## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-2564

___________ Arkansas Adapt; Stephen Keith, as * parent and next friend of Ezekiel Keith, * a minor; Susan Keith, as parent and next* friend of Ezekiel Keith, a minor; Janet * Stevens, as mother of Samantha Stevens,* a minor; Janelle Romandia, as mother of* Brandy Romandia, a minor, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Appellants, * Eastern District of Arkansas. * [UNPUBLISHED] v. * * Roger W. Johnson, Administrator, * United States General Services * Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: April 15, 1998 Filed: June 2, 1998

___________ Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________The Honorable George Howard, Jr., United States District Judge f or the Eastern 1 District of Arkansas. -2- PER CURIAM. Arkansas Adapt and separate appellants appeal the district court’s adverse grant o f 1 summary judgment in their civil action against the General Services Administration and its administrator (collectively GSA). We affirm.
In t heir complaint, plaintiffs asserted that because of the inaccessibility of physica l facilities, GSA failed to make the programs, services, and activities offered at the Little Rock, Arkansas federal office building readily acc essible to disabled citizens, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Plaintiffs sough t declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted GSA’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action without prejudice, concluding that plaintiffs ha d failed to exhaust administrative remedies as require d by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, which was th e proper avenue for judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (requiring exhaustion o f administr ative remedies). After de novo review, see Earnest v. Courtney , 64 F. 3d 365, 366-67 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (standard of review), we conclude the district court’s decision was correct.
We have not specifically addressed whether exhaustion of administrative remedies i s required in the context of a Rehabil itation Act claim against the federal government in its proprietary capacity. Cf. Morgan v. United States Postal Se rv. , 798 F.2d 1162, 1165 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (federal employee must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing § 504 handicap discrimination claim against federal government as employer), cert. denied , 480 U.S. 948 (1987). Appellants do not dispute the availability of a n ad ministrative procedure in which to bring their complaint and obtain relief. See 4 1 C.F.R. §§ 105-8.101 to 105-8.170-13 (1997) (describing-3-

adm inistrative procedures for filing complaint alleging handicap discrimination by GSA in violation of § 5 04); cf. J.L. v. Social Security Administration , 971 F.2d 260, 262, 270 (9th Ci r. 1992) (mentally handicapped individuals, who had raised § 504 handicap

discrimination challenge to Social Security Administration’s application procedures for sup plemental security income, were required first to exhaust administrative remedies). Appellants also do not dispute that their claim involves fa cts and decisions that GSA has the expertise to address, and they have fail ed to show that administrative remedies would be futile. Cf. Miener v. Mi ssouri , 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir.) (not requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in § 504 suit against federally funded state entities wher e regulations adopted b y Department of Health and Human Services were of little comfort to individual plaintiff), cert. denied , 459 U.S. 9 09, and cert. denied , 459 U.S. 916 (1982). At oral ar gument, counsel for appellants conceded that he would seek relief from th e agency before filing suit were a similar case to arise in t he future. Counsel acknowledged that, with the exception of the relocation of two existing handicapped-parking spaces, the federal building & s physical facilities ha ve now been made accessible to disabled citizens. Alt hough the appeal is thus largely moot, the alleged lack of appropriately locate d handi capped-parking spaces presents a live controversy. See Layton v. Elder , No. 97

- 1698, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. May 6, 1998). Given that appellants’ action involves the accessibility of one federal buil ding to disabled persons , we reject their argument that exhaustion should not be required because thei r complaint involves questions of significant national interest. See Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Block , 755 F.2d 368, 371 (4th Cir. 1985). We also reject appellants’ argument that , because purely legal issues are involved, exhaustion is not required. See Missouri v

. Bowen, 813 F.2d 864, 871 (8th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.-4-

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.