept any gross generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature 

seems to have made.”]; Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 887 [“[T]he Legislature is 

afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences of criminal 

offenses.”].) Under this permissive standard, denying subsequently incarcerated 

former probationers certificates of rehabilitation is sufficiently grounded in 

distinctions from other classes of convicted felons that it can be considered a 

rational manner of providing some former probationers a valuable rehabilitative 

tool in the face of scarce resources. 

The rationality of this distribution is further supported by the existence of 

alternatives to section 1203.4 dismissal potentially available to Chatman and 

others in his position. Subsequently incarcerated former probationers continue to 

remain eligible for executive pardons, and the Penal Code makes clear that

certificates of rehabilitation are meant to serve as “an additional, but not an 

exclusive, procedure for the restoration of rights and applications for pardon.” 

(§ 4852.19.) There may be other statutory avenues to obtain the particular realworld benefit the subsequently incarcerated former probationer hopes to obtain. In 

the context of the community care license that Chatman seeks, for example, the
20

Department of Social Services can “grant an exemption regarding the 

conviction . . . if the employee or prospective employee has received a certificate 

of rehabilitation.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. (g)(1)(A)(ii).) But that 

same provision also allows the Department of Social Services to “grant an 

exemption regarding the conviction . . . if the employee or prospective employee 

has been rehabilitated as provided in Section 4852.03 of the Penal Code, has 

maintained the conduct required in Section 4852.05 of the Penal Code for at least 

10 years, and has the recommendation of the district attorney representing the

employee’s county of residence.” (Ibid.) This alternative pathway features a few

of the same requirements as a certificate of rehabilitation, but is available to

persons seeking a community care license without having obtained a certificate of 

rehabilitation. The eligibility criteria in section 4852.01 seem to reflect a rational 

assumption that creating situation-specific additional exceptions for subsequently 

incarcerated former probationers is a more cost-effective solution than allowing all

subsequently incarcerated former probationers access to certificates of 

rehabilitation. 

Chatman compares the distinction at the heart of section 4852.01 to the one 

we invalidated in Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705

(Newland). The Court of Appeal relied heavily on Newland as well. The plaintiff 

in that case, William Newland, had applied for a teaching credential. His 

application was denied because he had seven years earlier been convicted of 

misdemeanor lewd conduct in violation of section 647, subdivision (a), and 

“section 13220.16 of the Education Code barred issuance of a credential to anyone 

convicted of . . . violations of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a).” (Id. at p. 

707.) Before Newland’s appeal of that denial was resolved, the Legislature 

amended section 13220.16 “to remove the bar for anyone found fit to teach 

provided he met three conditions: he had applied for or obtained a certificate of 
21

rehabilitation under Penal Code section 4852.01, his probation had been 

terminated, and the information or accusation had been dismissed under Penal 

Code section 1203.4.” (Ibid.) Newland satisfied the second and third of those 

conditions. But he could not satisfy the first condition because certificates of 

rehabilitation were only available to those convicted of felonies, and Newland had 

been convicted of a misdemeanor. 

Once the statute was amended, the Attorney General did “not attempt to 

suggest any rational basis for the challenged classification.” (Newland, supra, 19 

Cal.3d at p. 713.) To the contrary: the Attorney General “virtually concede[d] 

that if Education Code section 13220.16 and Penal Code section 4852.01 together 

work to deny misdemeanants relief available to felons, that discrimination renders 

either or both statutes unconstitutional.” (Ibid.) The Attorney General made this 

argument in order to “propose[] that we construe Penal Code section 4852.01 to 

permit a convicted misdemeanant who is affected by section 13220.16 to petition 

for a certificate of rehabilitation,” based on “the principle ‘that a statute which is 

reasonably susceptible of two constructions should be interpreted so as to render it 

constitutional.’ ” (Ibid.) Although we did not use that principle to resolve the 

case, we acknowledged that the statutory scheme’s exclusion of misdemeanants 

may have been inadvertent. (See id. at p. 712 [“[T]he Legislature’s insistence in 

amended section 13220.16 that all persons seeking relief under subdivision (b) of 

that statute apply for certificates of rehabilitation may simply be a case of 

legislative oversight — a failure to realize that this requirement would block any 

relief to a misdemeanant.”].) But whatever the explanation for that legislative 

choice, we reasoned that “[t]he Legislature could not possibly or sensibly have 

concluded that misdemeanants, as opposed to felons, constitute a class of 

particularly incorrigible offenders who are beyond hope of rehabilitation.” (Ibid.) 

So we held that the statute was unconstitutional. (See id. at p. 713 [“[W]hether the 
22

result of oversight or intention, the statutory classification discriminating against 

misdemeanants, lacking a rational relationship to the legislative goals, denies 

misdemeanants the equal protection of the laws.”].) 

The requirements invalidated in Newland — for which the Attorney 

General never tried to offer a rational basis, and which we described as so illogical

that the nature of their operation appeared inadvertent — were not as minimally 

rational as section 4852.01’s eligibility criteria. The statute at issue in Newland

barred misdemeanants from teaching while creating an exemption that permitted

felons to teach, simply because one of the requirements for triggering the

exemption — a certificate of rehabilitation — was only available to felons. We 

explained that “[t]his statutory discrimination against misdemeanants can claim no 

rational relationship to the protective purpose of section 13220.16.” (Newland, 

supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 712.) Whereas Newland could have obtained a teaching 

credential if he had simply been convicted of a felony, not a misdemeanor — in 

other words, if he had been convicted of a more serious offense — Chatman’s

ineligibility reflects his own response to the unique opportunities he received after 

he was sentenced to probation. Chatman was eligible for a certificate of 

rehabilitation up until he was incarcerated for driving under the influence after a 

court had dismissed his robbery conviction, thus showing less promise for 

rehabilitation under the metric devised by the Legislature. Until that moment, he 

had the very same eligibility as other felons. 

The statute at issue here –– despite any limitations in the persuasive appeal 

of its underlying policy justification –– sits in a different category in comparison 

to the statute in Newland. The distinctions made in section 4852.01’s eligibility 

criteria are rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of preserving 

government resources by providing certificate of rehabilitation resources only to

former prisoners (who have a greater relative need for such relief and a smaller 
23

population than former probationers) and former probationers not subsequently 

incarcerated (who presumably show greater promise for rehabilitation than 

subsequently incarcerated former probationers). The unequal treatment 

challenged in this case begins only if a felon reoffends after completing his or her 

probation. At that point, the Legislature has a rational basis to conclude that 

resources are better allocated to former prisoners than former probationers. Those 

former probationers must turn to other pathways to relief, such as an executive 

pardon or a different statutory exemption. 

Chatman emphasizes in his briefing that rehabilitation “is a fundamental 

value in our justice system,” and the “arbitrary technical bar” at issue in this case 

unfairly denies hundreds of former probationers “a chance for the court to consider 

their efforts at bettering themselves and their community.” Surely much of that is 

true at some level. Felons endeavoring to improve their lives no doubt deserve a

measure of mercy — and we are sensitive to the increasingly troubling fact that 

the law imposes severe consequences on felony convicts long after they have 

served their sentence. (See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) __ U.S. __ 

[137 S.Ct. 1730, 1737] [noting the “troubling” fact that a North Carolina statute 

concerning social media access for registered sex offenders “impose[d] severe 

restrictions on persons who already ha[d] served their sentence and [we]re no 

longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system”]; In re J.C. (2017) 

13 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1211 [noting the “substantial — even harsh and severe” 

nature of many non-penal consequences of a felony conviction].) But our role in 

this case is to review the rationality of the statutes at issue, not measure their

fairness or wisdom. The Legislature may ultimately revisit the statutory 

framework, especially in light of recent legislation that updates the certificate of 

rehabilitation scheme to deal with felons imprisoned in county jail under the 
24

state’s Public Safety Realignment initiative.4 Yet even if the Legislature could 

have chosen to enact a more sensible or judicious statutory scheme than the one in 

place today, section 4852.01’s current eligibility criteria are constitutional because 

they rationally serve a legitimate government purpose.

 

4 Regarding this legislation, Chatman’s answer brief in this court contains a 

claim “in the alternative” that the 2013 enactment of section 1203.41 rendered 

section 4852.01 unconstitutional. Section 1203.41 allows for felons imprisoned in 

county jail to move for dismissal of their convictions. Although section 1203.41 

bears similarities to section 1203.4, a 2016 amendment to section 4852.01 

nonetheless clarified that felons whose convictions were dismissed under section 

1203.41 are eligible for certificates of rehabilitation even if they are subsequently 

incarcerated. (See Stats. 2015, ch. 378, § 6.) Neither the trial court nor the Court 

of Appeal addressed this claim about section 1203.41 dismissal, because Chatman 

never mentioned the claim until his answer brief in this court. We have previously 

declined to address new claims related to a statute’s amendment that were not 

raised until the answer brief in this court. (See People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 

314, 322, fn. 11.) As in Brown, “[t]his new claim is not properly before us, and 

we do not address it.” (Ibid.)
25

V.

The Legislature enacted a scheme providing relief to former prisoners. It 

enacted a different, and more restrictive, scheme to govern former probationers’ 

access to certificates of rehabilitation –– a scheme applying to individuals who had 

an alternative process for mitigating the longer-term consequences of their felony 

convictions. In doing so, legislators weighed the broad class of problems 

associated with the administrative resources necessary to adjudicate eligibility for 

certificates of rehabilitation and could have rationally determined that preservation 

of government resources required the extension of certificates of rehabilitation to 

only those convicted felons with the highest relative need and those that might 

sensibly be understood to show the most promise for rehabilitation — former 

prisoners and former probationers not subsequently incarcerated. That this choice 

is within the permissible bounds of rational basis review is further evinced by the 

fact that former probationers outnumber former prisoners, and thus would create a 

larger burden on state resources. Former probationers remain eligible for other 

statutory exemptions as well as for pardons, and they remain eligible for 

certificates of rehabilitation too if they avoid subsequent incarceration. Because 

section 4852.01’s eligibility criteria therefore serve a legitimate government 

purpose, those criteria are minimally rational enough to withstand rational basis 

scrutiny. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 

CUÉLLAR, J.

WE CONCUR: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

 CHIN, J.

 CORRIGAN, J.

 LIU, J.

 KRUGER, J.

 MURRAY, J. *

 

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Chatman

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 2 Cal.App.5th 561

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S237374

Date Filed: February 1, 2018

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Alameda

Judge: Paul A. DeLucchi

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

David Reagan for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Kevin Kiley, Donna M. 

Provenzano, Laurence K. Sullivan and Catherine A. Rivlin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

David Reagan

725 Washington Street, Suite 200

Oakland, CA 94607

(510) 506-9061

Catherine A. Rivlin

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

(415) 703-5977