Filed 1/27/15 Certified for Publication 2/9/15 (order attached)

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA VI STA VILLAGE SAN DIEGO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. TECOLOTE INVESTORS, LLC, et al ., Defendants and Respondents. D064741

(Super. Ct. No. 37

- 2012

- 00085269

- CU

- MC

- CT L )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior C ourt of San Diego County, Judith F. Hayes, Judge. Affirmed; motion for judicial notice granted in part and denied in part

. Tatro & Zamoyski, Peter A. Zamoyski; Boudreau Williams and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff and Appellant. Duckor Spradling Metzger & Wynne, Anna F. Roppo, Douglas W. Lytle and Robert M. Shaughnessy for Defendant s and Respondents Tecolote Investors, LLC, C.H. Harp and Joan E. Harp (deceased), trustees of the C.H. Harp Family Trust; River Paradise Partnership; Stephen Leonard Fox and Lyn da K. Fox, trustees of Fox Revocable Trust and Matthew Follett.2

Jan I. Goldsmith, City Attorney, Daniel F. Bamberg, Assistant City Attorney and Carmen A. Brock, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent City of San Diego. This matter comes to u s on a judgment of dismissal of a complaint for declaratory and other relief, brought by p laintiff and appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego
H omeowners Association, Inc. (Appellant). Its members are sublessees of mobilehome park lots on a real property site (the park site) that is subject to a 1979 master lease between the landowner defendant and respondent, the City of San Diego (the City), and the predecessors of defendants and R esp ondents Tecolote Investors, LLC, et al

. (Landlord Defendants). 1 The m aster lease for th e park site was entered into after the City negotiated with developers to provide low income housing opportunities there

. Appellant ' s complaint was filed in 2012 against the Landlord Defendants and the City (together Respondents), and al leges that the park site is located on and should be properly characterized as " Pueblo lands, " within the meaning of San Diego City Charter section 219 (section 219). This section and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands n orth of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. 2 (See

1 Additional Landlord Defendants and respondents are C.H. Harp and Joan E. Harp (deceased), tru stees of the C.H. Harp Family Trust; River Paradise Partnership; Stephen Leonard Fox and Lynda K. Fox, trustees of Fox Revocable Trust and Matthew Follett.
2 Section 219 reads in relevant part : " No sale of Pueblo Lands owned by The City of San Diego whi ch are situated North of the North line of the San Diego River shall ever be valid and binding upon said City unless such sale shall have been first3

DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 15, 21 ( DeYoung ) [ terms " sell
or convey " impliedly includ e the power to lease ] .) Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleges the City was without power to enter into the existing 55

- year master lease of the
pa r k site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predec essors). As a consequence, Appellant seeks decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City

- approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various othe r types of relief, such as damages. Following demurrer proceedings and a hearing on Appellant ' s motion for preliminary injunction, the trial court sustained the Landlord Defendants ' demurrer without leave to amend, and denied the requested injunctive reli ef. At the joint hearing on the motions, Respondents presented to the trial court extensive historical documentation of the chain of title of the park site and its vicinity , through judicial notice requests and also by lodgment of exhibits in connection with authenticating declarations. According to the recorded ownership history of th e park site and surrounding areas, at the close of the California Spanish

- Mexican period and under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States came into ownership in 1847 of many parcels of " Pueblo lands, " including numbers 1190 and 1196, where this 74

- acre pa r k site is contained (designated here " the parcels " ) . ( See Richert v. City of San Diego (1930) 109 Cal.App. authorized by an ordinance duly passed by the Council and thereafter ratified by the electors of The City o f San Diego at any special or general municipal election. The City Manager shall have authority to lease Pueblo Lands, provided that any lease for a term exceeding one year shall not be valid unless first authorized by ordinance of the Council. No lease shall be valid for a period of time exceeding fifteen years. "4

548, 555

- 556 ( Richert ) .) By the 1850 ' s and as confi rmed by an 1874 patent deed, the United States recognized the claim of the City to all property rights in those historic Pueblo lands. Beginning in the 1850 ' s, the City transferred its ownership of many of the Pueblo lands properties to various private la ndowners, starting with railroad companies, which in turn made additional conveyances. In the 1940 ' s, all existing private landowners of approximately 297 acres around and including the parcels became subject to judgments of eminent domain takings by the f ederal g overnment. In 1959, the federal government recorded a quitclaim deed back to the City of all those holdings

. In the 1970 ' s, after the Landlord d efendants ' predecessor agreed to provide low income housing opportunities on
the parcels , the 1979 m aster lease was signed. 3 Against this historic backdrop, Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court utilized the wrong legal standards in sustaining the demurrer, and abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the pleading. Appellant contends t he master lease entered into between the Respondents, as amended and assigned, was invalid, void, or voidable, for lack of compliance with the voter approval term of section 219. Based on Appellant ' s

3 T he parcels have had several historic designations, beginning for our purposes with Pueblo Lands Nos. 1190 and 1196 in the U.S.

- City patent deed (from an 1800 ' s map, the Pascoe Map ). A 195 7 County survey map changed the designation s of Pueblo Lands Nos. 1190 and 1196 (and other adjoining Pueblo Lands parcels) to Parcels Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, all amounting to 297.3437 acres then owned by the federal government

. In 1959, the federal g overnment quitclaimed to the City all the parcels it had taken

. In the 1997 assignment of the lease to the Landlord defendants, the description of the park site within the parcels, as found in a 1980 recorded map, is Lots 1 through 4 of Linda Vista Villag e. For purposes of charter interpretation, we refer to the parcels as a whole, even though the park site occupies only a portion of them.5

broad interpretation of this charter provision for vote r approval of transfer of Pueblo lands, it argues that regardless of the history of title of the parcels, it can successfully amend to allege that the " reacquired " parcels retained " the nature of Pueblo lands " and should still be " classified " or characteri zed as Pueblo lands that are subject to these charter restrictions on transfers. Appellant thus contends these parcels remain within the protections and prohibitions of section 219, even though they were released from City ownership for years but were the n returned to it. Appellant seems to argue that the charter requirement of voter approval survived all transfers of the parcels, including the eminent domain proceedings, even if the Pueblo lands regulation became dormant or " ' quiescent ' " at times. (Se e U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, More or Less, Located in San Diego County, Cal. (9th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3d 1030, 1034 ( U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land ) .) On review, we apply the rule that a complaint may be subject to demurrer where facts that can be judicially noticed render it defective. ( Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 C al .4th 1, 6 ( Evans ) .) Before oral argument, we gave notice to the parties that we
propose d to take judicial notice on appeal of certain recorded title documents in the record, showing the mid

