UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4981

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAMONT LEE MILLER, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-4982

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAMONT LEE MILLER, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,

Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00062-1; 3:11-cr-00192-1)

Submitted: May 30, 2013 Decided: June 18, 2013

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Troy N. Giatras, THE GIATRAS LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charleston, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States 

Attorney, William B. King, II, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lamont Lee Miller, Jr., was sentenced to 132-months’ 

imprisonment after pleading guilty to two counts of receiving a 

firearm while under felony indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(n), 924(a)(1)(D) (2006), and five counts of distribution 

of a quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (2006). Miller initially pled guilty to the 

firearms charges pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange for 

the Government’s promise to drop the drug charges. However, 

after Miller breached the plea agreement and thereby released 

the Government from its obligation, Miller pled guilty to the 

drug charges as well. He now appeals his guilty pleas and 

sentence, contending the district court erred in voiding his 

plea agreement, in allowing him to plead guilty to both the drug 

and firearms charges, and in applying several offense-level 

enhancements. We affirm.

I.

Miller first contends the district court erred in 

voiding the plea agreement. We review a claim that a party has 

breached a plea agreement under a bifurcated standard, reviewing 

the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

application of contract interpretation principles de novo. 

United States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2000). Under 

general contract interpretation principles, an injured party is 
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relieved of its obligations under an agreement upon a breach 

only if that breach is material. United States v. Scruggs, 356 

F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2004). A material breach is one that 

deprives the injured party of the benefit that it reasonably 

expected to receive under the agreement. Id. In the context of 

a plea agreement, “[s]uch a breach relieves the government of 

its obligation to conform to the agreement’s terms even when 

defendant has relied to his substantial detriment by, for 

example, entering his guilty plea.” United States v. West, 2 

F.3d 66, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1993).

The district court properly found that Miller 

materially breached his obligation under the plea agreement to 

cooperate with the Government, by failing to be forthright and 

truthful in a debriefing and in grand jury testimony. Moreover, 

despite Miller’s contention to the contrary, the district court 

properly allowed Miller’s guilty plea to the firearms charges to 

stand despite freeing the Government from its obligation to 

dismiss the drug charges. West, 2 F.3d at 69-70. As the 

district court indicated, voiding the guilty plea would have 

unjustly rewarded Miller for his breach and disrupted the 

sentencing process. United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 184, 189 

(3d Cir. 1999) (“defendant’s breach of the plea agreement does 

not permit him to withdraw his guilty plea”); see also United 

States v. Bowe, 309 F.3d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Double 
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Jeopardy Clause cannot be applied to reward [defendant] with a 

type of punishment less severe than that provided for in his 

plea agreement when the less severe punishment was obtained only 

by his breach of his plea agreement.”). We therefore conclude 

that the district court properly voided the plea agreement. 

II.

Miller next contends that the district court erred in 

combining his guilty plea to the information with his guilty 

plea to the indictment. To the extent Miller challenges the 

validity of his guilty pleas, his contention fails. Our review 

of the transcripts of the guilty plea hearings leads us to

conclude that the district court complied with the requirements

of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Miller’s 

pleas. The court ensured that both of Miller’s guilty pleas 

were knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, and 

that Miller understood the rights he was relinquishing by 

pleading guilty and the sentence he faced. Moreover, the 

court’s order voiding the plea agreement did not force Miller to 

plead guilty to both the firearms and drug charges. That Miller 

was not free to withdraw his guilty plea to the firearms charges 

does not mean that he entered the plea involuntarily. Likewise, 

the Government’s ability to pursue the drug charges did not 

compel Miller to plead guilty. We therefore conclude that the 

district court properly accepted both of Miller’s guilty pleas.
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III.

Miller also contends that the district court erred in 

applying several offense-level enhancements at sentencing. In 

determining whether the district court properly applied the 

sentencing Guidelines, this court reviews its interpretation of 

the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. 

United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2004).

A.

Miller contends that the district court erred in 

applying an enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual (USSG) § 2K2.1(b)(4) (2012) based on his possession of a 

firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number. Miller 

asserts that “there is insufficient evidence to prove that the 

said firearm that allegedly had an obliterated serial number was 

intentionally possessed by the Defendant with full knowledge of 

the fact.” This contention is meritless. The Government 

presented ample evidence—including Miller’s stipulation, an 

investigating agent’s testimony, and a photograph of the 

firearm—that Miller possessed a firearm with an obliterated 

serial number, and the Guidelines specifically indicate that 

knowledge of the obliterated serial number is not required. 

USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4) cmt. n.8(B); see United States v. Brown, 514 

F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2008) (enhancement for obliterated serial 

number is a strict liability enhancement). Accordingly, we 
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conclude that the district court properly applied the 

enhancement. 

B.

Miller next argues that the Government presented 

insufficient evidence to support an enhancement for use of a 

minor to commit an offense. USSG § 3B1.4. “‘Used or attempted 

to use includes’ directing, commanding, encouraging, 

intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, or soliciting.” 

USSG § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1. The Government presented ample evidence, 

including Miller’s factual stipulation and an investigating 

agent’s testimony, that Miller used a person under eighteen to 

assist him by carrying and producing firearms for sale. United 

States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 513-14 (4th Cir. 2001). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly 

applied the enhancement.

C.

Miller argues that the district court erred in 

imposing a four-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) 

based on its finding that he engaged in the trafficking of 

firearms. The enhancement applies if the defendant transferred 

two or more firearms to another individual, knowing or having 

reason to believe that the other individual intended to use or 

dispose of the firearms unlawfully. USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) cmt. 

n.13(A). Miller contends that the Government failed to prove 
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that he knew or had reason to believe that the buyers intended 

to use or dispose of the firearms unlawfully. This contention 

fails. The Government presented sufficient evidence that Miller 

had reason to believe that his buyers would use or dispose of 

the firearms unlawfully, including that fact the buyers also 

purchased large quantities of crack cocaine from Miller, that 

the buyers indicated they were purchasing the guns to sell in 

other cities for a profit, the inflated prices paid by the 

buyers, and the clandestine nature of the transactions. In 

fact, Miller admitted that he had reason to suspect that the 

firearms would be disposed of unlawfully. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the district court properly applied the 

enhancement.

D.

Miller next contends that the Government presented 

insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Miller was 

an organizer or manager of the offense and therefore the 

district court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement 

pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1. To merit the enhancement, the 

defendant must have exercised managerial responsibility over 

other persons, rather than over property, assets, or activities. 

USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. The Government presented evidence that 

Miller occupied a managerial role over multiple associates by 

directing them to complete menial tasks, such as carrying and 
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producing the firearms and driving, while Miller retained the 

authority to plan the transactions, negotiate prices, and 

collect the money. See United States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160, 

165-66 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Leadership over only one other 

participant is sufficient as long as there is some control 

exercised.”) Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 

properly applied the enhancement.

E.

Finally, Miller asserts error in the imposition of a 

two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. USSG § 3C1.1. 

The Government claims that Miller obstructed justice by 

providing false information and failing to cooperate during a

debriefing and in testimony before a grand jury. Miller 

contends that his claim of full responsibility for and refusal 

to implicate others in his offenses did nothing to obstruct his 

own investigation or prosecution. However, this contention must 

fail. 

As part of his plea agreement, Miller agreed to a 

stipulation of facts describing his offense and relevant 

conduct. However, during his debriefing and before the grand 

jury, Miller directly contradicted various details contained in 

the stipulation. Miller repeatedly lied about his associates’

involvement, repeatedly claimed not to know or remember various 

details of his offense, and repeatedly attempted to “plead the 
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Fifth.” Miller thereby attempted to obstruct justice with 

respect to his own investigation, prosecution, or sentencing, 

and Miller’s actions related to his offense of conviction and 

relevant conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court properly applied the enhancement.

We therefore affirm Miller’s convictions and sentence. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED