IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Quinn Taylor :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, : No. 1314 C.D. 2017

Appellant : Submitted: November 9, 2018

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: December 6, 2018

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation

(Department), Bureau of Driver Licensing (Bureau), appeals from the September 5, 

2017 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) 

sustaining the statutory appeal of Quinn Taylor (Licensee) from an 18-month 

suspension of his operating privilege imposed following Licensee’s conviction for 

driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Upon review, we affirm.

On May 28, 2013, Licensee was convicted in the trial court of DUI

graded as a first-degree misdemeanor. See Allegheny County Court of Common 

Pleas Docket No. CP-02-CR-0014534-2012 at 5 & 9. Over 3 years and 3 months 

later, on August 31, 2016, the Allegheny County Department of Court Records 

transmitted certification of Licensee’s conviction to the Bureau. Eight days after 

receiving the trial court’s certification, on September 8, 2016, the Bureau mailed 
2

Licensee notice of the mandatory 18-month license suspension resulting from his 

DUI conviction, effective October 13, 2016.

On October 3, 2016, Licensee appealed the license suspension, and the 

trial court conducted a hearing on June 22, 2017. On September 5, 2017, the trial 

court entered an order sustaining Licensee’s appeal. The Bureau timely appealed.

1

On appeal, the Bureau claims the trial court erred in sustaining 

Licensee’s statutory appeal of his license suspension because the Bureau imposed 

the suspension by official notice sent only eight days after the Bureau received the 

certified notice of Licensee’s qualifying conviction from the Allegheny County 

Department of Court Records. See Bureau’s Brief at 4 & 10-21. We disagree.

The Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 101–9805, mandates an 18-month

suspension of driving privileges upon a first-degree misdemeanor DUI conviction. 

75 Pa. C.S. § 3804(e). To that end, the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part:

Suspension of operating privileges upon conviction.—

(1) The department shall suspend the operating privilege 

of an individual under paragraph (2) upon receiving a 

certified record of the individual’s conviction of or an 

adjudication of delinquency for:

(i) an offense under section 3802;[2]

. . . 

 

1

“Our standard of review in a license suspension case is to determine whether the factual 

findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court 

committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Negovan v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of 

Driver Licensing, 172 A.3d 733, 735 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

2 Section 3802 prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802.
3

(2) Suspension under paragraph (1) shall be in accordance 

with the following:

. . . 

(ii) 18 months for a misdemeanor of the first degree 

under this chapter.

75 Pa. C.S. § 3804(e). Per the statute, receipt from the trial court of the certified 

record of a conviction triggers the Department’s obligation to suspend a driver’s 

license. Id. 

Historically, to challenge a license suspension based on unreasonable 

delay, a licensee bore the burden of establishing: “(1) that there was an unreasonable 

delay that was attributable to [the Department]; and (2) that the delay caused her to 

believe that her operating privileges would not be impaired and that she relied on 

this belief to her detriment.” Pokoy v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 

714 A.2d 1162, 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (emphasis in original). As to the 

unreasonable delay prong, this Court explained:

Regarding the first element of this two-step analysis, the 

law is settled that, where [the Department] is not guilty of 

administrative delay, any delay caused by the judicial 

system (e.g., the Clerk of Courts) not notifying [the 

Department] in a timely manner, will not invalidate a 

license suspension that is authorized by the Code and 

imposed by [the Department]. In determining whether 

there was an unreasonable delay attributable to [the 

Department], the relevant time period is that between the 

point at which [the Department] receives notice of the 

driver’s conviction from the judicial system and the point 

at which [the Department] notifies the driver that her 

license has been suspended or revoked. In other words, 

only an unreasonable delay by [the Department], and not 
4

the judicial system, invalidates [the Department’s] license 

suspension.

Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Otherwise stated, the general 

rule was that only a Department delay, not one caused by the judicial system, would

suffice to invalidate a Department license suspension. Therefore, if the Department 

timely suspended the license after receiving notice from the courts of a qualifying

conviction, the suspension would stand.

However, this Court recognized a narrow “extraordinary 

circumstances” exception to the general rule in Gingrich v. Department of 

Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 134 A.3d 528 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). In 

Gingrich, the York County Clerk of Courts did not notify the Department of a

licensee’s 2004 DUI conviction until October 10, 2014. Id. at 529. The Department

then notified the licensee of the one-year license suspension within 14 days of 

receiving notification of the triggering conviction. Id. Licensee appealed, arguing 

the 10-year delay between her conviction and the attendant license suspension 

violated her right to due process. Id. The trial court found the delay was 

unconscionable, but affirmed the suspension based on the above-referenced general 

rule because the Department was not responsible for the delay. Id. at 530. This 

Court affirmed the general rule of unreasonable delay, but reversed the suspension, 

concluding that limited circumstances can exist where a non-Department delay could

warrant the vacation of a license suspension. 

