Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 10 , 2022

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 21

- 00427

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.U.D., S.L.D., A/K/A S.D., J.P.J.D., K.K.J.D., A.E.D., II, CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 308th District Court

Harris Count y , Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2018

- 37155

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appel lant R. J . ( “ Mother ” ) appeals the trial court ’ s or der terminating her parental rights to her children C.U.D., S.L.D. A/K/A S.D., J.P.J.D., K.K.J.D., and
A.E.D., II. 1 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann

. § 161.001( b)(1 ) , (b)(2)

. In three issues, Mother argues the trial court erred by : (1) denying her motion for mistrial, (2) admitting into evidence a police report containing inadmissible hearsay , and (3) entering an order terminating Mother ’ s pa rental ri g hts based on Family Code
§ 161.001 (b)(1)(O)

. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). We affirm.

1 C.U.D. was born i n 2 013, S.L.D. was born in 2014, twins K.K.J.D. and J.P.J.D . were born in 2016, an d A. E. D. , II was born in 2 017.2 I. B ACKGROUND 2

On August 13, 20 19, the Department of Family and Protec tive Services ( “ the Department ” ) filed its first amended petition for conservatorship and term i nation

o f the parent

- ch ild relationship between Mother and Father and their five children:
C.U.D., S.L.D. A/K/A S. D., J.P.J.D., K.K.J.D., and A.E.D., II

. On June 7, 2021, the Department filed its t hird amended petition , stating that Mother ’ s parental righ ts should be terminat ed under Ch apter 161 of the Family Code because Mother

committed one o r more of th e following acts or omissions: ( 1) knowingly placed or

allowed the children to remain in condit ions or surroundings that endang er their physical or emoti onal well

- being ; (2) engaged in conduct or knowing ly placed the children with persons who engaged in co nduct that endangered the child r en ’ s physical or emotio nal well

- being; (3) exec uted before or after the lawsuit was filed an affidavit of relinquishment of parent al rights as provided by Family Code Chapter 16 1 ; (4) was convicted or placed on community sup ervision for the death

or serio u s inju ry of a child und er spe cified sections o f the Penal Code ; (5)

c onstructively abandoned the child ren who had been in permanen t or temporar y managing conservator ship of the Department for at least six months, and the Depar tment ma de reasonable e fforts t o re turn the child to th e parent, the parent has not regularly visite d or maintained significant contact with the child, and the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a saf e environment ; (6)

f a i l e d t o comp ly with the pr ov isions of a court order that speci fically established the actions necessary f

or the parent to obtai n the return of the chi ldren wh o ha ve
be en in permanent or temp orary managing conservatorship o f the Department for

2 T he fact s of this case, as well as its procedural history, ar e well known to the partie s; therefore, w e will discuss the fact s of t he case only to the exten t they are re levant to the issues on appeal

. See Tex. R. App. P

. 4 7

. 1 (“The court of appeals must ha nd down a writte n opinion that is

a s brief as practicable b ut that addresses ever y issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”)

.3

at least ni ne months as a result of the c hild ren ’ s r emova l from the parent under

C hapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child ; and (7) used a controlled
substance, as de fined in Health and Safety Code Chapter 481, in a manner that endangered the child ren , and the parent fai led to complete a cou rt

- order ed abuse

treat ment program or co ntinued to use a controlled substance after the treatment

program

. S ee Tex. Fam. Code A nn. § 161 .001(b)(1) (D), (E), (K), (L), (N), (O), (P )

. On June 22, 2021, t rial began on the Department ’ s petition for t ermination

of Mother and Father ’ s parental rights

. The j ury heard testimony from Mother ; Deputies Jonathan Ajayi and C hristopher Cano of the Harr is C o unty She riff ’ s
Office ; the Department ’ s case worker assigned to t he Department ’ s case , Amanda

Ber mudez; the Depar tme n t ’ s case w orker for a differ ent case concerning a chi ld not subject to the underlying lawsuit , Jessica Espa illat; two psycho logists, D r.
Charles Cleve l and and Dr. Ebony Butler ; the senior pastor of a ch urch and the
operator of a shelter connected with the church, wh ere Mother and Fat her attempted to obt ain hou sing
, Dr. Edward Buford ; a nd the children ’ s guardian ad

litem
, Claudia Canales.

At the end of the presentation of evidence at trial, the Departme nt abandoned its reque st s f

or termination of Mother ’ s parental rights based on it s allegatio ns that

Mother : (1) exec uted before or after the lawsuit wa s fi led an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by Family Code Chapter 16 1 , and (2)

was convicted or placed on co mmunity supervision for the death or serious inju ry
of a child under certain sections o f the Penal Code

. S ee id. § 161 .001(b)(1) (K), (L)

. Mother moved for a di rected verdict as to all other predicate grounds for

termination alleged by the D epartment

. T he trial court denied Mother ’ s requests

. The trial court submitted the c ase to the jury with instructions as to four o f the4

predicate statutory grounds relied on b y the Department

. 3 See id. § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (N), (O)

. The jury found that termin at ion of Mother ’ s parental rights was pro per based on all four grounds su bm itted and th at termination was in the best int erest of the

children

. See id. § 161.001(b)(1 ) (D), (E), (N), (O)

. O n September 14 , 2021, th e trial court signed an order in corporating t h e jury ’ s findings and terminating

Mother ’ s parental rights to all five c hildren p ursuant to Family Code
§ 161.001(b)(1 )(D), (E ), ( K )
, (N), and (O)

. 4 See id. § 1 61. 001(b)(1). Mother timely appealed.

II. M OTI O N FOR M IST RIAL
In her first issue, Mother argues the trial court erred w hen it denied Father ’ s
motion for mistrial

.
A. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW

We review the trial court ’ s ruling on a motion for mistria l for an abus e o f

disc retion. Schlafly v . Schlafly

 ̧ 33 S.W .3d 863, 868 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); City of Jer sey Village v. Campbell , 920 S.W.2d 694, 698 ( Tex. App.

— H ouston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) ; see Tex. Turnpike Auth. v.

McCr aw , 458 S.W

. 2d 91 1, 913 (Tex. 19 70)

. A trial court abuse s its dis cretion

when it acts arbitrarily or unreas onably or without refe rence to guiding rules or

3 The trial court did not submit to the jury the question of whether ter mination was proper based on Mothe r ’ s alleged used of a controlled s u bstance, as de fined in H ea lth and Safety Code C hapter 481, in a manner that endangered the child
, a nd Mother ’ s alleged failure to complete a court

- order ed abuse treat ment program or co nti nued to ab use a controlled substan ce after the treatment program

. See Tex. Fam. Code An n. § 1 61 .001(b)(1)(P). At t he c harge conference, Mother ’ s counsel argued that th is predicate ground for termination “ was not pled as to mo ther
, ” and the trial court agre ed

. However, we note th at the Depar tmen t ’ s live pleading c o ntain ed this allegation

.

4 The tria l court ’ s order terminated F ather ’ s parental rig hts based on § 161.001(b )( 1)(D)
, (E) , (N), ( O), a nd (P) , consist en t with the jury ’ s findings

. See id. § 16 1.001( b) (1)

.5

principles. Bowie Me m . Hosp. v. Wright , 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex . 2002).

B. A NALYSIS
During Mother ’ s testi mony, the f ollow ing exchange occurred:

[The D epartment ] : Okay. And wer e you aware if a CPS investigator a ttempted to come and see you and [Father] at the Extended Stay in W ebster? [Mother]: Nobo dy tried to come see us. [The Department]: Okay. And are you aware of wh eth er or not [Father] made a statement to the investigat ive caseworker, “ That she could

come

-- ” [Mo ther ’ s coun sel] : Objection. [The Department] : If I can finish my statement, pleas e

. [Mother ’ s coun sel] : It ’ s hearsay on he arsay, Judge. [ Trial Cou r t] : She needs to finish her question and th en you can certai nly object before the witness responds. [The Department] : Are you aware of whether or not [Father]

ma de a statement to the inve s tigative caseworker, “ That she could come to that motel room in W e bster , Te xas, but if she did, he would shoot her in the face ” ? [Father ’ s cou nsel] : Your Honor, I ’ m going to object t o hearsay. [ Trial C ourt] : Sustained. [Father ’ s cou nsel]: And I ’ d ask t h at the jury be asked to disregard that qu estion. [Tr ial Court] : O kay. Bein g that that objection was sustained , the jurors are specifically instructed to disregard and not carry any

w eight in to the asked question. [Father ’ s coun sel]: Your Honor, at this time I ’ d move for a mistrial.6

[Tr ial Cour t] : Okay. The jurors, w e ’ re g oing to excuse them and we will have ar gument as to your request for a mistrial. Go ahead. All rise. (OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY) [Tr ial Court] : Now tha t the jurors are no longer in the presence of the court, [Father ’ s c ou nsel]
, make your argum e nt fo r yo ur request or motion for a mistrial

. [Father ’ s couns el]: Your Honor, I would ask for a mistrial at this poi nt because the question in and of itself the j ury hearing it, it ’ s highl y prejudicial. It ’ s a bell that can ’ t be, you can ’ t unring that be l l, de spit e the fact that you ’ re going to giv e

-- you gave the m the instruction or will give them the instruction to d isregard it. I think also asking for it to be struck, the problem is you ’ ve got 12 people who they ’ ve heard it. Th e damage is done. And so , your Hon or, for this point, especially as t o my cli ent, I th ink that this Court has got to grant a mistrial. [Tr ial Court] : Any response? [The D epartment] : My r esponse would be that, my a rgument, number one, as far as the hearsa y, it ’ s definitely a sta t ement aga inst interest as far

as [Father] is concerned, so th at would be my argument as to whether or not it ’ s even h earsay; that ’ s the first thing. The second thi ng is, I don ’ t believe that based on the Court ’ s instr uctions that t hey ’ ll have any issue wi t h det ermi ning that that ’ s not a piece of inf ormation or evide nce that they ’ re supposed to weigh in order to make a de cision, in order to make a decision in this

ca se, so I would ask tha t the mistrial be, the request f or mistrial be denied. [Tr ial Court] : Are t here any additional statements or respo nses that the add itional Attorney Ad7 Litems would like to make on the rec ord? I ’ ll begin by asking [Mo ther ’ s counsel] f irst

. [Mo ther ’ s counse l] : I ’ m sorry, I don ’ t understand any additio na l statements about thi s

. [Tr ial Court] : Yeah. [Mo ther ’ s counsel] : Well, your Honor , for one thing, I think that there are going to be othe r instances when we think that the Petitioner is back dooring inform ation , just defamatory information that is not relevant to this procee d ing t hat

-- [Tr ial Court] : That ’ s not relev ant to the reques t for a mistrial. [Mo ther ’ s counsel] : I understand that . But I ’ m saying there are going to be other i nstances, and I just w ant y ou to understand that this might be a

rec urring issue. The proble m is, this is defamatory against my client al lowing

-- or allo wing the jury to hear this, an allegation that the fathe r of her children has threatened, has allegedl y threatened to shoot anoth er person is defamatory against her [sic] . And asking her, ar e yo u awar e he said this, it ’ s not even establish ed yet. They ’ re j ust trying to back door this information to inflame the minds of the jury, and I don ’ t think that bell can be unrung. [Tr ial Cour t ] : Anything else, [ c hildren ’ s ad litem] ? [Children ’ s ad litem] : Your Hon or, if I may, I don ’ t believe that the statement was inflammatory, and certainly they can call a rebuttal wi tness to back up what they ’ ve said. It ’ s not l ike it ’ s something that was never said. I don ’ t think it rises to th e level of a mistrial.

. . . . [T rial Court]: After brea k and I believe t he question before the Court and the motion, I guess bet ter8 stated, by [Father ’ s counsel] on behalf of her client as to the reque st for a mistrial, the Court is denying t hat request. The Court b e lieves th at und er 403 as stated by [Father ’ s cou nsel] , that I do not believe and the Court specifically finds that th e statement would substantially outweigh by a danger of one or more of th e f ollowing, of possibly being unfairly p rejudicial or possibly c o nfusin g a n issu e or misleading the jury is n ot what would hap pen and, therefore, would not be cause to grant a mistri al at this time, and, specifically, based upon the question that was aske d by the State ’ s attorney.
Mot her argues that the trial cou rt err ed when it deni ed Father ’ s motion f or
mistrial. Howe ver , “ i n trials involving multiple d efendants, a party m ust make its own objection to the evidence if it wishes to preserve error for appeal.” Owens

Cornin g Fiberglas Co rp. v. Malone , 916 S.W.2 d 551, 556 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [1st Dist.] 1996 ), aff ’ d , 972 S. W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998 ) ; Bohls v. Oakes , 75 S.W.3d
473, 478 ( Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) ; Be utel v. Dall. Cnty. Flood

Control Dist. , No. 1 , 916 S.W.3d 685, 694 (Tex. App.

— Waco 1996, wri t denied); Celotex Corp. v . Tate , 797 S.W.3d 1 97, 201 (Tex. Ap p.

— Corpus Christi

– Edi nburg
1990, writ dism ’ d ); How ard v. Phillips , 728 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. App.

— For t
Worth 1987, no writ) ; see Tex. R. A p p. P. 33.1(a) ; Wolfe v. E. Tex . Se ed Co. , 583

S.W. 2d 4 8 1 , 482 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, wr it dism ’ d) ( “ [A] party must make his own objection to the evidence
, or an exce ption to the ruling of the court regard ing the objection, if he wishes to preserve any error for appeal

. ” )

. Here
, Mother did not mak e a motion for mistrial
, n o r does the record r eveal that the t rial court granted a r equest by Mother o r Father t o have a single objection preserve

error for bo th p arties. See Owens

- Cornin g Fiberglas Corp.
, 916 S.W.2d at 556

– 579

(co ncluding that appellant c o ul d rely on another defend ant ’ s objection when th e
trial cour t “ required that an objection made by one defend ant would be made on

behalf of all def

endants ” ). T hus
, we conclude that Mother has failed to preserve

this issue for our revie w. See Tex. R. App. P . 33.1(a); Owens

- Cor ning F iberg las Corp

. , 916 S.W .2d at 556 ; see also Kamine tzky v. Richardson
, No. 01

- 00

- 0 0 575

- CV, 200 3 WL 21470396, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [1s t Dist.] June 26, 2003, pet. denie d) (mem. op.) (“IPC cannot rely on the motions and objectio n s made by

other defendants to preserve error

. . . .”).

We ov errule Mother ’ s first issue.

III. H EARSAY
In her second issue, Mother argues the trial court abused its d isc retion when

it “ admitted inadmissible hearsay through a Houston P olice Depar tm ent offense

r ep ort riddled with out

- of

- court statements ass erte d for the t ruth of the matter th at were highly prejudicial

. . . . ”

A. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW

We review a trial co urt ’ s a dmission of evid ence under the abus e

- of

disc retion standard. In re J. P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 5 7 0, 575 (Tex. 2005) (per curia m)

. A

trial court ab uses its dis cretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreas onably or without

r eference to guiding rules or principles

. Bowie Me m . Hosp. , 79 S.W.3d at 52

.
We will not reverse a trial co urt ’ s judgment based on th e erroneous
admission of evide nce unles s we conclu de that the error pro bably caused the rendition of an impro per judgment

. Tex. R . A pp. P. 44.1(a )( 1) ; U

- Haul Int ’ l, Inc. v.

Wal drip , 380 S.W.3d 118, 136 (Te x. 2012); Interstate Nort hborough P ’ ship v.

St ate , 6 6 S .W.3d 213, 220 (Tex . 2001)

. In dete rmining whe ther the erroneous
admission of evidence was harmful, we review the entir e record. Inters tate10

Northborough , 66 S .W.3d at 220

. “ Typically, a successful ch allenge to a tri al

court ’ s eviden tiary ruling s require s the complaining party to de monstrate that the j udgment tur n s on the particular evidence excluded or admitted. ” Id. The e rroneous
admission of evid ence tha t is c umulative o f other properly admitted evidence is

harmless. Nissan Mo tor Co. v. Armstrong , 145 S .W .3d 131, 144 (Tex. 2004).

B. A PPLI CABLE L AW

Hear say is an out

- of

- court stat ement that a party offers in to evidence to

pro ve the t ruth of the matter asse rted in t he statement. Tex. R. Evi d . 801(d). Generally, hearsay is not admiss ible unless provided for by t he Texas Ru les of

Evid ence , a statut e, or othe r rule. Tex. R. Ev id. 802.

The rul e against hearsay does not ex clude a r ecord or statement of a pub lic

o ffice if :
(A) it sets out: (i ) the office ’ s a ctivit ies; (ii) a matter observed while under a le gal duty to r eport, but not in clu ding, in a cr iminal a crimina l case, a matter observed by law

- en forcement person nel; or (iii ) in a civil case

. . . fac t ual findin gs from a legally authorized investigation; and (B) the opponent fails to d emo nstrate that the sourc e o f the information or other circums tances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Tex. R. Evid. 803 (8)

. Hearsay within hearsay is not admissible u nless each part of

the combined statements conf orms with an exception to the general ru le excluding hearsay. Benson v. Chalk , 536 S.W.3d 886, 89 5 (Te x. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet

. denied) ; see Tex. R. Ev id. 805; Knox v. T ayl or , 992 S.W.2d 40, 64 (T ex. App.

— Houston [1 4th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)

. “ When a police report contains a hearsay statement, the statement mus t fall under some hea rsay exceptio n of it s own11

because neither the pu blic records and reports e xception, nor the r ecords o f regularly conduct ed activiti es excep tion, protects hearsay within hearsay. ” Benson
, 536 S.W.3d at 895.

C

. A NALYSIS

Here, Mother arg u es the trial court a bused its dis cretion when it admitted

exhibit thirteen , which contains two police report s reg arding the Februa ry 10 , 2020

incident

. One of the reports i s wri tt en by Officer “ Aguilar, R ” and a supplem ental

rep ort is writte n by Officer “ Pham, T T [. ] ” Offic er Aguilar ’ s police rep ort covers
events that occurred the day Mother and Fat he r visited the children w hile they

were in the Department ’s c are

. The relevant portions of Officer Aguil ar ’ s report provide :

I
, Officer R. Aguilar was rid in g 2 2 834E and was dis pa tched to a child custody situ ation at 3 Northpoint Dr on Monday 02

- 10

- 2 020 at 1611 Hrs

. I arrived at 1628 Hrs and made contact with the c ompl [ainant] and the suspects , the suspects provided fictitious cour t documents demanding that po lic e r emove the chil dr en from CPS

. The children wer e left in the custody of CPS and the paren ts/s uspects were provided a case number.
Off i cers with BWC : Sgt. A

. Anderson Pr# 140497 Officer Rangel Pr# 16 1125 Officer Aquino Pr# 1 60122
COMPLAINANT STATEMENTS : Be r mu dez
, Amanda
CP S Specialist

. . . . She stated that she worked for CPS and that she has temp orary custody of the children that was granted by Judge Gloria Lopez out of12

Court 308. With that court or der she (CPS) has cus tody of the ch i ldren and wanted p oli c e to assist i n h er in taking the additional 2 c hildren from the suspects. She then stated tha t the suspects did have a court [sic] to have the children returned to them on Oct 3
, 2019 but when they went t o drop off the children. The address the suspects prov ide d was fake an d could not release the children to them if they were still homeless an d did not have a [sic] actual place of residence.

. . . . Upon arrival t o the scene I made contact with the suspect s #1 and #2, I then gathe red their statement to why they c alled. The s uspect #2 then provide a ripped sin gle document regarding her case and ho w it was a official court document signed by the judge (paper did not have any official stamp by the judge). I th en spoke to the compl [ain ant] and gathered her side of th e incident
, I then advised the suspects that th e children were not going to be rele as ed. The suspects then demanded a captain to make t he scene
, I advised them th a t he would not make the scene. I th en advised them that I wa s going to get a Sgt to make the

scene. Mom en ts later Sgt. Anderson made the sce ne and further explained to the susp ec ts that CPS was going to maintain custody of the c hildren, and that he needed to go to court to get another court order

. After several att empts of providing his legal doc u ments, cal li ng 911 and requesting a chief
, thre atening police with being arrested b y the Feds for hindering justice susp ect #1 made an outcry that his daug hter was being sexually assaulted. Because of this the suspect #1 di d not feel comfortable in leavin g the child i n CPS custody, but did not provide any further details to the incident. B ased on the entire interaction with the suspects regarding the custody their children, and how they exhausted hoe [sic] avenues of trying to have police assist them in ge t ting their k ids back. I could not find his out cry credible at this time
, based on th e totally of the circumstances and how af ter 45

- 50 min of arguing with police regarding the courts & and child custody. The suspect #1 the n made the outcry in order to at t empt to ma in tain custody of the child. After se veral more moments of explaining to th e suspects that the children were going to stay with CPS
, the suspects finally left the lobby of the CPS office

. Offic e Pham ’ s report , dated February 11, 2020, provide s : On this da te , I, Detective TT Pham
, payroll #103881 reviewe d this13

ca se for follow up

. According to the report
, the officers settled the
case at scene

. There is no Inte rference w i th Child Custody had

oc curred at th i s time and the suspec ts were advised to go back to co u rt and update the order

. I closed this case fro m MPU's c as e management.
Case closed.

When exhibit thirteen was offered for admission , the follow ing ex change

occurred:

[ Trial Court] : Okay. And this is the State ’ s Exhibit 13;

co rrect? [The D epa

r tment] : Yes, Judge. [ Trial Court] : And I ’ m a ssuming t he re ’ s objec tions, and if so, what are those? [Father ’ s counsel]: Your Honor, my objection to No

. 13 c oming in is that it is simp ly a, I guess it ’ s an offense report. It ’ s not an act ual charge. I

wo u ld argu e that under 401, 403, it ’ s prejudici al. In addit io n to that, your Honor, it has hearsay within it. It ’ s written by an Officer Aguilar, who is not p resen t to testify. Under 803 in addition to that, there is
statement s made by Amanda Bermudez,

excus e me, on Page 5 at the bottom where she ’ s lis ted as a com pl ainant. Th ere is, there is hearsay listed on Page 6 statements made a Sergeant Anderson, which wo uld b e the second paragraph und er “ Officer ’ s Actions, ” and there is also a statement made a T. Pham

o n the l ast page. That ’ s on Page 1 of 1, but it ’ s the las t page, Page 9 for the purpose of the exhibit. And so, your Honor, for those reasons, I would ask t hat i t be excluded. [ Trial Cour t] : All right. Thank you. [Mo ther ’ s counsel] : Jud ge, I would also like to add that there has been extensive te sti mony abou t that incid ent, and so

-- and that the police were14 called out and this is needlessly cumulative of evidence a lready before the Co urt and the jury. [ Trial Court] : Tha nk you. Any resp onse? [The D epar t ment] : The only response would be that, the do cument is a certified document and, although, there has been testimony from at least two witnesses about the incident, there are cle arer d ifferences in perspective about what o ccurred; and so I would ask that the doc ument be entered specifically for the pu rpose of re buttal. [M o ther ’ s counsel] : Judge. [ Trial Court] : Yes. [Mo ther ’ s counsel] : The problem with a llowing hearsay in, if it ’ s g oing to be al lowed i n to prove the matt ers asserted the rein, that is su c h a vio lation of the Rules of Evidence. They ce rtainly h ad subpoena power. They could subpoena the officers. They could subpoena these people if they want to have additional proof, rel iable admissi ble pro of before the jury. But allowing th is in for any ot h er purp ose than to show that an offense repo rt was made is in violat ion of 803. [ Trial Court] : I believe there is

-- 803 has exceptions and this is a publ ic record, so there is an

exc eption so I ’ m not worried about Officer

or Deputy Aguil ar.

. . . . [ Tri a l Court ] : Okay. As to Officer Aguilar, I b eli eve that

an y statemen ts made by this deputy or officer in the report would fall under the exception under 80 3. As to Amanda Bermudez, I d on ’ t believe that would apply here. I a m concerned and I h ear the objec t ion in regards to any statements within15 the rep ort as to T . Pham, so I would like a response to the hearsay objections, specifically on Page 9 of the exhib it that relate to T. Pham ’ s s tatements or quotes and that ’ s being sp ecifically hears ay. [The D epartm e nt] : As far as T. Pham is concerned, that ’ s als o, that p er son is also listed as a detective, so I believe it would fall under the same purview the Court ju st listed as far as the sa me with Officer Aguilar, so I believe that it would
meet t he exceptio ns pr e viously stated by the Court, Judge. [ Tria l Cour t] : As t o the obj ections of cumulative, that ’ s overruled. As to hearsay, that ’ s overruled. As to 401 and 40 3, that ’ s overruled. [Fath er ’ s counsel]: Thank you, your Honor. [ T rial Court] : 13 is admitted

.
A s noted above, a party may not r ely on another de fenda nt ’ s objection to

preserve error for appeal. See Owens

- Cor ning Fiberg las Corp

. , 916 S.W .2d a t 556

. Here, Father objected to exhibit thirteen on the basis of hea rsay and i dentif ied the

statemen t s in the exhibit he was challenging . Mother, however, di d not object on

the basis of h ears ay, a lthoug h she did articu late the word “ hearsay ” to the trial

c our t during the discussion pe rtaining to exhibit thirteen ’ s admis sib ility. Assuming,

withou t decidin g , that Mother obj ected to exhibit thirteen on the basis of hearsay
, she faile d to i dentify the stat ement s that she was challenging as hea rsay. A blanket

he arsay objection t hat does not identify the stateme nts being challenged in a

docume n t preserves nothing for our review. See In re L. M. , 572 S. W .2d 823, 83 2

– 33 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th D ist.] 2019, no pet.) ( “ A hearsay objection that

does n ot ident ify which parts of a document contain hearsay is not suffici ently specific to preserve erro r w ith respect to those parts. ” ). The refore, this issue has

been waived

.16

N evertheless
, even if Mother challenged the same statem ents in exhibit

thirteen th at Father identified for the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discret i o n by admitting exhibit thir teen in to the record. Officer s Pha m

a nd Agu ila r ’ s statements in the p olice report are admissible u nder the exception to
the rul e against hearsay provided in Texas Rule o f Evidence 803( 8 ) because t he
reports are record s of a pub l i c off ice (the Hous ton Police Depar tment ) setting out

the office ’ s activit ies , factual findings, and matter s observe d while under a legal duty to re port

. S ee Tex. R. Evid. 803 (8) ( A) ; see also Tex. De p ’ t of Pub. Safety v.

