alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>



                                                                  Exhibit 12 (b)
                              J. C. Penney Company, Inc.
                            and Consolidated Subsidiaries

              Computation of Ratios of Available Income to Fixed Charges





                                                52 weeks              53 weeks
                                                  ended                 ended
                                                 Oct. 30,              Oct. 31,
     ($ Millions)                                  1999                  1998
                                                _________             _________

     Income from continuing operations          $    863              $    995
        (before income taxes and
        capitalized interest)

     Fixed charges

     Interest (including capitalized
     interest) on:

        Operating leases                             225                   180
        Short term debt                              133                   106
        Long term debt                               551                   555
        Capital leases                                 2                     6
        Credit facility                               -                     -
        Other, net                                    (3)                   -
                                                _________             ________
     Total fixed charges                             908                   847

                                                --------              --------
     Total available income                     $  1,771              $  1,842
                                                ========              ========
     Ratio of available income to combined
        fixed charges and preferred stock
        dividend requirement                         2.0                   2.2
                                                ========              ========



     The interest cost of the LESOP notes guaranteed by the Company is not
     included in fixed charges above.

     The Company believes that, due to the seasonal nature of its business,
     ratios for a period of time other than a 52 week period are inappropriate.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6913 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the amendments 

made to reporting of third party network transactions by the American 

Rescue Plan Act of 2021. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 3, 2022 

Mrs. STEEL (for herself, Mr. DONALDS, Mr. BUDD, Mr. BURCHETT, Mr. 

BUCK, Ms. HERRELL, Mr. GARBARINO, Mr. DUNN, Mr. MCKINLEY, Mr. 

MCCLINTOCK, Mr. JOHNSON of Ohio, and Mr. GIMENEZ) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal 

the amendments made to reporting of third party network transactions by the American Rescue Plan Act 

of 2021. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop the Nosy Obses5 sion with Online Payments Act of 2022’’ or the ‘‘SNOOP 

6 Act of 2022’’. 


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2 

•HR 6913 IH

1 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF MODIFICATION OF EXCEPTIONS FOR 

2 REPORTING OF THIRD PARTY NETWORK 

3 TRANSACTIONS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6050W(e) of the Internal 

5 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended to read as follows: 

6 ‘‘(e) EXCEPTION FOR DE MINIMIS PAYMENTS BY

7 THIRD PARTY SETTLEMENT ORGANIZATIONS.—A third 

8 party settlement organization shall be required to report 

9 any information under subsection (a) with respect to third 

10 party network transactions of any participating payee only 

11 if— 

12 ‘‘(1) the amount which would otherwise be re13 ported under subsection (a)(2) with respect to such 

14 transactions exceeds $20,000, and 

15 ‘‘(2) the aggregate number of such transactions 

16 exceeds 200.’’. 

17 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 

18 6050W(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 

19 amended by striking ‘‘described in subsection 

20 (d)(3)(A)(iii)’’. 

21 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—The amendment made by 

23 subsection (a) shall apply to returns for calendar 

24 years beginning after December 31, 2021. 

25 (2) CLARIFICATION.—The amendment made by 

26 subsection (b) shall apply to transactions after the 


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3 

•HR 6913 IH

1 date of the enactment of the American Rescue Plan 

2 Act of 2021. 

Æ 


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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-6486

PAUL DION BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

GEORGE TRENT; DAVID DEAN; MICHAEL COLEMAN,

A.W.O., Official and Individual Capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, District Judge.

(CA-98-350-5)

Submitted: August 24, 2000 Decided: August 30, 2000

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul Dion Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Lisa Jeanette Bray, George John

Joseph, BAILEY & WYANT, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West Virginia; Leslie

K. Kiser, Charles Patrick Houdyschell, Jr., WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Paul Dion Brown appeals the district court’s order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) complaint. We

have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting

in part the magistrate judge’s recommendation and sustaining the

defendant’s objections and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Brown v.

Trent, No. CA-98-350-5 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 23, 2000). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
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###### National Science Foundation

# AGENCY:

National Science Foundation.  

# ACTION:

Notice of Permit Applications Received Under the Antarctic Conservation Act.  

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given that the National Science Foundation (NSF) has received a waste management permit application for operation of a 54-foot steel-hulled ketch,                         *Northanger*, sailing and making landings along the west coast of the Antarctic Peninsula, operated by the Explorer's Corner LLC, a company within the United States. The application is submitted to NSF pursuant to regulations issued under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978.                      

# DATES:

Interested parties are invited to submit written data, comments, or views with respect to this permit application by  October 3, 2008. Permit applications may be inspected by interested parties at the Permit Office, address below.  

# ADDRESSES:

Comments should be addressed to Permit Office, Room 755, Office of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22230.  

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dr. Polly A. Penhale or Nadene Kennedy at the above address or (703) 292-8030.  

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

NSF's Antarctic Waste Regulation, 45 CFR part 671, requires all U.S. citizens and entities to obtain a permit for the use or release of a designated pollutant in Antarctica, and for the release of waste in Antarctica. NSF has received a permit application under this Regulation for operation of a sailing ketch, Northanger, conducting passenger landings along the western coast of the Antarctic Peninsula. The small amount of waste created by the expedition team will be removed, including all fuel bottles, batteries, plastics, and non-combustible wastes, including perishable and nonperishable food wastes.  

The permit applicant is: Olaf Malver, Explorers' Corner LLC, 1865 Solano Avenue, PMB926, Berkeley, CA 94707. Permit application No. 2009 WM-003.  

Nadene G. Kennedy,  

Permit Officer.

[FR Doc. E8-20268 Filed 9-2-08; 8:45 am]  

BILLING CODE 7555-01-P
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6806 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to ensure that bonds used 

to finance professional stadiums are not treated as tax-exempt bonds. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 22, 2022 

Mr. BLUMENAUER (for himself, Ms. SPEIER, and Mr. BEYER) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to ensure 

that bonds used to finance professional stadiums are 

not treated as tax-exempt bonds. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No Tax Subsidies for 

5 Stadiums Act of 2022’’. 

6 SEC. 2. NO TAX-EXEMPT BONDS FOR PROFESSIONAL STA7 DIUMS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 103(b) of the Internal 

9 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end 

10 the following new paragraph: 


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2 

•HR 6806 IH

1 ‘‘(4) PROFESSIONAL STADIUM BOND.—Any pro2 fessional stadium bond.’’. 

3 (b) PROFESSIONAL STADIUM BOND DEFINED.—Sec4 tion 103(c) of such Code is amended by adding at the end 

5 the following new paragraph: 

6 ‘‘(3) PROFESSIONAL STADIUM BOND.—The 

7 term ‘professional stadium bond’ means any bond 

8 issued as part of an issue any proceeds of which are 

9 used to finance or refinance capital expenditures al10 locable to a facility (or appurtenant real property) 

11 which, during at least 5 days during any calendar 

12 year, is used as a stadium or arena for professional 

13 sports exhibitions, games, or training.’’. 

14 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

15 this section shall apply to bonds issued after the date of 

16 the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


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#### CROCKETT v. TROPOLI.

No. 2542.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

June 30, 1943.

D. D. Newman, of Leesville, for appellant.

■ R. H. VanNorman, of Lake Charles, for appellee.

OTT, Judge.

The plaintiff brought this suit to recover the sum of $235 which he claims is the balance due by the defendant for certain work and material furnished by him as contractor in making certain repairs to the Old Opera House in Leesville. It is alleged by the plaintiff and admitted by the defendant that they entered into a written contract whereby the plaintiff was to make certain alterations and repairs on the second floor of the Old Opera House for a total consideration of $525; that there was a separate verbal agreement by which plaintiff agreed to build a certain number of tables for the sum of $110. It is admitted that the defendant paid plaintiff $400, but the defendant denies that he owes any further sum for the reason that plaintiff failed to perform the work as he agreed; that he did not complete the repairs nor make the tables as he agreed, the work being defective.

