# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O



## . 13-0303

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4


# H A R R IS 

# C O U N T Y 

# F L O O D 

# C O N T R O L 

# D IS T R IC T A N D 

# H A R R IS 

# C O U N T Y 

# , T E X A S 

# , P E T IT IO N E R S 

# ,

v
. 

# E D W A R D 

# A

. A N D 

# N O R M A 

# K E R R 

# , E T A L



# . , R E S P O N D E N T S

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## F I R S T 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## , joined by J U S T I C E 

## J O H N S O N 

## , J U S T I C E 

## L E H R M A N N 

## , and J U S T I C E 

## B R O W N 

## , dissenting.

Har ris County spent tens of milli ons of dollars on flood control measure s. The only
aff irmative County conduct about which the Plaintiff-homeowne rs compl ain was the approva l of
subdivision plats for private development, a routine activity perf ormed in e v e r

y c o u n ty

. B y Pl a in

tif fs’

own rec koning the flooding of their homes resulted from multipl e cause s. There is no evidenc e that
the County was substantially cer tain its conduct would result in the flooding of Plaintiffs’ particula r homes, or that the County ever intended to use those proper ties in any capa city for flo o d co n t rol

measure s. I would hol d t hat a cog nizable taking s claim is not prese nted. Today ’s decision will

encour ag e g overnme nts to do nothing to preve nt flooding, r ather than study ing and addre ssing the problem.

## I. Background

Plaintiffs c onsist of about 400 homeowner s whose homes we re loc ated in the upper Whit e
Oak Ba y ou water shed of Har

ris County

. The homes suffe red flood damag e one or more times during Tropica l Storm Fr ancis in 1998, Hurric ane Allison in 2001, and another u n n am ed storm in 2002.
Plaintiffs sued Har

ris County and the Har

ris County Floo d C ontrol District (collec tively the County ), assert ing a taking s cause of action. The homeowner s sued other defe ndants as well,

1 

## including the Texas Depa

rtment of Transpor

tation, municipal utilit y districts, eng ineer ing firms, and private de veloper s; those claims were settled or dismissed and ar e not pre sented for revie w.
Most of P laintiffs’ homes we re built in the 1970s and early 1980s. Prior to the t hree flood

events in issue, Plaintiffs’ homes had suffe red littl e or no flood damag e, althoug h the are a has a long history of flooding

. I n 1976 the U.S. Army Corps of Eng ineer s prepa red an “I nterim Report on Upper
Whit e Oak Ba

y ou.” The repor

t was coordina ted with numerous fede ral and state entities including
the District, the Citi es of Houston and J erse y Villag e, and the Har ris County Commi ssioners Court.
The repor t noted rec urring flooding in the upper Whit e Oak Ba y ou water shed, an are a of 61 square
miles. I t descr ibed damag ing flooding “occ urring almost an n u a lly for the past sever al y ear s.” I t stated that the flooding was “ cause d primarily by inadequa te cha

nnel ca pacities of the streams,” and that the problem wa s “compounde d by continuing ur

banization” of the fa st-g rowing are a. I t predicte d:
“Additional residential deve l o pment is expected to occur with or without an adequate plan for

T h e D e f e n d a n t s c o n t e n d t h e i r c o n d u c t w i t h r e s p e c t t o f l o o d c o n t r o l w a s c o e x t e n s i v e , a n d P l a i n t i f f s d o n o t 1

a r g u e o t h e r w i s e
. D e f

e n d a n t s p r e s e n t i d e n t i c a l a r g u m e n t t o u s i n c o m b i n e d b r i e f i n g
. T h e i r b r i e f

i n g s t a t e s t h a t “ [ t ] h e D i s t r i c t w a s t h e a r m o f t h e C o u n t y t h a t d e a l t w i t h f l o o d c o n t r o l , ” a n d a t o r a l a r g u m e n t , c o u n s e l f o r D e f e n d a n t s s t a t e d t h a t “ t h e D i s t r i c t r e a l l y c a n ’ t a c t w i t h o u t t h e C o u n t y ’ s a p p r o v a l

. T h e C o u n t y o n l y a c t s i n f l o o d c o n t r o l t h r o u g h t h e D i s t r i c t

. . . . T h e r e m a y b e d i f f e r e n t d u t i e s b u t i n t e r m s o f t h e i r a c t s i n t h i s c a s e t h e y ’ r e a b s o l u t e l y c o e x t e n s i v e
. ”



### 2

## controlling the floods. Although curr ent local reg ulations require that new structure s be built above

the level of the 100-y ear flood, damag es will incre ase substantially in the future wi t h i ncre ased
rainfa ll runoff rate s.” I t pr oposed “enla rg ement, rec tification, and partial paving ” of the bay ou and tributaries, toge ther with othe r flood control measure s. The plan was to be funded primarily by the
fede ral g overnme nt.
The Count y concur re d wi th Corps’ findi ng s and agr eed to act as a sponsor for the projec t,
but fede ral funding was slow to materia liz e. The County approve d new residential developments in
the 1976–1984 period. The District beg an requiring new developments in the upper bay ou water shed

to provide on-site detention ponds. The parties disag ree on the extent to which the District deviated
from this policy

. The District eventua lly hired Pate Eng ineer s to develop a flood control plan, which

was prese nted in a written repor t (the Pate Plan) in 1984. The Plan noted a “cur rent policy requiring
on-site s t o rm wa t er detention on all new development projec ts in the Upper Whit e Oak Ba y ou

water shed,” and proposed channe l improvements combined with detention basins, with the g oal of eliminating “the [100-y ear ] flood plain in the upper portion of the water shed.” The Plan stated that
its implementation “should eliminate the exis ting f lo o d p la in s th

r o u g h th e e xisting develope d portion
of upper Whit e Oak Ba

y ou and provide for phased implementation of the ultimate plan to maintain 100-y ear flood protec tion on Whit e Oak Ba y ou as future development occur s.” I n 1984, the County

approve d the Pate Plan and authorized the District to implement it. The Plan was to be funded throug h local taxes and impact fee s, beca use fede ral funding was no longe r available , and was to be implemented in pha ses. Deve lopers who did not construc t on- site detention fac iliti es could pay an impact fe e that would fund the construction of r eg ional detention fa cilities.

3

## The Pate Plan was never fully i m p lemented, and flooding continued. I n 1990 the District

commissioned a new study by Klotz Associates to addre ss flood conce rns. The Klotz Plan called for

meas u re s t hat wer e differ ent from the Pate Plan measure s. The parties offe r differ ent
char acte rizations of the shift from the Pate Plan to the Klotz Plan. The County contends the K lotz
Plan was nece ssary beca

use assumptions in the Pate Plan proved wrong , and that the Klotz Plan was

more ambitious than the Pate Plan. Plaintiffs contend the Klotz Plan was less extensive than the Pate
Plan for var ious reasons.
Plaintiff s cl ai m t h e flooding of their homes was cause d by the County ’s approva l of “unmitiga ted” upstream development, comb i ned with a failure to fully implement the Pate Plan.
Their ex pert, L arr

y May s, relied on alleg ed unmi tiga ted development occur ring in the 1976–1990
time frame

. 2


## The County filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgme nt. The trial court g rudg ingly

denied the motion, and the c ourt of appe als aff irmed. 3 4

T h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e a l l e g e d u n m i t i g a t e d d e v e l o p m e n t i s d i s p u t e d

. B u t t h e r e c o r d i s c l e a r t h a t t h e d a t e t h e 2

a l l e g e d u n m i t i g a t e d d e v e l o p m e n t e n d e d w a s n o l a t e r t h a n 1 9 9 0

. M a y s ’ f i r s t e x p e r t r e p o r t o n t h e 1 9 9 8 T r o p i c a l S t o r m F r a n c i s f l o o d i n g r e l i e d o n a m o d e l o f r a i n f a l l a n d r u n o f

f b a s e d o n 1 9 9 0 l a n d u s e c o n d i t i o n s , a n d a s s e r t e d t h a t “ d i f f e r e n c e s i n f l o w s t h a t w o u l d r e s u l t b y u p d a t i n g t o 1 9 9 8 c o n d i t i o n s a r e m i n i m a l

. ” H i s s e c o n d r e p o r t , d i s c u s s i n g t h e t w o l a t e r s t o r m s , a s s e r t e d t h a t “ [ t ] h e c a u s a t i o n s o f f l o o d i n g ” o f t h e t w o l a t e r s t o r m s “ a r e t h e s a m e a s p o i n t e d o u t i n m y 2 0 0 1 r e p o r t f o r t h e T r o p i c a l S t o r m F r a n c i s
. ” M a y s a l s o a t l e a s t t w i c e c o n f i r m e d i n h i s d e p o s i t i o n t h a t d e v e l o p m e n t a f t e r 1 9 9 0 d i d
n o t c a u s e a d d i t i o n a l f

l o o d i n g , a g r e e i n g t h a t “ f o r t h o s e s u b d i v i s i o n s t h a t w e r e d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n 1 9 9 0 a n d 1 9 9 8 , y o u a s s u m e d t h a t t h e y d i d n o t c o n t r i b u t e a n y a d d i t i o n a l f l o w s i n t o W h i t e O a k B a y o u , ” a n d “ i t i s f a i r t o s a y t h a t y o u h a v e n o e v i d e n c e t h a t d e v e l o p m e n t b e t w e e n 1 9 9 0 a n d 1 9 9 8 h a d a n y e f f e c t , a n y i m p a c t o n t h e P l a i n t i f f s ’ f l o o d i n g i n t h i s c a s e
. ”

T h e t r i a l c o u r t f

e l t o b l i g e d u n d e r t h e l a w o f t h e c a s e d o c t r i n e t o d e n y t h e m o t i o n b a s e d o n a n e a r l i e r c o u r t o f 3

a p p e a l s d e c i s i o n , b u t s t a t e d t h a t i t f o u n d t h e a p p e l l a t e d e c i s i o n “ c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o A r i s t o t l e ’ s P o s t e r i o r A n a l y t i c s i n a s m u c h a s t h e o p i n i o n f

i a t s t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t f o r e k n o w l e d g e o f

p o s s i b l e f

u t u r e f l o o d i n g i s e v i d e n c e o f

a f o r e w i l l t o t a k e w h e n a G o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y e l e c t s t o e x p e n d i t s f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s o n o t h e r v e n u e s r a t h e r t h a n p r o s c r i p t i v e l y e x p e n d i n g f

u n d s o n t h e p r o j e c t a t h a n d ( a t r a d i t i o n a l l y e x e m p t e x e r c i s e o f l e g i s l a t i v e d i s c r e t i o n

— a r g u a b l y t h u s t h e r o b b e r y v i c t i m m a y s u e f o r f u n d s s p e n t u p o n f

i r e p r e v e n t i o n a n d h o m e f i r e v i c t i m f

o r f u n d s s p e n t u p o n p o l i c e p r o t e c t i o n )

. ”

4 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d 2 4 2

. 4


### 4

## II. Analysi s
A. G eneral P rinciples of Taki ngs Law and th e Intent Elem ent
Gene rally , plaintiffs seeking rec overy for a taking must prove the g overnme nt “intentionally
took or damag ed their proper ty for public use, or was substantially cer tain that would be the result.” 5 

## Sovereig n immunit y does not shield the g overnme nt from liability for compensa tion u n d er the taking s clause. 6



## M u ch o f o u r t aking s jurisprudenc e focuses on the required mens rea
. We have made clear that a taking cannot be established by proof of mere neg lige nt conduct by the g overnme nt. 7



## B. Other Elem ents of Tak ings Ju risprudence: Affi rm ative

Condu ct, Specificity, and Public Use
Much of the briefing focuse s on the element of intent, but there are other elements of a taking
that rende r Plaintiffs’ cla im problematic.
1. Aff irm ative Conduct
Our jurisprudenc e provides that only aff irmative conduct by the g overnme nt will support a taking s claim. We have alway s char acte rized a taking s claim as based on some aff irmative “ac t” or
“ac tion” of the g overnme nt. For example, in Tarrant Regional W ater D istrict v. Gragg , we held “that
the requisite intent is prese n t when a g overnme ntal entity knows that a specific act is causing

C i t y o f K e l l e r v

. W i l s o n , 1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 2 , 8 0 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 5 )

. 5

G e n

. S e r v s

. C o m m ’ n v

. L i t t l e
- T e x I n s u l a t i o n C o

. , 3 9 S

. W

. 3 d 5 9 1 , 5 9 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 1 )

. L i k e t h e C o u r t ’ s o p i n i o n , 6 f o r c o n v e n i e n c e m y r e f

e r e n c e s h e r e i n t o “ s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y ” a r e t o t h e r e l a t e d d o c t r i n e s o f s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y a n d g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y
.

C i t y o f T y l e r v

. L i k e s , 9 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 9 , 5 0 5 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 7 )

. 7


### 5

## identifiable harm

. . . .” I n Gragg the damag e to the plaintiffs’ ranc h was cause d by the water 8


## distric t ’s af

fi rmative acts of constructing a rese rvoir and rele asing water from the rese rvoir’s floodg ates. Or in City of

Dallas v. Jennings , “the parties ag ree that only an intentional act can g ive 9


## rise to such a taking

. . . There may well be times when a g overnme ntal entity is awa re that its action
will nece ssarily cause phy sical damag e to cer tain private proper

ty , a nd y et deter

mines that the benef

it

t o the public outweig hs the harm cause d to that proper ty .” A g overnme nt cannot be lia b l e fo r a 1 0 

## taking if “it committed no intentional acts.” We have not rec og n i z ed a t ak i ng s claim based on 1 1


## nonfea sance
. Plaintiffs conce ded this point in their briefing to the trial court, sta t i n g, “O n e of the
elements of an ‘inverse condemna tion’ case t h at a plaintiff must prove is that the g overnme nt perf ormed intentional act( s).” This element is important in today ’s case b ec au s e Plaintiffs have consistently based their claim on the failure of t h e County to fully implement the Pate Plan,
combined with its alleg ed approva l of “unmitiga ted” private development. May s’ third expert repor t,
for example, assig ns two cause s for the flooding : “[u] nmitigated land development, approve d by the County ,” and “[f]ailure of t he [ District] to fully implem en t t h e 1984 Pate P lan.” But the l aw does

not r ecog nize taking s liabilit y for a failure to complete the Pate Plan, de spite Plaintiffs’ attempt to

