alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6905 

To provide for the withdrawal of normal trade relations treatment with 

the Russian Federation, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 2, 2022 

Mr. RICE of South Carolina introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To provide for the withdrawal of normal trade relations 

treatment with the Russian Federation, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defund Putin Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. WITHDRAWAL OF NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS 

6 TREATMENT WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERA7 TION. 

8 Notwithstanding the provisions of title I of the Russia 

9 and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky 

10 Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (Public Law 112– 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6905 IH

1 208; 19 U.S.C. 2434 note) or any other provision of law, 

2 effective on the date of the enactment of this Act normal 

3 trade relations treatment shall not apply pursuant to sec4 tion 102 of that Act to the products of the Russian Fed5 eration. 

6 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF PETROLEUM, 

7 NATURAL GAS, PETROCHEMICALS, AND COAL 

8 FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE 

9 REPUBLIC OF BELARUS. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi11 sion of law, the President shall take such actions as may 

12 be necessary to prohibit the importation of petroleum, nat13 ural gas, petrochemicals, and coal from the Russian Fed14 eration and the Republic of Belarus. 

15 (b) REGULATIONS.—The President shall promulgate 

16 such regulations as may be necessary and appropriate to 

17 carry out this section. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-40468

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GERALD DANIEL BEAUMONT,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:90-CR-53-2

- - - - - - - - - -

February 20, 1997

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Gerald Daniel Beaumont, federal prisoner No. 03776-035, was

convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to manufacture

methamphetamine and use of a telephone to facilitate that

conspiracy. He appeals the district court’s order reducing his

sentence from life in prison to 400 months of imprisonment. He

contends that the reduction should have been greater and

implicitly relies on U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11. He also contends for the
No. 96-40468

- 2 -

first time in his reply brief that his sentence would have been

less harsh if he had had competent counsel at sentencing. 

Section 2D1.11(c) specifically excludes from its coverage

conspiracy to manufacture drugs, and directs that sentencing for

such crimes be governed by § 2D1.1. See United States v.

Bellazerius, 24 F.3d 698 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 375

(1994). The district court did not abuse its discretion in using

§ 2D1.1 rather than § 2D1.11 in determining how much to reduce

Beaumont’s sentence. 

Regarding Beaumont’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

argument, this court does not address issues raised for the first

time in a reply brief. See United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d

1379, 1386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989). 

AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Vincent Shunsky, certify that:
6.    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Maxco, Inc.;
7.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
8.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
9.    The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
a)    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;
b)    [Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986]
c)    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosures controls and procedures, as of the end ofthe period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
d)    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and
10.    The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
a)    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and
b)    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlsover financial reporting.   Date:   August 14,2003              /s/ Vincent Shunsky
IA

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 11

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States authorizing

the Congress and the States to prohibit the act of desecration of the

flag of the United States and to set criminal penalties for that act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 7, 2001

Mrs. EMERSON introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred

to the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States authorizing the Congress and the States to prohibit the act of desecration of the flag of the United

States and to set criminal penalties for that act.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the following article is proposed as an amendment

4 to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be

5 valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitu6 tion when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of

7 the several States within seven years after the date of its

8 submission for ratification:
2

HJ 11 IH

1 ‘‘ARTICLE—

2 ‘‘The Congress and the States shall have power to

3 prohibit the act of desecration of the flag of the United

4 States and to set criminal penalties for that act.’’.

Æ
#### Eva Kleinmunz, Respondent, v Alvin Katz, Appellant.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs *(see, Balducci v Jason,*133 AD2d 436). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Kings County, Krausman, J.—restore to calendar.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Denman, Green, Balio and Davis, JJ.
#### ROY v. ROY.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division A.

June 15, 1954.

Rehearing Denied July 5, 1954.

Wideman, Caldwell, Pacetti & Robinson and Manley P. Caldwell, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

W. Q. Cain, Palm Beach, for appellee.

MATHEWS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. One of the principal, issues in this suit is that there had been filed and was pending at the time of these proceedings, a suit in Washington, D. C. for a divorce mensa et thoro. A judgment was entered in that suit whereby the wife received title to certain real property and claims that such suit operated as res judi-cata upon the final decree of divorce now under review or worked an estoppel by judgment as to the appellees cause of action.

The causes of action were entirely different. In the Washington, D. C. suit the appellant merely alleged desertion and cruelty as a ground for separate maintenance. In the Florida suit for divorce the appellee alleged habitual .intemperance together with extreme cruelty and desertion as the , grounds for divorce. The record shows that habitual intemperance was not an issue in the Washington, D. C. suit and it was an issue in the Florida suit, arid the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the Chancellor in finding that the appellant had been guilty of habitual intemperance. All of the assignments of error, pleadings, testimony and final de*295cree of the Chancellor have been carefully reviewed, and the final decree of the Chancellor was without reversible error.

It is, therefore, ordered that the final decree of the Chancellor be and the same is hereby

Affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lorenzo Pinkston, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Broomer, J.), rendered September 14, 1988, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the hearing court properly found that the police had probable cause to arrest him. The testimony of Police Officer Eaton, an experienced narcotics officer operating in a known narcotics location, concerning his observation of the exchange of a clear plastic bag for currency between the defendant and another individual, which he reasonably believed to be a drug transaction, was a sufficient basis for the defendant’s arrest on probable cause *(see, People v McRay,*51 NY2d 594, 604; *People v Mariner,*147 AD2d 659, 660), and for the ensuing search of the defendant’s person which revealed a loaded gun. Lawrence, J. P., Kunzeman, Rubin and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
193 La. 352

#### PREVOST v. PREVOST.

No. 34233.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 26, 1939.

Hypolite Mixon, of Amite, for appellant.

Morrison & Sims, of Hammond, for ap-pellee.

PONDER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of final divorce.

Plaintiff, Fred Brit Prevost, instituted suit against his wife, Edna Prevost, seeking separation from bed and board on the ground of cruel treatment. Sometime after the suit had been filed the plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended petition wherein he asked for judgment of final divorce on the ground of adultery. Upon trial the lower court rendered judgment of final divorce a vinculo matrimonii in favor of the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant has appealed.

The defendant-appellant filed no brief in support of her appeal. Counsel for the appellant did not appear at the hearing of the appeal. It would appear that the appeal has been abandoned. However, after examining the record, we can see no good reason to disturb the judgment of the lower court.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment is affirmed at the appellant’s cost.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Iran Broughton, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Finnegan, J.), rendered October 13, 1987, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Matthews, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence seized by the police.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence is granted, the indictment is dis*405missed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the purpose of entering an order in its discretion pursuant to CPL 160.50.

At the first suppression hearing, the prosecutor, before he rested, failed to elicit any evidence that the arresting police officer's street encounter with the defendant was justified at its inception. After both sides had rested, the prosecutor moved to reopen the hearing to cure this defect by introducing testimony that an identified resident of the housing project where the crime occurred had informed the arresting officer that the defendant had a gun in his bag. Over a month later, the hearing was reopened to elicit that testimony. The People concede that the reopening of the hearing was improper. They were given every opportunity to present the evidence in question at the original hearing. Their failure to present evidence of probable cause was not based upon an erroneous judicial ruling, and there is no basis to justify providing them with a second bite of the apple *(see, People v Robinson,*100 AD2d 945; *People v Sanders,*79 AD2d 688; *see also, People v Crandall,*69 NY2d 459, 464; *People v Havelka,*45 NY2d 636, 643). Since the People failed to demonstrate the reasonableness of the police action at the initial hearing, the sawed-off shotgun must be suppressed *(see, People v Wilkerson,*64 NY2d 749, 750).