- 19th century transfers of the parcels out of City ownership to private landowners, followed by a federal exercise of eminent domain that took the parcels by judgments recorded in the 1940 ' s. In 1959, a quitclaim deed returned the parcels to the City. (Evid. Code, § § 452, subd. (d) ; 455, subd. (a) ; 459, subd. (c).) In response to the notice we gave, the Landlord D efendants submitted a motion for judicial notice of their previously lodged documents containing that same chain of title6

information, as w ell as other documents submitted with their opposition to the preliminary injunction request. Opposition has been received and considered and the

matter discussed at oral argument. As explained in p art III.D, post , the judicial notice motion is grant ed i n part and denied in part

. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 do not apply, the face of the pleading fails to state its c auses of action, and the Landlord Defendants ' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis that is akin to judgment on the pleadings, the record fully supports the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City as w ell. (See Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 701

- 7 03 ( Coshow ) ; pt. III.B, post .) We affirm.
I
BACKGROUND A. Complaint In analyzing the challenged demurrer ruling, we take the facts properly pleaded to assess, as a matter of law, wh ether they state their causes of action. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In ruling on demurrer s , courts appropriately " ' consider matters which may be judicially noticed , ' " as if they had been pled. ( Evans, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1, 6; Helix La nd Co. v. City of San Diego (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 932, 937 ( Helix Land Co. ) [where demurrers were sustained without leave to amend, the reviewing court may consider other relevant matters of which the trial court could have taken notice, if relevant, as hav ing been pleaded]; Weil v. Barthel (1955) 45 Cal.2d 835, 837. ) The7

court s accept the plaintiff ' s properly pleaded facts as true, but a demurrer is not d e e med t o admit any conclusions of law or fact , nor any mere contentions. ( People ex rel Lungren v. Sup erior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 300

- 301.) The complaint sets forth five causes of action, initially seeking declaratory relief against all Respondents , on the basis that the park site is " located

. . . on Pueblo Lands

. . . . " As against the Landlor d D efendants, the Association brings related claims for setting aside the master lease or subleases through rescission, or for recovering damages for statutory violations or negligent misrepresentation. All claims are based on the premise that th is portio n of the City ' s parcels could not be leased to the Landlord
D efendants without voter approval. (Unfair Business Practices, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.; Mobilehome Residency Law, Civ. Code , § 798, et seq.) All causes of action were pled in terms of a class or representative action, on the basis that there were numerous residents who had typical claims, based on common issues of law and fact regarding the validity of the lease and subleases under section 219. In para graph 38 of the complaint, Appell ant originally pled that the site of the park within the parcels had been maintained in the City ' s ownership since January 19, 1909 (the date of an important charter amendment to the predecessor of section 219), through the date of the m aster l ease in 1979 . (See pt. III.C, post .) However, Appellant now concedes that in other transactions beginning in the 1850 ' s, the City transferred the8

parcels into private ownership , beginning with various railroad enterprises. 4 The parcels remained in private hands unt il 1941, when the federal government took them for World War II defense housing. In 1959, the federal government returned the entire 297.3437 acres in the two parcels to City ownership by a quitclaim deed. The complaint sets forth the history of the 1979 master lease arrangements, including a 1977 City resolution to enable a portion of the parcels to be developed as mobilehome properties and leased to low or moderate income tenants for the term of the lease. Other City resolutions continued to require lo w or moderate income housing to be provided there. The mobilehome park began operating in late 1980, and the Master Lease was amended several times. In 1983, negotiations were held on disputes among the parties about preserving the low income status of t he property. Only the Landlord D efendants and the City remained parties to the lease, but they consulted a committee of Appellant homeowners ' association. The 1983 amendments changed the base rent provisions in the master lease to allow a yearly minimum increase in space rent and to provide for reduction of rent for subsidized tenants, among other things. In 1997, the Landlord Defendants took the master lease by assignment.

4 The 1889 charter did not allow transfer of Pueblo lands that had been dedicated or reserved for public use (e.g., parks), although the Supreme Court held in Ames v. City of S an Diego (1894) 101 Cal. 390, 395 that adverse possession could occur against other types of City holdings. ( Richert , supra , 109 Cal.App. at p. 556.) These parcels have never been dedicated to p ublic use and this is not an adverse possession claim about them. (Cf. Hoadley v. San Francisco (1875) 50 Cal. 265, 275

- 276 ( Hoadley ) .)9

In all its causes of action, Appellant claims that due to the alleged voidness o r invalidity of the master lease for noncompliance with s ection 219 , the Landlord
D efendants and their predecessors had no power to impose rent increases, and that Appellant ' s members were being constructively evicted through such conduct. Appellant sough t a preliminary injunction to restrict the Landlord D efendants from raising rents or dissipating services , pending the outcome of the se claims. B. Responses and Motions The City filed an answer to the complaint, asserting as affirmative defenses that the City ' s conduct was legal and that Appellant had failed to state any of its causes of action, as well as numerous other defenses. The Landlord Defendants demurred, asserting failure to adequately state any of the causes of action, and a lack of standing i n Appellant to pursue any such claims. After a temporary restraining order was granted, Respondents each opposed Appellant ' s motion for a preliminary injunction, and joined in each other ' s opposition. In the moving and opposing papers for both the demurr er and the injunction, the parties discussed the effect of the ownership history of these parcels. The lodged defense exhibits included copies of judgments from the eminent domain takings of the parcels by the federal government in the 1940 ' s and the quit claim deed returning the parcels to City ownership in 1959. With respect to the Landlord D efendants ' demurrer proceedings, held concurrently with Appellant ' s preliminary injunction request, the record does not indicate that the trial court was requested t o take judicial notice of those historic private transfer deeds, or the10

recorded eminent domain judgments, or the quitclaim deed to the City. In opposition to the preliminary injunction motion, the Landlord Def endants requested judicial notice of
maps ass ociated with the quitclaim deed from the federal government to the City, but did
not do so for the deed itself , or the 1940 ' s condemnation judgments. 5 C. Hearing and Rulings Before the hearing, the trial court tentatively indicated in writing that any fa ct

based standing issues that were being raised, in terms of Appellant ' s entitlement to class certification, could not be appropriately resolved through demurrer proceedings. The trial court requested that the parties address, at the upcoming hearing, cer tain additional significant issues relating to standing that might affect the outcome of the motions. At the hearing before the trial court, Appellant contended the City could not claim that the previous conveyance s cleared restrictions on these Pueblo l a nds . Instead, the parcels should remain subject to the terms of section 219. Appellant offered to set forth evidence that the City had reacquired several other parcels of former Pueblo l ands and had sought voter approval for future transfers of them. Wi thout granting any offer of proof, the court took the matter under submission.

5 As noted, these materials were the subject of our order of October 21, 2014 notifying the parties we proposed to tak e judicial notice on appeal of title documents. (Evid. Code, §§ 455, 459.) We subsequently received the Landlord D efendants ' motion requesting such judicial notice, a s well as opposition, and addressed those issues at oral argument. Although Appellant r equested an opportunity to file supplemental briefing on the propriety of the requested judicial notice, or to further address estoppel issues against the City, we declined its request on the basis that the pertinent ownership issues are subject to resolut ion as issues of law on the current and now supplemented record. (See p t

. III.D, post

. )11

In the written ruling, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on numerous alternative grounds, including determinations that Appellant lacked standing to sue on the related causes of action, and the action was barred by the applicable limitations periods. The court also ruled that the parcels had lost any characterization of " Pueblo Lands, " within the meaning of section 219, through numerous title transfe rs. The request for injunctive relief was denied. Both as to the Landlord
D efendants and the City, the court dismissed the entire action. Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of that ruling or for a new trial , setting forth documen tation of the same three examples, as previously offered, about other former Pueblo lands parcels that had been reacquired by the City, then subjected to voter approval for future transactions about them. Appellant argued , without authority, that the City should be estopped from denying that election proceedings were required by section 219 regarding a lease transfer of these parcels, such as it had conducted elsewhere. Appellant defended the adequacy of its standing to sue and the timeliness of its filin g of the complaint. R econsideration was denied , Appellant brought this appeal , and we heard oral argument

. II

ISSUES PRESENTED AND SCOPE OF APPELLATE ANALYSIS We review the dismissal judgment that followed the ruling sustaining, without leave to amend, t he Landlord Def endants ' demurrer, which was heard concurrently with Appellant ' s motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellant makes no arguments on appeal about the denial of the injunctive relief. Although that ruling is not directly before12

us in this appeal, the trial court correctly observed that there was a fair amount of " cross over " analysis and documentation between the two sets of motions, and that is true of the reconsideration phase of the proceedings, as well. In that light and on this record , we next address various procedural problems argued by the parties. In parts III and IV, post , we shall analyze the adequacy of the complaint ' s statement of its declaratory relief and related causes of action , and address the judicial notice motion on ap peal.

A. Preliminary Standing Discussion; Limitations Issue Appellant complains that the trial court employed irregular procedures here in connection with the demurrer, by sua sponte raising issues about problems with Appellant ' s standing to sue and the applicable limitations periods, or by incorrectly utilizing preliminary injunction legal standards. Appellant further claims the court abused its discretion by failing to allow amendment of the pleadings, particularly in connection with the denial of its reconsideration motion. Based upon the nature of the legal issues inherent in dismissal of this complaint on demurrer, the better approach on appeal is to assume arguendo that Appellant can sufficiently assert standing to sue on each of the related causes of action. We will posit here that Appellant can adequately show its fitness to raise issues about whether the master lease is in compliance with C ity charter standards. (See Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (1972) 7 Cal.3d 150, 159 [municipal taxpayer had standing to challenge alleged waste of municipal assets]; Code Civ. Proc., § 526a.)13

We likewise accept for purposes of argument that Appellant can assert standing to challenge the validity of the City/Landlord D efendants ' master lease, based upon alleged third

- party beneficiary status, as " intended beneficiaries " of the lease contract. ( Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 127

- 1 28 ( Marina Tenants Assn .) [issues of law resolved on demurrer where trial court took judicial notice of a public entity ' s master lease, which placed the master lease within the scope of the pleadings ] ; Helix Land Co. , supra , 82 Cal.App.3d at p. 937.) To the extent that statutory limitations theories formed a basis of the challenged ruling, we need not resolve those issues. (Gov. Code, § 66499.37 [Subdivision Map Act provisions]; Gov. Code, § 65009 [Planning and Zoning Law provisions].) We view this complaint as essentially alleging that public property was illegally tran sferred, in violation of " binding " charter provisions. Such claims about ongoing public entitlement to use of contested property can be exempted from the application of statutes of limitations. For claims of adverse or illegal use of public property, " ' It is immaterial where the title

— that is, the record title

— is held, whether by the state at large, or by a county, or by some municipal department or other official body. There can be no adverse holding of such land which will deprive the public of the ri ght thereto, or give title to the adverse claimant, or create a title by virtue of the statute of limitations. The rule is universal in its application to all property set apart or reserved to the public use, and the public use for which it is appropriate d is immaterial. ' " ( Sixth Dist. Agr. Ass ' n. v. Wright (1908) 154 Cal. 119, 130; see Hoadley , supra , 50 Cal. 265, 275

- 276 [when land is14

dedicated to public use, the public entity ' s title cannot be extinguished by adverse possession and no statute of limit ations applies].) The nature of the essential legal questions about interpreting the language of section 219 in this context, as discussed in both sets of moving papers, allows us to conclude that the trial court and this court have both been given an ade quate basis in the record to identify and resolve the dispositive issues raised in the complaint. The two matters addressed at the hearing, as well as the reconsideration motion, involve closely related " cross - over " issues of law

. By letter before oral a rgument, we requested that the parties discuss whether the filing of the City ' s answer, including its affirmative defense s , affected the City ' s entitlement to dismissal of the complaint. In response to our request, the attorney representing the City point ed to the affirmative defense it raised to the only cause of action pled against it, declaratory relief, which asserted a failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Appellant responded that factual matters may remain to be litigate d, on whether the City ' s actions in voluntarily seeking voter approval of transactions concerning a different set of former Pueblo lands should estop it from claiming that it was not required to do so in this instance. Under all the relevant circumstances , it was not essential for the City t o join in the
Landlord D efendants ' demurrer , in order for it to be entitled to defend the dismissal judgment it obtained against this appeal . The City was seeking in the answer on file to have the complaint dismissed, for failure to state its causes of action that were all based on alleged noncompliance with City charter provisions. (See Coshow , supra , 13215

Cal.App.4th 687, 701

- 7 03 [trial court ' s inherent powers to control the progress of the proceedings allowed the cou rt to construe motions in limine concerning critical evidence that was justifiably excluded, as equivalent to motion for judgment on the pleadings, establishing that no viable cause of action could be stated].) We rely upon the affirmative defenses pled b y the City as raising the same issues of law litigated in the demurrer, concerning the validity of the master lease in light of charter provisions. We shall construe the City ' s answer and opposition to Appellant ' s motion for a preliminary injunction as ef fectively the same as a City motion for judgment on the pleadings. ( Coshow , supra , 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 701

- 7 03.) With that approach, and assuming without deciding that neither standing concerns nor limitations problems are dispositive here, we next anal yze the questions of law underlying the claims against all Respondents, regarding the applicability and effect of section 219 upon the " Pueblo lands " as they are described in this set of pleaded facts. B. Rules of Review: Demurrer, Judgment on the Pleadi ngs, Reconsideration The dismissal judgment determined that Appellant cannot set forth sufficient facts to support its declaratory relief and related causes of action for invalidation of the master lease, on its current theory of noncompliance with the ci ted charter provisions , as to all Respondents . We review that trial court conclusion under the rule that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. ( Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78

- 79 ( Grinzi ); Blank v. Kirwa n , supra , 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 .) " [W]e review the complaint de novo to determine whether it contains sufficient facts to state a cause of action. [Citation.] ' We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts16

properly pleaded, but not contentions, ded uctions or conclusions of fact or law. ' [Citation.] The trial court exercises its discretion in declining to grant leave to amend. [Citation.] If it is reasonably possible the pleading can be cured by amendment, the trial court abuses its discretion by not granting leave to amend. [Citation.] The plaintiff has the burden of proving the possibility of cure by amendment. " ( Grinzi , supra, at p. 79.)

" Judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer and is properly granted when the ' complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against [the] defendant. ' " ( Coshow , supra , 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 702 ; Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d) [grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters tha t may be judicially noticed].) " The trial court accepts as true all material facts properly pleaded but does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts which are judicially noticed. " ( Coshow , s upra , at
p. 70 2 .) In demurrer analysis, we test the sufficiency of the plaintiff ' s pleading against the relevant principles of law. ( Marina Tenants Assn. , supra , 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 127 .)

" ' As a reviewing court we are not bound by the construction pla ced by the trial court on the pleadings but must make our own independent judgment thereon, even as to matters not expressly ruled upon by the trial court. ' [Citation.] [¶] Other relevant matters which are properly the subject of judicial notice (Evid. C ode, § 452) may be treated as having been pled. " ( Marina Tenants Assn. , supra , at p. 132 , citing Helix Land Co., supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at p. 937 .)17

These rules presuppose " ' that a complaint otherwise good on its face is nevertheless subject to demurrer wh en facts judicially noticed render it defective.

. . . The theory is that the pleader should not be allowed to bypass a demurrer by suppressing facts which the court will judicially notice. ' " ( Marina Tenants Assn. , supra , 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 130.)
In reviewing the demurrer dismissal, we consider whether the allegations may state a cause of action under any possible legal theory. ( Grinzi , supra , 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 85 [ " Under these circumstances, new theories may be advanced for the first time on
appea l. " ]; People ex rel. Brown v. Powerex Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 93, 112 [ " A party may propose amendments on appeal where a demurrer has been sustained, in order to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. " ]; see
Economi c Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 677, 684, fn. 5; Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1035 [ " Where a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the complaint could have been amended to cure the defect; if so, it will conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff leave to amend. " ]; Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699, 712; City o

f Stockton v. Sup e ri or Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747 [no leave to amend necessary if complaint is facially incapable of amendment].) On appeal, Appellant has proposed new amendments to more fully bring the parcels subject to the master lease within the arguable scope of the charter provision, in

an attempt to cure the defects in the complaint. ( Grinzi , supra , 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 85.)18

We will also take into account the legal issues surrounding Appellant ' s asserted ground for seeking reconsideration of the trial court ' s ruling, i.e., that because of its disparate treatment of other Pueblo land properties, the City could be estopped from denying that voter approval would be required for this transfer. All of Appellant ' s arguments present the same core le gal issues, which require de novo interpretation and application of the charter language on City ownership of " Pueblo lands. "
III
DECLARATORY RELIEF CLAIMS V. ALL RESPONDENTS We next address the declaratory relief issues about the applicability of section 219 requirements to the pleaded facts about the master lease, in light of the background history of ownership of the parcels. We identify the applicable principles for charter interpretation and analyze the record accordingly. A. Nature of Requested Rel ief

" ' " The fundamental basis of declaratory relief is the existence of an actual, present controversy over a proper subject. " ' [Citations.] The language of Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 appears to allow for an extremely broad scope of an actio n for declaratory relief: [¶] ' Any person interested under a written instrument .

. . or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property .

. . may, in case s of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action

. . . for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of19

any question of construction or validi ty arising under the instrument or contract

. ' " ( Otay Land Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 556, 562 ( Otay Land Co

. ).)
In the context of a demurrer , the courts evaluate whether the factual allegations of

a complaint for declaratory relie f reveal that an actual , ripe controversy exists between the parties. ( Otay Land Co., supra , 169 Cal.App.4th 556, 562

- 5 63 .) A matter is not justiciable or appropriate for resolution through declaratory relief unless the proper criteria are present , that there is " an actual controversy that is currently active , " and both standing and ripeness are appropriate criteria in making that determination. ( Id

. at
p. 563. ) In applying the basic criteria, we evaluat e " the nature of the rights and duties that plaint iff is asserting, which must follow some recognized or cognizable legal theories, that are related to subjects and requests for relief that are properly before the

court. " ( Ibid .) The rights asserted by Appellant pertain mainly to the dispute with the La ndlord
D efendants about rent increases allowed by the master lease and subleases, and Appellant seeks to avoid those increases primarily through a declaration invalidating the master lease for the parcels. We explore Appellant ' s claims about the master le ase ' s degree of compliance with s ection 219 requirements, in light of the meaning and purpose of those charter requirements. B. Rules of Charter Interpretation Accepted methods of statutory construction apply to charter provisions. ( DeYoung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 1 7 .) Determining the meaning of a statutory standard requires the resolution of a question of law. ( People ex rel Lockyer v. Shamrock20

Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.) " The soundness of the resolution of such a question is examined d e novo. " ( Ibid. ) The superior c ourt was required to apply statutory standards to the pleaded facts, as we do, in examining the plain language of this section to ascertain its applicability. ( City of Poway v. City of San Diego (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 859

- 8 60.) Recourse to legislative history is proper, if necessary to ascertain legislative intent. ( Ibid .) Charter provisions " are construed in favor of the exercise of the power over municipal affairs and ' against the existence of any limitation or res triction thereon which is not expressly stated in the charter .

. . . ' [Citations.] Thus, ' [r]estrictions on a charter city ' s power may not be implied. ' " ( Domar Electric, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 9 Cal.4th 161, 171 ( Domar Electric, Inc. ); DeY oung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 17 .) To select the proper interpretation, we first turn to the apparent purpose of the provision, looking to the plain language used. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [ " plain meaning " rule].) Where that does not suffice, " ' " The court should take into account matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction

. " ' " ( DeYo ung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 18.)

C. History and Scope of Section 219; Its Arguable Ambiguity
In DeYoung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 19

- 21, this court set forth the relevant historical development of section 219. In the original Freeholders ' Charter of San Diego of 1889, the predecessor section of section 219 (§ 50) allowed the City to sell or lease all Pueblo lands without significant restrictions. For many years, that privilege was very21

freely used and abused by City authorities, allow ing Pueblo la nds to be taken by adverse possession or sold off very cheaply. (See Richert, supra , 109 Cal.App. 548, 555

- 5 59, citing Ames v. City of San Diego, supra , 101 Cal. 390, 395 [adverse possession allowed of P ueblo lands].) In 1909, former section 50 , subdivis ion (a) was amended to " reserve from sale, " or conveyance, those northern " Pueblo Lands owned by The City " until 1930, unless there

w ere compliance with new procedures that required a council ordinance that was ratified by C ity voters. At the same time, s ection 50 , subdivision (b) allowed the C ity council to sell or lease " all other lands now or hereafter owned by the said city not dedicated or reserved for public use, " at public auction. (Italics added ; DeYoung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 19

- 21.) In 1915 , the same provision of the charter applicable to transfers of northern Pueblo lands was amended and renumbered to section 48, to add a 15

- year limitation on leases of them. The same requirements, authorization by C ity ordinance and voter ratification, we re retained and remained in effect through 1930 (later extended to 1940). ( DeYoung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 20

- 21.) After 1929 amendments, a new C ity charter was approved in 1931, extending and renumbering to section 219 those enacted restrictions o n sale or lease of northern Pueblo lands owned by the City, by requiring council approval and voter ratification of sales, but without specifying an expiration date (previously 1930

- 19 40). Current section 219 " in essence reenacts and recodifies former sec tion 48, " and imposes a 15

- year limitation upon lease terms. ( DeYoung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 21.) However, in that case, we22

held th at the 15

- year limit on Council i ssued leases of Pueblo l ands was inapplicable, if voter approval of a longer lease h ad also been obtained. ( Id. at p. 22.) Appellant admits in the opening brief that " it could be argued in the abstract " whether s ection 219 still applies to Pueblo l and parcels that the City reacquired , after they had been conveyed to and among other owne rs, out of City hands. Appellant seeks to amend to allege that s ection 219 applies " in this particular situation, " to impose protected status against any City lease of these northern Pueblo lands without voter approval.!AOB 3 , RT 39 , RB 41)! The Landlord Def

endants concede there is potential ambiguity in section 219 ' s words regarding ownership ( " Pueblo Lands owned by T he City " ). ( Coburn v. Sievert (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495 [latent ambiguity exists where extrinsic evidence creates a necessity for interpretation, or a choice among two or more possible meanings]; Economic Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush, supra , 57 Cal.App.4th 677, 685.) They say this phrase " could have at least two meanings, based upon the contentions of the parties in this ca se. " ( City of Poway, supra , 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 859

- 8 60 [recourse to legislative history may be made to ascertain legislative intent].) On review, the question becomes, what period of ownership by the City of the subject parcels is necessary for the oper ative language of section 219 to apply and thus to
forbid the lease transfer of them as " Pueblo Lands owned by The City , " unless voter approval is obtained?23 D. Judicial Notice Judicial notice includes " the fact of a document ' s recordation, the date the d ocument was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document ' s legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document ' s authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face. " ( Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265 ( Fontenot ) .) Previously, we notified the parties we were considering taking judicial no tice of specified deeds and judgments, on our own motion. (Evid. Code, § § 459 , subd. (c) ; 455 , subd. (a).) We now address the Landlord D efendants ' request for judicial notice on appeal of exhibits they and the City previously lodged with the trial court (motion
contains an e xhibit A table, listing items Nos

