UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4075

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

BRENT RENARD CHRISTIAN,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00204-NCT-1)

Submitted: September 13, 2013 Decided: October 24, 2013

Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marcia G. Shein, LAW FIRM OF SHEIN & BRANDENBURG FEDERAL 

CRIMINAL LAW CENTER, Decatur, Georgia, for Appellant. Ripley 

Rand, United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Brent Renard Christian appeals from his conviction and 

178-month sentence entered pursuant to his conditional guilty 

plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and 

possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of one of the 

search warrants in his case, and he avers that the district 

court clearly erred in imposing a sentencing enhancement for 

maintaining a premises for drug manufacturing or distribution. 

We affirm.

When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, 

we review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions, while 

its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United 

States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2011). The 

evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the 

Government, the prevailing party below. United States v. 

Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 2004). Christian first 

contends that the warrant lacked probable cause as there was 

insufficient evidence connecting an apartment at 2122-H Chester 

Ridge Drive with criminal activity. 

To comport with the Fourth Amendment, a magistrate 

issuing a search warrant must find probable cause based on “a 

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair 
3

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 

in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 

(1983). “The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise 

definition or quantification into percentages because it deals 

with probabilities and depends on the totality of the 

circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 

For that reason, in reviewing the sufficiency of a supporting 

affidavit, we avoid “hypertechnical scrutiny,” instead granting 

great deference to the issuing magistrate. Owens v. Lott, 372 

F.3d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2004)(quoting United States v. Robinson, 

275 F.3d 371, 380 (4th Cir. 2001). Here, we conclude that the 

corroborated informant information, in conjunction with 

Christian’s drug activity and the detective’s knowledge of drug 

trafficking protocol, was sufficient to support probable cause 

for the warrant. 

A confidential informant provided information that 

Christian stayed at Chester Ridge. This tip was confirmed 

through surveillance; Christian was observed traveling between 

Chester Ridge and Wilson Place, the site of alleged drug 

dealing, and he was observed staying overnight on a regular 

basis at Chester Ridge. He was spotted at Chester Ridge the day 

before the warrant issued and was seen traveling between the two 

residences 48 hours prior to the warrant application. While 

Christian contends that these statements in the application were 
4

general and conclusory, we determine that, considering all the 

allegations together, there was sufficient specificity from more 

than one source to show that Christian regularly spent time at 

Chester Ridge and traveled between Wilson Place and Chester 

Ridge. 

Moreover, the application provided an undisputedly 

reliable confidential tip that Christian had sold cocaine within 

the five days prior to the warrant application at Wilson Place. 

In addition, the applicant detective included assertions based 

on his long experience as a veteran police officer that 

Christian would likely store his drugs and related items 

somewhere other than Wilson Place and that the storage would 

probably take place at a residence or business which is used as 

a “stash house.” See United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 471 

(4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he nexus between the place to be searched 

and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of 

the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely 

keep such evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United 

States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e 

have upheld warrants to search suspects’ residences and even 

temporary abodes on the basis of (1) evidence of the suspects’ 

involvement in drug trafficking combined with (2) the reasonable 

suspicion (whether explicitly articulated by the applying 

officer or implicitly arrived at by the magistrate judge) that 
5

drug traffickers store drug-related evidence in their homes.”). 

Based on the foregoing, the district court determined correctly 

that probable cause supported the warrant. 

Christian next argues that the sentencing judge erred 

by finding that he maintained a premises for manufacturing or 

distributing drugs, which resulted in a two-point enhancement of 

his sentence. Specifically, Christian avers that there was no 

evidence as to how long the drugs were stored at the Chester 

Ridge apartment and that he did not own, lease, live at, or pay 

any expenses for the apartment. 

We review the lower court’s application of the 

sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear 

error. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 

2012). The “premises” relied upon by the trial court in 

applying the enhancement was the master bedroom in the Chester 

Ridge apartment. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12) provides that “[i]f the 

defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing 

or distributing a controlled substance, increase [the offense 

level] by 2 levels.” According to the Guidelines commentary, 

“[a]mong the factors the court should consider in determining 

whether the defendant ‘maintained’ the premises are (A) whether 

the defendant held a possessory interest in (e.g., owned or 

rented) the premises and (B) the extent to which the defendant 

controlled access to, or activities at, the premises.” USSG 
6

§ 2D1.1 cmt. n. 17. The commentary makes clear that a 

“premises” need not be an actual house or residence, but may be 

a “building, room, or enclosure.” Id. “Manufacturing or 

distributing a controlled substance need not be the sole purpose 

for which the premises was maintained, but must be one of the 

defendant’s primary or principal uses for the premises.” Id.

According to the evidence established at sentencing as 

well as in the warrant application and the presentence report, 

Christian traveled regularly between Chester Ridge and the place 

where he distributed drugs. He had a key to the Chester Ridge

apartment, and he stayed there regularly but not exclusively. 

He “controlled” a chest and a safe in the master bedroom, which 

contained a great deal of money and drugs, as well as two 

firearms. A friend lived at least part-time in the apartment 

with her son, but she received her mail elsewhere, so presumably 

it was either not her only residence or perhaps a temporary 

residence. While there is no evidence as to how long the 

arrangement had been in place, the search warrant application 

makes it clear that there were multiple trips between 

residences, and the large amount of money and drugs, as well as 

the safe, at the Chester Ridge apartment indicates that the 

drugs were being stored there, as opposed to being there 

coincidentally. Finally, the spoons and bowls with cocaine 
7

residue that were recovered from the apartment support the 

conclusion that crack was being manufactured at Chester Ridge. 

We conclude that this evidence supports the inference 

that Christian maintained and/or controlled the apartment (or 

part of it) for the purpose of storing and manufacturing drugs 

for distribution. See United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 

707 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that enhancement applies “when a 

defendant uses the premises for the purpose of substantial 

drug-trafficking activities, even if the premises was also her 

family home at the times in question”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 

1296 (2013); United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 729 (7th

Cir. 2013) (noting that “enhancement clearly contemplates that 

premises can have more than one principal use. . . . the proper 

inquiry is whether the drug transactions were a second primary 

use of the premises or were instead merely a collateral use”), 

petition for cert. filed (June 3, 2013). Accordingly, the 

district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement. 

Thus, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED