Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 4, 2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-19-00921-CR

PHILLIP ALVARADO JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1579245

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Phillip Alvarado, Jr. appeals his conviction for murder. A jury 

found appellant guilty, and after appellant pleaded true to an enhancement 

paragraph, the judge assessed punishment at 25 years in prison. In a single issue, 

appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We 

affirm.
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Background

On October 23, 2017, police officers responded to the scene of a shooting at 

a motel in Harris County. There they discovered complainant Danny Garcia lying 

lifeless on the walkway outside of a motel room. A woman, A.M., was near 

complainant with bloodstains on her shirt, “yelling and screaming and crying.” An 

autopsy revealed that complainant died from a “gunshot wound of the torso.” The 

bullet entered through his back and exited through his front.

A.M. testified that she was working as a prostitute at the time and 

complainant was helping her. On the night in question, they stopped at the motel 

because A.M.’s acquaintance, L.R. was staying there and A.M. needed to use the

restroom. L.R. was sharing the room with appellant. A.M. went to L.R.’s room 

while complainant went to talk to a potential client for A.M. A.M. had been to the 

room a few times before to hang out and knew that Appellant used the room to bag 

methamphetamines and that L.R. was also working as a prostitute. 

According to A.M., after she entered the room, complainant returned and 

knocked on the door to the room. Appellant opened the door and appellant and 

complainant began arguing. A.M. did not recall what they were arguing about. 

A.M. moved between the men and tried to grab complainant and thinks she may 

have slapped him once. She said she could tell that the two men were about to fight

and she wanted to remove complainant and herself from the situation. L.R. began 

screaming and A.M. “went deaf.” Appellant and L.R. then hurriedly left as 

complainant fell to the floor and A.M. began to administer CPR.

A.M. said that no one was in the room at the time except appellant,

complainant, herself, and L.R. A.M. further explained that although she did not 

hear a gunshot, it must have been a gunshot that made her “go deaf.” She was 

raised around guns and said that if a gun fires close to a person it will make them 
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go deaf. Appellant had been right behind A.M. during the whole brief encounter as 

she was trying to get complainant to leave. A.M. said that she did not see appellant 

with a gun before or after the shooting, but she had previously seen that he kept 

one in a drawer in the room. After complainant was shot, A.M. pulled him out of 

the room to wait for an ambulance with the help of someone from an adjacent 

room. Another bystander called 911.

A.M. admitted that she was not truthful with police officers when first

questioned after the shooting, denying she knew complainant and telling the

officers that she was using the restroom in a bush when she saw two Hispanic men 

shoot complainant. She explained her subterfuge by saying she was scared and in 

shock at the time and mad and hurt that complainant had died. A.M. acknowledged 

that she had had something to drink and had taken a Valium before the shooting. 

She also had charges pending against her at the time of her testimony, but she said 

she had been willing to testify and met with the prosecutor before those charges 

were filed.

In her testimony, L.R. corroborated that she had known A.M. for a short 

time and on October 23, 2017, A.M. came to the room L.R. was sharing with 

appellant to use the bathroom. L.R. said that only she and appellant were in the 

room at the time. While A.M. was in the bathroom, complainant began beating on 

the door. When appellant opened the door, complainant began “screaming 

belligerently,” saying, “Just pop it, m— f—, just pop it.” L.R. did not recall any 

physical confrontation or seeing A.M. become involved, but she said complainant 

made his way into the room, A.M. yelled, there was a loud gunshot, and 

complainant crumpled to the floor.

L.R. said that she has never carried a gun and did not have one on that day, 

and although she had seen a gun in A.M.’s purse before, that played no role in that 
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night’s events. L.R. said that she knew appellant to have a gun that was readily 

available to him, although she professed she did not know where he kept it. After 

the shot was fired, appellant told L.R., “Get your s— and let’s go.” The two then 

left quickly with L.R. barefoot. L.R. said that before they left, she saw A.M. run to 

complainant and put her arms under his arms. A.M. said she was not going to call 

the cops. L.R. also said that she did not actually see appellant shoot complainant, 

but before they left, she saw a gun on the end of the bed. As they walked away 

from the motel room, appellant told L.R., “I’m sorry.”

Video from a security camera that showed the outside of the motel room 

during the relevant time period was admitted into evidence. The video shows two 

people, identified by an officer as complainant and A.M., pull up to the room.

A.M. goes to the motel room door, and after briefly joining her, complainant walks

further down the walkway in front of the rooms. A male identified as appellant 

opens the door and admits A.M. A short time later, complainant comes back to the 

door, and when the door opens, he steps just inside. There appears to be a

commotion at that point between complainant and A.M. A.M. appears to be 

holding or pushing complainant back, and he appears to be walking past her into 

the room. The door closes again, and a minute or so later, another man and another 

woman, identified as appellant and L.R., emerge and quickly walk away, with L.R.

apparently barefooted. Several minutes later, A.M. emerges and pulls complainant

out onto the walkway with the aid of a neighbor. Eventually, an EMS truck arrives

on scene.

Other evidence demonstrated that appellant and L.R. had rented the room

where the shooting occurred on consecutive nights, including the night of the 

shooting, and DNA likely belonging to appellant was recovered from a beer can

found in the room. A recording of appellant’s interview with police was played for 
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the jury in which appellant asserted he was with his girlfriend on the day in 

question but then admitted to being at the motel but leaving the girl that he was

with there and driving away. Appellant also presented an alibi witness who 

testified that she was appellant’s girlfriend and he was with her at the time of the 

shooting. 

Discussion

In his sole issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction. In reviewing evidentiary sufficiency, we consider all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on 

that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could 

have found the challenged element or elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see also 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). In reviewing historical facts that 

support conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved any conflicts in 

the State’s favor and defer to that resolution. Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166. Each 

fact need not point directly and independently to appellant’s guilt, so long as the 

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the 

conviction. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and 

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. We 

examine events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense

for incriminating evidence. See id.

We do not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substitute our judgment for 

that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. 

Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). As judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses, a jury may choose to believe all, some, or none of the 
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testimony presented. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997).

Appellant was charged with murder under section 19.02(b) of the Texas 

Penal Code, which provides that “[a] person commits an offense if he: (1) 

intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; [or] (2) intends to 

cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that 

causes the death of an individual.” Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b). Appellant argues 

that the evidence was insufficient to prove he caused complainant’s death; instead, 

appellant maintains that the evidence pointed to A.M. as the person who killed 

complainant.

In support of this assertion, appellant makes references to several pieces of 

evidence or inferences gleaned from the evidence, including (1) both A.M. and

L.R. said that they did not actually see appellant shoot complainant; (2) A.M. 

pushed and may have slapped complainant shortly before he was shot; (3) L.R. saw 

a small gun in A.M.’s purse the day before the shooting; (4) complainant was 

either A.M.’s pimp or an angry client, which gave her a motive to shoot him; (5) 

A.M. stated that she was between appellant and complainant when a gun fired; and 

(6) L.R. testified that she saw a gun at the end of the bed before she and appellant 

left the room, suggesting that A.M. must have been the one to dispose of the 

weapon as no gun was found when the room was searched by police. Although 

these are all factors the jury could have considered in making its finding, they do 

not render the evidence insufficient.

As set forth above, although neither A.M. nor L.R. saw appellant shoot 

complainant, their testimony, which was corroborated to a degree by the security 

camera video, strongly supports the conclusion that he did. A.M. testified that 

appellant and complainant were in the middle of an altercation, with appellant 
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immediately behind her to the point where she could feel him and complainant in 

front of her to the point where she could touch him. A gun then fired in close 

proximity to her, causing her to “go deaf” and complainant to fall to the floor. L.R. 

described the scene similarly and said immediately before the gunshot, 

complainant yelled at appellant, “Just pop it, m— f—, just pop it.” Both women 

testified that they knew appellant to have a gun close at hand. Also, according to 

both women, appellant left the scene immediately after the shooting, and L.R. said 

that he told her “I’m sorry” as they walked away from the motel room.

A.M. explained that she was pushing complainant and may have slapped 

him in her attempts to get complainant to leave a volatile situation. Although L.R. 

noted that she had seen a small gun in A.M.’s purse the day before the shooting, 

she also averred that that gun played no role in the shooting. As judge of the 

weight and credibility of witness testimony, the jury was free to believe this 

testimony. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407 n.5. Also, the fact that L.R. saw a gun at 

the end of the bed before she left the room does not necessarily indicate that A.M. 

disposed of the gun or was the shooter. L.R. did not state or suggest that A.M. took 

the gun or shot complainant, and nothing in the record suggests that appellant 

could not have taken the weapon with him when he left. The fact that A.M. was 

reportedly between appellant and complainant does not mean that appellant could 

not have shot complainant.

As stated, although the jury could have considered the points appellant 

raises, these arguments do not establish that A.M. shot complainant or otherwise 

render the evidence insufficient. See Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166; Hooper, 214 

S.W.3d at 13. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue.
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We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Frances Bourliot

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).