alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. 07-03-0464-CV

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL B

	JANUARY 6, 2004

	______________________________

	RANDY LACKEY,

			Appellant

	v.

	ROBERT E. McCOOL, 

			Appellee

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 72ND DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

	NO. 2002-518,887; HON. J. BLAIR CHERRY, PRESIDING

	_______________________________

	Order of Dismissal

	________________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ.

	Randy Lackey (Lackey) appeals from a take-nothing judgment rendered in favor of Robert E. McCool (McCool).  We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.     

	The order granting McCool’s summary judgment and finally disposing of all claims was signed on September 12, 2003.  No motion for new trial was filed.  Notice of appeal was received by the trial court clerk and contains a file mark of October 20, 2003.  Because Lackey’s notice of appeal was due no later than October 13, 2003, his notice was untimely.   Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 (stating that one must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the date the final order is signed, unless that deadline has been extended by motion or rule of procedure).  Furthermore, no timely motion to extend the October 12th deadline was received by this court.  So, by letter dated December 10, 2003, this court directed Lackey to explain, by December 22, 2003, either why the notice of appeal was late or why he believed it to be timely.  He was also told that the failure to comply with the directive may result in the dismissal of the appeal.  To date, no response has been received. 

	 A timely notice of appeal is essential to invoke our appellate jurisdiction.  In re A.L.B., 56 S.W.3d 651, 652 (Tex. App.--Waco 2003, no pet.).  If the notice is untimely, then the court of appeals can take no action other than to dismiss the proceeding.  Id.  However, the aforementioned deadline may be extended if, within 15 days after the deadline expires, a notice of appeal is tendered to the court clerk along with a motion requesting that the deadline be extended.  Tex. R. App. P. 26.3.  The motion must contain, among other things, a recitation of the facts relied on to reasonably explain the need for an extension.  Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b)(1)(C).  And, while we are to imply that a motion to extend has been filed when a litigant merely tenders a notice of appeal within the aforementioned window, Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997), Lackey must still reasonably explain the need for an extension.  Kidd v. Paxton, 1 S.W.3d 309, 310 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1999, writ denied).  It is not enough to simply file a notice of appeal.  Since no explanation has been provided, Lackey has failed to timely perfect his appeal.   Bixby v. Bice, 992 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. App.--Waco 1999, no pet.); Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Center Assoc., 974 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no writ) (dismissing because no explanation was offered). 

	Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 

							Brian Quinn

 							   Justice
---

---

The historical data, grouped by the table in which they appear in the G.17 release,
are available in text files.

The format for each line in the files consists of an industry code,
a year, and 12 months of data (to three decimal places) when available.  The data have
various start dates; the earliest is 1919. Documentation for importing data into Microsoft Excel.

The data and the documentation files are available through the following links.  (Tables 1B and 2B of the
release report percentage changes for items found in table 1A and 2A, and tables 5A and 5B of the release report a limited range of historical data for major aggregates found in other tables; these four tables are therefore not reported here).



- Table 1A:  Industrial Production: Market Groups
- Table 2A:Industrial Production:  Industry Groups
- Tables 3 and 4: Capacity Utilization and Industrial Capacity:  Manufacturing, Mining, and Utilities
- Table 6:  Industrial Production: Industry Subtotals and Individual Series
- Table 7:  Industrial Production: Gross Value of Products
- Table 8:  Diffusion Indexes of Industrial Production
- Table 9:  Electric Power Use: Manufacturing and Mining
- All Tables: Tables 1A, 2A, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9
- Relative Importance Weights for Seasonally Adjusted IP.

A separate set of data and documentation  show the seasonally adjusted aggregate initial estimate of the  Industrial Production index as it was originally published and subsequently revised during the normal four-month
estimation period.

Federal Reserve seasonal factors for domestic auto and truck production were updatedDecember 5, 2000.

G.17:

Release |
Release dates |
About |
ASCII |
PDF (195 KB) |

---
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7137 

To enact House Resolution 895, One Hundred Tenth Congress, (establishing 

the Office of Congressional Ethics) into permanent law. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 17, 2022 

Mr. O’HALLERAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on House Administration, and in addition to the Committee 

on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To enact House Resolution 895, One Hundred Tenth Congress, (establishing the Office of Congressional Ethics) 

into permanent law. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Clean Legislating and 

5 Ethical Accountability Now Act’’ or the ‘‘CLEAN Act’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7137 IH

1 SEC. 2. ENACTING HOUSE RESOLUTION 895 INTO PERMA2 NENT LAW. 

3 House Resolution 895, One Hundred Tenth Con4 gress, is hereby enacted into permanent law, except that— 

5 (1) the Office of Congressional Ethics shall be 

6 treated as a standing committee of the House for 

7 purposes of section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorga8 nization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 4301(i)); 

9 (2) references to the Committee on Standards 

10 of Official Conduct shall be construed as references 

11 to the Committee on Ethics; 

12 (3) the second sentence of section 1(b)(6)(A) 

13 shall not apply; 

14 (4) members subject to section 1(b)(6)(B) may 

15 be reappointed for a second additional term; 

16 (5) any individual who is the subject of a pre17 liminary review or second-phase review by the board 

18 shall be informed of the right to be represented by 

19 counsel and invoking that right should not be held 

20 negatively against them; and 

21 (6) the Office may not take any action that 

22 would deny any person any right or protection pro23 vided under the Constitution of the United States. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 22

- 3012

___________________________ Jane Doe

Plaintiff - Appellant

v. Anoka County; James Stuart, the Anoka County Sheriff in his official capacity; Detective Larry Johnson
Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota

____________ Submitted: November 8, 2023 Filed: February 26, 2024 [Unpublished]

____________ Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________
PER CURIAM

. Jane Doe appeals the district court’s order grant ing judgment on the pleadings to defendants, Anoka County, Minnesota, Sheriff James Stuart, and former Detective Larry Johnson , which held she lacked standing in her lawsuit regarding Anoka County’s alleged failure to test hundreds of rape kits, including her own

. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , we reverse and remand

.-2- “We review de novo a grant of ‘judgment on the pleadings.’” Henson v. Union Pac . R.R. Co. , 3 F

. 4th 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted)

. At this stage, we take the facts alleged by Doe as true and grant all reasonable inferences in her favor

. Id.

While the district court largely characterized Doe’s Equal Protection claim as

a failure to prosecute her assault , and therefore found she lacked standing, see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) , we understand her claim to be based on the Defendants’ alleged failure to timely investigate the crime of sexual assault due to an alleged discriminatory animus against women and girls

. After the parties filed their briefs, we decided Pratt v. Helms , 73 F.4th 592 (8th Cir. 2023)

. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), Defendants submitted a letter explaining that Pratt supported affirmance of the district court’s order. See City of Clarkson Valley v. Mineta , 495 F.3d 567, 569 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tanding is a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be resolved before reaching the merits of a suit.”)

. Doe filed a Rule 28(j) letter explaining that Pratt was inapposite

. The case was subsequently submitted on the briefs.

The parties dispute whether Pratt controls the outcome of this case. Accordingly, we find that it would be appropriate to reverse the grant of judgment on the pleadings and remand to the district court to consider Doe’s complaint in light of Pratt

.

W e therefore reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

.

______________________________
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          17,956
<SECURITIES>                                     5,965
<RECEIVABLES>                                   25,159
<ALLOWANCES>                                       730
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                70,822
<PP&E>                                       1,397,557
<DEPRECIATION>                                 108,102
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,401,448
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          105,049
<BONDS>                                        586,566
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           552
<OTHER-SE>                                     624,717
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,401,448
<SALES>                                        133,299
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               133,299
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  108,623
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,642
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 18,878
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,363
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             11,516
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                      (5,314)
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,201
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .12
        

</TABLE>
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report (the Report) of Powell Industries, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Don R. Madison, Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company Date: June 8, 2005
    
    /s/ DON R. MADISONDon R. MadisonVice President and Chief Financial Officer
 25
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATE OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

This Certificate is
being delivered pursuant to the requirements of Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code and shall not be relied on by any person for any other purpose.

The undersigned, who are the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Omni
Financial Services, Inc. (the issuer), hereby certify as follows:

The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the issuer for the period
ended December 31, 2006 (the Report), as amended, which accompanies this Certificate, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and all information contained in the Report
as amended, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.

Dated this 30th day of March,
2007.



| |  |                                                                           
| |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | /S/    STEPHEN M.
KLEIN                                                   
| |  | Stephen M. Klein, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer                    
| | 
| |  | /S/    CONSTANCE E.
PERRINE                                               
| |  | Constance E. Perrine, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
SC WC

- 21

- 0000 364

IN THE SUPR EME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI ‘ I

________________________________________________________________

STATE OF HAWAI ʻ I , Respondent/Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

vs.

TROY D. BORGE, JR ., Petitioner/ Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP

- 21

- 0000364; CR. NO. 2CPC

- 20

- 0000288)

SECOND ORDER OF CORRECTION (By: McKenna, J.)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Opinion of the Court,

filed March 15 , 2023 , is corrected as follows:

On page 17, in the second line of the first full footnote, the word “testimony” shall be inserted between the

word “Clifton’s” and the word “cured.”

On page 18, the first instance of the word “only”

shall be deleted in the heading for section IV.B.1.

