Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC19-1464

____________

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, etc., et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

FLORIGROWN, LLC, etc., et al.,

Respondents.

May 27, 2021

CORRECTED OPINION

PER CURIAM.

We have for review the First District Court of Appeal’s decision 

in Florida Department of Health v. Florigrown, LLC (Florigrown I), No. 

1D18-4471, 2019 WL 2943329 (Fla. 1st DCA July 9, 2019). The 

First District partially upheld a temporary injunction that prohibits

enforcement of certain statutory provisions relating to the 

regulation of medical marijuana treatment centers (MMTCs). We 

have jurisdiction because the district court passed upon and 

certified a question to this Court as one of great public importance. 
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Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown (Florigrown II), No. 1D18-4471, 

2019 WL 4019919, at *1 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 27, 2019); see art. V, § 

3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 

The temporary injunction was entered during a pending 

lawsuit filed by Florigrown, LLC, and Voice of Freedom, Inc. 

(collectively, Florigrown), against the Florida Department of Health

(Department) and other state actors. Florigrown’s lawsuit includes 

several constitutional challenges to section 381.986(8), Florida 

Statutes (2017). Specifically, Florigrown challenges two provisions

as inconsistent with the recent medical marijuana amendment to 

the Florida Constitution, article X, section 29 (the Amendment). 

One of those provisions mandates that MMTCs use a vertically 

integrated supply chain, see § 381.986(8)(e), and the other places 

statutory caps on the number of MMTC licenses available to 

authorize entities to participate in the medical marijuana industry, 

see § 381.986(8)(a). Florigrown also challenges three provisions of 

section 381.986(8) as special laws granting privileges to private 

corporations, contrary to article III, section 11(a)(12) of the Florida 

Constitution. See § 381.986(8)(a)1., 2.a., 3. The trial court agreed 
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with Florigrown as to each argument and entered a temporary 

injunction.

In its decision partially upholding the injunction, the First 

District certified the following as a question of great public 

importance:

WHETHER [FLORIGROWN HAS] DEMONSTRATED A 

SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE 

MERITS OF [ITS] CLAIMS THAT THE STATUTORY 

REQUIREMENTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND 

CAPS ON THE NUMBER OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA 

TREATMENT CENTER LICENSES AS SET FORTH IN 

SECTION 381.986(8), FLORIDA STATUTES, ARE IN 

DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ARTICLE X, SECTION 29, OF 

THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION.

Florigrown II, 2019 WL 4019919, at *1.

Having considered the certified question together with 

Florigrown’s special-law-based challenge to section 381.986(8), we 

hold that Florigrown has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood 

of success on the merits of any of its constitutional claims. 

Accordingly, and as is fully explained below, we quash the First 

District’s decision.

BACKGROUND

In November 2016, the people of Florida amended our state 

constitution to mandate the development of a carefully regulated 
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system for providing access to marijuana for certain patients 

suffering from debilitating medical conditions. Art. X, § 29, Fla. 

Const. The Amendment requires the Department to “issue 

reasonable regulations necessary for the implementation and 

enforcement of” its provisions, for the purpose of “ensur[ing] the 

availability and safe use of medical marijuana by qualifying 

patients.” Id. § 29(d). At the same time, the Amendment 

contemplates that the Legislature may “enact[] laws consistent 

with” its provisions. Id. § 29(e).

Among the regulations the Department is required to issue are 

“[p]rocedures for the registration of MMTCs that include procedures 

for the issuance, renewal, suspension and revocation of 

registration, and standards to ensure proper security, record 

keeping, testing, labeling, inspection, and safety.” Id. § 29(d)(1)c. 

The Amendment required the Department to issue these procedures 

within six months of the Amendment’s effective date, January 3, 

2017, and to begin registering MMTCs within nine months of that 

date. Id. § 29(d)(1) (2). 

The Amendment provides state-law immunity from criminal or 

civil liability for actions taken by an MMTC in compliance with the 
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Amendment and the Department’s regulations. Id. § 29(a)(3).1 It

defines “MMTC” as follows:

an entity that acquires, cultivates, possesses, processes . 

. . , transfers, transports, sells, distributes, dispenses, or 

administers marijuana, products containing marijuana, 

related supplies, or educational materials to qualifying 

patients or their caregivers and is registered by the 

Department.

Art. X, § 29(b)(5), Fla. Const.

This proceeding is based on a challenge to a statute enacted in 

light of the Amendment and to the Department’s deference to that 

statute. Because the statute builds on prior statutory law, a review

of the pre-Amendment law addressing the medical use of marijuana

in Florida will provide context for some of the challenged provisions.

In 2014, the Legislature enacted the “Compassionate Medical 

Cannabis Act of 2014.” Ch. 2014-157, § 1, Laws of Fla. This act 

created section 381.986, which allowed the medical use of “low-THC 

cannabis” for certain patients diagnosed with cancer or a “physical 

medical condition that chronically produces symptoms of seizures 

1. Marijuana is still an illegal controlled substance under 

federal law, with no exception for medicinal use. 21 U.S.C. §§ 

812(b)(1), 812(c), 841(a), 844(a); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 

27, 29 (2005).
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or severe and persistent muscle spasms.” § 381.986(2), Fla. Stat. 

(2014). This statute required such patients to be listed in the state 

registry and to obtain their low-THC cannabis from “dispensing 

organizations” regulated by the state. Id. § 381.986(1)(a), (b)-(d), (5), 

(7)(a). Under the 2014 law, “dispensing organization” was defined 

as “an organization approved by the department to cultivate, 

process, and dispense low-THC cannabis pursuant to this section.” 

Id. § 381.986(1)(a). The Department was required to “[a]uthorize 

the establishment of five dispensing organizations to ensure 

reasonable statewide accessibility and availability” of low-THC 

cannabis for qualifying patients. Id. § 381.986(5)(b). One applicant 

was to be chosen from each of five regions in Florida. Id. 

The Legislature expanded Florida’s cannabis law in 2016 to 

allow certain qualified patients to obtain full-potency “medical

cannabis” from dispensing organizations and to authorize the 

approval of three additional dispensing organizations once 250,000 

qualified patients were registered. § 381.986(1)(f), (5)(c), Fla. Stat. 

(2016); ch. 2016-123, § 1, Laws of Fla. To qualify for medical 

cannabis, rather than low-THC cannabis, qualified patients had to 

be terminally ill and expected to die within a year. §§ 499.0295(2), 
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381.986(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). In contrast, the Amendment allows 

the use of full-potency marijuana for medical purposes for qualified 

patients with “debilitating medical condition[s],” a term defined to 

include a more expansive set of conditions than the prior law and 

not limited to patients who are terminally ill. Art. X, § 29(b)(1), Fla. 

Const.

In June 2017, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed 

Senate Bill 8-A, which amended section 381.986 in light of the 

Amendment. Ch. 2017-232, § 3, Laws of Fla. The portions of that 

law that are most pertinent to this proceeding are the following: 

(8) MEDICAL MARIJUANA TREATMENT CENTERS.—

(a) The department shall license medical marijuana 

treatment centers to ensure reasonable statewide 

accessibility and availability as necessary for qualified 

patients registered in the medical marijuana use registry 

and who are issued physician certification under this 

section.

1. As soon as practicable, but no later than July 3, 

2017, the department shall license as a medical 

marijuana treatment center any entity that holds an 

active, unrestricted license to cultivate, process, 

transport, and dispense low-THC cannabis, medical 

cannabis, and cannabis delivery devices, under former s. 

381.986, Florida Statutes 2016, before July 1, 2017, and 

which meets the requirements of this section. . . . 
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2. The department shall license as medical 

marijuana treatment centers 10 applicants that meet the 

requirements of this section, under the following 

parameters:

a. As soon as practicable, but no later than August 

1, 2017, the department shall license any applicant 

whose application was reviewed, evaluated, and scored 

by the department and which was denied a dispensing 

organization license by the department under former s. 

381.986, Florida Statutes 2014; which had one or more 

administrative or judicial challenges pending as of 

January 1, 2017, or had a final ranking within one point 

of the highest final ranking in its region under former s. 

381.986, Florida Statutes 2014; which meets the 

requirements of this section; and which provides 

documentation to the department that it has the existing 

infrastructure and technical and technological ability to 

begin cultivating marijuana within 30 days after 

registration as a medical marijuana treatment center.

. . . . 

c. As soon as practicable, but no later than October 

3, 2017, the department shall license applicants that 

meet the requirements of this section in sufficient 

numbers to result in 10 total licenses issued under this 

subparagraph, while accounting for the number of 

licenses issued under sub-subparagraphs a. and b.

3. For up to two of the licenses issued under 

subparagraph 2., the department shall give preference to 

applicants that demonstrate in their applications that 

they own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for 

the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of 

citrus fruit or citrus molasses and will use or convert the 

facility or facilities for the processing of marijuana.

4. Within 6 months after registration of 100,000 

active qualified patients in the medical marijuana use 

registry, the department shall license four additional 
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medical marijuana treatment centers that meet the 

requirements of this section. Thereafter, the department 

shall license four medical marijuana treatment centers 

within 6 months after the registration of each additional 

100,000 active qualified patients in the medical 

marijuana use registry that meet the requirement of this 

section.

. . . . 

(e) A licensed medical marijuana treatment center 

shall cultivate, process, transport, and dispense 

marijuana for medical use. A licensed medical marijuana 

treatment center may not contract for services directly 

related to the cultivation, processing, and dispensing of 

marijuana or marijuana delivery devices, except that a 

medical marijuana treatment center licensed pursuant to 

subparagraph (a)1. may contract with a single entity for 

the cultivation, processing, transporting, and dispensing 

of marijuana and marijuana delivery devices.

§ 381.986 (8) (a), (e), Fla. Stat. (2017).

As noted at the outset, Florigrown’s lawsuit challenges some of 

these provisions as inconsistent with the Amendment and others as 

invalid special laws granting privileges to private corporations. 

Several months after filing the lawsuit, Florigrown moved for a 

temporary injunction prohibiting further registration or licensure of 

MMTCs under section 381.986(8) and requiring the Department to 

immediately register MMTCs, including Florigrown in particular.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Florigrown’s 

motion in July 2018. At that time, there were fourteen MMTCs 
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registered in Florida, and the Department had not issued MMTC 

licenses to any entities that had not applied to be dispensing

organizations under the former law. In fact, there was no rule in 

place for registering MMTCs that had not applied to be dispensing 

organizations. However, the Department was pursuing rulemaking 

under section 381.986 that would allow new entities to apply for 

MMTC licensure. 

A Department representative testified that, once rulemaking 

concluded, seven MMTC licenses would be available “to any 

company, including a company such as Florigrown,” except that 

one such license would have to go to a member of a class that 

Florigrown is not part of (and which is defined in section 

381.986(8)(a)2.b., a provision not specifically at issue in this 

proceeding), and two such licenses would be subject to the citrus

preference.

The trial court initially denied Florigrown’s motion without 

prejudice. The trial court recognized that, to be entitled to a 

temporary injunction, Florigrown needed to show (1) that it has a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that there is no 

adequate remedy at law, (3) that it would suffer irreparable harm in 
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the absence of a temporary injunction, and (4) that the injunction 

would serve the public interest. The trial court concluded that 

Florigrown had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on 

the merits of its constitutional claims—specifically, that the verticalintegration requirement and statutory caps conflict with the 

Amendment and that parts of the licensure scheme are invalid as 

special laws granting privileges to private corporations. The trial 

court also found that Florigrown has no adequate remedy at law for 

these violations and for the Department’s refusal to register 

Florigrown outside the statutory scheme. However, the trial court 

further found that Florigrown had failed to show that the denial of 

the temporary injunction would cause irreparable harm or that 

granting the temporary injunction would serve the public interest. 

Regarding the irreparable-harm inquiry, the trial court 

observed that, without the temporary injunction, Florigrown would 

still “have the ability to apply and compete for one of the remaining 

available MMTC licenses.” 

As for the public interest, the trial court observed that “[a]n 

injunction should preserve the status quo during the pendency of 

the case” and then concluded, “The requested injunction at this 
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time would substantially alter the status quo by halting the 

Department’s existing process and procedures for the issuance of 

MMTC licenses as well as the rulemaking currently underway to 

initiate the application process.” 

The trial court explained that the denial of the temporary 

injunction was without prejudice because “[t]he passing of more 

time may alter” the findings concerning irreparable harm and the 

public interest. It scheduled a case management conference for two 

months in the future to reassess those findings.

Shortly before the conference, Florigrown renewed its motion 

for a temporary injunction, alleging that the Department had failed 

to take “any meaningful action in recognition of” the trial court’s 

order. At the conference, Florigrown’s counsel advised that the 

Department had filed a proposed rule to implement portions of 

section 381.986 that the court had found substantially likely to be

unconstitutional on the merits. In addition, Florigrown’s counsel 

advised that the Department had announced at a public hearing 

that it intended to move forward with rulemaking under section 

381.986. Finding that the Department had failed to change course

since entry of the earlier order, the trial court entered a temporary 
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injunction requiring the Department to immediately stop registering 

or licensing MMTCs under section 381.986; to begin registering 

MMTCs under the constitutional language alone within two weeks; 

and specifically to register Florigrown as an MMTC within two 

weeks unless the Department could show before that deadline that 

“such registration would result in unsafe use of medical marijuana 

by qualifying patients.” The trial court found irreparable harm 

because the Department had not taken action in response to its 

prior order. The trial court determined that the injunction was in 

the public interest because the Amendment had received the 

approval of over seventy percent of voters and because compliance 

with the Amendment is required to ensure the availability and safe 

use of medical marijuana.

The trial court’s order was stayed, and the Department 

appealed to the First District. The First District agreed with the 

trial court that Florigrown had demonstrated a substantial 

likelihood of success as to two grounds of unconstitutionality—

namely, the statutory requirements of vertical integration and caps 

on the number of MMTC licenses—and further agreed that all the 

requirements for a temporary injunction were met. Florigrown I, 
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2019 WL 2943329, at *2-*5. As a result, over a dissent, the First 

District upheld the injunction “to the extent it requires the 

Department to consider Florigrown’s request for licensure without 

applying the portions of the statutory scheme [that the First 

District’s] opinion identifies as being [preliminarily]

unconstitutional.” Id. at *1. The First District did not find it in the 

public interest for the Department “to register MMTCs pursuant to 

a preliminary injunction without applying other regulations to 

uphold the safety of the public” and, therefore, explained that it was 

affirming “that portion of the injunction that precludes [the 

Department] from enforcing the [preliminarily] unconstitutional 

provisions but allows the Department a reasonable period of time to 

exercise its duties under the constitutional amendment.” Id. at *5. 

Later, on the Department’s motion, the First District certified the 

language quoted at the beginning of this opinion—pertaining to 

Florigrown’s likelihood of success on the merits of its challenges to 

the vertical-integration requirement and the statutory caps—as a 

question of great public importance. Florigrown II, 2019 WL 

4019919, at *1.
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We accepted review and, for the reasons explained below, now 

quash the First District’s decision.

ANALYSIS

The Department urges us to answer the certified question in 

the negative and, beyond that, challenges almost every aspect of the 

trial court’s order. Florigrown defends all aspects of the trial court’s 

order, including its conclusion, not addressed by the First District, 

that certain provisions of section 381.986(8)(a) violate the 

constitutional prohibition against special laws granting privileges to 

private corporations. We are unpersuaded by Florigrown’s defense 

of the trial court’s order.

A temporary injunction is extraordinary relief that should be 

granted only when the party seeking the injunction has established 

four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 

(2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, (3) irreparable 

harm absent entry of an injunction, and (4) that the injunction 

would serve the public interest. Provident Mgmt. Corp. v. City of 

Treasure Island, 796 So. 2d 481, 485 (Fla. 2001) (extraordinary 

relief); Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 2004) 

(elements of a claim for a temporary injunction). We review a trial 
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court’s factual findings on these elements for competent, 

substantial evidence, and we review its legal conclusions de novo. 

Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1258, 1265 

(Fla. 2017). To the extent the decision to enter a temporary 

injunction involves an exercise of discretion, we defer to the trial 

court unless it has abused its discretion. See id. at 1258.

In the analysis that follows, we explain our conclusion that 

Florigrown has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on 

the merits of its constitutional challenges to section 381.986(8). We 

need not discuss the remaining elements of the temporary 

injunction test, because a movant’s failure to establish any single 

element means that the injunction must be denied.

Florigrown’s Constitutional Claims

There are three claims at issue: (1) that section 381.986(8)’s 

vertical-integration requirement conflicts with the Amendment; (2) 

that section 381.986(8)’s caps on the number of MMTC licenses 

available conflicts with the Amendment; and (3) that three aspects 

of section 381.986(8)(a) violate Florida’s constitutional prohibition

against the use of a special law to grant a privilege to a private 

corporation.
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All of these claims present issues of statutory or constitutional 

construction, which we review de novo, and, to the extent these 

texts are clear and unambiguous, we accord them their plain 

meaning without resort to external sources cited in support of a 

litigant’s view of what the legislators or voters intended beyond that 

plain meaning. Advisory Op. to Governor re Implementation of 

Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 

1078 (Fla. 2020); Israel v. DeSantis, 269 So. 3d 491, 495 (Fla. 

2019). To the extent the claims involve issues of fact, we review the 

trial court’s findings for competent, substantial evidence in the 

record. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Mem’l Healthcare Grp., Inc., 

967 So. 2d 794, 799 (Fla. 2007). 

Additionally, our consideration of Florigrown’s likelihood of 

success on the merits of these claims is guided by a few overarching 

considerations. First, article III, section 1 of the Florida 

Constitution vests “[t]he legislative power of the state” in the 

Legislature. Second, “[t]he Legislature may exercise any lawmaking 

power that is not forbidden by [the Constitution],” which means 

that, “unless legislation be clearly contrary to some express or 

necessarily implied prohibition found in the Constitution, the 
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courts are without authority to declare legislative acts invalid.” 

Savage v. Bd. of Pub. Instr. for Hillsborough Cty., 133 So. 341, 344 

(Fla. 1931). Third, “statutes are presumed constitutional, and the 

challenging party has the burden to establish the statute’s 

invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 

423, 426 (Fla. 2016). With these considerations in mind, we turn to 

Florigrown’s constitutional challenges to section 381.986.

Vertical Integration

Florigrown argues, and the lower courts agreed, that 

Florigrown has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of 

its claim that section 381.986(8)(e)’s vertical-integration 

requirement conflicts with the definition of “MMTC” provided in the 

Amendment. As noted earlier, the Amendment defines “MMTC” as 

“an entity that acquires, cultivates, possesses, processes . . . , 

transfers, transports, sells, distributes, dispenses, or administers 

marijuana, products containing marijuana, related supplies, or 

educational materials to qualifying patients or their caregivers and 

is registered by the Department.” Art. X, § 29(b)(5), Fla. Const. In 

pertinent part, section 381.986(8)(e) provides as follows:
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A licensed medical marijuana treatment center shall 

cultivate, process, transport, and dispense marijuana for 

medical use. A licensed medical marijuana treatment 

center may not contract for services directly related to the 

cultivation, processing, and dispensing of marijuana or 

marijuana delivery devices, except that a medical 

marijuana treatment center licensed pursuant to 

subparagraph (a)1. may contract with a single entity for 

the cultivation, processing, transporting, and dispensing 

of marijuana and marijuana delivery devices.

The trial court and the First District concluded that section 

381.986(8)(e) modifies or restricts a right granted under the 

Amendment by requiring an MMTC to perform several specified 

functions in order to be licensed as an MMTC, whereas the 

constitution defines “MMTC” using a disjunctive list of those and 

other functions. We disagree. In reaching their conclusions, the 

trial court and the First District misconstrued the constitution by 

overlooking the context of the definition of “MMTC” provided in the 

Amendment and by failing to give due consideration to the authority 

that the Amendment, by its plain language and when considered 

together with article III, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, leaves 

to the Legislature in the establishment of policy related to MMTCs.

More specifically, Florigrown contends, and the lower courts 

found, that the Amendment’s definition of “MMTC” conflicts with 
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the vertical-integration requirement. Article X, section 29(b)(5) of 

the Florida Constitution provides a two-part definition of “MMTC.” 

That definition, in itself, gives no entity the right to be either 

registered or licensed. Under that definition, an entity is an MMTC 

if it “[1] acquires, cultivates, possesses, processes . . . , transfers, 

transports, sells, distributes, dispenses, or administers marijuana, 

products containing marijuana, related supplies, or educational 

materials to qualifying patients or their caregivers and [2] is 

registered by the Department.” Art. X, § 29(b)(5), Fla. Const. Thus, 

an entity is an MMTC if it performs any one of the listed functions 

and is registered by the Department. Id. Section 381.986(8)(e) does 

not say otherwise.

In fact, section 381.986 does not undertake to define “MMTC”

at all. What it does is set forth requirements that an MMTC must 

meet in order to be licensed. One of those requirements, the one 

pertinent here, is that the MMTC must “cultivate, process, 

transport, and dispense marijuana for medical use” and “may not 

contract for services directly related to the cultivation, processing, 

and dispensing of marijuana or marijuana delivery devices,” with 

certain exceptions. § 381.986(8)(e). Because the Amendment 
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nowhere says that any entity that performs one of the listed 

functions is entitled to registration or licensure, the statute’s 

requirement that an entity perform several of those functions to be 

licensed does not conflict with the Amendment. 

