1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

) 

JEAN ALIX LOUIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 12-918 (ESH) 

 ) 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) 

) 

Defendants. )

 ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Plaintiff Jean Alix Louis, individually and as a representative of the estate of Jean Edny 

Louis, has sued the District of Columbia and Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officer 

Paul Riggins, in his individual and official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and assorted 

provisions of state law. The suit grows out of an encounter between plaintiff’s mentally ill 

brother, Jean Edny Louis (“Louis”), and MPD officers, during which Officer Riggins fatally shot 

Louis. Before the Court is defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (“Mot.”, Feb. 19, 2014 

[Dkt. No. 35].) Having considered the record and the parties’ briefs, and for the reasons stated 

below, the Court will grant defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s federal-law claims and dismiss 

plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 On June 14, 2011, the MPD was called to Louis’s apartment to assist the D.C. Mobile 

Crisis Unit in effecting an FD-12 application for Louis’s emergency hospitalization. (FIT 

Report, Aug. 29, 2012 [Dkt. No. 40-1 Ex. C] at 1.) Louis had been acting irrationally, and his 

case manager and the Mobile Crisis Unit had concluded he needed emergency psychiatric 

services pursuant to D.C. Code § 21-521 (2003). 
2 

 When MPD officers arrived at Louis’s apartment, the three mental health professionals 

on the scene informed the officers that Louis was in an agitated state and was armed with a 

screwdriver. (FIT Report at 1.) At the time, Louis was located inside the bathroom. (Id.) After 

fifteen to twenty minutes of failed attempts to convince Louis to exit the bathroom, the officers 

attempted to enter. (Dep. of Gordon Peterson, Oct. 3, 2013 [Dkt. No. 35-7] at 48-49.) When the 

door opened, Louis swung an eleven-inch screwdriver with an artificially sharpened, seven-inch 

blade at the officers and stabbed Officer Rafeal Sarita in the right arm, causing a puncture 

wound. (Id. at 49-50; FIT Report at 1; Incident-Based Event Report, June 14, 2011 [Dkt. No. 

35-1] at 2.) Officer Sarita sprayed a one-second burst of OC (pepper) spray at Louis, who, 

unfazed, threw water at the officers and slammed shut the bathroom door. (FIT Report at 1.) 

The commanding officer on the scene then declared a barricade situation and requested the 

Special Operations Division Emergency Response Team (“ERT”) to respond to the scene. (Id.) 

 Upon arriving at Louis’s apartment building, the ERT members were briefed on prior 

events, including Louis’s stabbing of Officer Sarita with the screwdriver. (Dep. of Robert 

Glover, Dec. 10, 2013 [Dkt. No. 35-6; 40-1 Ex. E] at 174-75; Dep. of Paul Riggins, Dec. 17, 

2013 [Dkt. No. 35-9; 40-1 Ex. M] at 344.)) ERT members were also informed that in prior 

instances requiring Louis’s emergency hospitalization, it had taken several officers to subdue 

Louis. (Glover Dep. at 175.) The ERT established sniper observation posts with lines of sight 

into Louis’s bathroom and formed a tactical entry team. (FIT Report at 2; see Glover Dep. at 

176.) A short time later, the tactical entry team entered Louis’s apartment with ERT negotiators. 

(FIT Report at 2.) 

 ERT negotiators unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with Louis for around an hour and 

a half. (Glover Dep. at 81.) The negotiators failed to establish a meaningful dialogue with 
3 

Louis, who would repeat (in English)1 what the negotiators said to him, speak unintelligibly, or 

not respond at all. (Id. at 121; FIT Report at 2.)

 During the negotiations, Louis went silent for approximately twenty minutes. (Glover 

Dep. at 106.) Members of the sniper team informed the tactical team that Louis was sitting on 

the toilet and appeared either asleep or unconscious. (Id.) Commanding officer Lieutenant 

Robert Glover, concerned about Louis’s safety and also concerned that this “might be the only 

opportunity to safely take [Louis] into custody,” authorized a tactical plan for a four-man team to 

safely apprehend Louis. (Id. at 105-06.) Under the plan, Officer Mark Wascavage was to breach 

the door, and Officers Paul Riggins, Gregory Robinson, and William Powell were to enter the 

bathroom, in that order. (Dep. of William Powell, Dec. 10, 2013 [Dkt. No. 35-8; 40-1 Ex. D] at 

94.) Although the officers wore protective gear and shields, their necks, arms and thighs were 

exposed, (Defendants’ Statement of Facts (“DSOF”), Feb. 19, 2014 [Dkt. No. 35] ¶ 10), and the 

shields were not designed to protect against sharp objects. (Dep. of Mark Wascavage, Dec. 17, 

2013 [Dkt. No. 35-11; 40-1 Ex. P] at 88.) Before entering, Officer Riggins looked through a 

hole in the bathroom door and personally observed Louis sitting on the toilet seat with his head 

dropped, appearing to be either asleep or unconscious. (Riggins Dep. at 68-69.) 

 Less than one minute later, Officer Wascavage breached the bathroom door with a oneman battering ram. (DSOF ¶ 1; Riggins Dep. at 69; Powell Dep. at 129.) Upon entering the 

bathroom, Officer Riggins realized that Louis was no longer sitting on the toilet, but was now 

positioned behind the bathroom door with a screwdriver in his right hand. (Riggins Dep. at 346.) 

Louis then pushed himself against the door to try to keep Officer Robinson from entering behind 

                                                             1

 Louis was bilingual. He could speak, understand, read, and write in English, but also spoke 

Haitian Creole. (Glover Dep. at 71-72.) The ERT requested a Haitian Creole translator to use during 

negotiations, but because the officers established that Louis could communicate in English, the translator 

was not used. (Id.) 
4 

Officer Riggins. As Officer Robinson pushed back against the door, Louis swung the 

screwdriver—which he held pointing downward—in a stabbing motion around the door multiple 

times at Officer Robinson. (Riggins Dep. at 31-32, 346; Dep. of Gregory Robinson, Jan. 3, 2014 

[Dkt. No. 35-10; 40-1 Ex. N] at 197.) At this point, Officer Riggins—between three and five 

feet from Louis (Riggins Dep. at 288, 323 (less than three feet); Dep. of Charles Key, Jan. 31, 

2014 [Dkt. No. 38-17] at 163 (up to five feet))—believed that Louis had stabbed Officer 

Robinson. (Riggins Dep. at 54, 322, 346.) Officer Riggins threw down his can of OC spray and 

drew his service pistol, at which point Louis slid along the door and raised the screwdriver in a 

stabbing motion toward Officer Riggins. (Id. at 42, 189, 317, 322.) Officer Riggins fired two 

shots at Louis, hitting Louis once in the right side of the head and once in the right shoulder. (Id.

at 21, 23, 41-42, 189.) Louis fell unconscious immediately. (DSOF ¶ 9.) The confrontation in 

the bathroom lasted between only seven and ten seconds (Robinson Dep. at 197), during which 

Officers Robinson and Riggins were unable to see one another. (Id. at 198.) Although an EMTcertified ERT member attempted first aid on Louis, Louis was later pronounced dead at Howard 

University Hospital. (FIT Report at 2.) Approximately four hours passed between the time 

officers were originally called to Louis’s apartment and when Louis was shot. (See id. at 1-2.) 

Plaintiff, as a representative of Louis’s estate and Louis’s survivor, filed this suit against 

the District of Columbia and “John Doe Police Officers” on June 6, 2012. (Compl., June 6, 2012 

[Dkt. No. 1].) On October 2, 2012, plaintiff added Officer Riggins as a named defendant. (First 

Amd. Compl., Oct. 2, 2012 [Dkt. No. 9].) On September 5, 2013, plaintiff filed his second 

amended complaint, which contained two federal- and four state-law counts: (1) an excessive 

force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Riggins; (2) a municipal liability claim under 

section 1983 against the District of Columbia; (3) a state-law assault and battery claim against 
5 

both defendants; (4) a state-law negligent excessive force claim against both defendants; (5) a 

state-law survival act claim against both defendants; (6) a state-law wrongful death claim against 

both defendants. (Second Amd. Compl. (“SAC”), Sept. 5, 2013 [Dkt. No. 31] ¶¶ 28-54.) 

Discovery has closed and defendants now move for summary judgment. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat 

summary judgment, the non-moving party must then “designate specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a 

factual disagreement is insufficient to preclude summary judgment: a dispute is “genuine” only if 

a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party; a fact is “material” only if it is 

capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

247-48 (1986); accord Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

The court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 

378 (2007) (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 

(1962)). However, a court should not consider a non-moving party’s “unsubstantiated 

allegations.” Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Indeed, “summary 
6 

judgment ‘is most likely when a plaintiff’s claim is supported solely by the plaintiff’s own selfserving testimony, unsupported by corroborating evidence, and undermined either by other 

credible evidence, physical impossibility or other persuasive evidence that the plaintiff has 

deliberately committed perjury.’” Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 343 (D.C. Cir. 

2006) (quoting Johnson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 883 F.2d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 

1989)). 

ANALYSIS 

I. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 

 A. Count V – Excessive Force 

Plaintiff’s central federal-law claim under section 1983 is that Officer Riggins used 

excessive force when breaching the bathroom and when he fatally shot Louis. (SAC ¶¶ 42-43; 

Opp’n at 13-14.) Officer Riggins claims that his actions are protected by qualified immunity. 

(Mot. at 5.) 

“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but 

mistaken judgments about open legal questions” by “protect[ing] ‘all but the plainly incompetent 

or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, -- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 

(2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Under this doctrine, government 

officials are shielded from money damages unless a plaintiff demonstrates “(1) that the official 

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the 

time of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 2080. A court has the discretion to determine which 

prong of the qualified immunity analysis to undertake first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

236 (2009). 
7 

“A claim that law-enforcement officers used excessive force to effect a seizure is 

governed by the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, -- U.S. -

--, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014); accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“[A]ll 

claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of 

an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the 

Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”).2 The “reasonableness” inquiry is an 

objective one, Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, and is analyzed from the perspective “of a reasonable 

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” id. at 396. Stated succinctly, 

“[a]n officer will only be held liable if the force used was so excessive that no reasonable officer 

could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions.” Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 

54 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

Courts consider the reasonableness of force based on the “the totality of the 

circumstances,” Plumhoff, 134 S.Ct. at 2020, including “the severity of the crime at issue,” 

whether the suspect was “actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight,” and 

whether the suspect “pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This allows “for the fact that police officers are often forced to make 

split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about 

the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 397. 

                                                             2

 Plaintiff also purports to bring excessive force claims pursuant to the due process clauses of the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (SAC ¶ 42.) However, because the District of Columbia is not a 

state, but a “political entity created by the federal government, it is subject to the restrictions of the Fifth 

Amendment, not the Fourteenth.” Propert v. Dist. of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 

1991) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). Moreover, the Fifth Amendment does not 

apply to claims that law enforcement officers utilized excessive force during the course of an arrest. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; accord Armbruster v. Frost, 962 F. Supp. 2d 105, 111 (D.D.C. 2013). The 

Court will therefore grant summary judgment to defendants as to plaintiff’s excessive force claims 

brought pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
8 

The Supreme Court has articulated a narrower “reasonableness” standard for the use of 

deadly force. “[I]t is unreasonable for an officer to ‘seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by 

shooting him dead.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) (quoting Tennessee v. 

Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). “Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and 

no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of 

deadly force to do so.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. “But ‘[w]here the officer has probable cause to 

believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, 

it is not constitutionally unreasonable to . . . us[e] deadly force.’” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 197-98 

(quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11). Thus, “if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon . . . 

deadly force may be used.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; accord Buruca v. Dist. of Columbia, 902 F. 

Supp. 2d 75, 86 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that officer’s use of deadly force was reasonable 

when suspect pointed pistol at officer); Wallace v. Dist. of Columbia, 685 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 

(D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that two officers’ use of deadly force was reasonable when the 

officers faced an armed individual who put his gun to his head, then moved his hand towards one 

of the officers); White v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 2d 41, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding 

that officers’ use of deadly force was reasonable when an individual pointed his gun at one of the 

officers). “‘[T]he law does not require officers in a tense and dangerous situation to wait until 

the moment a suspect uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.’” Wallace, 685 F. Supp. 

2d at 111 (quoting Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1169 (11th Cir. 2009)). 

“Although [courts] evaluate the reasonableness of the officers’ actions by viewing the 

events from their perspective,” courts must at summary judgment “consider the facts in the 

record and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to [plaintiff].” 

Scott v. Dist. of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1996). So viewing the record, “a 
9 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment is to be denied only when . . . a reasonable jury could 

conclude that the excessiveness of the force is so apparent that no reasonable officer could have 

believed in the lawfulness of his actions.” Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 

1993).3

 1. Shooting of Louis 

Officer Riggins maintains that he shot Louis because Louis was “assaulting” him and 

Officer Robinson “with a deadly weapon.” (Riggins Dep. at 23-24; see also id. at 344.) Plaintiff 

argues that there are several disputed issues of material fact as to whether Officer Riggins’s 

decision to shoot Louis was objectively reasonable, including (1) whether Louis was wielding 

the screwdriver when Officer Riggins discharged his firearm; and, if so, (2) whether Louis had 

attempted to stab Officers Robinson and Riggins; and, if so, (3) whether those attempted 

stabbings could have caused death or serious bodily injury. (See Pl.’s Statement of Material 

Facts in Disputed (“PSOF”), March 7, 2014 [Dkt. No. 38] ¶¶ 16, 20, 22; see also Opp’n at 17.)4

 

                                                             3

 Plaintiff asserts that the excessive force claims “will rarely be susceptible to summary 

judgment” because of the necessarily fact-bound nature of the objective reasonableness inquiry. (Opp’n 

at 9-10.) While the reasonableness inquiry is undeniably fact-bound and case-specific, see Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396, this does not preclude summary judgment where there is no disputed fact material to the 

objective reasonableness of the use of force. See, e.g., Plumhoff, 134 S.Ct. at 2024 (reversing circuit 

court’s judgment denying summary judgment); Scott, 550 U.S. at 386 (same); Lash v. Lemke, 971 F. 

Supp. 2d 85, 93 (D.D.C. 2013) (granting summary judgment); Armbruster, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 115 

(same); Garay v. Liriano, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2013) (same); White v. United States, 863 F. 

Supp. 2d at 49 (same). 

4

 Plaintiff “disputes” many other facets of defendants’ statement of facts. (See Opp’n at 16-22; 

see generally Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF, March 7, 2014 [Dkt. No. 38].) However, these “disputes” generally 

consist of plaintiff “den[ying] this statement” without a citation to record evidence that creates a genuine 

issue of fact or even supports plaintiff’s theory of the case. (E.g., Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s 

own “statement of material facts in dispute” is similarly unhelpful, as it consists of a hodgepodge of legal 

conclusions (e.g., PSOF ¶¶ 2-3, 21), facts that are undisputed (e.g., id. ¶¶ 6, 19), and allegedly “disputed” 

facts with record citations that fail to establish a genuine “dispute.” (E.g., id. ¶¶ 21-22.) As one example, 

plaintiff states that “Louis did not use a level of force that could have caused death or serious bodily 

injury when he was confronted by Defendant Riggins in his bathroom,” citing Officer Riggins’s 

deposition testimony. (Id. ¶ 22.) However, the cited testimony states the exact opposite: “Mr. Louis was 

using a level of force . . . that he can [sic] cause death or serious injury to me.” (Riggins Dep. at 344.) 
10 

However, plaintiff’s averments that these facts are genuinely disputed does not make 

them so. For plaintiff’s allegations are unsupported by the record and based almost entirely on 

his theory that Officer Robinson and Riggins’s testimonies are post facto rationalizations meant 

to insulate defendants from liability. (See Opp’n at 17 (“The only evidence that [Louis] was 

holding [the screwdriver] after the entry comes from Defendant Riggins and Officer Robinson, 

whose testimony the jury could disregard.”); id. at 20 (“The jury could just as easily determine 

that Officer Riggins had invented this ‘belief’ to justify his use of lethal force.”).) The Court is 

sensitive to the fact that in cases such as this one, where “the witness most likely to contradict 

[the officers’] story—the person shot dead—is unable to testify,” it should “not simply accept 

what may be a self-serving account by the police officer[s].” Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 

(9th Cir. 1994). However, the fact that an individual died after an encounter with police officers 

does not preclude summary judgment for those officers in a subsequent section 1983 action. See, 

e.g., Buruca, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 86. For a Court cannot set aside the officers’ testimony absent 

“circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer’s story, and 

. . . could convince a rational factfinder that the officer acted unreasonably.” Scott, 39 F.3d at 

915. As described below, plaintiff fails to identify any such circumstantial evidence. 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

Plaintiff cannot render this fact “disputed” by merely labelling it so. Plaintiff must “point[] to 

‘affirmative evidence’ showing disputed material facts.” Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57); see also 

Buruca, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (“The plaintiff can defeat the District’s motion only if it points to 

‘particular facts’ supported by ‘materials in the record’ to dispute the District’s version of the story.” 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A))). 

 The Court notes that the purpose of Local Civil Rule 7(h)’s requirement that parties file 

respective statements of material fact is to “‘isolate[] the facts that the parties assert are material, 

distinguish[] disputed from undisputed facts, and identif[y] the pertinent parts of the record.’” Burke v. 

Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Gardels v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 637 F.2d 770, 

773 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). “[A] district court judge should not be obliged to sift through hundreds of pages of 

depositions, affidavits, and interrogatories in order to make [its] own analysis and determination of what 

may, or may not, be a genuine issue of material disputed fact.” Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1425 

(D.C. Cir. 1988). Unfortunately, this is precisely the burden that plaintiff’s failure to comply with Local 

Rule 7(h) has placed on the Court. 
11 

First, there is no genuine dispute as to whether Louis wielded the screwdriver and 

attempted to stab Officer Robinson. Both officers recounted that after Louis began to push 

against the bathroom door to prevent Officer Robinson from entering, he also began to try to stab 

Officer Robinson around the door with the screwdriver. (Riggins Dep. at 54, 320, 346; Robinson 

Dep. at 197.) In addition, the officers recovered the screwdriver from the bathroom after the 

altercation. (FIT Report at 4.) Plaintiff offers no evidence to undermine this consistent 

testimony of the officers and the physical evidence from the scene.5

Second, there is no genuine dispute as to whether Louis also threatened Officer Riggins 

with the screwdriver. Officer Riggins testified that after he dropped his OC spray and drew his 

service pistol, Louis raised the screwdriver in a stabbing motion in his direction. (Riggins Dep. 

at 317.) Plaintiff argues that Officer Riggins’s testimony should be disregard as “implausible” 

because (1) Officer Robinson testified that Louis did not decrease his resistance on the door 

before Officer Riggins shot him; (2) Officer Riggins himself testified that Louis remained in 

contact with the door at all times; and (3) Officer Riggins shot Louis in the side of the shoulder 

and head, which is inconsistent with a frontal attack by Louis. (Opp’n at 20-21; Pl.’s Response 

to DSOF, March 7, 2014 [Dkt. No. 38] ¶ 4.) On this basis, plaintiff contends, a jury could 

conclude Louis was not threatening Officer Riggins. However, this purported “implausibility” in 

Officer Riggins’s testimony is solely of plaintiff’s invention. Officer Riggins never testified that 

Louis turned and approached him head on. Instead, Officer Riggins testified consistently that 

Louis, who remained in contact with the door throughout the encounter (Riggins Dep. at 48, 194, 

317-19), was “never facing” him and kept his body “always towards the side,” even when he 

                                                             5

 Plaintiff argues that “there is no evidence that [Louis] could have reached a screwdriver around 

the door to pose any threat to Officer Robinson based on how [Louis] was positioned and built.” (Opp’n 

at 19-20.) However, the officers’ unrebutted testimony provides that evidence. That testimony is not so 

facially implausible as to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
12 

threatened Riggins with the screwdriver. (Id. at 318, 347.) Thus, the fact that Officer Riggins 

shot Louis in the side of his shoulder and head is completely consistent with the Riggins’s 

testimony of Louis’s threatening actions.6

Finally, there is no genuine dispute as to whether Louis could have caused death or 

serious bodily injury to Officers Robinson and Riggins. It is undisputed that Louis was 

attempting to stab the officers with a screwdriver with an artificially sharpened seven-inch 

blade—the same screwdriver with which he had stabbed Officer Sarita hours before. Not only 

have courts concluded that attacks by a suspect wielding similarly-sized knives are sufficiently 

dangerous to justify the use of deadly force, e.g., Samuel v. City of Broken Arrow, 2011 WL 

6029677, * 4-6 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2011) (ten-inch knife with five-inch blade), but several 

courts specifically have held that screwdrivers, when wielded as weapons, may justify the use of 

deadly force. See J.P. ex rel. Balderas v. City of Porterville, 801 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981-83 (E.D. 

Cal. 2011); Nicarry v. Cannaday, 260 F. App’x 166, 170 (11th Cir. 2007). During the encounter, 

Louis was at most five feet away from Officer Riggins and was stabbing around the door at 

Officer Robinson. The protective gear worn by the officers left their necks, arms, and thighs 

exposed and the shields were not designed to protect officers from sharp objects. Under these 

undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Louis did not pose a threat of serious 

harm to the officers. 

                                                             6

 This fact distinguishes the case from Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999), and 

Fenwick v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2013). In Abraham, the Third Circuit considered 

whether the evidence established that the police officer acted in self-defense when he shot the decedent as 

he attempted to escape in a car. 183 F.3d at 293-96. Although all of the witness testimony supported the 

officer’s claim that he was in front of the car (and thus at risk) when he shot the suspect, the physical 

evidence that the bullet entered through the car’s side window, striking the decedent in the arm before 

entering his chest, undermined the witness and officer testimony, and precluded summary judgment. Id.

at 293-94. Similarly, in Fenwick, video evidence created a triable issue of fact as to whether the 

defendant police officer was in danger of being hit by the suspect’s car when he fired his service weapon. 

926 F. Supp. 2d 227-28. Here, plaintiff fails to identify similar contradictory evidence. 
13 

Thus, the Court is left with a fairly simple, albeit unfortunate, case. After Officer Riggins 

entered the bathroom, and before Officer Robinson could do so, Louis resisted by pushing 

against the bathroom door and attempting to stab the officers—first Officer Robinson and then 

Officer Riggins—with the same artificially sharpened screwdriver with which he had stabbed 

Officer Sarita. In response to Louis’s attacks, Officer Riggins discharged his firearm twice, 

striking Louis in the side of the shoulder and head, killing him. All of this occurred in fewer 

than ten seconds. While, with hindsight, it is easy for plaintiff to say that Officer Riggins should 

have approached the situation differently—by using non-lethal force, or by retreating out of the 

bathroom, or by trying to verbally reason with Louis—that is not what the Constitution requires. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The Constitution allows police officers to make split-second decisions 

regarding the use of force, including the reasonable decision to use lethal force when a suspect 

threatens serious physical harm upon another officer. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.7

 No 

reasonable jury could disagree that Louis posed such a threat to Officers Robinson and Riggins. 

Accordingly, no reasonable jury could conclude that under the totality of the circumstances 

Officer Riggins’s use of deadly force was so excessive that no reasonable officer could have 

believed it was lawful. See J.P. ex rel. Balderas, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 981-83 (police officer acted 

                                                             7

 Plaintiff’s argument that Officer Riggins’s actions were unreasonable under Garner, because 

there was no risk of Louis escaping and Officer Riggins did not give a verbal warning before firing, is 

misplaced. (Opp’n at 15.) Garner itself clarified that warning was required only “where feasible.” 471 

U.S. at 11-12; accord Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1321 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A warning is 

not invariably required even before the use of deadly force.”). Moreover, as the Supreme Court has 

clarified, “Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an 

officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’” Scott, 550 U.S. at 382. While Garner considered the use of 

deadly force to prevent the escape of felony suspects, 471 U.S. at 11-12, it did not limit the use of deadly 

force to situations where escape was possible or imminent. Scott, 550 U.S. at 382. “Garner was simply 

an application of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test to the use of a particular type of force in 

a particular situation” – namely, where a police officer had shot a young, unarmed burglary suspect who 

posed no threat to anyone merely to prevent his escape. Id. (citations omitted). “Whatever Garner said 

about the factors that might have justified shooting the suspect in that case, such ‘preconditions’ have 

scant applicability to this case, which has vastly different facts,” id., including the suspect’s attack of the 

police officers with a dangerous weapon. 
14 

reasonably when he fatally shot suspect who was approaching with a screwdriver raised, having 

earlier stabbed another police officer); Nicarry, 260 F. App’x at 170 (police officers acted 

reasonably when using deadly force on suspect who was charging with a screwdriver). 

 2. Breach of the bathroom door 

In his opposition, plaintiff also argues that the breach of the bathroom door was an 

independent and unreasonable use of force that violated Louis’s constitutional rights. (Opp’n at 

25-26.)8 Officer Riggins responds that because he did not make the decision to breach the door 

(Glover Dep. at 105), and did not personally breach the door (DSOF ¶ 1), he cannot be held 

personally liable for that alleged excessive use of force. (Reply at 18.) As an initial matter, 

although Officer Riggins did not personally breach the bathroom door, he was a member of the 

four-person team that executed the plan to breach the door and apprehend Louis. Federal 

common-law tort principles govern the application of section 1983. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.S. 384, 387 (2007). And it “‘is axiomatic that where several independent actors concurrently 

or consecutively produce a single, indivisible injury, each actor will be held jointly and severally 

liable for the entire injury.’” Wesby v. Dist. of Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 20, 41 (D.D.C. 2012) 

(quoting Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 179 (7th Cir. 1985)). Considering the evidence in the 

light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find Officer Riggins jointly and 

severally liable for any unconstitutional actions taken by his fellow officers when they 

collectively implemented the plan to breach the door and enter the bathroom. 

However, there is no material question of fact as to the objective reasonableness of the 

breach of the bathroom door. It is undisputed that after the police officers’ first encounter with 

Louis—which culminated in Louis stabbing an officer—the specialist ERT was called in to 

                                                             8

 The Court agrees with defendants that it is questionable whether plaintiff’s complaint can be 

fairly read to encompass this claim. (See SAC ¶¶ 20, 42-43; Reply at 3-4 ns.1-2.) However, the Court 

does not address this issue, as the claim nonetheless fails on the merits. 
15 

handle the barricade situation. The ERT negotiators unsuccessfully attempted to create a 

dialogue with Louis for around an hour and a half. When Louis went silent for an extended 

period of time, ERT members confirmed that Louis appeared to have either passed out or fallen 

asleep in the bathroom. Based on this information, Lieutenant Glover decided to breach the 

bathroom on his belief that the situation presented an opportunity to take Louis into custody 

without incident. Only then did the four-man team breach the door and attempt to apprehend 

Louis. 

This case is thus distinguishable from those cases plaintiff cites where a reasonable jury 

could find that police officers’ decisions to breach a house or room in a barricade situation was 

objectively unreasonable. In Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third 

Circuit concluded that, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it was 

objectively unreasonable for police officers to “storm [the suspect’s] shed and house using flashbang grenades” considering, inter alia, that the officers knew that the suspect was a mentally 

unstable Vietnam War veteran suffering from intermittent war flashbacks, post-traumatic stress 

disorder, and a heart condition. Id. at 151-52.9

 Importantly, however, Smith hinged entirely on 

the officers’ use of flash-bangs and said nothing of the reasonableness of the general decision to 

breach the shed or house to confront the mentally unstable, potentially dangerous suspect. See 

id. at 152 (“It is useful to compare the decision to activate [the tactical team] with the decision to 

enter Smith’s house and shed using the tactics employed here.” (emphasis added)). In this case, 

the officers’ method of breaching the bathroom door is simply not comparable to the officers’ 

use of flash-bang grenades when storming the suspect’s shed and house in Smith. Thus, Smith is 

inapposite. 

                                                             9

 The Smith court also considered the fact that nearly six hours had passed between the initial 

complaint bringing police to the suspect’s house and when the tactical team stormed the house, during 

which time no officer had made contact with the suspect. 430 F.3d at 151. 
16 

Although more similar to this case, Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 

1211 (9th Cir. 2014), is also distinguishable.10 In that case, two officers responded to a call from 

a social worker seeking to detain Sheehan, a woman with an established mental illness, for a 

seventy-two hour psychiatric evaluation and treatment. Id. at 1217. The social worker informed 

the police that Sheehan was known to make violent threats, had threatened to kill him with a 

knife, and was currently in her room on the second floor, from which the only exit was a door 

into the hallway. Id. at 1217-18. When the officers entered Sheehan’s bedroom (using a key), 

Sheehan, holding a large knife, slowly approached them and repeatedly stated that she would kill 

them if they did not leave her room. Id. at 1218-19. The officers retreated from Sheehan’s 

bedroom and called for backup. Id. at 1219. 

Similarities between Sheehan and this case, however, end there. Rather than waiting for 

backup and providing Sheehan the opportunity to calm down, the officers immediately and 

forcibly reentered Sheehan’s room with service weapons drawn. Id. As could be expected, 

Sheehan began attacking the officers with her knife, at which point they discharged OC spray 

without effect and then fired their service weapons, hitting Sheehan at least five times. Id. at 

1219-20. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, although Sheehan’s attack justified the officers’ use 

of deadly force, id. at 1229-30, a reasonable jury could find the officers’ decision to enter the 

bedroom a second time was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1225-27.11 The Ninth Circuit 

                                                             10 Sheehan was decided after defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, but before 

plaintiff filed his opposition. Although the parties did not address Sheehan in their summary judgment 

briefs, plaintiff later filed a notice of supplemental authority with the Court, to which defendants 

responded. (See Pl.’s Notice of Suppl. Auth., April 9, 2014 [Dkt. No. 44]; Response to Pl.’s Notice of 

Suppl. Auth., April 25, 2014 [Dkt. No. 45].) 

11 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that, taking into account the events leading up to the officers’ 

use of deadly force, a reasonable jury could find that the officers recklessly provoked the violent 

confrontation, exposing them to liability for the otherwise defensive use of deadly force. Sheehan, 743 

F.3d at 1230. 
17 

faulted the officers breaching the door before their specialized backup could arrive “without a 

countervailing need” for doing so. Id. at 1226-27. The officers had no reason at that point to 

enter the bedroom when they knew a deadly confrontation was likely: there was no evidence 

Sheehan was a threat to herself or—without means of escaping her bedroom—other people. Id.

at 1226-27.12

 In contrast to the officers in Sheehan, the responding officers in this case, after their 

initial confrontation with Louis, waited for their specialized backup: the ERT. The ERT 

attempted to negotiate with Louis, albeit unsuccessfully, for over an hour and a half. It was only 

after the ERT had evidence that Louis—silent for nearly twenty minutes—had passed out or 

fallen asleep that Lieutenant Glover ordered the four-man team to breach the door. Unlike 

Sheehan, where the officers had no reason to forcibly enter her room at that time, Lieutenant 

Glover’s decision to breach the door was not made in total disregard for Louis’s safety. See 

Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1226-27; see also Estate of Smith, 430 F.3d at 151-52. Instead, the officers 

here had a reasoned basis for their action: Louis’s apparent unconsciousness provided an 

opportunity to apprehend him without incident. Far from disregarded, Louis’s safety was 

paramount in Lieutenant Glover’s decision to breach the bathroom door at that time. 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

12 The Ninth Circuit also relied significantly on expert testimony that the officers had departed 

from departmental policy. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1225-26. Plaintiff’s expert, in a conclusory and 

inflammatory Rule 26(b)(4) statement, offered similar proposed testimony for this case. (See Rule 

26(b)(4) Statement of James E. Bradley, Jr., June 10, 2013 [Dkt. No. 20] at 6 (concluding, with little 

supporting analysis, that Officer Riggins’s actions “violated . . . the published general orders of the 

Metropolitan Police Department”.) However, in this Circuit, whether Officer Riggins violated MPD 

policy is “irrelevant” to the Fourth Amendment analysis. English v. Dist. of Columbia, 651 F.3d 1, 9 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)).
18 

 Under the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that the officers 

acted in an objectively unreasonable fashion when breaching the bathroom door.13 Even 

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Lieutenant Glover’s 

decision, after hours of failed negotiation, to take advantage of an apparent opportunity to 

apprehend Louis without incident, was reasonable. Cf. McCracken v. Freed, 2006 WL 83452, at 

*10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) (forcible entry into home using pepper spray was reasonable when 

hours of attempted negotiations failed and plan to enter home was made in consideration of the 

safety of all parties involved). That the plan failed is ultimately irrelevant to the question of 

whether the plan, as executed, was objectively reasonable. 

 In the alternative, it is arguable that Officer Riggins would be protected by qualified 

immunity because he was merely following his superior officer’s objectively reasonable order to 

breach the bathroom door. The Court recognizes that thirty years ago the D.C. Circuit refused to 

accept a “just following orders” defense from defendants who had complied with an agency’s 

approved policy. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“In its most extreme 

form, this argument amounts to the contention that obedience to higher authority should excuse 

disobedience to law, no matter how central the law is to the preservation of citizens’ rights. We 

have no hesitation in rejecting this new argument.”). However, the D.C. Circuit did not foreclose 

the possibility of the defense applying in another case. See Wesby, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (“[O]ur 

Circuit has specifically rejected the argument that immunity automatically attaches were public 

officials violate a citizen’s rights at the direction of higher authority.” (emphasis added)). 

Indeed, as other Circuits have held in cases more recent than Hobson, a “just following orders” 

defense may establish qualified immunity when “plausible instructions from a superior or fellow 

                                                             13 For the same reasons, no reasonable jury could find that the officers recklessly failed to take 

into account Louis’s mental state when breaching the bathroom, thereby provoking a deadly confrontation 

that could have been avoided. 
19 

officer . . . viewed objectively in light of the surrounding circumstances . . . could lead a 

reasonable officer to conclude that the necessary legal justification for his actions exists.” 

Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 199 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bilida v. McCleod,

211 F.3d 166, 174-75 (1st Cir. 2000)); see also Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 81-82 (2d Cir. 

1997); Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Here, because there is 

no genuine dispute as to whether a reasonable officer in Officer Riggins’s position would have 

concluded (correctly) that the “necessary legal justification” existed for breaching the bathroom 

door, the Court concludes it is at least arguable that Officer Riggins is independently protected 

by qualified immunity pursuant to the “just following orders” defense. 

Accordingly, in light of all of the facts and circumstances, no reasonable jury could find 

that Officer Riggins’s participation in the breach of the bathroom door or ultimate use of deadly 

force against Louis was so excessive that no reasonable officer could have believed it was 

lawful. Therefore, Officer Riggins is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s section 1983 

excessive force claim, and the Court will grant his motion for summary judgment as to Count V. 

See Armbruster v. Frost, 962 F. Supp. 2d 105, 115 (D.D.C. 2013). 

 B. Count VI – Monnell Claims 

 In Count VI of his second amended complaint, plaintiff brought a separate section 1983 

claim against the District of Columbia based on the MPD’s alleged unconstitutional policies and 

failure to properly train its employees. (SAC ¶¶ 45-54; Opp’n at 31-32.) A municipality’s 

liability under section 1983 is limited. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 

U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury 

inflicted by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or 

custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). For 
20 

a Monell claim to survive a municipal-defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court 

must conclude that there is evidence both (1) of a “predicate constitutional violation” and (2) 

“that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.” See Baker v. Dist. of 

Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 

503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992)); accord Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 

2008); Konah v. Dist. of Columbia, 971 F. Supp. 2d 74, 81 (D.D.C. 2013). 

 Because the Court will grant summary judgment for Officer Riggins as to plaintiff’s 

excessive force claims, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the requisite “predicate constitutional 

violation” for Monell liability in this case.14 Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment for 

the District as to Count VI. 

III. STATE-LAW CLAIMS 

In Counts I-IV, plaintiff brings state-law negligence, assault and battery, survival action, 

and wrongful death claims against Officer Riggins and the District. (See SAC ¶¶ 28-40.) When, 

as here, the Court will grant summary judgment for defendants as to the federal-law claims 

providing the Court with original jurisdiction, the Court “may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); accord Shekoyan v. 

Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of 

                                                             14 Even had plaintiff demonstrated that Officer Riggins, or some other officer, used excessive 

force on Louis, plaintiff (and his expert) failed to identify evidence sufficient to demonstrate that District 

“custom or policy caused the claimed violations of his constitutional rights.” Warren v. Dist. of 

Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). There is no evidence that any policy “explicitly adopted” by 

the District was “‘the moving force of the [alleged] constitutional violation.’” Id. at 39 (quoting Monell, 

436 U.S. at 694). Nor is there evidence that a policymaker “knowingly ignore[d] a practice that was 

consistent enough to constitute custom.” Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 

(1988)). Finally, there is no evidence that the District acted with “deliberate indifference” as to the 

constitutional violations alleged here—i.e., “knew or should have known of the risk of [the alleged] 

constitutional violations,” but did not act to prevent them. Baker, 326 F.3d at 1307 (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840-41 (1994)). Proof of a single constitutional violation cannot, alone, establish 

an actionable policy or custom under Monell. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 

(1985). Plaintiff’s failure to identify a policy or custom actionable under Monell provides an alternative 

basis for the Court’s determination that summary judgment for the District is appropriate as to Count VI. 
21 

discretion, not a plaintiff’s right.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In 

deciding “whether to exercise [its] jurisdiction,” the Court “should consider and weigh . . . the 

values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are 

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise 

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Id. at 350 n.7. 

Although the state- and federal-law claims in this case share “a common nucleus of 

operative fact,” see Armbruster, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 116, the Court concludes that convenience, 

fairness, and comity disfavor this Court’s consideration of plaintiff’s state-law claims—some of 

which raise complex state-law issues. The Court will therefore dismiss plaintiff’s Counts I-IV 

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment [Dkt. No. 35] as to plaintiff’s federal-law claims and dismiss plaintiff’s remaining 

state-law claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.. An Order consistent with this 

Memorandum Opinion will be issued on this day. 

 /s/ 

ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE 

United States District Judge 

DATE: July 23, 2014