. 1 through 99 [with a few gaps]). 6 We considered the opposition filed to the motion for judicial notice and heard the parties ' views at oral argument

. First, the Landlord D efendants request judicial notice of their previous exhibits to declarations, the recorded deeds showing that the City transferred these parcels to private ownership beginning in the 1860 ' s. The Landlord D efendants supplied to the trial court their lodged exhibits N os. 2, 3, 4A, 4B (the 1868

- 1873 conveyances away from the C ity),
and N os. 4c through 32 (1873

- 1940 non

- City title holders). The City supplied documents

6 In the e xhibit A list that was supplied as an attachment to the motion for judicial notice, there is no document corresponding to any requested item numbers 70 thro ugh 71, 74 through 76, 82, 86, 89, or 92 through 98.24

showing the 1855 sales by City to the railroads, and exh ibit No. 1, the 1874 U.S. Patent deed to the City. Additionall y, the City lodged versions of section 219, from 1909 and 1929, to the present. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) [ official gov ernment acts ] .) Next, the Landlord D efendants seek judicial notice of their previously lodged exhibits , N os. 33 through 38 (the 194 1

- 1943 federal condemnation judgments). In 1959, the federal government issued a quitclaim deed for the parcels to the City, with associated maps. At the trial level, the Landlord Def endants requested judicial notice of those maps. On appeal, they have additionally sought judicial notice of exhibit No. 39, the deed itself. The trial court's order does not expressly show whether any judicial notice requests were granted. We can assume the trial court took notice of mandatory items, or discretionary

mate rial for which notice was given at the trial level. (Evid. Code, § 453.) It is well accepted that when courts take judicial notice of the existence of court documents, the legal effect of the results reached in orders and judgments may be established. ( Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 ; Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7; see People v. Harbolt (1997) 61 Cal.App.4th 123, 127 [ no authority found that an appellate opinion affirming a conviction is not part of the " record of c onviction " ]

. ) It is not disputed that the same parcels at issue in the complaint are those described in the copies provided of the 1940 ' s eminent domain judgments

. Likewise, the same properties were the subject of the earlier transfer deeds involving the railroads and others, and the 1959 quitclaim deed , in the documents provided

. We grant the motion as to the dispositive title documents. (Evid. Code, § § 455, subd. (a) ; 459, subd. (c).) These include the Landlord D efendants ' exhibits N os. 2, 3, 4A,25

4B (the 1868

- 1873 conveyances away from the C ity), and N os. 4c through 32 (1873

- 1940 non

- City title holders). We also take judicial notice of the City ' s title and charter documents (the 1855 sales by City to Railroad and exh ibit No. 1, the 1874 U.S. Patent d eed to the City ; and the 1909, 1929 and current versions of § 219). Further, we grant judicial notice of exhibits N os. 33 through 38 (the 1941

- 1943 federal condemnation judgments), and exhibit s N os. 39 through 41 (federal government quitclaiming the
prope rty to the C ity ; i.e., motion granted as to all requested items Nos. 1

- 41 ). With respect to the Landlord D efendants ' request for judicial notice on appeal of lodged exhibits N os. 52 through 57, 60 through 61, 80, 84 (i.e., newspaper articles and historica l articles and brochures that are not recorded documents), it is arguable whether they clearly fall within the provisions of Evid ence Code section 452, subd ivision (h), as

" facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute " that are " capabl e of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable
accuracy. " ( Ibid .; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Jud icial Notice, § § 32

- 33,
pp. 138

- 142 .) Under Evidence C ode section 452, subd ivision (h), it is discretio nary with this court whether to take judicial notice of such historical articles, and in any case, we would not take judicial notice of the truth of those views. The motion for judicial notice is denied in part, as to exhibits Nos. 52 through 57, 60 throu gh 61, 80, 84 (newspaper articles and historical publications)

. As to the balance of the motion, i t is grant ed, including its exhibit No. 64, the City
A ttorney opinion, No

. 99

- 2 (the " 1999 opinion " ), that was issued in a dispute about different Pueblo lan ds properties that had likewise been transferred outside of City26

ownership, and then back again. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) [official acts of governmental agency].) Other appropriate requests that are granted include exhibit N o. 43, a City Att orney op inion, and the City planning commission maps and documents about the parcels and the master lease, as well as City council resolutions about low income housing proposals , identifying these parcels and this site, and legislative acts (i.e., exhibits N os. 42

- 51, 58

- 59, 62

- 69, 72

- 73, 77

- 79, 81, 83, 85, 87

- 88, 90

- 91, 99). E. Section 219 Interpretation: Historical Context of Charter Amendments We can now determine as a matter of law whether Appellant ' s assertions and proposed amendments about the applicabilit y of section 219 to these leased parcels are supported by this record and the applicable legal principles. If instead, they would merely amount to conclusory statements or arguments, the proposed amendments would be inadequate. ( Zelig v. County of Los An geles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126 ( Zelig ) .) We review de novo whether a plaintiff is making " allegations contrary to law or facts which are judicially noticed. " ( Coshow, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 702

. ) As explained in the City A ttorney ' s 1999 opinio n, the language regarding voter approval of property transactions, when affecting northern " Pueblo lands owned by The City, " was adopted in 1909 and incorporated into the operative 1931 charter (now § 219; see fn. 2 , ante ). The amendment of the former cha rter language in 1909 was made in response to the result in Ames v. City of San Diego , supra , 101 Cal. 390, in which the Supreme Court upheld an adverse possession decree against Pueblo lands. ( Id

