F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

R I C H A R D H. B L A I S D E L L , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v.

C. F R A P P I E A , Defendant-Appellee

. No. 10-16845

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01462-J A T

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na J ames A. Teilborg , District J u d g e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted April 16, 2013—San F rancisco, California

F iled September 10, 2013

B efore: Alfred T. Goodwin, Diarmuid F . O’Scannlain, and N. Randy

Smith, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by J udg e O’ScannlainB L A I S D E L L V

. F R

A P P I E A 2

SUMMARY *

P risoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district c ourt’s summary judg ment and held that an inmate did n ot eng ag e in constitutionally
p r o t e c ted activity when he served a prison official with a summons and complaint on another inmate’s behalf.

Plaintiff alle ge d that a prison official retaliated ag ainst him by issuing him a disciplinary report a fter h e attempted to

serve her w ith a federal summons and complaint on behalf o f another inmate. The p anel first held that the district court did
not err by d etermining that plaintiff waived his claim that his prior litig ation activity ag ainst the prison trig g e red retaliation
g iven his acknowledg ment, in his own mo t i o n for summary judg ment, that the disciplinary report was not issued because of his other litig ation activities.

The panel held that the access-to-court d octrine did not provide plaintiff with constitutional p r o t ection. The panel fu rther held that because of the g eneral incompatibility between prison a

nd free association, a

nd b e c a u se there was

no evidence of ex pressive association, the F irst Amendment did not prot ect plaintiff’s attempted service of process on a prison official.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.B L A I S D E L L V

. F R

A P P I E A 3

COUNSEL

Dawn Sestito, O’Melveny & My ers L L P, L o s Ang eles, CA,
arg ued the cause and filed the briefs for the plai n t i ffappellant. Mica D octoroff, UCL A School of L aw Ninth Circuit Clinic, L os Ang eles, CA, also a rg ued the cause for the plaintiff-appellant. W ith them on the briefs was Katharine S. Mercer, O’Melveny

& My ers L L P, L os Ang eles, CA.

N i c holas D. Acedo, Struck W ieneke & L ove, P.L

. C

. , Chandler, Ariz ona, arg ued the cause and filed a supplemental brief for the defendan t

- a p p e l l ee. W ith him on the b rief was Daniel P. Struck, Struck W ieneke & L ove, P.L .C, Chandler, Ariz ona. J aleh Najafi, J ones, Skelton & H ochuli, P.L .C, Phoenix
, Ariz ona, filed the orig inal brief for the defendantappellant. W ith him on the br i ef w e re Eileen Dennis GilB ride, J o nes, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L .C

. , Phoenix
, Ariz ona, and Daniel P. Struck, J ones , Skelton & Hochuli, P.L .C., Phoenix , Ariz ona.

OP INION

O’SCANNL AI

N, Circuit J udg e:

W e must decide whether an inmate eng a g ed in constitutionally protecte d activity when he served a prison official with a summons and complaint on another inmat e ’s behalf.B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 4

I

A

The State of Hawaii contrac t s w i th the Corrections Corpora t i o n o f America (“CCA”) to house some of its prisoners within the Sag uaro Correctional Center, a privately operated prison in Eloy
, Ariz ona. 1 Richard B laisdell is one o f those inmates. On April 23, 2 008, B laisdell visited Christina F rappiea—the prison’s Classification Supervisor—to ask her
to nota r i z e a document for a new lawsuit he planned to file
ag ainst the prison. 2 This was not B laisdell’s first attempt at litig ation. He had filed at least t h r ee lawsuits ag ainst the prison and its officers since 2007. F rappiea notariz ed t h e document.

As soon as F rappiea had finished, B l a i sdell announced that she had b een “served” and handed h e r a summons a nd complaint in a federal civil Racketeer I nfluenced and Corrupt Org a niz ations Act (“RI CO”) suit prep a red by another prisoner: Anthony Gouveia. B laisdell ha d a g reed to serve process a s a favor to Gouveia and was not a party to his lawsuit. The suit ag ainst F r appiea c o n cerned her apparent unwilling ness to notariz e a c o n tract for Gouveia which

1 B ecau se B laisd ell’ s claim reg ard in g retaliatio n w as n o t co n clu s iv ely

reso l v ed u n til su

m m ary j u d g m en t, see in

fra P art I.B
., w e “ d raw all

reaso n ab le i n f

eren ces su

pp o rted b y th e ev id en ce in f av o r o f [B laisd ell as] th e n o n

- m o v in g party .” V i l l i a r i m o v. Alo ha Isla n d Air, In c. , 2 8 1 F.3 d 1 0 5 4 , 1 0 6 1 (9 th

Cir. 2 0 0 2).

