alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                             5
       
<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>            JUL-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>               AUG-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                 OCT-31-1998
<CASH>                        10,118,926
<SECURITIES>                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                  1,402,918
<ALLOWANCES>                     190,000
<INVENTORY>                    4,932,910
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              16,502,950
<PP&E>                         5,210,222
<DEPRECIATION>                 2,492,793
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                20,343,503
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>          2,756,590
<BONDS>                       11,534,074
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                  0
<PREFERRED>                            0
<COMMON>                       4,901,976
<OTHER-SE>                     1,042,763
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  20,343,503
<SALES>                        1,859,560
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               1,859,560
<CGS>                          1,534,259
<TOTAL-COSTS>                  1,534,259
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               3,541,477
<LOSS-PROVISION>                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>               177,055
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (3,393,231)
<INCOME-TAX>                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (3,393,231)
<DISCONTINUED>                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                        0
<CHANGES>                              0
<NET-INCOME>                  (3,232,169)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                       (.26)
<EPS-DILUTED>                       (.26)
        

</TABLE>
#### Parker Kelly et al., Respondents, v Diane Seager, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Order unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: The collateral source rule set forth in CPLR 4545 (c) does not apply to subrogation actions seeking to recover moneys paid by an insurer on a fire loss. The purpose of the statutory collateral source rule is to prevent multiple recoveries for the same loss by an injured party *(see generally,*5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac 4545.01). That purpose would not be served by its application to subrogation claims. Subrogation itself "exists to prevent double recovery by the insured and to force the wrongdoer to bear the ultimate costs” *(Scinta v Kazmierczak, 59*AD2d 313, 316). Where, as here, the insurer has indemnified its insureds for their fire loss, the insurer is the real party in interest on the subrogation action *(see,*Siegel, NY Prac, § 137), and the pertinent issue, for purposes of CPLR 4545 (c), is whether the insurer stands to obtain a multiple recovery. Defendants do not contend that the insurer has, or will, receive moneys from a collateral source, and Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Ontario County, Boehm, J.—summary judgment.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Denman, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ. *[See,*144 Misc 2d 458.]
2004DECLARATION OF AMEND. TO BB&T CORP. NON-EMPLOYEE DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN



 Exhibit 10(c) 
  
 2004 DECLARATION OF AMENDMENT TO 
 BB&T CORPORATION 
 NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTORS’ DEFERRED COMPENSATION AND STOCK 

OPTION PLAN 
  
 THIS DECLARATION OF AMENDMENT is made this 24th day of February, 2004, by BB&T CORPORATION (the “Corporation”) to the BB&T Corporation
Non-Employee Directors’ Deferred Compensation and Stock Option Plan, as amended and restated (the “Plan”). 
  
 R E C I T A L S: 
  
 It is deemed advisable to amend the Plan to extend the term of the Stock Option Subplan, a component of the Plan, in order
to (i) comply with certain requirements recently imposed by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and (ii) continue to effectuate the purpose of the Plan by providing eligible participants with the opportunity to acquire or increase their proprietary
interest in the Corporation through the grant of stock options and purchase of shares of the Corporation’s common stock thereunder. 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS DECLARED that, effective as of February 24 , 2004, the Plan shall be amended by deleting Section 4.9.1 (“Effective Date and
Term of Options” ) in its entirety and inserting the following in lieu thereof: 
  
 “Effective Date and Term of Stock Option Subplan: The Stock Option Subplan was adopted effective December 19, 1991, amended and restated effective October 22, 1996, January 1, 1997 and November 1, 2001, and
further amended December 18, 2001. Options may be granted under the Plan on and after the effective date and until April 21, 2007 or until the earlier termination of the Plan by the Board; provided, however, that any Option granted prior to the
termination of the Plan may be exercised in accordance with its terms.” 
  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Declaration of Amendment is executed on behalf of BB&T Corporation on the day and year first above written. 
  

			
	 BB&T CORPORATION

		
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Kelly S. King

	 	 	 Kelly S. King

	 	 	 President



  

	
	 ATTEST:

	
	 /s/ David L. Craven

	 David L. Craven

	 Senior Vice President and Assistant Secretary


  
 [Corporate Seal] 
  









 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the proper officers of the Corporation, acting for and in behalf of the
Corporation, shall be and hereby are authorized and directed to execute the Amendment and to take such additional actions as may be deemed necessary or advisable to carry out the intent and purpose of these resolutions. 
  
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
  
 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of
resolutions duly adopted by the Board of Directors of BB&T Corporation on the 24th day of February, 2004.

  

			
		
	 By:
	 	 /s/ David L. Craven

	 	 	 David L. Craven

	 	 	 Senior Vice President and
 Assistant Secretary



  
 [Corporate Seal] 
  

 2
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the followingcertifications are being made to accompany the Registrant’s annual report on Form 10-Kfor the fiscal year ended August 2, 2008:**

 

**Certification of Chief Executive Officer**(1)

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, ascreated by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersignedofficer of Neiman Marcus, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to suchofficer’s knowledge, that:

 

(i)                                     the AnnualReport on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended August 2,2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) orSection 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended; and

 

(ii)                                  the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Dated: September 24, 2008 | /S/ BURTON M. TANSKY                  |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                           | Burton M. Tansky                      |
|                           | President and Chief Executive Officer |

 

**Certification of Chief Financial Officer**(1)

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, ascreated by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersignedofficer of Neiman Marcus, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to suchofficer’s knowledge, that:

 

(i)                                     the AnnualReport on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended August 2,2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) orSection 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended; and

 

(ii)                                  the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Dated: September 24, 2008 | /s/ JAMES E. SKINNER                                 |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
|                           | James E. Skinner                                     |
|                           | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

----

(1)                                  A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to Neiman Marcus, Inc. and will be retained by Neiman Marcus, Inc.and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.

 

1

----
#### In the Matter of Henry Finger, Respondent, v Herbert Levenson et al., Appellants.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review so much of a determination of the respondent Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Putnam Valley dated October 14,1987, as imposed conditions upon the granting of a use variance to the petitioner, which was adhered to after a rehearing on February 18, 1988, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Dickinson, J.), entered February 27, 1989, which annulled so much of the determination as imposed the conditions.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the determination is confirmed insofar as reviewed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.

The respondent Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Putnam Valley contends that the conditions it imposed upon granting the petitioner a use variance were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. We agree and find that the judgment annulling the conditions should be reversed and the petition dismissed.

In reviewing a determination by a zoning board, courts should presume that the decision was correct *(see,*2 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice § 26.17 [3d ed]). A determination of a zoning board will not be set aside unless there exists a clear abuse of discretion, or an illegal or arbitrary action. The determination must be upheld as long as there is a rational basis for it and it is supported by substantial evidence *(see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley,*45 NY2d 441; *Matter of Cowan v Kern,*41 NY2d 591). Further, it is settled that a zoning board may impose conditions in conjunction with granting a variance, as long as the conditions are reasonable and relate only to the real estate involved, without regard to the person who owns or occupies it *(see, Matter of St. Onge v Donovan,*71 NY2d 507; *Matter of Dexter v Town Bd.,*36 NY2d 102, 105; *see also,*Town Law § 267).

In the instant case, the subject premises occupy an area zoned for single-family dwellings. Despite finding that the *478petitioner altered the premises without obtaining the requisite approval, the Zoning Board of Appeals granted the petitioner a use variance to use the premises as two dwelling units and a store selling antiques. The variance was conditioned, *inter alia,*upon the antiques store occupying no more than 25% of the total floor space of the dwelling and upon the property owner residing in one of the dwelling units. These conditions were reasonably related to the purposes underlying the zoning code. Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in vacating the conditions. Thompson, J. P., Rubin, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.
The Honorable Joe Christie

Chairman State Board of Insurance 1110 San Jacinto Austin, Texas 78786 Dear Chairman Christie: Opinion No. H-923 Re: Required presence of attendants at selfservice gasoline stations.

You have requested our opinion regarding whether article 9201,V.T.C.S., requires thepresence of attendants at selfservice gasoline stations. Article 9201 empowers the State Board of Insurance to formulate, adopt, andpromulgate rules and regulations for the safe storage, handling and use of flammable liquids at retail service stations within the scope provided by Sections 4, 5and 6of thisAct. Sec. 2(a). Article 9201 confers broad authority upon the Board to regulate flammable liquids which are stored on thepremises of retail service stations. Section 2(c)provides, however:

Nothing in thisAct or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to thisAct shall in anymanner be interpreted as prohibiting, orpermitting theprohibition of, self-service gasoline station operations, so long as such stations require an attendant to be on thepremises. You inquire whether section 2(c) requires that every selfservice gasoline station have an attendant, orwhether it merely permits the Board to impose such a requirement.

p. 3866The Honorable Joe Christie -page 2

Section 2(c) is "tobe regarded

_ exception" to the general regulatory City of Baytown v. Angel, 469 S.W.2d
-- Houston 114thxist.l 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.1. It states as though itwere an scheme of the statute. 923, 925 (Tex.Civ.App. (H-923)

that, whatever else the Board may dowith regard to regulation under article 9201, itmay notprohibit the operation of any self-service gasoline station which requires an attendant to be on thepremises. Section 2(c) is silent, however, as to unattended stations, and the Board's authority topermit or prohibit them. It iswell established that exceptions to a statute indicate that the statute isapplicable inall cases not specifically excepted. State v. Richards, 301 S.W.Zd 597, 600 (Tex.Sup. 1957). An excesion to a statute should be strictly construed, particularly where it isregulatory in

therefore, section 2(c)merely prohibits the Board from proscribing the operation of any attended self-service gasoline stationmerely because it is a self-service operation. Since the statute does not expressly prohibit unattended stations, we believe that it contemplates that any decision as to their prohibition is tobemade by the Board, in accordance with the general regulatory design of the statute. SUMMARY Section 2(c) of article 9201,V.T.C.S., does not require thepresence of an attendant at every self-service gasoline station, but merely permits the State Board of Insurance to impose such a requirement.

Attorney General of Texas

v p. 3867The Honorable Joe Christie -page 3 (H-923)

APPROVED:

Opinion Committee jwb

p. 3868
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kenneth Alexander, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant’s primary contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to charge assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [2]) as a lesser included offense of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [7]). Assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [2]) can theoretically be a lesser included offense of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [7]; *see, People v Green,*56 NY2d 427, 435, *rearg denied*57 NY2d 775; *People v Collins,*86 AD2d 616; *cf., People ex rel. Gray v Tekben,*57 NY2d 651, 653). From our review of the record, however, there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that defendant committed the lesser but not the greater offense. Defendant’s request to charge was therefore properly refused *(see, People v Glover,*57 NY2d 61, 63; *People v Johnson,*158 AD2d 939).

Defendant also contends that prosecutorial misconduct on summation requires reversal. Since no objection was made to the alleged impropriety, this issue has not been preserved for our review (CPL 470.05 [2]). (Appeal from judgment of Livingston County Court, Houston, J.—assault, second degree.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Lawton, Davis and Lowery, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Henry Bradley, Appellant.

Judgment Supreme Court, New York County (George Roberts, J., on *Wade*motion; Edward McLaughlin, J., at trial and sentence), rendered March 23, 1988, convicting defendant, upon a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 5 to 10 years, unanimously affirmed.

*160The court’s denial, without a hearing, of defendant’s motion to suppress a postarrest station house identification was proper. The precinct house viewing of defendant by a trained undercover narcotics officer who conducted the "buy” one hour earlier constitutes a confirmatory identification, not warranting a *Wade*hearing. *(See, e.g., People v Wharton,*74 NY2d 921 [1989]; *People v Morales,*37 NY2d 262 [1975]; *People v Hill,*147 AD2d 500, 501 [2d Dept 1989].)

Next, the trial court’s instructions concerning inferences which could be drawn from the arresting officer’s failure to recover the prerecorded "buy” money did not dilute the People’s burden of proof. That instruction was part of the general introductory portion of the charge and the court later instructed the jury on the burden of proof. Viewed as a whole the instruction was proper. *(People v Goodfriend,*64 NY2d 695 [1984]; *People v Ford,*66 NY2d 428, 442 [1985].)

We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Ellerin and Smith, JJ.
#### D’ANTONI v. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION.

No. 2842.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit

Dec. 23, 1946.

Writ of Certiorari Granted Feb. 10, 1947,

For former opinion, see 28 So.2d 49.

Fred G. Benton and Carlos G. Spaht, both of Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Durrett & Hardin, of Baton Rouge, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In his application for rehearing, plaintiff contends that we have committed an error of law in not following the decisions of Carlino v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228, and Thornton v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So.2d 46, contending that these decisions grant him the right to have his claim adjudicated regardless of the fact that no compensation is actually presently due at the time of the filing of the suit. We have discussed these cases in our opinion and see no reason to again discuss them.

Plaintiff,' in his application for rehearing, now admits that, at the time he filed his suit, he was receiving wages far in excess of the maximum amount allowed by law as compensation and that of such wages the maximum amount allowed by law as compensation should be credited “pro tanto.” He also admits that the payment of such wages in lieu of compensation interrupted the running of prescription and has abandoned his position as contained in the latter part of Article 11 of his petition reading as follows: “* * * that the filing of this petition was originally made necessary within the year following the last compensation payment in order to eliminate the possibility of prescription running against any part or all of petitioner’s claim.” Under such admissions, more than ever, the suit of plaintiff is premature. He must wait, before filing suit, until he is discharged from his duties and his employer refuses to pay him compensation.

Plaintiff's application for rehearing is refused.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lazaro Carus, Appellant.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Antonio Brandveen, J., at suppression hearing; David Stadtmauer, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered April 20, 1988, convicting defendant of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1]) and sentencing him, as a predicate felon, to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 7 Vi to 15 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of selling one glassine envelope of heroin to an undercover officer. The evidence produced at the suppression hearing showed that defendant was promptly arrested after the undercover officer radioed that the transaction had been concluded. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant’s claim that his arrest was not supported by probable cause *(People v Petralia,*62 NY2d 47 [1984], *cert denied*469 US 852 [1984]; *People v Amoateng,*141 AD2d 398 [1st Dept 1988], *lv denied*73 NY2d 852 [1988]) or that the confirmatory showup was suggestive *(People v Wharton,*74 NY2d 921 [1989]; *People v Morales,*37 NY2d 262 [1975]).

We further conclude that the *Sandoval*ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Nor was the defendant prejudiced by the prosecutor’s summation which was a fair response to that of the defendant’s counsel. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Carro, Rosenberger, Kassal and Smith, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 1 9

- 0320

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ETTA KOEHLER DOUBEK

,
Defendant and Appellant

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension

of time to and including May 24, 2020 , within which to prepare, file,

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 17 2020

04/17/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0320
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.2


                SUMMARY OF THE AWARD LEVELS AND PERFORMANCE GOALS
                       UNDER THE MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE PLAN
                        FOR THE NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
                  OF REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED

<Table>
<Caption>


                                                                        INCENTIVE AWARD AS A
            NAME AND TITLE OF EXECUTIVE OFFICER                     PERCENTAGE OF BASE SALARY(1)
---------------------------------------------------------         --------------------------------
<S>                                                                <C>
A. Greig Woodring                                                             0 - 140%
     President and Chief Executive Officer
David B. Atkinson                                                             0 - 120%
     Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
Jack B. Lay                                                                   0 - 120%
     Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Paul A. Shuster                                                               0 - 120%
     Executive Vice President, U.S. Operations
Graham Watson                                                                 0 - 130%
     Executive Vice President, International
</Table>

-------------------------------

(1)  Effective as of January 1, 2005, results for Reinsurance Group of America,
     Incorporated (the "Company") under the RGA Reinsurance Management Incentive
     Plan, as amended and restated effective January 1, 2003 (the "MIP"), will
     be measured primarily on annual operating earnings (net income from
     continuing operations less realized capital gains and losses and certain
     other non-operating items) per share and, secondarily, on annual
     consolidated revenues. The MIP award for certain participants may be
     measured in part or in whole on divisional results, which will be based on
     the division's revenues and operating earnings.