Filed 6/22/21 P. v. Wilson CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EXRILL DARILE WILSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H046730

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. C1648876)

In a negotiated disposition, defendant Exrill Darile Wilson pleaded no contest to 

several counts of burglary of a vehicle and was sentenced to two years in state prison. At 

sentencing, the trial court also ordered, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13350, that 

Wilson’s convictions be reported to the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)

for revocation of his driving privilege. 

On appeal, Wilson argues the trial court erred in directing that his convictions be 

reported to the DMV because there was no factual basis for that order. On our own 

motion, we ordered the record augmented to include the transcripts from the preliminary 

hearing. We also requested supplemental briefing from the parties, once those transcripts 

were filed, to address the following question: “May the sentencing judge, who also 

presided over the preliminary hearing in this case, rely on the testimony and other 

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to inform her sentencing choices, including 

the decision to notify the California Department of Motor Vehicles of defendant’s 

convictions pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13350?” 
2

In his supplemental brief, Wilson argued that revoking a driver’s license is a

punishment and, under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi), a 

punishment may only be imposed if the facts supporting it were proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In his view, testimony from the preliminary hearing, at which the 

magistrate need only find that probable cause exists to hold a defendant to answer, is 

insufficient to support this aspect of his sentence. 

We disagree and will affirm the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On May 24, 2018, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a third amended 

information charging Wilson with participation in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 

§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 1)1and three counts of burglary of a vehicle (§§ 459, 460, 

subd. (b); counts 2-4). The information further alleged that the burglaries were 

committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)) and that 

Wilson had a prison prior conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Wilson pleaded no contest to counts 2, 3, and 

4 in exchange for an indicated sentence of 24 months plus dismissal of count 1 and the 

gang enhancements. At the December 21, 2018 sentencing hearing, the trial court 

imposed a sentence of 24 months in prison, deemed served with his 732 days of credits 

(366 days of custody credits plus 366 days of conduct credits pursuant to section 4019). 

The trial court also imposed various fines, fees, and assessments, none of which are at 

issue in this appeal. Finally, the trial court, over defense objection, stated that it would

report Wilson’s convictions to the DMV for revocation of his driving privilege pursuant 

to Vehicle Code section 13350. 

Wilson timely appealed.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

B. Factual Background2

1. Count 2

On April 30, 2015, Sherry L. parked her Volkswagen in the parking lot of a 

restaurant on El Camino Real in Palo Alto. Sometime later, Sherry L. returned to her car 

and noticed that one of the rear windows had been broken. Sherry L. did not believe 

anything had been taken from her vehicle. 

A witness, John S., was walking his dog near the restaurant that night and noticed 

two men walking around with flashlights in the parking lot. John S. thought this was 

suspicious, so he called 911 and provided the license plate number of a vehicle associated 

with the two men. Palo Alto Police Officer Chris Correia responded to the scene and 

spoke with John S. who described one of the two men he had seen in the parking lot as a 

“heavyset male.” 

2. Count 3

On April 30, 2015, Alexandra O. was sitting in her car in the parking lot of a 

restaurant on El Camino Real in Palo Alto, waiting for her husband. She saw a silver 

BMW SUV pull into the parking lot and circle around a couple of times. Two men got 

out of the vehicle and started looking into cars in the parking lot. One of the men was a 

“skinny black male . . . with a black hoodie” and the other was a “heavy black male 

wearing a white T-shirt.” The thinner man had a flashlight and, after he said something 

to the heavier man, the heavier man went back to the BMW. Alexandra O. saw the 

skinny man run back to the BMW carrying a black bag. He climbed in and the BMW 

drove away. Alexandra O. subsequently identified Wilson in a photo lineup as the 

“heavier-set man” in the BMW that night. 

