MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 80 Docket: Ken

- 19

- 517 Submitted

On	B riefs : May	28,	2020 Decided: June 4 ,	2020 Panel: GORMAN,	JABAR , HUMPHREY , HORTON, and CONNORS , JJ.

IN	RE	CHILDREN	OF	BRANDON	D.

PER	CURIAM [¶1] Brandon	D. and	the	mother appeal	from separate judgment s entered by the	District	Court	(Augusta, Nale,	J. )	terminating their parental	rights	to the
children .	 	 The	 mother,	 whose	 parental	 rights	 were	 terminated pursuant	 to
22 M.R.S	§	4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(1) (2020) ,	argues that	the	court	erred	in finding	 that	 her	 consent	 to	 the	 termination	 was	 made	 knowingly	 and voluntarily. The	 father ,	 whose	 parental	 right s	 were	 terminated	 pursuant	 to
22 M.R.S.	 § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) and (b)(i)

- (ii) (2020) , argues	 that	 there	 is insufficient	evidence	in	the	record	to	support	the	court’s	findings	of	at	least	one ground	of	parental	unfitness	and	that	termination	was	in	the	best	in terests	of
the	children

. We affirm	the	judgments.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] On	April	25,	2018,	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services filed	a	petition	for	a	child	protection	order	regarding	the	older	child,	alleging2 that	the	parents	were	unable	to	manage their	substance	abuse	issues	and	that, as	 a	 result,	 the	 child	 was	 exposed	 to	 unsafe	 conditions	 and	 neglect. 1 See
22 M.R.S.	 §	 4032 ( 2020 )

. At	 the	 time	 the	 petition	 was	 filed,	 the	 father	 was incarcerated. Two	 days	 later ,	 the	 court	 ( Fowle , J. )	 entered	 an	 o rder	 of preliminary	protection	and	placed	the	child	in	the	custody	of	the	Department.
See 22	M.R.S.	§	4034 ( 2020 ) .		The parents later	waived their o pportunity	for a summary	preliminary	hearing , after	which	the	court	( Nale,	J. )	entered	an	order maintaining the	Department’s	custody	of	 the	child	and	placing	 the	child	with
the child’s paternal	step

- grandmother. [¶ 3 ]	 	 Following	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 younger	 child,	 the	 Department	 filed a petition	for	a	child	protection	order for	th at child	on	May	23,	2018.		On	th e same day,	the	court	( E.	Walker,	J. )	entered	an	order	of	preliminary	protection.		After the	parents	again	waived	their	opportunity	for	a	summary	preliminary	hearing, the	court	( Nale,	J. )	placed	the	younger	child	with	the	paternal	step

- grandmother
and main ta ined	the	Department’s	custody	of	the	child.		On	August	16,	2018,	the court	entered	a	jeopardy	order as	to	both	children	with	the	agreement	of	the parents. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4035 ( 2020 ) .		The	jeopardy	order	conditionally	placed

1 Additionally,	the	petition	sought	to	protect	 the	child	 from	 the	maternal	grandmother	who,	at that	time,	was	the	child’s	legal	guardian.3 the	older	child	with	 the	mater nal	grandmother	and maintained placement	of the	younger	child	with	the	paternal	step

- grandmother. [¶ 4 ]		In	March	2019,	the	father	was	released	from	prison. On	March	25, 2019, he signed	a	rehabilitation	and	reunification	plan, agreeing to	attend	the children’s	medical	appointments,	secure	and	maintain	an	appropriate	home	for the	children	and	himself,	and	complete	a	substance	abuse	evaluation. [¶ 5 ]		On	May	21,	2019,	the	Department	filed	a	petition	to	terminate	the parental	rights of	th e	mother	and	the	father. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4052 (2020). The Department alleg ed that	 the	 mother continued	 to	 struggle	 with	 substance abuse	issues	and	was	unable	to	secure	an	appropriate	home	for	the	childre n, and	 that father	had	 “just	begun	 to	address	his	l ongstanding	 substance	abuse
issues

. ” In	August	2019 ,	 the	mother	 and	 father	were	involved	in	a	domestic dispute,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 father being incarcerat ed for	 assaulting	 the mother.		The	father	was	released	from	jail	in October 2019

. [¶ 6 ] The	 cour t	 held	 a	 hearing	 on	 the termination petition on November 14,	2019

. At	the beginning	of	the hearing,	the	mother	informed	the court	 that	 she planned to consent to	 the	 termination of	 her	 parental	 rights “under	advice	from	my	counsel

. ” T he	court	asked	the	mother if	she	“personally .	.	.	intended[ed]	to	terminate [her] parental	rights	in	this	matter

. ”		The	mother4 replied:	“If	it’s	going	 to	help	my	 kids	be	adopted	by	 [ the ]	Grandmother,	 then yeah.” [¶ 7 ]		The	court	then	informed	the	mother that	she	would	be	waiving	her right	 to	a	 trial if	 she	consented , and it explained	 the	 effects	 of a termination order

. The	mother	stated	that	she	understood. The	mother	also	assured	the court	 that	 she	 was	 not	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 any	 alcohol	 or	 drugs,	 h ad	 the opportunity	to	discuss	her	consent	with	her	attorney,	and	was	not	pressured	or threatened	 to	 consent.	 	 The	 court	 then	 had	 the	 following	 exchange	with	 the
mother:
THE	 COURT : You	 understand	 that	 there’s	 no	 guarantee

— listen very	carefully,	there’s	no guarantee	that	the	children	will	be	placed where	 they	 are	 now	 or	 that	 the	 permanency	 plan,	 adoption	 or w hatever,	will	go	forward ? Something	could	happen	in	the	future to	 stop	it	and	 you	cannot	 object	 to	 that	plan.	Do	 you	understand that?
MOTHER : I	do , yeah. The	court	continued	its	colloquy	with	 the	mother,	again	informing	her	of	 the prospective effects	of	consenting to	the	termination	of	her	parental	rights .		After
the	 mother	 confirmed	 to	 the	 court	 that	 it	 was	 her	 intent	 to	 consent	 to	 the5 termination, the	mother	signed	the	consent	form	and	the	court	terminated	her parental	rights. 2 See 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(1). [¶ 8 ] Following	 the	 mother’ s consent	 to	 termination,	 the	 court held a contested	hearing	regarding	the	termination	of	the	father’s	parental	r ights

. T he
court	concluded	that	the	father has	been “ unable to	take	responsibility	for	the children	within	a	time	which	is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	needs	of	the children,”	 finding	 that	 the	 father	 had	 failed	 to	 take	 part	 in	 substance	 abuse counsel ing	and had	not f oun d	“safe	housing”	for	himself	and	the	children.		The
court	also	 found	 that the	children	are	 “being	well	cared	 for”	in	 their	current placement s and	that the time	that	the father needs	“to	heal	.	.	.	[and]	to	move
forward	is	inconsistent with	the	time	th at [the]	children	need.” [¶ 9 ] By	judgment	entered	 on December 23 ,	2019, the	court	made	 the following additional findings	of	fact, all	of which	are	supported	by	competent
evidence	in	the	record

. See In	re	Child	of	Corey	B. ,	2020	ME	3,	¶ 3,	223	A.3d	462

. [ T]he Department	has	made	reasonable	efforts	to	rehabilitate	and reunify	the	family	and	has	made	reasonable	efforts	to	identify	and pursue	 an	 alternative	 permanency	 plan.	 	 The	 Department caseworker	 has	 made	 numerous	 efforts	 to	 engage	 the	 f ather	 in reunification	 services	 .	 .	 .	 documented	 in	 the	 two	 signed reunification	 plans.	 	 [T]he	 Department	 caseworker	 held	 at	 least two	 Family	 Team	 Meetings	 and	 twice	 traveled	 to	 [ a correctional facility]	 to	 visit	 the	 father	 while	 he	 was	 incarcerated.	 	 [T]he

2 The	court	entered	an	order	terminating	the	mother’s	parental	rights	on	December	23,	20 19.6 Department	caseworker	has	[made]	efforts	to	refer	the	father	for	a substance	abuse	evaluation.		To	date,	this	evaluation	has	not	taken place.

. . . The	expectations	for	the	father were	clearly	outlined	in the	reunification	plan	from	March,	25,	2019,	which	was	completed after	 the	 father	 was	 released	 from	 incarceration. As	 part	 of	 the plan,	the	father	was	required	to	.	.	.	participate	in	a	substance	abuse evaluation,	and	participate in	the	Department’s	drug	testing	line.

