alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### GROSS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 17726.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

May 29, 1944.

Ashton Phelps, of New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

No appearance for plaintiff.

PER CURIAM.

'When this appeal was pending in this Court the defendant-appellant moved to reverse the judgment and remand the case to the First City Court upon the ground, verified by affidavits, to the effect that the judgment rendered against it was based upon the alleged death of one of its insured who, subsequently to the rendition of the judgment, was discovered to be alive. Plaintiff, though notified, made no appearance or objection and, therefore, believing that the ends of justice will be served by remanding the case to permit the introduction of proper evidence to support appellant’s allegations.

It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment appealed from be and it is annulled, avoided and reversed and it is now ordered that this cause be remanded to the First City Court of New Orleans for further proceedings according to law and not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.
Exhibit 10.9


 


Director
Compensation Summary


 


The
Valmont board of directors on December 20, 2004 established director
compensation for fiscal 2005. 
Non-employee directors will receive (1) an annual retainer of $55,000,
(2) $2,500 for each board meeting attended ($1,000 if the participation was via
teleconference), and (3) $2,000 for each committee meeting attended.  The lead director receives an additional
$25,000 per year and each committee chairman receives an additional $10,000 per
year.  Directors have the ability to
receive cash fees in the form of deferred compensation which accrues interest
indexed to U.S. Government Bonds compounded monthly.


 


Non-employee
directors also receive equity compensation as provided in the
stockholder-approved 2002 Stock Plan. 
The equity compensation consists of (1) an annual grant of 2,000 shares
of common stock and (2) an annual grant of a nonqualified stock option for
4,000 shares of common stock exercisable at the fair market value of the
Company’s common stock on the date of grant. 
The equity grants are made annually on the date of and following
completion of the Company’s annual stockholders’ meeting.  The common stock grant is forfeited if a
director’s services terminate for any reason other than death, retirement from
the board at mandatory retirement age, or resignation or failure to stand for
re-election, in any case without the prior approval of the board.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                    5
       
<S>            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>  9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>            JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>               AUG-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                 APR-30-1997
<CASH>                         6,910,881
<SECURITIES>                  10,893,068
<RECEIVABLES>                    918,214
<ALLOWANCES>                      65,000
<INVENTORY>                    2,744,454
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              21,835,170
<PP&E>                         4,425,243
<DEPRECIATION>                 1,809,661
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                24,810,674
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>          2,206,242
<BONDS>                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                  0
<PREFERRED>                            0
<COMMON>                       4,850,756
<OTHER-SE>                    17,724,442
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  24,810,674
<SALES>                        1,628,319
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               3,625,649
<CGS>                          3,605,514
<TOTAL-COSTS>                  3,605,514
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               6,506,349
<LOSS-PROVISION>                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 4,790
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (5,705,745)
<INCOME-TAX>                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (5,705,745)
<DISCONTINUED>                   111,539
<EXTRAORDINARY>                        0
<CHANGES>                              0
<NET-INCOME>                  (5,594,206)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                       (.46)
<EPS-DILUTED>                       (.46)
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Richard T. Szymanski, Chief Financial Officer of Prime Hospitality Corp. (the
"registrant"), certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the registrant;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect

<PAGE>

the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: August 6, 2004

                                                     -----------------------
                                                     Richard T. Szymanski
                                                     Chief Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 24, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-31225

Summary Calendar

CLARENCE RANDOLPH, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ST. TAMMANY PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE; RODNEY J. STRAIN, JR.,

St. Tammany Parish Sheriff; FARREL CRANDLE, St. Tammany

Parish Jail Medical Director; MARLIN PEACHEY, Warden, 

St. Tammany Parish Jail,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:02-CV-1239

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Clarence Randolph appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 suit, wherein he alleged that the defendants failed to

protect him from harm and were deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs while he was incarcerated in the St. Tammany Parish

Jail. During the course of the litigation, Randolph’s claims

against St. Tammany Parish President Kevin Davis, the St. Tammany

Parish Consolidated Government, the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s
No. 04-31225

-2-

** The parties consented to proceed before the magistrate

judge.

Office, Peter Galvin, Warden Marlin Peachey, and Farrell Crandle

were dismissed. Following the dismissal of his claims against

Strain, Randolph appealed.

Randolph argues that the magistrate judge** erred by

granting Strain’s motion for summary judgment because he

presented sufficient facts to support his claims. He also seeks

leave to supplement the record on appeal to include evidence not

before the magistrate judge.

Randolph’s motion to supplement the record on appeal is

denied. See Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491

n.26 (5th Cir. 1999). Randolph has not briefed any issues

related to the dismissal of any defendant, except Strain. By

failing to brief any issues related to the dismissals of the

other defendants, he has abandoned these issues on appeal. 

See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). 

A review of the record shows that Randolph failed to allege

facts sufficient to establish that Strain was deliberately

indifferent to Randolph’s safety. Accordingly, Randolph failed

to establish that Strain failed to protect him. See Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34, 837 (1994).

