alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### DUNN v. BAKER-LAWHON & FORD, Inc., et al*.*

No. 5739.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Jan. 10, 1939.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1939.

Writ of Certiorari and. Review Denied May 1, 1939.

*416Sholars & Gunby, G. Allen Kimball, and Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh, all of Monroe, for appellants.

McHenry, Lamkin & Titche, of Monroe, for appellee.

HAMITER, Judge.

The accident discussed in the opinion of the case of Austin v. Baker-Lawhon & Ford, Inc., et al., 188 So. 416, this day decided by us, is responsible for the filing of this proceeding.

Oscar Lee Dunn was found, as stated in the aforementioned opinion, at the locus of the collision in an unconscious and injured condition. He attributes his injuries to said accident, and asks damages from James Marshall, Baker-Lawhon & Ford, Inc., Trinity Universal Insurance Company, J. T. Austin and the Employers Casualty Company.

The district judge awarded him a sol-idary judgment against the first three named defendants in the amount of $378, but rejected his demands against the latter two. He did not perfect an appeal from the judgment, and, consequently, we cannot review his claim against the said Austin and the Employers Casualty Company. However, he asks, through an answer to the appeals of the other defendants, an increase in his award.

Plaintiff worked as a delivery boy for one Sam Inzina, who operated a grocery store on the southeast corner of the intersection. Immediately before the occurrence of the collision he was observed innocently seated on a bench located on neutral ground in front of that store. The Austin car, following the impact with the truck, struck the bench. Thereafter he was found lying in a nearby ditch. He was unable to testify as to the object that struck him, for his back was toward the intersection at the time. There was no other happening, however, that could have caused his injuries and we think that the proof amply sustains his contention that the collision was responsible therefor.

In view of the fact that plaintiff was in no manner negligent and did not contribute to the accident, and for .the reasons given in the opinion of the Austin case, supra, we hold that appellants are liable in damages to him.

Plaintiff’s work consisted of cleaning the store and' delivering groceries. For this he was paid a weekly wage of $7. Several hours after the accident he was taken to a physician’s office for observation and treatment. He regained consciousness before his arrival there. An examination revealed a severe sprain of his right ankle and contusions about his body. He was confined to his bed for a.period of ten days, endured much pain during that time, and was unable to work for four weeks. The judgment of the trial court was for $28 for loss of wages and $350 for injuries, pain and suffering, or the total of $378. This amount appears to be neither excessive nor inadequate.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.
|    |                                                                                                    |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | the report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and |

|    |                                                                                                                                                                           |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. | the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Cincinnati Financial Corporation. |

|                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                              |  |
| /S/ Steven J. Johnston                                       |   |
| Steven J. Johnston, FCAS, MAAA, CFA, CERA                    |   |
| President and Chief Executive Officer                        |   |
|                                                         |   |
| /S/ Michael J. Sewell                                        |   |
| Michael J. Sewell, CPA                                       |   |
| Chief Financial Officer, Senior Vice President and Treasurer |   |
52902 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 177 / Thursday, September 11, 2008 / Notices 

Abstract: VA Form 10–21091 will be 

used to gather input from returning war 

zone veterans to identify their needs, 

concerns and health care preferences. 

VA will use the data collected to 

improve the quality and relevance of 

care offered as well as access to care 

through the removal of identified 

barriers to care and to develop care 

pathways as indicated by veterans’

responses to the survey. 

Affected Public: Individuals and 

households. 

Estimated Annual Burden: 1,000 

hours. 

Estimated Average Burden per 

Respondent: 20 minutes. 

Frequency of Response: On occasion. 

Estimated Number of Respondents: 

3,000. 

Dated: September 4, 2008. 

By direction of the Secretary. 

Denise McLamb, 

Program Analyst, Records Management 

Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–21049 Filed 9–10–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8320–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS 

Blue Ribbon Panel on VA-Medical 

School Affiliations; Notice of Renewal 

In compliance with the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–

463), the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA) gives notice that the Blue Ribbon 

Panel on VA-Medical School 

Affiliations has been renewed through 

September 30, 2009. 

The Panel advises the Secretary of 

Veterans Affairs and the Under 

Secretary for Health on the framework 

for guiding VA’s affiliations with 

medical schools and academic medical 

centers. 

Dated: August 29, 2008. 

By direction of the Secretary. 

E. Philip Riggin, 

Committee Management Officer. 

[FR Doc. E8–21050 Filed 9–10–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8320–01–P 


rmajette on PRODPC74 with NOTICES
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

DARREN DAVID CHAKER, AKA

Darren Del Nero, AKA Darrin Shackler,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-50138

D.C. No. 3:15-cr-07012-LAB-1

MEMORANDUM*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

DARREN DAVID CHAKER, AKA

Darren Del Nero, AKA Darrin Shackler,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-50193

D.C. No. 3:15-cr-07012-LAB-1

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

FILED

JUL 06 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Argued and Submitted June 10, 2016

Pasadena, California

Before: KOZINSKI and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges and KORMAN,** Senior

District Judge.

Darren David Chaker appeals the district court’s revocation of supervised

release and the sentence imposed upon revocation. We have jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the revocation of Chaker’s supervised release and

vacate the sentence imposed.

The relevant supervised release condition provides that Chaker “may not

stalk and/or harass other individuals, to include, but not limited to, posting personal

information of others or defaming a person’s character on the internet.” Chaker’s

blog post, which claimed that former police investigator Leesa Fazal “was forced

out of the Las Vegas Metro Police Department,” does not qualify as harassment. 

Among other issues, the blog post was not directed at Fazal, and the government

failed to prove that Chaker intended to harass Fazal. See United States v. Gnirke,

775 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[C]onditions of supervised release are read

to require an element of mens rea.”) (citation omitted); Harassment, Black’s Law

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The government also failed to prove that Chaker’s

blog post satisfied the elements of defamation, including falsity and actual malice. 

See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 279–80 (1964); Defamation, Black’s

2
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). We therefore conclude that Chaker did not

violate the special condition of supervised release.

Because we reverse the revocation of Chaker’s supervised release on these

grounds, we need not reach his constitutional arguments. Similarly, because we

vacate Chaker’s sentence for the reversed revocation, see United States v.

Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010), we need not address Chaker’s

challenges to the newly imposed conditions of supervised release, which were only

imposed as a result of that reversed revocation.

REVERSED; VACATED.

3
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7050 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7050

To amend title 38, United States Code, to make certain improvements in 
the laws relating to the administration of certain benefits payable to 
        survivors of deceased veterans, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 9, 2022

 Ms. Stefanik (for herself, Mr. Ryan, Mrs. Rodgers of Washington, Mr. 
 McKinley, Mr. Massie, Mr. C. Scott Franklin of Florida, Mr. Cole, Mr. 
 DesJarlais, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and Mr. Gosar) introduced the following 
     bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 38, United States Code, to make certain improvements in 
the laws relating to the administration of certain benefits payable to 
        survivors of deceased veterans, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ernest Peltz Accrued Veterans 
Benefits Act''.

SEC. 2. PAYMENT OF CERTAIN BENEFITS TO SURVIVORS OF DECEASED VETERANS 
              BY SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS.

    (a) Payment of Benefits for Month of Death.--Section 5310 of title 
38, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``A surviving 
        spouse'' and inserting ``An eligible survivor'';
            (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``surviving spouse'' 
        both places it appears and inserting ``eligible survivor''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(c) Eligible Survivor Defined.--In this section, the term 
`eligible survivor' means the living person first listed below:
            ``(1) The veteran's spouse.
            ``(2) The veteran's children (in equal shares).
            ``(3) The veteran's dependent parents (in equal shares).''.
    (b) Accrued Benefits.--Section 5121 of title 38, United States Code 
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(d) The amount of the accrued benefit payable under subsection 
(a) on behalf on an individual is the total amount of the periodic 
monetary benefits (other than insurance and servicemen's indemnity) 
under laws administered by the Secretary to which the individual was 
entitled at death for the entire period of time for which the 
individual was entitled to, but did not receive, such benefits.''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply with 
respect to deaths that occur on or after that date.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND NOTES THERETO
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                           1,588
<SECURITIES>                                    17,891
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,507
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (392)
<INVENTORY>                                      5,409
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                40,495
<PP&E>                                          16,089
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (6,195)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  82,111
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           28,560
<BONDS>                                          7,536
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,650
<COMMON>                                         3,707
<OTHER-SE>                                      35,515 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    82,111
<SALES>                                         39,990
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                39,990
<CGS>                                           33,367
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   39,303
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 714
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 35,621
<INCOME-TAX>                                    13,388
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             22,233
<DISCONTINUED>                                     464
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    22,697
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     5.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     5.16
        

</TABLE>
#### BAPTISTE v. LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA.

No. 17436.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

June 13, 1940.

Godfrey Regan, of New Orleans, for appellant Mrs. Rosetta Baptiste.

Eugene J. McGivney and Solomon S. Goldman, both of New Orleans, for appel-lee Life Ins. Co. of Virginia.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff instituted suit in the First City Court of New Orleans, claiming damages in the sum of $300 for an assault which she alleges was made upon her by the agent of the Life Insurance Company of Virginia. The said company and its said agent, Raymond Bouche, were made defendants.

The matter was duly tried, resulting in a judgment dismissing plaintiff’s suit against the insurance company but granting judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the agent, Raymond Bouche, in the sum of $100.

The judgment was rendered on April 22, 1940, and signed on April 26, 1940. On May 23, 1940, approximately 27 days after the signing of the judgment, the plaintiff applied to the trial court for an order of devolutive appeal.

Defendant-appellee, the Life Insurance Company of Virginia, moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed to apply for it within the time fixed by law.

Act No. 219 of 1932, section 1, governing appeals from the First City Court of New Orleans provides in part that “Appeals shall be allowed *within ten*days, *exclusive of Sttndays, from the signing of the judgment ”*(Italics ours.)

In the recent case of Christmon v. Hawkins, 171 So. 621, 622, we sustained a motion to dismiss a devolutive appeal from a judgment of the First City Court of New Orleans on the ground that ten days, exclusive of Sundays, had intervened between the date of the signing of the judgment and the date the appeal was applied for. In that case we said:

> “The statute allowing appeals from the First city court, above quoted, is clear and unambiguous. Unless thp appeal is taken within ten days from the date on which the judgment is signed, it comes too late. * * *

> “In the instant case, inasmuch as appellant did not file his motion for appeal until June 5, 1936, but allowed ten days, exclusive of Sundays, to elapse from the date the judgment was signed, without taking action, he is held to have abandoned his right, and we are without jurisdiction to grant him relief.”

Applying the provisions of Act 219 of 1932 to the facts of the case at bar, it will be observed that the judgment herein was signed on April 26, 1940. The plaintiff-*576appellant, therefore, had ten days after April 26, 1940, exclusive of Sundays, to apply for an appeal. The appeal was not taken until May 23, 1940. Thus, it will be seen that it was long after the expiration of ten full days that appellant filed her motion and obtained her order of appeal.

For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal is sustained and the appeal dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, May 22, 2020. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, May 22, 2020 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A20D0381. CHRISTOPHER JOHN GEORGE v. BRANDY NICOLE GEORGE.
Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 17CV2456
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 17

- 112 V

Filed: August 9, 2017

UNPUBLISHED

JEAN LALLENSACK

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Special Processing Unit (SPU) ; Rul ing on Entitlement; Concession;

Causation

- In

- Fact; Influenza (Flu)
Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)

Ronald Craig Homer, Conway, Homer, P.C., Boston, MA , for petitioner. Christine Mary Becer , U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

Dorsey

, Chief Special Master:

On January 25, 2017

, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa

- 10, et seq.

, 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a right shoulder injury caused

- in

- fact by her October 23, 2014 influenza vaccination . Petit ion at 1 . The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On Au gust 7, 2017

, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case for an injury consistent with a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration ( “ SIRVA ”) . Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 1. Specifically, respondent “ has concluded that a preponderance of evidence establishes that the injury to petitioner’s right shoulder was caused

- in

- fact by the

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance wi th

the E

- Government Act of 2002

. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for

e ase of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012 ).administration of her October 23, 2014, flu vaccine, and that petitioner’ s injury is not due

to factors unrelated to the administration of the flu vaccine. ” Id. at 3. Respondent further agrees that petitioner has met the statutory six month sequela requirement and that petitioner ’ s injury is compensable as a cau sed- in

- fact injury under the Vaccine Act

. Id.

In view of respondent’s position and the evidence of record, the undersigned find s that petitioner is entitle d to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey
Nora Beth Dorsey Chief Special Master
IA

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 39

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to repeal

the 22nd amendment to the Constitution.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 20, 2001

Mr. HOYER (for himself, Mr. HYDE, Mr. FRANK, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. SABO, and Mr. PALLONE) introduced the following joint

resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States to repeal the 22nd amendment to the Constitution.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when

7 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several

8 States within seven years after the date of its submission

9 for ratification:
2

•HJ 39 IH

1 ‘‘ARTICLE—

2 ‘‘The twenty-second article of amendment to the Con3 stitution of the United States is hereby repealed.’’.

Æ