Palo Alto Police Officer Brad Young responded to the restaurant parking lot and 

spoke to Q.L. and W.F. who reported that their 2014 Dodge Grand Caravan had been 

2 Because Wilson pleaded no contest prior to trial, we derive the facts from the 

preliminary hearing transcript. 
4

burglarized that evening. Young observed that the rear passenger window of the vehicle 

had been broken and Q.L. reported that a black backpack containing a computer, a cell 

phone, an iPad Mini and “other important documents” had been taken from inside. W.F. 

said that his black backpack which also contained a computer and documents had been 

taken as well. Police recovered two bags containing Q.L.’s and W.F.’s identification near 

the intersection of “Margarita and Orinda.” 

3. Count 4

On May 7, 2015, at around 9:00 a.m., Elaine M. parked her Toyota Sienna in the 

parking lot of a donut shop located in Mountain View. When she returned to her car, she 

noticed that one of the windows had been broken and two backpacks as well as a laptop 

computer had been stolen from inside. Mountain View Police Officer Andrew Wong 

viewed the donut shop’s video surveillance footage of its parking lot and saw a black 

Volkswagen SUV park next to Elaine M.’s vehicle. A “heavyset black male . . . wearing 

a plain white T-shirt” got out of the driver’s seat of the Volkswagen and looked in Elaine 

M.’s vehicle. A second black male, wearing a black knit cap and a light blue jacket, got 

out of the front passenger seat and went to look into another car. The heavyset man 

waved the second man over and then got back into the driver’s seat of the Volkswagen. 

He left the driver’s side door open, which Wong believed was to “shade or block” anyone 

else’s view of the space between his car and Elaine M.’s car. The second man came over, 

broke the window on Elaine M.’s car, grabbed something out of it and ran back to the 

passenger seat of the Volkswagen. The Volkswagen then drove out of the parking lot. 

Wong subsequently identified the passenger as Andrew Peacock based on 

surveillance video from a recent burglary in Menlo Park. In the video from the Menlo 

Park burglary, Wong could see that Peacock was the passenger in a black Volkswagen 

SUV and that a heavyset black male wearing a white T-shirt was the driver. Wong could 

also make out the license plate of the vehicle. 
5

Later that day, Wilson was arrested by the California Highway Patrol (CHP) while 

driving a black Volkswagen SUV with the same license plate Wong had observed in the 

Menlo Park burglary video. Wong viewed the CHP dashcam video of the encounter and 

observed that Wilson was wearing a white T-shirt when he was arrested. 

Wong later interviewed both Wilson and Peacock. Wilson admitted that he was 

arrested by the CHP in a Volkswagen SUV but denied being involved in the burglary at 

the donut shop. Peacock admitted he was the person shown in the Menlo Park burglary 

surveillance video and also said he was with Wilson that morning. However, Peacock 

said he could not remember if he and Wilson went to Mountain View that day.

II. DISCUSSION

Vehicle Code section 13350 provides that the DMV “immediately shall revoke

the privilege of a person to drive a motor vehicle upon receipt of a duly certified abstract 

of the record of a court showing that the person has been convicted of . . . [¶] . . . [a] 

felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used . . . .” (Veh. Code, § 13350, 

subd. (a)(2).) Wilson contends that the trial court abused its discretion at the sentencing 

hearing when it found that a vehicle was used in the commission of the burglaries. In his 

supplemental letter brief, he argues that revoking his driver’s license is an increased 

punishment which may only be imposed if the facts supporting it were proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt, citing Apprendi supra, 530 U.S. at page 490. 

Consequently, before examining whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

reporting Wilson’s convictions to the DMV pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13350, we 

must determine if the trial court’s finding under that statute is subject to Apprendi. We 

conclude it is not.

