alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Yueseyuan CRUEL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-4146.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted July 24, 2003.

Decided Aug. 18, 2003.

Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kevin Frank McDonald, Office of the United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before LUTTIG, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Yueseyuan Cruel made a conditional guilty plea to possessing fifteen counterfeit securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a) (2000). He was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 *263L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), alleging that there are no meritorious claims on appeal but raising the following issue: whether 18 U.S.C. § 513(a) is constitutional in light *of United States v. Lopez,*514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). We review de novo whether a federal statute is constitutional. *United States v. Buculei,*262 F.3d 322, 327 (4th Cir.2001), *cert. denied,*535 U.S. 963, 122 S.Ct. 1378, 152 L.Ed.2d 370 (2002).

We find that a violation of § 513(a) contains a jurisdictional element which shows an affect on interstate or foreign commerce, and thus the statute does not run afoul of *Lopez. See United States v. Kovach,*208 F.3d 1215, 1217 (10th Cir.2000). Thus, we agree with counsel that this claim fails on appeal. Despite notice of his right to do so, Cruel has failed to file a pro se supplemental brief.

We have examined the entire record in this case in accordance with the requirements of *Anders,*and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6903 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6903

  To require the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out activities to 
              suppress wildfires, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 2, 2022

 Mr. McClintock (for himself and Mr. LaMalfa) introduced the following 
   bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture, and in 
  addition to the Committee on Natural Resources, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
  of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
                               concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To require the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out activities to 
              suppress wildfires, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SUPPRESSION OF WILDFIRES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the 
Chief of the Forest Service--
            (1) shall--
                    (A) to the maximum extent practicable--
                            (i) use all available resources to carry 
                        out wildfire suppression with the purpose of 
                        extinguishing wildfires detected on National 
                        Forest System lands not later than 24 hours 
                        after such a wildfire is detected; and
                            (ii) immediately suppress any prescribed 
                        fire that exceeds prescription;
                    (B) not inhibit the suppression efforts of State or 
                local firefighting agencies that are authorized to 
                respond to wildfire on National Forest System lands;
            (2) may only use fire as a resource management tool if the 
        fire is a prescribed fire that complies with applicable law and 
        regulations;
            (3) may only initiate a backfire or burnout during a 
        wildfire by order of the responsible incident commander; and
            (4) shall control any such initiated backfire or burnout 
        until extinguished.
    (b) Penalty.--Any person aggrieved by a violation of paragraph (3) 
or (4) of subsection (a) may bring a civil action against the United 
States in the appropriate Federal district court for actual damages.
                                 <all>
```
|Industrial production | 2007=100 | Percent change
|--------------------- | -------- | --------------
|
|
|                      |          |               
|89.6                  | 90.5     | 90.5          
|100.2                 | 101.3    | 101.3         
|                      |          |               
|                      |          |               
|91.2                  | 92.4     | 91.9          
|92.6                  | 93.7     | 92.9          
|87.4                  | 88.5     | 88.5          
|83.1                  | 83.4     | 82.9          
|73.6                  | 74.8     | 74.6          
|90.3                  | 91.2     | 91.9          
|                      |          |               
|                      |          |               
|86.9                  | 87.8     | 87.6          
|98.5                  | 99.4     | 99.3          
|                      |          |               
|94.9                  | 96.5     | 97.8          
|101.2                 | 102.1    | 102.1         

``

|Capacity utilization | Percent of capacity | Capacitygrowth
|-------------------- | ------------------- | --------------
|
|
|
|
|                     |                     |               
|80.6                 | 85.2                | 78.7          
|80.6                 | 85.1                | 78.7          
|                     |                     |               
|79.2                 | 85.6                | 77.2          
|79.2                 | 85.4                | 77.2          
|87.4                 | 86.4                | 83.6          
|86.7                 | 92.9                | 84.3          
|                     |                     |               
|                     |                     |               
|86.5                 | 87.8                | 84.2          
|81.6                 | 86.6                | 77.9          
|77.5                 | 83.4                | 77.3          

`r  Revised.  p  Preliminary.
Note.  The statistics in this release cover output, capacity, and capacity utilization in the
U.S. industrial sector, which is defined by the Federal Reserve to comprise manufacturing,
mining, and electric and gas utilities. Mining is defined as all industries in sector 21 of the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS); electric and gas utilities are those in
NAICS sectors 2211 and 2212. Manufacturing comprises NAICS manufacturing industries (sector 31-33)
plus the logging industry and the newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishing industries.
Logging and publishing are classified elsewhere in NAICS (under agriculture and information
respectively), but historically they were considered to be manufacturing and were included in
the industrial sector under the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system.  In December 2002
the Federal Reserve reclassified all its industrial output data from the SIC system to NAICS.`

Statistical releases

---

Home Economic research and data  Accessibility Contact Us  Last update: June 25, 2010
#### Frank PEARSON, Appellant v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

March 12, 1954.

Affirmed.
OFFICE OF THE AlTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Eononbl* sehn D* mod, Uorrlrdoaer 

Eureaa ot Labor Sathtlor 

AwU8, TOPD 

de to our orrio. 

r8ain aoatnot ro0r tbelt Dy br 

“84oh Mnaraatur~, -tile, airI*, 

q a ur y ifinil& r md l troot lnllW~Y, o ffa ao l, il, 

&aubeat,, tele(met&e, 1 o ~o nta q d orpr e~OOo Rp a ny, rrp lo y a o ne or ma r e p emo n~, a nd oaoh 

an6 every ratir wmpeay n6t o&wated br a SW&&O&- 

pal Oorgoratfon, aad aaah -4 w&-y wb8a-t Oommfw, 
a a d l ror y o ther aorporatian eng a ged in a ny b udaeda dthln WA3 State, or any person, tia or 

ooorpontlon eagagod In or upon any mbllo work _ 

Sor tha Ststo or for uiy oouuty or 8nj muniolpil 

a orpo ntlo n ther eo f, either l 6 a aontxaotor or a 

l tkok ltno theo rr, ewith, l 8ll jmy uoh or it8 

uployeo~ the wegeo oarnod by bin or her aa ottm 

l * l mb a io n8h ly, o n6 my to l da y not WO 8hul 

rlr8oon (1.6) days prior to the dey oi 

~1un6o4 Aot8 1933, 43rd Lag., D* 

You have giwuf me t&o further lfUorfm8ion tint Gray 

Oleuter8 SD a oleudag a& promlng e8tdMahuaatand la not 

a 0eiporatlon. 

It is oar opiaion t&at Art1010 U55, won, door 

ngt~.p~to4ttny ClunenaabtPII youhar*no jurl8dlaUon 

3iaoo you bra M jurldiotioo ia the mttor 

we do not expieu any opinleft dth retoronao te tlm ooatraeta 

lnvolwd. 

Vary tnly yoara 

ATTolutKY o- OF l%xAs
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Edwin Bryant Wade, Janet Lynn Wade, and 

Jeremy Wade, Appellants

No. 06-23-00095-CV v.

McLane Company, Inc., and Jose Efrain 

Perez, Jr., Appellees

Appeal from the 336th District Court of 

Fannin County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. CV-23-

46149). Panel consists of Chief Justice 

Stevens and Justices van Cleef and Rambin. 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Rambin. 

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We further order that the appellants, Edwin Bryant Wade, Janet Lynn Wade, and Jeremy 

Wade, pay all costs incurred by reason of this appeal.

RENDERED SEPTMEBER 26, 2024

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

SCOTT E. STEVENS

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
Exhibit 15
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   The Board of Directors
   Polaroid Corporation
   
   
   Ladies and Gentlemen:
   
    Re:   Registration statements No. 33-36384 on Form S-8, No. 33-44661
          on Form S-3, No.33-51173 on Form S-8, and No. 333-0791 on Form 
          S-3 of Polaroid Corporation.
   
   With respect to the subject registration statements, we acknowledge
   our awareness of the use therein of our report dated April 15, 1997,
   related to our review of interim financial information.
   
   Pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, such report
   is not considered part of a registration statement prepared or
   certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an
   accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.
   
   
                                        Very truly yours,
                                        
                                        
                                       /s/  KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
   
   
   Boston, Massachusetts
   May 12, 1997
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Prime Hospitality Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard
T. Szymanski, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Richard T. Szymanski
------------------------
Richard T. Szymanski
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

May 10, 2004
#### GAY et al. v. RUTHERFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division A.

May 25, 1954.

*61Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Burns, Asst. Atty. Gen., John D. Moriarty, Tallahassee, for C. M. Gay, comptroller.

Castagna, Satterfield & Stamathis, Clear-water, for Lester W. Lambert, appellants.

Harris, Barrett, McGlothlin & Dew, St. Petersburg, for William A. Rutherford.

Mann, Harrison & Stone, St. Petersburg, for Willie May Wade and Wilbur C. Stone.

Baynard & Baynard, St. Petersburg, for Raymond C. Chapin and wife, appellees.

MATHEWS, Justice.

This Í9 an appeal from a final decree entered by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County finding that the liens for intangible personal property taxes on real property became void under Chapter 20,724 Acts of Florida 1941, F.S.A. § 199.01 et seq., after seven years from the date of the issuance of executions.

In and by the final decree the Chancellor held:

> “ * * * the Court finds and holds that in repealing Chapter 15,789, Florida. Laws of 1931, and enacting Chapter 20,724, Acts of Florida, 1941, wherein provision was made for collecting intangible personal property taxes by executions, which method was not a part of the 1931 Act, and providing that such executions were good and valid for only seven years from the date of their issuance and thereafter were void and, of no force and effect, it must have been and was the intention of the Legislature to limit the duration of the tax lien to the life of the execution, as otherwise there would have been little or no reason for enacting Chapter 20,724, Acts of 1941, and repealing Chapter 15,789, Acts of 1931.”

After making .the above finding the Court then ordered and adjudged that the liens in question no longer existed and' that they had expired and were of no force or effect as to real estate involved, and that such real estate was no longer encumbered with the liens on account of the said taxes.