A review of the record also shows that Randolph failed to

establish that Strain was deliberately indifferent to Randolph’s

serious medical needs. Randolph received medical treatment for
No. 04-31225

-3-

the injuries he sustained after he was attacked by another

prisoner. His allegations establish nothing more than a

disagreement with the medical treatment provided. These

allegations are insufficient to state a constitutional claim. 

See Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). 

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Juan Eulogio Marte, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Clabby, J.), rendered March 9, 1987, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Bianchi, J.), of the defendant’s motion to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We find that testimony as to the defendant’s identification at a station house showup and in court, both made by a trained undercover police officer, was properly admitted. At the suppression hearing, the undercover officer testified that he had purchased cocaine from the defendant, and that the *615transaction lasted approximately two minutes. There was ample lighting and the officer had had a prior acquaintanceship with the defendant. The officer further testified that the defendant was not arrested at that time so that a search warrant could be obtained. Three months later, at a station house showup, the officer identified the defendant as the individual from whom he had purchased the cocaine. Under these circumstances, the station house showup was more in the nature of a confirmatory viewing than an identification *(see, People v Morales,*37 NY2d 262; *People v Welker,*150 AD2d 515; *People v Francis,*139 AD2d 527).

Finally, we find that the sentence was not excessive. Bracken, J. P., Kunzeman, Fiber and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
First Amendment to Contract for Purchase and Sale



 






EXHIBIT 10.26




FIRST AMENDMENT TO CONTRACT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE




     THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO CONTRACT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE (this “Amendment”) is entered into by
and between BRHP, LLC, a Florida limited liability company (“Seller”) and STILES CORPORATION, a
Florida corporation (“Purchaser”).



RECITALS:




     A. Purchaser and Seller entered into that certain Contract for Purchase and Sale,
dated as of December 29, 2004 (the “Contract”) for the sale of a certain parcel of land containing
approximately 23 acres of land situated in the City of Boca Raton, Palm Beach County, Florida, as
more particularly described in the Contract.



     B. Purchaser and Seller intend to modify and amend the Contract as set forth in this
Amendment.



     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of TEN & NO/100 DOLLARS, the mutual promises
contained herein, and other good and valuable considerations, the receipt, sufficiency and adequacy
of which are hereby acknowledged, Purchaser and Seller agree as follows:



1. Incorporation of Recitals; Capitalized Terms. The foregoing Recitals are true and
correct and are incorporated herein by this reference, as if set forth in their entirety. Any
capitalized term not defined in this Amendment shall have the meaning ascribed to it in the
Contract.



2. Conflict. In the event of any conflict between the terms and conditions set forth in
the Contract and those set forth in this Amendment, the terms and conditions of this Amendment
shall control.



3. Extension of Inspection Period. The Inspection Period, as defined in Section 4 of the
Contract, is hereby extended to 5:00 p.m. (Boca Raton, Florida time) on Friday, February 4, 2005.



4. Counterparts; Facsimile. For the convenience of the parties, this Amendment may be
executed in one or more counterparts and each executed counterpart shall, for all purposes, be
deemed an original and shall have the same force and effect as an original, all of which
counterparts together shall constitute in the aggregate but one of the same instrument. The
parties may rely on signatures transmitted via facsimile. This Amendment shall become effective
upon execution by all parties hereto.



1









 








5. Ratification. Except as expressly set forth in this Amendment, the Contract is ratified
and confirmed as written.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the date set forth below.


	 	 	 	 	 
	 	SELLER:



BRHP, LLC, a Florida limited liability company

 	 
	 	By:  	OFFICE DEPOT, INC., a Delaware corporation
 	 
	 



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ DAVID
C. FANNIN	 
	 	Name:  	David
C. Fannin 	 
	 	Title  	E.V.P.
and General Counsel 	 
	 	Date:  	1/27/05 	 
	 



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	PURCHASER:



STILES CORPORATION, a Florida corporation

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ DENNIS
F. O’SHEA	 
	 	Name:  	Dennis
F. O’Shea	 
	 	Title  	Vice
President 	 
	 	Date:  	1/28/05 	 
	 





2
Statement of
Compliance of The Bank of New York, as Trustee. I, Joseph Panepinto, Vice President
of The Bank of New York, a New York corporation (the Trustee), state: (a) A review of the Trustees
activities for the period from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007 (the Reporting
Period) and of the Trustees performance under the Standard Terms for Trust
Agreements dated November 5, 2004 between Merrill Lynch Depositor, Inc. as depositor (the
Depositor) and the Trustee, as trustee and securities intermediary (the Securities
Intermediary), in each case amended by a series supplement between the Depositor,
the Trustee and the Securities Intermediary (as amended in each such case, the Trust
Agreement), has been made under my supervision. (b)  To the best of my knowledge and
based on such review, the Trustee has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Trust
Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period for PPLUS Trust Series
LTD-1 Trust Certificates. Date:
March  5, 2008
      /s/ Joseph Panepinto
Joseph Panepinto
                                                 Vice President
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 15, 2015

No. 04-14-00579-CV

Jay Kay BEAR Ltd,

Appellant

v.