A. Vehicle Code Section 13350 and Apprendi

“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) “Although the high 
6

court has not specifically defined the word ‘penalty’ as used in Apprendi . . . , Apprendi

itself involved a court-made factual finding that directly increased the length of the prison 

sentence for the crime to which the defendant had pled guilty.” (People v. Mosley (2015) 

60 Cal.4th 1044, 1056 (Mosley).)

In Mosley, the California Supreme Court held that residency restrictions imposed 

on registered sex offenders pursuant to Jessica’s Law are not subject to Apprendi

because, among other reasons, the “restrictions are not intended as punishment or 

retribution for the offense or offenses that led to their imposition.” (Mosley, supra, 60 

Cal.4th at p. 1062.) “Rather, their purpose is to serve a legitimate regulatory goal—

reducing the opportunity for persons convicted of sexually related crimes, who are at 

large in the community but still deemed dangerous, to reoffend in the future. The 

restrictions may lead to significant disabilities in individual cases, but in the abstract, they 

do not so resemble traditional forms of punishment, and are not so clearly punitive in 

effect, as to override their regulatory aim.” (Ibid.)

We conclude that like the sex offender residency restrictions in Mosley, the license 

revocation requirement of Vehicle Code section 13350 is not “intended as punishment or 

retribution for the offense or offenses that led to [its] imposition.” (Mosley, supra, 60 

Cal.4th at p. 1062.) Revoking the driver’s license of someone who has used a motor 

vehicle to commit a felony “serve[s] a legitimate regulatory goal—reducing the 

opportunity for persons convicted of [qualifying] crimes, who are at large in the 

community . . . , to reoffend in the future.” (Ibid.) We have no doubt that revocation of a 

driver’s license “may lead to significant disabilities in individual cases, but in the 

abstract, [it] do[es] not so resemble traditional forms of punishment, and [is] not so 

clearly punitive in effect, as to override [its] regulatory aim.” (Ibid.) 

Further, while we have found no case directly addressing whether Apprendi is 

applicable to Vehicle Code section 13350, the California Supreme Court has explained 

that in most contexts, “the suspension or revocation of a driver’s license generally has 
7

been viewed as a sanction that is ‘civil’ rather than penal.” (Larsen v. Dep’t of Motor 

Vehicles (1995) 12 Cal.4th 278, 286, fn. 6.) Driving is “a privilege, not a right, and 

license revocation [is] a civil, not a criminal, sanction.” (People v. Linares (2003) 105 

Cal.App.4th 1196, 1199.) 

For these reasons, we conclude that Apprendi is not applicable to the revocation 

provisions of Vehicle Code section 13350. The sentencing judge, who also presided over 

the preliminary hearing, was entitled to rely on her knowledge of the evidence presented 

at that hearing3to conclude that Wilson’s conviction should be reported to the DMV 

under the statute.

B. License Revocation Pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 13350

We now turn to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the 

trial court’s finding that Wilson used a motor vehicle in the commission of the auto 

burglaries that formed the basis of his no contest pleas. We conclude the finding is 

supported by sufficient evidence. 

Vehicle Code section 13350 is appropriately invoked when the court finds “a 

nexus between the offense and the vehicle, not merely that a vehicle was incidental to the 

crime.” (People v. Poindexter (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 803, 808.) In Poindexter, the 

defendant pleaded no contest to grand theft from a person who was stopped on the side of 

the road, fixing his vehicle. (Id. at pp. 805-806.) A car driven by a codefendant, with the 

defendant as a passenger, stopped behind the victim’s car. The codefendant asked the 

victim where he got the “ ‘bra’ ” on the front of his car. (Id. at p. 806.) The defendant 

and the codefendant took the bra from the victim’s car and put it on the codefendant’s 

car. They also demanded money from the victim. (Ibid.) On appeal, the court reversed 

3 The preliminary hearing transcript is a part of the record of conviction because of 

“the procedural protections afforded the defendant . . . includ[ing] the right to confront 

and cross-examine witnesses and the requirement those witnesses testify under oath, 

coupled with the accuracy afforded by the court reporter’s verbatim reporting of the 

proceedings.” (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223.) 
8

the defendant’s license revocation pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13350 concluding 

that, based on the record, “[t]he crime was not carried out by means of the car, nor was 

the car used as an instrumentality in the crime.” (Poindexter, supra, at p. 808.) 

Other courts have found a sufficient connection between a defendant’s vehicle and 

his or her crime. In People v. Paulsen (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 1420 (Paulsen), the 

defendant and a codefendant acquired musical and television equipment by fraudulent 

means and used a car and a U-Haul truck to carry that equipment away. The Court of 

Appeal, citing the preliminary hearing transcript,4 distinguished Poindexter on its facts 

and affirmed the revocation of the defendant’s license under Vehicle Code section 13350. 

(Paulsen, supra, at p. 1423.) The Paulsen court stated that “there was a strong nexus 

between the crimes perpetrated by defendant and the two motor vehicles in this case. 

Both the Isuzu car and the U-Haul truck were instrumental in carrying out the crimes 

charged. Their use was necessary in order to haul away the merchandise acquired in the 

fraudulent purchases. Defendant and her codefendant would not have been able to move 

the heavy musical and television equipment away from the stores where they obtained the 

merchandise without the use of such vehicles.” (Ibid.)

In People v. Gimenez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1233, a sheriff’s deputy saw the 

defendant getting out of a Camaro in a car lot. By the time the deputy made a U-turn, the 

defendant was gone. The deputy checked the Camaro and saw that its radio had been 

removed and placed on the front seat. The defendant was found in a nearby parking lot 

along with tools which could be used to remove the radio. (Id. at p. 1235.) In a recorded 

interview, the defendant admitted he had seen the radio “earlier in the day,” “ ‘wanted it 

for himself and went back to get it that night.’ ” (Id. at p. 1237.) Noting the defendant’s 

daytime formulation of a plan to drive to the car lot that night and steal the radio, the 

Gimenez court distinguished Poindexter on its facts, noting that Poindexter formed the 

4 Like Wilson, the defendant in Paulsen was convicted after entering into a plea 

agreement. (Paulsen, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1421.) 
9

intent to steal after happening upon the victim stopped along the side of the road. 

The court reasoned that by planning the theft in advance, driving to the location of the 

coveted radio, and retreating to the car when the theft was interrupted, Gimenez “used his 

vehicle for the purpose of committing the crime, and . . . the vehicle was instrumental . . .

in the commission of the crime.” (Gimenez, at p. 1237.) As a result, “there was a 

sufficiently strong nexus between the vehicle use and the crime to justify the application 

of Vehicle Code section 13350.” (Ibid.)

This case is much more similar to Paulsen and Gimenez than it is to Poindexter. It 

is reasonable to infer from the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing that Wilson 

and his codefendants formed their intent to steal items from vehicles prior to driving to 

various parking lots along El Camino Real at night. Their approach was systematic and

organized. Upon arrival at a given parking lot, they used flashlights to peer into the 

windows of parked vehicles, apparently looking for backpacks, laptops, and bags used to 

carry personal belongings and electronics of value. Having spotted such items, Wilson 

and his codefendants quickly smashed the windows of those specific vehicles and 

removed the personal possessions of the victims. Returning to their vehicle with the 

articles, Wilson and his codefendants drove to a different parking lot and repeated the

process. The vehicle thus facilitated multiple thefts in a given night, also allowing

Wilson and his given companion to quickly leave the scene of the thefts with less risk of 

apprehension by law enforcement. 

And while Wilson may have been a passenger for some of the burglaries, the 

evidence also showed that Wilson was the driver of the Volkswagen involved in the 

May 7, 2015 burglary. Mountain View Police Officer Wong testified that after Wilson 

looked in a particular vehicle, he waved over his companion, got back into the driver’s 

seat, and used the driver’s door of the Volkswagen to obscure any bystander’s view of the 

space between the Volkswagen and the car that was then burglarized. In short, Wilson 

used the car itself to facilitate the auto burglary. These facts demonstrate a sufficiently 
10

strong nexus between the use of the car and the offenses. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in reporting Wilson’s vehicle burglary convictions to the DMV under Vehicle 

Code section 13350.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
_______________________________

Greenwood, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________

 Elia, J.

______________________________________

 Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

People v. Wilson

No. H046730