1 5 1 S

. W

. 3 d 5 4 6 , 5 5 5 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. 8

I d

. a t 5 5 0 , 5 5 2

. 9

1 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 1 0 , 3 1 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. S e e a l s o i d

. ( “ O u r e a r l i e r j u r i s p r u d e n c e h a s l e f t o p e n 10 t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t l i a b i l i t y m a y b e p r e d i c a t e d o n d a m a g e t h a t i s n e c e s s a r i l y a n i n c i d e n t t o , o r n e c e s s a r i l y a c o n s e q u e n t i a l
r e s u l t o f , t h e a c t o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y
. ” ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d , i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) ; S t a t e v

. H a l e , 1 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d 7 3 1 , 7 3 6 ( T e x
. 1 9 4 1 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t t o b e l i a b l e f o r a t a k i n g , t h e g o v e r n m e n t m u s t “ p e r f o r m c e r t a i n a c t s i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f

i t s l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y
. . . w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n t h e t a k i n g o r d a m a g i n g o f p l a i n t i f f s ’ p r o p e r t y ” ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

.
L i k e s , 9 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 5 0 5

. 11


### 6

## somehow bundl e that inaction wit h the af firmative c onduct of a

pproving development. Assuming
all other elements are met, liability for the taking of Plaintiffs’ proper ties can derive , if at all, from the County ’s af

firmative a cts of appr oving de velopment. 2. Specif icity

I n addition, a specific ity element runs throug h our jurisprudenc e. The case law indicates that
in o rd er to form the requisite int ent, t he gover nment ordinarily knows which property it is taking

. For example, Jennings descr ibes the intent require ment as cover ing situations wher e “a

g overnme ntal entity is awa re that its action will nece ssarily cause phy sical damag e to certain private

proper ty .” The g overnme nt must know that “a specific act is ca using identifiable harm” or know 1 2


## that “ specific p r o

p erty damage is substantially cer tain to result from an authorized g overnme nt
action.” We have not rec og nized liabi l i t y wher e the g overnme nt only knows that someday ,

1 3 

## somewhere, its perf

ormanc e of a g ener al g overnme ntal function such as g ranting permits or approving plats will result in damag e to some unspec ified prope rty

.

3. P ubl ic Use in this Anti-Regulatory Takings Case
This most cer

tainly is not an ordinary reg ulatory taking s case , one wher e the plaintiff complains that the g overnme nt throug h reg ulation so burdene d his proper ty as t o d eny him its
economic value or unrea sonably interfe re with its use and enjoy ment. Today ’s case does not fit this 1 4

J e n n i n g s , 1 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 1 4 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. 12

I d

. ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ; a c c o r d C i t y o f S a n A n t o n i o v

. P o l l o c k , 2 8 4 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 9 , 8 2 1 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 9 )

. 13

S e e M a y h e w v

. T

o w n o f S u n n y v a l e , 9 6 4 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 2 , 9 3 5 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( “ A c o m p e n s a b l e r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g 14

c a n a l s o o c c u r w h e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s i m p o s e r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t e i t h e r ( 1 ) d e n y l a n d o w n e r s o f a l l e c o n o m i c a l l y v i a b l e u s e o f t h e i r p r o p e r t y , o r ( 2 ) u n r e a s o n a b l y i n t e r f e r e w i t h l a n d o w n e r s ’ r i g h t s t o u s e a n d e n j o y t h e i r p r o p e r t y
. ” )

. 

### 7

## body of taking s jurisprudenc e and is in a sense its antithesis. First, Plaintiff s ar e n o t co m plaining
about reg ulation of their proper ty but r eg ulation of other private proper ties. Second, the complaint
is not excessive reg

ulation, b u t insufficient reg ulation via the alleg ed approva l of “unmitiga ted development.” Plaintiff

s s i m i l ar l y complain that in abandoning the Pate Plan the County did not

reg ulate enoug h.
This unchar

ted theory s h o u l d g ive the Court pause to ponder whether the claim, even if
fac tually supported, is the stuff of a con s tituti onal taking

. I f a private develope r, afte r routine

approva l of its plat, uses its proper ty in a m an n er causing damag e to other proper ties, might the

reme d y lie ag ainst the develope r rathe r than the county ? One can cer tainly arg ue that if the 1 5



## g overnme nt’s alleg ed aff

irmative conduct is nothing bey ond allowing private develope rs to use their

proper ty as they wish, the more appropr iate reme dy is a claim ag ainst the private develope rs rathe r
than a novel taking s claim ag ainst the g overnme nt. The homeowner s in fac t sued private develope rs
and other private parties, and neither side contends that reme dies ag ainst such parties do not exis t. 1 6 

## One way of analy

zing t h i s q u estion is throug h the element of publ ic us e. Article I , section
17 o f o u r Constit ution provides for compensa tion wher e the proper

ty is “take n, damag ed or destroy ed for or applied to public use.” We have rec og nized that a taking may occur “if an injury

resu l t s from either the construction of public works or their subsequent maintenanc e and

S e e C i t y o f K e l l e r , 1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 3 3 ( O ’ N e i l l , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t r e v i e w o f s u b d i v i s i o n p l a t s “ i s 15 i n t e n d e d t o p r o t e c t t h e c i t y ’ s r e s i d e n t s ; i t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o t r a n s f e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f

o r a f l a w e d s u b d i v i s i o n d e s i g n f r o m t h e d e v e l o p e r s t o t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y ” )

.

S e e i d

. a t 8 3 5 ( O ’ N e i l l , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g ) ( “ [ W ] h e n a p r i v a t e d e v e l o p m e n t f l o o d s n e i g h b o r i n g l a n d , t h e o w n e r 16

o f t h e d a m a g e d p r o p e r t y w i l l o r d i n a r i l y h a v e r e c o u r s e a g a i n s t t h e p r i v a t e p a r t i e s c a u s i n g t h e d a m a g e
. ” ) ( c i t i n g T E X

. W A T E R C O D E § 1 1

. 0 8 6 )

. 

### 8

## opera tion,” but we have not held that the public-use element is met wher e t h e go v er n ment does 1 7 

## nothing more than appr ove plats or building permits for pr ivate deve lopment. Plaintiffs arg ue that the public-use element i s met here beca use we held i t was met in City of Keller v. W

ilson

. That case is fac tually distinguishable. I n City of Keller , the city adopted a master
draina g e plan that called for a draina g e ease ment on land belong ing to the plaintiffs, the Wil sons. 1 8


## The ease ment was to contain a ditch, and the plan orig inally called for the city to condemn 2.8 acr es
of the Wil son proper

ty for construction of the ditch. The ditch would trave rse the Wil sons’ proper ty 1 9


## and other proper

ties and terminate in a cre ek. Deve lopers wer e require d to c omply with the plan, 2 0


## and b u i lt a ditch on an adjac ent proper ty , the Sebastian proper

ty , but made no provision for a
draina g e ease ment acr oss the Wil sons’ proper ty

. The city built a culver t to the cre ek, but it did not 2 1



## connec t the ditch to the culver t as planned beca

use neither the city nor the develope rs purcha sed an

ease ment on the Wil sons’ proper ty , nor did they extend t h e d i tch acr oss the Wil son proper ty as planned. The result was that the Wil son proper ty would flood when it raine d. Wit hout any 2 2 2 3 

## analy sis of the public-use e lement, we a g ree d with the court of appeals t hat t his element had been

L i k e s , 9 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 5 0 5

. 17

1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 0 9

. 18

S e e C i t y o f K e l l e r v

. W i l

s o n , 8 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 3 , 7 0 2 ( T e x
. A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h 2 0 0 2 ) , r e v e r s e d , 1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 2 19 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 5 )

.