.	.	.	. The	 Court	 finds	 that	 the	 father	 .	 .	 .	 was	 aware	 of	 why	 the children	were	removed	 from	 the	parents. The	 father	agreed	 to	a jeopardy	 order	 on	August [16] ,	2018,	which	expressly	 stated	 the issues	 placing	 t he	children	in	circumstances	 of	jeopardy.

.	 .	 . The father	has	not	complied	with	the	services	in	the	reunification	plan date d March 25,	2019.		[The	father]	agreed	to	find	safe	housing	for himself	and	his	children	as	part	of	the	reunification	plan.		The	Cou rt believes	that	[the	father]	is	searching	for	housing	but	finds	that	the father	did	not	exhibit	fervor	or	urgency	in	doing	so

. [The	father] spent	 several	months	 after	 his	 release	 	 from	incarceration	living with	his	brother	in	a	living	situation	that	was not	appropriate	for children.		[The	father]	recognized	this	fact	but	continued	to	make minimal	 efforts	 to	 obtain	 adequate	 housing.	 	 As	 of	 the	 time	 of hearing,	[the	father]	had	still	not	obtained	adequate	housing	for	his children. [The	 father]	 has	 not	 part icipated	 in	 the	 Department’s drug	testing	line	and	has	not	obtained	a	substance	abuse	evaluation as	agreed	to	in	the	reunification	plan.		Additionally,	[the	father]	has only	attended	approximately	two	of	[the	younger	child’s]	medical appointments

.	.	. .	Th is	is	despite	 [the	 younger	child’s]	numerous appointments

. Additionally,	 the	 father	 was	 involved	 in	 a	 domestically violent	physical	altercation	with	the	mother	in	August	2019	which left	the	mother	injured.		As	a	direct	result	of	his	actions,	[the	fathe r] was	 incarcerated	 for	 approximately	 one	 month	 between September	2019	and	October	2019.		The	father’s	issues	for	violence [ ha ve] not	 been address ed and	 he	 cannot	 even	 identify	 what caused	 the	 argument	 between	 himself	 and	 the	 mother	 in	 the7 August	2019	inci dent.		[The	father]	has	just	started	the

.	.	. batterer’s intervention	 program	 and	 has	 forty

- four	 weeks	 left	 to	 complete this	program.		During	that	month	that	the	father	was	incarcerated again,	visits	with	both	children	were	interrupted	and	[the	father] wa s	 not	 able	 to	 attend	 his	 regular	 medication	 assisted treatment.

. . .	 [The	 father] never requested	 increased	 visits	 with the	children	 throughout	 the	lifetime	 of	 this	case.

.	 .	 . [T]he	 father was	provided	ample	time	in	this	case	to	complete	the	services	that was	asked	of	him	by	the	Department.		This	did	not	happen	despite the	clear Rehabilitation and	Reunification plan	which	specified	the services	 that	 the	 father	 needed	 to	 particip ate	 in	 to	 alleviate jeopardy.

.	.	.	.

.	 .	 .	 . In	 this	 case,	 despite	 the	 reasonable	 efforts	 of	 the Department,	 the	 father	 did	 not	 rectify	 or	 resolve[]	 the	 problems that	prevented	the	return	of the	child[ren]	to	the	home	and	made minimal	 efforts	 to	 eng age	 in	 services	 in	 accordance	 with	 the rehabilitation	and	reunification	plan.

.	.	.	.

.	.	.	. Both	children	are	in	safe	and	nurturing	placements.		The [younger	child]	remains	in	the	only	home	he	has	ever	known.

.	.	. [The	older	child]	has	remained	with	the	maternal	grandmother	for over	a	year	since	the	pendency	of	this	case. [¶1 0 ] Based	on	these	findings,	the	court	terminated	the	father’s	parental rights ,	 concluding	 that the father is	 unable	 to	 protect	 the	 child ren from jeopardy	and has	been unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the	child ren within	a
time that	is reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	child ren’ s	needs

. See 22	M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

- (ii). The	 court	 also	 concluded	 that termination	 of	 the8 father’s	parental	 rights is in	 the	best	interests	 of	 the	children. See 22	M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). [¶1 1 ] Both	 parents timely appeal ed

. See 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4006 (2020);
M.R. App.	P.	2B(c)(1)

. II.		DISCUSSION
A. The Mother ’s	Consent [¶1 2 ]	 	 The	 mother	 contends	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 finding	 that	 she voluntarily	and	knowingly	consented	to	the	termination	of	her	parental	rights, arguing	 that the	 court	 did	 not	 ask	 about	 her	 motivations for	 consenting or whether	 she	 had been	 given	 “ sufficient	 time ” to consider	 her	 consent	 and
discuss	it with	her	attorney

. We	review	for	clear	error	a	court’s	finding	that	a parent	voluntarily	and	knowingly	consented	to	an	order	terminating	parental rights. See In	re	H.C. ,	2013	ME	97,	¶	11,	82	A.3d	80

. [¶1 3 ] “ Before	it	may	 terminate	a	parent ’ s	rights	pursuant	 to 22	M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(1),	the	District	Court	must	find	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence that	the	parent	consented	to	the	termination	voluntarily	and	knowingly .” In	re Child	 of	 Rebecca	J. , 2019	ME	 76,	 ¶ 12,	 208	 A.3d	 405

. To	make	 this	 required finding,	“ a	court	must,	at	minimum,	(1)	explain	to	the	parent	his	or	her	parental rights	and	the	effects	of	his	or	her	decision	thereon,	(2)	inquire	into	the	parent ’ s9 understanding	of	the	effects	of	th e	decision,	and	(3)	determine	that	the	parent ’ s decision	 is	 freely	 given. ” Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted); see 22	 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(1). Section	4055	also	requires	t hat	a	parent’s	consent be “written
and	.

. .	executed	in	court	before	a	judge.”		22 M.R.S.	§ 4055(1)(B)(1). [¶1 4 ] In	this	case , the	mother	initially	appeared	to	condition	her	consent upon	her	children	“be[ing]	adopted	by [ the ]	grandmother.”		After	the	mother’s response,	 however,	 the	 court	 informed	 the	 mother	 of	 her	 right	 to	 a	 trial, expl ained	the	effects	of	a	termination	order,	and confirmed that	the	mother	had previously	 had	 an	 opportunity	 to	 discuss	 her	 consent	 with	 her	 attorney. 3 Further,	the	mother,	after	questioning	by	the	court,	informed	the	court	that	she
understood	that	there wa s “ no	guarantee	that	the	children	will	be	placed	where they	are	now”	if	she	consented,	and	that	she	would	be	unable	to	object	to	any future	permanency	plan. [¶1 5 ]	 	 Therefore,	 based	 on	 the	 court’s	 colloquy	 with	 the	 mother,	 we
discern	 no	 error	 in	 the	 court’ s	 finding	 that the mother knowingly	 and voluntarily	consented	to the	termination	of her parental	rights. See	In	re	Child of	Rebecca	J. ,	2019	ME 76,	¶¶	14

- 15,	208	A.3d	405.

3 The	mother’s	attorney	also	represented	to	the	court	that	she	had	“reviewed	the	[consent]	form” with	the	mother	and	“had	read	through	the	language	in	the	form	with	her.”10 B. Termination	of Father ’s	Parental	Rights [¶1 6 ]		The	father	argues that	there	is insufficient	evidence	in	the	record to	support	the	court’s	findings	of	at	least	one	ground	of	parental	unfitness and that	termination	was	in	the	best	interests	of	the	children ,	arguing	that	he	has shown	progress	in alleviating	jeopardy	and	reunifying	with the	children. [¶1 7 ] To	terminate the	father’s parental	rights	without his consent, “ the trial	court	was	required	to	find,	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence,	at	least	one ground	of	parental unfitness	and	that	termination	is	in	the	best	interest [s] of
the child [ren]

. ” In	re	Child	of	Amber	D. ,	2020	ME	30,	¶	6,

--- A.3d

--- ; see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2).	 	 “ We	 review	 the	 court ’ s	 factual	 findings	 for	 clear	 error	 and
review	the	court ’ s	ultimate	conclusion	that	termination	of	parental	rights	is	in
the	best	interest	of [each] child	for	an	abuse	of	discretion. ” In	re	Child	of	Megan
D. ,	2019	ME	52,	¶	6,	206	A.3d	899

. [¶1 8 ] Contrary	to	the	father’s	contention , there is	competent evidence	in
the	record supporting	the	court’s	findings	of	parental	unfitness. See 22	M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

- (ii).	 	 Although	 the	 father	 was	 incarcerated	 at	 the beginning	 of	 the	 child	 protection	 proceedings,	 the	 father	 agreed,	 upon	 his release,	to	a	rehabilitation	and	reunification	plan	that	required	him	to	complete
a	substance	abuse	evaluation ,	attend	his	children’s	medical	appointments,	and11 secure	 an	 appropriate	 home	 for	 himself	 and	 the	 children. The	 court	 found, however,	that	the	father	had	failed	to	complete	a	substance	abuse	evaluation and	he	was	unable	to	secure	“adequate	housing”	for	him self,	and	these	findings were	 supported	by	 testimony	 from	a	Department	caseworker	 and	 the	 father
himself. The	court	also	found	that	the	father	was	unfamiliar	with	the	children’s medical	 care	 providers	 and	 had	 attended	 only	 two	 of	 the	 younger	 child’s
medic al	 appointments	 since	 March	 2019. Because	 the court’s	 findings	 are supported	by	the	record,	the	court	did	not	err	in	finding	that	the	father	is	unable to	 protect	 the	 children	 from	 jeopardy	 and has	 been unable	 to	 take responsibility	for	the	children	within a	time	which	is	reasonably	calculated	to
meet	 their	needs. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

- (ii) ; In	re	Children	of	Anthony
M. ,	2018	ME	146,	¶	11,	195	A.3d	1229 (“Marginal	progress	toward	reunification and	a	simple	desire	to	remain	[a]	parent[]	is	not	enoug h	to	ameliorate	jeopardy

. . . . ” (quotation	marks	omitted) ). [¶1 9 ] Further,	we	discern	no	abuse	of	discretion	in	the	court’s	conclusion that	termination	of	the	father’s	parental	rights	was	in	the	best	interests	of	the children.		“[A]	court	determines a child ’ s	best	interest	by	considering	 factors including	the	needs	of	the	child,	the	child ’ s	age,	attachment	to	relevant	persons, periods	 of	 attachment	 and	 separation,	 ability	 to	 integrate	 into	 substitute12 placement	 or	 back	 into	 [the]	 parent's	 home,	 and	 the child's	 physical	 and
emotional	 needs. ” In	 re	 Child	 of	 Sherri	 Y. ,	 2019	 ME	 162,	 ¶	 8,	 221	 A.3d	 120 (quotation	marks	omitted); see 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(2) (2020). “ Also	relevant	to the	 best	 interests	 determination	 is	 the	 harm	 the	 children	 may	 suffer	 if	 the
paren t ’ s	 rights	 are	 not	 terminated,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 children ’ s	 need	 for permanence	and	stability. ” In	re	Children	of	Christopher	S. ,	2019	ME	31,	¶	8,	203 A.3d	 808 (quotation	 marks	 omitted). Here,	 the	 record	 demonstrates	 that , although the	children are	being	“w ell	cared	for”	in	their	current	placements , the
father	is	unable	to	meet	their	current	needs

. See	id. (“[E] ven	though	parental
unfitness	and	a	child ’ s	best	interest	are	separate	elements	of	a	termination	case,
the	court's findings that	bear	on	parental unfitness	may	also	be	relevant	to	the question	of	whether	termination	is	in	the	child ’ s	best	interest. ”). [¶ 20 ]		Therefore,	the	court	did	not	clearly	err	or	abuse	its	discretion	in finding	at	least	one	ground	of	parental	unfitness	and	that	termination	was in the	best	interest s of	the	children

. See In	re	Child	of	Megan	D. ,	2019	ME	52,	¶ 8 , 206	A.3d	899

. The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed.13 Andrew	Wright,	Esq.,	Brunswick,	for	appellant f ather David	Paris,	Esq.,	Bath,	for	appellant m other Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Zack	Paakkonen,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

Augusta	District	Court	docket	numbers	PC

- 2018

- 25	and	PC

- 2018

- 28 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY