Filed 8/27/24 P. v. Scheetz CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER 

SCHEETZ,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G063588

 (Super. Ct. No. FVI21000983)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino

County, Shannon Faherty, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark D. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa 

Mandel and Anne Spitzberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

After a jury found Christopher Alexander Scheetz guilty of 

multiple sex crimes, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 63 years to 

life. Scheetz appeals from the trial court’s denial of his counsel’s request to 

suspend proceedings and hold a second competency hearing. We conclude he 

failed to present new evidence or a substantial change in circumstances 

casting a serious doubt on the validity of the jury’s previous finding that he 

was competent. Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 5, 2021, the San Bernardino County District

Attorney filed a felony complaint charging Scheetz with two counts of 

committing a lewd act upon a child under age 14. 

On June 7, 2021, during pretrial proceedings, Scheetz’s counsel 

declared a doubt as to Scheetz’s competency to stand trial pursuant to Penal 

Code section 13681, and the trial court suspended criminal proceedings. On 

August 5, 2022, a jury found Scheetz competent to stand trial.

On August 17, 2022 the district attorney filed an information 

charging appellant with sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years 

old or younger (count 1, § 288.7(a)), oral copulation with a child 10 years old 

or younger (count 2, § 288.7(b)), sexual penetration with a child 10 years old 

or younger (count 3, § 288.7(b)), and lewd act upon a child under age 14

(count 4, § 288(a)). 

On September 15, 2022, defense counsel declared a doubt about 

Scheetz’s competence to stand trial, and stated Scheetz would refuse further 

evaluations. Counsel did not request another competency hearing, and 

provided no evidence casting doubt on the prior competency finding. 

1

All further statutory refences are to the Penal Code.
3

On January 31, 2023, defense counsel again declared a doubt

about appellant’s competence to stand trial and formally asked the court to 

conduct a second competency hearing. Counsel argued Scheetz’s current 

communications with the court and a handwritten letter casted doubt on the 

prior finding of competency. 

Counsel noted that at the competency trial, a doctor had testified 

about the handwritten letter. The doctor testified that during his evaluation 

of Scheetz, Scheetz showed him a document. The doctor stated: “[I] observed 

a handwritten -- I don’t know what to call it – it’s like a manifesto almost that 

he prepared for counsel. And it was -- it looked psychotic to me. Frequently 

when people are psychotic, they write in a very pinched, cramped manner. 

And his language was very inappropriate for what he was asking for. The 

words were insubstantial and didn’t seem to have any meeting.” The doctor

opined the document did not “make any sense at all.” “The words that were 

used were designed, it seemed, to impress the reader with his extensive 

vocabulary but it didn’t seem to be in any way grounded in reality . . . .” It 

was “similar to the way [Scheetz] would talk when [the doctor had] 

conversations with him . . . .” 

Defense counsel further noted the jury had requested to see the 

“manifesto,” but it was never shown to the jury because it was never 

introduced into evidence. At the time of the competency trial, counsel 

explained why the document was never introduced into evidence. He stated: 

“[E]ven though I’d had my client say he didn’t have any issue with it being 

introduced regarding attorney-client privilege, since it is my position he is not 

competent now, I don’t think he is probably in a position to waive those kinds 

of issues. So I didn’t feel that it would probably be appropriate for me to 

introduce the document into evidence, and then have to turn it over to the 
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[district attorney] and things of that nature because of that. So that’s why I 

ultimately made the decision not to introduce it even though it was 

inadvertently referenced to because [the testifying doctor] had actually seen 

it before.” 

Scheetz, however, testified at the hearing that the handwritten 

letter submitted with the request for a second competency hearing was 

different from the manifesto. The manifesto was about “a sense of culture 

shock” and “the audacity and the persecution.” The handwritten letter is a 

“legalese written profile . . . about my personal standing on how . . . to look 

outside of myself in on [sic] a type of cultural jailhouse inmate population.” 

In response to the court’s query, Scheetz stated he wrote the letter near the 

beginning of the case. 

The trial court denied the request to suspend proceedings. It 

found that Scheetz’s “communication style” was “odd,” but did not “rise to the 

level of incompetence.” As to the letter, the court stated: “I don’t think that a 

letter that was written near the beginning of the case is a substantial change 

in circumstance.” 

On February 16, 2023, a jury found Scheetz guilty as charged. 

He was sentenced to a determinate term of 8 years, followed by an 

indeterminate term of 55 years to life. 

DISCUSSION

I.

COMPETENCY HEARINGS

“The due process clause of the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth 

Amendment prohibits trying a criminal defendant who is mentally 

incompetent. [Citation.] A defendant is deemed competent to stand trial only 

if he “‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
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reasonable degree of rational understanding’” and “‘has a rational as well as 

factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”’” (People v. Ary (2011) 

51 Cal.4th 510, 517 (Ary), quoting Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 

402, 402.) “When a trial court is presented with evidence that raises a 

reasonable doubt about a defendant’s mental competence to stand trial, 

federal due process principles require that trial proceedings be suspended 

and a hearing be held to determine the defendant’s competence. [Citations.] 

Only upon a determination that the defendant is mentally competent may 

the matter proceed to trial. [Citation.]” (Ary, at p. 517.)

“California law reflects those constitutional requirements. 

Section 1368, in subdivision (a), requires a trial court to suspend criminal 

proceedings at any time ‘prior to judgment’ if the court reasonably doubts ‘the 

mental competence of the defendant.’ A defendant can create reasonable 

doubt through substantial evidence of mental incompetence, or the trial court 

can raise the issue on its own.” (Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 517.) “‘[M]ore is 

required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre 

statements [citation] or statements of defense counsel that defendant is 

incapable of cooperating in his defense [citation] or psychiatric testimony that 

defendant is immature, dangerous, psychopathic, or homicidal or such 

diagnosis with little reference to defendant’s ability to assist in his own 

defense [citation].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 270.)

