alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
189 La. 990

#### SUPERIOR OIL CO. et al. v. LECKELT et al.

No. 34643.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 4, 1938.

Rehearing Denied May 2, 1938.

W. J. & H. W. Waguespack and Denegre, Leovy & Chaffe, all of New Orleans, for appellants.

Emile A. Carmouche, Jr., of Lake Charles, in pro. per. and for appellant William Leckelt.

Liskow & Lewis, of Lake Charles, and F. P. Jones, Jr., of Leesville, for appellees.

PONDER, Justice.

There was no order to consolidate this suit with the suit of Superior Oil Producing Company et al. v. Richard Leckelt et al., La.Sup., 181 So. 462. However, the suits were treated together in the argument and the same points of law raised. We find that in the briefs of plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants’ counsel that they were treated together raising the same issues. We also *469find in the transcript where it is stipulated hy counsel for both sides that the evidence taken in Superior Oil Producing Company et al. v. Richard Leckelt et al., was to be considered as the record in this case, reserving to both sides the right to offer additional evidence. After a careful review of the record in this case, we find that the same legal questions are involved in this case as those raised in Superior Oil Producing Company et al. v. Richard Leckelt et al. Having recited the facts involved in this suit in detail and having disposed of the legal questions presented herein in our opinion this day handed down in Superior Oil Producing Company et al. v. Richard Leckelt et al., it would be unnecessary to again recite these facts and to again discuss these same legal questions.

In this suit a similiar lease, power of attorney, and transfer of mineral rights, was executed by William Leckelt to E. A. Carmouche, Jr. However, in this case, prior to the execution of these instruments, William Leckelt had' only disposed of one-half of his mineral rights. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court was correct in setting aside these instruments only in so far as they affected the rights of the plaintiffs.

For the reasons assigned and the reasons this day handed down in Superior Oil Producing Company et al. v. Richard Leckelt et al., the judgment of the lower court is affirmed at appellants’ cost.
#### In the Matter of Nicole L., an Infant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Same memorandum as in *Matter of Sommerville v Erie County Dept. of Social Servs.,*([appeal No. 1] 163 AD2d 838 [decided herewith]). (Appeal from order of Erie County Family Court, Manz, J.—adoption.) Present—Boomer, J. P., Green, Pine, Davis and Lowery, JJ.
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Annual Report on Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of
Buckeye GP Holdings L.P.; and
 2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report.
 MAINLINE MANAGEMENT LLC, as general partner of the registrantDate:  August 26, 2010
    /s/  FORREST E. WYLIEForrest E. WylieChief Executive Officer
Order entered July 24, 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05 - 19 - 00280 - CR EX PARTE CHRISTOPHER RION On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5

Dallas County, T exas Trial Court Cause No. WX18 - 90101 - L



### O RDER Before the Court is the State’s July 22, 2019 first motion for extension of the time to file the State’s brief. The Court GRANTS the motion and ORDERS the State’s brief filed on or before July 26, 2019

. /s / BILL PEDERSEN, III JUSTICE
#### HOMESTEAD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff—Appellant, v. SHERMAN WAY BILTMORE APARTMENTS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-55578.

D.C. No. CV-01-09644-R.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 3, 2003.

Decided Feb. 24, 2003.

Before D.W. NELSON, WARDLAW and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

The district court improperly abstained from exercising jurisdiction over Sherman Way’s damages action against Homestead and Homestead’s declaratory judgment action against Sherman Way. We decline to reach the merits of Homestead’s constitutional claims because there are factual questions that remain unresolved. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s orders of abstention in these actions and REMAND for further proceedings.

A federal court may not dismiss a damages action or remand it to state court *207based on abstention. *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517*U.S. 706, 711, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996). The district court therefore had no discretion to remand Sherman Way’s damages action on grounds of abstention.

The district court also improperly dismissed Homestead’s declaratory judgment action without stating its reasons for abstaining. *Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol,*133 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (so holding and identifying considerations relevant to abstention). We reverse the dismissal and remand to the district court so that it may reconsider its decision, including taking into account its resolution of the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the related case of *Casden Co. v. Homestead Insurance,*D.C. No. CV-02-00623-R. If the Casden damages action is not remanded to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we can see no reason why the district court should abstain from Homestead’s declaratory judgment action against Sherman Way. *See Md. Cas. Co. v. Knight,*96 F.3d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir.1996) (noting that “[c]ases ... in which there are no parallel state court proceedings ... he at the outer boundaries of the district court’s discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Under such a scenario, the district court would have to reach Homestead’s constitutional claims in any event as defenses to Casden’s and Sherman Way’s damages actions, and thus abstaining from the declaratory judgment action would result in piecemeal litigation. *See id.*If the district court again decides to abstain, it must “record its reasoning in a manner sufficient to permit the proper application of the abuse of discretion standard on appellate review.” *Dizol,*133 F.3d at 1225.

This panel shall retain jurisdiction over any further appeal in this matter. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7018 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7018

   To prohibit the United States Postal Service from carrying out a 
 contract for the procurement of next generation vehicle fleet unless 
 such fleet is at least 75 percent electric or zero emission vehicles, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 9, 2022

Mr. Connolly (for himself, Mr. Sarbanes, Ms. Barragan, Mr. Huffman, Mr. 
Gomez, Ms. Adams, Ms. Pingree, Mr. Casten, Mr. Rush, Mr. Courtney, Mr. 
  Blumenauer, Ms. Newman, Ms. Porter, Mr. Larson of Connecticut, Mr. 
Ryan, Mr. Smith of Washington, Mr. Nadler, Ms. Sherrill, Mr. McGovern, 
Mr. Raskin, Ms. Bass, Mr. Cohen, Ms. Clarke of New York, Mr. Evans, Ms. 
Norton, Mr. Trone, Mr. Welch, Mr. McEachin, Mr. Takano, Mr. Beyer, Ms. 
 Speier, Mr. Garamendi, Mr. Ruppersberger, Ms. Lee of California, Mr. 
Suozzi, Mr. Cooper, Ms. Escobar, Ms. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Schneider, Mr. 
 Mfume, Mr. Tonko, Mr. Bowman, Mr. DeFazio, Ms. Lofgren, Ms. Brownley, 
Mr. Michael F. Doyle of Pennsylvania, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Scanlon, Ms. 
   Titus, Mr. DeSaulnier, Ms. Matsui, Ms. DelBene, Ms. Bonamici, Mr. 
 Quigley, Mr. Cleaver, Mr. Krishnamoorthi, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Soto, Mr. 
    Auchincloss, Ms. Castor of Florida, Mr. McNerney, Mr. Levin of 
    California, Mr. Scott of Virginia, Ms. DeGette, Mr. Thompson of 
California, Mr. Jones, Mr. Garcia of Illinois, Mr. Brendan F. Boyle of 
 Pennsylvania, and Mr. Cardenas) introduced the following bill; which 
         was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To prohibit the United States Postal Service from carrying out a 
 contract for the procurement of next generation vehicle fleet unless 
 such fleet is at least 75 percent electric or zero emission vehicles, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Green Postal Service Fleet Act of 
2022''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CARRYING OUT PROCUREMENT CONTRACT FOR USPS NEXT 
              GENERAL FLEET.

    (a) In General.--The United States Postal Service may not implement 
or otherwise carry out the contract, entered into with Oshkosh Defense, 
for the procurement of postal delivery vehicles unless each purchase of 
vehicles under such contract is at least 75 percent electric or zero 
emission vehicles.
    (b) Compliance.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Postal Service 
shall comply with chapter 83 of title 41, United States Code (popularly 
known as the Buy American Act), and any applicable Federal labor or 
civil rights laws.
                                 <all>
```
#### WELSON v. LAGASSE.

No. 13116.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Jan. 13, 1930.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1930.

Cahn & Cahn, of New Orleans, for appellee.

Paul- W. Maloney, of New Orleans, for appellant.

JANVIER, Judge.

Plaintiff obtained by default judgment for $300 on a draft which had been accepted by defendant. The draft was for more than $300, but, in order to give the First city ' court jurisdiction, plaintiff remitted so much of the claim as was in excess of the jurisdictional limit of that court.

Appellant suggests that the judge erred in rendering judgment for the following reasons: (1) That, prior to the time it was rendered, there had been filed by his counsel a motion that plaintiff be required to furnish a bond for costs; (2) that in the record there is no evidence sufficient to sustain the judgment.

In considering the first contention we find that, at the time the judgment was rendered, defendant had not obtained from the judge an order requiring plaintiff to furnish bond for costs. It is true that, oh the day prior to that on which the judgment was rendered, there had been filed with the clerk of court a motion suggesting that such bond should be executed and filed, but this motion was never handed to the judge, nor was it signed by him.

Under Act No. 136 of 1880, an order of the judge is required fixing the amount of the bond. It was defendant’s duty to see that such order was signed. His failure to obtain it deprives his motion ,of any effect.

With regard to the second contention, we find in the record a note of evidence which shows that: “Counsel for plaintiff offers in evidence the petition, citation with the return thereon showing due service June 1st, 1929, in person and trade acceptance or draft drawn by petitioner on the defendant on February 14th, 1929, and the signature of the defendant thereon, dated February 14th, 1929, and the entire record, as well as the notation of the docket clerk showing no answer filed.”

We also find on the judgment itself the following notation: “Note in evidence.”

We presume that the word “note” refers to the draft or trade acceptance which forms the basis of this suit.

Counsel for defendant contends that we should not consider the note of evidence, because it was never filed. We cannot determine from the record whether the note of evidence was in fact filed, but inasmuch as the record, as it appears before us, was produced by appellant, and inasmuch as the note appears in that record, it seems to us that a rather strong presumption exists that it was actually filed. However, if it was not, the notation on the judgment to the effect that the note was filed in evidence appears to us to be sufficient to warrant the rendering of the judgment in the first instance, Kearney & Co. v. Robt. Fenner & Co., 14 La.Ann. 870, and justifies the affirmance of that judgment.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 173 (Friday, September 5, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51877-51878]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20462]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration


Notice of Intent To Rule on Request To Release Airport Property 
at Seattle Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, WA

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of intent to release airport property.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to rule and invite public comment on the 
release of land at Seattle Tacoma International Airport under the 
provisions of Section 125 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment 
Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21).

DATES: Comments must be received on or before October 6, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this application may be mailed or delivered to 
the FAA at the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 1601 
Lind Ave., SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356. In addition, one copy of 
any comments submitted to the FAA must be mailed or delivered to Mr. 
Mark Reis, Airport Director, Port of Seattle, P.O. Box 68727, Seattle, 
Washington 98409-7322.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Paul Johnson, Project Manager, 
Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest Mountain Region, Airports 
Division, Seattle Airports District Office, 1601 Lind Ave., SW., Suite 
250, Renton, Washington 98057-3356. The request to release property may 
be reviewed in

[[Page 51878]]

person at this same location, by appointment.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA invites public comment on the 
request to release property at the Seattle Tacoma International 
Airport, under the provisions of the AIR 21.
    The Port of Seattle requests the release of 3 acres of airport 
property to the Highline School District. The property is located 
adjacent to Des Moines Way and 8th Ave. and is not needed for airport 
purposes.
    Any person may inspect the request in person at the FAA office 
listed above under: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
    In addition, any person may, upon request, inspect the application, 
notice and other documents germane to the application, in person at the 
Port of Seattle, Acquisition and Relocation Office, 19639 28th Ave. S. 
Bldg. E, SeaTac, Washington 98118-16715.

    Issued in Renton, Washington on August 20, 2008.
Paul Johnson,
Compliance Specialist, Seattle Airports District Office.
[FR Doc. E8-20462 Filed 9-4-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         100,666
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,665
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               104,331
<PP&E>                                              34
<DEPRECIATION>                                      16
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 177,482
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,640
<BONDS>                                         42,882
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        11,226
<OTHER-SE>                                     121,734
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   177,482
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                21,231
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,423
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,317
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,162
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,329
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,329
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 19,584
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    25,913
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.31
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.31
         

</TABLE>
#### Industrial Bank of Schenectady, Plaintiff, *v.*Walter Jack et al., Defendants.

County Court, Schenectady County,

January 22, 1957.

*524
      *Gerald E. Hennessy*for Matthew J. Maderic, defendant.

*George E. Severson*for plaintiff.

Archibald C. Wemple, J.

This action was commenced on January 12, 1953, on a conditional sales contract to recover the balance owing to the plaintiff, as assignee from Kaye-Kars, Inc., because of the failure of the defendant, Walter Jack, in making monthly payments in accordance with said contract for the sale of a 1948 Buick automobile.

The defendants were sued both jointly and severally as purchasers under the conditional sales contract. The defendant, Walter Jack, defaulted in appearing or answering, but the defendant, Matthew J. Maderic, answered by a general denial and six affirmative defenses. Default judgment was taken by the plaintiff against Walter Jack on October 22, 1953 without obtaining an order of severance and continuance of the action against Maderic. Thereafter, on December 16, 1953, a default judgment was taken against defendant Maderic, which judgment was vacated on appeal by the Appellate Division, in December, 1954 (284 App. Div. 1083).

Section 474 of the Civil Practice Act, at the time the default judgment was taken, read, in part, as follows: “2. Where the action is against two or more defendants, and a several judgment is proper, the court may render judgment, or require the plaintiff to take judgment, against one or more of the defendants ; and direct that the action be severed, and proceed against the others as the only defendants therein.”

Defendant Maderic contends that the failure of the plaintiff to obtain an order of severance and continuance when it took the default judgment against defendant Walter Jack, merged the entire cause of action into that judgment, thereby releasing Maderic.

The court is of the opinion that under our modern system of liberal practice, the failure of the plaintiff in not obtaining an order of severance and continuance is not fatal to its cause of action against codefendant Maderic, and the opening of the default judgment against Maderic by the Appellate Division revives that cause of action.

Motion denied, Submit order.
EXHIBIT 31.1

             CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(D)/15D-14(D)
                  UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
I, Anthony N. Renzi, certify that:
1. I have  reviewed  this  report  on Form  10-K and all  reports  on Form  10-D
   required to be filed in respect of the period  covered by this report on Form
   10-K of RAMP Series 2006-RS4 Trust (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");
2. Based on my knowledge,  the Exchange Act periodic reports,  taken as a whole,
   do not contain  any untrue  statement  of a material  fact or omit to state a
   material  fact  necessary  to make  the  statements  made,  in  light  of the
   circumstances  under which such  statements  were made, not  misleading  with
   respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based  on  my  knowledge,  all  of  the  distribution,  servicing  and  other
   information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by
   this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;
4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities  performed by the servicers and
   based on my knowledge and the compliance  reviews  conducted in preparing the
   servicer  compliance  statements  required in this report  under Item 1123 of
   Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic  reports,
   the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements
   in all material respects; and
5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance  with  servicing  criteria for
   asset-backed  securities and their related  attestation reports on assessment
   of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to
   be included in this report in accordance  with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
   Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
   report,  except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances
   of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report
   on Form 10-K.

   In giving the  certifications  above, I have reasonably relied on information
   provided to me by the  following  unaffiliated  parties:  SunTrust  Mortgage,
   Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A.

Date:  March 26, 2007

By:   /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      --------------------
      Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
      Title: Managing Director
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 14
- 00551
- CV

Scott Schroeder, Appellant

v. Eduardo S. Espinosa, in his Capacity as Receiver of Retirement Value, LLC, Appellee

FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D
- 1
- GN
- 14
- 00 1 588, THE HONORABLE GISELA D. TRIANA, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

T his Court stayed th is appeal in 20 1 4 after receiving notice of a relat ed bankruptcy. See Tex. R. App. P. 8.1, 8.2. After the stay , no party to this appeal sough t
reinstatement. See id. R. 8.3. We have now b een informed that the bankruptcy case related to
th is appeal is closed and, therefore, have reinsta ted the appeal

.

On June 26, 2020 , the Clerk of this Court sent notice to the parties that th is

appea l would be dismissed for want of prosecution unless a sta tus report was filed on or before July 6, 2020 , that provided reason to retain these appe als. See id. R

. 42.3(b). The Court received responses from both appellant ’ s and appellee ’ s attorney s
. Appellant infor med us that he did not intend to pur sue the appeal, and appellee likewise advised us that the appeal should be dismissed

. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution.2 __________________________________________ Thom as J. Baker, Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Kelly
Dismissed for Want of Prosec ution
Filed: September 2 3 , 2020