# FILED
December 12, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk CHARLES MU LLE, JR., ) ) Petitioner/Appe llee, ) ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9704- CV-00161 VS. ) ) Davidson Circuit ) No. 86D-459 KATHY REESE MULLE YOUN T, ) ) Respondent/Appell ant. )

COURT OF APPE ALS OF TENNESSEE MIDDLE SEC TION AT NASHVILLE

APPEALE D FRO M THE C IRCU IT COU RT OF D AVIDSO N COU NTY AT NASHVILLE, TENN ESSEE THE HONORABLE MURIEL RO BINSON, JU DGE

PEGGY D. M ATHES EDW ARD L. HILAND 214 Second Avenue North, Suite 105 Nashvil le, Tennessee 37201 Attorneys for Petitioner/ Appellee J. RUSSELL H ELDMAN 320 Main Street , Suite 101 Franklin, Tennessee 37064 ROBERT L. JACKSON One W ashington Square 214 Second Avenue, North, Suit e 103 Nashvil le, Tennessee 37201 Attorneys for Respondent/Appel lant

AFFIR MED I N PART ; VACA TED IN PART; AND REMAN DED

BEN H. CAN TRELL, JUDGE CONCUR: TODD, P.J., M .S. BUSSART, J. 

## O P I N I O N- 2 - In this custody and visitatio n c ase, the trial court modified the father’s visitati on schedu le, and found th e mother to be i n conte mp t o f its prior orders. The mother argues on appeal tha t since Tennessee has not been the home state of the minor child since 1988, the Tennessee courts no lon ger have jurisdiction over matters involv ing him. We disagree, a nd we affirm the tr ial court.

I.

This case invo lvesthe proper forum for the exerci se of jurisdi ction under the Child Custody

Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-201 et seq. , and the Parental Kidna pping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. §1738A , where the mother and child have resided in t hree states, and pleadings hav e been filed in the cour

ts of all those states.

The parties were divorced in Tennessee, and th is state issued the initial order givi ng the mother phy sical cust ody of the chil d, and granti ng the father joi nt custody and reasonable v isitation. The mother moved w ith the chil d to Georgi a, where they liv

ed for ei ght years. After a period of con fusion, during which procee dings were pendi ng in both st ates, Georgi a assumed juri sdiction asthe home state of the child , and Tennessee stayed the exercise of its jurisdiction in deference to the Georgi a court.

The mother then moved to North Carolina, and after she and thechild had been resident i n that state for more than s ix mo nths, she applied to estab lish juris diction in its cour

ts. The North C arolina cour t declined to ex

ercise home st ate jurisdict ion, and Tennessee subseq uently went forward with a hear ing on all pending petitions, which resulted in an ex pansion of the f ather’s v isitation r ights, and t he imposition of sanction s for contempt against the mother.1 W e note t hat t hree publ ished o pini ons have al readyresul ted fr om lit igat ion be tween t hese part ies: M ulle v. Y ount , 420 S.E .2d 7 76 (G a. C t. App . 199 2), Mull e v. Yount , 440 S.E .2d 2 10 (G a. C t. Ap p. 19 93), Yo un t v. M ulle , 470 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. S.Ct. 1996). - 3 - The mother argues

that under th e UCCJA and the PKPA, Tennesse e lost jurisdic

tion once Ge orgia be came the child’ s home state. She a lso claims that Tennessee is not entitl ed to assume jur isdiction ag ain, b e cause in decli ning jurisdict ion, North Car

olina did not s pecifically find, as the lang uage of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-203(a)(3) apparen tlyrequires, that Tennessee “is the more appropr iate forum to determine chi ld custody , and it is i n the best interest of the child tha t a court of this state assume jurisdiction.”

Before analyz ing this a rgument, we will set out a more detailed accoun t of the proceeding s leading up to this appeal. We do not think it necessary, however, to exhaustively document everypetition, response and orde r involving these parties,
as they have been involved in virtually nonstop litigation since 1987. 1 We will primarily focus on those proceedings most nece ssaryto understand the factual background of this case, and those most relev ant to the quest ion of jurisdi ction.

II. Proceedin gs in Tenne ssee

In May of 1987, the Fourth Circuit Court of Dav idson County granted a divorce to Tenne ssee reside nts Charles Mulle Jr . and Kathy R eese Mulle on the ground of i rrecon cilable differenc es. The final decree incorporate d an agreement between the par

ties that cust ody of their t hree month old son, Dannon Bruce Mull e, “shall be vested in them jointly.” The wife was to exercise physi cal cu stod y, with reasonable v isitation g ranted to the husba nd.

Sixmonths after the div orce, the w ife re married, and moved to Savannah, Georgia , app aren tly in i gno rance of, or in defiance of, a restraini ng order forbidding her to leave the State. (She wi ll henceforth be r eferred to in thi s opinion- 4 -

byher married name as Mrs. Yount.) Whatever good wil l may have existed between the par ties at t he ti me of their agreem ent eroded qui ckly, i n part because of disagreements

about visi tation. Mr. Mul le filed a petit ion in the Davidson County court forchange of custody

and for contempt, and t he wife answered and counter- claimed for sole custody

and for contempt.

After a hearing, t he trial cour t found there to be no c ha nge o f circumstances

suc h as wou ld j usti fy

a cha nge of custody, but it set forth a specific visitati on order on June 2 , 1988, to replace the general order for “reasonable visitati on” established ear lier. The new vi sitation schedule gav e Mr. Mul le the rig ht to
see his so n ever y othe r we ekend, on certai n specific holi days, and dur ing the summer, with pi ck-up and del iver y of the child to take place at specif ic times in Atlanta, about hal fway between Savannah and N ashvill e.

We note that such a schedule inv olves ex tensive tr

avel and ex pense by both parties, and t hat a great deal of coordination an d understanding between them is required for it to succeed. Unfort unately, the necessary degree of cooper

ation was not fo rthcom ing.

Though visitation often did occur as contemplated by the court’s order, at other times Mrs. Yount either failed to appear, or

let Dannon go with his father only afterexpressi ng great hostility towards Mr. Mull e in the presence o f the child. A transcript

of a tape made on a1991 occasion when Mr . Mulle pic ked Dannon up for pre-arrang ed visitat ion at Mrs. Yount’s mot her’s house in Madis on, Tennessee has been made a part of the record. The transcipt c learly reveals M rs. Yount c reating an emotional scene to test Dannon’s loyalty to her, and to unde rmine his affectio n for his father, without

considerati on for the feelings and emoti onal well -being of her four and a half year ol d child.- 5 - On another notable occasion, Mr . Mulle’s plane was delayed due to weather conditions i n A tlan ta. He arranged for a friend, a pe rson known to Mrs. Yount, to pick Dannon up in the Atlanta airport and watch him until Mr. Mulle’s plane arrived. Mrs. Yount refused to gi ve the chil d to the friend, and drove back to Savannah with hi m. The ne xt mornin g, Mr. Mull e chartered a pl ane to Savannah, and took a taxi to the Yount residence for the purpo se of exercis ing his scheduled visitati on. Mr. Yount

th reatened Mr. Mulle w ith a crow bar, and threw him off the property, as Mrs. Yount watched in apparent approval.

Mr. Mulle filed another petitio n for change of cust ody and for contempt, alleging numerous vi olations of the v isitation schedule by Mrs . Yount (thi s petition was filed prior to th e events desc ribed in the pr eceding two paragraph s). Again, Mrs. Yountfiled a counter- petition for full custody, and formodification of v isitation. After
a full hearing , includingtestimony by the par t ies and corr

oborating w itnesses, the court determined on February 13, 1990 that its

prior orde r

should remain substantially unchanged, but directed t he partiesto regular ly communicate with eac h other in ord er forv isit ation to run more smoothly. The court did find M rs. Yount t o be in wi llful contempt of its prior orders, an d ordered her to take a tour of the jail.

III. Proceedi ngs in Tenn essee and Georg ia

On January 29 , 19 91, M rs. Yo unt f iled a pet itio n in Ch atha m Cou nty, Georgia, asking that

she be granted s ole custody of Dannon, that weekend visi tation be reduced to oneweekend per month, and that it take place in Savannah only. The petition alleged that t he Georgia court h ad homestate jurisdiction under that state’s version of the UCCJA.- 6 - On February

19, 1991, Mr. Mulle filed a notherpetition in D avidson Coun ty, allegingthat Mrs. Yount had failed to abi de by th e p rovisions of the court’s previousorder. He asked the court to issue a stay of all proce edings in Georgia, until the Tenne ssee cou rt could c ommu nicate with the Ge orgi a Superi or Court, and determine the most a ppropriate forum to litigate all issues.

T he tr ial court g ranted Mr. M ulle the temporar y restr aining orde r he requested, and issued a sh ow cause or der for Mrs. Yount to appear

and explain why t he or der should not bemade permanent. Thereafter , motions were filed by both parties, in both states, i ncluding moti ons by Mrs. Yount for the Dav idson County trial judge to recuse her

self and to decli ne jurisdic tion in favor

of the Georgia courts, both of which motion s were deni ed.

On June 1, 1991, theGeorgia Sup erior Court declar

ed that Georgi a was the appropriate pl ace to exercise juri sdiction under the UCCJA, because it had becomethe ch ild’ s homestate, and because in the language of the UCCJA “there is available in this state substant ial evidence concerning the child’s present or fut ure care, protection, t raining and personal relationships.” The court subsequently mod ified visitation by requiring that all pick-up and return of the child take place in Savannah rather

than in Atlanta.

Mr. Mulle subs equently filed a discretionaryappeal in the Georgia Court of Appeals. In an October 27, 1992 opinion, Mulle v. You nt , 420 S.E. 776, that court vacated the order of the Ge orgia Super ior Court, finding that under Georg ia’s ver

sion of the UCCJA, the Superior Court was without

authority

to modify the or

ders of the Tennessee court unless it also found eit her that Tennessee no longer had j urisdicti on, or that Tennessee had declined to exercise its jurisdic tion.- 7 - On remand, the Superi or Court dec lared that Tennessee no lo nger had j urisdicti on, and it issued a new order on visi tation on December 23, 1992, w hic h differed from its earlier order in several respects, but chie fly by limi ting weekend visitati on to one weeken d per month. The Georgia court’ s order stat ed: “[a]ll ot her aspects of the Tennessee Court Order, entered on or about May 19, 1987, in the Fourth Circuit Court of Dav idson County , Tennessee, Case N o. 86 D-459, notso modified by thi s Order, sha ll remain i n full force and effect.”

On February 4, 1993 the Davidson County Circuit Court held a hearing
on Mr. Mull e’s earlier-filed petiti ons for contempt. Mrs . Yount was not present, but her attorney made a

special appear

ance for the purpose of moving the court to dismiss the petitions for

lack of juri sdiction. I n colloquy between the t rial judg e and Mr. Mulle’s atto rney, the trial judge revealed that she had been in communication with the Georgia court prior to J une 1, 1991, but that its rulin gs on juri sdiction were cont rary to whatshe had been led t o bel ieve they would be. The court subseq uently hear d direct test imony byCharles M ulle, and by his present wife, Katie Stone Mulle, in regard to the con duct of Mrs. Yount

relative to Mr. Mu lle’s v isitation w ith Dannon.

On Febru ary 2 5, 1993, the court denied the defendant’s mot ion to dism iss, findi ng that it had never rel inquished j urisdicti on to the state of Georgia. It fu rther found Mrs. Yount in contempt for h aving w illfully prevented M r. Mul le fro m exercis ing visitat ion with his son on seven occasions, and sentenced her to serve ten days in j ail for each v iolation of its orders.
This apparent

stalemate between competing courts ended when, w ith the prompting of the Georgia cou rt, the parties ente red into an ag reed order on visitati on, with Mr. Mulle agreeing to refrain from fil ing further ac tions in Tennesse e. On the motion ofMr. Mull e, the Davi dson County court entered an order on June17, 1993 i n which it set aside its contempt order of Feb ruary 25, 1993, and recit ed tha t- 8 -

in light of communication between it and theGeorgia court, it was staying all further litigati on in the state of Ten nessee, “pending furthe r orders of this court.” Theparties thereafter liti gated their differences in the Ge orgia cour t.

IV. Proceedin gs in Nort h Carolina and Tennessee

Mrs. Yount moved to Forsy th County, N orth Carolina on May 27, 1995. In February

of 1996, Mr. Mul le filed a petit ion in Tennessee for contempt, to modi fy visitati on, and t o procee d wi th al l pe tit ions pre vi ousl y fi l ed in the Dav idson County Circuit C ourt. On May

14, 1996, the Cour

t ordered as foll ows: ORDERED AND ADJU DGED by t he C ourt t hat all matters pend ing in t he Fo urt h Ci rcu it C ourt fo rDavidson Coun ty, Tennessee shall be continued indef initely until such time as th e Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia makes a ruling as to whether they are r elinquishi ng jurisdict ion of the custody and welfare of this child and in the eventthe Superior Court of Georgia does relin quish jurisdict ion, then the Four th CircuitCourt w ill confer w ith the Court in W inston/Salem North Carolina as to which Court will exercise jurisdic

tion over the custody and welfare of theminor child, Dannon Bruce Mull e.

The Georgia court subsequently issued an order re linq uishing jurisdict ion over chi ld custody and visi tation matters, and Mrs. Yount filed an ac tion in the Forsyth County District Courtrequesting that North Carolina take jurisdic tion of the matter. On Jul y 23, 1996, the North Car olina court d eclined to take jurisdic tion, and dismissed t he action.

The court noted that

it was entitled toa ssume home state jur isdiction under Chapter 50A of

the North Ca rolina General Statutes, the North Carol ina version of the UCCJA. B ut it declin ed to do so under another provision of the Act, which bars the exercise of jurisdict ion if proceeding s in conformity with the UCCJA are pending in the courts

of another state.2 Though the G eorg ia cou rt state d in its order of 3/23/92 t hat “ It is f urth er t he fi nding of this court that

. . . by

the l ack of cont acts t hat t he minor chi ld has wit h the St ate of T en ne ss ee , it is cle ar ly indi cated that T enn ess ee n o long er ha s juris diction in this m atter. . .” thatfi nding is cl earl y er roneous, and is not b inding on th e T enn ess ee c ourt. - 9 -

On Oc tober 31, 1996, the Davidson C ounty Circuit Court held its previouslydeferred hearing . Mrs. Yount did not personal ly appear, but her attorney again contested the j urisdicti on of the court. After he aring test imony by Mr. Mull e and his wife, the cou rt reinstat ed the order of Febr uary 25, 1993, which it had previously stayed. It also found Mr s. Yount t o be guilty

of two counts of contempt by faili ng to appear to respond to tw

o show caus e orders, and s entenced her to s erve ten days in the Metropol ita n Davidson County Jai l for each vi olation, w hich together with the reinstated judgment m ade for a total sentence of ninety days. The court also reinstated tw

o weekend per

month visi tation by th e father. This appeal followed.

V. Jurisdiction

The UCCJAis desig ned to “[a]void jurisdictional competition and con flict with courts of other states in matter s of child cust ody

. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 201(a)(1). As this case demonstrates, the Act is not self-executing, nor does it imm unize the courtsof the various states from being drawn int o disputes over jurisdict ion in a way that mirrors the disagreements between the parties them selves. Nonetheless, t he Act, togethe r with the complementary federal statute, 2 8 U.S.C.A. § 1738A, makes possible ne ar-uniform nationwide stand ards for states to apply in order to determine w hether or not to assume juris diction over a given custody dispute.

Under those standards , Tennessee decli ned to exercis e its juri sdiction
over the custody

of Dannon Mulle in deference to t he Georgia court. But the t rial court made it c lear that in deferring to G eorgia’s “home state” j urisdicti on, it wasnot thereby abandoning its own right to exercise jurisdiction, if and when Georgia relinqui shed the role i t had assumed. 2- 10 - 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A reads in per tinent part: (c) Achild custo dy determinat ion mad e b y a cour t of a State is consistent with the provi sions of this section only if -- (1) such court has jurisdict i on under the law of such state; and (2) one of the followi ng condition s is met:

. . . (E) the court has cont inuing jurisdic tion pursuant

to subsection (d ) of this secti on. (d) The jurisdic

tion ofa court of a State which has made a child custo dy determinat ion consistent ly w ith the provisi ons of this secti on continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such state remains the residence of the child or of any contestant

. (emphasis added)

This section indicates that a state do es not necessarily lose jurisdic tion
over a child custody case merely because the child hasresided in a nother state lo ng enough for that other st ate t o bec ome the child’s home state. SeeState ex rel. Cooper v. Hami lton, 688 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. 1985). Subsections(c)(1) and (d) require us to examine our own l aw to deter mine the proper for um for decision.

The appellant arg ues thatTennessee does not meet the r equirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36 -6-203 for the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. The relevant portion of that statu te reads:

(a) A court of this state . . . has jurisdiction to ma ke a child custo dy determinat ion by ini tial or modification decree if: (1) This state:

(A) Is the home state of the ch ild at thetime of commencement of the proceedi ng; or . . .; or (2)(A) It appears that no state has juri sdiction under subdivis ion (a)(1), or each state with ju risdicti on under subdivis ion (a)(1) ha s declined toexercis e jurisdic tion on the ground that this state i s the more appropriat e forum to determine the custody of the c hild; and (B) The child and at least one ( 1) contestant have a sig nificant connecti on with thi s state; and (C) There is available in this st ate substantia l evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, tr

aining and per

sonal relati onship; and (D) It is in the best inte rest o f the child that a court of this state assume juri sdiction.- 11 - The appellant point s ou t tha t in declini ng to exer cise home-stat e jurisdiction over Dannon Mulle, the North Carolina court did not specifically find that Tennessee “is the moreappropriate foru m t o d e t e r m i n e t h e c u s t o d yo f t h e c h i l d

. ” We d o not believe, however that Tennessee i s required to wait upon such a f inding b y North Carolina, in light of the f act that i t is the ori ginal rende ring stat e, that it never reli nquished jurisdic

tion of the case, and that there is substantial ev idence in the record relative to the requir ements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 203(a)(2)( B), (C) and (D).

As the state w hich rendered the o riginal custody or der in this case as well as several subsequent modifications, Tenness ee remains a re pository of information about the child ’s “care, protection, tr aining and per

sonal relationshi p.” The proof shows that

Mr. Mull e has remained a r esident of Tennessee si nce the divo rce, while Mrs. Yount has changed her state of residence tw ice. The record als o indicates that Dannon’s matern al grandmother , his maternal great-g randmother, and other relatives on his mother’s si de live i n Nashvil le. The pediatri cian thattreated Dannon since his birth practices i n the Nashvi lle area, and r emains avail able to him. The record does not indicate that Mrs. Yount hasany family connect ions in Nor th Carolina, other than Dannon a nd Mr. Youn t.

Mr. Mull e has testified that he and his new wife have forged a stro n g bond with Da nnon. He has cons istently exercis ed his vi sitation ri ghts excep t when prevented from doing so by Mrs. Yount, and he has faith fullymet h is child support obligations. Though he has sometim es exercised visitation at his co ndo minium in Florid a, it ap pears to this court that his actions have helpe d Dannon to maintain “a significant connection with this state.”- 12 - The original decree of the Ten nessee court granted joi nt custody of the child to both parties, and that part of the decree has n ever been modi fied. We note that joint custody

implies some l evel ofjoint decis ion-making by the part ies, and that the court’s or

der specifical ly req uired the partiesto decide joi ntly on a pr ivate scho ol for Dannon, wi th each party to pay half the cost.

The Georgia court subsequently modified the order, requiring Mr. Mulle to pay all t he costs of priv ate school, and M r. Mulle expressed his wi llingness to do so. Mr. Mulle has t estified that Dann on has been diag nosed with a learning disability , and that he believes that a good private school education would mo re likely meet his needs than would public school.

Howeve r Mrs. Yount has ignor ed th e orders of both courts, has not consulted with Mr. Mulle, and has enrolled Dannon in public sch ools the last t wo years. It is apparent to this court that Mrs. Yount is willing to ignore the best interest of her child when to do so would mean conceding Mr. Mulle a larger role in Dannon’s lifet h a n s h e w o u l d l i k e h i m t o h a v e . We therefore find th at it is not in the best interest of the child to all ow the que stion of juris diction to remain in limbo unt il the Nor t h Carolina court chooses to speak more de finitively, and we affirm the jurisdi ction of the Tennessee court.

VI. Visitation

In its order

of November 18, 1996, th e trial court reinstated the twice monthly visitat ion that Mr. Mulle enjoyed before it wa s reduced to once a month by the Georgia court. The appell ant argues th at the Tennessee court wasin error because it failed to giv

e full effect to Tenn. CodeAn n. §§ 36-6-215(b) and 36-6-22 3. Those portionsof the UCCJA require that upon taking juri sdiction ofa custody case, the Tennessee court must request transcripts and records o f proceedings fr om other- 13 -

states wh ere ju risdicti on was prev iously exercised, and g ive due cons ideration to those documents.

The appellee points

out that the appellan t never asked the trial court, by motion or otherw ise, to request su ch documents of the Georgi a trial cour

t prior to t he hearing in question. W e agree with the appellee that this is a proper situatio n fo r application of Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a), w hich deals w ith the reli ef to be granted by an appellate cour t in th e fa ce of error belo w, and which reads in pert inentpart, “[n]oth ing in this rule shall be const rued as req uiring relief be grante d to a party responsible for
an error, or

who failed to take whatev er action was reasonably availabl e to prevent or nullify the harmful ef fect of an error.”

We also note that t he appellant has app ended to her brief co pies of the transcript

of the proceed ings in the Georgia court, and that court’s final orde r, which she ins i sts the tri al court shoul d have consi dered pursuant t o the above-ment ioned statutes. We have read those d ocume nts, and we find nothing in them th at would lead us to believe that consideration of their contents would have cause d the tria l judge to is sue a different order than the one she di d.

On the c ontr ary, we have found possible reason s that Mrs. Yount might not have been very

eager for the Tennes see court to examine those recor ds, for the Georgia court found that M rs. Yount ha d violated the parties ’ agr eement to enroll Dannon in an appropri ate privat e school, and i t fined her $100 for her willful contempt of its order on telephone vi sitation.
VII. Contempt

As r egardsthe contempt porti on of the Tennessee court ’s order, we note that al l seven violations of the 1988 visitation order occurred bef ore Tennesse e- 14 -

deferred to the juris diction of the Georgia court, as did the sanctioning of Mrs. Yount forthose viol ations. It thus does not appear th at there could be any transc ripts or recordsin Georgi a that would be relevan t to the decision to reinstate those pen alties.

We also cannot

credit the appellant’s argument tha t the Georgia court’s ruling on contemptis res j udicata, and cannot be re-lit igated in the Tennessee court. The Georgia court found Mrs. Yount to be guilty of a single act of co ntem pt of its own order, a judicial decision that has nothing t o do with t he prior cont empts of th e Tennessee court’s order, for which penaltie s wer e first imposed i n 1993 and reinstated in 1996.

Howeve r the additiona l penalties l evied by the Tennessee court

stand
on a somewhat di fferent footing. The tri al court stat ed that “Mrs . Yount has fail ed to appear in Court in response to the last two directives of the Court, and she is found to be in will ful crim inal contempt for fail ure to appear.” The court sentenced her to serve ten d ays in j ail for each of thosecontempts.

The trial cour

t is apparentl y referri ng to itsshow cause orders of March 5, 1993 and March 26, 1996, in both of which Mrs. Youn t was dir ected to appear and show cause why

she should not be found i n contempt of the prio r orders of the court. Mrs. Yountresponded to both of those orders by filing motio ns to dismiss forlack of jurisdict ion, and her attorney s filed notices

of special appear

ance, and appeared at both hear ing s on Mrs . Yo unt’ s beh alf, solely for the purpose of contesting j urisdicti on.

We recogniz e that a c ourt may punish an individual for disobeyi ng its orders, even wh en those orders may later be found to be e rroneous. State v. Sammons , 6 5 6 S

. W. 2d 862 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 82). H owever w e do not deem a litigant’s decision to mak e a special appe arance to contest the juris diction of the tr ial court to be a violation of an order to appe ar, so long as there is a legitimatequestion- 15 -

as to whether or

not the court ha s jurisdi ction. We therefore rever se the two t en day sentences imposed by the tri al court.

VIII.

We affirm the order of the t r ia l court in all respect s, except for the findin gs of contempt for failure to appear. That por tion of the court’s order is v acated, and this cause i s remanded to the C ircuit Co urt of Davi dson Coun ty for further proceedings

consistent w ith this opi nion. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant.

________________________________ BEN H. CAN TRELL, JUDGE
CONCUR:

_______________________________ HENRY F . TODD, PRESID ING JUDGE MIDDLE SEC TION

_______________________________ WALT ER W. BUSSART, JUDGE