The appellants insist that the liens continue to encumber the real estate until the taxes are paid and cite 84 G.J.S., Taxation, § 595, to the effect that, “In the absence of a statutory provision as to the duration of the lien, it continues until the tax is paid.” This contention may be true but in the case now presented there is a statutory provision and under this statute the Chancellor correctly held that the liens against the real estate were void.

The appellants failed to meet the burden of showing any reversible error in the final decree.

Affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

January 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

134766 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 134766 

 COA: 269569 

Wayne CC: 05-012184-01 

FELTON LEE BURKS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 17, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

t0114 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

January 22, 2008 

Clerk
**EXHIBIT 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Corrado De Gasperis, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Novamerican Steel Inc.;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the condensed consolidated financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s registered public accounting firm and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

| Date: | June 11, 2008 |   |
|-------|---------------|--------|

 

 

| */s/ Corrado De Gasperis*       |   |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| *Corrado De Gasperis*           |   |
| *(Principal Financial Officer)* |   |
## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD

- 0471

- 23

JOHN PAUL CRUMLEY

, App ellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

COLLIN COUNTY

N EWELL , J.

, filed a concurring opinion in which H ERVEY , R ICHARDSON and W ALKER , JJ., joined

.



### I agree with the Court ’s conclusion that Appellant did not

sufficiently establish that his autism rebutted the State’s evidence of the

requisite mens rea for the offense. 1 

### That is not to say, however, that

1 Ruffin v. State , 270 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding “both lay and expert

testimony of a mental disease or defect that directly rebuts the particular mens rea necessary

### Crumley Concurring

— 2

evidence of autism, including the type of autism attributed to Appellant,

could never rebut the requisite mens rea for this or other offenses. It

is enough to say that in this case, the Appellant never proffered

testimony explaining how autism could have caused him to misperceive

the age of the person he was communicating with. Without such

testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the

evidence of Appellant’s autism. To the extent that the Court goes

further than that, I do not join that aspect of the opinion.

With these thoughts, I concur.

Filed: August 21, 2024

Publish

fo r the charge d offense is relevant and admissible unless excluded under a specific evidentiary

rule”).
NATIONAL PRESTO INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
Three Months and Nine Months Ended October 1, 1995 and October 2, 1994
               (Unaudited)
(In thousands except per share data)
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                           THREE MONTHS ENDED        NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                                           1995         1994         1995         1994

<S>                                                                     <C>          <C>          <C>          <C>       
       Net Earnings                                                     $    4,797   $    4,799   $    9,841   $    9,211

       Add interest expense related to convertible 
          debenture, net of income taxes                                        --           79          160          239

       Adjusted net earnings  (1)                                       $    4,797   $    4,878    $  10,001   $    9,450

       Weighted average common shares outstanding                            7,346        7,337        7,346        7,337

       Common equivalent shares from the assumed
          debenture conversion                                                  --          124          --           124

       Adjusted common and common equivalent shares  (2)                     7,346        7,461        7,346        7,461

       Net earnings per common and common equivalent
          shares outstanding  (1/2)                                     $     0.65   $     0.66   $     1.35   $     1.27

</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.32

Execution Copy

AMENDMENT TO

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

Amendment to Employment Agreement dated as of
February 21, 2007 (the Amendment) between Affinion Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation (Affinion or the Company), and Thomas A. Williams (the Executive).

WHEREAS, the Executive entered into an Employment Agreement dated as of November 8, 2006 (the Employment Agreement) with the Company;

WHEREAS, each of the Company and the Executive wants to amend the Employment Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth in this
Amendment;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which are hereby acknowledged, the Employment Agreement is hereby amended as follows:

1. Section 2(c)(vii) of the Employment Agreement is
hereby deleted in its entirety, and the following Section 2(c)(vii) hereby inserted in its place and stead:

Investment. For
ninety (90) days following the Effective Date, Executive shall have the right, but not the obligation, to purchase up to Twenty Five Thousand (25,000) shares of the Parents common stock, par value $0.01, at a price equal to the fair market
value of Parents common stock at the date of any such purchase. Any purchase will be subject to the terms of a subscription agreement to be entered into between Executive and the Company (which will be upon the same terms as the subscription
agreement between the Company and other similarly situated senior executives).

2. Except as specifically amended above, the
Employment Agreement remains unchanged and in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Agreement as
of the date first written above.



AFFINION GROUP, INC.By:

/s/ Nathaniel LipmanName:  Nathaniel LipmanTitle:    President and CEO




EXECUTIVE:/s/ Thomas A. WilliamsThomas A. Williams