2 T h e classif

icatio n su p erv iso r’ s j o b is to m ak e reco m m en datio n s ab o u t in m ate p lacem en t so th at p riso n ers are “ assig n ed to th e ap p ro priate j o b
, h o u sin g an d reh ab ilitativ e p ro g ram s.” T h e reco rd is silen t ab o u t w h eth er

n o tarizin g co u rt d o cu m en ts w as p art o f Frap p iea’ s o f

f icial d u ties.B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 5

p e rtained to a lawsuit he had already filed in Mississipp i federal district court. After looking at the document, F rappiea reportedly said: “ O h. W e l l
, y ou can’t serve that. You’re a state prisoner

. ” Blaisdell claims he replied b y stating : “[ T] his is not a state suit and I have every leg a l rig ht in the world to serve this to y ou. I am over 18, and I ’m n o t a party to the suit. And it’s not breaking any laws or a ny rules
or any thing

. ”

F ollowing this ex chang e o f w ords, F rappiea prepared a di sciplinary report charg ing B laisdell with Conspiracy
, F ailure to F ollow Rule s , a n d “Violation of F ederal, State o r L o cal L aws.” Under the p r ison rules inmates are n o t permitted to possess another inmate’s property , including his leg al paperwork, without permission. The “Conspiracy” was B laisdell’s ag reement to p o s sess Gouveia’s summons a nd complaint. As for the laws transg ressed, F rappiea’s disciplinary report references Ariz ona statutes that spell out the requirements to act as a process server. Fr a p piea later characteriz ed B laisdell’s leg al violation as a failure to comply with the screening provisions of the Prison L itig ation Reform Act ( “PL RA”) b efore attempting service. See 28 U .S.C. § 1915A. 3 A CCA hearing o f f icer found B laisdell g uilty on all three counts and sentenced him to six ty day s o f administrative seg reg ation.

B

Proceeding pro se, B laisdell initiated the instant litig ation in Ariz ona Superior Court. The c a se was removed to federal

3 Frap p iea h as n o f

o rm al leg al ed u catio n an d ack n o w led g ed t h a t h e r ch aracterizatio n o f B laisd ell’ s leg al v io l atio n w as a “ g o o d f aith ,” alth o u g h
p o ten tially

in accu rate, in terp retatio n o f th e P L RA

.B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 6

district court w here B laisdell subsequently filed an amended
pro se c ompl a i n t u n der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 containing four
counts. Count One claimed that his discipline in connection with the events of April 2 3 had b een unconstitutional retaliation. Counts Two, Three, and F o ur asserted violations of the Due Process Clause, Ariz o na state law, and the federal Fr eedom of I nformation Act. He soug ht $10,00 0 i n compensatory and punitive damag es.

Pursuant to the PL RA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), the district
court sua sponte screened the complaint, dismis s i n g Counts Two, Three, and F o ur. During its screening
, the district court perceived two distinct assertions within Count One. F irst, the
court identified an alleg ati o n o f r e taliation by F rappiea for B laisde l l ’ s attempt to serve Gouveia’s lawsuit. Second, the
court identified a p ossible assertion that F rappiea h ad prepared the d isciplinary charg e “to g et even” w ith B laisdell for his own prior lawsuits ag ainst CCA and its o f ficers. The court’s screening order, while e x pressing the view that B laisdell’s service of process was not an actionable basis for

a retaliation claim, did n ot definitively screen that alleg ation. I nstead, the order simply

directed F rappiea to file an answer as to Count One.

F ollowin g discovery
, both sides moved for summary judg ment. 4 F rappiea arg ued in her motion that (1) B laisdell’s “actions a s a process server [did] not constitute protected conduct” under the Constitution and (2) there was no causal “nex u s betwee n t he disciplinary report and [ B laisdell’s] litig ation activity .” The d istrict court ag reed that B laisdell’s service of process was not c o nstitutionally protected. As for B laisdell’s own litig ation activity
, the court observed that, in

4 B laisd ell’ s cro ss m o tio n f or su m m ary j u dg m en t w as d en ied

.B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 7

responding to F rappiea’s summary judg ment br i e fing
, B laisdell had d isclaimed a claim for retaliation o n that basis. The cou rt concluded that “[ f] or this reason alone,” any such theory of retaliation necessarily failed.

B laisdell timely appealed fr o m t he order g ranting
summary judg ment to F rappiea and received c ourt-appointed counsel.

I I

B laisde l l fi rst arg ues that the district c ourt e rred in determining that he waived the claim that his prior litig ation activity ag ainst the prison trig g ered retaliation.

Courts in this c ircuit have an o blig ation to g ive a liberal construction to the filing s of pro se litig ants, especially when they a re civil rig hts claims b y inmat e s

. S ee Thomas v

. P o n der
, 611 F .3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010); B retz v

. Kelman
, 773 F .2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th C i r

. 1 985) (en banc). This rule relieves p ro se litig ants from the strict a p p l i c ation of procedural r

ules and demands that courts not hold missing

or inaccurate leg al terminolog y or muddled d raftsma n s hip
ag ainst them. S

ee, e.g. , Agyeman v. I.N.S.
, 296 F .3d 8 7 1, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Albeit inartfully
, Ay g eman raised pro se his due process claims

. . . . [ notwithstanding that] he did not use the specific phrase ‘due process violation’. . . .’”).

I n this case, B laisdell wrote in his s ummary judg ment briefing that “[ t] he issue in this case is not whether F rappiea
wrote a false D .R. [ disciplinary report] because of plaintiff’s multiple lawsuits, it is because plaintiff leg ally s e r v ed F rappiea with a federal summons and complaint naming her

as a defendant in a Mississippi lawsuit.” (e m p h asis inB L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 8

o rig inal). T hroug h counsel, B laisdell now arg ues that o u r decision in Bretz and the rule of liberal construction c ompel us to ig nore his statement.

I n Bretz
, we construed a pro se claim “drafted in terms o f § 1983” as arising instead under section 1 985—a r elated civil-rig hts provision. 773 F .2d at 1027 n.1. B laisdell is not asking u s to ide n t i f

y which leg al terminolog y describes his

cause of action; instead, he is asking us to take up on appeal

a claim wh i ch he clearly told the district court he was not bring ing

. W e decline to do so. See Zixiang Li v. Kerry , 710 F .3d 995, 1000 n.4 ( 9th Cir. 2013) ( “[ A] party waives an arg ument by f

ailing to make it before the district court

. . . .”) (quoting G & S H

oldings L L C v

. C o nt’l Cas. Co.
, 697 F .3d 534, 538 ( 7th Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) ( alterations and omission in orig inal)).

W ithout resort to Orwel l i a n “Newspeak,” liberal construction c annot turn B laisdell’s ex pla nation a bout what his “case is not ” into a d escription about what his case is

. I n part, we credit his disavowal because i t conforms with h ow he described his claim a t other times d uring the litig ation. He used a form complaint desig ned to a id prisoners proceeding
pro se. W h en the form c omplaint prompted him to state the rig ht violated, B laisdell wrote: “Retaliatio n ag ainst the plaintiff for ex ercis i n g his rig ht to serve F ederal Summons and Complaint on Fr a p p i e a

. ” 5 Then, in his own motion for
summary ju d g m e n t B laisdell arg ued that “F rappiea wrote a disciplinary r eport on plaintiff as a result of [ p] laintiff’s attempt to serve [ d ] e f

endant with a v alid lawful federal

5 It is also salien t th at a claim based o n B laisd ell’ s o w n litig atio n w ou ld

n ev er h av e b een r e co g n i zed w ere i t n o t f o r th e d istrict co u rt’ s lib eral

co n stru ctio n

d u rin g screen in g

.B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 9

summons and complaint” and stated that he was “entitled to perform the only

act he did and that was to serve F rappiea.”

B l a i s d e l l ’ s “ a c k

n o w l e dg [ ment] that the disciplinary re p o r t

was not issued because of his other litig ation activi t i e s ” compels the conclusion that F rappiea is entitled to summary judg ment on the retaliation claim to the ex tent it is based on prior lawsuits.

I I I

B laisdell’s r emaining c laim for r etaliation t herefore hing es on whether h e e ng a g ed in “ protected conduct” when he served process on ano t h e r i nmate’s behalf. Rhodes v

. Robinson , 408 F .3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005).

Resolving this question requires us to wade into doctrinal
waters not often ex p lored in detail by courts. Althoug h commonly r eferred to as c laims for “F irst A mendment retaliation,” id.
, such actions need no t b e tethered to the speech or associational freedoms secured by t h a t Bi ll o f Rig hts p rovision. 6 I nstead—as an aspect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—a claim for retaliation

can be based u

pon the theory that the g overnment imposed a burden on the p laintiff, more g enerally
, “because he

ex e r cise[ d] a c onstitutional r ig ht.” Regan v. Taxation W ith Representation of W

ashington
, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983); see al s o B d

. o f Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr
, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (situa t i n g several cases a lleg ing retaliation for

6 T h e First A m en d m en t pro v id es th at “ Co n g ress sh all m ak e n o law

. . . . ab rid g in g th e f

reed o m o f sp eech
, o r of th e p ress; o r th e rig h t o f th e peo p le
p eaceab ly to asse m

b le, an d to p etitio n th e Go v ern m en t f o r a red ress of
g riev an ces.” U.S. Co n st. am en d . I.B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 10

protected speech amidst the “modern unconstitutional conditions doctrine” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 7 B laisdell directs us to two possible sources of constitutional protection for his effort to serve process f or his f ellow inmate.

A

B laisdell first points to a “p r isoner’s rig ht of meaning f ul

access to the c o u r t s

. ” Bradley v. Hall
, 64 F .3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on o ther gr o u n d s by S haw v

. Murphy
, 532 U.S

. 223, 230 n.2 (2001). I n the contex t o f prisoners’ rig hts, the S upreme Court chiefly has located the
access-to-courts doctrine in the Constitution’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See, e.g. , Lewis v. Casey
, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J
., concurring ) (observing that

ov e r the decades the Court has characteriz ed the rig ht “as a ‘consequence’ of due process, as an ‘ a spect’ o f equal protection, or as an ‘equal p rotection g uarantee’” ( i n ternal citations o mitted)). At other times, the Court has described the doctrine a s part of every c itiz en’s F irst Amendment rig ht
to petition the g overnment. See Tur n er v. Safley
, 4 82 U.S. 78, 8 4 (1987) (“[ P] risoners retain the constitutional r ig ht to petition the g overnment f or the redress of g rievances

. . . .”); Cal. M otor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
, 404 U.S. 508,

7 P erh ap s n o t an y co n stitu tio n al rig h t w ill su f

f ice, h o w ev er. A cco rd in g to o n e sch olar, th e u n co n stitu tio n al co n d itio n s d o ctrin e o n ly saf eg u ard s

“ t h o s e rig h ts th at d ep en d o n so m e so rt o f ex ercise o f au to n om o u s ch o i ce b y t h e rig h th o l d er, su ch as in d iv id u al rig h ts to sp eech
, ex ercise o f relig io n

o r p riv acy , co rp o rate rig h ts t o do in terstat e b u s i n ess o r in v o k e f ed eral d iv ersity j u risd ictio n , o r state rig h ts to s elf

- g o v ern m en t.” K ath leen M. Su lliv an , Un co n s titu tio n a l Co n d i t io n s , 1 0 2 H arv

. L

. Rev

. 1 4 1 3
, 1 4 2 6 (1 9 8 9).B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 11

510 (1972) (“The r i g ht of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the rig

ht of petition.”). 8

B laisdell arg u es that two ac c e s s

- t o

- c o urts principles cover his conduct: ( 1) a rig ht to pursue “ litig ation-related activities” and (2) the rig ht of leg al assistance between inmates.

1

Prisoners have the “rig ht[ ] to litig at e w i thout active interference
, ” Silva v. Di Vittorio
, 658 F .3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011), a g uarantee that ex ists so prisoners have a “viable mechanism to remedy prison injustices.” Rhodes v

. Robinson
, 4 0 8 F .3d 559, 5 67 (9th Cir. 2 005). The heart of the anti-interference rig ht is “the presentation of constitutional, civil rig hts and habeas corpus claims,” Snyder v. Nolen , 380 F .3d 279, 291 (7th Cir. 2004). 9 B ut, by v irtue of their “broader rig ht to petition the g overnmen t f o r a redress o f [ their] g r ievances u nder the F irst Amen d m e n t ,” Bradley
, 64 F .3d a t 1279, p risoners must also have opportunities to pursue

c e rtain other ty

pes of civil litig ation. See, e.g. , Snyder
, 3 8 0 F .3d at 2 91; S

traub v. Monge
, 815 F

. 2d 1467, 1470 (11th Cir. 1 9 8 7); Jackson v. Procunier
, 789 F .2d 307, 311 (5th C i r. 1986).

8 T h e ex ercise o f rig h ts w

h ile in p riso n , th ou g h
, is cab in ed

. S ee Tu rn er , 4 8 2 U.S. at 8 9 (“ [W ]h en a p riso n reg u latio n im p in g es o n in m a t e s ’

co n stitu tio n al rig h ts, th e reg u l atio n i s v a lid if it is reaso n ab ly related to leg i tim ate p en o lo g ical in terests.”).

9 T h e access- to

- co u rts rig h t o rig in ated w ith d i rect ap p eals f ro m

co n v ictio n s an d h ab eas co rp u s an d th en w as ex ten d ed “ o n ly slig h t l y , to

‘ civ il rig h t s actio n s ’— i

. e

. , actio n s u n d er 4 2 U.S.C. § 1 9 8 3 to v in d icate

‘ b asic co n s titu tio n al rig h ts.’ ” Lewis , 5 1 8 U.S. at 3 5 4

.B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 12

The ex act nature of Gouveia’s lawsuit is u n k n own. According to B laisdell, it was “wa s a p e rsonal suit and h ad nothing to do with the Sag uaro Prison.” W e w ill look p a st this statement, however, since the complaint which B laisdell
soug h t to serve did concern a perceived injustice at Sag uaro: F rappiea’s alleg ed refusal to notariz e a contract for Gouveia in c o nnection with his underly ing civil action. Therefore, we

assume for the sake of arg ument that Gouveia’s claim ag ainst F rappiea is the ty

pe of civil suit covered by t he F irst Amendment’s rig ht to petition.

Y e t, the Supreme Court has cautioned that despite so m e past imprecisi on in its a

r ticulation of the protection, accessto-courts ri g hts do not ex ist in an “abstract, freestanding ” form. Lewis
, 518 U.S

. a t 3 5 1

. I nstead, they are tethered to pr i n c i p les of Article I I I standing

. See id. (remarking that “actual injury is apparent on the f ace of almost all the opinions in the 35-y ear line of access-to-courts cases”). 1 0 F o r there to be a judicially cog niz able injury
, “the party b e f o r e [ the court] must seek a remedy for a p ersonal a nd tang ible harm.” Hollingsworth v

. Perry
, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (emphasis added); see also New Y ork v. Ferber
, 458 U .S. 747, 767 (1982) (describing “the p ersonal nature of constitutional rig hts” as a “cardinal principle[ ] o f our constitutional o rder”). Thus, while Gouveia and B laisdell each have a n a c cess-tocour t s rig ht to file litig ation from prison, they cannot

10 T h is ref lects t h e f act t h at in o u r sy s tem o f sep arated p o w ers “ i t is n o t th e ro le o f co u rts, b u t th at o f th e po litical b ran ch es, to sh ap e t h e in stitu tio n s o f g o v ern m en t i n su ch f ash io n as t o co m

p ly w ith t h e law s an d th e Co n stitu

tio n .” Lewis , 5 18 U.S. at 3 4 9

.B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 13

vicariously assert that protection on e a c h other’s behalf. 1 1 And b e cause B laisdell has no share in Gouveia’s “rig ht to be free fr om interference,” this aspect o f the access-to-courts doctrine cannot support his action. Silva , 658 F .3d at 1103.

2

B laisdell nex t claims that Fr a ppiea’s disciplinary report

wa s issued to r etaliate ag ainst him for providing affirmative leg al assistance to his fellow inmate. See Johnson v. Av e r y , 393 U.S. 4 83, 4 9 0 ( 1 9 69). “W e have traditionally differentiated b etween two ty pes of access-to-court claims: those involving p risoners’ r ig ht to affirmative assistance a nd those involv ing prisoners’ r ig hts to litig ate without active interference

. ” Silva
, 658 F .3d at 1102. A close inspection o f Jo h n s o n a

nd its prog eny illustrates that, as with the access doctrine a lready ex p lored, B laisdell misc o n c eives the true nature of the rig

ht to assistance.

Constituti onal doctrine requires that inmates receive affirmative assistance in the “preparati o n and filing ” o f certain leg al pleading s. Silva
, 658 F. 3d at 1102 (quoting Bounds v. Smith
, 430 U .S. 8 1 7, 828 (1977))

. H o we v er, the Constitution d oes not speci f y t h e f orm such assistance must take. I n Johnson
, the Te n n e s s e e prison sy stem had a reg ulation barring inmates from a d v i sing or assisting e ach

11 B ecau se o f lo ose lan g u ag e i n access- to

- co u rts p reced en ts bef o re Lewis th is i ssu e h ad d iv id ed th e l o w e r co u rts. C o mp are Ad

a ms v. Ja mes , 7 8 4 F.2 d 1 0 7 7
, 10 8 0 (1 1 th Cir. 1 98 6 ) (“ In a n o n

- class- actio n co n tex t a p riso n er h as n o stan d in g to litig ate an o th er p riso n er’ s claim of den ial of

access to th e co u

rts.”), with Rh od

es v. Ro b i n so n , 6 1 2 F.2 d 7 66
, 7 6 9 (3 d Cir. 1 9 7 9 ) (read in g p rio r Su p rem e Co u

rt caselaw o n access to c o u r t s a s

“ disreg ard [in g ] t h e r u l e ag ain s t J u s tertii, t h e v icario u s assertio n of rig h ts”).B L A I S D E L L V

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A P P I E A 14

other a b o u t l e g a l matters. 393 U.S. a t 485. The Court invalidated that rule—not because prisoners have a constitutional rig ht t o “the assistance of fellow inmates”—but because Tennessee f

ailed to provide any other mechanism for helping inmates who were incapable of preparing leg al papers themselves. See id. ( e x p l a i n ing that “unless and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to a s s ist inmates in the preparation of petitions for p o st-conviction relief, it
may n o t validly e nforce [ the] reg ulation”); S mith v

. Maschner
, 899 F .2d 940, 9 5 0 ( 1 0 t h Cir. 1990) (“Prison inmates do n ot possess the r ig ht to a particular prisoner’s h elp in preparing their leg al m a t e rials, so long as prison officials make other assistance available.”); Kunzelman v

. Thompson
, 799 F .2d 1172, 1179 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the “rig ht
to r eceive assistance f

rom other prisoners is conditioned upon

a showing that the inmates in question did not have adequate

access to the court without the h el p o f a n inmate writwriter”).

Confronted with arg uments akin to B lai s dell’s in the y ears since Johnson
, the Supreme Court has made the c onting ent nature of the protection for leg al a ssistance ex plicit. See Shaw
, 532 U.S. at 231 n.3 (“Under our rig ht-of-access precedents, inmates h ave a rig ht to receive leg al advice from other inmates only when it is a necessary means f or ensuring

a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations o f f

undamental constitutional rig hts to the courts.” (quoting Lewis
, 518 U.S. at 350–51 (internal quotation marks omitted)). CCA’s Corporate a n d F acilities Policy provides for a law library and for contract att o r n e y s or paraleg als to help inmates prepare motion s to p r oceed in forma pauperis
, motions for appointment of counsel, habeas petition s , a nd § 1983 suits. B laisdell d oes not cha l l en g e either the sufficiency or the enforcement of that access-to-courts policy

.B L A I S D E L L V

. F R

A P P I E A 15

H e a lso acknowledg es that the federal rules furnish e d Gouveia w ith potential way s to effec t u ate service. 1 2 Moreover, it is far from clear that “the rig ht to provide leg al advice f ollows from a rig h t t o r e ceive leg al advice,” Shaw
, 5 3 1 U.S. at 231 n.3, a c rucial leap were B laisdell to h a v e standing to claim the dis c i p linary charg e imping ed on the

ex e r cise of his rig hts. Cf. Lewis , 518 U.S. at 351–52.

F or a ll o f these reasons, B laisdell’s decision to serve process on behalf of Gouveia cannot be g rounded on the access-to-court doctrine.

B

As an alternative v ehicle f o r c onstitutional protection, B laisdell invokes the freed o m o f “ association for the advancement o f beliefs and ideas.” NAACP v. Button
, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). 1 3

1 2 Ru l e 4 p ro v id es th at at a “ p lain tif f ’ s req u est, th e co u rt m ay o rd er th at

serv ice b e m ad e b y a Un ited States m arsh al o r d e p u ty m arsh al o r b y a p e r so n sp ecially ap po in ted b y th e co u rt. T h e co u rt m u st so o rd er if t h e p lain tif f is au th o rized to pr o c e e d i n f o rm a p au p eris u n d er 2 8 U.S.C. § 1 9 1 5.” Fed

. R. Civ

. P

. 4 (c). See g en era l ly La u ren ce v. A.T. W a ll
, 5 5 1 F.3 d 9 2
, 9 3– 9 4 (1 st Cir. 2 0 0 8 ). T h e f act th at G o u v eia p aid t

h e f ilin g f ee in li e u o f seek in g in fo rma p au p eris d esig n atio n d o es n o t au to m atically
g iv e h im an access- to

- co u rts claim

. A t th e v e r y l east, th ere w o u ld n eed
t o b e ev id en ce th at th e co u rt ref u s ed h is req u est f

o r serv ice as w e l l a s

e v i d e n ce t

h at th e p riso n f

u rn i sh ed n o altern ativ e m ech an ism f o r in m ate

serv ice. B laisd ell h as o f

f ered n o su ch

ev id en ce.

1 3 No t ex p ressly en u m erated
, th is f reed o m is a co n seq u en ce o f th e First A m en d m en t’ s tex tu al g u aran t ees. S ee Ro b erts v. Un ited S ta tes Ja ycees , 4 6 8 U.S. 60 9
, 6 2 2 (1 9 8 4 ) (“ A n in div i d u al’ s f reed o m to sp eak
, to w o rsh ip
, an d to p etitio n th e g o v ern m en t f o r th e red ress o f g riev an ces co u ld n o t b e

v ig o ro u sly p ro tected f

ro m in terf

eren ce b y t h e St a te u n less a co rrelativ eB L A I S D E L L V

. F R

A P P I E A 16

B laisdell cites Rizzo v. Dawson
, 7 78 F

. 2d 527 ( 9 th Cir. 1985) as support for t h e proposition that he has a viable

a s s o c iational c laim. I n Rizzo
, we held that “a ‘ jailho u s e lawy er’ assisting other inmates with habeas p e titions a nd other federal actions” w as eng ag ing in e x pressive a ssociation under t h e Fi r st Amendment. 778 F .2d at 529. Riz z o pro v i ded h is leg al a ssistance during a prison-vocational
course; thus, we held that he could viably alleg e t h a t his forced transfer out of the c o urse had been in retaliation for his

ex e r cise of the constitutional rig ht to associa t e

. B laisdell’s

own evidence, however, shows that he does not function a s a jailhouse lawy e r, or any

thing approaching it. I n his statement of facts in support o f summary judg ment, he wr o te: “ All o f the p o ints on a ccusing me of h elping other inmates at Sag uaro

are fic t i t i o u s and f

alse b e c ause I have not helped any other [ inmates] w ith their lawsuits at Sag u aro.” 1 4 B laisdell f urther represented having “had nothing to do wit h t he drafting o r filing of Gouveia’s lawsuit.” B ecause B laisdell does not eng ag e in the kind of activity which R izzo held w as protected, that case is not controlling here.

I n effect, B laisdell encourag es us to ex tend Rizzo and to hold that service of process, divorced from substantive leg al assistance, qualifies as F irst Ame n d ment association. Two

fr eed o m to en g ag e in g ro u p ef f o rt to w ard t

h o se en d s w ere n o t a l s o g u aran teed .”).

1 4 T h e p o rtio n o f th e reco rd h e cited in h is ap p ellate b rief
, o sten sib ly as

ev id en ce th at h e o f

f ers l eg al assistan ce, d o es n ot p u t t h is rep resen tatio n at issu e. T h ere, h e d iscu sses a discip lin ary actio n w h ich “ accu sed [h im ] of
attem p tin g to en co u rag e W ash in g to n in m ates to f ile law su its ag ain st CCA f o r v io latio n

o f th eir civ il rig h ts.” B laisd ell testif ied th at w h ile h e m ig h t h av e of f h an d ed ly stated “ W ell, su e th em ,” h e co u ld n ot “ ev en rem em ber th e in cid en t .”B L A I S D E L L V

. F R

A P P I E A 17

d o c t ri nal developments since 1985 convince u s that it doe s not.

F irst, the Court has clarified that associational rig h ts only

ex tend to g r oups eng ag ed i n e x pressive activities. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale , 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); V illegas v

. City of Gilroy
, 484 F .3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 7 )

. 1 5 I n Dale
, t h e Bo y Scouts qualified a s ex pressive because its “g eneral mission” was inculcating members with a set o f values “both ex pressly and b y ex ample.” 530 U.S. at 649–50. Similarly
, fraternal and civic associations usually can invoke the freedom o f association. See, e.g. , Roberts v. United States J aycees , 4 68 U.S. 609, 612 (1984) (national men’s
org aniz ation devoted to “g enuine Americanism a nd civil interest” was protected).

Unable to cite to these conventional modes of association, B laisdell simply asserts that civil rig h ts litig ation is “a form of political ex pression.” Button
, 3 7 1 U.S. at 429. I n Button
, the N AACP had associational rig hts b ecause i t worked “to vindicate the leg a l rig hts of members o f the American Neg r o community
, [ and] at the same tim e and perhaps more importantly
, ma[ de] p ossible the distinctive c ontribution o f a minority g r oup to the i d ea s and beliefs of our society .” 371 U.S. at 4 31. Such litig ation was deemed political ex pression and thus protected “ political as s o c iation.” Id. W hen the Court h e l d that the ACL U’s litig ation also was protected, it did so based on the ACL U’s “ e x t e n s ive educational a nd lobby ing activities” and involvement in public-interest cases rang ing f rom “political dissent, juvenile rig hts, pr i s oners’

1 5 I n Villeg a s , w e cab in ed a 1 9 84 p reced en t th at h ad d eclared th at th e Hells A n g els’ m o to rcy cle clu b h ad asso ciatio n al rig h ts w ith ou t an aly zin g th is d octrin al req u irem en t. Id

. at 1 1 4 1 n . 1 0

.B L A I S D E L L V

. F R

A P P I E A 18

rig hts, military law, a mnesty , and p r i v a c y .” In re Primus
, 436 U.S. 412, 427–28 (1978).

W h ile inmates eng ag ed in c ollective civil r ig hts litig ation conceivably could claim to be e x pressively associating
, 1 6 the

same cannot be said for the one-time service of proc e s s at issue h ere. Service of process has no inherent l y e x pressive dimension. Cf. V

i l l e g as , 4 84 F .3d at 1141 (“act of wearing

. . . vests a dorned with a common insig nia simply d o e s not amount to the sort of ex press i v e c onduct protected by the F irst Amendment”). I nstead, it merely is a p r o cedural mechanism for announcing that leg al pr o c e eding s have beg un.

A second reason not to ex tend Rizzo is that its holding is difficult to square with th e S u preme Court’s subsequent teaching s on p risoners’ rig hts. See Pratt v. Rowland
, 65 F .3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (cautiously a p p ly ing Rizzo in lig ht o f later admonitions). As a g e neral matter, the Court has instructed that “freedom of association is among the rig hts least compatible with incarceration. ” Overton v. Bazzetta
, 53 9 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). More specifically
, the Court overruled a decision of ours which—rely ing on Rizzo —held that an inma t e law clerk had heig htened F irst A mendment protection because h e was a p urvey or of leg al assistance. See Murphy v. Shaw 195 F .3d 1 121, 1124–25 (9th C i r

. 1999),

1 6 As a th ree-

j u d g e p an el, w e resp ect Rizzo as b in d i n g d esp ite so m e d issatisf actio n w ith i ts reaso n in g

. T h e T en t h Circu it au th o rity

th at Rizzo
reg ard ed as p ersu asiv e, strik es u s as w ro n g ly d ecid ed

. S

ee Owen s v. Ru sh
, 6 5 4 F .2 d 1 3 7 0
, 1 3 7 9 (1 0 th Cir.1 9 8 1 ) (co n clu d in g th at b y h elp in g h is w i f e

w ith h er T itle V II su it an d “ acco m pan [y in g ] [h er] to h er atto rn ey ’ s o f f i ce”

a h u sb an d cam e “ w ith i n th e activ i ties h eld to b e p ro tected b y th e F i r s t A m en d m en t in NAACP v. Bu tto n ” )

. H e lp in g o n e’ s sp o u se w ith a sin g le law su it d o es n o t tran sf

o rm th e co u p le in to an ex p ressiv e asso ciatio n

.B L A I S D E L L V

. F R

A P P I E A 19

overruled by Shaw
, 532 U .S. a t 2 2 7
, 230–32. B laisdell correctly notes that S

h aw fell short of holding that prisoners have no F irst Amendment rig h ts when assisting e a c h other with leg al matters. Shaw concerned a more discrete issue: it held that deferential scrutiny still applies when courts assess the v alidity of prison re gu lations affecting inmate leg al assistance. See 5 32 U.S. at 228. Yet, not only did the Court

ex p res s s k e p t icism a

bout the rig ht we declared in Rizzo
, 1 7 it reminded us that: (1) “the constitutional rig hts that prisoners
possess are more limited in s c ope than the constitutional rig hts h eld b y individuals in society at larg e” and (2) “courts

are particularly ‘ill equipped’ to deal with” issues which arise behind bars. Shaw
, 5 3 2 U

. S. at 229; see also id. at 228 (“Traditionally federal courts did not intervene in the internal affairs o f prisons and instead ‘ad opted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration.’”).

B e cause of questions about Rizzo ’s v i t ality
, the g eneral incompatibility between p rison and free a s sociation, a nd because there is no evidence of ex pres s i ve association, we conclude that the Fi r s t Amendment does not protect B laisdell’s attempted service of process on F rappiea.

17 T h e sk ep ticism is ap p aren t b o th in th e u n an im o u s m aj o rity an d th e

co n cu rren ce. S

ee id

. at 2 3 1 (ex p lain i n g in d icta th at “ ev en if w e w ere to

co n sid er g iv in g s p ecial p ro tectio n t o p articu lar k in d s o f s p eech b ased u p on

c o n t e n t, w e w o u ld n o t d o s o f o r sp eech t

h at in clu d es leg al ad v ice”), i d

. (rem ark in g t h a t “in m ate law clerk s are so m etim es a m en ace to p riso n d iscip lin e”) (in tern al qu o t atio n m ark s om itted ); id

. at 2 3 2 (Gin sb u rg , J
., co n cu rrin g ) (“ I ag ree w ith th e Co u rt th at th e Nin th Circu it erred in h o ld in g th at th e F irst A m en d m e n t secu res to p riso n ers a f reestan din g rig h t to p ro v id e leg al assistan ce to o th er in m ates.”).B L A I S D E L L V

. F R

A P P I E A 20

I V

As any alleg ed retaliation ag a inst B laisdell was not rooted in activity safeg u arded by the Constitution, the district court properly awarded summary

judg ment in favor of F rappiea.

AF F IRMED.