J-S43032-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EMANUEL HARMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 118 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Order December 21, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0001769-2008

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 24, 2018

Appellant Emanuel Harman appeals from the order dismissing as 

untimely his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant argues that his guilty plea was defective in

light of the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history 

of this case as follows:

[Appellant] is a native of South Sudan and a citizen of Sudan. 

[Appellant] was admitted to the United States at Chicago, IL on 

or about July 25, 2003 as a refugee. On November 10, 2005, 

[Appellant]’s status was adjusted to a lawful permanent resident 

of the United States. 

On January 5, 2009, [Appellant] ple[d] guilty to Theft by Unlawful 

Taking, 18 § Pa.C.S.A. 3921(a), and Receiving Stolen Property, 

18 § Pa.C.S.A. 3925(a). On March 2, 2009, [Appellant] was 

sentenced to 60 months of probation. [Appellant did not take a 

direct appeal]. On August 23, 2010, [Appellant] was revoked and

resentenced to the same 60 months of county probation. On 

January 4, 2013, [Appellant] was again revoked and then 
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resentenced to 9 to 23.5 months’ incarceration at the Erie County 

Prison with 119 days credit for time served followed by 3 years of 

county probation. [Appellant did not appeal from the January 4, 

2013 revocation sentence.]

On or about September 20, 2016, [Appellant] received a form I862 Notice to Appear (“I-862”) stating he was required to appear 

before an Immigration Judge. The I-862 stated [Appellant] is 

subject to removal from the United States pursuant to section 

237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("Act"), 

as amended, in that, at any time after admission, [Appellant] was 

convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in section 

101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, a law relating to a theft offense 

(including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which 

the term of imprisonment [of] at least 1 year was imposed. 

Specifically, the I-862 stated [Appellant] was convicted on March 

2, 2009 for the offense of Theft by Unlawful Taking for which a 

term of 60 months of probation was originally sentenced on March 

2, 2009. [Appellant] was then resentenced on January 4, 2013 to 

a term of 9 to 23.5 months of incarceration. [Appellant] was also 

convicted on March 2, 2009 for the offense of Receiving Stolen 

Property which a term of 60 months of probation was originally 

sentenced on March 2, 2009. [Appellant] was then resentenced 

on January 4, 2013 to merge with Count 3 - Theft by Unlawful 

Taking for sentencing purposes.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 11/17/17, at 2-4; see also PCRA Ct. Op., 3/18/17 

at 1.

Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition was docketed on August 7, 2017. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on October 6, 

2017. The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss on 

November 17, 2017, concluding that Appellant’s petition was facially untimely 

and failed to prove any of the time-bar exceptions. See Rule 907 Notice, 
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11/17/17. Appellant did not file a counseled response.1 On December 21, 

2017, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing the petition. This timely 

appeal followed.2

Appellant presents the following question for review:

Whether the instant guilty pleas were deficient in that neither the 

Commonwealth, the [c]ourt nor [Appellant’s] attorney ever 

apprised [Appellant] of the potential consequence of his guilty 

pleas and resultant conviction arising therefrom causing him to 

potentially be deported as violations of INS law under Padilla v. 

Kentucky . . . ?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (emphasis added).

Appellant argues that his 2009 guilty plea was deficient, as he was never 

apprised of the potential immigration consequences of entering a plea. Id. at 

4. In support, Appellant relies on Padilla, in which the United States Supreme 

Court held that counsel has an affirmative duty to inform a defendant of the 

deportation consequences of entering a plea. Id. at 4-5; see Padilla, 559 

U.S. at 356. Appellant argues that Padilla imposes a new constitutional right, 

and therefore, should apply to his case retroactively. Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

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1 The record contains Appellant’s pro se letter responding to the PCRA court’s 

Rule 907 notice and asserting governmental interference based on the trial 

court’s, the Commonwealth’s, and his plea counsel’s failure to inform him of 

the deportation consequences of his plea. However, Appellant did not explain 

how the alleged interference prevented him from filing a PCRA petition several 

years after Padilla was decided or nearly one year after receiving notice of 

the deportation proceedings. 

2 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 19, 2018, and a timely, 

court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on 

February 9, 2018. The PCRA court entered an opinion on March 13, 2018.
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Finally, he states that “the instant PCRA [p]etition and invocation of his rights 

is a timely exercise and filing in that governmental interference served to 

deprive him of the timely filing of his pleading” Id.

Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to 

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

It is well settled that “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional 

requisite.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 175 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). A PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent 

petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is final “at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time 

for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

An untimely PCRA petition may be considered if one of the following 

statutory exceptions applies:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

has held that the PCRA does not permit “ad hoc equitable exceptions to the 

PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.” 

Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted).

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on April 1, 2009, 

when the time for taking a direct appeal expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1), (3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Therefore, Appellant had until April 1, 

2010 to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant 

filed the instant petition on August 7, 2017, more than seven years after the 

deadline. Thus, his petition was facially untimely.3

Appellant’s reliance on Padilla is unavailing. In Chaidez v. United 

States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), the United States Supreme Court held that 

Padilla does not apply retroactively on collateral review. Chaidez, 568 U.S. 

at 344. Thus, Padilla cannot serve as the basis for excusing Appellant’s 

untimely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii); see also

Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 496 n.6 (Pa. 2016) (“Padilla

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3 Because Appellant challenges the validity of his initial plea in this case, we 

use the March 2, 2009 date of his original conviction to determine the facial 

timeliness of his PCRA petition. Even if Appellant was challenging his January 

4, 2013 sentence following revocation of his probation, the instant petition 

would be untimely on its face. 
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does not apply retroactively and may not serve as the basis for a collateral 

attack on a conviction which became final before that decision.”). 

Moreover, Appellant’s bare assertion that the government interfered 

with his ability to raise a claim based on Padilla is wholly undeveloped in his 

brief. Thus, we decline to address it. See Commonwealth v. McDermitt, 

66 A.3d 810, 814 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[I]t is a well settled principle of appellate 

jurisprudence that undeveloped claims are waived and unreviewable on 

appeal.” (citation omitted)). 

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has failed to satisfy any 

exception to the PCRA time bar.4 Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in 

dismissing the petition as untimely. See Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1242.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/24/2018

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4 We add that it is unclear whether Appellant is still serving the sentence in 

this matter. See Descardes, 136 A.3d at 503. Nevertheless, because 

Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely, we need not determine whether he 

remains eligible for relief under the PCRA.