alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7327

CALVIN EARL CARTER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

DAVID ROBINSON,

Respondent - Appellee,

and

S. K. YOUNG, Warden,

Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief

District Judge. (CA-04-812-3)

Submitted: January 19, 2006 Decided: January 25, 2006

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Calvin Earl Carter, Appellant Pro Se. Stephen R. McCullough,

Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Calvin Earl Carter seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a

§ 2254 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d

676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the

record and conclude that Carter has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
Exhibit 31(ii)
                                --------------


                                CERTIFICATIONS


     I, Steve Bailey, certify that:

          1.   I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on
               Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered
               by this report on Form 10-K of Alternative Loan Trust 2006-16CB
               (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

          2.   Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken
               as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material
               fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
               statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
               statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
               covered by this report;

          3.   Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and
               other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for
               the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange
               Act periodic reports;

          4.   I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
               servicer(s) and based on my knowledge and the compliance
               review(s) conducted in preparing the servicer compliance
               statement(s) required in this report under Item 1123 of
               Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act
               periodic reports, the servicer(s) have fulfilled their
               obligations under the servicing agreement(s) in all material
               respects; and

          5.   All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
               criteria for asset-backed securities and their related
               attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
               criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in
               this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
               Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an
               exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this
               report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in
               such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

     In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
     information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: The
     Bank of New York, as Trustee.

          Date: March 27, 2007


           /s/ Steve Bailey
           ----------------
           Steve Bailey
           Senior Managing Director, Loan Administration
#### E. GEORGE ROGERS & CO. v. BLACK et al.*

No. 1298.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

June 11, 1934.

For former opinion, see 154 So. 667.

Spearing & McClendon, of New Orleans, for appellant.

S. S. Reid, of Amite, for appellees.

*

 Rehearing denied June 11, 1534.

LE, BLÁNC, Judge.

Although the solidarity of the obligation herein sued on was alleged in the petition filed by the plaintiffs, neither of the defendants in their answers met that issue as one tendered under the pleadings. They raised the question for the first time in this application for a rehearing.

In their application they aver that it was error on our part to render a solidary judgment against them in view of article 2093 of the Revised Civil Code, which they correctly quote as follows: “An obligation in solido is not presumed; it must be expressly stipulated. This rule ceases to prevail only in cases where an obligation in solido tabes place of right by virtue of some provisions of the law.”

Referring to article 2091 of the Civil Code, we find what we take to be an express provision of law which applies in this case and takes the obligation sued on out of the presumption created under article 2093 above quoted. Article 2091 reads as follows: “There is an obligation in solido, on the part of the debtors, when they are all obliged to *the*same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the payment -which is made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor.”

This court had occasion to apply the provisions of that article in the case of North British Mercantile Insurance Co. v. Patterson & Shirley, 5 La. App. 327. In that case the defendants had bound themselves, as did those in the present case, to do the same thing in the same contract, and they were held soli-darily obligated on their contract. “The philosophy of the rule,” we said, “which, under such a contract, creates a solidary obligation is well stated in Jacobs v. Williams, 12 Rob. 183, the leading case on this question, as follows: ‘When several debtors bind themselves for the same debt, in the same contract, they create among themselves a kind of partnership as regards that debt; they mutually charge each other by a tacit, yet real proxy to pay it.’ Under a contract of that character the obligors are bound in soli-do, C. C. art. 2091; Teutonia National Bank v. Wagner, 33 La. Ann. 732. If the defendants had obligated themselves in the instant case for distinct, independent or separate amounts, although in the same contract, a different rule would apply and the appellant could be held jointly, only. It is not so, however, as defendants were bound for the whole debt in the same contract which binds Shirley to a soli-dary obligation as was decreed below.”

We think the language quoted from that case is peculiarly significant and applicable in this case, and stands as authority for overruling the application on this point.

All other issues presented in the application were disposed of in the original opinion herein handed down, and the application is therefore refused.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6792 

To prohibit the Secretary of State from issuing a passport, passport card, 

or Consular Report of Birth Abroad that includes the unspecified (X) 

gender designation, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 18, 2022 

Mr. ROY (for himself, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, Mrs. MILLER

of Illinois, Mrs. BOEBERT, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. BUDD, and Mr. DUNCAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Secretary of State from issuing a passport, 

passport card, or Consular Report of Birth Abroad that 

includes the unspecified (X) gender designation, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Passport Sanity Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6792 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION REGARDING CERTAIN GENDER DES2 IGNATION ON PASSPORTS, PASSPORT CARDS, 

3 AND CONSULAR REPORTS OF BIRTH ABROAD 

4 ISSUED BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall— 

6 (1) ensure each application for a covered docu7 ment includes only the gender designations male and 

8 female; and 

9 (2) prohibit the issuing of a covered document 

10 that includes the unspecified (X) gender designation. 

11 (b) COVERED DOCUMENT DEFINED.—In this section, 

12 the term ‘‘covered document’’ means a passport, passport 

13 card, or Consular Report of Birth Abroad issued by the 

14 Department of State. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6750 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6750

 To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to certain 
       security registration thresholds, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 15, 2022

Mr. Steube (for himself and Mr. Donalds) introduced the following bill; 
       which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to certain 
       security registration thresholds, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``More Accurate Metrics in Securities 
Law Act''.

SEC. 2. SECURITY REGISTRATION THRESHOLDS.

    (a) In General.--Section 12(g)(1)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(g)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(A) within 120 days after the last day of its first 
        fiscal year ended on which the issuer has--
                    ``(i) total assets exceeding $15,000,000; and
                    ``(ii) either--
                            ``(I) a class of equity security (other 
                        than an exempted security) held of record by 
                        greater than a number of beneficial owners 
                        determined by the Commission by rule; or
                            ``(II) market capitalization exceeding an 
                        amount determined by the Commission by rule, 
                        and''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 31.2



CERTIFICATION



I, JEFFREY D. SERKES, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of THE POTOMAC EDISON COMPANY.



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I
have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                   |  |                                              
|------------------ |  | ---------------------------------------------
|                   |  | /s/ Jeffrey D. Serkes                        
|Date: May 10, 2005 |  | Jeffrey D. Serkes Principal Financial
Officer
#### Pedro Ortiz and Epifanio Ortiz v. State.

No. 24511.

November 30, 1949.

*53
      *Frank J. Alvarado,*San Antonio, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP. Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for rape in which Epifanio L. Ortiz was assessed a sentence of seven years in the penitentiary and Pedro Ortiz was given five years.

Appellants were jointly indicted, along with Jose Marin, for the offense of rape, the victim being a Negro woman. Jose Marin was granted a severance and was not tried with these appellants. The evidence of the case is amply sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict finding them guilty of rape by force.

The record brings to us two bills of exception which may be considered together under the same discussion. The prosecuting witness testified, giving her name as Mattie Mae Teel. It developed during her testimony that she was the common law wife of a Negro named Teel and she stated that she had been married to another man, in Grayson County, but was divorced from him. She had two children by that marriage who lived in Grayson County. Following this the appellants presented a telegram from the district clerk at Sherman stating that the records of that county did not show a divorce for the prosecuting witness. Appellants offered this telegram in evidence. The state objected to its introduction, and the trial court properly refused to receive it in evidence. Appellants asked for a postponement of the case until they could bring the records from Grayson County to be used in evidence. This request was made orally and we find no written motion asking for a continuance of the case, or a postponement for that purpose. This procedure is not in compliance with Article 551, C. C. P., as construed by this *54court in Bascom v. State, 114 Texas Crim. Rep. 32, 24 S. W. 2d 437. See also Walker v. State, 232 S. W. 509.

It is not necessary to discuss the other questions briefed, and our conclusion that proper steps were not taken to secure the postponement precludes the necessity for further discussion of either bill.

Finding no reversible error shown by the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsection (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) each of the undersigned officers of Red Metal Resources Ltd. (the “Company”) does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:

(a)   The Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended January 31, 2019 of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;  and 

(b)   Information contained in the Form 10-K/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: July 18, 2019

/s/ Caitlin Jeffs

Caitlin Jeffs, Chief Executive Officer and President

(Principal Executive Officer)

/s/ Joao (John) da Costa

Joao (John) da Costa, Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6774 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6774

   To amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs to provide coverage for boxing-based exercise classes 
 for veterans diagnosed with certain movement disorders, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 18, 2022

  Mr. Higgins of New York (for himself and Mr. LaHood) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs to provide coverage for boxing-based exercise classes 
 for veterans diagnosed with certain movement disorders, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Boxing Therapy for Parkinson's 
Access Act of 2022''.

SEC. 2. BOXING-BASED EXERCISE CLASSES FOR TREATMENT OF VETERANS 
              DIAGNOSED WITH CERTAIN MOVEMENT DISORDERS.

    (a) Coverage.--Subchapter II of chapter 17 of title 38, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section 
(and conforming the table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
accordingly):
``Sec. 1720K. Boxing-based exercise classes for treatment of certain 
              movement disorders
    ``(a) Classes.--In furnishing medical services under this chapter, 
the Secretary shall furnish boxing-based exercise classes to a veteran 
(through the provision of such classes to the veteran at a medical 
facility of the Department or the reimbursement for such classes 
provided to the veteran at a non-Department facility) if the veteran--
            ``(1) is enrolled in the health care system established 
        under section 1705(a) of this title;
            ``(2) has been diagnosed with a covered movement disorder; 
        and
            ``(3) elects to participate in such classes for the purpose 
        of treating the covered movement disorder with which the 
        veteran has been diagnosed.
    ``(b) Covered Movement Disorder Defined.--In this section, the term 
`covered movement disorder' means Parkinson's disease or a similar 
movement disorder.''.
    (b) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to medical services furnished on or after the date 
that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronaldo Tynell LIGHTFOOT, a/k/a Tynell, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-6709.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 14, 2003.

Decided Aug. 21, 2003.

Ronaldo Tynell Lightfoot, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Ronaldo Tynell Lightfoot seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Lightfoot,*No. CR-98-150 (E.D.Va. Apr. 11, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dalton Harvey, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Paño Z. Patsalos, J.), rendered March 6, 1989, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Orange County, for the purpose of entering an order in its discretion pursuant to CPL 160.50.

Viewing the circumstantial evidence adduced at the trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Betancourt,*68 NY2d 707), we find that it was legally insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s mere presence in the house where the controlled substances were found is not sufficient to establish that he exercised such dominion and control over them as to establish constructive possession *(see, People v Garcia,*133 AD2d 123; *People v Reyes,*126 AD2d 681; *People v Ortiz,*126 AD2d 677). Although the defendant owned the house where the controlled substances were found, he was not residing there. He was renting the first floor to a number of tenants, and was in the process of renovating the second floor. The contraband was discovered in the kitchen pantry on the first floor, in a place equally accessible to the tenants and other persons who were present in the house at the time of the seizure *(see, People v Betances,*145 AD2d 961; *People v Waller,*131 AD2d 898; *People v Bentley,*112 AD2d 109; *People v*
      *533
      *Schriber,*34 AD2d 852, *affd*29 NY2d 780). Nor is the evidence of consciousness of guilt, i.e., the defendant’s attempt at flight and concealment when the police arrived at the premises, sufficient to convict in the absence of more tangible evidence of guilt *(see, People v Marin,*102 AD2d 14, *affd*65 NY2d 741).

Where proof of guilt is based solely on circumstantial evidence of constructive possession, the evidence must be such as to exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but that of guilt and be inconsistent with innocence *(see, People v Giuliano,*65 NY2d 766; *People v Cleague,*22 NY2d 363; *People v Harris,*47 AD2d 385). Here, the evidence is at least equally consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Bracken, J. P., Rubin, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.