I d

. ; C i t y o f K e l l e r , 1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 0 8

. 20

C i t y o f K e l l e r , 1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 0 8

. 21

I d

. 22

I d

. 23


### 9

## s at i s fi ed , but we ultimately held that the intent element had not been established, due to lac k o f 2 4 

## “proof that the City knew the plans it approve d wer e substantially cer tain to incre ase flooding on the
Wil sons’ proper

ties.” 2 5 

## City of Keller i s fa ct ually distinguishable beca use the city there planned to condemn an

ease ment and buil d a d i tch acr oss the plaintiffs’ proper ty , knowing draina g e acr oss that specific

proper ty was part of the master plan. The jury found that the failure to bu i l d t h at l eg o f the ditch resulted in flooding on the Wils on proper ty . As the cour

t of appe als rea soned: Clearly , had the City used its power s of eminent domain to condemn a portion of the Wil son proper

ty for an ease ment, that use would have been a “publi c u s e” to implement the City ’s Master Dra inag e Pl an
. The fac t that the City chose not to condemn any of t he W ilson proper ty and to inste ad , in violation of t he P lan, allow the water flowing from the Sebastian ease ment to discharg e, uncontrolled, acr oss the Wil son proper

ty shows that the invasion of the Wil son proper ty by the water flowing from the Seba stian ease ment was for “public use.” 2 6



## Henc e, the p u blic-use element as to the particula r plaintiffs was not established mere ly by the

approva l of private development on other proper ties. I n t o d ay ’s case , there was no compar able 2 7 

## proof that th e C o unty intended to purcha se ease ments on Plaintiffs’ particula r proper ties and

construct draina g e fac iliti es as part of a master plan, such that with or without suc h ease ments and
draina g e fac iliti es runoff would under the plan trave rse the plaintiffs’ proper ties. T h e p u b l ic-use

I d

. a t 8 3 0

. 24

I d

. 25

C i t y o f K e l l e r , 8 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 0 8

. 26

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s e x p r e s s l y h e l d t h a t “ t h e C i t y ’ s l i a b i l i t y i s n o t b a s e d m e r e l y o n i t s a p p r o v a l o f t h e 27 d e v e l o p e r ’ s p l a n s
. ” I

d

. a t 7 0 1 n
. 2

. S e e a l

s o C i t y o f K e l l e r , 1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 3 3 ( O ’ N e i l l , J

. c o n c u r r i n g ) ( “ [ T ] h e C i t y ’ s m e r e a p p r o v a l o f t h e p r i v a t e d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n s d i d n o t r e s u l t i n a t a k i n g f o r p u b l i c u s e , a s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d r e q u i r e s f o r a c o m p e n s a b l e t a k i n g
. ” )

. 

### 1 0

## element was more appar ent in City of Keller beca use with or without the ease ment and ditch t h e plaintiffs’ land would by

city desig n be available to car ry runoff to the cre ek. Similarly , in Gragg , the defe ndant water district denied that it had inversely condemne d ranc h proper ty by rele asing water throug h rese rvoir floodg ates, but counter claimed for a flowag e ease ment if the court found that the

proper ty had been inversely condemne d. The trial court g rante d such an ease ment on the portion of
the ranc h subject to flooding

. And in Kopplow Dev elopment, Inc. v. City of San Antonio , when the 2 8 

## City decide d to build a detention fac ility it “knew the projec t would i n u n d at e part of [pl aintiff] Kopplow’s proper

ty befor e it ever beg an construction, promptin g the City to seek a draina g e

ease ment from Kopplow.” I n today ’s case , in c ontrast, whether viewed throug h the lens of intent 2 9



## or public use, there was no evidenc e that the County ever had desig ns on Plaintiffs’ particula r
proper ties, and intended to use those proper ties to acc omplish a specific f lood control measur e.
I also find the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision i n K el o v. City of New
London fac tually and leg ally distinguishable. I n Kelo , a city authorized a private nonprofit entity

3 0 3 1



## to condemn proper

ty as part of an economic revitalizati on plan. The city claimed and the Court 3 2



## acc epted that the public-use require ment was met beca use the plan would enhan ce t h e o v erall

G r a g g , 1 5 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 5 0

. 28

3 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 5 3 2 , 5 3 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 3 )

. 29

5 4 5 U

. S

. 4 6 9 ( 2 0 0 5 )

. 30

K e l o w a s a f

e d e r a l t a k i n g s c a s e , b u t w e h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t f e d e r a l a n d T e x a s t a k i n g s j u r i s p r u d e n c e a r e 31 g e n e r a l l y c o n s i s t e n t

. S e e H e a r t s B l u f f G a m e R a n c h , I

n c

. v

. S t a t e , 3 8 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 8 , 4 7 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 ) ; E d w a r d s A q u i f e r A u t h

. v

. D a y , 3 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d 8 1 4 , 8 3 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 )

.

K e l o , 5 4 5 U

. S

. a t 4 7 3

– 7 5

. 32


### 1 1

## economic he alth of the c ommunity

. But Kelo was not an inve rse c ondemnation ca se like today ’s 3 3



## case
. I n Kelo , the g overnme nt, throug h an ag ent, condemne d plaintiffs’ proper ties for an alleg ed public purpose. I ndisputably the plaintiffs’ proper ties wer e taken from them by g overnme nt action.

I n today ’s case , wher e the only aff irmative conduct that alleg edly damag ed Plaintiffs’ proper ties was
the approva l of private development, there i s i n my view a rea l question whether a taking by the

g overnme nt even occur

red, that is, whether the homeowner s’ claim even belong s i n t h e world of taking s jurisprudenc e and is proper ly analy zed as a taking s claim. I n Kelo the plaintiffs arg ued that 3 4


## there was no public use within the ambit of the fede ral Taking s Clause, in hopes of disallowing the taking of their land; here the Plaintiffs are in a completely differ ent posture, arg uing that the approva l
of private development was a public use, so as to establish that a taking within the ambit of the Texas Taking s Clause actua lly occur red. I n light of these fac tual and leg al disti n ct i o n s , K elo does not compel a r esult one wa

y or the other

in today ’s ca se.
The Washington Supreme Cour t considere d a case wher e plaintiffs filed an inverse
condemna tion claim ag ainst a county , alleg ing that plai n t i ff s ’ proper ty flooded afte r the county

approve d a development plat for a neig hboring proper ty

. The Court he ld tha t me re approva l of the plat could not support a taking s claim:

I f all the County had done was to approve private development, then one of the elements of an in v er s e condemnation claim, that the g overnme nt has damag ed the [pl aintiffs’] proper

ty for a public purpose, would be missing. There is no p u blic

I d

. a t 4 8 3

– 8 4

. 33

I u n d e r s t a n d J U S T IC E L E H R M A N N ’ s d i s s e n t t o u r g e t h a t i f a t a k i n g f

o r p u b l i c u s e i s c o m p e n s a b l e , t h e n s u r e l y 34

a t a k i n g f

o r p r i v a t e u s e w o u l d a l s o b e c o m p e n s a b l e
. I c e r t a i n l y a g r e e
. M y p o i n t h e r e , h o w e v e r , i s t o q u e s t i o n , u n d e r t h e r u b r i c o f p u b l i c u s e , w h e t h e r t h e C o u r t s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e t h a t a t a k i n g e v e n o c c u r r e d g i v e n t h e f a c t s o f t o d a y ’ s c a s e
. 

### 1 2

## aspec t when the County ’s only action is to approve a private development under then

exis ting reg ulations. F urthermor e, the eff ect of such automatic liability would have a complete ly

unfair r esult. 3 5


## The approva l of private development in this case —doing nothing more than allowing private parties to use t heir proper t i es as t hey wish—prese nts at best a highly attenuate d basis for meeting
the public-use element of a taking s claim. I n light of this a nd other considerations, I find the claim leg ally defic ient.
C. The Unavoid able Tension Between Taki ngs Ju risprudence

and S overe ign Imm uni ty
Whil e compen s at i o n t o those whose proper ty is taken for public use is an important and constitutionally imposed obliga tion of democr atic g overnme nt, g overnme nts must also be allowed

to survive financ ially and car ry out their public functions. They cannot be expected to insure ag ainst

ever y misfortune occur

ring within their g eog raphic al boundarie s, on the theory that they could have
done more. No g overnme nt could aff ord such obliga tions. J ustices J ackson and Gol dberg both

rec og nized that the Bill of Rights is not a suicide pa ct. 3 6


## This Court has repe atedly , rec ently , and unanimously rec og nized that strong j u d i ci al
protec tion for individual proper ty ri gh t s i s essential to “fr eedom itself.” L ocke deeme d the 3 7

P h i l l i p s v

. K i n g C n t

y

. , 9 6 8 P

. 2 d 8 7 1 , 8 7 8 ( W a s h

. 1 9 9 8 )

. 35

T e r m i n i e l l o v

. C i t

y o f C h i c a g o , 3 3 7 U

. S

. 1 , 3 7 ( 1 9 4 9 ) ( J a c k s o n , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( “ T h e r e i s d a n g e r t h a t , i f t h e 36 C o u r t d o e s n o t t e m p e r i t s d o c t r i n a i r e l o g i c w i t h a l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l w i s d o m , i t w i l l c o n v e r t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l B i l l o f R i g h t s i n t o a s u i c i d e p a c t

. ” ) ; K e n n e d y v

. M e n d o z a
- M a r t i n e z , 3 7 2 U

. S

. 1 4 4 , 1 6 0 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ( “ [ W ] h i l e t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o t e c t s a g a i n s t i n v a s i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , i t i s n o t a s u i c i d e p a c t

. ” )

.

T e x

. R i c e L a n d P a r t n e r s , L t d

. v

. D e n b u r y G r e e n P i

p e l i n e
- T e x

. , L L C , 3 6 3 S

. W

. 3 d 1 9 2 , 2 0 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 )

. 37


### 1 3

## prese rvation of proper ty rig hts “[t] he g rea t and chief end” of g overnme nt, a view we echoe d almost 3 8



## 300 y ear s later, calling it “one of the most important purposes of g overnme nt.” I ndividual proper ty 3 9 

## rig hts are a foundational liberty , not a conting ent privileg e. They are “funda mental, natura l, inhere nt, inalienable, not de rived fr om the leg islature and a s pree x isting eve n constitutions.” 4 0



## But there is alway s tension betwee n the compensa tion obliga tion of the Taking s Clause and
the necessar

y doctrine of sovere i gn i m munity , also a doctrine of constit utional signific ance
. We 4 1 

## long a g o rec og nized that where g overnme nt conduct ca used dama g e to a plaintiff’ s proper ty , One’ s normal rea ction is that he should be compensa ted there for. On the other hand, the doctrine of the non-sua bility of the state is g rounded upon sound public policy

. I f the state wer e suable and liable for eve ry tortious act of its ag ents, serva nts, and employ ees committed in the perf ormanc e of their officia l duties, there would result
a serious impairment of the public service and the nece ssary administrative functions of g overnme nt would be hamper ed. 4 2



## D. Application of

Taki ngs Law to the F acts P rese nted
Since inaction cannot g ive rise t o a t aking , we cannot consider any alleg ed failure to take
further steps to control flooding , such as the failure to complete the Pate Plan. Since a taking cannot
be premised on neg lige nt cond u c t, we must limit our consideration to aff irmative conduct the County

J O H N L O C K E , S E C O N D T R E A T IS E O F G O V E R N M E N T , C h a p
. I X , S e c
. 1 2 4 ( C

. B

. M a c P h e r s o n , e d

. , H a c k e t t 38 P u b l i s h i n g C o
. 1 9 8 0 ) ( 1 6 9 0 )

.

E g g e m e y e r v

. E g g e m e

y e r , 5 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 1 3 7 , 1 4 0 ( T e x
. 1 9 7 7 )

. 39

I d

. 40

S e e , e

. g

. , A l d e n v

. M a i n e , 5 2 7 U

. S

. 7 0 6 , 7 3 3 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ( “ A l t h o u g h t h e s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y o f t h e S t a t e s d e r i v e s 41

a t l e a s t i n p a r t f

r o m t h e c o m m o n - l a w t r a d i t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d h i s t o r y o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n m a k e c l e a r t h a t t h e i m m u n i t y e x i s t s t o d a y b y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e s i g n
. ” )

.

T e x

. H i g h w a y D e

p ’ t v

. W e b e r , 2 1 9 S

. W

. 2 d 7 0 , 7 1

– 7 2 ( T e x
. 1 9 4 9 )

. 42


### 1 4

## was substantially cer tain would cause flooding to Plaintiffs’ pro perties and that would not have taken place otherwise. The only aff irmative conduct on which Plaintiffs rely is the approval o f p rivate develop me nt. Fur

ther, Plaintiffs offe red no proof that the County was substantially cer tain Plaintiffs’ particula r proper ties would flood if the County approve d new housing developments. Plaintiffs did

not even asser

t s u ch a claim, claiming instead that the County was substantially cer tain that its
actions in approving “unmitiga ted development” wo u l d result in flooding “in the vicinity of
Plaintiffs’ proper

ties.” Plaintiffs never ex p l ai n ed whether the “vicinity ” is a few square miles or
hundreds of square miles. They never identified prec isely or ev en ap p ro x imately the are a of unmitigated development. The Pate Plan de scribed the Whit e Oak Ba y ou water shed as 110 square
miles in siz e. Plaintiffs’ expert May s admitted that “I haven’ t been asked to do any thing conce rning specific plaintiffs.” The County ’s expe rt , Melvin Spinks, ag ree d that “May s was unable to
demonstrate that any actions of Def endants wer e the proxi mate cause of flooding of any particula r
Pl aintiff’s proper

ty ,” nor did May s “dete rmine the causa tion of flooding subdivision b y s u b d iv is io n
. ”

I n the trial court , the County acc urate ly descr ibed Plaintiffs’ particula r parc els as “sca ttered in a
chec ker boa

rd fa shion in the upper White Oak B ay ou water shed, stretc hing se vera l miles.”

