NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHARLES M.F. KAHALEHOE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10449 

D.C. No. 1:10-cr-00232-HG-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Helen W. Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 9, 2018

Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: WARDLAW, BERZON, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Charles Kahalehoe appeals the imposition of a special condition of 

supervised release that prohibits him from enrolling in any “classes aimed at 

becoming a drug or certified substance abuse counselor . . . for a period of 

approximately one year.” We review a challenged supervised release condition for 

abuse of discretion when trial counsel objects to the condition, and whether a 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

FEB 6 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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special condition violates the Constitution de novo. United States v. Aquino, 794 

F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2015). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We vacate the condition of supervised release and 

remand with instructions to strike the condition from the judgment. 

1. The expiration of the special condition on September 1, 2018 does not 

moot Kahalehoe’s claim.1 Kahalehoe remains on supervised release, and the 

condition may be re-imposed. It is therefore “capable of repetition, yet evading 

review.” Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cole v. 

Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000)). The district 

court has already twice imposed almost identical educational restrictions on 

Kahalehoe. It is thus reasonably likely that if Kahalehoe violates the conditions of 

his supervised release again, the district court would once more impose a similar 

educational restriction. Moreover, “the challenged action is too short in duration to 

be fully litigated before cessation or expiration.” Id. (quoting Cole, 228 F.3d at 

1098).

2. The district court abused its discretion in imposing the special condition. 

The condition does not “reasonably relate[] to the goals of deterrence, protection of 

the public, and/or defendant rehabilitation,” and it involves “greater deprivation of 

 

1

In a prior appeal, we ruled that this claim was not moot. See United 

States v. Kahalehoe, 693 F. App’x 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem.).
3 

liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve those goals.” United States v. 

Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the requirements of 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(d) on supervised release conditions). 

First, there is no logical nexus between an educational restriction and the 

goal of deterring illegal drug use while on supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(2)(B). Moreover, the district court’s conclusory reasoning—that the 

condition “is reasonably related to deterrence because it demonstrates to others that 

there are consequences to repeated use of controlled substances while on 

supervised release”—fails to elucidate how the specific condition would realize the 

deterrent effect of the special condition, as distinct from the obvious consequences 

of violating the prohibition of using controlled substances themselves—revocation 

and imprisonment.

Second, the district court erroneously concluded that the special condition 

“protects the public by requiring [Kahalehoe] to demonstrate that he is able to 

maintain his own sobriety before he provides counseling to the public on how to 

maintain sobriety.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Again, nothing logically 

tethers an educational restriction to the statutory goal of protecting the public. The 

restriction does not prohibit Kahalehoe from working as a substance abuse 

counselor, which he previously did so for many years. No record evidence shows 

how the condition actually protects the public in any way.
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Third, the special condition does not reasonably relate to Kahalehoe’s 

rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Record evidence neither ties

Kahalehoe’s supervised release violations involving drug use to the classes he took 

before the district court imposed the special condition, nor connects his former 

work as a substance abuse counselor to his offense of conviction. To the contrary, 

the record indicates that Kahalehoe’s relapses occurred after he left school and that 

Kahalehoe entered into drug trafficking after he left employment as a substance 

abuse counselor. The special condition has no reasonable basis in the record, and 

so involves greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. 

Instead, the district court’s statements regarding the challenged special 

condition evince a punitive purpose behind its imposition. The court opined that 

“a person who is using drugs is [not] a suitable person to go and spend public 

money to train to be a drug counselor,” and that “there are other people who 

deserve [public funds Kahalehoe received in the form of an educational grant] 

more” than he. But “[t]he provision of just punishment is not a criterion for 

supervised release conditions.” United States v. Eyler, 67 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 

1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) 

(excluding 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the factors to be considered in 

imposing a condition of supervised release).

3. The special condition is not an impermissible occupational restriction 
5 

under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5F1.5 because it does not prohibit 

Kahalehoe from seeking employment in his pre-conviction profession, i.e., as a 

non-certified substance abuse counselor. See United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 

608, 622 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 929 (9th 

Cir. 2008).

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.