Patty MARTIN,

Appellee

From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2011-CI-11890

Honorable Cathleen M. Stryker, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The Appellee’s Motion for Leave to File Response to Appellant’s Post-Submission Letter 

Brief is GRANTED.

It is so ORDERED on this 15th day of September, 2015.

PER CURIAM

Attested to: _____________________

Keith E. Hottle
Opinion filed December 16, 2010

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-10-00087-CV

__________

MICHEAL RALSTON, Appellant

V.

DENISE UPFOLD ET AL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 259th District Court

Jones County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 021970

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Micheal Ralston sued Denise M. Upfold, Roxann D. Martinez, and Janay B. Williams for 

unlawfully appropriating seventy-six photographs, eight role playing books, and one wireless 

notebook. Ralston alleged that the taking occurred while he was confined in the French M. 

Robertson Unit and while the defendants were employed as correctional officers. Ralston sought 

$288.75 in actual damages as well as $1,000 in punitive damages from each defendant. The trial 

court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. ch. 14 (Vernon 2002). We affirm.
2

On appeal, Ralston contends that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing 

without conducting a hearing first and by failing to enter specific findings on his allegations 

concerning violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. ch. 134 (Vernon 2005). Ralston also argues that he has a cognizable claim under the Texas 

Liability Act.

Pursuant to Section 14.008(a), the trial court may but is not required to conduct a hearing. 

In its order, the trial court stated that appellant had failed to comply with the requirements of 

Chapter 14. The record supports the trial court’s findings. Moreover, the record does not 

support Ralston’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion or that he alleged a cause of 

action under Section 134.001. All of Ralston’s contentions have been considered, and each is 

overruled.

The order of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

December 16, 2010

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.
#### THOMAS v. MISSOURI PAC. R. CO.

No. 4530.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

March 29, 1934.

Tobin R. Hodge, of Rayville, for appellant.

George Wesley Smith, of Rayville, for ap-pellee.

MILLS, Judge.

It is not disputed in this case that two mules belonging to plaintiff were, at about 6:30 p. m., on February 23, 1932, killed by defendant’s train, on its tracks near Dehleo Station in Richland parish. The tracks being unfenced, Act. No. 70 of 1886 imposes upon defendant the burden of proving that the killing was not the result of fault or carelessness' on its part. In support of this burden it relies solely upon the testimony of the locomotive engineer operating the train on the night of the killing.

His testimony is that the night was starlit, but that there was a curtain of fog and smoke hanging over the place where the mules were struck. That for this reason he did not see the animals until within twenty feet of them. That on a clear night his headlight would enable him to see eight hundred feet ahead. That at the speed he was traveling he could stop his train in one hundred yards. That though the animals were directly in front of him when he first saw them, he presumes that they came suddenly upon the track ahead of his train, too close to permit him to avoid hitting them. He testifies that within the twenty feet he cut off the power and lights, sounded the whistle, and applied the brakes, but could not avoid the collision.

For plaintiff, Simmie Pater, who saw the accident, says that the mules were standing still on the track two hundred yards ahead of the train when he first saw them. He and Frank Howard both testify that there was no smoke, fog, or dust to obscure the view of the engineefc.

The lower court rendered judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $190, with legal interest from judicial demand, from which defendant alone appeals.

Defendant having failed to prove by a preponderance of the testimony. that the mules came suddenly upon the track or that the vision of the engineer was obscured by fog and smoke, the judgment is correct and is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1867

NATIONAL ELECTRICAL BENEFIT FUND, by its trustees; 

SALVATORE J. CHILIA, Trustee; D. R. BORDEN, JR., Trustee,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

MIRARCHI BROTHERS, INC.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District 

Judge. (8:11-cv-02621-DKC)

Submitted: January 31, 2014 Decided: February 12, 2014

Before KING and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Matthew I. Sack, DAVIS BUCCO & ARDIZZI, Conshohocken, 

Pennsylvania; Jeffrey D. McMahan, Jr., MCGUIREWOODS LLP, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer Bush Hawkins, 

POTTS-DUPRE, DIFEDE & HAWKINS, CHTD., Washington, D.C., for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Mirarchi Brothers, Incorporated, appeals the district 

court’s order granting summary judgment for National Electrical 

Benefit Fund (“NEBF”) under the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974 and awarding NEBF unpaid contributions, 

liquidated damages, interest, and audit fees related to an audit 

of Mirarchi’s contribution records. On appeal, Mirarchi 

contends that summary judgment is improper because there is a 

genuine dispute over whether it owes NEBF unpaid contributions. 

Finding no error, we affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment, “viewing the facts and the reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th 

Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). A court should grant summary judgment unless a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party 

on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 249 (1986). We conclude that, in this case, there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED