The Honor able Solomon Oliver, J r., Dist rict J udg e for the Northern Dis trict of Ohio, sitting * by desig nation. 

## FIL ED APR 28, 2010 LEO NARD GREEN, Clerk NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0261n.06 No. 08-5279 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,
v. ED WARD EV AN S, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

BEFORE: M OORE an d WHIT E, Circuit Judges, and OLIVER, District Judge. * HELE NE N. WHITE, Circuit Jud ge . D e fe nd ant E dw ard Ev ans c ha lle ng e s the 57 -m on th

se ntenc e im po sed b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt

fo llo wi nghis g uil ty -p le a c on vic tio n o f b e inga

fe lon in po sse ssi on of a fi re arm , 18 U .S. C. § 92 2( g )( 1) . D e fe nd ant m a int a ins his ba se of fe ns e le ve l sh ou ld have been calc ulated as 20, based on a single prior fe lony

conviction of a

crime of violence, r ather than 24, base d on two prior fe lony convictions of cr imes of violence . Be cause the district court’s analy sis does not comport with the modified categ orica l a pproac h set forth in Begay v. United States , 553 U.S. 137 (2008), which was issued during the pendenc y of this a ppeal, we vacate the sente nce and remand t o the di strict court for rec onsideration whether the challeng ed prior conviction i s of a ‘cr ime of violence ’ in light of Begay and thi s c ourt ’s re c e nt c a se s.No. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

Evans’s Guide lines rang e would be 37 to 46 months if calc ulated usi ng a base offe nse leve l 1 of 20, base d on a sing le prior c onviction of a violent fe lony . U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)( 4)(a ). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.1, which states: “‘Crime of violence’ has the mea ning g iven 2 that ter m in § 4B 1. 2( a ) an d App lic a tio n Not e 1 of the Com me nta ry to § 4B 1. 2. ” ; se e als o Bartee , 529 F.3d at 359. - 2 - I Evans plea ded g uilty

of beinga fe lon in possession of a fire arm. His pre sentenc e re port (PSR) c alculate d his total offe nse level at 21, based on a base level of 24 for two pri o r f elony convictions of cr imes of violence , U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)( 2), and a three -leve l reduc tion for ac cepta nce of re sponsibili ty . Wit h a cr iminal hist ory cate g ory o f I V, E v an s ’s Guidelines ra ng e wa s 57 to 71

mon ths

. Evans objec ted to the PSR ’s Guidelines c alculation, ar gu i n g that his prior conviction of statutory rape (in Tenne ssee) does not qua lify as a cr ime of violence under U .S.S.G. § 2K2.1. The 1 district court over

ruled Eva ns’s objection , an d s entenc ed him to 57 months of imprisonm ent and three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. A W e r eview de novo a d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e te r mi n a ti o n th a t an o f

f e n s e c o n s ti tute s a “ c r im e of violence” under the Guidelines. United States v. Bartee , 529 F.3d 357, 358 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Hargrov e , 4 16 F .3 d 4 86 , 4 94 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ). Th e te rm “ c ri me of

vio le nc e ” in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 is defined by ref ere nce to U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2, the ca ree r-of fende r provision, which 2 pr ov ide s in

pe rt ine nt p art :No. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

- 3 - (a ) T he te rm

“ c ri me of

vio le nc e ” me ans any of

fe ns e un de r fe de ra l or sta te law, punis ha ble by imprisonment for a ter

m exceeding one y ear , that-- (1) ha s as an e lement the use, atte m p t ed use, or threatened use of phy sical forc e ag ainst the person of another , or (2) is burg lary

of a dw elling, ar s o n or extortion, invol ves the use of explos ives, or other

wise involves conduc t that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury

to another. Th e Com me nt t o U .S. S.G . § 4B 1. 2, n. 1, state s in pe rt ine nt p a

rt : 1. For purposes of this g uideline--

“ Cr ime of vio le nc e ” inc lud e s mu

rd e r, mans la

ug hte r, kid

na pp ing , a g g ra

vate d a ssa ult , forc ible sex off

enses, r obbery , arson, e x tortion, ex tortionate extension of cre dit, and b u rgl ary of a dw elling. O ther off enses a re inc luded as “ crimes of violence” if (A) that offe nse has as an element the us e, attempted use , or threatened use of phy sical fo rc e a g a ins t th e pe rs on

of ano the r, or (B) th e c on du c t se t f or th ( i.e ., e xpre ssl y char g ed) in the c ount of which t he def endant wa s convicted involved use of explos ives

. . . or, by

its nature, pre sented a

serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another. I n deter mining whe ther a

prior convic tion is of a violent f elony under § 4B1.2, w e apply the rules deve loped for eng ag ing in the para llel inquiry under the Armed Car eer Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)

. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . A rn old , 58 F.3d 1117, 1121 ( 6th Cir. 1995).

B I n Begay , 553 U.S. at 141-42, the Supreme Court held that New Me x ico’s cr ime of driving under the influence falls outside the scope of the ACCA’s “violent fe lony ” def inition. C onsistent with its prior decis i o n s , t he Court noted that whe ther a crime is a violent f

elony is determined by

c on sid e ri ngthe of

fe ns e g e ne ri c a lly , th a t is , “ in t e rm s of how the law de fi ne s th e of fe ns e and no t in terms of how an individual offe nder might have committed it on a par ticular oc casion.” Id. (citingNo. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

- 4 - Taylor v. United States , 4 95 U. S. 5 75 , 6 02 (1 99 0) ); se e als o United States v. Mosle y , 575 F.3d 603, 606-07 (6th Cir. 2009). The court e x amined the statutory lang uag e and was convince d “that ‘to g ive eff ect . . . to eve ry

cla u s e an d wo rd’ of

this statute, we should rea d the examples as limiti ng the

c ri me s th a t c la

us e (i i) [of

§ 9 24 (e )( 2) (B )] c ov e rs to c ri me s th a t are ro ug hly sim ila r, in k ind a s w e ll as in deg ree of risk posed, to the e x amples themselves.” Begay , 553 U.S. at 14 3 (s ome quotation marks omitted). I n United States v. W

ynn , 579 F.3d 567 , 571-72 (2009) , decide d afte r Begay , this court discussed the “ cate g orica l” and “ modified ca t ego ri cal” approa ches to de termining whether a

c on vic tio n q

ua lif ie s a s a ‘c ri me of vio le nc e ’: To de te rm ine wh e the r a

pr ior c on vic tio n c on sti tut e s a

‘c ri me of vio le nc e ,’ we mus t apply the cate g orica l a

pproac h expressed in Taylor v. United States , 4 9 5 U

. S. 5 7 5 [] (1 9 9 0 ), and ex panded to c onvictions based on g uilty pleas in Shepard v. U

nited States , 544 U.S. 13 [ ] (2005). ‘Under this categ orica l approa ch, the court must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition – not the fac ts underlying the offe nse – to deter

mine wh ether

that definition supports a conc lusion that the conviction was for a

crime of violence.’ Bartee , 529 F.3d at 359 (emphasis adde d) (c i t i n g United States v. Armstead , 467 F .3 d 943 , 947 (6 Cir . 2 00 6) ); Begay , 1 28 S. th Ct. a t 15 84 (‘ [W]e con sid e r the of fe ns e g e ne ri c a lly , th a t is to s ay , w e e xami ne it i n terms of how the law def ines the off

ense a nd no t in terms of how a n individual offe nder mig ht have committed it on a particular occasion.’) There is, however , an e xc e p ti o nto th e c a te g o r ic a l a p p r o a c h [c a ll e d th e “ mo d if ie d c a te g o r ic a l a

p p r o a c h ” ]: “‘[W] hen the statutory

definition [of the prior crime to which the de fenda nt pleaded gu i l ty ] i s ambig uous . . . the court may examine . . . ‘the terms of the char g ing document, the ter

ms of a plea ag ree ment or t ransc ript of colloquy betwee n judge and defe ndant in w hich the fac tual basis for the ple a wa s confirme d by the def endant, or to some compara

ble judicial reco rd o f t h is information.’” Bartee , 529 F.3d at 359 (q u o t i n g Sh e

pa rd , 5 4 4 U

. S. a t 2 6 )

. [C e rta in in te r n a l c it a ti o n s o mi tt e d ].No. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

- 5 - C I n th e ins tant c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly be g an its ana ly sis by

fo c us ingon

the g e ne ri c definition of the off

ense. Id. I n Tenne ssee, statutory rape was d efined at the time of Eva ns’s

c on vic tio n a s: (a) Stat u t o ry ra p e is sex ual pene tration of a vic tim by the def endant or of the defe ndant by

the victim when the victim i s at l east thirtee n (13) but less than e ighte en (1 8) y e ars of

a g e and the de fe nd ant i s at le a st f our ( 4) y e ars old e r t

ha n th e vic tim

.