We explained the extraordinary delay exception as follows:

Where a conviction is not reported for an extraordinarily 

extended period of time, the licensee has a lack of further 

violations for a significant number of years before the 
5

report is finally sent, and is able to demonstrate prejudice, 

it may be appropriate for common pleas to grant relief.

Gingrich, 134 A.3d at 534. This Court explained that this exception was to be 

narrowly construed and was meant to apply only “where the suspension [imposed 

long after the fact] loses its public protection rationale and simply becomes an 

additional punitive measure.” Id. Additionally, we declined to create a bright-line 

rule for what period of time would constitute an “extraordinarily extended period of 

time,” noting that the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 

534 & 535 n.7. Thus, we found that the facts at hand–a 10-year delay in license 

suspension imposition, no further incidents with the law, and prejudice in that the 

licensee would have chosen a different school for her children and would likely lose 

her job if her license was suspended–warranted the application of the extraordinary 

delay exception because, after 10 years, the license suspension lost its “underlying 

public safety purpose” and became “a punitive measure sought to be imposed too 

long after the fact.” Id. at 535.

Following Gingrich, this Court ruled both in favor of and against the 

application of the extraordinary delay exception. See Capizzi v. Dep’t of Transp., 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 141 A.3d 635 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (7-year, 10-month 

delay warranted vacating suspension); Eckenrode v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of 

Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 168 C.D. 2015, filed July 14, 2016) (9-year 

delay); Orwig v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

286 C.D. 2015, filed June 3, 2016) (10-year delay); but see Nercesian v. Dep’t of 
6

Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1795 C.D. 2016, filed June 

12, 2017)3(nearly 5-month delay not an extraordinarily extended period of time).

On comparable time periods to the 3-years, 3-months involved in the 

instant matter, the Court has made three recent pronouncements. In one case, the 

Court found that a 2-year, 7-month delay could be considered an extraordinarily 

extended period of time where the licensee had no subsequent violations and 

established that he would be prejudiced by a license suspension. See Gifford v. Dep’t 

of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 386 C.D. 2017, filed Oct. 

24, 2017). The Court has also stated, albeit in dicta, that a 3-year delay occasioned 

by a non-Department entity could potentially be considered an extraordinarily 

extended period of time, triggering the Gingrich exception. See Currie v. Dep’t of 

Transp., Bureau of Licensing, 142 A.3d 186, 189 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). On the 

other hand, in a separate matter, the Court found that the licensee failed to meet the 

Gingrich prongs and was not entitled to the application of the extraordinary delay 

exception where, despite a 2-year delay, the licensee had a subsequent criminal 

violation shortly after the violation at issue. See Janes v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau 

of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 369 C.D. 2017, filed Oct. 24, 2017).

Recently, this Court revisited and clarified the first Gingrich factor in 

Middaugh v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, __ A.3d 

___ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 815 C.D. 2017, filed Oct. 31, 2018). In Middaugh, the trial 

court failed to notify the Department of a licensee’s DUI conviction until 2 years 

and 4 months after the conviction. Id., __ A.3d ___, slip op. at 3-4. Fifteen days 

after receiving notification from the trial court, the Department notified the licensee 

 

3 While this Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may not be cited as binding 

precedent, they may be cited for persuasive value. Commonwealth Court Internal Operating 

Procedure § 414(a), 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
7

that his operating privilege would be suspended for a year per statute. Id., __ A.3d 

___, slip op. at 4. The licensee appealed and, at a hearing before the trial court, 

testified that he would be prejudiced by the imposition of the suspension years after 

his conviction because he had undergone numerous changes to his life circumstances 

since his conviction, specifically: he was no longer married and was no longer 

working due to a worsening neurological condition for which he had gone on total 

disability after his DUI conviction. Id., __ A.3d ___, slip op. at 5-6. The licensee 

further testified that: he needed to drive himself to medical appointments that were

not within either walking or biking distance from his home; he had no family who 

could help him with rides; due to his fixed income, he could not afford to take taxis 

or Uber, and his health insurance would not cover transportation costs. Id. Applying 

the Gingrich factors, the trial court found that the 2-year, 4-month delay in imposing

the license suspension was unreasonable, that the licensee had no further violations 

for a significant number of years, and that the licensee would be prejudiced by the 

loss of his license. Id., __ A.3d ___, slip op. at 6. Accordingly, the trial court 

sustained the licensee’s appeal and ordered the reinstatement of the licensee’s 

operating privilege. Id. The Department appealed. Id. 

This Court affirmed the trial court on appeal. Id., __ A.3d ___, slip op.

at 25. The Court closely examined the statutory framework of, and this Court’s case 

law regarding, license suspensions in relation to the first Gingrich factor: 

extraordinary delay. Id., __ A.3d ___, slip op. at 10-19. The Court then refined the 

first Gingrich factor by examining further objective criteria that trial courts should

consider to determine whether a non-Departmental license suspension imposition 

delay qualifies as extraordinary: (1) the 10-day trial court-to-Department reporting 
8

requirement established by Section 6323(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code,

4

and (2) the 

length of the underlying statutory suspension pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S. § 3804(e). Id., 

__ A.3d ___, slip op. at 19-25. After examining these further objective criteria, we

concluded:

[I]f a clerk of court reports a conviction to the Department 

within the applicable period of the license suspension plus 

10 days, such delay, as a matter of law, cannot be an 

extraordinarily extended period of time sufficient to meet 

the first Gingrich factor. However, where the delay 

exceeds that period, and where the remaining Gingrich

factors are satisfied, a court of common pleas can find that 

relief is appropriate under Gingrich.

 

4 Section 6323 requires trial courts to report license suspension qualifying convictions to 

the Department within 10 days as follows:

§ 6323. Reports by courts

Subject to any inconsistent procedures and standards relating to 

reports and transmission of funds prescribed pursuant to Title 42 

(relating to judiciary and judicial procedure):

(1) The following shall apply:

(i) The clerk of any court of this Commonwealth, within ten 

days after final judgment of conviction or acquittal or other 

disposition of charges under any of the provisions of this title 

or under section 13 of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, 

No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device 

and Cosmetic Act, including an adjudication of delinquency 

or the granting of a consent decree, shall send to the 

department a record of the judgment of conviction, acquittal 

or other disposition.

75 Pa. C.S. § 6323.
9

Id., __ A.3d ___, slip op. at 23 (footnote omitted). This Court then found the trial 

court did not err in concluding that the 2-year, 4-month delay in Middaugh was an 

extraordinary delay based on the objective measurement provided by the Court’s 

pronouncement. Id., __ A.3d ___, slip op. at 25.

Here, the Department sought to impose an 18-month license suspension 

following a 3-year, 3-month reporting delay by the trial court.

5 This 39-month delay 

exceeds the applicable period of Licensee’s license suspension (18 months) plus 10 

days, and the record provides no explanation for the delay. Therefore, provided the 

other Gingrich factors were met, the trial court could grant relief under Middaugh.

The record reveals that Licensee has received no additional traffic 

violations or criminal convictions since his DUI conviction. See Notes of 

Testimony, June 22, 2017 (N.T.) at 7-8. Additionally, the record indicates that 

Licensee, assuming his license was suspended, unsuccessfully attempted to 

surrender his license to the Department two times, and then acquired a non-license 

state identification card and voluntarily ceased driving for 18 months.6 N.T. at 10-

13. Further, Licensee incurred student loans, completed a course of education to 

become an electrician, and then took a license-dependent salaried job as an 

electrician, all assuming that his license suspension would have expired by the time 

he completed his studies and got his job, at which he has succeeded and advanced. 

N.T. at 17-18; Trial Court Opinion at 3. The trial court also expressly noted that the 

Allegheny County Department of Court Records failed to transmit certification of 

 

5 No party argues that the Department did not act in a timely fashion to impose the 

suspension upon the transmission and certification of Licensee’s conviction from the trial court.

6 The trial court found credible Licensee’s testimony that he ceased driving from June 9, 

2013, through February 25, 2015. Trial Court Opinion at 2-3.
10

Licensee’s conviction as required by Section 6323 of the Vehicle Code. See Trial 

Court Opinion at 3. Based on the above evidence and findings, the trial court 

correctly applied the Gingrich factors and sustained Licensee’s appeal of his license 

suspension. See id. at 4.

For the above reasons, the trial court properly sustained Licensee’s 

appeal of his license suspension. See Middaugh. Accordingly, we affirm.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

Judge Cohn Jubelirer did not participate in the decision of this case.

Judge Ceisler dissents. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Quinn Taylor :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, : No. 1314 C.D. 2018

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 6

th day of December, 2018, the September 5, 2017

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Quinn Taylor :

:

v. : No. 1314 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: November 9, 2018

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge 

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

CONCURRING OPINION 

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: December 6, 2018

I acknowledge that the Majority opinion in this case is consistent with 

the Majority opinion in this Court’s recent en banc decision in Middaugh v. 

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 815 C.D. 2017, filed October 31, 2018). Because I disagree with the 

Majority opinion in Middaugh, however, I write separately.

Primarily, I disagree that the passage of three years and three months 

is an extraordinarily extended period of time as a matter of law, within the analysis 

of Gingrich v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 134 

A.3d 528 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Instead, I believe the extraordinary delay evaluation 

entails a mixed question of law and fact, and that some testimony must be offered 

by the licensee to establish the very unusual nature of the delay. Within the 

framework of a delay attributable to a county clerk of court’s office, some 
RES - 2

testimony by a clerk should be offered as to what delay, if any, is usual in 

processing convictions entailing automatic drivers’ license suspensions. Where, as 

here, such baseline evidence is lacking, no evaluation of extraordinary delay can be 

made. In such a circumstance, remand to the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County for additional evidence is necessary. 

For these reasons, I concur in the result only.

 

 ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge