19‐308‐cr  

United States v. Raymond McLaughlin

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2019

No. 19‐308‐cr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee,

v.

RAYMOND MCLAUGHLIN, aka Shakir Ra‐Ade Bey, aka Shakir Ade

Bey,

Defendant‐Appellant.

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Connecticut

   

SUBMITTED: DECEMBER 9, 2019

DECIDED: DECEMBER 30, 2019

   
2

Before: CABRANES and DRONEY, Circuit Judges, and REISS, District

Judge. *

   

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut (Michael P. Shea, Judge), Defendant‐Appellant

Raymond McLaughlin was convicted of obstruction of Government

administration for making false statements to the Internal Revenue

Service. He now challenges his conviction on the grounds that the

District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. For the reasons

set forth below, we AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment.

   

         Henry K. Kopel (Marc H. Silverman, on the

brief), for John H. Durham, United States

Attorney for the District of Connecticut,

New Haven, CT, for Appellee.

Raymond McLaughlin, pro se, Brooklyn,

NY.  

   

* Judge Christina Reiss, of the United States District Court for the

District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
3

PER CURIAM:

The case before us poses a simple question: when does a

Federal court have personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a

criminal proceeding? We hold that personal jurisdiction exists

whenever an individual, charged with a crime over which the

Federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, is brought before that

court. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment that it

had personal jurisdiction over Defendant‐Appellant Raymond

McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”).

I: BACKGROUND

Defendant‐Appellant McLaughlin was convicted, following a

jury trial, of making false statements to the Internal Revenue Service

(“IRS”) in 2014, when he submitted documents purporting to show a

payment of more than $300,000 to a Connecticut state court judge

then presiding over a foreclosure action against him. The payment

was a fiction, but the documents submitted by McLaughlin were

designed to bait the IRS into penalizing and assessing additional tax

obligations on the state judge on the grounds that the judge never

reported such income. By submitting these false documents under

penalty of perjury, McLaughlin was in clear violation of 18 U.S.C.      

§ 1001.

Before his conviction, McLaughlin filed multiple pro se motions

to dismiss the indictment, asserting that the District Court lacked

personal jurisdiction over him. The District Court denied the

motions. McLaughlin now appeals his conviction, proceeding pro se,
4

and arguing again that the judgment lacks validity because the

District Court lacked personal jurisdiction. He frames the question on

appeal as whether a public officer can possess personal jurisdiction

over a criminal defendant, which we answer in the affirmative.

Throughout, McLaughlin has made arguments that are

consistent with a “Sovereign Citizen” ideology. Proponents of that

ideology, like McLaughlin, believe that the Federal Government is

illegitimate, and therefore that its laws are not binding. 1 As the

District Court aptly noted, so‐called “Sovereign Citizens” seek to

“clog[] the wheels of justice” and “delay proceedings so justice won’t

ultimately be [d]one.” App. 78.  They do so by raising numerous—

often frivolous—arguments, many alleging that the Courts or the

Constitution lack any authority whatsoever.

McLaughlin’s argument here goes to the very heart of our

authority to hear Federal criminal cases. It raises an issue that

warrants a clear statement from this Court, to deter future litigants

from making similar claims.   

1 According to a 2011 article issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”), sovereign citizens “follow their own set of laws” and, accordingly, “do

not recognize federal, state, or local laws, policies, or regulations” as legitimate.

Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement, FBI Law

Enforcement Bulletin (2011), https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featuredarticles/sovereign-citizens-a-growing-domestic-threat-to-law-enforcement. 
5

II. DISCUSSION

We construe McLaughlin’s appeal as a challenge to the denials

of his motions to dismiss the indictment. We review such denials de

novo. United States v. Scott, 394 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2005).     

When a District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the

criminal offenses charged, it has personal jurisdiction over the

individuals charged in the indictment and present before the court to

answer those charges. See United States v. Alvarez‐Machain, 504 U.S.

655, 661‐62, 670 (1992) (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522

(1952)); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 65 (1951) (“The District

Court had jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of the United

States. Hence, it had jurisdiction of the subject matter, to wit, an

alleged violation of a federal conspiracy statute, and, of course, of the

persons charged.” (internal citation and footnote omitted)); see also

United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A

federal district court has personal jurisdiction to try any defendant

brought before it on a federal indictment charging a violation of

federal law.” (citing Alvarez‐Machain, 504 U.S. at 659–70)).  The

voluntariness of the defendant’s appearance in the District Court is

not relevant. See Alvarez‐Machain, 504 U.S. at 662 (citing Frisbie, 342

U.S. at 522); see also United States v. Pryor, 842 F.3d 441, 448 (6th Cir.

2016) (“Federal courts have personal jurisdiction over criminal

defendants before them, whether or not they are forcibly brought

into court.”); United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“Personal jurisdiction is supplied by the fact that Burke is within the

territory of the United States.”). A defendant need not acquiesce in or
6

submit to the court’s jurisdiction or actually participate in the

proceedings in order for the court to have personal jurisdiction over

the defendant.

Here, the District Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter

of the case: an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See 18 U.S.C.        

§ 3231 (“The district courts of the United States shall have original

jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses

against the laws of the United States.”). The indictment charged

McLaughlin and McLaughlin was present before the District Court.

Accordingly, the District Court had personal jurisdiction over

McLaughlin and the judgment is valid. See Williams, 341 U.S. at 65.   

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District Court’s

judgment from January 30, 2019.