UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5101

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROSCOE P. MILLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (6:09-cr-00785-HMH-5)

Submitted: April 20, 2012 Decided: April 25, 2012

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, 

United States Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr., Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Roscoe P. Miller appeals his twenty-four-month 

sentence for violation of his supervised release. Miller argues 

that his revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable because the 

district court failed to explain the basis for the sentence it 

selected. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

After pleading guilty to conspiracy to defraud the 

United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006), Miller 

was sentenced on January 19, 2010 to fifteen months in prison, 

to be followed by a thirty-six-month term of supervised release. 

Miller’s supervised release commenced on July 1, 2010. Miller 

absconded from supervision shortly thereafter, and a warrant was 

issued for his arrest. The warrant was not executed, however,

until August 26, 2011, over a year after its issuance. On 

August 30, 2011, Miller’s probation officer petitioned the court 

to revoke supervised release. 

The district court relied on Miller’s admission to 

find that Miller had violated the terms of his supervised 

release. The court next detailed the relevant sentencing 

calculations, including the policy statement range of five to 

eleven months’ imprisonment, and the statutory maximum sentence
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of twenty-four months.1 The court then heard argument from 

counsel and allowed Miller to allocute. 

Counsel for Miller noted several facts relevant to his 

request for leniency, but did not argue in favor of a specific 

sentence below (or within) the advisory policy statement range. 

In his statement, Miller offered that he had stopped using 

drugs, had recently become a father, and that he was en route to 

report to his probation officer at the time of his arrest. 

After expressing incredulity as to the latter contention, the 

court summarily imposed the twenty-four-month sentence. 

The district court has broad discretion to impose a 

sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, we 

will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised 

release if it is within the governing statutory range and not 

plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In doing so, the court “follow[s] 

 1 Miller’s absconding from supervision was a Grade C 

violation. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) 

§ 7B1.1(a)(3)(B), p.s. (2009). This, coupled with Miller’s 

placement in Criminal History Category III, resulted in an 

advisory policy statement range of five to eleven months’ 

imprisonment. USSG § 7B1.4(a), p.s. Because Miller’s 

underlying offense conduct was a Class D felony, the statutory 

maximum sentence for Miller’s supervised release violation was 

twenty-four months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006). 
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generally the procedural and substantive considerations” used in 

reviewing original sentences. Id. at 438. 

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if 

the district court has considered the policy statements 

contained in Chapter Seven of the Guidelines and the applicable 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, id. at 440, and has 

adequately explained the sentence chosen, though it need not 

explain the sentence in as much detail as when imposing the 

original sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper 

basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the statutory 

maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. If, after considering the 

above, the appeals court decides that the sentence is not 

unreasonable, it should affirm. Id. at 439. Only if the court 

finds the sentence unreasonable must the court decide “whether 

it is ‘plainly’ so.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 

657 (4th Cir. 2007). 

Miller did not request a specific sentence, either 

within or outside the policy statement range. Therefore, his 

challenge to the adequacy of the explanation for his revocation 

sentence is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Lynn, 
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592 F.3d 572, 577-79 (4th Cir. 2010);2 see United States v. 

Williams, 401 F. App’x 776, 778 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished 

after argument) (reviewing for plain error unpreserved objection 

to supervised release revocation sentence). To establish plain 

error, Miller must show that an error occurred, that the error 

was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights. 

United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600, 611 (4th Cir. 2012). 

Assuming, arguendo, that the district court’s 

explanation was inadequate, Miller fails to argue, and nothing 

in the record indicates, that the court would have imposed a 

lighter sentence had it provided a more thorough explanation.

Accordingly, we conclude Miller’s challenge to his revocation 

sentence cannot withstand plain error review, as he cannot 

establish that any error by the district court affected his 

substantial rights. See United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 

178 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that, to demonstrate that a 

sentencing error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, 

“the defendant must show that he would have received a lower 

sentence had the error not occurred”). We therefore affirm the 

district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

 2 We conclude that counsel’s bald and unsupported request 

for leniency is insufficient, under Lynn, to preserve the issue 

for harmless error review.
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in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED