[J-95-2014] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

WAYNE HARRISON AND MARY HARRISON, Appellees

v. CABOT OIL & GAS CORPORATION,

Appellant : : : : : : : : : : No. 75 MAP 2014 Appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit No. 12-3613, Granting Petition for Certification of Question of Law

SUBMITTED: October 8, 2014

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: February 17, 2015

We accepted certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to address whether the primary term of an oil- and-gas lease should be equitably extended by the courts, where the lessor has pursued an unsuccessful lawsuit challenging the validity of the lease. The Third Circuit has related the material, undisputed facts along the following lines. In August 2007, Appellee Wayne Harrison entere d into a lease with Appellant Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation, per which Cabot obtained the exclusive right to explore oil-and-gas resources on Mr. Harrison’s property. In ex change, the company agreed to pay an initial bonus plus a one-eighth royalty on oil or gas successfully produced from the land. The instrument carried a “primary term” of five years, but it also provided for an extended term “as long thereafter as oil or gas is p roduced . . . in paying quantities[J-95-2014] - 2

from the premises[.]” See generally T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka , 615 Pa. 199, 42 A.3d 261 (2012) (discussing the “paying quantit ies” convention frequently utilized in oil-and-gas leases). Furthermore, Cabot w as provided with an option to extend the primary term for an additional five year s. Approximately halfway through the primary lease term, Mr. Harrison and his wife commenced a civil action against Cabot in a federal distr ict court, seeking a declaration that the lease was invalid. Via an amended complaint, the Harrisons centered the litigation upon their contention that the company had fraudulently induced Mr. Harrison to enter into the lease via an agent’s representation that Mr. Harrison would never receive any more than $100 per acre as a threshold bonu s payment from a gas producing company. The Harrisons asserted that they subseq uently learned of other landowner-lessors receiving higher payments. Cabot denied the material allegations of the compla int and lodged a counterclaim. In this pleading, the company sought a de claratory judgment that, in the event the Harrisons’ suit failed, the primary term of the lease would be equitably tolled during the period of time during which the suit was pe nding, and, concomitantly, the lease would be extended for an equivalent period of time beyond what was provided by its actual terms. In support of this request, Cabot alle ged that the cloud upon the lease created by the Harrisons’ suit had prevented the company from “prudently tak[ing] any steps to develop or commence operations on [Harrison’s] l easehold as allowed by the Lease.” Petition for Certification of Question of La w in Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. , No. 12-3613, at 3 (3d Cir. Apr. 7, 2014) (citation omitted; interlineations in original). In support of its counterclaim, Cabot pointed to cases f rom several other oil-andgas-producing jurisdictions holding that: 1) a lessor’s com mencement of a lease-validity[J-95-2014] - 3

challenge constitutes an effective repudiation of the ag reement; 2) the lawsuit and attending uncertainty renders it economically impractical for the lessee to proceed with the costly development of production infrastructure on t he property; 3) it would be unfair to permit a meritless lease challenge to deprive the l essee of the benefit of its bargain, namely, the opportunity to establish production during a limited “window of opportunity” corresponding to the primary term of the lease (and th us to avoid defeasance of the lessee’s corporeal interest in real property); and 4) it is therefore appropriate for the courts to award an extension of the primary lease term, measured according to the length of time the unsuccessful lawsuit was pending. 1 Cabot sought summary judgment. Relative to its coun terclaim, the company submitted a declaration from one of its land managers i ndicating that the cost of drilling

1 See, e.g., Rougon v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. , 575 F. Supp. 95, 100 (M.D. La. 1983) (“[W]here a lessor questions the validity of a lease, t he term of the lease is suspended, the logic being that the lessee has been deprived of th e exercise of the rights granted to him by the lease by the act of the lessor and he is ther efore granted an extension beyond the primary term for the period during the p rimary term when the lease was placed in jeopardy.” (quoting Hanszen v. Cocke , 246 So.2d 200, 203 (La. Ct. App. 1971))); Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Elkins , 374 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Ark. 2010) (“Not to toll Southwestern Energy’s obligation to drill as of [a par ticular] date would create an impossible dilemma for [the company]: either use the con tested lands and potentially expose itself to more liability or refrain from using the lands and lose its investment and the one-year window . . . for development”); Greer v. Carter Oil Co. , 25 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Ill. 1940) (“The great weight of authority in othe r States holds that where the lessor brings suit to avoid an oil and gas lease and the liti gation ends after the grant has expired, that the lessors are estopped to claim the lea se is invalid because the term has expired, and that an additional period of time may be fixed by a court of equity in which to commence drilling operations.” (citations omitted)); cf. Kothmann v. Boley , 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1957) (directing that oil-and-gas l eases were to be extended on the basis that “[l]essors who . . . wrongfully repudiate the lessees’ title by unqualified notice that the leases are forfeited or have terminated canno t complain if the latter suspend operations under the contract pending a determination of the controversy and will not be allowed to profit by their own wrong”); Bingham v. Stevenson , 420 P.2d 839, 842 (Mont. 1966) (implementing an equitable lease extension based on actions by the lessors, including the transmittal of letters denying the vali dity of the lease).[J-95-2014] - 4

and completion of a specialized well generally require d to produce gas from Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania is in the range of $4 to $7 mil lion dollars. According to the land manager, “[t]he expense associated with such drilling and completion makes it particularly impractical for an oil-and-gas producer to invest in drilling, completing a well when there is an ongoing lawsuit regarding the validi ty of the oil-and-gas lease.” Declaration of Jeffrey Keim of Sept. 30, 2011, in Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. , No. 10-312 (M.D. Pa.), at ¶5. The district court awarded summary judgment in Cabot’s f avor on the suit to invalidate the lease. The court, however, resolved th e counterclaim in the Harrisons’ favor, concluding that the law of this Commonwealth do es not provide for equitable extensions of oil and gas leases under the circumstances. See Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. , 887 F. Supp. 2d 588, 596-98 (M.D. Pa. 2012). In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied pri marily on Derrickheim Co.

v. Brown , 305 Pa. Super. 173, 451 A.2d 477 (1982), which pri oritized the terms of a lease over equitable considerations in a circumstance in wh ich an oil producing company forewent operation of a well until a defect i n the lessor’s title was resolved.

See id. at 178, 451 A.2d at 480 (“The fact that it was ‘prud ent’ for [a lessee] to suspend operations upon learning of [a] cloud on the title do es not justify disregarding the express language of the lease.”). The district court to ok Derrickheim as a signal that Pennsylvania courts would reject the equitable extensio n practice implemented

elsewhere. See Harrison , 887 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97. Further, the court rea soned that, under Pennsylvania law, the mere filing of a declarat ory judgment action challenging a lease does not, in and of itself, comprise a repudiation of the lease such as would implicate judicial redress. See id. at 597 (“Until the Pennsylvania courts say otherwise, this Court will not find that a party’s filing of a l awsuit in federal court amounts to a[J-95-2014] - 5

repudiation of a lease between the parties, despite wh at courts in other jurisdictions have held.”). In this regard, and more broadly, the district court re lied upon a recent decision authored by a coordinate judge, Lauchle v. Keeton Group LLC , 768 F. Supp. 2d 757 (M.D. Pa. 2011). The Lauchle court additionally posited that “deeming these lease s to have been repudiated under the circumstances of this case i s both bad law and even worse public policy,” given the superior bargaining po wer of oil-and-gas-producing companies relative to the drafting of leases, as well a s the disincentive to the pursuit by lessors of potentially meritorious actions. Id. at 762. Cabot lodged an appeal in the federal intermediate appellate court, contending that, if presented with the question, this Court “woul d recognize the rule that, where a lessor repudiates a lease by initiating litigation seekin g to invalidate the lease, the lessee is entitled to an equitable extension of the lea se term if the lessor’s claim is

denied.” Petition for Certification in Harrison, No. 12-3613, at 5. In support of this position, the company pointed to other jurisdictions wh ich have adopted such approach. See supra note 1. Cabot also filed a motion requesting certification to t his Court. See Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures §8. The Third Ci rcuit granted this request and applied for certification, which we accepted, recognizing that the issue was one of first impression and of significant public importance, given t hat its resolution may affect a large number of oil-and-gas leases in Pennsylvania. Presently, Cabot grounds its position squarely on the pr inciple that a party to a contract is entitled to the benefit of its bargain. See, e.g., Ferrer v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa. , 573 Pa. 310, 340-41, 825 A.2d 591, 609 (2002). The company posits that, if one[J-95-2014] - 6

contracting party deprives the other of a bargained-fo r benefit, the law should correct the deprivation. Cabot also explains that, in the last decade, with the discovery of the potentially vast quantities of natural gas in the Marcellus Shale re serve in Pennsylvania, and with the introduction of new means to make production of th at natural gas more practical, thousands of Pennsylvania landowners have leased their property to oil-and-gas producers. Accord

Brief for Amici

Pa. Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Marcellus Shale Coal., Chief Oil & Gas, LLC, and Sw. Energy Prod. Co. [herei nafter the “Industry Amici ”] at 3 (“While Pennsylvania was home to the first oil well in the United States more than 150 years ago, advances in technology and discovery of the p romise of the shale gas plays have dramatically increased the impact of the oil-and-g as industry in Pennsylvania in the last decade.”). According to the company, disparit ies in lease remunerations exist due to various factors, often depending upon the timin g of lease consummation (particularly given the evolving knowledge relative to Marcellus Shale); the developing state of the technology; and fluctuating market conditio ns. Cabot suggests that such

differences have incentivized some landowner-lessors to w rongfully contest the validity of oil-and-gas leases in hopes of securing the freedom t o pursue more lucrative arrangements. The problem facing oil-and-gas-producing companies, Ca bot contends, is that such lease-validity lawsuits forestall drilling and well development, given the multimillion dollar investments attending such operations. See Brief for Appellant at 16 (“It would be essentially impossible for a producer to place such an investment at risk while there remains pending a lawsuit seeking to invalidate t he producer’s interest in the property.”); accord

Brief for the Industry Amici at 6 (“[T]he expense of drilling generally, and especially for wells in unconventional formations suc h as the Marcellus Shale, is[J-95-2014] - 7

too great for any reasonable production company to go forward with drilling while there is a pending lease challenge.”). The result, the com pany indicates, is that producers are deprived of the full benefit of their bargains b y meritless lease challenges. For these reasons, Cabot encourages this Court to follow the mainstream approach of other jurisdictions which have treated a meritless lease challen ge as a repudiation and applied equitable remedial principles. See supra note 1. Indeed, the company highlights, this principle has become essentially one o f black-letter law, as reflected in several prominent treatises in the field. 2 Cabot recognizes that the issue is one of first impression in this Court. According to the company, however, Pennsylvania already recogni zes all legal predicates to the equitable-extension principle. In particular, the comp any references the expectation remedy available to redress contractual breaches. See, e.g. , Ferrer , 573 Pa. at 340-41, 825 A.2d at 609. Additionally, Cabot contends, Pennsy lvania law provides that a party repudiates a contract, and thus effectuates an essential breach, when he makes an unequivocal statement that he will not perform in acco rdance with his agreement. See,

e.g. , Jonnet Dev. Corp. v. Dietrich Indus., Inc. , 316 Pa. Super. 533, 543, 463 A.2d 1026, 1031 (1983). The company regards the Harrison’s commence ment of an action as the equivalent of such a statement.

2 See 3 P ATRICK H. M ARTIN & B RUCE M. K RAMER , W ILLIAMS & M EYERS , O IL AND G AS L AW §604.7 (2009) (“[C]ourts have almost universally held that when the lessor has brought a suit during the primary term claiming the terminati on of the lessee’s interest, the lessee, should he prevail in such action, will be entitle d to a period of time extending beyond the expiration of the primary term to gain p roduction.” (citations omitted)); 2 N ANCY S AINT -P AUL , S UMMERS , O IL & G AS §14:36 (2014) (“Where a lessor has repudiated a lease by notice or suit for cancellation for alleged b reach by the lessee of his express or implied covenants . . ., such act of the lessor relie ves the lessee of the duty to continue further operations until the controversy is set tled and estops the lessor from claiming such cessation of operations by the lessee as grou nds for termination of the lease.”).[J-95-2014] - 8

In terms of the federal district courts’ reliance on Derrickheim , Cabot argues that such decision is irrelevant, since in that case the lessor ha d not commenced a lawsuit. In any event, the company stresses that an intermediate appellate court’s decision,

such as Derrickheim , is in no way binding upon this Court. See, e.g. , Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc. , 603 Pa. 399, 418–19, 984 A.2d 478, 490 (2009). C abot also proceeds to challenge the Lauchle court’s public policy perspective, arguing that the equitable-extension principle only serves to restore an agreed-to equilibrium after a disruption caused by meritless litigation. Accord Brief for the Industry Amici at 2 (“While successful oil and gas development is inherently uncertain , [the equitable-extension principle] would ensure that lessors do not profit from bringing challenges to the validity of their leases that turn out to be without merit.”)

. 3 In response to Cabot’s argumentation, the Harrisons poi nt to the reasoning of the

federal district courts in Harrison and Lauchle

. See, e.g. , Brief for Appellees at 8 (“No Pennsylvania law has required nor even suggested that p rimary terms may be extended beyond their express period, especially given Derrickheim ’s clear holding on the subject.”). The Harrisons also note that oil-and-gas-pro ducing companies frequently enter into leases then delay drilling according to the ir own interests and timetables. Moreover, according to the Harrisons, such companies are re adily capable of negotiating appropriate tolling provisions in connectio n with their leases to account for the prospect of delay occasioned by lessor validity challeng es. See, e.g. , id. at 33 (“[G]as companies can anticipate and manage issues relating to the length of primary terms within the context of their business relationships through the usual modes of drafting and negotiation.”).

3 In addition to the noted amici submission, Cabot’s position is also supported by a separate amicus

brief by Professor Bruce M. Kramer, who also emphasize s the weight of the authority supporting the equitable-extension p rinciple.[J-95-2014] - 9

Given such considerations, the Harrisons describe the equita ble-extension principle as nothing more than a “judicial affirmative action program” for oil-and-gasproducing companies, which “abuses landowners who have don e nothing other than exercise their legal rights.” Id. at 8-9; see also id. at 26 (“Cabot effectively seeks a judicially-run affirmative action program for the ben efit of oil & gas companies where the Pennsylvania courts do not enforce contractual rights but rewrite them in the companies’ favor.”). Consistent with Lauchle , the Harrisons also highlight the disparate bargaining power of landowner-lessors as compared to su ch companies. See, e.g. , id. at 16 (“ Lauchle expresses significant policy considerations that further mil itate against judicially extending a primary term, by highlighting the control that oil & gas companies exercise over lease language and the chilling effect tha t an extension rule would have on landowners’ willingness to bring meritorious challeng es.”). The Harrisons also differ with Cabot’s position that the mere filing of a declaratory judgment action represents a repudiation o f a lease. Again, the Harrisons regard the implementation of a contrary approach in the setting of oil-and-gas leases as an “upend[ing]” of Pennsylvania law for the “special b enefit for gas companies.” Id. at

33.

Several landowner-lessors submitted an amici brief in support of the Harrisons’ essential position. See Brief for Amici Pauline Beck, Ronald J. Gulla, Margeret Henry, Rebecca Roter, and Anagela and William Smith [hereina fter the “Landowner-Lessor

Amici ”]. These amici

also stress the differential bargaining position of oi l-and-gas production companies versus individual landowner-lessors. Moreover, as exemplified by the following passage from their brief, the Landow ner-Lessor Amiciregard leasevalidity litigation as merely one of a number of risks encountered by oil-and-gas-[J-95-2014] - 10

producing companies as a prerequisite to the rich rewards which may be attained by those willing to accept them:

The speculative nature of oil and gas extraction inher ently requires the assumption of large risks . . ., and producti on companies routinely absorb the cost of a wide variety of unsuccessful investments. They may invest millions of dollars in drilling and completing a well only to find that it is defective or “dry” and therefore must be plugged and abandoned. Companies may spend millions of dollars acquiring gas leases that they later abandon because of unfavorable market or regulatory conditions. They may choose not to develop leased acreage because greater profits are to be had by drilling somewhere else. The y also may choose not to invest in production while a lease challenge proceeds, but such business judgments are commonplace and do not warrant shifting the risk of liti gation from multimillion-dollar corporations to small landow ners such as Mr. Harrison. Id. at 7-8 (footnote and citations omitted). The Landow ner-Lessor Amici also observe that Cabot has never manifested any intention of dril ling in the vicinity of the Harrisons’ property, and thus, they regard “Cabot’s counterclaim [as] an opportunistic and exploitative attempt to extend the lease term until 2020, in the hope that market conditions will improve at the end of the decade.” Id. at 13. Preliminarily, we note that contractual remedies, in cluding equitable ones, generally flow from a breach of an agreement. See, e.g. , McShea v. City of Phila. , 606 Pa. 88, 97, 995 A.2d 334, 340 (2010) (stating the ge neral rule that a contract-based action seeking judicial redress requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a material breach). Cabot appears to accept this principle as applicable in the present circumstances. Accordingly, in this respect, the company asserts that the Harrisons’ conduct in seeking a judicial declaration that the Cabot/Harrison lease wa s invalid amounted to an “anticipatory repudiation” of the lease. See, e.g. , Brief for Appellant at 27 (“Certainly a[J-95-2014] - 11

lessor that files a lawsuit asking for a judicial declarati on that the lease is not valid has repudiated the contract.”). See generally 2401 Pa. Ave. Corp. v. Fed’n of Jewish Agencies of Greater Phila. , 507 Pa. 166, 174, 489 A.2d 733, 737 (1985) (discussin g the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation as giving rise to contract-based remedies, given that repudiation of an agreement entails an essential declar ation of an intention to breach). The difficulty with Cabot’s position, however, is that this Court has required more than the mere assertion of a challenge to the validit y of an agreement to demonstrate such repudiation. Under Pennsylvania law, anticipatory repudiation or breach requires an “absolute and unequivocal refusal to perform or a distinct and positive statement of an inability to do so.” Id. at 172, 489 A.2d at 736 (quoting McClelland v. New

Amsterdam Cas. Co. , 322 Pa. 429, 433, 185 A. 198, 200 (1936)). It is widely recognized, however, outside the oil-and-g as context at least, that the filing of declaratory judgment action merely contesting the validity or scope of an agreement does not entail such an unequivocal refusal to perform. See, e.g. , Principal

Life Ins. Co. v. Lawrence Rucker 2007 Ins. Trust , 674 F. Supp. 2d 562, 568 (D. Del. 2009) (explaining that “an action for declaratory jud gment does not indicate an unconditional refusal to comply with contractual obliga tions” and joining a “chorus of other jurisdictions in finding that . . . statements mad e in the context of a declaratory judgment action are insufficient to establish repudiati on as a matter of law”). 4 As related in the commentary to the Restatement Second of Contract s:

4 This principle is most frequently referenced in the cont ext of insurance coverage disputes. See, e.g. , id. ; see also Seneca Ins. Co. v. Shipping Boxes I, LLC , ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 2567158, *4 (E.D. Va. June 6, 2014) (explaining that the purpose of the declaratory-judgment remedy is to “gui de parties in their future conduct in relation to each other, thereby relieving them fr om the risk of taking undirected action incident to their rights” (quoting Charlottesville Area Fitness Club Operators Ass’n v. Albemarle Cnty. Bd. of Sup’rs , 737 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Va. 2013))); Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Schwarz , Civ. No. 09-03361(FLW), slip op. , 2011 WL 2357828, *3 (D.N.J. June 9, (Scontinued)[J-95-2014] - 12 Generally, a party acts at his peril if, insisting on wh at he mistakenly believes to be his rights, he refuses to perfor m his [contractual duties]. His statement is a repudiation if the threatened breach would, without more, have given th e injured party a claim for damages for total breach. M odern procedural devices, such as the declaratory judgment , may be used to mitigate the harsh results that might other wise result from this rule. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §250 cmt. d (1981) (e mphasis added); accord

Landwehr

, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 169 (explaining that “a declara tory judgment action

‘serves to set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations ’” (quoting Babb v. Superior Court , 479 P.2d 379, 383 (Cal. 1971) (emphasis in original )). Given the above, we view the controlling determinatio n in this case as devolving to whether this Court will adopt a special approach to repudiation pertaining to oil-andgas leases, as a substantial number other jurisdictions wou ld appear to have done. See

supra note 1. We decline to do so, however. In the first instance, for purposes of contract law in Pe nnsylvania, this Court adamantly has reinforced the clear predicates of repudi ation. See, e.g. , 2401 Pa. Ave. Corp. , 507 Pa. at 174, 489 A.2d at 737 (“[W]e reject any argument suggesting a dilution of our long recognized standard of an ‘absolute and u nequivocal refusal to perform.’”). We acknowledge the high stakes involved in oil-and-gas e xploration and production, as

(continuedS) 2011); Landwehr v. FDIC , 734 F. Supp. 2d 161, 169 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[N]umero us courts have concluded that neither the filing of a declarator y judgment action nor the allegations made in support of such an action can form t he basis of a claim for anticipatory repudiation.”). The precept nonetheless flows from the clear prerequisites to a repudiation, see 2401 Pa. Ave. Corp. , 507 Pa. at 172, 489 A.2d at 736, and thus, it applies more broadly. Cf. Lanyon Zinc. Co. v. Burtiss , 83 P. 989, 989-90 (Kan. 1905) (holding that the mere assertion of a lease-validity challenge, in the absence of an injunction or other interference with the operations of the lessee, was insufficient to justify the assertion of a court’s equitable powers to e xtend the lease).[J-95-2014] - 13

well as the incentive to lessor-landowners to maximize p ayments attending the use of their properties. Nevertheless, we agree with the Har risons and their amici that such factors do not justify a diminution of extant legal re quirements or, concomitantly, a curtailment of the rights of landowner-lessors to obtain a judicial declaration concerning their rights and interests. Significantly, in promulgating the Declaratory Judgmen t Act, 5 the Pennsylvania General Assembly implemented a remedial regime designe d to “settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” 42 Pa.C.S. §7541(a). Furthermore, the Legislature prescribed that the enactment was to be “liberally construed and administere d,” id. , in furtherance of such remedial aims. In our view, it would disserve the leg islative objectives to treat recourse to such procedure, alone, as a basis for altering mater ial provisions of the agreement in controversy ( i.e. , the lease term). Our reluctance, in this respect, is b olstered by the Harrisons’ observation that oil-and-gas-producing compani es are free to proceed according to their own devices to negotiate express tolli ng provisions for inclusion in their leases. Notably, neither Cabot nor its amici offer any direct response on this point. Certainly, in light of the voluminous decisional law, such companies are on sufficient notice of the prospect for validity challenges to warra nt their consideration of such protective measures. We do not foreclose that equitable relief may be avai lable to oil-and-gasproducing companies -- subject to applicable requirement s governing recourse to equity -- where there is an affirmative repudiation of a le ase. 6 Our determination is only that,

5 Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, §2 (as amend ed 42 Pa.C.S. §§7531-7541).

6 Notably, several of the decisions cited by Cabot did in volve some actual refusal by lessors to surrender possession of leasehold premises. See, e.g., Bingham , 420 P.2d (Scontinued)[J-95-2014] - 14

consistent with the prevailing substantive law of this Co mmonwealth, the mere pursuit of declaratory relief challenging the validity of a lease does not amount to such. Having answered the certified question, this matter is returned to the Third

Circuit.

Messrs. Justice Eakin and Baer, Madame Justice Todd and Mr. J ustice Stevens join the opinion.

(continuedS) at 841-42 (explaining that lessors had refused rentals a nd were unwilling to accept drilling by the lessee pursuing an equitable extension and concluding that the lessors therefore had “repudiated the lease by their various actions”), cited in Brief for Appellant at 24; Muller v. Leyendecker , 697 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (“[P]lai ntiff on several occasions peaceably demanded entry into and righ tful possession of his lease premises. However, defendants refused plaintiffs’ poss ession of the leased premises.”), cited in Brief for Appellant at 22, 38. Certainly, this is n ot true of all (or even perhaps the majority) of the cases cited by Appellant. See, e.g. , Greer , 25 N.E.2d at 810 (“It has been suggested that [the lessee] could have proceeded to drill without regard to the suit and should not be permitted to claim the benefit of a n estoppel unless it was actually prevented by court order or otherwise. In the cases fr om foreign jurisdictions this was not required, and when the great loss the lessee might suffer by successfully drilling a well and then losing title to the land is considered, we do not think that it should be required.”). Our point here is that the cases, factual ly at least, are not homogenous, and that some of the factual scenarios presented may ref lect a repudiation and, thus, could yield the potential for redress upon the applicat ion of Pennsylvania law.