Fur ther, Plaintiffs offe red no evidenc e that the County was consciously awa re that approva l
of unmitigated development in one define d are a, such as a specific blo ck o r neig hborhood, was substantially likely to cause flooding in another specific ally define d are a of the W hite Oak Bay ou

water shed that included Plaintiffs’ homes. The County offe red evidenc e to the contra ry
. District
Direc tor David Talbott attested t h at “[ t ] he Dist rict di d not approve of l and development knowing
that there was inadequa te stormwater runoff mitigation associate d with a particula r development,”

1 5

## and point ed out that the Dis trict was taske d wi t h addre ssing severe flooding problems not only in

the Whit e Oak Ba

y ou water shed wher e Plaintiffs resided, but also in the Clear Creek, Gre ens Ba y ou, Cy press Creek, and Br ay s Ba y ou water sheds. Whil e Plaintiffs number 400 who suffe red flood damag e during three events, Talbott pointed out tha t T ropica l Storm Allison a lone flooded 73,000
residenc es. Talbott and the vic e pre sident of Klotz both attested that it is ag ainst District policy to
“move a flood”—spar ing one neig hborhood that would other wi s e flood by causing another neig hborhood to flood. Talbott also attested: “Althoug h Whit e Oak Ba y ou was alway s a high priority , with limit ed Dist rict funding the District also had to consider other hi g h p ri ority projec ts throug hout the County

. District funds that wer e available wer e allocate d to various projec ts around the County , with Whi te Oak B ay ou rec eiving an appr opriate sha re.”
This case is qualitatively differ ent from rec ent case s wher e we rec og nized a taking , Kopplow
and Gr a g g
. I n K o p p low the city “knew the projec t would inundate part of [pl aintiff] Kopplow’s

proper ty ” and soug ht a draina g e ease ment from Kopplow, the city ’s projec t resulted in only one other

proper ty being place d below the 100-y ear flood plain, and the city obtained a draina g e ease ment on
that other proper

ty

. I n Gragg , one of the flood control district’s experts acknow ledg ed that his own 4 3 

## modeling showed t hat hi g her than natura l flooding would occur on the pl aintiffs’ pa rticular ranc h
in 10 out of 16 floods, the district’s rec ords showed hundreds of rele ases by the district sufficie nt to

cause flooding on the ranc h, and there was evidenc e that the ranc h had suffe red “a larg e number of
floods” afte r the district beg an the rele ases, wher eas befor e the district’s actions the ranc h had never

K o p p l o w , 3 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 3 7

– 3 8

. 43


### 1 6

## suffe red from extensive flood damag e. I n today ’s case , in contra st, the rec ord is devoid of evidenc e 4 4


## the County knew, at the time it alleg edly appr o v ed “unmi tiga ted” development, that Plaintiffs’ particula r properties would suffe r flooding. W e reco gn i z ed in Jennings that a taking occurs when

proper ty is “damag ed for

public use” in circumstance s where “a g overnme ntal entity is awar e that
its action will nece ssarily cause phy sical damag e to cer tain private proper

ty .” A conscious decision 4 5 

## to damag e ce rtain private proper ty for a public use is absent he re.
The homeowner s contend that Kopplow and Gragg are helpful to their case b ec au s e both
decisions rec og nized that the rec urre nce of flooding is probative on the issue of intent. But we also 4 6 

## held, in City of San Antonio v. Pollock , that when deciding intent in the taking s contex t , “[ t ]he

g overnme nt’s knowledg e must be deter mined as of the time it acte d, not with benef it of hindsight.” 4 7


## This rule limit s the persua siveness of Plaintiffs’ arg ument. Plaintiffs alleg ed i n their petition that “[m] ost, if not all of the plaintiffs here in, had never flooded befor e September, 1998,” the Hurric ane
Fr ancis flooding and the first of three floods about which they complain. Their rec urre nce arg ument

to us i s t h at “P l ai n tiffs’ homes flooded three times in five y ear s in 1998, 2001, and 2002.” They
contend these three flooding events are “proba tive evidenc e of intent under this Court’s holdings in Kopplow and Gragg .” But their expert, May s, opined that the unmitigated development that cause d

G r a g g , 1 5 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 5 0 , 5 5 2

. 44

1 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 1 4

. 45

S e e K o p p l o w , 3 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 3 7 ( s t a t i n g t h a t “ [ w ] i t h f l o o d w a t e r i m p a c t s , r e c u r r e n c e i s a p r o b a t i v e f a c t o r 46 i n a s s e s s i n g i n t e n t a n d t h e e x t e n t o f t h e t a k i n g ” ) ; G r a g g , 1 5 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 5 5 ( s t a t i n g t h a t “ [ i ] n t h e c a s e o f f l o o d

- w a t e r i m p a c t s , r e c u r r e n c e i s a p r o b a t i v e f a c t o r i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e e x t e n t o f t h e t a k i n g a n d w h e t h e r i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y i n c i d e n t t o a u t h o r i z e d g o v e r n m e n t a c t i v i t y , a n d t h e r e f o r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y c e r t a i n t o o c c u r ” )

.
2 8 4 S

. W

. 3 d 8 0 9 , 8 2 1 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 9 )

. 47


### 1 7

## the flooding of their homes ended no later than 1990, y ear s befor e the three flooding events. 4 8



## Plaintiffs’ rec urre nce a

rg ument is made with the bene fit of hindsight.

T he determination of whether a taking has occurre d is ultimately a question of l aw for t h e

court. The deter

mination does not alway s lend itself to simple rules an d s ometimes turns on the 4 9


## conflue nce of particula

r circ umstances prese nted. I would hold the homeowner s have not p r e sented 5 0 

## a cognizable takings claim where (1) the County never desired to c ause f

looding, but desire d only
the opposit e, (2 ) it undertook signific ant eff orts to preve nt flooding , spending tens of milli ons of
dollars over many y ear s, (3) the County never intended, as part of a flood control plan, to use
Plaintiffs’ particula

r proper ties for detention ponds, draina g e ease ments, or the l i k e, (4) the only
aff irmative conduct alleg edly causing the flooding was approva l of private development, (5) Plaintiffs offe red no proof that the County was substantially cer tain that its approva l of development would result in the flooding of Plaintiff’s particula r lots, and (6) even by Pl aint iffs’

rec koning the flooding resulted from multipl e cause s—Acts o f God, the activities of other 5 1

S e e s u p r a n o t e 2

. 48

C i t y o f A u s t i n v

. T

r a v i s C n t y

. L a n d f i l l C o

. , 7 3 S

. W

. 3 d 2 3 4 , 2 4 1 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 2 )

. 49

F o r e x a m p l e , c o u r t s h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o s t a t e a “ s e t f o r m u l a ” f

o r w h e n r e g u l a t o r y t a k i n g s o c c u r
. 50 E d w a r d s A q u i

f e r A u t h

. , 3 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 3 9 ( q u o t i n g P e n n C e n t

. T r a n s p

. C o

. v

. N e w Y

o r k C i t y , 4 3 8 U

. S

. 1 0 4 , 1 2 4 ( 1 9 7 8 ) )

. “ T h e [ U n i t e d S t a t e s ] S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s f r e q u e n t l y n o t e d t h a t w h e t h e r a p a r t i c u l a r p r o p e r t y r e s t r i c t i o n i s a t a k i n g d e p e n d s l a r g e l y u p o n t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n t h a t c a s e
. ” H e a r t s B l u f f G a m e R a n c h , I

n c

. v

. S t a t e , 3 8 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 8 , 4 7 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 ) ( b r a c k e t s , i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d )

.

T h e i r b r i e f t o u s , f

o r e x a m p l e , s t a t e s t h e o b v i o u s : “ O f c o u r s e , w i t h o u t e x c e s s i v e r a i n f a l l n o f l o o d i n g w o u l d 51 h a v e o c c u r r e d

. ”


### 1 8

## defe ndants, the alleg ed failure to complete the Pate Plan, and the approva l of private development. 5 2


## This is not a case wher e the g overnme nt made a conscious decision to subject particula r proper ties

to inundation so that other proper ties would be spare d, as happens when a g overnme nt builds a flood
control dam knowing that cer tain proper

ties will be flooded by the resulting rese rvoir. I n such case s
of cour se the g overnme nt must compensate the owne rs who lose their la nd to the rese rvoir.

I fea r Plaintiffs’ theory of taking s, which the Court acc epts, vastly and unwisely expands the liability of gover

nmental entit ies. I t would appea r t o cover many scena

rios wher e the g overnme nt
has no desig ns on a particula r plaintiff’s proper

ty , but only knows that somewhe re, someday , its
routine g overnme ntal opera tions will likely cause damag e to some as y et unidentified proper ty

. I
would not embra ce a new approa ch to taking s that might eff ectively abolish much traditional faultbased tort law, swallow much of sovere ign immunit y , and disru p t t h e ca ref ully cra fted waiver of
immunit y found in the Tort Claims Act. We have stat ed that sovere ign immunit y is universally

rec og nized and fundame ntal to the nature and functioning of g overnme nt, and that we leave it to the

L eg islatur e to make chang es to that doctrine, as it has done in the Tort Claims Act. There fore , I 5 3

S e e , e

. g

. , K e r r v

. H a r r i s C n t y
. , 1 7 7 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 0 , 2 9 5 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 5 , n o p e t

. ) 52 ( “ P l a i n t i f

f s a l s o s u e d J o n e s & C a r t e r , a n e n g i n e e r i n g c o m p a n y i n v o l v e d i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f B r o o k h o l l o w s u b d i v i s i o n , a l l e g i n g t h a t J o n e s & C a r t e r ‘ w a s n e g l i g e n t i n f a i l i n g t o p r o v i d e f

o r a d e q u a t e s t o r m w a t e r d e t e n t i o n / r e t e n t i o n f a c i l i t i e s o r i n s o m e o t h e r m a n n e r [ t o ] a d e q u a t e l y m i t i g a t e t h e i n c r e a s e d s t o r m w a t e r r u n o f f c r e a t e d i n c o n

j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e W h i t e O a k B a y o u w a t e r s h e d u p s t r e a m o f P l a i n t i f f s ’ p r o p e r t i e s
. ’ ” ) ; K e r r v

. T e x

. D e p ’ t o f T r a n s p

. , 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d 2 4 8 , 2 4 9 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 1 , n o p e t

. ) ( “ P l a i n t i f f s s p e c i f i c a l l y p l e a d e d t h a t T x D o t ’ s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f f

e e d e r l a n e s o n B e l t w a y 8 a n d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f p o r t i o n s o f H i g h w a y 2 9 0 i n t h e 1 9 8 0 s a n d 1 9 9 0 s i n c r e a s e d s t o r m w a t e r r u n o f f t h a t ‘ d e t r i m e n t a l l y i m p a c t e d ’ p l a i n t i f f s , w h o w e r e d o w n s t r e a m o f t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s
. ” )

. A s n o t e d
a b o v e , P l a i n t i f

f s a l s o s u e d m u n i c i p a l u t i l i t y d i s t r i c t s a n d p r i v a t e d e v e l o p e r s
.
W e h a v e n o t e d t h a t s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y i s “ i n h e r e n t i n t h e n a t u r e o f s o v e r e i g n t y ” a n d “ a n e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e 53

o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n a l l c i v i l i z e d n a t i o n s
. ” W i c h i t a F a l l s S t a t e H o s p

. v

. T a y l o r , 1 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 2 , 6 9 5 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( q u o t i n g T H E F E D E R A L IS T N o
. 8 1 , a t 4 8 7 ( A l e x a n d e r H a m i l t o n ) ( C l i n t o n R o s s i t e r e d

. , 1 9 6 1 ) a n d B e e r s v

. A r k a n s a s , 6 1 U

. S

. 5 2 7 , 5 2 9 ( 1 8 5 7 ) )

. “ W e h a v e h e l d

. . . t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i s b e t t e r s u i t e d t o b a l a n c e t h e c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i c y i s s u e s a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h w a i v i n g i m m u n i t y
. ” I d

. S e e a l s o T

e x

. N a t u r a l R e s

. C o n s e r v a t i o n C o m m ’ n v

. I T

- D a v y , 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d 8 4 9 , 8 5 4 ( T e x
. 

### 1 9

## believe so swee ping an expansion of taking s jurisprudenc e should be made only for the sound est

rea sons—rea sons that esca pe me h ere—g iven the corr esponding and massive contra ction in the

scope of sovere ign immunit y that would follow. Whil e the rig ht to compensa tion for a taking i s constitutionally

mandated, sove reig n immunit y is also a matter of

constitutional significa

nce.
Plaintiffs’ notion of a taking , embra ced by the Court, is expansive indeed. Take , for example,

a g overnme nt such as the City of Austin that supplies elec tric utilit y service to its citizens. I t surely
knows that in r

unning power lines throug hout the service are a, fire s or other damag ing events will

occa sionally occur when acts of nature knock down l ines or pol es. W itness the recent devastating
fires in the Ba strop are a al l ege dly cause d by power lines. The g overnme nt also surely knows that

some private properties—those adjace nt to the l ines, or, i n Plaintiffs’ verna cular , “in the vicinity ” of the lines, are e specia lly vulnera ble to such dama g e. Unde r the Court’s de cision, an Ac t of God,
such as a bolt of lightning , that cause s a high- voltag e line to topple or a transfor mer to blow, which
in turn cause s damag e to a pr ivate property , is arg uably a taking on the notion that prope rties nea r
the g rid h av e b een “sac rifice d” for the g rea ter public g ood of providing elec tricity service to the
whol e co m m u n i ty

. Neg lige nt maintenanc e of the utilit y g rid is irrele vant, so long as the city is substantially cer

tain that fires somewher e, someday , will occur along the g rid, as surely is the case
. I t ma tters not tha

t a storm c ontributed to the downed line, since in today ’s ca se storms also play ed

an essential role. Traditional fault-ba sed tort law, sovere ign immunit y , and the Tort Claims Act are

2 0 0 2 ) ( “ W e h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y d e f e r r e d t o t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t o w a i v e s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y f r o m s u i t , b e c a u s e t h i s a l l o w s t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t o p r o t e c t i t s p o l i c y m a k i n g f u n c t i o n
. ” ) ; G u i l l o r

y v

. P o r t o

f H o u s t o n A u t h

. , 8 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d 8 1 2 , 8 1 3 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( “ S i n c e t h e T o r t C l a i m s A c t w a s p a s s e d i n 1 9 6 9 , w e h a v e r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h a t t h e w a i v e r o f g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y i s a m a t t e r a d d r e s s e d t o t h e L e g i s l a t u r e
. ” ) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d )

. 

### 2 0

## irrele vant if the claim is fra med as a taking

. The hy

pothetical is arg uably a strong er case for a taking
than today ’s case , since providing an elec tric utilit y g rid is unquestionably a public use, wher eas in today ’s ca s e the only aff

irmative conduct alleg edly resulting in a taking was g ranting approva l of private de velopment, per

haps not a public use at all.
Or take any larg e city , school district, or other g overnme ntal entity that has a flee t of vehicles.
The g overnme nt surely knows its vehicles reg u l ar l y have acc idents causing damag e to private

proper ty

. The g overnme nt also surely knows that collisions will occ u r wi th g rea ter fre quency in

cer tain are as, such as along bus routes or near t h e garba g e truck depot, s chool bus lot, etc., where
the g overnme nt’s vehicular traff ic is conce ntrated. Under Plaintiffs’ theory , eac h acc ident resulting
in damag e to private proper ty in a highe r-r isk are a would appea r to be a compensa

ble taking , ag ain

on the theory that this proper ty has b ee n “sac rifice d” for the g rea ter g ood of providing city -wide public transporta tion. The claim is a rg uably strong er than the claim in today ’s case , since (1) there
is no Act of G od that can be assigned at least part of t he causation, (2) the city in the hy pothetical
is not just substantially cer tain but a bsolutely cer

tain that acc idents will occur, a nd (3) providing a
ci t y b u s sy stem is unquestionably a publi c use, unlike approva l of private plats. No need to prove
neg lige nce on the city ’s part; the intent e lement is me t be cause the city is substantially cer

tain that

acc idents happen. No need to predic t exactly wher e the a ccide nts will occur, since in today ’s ca se
the hom eowne rs never contended or offe red proof t hat t he C oun t y fo rmed any intent with respe ct

to their particula

r proper ties. The plaintiffs’ expert on the intent element conce ded, “I haven’ t been
asked to do a

ny thing c oncer

ning spe cific pla intiffs.”

2 1

## Or take any larg e city with its conting ent of high- rise buildings. A city may know that

somewher e, someday , a fire will occur on a floor the city fire trucks cannot rea ch. Suppose a city has a study in ha nd rec ommending larg er ladder trucks, and suppose it f ails to pur chase the trucks due

to funding problems or other priorities. Under the homeowner s’ approa ch, if a fire occur s on a highe r
floor of a building, and damag es adjac ent proper ties, those adjac ent owner s have a taking s claim if they can show that a larg er lad d er truck would have contained the fire. I t does not matter whether the city ’s conduct was reasona ble given it s tax base or funding priorities. I n tod ay ’s ca se, t oo, the

rec ord shows that funding issues play ed a role in the County ’s decisions. All that matters is that the city i s s u ed b u i l ding permits, knowing that somewher e, someday , a fire would likely occur on an
upper floor. This knowledg e supplies th e intent element, and the building permits supply the

causa tion element, reg ardle ss of whether an act of nature started the fire. I t does not matter whether
the building in issu e wa s p ri vately owned, since acc ording to Plaintiffs private owner ship of the

proper ty approve d for de velopment is no bar to re cover y
. Today ’s decision encour ag es g overnme nts to do nothing to preve nt flooding, i n s t ead of study ing and addre ssing t h e problem. As the Court rec og nizes, the homeowner s do not urg e the
exis tence of a g ener al leg al duty on the part o f t h e C ounty to preve nt flooding , brea ch of which
would g ive rise to a private cause of action. Their claim instead is that the County failed to complete
the Pate Plan and approve d private development, behavior alleg edly resulting i n a t aking of their

proper ties. I f various state and fede ral g overnme ntal entities had not commissioned and conducte d
detailed studies of reg ional flooding , the homeowner s would have no basis for contending that the County was substantially cer tain of the link betwe en deve lopment and flooding , and would not be

2 2

## able to use t hat knowledge ag ainst the C oun t y
. I f t h e C ounty had undertaken no eff orts to control flooding , the homeowner s could not asser t the fa i l u re t o complete the Pate Plan as a basis for liability

. III. Conclusi on By acc epting the homeowner s’ ca p ac ious, attenuate d approa ch to taking s, the Court

unnece ssarily expand s t akings liability

. By fra ming their claim as a constitutional taking , the
homeowner s’ claim is unbounde d by any statutory caps on compensa tory damag es the L eg islature might otherwise impose. I fea r today ’s decision will make the g overnme nt an insurer for all manner
of natura l disasters and inevitable man-made acc idents. I t endang ers the ability of g overnme nts to 5 4


## financ e and c arr

y out their nec essar

y functions, the basis for

sovere ign immunity

. The plea to the j urisdiction was well-t ak en and shoul d have been gr anted. I would reve rse
the cour t of appe als’ judg ment and dismiss the case.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Don R. Wi llett J ustice
OP INION DELIVERED: J une 12, 2015

S e e P h i l l i

p s v

. K i n g C n t

y

. , 9 6 8 P

. 2 d 8 7 1 , 8 7 8 ( W a s h

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t c o u n t y i s n o t l i a b l e f o r a t a k i n g i f 54 i t o n l y a p p r o v e s a p r i v a t e d e v e l o p m e n t p l a t , a n d s t a t i n g : “ I f t h e c o u n t y o r c i t y w e r e l i a b l e f o r t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f a p r i v a t e d e v e l o p e r , b a s e d o n a p p r o v a l u n d e r e x i s t i n g r e g u l a t i o n s , t h e n t h e m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , a n d u l t i m a t e l y t h e t a x p a y e r s , w o u l d b e c o m e t h e g u a r a n t o r s o r i n s u r e r s f o r t h e a c t i o n s o f p r i v a t e d e v e l o p e r s w h o s e d e v e l o p m e n t d a m a g e s n e i g h b o r i n g p r o p e r t i e s
. ” )

. 

### 2 3