1

Filed 2/1/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

GOPAL BALAKRISHNAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A164480

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG19018682)

This appeal addresses the authority of a public university to discipline 

a faculty member for certain off-campus behavior. We conclude the 

University of California, Santa Cruz (University or UCSC), could permissibly 

find, based on the plain language of its internal policies, rules and 

regulations, that a tenured professor could be dismissed and denied emeritus

status for sexually abusing (1) a fellow academic at an event held in 

connection with an off-campus academic conference and (2) a UCSC student 

whom he volunteered to walk home from an off-campus graduation party, two 

days after she walked in her graduation ceremony.

Plaintiff, Dr. Gopal Balakrishnan, a former tenured UCSC professor,

appeals from a judgment denying his petition for a writ of administrative 

mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.51 to set aside the 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Code 

of Civil Procedure.
2

findings and decision of defendant, The Regents of the University of 

California (Regents), to terminate his employment and deny him emeritus

status. In so doing, plaintiff does not dispute the University’s evidentiary 

finding that he sexually abused two women. Rather, he contends: (1) the

University lacked jurisdiction to discipline him because the victims did not 

qualify as University students, (2) the University misinterpreted and 

misapplied its own regulations and policies, (3) he did not receive notice of all 

charges, and (4) the sanctions were excessive.

We reject these contentions and affirm the trial court’s judgment to 

deny his writ petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff attended Cornell University. He earned a Ph.D. from the 

University of California, Los Angeles, and, in 2000, published a well-received 

scholarly book entitled The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt. 

In 2006, after holding several teaching positions at higher learning 

institutions in the United States and abroad, plaintiff became an associate 

professor in UCSC’s History of Consciousness Department. In 2015, he was 

promoted to tenured professor.

In 2017, an anonymous letter was published online, accusing plaintiff

of engaging in a pattern of sexual intimidation, harassment, and assault 

against young women and gender nonconforming people during his time as a 

UCSC professor. The letter contained seven anonymous firsthand accounts 

of plaintiff’s alleged abuse and called on the University to act. Over 150 

people signed this letter to show their support.

Plaintiff publicly denied the accusations in the anonymous letter and 

blamed “ ‘the current context of national indignation around the issue of 

sexual harassment . . . .’ ” In response, the University issued a statement 
3

that it was aware of the letter and asked individuals with relevant

information to contact the Title IX office to assist its investigation.

2

The University received multiple complaints about plaintiff’s conduct. 

One of the more serious complaints, involving Jane Doe, an academic, came 

in anonymously. Since Doe did not wish to participate in a formal 

investigation, the Title IX office relied on information she gave to a news Web 

site to identify an eyewitness who was willing to speak. The Title IX office

also decided to investigate complaints from three other individuals: Brian G., 

Anneliese H. and Patrick M.

On February 7, 2018, Executive Vice-Chancellor (EVC) Marlene Tromp 

notified plaintiff that a single investigation of all four complaints would go 

forward under the Title IX office’s supervision. The Title IX office thereafter 

engaged an outside investigator to conduct the investigation and draft an 

investigative report, a process that took over six months.

3

I. The Allegations and Investigative Findings.

A. Jane Doe.

Jane Doe, a poet and academic from the East Coast, met plaintiff when 

she traveled to Berkeley in 2013 to attend the three-day East Bay Poetry 

Summit (Poetry Summit), which plaintiff also attended. Doe, along with a

friend and professor (Witness 1), were invited to stay overnight at the home

2 Reports of sexual violence and sexual harassment at the University 

are handled by the Title IX office. When an investigation is warranted, the 

Title IX office appoints an investigator to conduct the investigation by 

interviewing witnesses and gathering evidence and then preparing a written 

report with findings of fact and a recommendation as to whether any 

University policy was violated.

3 On February 1, 2018, EVC Tromp placed plaintiff on involuntary 

leave due to the egregiousness of the allegations against him and for his own 

protection.
4

of the professor who was hosting the Poetry Summit. One evening, after the 

Poetry Summit ended for the day, the professor held a party for attendees at 

her home. It was a festive affair. At some point, Doe and plaintiff were 

observed kissing. After midnight, however, Doe and Witness 1 retired for the 

evening to the study where they were sharing a bed. A short while later, Doe

woke up to find plaintiff in the study, drunkenly trying to get in bed and 

asking to have sex with her. She told plaintiff that she was not interested in 

sexual activity and “ ‘shooed’ ” him from the room. Nonetheless, around 

2:00 a.m., Doe woke up again to find plaintiff naked and “loom[ing] over her 

while she lay in bed.” Plaintiff climbed into bed, and Doe could feel his penis 

poking into her side. Doe and Witness 1 forced plaintiff from the room and, 

this time, barricaded the door with furniture so he could not return.

After completing the Doe investigation, the investigator found plaintiff

engaged in “unwelcome physical conduct of a sexual nature which is conduct 

that falls squarely within the definition of prohibited conduct under the 

University of California Policy on Sexual Harassment dated February 10, 

2006, the policy in effect at the time of the incident.” However, the 

investigator could not substantiate a violation of this policy because it only 

applied to “ ‘member[s] of the University community.’ ”

B. Anneliese H.

Anneliese H. walked in her UCSC class graduation on June 16, 2013.

Days later, on June 18, 2013, Anneliese attended a graduation party at the 

off-campus apartment of her friend and neighbor, who was a UCSC student

(Friend 1). There, she met plaintiff for the first time without realizing he was 

a professor. Friend 1 had audited one of plaintiff’s classes and invited him to 

the party in an effort to obtain his mentorship. As the evening progressed, 

plaintiff danced and flirted with both Anneliese and Friend 1. Anneliese, 
5

who was quite intoxicated, began to feel nauseous and “ ‘on the verge of 

blacking out or browning out.’ ” Plaintiff offered to walk her home. 

Anneliese agreed and, after arriving at her home, she invited him inside. 

Plaintiff initiated sexual activity, but Anneliese insisted she only wanted to 

talk to him. Although Anneliese acknowledged experiencing memory lapses

after arriving home, she recalled being undressed in bed and kissing plaintiff. 

Then, after another memory lapse, she “ ‘came to,’ ” to find plaintiff on top of 

her, performing oral sex. Anneliese repeatedly told plaintiff, “ ‘You need to 

leave,’ ” and, “ ‘I do not want to have sex with you,’ ” yet he persisted. 

Plaintiff told Anneliese that he wanted to have anal sex with her. Anneliese

was scared, as plaintiff was bigger and stronger than her. Finally, after 

Anneliese pushed him away several times, plaintiff got up and left.

The next day, Anneliese woke up devastated by what happened with 

plaintiff. Anneliese’s friend (Friend 2), also a UCSC student, went to 

Anneliese’s home, and they discussed the incident. When Friend 2 told 

Anneliese that plaintiff may have been a professor, she was “ ‘traumatized.’ ”

About a week later, Anneliese told Friend 1 what happened with 

plaintiff. Friend 1 then shared that on the night of her party plaintiff bought 

her several drinks despite knowing that she was underage. Later, however, 

Friend 1 told plaintiff that she was not interested in him, after being

“ ‘shocked’ ” to learn he was 48 years old. At that point, plaintiff appeared to 

redirect his focus to Anneliese.

Shortly thereafter, Anneliese obtained plaintiff’s phone number from 

Friend 1 and called “ ‘to confront him.’ ” Friend 2 was with Anneliese when 

she made the call and overheard the conversation on speakerphone. When 

plaintiff answered, Anneliese identified herself. At first, plaintiff flirted with 

her and asked whether she wanted to meet. Anneliese responded, “ That is 
6

not why I am calling. I need to let you know what happened the other night 

was not OK. I was nearly blacked out. You did not have my consent. That is 

considered rape and it is not OK.’ ” At that point, plaintiff became defensive, 

telling Anneliese that it was not a good time to talk and that he had no idea 

she had been so intoxicated. Plaintiff also accused Anneliese of “ ‘forc[ing]

herself on him or seduc[ing] him.’ ” Anneliese responded, “ ‘That is not OK. 

You knew how drunk I was.’ ” The call ended after five to 10 minutes;

however, plaintiff later called Anneliese back and left a message. She deleted 

the message without listening to it.

In 2018, Anneliese contacted the Title IX office after receiving a call 

from Friend 1, who told her about the accusations that had been publicly 

raised against plaintiff. Anneliese was enraged that plaintiff was denying 

the accusations and blaming the “ ‘political’ ” environment.

The Title IX investigator interviewed Anneliese, her mother, Friend 1, 

Friend 2, and plaintiff regarding Anneliese’s allegations. Plaintiff recalled

attending Friend 1’s party in June 2013 and meeting Anneliese for the first 

time. Plaintiff claimed that he left the party alone and was walking to his

car when Anneliese came out of her apartment. According to plaintiff, 

Anneliese pulled him toward her apartment and he “reluctantly went in.”

After talking briefly, Anneliese suggested sexual activity, which surprised 

him. However, because Anneliese was highly intoxicated, plaintiff

“extricated [him]self from the interaction and left her apartment and went 

home.” He denied being naked or attempting to have sex with her.

According to plaintiff, when Anneliese called him about a month later, she

“clearly indicated” having no memory of what transpired between them that 

evening.
7

After concluding the Anneliese investigation, the investigator found “it 

is more likely than not that [plaintiff] engaged in unwelcome physical 

conduct of a sexual nature which is conduct that falls squarely within the 

definition of prohibited conduct under the University of California Policy on 

Sexual Harassment Policy [sic] dated February 10, 2006, the policy in effect 

at the time of the incident . . . .” This “unwelcome sexual activity occurred on 

June 18, 2013 after [Anneliese] had completed her course work and 

participated in commencement but before her degree was conferred.”

C. Brian G. and Patrick M.

Former UCSC student Brian G. reported that, during the fall or winter 

of 2009, when he was 18 years old, he attended a small party at plaintiff’s

residence. Brian knew plaintiff through campus activities but was not his 

student. At this party, plaintiff gave Brian and other attendees cocaine and 

alcohol, and afterward he drove Brian home while under the influence of 

alcohol and drugs. Brian also recalled other occasions during this time period

when plaintiff bought him alcohol at local bars although he was underage. 

Brian contacted the Title IX office after learning of the public accusations 

that had been raised against plaintiff because he believed his experiences 

were relevant.

Following an investigation, the investigator found by a preponderance 

of evidence that plaintiff gave Brian G. alcohol and cocaine at a party and 

bought him alcohol at least twice at local bars despite knowing he was under 

age 21.

Patrick M. was a Ph.D. candidate in the History of Human 

Consciousness Department in 2015, and plaintiff was his adviser. According 

to Patrick, one afternoon he visited plaintiff’s office to discuss his 

dissertation. The pair engaged in a heated discussion regarding the
8

appropriate direction of Patrick’s dissertation. At some point, plaintiff

became verbally and physically aggressive. Patrick protested and tried to 

leave, but plaintiff blocked him by lunging at him and aggressively grabbing

him.

Patrick reported this incident to Professor Dean Mathiowetz in 

November 2015 and later discussed it with the department’s chair, David

Marriott. Marriott secured plaintiff’s commitment to have no contact with 

Patrick and assigned Patrick a new adviser. Despite this informal resolution, 

Patrick came forward with an official complaint after reading the publicity, in 

2017, about plaintiff’s pattern of abusive behavior.

The investigator again found by a preponderance of the evidence that 

plaintiff engaged in the alleged misconduct. While plaintiff’s “overall intent 

may have been benign,” his advising approach was detrimental to Patrick. 

Further, Patrick reasonably viewed plaintiff’s conduct as unwelcome and

physically aggressive.

II. The Four Charges and Administrative Hearing.

The investigation reports were forwarded to the University’s Charges 

Committee to assess whether there was sufficient evidence to initiate

disciplinary action.

On November 9, 2018, the Charges Committee found probable cause as 

to each complainant: Jane Doe, Anneliese H., Brian G., and Patrick M. With 

respect to Doe, the Charges Committee acknowledged the investigator did not 

substantiate a violation of the UCSC sexual harassment policy because Doe

was not a member of the University community. The committee nonetheless 

found probable cause under part II of the University’s Faculty Code of 

Conduct (APM-015),

4 Professional Responsibilities, Ethical Principles, and 

4 See footnote 5, post, page 9.
9

Unacceptable Faculty Conduct (hereinafter, Faculty Code of Conduct, 

Part II), which permits faculty members to be disciplined “ ‘for conduct which 

is not justified by the ethical principles, and which significantly impairs the 

University’s central functions as set forth in the Preamble.’ . . . ‘Other types 

of serious misconduct, not specifically enumerated herein, may nonetheless 

be the basis for disciplinary action [if they also meet the preceding 

standards] . . . .”

5

Accordingly, on November 14, 2018, EVC Tromp issued plaintiff a 

notice of intent to discipline. In the notice, EVC Tromp proposed that 

plaintiff be dismissed and denied emeritus status “based on the egregious 

nature of [his] misconduct . . . .” She also advised plaintiff of his right to a 

formal hearing under academic senate bylaw 336 before the Committee on 

Privileges and Tenure (PT Committee) prior to the imposition of any 

disciplinary sanction.

This formal administrative hearing took place over five days in May 

2019. Initially, the PT Committee, made up of three UCSC professors, heard 

and denied 12 prehearing motions brought by plaintiff’s counsel. The

committee then heard from 11 University witnesses,

6 including Witness 1 in 

the Jane Doe case and Anneliese H., before issuing its final report on July 18, 

2019.

With respect to Jane Doe, the PT Committee found clear and 

convincing evidence that plaintiff violated the Faculty Code of Conduct, 

Part II, as there was “no question” his conduct toward Doe at an academic 

5 “APM” refers to the University’s Academic Personnel Manual. The

Faculty Code of Conduct is found at APM-015. 

6 Plaintiff and his counsel declined to participate in the hearing before 

the PT Committee.
10

event was not justified by ethical principles and undermined the University’s 

central function to provide an environment “ ‘conducive to sharing, extending, 

and critically examining knowledge and values, and to furthering the search 

for wisdom.’ ”

As to Anneliese H., the PT Committee found by clear and convincing 

evidence that plaintiff’s conduct violated “APM 015 II.C.7: Serious violation 

of University policies governing the professional conduct of faculty 

(specifically, the University Policy on Sexual Harassment, 2006).”

7 It also 

found “a close nexus” between plaintiff in his role as University 

representative and his conduct, since he was invited to the graduation party 

where he met Anneliese by a student who sought to foster his mentorship. 

Then, after using his professor status to connect with these women, plaintiff 

treated Anneliese in an “unwelcome, deeply harm[ful]” manner—conduct that 

constituted a “ ‘serious violation of University policies governing the 

professional conduct of faculty’ within the meaning of the [Faculty Code of 

Conduct], APM 015 II.C.7.”

The PT Committee also found plaintiff’s conduct independently violated 

other Faculty Code of Conduct provisions. As in the case of Jane Doe, his 

sexual abuse of Anneliese was not justified by ethical principles and 

7 The sexual harassment policy defines “[s]exual harassment” as 

“unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 

physical conduct of a sexual nature, when submission to or rejection of this 

conduct explicitly or implicitly affects a person’s . . . education, unreasonably 

interferes with a person’s work or educational performance, or creates an 

intimidating, hostile or offensive working or learning environment. . . . 

[¶] . . . [¶] In determining whether the reported conduct constitutes sexual 

harassment, consideration shall be given to the record of the conduct as a 

whole and to the totality of the circumstances, including the context in which 

the conduct occurred.”
11

significantly impaired the University’s central functions and, as such, 

violated the Faculty Code of Conduct, Part II.

With respect to Brian G., the PT Committee found evidence that 

plaintiff violated the University’s policy on substance abuse by knowingly 

providing him alcohol and cocaine. However, it concluded the evidence 

presented at the hearing did not meet the clear and convincing standard 

since Brian was vague as to key information, including times, persons, and 

dates. Accordingly, this charge was dismissed.

Lastly, the PT Committee dismissed the charge relating to Patrick M.

based on the three-year limitations period set forth in the Faculty Code of 

Conduct.

8

Thus, having unanimously found plaintiff committed serious violations 

of the Faculty Code of Conduct in the cases of Doe and Anneliese H., the 

PT Committee recommended his dismissal and denial of emeritus status.

III. Plaintiff’s Dismissal and Denial of Emeritus Status.

On August 15, 2019, UCSC Chancellor Cynthia K. Larive notified 

plaintiff that she had adopted the unanimous findings and recommendations

of dismissal and denial of emeritus status set forth in the PT Committee’s

July 2019 report. Chancellor Larive also imposed the interim sanction of 

“suspension without pay effective with the date of this letter until the earlier 

of either: 1) dismissal pursuant to my recommendation; or 2) twenty (20)

years.” In doing so, Chancellor Larive informed plaintiff that, while “not 

relevant to my recommendations to the President and Regents, or the 

8 Department chair David Marriott testified that he knew of the alleged 

incident as of November 1 or 2, 2015, the day of or after it occurred. Yet, 

Patrick did not file a formal complaint until 2018, and plaintiff did not 

receive notice of the University’s intent to discipline him until November 14, 

2018, about two weeks past the limitations period.
12

exercise of my authority under [the academic senate bylaws], it is notable 

that the record before me is devoid of any acknowledgement from you about 

your behavior or the detrimental impacts of your misconduct on the direct 

victims or the University.”

On August 23, 2019, University of California President Janet 

Napolitano issued a decision, based on her own independent review of the 

record, recommending that the Regents dismiss plaintiff from the 

University’s employ.9

In September 2019, the Regents held a meeting to consider President 

Napolitano’s recommendation of dismissal. Plaintiff did not avail himself of 

the opportunity to appear personally or through counsel. He did, however, 

submit a written statement arguing that the University lacked jurisdiction to 

pursue either incident of sexual misconduct because they occurred off campus 

and involved nonstudents. At the meeting’s conclusion, the Regents 

unanimously voted in favor of plaintiff’s dismissal and denial of emeritus

status.

IV. Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate.

On October 2, 2020, plaintiff filed the operative third amended petition 

for writ of administrative mandate in Alameda Superior Court. A hearing 

was held on September 1, 2021. Afterward, the court denied the petition, 

declining to set aside the administrative findings or sanction. This timely 

appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends on appeal: (1) the University lacked jurisdiction to 

discipline him with respect to Jane Doe or Anneliese H. because they were 

9 President Napolitano deferred decision on denial of emeritus status 

pending the Regents’ decision on her dismissal recommendation.
13

not University students; (2) in the case of Jane Doe, he cannot be disciplined 

for violating general ethical principles and there was no evidence his conduct

significantly impaired the University’s central functions; (3) in the case of

Anneliese H., he cannot be disciplined for violating uncharged provisions of 

the Faculty Code of Conduct for which he did not receive notice; and (4) the

sanctions of dismissal and denial of emeritus status were excessive. We 

address these contentions post, in appropriate order.

10

I. Administrative Mandate: Standard of Review.

“To prevail, a petitioner seeking a writ of administrative mandate must 

show the agency (in this case, [the University]) (1) acted without, or in excess 

of, its jurisdiction; (2) deprived the petitioner of a fair administrative hearing; 

or (3) committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (§ 1094.5, subd. (b); Doe v. 

University of Southern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 239 [200 

Cal.Rptr.3d 851] (Southern California I) [§ 1094.5’s ‘fair trial’ requirement 

means there must be a fair administrative hearing].) [Fn. omitted.] ‘ “Abuse

of discretion is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in the manner 

required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the 

findings are not supported by the evidence.” ’ [Citations.]” (Doe v. Regents of 

University of California (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 521, 532.)

10 Plaintiff raises two additional contentions that we decline to 

consider: (1) the University’s consolidation of two unrelated complaints was 

prejudicial and (2) the denial of his request for a continuance of the 

administrative hearing was unfair. We deem these contentions forfeited due 

to plaintiff’s failure, in his opening brief, to support them with reasoned legal 

argument. (See People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 683, fn. 7 [appellant

forfeited due process claim by failing to “develop the argument”]; In re 

Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 845 [“ ‘ “Contentions supported neither by 

argument nor by citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation 

and to have been abandoned” ’ ”].)
14

Where, as here, an administrative decision involves a fundamental 

vested right to employment, the trial court “independently review[s] the

record to determine whether the weight of evidence supports a factual

finding, whereas the substantial evidence test applies when a fundamental

right is not at issue. (Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th

305, 313 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 199] (Wences).) But [as] the appellate court[, we]

appl[y] a substantial evidence test, regardless of whether a fundamental

right is involved. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824 [85

Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 977 P.2d 693].)” (O’Brien v. Regents of University of

California (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1116.) Further, as always, we

exercise independent judgment on legal issues. (Manderson-Saleh v. Regents

of University of California (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 674, 693 (MandersonSaleh).)

II. The University’s Findings as to Jane Doe Stand.

A. Plaintiff’s Jurisdiction Argument Fails.

Plaintiff contends the Jane Doe findings must be set aside because the 

University cannot “exercise limitless jurisdiction by policing and prosecuting 

faculty for conduct that occurs off campus after hours, separate and apart 

from the faculty member’s professional role at UCSC.” The following rules

apply.

“The University is a statewide administrative agency with 

constitutionally derived powers. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (a); 

[citation].) Its employees are public employees. [Citation.] The University is 

administered by the Regents. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (a).) Regents 

have rulemaking and policymaking power in regard to the University; their 

policies and procedures have the force and effect of statute.” (Kim v. Regents 

of University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160, 165.) Generally, the
15

rules that govern statutory interpretation also govern interpretation of

administrative regulations. (Akella v. Regents of University of California

(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 801, 817 (Akella).) “Further, policies established by 

the Regents according to their constitutionally derived rulemaking and 

policymaking power, like the Academic Personnel Manual, have the force and 

effect of statute.” (Ibid.)

“Generally, the interpretation of a regulation [or statute] ‘ “is . . . a

question of law” and is . . . subject to de novo review.’ [Citation.] However, a

reviewing court accords an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own

regulation great weight and deference, unless the interpretation is

unauthorized or clearly erroneous. [Citations.] This rule recognizes that an

‘agency has developed a level of “expertise” in light of its familiarity with the

legal and regulatory issues.’ [Citation.] Courts are particularly deferential of

the Regents’ determinations because of its role as a state constitutional

entity. [Citations.] Thus, although we are not bound by the Regents’

interpretation, we give it great weight under the circumstances. (See

Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12

[citations]; [citation].)” (Manderson-Saleh, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 697; 

accord, Akella, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 817 [“considering it is well within

the Regents’ constitutionally delegated authority [citation] to hear and

resolve disputes related to the administration of the university’s academic

affairs ‘by applying University policies to particular cases’ [citation], we

conclude that Privilege & Tenure’s interpretation is entitled to a reasonable

degree of judicial deference”].)11

11 The Akella court recognized the degree of deference owed the 

University in interpreting one of its policies depends on the interpreter’s 

familiarity with the policy at issue, whether the University has adhered 

consistently to the interpretation at issue, and whether there was an 
16

In determining that plaintiff’s conduct toward Jane Doe was subject to 

discipline, the University relied on Faculty Code of Conduct, Part II. The 

relevant provision states: “Th[e] listing of faculty responsibilities, ethical 

principles, and types of unacceptable behavior is organized around the 

individual faculty member’s relation to teaching and students, to scholarship, 

to the University, to colleagues, and to the community. Since University 

discipline, as distinguished from other forms of reproval or administrative 

actions, should be reserved for faculty misconduct that is either serious in 

itself or is made serious through its repetition, or its consequences, the 

following general principle is intended to govern all instances of its 

application: [¶] University discipline under this Code may be imposed on a 

faculty member only for conduct which is not justified by the ethical 

principles and which significantly impairs the University’s central functions 

as set forth in the Preamble. . . . The Types of Unacceptable Conduct listed 

below in Sections A through E are examples of types of conduct which meet 

the preceding standards and hence are presumptively subject to University 

discipline. Other types of serious misconduct, not specifically enumerated 

herein, may nonetheless be the basis for disciplinary action if they also meet 

the preceding standards.” (Italics omitted.)

According to plaintiff, this language permits faculty members to be 

disciplined only as to matters “in the scope of their professional roles, not 

after they have hung up their coat and kicked off their shoes at the end of the 

day, and certainly not after an after-party for an off-campus poetry summit 

[unaffiliated] with UCSC.”

opportunity for comment to be made on the interpretation. (Akella, supra, 61 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 816–817.)
17

In its final report, however, the PT Committee interpreted this 

provision otherwise: “The [Faculty Code of Conduct] does in fact extend to 

interactions between faculty and ‘the community’: ‘This listing of faculty 

responsibilities, ethical principles, and types of unacceptable behavior is 

organized around the individual faculty member’s relation to teaching and 

students, to scholarship, to the University, to colleagues, and to the 

community’. (APM 015, Part II.) The ‘community’ meant here is clearly not 

the University community, but the community at large. It is not true that 

the conduct in question had no relation to the University. The poetry summit 

was an academic conference (testimony by [Witness 1], HT p. 272), and 

[plaintiff’s] presence at it was clearly related to his status as a Professor at 

the University. The question before us, then, is whether [plaintiff’s] conduct 

in the [Jane Doe] incident was conduct which ‘is not justified by the Ethical 

Principles and which significantly impairs the University’s central functions 

as set forth in the Preamble’.

“There is no question that the behavior was not justified by the Ethical 

Principles. We also find that it significantly impairs the University’s central 

functions. The Preamble states: ‘The University seeks to provide and 

sustain an environment conducive to sharing, extending, and critically 

examining knowledge and values, and to furthering the search for wisdom.’

The University is impaired in this function if its faculty, without consequence 

or sanction, engage in behavior in the context of professional events that 

would not be tolerated on campus because of their clear incompatibility with 

sustaining an environment ‘conducive to sharing, extending, and critically 

examining knowledge and values, and to furthering the search for wisdom’. 

For example, it is to be expected that neither Ms. [Doe] nor [Witness 1] (nor 

potentially others who became aware of the behavior) would want to work 
18

with [plaintiff] (or even with anyone from UCSC) in the future, if they see 

that this behavior has no consequences. In other words: only a safe 

environment is an environment conducive to sharing knowledge and values.”

Applying the above stated rules of statutory interpretation, we

conclude the PT Committee’s reading of the Faculty Code of Conduct was

consistent with the plain and commonsense meaning of the Code’s language. 

(Akella, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 817–818.) The PT Committee’s

interpretation also gave meaning to the provision “as a whole, giving effect to 

all of its parts . . . .” (Id. at p. 818.) And lastly, the PT Committee’s

interpretation respected the University’s underlying intent in prohibiting

faculty conduct “not justified by the Ethical Principles and which 

significantly impairs the University’s central functions.” (Ibid.) As explained 

in the PT Committee’s final report, “only a safe environment is an 

environment conducive to sharing knowledge and values.” Climbing naked

and uninvited into bed with and pressing his genitalia against a female 

academic attending the same academic conference at a party given by the 

conference host (also a professor) clearly created an unsafe environment not 

conducive to the sharing of knowledge and values.12

We hasten to add this interpretation of the Faculty Code of Conduct

was made by a committee comprised of three of plaintiff’s fellow UCSC

professors, adding to its evidentiary weight. As recognized by numerous

courts, “contextual familiarity matters. The disputed policy language, while

12 We reject plaintiff’s suggestion in his reply brief that there was no 

evidence he attended the poetry summit in his professional capacity. 

Witness 1 testified at the administrative hearing that the poetry summit was 

an offsite “academic conference” organized by “poets, professors, and 

members of the community in the East Bay” and that conference participants

knew and respected plaintiff as a historian of consciousness. Plaintiff chose 

not to participate in the hearing and, thus, presented no contrary evidence.
19

not complex or technical, should be interpreted in a manner that is both

knowledgeable of and sensitive to the needs of [the] department and

university population to which it applies. (See Simi Corp. v. Garamendi

(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1505 [citation] [noting the ‘particular expertise’

of the agency’s commissioner in that case was a ‘deep understanding of the

context in which the regulation exists’]; Berman [v. Regents of University of

California (2014)] 229 Cal.App.4th [1265,] 1271–1272 [explaining that the

court accords great weight and respect to the administration’s construction of

the university’s student conduct code based on its expertise and familiarity

with the legal and regulatory issues].)” (Akella, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p.

817.) There is no evidence calling into question the PT Committee’s

familiarity with both the Faculty Code of Conduct as a legal document and

the significance that its enforcement has within the University community.

For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the University’s finding that

plaintiff’s conduct toward Jane Doe at a party held in connection with an offcampus academic conference was subject to discipline under the Faculty Code

of Conduct.

B. Petitioner Violated Ethical Principles that Significantly

Impaired the University’s Central Functions.

Plaintiff next contends the University lacked authority to discipline

him for conduct not enumerated as “ ‘unacceptable conduct’ ” in the Faculty

Code of Conduct. A plain, commonsense reading of the Faculty Code of

Conduct, Part II, defeats plaintiff’s contention.

The relevant provision, discussed ante, states: “The Types of 

Unacceptable Conduct listed below in Sections A through E are examples of 

types of conduct which meet the preceding standards and hence are 

presumptively subject to University discipline. Other types of serious 

misconduct, not specifically enumerated herein, may nonetheless be the basis 
20

for disciplinary action.” (2d italics added.) This language reflects the 

University’s clear intent to authorize discipline for conduct not specifically 

laid out in the Faculty Code of Conduct, Part II, if it otherwise meets the 

standard of violating “ethical principles and . . . significantly impair[ing] the 

University’s central functions . . . .” Again, the PT Committee’s

interpretation of this language is reasonable and entitled to our deference. 

(Akella, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 817–818; Manderson-Saleh, supra, 60 

Cal.App.5th at p. 697 [courts accord an administrative agency’s 

interpretation of its own regulation great weight and deference, unless the 

interpretation is “unauthorized or clearly erroneous”].)

Plaintiff deflects with a fairness argument, insisting he had no notice 

the University would seek to regulate faculty behavior at a non-University 

event with respect to conduct not articulated in the Faculty Code of Conduct. 

We disagree. The regulated conduct was in fact set forth in the code, 

providing notice to him and other faculty members as to what was not 

acceptable—to wit, “conduct which is not justified by the ethical principles 

and which significantly impairs the University’s central functions . . . .” The 

code’s failure to enumerate every type of conduct meeting this standard does 

not render this provision unenforceable.

Finally, plaintiff claims the University “postulated without support

that anytime a faculty member engages in conduct that would not be

tolerated on campus, the University’s central functions are impaired.” Not

so.

The PT Committee explained its Jane Doe finding as follows: “The 

University is impaired in this function if its faculty, without consequence or 

sanction, engage in behavior in the context of professional events that would 

not be tolerated on campus because of their clear incompatibility with 
21

sustaining an environment ‘conducive to sharing, extending, and critically 

examining knowledge and values, and to furthering the search for wisdom.’ 

For example, it is to be expected that neither [Jane Doe] nor [Witness 1] (nor 

potentially others who became aware of the behavior) would want to work 

with Professor Balakrishnan (or even with anyone from UCSC) in the future, 

if they see that this behavior has no consequences. In other words: only a 

safe environment is an environment conducive to sharing knowledge and 

values.”

Plaintiff’s attempt to paint this explanation as mere postulating 

underscores his ongoing failure to recognize the gravity of his conduct. He 

sexually abused a fellow academic, Jane Doe, at an academic conference, and 

when she escorted him from the room, he returned later and abused her

again. In response, Doe and Witness 1 were forced to barricade the door for 

their safety. Plaintiff’s colleagues on the PT Committee appropriately

determined that his conduct presented a serious risk to the safety of others in 

the community and that his continued association with UCSC would likely 

discourage students and professors alike from participating in academic 

events where he might be present. The 2017 open letter calling on the 

University to discipline plaintiff for his pattern of abusive behavior, signed by 

over 150 people, confirms the PT Committee’s determination was well 

founded, as does Witness 1’s testimony about the trauma Doe suffered from 

his abuse. Accordingly, the University’s Jane Doe findings stand.

III. The University’s Findings as to Anneliese H. Stand.

A. Petitioner’s Jurisdiction Challenge Fails.

Plaintiff contends the University had no jurisdiction over 

Anneliese H.’s complaint because she was not a student or member of the 

University community when he sexually harassed her. Plaintiff relies upon 
22

the definition of “student” in the University’s Policies Applying to Campus 

Activities, Organizations and Students, part III, section 14.00,

DEFINITIONS, which states: A “ ‘student’ ” is “an individual for whom the 

University maintains student records and who: (a) is enrolled in or registered 

with an academic program of the University; (b) has completed the 

immediately preceding term, is not presently enrolled, and is eligible for reenrollment; or (c) is on an approved educational leave or other approved leave 

status, or is on filing-fee status.” According to plaintiff, Anneliese was a 

graduate who did not meet this definition, such that the University’s sexual 

harassment policy did not apply to her. Not so.

The evidence demonstrated that Anneliese walked in the UCSC 

graduation ceremony on June 16, 2018, about two days before attending the 

party after which plaintiff sexually harassed her. In fact, she attended this 

party in part to celebrate her graduation. At that time, the University had 

not yet audited Anneliese’s grades or conferred her degree, which did not

occur until July 2018. Under these circumstances, we conclude the evidence 

supports a finding that Anneliese was in fact a student under the 

University’s policies.

In any event, as the PT Committee pointed out, the University’s sexual 

harassment policy dated February 1, 2006, page 1, states, “Sexual 

harassment may include incidents between any members of the University 

community, including faculty and other academic appointees, staff, coaches, 

housestaff, students, and non-student or non-employee participants in 

University programs, such as vendors, contractors, visitors and patients.” 

Given this broad standard, “it is not necessary to quibble over the exact 

moment when [Anneliese H.] ceased being a student. The Sexual 

Harassment policy prohibits Sexual Harassment of any member of the 
23

University community. . . . There may be some question whether alumni 

remain members of the University community for the rest of their lives, but 

certainly a graduating senior does not cease to be a member of the University 

community on the last day of the final quarter. For this reason, we believe 

that the University Sexual Harassment policy does prohibit the behavior 

committed by Professor Balakrishnan on this occasion, and thus that this 

behavior was a violation of the Sexual Harassment policy, and consequently a 

violation of the FCC (APM 015.II.C.7).”

We conclude the PT Committee’s interpretation was consistent with 

both the language and purpose of the sexual harassment policy. Moreover, as 

stated before, the PT Committee was comprised of three of plaintiff’s

professor colleagues who were individually and collectively “knowledgeable of

and sensitive to the needs of [the] . . . university population to which [the

policy] applies.” (Akella, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 817, citing Simi Corp. v.

Garamendi, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505, and Berman v. Regents of

University of California, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1271–1272.) Relevant

here, as the PT Committee found, Friend 1 invited plaintiff to her graduation 

weekend party after having audited one of his classes because she was 

seeking his mentorship. Anneliese knew Friend 1 because they were both 

UCSC students living with other students in off-campus housing. Anneliese 

met plaintiff at Friend 1’s party and was sexually abused by him after he 

volunteered to walk her home, when she fell ill due to having consumed too

much alcohol. In these circumstances, plaintiff’s claim that Anneliese had 

ceased to be a member of the University community entitled to protection 

under the sexual harassment policy two days before he abused her rings 

hollow.
24

B. Plaintiff Had Notice of the Charge.

Plaintiff contends he had no notice of one of the two charges against 

him in the case of Anneliese H. The first charge, discussed ante, was for 

violation of the University’s sexual harassment policy. The second charge, of 

which plaintiff claims he had no notice, was for a violation of the Faculty 

Code of Conduct, Part II. We reject this contention.

Plaintiff is correct the notice of intent to discipline issued by the 

University identified one charge relating to Anneliese H.: “Alleged violation: 

APM 015 II.C.7: Serious violation of University policies governing the 

professional conduct of faculty (specifically, the University Policy on Sexual 

Harassment, 2006).” Following the hearing, the PT Committee found a 

violation of the sexual harassment policy and, thus, APM 015 II.C.7, with 

respect to plaintiff’s conduct toward Anneliese. In addition, the committee

found his conduct “independently violated the [Faculty Code of Conduct],” 

which “prohibits, in general, faculty conduct that is unacceptable because it is 

‘not justified by the Ethical Principles and significantly impairs the 

University’s central functions as set forth in the Preamble’ (APM 015, 

Preamble).” The committee reasoned: “Students have a right to expect that 

the University does not tolerate faculty who attempt to rape people. The 

University has an obligation to honor that right.”

The PT Committee’s findings and recommendations were then 

reviewed by Chancellor Larive, who determined, based on her own review of 

the evidence, that plaintiff violated the University’s sexual harassment policy 

(and, thus, APM 015 II.C.7). Chancellor Larive made no mention of, or 

finding as to, the Faculty Code of Conduct, Part II, before submitting her 

recommendation of dismissal and denial of emeritus status to University

President Napolitano.
25

After her own review, University President Napolitano adopted the 

same finding of a violation of the University’s sexual harassment policy in

submitting her recommendation of dismissal to the Regents, which the

Regents then approved—the administrative decision challenged by this writ 

petition.

Plaintiff’s lack-of-notice claim thus fails. In the case of Anneliese H., he 

was charged with—and disciplined for—only the serious violation of the 

University’s sexual harassment policy.

IV. The Sanctions Imposed Were Not Excessive.

Lastly, plaintiff contends dismissal of a tenured professor and denial of 

emeritus status for conduct that was never criminally charged, resulting in a 

loss of “upwards of a million dollars” in salary and benefits, is 

constitutionally excessive (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17). We disagree.

“We review the penalty imposed by an administrative body for an abuse 

of discretion. [Citation.] This court cannot ‘substitute its discretion for that 

of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed.’ 

[Citation.] Moreover, ‘[i]t is only in the exceptional case, when it is shown 

that reasonable minds cannot differ on the propriety of the penalty, that an 

abuse of discretion is shown.’ [Citation.]” (Doe v. Regents of University of 

California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1106; Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural 

Examiners (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 685, 692 [courts “ ‘pay great deference to 

the expertise of the administrative agency in determining the appropriate 

penalty to be imposed’ ”].)

The University found clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff

egregiously sexually abused both Jane Doe and Anneliese. As to the latter, in 

particular, plaintiff took advantage of Anneliese’s extreme intoxication to 

enter her home and attempt to rape her. Rather than challenge this 
26

evidence, plaintiff attempts to minimize its significance. However, as the 

University’s chancellor found, given the nature and severity of plaintiff’s

conduct, the harm to the victims, and the harm to the University, his 

dismissal and denial of emeritus status were warranted on the basis of either 

or both incidents. The University’s decisions were well within its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Burns, J.

Chou, J.
27

A164480/Balakrishnan v. Regents of University of California

Trial Court: Superior Court of the County of Alameda

Trial Judge: Paul Herbert

Counsel: Hathaway Parker, Mark M. Hathaway and Jenna E. 

Parker, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

University of California Office of the General Counsel and

Katharine Essick; Munger, Tolles & Olson, Hailyn J. 

Chen and Rebecca L. Sciarrino, for Defendant and 

Respondent.