The People’s argument that the defendant lacks standing to contest the lawfulness of the search and seizure of the cloth bag containing the sawed-off shotgun was withdrawn by them in the Supreme Court, Queens County, and therefore any issue of law with respect thereto has not been preserved for appellate review *(see, People v Stith,*69 NY2d 313, 320; *People v Cofresi,*60 NY2d 728, 730; *People v Kern,*149 AD2d 187). Thompson, J. P., Rubin, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 9, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 52400]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20837]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; Notice of 
Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases Special Emphasis Panel; Cooperative Research Partnerships 
for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases (U01).
    Date: October 1, 2008.
    Time: 11 a.m. to 4 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Rockledge 6700, 6700B 
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20817, (Telephone Conference Call).
    Contact Person: Brenda Lange-Gustafson, PhD, Scientific Review 
Officer, NIAID, DEA, Scientific Review Program, Room 3122, 6700-B 
Rockledge Drive, MSC-7616, Bethesda, MD 20892-7616, (301) 451-3684, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4a282d3f393e2b2c3925240a24232b232e64242322642d253c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="abc9ccded8dfcacdd8c4c5ebc5c2cac2cf85c5c2c385ccc4dd">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.855, 
Allergy, Immunology, and Transplantation Research; 93.856, 
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases Research, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS)

    Dated: September 2, 2008.
Jennifer Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. E8-20837 Filed 9-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


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</html>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bruce Galloway, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert Seewald, J.), rendered November 7, 1988, which convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree and sentenced him to consecutive indeterminate prison terms of from 1 to 3 years, is unanimously affirmed.

On November 18, 1987, the defendant and complaining witness had an argument about money. The defendant went into his house and returned with a gun. The complainant jumped into his van and drove off but became blocked at an intersection behind an unmarked police car. Defendant chased after the van. He shot at the van and its occupants 10 times. *65As it was night, the officer in the unmarked police car testified that he saw light from the muzzle of the gun.

Defendant urges that the People did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct created a grave risk of death to another person. We do not agree. Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a nonintent crime, which only requires that defendant’s reckless conduct create a grave risk of death to another person. *(People v Davis,*72 NY2d 32, 36.) In cases where a firearm is used, the use of the gun must create such a risk. *(Supra.)*In the instant case the repeated firing of the gun at the van and its occupants, especially at night, is indicative of such grave risk.

Although defendant asserts there was not sufficient evidence, we find that based on the record and testimony presented at trial, there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant created a grave risk of death to both the occupants of the van as well as innocent bystanders. To be convicted under Penal Law § 120.25, all that is necessary is that defendant create a grave risk of death to another person. *(People v Graham,*41 AD2d 226, 227.) Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Carro, Rosenberger and Asch, JJ.
Order entered August 26, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-00090-CR

DAVID BRIAN NEFF, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 401-82288-2018

ORDER

We REINSTATE this appeal.

We abated for a hearing to determine why appellant’s brief has not been filed. On 

August 19, 2019, appellant filed his brief along with a motion to extend time to do the so. On 

August 21, 2019, a supplemental reporter’s record was filed of the trial court’s August 19th 

hearing. We ADOPT the trial court’s findings that (1) appellant wishes to prosecute this appeal; 

(2) appellant, who is indigent, is represented by appointed counsel Stephanie Hudson; and (3) 

counsel did not abandon the appeal and filed the brief on August 19, 2019.

We GRANT appellant’s August 19, 2019 motion for extension of time and ORDER

appellant’s brief filed as of the date of this order.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to the Honorable Mark Rusch, 

Presiding Judge, 401st Judicial District Court; Stephanie Hudson; and to the Collin County 

District Attorney’s Office.

The State’s brief is due September 26, 2019.

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 9, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52443-52444]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20834]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i>11335]


Michigan Disaster Number MI-00013

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 1.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Michigan 
(FEMA-1777-DR), dated 07/14/2008.
    Incident: Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding.
    Incident Period: 06/06/2008 through 06/13/2008.
    Effective Date: 08/27/2008.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 09/12/2008.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 04/14/2009.

[[Page 52444]]


ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for Private Non-Profit organizations in the State of 
Michigan, dated 07/14/2008, is hereby amended to include the following 
areas as adversely affected by the disaster.
Primary Counties: Saginaw.
Contiguous Counties (Economic Injury Loans Only):
    Bay, Genesee, Gratiot, Midland, Tuscola.
    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59002 and 59008)


Herbert L. Mitchell,
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. E8-20834 Filed 9-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
Exhibit 32.2







CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the quarterly report of Tutor Perini Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Kenneth R. Burk, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Date:  May 5, 2011
/s/Kenneth R. BurkKenneth R. BurkExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer








A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Tutor Perini Corporation and will be retained by Tutor Perini Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.