United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2865

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jeffrey Ray Pendleton

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - St. Joseph

____________

 Submitted: June 17, 2016

 Filed: August 12, 2016

____________

Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Jeffrey Ray Pendleton was indicted for conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. A jury found him
guilty of both charges. Pendleton now appeals, raising several challenges to the

district court’s rulings. We affirm. 1

I.

In August 2012, a grand jury indicted Pendleton for conspiracy to distribute

500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

846, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (h). An earlier-filed criminal complaint indicated that Pendleton,

in the course of this conspiracy, had assaulted one of his co-conspirators. Pendleton

moved in limine to prevent the Government fromusing evidence ofthe assault at trial,

but the district court denied his motion.

Pendleton’s counsel moved to withdraw, per Pendleton’s request, citing lack

of communication and disagreement about trialstrategy. At a hearing on this motion,

Pendleton expressed concern that his attorney was not investigating his case

adequately. The magistrate judge denied the motion and declined to appoint new

counsel. The court concluded that Pendleton’s attorneywas fulfilling his professional

duties and that any lack of communication between Pendleton and his counsel

resulted solely from Pendleton’s refusal to discuss the case with his attorney.

Immediately prior to trial, Pendleton’s attorney filed a motion under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in which he sought disclosure of Pendleton’s coconspirators’ presentence investigation reports(“PSRs”). After conducting a hearing

on the motion and an in camera review of the PSRs, the magistrate judge concluded

that the PSRs contained no exculpatory information and denied the motion.

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.

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During voir dire,the district court informed the venire panel that Pendleton was

charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetime and conspiracy to commit

money laundering. The court asked if any members of the panel knew Pendleton or

anyone who might be related to him. Venireperson 43 informed the court that she

was a bail bondswoman and that she knew “Pendletons that had ties” to the St.

Joseph, Missouri area. When the court asked if her knowledge would impact her

judgment in the case, the venireperson said, “I’m very aware of the situation and, of

course, with the methamphetamines that were being distributed in the Pendleton

family.” The court cut her off, asking her simply to confirm that her judgment would

be impacted. Pendleton did not object, nor did he ask for any curative instruction. 

However, at the conclusion of voir dire, he asked for a mistrial, arguing that the

venireperson’s comments had tainted the panel. The court excused the relevant

venireperson, but it denied the mistrial motion. The court explained that it had acted

quickly to limit the comment and that its questions and instructions to the venire

panel repeatedly emphasized the need for jurorsto make a decision based only on the

evidence at trial. 

At trial, two officers testified that they had arrested Pendleton and found him

with drug paraphernalia and large amounts of cash. Other witnesses testified that

they bought drugs from or sold drugs to Pendleton or that they observed Pendleton

engage in high-value methamphetamine transactions. A few witnesses also testified

that they sold methamphetamine for Pendleton and gave himthe profits. One of these

witnesses, R.D., testified that she had been assaulted by Pendleton and his associate

because Pendleton believed that R.D. had stolen drugs and money from him. R.D.

authenticated photographs depicting the injuries she sustained from this assault.

After the Government presented its case in chief, Pendleton moved for

judgment of acquittal. Regarding the money-laundering charge, Pendleton claimed

that the Government had failed to prove that he sought to conceal the use of funds

derived from drug proceeds. The court denied his motion and submitted the case to

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the jury, which found Pendleton guilty. The district court sentenced Pendleton to

concurrent sentences of 300 months’ imprisonment for the drug-distribution charge

and 240 months’ imprisonment for the money-laundering charge. Pendleton now

appeals.

II.

Pendleton advances several arguments on appeal. First, he challenges the

denial of his motion for disclosure of his co-conspirators’ PSRs. Second, he argues

that the district court improperly denied his motion for new counsel. Third, he

contendsthat the court abused its discretion when it refused to declare a mistrial after

venireperson 43 alluded to extrajudicial knowledge of criminal conduct in the

Pendleton family. Fourth, Pendleton argues that the court abused its discretion by

admitting evidence of Pendleton’s assault of R.D. Finally, Pendleton appeals from

the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the money-laundering charge.

A.

We begin with Pendleton’s argument that the court improperly denied the

motion for disclosure of his co-conspirators’ PSRs. Pendleton contendsthat the PSRs

contained information that could have been used to impeach his co-conspirators, who

served as government witnesses during trial. We review the denial of this motion for

abuse of discretion. United States v. DeVore, 839 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1988);

United States v. Willis, 89 F.3d 1371, 1381 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996).

Under Brady v. Maryland, “suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either

to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. The prosecution’s duty to disclose extends to evidence

that may be used to impeach government witnesses. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.

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150, 154 (1972). However, the Government has no duty to disclose evidence that is

neutral, speculative, or inculpatory, or evidence that is available to the defense from

other sources. United States v. Flores-Mireles, 112 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1997). 

To obtain relief for a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice by

showing that “‘there is a reasonable probability’ that the result of the proceeding

would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the

defense.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999). “The question is not

whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict

with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as

a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. at 289-90 (quoting Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).

Generally, a defendant is not entitled to production of PSRs of government

witnesses. United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1209 (9th Cir. 2004); see also

United States v. McKnight, 771 F.2d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 1985). PSRs are confidential

reports created by an arm of the court and designed for use by a judge in reaching a

fair sentence. United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1976). A court

may, in its discretion, make an in camera inspection of a PSR if a defendant alleges

that the PSR contains material to which he would be entitled under Brady. United

States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garcia, 562

F.3d 947, 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that a court abuses its discretion by failing to

conduct an in camera review of a government witness’s PSR when “the defendant has

sought access to a coconspirator’s PSR, [and] the government has recognized the

possibility that the PSR contains Brady/Giglio information”). However, PSRs “are

not public and should not be disclosed to third persons absent a demonstration that

disclosure is required to meet the ends of justice.” McKnight, 771 F.2d at 390; see

also United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 656 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding the district

court’s decision denying disclosure of a witness’s PSR where the defendant presented

no compelling or substantial need for it).

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Pendleton argues that the court erred when it denied his request for the PSRs

of two co-conspirators, J.J. and B.B., who cooperated with the Government. 

According to Pendleton, their PSRs indicate that J.J. and B.B. did not implicate him

during their initial statements to police, even though they later named Pendleton as

a key player in the drug conspiracy. This inconsistency, Pendleton claims, could be

used to impeach their credibility. We reject Pendleton’s contention that the district

court erred when it determined that such evidence does not fall under Brady. First,

even if J.J. and B.B. failed to name Pendleton in early statementsto police, Pendleton

did not allege that these initial interviews included any specific questions about him

or his role in the conspiracy. Thus, he has not shown that the witnesses’ initial failure

to name him undermines their credibility. See Flores-Mireles, 112 F.3d at 340

(noting that neutral evidence does not fall under Brady). Second, Pendleton’s

knowledge of the inconsistent statements suggests that he had access to the

information from other sources, and Brady does not require disclosure in this

circumstance, id., particularly when the movant offers nothing more than speculation

to support his belief that a PSR contains the relevant information, see United States

v. Mitchell, 178 F.3d 904, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that mere speculation about

the contents of a PSR is insufficient to warrant disclosure under Brady).

Pendleton also argues that he is entitled to a new trial under Brady because the

court, following its in camera review, did not require the Government to disclose that

the PSRs of T.A. and J.M., two other co-conspirators, contained inconsistent

statements about when they began cooperating with police and other details, such as

whether T.A. actually accompanied Pendleton to a certain location to sell drugs. 

Pendleton argues thatsuch inconsistencies could have been used to impeach these coconspirators. We reject his contention that nondisclosure entitles him to a new trial.

The fatal flaw in Pendleton’s argument is his failure to demonstrate prejudice

fromthis nondisclosure. During trial, both T.A. and J.M. acknowledged that they had

cooperated with law enforcement in order to receive more favorable treatment in their

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own criminal proceedings. In this circumstance, their credibility had been shaken. 

Cf. United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Impeachment

evidence, even that which tends to further undermine the credibility of the key

Government witness whose credibility has already been shaken due to extensive

cross-examination, does not create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist

where that evidence is cumulative or collateral.”). Moreover, the testimony of these

two witnesses was not essential to proving Pendleton’s guilt because the other

evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (noting that

evidence affecting credibility must be disclosed under Brady if the “reliability of a

given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence” (quoting Napue v.

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959))); see Dye v. Stender, 208 F.3d 662, 666 (8th Cir.

2000) (concluding that lettersfromthe prosecuting attorney, which tended to impeach

two government witnesses’ testimony, were not material when the court found

“overwhelming circumstantial evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt”). Several other

2

witnesses testified that they observed Pendleton carry out drug purchases and sales

involving drug quantities valued as high as $10,000. Accordingly, we conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to order disclosure, and

we hold that Pendleton is not entitled to relief under Brady.

B.

Pendleton next argues that the court improperly denied his counsel’s motion

to withdraw and his request for new counsel. Pendleton contends that the court

should have granted this motion because a “complete breakdown in communication”

In his brief, Pendleton raises a one-sentence argument that the same

2

inconsistentstatements constitute newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial. 

We disagree. See United States v. Baker, 479 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2007)

(discussing motions for a new trial and stating that “newly discovered evidence must

be ‘more than merely . . . impeaching’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States

v. Dogskin, 265 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2001))).

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followed from his counsel’s failure to investigate the Brady material. See United

States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 839 (8th Cir. 2006). “We review a district court’s

denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw for abuse of discretion.” Sanford v. MaidRite Corp., 816 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2016). We review the denial of a request for

new counsel using the same standard. Boone, 437 F.3d at 839.

To obtain new counsel, a defendant must show justifiable dissatisfaction with

appointed counsel that arises from difficulties such as “irreconcilable conflict, a

complete breakdown in communication, or any other factor interfering significantly

with an attorney’s ability to provide zealous representation.” Id. Justifiable

dissatisfaction is not established “merely by a defendant’s frustration with counsel’s

performance or disagreement with his tactical decisions.” Id. Here, we conclude that

the court properly determined that Pendleton’s complaints did not reveal justifiable

dissatisfaction.

At a hearing on the motion, Pendleton stated that he stopped communicating

with his attorney because the attorney was not sufficiently investigating his case or

pursuing Brady material related to government witnesses. However, Pendleton

acknowledged that his attorney successfully had sought some Brady material. In

addition, immediately prior to trial, counsel filed a second motion for disclosure of

Brady material, one that specifically related to the PSRs Pendleton said that he

wanted at the hearing.

Pendleton’s attorney informed the court that he was prepared to go to trial

despite his professional view that Pendleton should have accepted a plea deal. He

also stated that he had gone to see Pendleton more than thirty times in the course of

his representation and that he continued to try to speak with Pendleton, even though

Pendleton declined to talk to him. Based on this information, the court concluded

that Pendleton’s counsel performed adequately and that any lack of communication

between Pendleton and his counsel did not stem from a complete breakdown in

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communication or attorney ineffectiveness but rather from an unwillingness on

Pendleton’s part to communicate with his counsel. Under such circumstances, a court

does not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint new counsel. See United States

v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming a district court’s denial of a

defendant’s motion for new counsel where “there was no total breakdown in

communication, only an unwillingness on [the defendant’s] part to communicate with

counsel”). Because Pendleton failed to show justifiable dissatisfaction, the court did

not abuse its discretion by denying his motion.3

C.

We next turn to Pendleton’s contention that the district court abused its

discretion when it failed to declare a mistrial after one venireperson said that she was

familiar with the Pendleton family and their distribution of methamphetamine. 

Although the court excused venireperson 43 for cause, Pendleton argues that this

action was not sufficient to address the effect of her statement on the forty-six person

venire panel. He argues that the court violated his constitutional rights when it

allowed the trial to proceed with the empaneled members. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366

U.S. 717, 722 (1961).

“Our review of whether the district judge conducted voir dire in a way that

protected [a defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury islimited

to an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Granados, 117 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir.

1997). This deferential standard of review reflects the fact that the district court is

In this direct appeal, we decline to consider Pendleton’s argument that he 3

received ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). Pendleton has not shown that his case is exceptional, and we therefore

conclude that this claim should be raised in a habeas corpus action. See United States

v. Golliher, 820 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting that we review Strickland

claims on direct appeal only in exceptional cases).

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in the best position to judge whether the dismissed venireperson’s statements are so

detrimental as to render the entire venire biased against a defendant. Arizona v.

Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514 (1978). After all, the district court, unlike a court of

appeals, may “observe the demeanor and response of the prospective jurors and

evaluate any possible prejudice.” United States v. Doggett, 821 F.2d 1049, 1051 (5th

Cir. 1987). As we said in Goldstein v. United States, “It is impossible to gather from

the cold record . . . the atmosphere of the [proceedings], the manner in which the

words were spoken, or the probable effect, if any, which they had upon the merits of

the controversy.” 63 F.2d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 1933).

Here, the record shows that the court carefully considered whether the panel

had been tainted by venireperson 43’s statement about the Pendleton family. When

Pendleton’s attorney moved for a mistrial following the conclusion of voir dire, the

court explained that it had acted quickly to interrupt venireperson 43 and that it “felt

that given the point that [it] cut her off that not only was it clear that [the court] didn’t

want to hear what her opinions were but it negated any impact that what she was

saying or attempting to say might otherwise have.” See United States v. Cantwell, 41

F. App’x 263, 269 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (finding no abuse of discretion and

noting that the “prospective jurors’ remarks were brief and quickly terminated by the

district court”). In addition, the court referenced the configuration of the courtroom

and the fact that those panel members nearest venireperson 43—presumably, those

most likely to have heard her statements—were seated in a row separate from the

other prospective jurors and that none of the venire members in venireperson 43’s

row were ultimately selected as members of the jury. As a result, the court concluded

that proper instructions could suffice to eliminate any taint. The court also noted that

it had “asked time and time again whether people could decide the case based on the

evidence that’s presented here and the law asI instructed themand will instruct them”

throughout the trial.

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The record confirms that the court took these precautions. Following

venireperson 43’s comment, the court asked the panel whether anyone could not

accept the presumption of innocence. The court also inquired as to whether the

venire members felt that any other factors would affect their ability to be fair and

impartial. Neither question elicited a positive response. In addition, the court

instructed the selected jurors at the outset of trial that Pendleton must be presumed

innocent and that all conclusions had to be drawn from evidence—that is, “the

testimony of witnesses, documents, and other things received as exhibits, any facts

that have been stipulated.” The court repeated these instructions after the trial, also

telling the jurors that they must not carry out independent investigation or research

in order to avoid being influenced by “inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading

information that has not been tested by the trial process.”

We presume that juries follow a court’s instructions. Conley v. Very, 450 F.3d

786, 788 (8th Cir. 2006). This presumption applies even when a potential juror refers

to having some extrajudicial knowledge of a defendant’s criminal conduct. For

example, our court upheld the denial of a mistrial motion after a potential juror, when

asked if he knew any of the defendants, said that one of the defendants had “shot [his]

son.” United States v. Wade, 467 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1972). Our court

determined that the statement did not irreparably damage the fairness of the trial in

large part because the court instructed the jury to disregard the statement and because

“[t]he court did all that could be done to obtain all information possible to aid it in its

determination of whether the juror’s statement would deprive defendants of a fair and

impartial trial.” Id.; see also Butler v. United States, 351 F.2d 14, 17, 19-20 (8th Cir.

1965) (rejecting a defendant’s contention that the court denied his right to a fair trial

when it retained the venire panel and instructed the jury to disregard a prospective

juror’s statement thatshe worked with victims who suffered “a lot oftrouble” because

of the defendant’s actions).

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Our sister circuits similarly have relied on the curative effect of proper

instructions in cases involving errant venireperson statements. For example, in

United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s decision

to retain a panel after one venireperson said that she had seen news stories related to

charges of bribery against Customs and Border Protection officers, that the stories

might have been about the defendant, and that she consequently suspected the

defendant was guilty. 593 F. App’x 649, 650 (9th Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied,

576 U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 2912 (2015). The Ninth Circuit explained that these

statements were not irreparably damaging and thusfound itsufficient that the district

court had “emphasized several times that jurors were required to decide the case

solely on the basis of the evidence presented in the courtroom, and [the district court]

gave several strong admonitions regarding the presumption of innocence and the

requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.; cf. Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d

630 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the court, at minimum, should have conducted

further voir dire to determine whether the panel had been infected after a prospective

juror employed as a social worker made several expert-like statementssuggesting that

child victims do not lie in sexual assault cases like the one at hand).

Similarly, in United States v. Moutry, the Seventh Circuit rejected a

defendant’s contention that the district court plainly erred when it proceeded with the

panel even after one venireperson—a pharmacist—“advised the court that he thought

he recognized [one of the defendants on trial for drug crimes] as someone who might

have attempted to pass a fraudulent prescription in one of the pharmacies where he

worked.” 46 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1995). Although the venireperson suggested

that the defendant might be someone who he knew “use[d] drugs,” the Seventh

Circuit rejected the defendant’s contention that the court plainly erred by not striking

the venire panel, in part because each juror had agreed that he or she could consider

the case fairly and impartially after hearing this comment. Id. at 603. The court also

noted that the defendant presented “nothing to indicate that any one of the jurors was

less than truthful about his or her ability to be fair and impartial, or that any of the

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jurors otherwise harbored a prejudice against the defendant.” Id. Relying on the

jury’s promise to remain impartial and commenting on the strength of the evidence

at trial, the Seventh Circuit upheld the court’s decision to proceed with the panel. Id.

Finally, in United States v. Carson, the Seventh Circuit determined that the

court did not abuse its discretion when it retained the venire panel after a potential

juror said that one of the defendants on trial for possession of a firearm as a felon had

held a pistol near the venireperson’s face several years before. 9 F.3d 576, 588, 590

(7th Cir. 1993), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Unites

States v. Fones, 51 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit noted that the court

“did an able job of minimizing the prejudicial effect of [the] unfortunate remarks

without drawing undue attention to them.” Id. at 589. The court explained that the

district court had given the panel membersthe opportunity to state whether they could

be impartial, and it advised the panel to decide the case based only on the evidence. 

Id. In rejecting the defendant’s appeal contending that the court abused its discretion,

the Seventh Circuit explained that it did not wish to adopt a standard that would

burden the courts with starting over any time a prospective juror revealed

extrajudicial knowledge that would affect his or her view of a defendant’s guilt. Id.

These casesreveal that there is no bright-line rule that a court must dismiss the

entire venire panel whenever a venireperson alludes to having outside knowledge of

a defendant’s criminal activity. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Doggett, statements

from a prospective juror indicating actual or media-based knowledge of the

underlying events are “grist for the mill of any voir dire inquiry in any criminal

charge which involves someone at least minimally well known in the community.” 

821 F.2d at 1051. Requiring the court inflexibly to start over again with a new venire

panel every time—regardless of the nature, credibility, brevity, or volume of the

statement—is a “burden [that] cannot be placed upon the criminal processes and the

selection of a jury.” Id. We think this is particularly true when, as here, the

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defendant’s counsel failed to request that the panel be stricken until the end of voir

dire.

Here, the court, having heard the statement and sitting in the best position to

observe the panel, concluded that the damage was not irreparable and that the court’s

questions and instructions would suffice to protect Pendleton’s constitutional rights.

Pendleton did not ask for any additional curative instruction, either at the time of the

comment or at the conclusion of voir dire. And when the court offered to explore the

impact of the statement at the conclusion of voir dire, Pendleton’s counsel asked that

the court not do so, stating that he did not want the court to draw attention to the

comment. See United States v. Lussier, 423 F.3d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding

no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to retain the panel where the court

offered curative measures, which the defendant rejected as “cures worse than the

disease”). Pendleton’s attorney ultimately informed the court that, while he was “not

giving up” his objection, he was “confident with the Court’s instruction going

forward that we can constitute the jury as [the court] ha[d] seen it given the strikes”

the court could use to dismiss potential jurors. Under these facts and the deferential

standard of review, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion

when it proceeded with the venire panel.

D.

Pendleton also argues that the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence

that Pendleton wasinvolved in the assault of a co-conspirator, R.D. He contendsthat

the evidence was both irrelevant to his charges and unduly prejudicial. See Fed. R.

Evid. 401, 403. “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.

2015).

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The evidence at issue consists of testimony from a co-conspirator, R.D., that

Pendleton ordered and participated in her assault after another co-conspirator accused

her of taking methamphetamine, money, and a DVD player. R.D. explained that she

had been involved in selling methamphetamine that she obtained from Pendleton. 

She said that another member of the conspiracy accused R.D. of taking the drugs and

money owed to Pendleton, a theft that compromised Pendleton’s ability to buy

additionalmethamphetamine. R.D. also explained that Pendleton ordered her into the

basement at a party, hit her, told another co-conspirator to hit her, and then forced her

to insert a hypodermic needle into her arm. Finally, R.D. testified that someone took

photographs of her injuries following this beating, and she authenticated the pictures

presented by the Government and offered into evidence.

In reviewing Pendleton’s claim that the assault evidence was irrelevant, we

note that the facts of this case are close to those at issue in United States v. Gasim AlDabbi, 388 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other

grounds sub nom. Adil Gasim Al-Dabbi v. United States, 546 U.S. 973 (2005). There,

a defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine argued that a district court

plainly erred by admitting evidence that the defendant violently assaulted his coconspirator. Id. at 1148. We rejected this contention, noting thatsuch evidence “was

relevant to proving the conspiracy charge—specifically, to showing [the defendant’s]

attempts to control the conspiracy through the mechanisms of violence and fear.” Id.

The same logic applies here. Pendleton’s defense at trial was that the evidence

established only that he was a mere user of methamphetamine and that every witness

who implicated him in a larger conspiracy to sell drugs lied to the jury. The evidence

of R.D.’s assault refuted this theory because Pendleton’s orchestration of and

participation in the assault as reprisal for R.D.’s alleged thefts of drugs and money

showed that he was involved, and indeed a key figure, in the drug-distribution

scheme. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; United States v. Mora, 81 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.

1996) (“Relevance of evidence ‘is established by any showing, however slight, that

the evidence makes it more or less likely that the defendant committed the crime in

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question.’” (quoting United States v. Casares–Cardenas, 14 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th

Cir. 1994))); cf. United States v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 920 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding

no abuse of discretion when the district court admitted audio recordings in which the

defendant referred to his violent conduct because the statements showed his role

within the drug conspiracy was that of an enforcer). In addition, the photographs

were relevant because they supported R.D.’s credibility on the issue of whether she

actually had been assaulted, and they showed the extent of the injuriesshe sustained. 

See United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding

admission of photographs of an injury in part because they assisted the jury in

evaluating the witness’s credibility).

Although Pendleton contends that the prejudicial effect of the evidence

substantially outweighed its probative value, see Fed. R. Evid. 403, we see no abuse

of discretion on this basis. “[A] district court is granted broad discretion in

determining whether the admission of contested evidence could result in the

possibility of unfair prejudice.” Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d at 1027. We afford

great deference to the court’s balance of the prejudicial and probative impact of

evidence. Id. Here, the photographs were not unduly gruesome; they depicted the coconspirator’s bruises and a cut lip. See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 122 F.3d 531,

538 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[A] trial court has discretion to admit a relevant photograph

unless it is ‘so gruesome or inflammatory that its prejudicial impact substantially

outweigh[s] its probative value.’” (quoting United States v. Petary, 857 F.2d 458, 463

(8th Cir. 1988))); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 878 (8th Cir. 1996)

(determining that photographs depicting a gunshot wound and head injuries were not

“particularly prejudicial as unduly gruesome or confusing”). Finally, we note that the

court instructed the jury that Pendleton was on trial “only for the crimes charged, not

for anything else.” Because we assume that the jury follows instructions, we

conclude that the instruction mitigated the danger that the jury would convict

Pendleton of the charged crimessolely based on his assault of R.D. See United States

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v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1028 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting that a court may diminish the

danger of unfair prejudice through jury instructions).

E.

Finally, Pendleton argues that the district court improperly denied his motion

for judgment of acquittal on the money-laundering charge because the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction. “We review the sufficiency of the evidence de

novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving

conflicts in the government’s favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that

support the verdict.” United States v. Lockett, 601 F.3d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2003)). We will

affirm the verdict “if any rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ojeda-Estrada, 577 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir.

2009).

Conviction for money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A) requires the

Government to prove that the defendant, “knowing that the property involved in a

financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,

conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves

the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . with the intent to promote the carrying

on of specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i); see United States

v. Cruz, 993 F.2d 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1993). On appeal, Pendleton contends that the

evidence presented by the Government did not show that he engaged in financial

transactions in order to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.

4

The ground Pendleton raises on appeal regarding the sufficiency of the

4

evidence differs fromthe ground raised in his motion for judgment of acquittal during

trial. During trial, Pendleton argued that the Government had not shown that he

attempted to conceal his use of funds derived from the drug operation. The

Government responded, and the court correctly found, that this argument goes only

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However, this argument is directly rebutted by the evidence presented at trial. 

Several witnesses, including R.D. and J.C., another co-conspirator, explained that

Pendleton had used his methamphetamine-sale profits to purchase additional

methamphetamine. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that

Pendleton engaged in financial transactions in order to promote the carrying on of

specified unlawful activity. See United States v. King, 169 F.3d 1035, 1039 (6th Cir.

1999) (collecting casesshowing that payment for drugs may constitute promotion for

the purposes of the money laundering statute when such payment encourages further

drug transactions). The court properly denied Pendleton’s motion for judgment of

acquittal.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

to one method of proving money laundering, a method that the Government did not

pursue. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A) (not requiring proof of attempted

concealment) with § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I) (requiring proof of attempted concealment). 

Normally, our court would conclude that Pendleton forfeited the argument he now

raises on appeal regarding sufficiency. See United States v. Calhoun, 721 F.3d 596,

600 (8th Cir. 2013). However, the Government does not assert forfeiture and instead

argues for de novo review on the merits. Thus, we choose to apply the usual standard

for evaluating the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. See United States v. Kelly, 625

F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir. 2010).

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