alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mae DAVIDSON, Defendant-Appellant, v. Beverly DAVIDSON, Plaintiff-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

Dec. 10, 1954.

Fred R. Brannon, Jr., New Smyrna Beach, for appellant.

David L. Shannon, New Smyrna Beach, for appellee.

WEHLE, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff-appellee will be referred to herein as the husband and the defendant-appellant as the wife.

The wife in 1952 sued her husband for divorce and obtained service by publication .alleging the husband’s residence to be unknown. A decree pro confesso was entered and the case proceeded to final decree in October 1952.

In April 1953 the husband filed a bill in the nature of a bill of review seeking to set aside the divorce, alleging that the wife had fraudulently secured constructive service by means of a false affidavit. The wife was personally served in the proceeding on April 10, 1953 and filed no appearance or pleadings. The husband did not take a decree pro confesso but on May 8, 1953, filed an amended bill in the nature of a bill of review which amended bill was identical with the original bill except for two minor and insignificant changes. The wife had meanwhile left Florida and the husband did not serve on her the amended bill in the nature of a review. On June 30, 1953, the husband proceeded to take a decree pro confesso on the original bill in the nature of a review and the wife’s default thereon. The matter was referred to a special examiner who took testimony and filed a report. Before final judgment was entered thereon the wife (on October 1, 1953) moved to vacate the decree pro confesso and for permission to file an answer to the amended bill in the nature of a bill of review, claiming that the filing of the amended bill superseded the original bill. The Chancellor denied the motion and entered final judgment on the original bill, setting aside the divorce.

The sole question presented here is whether the filing (but not serving) of an amended bill supersedes an original bill on which personal service was secured and which opposing party had failed to answer or otherwise contest.

The wife was properly served with the original bill in the nature of a bill of review, was acquainted with its content and purpose, and chose to ignore it. The filing of an amended bill, which was not served on the wife and of whose existence she did not even know, did not in any way prejudice the wife or mislead her to her injury. She was in default on the original bill and the husband had the right to take judgment in accordance with the allegations and prayers of the original bill.

The decree pro confesso entered on the original bill in the nature of a bill of review, the order denying appellant’s motion to vacate the decree pro confesso, and the order granting the relief prayed for by the bill in the nature of a bill of review, which order vacated the final decree of the divorce between the parties, are each affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., and HOBSON and DREW, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Raffaela Forte, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance based upon a sale of cocaine to an undercover police officer. On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict him. He claims that the evidence establishes merely that he was present when the accomplice made the sale to the officer and that there is no evidence to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony that the defendant supplied the cocaine for the sale or that he received any money therefrom.

The corroboration required by CPL 60.22 (1) must consist of " 'evidence from an independent source of some material fact tending to show that defendant was implicated in the crime’ ” *(People v Moses,*63 NY2d 299, 306, quoting *People v Kress,*284 NY 452, 460). The independent corroborative evidence need only connect defendant to the commission of the crime; it need not prove that defendant committed it *(see, People v Hudson,*51 NY2d 233, 238) and need not independently establish each element of the crime *(see, People v Cunningham,*48 NY2d 938, 940; *People v Edge,*127 AD2d 889, 890, *lv denied*70 NY2d 711).

From our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient. The proof at trial established that the undercover officer went to the home of the accomplice to purchase cocaine; that he had to wait there for the accomplice’s "source of supply” to arrive in order to consummate *841the sale; that defendant arrived in a maroon Pontiac; that the accomplice met defendant at his car and that they entered the house together; that the accomplice and defendant entered the attic together; that the accomplice then possessed cocaine to sell to the officer; that defendant was physically present when the sale took place; that defendant left the attic after the accomplice received the money from the undercover officer, but remained in the house until after the officer had left; and that defendant left the scene shortly thereafter. This proof established more than defendant’s mere presence at the scene of the crime and sufficiently connected defendant to the sale of cocaine to provide the necessary corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony *(see, People v Bolden,*161 AD2d 1126; *People v Comfort,*151 AD2d 1019, *lv denied*74 NY2d 807; *People v Chamberlain,*38 AD2d 306, 310).

We further conclude that the convictions were not against the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495) and that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term of five years to life on the criminal sale conviction and a concurrent indeterminate term of 5 to 15 years on the criminal possession conviction. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe County Court, Wisner, J.—criminal sale of controlled substance, second degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Doerr, Pine and Law-ton, JJ.
**EXHIBIT 99.15**

**Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18****of the United States Code**

I, Thomas M. O’Flynn, Chief Financial Officer of PSEG Energy Holdings LLC, to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the Quarterly Report of PSEG Energy Holdings LLC on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2003 (the “Periodic Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of PSEG Energy Holdings LLC.

 

|   |   |   |   |                                                                             |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |        |   |   | /s/ Thomas M. O’Flynn                                                       |
|   |   |   |   |                                                                                  |
|   |   |   |   | Thomas M. O’FlynnPSEG Energy Holdings LLCChief Financial OfficerMay 2, 2003 |
194 La. 985

#### Succession of BURG.

No. 35730.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 1, 1940.

*514Benjamin Y. Wolf, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Geo. Montgomery, of New Orleans, for appellee.

FOURNET, Justice.

This case is before us on the appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal taken -by the Recorder of Mortgages for the Parish of Orleans from a judgment ordering him to cancel and erase from the records of his office a general and special mortgage in favor of the minors Louisa Augusta, Edith Ruth, and Philip J. Burg, on the ground that appellant, having no interest in the matter, is without right to appeal from the judgment, it being mover’s contention that the natural tutor and under-tutor ad hoc appointed by the court are the only parties interested in protecting the' rights of the minors.

It is revealed by the record that Mrs. Lorraine Labradle Zay, having purchased the property upon which there was a special and general mortgage in favor of the minors, ruled their natural tutor and under-tutor, as well as the Recorder of Mortgages for the Parish of Orleans, to show cause why these encumbrances should not be cancelled and erased, and, from.the judgment of the lower court ordering him to cancel same, the recorder has appealed.

Under the express provisions of the Code of Practice, the Recorder of Mortgages, having been made a party to these proceedings,’ is entitled to appeal from the judgment as. a matter of right. Articles 564 and 565. See, also, State ex rel. Graham and Dubuclet v. Judge, 23 La.Ann. 595; Tharp v. Edmiston, 175 La. 1075, 145 So. 12. Moreover, we think that he (the Recorder of Mortgages) was not only a necessary party to the proceedings (Cappel v. Hundley, 168 La. 15, 121 So. 176), but, being bonded “* * * for the faithful execution of the duties required of him by law, and for the payment of such damages as may be sustained by his failure to discharge such duties” (Article 3395, Revised Civil Code), has an ap-pealable interest in this case within the meaning and contemplation of Article 571 of the Code of Practice.

For the reasons assigned, the motion to dismiss is denied.
#### Constance Kirisits, as Adoptive Mother and Guardian of Sherilynn M. Kirisits, an Infant, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

(Claim No. 77401.)

Order unanimously reversed on the law with costs and motion granted. Memorandum: The infant claimant appeals from an order denying her motion for partial summary judgment in her action to recover damages for developmental difficulties stemming from gestational deprivation allegedly resulting from the State’s negligence. As found in a previous action against the State, the claimant’s mother, while pregnant with claimant, was severely injured as a result of the State’s negligent maintenance of a guardrail *(Kirisits v State of New York,*107 AD2d 156). In denying the infant claimant’s motion for summary judgment, the court refused to accord collateral estoppel effect to that judgment, and also apparently found that claimant had not sustained her burden of demonstrating, as a matter of law, that her injuries were caused by the State’s negligence.

Claimant is entitled to partial summary judgment. The State is precluded from relitigating issues common to this claim and the prior claim: the State’s negligence in maintain*861ing the guardrail; claimant’s mother’s freedom from contributory negligence; the absence of negligence by any third party; and the causal relationship between the State’s negligence and the mother’s injuries. Those issues were necessarily decided in the prior action, and the State had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them *(Kaufman v Lilly & Co.,*65 NY2d 449, 455; *Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx,*24 NY2d 65, 69).

Moreover, although the prior action did not involve the causal relationship between the State’s negligence and claimant’s injuries, that issue was addressed by competent medical proof adduced on claimant’s summary judgment motion. The attesting physician averred that, because the accident occurred when claimant’s mother was six weeks pregnant and caused her to be comatose for the duration of her pregnancy, the mother’s injuries "severely compromised the intrauterine well-being and gestational environment” of claimant at a "critical time in her development” and thus, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, claimant’s developmental problems were "causally related to and were brought about by” the injuries sustained by claimant’s mother as a result of the accident. Claimant sustained her burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of causation and the State failed to adduce any medical proof in opposition. Thus, claimant is entitled to partial summary judgment on liability. (Appeal from order of Court of Claims, NeMoyer, J.—summary judgment.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Denman, Green, Balio and Lowery, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6917 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6917

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 301 East Congress Parkway in Crystal Lake, Illinois, as the ``Ryan 
                  J. Cummings Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 3, 2022

 Mr. Casten (for himself, Mr. Rush, Ms. Kelly of Illinois, Ms. Newman, 
 Mr. Garcia of Illinois, Mr. Quigley, Mr. Danny K. Davis of Illinois, 
  Mr. Krishnamoorthi, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Schneider, Mr. Foster, Mr. 
   Bost, Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois, Ms. Underwood, Mrs. Miller of 
 Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger, Mrs. Bustos, and Mr. LaHood) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and 
                                 Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 301 East Congress Parkway in Crystal Lake, Illinois, as the ``Ryan 
                  J. Cummings Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RYAN J. CUMMINGS POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 301 East Congress Parkway in Crystal Lake, Illinois, shall 
be known and designated as the ``Ryan J. Cummings Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Ryan J. 
Cummings Post Office Building''.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of Raymond A. LaMorie, Petitioner, v Daniel W. Joy et al., Respondents.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, *inter alia,*to prohibit the respondents, Daniel W. Joy, a Justice of the Supreme Court, and John J. Santucci, the District Attorney of Queens County, from taking any further proceedings in connection with Queens County indictment Number 4127/89.

Adjudged that the petition is denied and the proceeding is dismissed, on the merits, without costs or disbursements.

"Because of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court—in cases where judicial authority is challenged —acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers” *(Matter of Holtzman v Goldman, 71*NY2d 564, 569; *accord, Matter of Rush v Mordue,*68 NY2d 348, 352). Inasmuch as the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to this remedy which transcends a question of substantive or procedural law, and which could not otherwise be safeguarded through the alternative remedy of appeal *(see, Matter of Lipari v Owens,*70 NY2d 731; *Matter of Rush v Mordue,*68 NY2d 348, *supra; Matter of Molea v Marasco,*64 NY2d 718), the proceeding is dismissed. Kunzeman, J. P., Rubin, Eiber, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-31134

Conference Calendar

NATHAN ROLLINS

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

KEITH BICKHAM, Major; JOHNNY GERALD, Major; WAYNE KENNEDY,

Sergeant Master; ERIC MANNING, Sergeant; RICK WARREN, Lieutenant;

ROBERT TANNER, Warden; B-TEAM EXTENDED LOCKDOWN OFFICERS

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:05-CV-1961

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Nathan Rollins, Louisiana prisoner # 131530, appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against various Louisiana

Department of Corrections officers. He also moves for oral argument on appeal

and for the exclusion of evidence introduced in the district court. 

Rollins argues on appealthatthe evidence does not support the magistrate

judge’s determination, which the district court adopted, that Rollins’s excessive

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 10, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-31134

2

force claims against Officers Keith Bickham, Johnny Gerald, and Rick Warren

were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. However, Rollins has

not demonstrated that the magistrate judge’s factual and credibility

determinations concerning these claims constituted clear error. See Baldwin v.

Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Rollins does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his claims

against the Washington Correctional Institute, Officer Robert Tanner, and

Officer Wayne Kennedy for failure to exhaust administrative remedies or, in the

case of Officer Kennedy, as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Accordingly, he has abandoned these claims. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County

Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). 

AFFIRMED; ALL PENDING MOTIONS DENIED.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7048 

To prohibit the Secretary of Veterans Affairs from replacing physician anesthesiologists with certified registered nurse anesthetists under the health 

care system of the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 9, 2022 

Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia (for himself, Mr. TURNER, and Mr. GARBARINO) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 

Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Secretary of Veterans Affairs from replacing 

physician anesthesiologists with certified registered nurse 

anesthetists under the health care system of the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protect Lifesaving An5 esthesia Care for Veterans Act of 2022’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7048 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON REPLACEMENT OF PHYSICIAN AN2 ESTHESIOLOGISTS UNDER HEALTH CARE 

3 SYSTEM OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AF4 FAIRS. 

5 (a) PROHIBITION.—The Secretary of Veterans Af6 fairs may not— 

7 (1) modify the policy of the Department of Vet8 erans Affairs relating to anesthesia care in a manner 

9 that would provide any medical professional other 

10 than a physician anesthesiologist with full practice 

11 authority for the furnishment of anesthesia care to 

12 veterans under the laws administered by the Sec13 retary (including by providing certified registered 

14 nurse anesthetists with such full practice authority); 

15 or 

16 (2) finalize, implement, or enforce the provi17 sions relating to anesthesia care of the proposed rule 

18 titled ‘‘Advanced Practice Registered Nurses’’ and 

19 published in the Federal Register on May 25, 2016 

20 (81 Fed. Reg. 33155), or any substantially similar 

21 rule. 

22 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec23 tion shall be construed to limit the authority of the Sec24 retary of Veterans Affairs to issue any short-term emerVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:24 Mar 14, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7048.IH H7048

pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 7048 IH

1 gency order relating to the safety, care, or well-being of 

2 veterans during surgical procedures. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

SUSANA BALDWIN, )

a/k/a SUSANA SANCHES LUVIANO )

BALDWIN, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-2370

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed April 3, 2019.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk 

County; Keith Spoto, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and 

Clark Green, Assistant Public Defender, 

Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

VILLANTI, KHOUZAM, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
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 Home Economic Research & Data Statistical Releases and Historical Data
 DDP Print
   Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization - G.17 Current Release
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 Annual Revision (400 KB PDF) (ASCII)  Table 4 [1]
 Item
Revised Growth Rates
Difference betweenrevised and earlier rates(percentage points)2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011Total IP
2.5
-3.5
-11.4
5.4
4.0
-.2
.2
-.3
.1
-.1MARKET GROUPConsumer goods
.4
-4.9
-6.9
1.1
2.3
-.4
.3
.4
-3.1
.3Durable
1.6
-11.2
-16.6
8.2
7.1
-.3
.1
-.7
-2.9
-.4Nondurable
.1
-2.8
-3.9
-.7
1.0
-.4
.4
.7
-3.2
.4Business equipment
4.5
-2.4
-18.2
8.3
8.2
.2
.1
-1.9
.6
-2.6Defense and space equipment
18.9
7.0
-4.2
4.1
2.6
.6
-.9
-5.5
-.9
.4Construction supplies
-1.1
-9.3
-23.0
3.9
5.5
.2
.3
-.4
.0
.6Business supplies
.8
-4.1
-10.6
2.1
1.3
-.9
.7
-.6
1.0
-.4Materials
3.6
-2.7
-11.5
8.4
4.6
-.1
.0
.1
2.1
.0Non-energy
4.5
-4.8
-17.1
11.0
4.9
-.1
.0
.0
3.6
-.2Energy
1.9
.6
-2.2
4.1
3.9
.0
.0
.2
-.5
.4INDUSTRY GROUPManufacturing[2]
2.7
-4.8
-13.8
5.7
4.3
-.3
.2
-.4
.4
-.2Manufacturing (NAICS)
3.1
-4.8
-13.8
6.3
4.8
.0
.0
-.4
.4
-.2Durable manufacturing
4.8
-3.7
-19.0
10.3
7.7
-.1
-.1
-1.0
2.4
-.6Nondurable manufacturing
1.2
-5.9
-7.7
2.2
1.7
.0
.0
.4
-1.5
.0Other manufacturing (non-NAICS)
-5.8
-6.4
-13.8
-5.2
-6.4
-4.5
4.3
.0
-1.3
-2.0Mining
.6
1.0
-5.1
5.1
6.0
.1
.2
.0
-.7
.2Utilities
3.4
-.1
-2.5
3.5
-.3
.0
.0
.1
-.5
.1     Return to table   Return to table                 Return to top
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Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-12-0001078

24-JUN-2014

09:34 AM
EX-35 (b)
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

MSM 2006-7

I, Michael De Francesco, an authorized officer of GreenPoint Mortgage Funding,
Inc. (the "Servicer"), certify that:

1. A review of the Servicer's activities during the period from and including
January 1, 2006 through and including December 31, 2006 (or applicable
portion thereof) and of the Servicer's performance under the applicable
servicing agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable servicing agreement
in all material respects throughout such period.

Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them
in the Agreement.

February 28, 2007




/s/ Michael De Francesco
Michael De Francesco
Senior Vice President, Loan Administration