Because there is no conflict between the MMTC definition and 

the statute’s vertical-integration requirement, and the Amendment 

expressly left the Legislature its authority to “enact[] laws consistent 

with this section,” art. X, § 29(e), Fla. Const., Florigrown’s challenge 

to section 381.986(8)(e) does not have a substantial likelihood of 

success on the merits. 

Additionally, to the extent Florigrown is arguing that the 

Legislature has no right to require licensure of MMTCs or that the 

Department is required to register MMTCs who do not qualify for 

licensure under the statute, we conclude that Florigrown does not 

have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. 

Florigrown points out that the Amendment does not speak of 

“licensing” MMTCs but instead directs the “registering” of MMTCs. 

Art. X, § 29(d)(3), Fla. Const. However, this is not a conflict 

between the statute and the constitution but a difference in the 

chosen labels. It is clear from the Amendment that “registration” is 
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not simply putting an entity’s name on a list as a business that 

performs one of the functions of an MMTC. The constitution directs 

the Department to promulgate “[p]rocedures for the registration of 

MMTCs that include procedures for the issuance, renewal, 

suspension, and revocation of registration, and standards to ensure 

proper security, record keeping, testing, labeling, inspection, and 

safety.” Art. X, § 29(d)(1)c., Fla. Const. This language establishes 

that the right to register does not result directly from the 

constitutional definition of MMTC, but from regulations 

promulgated by the Department providing standards to be met. 

Notably, the constitutional definition of “MMTC” does not provide 

for unilateral registration “with” the Department; it requires an 

entity to be registered “by” the Department, according to regulations 

designed to ensure safety and security, before it can be considered 

an MMTC and entitled to immunity from state-law liability. Art. X, 

§ 29(b)(5), (d)(1)c., Fla. Const. 

While the Amendment uses the term “procedures” to refer to 

the regulations the Department must promulgate, the language 

describing the subject matter of those procedures—including 

“suspension and revocation of registration” and “standards to 
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ensure proper security, record keeping, testing, labeling, inspection, 

and safety”—indicates that the Amendment contemplates 

substantive standards to be imposed on entities seeking registration 

as MMTCs. See art. X, § 29(d)(1)c., Fla. Const. Thus, the 

registration the Amendment speaks of operates as a license. 

Indeed, this Court understood this language to refer to licensure 

when it reviewed the Amendment for placement on the ballot as a 

citizen initiative. See In re Adv. Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana 

for Debilitating Med. Conditions, 181 So. 3d 471, 477 (Fla. 2015).

In sum, the Amendment defines “MMTC” by reference to its 

“regist[ration] by the Department,” requires the Department to 

promulgate substantive regulations for both the issuance and 

potential revocation of such “registration,” and further, expressly 

recognizes the Legislature’s authority to “enact[] laws consistent 

with this section.” Art. X, § 29(e), Fla. Const. Because the 

Amendment does not entitle an entity to either registration or 

licensure simply because it intends to perform one of the listed 

functions, and the Amendment contemplates licensure according to 

substantive standards, the Legislature’s enactment of standards 

that include vertical integration is not inconsistent with the 
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Amendment. Accordingly, the vertical-integration requirement of 

section 381.986(8)(e) is within the Legislature’s specific authority 

recognized in article X, section 29(e) and its plenary lawmaking 

authority set out in article III, section 1 of the Florida Constitution. 

Florigrown does not have a substantial likelihood of success on the 

merits of its challenge to the statute’s vertical-integration 

requirement for licensure as an MMTC.

Statutory Caps on the Number of Licenses 

As for the statutory caps set out in section 381.986(8)(a), 

Florigrown argues, and the lower courts agreed, that Florigrown has 

a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that 

these caps violate the Amendment by placing an unreasonable 

restriction on the medical marijuana industry and conflicting with 

the Amendment’s purpose of “ensur[ing] the availability and safe 

use of medical marijuana by qualifying patients.” Art. X, § 29(d), 

Fla. Const. These rulings are not based on a direct conflict between 

any constitutional language and the statute. They are based partly 

on a factual finding that the statutory caps have made medical 

marijuana unavailable, or insufficiently available, in this state and 

partly on a legal conclusion that the statutory caps are 
- 25 -

unreasonable in light of the Amendment’s purpose. We disapprove 

of these rulings because competent, substantial evidence does not 

support a finding that the statute has made medical marijuana 

unavailable, and the Amendment does not preclude a limit on the 

number of MMTCs that can be licensed.2

To assess Florigrown’s argument and the lower courts’ rulings, 

we first review and explain the statutory caps. Under section 

381.986(8)(a), the Department was required to issue a limited 

number of licenses between the date of the statute’s enactment in 

June 2017 and October 1, 2017, and is required, on a continuing 

basis, to issue additional licenses as the number of registered 

qualifying patients increases. § 381.986(8)(a)1.-4. Specifically, 

section 381.986(8)(a) provides for the issuance of licenses to all 

existing dispensing organizations plus ten other entities and further 

provides for an expanding number of licenses, in increments of four 

per 100,000 qualifying patients. § 381.986(8)(a)1.-4.

2. Florigrown concedes that the Legislature has the authority 

to impose a cap but argues that the chosen cap is unreasonable, 

without providing any standard for this Court to determine what 

would be reasonable under the Amendment’s language. 
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When the trial court issued the temporary injunction in this 

case, fourteen entities had been licensed as MMTCs, at least seven 

more licenses were to become available upon completion of ongoing 

rulemaking, and the statute provided for even more licenses to 

become available as the patient population increased. When 

enacted, the statute limited the number of dispensing facilities each 

entity could operate, providing a limit of twenty-five per MMTC and 

a limit within that twenty-five of how many dispensing facilities 

each MMTC could operate in each of five regions of the state. § 

381.986(8)(a)5.a. However, the statute provided for an expanding 

number of facilities in increments of five additional facilities per 

MMTC each time the patient population reached an additional 

100,000 patients. Id. Further, as planned from the outset by the

terms of the statute, the limitation on the number of dispensing 

facilities MMTCs are permitted to operate expired on April 1, 2020. 

§ 381.986(8)(a)5.d. There is now no limit. Id. 

In addition to operating an unlimited number of dispensing 

facilities as of April 1, 2020, MMTCs are permitted to deliver 

medical marijuana to qualifying patients. § 381.986(8)(g). There 

also is no limit, and there has not been a limit, on the size of a 
- 27 -

dispensing facility or on the amount of medical marijuana each 

MMTC may produce and sell. 

Given the provision in the statute for at least twenty-one

vertically integrated MMTCs—the fourteen that were licensed at the 

time of the trial court’s decision and the seven others that could

become licensed upon completion of rulemaking—and the 

statutorily planned expansion of that number in proportion to an 

increase in the patient population, with no limit on the amount of 

marijuana that can be produced and sold per MMTC, the trial 

court’s finding that the statute violates the Amendment by making 

medical marijuana essentially unavailable in the state is 

inconsistent with the language of the statute. It also lacks record 

support. 

In an attempt to support the ruling, Florigrown points out 

sixteen affidavits it submitted to the trial court, in which qualifying 

patients attested to difficulties in finding the products they need, 

high prices when they do find the products they need, and lack of 

knowledge and professionalism in MMTC employees they have dealt 

with. These affidavits are not competent, substantial evidence that 

medical marijuana is not available in this state, even when viewed 
- 28 -

in light of testimony by Florigrown’s witnesses that the troubles 

revealed in these affidavits are consistent with what they have seen 

in other vertically integrated markets. These affidavits and this 

testimony would support a finding that Florida’s fledgling medical 

marijuana market is not functioning seamlessly, but not that the 

statute renders medical marijuana essentially unavailable for safe 

use in this state.

Florigrown also asserts, as support for the trial court’s finding,

that the Department has found that Florida needs 1,993 MMTCs to 

serve its population of qualifying patients. However, Florigrown has 

taken this number out of context. This number was calculated by 

the Department before the Amendment became effective and before 

section 381.986 created a vertically integrated market, and it was 

calculated for the purpose of estimating the costs of implementing 

the Amendment. The Department arrived at this figure based on an 

extrapolation from the number of facilities operating in Colorado’s 

horizontal medical marijuana market, and in reaching this figure, 

the Department assumed a total patient population in Florida of 

440,552. In contrast, at the time of the hearing conducted on 
- 29 -

Florigrown’s motion for a temporary injunction, the registry of 

qualified patients had just crossed the 100,000-patient threshold. 

Furthermore, the number 1,993 is not the Department’s 

determination of the minimum number of facilities the state must 

have to adequately serve the needs of qualifying patients, but of the 

number of facilities the Department expected the state to have after 

implementation of the Amendment based on Colorado’s experience 

with medical marijuana. For these reasons, the out-of-context 

number emphasized by Florigrown does not support its claim that 

the statute was making medical marijuana essentially unavailable 

at the time of the trial court’s order. And, in any event, because the 

statute’s limitation on the number of dispensing facilities that each 

MMTC could operate has now expired, any claim that medical 

marijuana is somehow unavailable because the state does not have 

1,993 facilities is even less supportable. Florigrown has not shown 

that the statute precludes the opening of a sufficient number of 

facilities to meet the demands of the population of qualifying 

patients.

Finally, Florigrown and its amici curiae assert that many 

current MMTC licensees are not producing medical marijuana and 
- 30 -

that others have sold their licenses for exorbitant amounts of 

money, some without having produced or sold any marijuana. 

However, Florigrown has not argued that there is a constitutional 

infirmity in the statute’s allowance for the sale of licenses, and any 

lack of production is the result of failure or inaction by the 

licensees, not a statutory block to production or distribution of 

marijuana.

For these reasons, we conclude that Florigrown does not have 

a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its challenge to 

the statutory caps.

Special-Law Challenge

Florigrown’s last claim on the merits is that subparagraph 1, 

sub-subparagraph 2.a, and subparagraph 3 of section 381.986(8)(a) 

are unconstitutional under article III, section 11(a)(12) of the 

Florida Constitution because they are special laws granting 

privileges to private corporations. The trial court found that 

Florigrown has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of 

these claims. Again, we disagree.

The statutory provisions that Florigrown challenges as special 

laws granting privileges to private corporations are the following: 
- 31 -

1. As soon as practicable, but no later than July 3, 

2017, the department shall license as a medical 

marijuana treatment center any entity that holds an 

active, unrestricted license to cultivate, process, 

transport, and dispense low-THC cannabis, medical 

cannabis, and cannabis delivery devices, under former s. 

381.986, Florida Statutes 2016, before July 1, 2017, and 

which meets the requirements of this section. . . . 

2. The department shall license as medical 

marijuana treatment centers 10 applicants that meet the 

requirements of this section, under the following 

parameters:

a. As soon as practicable, but no later than August 

1, 2017, the department shall license any applicant 

whose application was reviewed, evaluated, and scored 

by the department and which was denied a dispensing 

organization license by the department under former s. 

381.986, Florida Statutes 2014; which had one or more 

administrative or judicial challenges pending as of 

January 1, 2017, or had a final ranking within one point 

of the highest final ranking in its region under former s. 

381.986, Florida Statutes 2014; which meets the 

requirements of this section; and which provides 

documentation to the department that it has the existing 

infrastructure and technical and technological ability to 

begin cultivating marijuana within 30 days after 

registration as a medical marijuana treatment center.

. . . .

c. As soon as practicable, but no later than October 

3, 2017, the department shall license applicants that 

meet the requirements of this section in sufficient 

numbers to result in 10 total licenses issued under this 

subparagraph, while accounting for the number of 

licenses issued under sub-subparagraphs a. and b.

3. For up to two of the licenses issued under 

subparagraph 2., the department shall give preference to 
- 32 -

applicants that demonstrate in their applications that 

they own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for 

the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of 

citrus fruit or citrus molasses and will use or convert the 

facility or facilities for the processing of marijuana.

§ 381.986(8)(a).

Article III, section 11(a)(12) of the Florida Constitution provides 

that “[t]here shall be no special law or general law of local 

application pertaining to . . . private incorporation or grant of 

privilege to a private corporation.” Thus, to violate this provision, a 

statute must have two features: (1) it must be either a special law or 

a general law of local application, and (2) it must grant a privilege to 

a private corporation. We conclude that the challenged provisions 

are parts of a general law implementing a statewide regulatory 

scheme and, accordingly, do not violate article III, section 11(a)(12)

of the Florida Constitution.

The Florida Constitution defines “special law” as “a special or 

local law.” Art. X, § 12(g), Fla. Const. A “special law” is “one 

relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons or 

things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or 

things when classification is not permissible or the classification 

adopted is illegal.” State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 
- 33 -

(Fla. 1934) (citation omitted). Additionally, in consideration of the 

constitutional requirement that a special law not be passed without 

either notice or a referendum, see art. III, § 10, Fla. Const., this 

Court has made the following observation: 

The terms “special or local laws” as used in the 

Constitution refer ordinarily to law relating to entities, 

interests, rights, and functions other than those of the 

State since the organic law does not contemplate or 

require previous publication of notice of proposed laws 

for the exercise of State powers and functions though 

they may be more or less local or special in their 

operations or objects. 

State ex rel. Gray v. Stoutamire, 179 So. 730, 733 (Fla. 1938). 

A law that addresses state interests and operates to protect 

those interests using valid classifications “based upon proper 

differences which are inherent in or peculiar to the class[es]” is a 

general law. Schrader v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 840 So. 2d 

1050, 1055 (Fla. 2003) (citing Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. SanfordOrlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1983)); see also 

Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing 

Ass’n, Inc., 967 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 2007). Even if the law is 

limited in direct application, it is still a general law as long as the 

limitation on its application bears a reasonable relationship to its 
- 34 -

statewide purpose. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hall, 67 So. 3d 

1084, 1090-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (finding a law general where it 

applied to five tobacco companies in such a way as to protect funds 

used for statewide programs). The law at issue here appears to 

satisfy these criteria, and Florigrown has no substantial likelihood 

of proving otherwise.

