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## T&E ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS

lbvember 7, 1968

Iionorrble

Riabard IL Price District **Attorney Taylor**  County **Courthouaa** Abllane, Texas Opinion MO. X-305

Rer Term of the Presiding Judge of the 7th Administrative Judicial .' District under Article 2008, 8~. 2, Vernon's

Dear ML.Prices Civil Stetutea, in view of the stated **facts.**

**Your request**  for **an** opinion on-the abwe subjectmstter states that on March 12, 1965, the District Judge 

## ofthe 104th Judicial Districtwas designatedby **the Gwernor**  of the State of Texas as PresidingJudge of the 7thAdministrative Judicial District. Such appointmantwas **confirmed** by the Texas Senate and that district judge qualified as Presiding Judge of the 7thAdministrative District on **March** 30, 1965. 'Youfurther state thathe will retire as District Judge of **the** 104th Judicial District of Texas on December 31, 1968. In view of the foregoing stated factsyou have inquired as to the expiration date of the term of the PresidingJudge of the 7thAdministrative Judicial District under the prwisiona of Section 2 of Article ZOOa,Vernon's Civil Statutes, as amended in 1965.

**As** origlnally enacted in 1927by the 40th Legislature, Section2 of Article 20Oa, Vernon’s Civil Statute& provided '? as follartac

*Sec. 2. Imaedlptelyafter this act becomes effective it shall be the duty *ofthe Governor,with the advice and consent of the LSenate, to designate one of the.regularly elected and commissioneddistrict judges of each of said districts as PresidingJudge of **the** Administrative Judicial District. Upon.the **death,** resignation or the expiration of the

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-1483-**Hon.** Richard M. Price, page 2 (n-305)

term of office of such PresidingJudge, the Governor shell thereafter immediatelydesignate
a new Presiding Judge of the Administrative District, as in the first instance."

In construing th'eforegoingprovisions,, the Court in EucalineUedicine Comoanv vs. Standard Inv. Co., 25 S.W.28 259, 261 (Tex.Civ.App.1930, err. **ref.)** expressly overruled the contention that the position of PresidingJudge **of** an Administrative Judicial District is an "office'within the ,meaningof Section 40,, Article XVI, and Constitution of Texaa,~ pertinentlyheld:

**nNor** is the position **of** preaiding judge **of** the administrativedia'trict **an** office that a' regularly elected district judge is forbidden by the Constitution to hold and exercise. Its functionaare'j~udicial in nature, are ,notinconsistentwith',the constitutionalduties d&the district judge, and should. in our oninion.?be regarded aimolv aa aunaraddedduties that the ", Leaialaturewaa,authori ed o reau e district + judaea to nerform.* (I&ha:is add::.)

In view of the refusalby the Supreme Court'of the writ.of error in this case in 1930, thisbeing after June 14, 1927, the judgment of the Court of CivilAppeals is deemed correct and the principlea of iaw declared in the opinion are deemed as correctly determined. Hamilton v. Emnire 6218& Fuel .gQ.. 134 Tex; 377,383,llOS.W.Zd'561,565 (1937).

In view of the construction of Section 2, Article 200a, it was held inAttorney General,OplnionNumber S-09 (1953)that the term of aipresidingjudge of an administrative judicial, district is the same as his term of office as district judge and that the designation as Presiding Judge **of the**  administrative district is not a sepsrate officebut merely an extra duty that may be imposed upon a district judge,

In 1965, the 59th Legislature amended Section 2 so that it now providesg

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,Hon. Richard W. Price, ,page3 (&305)

*Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of the Governor,with the advice and consent of the Senate, to designate one of the regularly elected district judges, or a retired district fudae.who voluntorilv retired from office.who.reaideawithin the district. and who has certifiedhis willincmeaa to aerve,'in each **of** said diatritita aapreaidinq Judge of theAdministrative Judicial District. Adeauate auartera for the ooeration of such District and orenervation of records shallbe Provided in the courthouse of the countv inwhich such Preaidinq Judae reaidaq. Upon the death, resignation or expiration of the term of office of #pch Presiding Judge, $he Gwernor shall thereafter iammdiately a&oint*'or reappoint a PreaidLng, Judge of the AdministrativeDistrict, as in the first instances above. PresidinaJudaea ofAdministrative Judicial Districts shall **serve** for a term of four (4)Years from date of auallfication as su h administrative judqe

. . .* (Rmphaaiaaupplied'as to added language of amendment.)

If the foregoingamendment to Section 2 of Article 200a haa,the effect of now creating **an** "office"as distinguished fram constituting "aunsraddedduties that the~leaialaturewas authorized to reuuire district iudaea to oerform", Section 40 ofArticle XVI of the Constitution of Texaswould prohibit a district judge fromholding the additional affice. We do not believe the legislaturehad any such intention. Likewise, Section 30 of ArticLe XVI would limit the term of office to two years only, contrary to the fouryear term providedby the legislature. It is our opinion,however, that since the legislatursdid not change by the amsndatory language the duties of the presiding judge of the administrativedistrict, the construction @Paced
on Section 2 by the Court in RucalineMedicine Co. vs. Standard Inv. Co., supra, remains equally applicable to Section 2, as amended. Therefore.no *office"within the meaning of Sections 30 and 40 ofArticle XVI of the Constitution of Texaswas created, Rucalinemedicine Co. vs. Standard Inv. Co., aupra; cf. Aldine IndeoendsntSchool District vs. Stendlev, 154 Tex. 547, 289 S.W. 26 578 (19SS), We therefore are of the opinion that the legislaturemerely placed added duties on regularly elected district judges pursuant to provisions of Section 7 of Article v. Constitution of Texas, and provided for the Yreassignmsntto

-1485-Ron. Richard H. **Price,** page 4 (d305)

active duty where and when needed" of voluntarily retired district judges Qursuant to provisions of Section la of Article V, Constitution of Texas.

Since Section 2 **of** Article 200a,Vernon's Civil Statutes,

specificallyprovides that "upon the death, resignation
**or** expiration of the term of,office **of** the presiding judge, the Governor-

shall thereafter~lmmediatelyappoint or reappoint
a QrSSiding judge of the administrativedistrict as in the **first** instance above,* (Emphasisours). You are advised that the **words** *term of office* as used in this statutemean the term of office as district judge, thisbeing the only 'office"held. Upon certification of his willingness to serve after retirement, the same presiding judge may be reappointed to. carry out the' additional duties as presiding judge of the administrative district for a Qeriod of four years or the Gwernor may appoint another judge to so serve.' \ .i. **SUMMARY**

The position ?f preeiding judge of an administrative judicial district does not conatitute~
an "office"within the meaning **of** Sections 30 and 40 of Article XVI of the Constitution of Texas,but is regarded simply as superaddeddutiesthat the legialaturewas authorized to require district judges to per f arm. EucalinsWedicine~Co.vs. Standard Inv.Co,, 25 S.W.2d 259 **$T~x.CIV.AQQ.** 1930, err. ref.). The term of the QrSSiding judge of an administrative judicial district expireswith his term of office
as District Judge. Upon certification of his willingness to serve,he may be appointed for an additional period of four years. Article 2GOa, Section 2,Vernon"8 Civil Statutes. V&truly yours.

At$rney General .of**ffexaa** 3.'.

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Hon, Richard M. Price, page 5 (M-305)

Pixparedby John Banks Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED:. OPINION CCUMITTEE Hawthorne **Phillips,** Chairman Kerns Taylor, Co-Chairman Arthur Sandlin Ralph Rash Harold Kennedy Jay Floyd **,A,** J, CARUBBI, JR. ExecutiveAssistant

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