______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

2022 IL App (2d) 200535 

No. 2-20-0535 

Opinion filed March 21, 2022 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

SECOND DISTRICT 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 19-CM-3363 

) 

JABARI D. McINTYRE, ) Honorable 

) Jennifer J. Clifford, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Hudson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Winnebago County, defendant, Jabari D. 

McIntyre, was convicted of resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2018)). Defendant 

argues on appeal that his jury waiver was invalid because the trial court erroneously admonished 

him that the waiver was irrevocable. We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Defendant signed a written jury waiver in open court, with his attorney present, on July 15, 

2020. Before defendant did so, the trial court questioned him to confirm that he understood that 

(1) he had a right to a trial by jury, (2) if he exercised that right, 12 members of the community 

would serve on the jury, (3) the jury’s verdict to convict or acquit would have to be unanimous, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2022 IL App (2d) 200535 

and (4) if he waived the right to a jury, the case would be tried before a judge. The court further 

confirmed that defendant had an opportunity to talk with his attorney about waiving a jury and that 

the decision was his own, made without force, threats, or promises. Before defendant signed the 

waiver, the trial court advised him, “[O]nce you waive your right to a jury trial, you can’t change 

your mind and take it back.” 

¶ 4 A bench trial was held on September 11, 2020. At trial, Rockford police officer Lucas 

Davidson testified that, on November 2, 2019, he responded to a report of domestic battery at a 

residence on Darwood Avenue. Officer Sims also responded. Through a window, Davidson 

observed defendant push a woman in her midsection. Davidson then knocked loudly on the door, 

announcing that he and Sims were police officers. The woman walked toward the door and started 

to open it, but defendant shut the door. He then turned around so that his back was against the 

door, bracing it shut. Defendant refused the officers’ commands to open the door. The officers 

pushed the door open and took defendant into custody. 

¶ 5 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 6 Defendant maintains that his jury waiver was not valid because, due to the trial court’s 

erroneous admonition, he was left with the mistaken impression that there was no possibility that 

he could withdraw the waiver. 

¶ 7 Defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve this issue for review. He did not object 

to the trial court’s admonitions during the waiver colloquy or raise the issue in his posttrial motion. 

Both steps were necessary to avoid forfeiture of the issue. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65 

(2008). Defendant argues, however, that the error is reviewable under the plain-error rule. Under 

the plain-error rule, we “will review unpreserved error when a clear and obvious error occurs and: 

(1) the evidence is closely balanced; or (2) [the] error is so serious that it affected the fairness of 

- 2 -
 

 

 

 

 

 

2022 IL App (2d) 200535 

the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. (citing People v. 

Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007), and People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 335 (2000)). 

¶ 8 The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution 

(U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV) and the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13). 

Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 65. Under the Illinois Constitution, the right to a trial by jury includes the 

right to waive a jury trial. Id. A defendant’s waiver is valid if he makes it knowingly and 

voluntarily. Id. Here, defendant contends that the trial court was mistaken in stating that a jury 

waiver categorically cannot be withdrawn. However, when a criminal defendant voluntarily 

waives the right to a jury trial, he or she is not entitled to withdraw the waiver as a matter of right. 

People v. Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d 749, 753 (2001). Nonetheless, a trial court may permit the 

defendant to withdraw the waiver. Whether to do so “is a matter that is ordinarily within the 

discretion of the trial court unless the circumstances indicate the defendant failed to realize the 

consequences of his waiver.” Id. 

¶ 9 Although the trial court’s admonition was misleading, it did not affect the validity of 

defendant’s jury trial waiver. 

“[T]here is no precise formula for determining whether a jury waiver is understandingly 

made [citation]; however, a waiver will not be held invalid where the defendant, with 

counsel at his side, unambiguously chooses a bench trial, unless some prejudice to him is 

alleged and proved [citations].” People v. Crespo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 815, 820 (1983). 

Here, there was no prejudice regarding defendant’s jury waiver. Since defendant was willing to 

make an irrevocable waiver of the right to a jury, we have no reason to believe that he would have 

been unwilling to make a potentially revocable waiver. Thus, the possibility of withdrawing the 

waiver would not have dissuaded defendant from making the waiver. Because any 

- 3 -
 

 

 

2022 IL App (2d) 200535 

misunderstanding on defendant’s part did not affect his decision to waive a jury, he suffered no 

prejudice. Accordingly, the waiver of the right to a jury trial was valid. 

¶ 10 The trial court’s misleading admonition could, however, have affected defendant’s postwaiver decision making. Hypothetically, were defendant to have had a change of heart about his 

jury waiver, the trial court’s admonition might have led him to refrain from seeking leave to 

withdraw the waiver. However, any error in that regard is outside the scope of plain-error review. 

Defendant seeks plain-error review on the basis that the trial court’s error implicated his 

fundamental right to a jury trial. See People v. Ruiz, 367 Ill. App. 3d 236, 237 (2006) (“The issue 

of a defendant’s waiver of his fundamental right to a jury trial is a matter that we may consider 

under the plain error rule, despite a defendant’s failure to properly preserve that issue.”) However, 

once a defendant validly waives the right to a jury trial—as done here—there is no fundamental 

right to withdraw the waiver. Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 753. 

¶ 11 As our supreme court has explained: 

“The plain-error doctrine does not instruct a reviewing court to consider all forfeited errors. 

[Citation.] It is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting 

substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ 

[Citation.] Rather, it is ‘a “ ‘narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule’ ” ’ 

[citation], whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and 

reputation of the judicial process [citation].” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2005). 

Defendant does not contend that the evidence was closely balanced. Rather, he seeks review under 

the second prong of the plain error rule, which applies when “[the] error is so serious that it affected 

the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” Bannister, 

232 Ill. 2d at 65. 

- 4 -
 

 

2022 IL App (2d) 200535 

¶ 12 The second prong of plain error can be equated with “structural error.” People v. Bever, 

2019 IL App (3d) 170681, ¶ 46. “A structural error is ‘ “a systemic error which serves to ‘erode 

the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant’s trial.’ ” ’ ” Id. 

(quoting People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 614 (2010), quoting People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 

173, 197-98 (2009), quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186). “Structural errors are recognized in a very 

limited class of cases, including a complete denial of counsel, trial before a biased judge, racial 

discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, denial of self-representation at trial, and a defective 

reasonable doubt instruction.” People v. Ortega, 2021 IL App (1st) 182396, ¶ 64. The alleged error 

here—an admonition inaccurately suggesting that withdrawal of a jury waiver was categorically 

forbidden—is not of the same character or quality as errors that have been deemed structural. 

¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago 

County. 

¶ 15 Affirmed. 

- 5 -
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2022 IL App (2d) 200535 

No. 2-20-0535 

Cite as: People v. McIntyre, 2022 IL App (2d) 200535 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 19-

CM-3363; the Hon. Jennifer J. Clifford, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Drew A. Wallenstein, of 

for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant. 

Appellant: 

Attorneys J. Hanley, State’s Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick Delfino, 

for Edward R. Psenicka, and John G. Barrett, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellee: Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People. 

- 6 -