There was judgment below in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $225 and the defendant has taken a suspensive appeal from this judgment.

The proof for the plaintiff consists principally in his own testimony and that of his son who helped on the job. Both of these witnesses testified that the contract for making the alterations and repairs in the building and in making the tables was fully carried out. The defendant attempted to point out many defects in the carpenter work and in the tables for his eating place. It is fairly clear from the testimony, however, that the defendant did not make any serious objection to the work until he was pressed for payment of the balance due.

The trial judge found in favor of the plaintiff, and we see nothing in the record to justify a reversal of his findings. Neither side has filed briefs in the case.

Finding no error in the judgment appealed from and none being pointed out to us, the judgment is therefore affirmed at the cost of defendant in both courts.
#### 520 East 81st Street Associates v Lenox Hill Hospital.

Leave to appeal to Court of Appeals and stay granted, all as indicated. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ross, Milonas, Smith and Rubin, JJ.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 19

- 1194

_____________________________
M ICAH L AMB , Petitioner,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

— Original Jurisdiction.

August 5, 2019

P ER C URIAM

. The amended petition for writ of mandamus is denied on the merits.

L EWIS , R OWE , and K ELSEY , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Micah Lamb, pro se, Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
#### CABRAL v. TOTARO et al.

No. 20254.

Court of Appeals of Louisiana. Orleans.

June 21, 1954.

Harry R. Cabral, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.

Adams & Reese, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.

Before McBRIDE and REGAN, JJ., and REDMANN, Judge ad hoc.

REDMANN, Judge ad hoc.

Plaintiff sues for damages resulting from a collision of plaintiff’s 1951 Plymouth Sedan with defendant’s 1952 Ford automobile. The accident occurred on Sunday, July 27, 1952, at about 1:15 p. m., at the intersection of South Carrollton Avenue and Oleander Street. Defendants reconvened, claiming that plaintiff’s negligence was the cause of the accident. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $201.49 and dismissing the reconventional demand, defendants appealed.

The plaintiff was driving his car in the center traffic lane on South Carrollton Avenue towards Canal Street at about *211thirty miles per hour. South Carrollton Avenue is one of the widest neutral-ground streets and one of the main traffic arteries in the City of New Orleans. When plaintiff’s car was about 150 feet from Oleander Street, which traverses South Carrollton Avenue, the car of defendant Totaro was crossing the neutral ground on the Avenue. There was another car proceeding in the same direction as plaintiff’s but in the left traffic lane and slightly behind plaintiff’s car. The defendant, believing that he had time to clear the oncoming cars, made a left turn into Carroll-ton Avenue,, clearing the car in the left lane, going over into the center traffic lane where the right rear of his car was struck by the left front of plaintiff’s car. The car of defendant Totaro had just about negotiated the turn when the collision occurred.

While there is some conflict in the testimony, we find no reason to believe that the trial judge was in error in holding the defendants responsible for the accident. After all he was in the superior position to weigh the testimony and determine the credibility of the witnesses. We fail to discern manifest error in his factual conclusions.

In Myers v. Landry, La.App., 50 So.2d 318, 320, we said:

> “The law is. to the effect that the operator of a motor vehicle, desiring to turn left, carries the responsibility of being certain that the turn can be made without danger to normal overtaking or oncoming traffic, and he must yield the right of way to such vehicles. Michelli v. Rheem Mfg. Co., La.App., 34 So.2d 264, and cases therein cited.”

The defendant Totaro could not reasonably expect traffic moving on a main and right of way thoroughfare to stop or even slow down beyond the maximum allowable speed at every cross street on which an automobile might be upon a wide neutral ground such as Carrollton Avenue. The plaintiff had the right of way, was crossing at an allowable rate of speed, and was entitled to believe that defendant Totaro would not improvidently proceed and turn left into the path of the oncoming cars.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed at the cost of appellants.

Affirmed.
224 La. 588

#### STATE ex rel. OGDEN v. ROBARDS. In re OGDEN.

No. 41440.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 14, 1953.

Ralph L. Roy and Joseph W. Starring, Baton Rouge, for relator.

PONDER, Justice.

On application of the relator we granted the writ of certiorari and issued a rule on the respondent Judge to show cause why a hearing should not be granted to the relator, who is being confined in East Louisiana Hospital, to determine whether or not the relator should be discharged.

It appears that the relator was committed to this hospital at various times beginning November 1, 1947 and is now being confined under the last commitment of date May 27, 1953.

On June 26, 1953 the relator petitioned the committing District Court for his release. He asked for a hearing under the-provisions of LSA-R.S. 28:61. The district judge refused the hearing and the relator sought and obtained the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.

The relator is a chronic alcoholic and it appears that he has received all the treatment that can be given and that there is little left in the line of definite therapy as certified by the superintendent of the institution.

The relator contends that treatment for alcoholism is no longer beneficial or necessary for him, that no treatment is being now administered to him and that any further confinement of him is illegal and unlawful. He takes the position that he is entitled to a hearing under the circumstances with the view of obtaining his discharge.

It is provided in LSA-R.S. 28:61 that “No person committed to an institution-in accordance with R.S. 28:52 or 28:53, shall be detained for treatment as an inebriate for a period of more than one year, unless the court believes that detention for a longer period is beneficial and necessary, as certified by the superintendent of the institution. Whenever the superintendent certifies that the patient is cured or that treatment is no longer beneficial or necessary, the court shall -order the patient discharged upon whatever conditions it designates.”

Whether or not the, relator is entitled to discharge is a question that can only be -answered after a hearing but under this section of the Revised Statutes a person so committed for such a period of time is en*136titled, upon application, to a hearing when the superintendent certifies, as in the' present case, that treatment is no longer beneficial. Consequently the refusal of the hearing was án 'abuse of discretion.

For the reasons assigned, the rule is made absolute and accordingly the respondent Judge is directed to grant the relator a hearing pursuant to the views herein expressed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *499Richard Singleton, Also Known as Richie Davidson, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuffner, J.), rendered January 13, 1988, convicting him of rape in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial when the complainant’s hospital record was received into evidence. The hospital record contains a description of the events leading up to the rape. Although this description should have been redacted as improper bolstering *(see, Williams v Alexander,*309 NY 283; *People v Jackson,*124 AD2d 975), the error was harmless, in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt *(see, People v Johnson,*57 NY2d 969, 970; *People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230).

We have considered the contention raised by the defendant in his supplemental *pro se*brief and find it to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
Sunoco, Inc. Executive Compensation Summary Sheet.


 Exhibit 10.18 
  
 Sunoco, Inc. Executive Compensation Summary Sheet 
  
 The following is a summary of the base salary, annual guideline incentive bonus opportunity under the Executive Incentive Plan, and
long-term incentive awards (stock options and performance-based common stock units) under the Long-Term Performance Enhancement Plan II, of the named executive officers of Sunoco, Inc. for 2005: 

	


										
	 Name/Title

	  	Base Salary

	  	Annual Guideline
Incentive Bonus
Opportunity
Under the
Executive
Incentive Plan
(% of Base Salary)

	 	Stock
Options1

	  	Performance-
Based Common
Stock Units1


	 John G. Drosdick
 Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
	  	$	1,100,000	  	120%	 	118,000	  	31,640
	 Joel H. Maness
 Senior Vice President, Refining and Supply
	  	$	500,000	  	70%	 	32,800	  	8,780
	 Thomas W. Hofmann
 Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
	  	$	475,000	  	70%	 	30,000	  	8,020
	 Robert W. Owens
 Senior Vice President, Marketing
	  	$	450,000	  	70%	 	28,200	  	7,560
	 Charles K. Valutas
 Senior Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer
	  	$	400,000	  	65%	 	24,900	  	6,660

  
 NOTE TO TABLE: 
  

	1	The stock options and performance-based common stock units awarded for 2005 were granted in
December 2004 under the Long-Term Performance Enhancement Plan II.