PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-4604

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GLENDA TAYLOR-SANDERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 21-4136

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GLENDA TAYLOR-SANDERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:19-cr-00147-RJC-DCK-1)

Argued: September 22, 2023 Decided: December 12, 2023

Before WYNN, QUATTLEBAUM, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

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Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge 

Quattlebaum and Judge Heytens joined.

ARGUED: David Quentin Burgess, DAVID BURGESS LAW, PC, Charlotte, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Julia Kay Wood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dena J. King, United 

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

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WYNN, Circuit Judge:

When a criminal defendant’s valid guilty plea includes a waiver of the right to 

appeal, this Court generally enforces the waiver by dismissing any subsequent appeal that 

raises issues within the scope of the waiver. E.g., United States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 

182 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Cohen, 459 F.3d 490, 497 (4th Cir. 2006). But we 

have established narrow exceptions to that rule. For example, even if an appeal waiver is 

valid and applicable, we will review a claim that a district court’s sentence or restitution 

order exceeded the court’s statutory authority. Cohen, 459 F.3d at 497–98. 

Defendant Glenda Taylor-Sanders challenges several aspects of the sentence and 

restitution order that the district court entered following her guilty plea. Each of these 

challenges falls squarely within the scope of Taylor-Sanders’s valid appeal waiver, and 

none qualifies for an exception that would permit our review. Accordingly, we dismiss 

Taylor-Sanders’s appeal in its entirety.

I. 

From February 2017 through May 2019, Taylor-Sanders took advantage of her role 

as a licensed insurance agent to defraud several trucking companies and the insurance 

finance company BankDirect Capital Finance. She defrauded the trucking companies by 

misappropriating funds that the companies provided her to pay for their insurance policy 

premiums. And she defrauded BankDirect Capital Finance by obtaining loans under the 

guise of nonexistent insurance policies. Instead of using the funds she obtained to pay 

insurance policy premiums or to pay back BankDirect Capital Finance for the legitimate 

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loans it made to the trucking companies, Taylor-Sanders spent the funds on personal 

expenditures including cars, football tickets, and mortgage payments.

Predictably, some of the trucking companies’ insurance policies lapsed because 

Taylor-Sanders did not pay the insurance premiums. Her scheme unraveled when one 

trucking company, DW Express, discovered its insurance policy was canceled for 

nonpayment after it tried to file a claim for an April 2019 trucking accident. A grand jury 

indicted Taylor-Sanders the next month on four counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1343 and two counts of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). 

On January 22, 2020, with the assistance of counsel, Taylor-Sanders signed a plea 

agreement, under which she agreed to plead guilty to one count of wire fraud (Count Four).

She also agreed to pay “full restitution, regardless of the resulting loss amount, to all 

victims directly or indirectly harmed by [her] ‘relevant conduct,’ . . . including conduct 

pertaining to any dismissed counts or uncharged conduct, regardless of whether such 

conduct constitutes an ‘offense’ under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2259, 3663 or 3663A.” S.J.A. 635

¶ 9a.1 And she “waive[d] all rights to contest the conviction and sentence in any appeal” 

on any grounds other than ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.

S.J.A. 636 ¶ 17. In exchange, the Government agreed to dismiss all the remaining counts 

against her.

On January 24, 2020, Magistrate Judge David C. Keesler conducted a plea hearing 

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. When the magistrate judge 

1 Citations to the “J.A.” and “S.J.A.” refer, respectively, to the Joint Appendix and 

Sealed Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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asked Taylor-Sanders whether she had carefully reviewed the plea agreement with her 

lawyer, Taylor-Sanders responded, “Not as much as I would like.” J.A. 80. The magistrate 

judge then granted defense counsel’s request for a recess to further discuss the plea 

agreement with Taylor-Sanders.

Following a thirty-minute recess, Taylor-Sanders confirmed that she had an 

adequate opportunity to review the plea agreement and the corresponding factual basis 

document with counsel and was ready to proceed. She confirmed that she understood “that 

the right to appeal [her] conviction and/or [her] sentence has been expressly waived in [her] 

Plea Agreement.” J.A. 82. 

However, when the magistrate judge asked Taylor-Sanders if she understood and 

agreed with the factual basis document, Taylor-Sanders again waivered, claiming that some

facts within the document were “incorrect.” J.A. 84. The magistrate judge responded that 

he would end the hearing for the day to allow Taylor-Sanders and her counsel to “have 

some further conversation about” the plea deal. Id. Defense counsel informed the court that 

Taylor-Sanders had changed her mind again and “wishe[d] to go through with the plea.”

J.A. 85. But the magistrate judge ended the hearing, stating, “I think the record is now 

muddied enough that you guys are going to have to talk about it.” J.A. 85. 

Eighty minutes later, the magistrate judge reconvened the hearing. He explained 

that, because he had not intended to resume the hearing that day, he wanted to “make an 

appropriate record about what we’re doing and why we’re doing it.” J.A. 86. Defense 

counsel announced that she and the Government had submitted a revised factual basis 

document that addressed Taylor-Sanders’s previous concerns. And defense counsel noted 

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that she had reviewed the amended document with Taylor-Sanders, who “intend[ed] to 

enter her guilty plea [that] afternoon.” J.A. 87.

To ensure that the plea was knowing and voluntary, the magistrate judge 

reconducted much of the Rule 11 colloquy that he had begun earlier. Taylor-Sanders 

confirmed that she intended to plead guilty, understood that the decision to plead guilty 

was entirely hers, and had an adequate opportunity to review the plea documents and 

discuss possible defenses with counsel. She confirmed that she understood and agreed with 

the plea documents, that no one had threatened, intimidated, or forced her to enter the guilty 

plea, and that she understood all parts of the proceeding. She also confirmed that she was 

satisfied with her counsel’s services, had no further questions or statements, and still 

wished to plead guilty.

After this colloquy, the magistrate judge found that Taylor-Sanders’s plea was 

knowing and voluntary and that Taylor-Sanders understood the charges and potential 

penalties and consequences of her plea. Finally, the magistrate judge found that the plea 

was supported by an independent factual basis. As such, he accepted the plea and 

recommended that the district court enter judgment.

Four months later, in May 2020, Taylor-Sanders moved to withdraw her guilty plea,

asserting “she was told she had no choice but to plead guilty” and that “her plea was not 

knowing and voluntary because ‘she did not fully understand the interplay between what 

her guideline range could be versus the final sentence.’” J.A. 107 (quoting Motion to 

Withdraw Plea, No. 3:19-cr-00147-RJC-DCK-1 (W.D.N.C. May 22, 2020), ECF No. 43).

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She also asserted her legal innocence, arguing that she never acted with the requisite intent 

to defraud.

Evaluating the motion, the district court found that “[a] proper Rule 11 hearing was 

conducted,” during which Taylor-Sanders “testified under oath that she understood the 

maximum penalty she faced, that she understood the terms of her Plea Agreement, that no 

additional promises had been made to her, that she was satisfied with her attorney, and that 

[the] Amended Factual Basis was true.” J.A. 113. The court therefore denied TaylorSanders’s motion to withdraw, concluding that Taylor-Sanders’s claim was “not credible” 

and that she had “failed to establish a fair and just reason to justify withdrawal of her guilty 

plea.” J.A. 110–11.

In October 2020, the district court conducted Taylor-Sanders’s sentencing hearing.

The Government presented testimony from an FBI agent about the insurance fraud 

investigation and testimony from a DW Express employee regarding the severe financial 

impact of Taylor-Sanders’s fraud on DW Express’s business. Taylor-Sanders took the 

stand and again disputed her guilt, claiming that the allegedly fictitious loans were not 

fabricated and that DW Express was responsible for the lapse in its insurance coverage.

The district court found that the Government’s witnesses were credible, that the 

documents it submitted were consistent with the factual basis document and Presentence 

Investigation Report, and that the evidence “overwhelmingly establishe[d] a factual basis” 

for Taylor-Sanders’s guilty plea. J.A. 238. In contrast, the district court found that TaylorSanders’s testimony was not credible, noting Taylor-Sanders was “thoroughly impeached 

by her prior misstatements in other arenas.” J.A. 238. The district court further found that 

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Taylor-Sanders had “engaged in a pattern of fraudulent activity over a lengthy period of 

time involving multiple businesses in which she received funds to obtain insurance 

policies, and on multiple occasions either failed to turn those funds over or . . . didn’t apply 

for the insurance policy at all” and instead “used those funds for personal benefit and to 

make Ponzi payments so that she could keep the fraudulent scheme alive.” J.A. 248.

The district court adopted the Presentence Investigation Report’s calculation of 

Taylor-Sanders’s offense level as 25, including a two-point increase for causing DW 

Express substantial financial hardship and another two-point increase for unauthorized use 

of a means of identification. Since Taylor-Sanders had a criminal history category of I, the 

district court calculated her Guidelines sentencing range as 57 to 71 months. It then 

sentenced Taylor-Sanders to 66 months’ imprisonment, within that range, and entered 

judgment. 

In December 2020, the Government requested more than $700,000 in total

restitution. It sought $242,092.47 of restitution for harm to BankDirect Capital Finance.

And for DW Express, the Government requested:

1) $125,363.80 for the value of the totaled truck and interest payments owed on 

a loan that financed the truck;

2) $21,821.25 for the loss of the flatbed trailer destroyed in the accident;

3) $62,874.59 for the total value of loan payments DW Express made to 

Taylor-Sanders that she failed to transfer to BankDirect Capital Finance; 

4) $120,030.68 for towing fees, storage fees, cleanup costs, and destroyed cargo 

expenses that DW Express incurred because of the accident; and

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5) $139,847.09 for the profits DW Express lost from April 2019 through April 

2020 because it could not use the destroyed truck and trailer,

2

for a total of $469,937.41.

On March 10, 2021, the district court ordered Taylor-Sanders to pay restitution in 

the amounts the Government requested. 

Taylor-Sanders now raises several challenges to her guilty plea, sentence, and 

restitution order.3 She argues that her guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because 

of the stops and starts during her Rule 11 colloquy, that the district court miscalculated her 

offense level, and that the district court made several errors when awarding DW Express 

restitution. Among Taylor-Sanders’s challenges to the restitution award is a claim that the 

district court lacked authority under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act to award 

restitution for DW Express’s lost profits. 

II.

A.

At the outset, we must determine whether Taylor-Sanders’s guilty plea and plea 

waiver were valid. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168–69 (4th Cir. 2005). While 

Taylor-Sanders’s plea agreement contained an appeal waiver, the existence of such a

waiver does not bar our review of the validity of the guilty plea and plea waiver. See United 

States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991).

2 The Government estimated lost profits as the profits earned from a similar truck 

in the previous year. 3 Taylor-Sanders timely appealed her conviction, sentence, and restitution order. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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“[W]e review the acceptance of a guilty plea under the harmless error standard.”

United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). “Under harmless error review, 

‘[a]ny deviation from the requirements of Rule 11 is reversible unless the government 

demonstrates that it was harmless.’” United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 

2002) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1321, 1322 n.1 (D.C.

Cir. 1995).

Rule 11 requires that, before accepting a guilty plea, a district court “must ensure 

that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, any 

mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the various rights the 

defendant is relinquishing by pleading guilty.” Williams, 811 F.3d at 622. The district court 

must also “determine that the plea is voluntary and that there is a factual basis for the plea.”

Id. “[I]n the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the truth of sworn statements made 

during a Rule 11 colloquy is conclusively established.” United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 

216, 221–22 (4th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, a properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy raises 

“a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.” United States v. Bowman, 348 

F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th 

Cir. 1992) (en banc)). 

“Generally, if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate 

rights during [a properly conducted] Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the 

defendant understood the full significance of the waiver,” we will also hold that the appeal 

waiver is valid. United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012); see also 

United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021) (“A ‘valid’ appeal waiver is 

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one entered by the defendant knowingly and intelligently, a determination that [the Court] 

make[s] by considering the totality of the circumstances.”). 

Here, the magistrate judge conducted a proper Rule 11 colloquy. The magistrate 

judge confirmed that Taylor-Sanders had reviewed the charge with counsel, understood the 

contents and possible consequences of her plea agreement, and was voluntarily pleading 

guilty. When Taylor-Sanders twice expressed concerns about the plea agreement or factual 

basis document, the magistrate judge provided a recess for her to convene with counsel and 

make any necessary changes to the plea agreement before proceeding.

While Taylor-Sanders claims the interruptions in the colloquy show her plea was 

not knowing or voluntary, they in fact demonstrate the opposite. The magistrate judge took 

great care in ensuring that Taylor-Sanders received the time she needed to fully understand 

the terms and consequences of her guilty plea. If the magistrate judge had ignored TaylorSanders’s hesitations and continued the colloquy uninterrupted, that may have raised 

questions about Taylor-Sanders’s knowingness. That the magistrate judge instead 

addressed her uncertainties by pausing the proceedings demonstrates that the process, 

though bumpy, constituted a full and proper Rule 11 colloquy. Accordingly, we hold that 

Taylor-Sanders’s guilty plea is valid and binding.

We also conclude that Taylor-Sanders’s appeal waiver was valid. The plea 

agreement unequivocally states that Taylor-Sanders waived “all rights to contest the 

conviction and sentence in any appeal” except for claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. S.J.A. 636 ¶ 17. And during the Rule 11 colloquy, 

the magistrate judge explained the appeal waiver and Taylor-Sanders affirmed that she 

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understood it. Since Taylor-Sanders’s appeal waiver was included in her plea agreement

and addressed during the Rule 11 colloquy, and since the plea agreement was valid, her 

appeal waiver is also valid.

B.

Because Taylor-Sanders’s plea agreement included a valid appeal waiver, we next

consider whether the issues she raises on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver. In 

doing so, we interpret the plea agreement via basic principles of contract law, but “with a 

greater degree of scrutiny than we would evaluate a contract in a civil context.” Boutcher, 

998 F.3d at 608. “Nonetheless, courts cannot rewrite agreements or construe ambiguities 

when none exists.” Id. at 608–09. 

“[R]estitution is . . . part of [a] criminal defendant’s sentence.” Cohen, 459 F.3d at 

496. And Taylor-Sanders’s appeal waiver broadly and unambiguously bars claims 

regarding Taylor-Sanders’s conviction and sentence. When an issue falls within the scope 

of a valid appeal waiver, we generally enforce the waiver by declining to hear the covered 

issues. Adams, 814 F.3d at 182. Each of the issues Taylor-Sanders raises on appeal 

regarding calculation of her offense level or restitution fall within that broad waiver, so we 

must dismiss her appeal. 

To be sure, there are narrow circumstances in which we will not enforce an appeal 

waiver that is otherwise applicable. See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 

1146 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[E]ven valid appeal waivers will not bar appellate review of every 

sentence.” (citing United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992))); Marin, 961 

F.2d at 496 (“[A] defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to 

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being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court.”). One exception permits us to

review claims that the district court’s sentence or restitution order exceeded the court’s 

statutory authority. Cohen, 459 F.3d at 497–98. Taylor-Sanders attempts to frame one issue 

on appeal—her appeal regarding the district court’s order of restitution for DW Express’s 

lost profits—as falling under this exception. We are not persuaded.

We have stated that this exception permits “appellate review of a sentence imposed 

in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute or based on a constitutionally 

impermissible factor such as race.” Marin, 961 F.2d at 496. But in doing so, we have 

distinguished claims that a sentence is “illegal” because the district court lacked the 

authority to issue the sentence (which remain reviewable despite an appeal waiver) from 

claims that a sentence was “imposed in violation of law” because it has otherwise merely 

“been touched by a legal error” (in which case we will enforce the appeal waiver). 

Thornsbury, 670 F.3d at 539.

For example, if the district court imposes a term of imprisonment that exceeds the 

statutory maximum, the resulting sentence is illegal as beyond the court’s authority, and 

our review will not be barred by an appeal waiver. See Marin, 961 F.2d at 496. But while 

a district court’s failure to consider a nonfrivolous argument at sentencing might mean that 

a sentence is imposed in violation of law, that is a legal error, the appeal of which can be 

barred by an appeal waiver. See United States v. McGrath, 981 F.3d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 

2020).

In the restitution context, we have applied this exception to review claims that a 

district court lacked the authority to order restitution at all. See Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 

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at 1147 (“Because a restitution order imposed when it is not authorized by the [Victim and 

Witness Protection Act] is no less ‘illegal’ than a sentence of imprisonment that exceeds 

the statutory maximum, appeals challenging the legality of restitution orders are similarly 

outside the scope of a defendant’s otherwise valid appeal waiver.”). But we held in United 

States v. Boutcher that when a district court commits legal error by valuing restitution as 

the amount of a defendant’s profit rather than of a victim’s loss, that error falls within the 

scope of an appeal waiver because it challenges the amount of restitution rather than the

court’s authority to impose restitution at all. Boutcher, 998 F.3d at 610 (citing Cohen, 459 

F.3d at 497–500).

Here, the restitution order included $139,847.09 for a year of DW Express’s lost 

profits. This amount was calculated based on the profits from a truck similar to the totaled 

truck in the year preceding the wreck, on the theory that, but for Taylor-Sanders’s fraud, 

DW Express would have quickly replaced the wrecked truck and trailer with insurance 

proceeds and continued to enjoy profits from their use. Taylor-Sanders argues that this 

portion of the restitution order exceeded the scope of the court’s authority because “[t]he 

plain language in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1) does not authorize a district court to order 

restitution for lost income in cases involving property.” Opening Br. at 24.

Taylor-Sanders’s argument is foreclosed by our decision in Boutcher.

4 Just like the 

defendant in Boutcher, Taylor-Sanders does not dispute that the Mandatory Victims 

Restitution Act permits restitution for the offense for which she was convicted. And this 

4 We express no opinion on the merits of Taylor-Sanders’s interpretation of 

§ 3663A(b)(1) and instead limit our analysis to whether the issue was waived.

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case and Boutcher involve a claim that the district court misinterpreted the definition of 

restitution in § 3663A(b)(1) and by doing so erroneously increased the amount of 

restitution it ordered. Taylor-Sanders has not offered, and we cannot discern, any reason to

distinguish the legal error claimed in Boutcher from that claimed here. Accordingly, we 

must also dismiss Taylor-Sanders’s lost-profits claim.5

III.

We conclude that each of Taylor-Sanders’s claims on appeal are barred by the 

appeal waiver in her guilty plea. Therefore, her appeal is 

DISMISSED.

5 In addition to dismissing the appeal as to Taylor-Sanders’s sentencing and 

restitution claims, we dismiss her appeal related to claims for ineffective assistance of 

counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Taylor-Sanders raised those two issues without any 

substantive argument to avoid procedural default in the event of a post-conviction 

challenge. “A party waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening brief or by 

failing to develop its argument—even if its brief takes a passing shot at the issue.” Grayson 

O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Because TaylorSanders fails to raise substantive arguments on these issues, we dismiss them as waived.

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