J-S50023-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARREO MARQUIST TATE 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 216 WDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0003309-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Marreo Marquist Tate (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. Upon review, we remand with instructions.

[Appellant] was charged with Aggravated Assault, Recklessly 

Endangering Another Person, two counts of Terroristic Threats, 

Simple Assault, Intimidation of Witnesses or Victims, Disorderly 

Conduct, and Possessing Instruments of Crime.FN1 The charges 

arose on July 24, 2016, when [Appellant] and the victim, Javonna 

Moff[a]tt (“Moff[a]tt”), began engaging in a verbal altercation 

after Moffett arrived home from work and found [Appellant] in her 

home. The verbal altercation escalated and [Appellant] poked 

and/or punched Moffatt in the face and threw her into a television 

console, breaking the television and console and causing Moffatt 

to fall against a coffee table. Moffatt told police [Appellant] 

pointed a semi-automatic handgun at her head and threatened to 

shoot/kill her and her family if the police were contacted.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S50023-19

- 2 -

FN1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(4); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705; 

2 counts 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2701(a)(3); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5503(a)(4); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(b), respectively.

After a jury trial on February 6th and 7th, 2017, [Appellant] was 

convicted of Count Three, Terroristic Threats; Count 5, Simple 

Assault; and Count 6 Intimidation of Witnesses or Victims. Counts 

One and Four, Aggravated Assault and Terroristic Threats, were 

withdrawn by the Commonwealth. Count 7, Intimidation of 

Witnesses or Victims, was dismissed by the Court and [Appellant] 

was acquitted of Counts 2 and 8, Recklessly Endangering Another 

Person and Possessing Instruments of Crime.

On March 31, 2017, [Appellant] was sentenced as follows:

Count 3 – Terroristic Threats: 16 – 32 months of 

incarceration consecutive to Docket Number 2944 of 

2015;

Count 5 – Simple Assault: 12-24 months of 

incarceration consecutive to Count 3; and 

Count 6 – Intimidation of Witnesses or Victims – 24 

months of probation consecutive to Count 5.

On April 10, 2017, a Post Sentence Motion was filed requesting 

the sentences be imposed concurrently rather than consecutively. 

Said Motion was denied. A direct appeal was not filed.

On October 27, 2017, [Appellant] timely filed a pro se Motion for 

Post Conviction Collateral Relief alleging ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel for failing to object to alleged prejudicial statements 

by the Commonwealth and failing to object to the imposition of an 

illegal sentence based on an incorrect prior record score. PCRA 

counsel was appointed and filed Supplemental Motions of Monarch 

22, 2018 and August 6, 2018, reiterating [Appellant’s] claims.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 12/17/18, at 

1-2.

On December 17, 2018, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to 

dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Rule 907 of 
J-S50023-19

- 3 -

the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant did not file a 

response to the court’s notice, and on January 11, 2019, the PCRA court 

dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Both 

the PCRA court and Appellant have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.

Appellant states his issues as follows:

A. Whether the PCRA Court erred in failing to find that the 

appellant was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel to 

object to prejudicial questions posed by the Commonwealth in 

which it was directly conveyed to the jury that the appellant 

was known to lose his cool and that he was known to carry a 

gun?

B. Whether the sentence imposed was illegal in that the incorrect 

prior record score was applied?

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

Upon review of Appellant’s brief, we are constrained to find both of his 

issues waived for failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Rule 2111(a)(8) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 

requires that every appellant’s brief shall contain, inter alia, a distinct section 

setting forth its relevant legal arguments in support of its questions involved. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(8). Rule 2119 further mandates: 

(a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as many 

parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the 

head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively 

displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such 

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent. 
J-S50023-19

- 4 -

(b) Citations of authorities. Citations of authorities in briefs 

shall be in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 126 governing citations of 

authorities. 

(c) Reference to record. If reference is made to the pleadings, 

evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other matter appearing 

in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate 

connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the 

place in the record where the matter referred to appears (see

Pa.R.A.P. 2132). 

(d) Synopsis of evidence. When the finding of, or the refusal 

to find, a fact is argued, the argument must contain a synopsis of 

all the evidence on the point, with a reference to the place in the 

record where the evidence may be found. 

(e) Statement of place of raising or preservation of issues. 

Where under the applicable law an issue is not reviewable on 

appeal unless raised or preserved below, the argument must set 

forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote thereto, 

either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the 

statement of the case which set forth the information relating 

thereto as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), or substantially the 

same information. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(e). 

Our Supreme Court has stated:

The briefing requirements[,] scrupulously delineated in our 

appellate rules[,] are not mere trifling matters of stylistic 

preference; rather, they represent a studied determination by our 

Court and its rules committee of the most efficacious manner by 

which appellate review may be conducted so that a litigant’s right 

to judicial review . . . may be properly exercised. Thus, we 

reiterate that compliance with these rules by appellate advocates 

. . . is mandatory.

Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 837-38 (Pa. 2014).

Moreover, “while a person convicted of a crime is guaranteed the right 

to direct appeal under Article V, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 
J-S50023-19

- 5 -

where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation 

to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful 

fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted). See also

Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material 

respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances 

of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if 

the defects are in the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are 

substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.”); see 

also Commonwealth v. Franklin, 823 A.2d 906, 910 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(“These rules ensure that a brief serves its purpose-to permit the appellate 

court to address the assignments on their merits.”) (footnote omitted). Our 

Supreme Court has long held that it is not this Court’s obligation to formulate 

arguments on behalf of an appellant. Johnson, 985 A.2d at 924.

Upon review of Appellant’s brief, we note glaring errors and omissions 

that constitute clear violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and more 

significantly, deprive us of a basis upon which to review Appellant’s claims. 

Commonwealth v. Hakala, 900 A.2d 404, 406 (Pa. Super. 2006). As 

delineated above, Appellant presents two questions for our review. See 

Appellant’s Brief at 2. Appellant’s argument section fails to provide support 

for any of his two issues raised, effectively divesting this Court of any 

meaningful basis for which to review his claims. Moreover, the argument 

section of his brief, which spans a cursory 1⁄2 page, fails to include citations to 
J-S50023-19

- 6 -

legal authority and record citations. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring that an 

appellant develop an argument with citation to and analysis of relevant legal 

authority). 

Our Supreme Court has long held that it is not this Court’s obligation to 

formulate arguments on behalf of an appellant. Commonwealth v. Wright, 

961 A.2d 119, 135 (Pa. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 

A.2d at 924 (stating that “where an appellate brief fails to provide any 

discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the 

issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is 

waived”); Commonwealth v. Clayton, 816 A.2d 217, 221 (Pa. 2002) (“[I]t 

is a well[-]settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that undeveloped claims 

are waived and unreviewable on appeal.”).

In sum, Appellant’s patently defective brief submitted to this Court 

deprives us of any meaningful basis for which to review any of Appellant’s 

claims. We therefore conclude that both of Appellant’s questions presented 

are waived. 

Because all of Appellant’s issues have been waived for purposes of our 

review, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Rosado, 150 A.3d 425 (Pa. 2016), 

we are constrained to hold that Appellant’s counsel was per se ineffective by 

filing a wholly defective appellate brief. Our Supreme Court in Rosado

explained: 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 

that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 

. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. 
J-S50023-19

- 7 -

amend. VI. The right to counsel is not a mere hollow formality 

satisfied by trial alongside a person who happens to be a lawyer, 

but, instead, is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

Generally, an accused asserting that he has been denied his 

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must 

demonstrate that counsel engaged in errors which caused him 

prejudice—i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different . . . However, in certain limited circumstances, including 

the actual or constructive denial of counsel, prejudice may be so 

plain that the cost of litigating the issue of prejudice is unjustified, 

and a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel per se is 

warranted. 

* * *

[T]his Court has . . . held that errors which completely

foreclose appellate review amount to a constructive denial 

of counsel and thus ineffective assistance of counsel per 

se, whereas those which only partially foreclose such review are 

subject to the ordinary [Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 

2052 (U.S. 1984)]/[Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 

(Pa. 1987)] framework. 

Rosado, 150 A.3d at 431-32, 438-39 (some citations and footnotes omitted, 

emphasis added). 

The argument section of Appellant’s brief is so inadequate that it has 

waived all claims on appeal, and therefore, “[C]ounsel has forfeited all 

meaningful appellate review.” Rosado, 150 A.3d at 440; see also Johnson, 

889 A.2d at 623. As evidenced by Counsel’s waiver of both of Appellant’s

questions presented, Appellant was denied the assistance of counsel. Thus, 

Counsel was per se ineffective, and we remand the matter to the trial court 

for the appointment of new counsel to represent Appellant on appeal. 
J-S50023-19

- 8 -

For the foregoing reasons, we remand Appellant’s case to the trial court. 

Upon remand, we direct the trial court to withhold compensation from counsel 

for his appointment and representation in this matter. The trial court is 

directed to appoint competent appellate counsel within fifteen days of the date 

of this memorandum. Following his or her appointment, new counsel shall 

undertake all appropriate measures, including, if deemed necessary, the filing 

of a cogent appellate brief on behalf of Appellant. 

Case remanded with instructions. Panel jurisdiction retained.