No. 91-304 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

RAVALLI COUNTY ELECTRIC CO-OPERATIVE, INC. and FEDERATED RURAL 

ELECTRIC INSURANCE CORPORATION, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Ravalli, 

The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Robert B. Brown, Attorney at Law, Stevensville, 

Montana. 

For Respondent : 

Joe Seifert; Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, 

Helena, Montana. 

Submitted on briefs: September 19, 1991 

Filed: 

Clerk 
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Plaintiff Darwin Titeca (Titeca) brought a negligence action 

against Ravalli County Electric Co-operative, Inc. (Ravalli 

Electric) in Justice Court. Titeca prevailed in justice court, and 

Ravalli Electric appealed this ruling to the Fourth Judicial 

District Court, Ravalli County. In that trial de novo, a jury 

found Ravalli Electric was not negligent. From this judgment 

Titeca appeals. We affirm. 

The issues raised by Titeca are restated as follows: 

1. Was it error for the District Court to prohibit the 

plaintiff from referring to the prior trial in justice court? 

2. Did the District Court commit reversible error by refusing 

Titeca's proposed jury instruction? 

Titeca's cow was electrocuted by a live wire inside an 

irrigation pump house. Ravalli Electric supplied electricity to 

the pump house located on 72 acres of pasture land leased by 

Titeca. 

Two separate transformers supplied electricity to the 

pumphouse. The first transformer supplied electricity to the pump 

and motor, while the second transformer supplied electricity to a 

disconnect panel. In the early 1980is, Jay Knab (Knab), the prior 

owner, failed to pay his electric bill and Ravalli Electric 

disconnected the transformer supplying energy to the pump and the 

motor. Ravalli Electric did not disconnect the second transformer 

until after Titeca's cow was electrocuted by the wire. 

Parties presented evidence that after Ravalli Electric 

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disconnected the first transformer, Knab removed the pump, the 

motor and the disconnect panel from the pump house, Remaining 

wires that previously supplied the disconnect panel with 

electricity were still energized. Testimony indicated Titeca's cow 

was electrocuted by an energized wire left detached after Knab 

removed the disconnect panel from the pump house. 

Was it error for the District Court to prohibit the plaintiff 

from referring to the prior trial in justice court? 

Titeca contends' that by prohibiting him from referring to the 

trial in justice court, the District Court impaired the interaction 

between himself and his witnesses. Further Titeca argues that 

referring to the prior testimony as "prior sworn statements" could 

have undermined the importance of these statements to the jury. 

Ravalli Electric contends the prior trial had no probative 

value in the District Court proceeding. It states that under § 25- 

33-301(1), MCA, an appeal from justice court must be tried anew in 

district court; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by prohibiting Titeca from referring to the prior trial. 

The admissibility of evidence is left to the discretion of the 

trial court. In Zugg v. Ramage (l989), 239 Mont. 292, 779 P.2d 

913, this Court stated: 

Questions of admissibility of evidence are left largely 

to the discretion of the trial court which will be 

overturned only in cases of manifest abuse of discretion. 

[Citations omitted.] Zuqq, 779 P.2d at 916. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding nonprobative testimony. Further, Titeca fails to show the ruling 
prejudiced his case. Without providing specific examples of how 

this exclusion Ifimpaired interactiont' between himself and his 

witnesses or caused the jury to draw "erroneous conclusions . - . 

concerning the importance of the testimony" we refuse to disturb 

the District Court's ruling on this issue. 

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion and hold the District Court correctly prohibited the 

plaintiff from referring to the prior trial in justice court. 

I1 

Did the District Court commit reversible error by refusing 

Titecats proposed jury instruction? 

Titecats proposed jury instruction # 5 stated: 

You are instructed that a company engaged in furnishing 

electricity to consumers is without authority to continue 

the flow of electricity beyond a reasonable time to do so 

after the termination of a contractual relationship. 

Appellant relies on Pacific Brick v. So. Cal. Edison, (Cal. App. 

1941), 116 P.2d 131, as authority for the above instruction. The 

court refused this instruction on the grounds that Titeca 

presented no evidence to the jury that Ravalli Electric ever 

received a request to terminate the electricity supply. 

We agree with the District Court and hold that the District 

Court did not commit reversible error by refusing Titeca's proposed 

jury instruction. 

We affirm and award defendant Ravalli Electric its costs on 

appeal. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as 

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precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document 

with the Clerk of this Court and by a report of its result to the 

West Publishing Company. 

We Concur: d 

_,,/- C [-yh ief Justice 
November 5, 1991 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the 

following named: 

ROBERT B. BROWN 

Attorney at Law 

3556 Baldwin Road 

Stevensville. MT 59870 

Joe Seifert, Esq. 

GOUGH, SHANAHAN, JOHNSON & WATERMAN 

P.O. Box 1715 

Helena, MT 59624 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

MONTANA 

BY: 

Deputy