. . . (c) Statutory

rape is a Class E Fe lony

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-506. Tenne ssee’ s offe nse of statutory rape does not have as an e lement “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of another ,” which w ould rende r it a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2( a). See B egay , 553 U. S. at 141 . N or is i t on e of

the sp e c if

ic a lly

enumer ated of

fense s of § 4B 1.2(a) – burg lary of a dwelling, arson, or ex tortion, or an off ense that involves expl osives. Thus, as in Begay , our foc us is on the “otherw ise” or “ residual” clause

. See Bartee , 529 F.3d at 362. D Whe re the statut or

y de fi n i t i o n o f a p r i o r - c on vic tio n o ff

e ns e inc lud e s b oth

of fe ns e s th a t w ou ld constitute a cr ime of violence under § 4 B1

. 2 an d offe nses that would not, we must utiliz e the modified categ orica l approa ch. Shepard v. U nited States , 5 44 U. S. 1 3, 26 (2 00 5) ; W ynn , 579 F.3dNo. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

This circumstanc e is to be distinguished f ro m c ir c u ms ta n c e s in wh ic h th e statutory

definition 3 of t he offen s e c le ar ly

f a ll s b e y o n d

th e s c o p e o f

§ 4 B 1

. 2

. Wh e r e th e s tatuto r y d e f in it io nd o e s n ot include both offe nses that ar e within the re ach of § 4B1.2 a

nd those that are bey ond it, courts may not look to the documents noted in Sh e pa rd and conclude from those documents that the def endant’ s pr ior c on vic tio n w a s a c tua lly

of a c ri me of vio le nc e , a lth ou g h th e statut or y de fi nit ion

of the of fe ns e does not satisfy

§ 4B1.2. Se e Sh e

pa rd , supra. Th e Af fi davit of Com pla int state s: 4 Th e Co A ff

iant Sg t Lue lle n wa s a ssi g ne d thi s Statut or y Ra pe fi le d und e r M e mph is Police Depa

rtment repor

t . . . T he Affia

nt’s daug hter

. . . was spending the wee kend of [J anuar y 15-17, 2005,] with her g randmother at 1545 Humber . The victim and he r c ou sin

. . . c a lle d th e su sp e c t ( Ed wa rd Ev ans ) a nd his fr ie nd Ky le a [sic ] by ph on e to come ove r and se e them at 1545 Humbe r. The vi ct i m . . . h er cousin . . . and the su sp e c t st art e d to pla

y the g a me tr

uth or da re . T he su sp e c t E dw ard

da re d th e vic tim to go to the r ear

of his SUV and she did. The suspect then da red the victim to take off he r clothes and she did. The suspec t took off his pants and put on a c ondom and had ana l sex with the victim. The victim’s cousin . .

. witnessed the incident. The vic tima dmi tte d th a t sh e a llo we d the su sp e c t to h a ve ana l se x with he r. Th e vic tim thought the suspe ct was c ute and she was willing to do any thing that he aske d of her

. T h e v ic ti m i s th ir

te e ny e ar s o f

a g e an d th e s u s p e c t i s tw e n ty

thr e e y e ar s o f

a g e . []

- 6 - at 572-75. Under a modi fied categ orica l analy sis, the s entenc ing court was oblige d to look to, along

3 with the statutory definition of t he offense,“ ‘the terms of t he charg ing doc ument, the terms of a plea ag ree ment or transc ript of colloquy betwee n judge and defe ndant in which the fa ctual basis for the plea was confirme d by the defe ndant, or to some compar able judicial rec ord of this information.’” Bartee , 5 2 9 F. 3 d

at 3 5 9 (q u o t i n g Sh e

pa rd , 5 4 4 U

. S. a t 2 6 ) to d e te r mi n e w h e th e r

E v an s ’ s p r ior statutory rape conviction is of a c rime of violenc e. The district cour

t had bef ore it the transcr ipt of g uilty -plea proce eding s pertainingto Evans’s
statut or y -r a pe g uil ty ple a , a nd the Af fi davit of Com pla int

. Th e ple a

tr ans c ri pt s ta te s: 4No. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

See , e.g. , Un ite d Stat es v. S awy e rs ( Sawyers II

), 223 F . App’x 475, 476-78 (6th Cir. 2007) 5 (finding serious potential risk of phy sical injury wher e 21-y ear -old defe ndant eng ag ed in ac tiviti es that c oe rc e d 1 5- y e ar- old

g ir l to e ng a g e in m

ult ipl e se xua l a c ts) ; Un ite d S tat es v . Ca mp be ll , 256 F.3d 381, 395-97 (6th Cir. 2001) (holdingthat a convic tion of second- deg ree criminal sexual co nduct - 7 - MS. TA YL OR

[ Assistant Dis trict Attorney Gene ral, Memphis Office ]: Your Honor , in t he ma tte r o f B ri an H awk ins and Ed wa rd Ev ans . * * * The fa cts which g ive rise to this indictment a re on January

–somewher e betwe en the dates of January

15th and J anuar

y 17th of 2005, at 1545 Hu b er t (phonetica lly) the victim, . . . , was spending the wee kend with her gr andmother. The victim and her c ou sin

. . . c a lle d the su sp e c t Mr

. Ev ans and his fr ie nd s to c ome ov e r a nd se e the m. The victim . . . , her cousin

. . . and the suspec t beg an to play the g ame truth or da

re. The s u s p e c t E dw ar d d ar e d th e v ic ti m to g o to th e r e ar o f h is SU V , w h ic h s h e did. The suspect then dare d the victim to take off her clothes, which she did. T he suspec t the n to ok of f his pa nts and pu t on a con do m and ha d sex with the vic tim . T he vic tim a tt h e t i m e w a s 1 3 ye ar s o l d

. T h e s u s p e c t i s 2 3

. T h a to c c u r r e d i nS h e l b y C o u n t y, Tenne ssee. We a sk c ouns e l to sti pu la te tho se wo uld have be e n th e fa c ts h a d th is ma tte r g on e to tr ia l. A sk Yo ur Ho no r t o a c c e pt t

he ne g oti a te d s e ttl e me nt. MR. HAL E [

Assistant Publ ic Defe nder ]: We stipul ate, Your Honor, a n d ask t he Court to a c c e pt. TH E CO UR T: Th e Court wi ll a c c e pt. Foc using on the “other

wise” c lause, the district c ourt soug ht to determine whe ther the pr iorconviction offe nse “ b y i t s nature, pr esente d a ser ious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2., cmt. n.1. De fense co u n s el set forth va rious case s in which this and other
courts have strug g led to a rticulate the line betwee n statutory rape that prese nts a seri o u s p o t ential ri sk of ph y sic a l inj ur

y to ano the r, and statut or

y ra pe that do e s no t. Ce rt a in f a c tor s p re se nt i n th e se

ca s es re p ea t ed l y

t i p p edt h e s ca l es o n e w ay o r t h e o t h er

– m o s t o ft en , t h e a ge o f t h e v i ct i m , t h e a ge of the perpe trator, and whether the situation wa s inhere ntly coer cive. The district court consider ed 5No. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

under Michig an law c onstitut ed a “ crime of violence” based on se x ual contac t with a person be tween 13 and 16 y e ars old

and re la te d b y

blo od to t he de fe nd ant) ; United States v. Grundy , 178 F. App’ x 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublis hed disposition) (holding that f irst-deg ree sexual abuse base d on sexual contact w i t h a p erson less than 12 y ear s old was a c rime of violenc e under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2( a)) ; and United States v. Hargrov e, 416 F.3d 486, 495 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) (h o l d ing that de fe nd ant’ s sex ual batte ry c on vic tio n b a se d o n s e xua l c on du c t w ithhis ste pd a ug hte rs wa s n ot a crime of violence be cause the offe nse did not require either lack of consent or that the stepdaug hters be minors, and the indictment a lso made no re fer ence to the stepdaug hters’ a g es or whe ther the conduct was coer ced or consensua l). These pre- Begay case s may provide a frame of re fer ence for the deg ree o f ri s k as s es s m ent in statutory rape crimes, but they

did not apply

the two-step Begay analy sis, wi t h i ts requisite similar-in-kind and similar-in-de g ree inquiry , and ar e no long er co n t ro l l i n g. - 8 - these fa ctors fr om the pre -Begay case s, determined that in the instant case “the critical poi nt is the immaturity , the y outh of the victim and the co n s i d er able a g e g ap, ten y ear s differ ence [,] of the p e r p e t r a t o r , ” ( J

. A

. 7 8 ) an d

c o n c l u d e d

t h a tt h e o f

f e n s e p r e s e n t e d

a s e r i o u s r i s k

o f p h ys i c a l i n

j u r y. II Be cause the district cou rt ’s analy sis did not comply with the require ments of a modified
cate g orica l approa ch under Begay , and re lied on pre- Begay case s that are no longe r controlling , we must remand. Begay

require s that the sentenc ing c ourt deter mine whether

the prior c onviction is of

a cr ime that is “roug hly

sim i l ar , i n k i n d as we ll as in deg ree of risk posed, to the e x amples themselves [the offe nses enumer ated in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2].” 553 U.S. at 143. After Begay , the Court held in Chambers v. United States , 129 S. Ct . 687, 691-93 (2009) , that I llinois ’ cr ime of fa ilure to repor t for pena l confineme nt does not satisfy the ACCA’s “violent fe lony ” de fi nit ion be c a

us e it d oe s n ot h a ve a s a

n e le me nt t

he us e , atte mpt e d u se or

thr e a te ne d u se of phy sical force ag ainst the person of another, does not consist of burglar y , arson, or ext ortion, or involve the use of explos ives and, “ more c ritically for pr esent purpose s, it does not ‘involve conductNo. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

The Cha mb e rs Court noted: 6 Conceptually

speaking , the cr ime amounts to a form of i n ac tion, a far cry from the “purposef

ul, ‘violent,’ and ‘ag g ressive’ conduct” potentially at issue when an off ender uses explosi ves ag ainst proper ty , commits arson, burg les a dwelling or residenc e, or e ng ag es in ce rtain for ms of extorti on. Cf

. id. [ Begay ] , 553 U.S., at —, 128 S. Ct . at 1586. While an o ff en d er wh o fails to repor

t must of course be doing something at t he relevant ti me, t here is no reason to be lieve that the something poses a ser ious potential risk of phy sic al injury

. Cf

. Jame s , 55 0 U .S. , at 20 3- 20 4, 12 7 S. Ct. 1586. To the contrar

y , an indi vidual who fails to repor t would seem unlikely , not likely , to c all attention to his whe rea bouts by simult aneously

eng ag ing in a dditional vio le nt a nd un lawf ul c on du c t. Cha mb e rs , 129 S. Ct . at 692. Ba rtee had bee n char g ed with att em p t ed C ri minal Sex ual Conduct in the second de g ree , 7 un d er t he subsec tion of the Michig an statute prohibiting sexual contact under circ umstances involving the c ommissi on of anothe r fe lony . The go v ernme nt acknowle dg ed that neither the statutory definition nor the ame nded information specified that the sexual c ontact was with a minor. The district cour

t appar ently

relied on the PSR , which is not a Sh e pa rd -elig ible rec ord, see Barte e, 52 9 F .3 d at 36 1; W

ynn , 5 79 F .3 d at 5 75 -7 6, in c on c lud ingthat th e vic timwa s a min or . T he PSR stated that the prior

conviction ar ose out of a c onsensual sexual relationship betwee n Ba rtee (who was 19 a nd 20 at per

tinent times) and a 15-y ear -old g irl. This court vac ated a nd rema nded, noting (a ft er d i s cu s s i n g Begay ): * * * we c onclude that [U.S.S.G.] § 4B1.2( a)( 2) also should be limited to crimes that are simil ar in both ki nd and deg ree of risk to the enume rate d examples – burg lary of a dw e lli ng , a

rs on , e xtor

tio n, or c ri me s in vo lv ingthe us e of e xplos ive s. Whil e thi s interpre tation na

rrows the scope of convictions that qualify as a “c rime of violenc e” under § 4B 1.2(a) (2), makingi t m o re difficult for the g overnme nt to invoke the - 9 - that prese nts a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.’ ” Id

. (citation and some quotation marks omitted). The Begay Court expl ained that in gaug ing whether a convic tion is si milar in kind 6 to the enum er ated of

fense s, a cour

t should ex amine whe ther the c rime of c onviction involved “purpose ful, violent and ag g ressive c onduct.” Begay , 553 U.S. at 145 (citations and quotation mar ks omitted). This court in Bartee applied Begay and conc luded that “this court’s de termination that 7No. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

e nh anc e me nt, it w ou ld b e ina pp ro pr ia te fo r t

his c ourt to s pe c ulate on

the argume nts that might be ma de in light of Begay if the g overnme nt is able to establish, consistent with Sh e pa rd , tha t the c on vic tio n n e c e ssa ri ly re qu ir e d p ro of

of se xua l c on ta c t w ith a minor that pre sents a “se rious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” Bartee , 529 F.3d at 363. - 10 - at least some convictions involving sexual c ontact with minors prese nt ‘a ser ious potential risk of phy sical injury ’ is not s ufficie nt to establish that the conviction comes within the scope of the ‘otherw ise’ cla

use,” a nd rema nded for further proce eding s. 529 F.3d at 362. I n s um, a pp lic a tio n of the “ oth e rw ise c la us e ” re qu ir e s tha t the pr ior c ri me be bo th s imi lar t o the enumer ated of

fense s of § 4B 1.2(a) in its risk of phy sical injury to others, an d al i k e in t he “purpose ful, violent, and agg ressive” nature of the c onduct. Mosley , 5 7 5 F. 3 d at 6 0 6 (c i t i n g Begay 55 3 U .S. a t 144- 46 , 128 S. Ct. at 15 86 ; Cha mb e rs , 129 S. Ct . at 691-92; and Un ite d S tat es v . F or d , 56 0 F .3 d 4 20 , 4 21 -2 2 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 9) ). Th e of

fe ns e of statut or y ra pe un de r t

he Ten ne sse e statut e satisfies neither

prong under a strict cate g orica l approa ch base d solely on the statutory

definition of the offe nse. T h u s , t h e determination whether Evans’s pr ior conviction is of a c rime of violenc e

re qu ir e s a pp lic a tio n o f t

he mod if ie d cate g or ic a l app ro a c h. Ho we ve r, the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s ana ly sis did
not c omply with the require ments of the modified c ateg orica l approa ch under Begay , and we mus t there fore vaca

te Evans’ s sentence and re mand for r econside ration. III We observe that in considering whether Evans’s pr ior offe nse wa s a cr ime of violence , the

se nte nc ingc ourt

a pp e ars to h a ve c on sid e re d fa c ts g le ane d fr om the Af fi davit of Com

pla int a s w e ll as the sente ncing transcr ipt. Although Eva ns did not object, only the t ransc ript is a prope r Sh e pa rdNo. 08-5279

United States v. Ev ans

- 11 - document. W

ynn and Bartee make clear that an affidavit i n support of a criminal complaint i s not

a Shepard- a c c e pta

ble do c ume nt: The Bartee panel noted th at “t he Court [in Sh e pa rd ] specifically

reje cted the g overnme nt's c all to permit consideration of police re ports an d cr iminal complaint applications to support a finding that the g uilty plea c ould only

have be en base d on fac ts t h at wo uld qualify

the conviction as a

‘violent felony .’ ” Id. at 359-60 (c iting Sh e pa rd , 544 U.S. at 21, 125 S.Ct . 1254).

. . . . [T] he Bartee panel c ompare d the fa ctual re ci t at ions in a PS R ge nera lly to the inf or ma tio n c on ta ine d in a po lic e re po rt or lik e ma te ri a ls, c on c lud ing that t he PSR contained “ the sort of information that one mig ht expect to find in a police re port or application for

criminal complaint.” W ynn, 5 7 9 F. 3 d

at 5 7 6 (q u o t i n g Bartee, 529 F.3d at 361.)] A prope r dete rmination whether Evans’s p ri o r co n viction is of a cr ime of violence require s application of Begay ’s two-prong ed inquiry – whether

the cr ime is both sim ilar in kind and in deg ree

o f r i s k t o t h e e n u m e r a t e d

c r i m e s – t o f a c t s e s t a b l i s h e d b y Sh e pa rd -ac cepta ble documents. The Af fi davit of Com pla int is n ot s uc h a

do c ume nt. We VACATE Evans’ s sent en ce and R EMAND f or re sentenc ing a fter r econside ration whether Evans’s prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence unde r Begay and our r e c e nt c a se s. On remand, the district court sha ll be mindful of Sh e pa rd ’s stricture s, and, as in W ynn , the g ov e rnme nt s ho uld

be pe rm itt e d to su

bmi t a dd iti on a l Sh e

pa rd -ac cepta ble evidenc e, if available. See W ynn 57 9 F .3 d at 57 7; United States v. Bak er, 559 F.3d 443, 455 & n.10 (6th Cir. 2009).