Ca ruana , 363 S. W.3d 558, 564 (Tex. 2 012) ( “ Law enforcement investigati on reports are common ly admitted in civ il case s

. . . . ” ) ; McRae v. Echols , 8 S. W .3d
797, 799

– 800 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2000, pet . denied) (concluding police off icer ’ s report was admissible unde r 803(8))

. F ur thermore, Mother d i d not argue at the trial

court that the sour ce of the r e po rt or other circ umstances indicated a lack of

trustworthin ess

. See T ex. R. App. P. 33.1(a ); Tex

. R . Ev id. 803(8) ( B )

.
As to the st atement s in the report by Bermudez and Sergeant Anderson 5 that

were c hallenged in the tr ial c ourt , Berm udez testified at t r ial without objecti on

re garding the same information

. Bermude z is the De partment ’s case worder assig ned t o the underlying case . According to Be rmudez, on the day of the

visitation in question, Mother a n d Father “ca lled the cops to come to the CPS
office, beca use [Father] was alleging that C PS did not follow a court order and that

this case is fraud and t hat [CPS] kidnapped his children. ” When the visitati on was ended, Mother and Father s e iz ed S. L. D. and J .P.J .D

. , prevented them from goin g
behind the locked doo r with Bermudez
, took the children to the lobby , and Father

5 We note that the on ly hearsay state ment by Se rgeant Anderson in the polic e report is the first sen tence of the paragraph i dentified by Father to the trial court , which provides “ Mome nts later Sgt. Anderson made the scene and further explained to t he suspects that CPS was g oi ng to maintain custody of the c hildren, and that he needed to g o to co urt to get ano t her court order

. ” The remain der of the par agraph is Of ficer Aguilar ’ s narrativ e.17

sh ie lded the children from Bermudez. F ather was aggressive and threateni ng and

used obscenities
, and Mother “was also very loud and yelling and cursing an d threatening to s u e and to call the cops and have everyone arrested. ” When law

enfor cement arrived, Mother an d Father told the officers “ [t ] hat CPS had

ki dnapped their children. ”

Bermudez testified that Mother a n d Father presented the police officer with

an outdated court order in which t he trial court order ed the Department to return

th e children home

. Mother and Father , however, failed to mention to t he officer

that the trial court h e ld an other hearing and a subsequent ord er was entered

. Bermudez “ had to find the court or der where CPS granted [ temp orary managing

con servator ship ] of the children to prove to the cop s that CPS did , in fact, have Temporary Mana g ing Conservators hip of the children. ” Bermudez prese nted the police with the order naming the Department as the child r e n ’s temporary managi ng

c onservator, and then Ber mudez “was a ble to t ake the children and return them

home. ”

Becaus e the same evidence complained of in exhibit thirteen attributed to the

statements of Bermudez and Serge ant Anderso n was also admitted duri ng
Bermudez ’ s t estimony without objection, any er ror in the admission of Bermudez

and S ergea n t A nderson ’ s statements in exhibit thirteen is harm less. See Nissan

Motor Co. , 145 S.W .3d at 144

. Furthermore, t o the extent M o ther complains on appeal of st atemen ts in exhibit t hirteen that were not bro ught to t he court ’ s attention, we conclude that thos e complaints are wa ived because they were not

raised in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. 33.1( a ).

We overrule Mother ’ s second issue.18 IV. T EXA S F A MILY C ODE § 161. 001( b )(1)

In h er third issue, Mot her argues “ [t] he tri al court improperly entered an order to terminate the pare ntal rights of [Mother] in th i s case pursuant to ”
§ 161.001(b)(1)( O) “because the children in this case were not removed for ‘ abuse or neglec t ’

. . . . ” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1 )(O)

. Mot her argu es
that “the jury h ea rd that [Mother] struggled with housing a nd finances, b u t did not heard [s ic ] ev idence that would support any n otion other than that she loved and

car ed for her childr en the best she c ould. ” We con strue Mother ’ s argument as a
challen ge to the legal sufficiency und er l ying the ju r y ’ s finding that termination was

proper under § 161.001(b)(1)(O)

. 6

A. A PPLI CABLE L AW

“ Texas Family Code Section 161 .001(b) allows fo r inv olu nt ary terminat ion of paren tal ri ghts if a court finds by clear and convi ncing evidence both that a

paren t e ngaged in on e or more enumerated predicate grounds for termination and

that termination is in the be st inte rest of the child

. ” In re M.P.
, No . 21

- 0360,

__ S.W .3d _
_, __ , 2022 WL 333 363, *1 (Tex. Feb. 4, 2022) (per curiam) (cit ing Tex

. Fam. Code Ann. § 1 61.001(b)( 1) (A)

– (U), (b)(2) )

. Thus, a single predicate find ing

u nder § 161.001(b )(1) of the Family Code is suf ficient to suppor t a judgment of

t ermination when there is also a fi nding that termination is in the child ’ s b est
inter est. I

n re A. V. , 113 S.W .3d 355, 362 (T ex. 2003). I f multiple predicate grounds are fo und
, the n we may affirm on any one ground because o nly one is

necess ary fo r term inati on of parent al rights. See In re T .G.R.

- M. , 404 S.W.3d 7, 13 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.)

. Howe ver,

becaus e p r ior termi nation for enda ngerment is a predicate ground for a

6 Mother concedes in her brief that she did not file a motion f or new trial, and thus, fa iled
to preserve a challenge to the fac tual s ufficiency of the evidenc e

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 32 4(b)(2)

.19

future termination, due process a nd due co urse of law require that [a] court of appeals r eview the l e gal an d factual sufficiency of the evidence supp or ting a trial court ’ s order o f terminatio n u n der Subsections 161.001(b) (1)(D) and (E) w hen challenged on appeal

. In re M.P.
, __ S.W.3d at _

_ , 2022 WL 333363 , at *3 (emphasis added) ; see In re

Z.M .M. , 577 S.W .3d 54 1, 543 (Te x. 2019) (per curiam); In re N.G. , 577 S.W .3d
230, 237 (Tex. 2 019) (per cu ria m )

.
Under § 161.001(b)(1)(O)
, t he trial court may order termination of the

par ent

- child relatio nship if the re i s clear and convi n cing evidence th at the parent
has :

faile d to comply with the provisions of a court order that s pecif ically estab lished the a cti o ns necessary for t he parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managi ng conservator shi p of the Department of Family and Protec tive Services for not less than nine mo nths as a result of t h e child ’ s r emova l from the parent under Chapt er 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child [.]
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.0 01(b)(1)(O) (emph asis added) ; see id. § 262.001(a) ( “ A g overnm ental entity with an interest in the child may file a suit affecting the
parent

- chil d relationsh ip r equesting an order or take possession of a child with out a court order as provided by this chapter. ” ) ; id. § 262.104 (pro viding that the Department ma y take possession of a child in an emergency without a court order );

see also In re E.C.R. , 402 S.W.3d 239, 24 8 (Tex. 2013) ( “ [W]hile subsection O requires removal under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect, t hose words are used broadly. ” ); In re A.A.A. , 265 S .W.3d 507, 516 (T e x. App.

— Houst on [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (concluding that child in care of a s helter a t the time of removal was removed from the parent under chapter 262 for abuse or neglect); In r e A.P

. , No. 13

- 19

- 00342

- CV, 2019 W L 6315429, at *6

– 7 (Tex. App.

— Corp u s Christi

Nov. 26 , 201 9, no pet.) ( “ [c]hildren are removed from their pa rents under Chapter

2 62 for the abuse o r neg lect of a child [even] where the children may have been20

physically in t he care of a relative, a med ical o r social services institution, or t he Department. ” ) ; In re J.H. , No. 09

- 14

- 00171

- CV, 2015 WL 5093400, at * 4

– 5 (Tex. Ap p.

— Beaum o nt Aug. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting mother ’ s argument

t hat c hild was not removed from her care when child was remov ed from relative s appoi nted as man a ging conservators because the child “was original ly removed

from Mother ’ s care pursu ant to C h apter 262”)

.
B. A NALYSIS
Mother argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury ’ s finding of predicate g rounds for termination under part ( O) of F amily Code
§ 161. 001(b)(1). See Tex. Fam. Co de Ann. § 161.001(b)( 1)( O). Howev er, she d oes not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury ’ s finding of grounds

for termination under part (D), (E ), a nd (N) of the statute. Furthermore
, M o t her does not argue that termination of her pa rent al rights was not i n the childr en ’ s bes t
interest.
To succeed on appeal from a termination decree, an appellant must establish that the findings on all of the termination grounds found by th e factfinder are unsupported by t he evidence. In re A.V. , 113 S.W.3d at 36 2 (holding that father ’ s failure to challenge sufficiency of evidence to support finding under one subsection

of § 161.001(1) made it unnecessary to address father ’ s challenges to o ther grounds for termination ); In re G.S. , No. 14

- 14

- 00477

- CV, 2014 WL 4699480, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; see In re

B.K.D

. , 131 S.W.3d 10, 16 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (holding

that because th e jury found four grounds for termination under § 161.001(1) and

the fath er challenge d only three of those grounds, appellate court was not require d to address his argument that the evidence was insufficient on the three challenged grounds). Here, the jury found that Mother ’ s parent al rights should be terminated21

on four ground s under § 161.001 (b) (1)

. On appeal, Mother challenges only one of those grounds. Because Mother does not challenge th ree other ground s supportive of the judgme nt , we need not address h er argument that the evidence is insufficient to support the ju ry ’ s finding on the one ground she challenge s on appeal

. Accordingly, we overrule Mother ’ s third issue

.
V. C ONCL U SION
Having ove rruled all of Mother ’ s issues on appeal, we affi rm the trial court ’ s
orde r.

/s/ Margaret “ Meg ” Poi ssant Justice

Panel co nsists of Justices Wise, Jewe ll, and Poissant.