If a defendant has been found competent to stand trial, “a trial 

court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing 

unless ‘it is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new 

evidence’ casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding. [Citations.]” 

(People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153 (Jones).) A substantial change of 

circumstances or new evidence casts a serious doubt on the validity of the 
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prior finding if it “ma[kes] it unreasonable [for the trial court] to continue to 

rely on the prior competence finding.” (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 

235 (Rodas).) However, “the duty to suspend is not triggered by information 

that substantially duplicates evidence already considered at an earlier, 

formal inquiry into the defendant’s competence; when faced with evidence of 

relatively minor changes in the defendant’s mental state, the court may rely 

on a prior competency finding rather than convening a new hearing to cover 

largely the same ground.” (Id. pp. 234-235.) “If in the course of [criminal]

proceedings the trial court learns of new facts and circumstances inconsistent 

with the predicate assumptions, it has a duty to declare a doubt regarding 

the defendant’s current competence and conduct a hearing on the subject.” 

(People v. Tejeda (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 785, 792.) 

A reviewing court applies “a deferential standard of review to a 

trial court’s ruling concerning whether another competency hearing must be 

held.” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 220.) “We review for 

substantial evidence the trial court’s finding of no substantial change of 

circumstances or no new evidence casting serious doubt on the initial 

competency determination.” (People v. Easter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 226, 243

(Easter).) 

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE REQUEST FOR A SECOND 

COMPETENCY HEARING

Because a jury previously found Scheetz was competent to stand 

trial, he must present new evidence or a substantial change in circumstances 

casting doubt on that prior finding before the trial court is required to 

suspend proceedings. Scheetz’s request to suspend proceedings is based on: 
7

(1) his current communications with the court and counsel; and (2) a 

handwritten letter. 

As to the handwritten letter, it is unclear whether this letter is 

the same as the manifesto, which the jury heard about before making its 

determination. To the extent the handwritten letter or its content would be 

“new” to a factfinder, Scheetz does not explain how the letter casts doubt on 

the prior competency finding. He acknowledges that, during the prior 

competency trial, the jury heard expert testimony that the same or similar 

document was evidence of psychosis. His argument on appeal is that seeing

the contents of the letter would be more impactful than hearing a brief 

summary of the contents. While that may be true, it does not warrant 

suspension of proceedings for a second competency hearing because the letter 

and its contents constitute additional evidence of the same type of arguably 

irrational behavior a jury had previously considered before making its finding 

of competency. As the high court stated, “the duty to suspend is not triggered 

by information that substantially duplicates evidence already considered at 

an earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant’s competence.” (Rodas, supra, 6 

Cal.5th at p. 234; see, e.g., People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 892 [a

doctor’s report that reiterates symptoms considered in a previous competency 

hearing did not tend to undermine the jury’s prior finding]; People v. Lawley

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 136-139 [no error in failing to conduct a second 

competency hearing where proffered evidence affirmed “the same arguably 

delusional beliefs reported” by experts in their previous competency 

evaluations].)

As to Scheetz’s communications with the court and counsel, the 

trial court determined that, although Scheetz’s communications style was 

odd, it did not demonstrate incompetence. This determination was based on 
8

the trial court’s observations, which the court may rely on to make its 

determination. (See Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1153 [“[T]he trial court may 

appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining 

whether there has been some significant change in the defendant's mental 

state”].) Moreover, the hearing transcripts show Scheetz understood the 

court’s questions and provided responsive answers, albeit not in the most 

concise manner. For example, when asked when the letter was written, 

Scheetz answered it was “well before . . . we even put preliminary findings on 

the record.” He also was cognizant when he was babbling and apologized. 

Finally, for the same reasons stated above, the duty to suspend 

proceedings a second time was not triggered because the concerns over 

Scheetz’s communications were considered by the jury in the first competency 

hearing. As an example, in the competency trial, a testifying doctor explained 

the language used in the manifesto, which seemed designed to impress with 

extensive vocabulary but made no sense, was similar to how Scheetz 

communicated with the doctor. The written request for suspending 

proceedings asserted that “Mr. Scheetz[’s] behavior and bizarre 

communication has not changed” since the first competency trial. The case

thus is distinguishable from Easter, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 226, where the 

defendant’s communications deteriorated over time. (See id. at p. 243 [noting 

“defendant’s recent communications consist[ing] of jumbled words and 

fanciful response . . . was different than anything described by [two experts] 

and was not presented to the jury [in the prior competency hearing]”].) In 

sum, the trial court did not err in denying the request to suspend proceedings 

and conduct a second competency hearing.

Our conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to 

suspend criminal proceedings also disposes of Scheetz’s related due process 
9

claim. As he correctly notes, the due process clause of the federal 

Constitution requires a hearing on competence to be held when a defendant 

has come forward with substantial evidence of incompetence. (See, e.g., Ary, 

51 Cal.4th at p. 517 [“When a trial court is presented with evidence that 

raises a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s mental competence to stand 

trial, federal due process principles require that trial proceedings be 

suspended and a hearing be held to determine the defendant’s competence”].) 

However, as discussed, Scheetz failed to present substantial evidence casting 

doubt on the prior competency finding. Accordingly, he was not denied his 

due process right to a competency hearing.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR: 

MOTOIKE, ACTING P.J. 

GOODING, J.