Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 9

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION IV

No. CR-22-701

JASON BAXTER

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered January 10, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE WHITE COUNTY 

CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 73CR-20-357]

HONORABLE MARK PATE, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

Jason Baxter entered a conditional plea of guilty to first-degree murder in the White 

County Circuit Court and was sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues 

that the circuit court erred in denying his five motions to suppress his interrogation. We 

affirm.

On May 14, 2020, while conducting a welfare check on the seventy-seven-year-old 

victim, Julius Williams, Officer Dillon Chandler of the Kensett Police Department 

discovered Williams’s front door cracked open and Williams lying dead on the floor just 

inside the door with a gunshot wound to his face. Williams’s next-door neighbor, Brandon 

Swain, told police that he heard a gunshot around 1:00 p.m. the day before police discovered 

Williams’s body and that he saw a heavy-set white male with dark hair running through 

Williams’s yard immediately after the gunshot in the direction of the neighboring trailer 
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park. Swain said that the man returned later with his shirt off and that he had a large scar 

on his back.

During the investigation, Officer Robert Parsons, chief of police of the Judsonia 

Police Department, went to the trailer park and took pictures of four white males who 

matched Swain’s description: Baxter; Baxter’s father, who was also at Baxter’s trailer when 

Officer Parsons arrived; and two other individuals. While taking these photos, Officer 

Parsons told Baxter that they were investigating “a shooting” at Williams’s home and asked 

if he knew anything about it. Baxter denied knowing Williams or knowing anything about a 

shooting. He also said he did not have a gun but admitted that he heard three shots “the 

other day” while he was in his home and mentioned that “if there’s a murder . . . you need 

to know something about it.” When Officer Parsons returned to Swain’s home with the four 

photos he had taken, Swain identified Baxter as the man he saw running through Williams’s 

yard. Officer Parsons then returned to Baxter’s trailer, told him the neighbor had identified 

him, and said that the police wanted to speak to him if he was willing to go to the Kensett 

Police Department. Baxter agreed, and his father drove him to the police station.

When Baxter arrived, Officer Chandler read to him an Arkansas Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 2.3 rights form, which Baxter signed, acknowledging that the police asked him 

there to furnish information or cooperate in an investigation but that he was not legally 

obligated to do either. Officer Chandler also read to him a Miranda statement-of-rights form, 

which Baxter executed, waiving his Miranda rights. Both Officers Chandler and Parsons, who 

questioned Baxter at the police department, testified that Baxter did not appear intoxicated 
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or impaired. They recorded the entire interview on a video that was played for the circuit 

court at the suppression hearing.

Officer Chandler initiated the questioning by asking if Baxter knew why he was there, 

to which Baxter replied, “I heard three shots, looked outside. Wouldn’t know what to do if 

I was around a murder. Freaked the hell out.” When asked what Baxter knew about 

Williams, Baxter said that he “caught him outside the other day” at Williams’s house and 

spoke to him about mowing his yard. Baxter said that they had not discussed a price and that 

he had never mowed Williams’s yard. He also said that he had walked past Williams’s house 

on the day of the murder on his way to get a soda, then claimed he said he had simply been 

“on a jog” that day. When Officer Parsons asked Baxter if he could explain “why people 

[had] seen you run from this guy’s house after hearing a gunshot,” Baxter replied, “I was on 

a jog, and I cut through[.]”

Officer Parsons eventually told Baxter that someone had shot and killed Williams, 

and Baxter replied, “For real?” and “I heard shots.” Officer Parsons informed Baxter that a 

neighbor had seen him running through Williams’s yard after hearing a gunshot, to which 

Baxter responded, “I wasn’t there.” When Parsons asked Baxter whether it was self-defense, 

Baxter continued to deny having anything to do with the shooting. He explained that he had 

simply been running through Williams’s yard because he was on a jog and “cut through” 

Williams’s yard. He had his shirt off because he “was sweaty,” but when the officers asked to 

see his scar, he refused to show them. He said, “You hear a shot, you’re going to run.” Baxter 
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denied actually witnessing the shooting, however, explaining that “[h]earing shots and seeing 

them is total[ly] different.” 

When Officer Parsons began asking Baxter if he was trying to protect anyone—

explaining to Baxter that he wanted Baxter to “give” him something so he could “help” him—

and asking Baxter the difference if a crime is committed in self-defense, Baxter replied, 

“Texas.” Officer Parsons said he needed to know if it was self-defense because if it was not, 

he would have to arrest the offender and “work it like a capital murder case.” Baxter said he 

hoped Officer Parsons “find[s] them.”

Officer Parsons and Baxter then began discussing Baxter’s conversation with 

Williams about mowing his yard. Baxter said Williams wanted him to mow it and that they 

had agreed he would mow it “[w]hen it’s dried out.” He then revised his account and said he 

had not actually been to Williams’s home to discuss the job but had spoken to him on the 

phone. When pressed again, Baxter said he had not actually called Williams, and he refused 

to consent to a search of his cell phone. When Officer Chandler asked Baxter why he had 

lied about calling Williams, Baxter said, “I’ve got so much anxiety from being questioned.” 

Chad Everetts, Baxter’s probation officer, arrived during the interview and stood in 

the open doorway while Baxter was being questioned. Officers Parsons and Chandler left 

the room midway through the interview, and the following colloquy occurred between Baxter 

and Everetts:

BAXTER: Shut the door.

EVERETTS: Do what?
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BAXTER: Close the door.

EVERETTS: No. We’re running this. You sit there and shut up and don’t move.

BAXTER: Be nice if I could leave.

EVERETTS: I’m sure it would be, buddy, but you’re not. I told you to sit there and 

be quiet.

(Detective Chandler returned to the interview room.)

CHANDLER: Right now is the best time to talk to us, man, ‘cause later on down the 

road, it’s not going to be good talk. Everything’s been good right now.

BAXTER: I’ve said what I had to say. Answered what you’ve asked.

CHANDLER: But you also lied to us.

BAXTER: I’ve got so much anxiety.

CHANDLER: Why?

BAXTER: Anxiety, flipping out, being questioned.

CHANDLER: If you didn’t do anything, you shouldn’t have anything to flip out 

about.

BAXTER: I’ve never been questioned like this before.

CHANDLER: I understand that.

BAXTER: Silence kills me.

CHANDLER: Well, what do you want to talk about?

BAXTER: Say what I got to say and get out of here.

The questioning continued, and Baxter admitted that he had knocked on Williams’s door 

and then shot Williams in the face when he answered the door. He said he had thrown the 
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gun in some foliage behind his (Baxter’s) house, which he later showed to the police, who 

recovered the gun. 

In an information filed on June 18, 2020, Baxter was charged with one count of 

capital murder. On March 16, 2021, Baxter filed five separate motions to suppress the 

interrogation due to (1) violation of Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 2.3; (2) 

violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) violation of the Fifth Amendment; (4) violation of 

the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure when police prevented Baxter from leaving the 

interrogation; and (5) the State’s failure to obtain a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent 

waiver of his Miranda rights.

On August 20, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on Baxter’s suppression 

motions. In addition to the testimony of Officers Chandler and Parsons about their 

investigation and recorded interview of Baxter, Baxter’s father also testified. He said that he 

drove Baxter to the police station and remained in the room with him during the interview. 

He said that Baxter was acting peculiarly and not answering in complete sentences. He also 

testified that the police officers requested that he ask Baxter to tell the truth and give Baxter 

a hug, which he did. He said Baxter became very emotional and started crying.

Everetts testified that one of the conditions of Baxter’s probation was that he not use 

or possess alcohol or illegal drugs. He testified that he was at the police station for Baxter’s 

interview because the police had called Everetts to “maybe do a home visit” on Baxter and 

asked Everetts to come to the Kensett police station. After he arrived, he was told that there 

had been a homicide Baxter was “possibly involved in.” Everetts said he could tell something 
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was wrong when he saw Baxter because he was acting much differently than he had in 

Everetts’s previous interactions with him. He said in his earlier meetings with Baxter, he had 

been “cool and collected.” Everetts said Baxter did not appear intoxicated but rather “in 

shock” or “kind of weirded out with this situation.”

Baxter presented the testimony of psychologist Dr. Benjamin Silber, a certified 

forensic examiner. In addition to reviewing police records and the video of the interrogation, 

Dr. Silber evaluated Baxter on March 23, 2021, nine months after his arrest. During Dr. 

Silber’s examination, Baxter told Dr. Silber that he had been hearing voices in his head for 

years telling him that he was gay. Dr. Silber testified that it was clear to him Baxter was 

hearing these voices during his interrogation with the police and that he was responding to 

the voices throughout the interrogation, including his responses of “[s]tay straight,” “[i]t’s 

three years,” “not married,” and “stuck,” none of which were appropriate responses to the 

officer’s questions. He opined that Baxter’s delusions impacted his decision-making during 

the interrogation and that Baxter was “derailed” and “distracted” by the voices. He testified 

that the hallucinations “raise concerns for whether he is truly knowing and intelligent in 

what he is doing.” Dr. Silber said Baxter explained that he intended to “plead the Fifth” 

when he responded “Texas” to Officer Parson’s question about self-defense. Baxter told Dr. 

Silber that Texas was the state you can “plead the Fifth in.” Dr. Silber said this concerned 

him because it suggested Baxter probably did not “knowingly and intelligently recognize he 

had these rights in the first place to waive them in a knowing and intelligent manner.” Dr. 

Silber opined that Baxter suffered from a “settled insanity,” which he said is a substance-
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abuse psychotic disorder due to his lengthy history of methamphetamine use. He testified 

that the symptoms, hallucinations, and delusions increase significantly during times of stress.

Dr. Silber noted that, during the interrogation, Baxter often sat still and closed his 

eyes. Baxter explained to Dr. Silber that the voices told him they could “teleport him to 

another location,” which he hoped would happen if he closed his eyes. Finally, Baxter told 

Dr. Silber that the voices informed him that if he told the officers he did it, they would let 

him go. He said he believed them and thought “everything would be okay” if he said he shot 

Williams. Dr. Silber opined that Baxter’s responses were directly related to the hallucinations 

rather than to a rational understanding of the consequences of waiving his rights.

On December 3, 2021, the circuit court issued an oral ruling denying Baxter’s 

motions to suppress, specifically rejecting Dr. Silber’s opinion, and orally pronouncing that 

the “best evidence in the case . . . is the video itself.” The court credited the officers’ testimony 

that they did not believe Baxter was intoxicated, stated that it had reviewed the video more 

than twice and did not see that Baxter was intoxicated or that alcohol had any influence in 

the interview process, and specifically found that Baxter was not intoxicated during the 

interrogation. The court recognized that Baxter exhibited “some strange behavior” but noted 

that Dr. Silber never said Baxter suffered a mental breakdown during the interrogation. The 

court reasoned that Baxter was a twenty-four-year-old high-school graduate with no evidence 

to indicate that he had a low IQ and thus was old enough to understand the circumstances; 

agreed to go to the police station and rode there in his father’s car; and was “properly” read 

Miranda warnings and the Rule 2.3 rights form, both of which he initialed and signed. The 
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court found that the entire interview did not last more than two hours; that the officers did 

not brandish their weapons or hover over Baxter during the interrogation; and that Baxter’s 

father was present, able to hear what was happening, and participated. Regarding Baxter’s 

statement to Everetts that it would be “nice if I could go home,” the circuit court found 

Baxter never asked for an attorney and never “specifically asked for the interview to cease.” 

The court entered a written order on March 30, 2022, denying Baxter’s motions to suppress, 

and on April 12, Baxter entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the 

suppression issues. 

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate courts 

conduct a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of 

fact for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or 

probable cause. Baird v. State, 357 Ark. 508, 513, 182 S.W.3d 136, 139 (2004). We will not 

reverse the circuit court’s decision unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the 

evidence. Fricks v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 415, at 4, 501 S.W.3d 853, 856. We give due weight 

to inferences drawn by the circuit court, recognizing that it has a superior opportunity to 

determine the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given to their testimony. Batchelor v. 

State, 2014 Ark. App. 682, at 2, 450 S.W.3d 245, 246.

I. Violation of Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 2.2 and 2.3

Baxter contends that law-enforcement officers violated his rights under Arkansas 

Rules of Criminal Procedure 2.2. and 2.3 by implying that he was required to go to the police 

station and failing to inform him that he had no legal obligation to do so. The State responds 
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that the police made it clear to Baxter that his appearance was voluntary. The relevant rules 

provide the following: 

(a) A law enforcement officer may request any person to furnish information or 

otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of crime. The officer may 

request the person to respond to questions, to appear at a police station, or to comply 

with any other reasonable request.

(b) In making a request pursuant to this rule, no law enforcement officer shall 

indicate that a person is legally obligated to furnish information or to otherwise 

cooperate if no such legal obligation exists. Compliance with the request for 

information or other cooperation hereunder shall not be regarded as involuntary or 

coerced solely on the ground that such a request was made by a law enforcement 

officer.

Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2 (2022).

If a law enforcement officer acting pursuant to this rule requests any person to 

come to or remain at a police station, prosecuting attorney’s office or other similar 

place, he shall take such steps as are reasonable to make clear that there is no legal 

obligation to comply with such a request.

Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.3 (2022). A police officer is not required to make an express statement 

that the person is under no legal obligation to comply; the question is whether a reasonable 

person would feel free not to comply. Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 347, at 7, 423 S.W.3d 62, 67.

Here, Officer Parsons testified that he told Baxter, “[T]he Kensett Police Department 

does want to speak to you . . . if you’re willing to come up to the PD.” He specifically said 

that he did not tell Baxter he had to go. Officer Parsons then told Baxter’s father, “I’ll let 

you bring him up there.” Moreover, as soon as Baxter arrived at the police station, police 

provided him with a Rule 2.3 rights form and read his Miranda rights to him. Baxter executed 

both forms. Further, there is no evidence in the record that Baxter was threatened. We hold
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that the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Baxter’s motion to suppress his 

interrogation on this basis. Charland v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 4, 380 S.W.3d 465 (holding 

suppression not required when officers failed to expressly inform defendant that he was not 

legally obliged to comply with officers’ request to accompany them to police station where 

police officers did not threaten defendant in any way when asking defendant to go to station, 

defendant and his wife traveled to station in their own vehicle, and defendant was advised 

of his Miranda rights before statements were made). 

II. Violation of Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.1 and 4.1

Baxter argues that the officers violated the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 

when they prevented him from leaving the interrogation. He alleges that he was detained for 

two hours and that neither Rule 3.1 nor Rule 4.1 sanctions the officers’ conduct. Rule 3.1 

permits an officer to “detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has 

committed, or is about to commit” a crime for a period of fifteen minutes or for a reasonable 

time under the circumstances. Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 (2022). Rule 4.1 involves the arrest of a 

suspect, which did not occur in this case until after Baxter was interviewed. See Ark. R. Crim. 

P. 4.1. Neither of these rules is relevant because Baxter came willingly to the police station 

as discussed earlier. He was not detained under Rule 3.1, nor was he arrested before he was 

interviewed. 

III. Violation of the Fifth Amendment

Baxter argues that the circuit court should have suppressed his interrogation because 

the police violated his right to remain silent and end the interrogation under the Fifth 
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Amendment. He points specifically to his request to his probation officer to close the door 

after the investigative officers left the interrogation room during the interrogation. Everetts 

said, “No. We’re running this. You sit there and shut up and don’t move.” And Baxter 

replied, “Be nice if I could leave.” Everetts responded, “I’m sure it would be, buddy, but 

you’re not. I told you to sit there and be quiet.” The officers then returned, and the 

questioning continued. Baxter cites Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966), in 

support of his argument that if an individual indicates at any time prior to or during 

questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must end.

It is blackletter law that a defendant’s right to remain silent must be “scrupulously 

honored” when it is invoked. Fritts v. State, 2013 Ark. 505, at 8, 431 S.W.3d 227, 231. The 

question in this case is whether Baxter invoked that right. An invocation of the right to 

remain silent must be unequivocal and unambiguous, id. at 10, 431 S.W.3d at 233, and 

answering questions following a statement that attempts to invoke the right to remain silent 

may waive that right by implication. Bryant v. State, 2010 Ark. 7, at 15, 377 S.W.3d 152, 161. 

In support of his argument, Baxter cites State v. Kasel, 488 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1992), 

which he contends is “nearly identical” to the case at bar. Kasel was twenty-two years old, 

had been enrolled in special-education classes when in school, was of “limited abilities,” was 

dependent on her parents, had been unable to maintain a job other than babysitting, and 

had been charged with sexually abusing a seven-year-old boy for whom she regularly babysat. 

Id. at 708. During questioning at the police station, Kasel refused to execute a waiver of her 

Miranda rights, stormed out of the interrogation, and was grabbed by her arm and returned 
13

to the room by an officer who told her that “the rules have changed.” Id. Crying and upset,

Kasel broke down, telling police she would tell them what happened if she could go home 

with her mother. Id. at 709. The Iowa Supreme Court held that Kasel’s privilege against selfincrimination was not honored because her “obvious attempt to end the interrogation and 

rejoin her mother was met with a firm rebuke and physical restraint.” Id. 

We hold that Kasel is inapposite. First, unlike Kasel, Baxter executed a waiver of his 

Miranda rights before the officers began to question him. Moreover, the circuit court 

specifically found no evidence that Baxter was impaired or of limited abilities. Finally, Baxter 

did not “storm out” of the interrogation room indicating an unequivocal and unambiguous 

invocation of his right to remain silent, and he was not physically restrained. Rather, after 

the police officers left the room midway through the interview, he told his probation officer 

that it would be nice if he could leave. Kasel is not persuasive.

In Standridge v. State, 329 Ark. 473, 951 S.W.2d 299 (1997), the supreme court held

that a suspect’s statement that “I ain’t ready to talk” was not an unequivocal invocation of 

his right to remain silent when he continued to talk and answer questions. In addition, in 

Bryant v. State, 2010 Ark. 7, at 15, 377 S.W.3d 152, 161, the supreme court held that the 

following statement was not an unequivocal request to invoke the right to remain silent: 

“Okay, then we’re through with this interview then.” The court reasoned that the statement 

was made after the defendant had repeatedly denied committing the offense and the 

detective had repeatedly refused to believe the defendant. Id. at 15, 377 S.W.3d at 161. That 

is, the two had been arguing when defendant made the statement that the interview was 
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“through.” However, after making the statement, the defendant kept talking and denying his 

involvement. Id. at 15, 377 S.W.3d at 161. The court held not only that this was not an 

unequivocal request but also that the defendant’s willingness to continue the conversation 

implicitly waived any attempt to invoke that right. Id. at 15, 377 S.W.3d at 161.

In the case at bar, during a break in the interrogation, Baxter told Everetts—who was 

merely present but not a participant in the interrogation—that it would be nice if he could 

leave. When the officers who were questioning Baxter returned to continue the 

interrogation, Baxter continued to answer their questions and said he wanted to say what he 

had to say and then “get out.” Never again did Baxter indicate that he did not want to 

continue the interrogation, nor did he attempt to invoke his right to remain silent. 

Therefore, we hold that Baxter’s statement to his probation officer that it would be nice if 

he could leave did not constitute an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his right 

to remain silent. And, in any case, by continuing the interrogation with the officers, he 

waived this right.

IV. Violation of Fourth Amendment

Baxter argues that the circuit court should have suppressed the interrogation because 

the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. He contends that when he 

asked to leave and Everetts told him “you’re not” and to “sit there and be quiet,” he had 

been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and thus that the officers were required 

to have probable cause to arrest him. The State does not dispute that Baxter transitioned 

from a witness to a suspect at that point and had been “seized” for purposes of the Fourth 
15

Amendment, but it contends that the officers then had probable cause at that point to detain 

him. 

Probable cause is determined by applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test and exists 

where facts and circumstances within the collective knowledge of the officers are sufficient 

to permit a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed by 

the person to be arrested. Baird v. State, 357 Ark. 508, 513, 182 S.W.3d 136, 140 (2004); 

Hudson v. State, 316 Ark. 360, 364, 872 S.W.2d 68, 70 (1997); Harris v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 

348, at 4, 525 S.W.3d 472, 475. Probable cause does not require the degree of proof 

necessary to sustain a conviction, Harris, 2017 Ark. App. 348, at 5, 525 S.W.3d at 475, and 

in assessing the existence of probable cause, our review is liberal rather than strict. Erby v. 

State, 2023 Ark. App. 220, at 3–4, 663 S.W.3d 811, 814.

The record reflects that when Baxter asked to leave the interrogation, the officers had 

knowledge of the following facts and circumstances. Baxter was seen by a neighbor running 

in Williams’s yard immediately after the neighbor heard the shots fired. When asked to 

explain why the neighbor saw him there, Baxter said, “I was on a jog, and I cut through[.]” 

Baxter also gave inconsistent statements about where he was when he heard the shots on the 

day of the murder—first at home, then walking in Williams’s yard on the way to get a soda,

and then on a jog. He gave conflicting statements about whether he knew Williams and 

when and in what manner he had spoken with him. He initially denied knowing Williams 

but later admitted that he and Williams had discussed his mowing Williams’s yard at 

Williams’s home “the other day.” He said that he had not yet mowed the yard, and his 
16

explanation on whether or when they had agreed he would do so was inconsistent. He also 

said that he had spoken on the phone to Williams about the yard but then denied that he 

had talked to him on the phone. Finally, Baxter mentioned “murder” twice—once at his 

trailer and once at the initiation of the interview, both times before officers had informed 

him that Williams had been killed—and then he feigned surprise later in the interview when 

he was told Williams was dead. Recognizing that probable cause does not require the degree 

of proof necessary to sustain a conviction and that our review in probable-cause-suppression 

cases is liberal rather than strict, we hold that the officers had probable cause to believe that 

Baxter had committed the offense of capital murder. Thus, the circuit court’s decision to 

deny Baxter’s motion to suppress on the basis of the Fourth Amendment is not clearly against 

the preponderance of the evidence.

1

V. Waiver of Miranda Rights

Finally, Baxter argues that the circuit court erred in not suppressing the interrogation 

because it was conducted without a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda

rights. In order to determine whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary, knowing, and 

 

1

In deciding that probable cause existed to detain or arrest Baxter, the circuit court 

stated that it had reviewed “[its] notes, testimony, video, the officers were aware that there 

had been a report filed by the decedent regarding some criminal mischief alleging that a 

person who – had recently moved in the trailer park may have been the person behind –

behind the criminal mischief issue.” Although the State mentioned this report in a pleading 

and in closing argument at the suppression hearing, no such report was ever introduced into 

evidence, and the record does not contain the alleged report. Despite the circuit court’s 

mistaken analysis including a report that is not in evidence, the circumstances outlined above 

are sufficient to establish probable cause. 
17

intelligent, the appellate courts look to see if the statement was the product of free and 

deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Flanagan v. State, 368 

Ark. 143, 243 S.W.3d 866 (2006). To make this determination, we review the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the waiver, including the age, education, and intelligence of the 

accused; the lack of advice as to his constitutional rights; the length of the detention; the 

repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the use of mental or physical punishment; 

and statements made by the interrogating officers and the vulnerability of the defendant. 

Bryant v. State, 2010 Ark. 7, at 11–12, 377 S.W.3d 152, 159. Although mental capacity is a 

factor to be considered, standing alone, it does not support suppression. Sweet v. State, 2011 

Ark. 20, at 19, 370 S.W.3d 510, 523. Additionally, the fact that the defendant is not a 

stranger to the criminal-justice system is a factor to be considered in determining whether a 

custodial statement was voluntarily made. Id. at 19, 370 S.W.3d at 523. Finally, we will 

reverse the circuit court’s ruling on this issue only if it is clearly against the preponderance 

of the evidence. Id. at 19, 370 S.W.3d at 523.

The circuit court specifically found at the hearing that Baxter’s waiver of his right to 

counsel and his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and provided the 

following explanation: Baxter was twenty-four years old, had a high-school education, and 

could read and write with no evidence that his IQ was “low or improper”; the proper rights 

forms were provided and read to him, and he initialed them; the detention did not last more 

than two hours; and there was no use of physical or mental punishment during the interview. 

We also note that the record indicates that Baxter properly filled out the statement-of-rights 
18

forms by providing his name, birth date, and Social Security number. Moreover, although 

he said some things that appeared unresponsive to the officers’ questions, both officers 

testified that Baxter did not appear intoxicated. The circuit court specifically found that 

Baxter was not intoxicated and noted that he did not appear to be mentally impaired or of 

low IQ, rendering him unable to understand his rights. In addition, Baxter refused to 

consent to a search of his phone or to show the officers the scar on his back when asked, 

indicating he understood his right to deny the officers’ requests. Finally, Baxter is not a 

stranger to the criminal-justice system and was on probation at the time of the offense. Our 

de novo review of this record does not convince us that the circuit court’s finding that he 

understood his rights and that his waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent was clearly 

against the preponderance of the evidence.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and KLAPPENBACH, JJ., agree.

Short Law Firm, by: Lee D. Short, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.