The dock et do es n ot reflect the issu ance of sum m onses to an d se rv ice of process up on the C hief 1 of

P ol ic e, th e F ed er al P ro te ct iv e S erv ic e A g en cy , Ins p. Wi ll iam s or O fc
. B land , a ll o f w ho m w er e first nam ed a s de fendants in the am ended com plaint
. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA SHAUN DEI ON SWI

NSON, SR., :

: Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 08-0809 (RMU)

: v. : Document No.: 18

: : D.C. METRO POL I CE : DEPARTMENT e t al

. , : : De fe nd ants . :

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION G R A N TI N G TH E D EF END A N TS ’ M OT I ON F OR S UM M ARY J UDGMENT

I. IN TR OD UC TIO N In th is c ivi l a c tio n b ro ught pro se by a fe dera l prisoner, the pla intiff alleg es that he w as unlawfully

arr ested a

nd detained on D ece mber 11, 2005. In his amended c omplaint, the plaintiff
su e s th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , th e Me tr op oli tan Po lic e De pa rtme nt ( “ MPD ” ), the Ma

y or in h is officia l and individual capa city , the Chief of Police in he r off icial and individual ca

pacity , the Fe dera l Protective Service Ag ency , “Insp. Wi lliams” and “O fc. B land.” Am. Compl. at 1. The 1 Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , th e MPD and the Ma y or (c oll e c tiv e ly

“ the de fe nd ants ” ) m ov e to d ism iss purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 12 (b )( 6) or fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt p ur su ant t o Ru le 56. Upon consider ation of the pa rties’ submissions and the entire r ecor d, the cour t gr ants the movants’ motion for summary judgme nt and dismisses the complaint ag ainst the rema ining defe ndants pursuant to the scr eeningprovisions of the Prison L itigation Refor m Act (“ PL RA”) codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 II. BACKG ROUND Th e pla int if

f a rgue s th at hi s arr e st o n D e c e mbe r 1 1, 20 05 vio late d h is rig ht t o d ue pr oc e ss beca use the “ defe ndants alleg ed that the plaintiff ha d an outstandingwar rant for failingto appea

r at trial for possession of marijuana

in Virg inia,” Am. Compl. ¶ 2, but failed to produc e the
war rant at the prec inct, id . ¶ 4. He contends that he was unlaw fully detained f

or 12 day s “bef

ore beingtaken be fore a Mag istrate Judge in Virg inia.” Id . ¶ 5. The pla intiff advanc es the following claims: unlawful ar

rest, unlawf

ul detainer , g ross neg lige nce, pe rsonal injury and fr aud. Id . at 2. The plaintiff se eks an a dmission from the defe ndants “that ther e wa s never an ar rest wa rra nt for the plaintiff,” id ., and monetar y damag es, id . at 3.

III . A NA LY SIS A. Le ga l St anda r d forRul e 56 M ot ion forSum m ary J udgm e nt Summary judgme nt is appropriate when “ the pleading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 (c ); se e als o Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 77 U. S. 3 17 , 3 22 (1 98 6) ; Diamond v. Atwood , 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To dete rmine which f acts a re “ materia l,” a c ourt must look to t he substantive law on which e ach c laim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “g enuine issue” is one whose r esolution could establish an ele ment of a c laim or defe nse and, there fore , aff

ect the outc ome of the a ction. Celotex , 4 77 U. S. at 32 2; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248. In rulingon a motion for summary judgme nt, the court must drawall justifiable infere nces in the nonmoving pa

rty ’s favor and a cce pt the nonmoving pa rty ’s evidenc e as true . Anderson , 4 77 U. S.3

at 255. A nonmovingparty must establish more than “the me re e x istence of a scintilla of evidenc e” in support of

its posit ion, id. at 252, and may not rely solely on alleg ations or conclusory

statements, Gree ne v. D alton , 1 64 F .3 d 6 71 , 6 75 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 9) ; Harding v. Gray , 9 F.3d 150, 154 ( D.C. Cir. 1993). “The object of [Rule 56(e) ] i s not to replace conclusory alleg ations of the complaint or a nswer w ith conclusory

alleg ations of an a ffidavit,” Lujan v. National W ildlif e Fe deration , 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990), but to identify a g enuine issue of
mate ri a l f a c t. T he no nmo vin gpa

rt y mus t pr e se nt s pe c if

ic fa c ts t hat w ou ld e na

ble a re a so na ble jury to find in its favor. Gree ne , 1 64 F .3 d at 67 5. I f t he no nmo vin gpa

rt y ’s e vid e nc e “ is m e re ly colora ble, or is not signific antly probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Anderson , 477 U. S. at 24 9- 50 (i nte rn a l c ita tio ns omi tte d) . “ Th e re mov a l of a fa c tua l qu e sti on

fr om t he jur y is most li kely

when a plaintiff' s claim is supported solely by the plaintiff' s own self-se rving te sti mony , uns up po rt e d b y c or ro bo ratin ge vid e nc e , a

nd un de rm ine d [] by

oth e r c re dib le evidenc e[.] ” J

oh ns on v . W

as hingto n M

e tro po lit an Ar e a Tran sit

Au tho rit y , 883 F.2d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (c itations omi tted). To preva il on a motion for summary judgme nt, the moving pa rty must show that the nonmoving pa

rty “fa il[ ed] to make a showingsufficie nt to establish the exi stence of an e lement essential to that par

ty ’s ca se, and on which that par ty will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322. By pointing to the abse nce of evidenc e prof

fer ed by the nonmoving party , a movingparty

may succe ed on summary

judgme nt. Id.

B. Th e Mayorand th e MP D are Entitled to Jud gm ent as a Mat terof L aw Th e de fe nd ants ri g htl y

a sse rt that th e pla int if

f h a s n ot s tate d a

c la im a g a ins t th e Ma

y or inThe defen dant also arg ues that the plaintiff’s false arrest claim is b arred b y

the District’s one- 2 y ear statute of lim itations, but it is unclear from the record whe ther th e plaintiff has rem ained incarcerated

since his arrest. I f so, the statute o f lim itations is tolled
. See D .C . C ode § 12- 302(a )(3) (tollingthe lim itations period if a c laim ant is disabled by , in te r al ia , im

prisonm ent). Beca use the ca se can b e reso lv ed o n o ther ground s, the co urt w ill not prolon gthe procee ding s by seek ingadd itional in form ation to ad dress this argum ent. 4 his personal c apac ity

beca use the a lleg ations in the complaint fail to establish the Mayor’s p er s o n al i n v o l v em en ti nth e a l l ege d wr o n gd o i n g, see Came ron v. Thornburgh , 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and the officia l-ca pacity claim is, in effe ct, ag ainst the District of Columbia, Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). In addition, the defe ndants rig htly asser t that the complaint ag ainst the MPD should be dismis sed bec ause the MPD is not an entity that may be sued sepa rate ly from the District of

Columbi a. See Hi nto n v . M e tro . P oli c e De

p’ t, F ift h D ist
. , 726 F. Supp. 875 (D.D .C. 1989). 2

C. The De fend ant s a r e Ent it le d t o J udgm e nton t he F e de r al C lai m To state a c laim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must alleg e the de privation of "r ights, privileg es, or immunities secure d by the Constitut ion and laws" by a per son actingunder color of state, terr itorial or District of Columbia law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipality may be liable as a person unde r § 1983 but only if the alleg ed wr ong doing r esulted fr om an unconstitutional poli cy , prac tice or c ustom promulgate d or sanc tioned by the municipality
. See Atc hin so n v . D ist. o

f Co lum bia , 73 F.3d 418, 420 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). To deter mine municipal liability under 42 U .S.C. § 1983, t he district cour t must conduct a two-step inquiry
. Bake r v. Di st. of C olu mb ia , 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 ( D.C. Cir. 2003). First, the c ourt deter mines whether

the plaintiff establishes a

predic ate c onstitut ional or statutory violation. Id .; see also Hoai v. V o , 935 F.2d 308, 312 ( D.C. Cir. 1991). I f so, the cour t then deter

mines whether

the complaint states a claim that a c ustom or policy of the municipality

cause d the violation. Id .; Monell v. D ep't of5

S o c . S e rv s . o f N

. Y. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The plaintiff’ s claim fails on the fir st require ment. Other tha n a passingref

ere nce to due pr oc e ss, the pla int if

f h a s n ot s tate d a

ny fa c ts i n th e ame nd e d c omp la int that su pp or t a
c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n. Th is o mis sio n is re a so n e no ugh to dis mis s th e § 1 98 3 c la im. Bowman
v . D ist. o f Co lum bia , 477 F. Supp.2d 217, 221 (D.D .C. 2007). In any event, the police repor

t prepa red on the date of

the ar rest states that the pla intiff was a rre sted afte r an “NCI C chec k [re ve a le d] th e de fe nd ant h a d a n o uts tand ingwa

rr ant i n Ri c hmo nd , V ir g ini a .” De f. ’s Ex. Aat 2 (listing wa

rra nt number). The plaintiff disputes the exist ence of a w arr ant, but he has not produce d any

evidenc e questioningthe validity of the c ontemporane ously prepa red police repor

t or the off icer ’s g ood-fa ith reliance on the “national law enf orce ment databa se known a s the National Crime Information Center (NCI C).” Valdes v. U.S. , 475 F.3d 1319, 1334 ( D.C. Cir. 2007). Nor ha s the plaintiff cla imed that the war rant fla g g ed by

NCI C was invalidated by the issuing cour

t or that he wa s the victim of mistaken identity
. The de fenda

nt’s evidenc e of a

presumptively

valid arr est, then, belies a ny claim of constitutional dim ension ag ainst the arr estingoffice r or “ the offic ial char g ed with maintaining custody of the a ccuse d named in the wa rra nt.” Bake r v. Mc Collan , 4 43 U. S. 1 37 , 1 46 (1 97 9) ; see id . at 146 (stating , “[w]hatever c laims this s ituation [ arr est and e ight- day detention] mi g ht give rise to under

state tort law, we think it gives rise to no c laim under the United States Constit ution”); Ha rp e r v . M c Do na ld , 679 F.2d 955, 959 ( D.C. Cir. 1982) (notingthat “[t] he key fac tor in the Court’s dec ision in Baker was that re spondent had be en ar rested pur suant to a fac ially valid war rant” ). Even if

“the de fenda

nts never pr oduced the alleg ed wa rra nt” at the police pre cinct, Compl. ¶ 4, this fact alone does not neg ate the e vidence establishing the office r’s6

probable cause to arre st the plaintiff. In the abse nce of any evidenc e of a

constitutional viol ation stemming fr om the plaintiff’s ar rest, the c ourt conc ludes that the plaintiff ha s failed to state a § 1983 claim and, thus, g rants summary judgme nt to the movant on the fede ral c laim. See B aker , 443 U.S. at 146 (holdingthat “[s] ection 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitut ion, not for violations of duties of ca re a rising out of

tort law[, which] m ust be soug ht in state court under traditional tort-law pr inciples”). D. The P lai nt iff F ail e d t o C om plyWit h t he Di st r ic t’ s St at ut or y N ot ic e Re quir e m e nt The District of Columbia asse rts that the common law c laims should be dismi ssed beca use the plaintiff f

ailed to provide pr oper notice of a c laim pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-309. Under that provision: An ac tion may

not be maintained a g ainst the District of Columbia for unliquidated d am age s t o p er s o no r p ro p erty un l es s , wi th i ns i x m o n th s af t er th e i n j ury o r d am age was sustained, the claimant, his ag ent, or attorney has given noti ce in writing to the Mayor of the D istrict of Columbia of the approximate t i m e, place , cause , and circ umstances of

the injury or dama g e. A r eport in writingby the Metropolitan Police Depa rtment, in regular c ourse of duty , is a sufficie nt notice under this section. D.C. Code § 12-309. To bringtort claims ag ainst the District of Columbia, a plaintiff must provide wr itten notice (of the appr ox imate time, place , cause and cir cumstance s of the injury or dama g e) to the Mayor of the D istrict of Columbia within s ix months of sustaining the injury or dama g e. Dist. of Colum bia v . Ca mp be ll , 580 A.2d 1295 , 1298 (D.C. 1990) ( holding that the pla intiff did not meet the D. C. C od e § 1 2- 30 9 n oti c e re qu ir e me nt w ithre g ard to c la ims , in c lud ingne g lig e nc e , a g a ins t the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia ); Sh e hy n v . D ist. o f Co lum bia , 392 A.2d 1008, 1013-14 (D .C. 1978) (notingthat § 12-309 applies to cla ims arising out of tor tious conduct of employees of the District). Compliance with the timely notification requir ement of § 12- 309 is strictly applied.7

Di st. of C olu mb ia v . D un mo re , 662 A.2d 1356 (D.C. 1995) ( stating that § 12-309 is construed
narr owly ag ainst claimants and c ompliance with its terms is “mandator y as a pr ere quisite to filing suit ag ainst the District”) ( internal c itation omit ted). The plaintiff ha s not countere d the District’s evide nce that it rece ived no such notice from him with reg ard to his ar

rest on De cembe r 11, 2005, De f.’s Ex. B, Aff . of Robert Car

ter ¶ 3, a nd his reliance on the police a rre st report, Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, is mi splace d. Section 12-309 is intended to “provide a

n ear ly war ning to District of

Columbi a off

icials reg ardinglitigation likely to occur in the future.” Pi tts v . D ist. o f Co lum bia , 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1978). “ [A] police re port of
an a rr e st i s p re sumpt ive ly

de vo id o f a

ny no tic e of a po te nti a l c la im o f i nju

ry or dama g e fr om f

a lse
arr est, assault and battery , or neg lige nce.” Al le n v . D ist. o f Co lum bia , 5 33 A. 2d

12 59 , 1 26 3 ( D. C. 19 87 ); see Pitts, 391 A.2d at 808 (notingcase s that have “ held that a police arr est repor t is not notice to the District of a

possible False arr est”) ( citations omitt ed). The police ar rest re port shows that the plaintiff wa s arr ested on a n outstanding w arr ant from Vir g inia. Def .’s Ex. A. Be cause the re port sug g ests a lawf ul arre st, it cannot rea sonably serve as suffic ient notice of a n

“ inj ur y or dama g e .” D. C. C od e § 1 2- 30 9; se e J e nk ins v . D ist. o

f Co lum bia , 379 A.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C. 1977) (r eport must “ac tually notify the District of Columbia of the injury claimed” ) (c itation omi tte d) . “ [N]ot ic e is f

ata lly de fe c tiv e if

[, a s h e re ,] on e or

mor e of the statut or

y e le me nts is lacking .” Bo on e v . D ist. o f Co lum bia , 2 94 F . Su

pp . 1 15 6, 11 57 (D .D .C. 19 68 ). F or the se re a so ns , the plaintiff ca

nnot maintain the common law cla ims ag ainst the District. E. Th e Re m aind er of the Com plain t is Dism issed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A The PL RA require s the court to scr een a nd dismiss “as soon a s prac ticable” a prisoner ’s complaint that fails to state a c laim upon which re lief may be g rante d. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (a)-Presum ably plaintiff m ay

seek redres s of such claim s in the S uperior Cou rt of the D istrict of 3 Colum

bia. 8 (b)( 1). In view of the deter mination that the plaintiff has not stated a f eder al claim, the c ourt declines to e x erc ise supplemental jurisdiction over a ny common law cla ims ag ainst the unserve d ind ivi du a lly

name d d e fe nd ants . 3

IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt there fore g rants the de fenda nts’ motion for summary judgme nt and dismisses the complaint in its entirety . An Orde r consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately

and conte mporane ously

issued this 12th day

of May 2009.
RI CARDO M. URBI

NA Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge