* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This orde r and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by desi gnation. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 13 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BARBARA J. STRUNK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 03-5164 (D.C. No. CV-02-588-J) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges, and KANE , ** Senior District Judge.
Claimant Barbara J. Strunk appeals from a decision of the district court affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of Ms. Strunk’s application-2-

for supplemental security income (SSI). Ms. Strunkalleged disability due to cervical and lumbar strains, asthma, depression, anxiety, and atypical migraines. The agency denied her application initially and on reconsideration. Ms. Strunk then received a de novo hearing before an administr ative law judge (ALJ). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Williams v.
Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). In this c ase the ALJ found, at step four of the sequential evaluation process, that Ms. Strunk was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act becau se her residual functional capacity did not preclude her from performing past relevant work. In the alternative the ALJ found, at step five of the sequ ential evaluation process, that even if Ms. Strunk “were unable to perform past rel evant work, thus shifting the burden to the Commissioner to show that there [are] a significant number of other jobs in the national economy, the medical-vocationa l guidelines . . . would direct a conclusion of ‘not disabled’ at the light exertio nal level.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 103. The Appeals Council denied Ms. Strunk’s re quest for review, making the ALJ’s March 2000 decision the final decision of the Commissioner. The district court affirmed in August 2003, and this appeal foll owed. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and a ffirm.1 Ms. Long, who has a master’s degree in social work, served as Ms. Strunk’s

non-medical counselor at Parkside Mental Health between approximately (continued...) -3- Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limite d to determining whether the correct legal standards were applied an d whether the Commissioner’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Doyal v. Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003). In so doing, we may neither “reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment f or the [Commissioner’s].” Glass v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994). Ms. Strunk raises two issues on appeal. First, she generally asserts that the ALJ failed to properly consider her mental impairme nt. In particular, she contends that the ALJ erred in affording greater we ight to the opinion of Thomas A. Goodman, M.D., than to the opinion of Kathleen L ong, M.S.W. The relevant regulation pertaining to the evaluation of opinion evidence states that “[m]edical opinions are statements from physicians and psychol ogists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a) (2). There are five acceptable medical sources: (1) licensed medical or osteopath ic doctors, (2) licensed or certified psychologists, (3) licensed optometrists, (4) licensed podiatrists, and (5) qualified speech-language pathologists. Id. § 416.913(a)(1)-(a)(5). Ms. Long is not an acceptable medical source. See id. 1 Notwithstanding, the ALJ throughly1 (...continued)

September 1999 and November 2000. Dr. Goodman is alicensed medical doctor and certified psychiatrist who examined Ms. Strunk on June 1, 1999. -4- considered Ms. Long’s treatment notes and the psych iatric review technique (PRT) form she completed. This PRT, upon which Ms. Strunk places great emphas is, indicated that she suffered from a severe impairment. It also rated M s. Strunk’s functional limitations. But the functional limitations Ms. Lo ng identified in the PRT were inconsistent with Ms. Long’s treatment notes. More over, the PRT stated that Ms. Strunk’s impairment, while severe, was not expe cted to last twelve months, Aplt. App., Vol. II at 205, thereby precluding an award of benefits, see 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (stating that an individual must d emonstrate his “medically determinable . . . mental impairment . . . can be e xpected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months” t o be considered disabled under the Act); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). Having meticulously review ed the record and viewed it in its entirety, see Williams , 844 F.2d at 750, we agree with the ALJ’s decision not to “accord great weight to the assessment by Kathleen Long,” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 101, and we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Goodm an’s opinion. The second issue Ms. Strunk raises on appeal is two -part. She asserts the ALJ failed to properly (1) consider her impairments in combination, see 20 C.F.R.-5-

§ 416.923, and (2) construct hypothetical questions for the vocational expert. To support these assertions Ms. Strunk quotes the ALJ’s hypothetical. But the hypothetical and the ALJ’s written decision make cl ear that the ALJ correctly considered Ms. Strunk’s impairments in combination. Ms. Strunk also contends the ALJ’s hypothetical was flawed because the ALJ d id not “obtain a precise description of the particular job duties . . . in o rder to determine if the claimant’s mental impairment [would be compatible] with the pe rformance of such work.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 20. But the ALJ is not requir ed to do so. The ALJ explicitly “rate[d] the degree of [Ms. Strunk’s] functional lo ss,” as required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(b)(3)-(c) (2000), and found “no signific ant limitation from the depression and/or anxiety,” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 1 01. Substantial evidence in the record supports this conclusion, and a precise desc ription of job duties, on the facts of this case, would be superfluous. The record contains substantial evidence to supportthe ALJ’s finding of nondisability and the correct legal standards were applied. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court

Stephanie K. Seymour Circuit Judge