2015 WI 83

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2013AP1619-D 

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against 

Paul A. Strouse, Attorney at Law: 

Office of Lawyer Regulation, 

 Complainant-Respondent, 

 v. 

Paul A. Strouse, 

 Respondent-Appellant. 

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST STROUSE 

OPINION FILED: July 15, 2015 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: April 16, 2015 

SOURCE OF APPEAL: 

 COURT: 

 COUNTY: 

 JUDGE: 

 

JUSTICES: 

 CONCURRED: 

 DISSENTED: 

 NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J. did not participate. 

 

ATTORNEYS: 

For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Dean R. 

Dietrich and Ruder Ware L.L.S.C., Wausau, and oral argument by 

Dean R. Dietrich. 

For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by James 

C. Reiher and The Schroder Group, S.C., Waukesha, and oral 

argument by James C. Reiher. 
2015 WI 83

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2013AP1619-D 

 

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT 

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Paul A. Strouse, Attorney at Law: 

Office of Lawyer Regulation, 

 Complainant-Respondent, 

 v. 

Paul A. Strouse, 

 Respondent-Appellant. 

FILED 

JUL 15, 2015 

Diane M. Fremgen 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

suspended. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Paul A. Strouse has appealed a 

report filed by Referee Kevin L. Ferguson, concluding that he 

engaged in professional misconduct and recommending that this 

court suspend Attorney Strouse's license to practice law for 60 

days and impose full costs, which total $67,562.12 as of May 6, 

2015. 

¶2 Having considered the referee's report and the 

parties' briefs and oral argument on appeal, we conclude that 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

2 

the referee's findings of fact are supported by satisfactory and 

convincing evidence and we accept his conclusions of law, with 

one exception: we dismiss the allegation that Attorney Strouse 

violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:8.4(c). We agree that 

Attorney Strouse's misconduct warrants the suspension of his 

license to practice law for 60 days and we impose the full costs 

of this proceeding. 

¶3 Attorney Strouse was admitted to practice law in

Wisconsin in 1991. He practices in Milwaukee, primarily 

representing debtors in bankruptcy proceedings. Attorney 

Strouse has received two previous public reprimands for 

misconduct that occurred between 2007 and 2009. Public 

Reprimand of Paul A. Strouse, 2010-2; Public Reprimand of Paul 

A. Strouse, 2011-5. In addition, during the pendency of this 

proceeding, Attorney Strouse received a third public reprimand. 

Public Reprimand of Paul Strouse, 2015-6. 

¶4 The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed the 

complaint giving rise to this proceeding on July 22, 2013, 

alleging eights counts of professional misconduct committed in 

four separate client matters. Attorney Strouse filed an answer 

and Referee Ferguson was appointed. Attorney Strouse amended 

his answer, and discovery and pre-hearing motions followed. 

¶5 Shortly before the evidentiary hearing, Attorney

Strouse entered into a stipulation with the OLR to withdraw his 

amended answer and allow entry of judgment regarding Counts One 

and Two, pertaining to the matter of F.E. Subsequently, the 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

3 

parties entered into a stipulation of facts, including 59 

exhibits. 

¶6 In June 2014, the referee commenced a four-day 

evidentiary hearing which included extensive testimony, more 

than 100 exhibits, and more than 150 pages of briefing. The 

referee issued his report and recommendation on October 30, 

2014. This appeal followed. The court heard oral argument on 

April 16, 2015. 

¶7 When reviewing a referee's report and recommendation, 

the referee, as the finder of fact, is the ultimate arbiter of 

the credibility of the witnesses. In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Alia, 2006 WI 12, ¶71, 288 Wis. 2d 299, 

709 N.W.2d 399. We affirm the referee's findings of fact unless 

they are clearly erroneous. In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 

125. We review the referee's conclusions of law de novo. Alia, 

2006 WI 12, ¶39. We determine the appropriate level of 

discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 

independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefitting 

from it. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 

2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 

¶8 Each of the client matters raised in the OLR complaint 

will be addressed seriatim. 

Matter of F.E. 

¶9 Attorney Strouse stipulated that he committed the 

misconduct alleged in connection with his representation of F.E. 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

4 

The facts will be summarized because the admitted misconduct is 

relevant to our assessment of appropriate discipline. 

¶10 F.E. purchased a gas station/convenience store in 

Milwaukee and, as part of that transaction, F.E. signed a 

Commercial Security Agreement that gave Ridgestone Bank 

(Ridgestone) a security interest in, as relevant here, certain 

fuel monitoring equipment. In April 2009, Ridgestone started 

foreclosure proceedings on the gas station, and obtained a 

default judgment in June 2009. Also in June 2009, F.E. hired 

Attorney Strouse. Ridgestone's lawyer began asking Attorney 

Strouse to arrange for F.E. to return the fuel monitoring 

equipment. Meanwhile, Attorney Strouse filed a Chapter 7 

bankruptcy petition on behalf of F.E. and, at some point, F.E. 

delivered the fuel monitoring equipment to Attorney Strouse's 

office. Attorney Strouse did not give F.E. a receipt. 

¶11 On November 20, 2009, after Attorney Strouse had 

failed to respond to repeated requests for the return of the 

equipment, the gas station's receiver went unannounced to 

Attorney Strouse's office to collect the fuel monitoring 

equipment. Attorney Strouse admitted the equipment had been 

stolen or lost. 

¶12 The complaint alleged and Attorney Strouse later 

stipulated that, by failing to clearly identify and

appropriately safeguard the fuel monitoring equipment left in 

his possession, notwithstanding his receipt of written notice of 

Ridgestone's interest in the property, Attorney Strouse violated 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(6), which provides, in pertinent part, that 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

5 

"[t]he lawyer shall clearly identify and appropriately safeguard 

other property of a client or 3rd party" (Count One). 

¶13 The complaint alleged further and Attorney Strouse 

stipulated that, by failing to provide a signed, written receipt 

to F.E. describing the fuel monitoring equipment he had taken 

into custody and the date of receipt, Attorney Strouse violated 

SCR 20:1.15(j)(8)b., which provides that "[u]pon taking custody, 

as a fiduciary, of any tangible personal property or securities 

in bearer form, the lawyer shall provide to the previous 

custodian a signed receipt, with a description of the property, 

and the date of receipt" (Count Two). 

¶14 We turn to the disputed aspects of this disciplinary 

matter. 

Matter of G.B. 

¶15 Attorney Strouse appeals the referee's conclusion that 

he committed two counts of misconduct in his representation of 

G.B. In November 2009, G.B. and his partner, C.W., met with 

Attorney Strouse to discuss Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. 

Attorney Strouse quoted each a fee of approximately $900 for 

their respective bankruptcy proceedings, consisting of $300 in 

filing fees and $600 in legal fees. It is undisputed that the 

initial fee quote was less than $1,000. 

¶16 On February 3, 2010, they met again and G.B. offered 

to provide website design services in exchange for the $600 

attorney fee. The OLR alleged that Attorney Strouse orally 

agreed to G.B.'s suggestion. G.B. claimed he subsequently spent 

some 15 hours on the website project. Attorney Strouse disputes 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

6 

this claim, stating that he rejected G.B.'s suggestion because a 

longtime friend did his website design. He claims that, 

instead, he renewed his offer for a "special rate" of $975 

conditioned upon receiving $650 up front before filing the 

bankruptcy petition. G.B. gave Attorney Strouse $300 for the 

bankruptcy filing fee that day. 

¶17 On March 6, 2010, G.B. met with Attorney Strouse's law 

associate to review and sign bankruptcy schedules for his 

bankruptcy petition. The schedules included Form 2016(b), which 

stated that Attorney Strouse had agreed to accept $0.00 in 

attorney's fees and that no balance was due. The form also 

contained the following certification: "I certify that the 

foregoing is a complete statement of any agreement or 

arrangement for payment to me for representation of the 

debtor(s) in this bankruptcy proceeding." 

¶18 G.B. stated that he interpreted the $0 as evidence of 

the agreement to exchange web design for legal fees. Attorney 

Strouse maintains that the $0 figure was an error; he stated 

that the bankruptcy petition had to be filed quickly because a 

small claims action had just been filed against G.B. 

¶19 On March 8, 2010, Attorney Strouse filed G.B.'s

bankruptcy petition and sent G.B. a letter advising him that the 

bankruptcy petition had been filed. This letter did not request 

any additional fee. 

¶20 On or about March 15, 2010, Attorney Strouse and G.B. 

spoke by telephone. The substance of that conversation is hotly 

contested. G.B. claimed that Attorney Strouse abruptly stated 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

7 

that he no longer wanted G.B. to work on the website and 

demanded $750, increasing the total cost of representation to 

$1,050. Attorney Strouse claims that G.B. realized that most of 

the work on his bankruptcy case was done and didn't intend to 

pay his balance. Attorney Strouse acknowledged that he "got 

angry" and demanded payment. 

¶21 On March 17, 2010, Attorney Strouse sent G.B. an 

invoice for $1,050, reflecting a $300 payment received and a new 

balance due of $750. A series of oral demands for payment and 

refusals ensued. G.B. terminated Attorney Strouse's 

representation and Attorney Strouse withdrew as counsel for 

G.B.'s bankruptcy case. 

¶22 On March 26, 2010, G.B. filed a small claims action 

against Attorney Strouse in Kenosha County, seeking a refund of 

his $300 filing fee, and alleging that Attorney Strouse reneged 

on a barter for services agreement. On July 21, 2010, G.B. 

prevailed at a bench trial. The transcript from this small 

claims proceeding reflects that the circuit court found that 

Attorney Strouse reneged on a barter agreement for services. 

The circuit court deemed significant the $0 in fees claimed in 

the bankruptcy disclosure. The circuit court awarded G.B. 

$459.50. 

¶23 Turning to this disciplinary proceeding, the referee 

concluded that "Attorney Strouse failed to provide to [G.B.] a 

written fee agreement setting forth the scope of the 

representation and the basis or rate of the fees or expenses for 

representation" and that "Attorney Strouse reneged on an 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

8 

agreement to provide legal services to [G.B.] for $900.00 and 

subsequently failed to abide by the agreement when he increased 

the fee to $1,050.00 without his client's consent." The referee 

thus concluded that Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) 

(Count Three) and SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count Four) in his

representation of G.B. 

¶24 We first consider whether Attorney Strouse violated 

SCR 20:1.5(b)(1). SCR 20:1.5(b)(l) provides: 

The scope of the representation and the basis or 

rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will 

be responsible shall be communicated to the client in 

writing, before or within a reasonable time after 

commencing the representation . . . . If it is 

reasonably foreseeable that the total cost of the 

representation to the client, including attorney's 

fees, will be $1,000 or less, the communication may be 

oral or in writing. Any changes in the basis or rate 

of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 

writing to the client. 

¶25 The American Bar Association Comment to 

SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) reminds us of the reason for this rule: 

In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an 

understanding as to fees and expenses must be promptly 

established. Generally, it is desirable to furnish

the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy 

of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states 

the general nature of the legal services to be 

provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee 

and whether and to what extent the client will be 

responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements 

in the course of the representation. A written 

statement concerning the terms of the engagement 

reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. 

¶26 Attorney Strouse takes issue with the referee's

statement that he "failed to provide to [G.B.] a written fee 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

9 

agreement." Attorney Strouse correctly notes that the term 

"written fee agreement" does not appear in the rule and that no 

written fee communication is required when it is foreseeable 

that the total cost of representation will be $1,000 or less. 

¶27 However, our rule requires that certain information 

with respect to fees and expenses be communicated to the client, 

whether orally or in writing. The rule expressly requires that 

any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall

also be communicated in writing to the client. The first 

paragraph of the Wisconsin Committee Comment to SCR 20:1.5 

observes that "communication to the client through the billing 

statement should clearly indicate that a change in the basis or 

rate of the fee or expenses has occurred along with an indication 

of the new basis or rate of the fee or expenses." This was not 

done. 

¶28 The referee found that "Strouse unilaterally set 

[G.B.'s] account at his regular flat rate of $1,050 and sent the 

Statement . . . to [G.B.] because he was angry with [G.B.]" 

(emphasis added). Attorney Strouse sent a brief cover letter 

and a cursory billing statement that makes absolutely no mention 

of any change in the fee charged to G.B., much less setting 

forth the reason for the change. Simply put, the cursory 

billing statement submitted to G.B., unilaterally increasing the 

fee for legal services in the wake of an acrimonious telephone 

call, does not satisfy the requirements of SCR 20:1.5(b). 

Notwithstanding the imprecise language in the referee's 

conclusion regarding a "written fee agreement," the record 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

10 

contains clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 

Attorney Strouse failed to satisfy the requirements of 

SCR 20:1.5(b)(l). 

¶29 We next consider Attorney Strouse's appeal from the 

referee's conclusion that he violated SCR 20:8.4(c) in his 

representation of G.B. SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is 

professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 

Attorney Strouse contends that the referee failed to make 

necessary or sufficient credibility determinations to support 

his findings and conclusions on this point. We agree. Our 

review would be simpler had the referee made more explicit 

findings to support his conclusion that Attorney Strouse's 

conduct constituted fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in 

violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 

¶30 The OLR alleged that, by reneging on an alleged

agreement to provide legal services to G.B. in exchange for 

website design services or, in the alternative, by agreeing to 

provide legal services for $900 and subsequently failing to 

abide by that agreement, unilaterally increasing the fee to 

$1,050 without his client's consent, Attorney Strouse violated 

SCR 20:8.4(c). 

¶31 The referee made a factual finding that the small 

claims court "found in favor of [G.B.] and awarded [G.B.] a 

judgment of $300.00 plus costs against Strouse to be paid 

[G.B.]" and that the court "concluded that there was an 

agreement between [G.B.] and Strouse for website design services 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

11 

in lieu of bankruptcy legal fees [when he stated]: 'I'm 

satisfied there was an agreement. You were taking it out in 

work.'" However, the referee's mere recognition of the prior 

small claims proceeding is insufficient, alone, to sustain a 

violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) under these facts, particularly in 

view of the lower burden of proof applicable in small claims 

proceedings. The referee did find that Attorney Strouse 

"reneged" on an agreement with G.B., but the precise nature of 

that agreement remains unclear and the circumstances as 

reflected in the referee's findings do not establish that 

Attorney Strouse's conduct rose to the level of 

misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). This court 

will not make a finding that the referee could have made but did 

not. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood,

122 Wis. 2d 610, 363 N.W.2d 220 (1985); see also In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Swartwout, 116 Wis. 2d 380, 

342 N.W.2d 406 (1984). We conclude that the referee's findings 

do not support the conclusion that Attorney Strouse's conduct 

constituted misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and 

we dismiss this charge. 

Matter of Y.W. 

¶32 Attorney Strouse appeals Referee Ferguson's 

determination that Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) in 

his representation of Y.W. In February 2010, Attorney Strouse 

agreed to represent Y.W. in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy matter and, 

on February 4, 2010, Y.W. paid Attorney Strouse $100 to start 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

12 

the proceeding. The receipt reflects payment but does not state 

a balance due. 

¶33 On April 3, 2010, Y.W. paid an additional $300. The 

receipt reflects a balance due of $650. 

¶34 On April 15, 2010, Attorney Strouse filed Y.W.'s 

Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, without schedules. He sent a 

billing statement to Y.W. dated April 15, 2010, reflecting an 

opening balance of $1,050 with a balance due of $650.1 

¶35 On April 22, 2010, Attorney Strouse met with Y.W. and 

told her she owed him an additional $700. Attorney Strouse 

later told the OLR that Y.W. agreed to pay the extra $50, a 

claim Y.W. disputes. Attorney Strouse agreed to accept two 

post-dated checks, each in the amount of $350, as payment, now 

reflecting a total cost of representation of $1,100. 

¶36 The same day, Attorney Strouse filed the requisite 

bankruptcy schedules with the bankruptcy court and certified to 

the court that he was charging Y.W. $750 for legal services, of 

which $50 had been paid, with a balance due of $700. 

¶37 Y.W. filed a grievance claiming that Attorney Strouse 

agreed to represent her for a fee of $500. Attorney Strouse 

denied that he would have agreed to a $500 fee. 

 

1 Attorney Strouse paid $300 for the bankruptcy filing fee 

and $28 for the purchase of three credit reports from the $400 

he had received from Y.W. 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

13 

¶38 The referee found that "the testimony of [Y.W.] on the 

total amount of fees was not credible," but concluded that 

Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) (Count Five). 

¶39 On appeal, Attorney Strouse maintains that the 

April 15 billing statement sent to Y.W. satisfies the 

requirements of SCR 20:1.5(b)(1). We disagree. 

¶40 The referee found that Attorney Strouse agreed to 

represent Y.W. for $1,050, consistent with his standard fee for 

a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, and that Attorney Strouse did 

not "provide [Y.W.] with a written document stating the scope of 

the representation to be provided and the basis of the fee of 

$1,050." The evidence supports the referee's findings and we 

accept them. 

¶41 The barebones billing statement sent to Y.W. does not 

satisfy the requirements of SCR 20:1.5(b)(1), which required 

Attorney Strouse to provide to Y.W., in writing, the scope of 

the representation and the basis or rate of the fee. Nor, to 

the extent there was a change in the fee from $1,050 to $1,100, 

does the billing statement adequately denote the change in the 

basis or rate of the fee or expenses. We agree with the 

referee's conclusion that Attorney Strouse violated

SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) in his representation of Y.W. 

E.J. and S.J.

¶42 Attorney Strouse next appeals the referee's conclusion 

that Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.2(a) (Scope of 

Representation) and SCRs 20:1.4(a)(2), 20:1.4(a)(4), and 

20:1.4(b) (Communication) in his representation of E.J. and S.J. 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

14 

He contends that Referee Ferguson fails to make necessary 

credibility determinations to support his findings and 

conclusions. We disagree. 

¶43 In 2009, E.J. and S.J. retained Attorney Strouse to 

file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding for them. The parties 

disagree as to whether Attorney Strouse also agreed to represent 

them in an adversary proceeding involving the discharge of 

E.J.'s student loans. E.J. and S.J. claim there was such an 

agreement. Attorney Strouse denies it; he claims they had a 

limited agreement whereby he would look into the issue of 

potentially representing them on the discharge of the student 

loan and evaluate the likelihood of success of such a claim. 

¶44 On August 1, 2009, E.J. and S.J. paid Attorney Strouse 

$750. No written fee agreement was executed. It is undisputed 

that Attorney Strouse filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on 

the clients' behalf, which proceeded without incident. In 

November 2009, when E.J. and S.J. sent Attorney Strouse a final 

check for his services, however, they inquired about the student 

loan discharge. In early January 2010, E.J. and S.J. handdelivered to Attorney Strouse's office a letter expressing 

concern about Attorney Strouse's failure to return their calls 

or communicate about the bankruptcy matter and the student loan 

issue. Attorney Strouse did not respond. 

¶45 On January 31, 2010, E.J. and S.J. again wrote to 

Attorney Strouse about the student loan issue, requesting 

information regarding a hearing date. Attorney Strouse did not 

respond. On February 4, 2010, E.J. sent another letter to 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

15 

Attorney Strouse regarding the student loan issue. Attorney 

Strouse did not respond. 

¶46 Finally, E.J. and S.J. claim that on April 8, 2010, 

they met with Attorney Strouse to discuss the student loan 

matter. At this meeting, they say Attorney Strouse admitted 

that he missed a relevant filing date and returned their file. 

Attorney Strouse refutes this claim. 

¶47 During the ensuing disciplinary proceeding, Attorney 

Strouse told the OLR that he had prepared and delivered a legal 

research memorandum to E.J. and S.J. addressing the student loan 

issue. E.J. and S.J. deny receiving any such memorandum and 

deny that Attorney Strouse discussed the contents of such a memo 

with them. 

¶48 The referee concluded that, by failing to consult with 

E.J. and S.J. regarding the means by which the objectives of the 

representation were to be pursued, including the discharge of 

student loan debt, Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.2(a)2 and 

SCR 20:1.4(a)(2)3 (Count Six). In addition, the referee 

concluded that, by failing to explain to E.J. and S.J. the 

issues associated with the discharge of student loan debt, 

 

2 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides, in relevant part, "Subject to 

pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions 

concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by 

SCR 20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by 

which they are to be pursued." 

3 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall "reasonably 

consult with the client about the means by which the client's 

objectives are to be accomplished." 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

16 

including the cost to pursue an adversary proceeding, the 

likelihood of success of such efforts, and the results of his 

research into the viability of such a claim, Attorney Strouse 

failed to explain matters sufficiently to enable E.J. and S.J. 

to make informed decisions regarding the representation. In so 

doing, Attorney Strouse violated SCR 20:1.4(b)4 (Count Seven). 

In addition, the referee concluded that, by failing to respond 

to the multiple requests for information from E.J. and S.J., 

including letters dated November 7, 2009, January 4, 2010, 

January 31, 2010, and February 4, 2010, Attorney Strouse 

violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4)5 (Count Eight). 

¶49 Attorney Strouse appeals, claiming, inter alia, that 

the referee's findings are insufficient to support these charges 

and that his credibility determinations are clearly erroneous. 

¶50 The referee found that that E.J. and S.J. sought 

Attorney Strouse's representation in filing for Chapter 7 

bankruptcy and to discharge E.J.'s student loan debt. The 

referee found that "[b]oth [E.J. and S.J.] offered credible 

testimony there was such an agreement." The referee explicitly 

stated that, "[h]aving weighed the contradictory testimony and 

evidence on the issue of the scope of representation, I did not 

find the testimony of Strouse to be credible." (Emphasis 

 

4 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a 

matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 

to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 

5 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall "promptly 

comply with reasonable requests by the client for information." 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

17 

added.) The referee found that Attorney Strouse failed to 

respond to E.J.'s and S.J.'s repeated requests for information 

related to the discharge of the student loan. The referee found 

that Attorney Strouse never consulted with E.J. and S.J. 

concerning the means by which the objectives of his

representation were to be pursued to secure the discharge of the 

student loan. The referee found that Attorney Strouse never 

explained to E.J. and S.J. the issues associated with the 

discharge of the student loan debt, the costs of pursuing any 

adversary proceedings, the likelihood of success, or the results 

of any research he had done. The referee found that Attorney 

Strouse never explained matters sufficiently to E.J. and S.J. to 

enable them to make informed decisions regarding the student 

loan discharge. The evidence supports these findings and we 

adopt them. 

¶51 Attorney Strouse contends that this is not enough and 

proceeds to outline a number of additional factual findings he 

thinks the referee should have made. He reminds the court that 

the "testimony, documentation, and argument the parties 

presented to Referee Ferguson was substantial and hotly 

contested in many respects." He claims that Referee Ferguson 

failed to make necessary credibility determinations or to 

include specific findings of fact to support his conclusions of 

law. He suggests that Referee Ferguson's finding that he "did 

not find the testimony of Strouse to be credible" is somehow 

inadequate and "does not go to the merits of the parties' 

contested arguments." 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

18 

¶52 From our perspective, Attorney Strouse simply 

disagrees with the referee's credibility determinations, as 

evidenced by his claim that it is "contrary to the evidence." 

He suggests that the referee should have made a different 

credibility determination. Attorney Strouse states: 

[E.J.'s] credibility must be doubted in this respect 

as well as others concerning the representation. 

First, she has a mental condition that affects memory 

and ability to remember the dates of events. This was 

demonstrated numerous times throughout the hearing.

She denied meeting with Strouse on July 22, 2009, 

which was corroborated by Strouse's calendar and the 

intake questionnaire that was completed and dated by 

her. She could not recall the date of the meeting 

between [E.J. and S.J.] and Strouse on September 12, 

2009, to sign the bankruptcy petition. She denied 

meeting with Strouse on January 20, 2009, an event 

listed on Strouse's calendar maintained in the normal 

course of business. Further, she was fixated on the 

adversary proceeding as the method to discharge her

student loans. This is demonstrated in the fact that 

she brought case law with her at the initial meeting 

on the issue, allegedly other case law in a subsequent 

meeting, and in her written communications to Strouse. 

(Record citations omitted.) Attorney Strouse thus claims that 

he is more credible than E.J. He asks the court to find Referee 

Ferguson's credibility determination with respect to E.J. 

clearly erroneous. 

¶53 We reject this invitation to disregard the referee's 

credibility determination. The referee is the ultimate arbiter 

of the facts and credibility of witnesses and there is no reason 

to deem these findings clearly erroneous. E.J. was very 

forthright in her testimony about the fact that a medical 

condition affected her ability to recall specific details such 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

19 

as dates, but her testimony as to the substance of what occurred 

was clear and bolstered by documentary evidence, including 

letters to Attorney Strouse. The referee's findings of fact and 

conclusions of law relating to this matter are substantiated by 

clear and convincing evidence from the record and we adopt them. 

¶54 We turn to the question of appropriate discipline. 

The OLR sought and the referee recommends a 60-day suspension. 

Attorney Strouse seeks a private reprimand or, at most, a public 

reprimand. Attorney Strouse reasons that the matter of F.E. 

involved minor technical violations and that the other 

allegations are similarly de minimus. 

¶55 Even with our decision to dismiss the alleged 

violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count Four), the record before this 

court and the concept of progressive discipline support a 60-day 

suspension. The record here suggests that Attorney Strouse is a 

busy, aggressive lawyer who serves an important role in the 

Milwaukee legal community, providing affordable bankruptcy 

representation. It bears noting that Attorney Strouse 

successfully obtained bankruptcy discharges for all the clients 

at issue in this proceeding. We also accept and acknowledge the 

mitigating fact that Attorney Strouse has taken steps to 

establish better written fee communications in his office. 

However, the record before us also reveals a persistent pattern 

of failure to abide by the requirements of our rules of 

professional conduct. Attorney Strouse has thrice been publicly 

reprimanded by this court, once for conduct that also resulted 

in being suspended by a bankruptcy court. 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

20 

¶56 While the misconduct committed in this matter is not 

identical, we observe a continuing pattern of disregard of 

supreme court rule requirements. Representation anticipated to 

exceed $1,000 requires a written fee communication. See 

SCR 20:1.5. Unilateral changes to fees charged to clients 

certainly require more than a single line on an invoice. We 

note, with some concern, repeated discrepancies between 

disclosures on bankruptcy filings and invoices submitted to 

clients, a factor that adds to client confusion. As the referee 

observed, "by failing to accept responsibility for his actions 

and attempting to shift the blame to others for the poor 

handling of these matters, Attorney Strouse demonstrates that he 

lacks both remorse and insight into the impact of his repeated 

violations on his clients and other third parties." 

¶57 We acknowledge that none of the cases cited by the 

parties are directly on point. This is not unusual in 

disciplinary matters. We find In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Kitchen, 2004 WI 83, 273 Wis. 2d 279, 682 N.W.2d 780 

provides useful guidance, and ultimately, we accept the 

referee's recommendation for a 60-day suspension as consistent 

with the principles of progressive discipline. 

¶58 Finally, we consider Attorney Strouse's objection to 

the costs of this proceeding. We consider the factors set forth 

in SCR 22.24(1m), which include the number of counts charged, 

contested, and proven; the nature of the misconduct; the level 

of discipline sought and recommended; cooperation with the OLR; 

prior discipline; and other relevant circumstances. We are not 
No. 2013AP1619-D 

21 

persuaded that this scope of the appeal was enlarged due to 

Referee Ferguson's insufficient credibility determinations or 

failure to discuss the parties' arguments. Full costs are 

appropriate in this vigorously litigated case. 

¶59 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Paul A. Strouse to 

practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, 

effective August 14, 2015. 

¶60 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 

of this order, Paul A. Strouse shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $67,562.12. 

¶61 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Paul A. Strouse shall 

comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 

a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 

suspended. 

¶62 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 

conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See 

SCR 22.28(2). 

¶63 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
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