alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Alfred Schiff, Petitioner, against Attorney-General of the State of New York, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

December 17, 1956.

*1019
      *Saunders & Franklin*for petitioner.

*Jacob K. Javits, Attorney-General (Ralph Ober*of counsel), respondent in person.

Irving H. Saypol, J.

Upon the foregoing papers this motion to vacate a subpoena issued by the respondent on October 25, 1956 under the authority of the Martin Act (General Business Law, art. 23-A, § 352) is denied.

No sufficient showing is made to warrant the interposition of the court’s power to restrain the Attorney-General in the discharge of his duty as an executive official of the State because it is not shown that he has “ embark[ed] upon any roving course for the purpose of generally prying into the affairs of any person.” *(Carlisle*v. *Bennett,*268 N. Y. 212, 217, quoting *Dunham*v. *Ottinger,*243 N. Y. 423, 433.) Nor is there any impropriety in the alleged breach of secrecy in the disclosure of the service on the petitioner of the 17-year-old restraining order for practices condemned under the same statute *(Matter of McNamara,*128 Misc. 84, 88, citing *Matter of Ottinger*v. *Civil Service Comm.,*240 N. Y. 435).

The record otherwise showing three brief appearances by the petitioner who stands enjoined for meretricious practices in securities and is admittedly convicted of felonious larceny is insufficient to overcome the respondent’s sworn declaration that he is proceeding officially on complaints of questionable securities activities which are not safely to be disclosed in the public interest.
EXHIBIT
32.2


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350


As
Adopted Pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In
connection with this Annual Report of Red Trail Energy, LLC (the “Company”) on
Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Mark E. Klimpel, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:





1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and





2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated:  March
      31, 2010
              
              /s/
      Mark E. KlimpelMark
      E. KlimpelChief
      Financial Officer
Exhibit 99.3


                            [LETTERHEAD OF KPMG LLP]


                         INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT


Travelers Bank Credit Card Master Trust I
c/o The Bank of New York, as Trustee

Citibank USA, as servicer

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying Management
Report on Citibank USA's (the Bank) Compliance, as Servicer, with the Servicing
Requirements of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, that the Bank complied with
the servicing requirements in Article III, Sections 3.01, 3.02, 3.04, 3.05,
3.06 and 3.09, Article IV, Sections 4.02 through 4.06, and Section 8.08 of the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the Travelers Bank Credit Card Master Trust
I, dated as of March 1, 1998 (the Agreement) for the year ended December 31,
2000. Management is responsible for the Bank's compliance with those
requirements. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's
assertion about the Bank's compliance based upon our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,
accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Bank's
compliance with those requirements and performing such other procedures as we
considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a
legal determination on the Bank's compliance with those requirements.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Bank was materially in
compliance with the aforementioned sections of the Agreement for the year ended
December 31, 2000 is fairly stated in all material respects.


/s/ KPMG LLP

March 23, 2001



<PAGE>


                          [LETTERHEAD OF CITIBANK USA]



          MANAGEMENT REPORT ON CITIBANK USA'S COMPLIANCE, AS SERVICER,
     WITH THE SERVICING REQUIREMENTS OF THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT


Management of Citibank USA ("the Bank"), as servicer, is responsible for
compliance with the servicing requirements in Article III, Sections 3.01, 3.02,
3.04, 3.05, 3.06, and 3.09, Article IV, Sections 4.02 through 4.06, and Section
8.08 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the Travelers Bank Credit Card
Master Trust I, dated as of March 1, 1998 ("the Agreement").

Management has performed an evaluation of the Bank's compliance with the
aforementioned sections of the Agreement for the period January 1, 2000 to
December 31, 2000. Based upon this evaluation, management believes that for the
period January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000, the Bank as Servicer, was
materially in compliance with the aforementioned sections of the Agreement.



/s/ Carlos J. Menendez
-------------------------------
    Carlos J. Menendez
    Senior Vice President and
    Chief Financial Officer


March 23, 2001
## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S N O. AP-77,105 TYRONE JAMAAL WILLIAMS, Appellant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. 31293 IN THE 196 T HDISTRICT COURT HUNT COUNTY Per curiam . ORDER The above-sty led and num bered cause is pending bef ore this Court as a result of appellant’s capital m

urder conviction and resulting sentence of death in the 196 t hDistrict Court of Hunt County , Cause No. 31293, sty led The State of Texas v. Ty

r one Jam aal W i lliam s. Appellant has f iled in this Court a “Motion to Abate Appeal and Rem and Case f or Com pletion of Appellate Record.” In his m otion, appellant asks f or the juror inf

orm ation cards and questionnaires to be included in the appellate record. Appellant should f irst present his request f

or theW illiam s – 2

disclosure of

this inf orm ation to the trial court. See T EX . C ODE C R I M . P R O C . Art. 35.29. Appellant also lists several item s that he contends are m issing f rom the appellate record. Because the trial court is in a better position to determ ine the accuracy of the record, we abate the appeal and rem and this cause to the trial court to resolve this issue. The trial court is directed to m ake f indings of

f a ct regarding whether the item s in question have been om itted f

rom the record, and if

so, whether they

should be included. If

the trial court determ ines that certain item s need not be included in the record, then the trial court should state its reasons f

or m a king that determ ination. If the trial court determ ines that any relevant item s have been om i tted f rom the clerk’s record or reporter’s record, then the trial court shall direct the clerk and/or court reporter to prepare, certif y , and f ile in this Court a supplem ental record containing the om itted item s. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 34.5(c)(1) & 34.6(d). Appellant f

urther asks us to “strike” the clerk’s record and reporter’s record that have already

been f iled in this Court and to “instruct the trial court to have the District Clerk and Court reporter create new records such that the entirety of the records correctly ref lect the events in chronological order of occurrence.” In addition, Appellant requests that the district clerk be ordered to “provide . . . appellate counsel with copies of all sealed and ex parte docum ents previously f iled by the def

ense in the trial court” and to “provide both . . . appellate counsel and . . . counsel f or the State of

Texas with copies of docum ents f

iled under seal in the trial court but not f iled ex parte [

. ] ” W e d ecline theseW illiam s – 3

requests. The f indings shall be m ade and any necessary

supplem ents shall be f

iled within 30 day s of the date of

this order. Appellant’s brief will be due in this Court within 30 day s thereaf ter. IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 14 t hDAY OF DECEMBER, 2022. Do not publish
#### WILLIS v. JOHNSON et al.

No. 7376.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Oct. 28, 1949.

John B. Files, Shreveport, for appellants.

Donald Lavine, Oil City, for appellee.

KENNON, Judge.

Plaintiff filed this suit for $2,023 allegedly due for labor and trucking services rendered to the defendants. After filing preliminary pleas, defendants answered, denying any contract with plaintiff. After trial, the District Court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for a total amount of $1,968.25, with 10% additional as attorney’s fees, together with interest and costs.

The case is before us on defendants’ appeal from that judgment.

Paragraph 10 pf Article 7 of the Constitution provides that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to civil suits (of this nature) where the amount in dispute shall exceed $2,000, exclusive of interest. Attorney’s fees included in the judgment are considered in arriving at the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining appellate jurisdiction.

In the case before us, there was an admission that $130 was due. Subtracting this from the $1,968.25 awarded leaves a principal sum of $1,838.25; adding 10% to this amount makes a total of $2,022.07.

In accordance with Act 19 of 1912, it is ordered that the appeal in this case be transferred to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The appellants are hereby granted a period of sixty days from the date this decree becomes final to file the necessary transcript and perfect their appeal, and should they fail to do so within this sixty day period, the appeal is to stand dismissed. Appellants to pay the cost of this appeal) all other costs to await the final outcome of the litigation.
# Fourth Court o f Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 6, 2018

No. 04

- 17

- 00780

- CR

Clint Harrison ELLER, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. A15100 Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presidi ng



### O R D E R

By order dated February 28, 2018, th e s e appeal s w ere abated to the trial court for an indigency hearing. The trial court conducted a hearing and determined appellant is not indigent. The appeal s are REINSTATED on the docket of the court. During the abatement of the appeal s

, the court reporter responsible for preparing the reporter’s record in th e s e appeal s filed a notification of late record requesting an extension of time to file the reporter’s rec ord to April 30, 2018. The request is GRANTED. The reporter’s record must be filed in these appeals no later than April 30, 2018.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed th e seal of the said

court on this 6th day of April, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
EX-10.5



 EXHIBIT 10.5 

FIRST AMENDMENT TO 

NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AWARD 

This Amendment (the “Amendment”) is made and entered into as of this
[            ] day of [            ], 2014 by and between Navigant Consulting, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
“Company”), and William Goodyear (the “Participant”) as an amendment to the Non-Qualified Stock Option Award Agreement between the Company and the Participant, dated as of
[            ] (the “Award”), granted pursuant to the provisions of the Navigant Consulting, Inc. 2005 Long-Term Incentive Plan. 

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section II.I of the Award, the provisions of the Award may be amended by a written agreement between the Company
and the Participant; and 
 WHEREAS, in connection with the retirement of the Participant and in recognition of the
Participant’s years of service with the Company, the Company desires to amend the Award to extend the exercise period following a termination of employment. 

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Award hereby is amended, effective as of
[            ], 2014, as follows: 
 1. Section I is amended by replacing the
phrase “or, if earlier, three months after termination of employment or service” with the phrase “or, if earlier, the period provided in Section II.B.3 below” where it appears therein. 

2. Section II.B.3 of the Award is amended and restated as follows: 
  

	 	(a)	If the Optionee’s employment or service with the Company ceases for any reason other than death, disability or termination for “cause” on or prior to April 30, 2014, the Optionee shall be permitted
to exercise the Option, to the extent it was exercisable on the date of such cessation, but only within 12 months of such cessation, or, if earlier, within the originally prescribed term of the Option as shown in Section I above; provided, however,
that if the Optionee dies or becomes disabled within the three month period after the termination of such service, or, if earlier, within the originally prescribed term of the Option, the Optionee or the Optionee’s estate or personal
representative may exercise the Option within 12 months after the date of the Optionee’s death or disability, but in no event beyond the originally prescribed term of the Option. 


 

	 	(b)	If the Optionee remains continuously employed by the Company through April 30, 2014 (the “Retirement Date”), the Optionee or the Optionee’s estate or personal representative (in the event of the
Optionee’s death or disability on or after the Retirement Date) shall be permitted to exercise the Option, to the extent it was exercisable on such date, within 12 months of the Retirement Date, or, if earlier, within the originally prescribed
term of the Option as shown in Section I above. 








 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be signed by its duly
authorized representative and the Participant has signed this Amendment as of the day and year first above written. 
  

			
	NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC.
		
	By:	 	  

		 	Name:
		 	Title:
	
	  

	William Goodyear



  
 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         13,410
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  4,670
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    35,182
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               58,142
<PP&E>                                         8,680
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2,608
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 69,875
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          6,223
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       202
<OTHER-SE>                                     25,118
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   69,875
<SALES>                                        22,681
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               25,187
<CGS>                                          18,210
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  25,191
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             377
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (330)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (126)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (204)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.02)
        


</TABLE>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 21

- 1674

_____________________________
D IANNE C URTIS P OCASE , Appellant,

v.

W ALMART I NC

. a nd S EDGWICK C MS / W ALMART & S AM ' S C LUB , Appellee s

.

_____________________________

On appeal from an order of the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims. Jonathan E. Walker , Judge

.
Date of Accident: August 12, 2017.

September 8, 2022

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.

L EWIS , T ANENBAUM , and L ONG , JJ., concur

.2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________ Tyler L. Gray, Pensacola
, for Appellant.

Susan N. Marks of McConnaughhay, Coonrod, Pope, Weaver & Stern, P.A. , Pensacola ; Tracey J. Hyde of McConnaughhay, Coonrod, Pope, Weaver & Stern, P.A. , Panama City
, for Appellee s

.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed 

August 30, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-18-00716-CR

IN RE GERALD J. DURDEN, Relator 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

 248th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 905464 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

On August 16, 2018, relator Gerald J. Durden filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (West Supp. 2017); see 

also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the District 

Clerk of Harris County, Texas, Chris Daniel, to present relator’s motion for postconviction DNA testing to the appropriate trial court.
2 

This court’s mandamus jurisdiction is governed by section 22.221 of the 

Texas Government Code. Section 22.221 expressly limits the mandamus jurisdiction 

of the courts of appeals to: (1) writs against a district court judge or county court 

judge in the court of appeals’ district, (2) writs against a judge of a district court who 

is acting as a magistrate at a court of inquiry under Chapter 52, Code of Criminal 

Procedure, in the court of appeals district; (3) writs against an associate judge of a 

district or county court appointed by a judge under Chapter 201, Family Code, in the 

court of appeals district for the judge who appointed the associate judge; and (4) all 

writs necessary to enforce the court of appeals’ jurisdiction. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. 

§ 22.221 (West Supp. 2017). Because the petition for writ of mandamus is directed 

toward a district clerk and is not necessary to enforce this court’s jurisdiction, we 

have no jurisdiction. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is ordered dismissed for lack 

of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Busby. 

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
2005 executive officer incentive compensation program performance goals



 Exhibit 10.8 
  
 Danaher Corporation 
 2005 Executive Officer Incentive Compensation Program Performance Goals 
  
 For 2005, the personal performance objectives for the Company’s named executive officers encompassed objective, quantitative goals relating to Company and business
unit financial results, working capital performance, cost reduction and operational performance, as well as subjective goals relating to development, application and execution of the DANAHER BUSINESS SYSTEM, globalization, Company and departmental
leadership and development, organizational development and talent development, development of individual skills, proficiencies and relationships, establishment of a culture of growth and innovation, growth capacity, execution of low-cost region
initiatives, mergers and acquisitions, investor relations, internal controls and special projects.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Guy Laddie COCKRELL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-31199.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 19, 2003.

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Guy Laddie Cockrell challenges his conviction and the sentence he received after he pleaded guilty to possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and to carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. Cockrell argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred when it did not hold a hearing on his lawyer’s motion to withdraw. Because Cockrell did not argue in the district court that he was entitled to a hearing, this issue is reviewed for plain error. *United States v. Iwegbu,*6 F.3d 272, 274-75 (5th Cir.1993). In light of Cockrell’s statement to the court that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation, *386the district court did not err by not conducting a hearing.

Cockrell also argues for the first time on appeal that the Government was required to file a motion for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The Government’s failure to file a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion was not plain error because, under the terms of the plea agreement, the Government agreed merely to advise the court of Cockrell’s assistance. *Wade v. United States,*504 U.S. 191, 184, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992); *United States v. Garcia-Bonilla,*11 F.3d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1993). The record reflects that the Government told the court about Cockrell’s cooperation.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

DEMETRIUS BAILEY,

Petitioner

v.

JUDGE WILLIAM R. CUNNINGHAM,

ERIE COUNTY COURTHOUSE :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 54 WM 2017

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 18th day of September

, 2017, the Application for Leave to File

Original Process is GRANTED, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary

Relief is DENIED, and the Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the name of the jurist

from the caption.