alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Lewis, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kreindler, J.), rendered February 20, 1986, convicting him of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree (two counts), and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Lombardo, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by him to the police.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We find no merit to the defendant’s contention that the *Miranda*warnings given to him were insufficient because the last inquiry, e.g.: "Now that I have advised you of your rights, are you willing to answer questions”, did not include the phrase: "without the presence of an attorney”. It is not necessary that the police " 'mouth "a ritualistic formula” so long as the words used convey the * * * requisite information’ ” *(People v Anderson,*146 AD2d 638, 640, quoting *People v Jordan,*110 AD2d 855). A review of the *Miranda*warnings read to the defendant reveal that he was sufficiently advised of his constitutional rights and that the language used *329satisfied the standards set forth in *Miranda v Arizona*(384 US 436). Furthermore, the record shows that the defendant understood his rights and expressly waived them.

The defendant failed to establish his affirmative defense to the felony murder charge. There was ample proof by which the jury could conclude that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that one of the other participants in the crime was armed with an instrument readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons *(see,*Penal Law § 125.25 [3] [c]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]). Lawrence, J. P., Kunzeman, Rubin and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PR ECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent,

v.

David Gerrard J ohnson, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001506

ON WRI T OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal From Florence County Thomas A. Russo, Ci rcuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2015-MO-067 Heard October 8, 2015 – Filed December 2, 2015

CERTIORARI DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General D onald J. Zelenka, SeniorAssistant Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements III, of Florence, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion in State v. Johnson , Op. No. 2014-UP-167 (S.C. Ct. App. filed April 9, 2014). We now dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY , KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ.,

concur.
JOSB FY 2013 EX 10.7(e)






    Exhibit 10.7(e)




FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CONSULTING AGREEMENT


THIS FOURTH AMENDMENT (this "Amendment") is made as of the 8th day of May, 2014 to that certain CONSULTING AGREEMENT, dated as of September 9, 2008, as amended (the "Consulting Agreement"), by JOS. A. BANK CLOTHIERS, INC. (the "Client") and ROBERT N. WILDRICK ("Consultant").
FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, Client and Consultant, being the sole parties to the Consulting Agreement, hereby amend the  Consulting Agreement by restating Section 6.3(b) in its entirety, as follows:
(b)  In the event that, within ninety days following a change of control (which, for the avoidance of doubt, must qualify as change in the ownership or effective control of Client for purposes of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended), either (i) Consultant terminates this Agreement or (ii) Client terminates this Agreement, then Client shall immediately pay to Consultant the balance of the consulting fee for remainder of the term which would have constituted the  Consulting Period absent such termination.
Except as specifically amended hereby, the Consulting Agreement shall remain in full force and effect according to its terms.  To the extent of any conflict between the terms of this Agreement and the terms of the remainder of the Consulting Agreement, the terms of this Amendment shall control and prevail.  Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have those respective meanings attributed to them in the Consulting Agreement.  This Amendment shall hereafter be deemed a part of the Consulting Agreement for all purposes.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of the date first above written.


CLIENT:                            CONSULTANT:


JOS. A. BANK CLOTHIERS, INC.            




By:    /s/: Charles D. Frazer                    /s/: ROBERT N. WILDRICK
Charles D. Frazer,                     ROBERT N. WILDRICK
Senior Vice President-General Counsel
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 17, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-50344

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAVIER HERRERA-FLORES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:03-CR-623-1-AML

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Javier HerreraFlores raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that a

prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF GETTY REALTY CORP. AND SUBSIDIARIES AS OF
JULY 31, 1997 AND FOR THE SIX MONTHS THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1997
<CASH>                                           8,443
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,079
<ALLOWANCES>                                       222
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         202,649
<DEPRECIATION>                                 104,826
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 156,375
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                         36,193
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,414
<OTHER-SE>                                      56,424
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   156,375
<SALES>                                         13,644
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                45,415
<CGS>                                           12,418
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   27,677
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,166
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    33
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,689
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,584
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,427
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,157
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,157
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .40
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 32**

 

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

Inconnection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of US Gold CanadianAcquisition Corporation (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31,2007 to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”),each of the undersigned officers of the Company does hereby certify pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that to the best of ourknowledge:

 

1.                                       The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                                       The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Dated: March 27,2008

 
|   | US GOLD CANADIAN ACQUISITION CORPORATION |
|--------|------------------------------------------|
|   |                                     |
|   | By:                                      | /s/ Robert R. McEwen |
|   |                                     | Robert R. McEwen, Chairman of the Board of  Directors and Chief Executive Officer |
|   |                                     |   |
|   | By:                                      | /s/ William F. Pass |
|   |                                     | William F. Pass, Vice President, Chief Financial  Officer and Secretary |

 

----
EXHIBIT 32.2



                       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                        AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
              SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Portsmouth Square, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2004,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I David T. Nguyen, Treasurer and Controller of the Company,
serving as Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
to the best of my knowledge, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
    15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
    Company.


Date: February 11, 2005                         /s/ David T. Nguyen
                                                ----------------------------
                                                David T. Nguyen, Treasurer
                                                and Controller (serving as
                                                Chief Financial Officer)




[A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Portsmouth Square, Inc. and will be retained by Portsmouth
Square, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.]
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                          -----------------------------

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT

                     Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
                         Securities Exchange Act of 1934


                               FEBRUARY 29, 2000
              ---------------------------------------------------
                Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported)


                        TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY CORP.
              ---------------------------------------------------
               (Exact name of registrant as specified in charter)


      DELAWARE                     1-14328                   06-1445591
   ---------------             -----------------         ------------------
   (State or other          (Commission File Number)       (IRS Employer
   jurisdiction of                                         Identification
   incorporation)                                              Number)


  ONE TOWER SQUARE, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT                      06183
  ----------------------------------------                    ----------
  (Address of principal executive offices)                    (Zip Code)


                                 (860) 277-0111
              ----------------------------------------------------
              (Registrant's telephone number, including area code)



<PAGE>



                        Travelers Property Casualty Corp.
                           Current Report on Form 8-K


Item 5.           Other Events.

On February 29, 2000, Travelers Property Casualty Corp. issued a press release
announcing that it has signed a letter of intent to acquire the surety business
of Reliance Group Holdings, Inc. A copy of the press release is attached hereto
as Exhibit 99.01 and incorporated herein by reference.



Item 7.  Financial Statements, Pro Forma Financial Information
         and Exhibits.

         (a)       Not applicable.

         (b)       Not applicable.

         (c)       Exhibits


                   Exhibit No.       Description
                   -----------       ------------------

                   99.01             Press Release of Travelers Property
                                     Casualty Corp. dated February 29, 2000



                                       2


<PAGE>



                                    SIGNATURE

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.


Dated: February 29, 2000


                                       TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY CORP.


                                       By: /s/ Paul H. Eddy
                                          --------------------------
                                       Name:   Paul H. Eddy
                                       Title:  Assistant Secretary



                                       3
# Supreme Court of Florida

____________ No. SC17

- 552

____________ CARL PUIATTI, Appellant,

vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. [ January 23, 2018 ]

PER CURIAM. We have for review Carl Puiatti’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Puiatti’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Puiatti’s motion sought relief pu rsuant to the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Hurst v. Florida , 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in
Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). This Court stayed Puiatti’s appeal pend ing the disposition of Hitchcock v.
State , 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017) . After this- 2

-

Court decided Hitchcock , Puiatti responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this c ase. After reviewing Puiatti’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Puiatti is not entitled to relief. Puiatti was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of
elev en to one. Puiatti v. State , 495 So. 2d 128, 130 (Fla. 1986)

. Puiatti’s sentence
of death became final in 1988. Puiatti v. Florida , 488 U.S. 871 (1988). Thus,
Hurst does not apply retroactively to Puiatti’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock , 226 So. 3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Puiatti’s motion. The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Puiatti , we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so
ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result. QUINCE, J., recused. PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchc ock
v. State , 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017) , is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock

. An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County,- 3

-

Pat Edward Siracusa, Jr. , Judge

- Case No. 511983CF001383CFBXWS Ardith Michelle Bronson, DLA Piper, LLP, Miami, Florida, and Adamn B. Banks, Miranda S. Schiller, and Steven A. Reiss, Weil, Gotshal, & Manges, New York, New York, for Appel lant Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 99-A

I, Gene M. Henderson, President and Chief Executive Officer of iDine Rewards
Network Inc., certify to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:

(1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30,
2002 (the "Periodic Report") which this statement accompanies fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and

(2)  information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
iDine Rewards Network Inc.

Dated:  August 14, 2002


                              /s/ Gene M. Henderson
                              ----------------------
                              Gene M. Henderson
                              President and Chief Executive
                              Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
S.E.C. Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 1, 1995 and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-01-1995
<CASH>                                          56,000
<SECURITIES>                                    10,700
<RECEIVABLES>                                  496,300
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (26,200)
<INVENTORY>                                    701,300
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,420,000
<PP&E>                                       2,136,400
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,366,900)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,272,300
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          615,300
<BONDS>                                        547,000
<COMMON>                                        75,400
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     737,200
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,272,300
<SALES>                                      1,562,100
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,562,100
<CGS>                                          899,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,579,300
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 7,400
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              38,700
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (46,500)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (17,300)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (29,200)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (29,200)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.64)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis SIFFORD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-6123.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted July 23, 2003.

Decided Aug. 18, 2003.

*974Curtis Sifford, Appellant Pro Se. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case is on remand from the United States Supreme Court for “further consideration in light of *Clay v. United States,*537 U.S. 522, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003)”. Curtis Sifford seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). Because we find that he fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as discussed below, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

The district court’s order denied Sifford’s § 2255 motion as time-barred under the AEDPA. Under prevailing Fourth Circuit caselaw at that time, Sifford’s conviction was considered final as of the time this court issued its mandate affirming the conviction. *See United States v. Torres,*211 F.3d 836, 839 (4th Cir.2000). The Supreme Court abrogated the rule announced in *Torres*in its recent opinion in *Clay,*and held that a federal criminal conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court’s affirmation of the conviction in the Supreme Court. *Clay,*123 S.Ct. at 1079. Thus, in light of *Clay,*we now find that Sifford’s motion was timely filed under the AEDPA.

Sifford may not appeal from the denial of relief on his § 2255 motion, however, unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1040, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,*534 U.S. 941, 122 S.Ct. 318, 151 L.Ed.2d 237 (2001).

While we conclude that jurists of reason could debate the correctness of the district court’s procedural ruling, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Sifford has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*