[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-13670

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00126-MSS-MAP-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

GREGG GERMAIN WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(July 9, 2015)

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Gregg Germain Williams appeals his total 120-month sentence, the statutory 

mandatory minimum, after he was convicted of 1 count of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), 846, 1 count of possession with intent to 

distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A)(viii), and 2 counts of use of a communication device during the 

commission of a drug-related offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). First, 

Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions 

to continue sentencing until November 2014, pending the passage of legislation 

that would have affected the penalties for his drug-related offenses. Next, 

Williams argues that his total 120-month mandatory minimum sentence violates 

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Williams argues that his 

total 120-month mandatory minimum sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

I.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to continue sentencing for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 896 (11th Cir. 2005). In 

light of the circumstances presented, we must focus upon the reasons for the 

continuance offered to the trial court when the request was denied to determine 

whether the denial was proper. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1350 

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(11th Cir. 2007). Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(1) provides that “[t]he court must impose 

sentence without unnecessary delay.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(1). The defendant has 

the burden to demonstrate that “the denial was an abuse of discretion and that it 

produced specific substantial prejudice.” United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161, 

1166 (11th Cir. 1985).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to delay Williams’s 

sentencing hearing until November 2014. Williams failed to show that he suffered 

specific substantial prejudice from the court’s denials of his motions to continue 

sentencing because the evidence suggests that both pieces of legislation, which he 

stated would have affected his sentence, remain pending. In addition, he remained 

subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, regardless of whether he 

was sentenced under the November 1, 2013, Sentencing Guidelines or the 

November 1, 2014, Sentencing Guidelines. 

II.

Next, Williams argues that his total 120-month mandatory minimum 

sentence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We review

constitutional sentencing arguments de novo. United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 

1254, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has found that a sentencing court 

may impose whatever penalty is authorized by statute so long as the penalty is not 

based on an arbitrary distinction that would violate the Due Process Clause of the 

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Fifth Amendment. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 

1927, 114 L.Ed.2d 524, 538 (1991). A sentence imposed by statute is not arbitrary 

when the statute has a rational basis. See United States v. Solomon, 848 F.2d 156, 

157 (11th Cir. 1988) (analyzing the mandatory minimum for possession of cocaine 

with the intent to distribute, pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), under a rational basis 

standard because no suspect classification or fundamental right was at issue). In 

non-capital cases, “Congress has the power to define criminal punishments without 

giving the courts any sentencing discretion.” Chapman, 500 U.S. at 467, 111 S.Ct. 

at 1928. Thus, the district court is bound by statutory mandatory minimum 

sentences. United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 2008). 

In addition, the general rule is that a defendant should be sentenced pursuant to the 

law in effect at the time of his sentencing. United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 

1351 (11th Cir. 1998).

Williams’s due process argument fails because there is no evidence that his 

120-month mandatory minimum sentence was based on an arbitrary distinction. In 

particular, he acknowledged at the time of his sentencing that the statutory 

mandatory minimum sentence was 10 years and that he qualified for this sentence, 

and all district courts were bound to apply the statutory mandatory minimum 

sentence, pursuant to § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), in effect at the time of his 

sentencing. 

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Finally, Williams argues that his total 120-month mandatory minimum 

sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. In evaluating an Eighth Amendment challenge in a non-capital case, 

we first make the threshold determination that the sentence imposed is grossly 

disproportionate to the offense committed. United States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 

1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006). The defendant bears the burden of making this 

threshold showing. Id. In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279-303, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 

3004-17, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), the Supreme Court held that “a criminal sentence 

must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted” 

and in determining whether a sentence is in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 

courts “should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the 

offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other 

criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission 

of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” The Supreme Court has recognized that, 

although the application of new sentencing minimums to offenders sentenced after 

new Sentencing Guidelines take effect will create sentencing disparities, “those 

disparities, reflecting a line-drawing effort, will exist whenever Congress enacts a 

new law changing sentences” and such a disparity “cannot make a critical 

difference.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. __, __, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335, 183 

L.Ed.2d 250 (2012). 

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Williams has failed to establish that the Eighth Amendment applies because 

he did not show that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his 

methamphetamine offenses. In addition, it did not make a critical difference that 

he could have been sentenced under different standards than a defendant in the 

same jurisdiction convicted of the same offense, who was sentenced at a later date, 

especially given that no legislation has passed that has changed the mandatory 

minimum sentence for methamphetamine offenses. Accordingly, upon review of 

the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

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