On page 24, the word “now” shall be replaced with the
word “not” in the heading for section IV.B.2.c.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to take all
necessary steps to notify the publishing agencies of th is
chang e.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai ‘ i, May 11 , 2023

. /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

Associate Justice Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-21-0000364 11-MAY-2023 09:14 AM Dkt. 31 OCOR
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tracy Brown, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Miller, J.), rendered July 9, 1985, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the admission into evidence of the interlocking confession of the codefendant Leonis West undermined his attempts to contest the voluntariness of his written statement and that reversal is therefore warranted. We disagree. Although pursuant to *Cruz v New York*(481 US 186), the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion *406for a severance, that error does not, under the circumstances, require reversal of the judgment of conviction.

Where a Confrontation Clause violation is involved, the error under review will be deemed harmless only where it can be said that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, Harrington v California,*395 US 250; *People v Smalls,*55 NY2d 407). To satisfy that criterion, there must be overwhelming proof of guilt and no reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted the defendant but for the error *(People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230). This court has already determined that the admission of the defendant’s statement against the codefendant West was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v West,*137 AD2d 855, *affd*72 NY2d 941). Since the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was even stronger than that of West’s insofar as it additionally included a lineup and in-court identification of the defendant as one of the perpetrators, we determine that any error arising from the admission of West’s statement into evidence against the defendant was likewise harmless beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Crimmins, supra).*

We note further that while the prosecutor’s summation did contain some improper and potentially prejudicial remarks, the trial court’s prompt curative instructions served to correct these improprieties *(see, People v West, supra; see also, People v Berg,*59 NY2d 294; *People v Cuesta,*119 AD2d 688).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Rubin and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                                     FORM 15

   Certification and Notice of Termination of Registration under 12(g) of the
  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Suspension of Duty to File Reports Under
          Sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

                        Commission File Number 333-43167

                       CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC.
           (Issuer in respect of the REMIC Pass-Through Certificates)
             (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

                          909 Third Avenue, 30th Floor
                            New York, New York 10043
                                 (212) 559-6727
   (Address, including zip code, and telephone number, including area code, of
                    registrant's principal executive offices)

                     REMIC Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-6
            (Title of each class of securities covered by this Form)

                                 Not Applicable
   (Titles of all other classes of securitiesfor which a duty to file reports
                          under Section 13(a) or 15(d)remains)

         Please place an X in the box(es) to designate the appropriate rule
provision(s) relied upon to terminate or suspend the duty to file reports:

      Rule 12g-4(a)(1)(i)       [ ]           Rule 12h-3(b)(1)(ii)      [ ]
      Rule 12g-4(a)(1)(ii)      [ ]           Rule 12h-3(b)(2)(i)       [ ]
      Rule 12g-4(a)(2)(i)       [ ]           Rule 12h-3(b)(2)(ii)      [ ]
      Rule 12g-4(a)(2)(ii)      [ ]           Rule 15d-6                [x]
      Rule 12h-3(b)(1)(i)       [ ]

Approximate number of holders of record as of the certification or
notice date:  26

      Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. has caused this certification/notice to be
signed on its behalf by the undersigned duly authorized person.


Dated as of: January 26, 1999                BY:      /s/ Carol Koch
                                                      --------------
                                                      Carol Koch
                                                      Assistant Secretary

      Instruction: This form is required by Rules 12g-4, 12h-3 and 15d-6 of the
General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
registrant shall file with the Commission three copies of Form 15, one of which
shall be manually signed. It may be signed by an officer of the registrant, by
counsel or by any other duly authorized person. The name and title of the person
signing the form shall be typed or printed under the signature.
#### Jaw-Shi WANG, Petitioner—Appellant, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General; et al., Respondents—Appellees.

No. 02-57047. D.C. No. CV-02-01623-IEG.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*625Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 23, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Jaw-Shi Wang appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo, *Wade v. Terhune,*202 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

Wang contends that application of section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) results in an impermissible retroactive effect. This provision precludes aggravated felons from seeking a discretionary waiver of deportation under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). Because Wang did not plead guilty but was convicted by a jury, applying AEDPA § 440 does not result in any retroactive effect. *See Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik,*291 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2002), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2247, 156 L.Ed.2d 110 (2003).

We reject Wang’s contentions that his ineligibility for INA § 212(c) relief violates his rights to due process and equal protection of the law. *See INS v. St. Cyr,*533 U.S. 289, 321-23, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (explaining that the government has a rational basis for treating aliens convicted after trial differently from those who enter plea agreements); *Dillingham v. INS,*267 F.3d 996, 1004-06 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that due process incorporates equal protection guarantees and that the government must have a rational basis for differentiating between groups of aliens).

Wang’s motion to file an oversized reply brief is granted.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.