. at p . 395; see 1999 opinion, p. 5.) The 1999 opinion con cludes that the legislative intent, evidenced27

in 1909 and continued into section 219, was to protect from impolitic transfers those
P ueblo lands that remained in City ownership as of 1909. The 1999 opinion further states that even if a property ' s legal de scription may include the term, " Pueblo lands, " section 219 nevertheless applies only to those northern Pueblo lands that were part of the 1874 patent deed from the f ederal g overnment, and that were still in C ity ownership when the 1909 amendment was adopt ed, and that have remained in continuous City ownership to the present. The 1999 opinion concludes that section 219 cannot properly be interpreted so broadly as to encompass northern Pueblo lands regardless of when they were acquired by the City, in light of that apparent legislative intent. The purpose of the 1999 opinion was to analyze the legislative history of section 219 in a case involving certain other Pueblo lands that also had an interrupted ownership history (from the City, to a non

- C ity owner, back to the City). It opined, " To interpret the provision so broadly as to encompass pueblo lands regardless of when acquired would lead to the unintended result of subjecting any property owned or acquired by the City north of the north line of the San D iego River to the Section 219 restrictions. " (Italics added.) Such opinions of a city attorney construing its charter provisions are equivalent to the construction of a statute by officials charged with its administration, and are entitled to considerati on in charter interpretation. ( DeYoun g , supra , 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 18; see Evans , supra , 38 C al .4th at p. 9 , fn. 5 .) Charter provisions should be " construed in favor of the exercise of the power over municipal affairs and ' against the existence of any28

l imitation or restriction thereon which is not expressly stated in the charter .

. . . ' [Citations.] Thus, ' [r]estrictions on a charter city ' s power may not be implied. ' " ( Domar Electric, Inc. , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 1 71.) The 1999 opinion sets forth a reasonable approach to understanding the effect of section 219. It is not disputed that these parcels left City ownership in the mid

- 1800 ' s and did not return to it until 1959. To give a very broad reading of the charter term

" Pueblo Lands owned by The City " would be to imply a charter restriction on the City ' s power to enter into a lease of property that it did not acquire (or reacquire) until 1959. These parcels were not held in City ownership when the voter approval provisions were added in 1909, and it is unlikely that the framers of the amendment could have been considering these (or any other already transferred parcels) as potentially subject to the amendment, which by its terms restricts future transactions on Pueblo lands property still

" owned " by the City as of 1909. Section 219 was evidently intended to protect those Pueblo lands remaining in C ity ownership, as of 1909, from future uncontrolled sales or other acquisitions. That narrow interpretation of section 219 is consistent with the plain language of the provision regarding ownership, as governing the rights and duties of the City with respect to its own remaining Pueblo lands, determined as of 1909 when the restrictions were imposed. " Where the words of the charter are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the charter or from its legislative history. " ( Domar Electric, Inc., supra , 9 Cal.4th 161, 171

- 1 72.) We agree29

with the Landlord D efendants that " section 219 was not intended to protect former City owned Pueblo Lands re - acquired after the 1909 date of the original provision

. " Even if the " ownership " language of section 219 is arguably ambiguous, we should select the interpretation that is consistent with the apparent intent e xpressed in the charter history since 1909, that was to pr event transfers of the City ' s then

- remaining Pueblo l ands unless approval by ordinance and the voters wa s obtained. (See DeYoung,
supra , 147 Cal.Ap p. 3d at pp. 20

- 21.) It would not be consistent wi th the apparent purpose of section 219 to apply its requirements to parcels, such as these, that were not continuously held in City ownership in 1909 and thereafter.

F. Section 219 Interpretation on Record Showing Chain of Title We next address Appellant ' s express or implied claims that even if the City ' s property rights were severed after the 1850 ' s - era private transfers concerning the parcels, such that section 219 might not apply, it was only a temporary severance of charter protections. Appellant see ks an opportunity for more discovery to clarify factual matters ab o ut title transfers of the parcels and to amend the plead ings to assert that the City ' s rights and obligations, to secure voter approval for transfers pursuant to the charter, still exist de spite those transfers and the 1940 ' s eminent domain taking that occurred of the parcels , and that affect ed (took) the entire property interests of the then

- private landowners. In light of the ownership history of these parcels as laid out in connection wi th the concurrent preliminary injunction proceedings, and as above, we will not disregard the judicially noticeable materials showing that the federal government obtained full title to3 0

this property for almost two decades, then deeded it to the City . The authorities establish that when a complete taking of a property interest pursuant to f ederal eminent domain occurs, it establish es new title and extinguishes previous interests not specifically excepted by the taker. ( U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, supra , 6 83 F.3d 1030, 1034; Burkhart v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1955) 227 F.2d 659, 661

- 662; U.S. v. Carmack (1946) 329 U.S. 230, 240

- 242.) No exceptions to these takings were specified on the face of the judgments.
In U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, supra, 683 F.3d 1030, t he court was concerned with a dispute between the federal government and the California State Lands Commission (the Commission) over land formerly owned by the Commission. The Commission unsuccessfully argued its public trust rights to some of the lands ( as tidelands) had survived a taking by the federal government, although the government had paid just compensation for the property. The court concluded any such state rights were extinguished, and no such " ' quiescent ' " rights would reemerge for the Comm ission, such as if the United States later sought to transfer the property to a private party. ( Id. at
p . 103 8 ; 11 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Est ate (3d ed. 2011) § 30A:4, p. 30A

- 8, and 2014

- 2015 supp. , p. 53.) Our de novo pleadings interpretation of the language of the complaint properly
takes into account these judgments and deeds affecting the title history of the property. ( U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, supra, 683 F.3d 1030, 1034 .) As a matter of law, not only the pre

- 1909 break that occurred in the c hain of title between the periods of the City ' s ownership of the parcels , but also the later taking by eminent domain, operated to31

extinguish the section 219 requirement for voter approval of this master lease concerning these parcels. Once the 1940 ' s emi nent domain taking was accomplished, the property interests that could be conveyed back to the City by the federal government did not include the allegedly appurtenant City charter restrictions. Even assuming there is some ambiguity in the ownership langu age of section 219, the eminent domain taking was definitive and defeated any potential applicability of the 1909 charter restrictions in this respect. ( Williams v. Wraxall , supra , 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7 [

judicial notice of the truth of results re ached in orders and judgments allowed].) Accordingly, the previous historic characterization of the parcels as Pueblo lands, before they were repeatedly transferred out of C ity ownership, became inoperative for purposes of charter interpretation, as const rued in light of judicially noticed materials. The legal effect of the documents ' language is clear and not reasonably subject to dispute. ( Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 .) It would be fictitious and unduly conclusory to make allegations in the complaint about violation of " binding " charter provisions, since such allegations are defective when viewed in light of contrary facts that are judicially noticeable. ( Evans, supra , 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) Even if we take into account the three examples of reacquired City property (for which voter approval of transactions was sought), that were offered as the subjects of Appellant ' s reconsideration motion ( but without substantive briefing ) , no different result will obtain. As the Landlord D efendants proper ly observe, " [S] imply because the City sought voter approval of the transfer and/or exchange of certain other Pueblo Lots at a certain point in time, " it did not therefore concede the application of section 219 to all its32

reacquired property. The City can decide to go beyond charter requirements in going to the voters, but it was not compelled to do so in this instance. We see no indication in the legislative history that the protections of section 219 should reattach to formerly owned City property, if i t is ultimately reacquired by the City. (See DeYoung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 17

- 18.) Both to the trial court and at oral argument before this court, Appellant has admitted that it cannot properly allege the City held ownership of these parcels as of t he time the provisions of section 219 were enacted, until 1959, when the City regained possession. Appellant cannot show a right to amend its p leading to attempt to bring the parcels within the scope of section 219, as it i s properly interpreted in light of its legislative history. Also, Appellant has not established why any governing City legislation or authority would serve the same function of reinstating Pueblo lands protections on reacquired property, nor suggested why its estoppel theory could be

su ccessfully pled as based on anything other than a discretionary or nonbinding policy for placing land use matters concerning reacquired property before the voters. We may not interpret charter restrictions as arising on the basis of implication, such as a ny implied dormant or " ' quiescent ' " obligations retained by the City to seek voter approval of the master lease. ( U

. S

. v. 32.42 Acres of Land , supra , 683 F.3d at
p. 1032; Domar Electric, Inc

. , supra , 9 Cal.4th 161, 170

- 1 71.) These parcels have not

cont inuously retained their Pueblo land status over the relevant time periods, and therefore Appellant ha s not assert ed rights and duties that entitle it to declaratory relief on charter interpretation, with respect to any applicable voter approval requirement s under33

section 219. (See Otay Land Co., supra , 169 Cal.App.4th 556, 562

- 5 63 .) The proposed amendments are ineffective conclusory statements that are contradicted by the record. ( Zelig, supra , 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126; see Evans, supra , 38 Cal.4th at p. 6. ) The dismissal of the declaratory relief cause of action was proper as to all Respondents.
IV
REMAINING STATUTORY AND TORT CLAIMS AGAINST L AND L ORD DEF

ENDANTS Appellant ' s complaint alternatively seeks relief through rescission of the master lease and/or the subleases, or award s of restitution of rents, or tort damages for negligent misrepresentations. Appellant alleges or would amend to allege that the City

- owned parcels remained subject to section 219, as " in the nature of " Pueblo lands. It therefore

c laims the Landlord D efendants and their predecessors had no power to impose the amended rent provisions that allowed yearly rent increases, pursuant to the master lease and the related City resolutions permitting development on the parcels to include low o r moderate income housing. Appellant takes the position that its members were being constructively evicted through such " illegal " conduct. In its statutory causes of action, Appellant sought to restrict the Landlord
D efendants from carrying out those all egedly unfair business practices, to rais e rents or dissipat e services , pending the outcome of the se claims. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 1720 0 et seq.; Civ. Code , § 798 et seq.) These theories seem to ask the courts, effectively, to compel renegotiation of the rent increase provisions in the master lease, in such a manner as to accomplish rent control for the subleases, all due to alleged invalidity under section 219. However, the key interpretive question of ownership of the parcels at the relevant34

times must be resolved against Appellant ' s position. For the same reasons explained above, i t would not be consistent with the evident purpose of section 219 to permit the use of the se alternative theories in the complaint as vehicles to seek changes in the terms

o f the master lease. To the extent the record gives insight into the meaning of section 219, we may look to " ' " matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, publi c policy, and contemporaneous construction. " ' " (See DeYoung, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 18 .) We believe the City could reasonably interpret section 219 as allowing it to pursue legitimate public policy goals even on historic Pueblo lands, such as leas ing these parcels for the purpose of providing low to moderate income housing development, as specified in the lease. As amended, the master lease allows the parties to require regular rent adjustments. Such a policy was recognized in th e factual context of DeYoung as being fiscally prudent for the City. ( DeYoung, supra, at p. 22, fn. 6.) In conclusion, Appellant has not established any entitlement to relief based on its claim that reacquired City Pueblo lands (following periods of severed C ity ownershi p rights) somehow remain subject to section 219 requirements for voter approval of property transactions. We disagree with any claim that the trial court failed to use proper procedures in ruling on the various motions. When resolving the pleadings quest ions, the trial court was not required to ignore the judicially noticeable material presented in connection with the other motion being heard. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d).) The dispositive legal questions as to all Respondents were properly broug ht before the trial35

court in the demurrer proceedings, the companion motion and its record, and in the City ' s answer on file , and they have been fully presented in this appeal

. Judgment on the pleadings was appropriate and the demurrer wa s properly sustai ned without leave to amend.
DISPOSITION The judgment of dismissal is affirmed as to all Respondents. The m ot ion for j ud icial not ice is granted in part as to all requests, with the exception that it is den i ed as to exhibits Nos. 52 through 57, 60 through 61, 80 and 84 as they are listed in exhibit A to the motion

. Costs are awarded to Respondents.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

McDONALD, J.Filed 2/9/15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA VISTA VILLAGE SAN DIEGO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. TECOLOTE INVESTORS, LLC, et al., Defenda nts and Respondents. D064741

(Super. Ct. No. 37

- 2012

- 00085269

- CU

- MC

- CTL)
ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT: The opinion filed January 27, 2015, is ordered certified for publication.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. Copies to: All parties