UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

HAIGHT, WEIS, and ALMANZA1

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E2 DEVIN L. GOETSCH 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140623 

Headquarters, 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command 

Mark A. Bridges, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Maureen A. Kohn, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Major Andres Vazquez, Jr., JA; Captain John L. Schriver, JA. 

For Appellee: Major A.G. Courie III, JA. 

30 September 2015 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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WEIS, Judge: 

A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of failure to obey a lawful general order and two specifications 

of wrongful distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of Articles 92 and 

112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892 and 912a [hereinafter 

UCMJ]. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence of a bad-conduct 

discharge, confinement for five months, forfeiture of $800.00 pay per month for five 

months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. 

This case is before us pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellate defense 

counsel submitted the case for appellate review on its merits. However, appellant 

also personally raises several issues pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 

431 (C.M.A. 1982), one of which merits discussion and relief. 

Background 

 

1

 Judge WEIS and Judge ALMANZA both took action while on active duty. 
GOETSCH—ARMY 20140623 

2 

Appellant’s court-martial adjourned on 8 August 2014. On 13 May 2015, 278 

days later, the convening authority took action. This period includes an initial 175 

days for the government to transcribe the 85-page record of trial and deliver it to the 

military judge for authentication on 30 January 2015. The military judge 

authenticated the record the day he received it, but another 33 days elapsed before 

the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) completed her post-trial recommendation (SJAR) to 

the convening authority on 4 March 2015. Appellant received a copy of the record 

on 10 April 2015, and trial defense counsel took 30 days to submit clemency matters 

on appellant’s behalf on 10 May 2015. The SJA’s addendum to the SJAR and the 

convening authority’s action were completed three days later, and this court received 

the record of trial from Korea on 28 May 2015. 

In the clemency matters submitted on behalf of appellant pursuant to Rule for 

Courts-Martial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 1105, defense counsel alleged the government 

violated the post-trial processing standards recognized by our superior court in 

United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006), and that the delay amounted 

to legal error. In her addendum, the SJA disagreed with this assertion and concluded 

“[n]o corrective action [was] required” and “no clemency [was] warranted” in 

appellant’s case. The record of trial is devoid of any explanation or justification for 

post-trial processing time, which took more than nine months. 

Dilatory Post-Trial Processing 

 In Moreno, our superior court established timeliness standards for various 

stages of the post-trial and appellate process. 63 M.J. at 142-43. Specifically, 

action of the convening authority should be taken no later than 120 days after 

completion of the trial. Id.2

 Failure to satisfy any of these standards creates a 

“presumption of unreasonable delay,” prompting this court to apply and balance the 

four factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), to determine 

whether appellant’s due process rights were violated. See Moreno, 63 M.J. at 136. 

The first factor, length of delay, plainly weighs in appellant’s favor. Here, 

the post-trial processing standard for the completion of the convening authority’s 

action was exceeded by a significant margin. We therefore proceed to the remaining 

three factors, beginning with “[r]easons for the delay.” Id. Here, the government 

has offered none and we will not speculate without more. The third factor, assertion 

of the right to a timely review and appeal, also weighs in appellant’s favor. Id. at 

138. Defense counsel specifically requested speedy post-trial processing in a 

memorandum to the SJA on 5 October 2014, more than seven months before the 

process was ultimately completed. 

 

2

 Two additional standards—the time the government takes to deliver the record of 

trial to this court and timeliness of appellate review before this court—are not 

relevant here. Moreno, 63 M.J. at 142-43. 
GOETSCH—ARMY 20140623 

3 

However, despite the delays, appellant’s assertion of this issue before the 

convening authority and this court, and the absence of any explanation by the 

government for its dilatory processing, appellant is still not entitled to relief 

pursuant to Moreno. Appellant did not make any effort, let alone demonstrate, that 

he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay, and we find this absence 

outweighs the first three factors to a degree that we can confidently conclude his due 

process rights were not violated. Id. at 138. Additionally, while the post-trial delay 

here is excessive, it is not “so egregious that tolerating it would adversely affect the 

public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system.” 

United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2006). Nonetheless, appellant 

is not foreclosed from relief for the government’s delays. 

Even in the absence of actual prejudice from unreasonable post-trial 

processing, this court is still authorized to grant relief for excessive delay in our 

assessment of the appropriateness of appellant’s sentence pursuant to Article 66(c), 

UCMJ. See United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2002); United States 

v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2000). Here, a delay of more 

than nine months to process an 85-page record of trial is excessive and warrants 

relief. As such, we will provide relief in our decretal paragraph below. 

Conclusion 

The findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. After considering the entire record 

and those matters personally raised by appellant pursuant to Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431, 

we affirm only so much of the sentence as provides for a bad-conduct discharge, 

confinement for four months, forfeiture of $800.00 pay per month for four months, 

and reduction to the grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and property of which 

appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of his sentence set aside by this 

decision, are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c) and 75(a). 

Senior Judge HAIGHT and Judge ALMANZA concur. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: