1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 41683 PEGGY CEDILLO,

Plaintiff

- Respondent,

v.

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO,

Defendant

- Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Boise, December 2014 Term
2015 Opinion No. 3 1

Filed: March 5 , 2015
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

SUBSTITUTE OPINION
The original Opinion issued March 3, 2015 is hereby Withdrawn.

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.

D istrict court’s order confirming the arbitration award on underinsured motorist policy
, affirmed.
Elam & Burke, Boise, and Johnson Law Group, Spokane, WA for appellant. Jeffrey A. Thomson argued.
Runft & Steele Law, Boise, for res pondent Jon M. Steele ar gued.

__________________________________ BURDICK, Chief Justice
This appeal arose from an arbitration decision regarding Peggy Cedillo’s u nderinsured
motorist insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (“Farmers”) and damages
for injuries she suffered in a motorcycle accident. A fter the arbitrator issued his final a ward, Farmers provided the arbitrator evidence that Farmers had already paid Cedillo the total amount of remaining damages. The arbitrator adjusted the award by subtracting Farm er s ’ payment from the prejudgment interest Farmers owed Cedillo. The Ada County district court confirmed the
arbitrator’s amended award and awarded Cedillo attorney fees

. On appeal, Farmers argues the
district court should have modified the award because t he arbitrator miscalculated prejudgment
interest by applying Farmers’ payment to the interest awar d . Farmers also argues on numerous grounds that Cedillo was not ent itled to attorney fees in the district court

. We affirm.2 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 25, 2008, Peggy Cedillo was injured while riding as a passenger on Jon Steele’s motorcycle

. The motorcycle drifted to the right and hit a concrete barrier. Cedillo later married
Steele.
Cedillo had an insurance policy with Farmers. That insuranc e contract obligated Farmers to compen sate Cedillo for damages from an underinsured motorist (“UIM”). Steele had his own insurance with $100,000 in bodily injury coverage and $5,0 00 in medical payment coverage. On July 28, 2009, Cedillo sent Farmers a lett er stating that she had settled her claim against Steele
f

or his policy limits

. Her letter then demanded her policy limits of $500,000 and asked that the claim be resolved in 30 days. On August 25, 2009, Farmers sent Cedillo a check for $25,000
with a lett er tha t stated the check was Farmers’ valuation of her UIM claim. The matter went to binding arbitration under Cedillo ’s policy’s requirement to arbitrate. Cedillo and Steele signed a contingent fee agreement on November 11, 2011. On March 1, 2012,
Steel e provided a notice of conflict disclosure to Farmers and the arbitrator. Arbitration began on November 20, 2012, and the parties completed the evidentiary portion the next day . The parties submitted written closing arguments and responses. Steele represen ted Cedillo in the arbitration.
The arbitrator issue d an interim award on January 16 , 2013. That award determined
Cedillo suffered $121,700 in medical expenses and $135,000 in lost income, which equaled $256,700 in economic damages. 1 The arbitrator also awarded $150,000 in non

- economic damages . This made the total award $406,700 without any adjustments

. The parties had stipulated that after the arbitrator issued the interi m award, he would determine any adjustments “for prejudgment interest, set offs or c ollateral sources and subrogation issues . . . .” The
arbitrator was to include these adjustments in his final a ward.
The arbitr ator considered the parties’ proposed adjustments and issued the final a ward on April 29, 2013. That award reduced the i nterim award by (1) $105,000 that Steele’s insurance already paid to Cedillo ; (2) $180,000 for Farmers ’ $25,000 payment on August 25, 2009 , and $155,000 payment on October 18, 2012; and (3) $21,367 for a pre

- existing condition, an unsupported medical expense, an d contractual adj ust ments. After these reductions , the adjusted
interim a ward was $100,333

.

1 For clarity, this opinion approximated all numbers by rounding them to the nearest dollar.3 The arbitrator also awarded prejudgment interest. The arbitrator determined that prejudgment interest began accruing on August 25, 2009
, because on that date Farm ers had sufficient information to investigate and determine its liability in a fair and accurate manner. The

a rbitrator calculated prejudgment interest by applying the statuto ry interest rate of 12% to the
initial a mount of $255,784

. Th e arbitrator calcula ted the initial a mount by reducing the interim award by $21,367 f or contractual and other minor adjustments and by $25,000 for Farmers’ payment on August 25, 2009. The arbitrator calculated int erest on the initial a mount from August 25, 2009 , to October 18 , 2012

. Because Farmers paid Cedillo a $155,000 UIM payment on October 18, 2012, the arbitrator calculated the remaining prejudgment interest at 12% of $100,784 for October 18, 2012
, to April 3 0, 2013

. The arbitrator added these interest amounts together, which brought the final a ward’s total prejudgmen t interest amount to $103,135

. Cedillo then filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award in the Ada County district

court. That petition was also for the award of attorney fees. On May 20, 2013, Farmer s file d with
the arbitrator a motion to reconsider the prejudgment interest award accompanied by evidence
that Farmers paid Cedillo $100,333 on March 25, 2013. 2 Farmers argued that the arbitrator
should adjust the prejudgment interest to account for the fa ct Farmers paid Cedillo $100,333
before the arbitrator issued the final a ward. Farmers also argued that the a rbitrator should
recalculate the prejudgment interest on medical expenses, lost income, and general damages
because Farmers cou ld not mathematicall y calculate those amount s before the arbitrator iss ued
his final a ward.
The arbitrator denied the motion on July 24, 2013, issuing the amended final a ward and a final order explaining his decision

. The amended final a ward was $ 101,948

. The arbitrator not ed that on March 25, 2013, Farmers owed Cedillo the adjusted interim award and the outstanding prejudgment interest. He then took into account Farmers’ March 25, 2013 payment of $100,333
and stated, “The payment was applied to the accrued pre judgment inter est of $103,135[] , le aving unpaid the award of $100, 33[3] pl us accrued interest of $2,80[3]

. ” The arbitrator then gave Farmers credit for 36 days of interest for paying in March

. The arbitrator noted that prejudgment
interest continued to accrue on the unp ai d $100,333 adjusted interim a ward after March 25
, 2013

.

2 The arbitrator treated the part of Farmers’ motion to reconsid er that related to the March 25 payment ’s interest as a timely motion to modify.4 The arbitrator explained that he could recalculate the award to include Farmers’ Ma rch
2013 payment, 3 but had to deny the parts of Farmers’ arguments that were based on a legal argument about how to apply prejudgment interest

. He held controlling law mandated that he
calculate prejudgment interest on the entire final a ward from the date that the insurer had
sufficient information to investigate and determine liability. He determined that even if th is decision was erroneous, he had no authority to correct the error because it was not a m ath err or. Farmers filed a second motion to reconsider and motion to modify on July 30, 2013. Farmers argued its March 2013 payment paid off the damage award, so th ere was no prejudgment interest award upon which to apply the payment

. The arbitrator denied this motion on August 21, 2013 . He held that the law entitled Cedillo to prejudgment interest regardless of whether the payment was applied to principal or interes t. The arbitrator also found Farm er s ’ request to apply the payment to principal instead of interest was not something he could modify
under Idaho Code section 7

- 913. On August 16, 2013, Cedillo filed an amended petition to confirm the arbitration award
i n the Ada County district court. This included an amended motion for t he award of attorney
fees. Farmers paid $101,948 to Cedillo on September 11, 2013. Cedillo applied $7,223 to outstanding pre judgment interest and $94,725 to the adjusted interim a ward. O n September 18, 2013, Farmers filed a motion for modification and/or correct ion of the arbitration award and a motion to disallow costs and attorney fees.
The district court confirmed the ar bitrator’s amended final a ward on November 14, 2013

. The court h eld that it lacked authority to modify the arbitrator’s prejudgment interest award
because all of Farmers’ alleged errors were legal, which is not a ground to modify an arbitrator’s
award under Idaho Code sections 7

- 912 or 7

- 913. The district c ourt also aw arded Cedillo $121,007 in attorney fees, ho ld ing that Cedillo’s fee request was not based on an illegal contract
, that the attorney fee agreement did not preclude an award , and that Cedillo was entitled to fees for the payments Farmers made after she agree d to her contingency fee contract with Steele. The
district court ’s judgment on Dec e mber 11, 2013
, also awarded Cedillo $5,608 for Farmers’ unpaid balance on the adjusted interim a ward and prejudgment interest of $132

. Farmers timely appealed.

3 The arbitrator also noted that his final award had calculated interest until April 30, but the award was issued on April 29. He determined that this was also an amount that he could recalculate.5 II . STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is limited to examining the award to determine whether any of the grounds for relief in Idaho Code sectio ns 7

- 912 and 7

- 913 are present. Cranney v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. , 145 Idaho 6, 8, 175 P.3d 1 68, 170 (2007). An arbitrator’s rulings as to questions of law and fact are binding unless one of those statutory grounds for relief applies. Id. Even where a reviewing court considers some of the arbitrator’s rulings on questions of law to be error, the a rbitrator’ s decision is nevertheless binding on the reviewing court. Deelstra v. Hagler , 145 Idaho 922, 924, 188 P.3d 864, 866 (2008). When we review a district
court’s decision to confirm an arbitration award, this Court uses the same standard of review a s the district court. Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank , 148 Idaho 261, 264, 220 P.3d 1080, 1083 (2009)

. III

. ANALYSIS Farmers appeals from the district court’s co nfirmation of the arbitrator’s amended final

a ward and the court’s award of attorney fees , arguing th e district court erred in granting both.
A. The district court properly confirmed the arbitration award

. Farmers argues the district court erred in denying Farmers’ motion to modify the
arbitration award because the arbitrator miscalculated prejudgment in terest and the award was imperfect in a matter of form. Farmers argues the arbitrator miscalculated interest when he
determined th at Farmers was entitled to a 36

- day interest credit for early payment, but subtracted Farmers’ payment from the prejudgment in terest instead of from the principal

. Farmers contends that the proper calculation would have been to subtract Farmers’ March 2013 payment of $100,333 from the a djus ted interim a ward of $100,333 . Farmers asserts that calculation would
leave a balan ce of ze ro dollars owed on the adjusted interim a ward and give credit for the interest
that no longer accrue d after the March 2013 payment

. Farmers argues this is cons istent with the
arbitrator’s 36

- day interest credit.
1. S ummary of the arbitrator’s awards.
The d istrict court’s co nfirmation of the arbitrator’s amended final a ward came about based on the interplay of four of the arbitrator’s decis ions: (1) the January 16, 2013 interim award; (2) the April 29, 2013 final award; (3) the July 24 , 2013 amended final a w ard; and (4) the August 21, 2013 denial of Farm ers’ application to modify the amended final a ward.
U nderstanding each dec ision is essential to address Fa r mers’ argument s

.6 The arbitrator’s interim award was $406,700 . The arbitrator adjust ed that award in his
final a ward. The final a ward reduced the i nterim award by (1) Steele’s insurance payment to Cedillo ; (2) two payments from Farmers to Cedillo ; and (3) other minor adjustments. A ll of these
reductions left a $100,333 adjusted interim a ward. The arbitrat or also awarded $103, 135 in prejudgment interest, using the 12% s tatutory interest rate and taking into account Farmers’ August 2009 and October 2012 payments

. In sum, the arbitrator’s final a ward added the $100,333 a djust ed interim a ward to the $103,135 o f pr ejudgment interest for a total final a ward of $203, 468

. However, Farm ers had paid Cedillo $100,333 on March 25, 2013. The arbitrator did not
know a bout this payment at the time he made his final a w ard. The arbitrator issued an amended
final a ward that considered Farmers’ March 2013 payment . The arbitrator applied Farmers’
March 2013 payment to the accrued pre judgment interest of $103,135 , le aving unpaid the $100, 333 adjusted interim award pl us $2,803 in accrued interest

. T he arbitrator gave Farmers

cre dit for 36 days of interest for paying the award early

. The total a me nded final a ward was $101,948

. Farmers filed a motion to modify, which the arbitrator denied on August 21, 2013. The arbitrator reasoned that applying Farmers’ payment to the principal instead of interest “would leave [Cedillo] with a balance of accrued interest owed and no right to collect interest on the money owed.” The arbitrator further explained : This application of the payment would deny [Cedillo] of the right under section 28

- 22

- 104 to collect interest at the rate of 12% per annum “on money after the same becomes due.” The right to prejudgment interest is “money after the same becomes due.” Thus, regardless of whether the pay ment was applied to principal

or accrued interest, [Cedi llo] is entitled to collect interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount that was due her on the date of the payment and thereafter until it is fully paid.
The arbitrator therefore still applied Farmers’ payment to interest and did not change the 3 6

- day
credit.
The district court confirmed the arbitrator’s decision

. The court reasoned that it had no authority to modify the prejudgment interest because the arbitrator’s decision to allocate Farmers’ payment to prejudgment interest was an alleged legal error and not an evident miscalculation of figures under Idaho Code section 7

- 913.
2. Cedillo’s jurisdictional challenges fail.7 Cedillo asserts various procedural arguments that she contends bar Farmers from even raising the issue of a possible improper awa rd

. Cedillo first argues that Farmers’ September 18, 2013 motion to modify was untimely
because Idaho Code section 7

- 913’s 90

- day time limit began t o run when the arbitrator issued his
final a ward on April 29, 2013
, and expired on July 29, 2013

. However, Farmers’ motion was timely under section 7

- 913. Idaho Code section 7

- 913 (a) states: “ Upon application made within ninety (90) days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award” when the grounds listed in the statute exist. T he statute requires that the application must be made within 90 days. The statute does not specify that “the award” refers to any specific award. Instead, the statute’s plain language suggests that “the award” is simply the award a p arty seeks to modify. Here, Farmers pe titioned to modify the a mended final a ward in the district court on August 16
, 2013 , less than a month after the arbitrator issued his amended
final a ward on July 24, 2013 . Cedillo also sought to con firm the amended fi nal a ward , not the April 2013 final award . Thus, Farmers’ motion to modify was timely. Next, Cedillo argues that res judicata mandates that the arbitrator’s ruling be upheld. Res judicata ’s rule is that
, in a second action between the same parties on the same claim
, “the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated
in the first suit.” Wolfe v. Farm Bure au Ins. Co. , 128 Idaho 398, 402

– 03, 913 P.2d 1168, 1172

– 73 (1996) (quoting Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch
, 123 Idaho 434, 436

– 37, 849 P.2d 107, 109

– 10 (1993)). However, because Idaho Code section 7

- 913 allows a party to apply for the
district cour t to modify an arbitration award and that decision is reviewable, this action is not yet complete. Thus, res judicata does not apply. Additionally, Cedillo argues that Farmers’ previous payments render the prejudgment
interest issue moot. An issue becomes moot when the issue does not present a real and substantial controversy tha t is capable of being concluded by judicial relief. State v. Barclay , 149 Idaho 6, 8 , 23 2 P.3d 327, 329 (2010)

. However , the only way Farmers’ payments make the appeal moot is if t he arbitrator found Farmers had paid all amounts in full . Then Farmers would
not have accrued additional interest and there would be no unpaid amount in dispute. Because
Fa rmers accrued additional interest and still has unpaid amounts, the prejudgment inte rest argument is not moot

. Thus, all of Cedillo’s jurisdictional challenges fail . W e therefore address8 the main issue on appeal: whether the district court erred in declining to modify the arbitrator’s
award.
3. The arbitrator did not miscalculate the award a nd the award was not imperfect in form

. Idaho Code section 7

- 913 (a) provides that when a party timely applies to modify an arbitration award
, a district court shall modify the award when: (1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mis take in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; o r (3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy. Cedillo contends that payment of a debt is properly applied first to accrued interest rather than the principal by relying on “the United States rule.” That rule provides that partial payment of a debt will be applied first to unpaid interest and then applied to the principal debt. Story v. Livingston , 38 U.S. 359 (1839). Regardless of Cedillo and Farmers’ arguments for and against this rule, applying the rule is a legal decision that we cannot modify unless one of the statutory grounds in Idaho Code section 7

- 913 is present. Cranney v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. , 145 Idaho 6, 8 , 1 75 P.3d 168, 170 (2007). Thus, we will not address this question. We will instead
focu s on whether the arbitrator’s award contained a miscalculation or was an award imperfect in
form. Farmers challeng es the district court’s decision to confirm the award, arguing the
arbitrator’s error was a n evident miscalculation of f igures or an award im perfect in form. Farmers asserts the arbitrator made a math error when he failed to deduct payment from the proper number: the damage award. “The evident miscalculation of figures under Idaho Code §
7

– 913(a)(1) must be a mathematical error in calculating t he amount of an award, not a legal error in the elements or measure of damages when making the award.” Id. at 9 , 175 P.3d at 171.
We have narrowly interpret ed when a math error occurs . For example, this Court held an arbitrator did not make a math error wh en he allocated prejudgment interest to an insured’s entire
award without accounting for a deduction required under the insurance policy

. American Foreign
Ins. Co. v. Reichert
, 140 Idaho 394, 401, 94 P.3d 699, 706 (2004). There, an uninsured motorist polic y entitled the insured to benefits, but also provided that worker’ s compensation benefits
would be deducted from the award. Id. at 397, 94 P.2d at 702. The arbitrator awarded interest9 based on the total award, but then modified the award to base prejudgmen t interest upon the net award, which was the award minus the worker’ s compensation benefits

. Id. at 397

– 98, 94 P.2d at
702

– 03. We held that the arbitrator could not modify the award because he made no math error
in the initial award as the parties agreed i n a pre

- hearing scheduling order that he would not

cons ider the deduction

. Id. at 401, 94 P.3d at 706. O ur decision in Reichert was a departure from Schilling v. Allstate Ins. Co.
, 132 Idaho 927, 980 P.2d 1014 (1999). In Schilling
, this Court held
the dist rict court p roperly modified an arbitration award to include prejudgment interest because
the arbitrator failed to award prejudgment interest. 132 Idaho at 931, 980 P.2d at 1018

. The
Court reasoned that the arbitrat ion panel’s failure to award any interest left no question that the amount was not properly calculated. Id. However, we have explained : “ Our opinion in Reichert impliedly overruled Schilling v. Allstate Ins. Co. If awarding prejudgment interest is not an ‘evident miscalculation of figures,’ the f ailure to award prejudgment interest likewise cannot be an ‘evident miscalculation of figures.’” Cranney , 14 5 Idaho at 9, 175 P.3d at 171. A n arbitrator
miscalcul ates an awa rd when he makes a math error in calculating the award’s amount, not a legal error in the award’s element s or measure of damages. Id. Hence, s ection 7

- 913(a)(l) does not permit an arbitration award to be modified for a non

- math error that awards prejudgment
interest. Here, the arbitrator made a legal decision about how to apply a paymen t, which is not a math error. The arbitrator stated in his amended final a ward and his denial of Farmers’ motion to modify that he decided to deduct payment from the interest amount. The arbitrator reasoned that applying Farmers’ payment to the principal b alance rather than interest “would leave the Claimant with a balance of accrued interest owed and no right to collect interest on the money
owed.” He reasoned that applying the payment to principal would deny Cedillo her right unde r section 28

- 22

- 104 to co llect interest “on money after the same becomes due” and interest is “money after the same becomes due.” He stated that “regardless of whether the payment was applied to principal or accrued interest, the Claima nt is entitled to collect interest at the rat e of 12% per annum on the amount that was due her on the date of the payment and thereafter until it is fully paid.” This language indicate s that the arbitrator made a legal decision that both inter est and principal are “money as the same becomes due” and subject to inter est. We cannot review an arbitrator’s legal decision regardless of whether the legal decision is wrong

. Moore v. Omnicare,
Inc. , 141 Idaho 809, 815, 118 P.3d 141, 147 (2005). Therefore, we affirm the district court10 because the alleged “math error” in this case was actually the arbitrator deciding to credit Farmers’ payment to prejudgment interest. Farmers urges that its challenge to the arbitrator’s award is not similar to the challenges
in Cranney and Riechet , but is instead similar to TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel Sec., Inc. , 9 53 A.2d 726 (Del. Ch. 2008 )

. However, in TD Ameritrade a Delaware court found math errors on the face of the award

. 953 A.2d at 737. T he re , the court held that the arbitration panel miscalculated da mages when a statute provided treble damages of three times compensatory damages and the arbitrators awarded a qualifying victim treble damages of four times her compensatory damages. Id

. at 736. Unlike the miscalculation on the face of the award
in TD Ame ritrade
, in this case the alleged error came from the arbitrator ’s d ecision to apply Farmers’ payment to interest instead of principal. The arbitrator’s award does not show he used an improper number in his interest calculation or count ed Farmers’ payment twice . Instead, the
arbitrator decided where he would apply Farmers’ payment. He simply put the payment towards interest instead of principal. Thus, the arbitrator made a legal decision and not a math error. Farmers also argues that the award was imperfec t in form because the arbitrator’s 36

- day
interest credit is inconsistent with his decision to apply Farmers’ payment to prejudgment
interest. This Court has only described an award “imperfect in a matter of form” as a

“ procedurally imperfect award.” Landm ark v. Mader Agency, Inc. , 126 Idaho 74, 77, 878 P.2d 773, 776 (1994). In Landmark
, this Court held that the district court improperly remanded an employer’s award to the arbitrator because both the record and the award itself did not provide any ba sis for a claim that the award wa s imperfect in form. Id. Further, the employer’s requested
relief was the arbitrator reconsidering factual conclusions about the employee’s liability, not the
award’s form. Id. Thus, Landmark indicates that for an a ward to be impe rfect in form, the award must be procedurally imperfect and the record must have a basis for the claim of imperfection. As a general rule, courts have been relucta nt to modify damage awards for awards imperfect in
form because changing the amount awarded a ffects the merits. 8 Philip L. Bruner and Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Bruner & O’ Connor on Construction Law § 21:215 (2002)

. In this case, the award was not procedurally imperfect. In addition, finding the award imperfect would affect the merits by affect ing Cedillo’s award and total damages

. The arbitrator
made a decision to awar d a certain amount of damages and apply Farmers’ payment to interest.
C orrecting the award in accordance with Farmers’ wishes involves a legal choice to instead11 apply the payment to principal

. Thus, the award was not imperfect in form. Because the award was not imperfect in form and did not contain a math error, we hold the district court properly
confirmed the award.
B. T he district court ’s award of attorney fees to Cedillo was prop er. The district court awarded $121,007 in attorney fees to Cedillo under Idaho Code section
41

- 1839 (1) and Cedillo’s contingent fee agreement with Steele ’s firm

. Farmers argues the district court erred in awarding Cedillo attorney fees because the award was based on an illegal contract and the contract did not provide for attorney fees in arbitration. Alternatively, Farmers argues the district court awarded the incorrect amount of attorney fees.
1. The contract was legal. Farmers argues the district co urt abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees on an unenforceable, illegal contract. Cedillo argues that Farmers waived this issue because Farmers did not object to Steele’s representation during the arbitration. “However, t his Court may raise
the is sue of illegality sua sponte. ” Barry v. Pac. W. Const., Inc. , 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d 440, 445 (2004). Thus, we do not address whether Farmers waived the issue.
T his Court must then address whether the contract was in fact illegal. Whether a contra ct is illegal is a question of law. AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC , 155 Idaho 159, 167, 307 P.3d 176, 184 (2013). A n illegal contract is a contract that “rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or pub lic policy

. ” Id. (quoting Farrell v.
Whiteman
, 146 Idaho 604, 609, 200 P. 3d 1153, 1158 (2009). A n illegal contract is void. Barry , 140 Idaho at 832, 103 P.3d at 445

. Farmers argues the contingent fee agreement is illegal because Cedillo sought attorney
fee s that were incurred because of her attorney’s wrongful conduct in injuring his client and the contract specifically calculated fees based on the damages from that wrongful conduct

. Farmers argues that courts should not award attorney fees to a wrongdoer l ike Steele because it is against public policy to allow a wrongdoer to benefit from his wrongful deeds. The district court held that Cedillo’s fee request was not based on an illegal contract. The
court found that Cedillo’s claim was her separate property and no evidence indicated that Steele
caused the accident to initiate a lawsuit or that the contract itself was illegal

. The district court’s reasoning is sound. This Court has held that a wife could pursue her tort remedy for damages arising out of a ca r accident where her husband was the tort

- feasor.12 Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co. , 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974). The respondent in Rodgers argued that the wife ’s damages were her and her husband’s community property , which barred
the action. Id. at 16, 539 P.2d at 568. This Court replied that Implicit in respondent’s argument is that the judicial system is inadequate to safeguard against collusion in tort actions between spouses. We reject this contention, for courts in this state presently weed out fra ud and collusion in other cases not involving actions between spouses. We find nothing unusual or peculiar in interspousal suits to frustrate the capability of the judicial system to avoid or anticipate such abuses.
Id. at 17, 539 P.2d at 569. Similarly, i n this case there is no reason to conclude the judicial system could not weed out any fraud and collusion between Cedillo and Steele. The district court
addressed this when it stated that there was no evidence Steel e caused the accident to initiate a
lawsu it. Further, Cedillo’s damages are her own separate property, as she incurred her cause of
action before she married Steele. While Steele ’s firm recovers attorney fees based upon those damages, his law firm did not begin to represent Cedillo until 2011, lo ng after the accident and
Cedillo’s initial injuries and claims. Thus, we hold in this case that the contract was not illegal as a matter of law because there was no evidence Steele caused the action to initiate the lawsuit and
the lawsuit was Cedillo’s ow n separate property. 2. The contract provide d for attorney fees in arbitration. Farmers argues that the district court erred in awarding attorney fees because the contingent fee agreement does not apply to fees incurred in arbitration. Farmers asserts th at the
fee agreement clearly and unambiguous ly bases the recovery of fee s on monetary damages and not upon a judicial process for confirming an arb itration award. Farmers argues Cedillo’s damage recovery came from the arbitration, and not the district cour t.
However , Farmers’ interpretation is not consistent with the contract’s plain language and
the law. Cedillo and Steele’s contingency fee agreement states that “legal fees will be paid only when, and if, you recover monetary damages on your claim in this matter, whether by settlement, or by decision of the district court.” The district court held that Cedillo’s recovery was all owable under the fee agreement because Cedillo had to fil e a petition to confirm the arbitration decision
in district court. We agr ee with the district court’s reasoning

. After all, Cedillo had to file her petition to confirm in the district court in order to get a final judgment

. Thus, the damages came “by decision of district court.” Thus, we reject Farmers’ argument that the contra ct did not provide for recovery of Cedillo’s attorney fees.13 3. T he district court’s amount of attorney fees was proper

. A district court’s attorney fees calculation is within the district court’s discretion.
Lettunich v. Lettunich
, 145 Idaho 746, 749 , 18 5 P.3d 258, 261 (2008). The district court awarded
Cedillo $121,007 in attorney fees, which was one

- third of her recovered damages. One

- third of attorney fees was the amount that Cedillo and Steele’s firm agreed on in their fee agreement

. Cedillo originall y requested $129,341 in attorney fees , which included Farmers’ $25,000 payment in 2009 . However, the district court denied Cedillo’s claim for one

- third of Farmers’ $25,000 payment because Farmers made that payment before Steele’s law firm represented her.
That decision is not in dispute.
Farmers instead disputes the arbitrator’s decision to award fees based on all of the other damages. Farmers argues that the most it owes is one

- third of the $100,333 adjus ted interim

a ward

. Farmers disputes three parts of the district court’s attorney fee award under Idaho Code
section 41

- 1839(1) . These are (1) the UIM benefits Farmers paid in October 2011 ; (2) the prejudgment interest in the f ina l a ward ; and (3) the accrued prejudgment interest based on the
arbitrator’s a lleged math error. Cedillo argues that these issues were untimely. 4
Idaho Code section 41

- 1839(1) provides Any insurer issuing any policy . . . of insurance . . . that fails to pay a person entitled thereto within thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy . . . or to pay to the person entitled thereto within sixty (60) days if the proof of loss pertains to uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist coverage benefits, the amount that person is justly due under such policy . . . shall in any action thereafter commenced against the insurer in any court in this state, or in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the policy

. . . pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney’ s fees i n such action or arbitration. In other words, a court can award reasonable attorney fees against an insurer when that insurer failed to pay within 30 days after the insured furnished the policy’s required proof of loss.

4 Cedillo argues Farmers waived its objections to the amount of attorney fees. She contends that I.R.C.P. 54 (e)(6) requires an objection that follow s I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6), which provides a motion to disallow costs must be filed within 14 days after the memorandum of costs is served. Indeed, this Court has held a party’s failure to make a timely objection waives any objection to the award of attorney fees

. Conner v. Dake , 103 Idaho 761, 761, 653 P.2d 1173, 1173 (1982)

. However, I.R.C.P. 54( d )(5) specifies that a party may serve its memorandum of costs “[a]t any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court.” Cedillo served her motion for atto rney fees and costs on August 16 , 2013, before the district court confirm ed the award i n November . Farmers filed a motion to disallow costs on September 18, 2013, specifying its objection to the early nature of Cedillo’s petition. Farmers’ objection was timely because the objection happened before the district court issued its decision to co nfirm the award.14 First, Farmers argues the award was erroneously based on UIM benefits that Farmers paid wit hin 30 days of receiving information sufficient to support payment. Specifically, Fa r mers argues it s $155,000 payment on October 18 , 2012, was within 30 days of a sufficient proof of
loss because Cedi llo did not provide Farmers any medical records, bills, or reports until September 18, 2012. Farmers’ argument s for a different proof of loss date for attorney fees echo its arguments
to the arbitrator that the proof of loss date was when Cedillo submitte d her bills because that was when Fa r mers could reasonably calculate her damages