Florigrown contends that the challenged provisions constitute 

special laws because they operate on closed classes. Indeed, we 

have often held that the closed nature of a class affected by a 

particular law indicated that the law was special. E.g., Ocala 

Breeders’ Sales Co. v. Fla. Gaming Ctrs., Inc., 793 So. 2d 899, 901 

(Fla. 2001) (holding that a statute was a special law because it 

“created an impenetrable barrier to all intertrack wagering 

applicants except [one]”); Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Classic Mile, 

Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1989) (“In determining if a 

reasonable relationship exists [between the statute’s purpose and 

the classification it uses], ‘[t]he fact that matters is that the 

classification is potentially open to other tracks.’ ” (quoting SanfordOrlando Kennel Club, 434 So. 2d at 882). However, we have not 

held that every statute operating on a closed class constitutes a 
- 35 -

special law. See, e.g., Schrader, 840 So. 2d at 1056 (upholding a 

law that operated only in Monroe County but served to protect a 

“vital natural resource” of the entire state); State v. Fla. State 

Turnpike Auth., 80 So. 2d 337, 343-44 (Fla. 1955) (upholding as 

general a law establishing the Florida State Turnpike Authority). 

Regardless, we conclude that the statute at issue creates an 

open class of entities that may be eligible for MMTC licensure and, 

within that open class, creates subclassifications “based upon 

proper distinctions and differences that inhere in or are peculiar or 

appropriate to the class,” Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So. 2d 

at 881, making it a general law. Florigrown’s contrary argument is 

based on a myopic view of the subparagraphs and subsubparagraph that it pulls out of the entire statutory scheme and 

fails to read the statute as a whole.

Read as a whole, and in light of the constitutional imperative 

for medical marijuana to be made available in a safe manner within 

nine months, the statute creates a licensure scheme designed to 

ensure regulated access to medical marijuana throughout the state 

within a short time frame, as contemplated by the Amendment. See

art. X, § 29(d)(2), Fla. Const. (requiring the Department to begin 
- 36 -

registering MMTCS and issuing patient and caregiver identification 

cards within nine months). The statute does so by giving

essentially immediate licensure to each licensed dispensing 

organization—which are spread across five regions encompassing 

the entire state—as long as those entities meet the current 

statutory criteria governing MMTCs. § 381.986(8)(a)1. (requiring 

licensure of dispensing organizations that meet the statutory 

criteria); § 381.986(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014) (requiring the Department 

to authorize the establishment of one dispensing organization in 

each of five regions in the state, consisting of the northwest, 

northeast, central, southeast, and southwest). Those licenses had 

to be issued by July 3, 2017. § 381.986(8)(a)1. The statute also 

required the licensure by August 1, 2017, of certain other entities 

that had already been through the application process for becoming 

dispensing organizations—as long as those entities met the 

statutory criteria governing MMTCs and provided “documentation . . 

. that [they had] the existing infrastructure and technical and 

technological ability to begin cultivating marijuana within 30 days 

after registration.” § 381.986(8)(a)2.a. These provisions essentially 
- 37 -

“grandfather” the dispensing organizations and prior applicants into 

the current licensure scheme.

This grandfathering is accomplished with valid classifications 

that bear a “reasonable relation to the subject matter” of the 

statute. See Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So. 2d at 881. 

Namely, these classifications describe entities that had already been

engaged in, or had made a substantial effort to be engaged in, the 

pre-Amendment medical marijuana industry in Florida. They were 

applicants who were more likely than most to be prepared to join 

the industry efficiently, and they were applicants the Department 

was already familiar with.

The grandfathering provisions of section 381.986(8) are 

analogous to the statute upheld as a general law in St. Johns River 

Water Management District v. Deseret Ranches of Florida, Inc., 421 

So. 2d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 1982). That statute, read in isolation, 

applied to a limited geographical area of the state. Id. at 1067-68. 

It was nevertheless a general law because it was one part of a 

statewide system of water management contained within the Florida 

Statutes. Id. at 1068-69. Thus, focusing on one statute within a 

chapter of the Florida Statutes addressing a comprehensive 
- 38 -

legislative scheme was an improper approach to the question of 

whether a law was special or general. See id. 

Similarly, when analyzing whether a law is special or general,

it is improper to isolate subparagraphs of a statutory section 

embodying a broad regulatory scheme. The provisions of section 

381.986 requiring the MMTC licensure of all dispensing 

organizations and certain prior applicants for dispensingorganization licensure—specifically, subparagraph (a)1. and subsubparagraph (a)2.a.—are components of a statewide system of 

medical-marijuana management. As in St. Johns River Water 

Management District, those provisions, though limited in direct 

application, “materially affect[] the people of the state” as part of a 

comprehensive approach to a statewide concern. 421 So. 2d at 

1069.

Importantly, the statute as a whole does not limit MMTC

licensure to the applicants that were eligible to receive licensure by 

July and August of 2017 based on their participation in the process 

for becoming dispensing organizations. Section 381.986(8)(a)2.c. 

provides for licensure by October 3, 2017, of additional applicants 

beyond those that participated in the prior process, until a total of 
- 39 -

ten licenses have been issued under section 381.986(8)(a)2., 

including those issued to prior dispensing-organization applicants 

and another group identified in section 381.986(8)(a)2.b., which is 

not at issue in this proceeding. In addition, any other entity that 

wishes to apply for a license in the future may do so, and may 

potentially receive one, as the number of available licenses expands 

under section 381.986(8)(a)4. to meet the needs of the state. 

All future licensees will receive licenses equal to the ones 

initially issued during this early stage of Florida’s medical 

marijuana industry. The fact that other entities may join the class 

of licensed MMTCs in the future as circumstances in the state 

change means that the class is open and the law general. Cf. City 

of Coral Gables v. Crandon, 25 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. 1946) (holding 

that a law was not special where it was applicable to only one 

county when it was enacted but where other counties were expected 

to meet the criteria to join the class in the future); Classic Mile, 541 

So. 2d at 1158 n.4 (finding a law special because its “classification 

scheme . . . [was] fixed so as to preclude additional parties from 

satisfying the requirements for inclusion within the statutory 

classification at some future point in time”).
- 40 -

Thus far in our special-law analysis, we have addressed only 

two of the three challenged provisions. In addition to challenging 

the grandfathering provisions of section 381.986(8)(a)1. and 2.a., 

Florigrown challenges section 381.986(8)(a)3., which provides a 

licensure preference to an open class of entities that intend to 

convert a citrus-processing facility into a marijuana-processing 

facility. The basis for this classification in relation to the purpose of 

the statute is unclear. However, even assuming (without deciding) 

that this portion of the statute does not operate on a valid 

classification and that its existence within a broader scheme 

allowing the licensure of an ever-expanding open class does not 

defeat Florigrown’s challenge, we conclude that this 

subclassification itself is open. This provision does not appear to be 

limited to entities who owned citrus facilities at the time of the 

statute’s enactment, and we are aware of no reason to conclude 

that, even though the class is technically open, it applies to and 

was designed to apply to a narrow set of entities for no reason 

rationally related to the statute’s purpose. Cf. Knight v. Bd. of Pub.

Instr. for Hillsborough Cty., 136 So. 631, 631 (Fla. 1931). Therefore, 

we have no reason to believe this portion of the statute, even if 
- 41 -

properly viewed in isolation, is a special law enacted in the guise of 

a general law.3

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Florigrown does not 

have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its 

constitutional challenge to section 381.986(8)(a)1, 2.a., and 3. as 

special laws granting privileges to private corporations in violation 

of article III, section 11(a)(12) of the Florida Constitution.

CONCLUSION

Florigrown does not have a substantial likelihood of success 

on the merits of its constitutional challenges to section 381.986(8). 

Accordingly, Florigrown’s request for a temporary injunction should 

have been denied. We quash the First District’s decision and 

remand this case to the First District with instructions to further 

remand to the trial court for vacation of the temporary injunction.

3. We understand that the citrus preference is the subject of 

separate litigation. Accordingly, we note that this opinion is not 

intended to announce a final conclusion on whether the citrus 

preference is an invalid special law or has any other constitutional 

infirmities. Our conclusions as to the citrus preference, like all of 

our conclusions on the merits of Florigrown’s claims, should be 

understood as limited to the point that Florigrown has not 

established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its 

claims, based on the arguments and evidence presented in this 

proceeding.
- 42 -

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 

GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.

LAWSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 

AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LAWSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority’s conclusions that Florigrown has not 

demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits as to 

its arguments (1) that section 381.986(8)’s vertical-integration 

requirement conflicts with the 2016 medical marijuana amendment 

added to the Florida Constitution as article X, section 29 (the 

Amendment); and (2) that section 381.986(8)’s caps on the number 

of MMTC licenses available conflicts with the Amendment. Unlike 

the majority, however, I conclude that Florigrown has demonstrated 

a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its challenge to 

section 381.986(8)(a)1. and 2.a. as special laws granting privileges 

to private corporations in violation of article III, section 11(a)(12) of 

the Florida Constitution.

As stated by the majority, a violation of article III, section 

11(a)(12) has two components: (1) the law is a special law or a 
- 43 -

general law of local application; and (2) the law grants a privilege to 

a private corporation. The latter inquiry is straightforward in this 

case. A privilege is a “right,” “benefit,” or “advantage.” Lawnwood 

Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 512 (Fla. 2008). The 

provisions in question, section 381.986(8)(a)1. and 2.a., grant 

certain private corporations—described so precisely that they might 

as well be named in the statute—the right to MMTC licensure 

without entering the competition that others must enter for a 

statutorily capped number of licenses. Because the law grants this 

clear benefit to these private corporations, it violates the Florida 

Constitution unless it can be properly construed as a general law.

Our case law firmly establishes that, with limited exceptions 

not applicable here but discussed below, a statute that operates on 

a closed class is a special law. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg. v. 

Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 967 So. 2d 802, 809 (Fla. 2007) 

(recognizing that a statute prohibiting intertrack wagering by 

certain pari-mutuel wagering permitholders applied the prohibition 

based on conditions that had no reasonable possibility of ever 

applying outside a small, specific area of the state and that, as a 

result, the statute was a special law); St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., Inc. v. 
- 44 -

Mem’l Healthcare Grp., Inc., 967 So. 2d 794, 802 (Fla. 2007) 

(holding that a statute providing an exemption for hospitals meeting 

certain criteria was a special law because it applied to only one 

hospital and could not reasonably be expected to apply to others in 

the future); Ocala Breeders’ Sales Co. v. Fla. Gaming Ctrs., Inc., 793 

So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla. 2001) (holding that a statute was a special law 

because it “created an impenetrable barrier to all intertrack 

wagering applicants except [one]”); Dep’t of Bus. Reg. v. Classic Mile, 

Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1989) (“In determining if a 

reasonable relationship exists [between the statute’s purpose and 

the classification it uses], ‘[t]he fact that matters is that the 

classification is potentially open to other tracks.’ ” (quoting Dep’t of 

Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879, 

882 (Fla. 1983)); cf. City of Coral Gables v. Crandon, 25 So. 2d 1, 2-

3 (Fla. 1946) (holding that a statute that applied to any county with 

a population greater than 260,000 was not a special law even 

though it applied to only one county at the time of enactment, 

where other counties were rapidly approaching that population 

size). This clear principle of law makes sense. 
- 45 -

The use of a closed class in a statute is “no different” from 

identifying the entities to which it applies by name, and that makes 

the statute a special law under a definition this Court has used 

since at least the early 20th century, in that the law “relate[s] to, or 

[is] designed to operate upon, particular persons or things.” City of 

Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 148 (Fla. 2002) (quoting State ex 

rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla. 1934)). There has been 

no request for us to reconsider this precedent, and the majority 

does not say it is doing so. Indeed, this precedent is firmly 

embedded in our law, existing as it has for almost a century, even 

while the constitution has undergone numerous revisions without 

any that undermine this understanding of what a special law is. Cf. 

City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So. 2d 1196, 1202 (Fla. 2000) 

(explaining that, when adopting a new version of a law, the 

Legislature is presumed to know the prior judicial constructions of 

it and to have adopted those constructions unless a contrary 

intention is expressed).

Neither the claimed existence of a reasonable relation between 

the statute’s purpose and the closed class nor the operation of the 

broader statute throughout the state is sufficient in itself to change 
- 46 -

the character of a statute from special to general when the statute 

operates on a closed class. See Classic Mile, 541 So. 2d at 1159 

(explaining that the “fact that matters” in determining whether a 

reasonable relationship exists and, thus, whether the law is a 

special law is whether it creates an open or a closed class) (quoting 

Sanford-Orlando, 434 So. 2d at 882). Nor is the combination of 

these two attributes. And, neither any participant in this case nor 

the majority has cited any precedent of this Court to the contrary. 

When this Court has discussed the reasonable relationship 

between a classification and the purpose of a statute, it has done so 

in the context of statutes that created open classifications. For 

example, this Court has relied on the reasonable relationship, or 

lack thereof, between a classification and the purpose of a statute to 

show why a statute constituted a special law despite the theoretical 

openness of its classification scheme. Knight v. Bd. of Pub. 

Instruction for Hillsborough Cnty., 136 So. 631, 631-32 (Fla. 1931). 

This Court has also cited the reasonable relation between an open 

classification and the purpose of a statute to support the point that 

a statute was a general law. See Sanford-Orlando, 434 So. 2d at 

881-82 (holding, after finding that a reasonable relationship existed 
- 47 -

between the classification in the statute and the classification it 

adopted, that the “controlling point” driving this Court’s 

determination that the statute at issue was not a special law was 

that the classification at issue was “open and ha[d] the potential of 

applying to other[s]”); Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Fla. State Racing 

Comm’n, 165 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1964) (holding that an act 

granting licenses for harness racing was a general law “[b]ecause all 

of the classifications effected by this act [were] made on the basis of 

factors which [were] potentially applicable to others and which 

[were] not purely arbitrary in relation to the subject regulated or the 

conduct authorized”). However, I am aware of no case in which this 

Court has held that a statute using a closed class of private entities 

can be saved from a determination that it is a special law simply 

because the classification scheme is reasonable in relation to the 

statute’s purpose.4 

4. The First District reached such a holding in R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Co. v. Hall, 67 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), but in so 

doing, the First District ignored that the statute gave a benefit to a 

closed class, focusing instead on a separate, open class, affected by 

the statute.
- 48 -

Such a holding would nullify the constitutional prohibition 

against enacting special laws without following the specific 

procedural requirements applicable to them, see art. III, § 10, Fla. 

Const., because the Legislature is already independently precluded 

from creating arbitrary classifications, as a matter of equal 

protection, see Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 2016). 

This Court’s precedent instructs that a classification generally must 

be both open and reasonable in relation to the statute’s purpose for 

the law to be considered general. See Sanford-Orlando, 434 So. 2d 

at 881-82; Biscayne Kennel Club, 165 So. 2d at 764; see also 

License Acquisitions, LLC v. DeBary Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 155 

So. 3d 1137, 1143 (Fla. 2014). The exception to this rule exists in 

cases addressing statutes that perform essential state functions 

and operate on the basis of closed classes of public property or 

geographic locations in such a way as to have a statewide effect. 

See, e.g., Schrader v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 840 So. 2d 1050, 

1056 (Fla. 2003) (statute protecting nearshore waters of the Florida 

Keys); St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Deseret Ranches of Fla., 

Inc., 421 So. 2d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 1982) (statute creating a water 

management district as part of a comprehensive scheme); State v. 
- 49 -

Fla. State Turnpike Auth., 80 So. 2d 337, 343-44 (Fla. 1955) (statute 

creating the Florida State Turnpike Authority to establish the 

turnpike in a limited geographic area); Cantwell v. St. Petersburg 

Port Auth., 21 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. 1945) (statute authorizing the 

Railroad Commission to grant franchises for the construction of 

bridges and operation of ferries and similar enterprises for travel 

over and through waters connected to the Gulf of Mexico). 

We have explained that a law is a general law despite its 

limited direct application if it pertains to state property, such as 

state buildings, lands, funds, and other “absolute property.” State 

ex rel. Gray v. Stoutamire, 179 So. 730, 733 (Fla. 1938). And, we 

have expressly recognized the following rule pertaining to cases 

involving the protection of vital natural resources or the 

construction of basic infrastructure affecting travel and tourism 

throughout the state: “[I]f a law utilizes a classification that is 

geographical in its terms but the purpose of the statute is one of 

statewide importance and impact, and the classification is 

reasonably related to the law’s purpose, it is a valid general law.” 

Schrader, 840 So. 2d at 1056; see Fla. State Turnpike Auth., 80 So. 

2d at 343-44; Cantwell, 21 So. 2d at 140. The reason such laws are 
- 50 -

general even though they operate on closed classes is that the 

closed classes themselves consist of aspects of the very fabric of the 

state, not “particular persons or things.” Landis, 163 So. at 240.

Private corporations that produce and sell medical marijuana 

are not aspects of the fabric of the state. They are not property of 

the state, and they do not individually execute functions that 

naturally affect the entirety of the state. Therefore, a law operating 

on a closed class of private corporations in the context of a medical 

marijuana regulation is a special law. Cf. Classic Mile, 541 So. 2d 

at 1159 (rejecting the argument that a pari-mutuel wagering statute 

was general despite its use of a closed class extending to a single 

county because it was “part of the overall statewide regulatory 

scheme for the parimutuel industry” and would generate revenue 

for the state); St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 967 So. 2d at 801-02 (holding 

that a law granting a licensure exemption to a hospital was a 

special law because it applied to a closed class of one hospital).

Plainly, this statute contains provisions—section 

381.986(8)(a)1. and 2.a.—that apply only to closed classes. That 

the statute, through section 381.986(8)(a)2.c. and 4., also creates a 

separate class of applicants that is open and may compete for the 
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licenses designated for that class does not change the analysis of 

whether the provisions guaranteeing licenses to particular entities 

without competition are special laws. The majority’s holding to the 

contrary renders article III, section 11(a)(12) of the Florida 

Constitution ineffective as the limitation on legislative power that it 

is. Under the majority’s holding, the Legislature can avoid the 

prohibition against granting a privilege to a private corporation 

through a special law by simply pairing any effort to do so with an 

open, even contingent, class. See DeBary Real Estate Holdings, LLC 

v. State Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 112 So. 3d 157, 165 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2013), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. License Acquisitions 

v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, 155 So. 3d 1137, 1143-5 (Fla. 

2014). We should not cast article III, section 11(a)(12) aside and 

ignore the closed class contained within the broader scheme of 

section 381.986(8). 

In addition, I note that the Department claimed at oral 

argument that the class is not closed because any entity can sell its 

license once the license is obtained. The idea is that anyone can 

effectively join the classes established by section 381.986(8)(a)1. 

and 2.a. by purchasing a license from one of the entities that 
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obtained their licenses under those provisions. This argument, of 

course, does not show that the classes created by section 

381.986(8)(a)1. and 2.a. are open. It only underscores that the 

privilege those classes have been granted—access to a limited 

number of licenses to sell an unlimited amount of marijuana—is a 

valuable commodity.

In sum, I conclude that Florigrown has a substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits of its claims that section 

381.986(8)(a)1. and 2.a. constitute special laws. It is undisputed 

that these provisions give specific, identifiable entities who 

participated in the dispensing organization application process the 

opportunity for licensure without competition and that no other 

entities can qualify for the licenses designated for these entities. 

Therefore, Florigrown is likely to succeed on its claim that these 

provisions are invalid as special laws, enacted in the guise of a 

general law, that grant privileges to private corporations.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 

– Certified Great Public Importance 

First District - Case No. 1D18-4471

(Leon County)
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Colleen Ernst, Executive Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, 

Florida; Louise Wilhite-St. Laurent, Florida Department of Health, 

Tallahassee, Florida; and Jason Gonzalez, Daniel Nordby, Amber 

Nunnally, and Rachel Procaccini of Shutts & Bowen LLP, 

Tallahassee, Florida,

for Petitioner

Katherine E. Giddings, Tallahassee, Florida, Jonathan S. Robbins, 

Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Ari H. Gerstin of Akerman LLP, 

Miami, Florida,

for Respondent

John M. Lockwood, Thomas J. Morton, and Devon Nunneley of The 

Lockwood Law Firm, Tallahassee, Florida; James A. McKee of Foley 

& Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, Florida; and William D. Hall III and 

Daniel R. Russell of Dean Mead & Dunbar, Tallahassee, Florida,

Amici Curiae DFMMJ Investments, LLC, d/b/a Liberty Health 

Sciences and Acreage Florida, Inc., Perkins Nursery, Inc., San

Felasco Nurseries, Inc. d/b/a Harvest, Mount Dora Farms, 

LLC, and Better - Gro Companies, LLC, d/b/a Columbia Care 

Florida, and Dewar Nurseries, Inc.

Mohammad O. Jazil of Hopping Green & Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, 

Florida; and Daniel William Bell, General Counsel, Florida House of 

Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida,

Amicus Curiae The Florida House of Representatives

Seann M. Frazier, Marc Ito, and Kristen Bond of Parker, Hudson, 

Rainer & Dobbs, LLP, Tallahassee, Florida,

Amicus Curiae Louis Del Favero Orchids, Inc.

Karl E. Pearson and Courtney M. Crossland of Pearson Doyle Mohre 

& Pastis LLP, Maitland, Florida,
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Amicus Curiae Liner Source, Inc.

Jeff Kottkamp of Jeff Kottkamp, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,

Amicus Curiae Triangle Capital, Inc.