. An insured submits a sufficient proof of
loss “ when the insured provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability.” Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho , 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). Here, the arbitrator
found the proof of loss date was July 28, 2009, because that was the day Cedillo sent Farmers a
letter that prov ided Farmers with enough information to obligate Farmers to investigate and determine its rights and liabilities in a fair and accurate manner. Far mers made the $155,000 payment i n October 2012, more than three years after Cedillo’s proof of loss date. The arbitrator rejected Farmers’ suggestion that the proof of loss date changes with every new medical bill.
There is no reason for this Court to adjust the arbitrator’s proof of loss date

. Thus
, we hold the district court properly award ed attorney fees on Fa rmers ’ $155,000 payment. Second, Farmers argues that Cedillo could not recover attorney fees on the prejudgment
interest award because prejudgment interest is not “ an amount justly due ” under Idaho Code
section 41

- 1839. Fa r mers argues that prejudgment in terest is instead due p ursuant to statute under Idaho C ode section 28

- 22

- 104. Section 28

- 22

- 104 applies when there is no contract provision for interest. That statute provides that a 12% interest rate applies to “[m]oney after the
same becomes due.” Idaho Code section 41

- 1839 provides attorney fees for the recovery of “the amount that person i s justly due under such policy . . . in any action thereafter commenced against the insurer in any court

. . . , or in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the

p olicy, certificate or contract. . . .” Section 41

- 1839 also provides that the insurer will “pay such
further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney’ s fees in such action or
arbitration.”
Farmers ’ argument does not consider the part o f section 41

- 1839 that provides the insurer will “pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney’s fees in such15 action or arbitration.” Here, the district court included prejudgment interest in its attorney fees
calculation becau se Cedillo’s contingent fee agreement calculated attorney fees based on the total damages Cedillo recovered

. While prejudgment interest is not specifically due under
Cedillo’s policy with Farmers
, prejudgment interest became part of the total damages under the
arbitrator’s final a ward. Cedillo’s fee agreement broadly allowed Steele to recover attorney fees
for any damages recovered , which meant the district court could reasonably base attorney fees on
that amount

. Therefore
, we hold the district court acted within its discretion by including prejudgment interest in the court’s attorney fees award. Third, Farmers argues it does not owe fees on the prejudgment interest accrued on unpaid
balances that the arbitrator’s errors created. Because we hold that the d istrict court did not err in confirming the award, the fees based on that award are proper. However, Farmers also argues that even without any math errors
, the district court erred in awarding fees on the balance Farmers still owed on November 22, 2013 . Fa rmers argues the award was in error because Cedillo had already been awarded attorney fees on those amounts as she had already calculated other parts of her attorney fees based upon previous payments of the interim a ward and interest.
Farmers is essential ly still arguing that it should only owe for the principal

. Farmers could have avoided additional fees by paying the full amount due. Farmers paid $101,948 on September 11, 2013. This was the amount of the amended final a ward, which inc luded the $100,333 i n damages and $1,615 in interest. In her affidavit of costs, Cedillo stated that she applied that payment first to interest accrued and then to principal. This l eft a $5,608 balance on the damages and $132 of prejudgment interest accrued. The court entered its award based on
these numbers. Farmers still had outstanding damages that Cedillo could recover , which meant
that Cedillo could calculate her attorney fees based on them. Thus, the district court properly included the outstanding damages and interest a s part of Cedillo’s attorney fees.
C. Cedillo is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Cedillo requests attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code sections 41

- 1839 and 7

- 914. Cedillo is the prevailing party, so we must determine whether she is entitled to a ttorney fees
under either statute. Idaho Code sections 41

- 1839 and 12

- 123 are the exclusive remedies for attorney fees in disputes arising out o f insurance policies. I.C. § 41

- 1839(4); Mortensen v.
Stewart Title Guar. Co. , 149 Idaho 437, 447, 235 P.3d 387, 397 (2010). Thus, section 7

- 914 does not apply.16 Cedillo argues for fees under Idaho Code section 41

- 1839(1) because the district court
awarded fees under that statute. When a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees under
section 41

- 1839 in the tr ial court and she prevails on the appeal challenging the reasonableness of that award, she is also entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Parsons v. Mut. o f Enumclaw Ins

. Co. , 143 Idaho 743, 748, 152 P.3d 614, 619 (2007) . Thus, we award Cedillo reasonable at torney fees and costs on appeal under section 41

- 1839

. I V . CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order confirming the arbitration award. We also affirm the district court’s award of attorney fees in the amount of $121,007.23. A ttorney fees and costs on appeal to Cedillo. Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, WALTERS, Pro Tem, KIDWELL, Pro Tem, CONCUR.