### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 00 75 -C V

______________________________ RO GE R A

ND L I ND A H OO PER , App e lla nts V. BOBBY S MA L L W OOD , I NDI VI DUA L L Y AN D D/ B/A BO BBY SMAL L WOOD CONSTRUCTI ON CO., I NC., ET AL ., Appellee s

On Appea l from the 62nd Judi cial District Court

L amar County , Texas Trial Court No. 74121

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Op ini on by Chi e f Jus tic e Mo rr iss2 O P I N I O N Th e 8, 00 0- sq

ua re -f oo t dre a m home of Rog e r an d L ind a Ho op e r, and the laws uit that aro se out of the construc tion of the house, bec ame a nightmar e for them, as well as for the builder of the house, B obby

Smallwood, individually and d/b/a B obby

Smallwood Const ruction Company , I nc.,

and c on c re te su

bc on tr a c tor, Rob e rt

Ski nn e r. Th e c e ntr a l qu e sti on in t his c a se is w he re the bla

me sh ou ld be p la c e d f

or the se ri ou s p hy sic a l pr ob le ms t hat de ve lop e d w iththe ho us e . A ft e r a tr ia l in wh ic h a L a mar C ounty

jur y he ard su bs tanti a lly c on fl ic tin g te sti mony , the jur y lay the bla

me sq ua re ly

a t t h e H o o p e r s ' f

e e t. F r o m t

h e tr ia l c o u rt' s ta

k e - n o th in g ju d g me n t, th e H o o p e r s a p p e a l, r aising

m u l t i p l e, ex t ensive, a

nd passionate a

rg uments to this C ourt. We aff irm the judg ment of the trial

c ourt , b e c a

us e we a g re e wi th S ma llw oo d' s a sse rt ion s o n a pp e a l: (1) no err or wa s committed in ref using the reque sted voir dire of witness J unior Fow ler

o r i na l l o w i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y; (2) limit ing te stimony of expert J ames Pea

rson was not e rror ; (3 ) no e rr or

wa s c omm itt e d r e la tiv e to b re a c h- of -w arr anty jur y iss ue s; (4 ) le g a lly

and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the jur y ' s v e rd ic t; (5) limit ing post-tr ial discovery was not an a

buse of discr etion; and (6) ref

using a new tria l was not an a

buse of discr etion. As in many

neg lige nce la

wsuits, the centra l bone of c ontention is whose behavior cause d the pr ob le m a t is su e . Wa s th e ins ta bil ity in the ho us e ' s f

ound a tio n c a

us e d b y Sma llw oo d' s d e c isi on

to3

dig out a "bathtub" in the cla

y and to fill it with sand, combined with the wide spacing of stiffening beams (thicke r sec tions) in the foundation? Or, on the other hand, wer e the problems ca used by the Ho op e rs ' un ilate ra l a c ts o f i ns ta lli ng si dew alks aro un d th e ho us e , le ve lin g the slo pe imm e diate ly adjac ent to the house, a dding so muc h soil just around the house that it broug ht the soil level to an improperly

high point on the f

oundation itself, and/or installing a swimming pool behind the house? No dispute exist s that the house deve loped var ious ailments relate d to its foundation: fo un datio n c ra c ks , s hif

tin g and lif

tin g wa lls , cr a c ks in wa llb oa rd , a nd sti c kin g do or s and

wi nd ow s. After hear ing a considera

ble amount of testimony from a number of dif fer ent source s, in answer ing pe rc e nta g e ne g lig e nc e qu e sti on s, the jur y fo un d th a t the Ho op e rs ' ne g lig e nc e in ma kin g c ha ng e s to the are a aro un d the fo un datio n wa s the so le c a us e of the pr ob le ms; that Sma llw oo d a nd Ski nn e r d id

no t f a il t o c omp ly

wi th a ny wa rr anty ; tha t Smal lw oo d did not e ng a g e in de c e pti ve a c ts o r p ra c tic e s;

and that the c os t of re pa ir s, los s of va lue , co ns e qu e nti a l dam a g e s, and a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s f or the Ho op e rs ' attorney wer e all zero. The trial court a ccor dingly rende red a

take- no t h i ng judgme nt in favor of Smallwood and Skinner. Although the Hooper s' brief se ts out twenty -one " issues," those issues or bit larg ely

around two foca l points: the wit ness, J unior Fowle r, and the s ufficie ncy of the e vidence . We have g rouped t h e i s s u e s f

o r c l ar i t y. We n ote that co- de fe nd ant Skinne r is men tio ne d only on c e in the lis t of iss ue s. Ski nn e r i s mentioned only

in connec tion with an alleg ed er ror because the t rial court ref used t o submit a breac h4

of wa r r an ty qu e s ti o n n a mi n g Sk inn e r . T h a t ar g ume n t c o n s is ts o f tw o s e n te n c e s a t th e e n d of the brief, w ithout discussion or refer ence to the rec ord or to author ity . Be cause the issue has not bee n adequately

briefe d, we will not addre ss it. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(h). ( 1) No Error W

as Committed in Refusing the Requested Voir Dire of W itness Junior Fowler or in Allowi ng His Testimony A hug e portion of the Hoopers' eff ort on appe al is about witness Fow ler, a lleg ing imprope r

c on ta c ts w ithhim

and fr a ud s o n th e tr ia l c ourt

inv olv inghim

. I n a rather odd seque nce of events, it appe ars t h at t h e Hooper s contac ted Fow ler (a local contra ctor) e arly

on, asking for infor

mation about the cost of r ebuilding the ir house. F owler looke d at the house a

nd g ave the Hooper s a g ener ic cost of c onstruction, plus a perce ntag e for ever y thing involved, due to the incr ease in materia ls and transportation costs since the orig inal construction wa s

com p l et ed. Mr. Hoope r had one of his employ ees ta ke that information, calculate amounts, and p l a c e i t o n o n e o f F o w l e r ' s l e t t e r h e a d s . T h a t i n f

o r m a t i o n w a s p r o v i d e d

t o S m a l l w o o d

i nd i s c o v e r

y,

re pr e se nte d a s b e ingF ow le r' s e xpe rt re po rt

. Be fore t ri al , S k i nner attempted to depose F owler. F owler did not appe ar. F owler r efuse d to r e tur n M r. Ho op e r' s tel e ph on e c a lls or a pp e ar pur su ant to the Ho op e rs ' su bp oe na , a nd ult imate ly ref used to appea

r for any depositions whatsoever . Smallwood's trial subpoe na succ eede d in ge tting Fowle r to appe ar at trial. Smallwood called F owler a s a wi t n es s . The Hoope rs soug ht to take Fowle r on voir dire : "We filed a motion to hol d him in contempt of Court a nd if we c an just takeF ow le r te sti fi e d that he thr e w the su bp oe na int o h is f ir e pla c e and

burn e d it and tha t he did 1 call Smallwood to tell him t hat he wa s not goingto appea r. 5 him on voir dire outsi de the pr esenc e of the jury to fig ure out what he did to convince him to do what he did ." Th e tr ia l c ourt

de nie d th e re qu e st. I n his te stimony , Fowle r descr ibed the condition of the house and sidew alks and the f ootprint of the house. F owler ultimately opined that the main ca

use of the d amage to the house wa s the Hooper s' addition of the sidewa lks and flattening of the site. He the n testified, quite pointedly , that he ha d v isi te d th e sit e on ly on c e " thi nk ingIwa s g oin g to h e lp a fr ie nd and a lso g e t a job a t the same time, and it was proba

bly to give —it would just be an estimated guess proba bly , g osh, four or f

ive, si x mo nt hs ago. I real ly

do n't k no w. I di dn 't wri te i t d own . I di dn 't do cum ent any th in g on t hat ." F ow le r t e sti fi e d th a t he ha d n e ve r a g re e d to te sti fy a s an e xpe rt fo r the Ho op e rs , that in iti a lly he had no ide a ther e wa s a lawsuit pending about the house, a nd that he told Mr. Hooper , "I ' m going to t e ll you ri g ht n ow , B ob by

Sma llw oo d an d I are fr ie nd s. Yo u a re my fr ie nd , a nd Ido no t w a nt t o g e t in the mid dle of thi s. " F ow le r al so e xpla ine d h owthe " re po rt " c a me int o e xiste nc e . F ow le r a lso 1 te sti fi e d tha t he ha d no de sir e to b e the re , a nd wa s th e re on ly

be c a us e he wa s a fr a id h e wo uld g o to jail if he did not appea

r in response to a trial subpoena

. Although the Hooper s assert e rror by the trial cour

t in allowing Fowle r to testify , the issue is not addressed by

their brief

in any detail. The pur

ported err or in a llowing Fowle r' s testimony has not been a dequate ly

briefe d, and we find nothing c ompelling that c onclusion.6

Th e Ho op e rs a lso c omp la in t hat th e y we re no t a llo we d to vo ir

dir e F ow le r, so tha

t th e y c ou ld explore Fowle r' s ref

usal to respond to Mr. Hooper ' s calls, and his ig noring of a subpoe na for a pre trial deposition. There is no attempt to apply this arg ument to the case , bey ond stating that, under Rul e 70 5( b) of

the Te xas R

ule s o f E vid e nc e , it

wa s an a bu se of dis c re tio n to de ny

the ir re qu e st t o conduct voir dire

. See T EX . R. E V ID . 705(b). Rule 705(b) is exclusively direc ted at allowingvoir dire "dir ecte d to the underlying f acts or data upon whic h the opinion is based." That is ne ither what the Hooper s asked for, nor what they appea r to have wanted the n or later . There is nothing in the rule to support that position. We find no err or re g ardingwitness Fowle r. ( 2) Limiti ng Testimony of Expert J ames Pe arson W

as Not Error The Hoope rs also cla im that the trial court erred in excluding testi mony of appr aiser Pea rson. Pearson ha d been c alled by the Hooper s to te stify that, beca use the e stimated cost of re pairing the ho us e —th a t is , r e pa ir ingthe imp ro vem ents on the land —e xce e de d th e a mou

nt r e po rt e dly

pa id t o build the house orig inally , the improvements currently had no value . After

Smallwood's c ounsel was allowed to take Pearson on voir dire and the Hoope rs' counsel wa s allowed to make an off er of proof, the trial cour

t ruled that Pear son' s testimony would not be allowed. The Hoope rs' argument on this point neit h er m ad e re fer ence s to the rec ord, nor c ited any authority for the pr oposition urge d. Appellate briefs must c ontain appropr iate citations to authorities and to the record. T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 8. 1( h) , 3 8. 2( a )( 1) . A n a rgume nt m ay

be wa ive d if

ina de qu a te ly7

briefe d. Fredonia St ate Bank v. Gen. Am . Life Ins. Co. , 88 1 S.W. 2d 27 9, 28 4 (T e x. 19 94 ); Gray v

. Nas h , 259 S.W .3d 286, 294 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2008, pet. denied). W e al s o o b s er v e th at P ea rs o n 's t es t i m o n y i n v o l v edo n l y

i s s u es o f d am age s . Gi v en t h e j u ry 's verdic t, no damag es were re cover able by the Hooper s, making any such testimony

on damag es ir re le va nt. We overrule this contention of err or. ( 3) No Error W

as Committed Relative to Breac h-of-W arranty Jury I

ssues The Hoope rs also ar g ue (w ith no refe renc e to authori t y or any leg al ana ly sis) that the trial

c o u r t e r r e d b y submitt ing a

question on whether

Smallwood breac hed express and implied wa rra nties beca use the Hoope rs established the brea ches as a matter of law. A n inadequately briefe d issue may be waived on appea l. See F redonia State Bank, 881 S.W .2d at 284 (discussing "long standing rule" that point may be waived due to ina dequate briefing ). Acc ording ly , in the absenc e of a uthority or analy sis, we will not consider these complaints. T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(h). We also note that, g iven t h e s u b s t an t i a l l y c o n f

l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e i nt h e r e c o r d , n o u l t i m a t e i s s u e w a s p r o v e nc o n c l u s i v e l y, leavingthe issues for the jury to decide. ( 4) Legally and Factually Sufficient Evidenc e Supports the Jury 's Verdict I n two variations on a theme, the Hooper s contend that the jury ' s verdic t f inding t hem neg lige nt is unsupported by sufficie nt e vidence and that they conclusively proved that Smallwood

was ne g li g e n t. T h e ir

ar g u me n t l ar g e ly

f o c u s e s o nth e c a

u s a ti o ne le me n t o f

a n e g li g e n c e c a

u s e ofThe Hoope rs also ar g ue, in this context , that there was no e vidence that they wer e 2 responsible for

the way in which the sidewa lks a

nd soil we re installed. I t is clear that they paid for the work a

nd that they

hired other s to perf

orm the j ob they laid out for them to do. F or the Hoope rs to n owc la im t hat th ey

ha d n o r e sp on sib ili ty

be c a us e so me on e e lse did

a s th e y dir e c te d is insupportable. F urther, if they wished to c laim that some other pa rty followed their dir ections in a ne g lig e nt m ann e r, it w a s th e ir re sp on sib ili ty

to b ri ngthe m in to t

he su it a s p art ie s and attemp t to rec over f rom them. The Hoope rs now state f latly in their appe llat e b ri ef

that the " independe nt contra ctor" was ne g lige nt. That argument is raised too late to be considere d. 8 a c tio n. We i nit ia lly

re c og nize tha

t th e qu e sti on of the Ho op e rs ' ow n ne g lig e nc e is n ot r e le va nt t o th is

re v i ew . T h e r e l e v a n t qu es t i o nb ef o re u s i s wh et h er

s u ff i ci en tev i d en ce s u

p p o rt s t h e j u ry 's conclusion that Smallwood wa s not neg lige nt. Although the a rg ument is imprecise, it appe ars the Hooper s' complaint is that the evidenc e of pr ox imate ca use wa s lacking , that is, the evidenc e prove s

c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a tS m a l l w o o d an d S k i n n e r w e r e t h e p r o x i m a t e c a

u s e o f t h e i n j u r y. 2 When a par

ty attacks the fac tual sufficie ncy of an a dverse finding on an issue on which he or she ha s the burden of

proof, the pa

rty must demonstrate that the a dverse fi n d i n g i s ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Do w Chem . Co. v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 242 (T e x. 20 01 ); In re Estate of Stee d , 152 S.W .3d 797, 806 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied)

. I n a re view of this nature , we are require d to c onsider and weig h all of the e vidence , and we

can se t aside a ve rdict only if the evide nce is so weak or if the finding is so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and prepondera

nce of the evidence that it is clea rly wrongand unjust. Steed , 1 52 S.W. 3d a t 80 6; see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W .2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). In conductingour re view, we are min df ul t hat th e fa c t- fi nd e r w a s th e so le jud g e of the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s and the we ig ht t o be g iven their testimony

. Golden Eagle Arc hery, I nc. v. J ackson , 116 S.W .3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003).9

We will not pass on the credibility of the witnesse s or substitute our judgmen t for that of the trier of fa ct, eve n if a diff

ere nt answer

could be r eac hed. Long v . L o ng , 1 9 6 S. W. 3 d 4 6 0 , 4 6 4 ( T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 6, no pe t.) ; In re Es tat e of H e nr y , 250 S.W .3d 518, 523 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). As mos t r e c e ntl y

art ic ulate d b y

the Te xas S up re me C ou rt, the te st f or le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y is "w hether the evidenc e at tria l would enable r easona ble and fair- minded people to re ach the verdic t

un der r evi ew. " Cit

y o f K el l er v. W

ilson , 1 68 S.W. 3d

80 2, 82 7 ( Te x. 20 05 ). I n ma kin g thi s deter mination, we cr edit favor able e vidence if a re asonable fac t-finder could, and disre g ard c ontrary evidenc e unless a r easona ble fa ct-finde r could not. Id . So long as the evidenc e fa lls withi n the zone of re asonable disag ree ment, we may not substit ute our judg ment for that of the fa ct-finde r. Id . at 82 2. Th e tr ie r of fa c t is the so le jud g e of the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s a

nd the we ig ht t o g ive the ir testimony

. Id

. at 819. Although we consider the evide nce in a light most favor able to the c halleng ed finding s, indulging ever

y rea sonable infe renc e that supports them, we may not disreg ard e vidence that allows only

one infe renc e. Id . at 822. I n deter mining a no- evidenc e issue, we are to c onsider only the evidenc e and inf ere nces that t en d to support the finding and disreg ard a ll evidence and infe renc es to the contra ry . Bradford v. Ve nto , 4 8 S. W.3 d 7 49 , 7 54 (T e x. 20 01 ); Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v . Cazarez , 937 S.W .2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1996).10

I n a fa ctual suff

iciency revie w, we c onsider and weig h all the evidenc e and will set aside the verdic t o n ly if th e e v id e n c e is s o w e a k o r th e f in d in g is s o a g a in s t th e g r e a t w e ig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that it is clearly wrongand unjust. Vi c k

e ry v . V ic k e ry , 999 S.W .2d 34 2, 37 6 ( Te x. 19 99 ); Pool , 7 15 S.W. 2d a t 63 5; Garza v. Alviar , 395 S.W .2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). The e le me n ts o f a n e g li g e n c e c a u s e o f a c ti o n ar e a le g a l d u ty , a b r e a c h o f th a t duty , and damag es p ro x i m at ely

cause d by

the bre ach. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of Desoto, Tex., Inc . v. Mason , 1 4 3 S

. W

. 3 d 7 9 4 , 7 9 8 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g D. Houston, Inc. v . Love , 9 2 S. W. 3 d 4 5 0 , 4 5 4 ( T e x. 2002)). To e stablish prox imate ca use, a pla intiff must prove two eleme nts, cause- in-fac t and fo re se e a bil ity. Id. Ca

us e -i n- fa c t is e sta

bli sh e d wh e n the a c t or omi ssi on wa s a su bs tanti a l fa c tor

in bring ing a

bout the injuries, and without it, the harm would not have occur red. Id. at 7 99 ; Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Pe rez , 819 S.W .2d 470, 472 (Tex. 1991). The jury ' s neg ative answ er to jury question number one as to Smallwood and Skinner re prese nted a r efusa l to find from a pr eponder ance of the evidenc e that neg lige nce of either Sm allwood or Skinner was a proxi mate ca

use of the oc curr ence . See Ste rner v. M

arathon Oil Co. , 76 7 S.W. 2d 68 6, 69 0 (T ex . 1 98 9) ; Hu tc his on v . Pha rri s , 158 S.W .3d 554, 564 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2005, no pet.). The followingevidenc e is not substantially disputed: (a) the house is on g round havinga fa irly substantial slope; (b ) the bu ild e r d

ugou t an a

re a of the c lay slo pe , fi lle d it wi th sa nd , and bu ilt the Ho op e rs ' house atop the sa

nd , re t aining the slope, which he descr ibed as c ritical to proper draina g e;We rec og nize that the Hoopers now c om p lain that Smallwood's testimony should be 3 disreg arde d beca

use he w as not named a s an expert witness. Howe ver, he was a ble to testify , and 11 (c ) the Ho op e rs , w ith ou t c on su ltatio n w ithSma llw oo d, ha d a no the r c on tr a c tor

bu ild sid e wa lks aro un d th e ho us e and ha d at le a st twen ty -on e du mp t ru c k lo a ds of

so il br ou g ht i n a

nd pla c e d ins ide the sid e wa lk p e ri me te r, e ff e c tiv e ly le ve lin g the are a s in the front a

nd back of

the house; and (d) water

collecte d under the slab causing expansion of the clay subsoil beneath the sa

nd and re sulting in the hea

ving of the house' s foundation. Be y ond those basics, ther e wa s considera ble diverg ence of evide nce and opinion. A number of wi tne sse s p ro vid e d a

numbe r o f p os sib le ans we rs to th e qu est ion of fa ult . T he wi tne sse s' te sti mony a tte mpt ingto a sse ss b lame fo r t he mov e me nt o f the so il an d the dama g e to t he ho us e is all over the map. The Hoope rs fa

ult Sm allwood for pr oviding no e x pert testimony that would set up a prope r standard of

car e that Smallwood a lleg edly met. As the Hooper s were plaintiffs, this is not the prope r view. The Hooper s provided ex p er t s t h at set up a number of inconsistent standar ds, and then a number of inconsistent way s in which thos e varying standards mi g ht be met. The problem is not that there was no e vidence of a pr oper standa rd of c are . The problem is that there wer e many differ ent proposed standa

rds of c are . Smallwood testified that, in his opinion, the collection of water and subsequent heavingof the soil was bec ause of

the Hooper s' flattening of the slo p e. W h en the complaints beg an, 3did so without obj ection. Any complaint about the nature of his te stimony has not be en pre serve d

for our revie w. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1. 12 Smallwood o f

f e r e d to r e mo v e th e s id e w a lk s an d r e s to r e th e s lo p e a t n o c o s t to th e H o o p e r s . Mr. Hoo p e r r e f

u s e d th e o f

f e r . I n s te a d , M r . H o o p e r d u g a h o le , f

o u n d n o w a te r a

p p e ar e d in it, and conclude d that this proved that the sidewa lks and slope wer e not the sourc e of the problem. The Hooper s later installed some F renc h drains ar ound the house. Donald I llingwor

th testified that the flat site an d l at er -a dded fill around the house wa s the problem and a g ree d that the sidewa lks s h o u l d h av e bee n taken out and the slope awa y from the foundation re stored. He also testified that h e b el i ev ed that the beams were too far a part a nd that Smallwood should have consulted a soils or structura l e ng ineer befor e prepa ring the foundation. He also admitted, howeve r, that foundation problems can exis t e ven with suc h additional information and that he ha d previously written an expert repor

t in a L amar

County case stating that a five- inch slab with no eng ineer ing or soil borings wa s rea sonable for the ar ea. I llingwor

th also opined that no f i l l d i rts h o u l d

h a v e b e e nu s e d

an d t h a tt h e s l a

b s h o u l d h a v e b e e np l a c e d

d i r e c t l y o nt h e c l ay. Geor g e Perdue did a boring around the house and found water

. He also deride d the dec ision to c re a te a

pa d f or the fo un datio n b y

dig g inga

ho le and pu tti ng san d in it , st a tin g that th is w ou ld

m a k e t h e s o i l p r o b l e m s o n l y w o r s e . P e r d u e d i s a g r e e d w i t h Il l i n g w o rt h a b o u tb u i l d i n g o nt h e c l a y, and also disag ree d with Newton Gor sha' s opinion. Gorsha, a nother e ng ineer , testified that the cla y beneath the house wa s shrinking or swelling beca use of water, a

nd with no underg round source, i t would nece ssarily come from another source .13

He a g ree d that gra d i n g was ne cessa ry to help water

flow aw ay

from the house and that expansive clay was a problem. He also believed that an eng ineer should have be en hire d and that a soils re port should have be en obtained befor e building. He opined that native soil and more fill dirt under the foundation should have be en used. Skinner testified that he me t with Mr. Hooper a nd Smallwood in ea

rly 2004 and discussed sidewal k s w it

h th e m. Sk inn e r

r e late d th a t S ma ll w o o d

w an te d th e m r e mo v e d , b u t M r . Hooper ref used. Skinner testified that the side walks we re le vel with the house, a nd t h e flowe r beds we re mounded up in such a f

ashion that water would run t owar d the hous e, with no way to ge t out. He

a lso su g g e ste d th a t w a te r i s g e tti ngin a ro un d th e pe ri me te r, ins ide the sid e wa lks

. Gar y Hilliard, a s o i l s eng ineer , also testified (by deposition) that Smallwood did not have enoug h stiffening in the foundation, that the be ams wer e too fa r apa rt , t h at t h e digg ing/sa

nd combination was a

poor wa y t o co nstruct such a

house, and that Smallwood shoul d have hir ed an eng ineer . When he was a sked to opine that the house was not built in a prudent manne r, howe ver, he re fused, stating that the vast majority of houses built in L amar County use neither soils testi ng nor eng ineer s, that nothing a

bout the foundation fe ll below standards, a nd that ever

y thing done on the ho us e wa s with in sta

nd ard s. He a lso a c kn ow le dg e d that " Murp hy a lw ay s r ule s" —in oth e r w or ds , sometimes problems occur no matter what prec autions are taken. Fr ed Mar shall, the Hoopers' expert for cost of repairs, believed water on the per imeter c aused the pr ob le m.Th e Ho op e rs argue that this wit ne ss' te sti mon

y sh ou ld b e dis re g ard e d a s w ith ou t any we ig ht, 4 beca use he is not an expert builder and works with a school district. I t is, however, a ppare nt from h i s t es t i m o n y

t h at t h e w i t n es s h as ex p er t i s e in co n n ec t i o nwi t h t h e c o n s t ru ct i o no f l ar ge b u i l d i n gs in t he are a . H e is h ard ly

inh e re ntl y

un be lie va ble a s c ouns e l su g g e sts , a nd any weak ness in

his c re de nti a ls o r t e sti mony

wi ll g o to the we ig ht o f his te sti mony and c re dib ili ty

—matte rs e xclu siv e ly for the de termination of the jury

. 14 Jer ry Ste ph e ns , a

c on c re te c on str

uc tio n a nd fo un datio n r e pa ir

bu sin e ssm an ( wi th o ve r t hir ty y ear s' experience in L amar County) testified that he we n t to the house. Stephens testified that he would not give his usual lifetime warr anty for foundation repa ir if the sidewa lks around the Hoope r house we re not corr ecte d and that, if he had been allowed to do the work ear ly on, when he first went out, the cost would have been le ss. Fowle r testified that he saw the water -ponding problem and told Mr. Hooper to take a ction to ge t water

awa y from the f

oundation. J ohn Br y ant, Skinner' s eng ineer , testified (by deposition) that he believe d water around the perimete r contributed to the damag e and that he assumed drains wer e put in beca use the sidewa lks

wer e tra pping w ater

. He equivocated at leng th, te stify ing that a number of fa ctors could c ause w ater to b e tr a pp e d, inc lud ingthe sid e wa lks

. Jame s Da ws on , the ind ivi du a l ov e rs e e ing c on str uc tio n pr oje c ts fo r a loc a l sc ho ol dis tr ict, noted that, even with soils testing, eng ineer ing, and the use of arc hitects, he h as s t i l l ex p erienced

su bs tanti a l pr ob le ms at ti me s. 4 I n short, we ha

ve evide nce, e x pert a

nd otherwise, suppor

ting both sides' positions about the

cause of the proble m. The evide nce w ould sufficiently support either jury finding : that the problemThe Hoope rs also ar g ue that ther e is no expert testimony that supports the jury ' s conclusion 5 that the Hooper s were neg lige nt. That particular arg ument is imm ater ial, as the que stion is whether Smallwood was neg lige nt, and whethe r the finding that he was not is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. 15 was c aused by

Smallwood's foundation design or his diggin g o u t and putting in sa nd under the foundation or that the pr oblem was c aused b y t h e Ho o pers' addition of sidewalks, re moval of the slope, and/or the a dditional f ill dirt. There is opinion evidence that the desig n of the foundation was ina de qu a te and , o n th e oth e r hand , tha t the de sig n wa s stand ard and a de qu a te fo r t

he are a . T he re is opinion evidence that eng ineer s and soi l tests should be used by any competent builder , testimony that they wer e not so used in L amar County , and opinion evidenc e that, even i f they had bee n used, the y wo uld no t ne c e ssa

ri ly have a vo ide d th e pr ob le m. Th ere is e vid e nc e that Sma llw oo d w a s a 5 g ood and compe tent builder, with over 700 home s to his credit, and other opinion evidence that he

wa s n ot t oo g oo d or he wo uld have inv olv e d e ng ine e rs and so il t e ste rs in t

he pr oc e ss. Th e " e xpe rt s" variously testified that the water c ame in fr om the perimete r ar ound the house, that it did not, and that an unknown unde rg round aquife r mig ht be ca using the problem. Ex perts opined that, either the soil should have been simply built on, that too muc h fill dirt was taken out, that no dirt should have been ta ken out, or that diff

ere nt ty pes of f ill shoul d have be en broug ht in. Clearly , the evidenc e is in conflict. This Court is not a fac t-finder and may not pass on the

cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s or substitute its j u d gm en t for that of the trier of fac t. Mar. Ove rseas Cor p. v . E lli s , 971 S.W. 2d

40 2, 40 6– 07 (T e x. 19 98 ); Be lle fon te Un de rwr ite rs In s. Co. v . B ro wn , 704 S.W .2d 742, 744 (Tex. 1986) (findings of fac t are exclusive province of jury or trial cour

t). I t is not16

within the province of this Court to inter fer e with the fac t-finder ' s resolution of conflicts i n t he

e v id e n c e o r to p a s s o n th e w e ig h t o r c r e d ib il it y o f th e w it

n e s s e s ' te s ti mony . S

w . Airlines Co. v. Jaege r , 8 67 S.W. 2d

82 4, 82 9– 30 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) . Wh ere the re is conf l i ct i n g evidenc e, the f

act- finder' s verdict on suc h matters is g ener ally reg arde d as conc lusive. Ed mu nd s v . S an de rs , 2 S.W. 3d

69 7, 70 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —E l P aso 19 99 , w ri t de nie d) ; see Pool , 715 S.W .2d at 634. There is evidence that would support a rather lar g e number of outcomes in this case . That being so, we c annot choose o n e o v er the other and disre g ard the jury ' s resolution of the disag ree ments among the witnesses. The jury ' s verdic t w as not r eac hed ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. I n related ar g uments, the Hooper s argue th at Smallwood judicially admitted that he wa s neg lige nt and that his admission thus conclusively proves his neg lige nce. We have re viewed the salient testimony . The testimony is not a n admission that he was neg lige nt. I n context, S mallwood made a n entirely rea sonable statement that, if he were buildi ng the hous e now, based on what he now knows, he would build it differe ntly . I n the second ref ere nced statement, Smallwood state d that he thought he was building the house in a g ood and workmanlike manner , but appar ently did not do so. Ag ain, af ter obser ving te stimony

from a host of experts, a

nd then being g rilled at some leng th about the va ri ou s p ro ble ms o f t

he ho us e , a

nd a bo ut a ll of the dif

fe re nt wa y s in w hic h th e fo un datio n c ou ld have be en built, the response is en t i rely rea sonable a

nd is certa inly

not a judicial admission of neg lige nce.17

The Hoope rs furthe r ar g ue, wi t h out refe renc e to authority , that the jury ' s answer s to the question of Smallwood's br eac h of wa rra nty wer e unsupportable beca use the evidenc e esta

blished conclusively that Smallwood br eac hed his w arr anty reg ardingthe quality of his construction and the implied warra

nty of g ood wor k m an s h i p . Howeve r, there is evidence , as pre viously noted, from multipl e sourc es indicating that Smallwood's workmanship was good and met all standards of the

are a and that he did not act in such an unsupportable fashion as would prove breac h as a matter of law. T h e H o o p er s co n cl u d e t h a t a r gu m en tb y s t at i n g i nt wo s h o rt p ar agr ap h s t h at S m al l wo o d 's repr esentations were suc h to require a finding in the Hooper s' fa v o r o n t h eir De ceptive T rade Practice s Act cla im. This se g ment likewise has no ref ere nce to r eleva

nt a uthority , does not set out the eleme nts of such a c laim, and makes no e ffor t to apply a broa d, g ener al s tatement of the fa cts of this case. As noted above, the evidenc e is in conflict, and even wer e the brief ing suf ficient (w hich it is not ), the a

rg ument would fail. These contentions are likewise over ruled. The Hoope rs also complain be cause the jury answe red w ith z ero amounts for both dama g es

or re pair c osts and attorney ' s fee s. They argue that the evidence conclusively shows that this cannot be ri g ht. Un de r o ur

re so lut ion

of the re ma ind e r o f t

his a pp e a l, w e ne e d n ot a dd

re ss t he se iss ue s. We overrule all contentions asser ting the insuff

iciency of the e vidence

. ( 5) Limiti ng Post-Trial Dis cove ry W as Not an Abuse of Discretion The Hoope rs also complain that they wer e not provided with sufficie nt post-trial discovery to allow them to fully

develop their theory about fraud and conspiracy . Unlike the situation where18

pretria l discovery is involved, there are no clea r rules r eg ardingthe provision of post-trial discove ry in this contex t. Gene rally , the scope of discovery relies on the prope rly exercised discr etion of the trial court. See I

n re CSX Corp. , 124 S.W .3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig . proce eding ) (pe r cur iam). The Hoope rs state they

wanted mor e discove ry

of communications between c ounsel and communications with adjust ers, billing r ecor ds, and additional telephone rec ords. As pointed out by Sma llw oo d' s atto rn e y , p art s o f t hat r e qu e st i mpl ic a te a tto rn e y -c lie nt p ri vil e g e , a nd c ouns e l f la tly de nie d th a t th e re qu e ste d e ma ils e xiste d. Th e re is n o a rt ic ula te d r e a so n w hy

a dd iti on a l ( pr e su ma

bly

e arl ie r) te le ph on e re c or ds wo uld be of a ssi sta nc e to t he Ho op e rs ' argume nts in f a vo r o f a ne w tri a l. At the hea

ring on the motion for new trial, the Hooper s introduced F owler' s telephone r ecor ds from April 2006 throug h Fe bruar y 15, 2007; Smallwood's telephone rec ords from De cembe r 24, 2006, thr ou g h F e br

ua ry 23 , 2 00 7; a

nd Cha dw ic k' s ( the a tto rn e y ' s i nv e s t i g a t o r) t e l e p h o n e r e c o rd s f

ro m Apr il 2006 throug h Fe bruar

y 15, 2007. The trial wa s held from F ebrua ry 6 throug h Fe bruar

y 9, 2007. Al tho ug h the Ho op e rs do no t f ind the qu antum of

dis c ov e ry

a llo we d to be su ff

ic ie nt, it i s difficult to conclude the trial cour t abused its discretion by limit ing disc overy as it did, and the Hooper s have pr ovided no ra tionale sug g esting such abuse . We overrule the issue. ( 6) Refusing a New Tri al W as Not an Abuse of Discretion The ge nera l rule is that a trial court ha s wide discre tion in ruling on a motion for ne w trial and that its actio n will not be disturbed on appea l absent a showingof an a buse of discr etion. J ac k so n v . V an W ink le , 660 S.W .2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983), overruled on othe r grounds b y Moritz v.Simi larly , if we classify this as involving newly

discovere d evidenc e, the standa rd for our 6 re vie w i s th e same : w e a lso re vie w a tr ia l c ourt ' s ru lin g on a

mot ion fo r n e w tri a l ba se d o n n e wl y discovere d evidenc e for an abuse of discretion. Mitchell v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 156 S.W .3d 622, 629 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 4, pe t. d e nie d) . Apa rt y se e king a ne w tri a l on

the g ro un d o f n e wl y d i s co v er edev i d en ce m u s ts h o w t h e t ri al co u rt t h at (1 ) t h e ev i d en ce h as co m e t o h i s o r h er kn o wl ed ge sin c e the tr ia l, ( 2) it w a s n ot o wi ngto t he wa nt o f d ue dil ig e nc e that it did no t com e so on e r, (3 ) i t is not cumulative, and ( 4) i t is so materia l that it would probably produce a differe nt result if a ne w trial wer e g rante d. W

heele r v. Gree ne , 194 S.W. 3d 1, 6 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 200 6, no pe t.) ; Fantasy Ranch, In c. v. C ity of Arlington , 1 9 3 S

. W

. 3 d 6 0 5 , 6 1 5 ( T e x. A p p . — F o rtW o rt h 2 0 0 6 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ; see Dallas I ndep. Sch. Dis t

. v. F

i nlan , 27 S.W .3d 220, 240 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pe t. denied), (c i t i n g Jack

son , 660 S.W .2d at 809). 19 Pr e iss , 1 21 S.W. 3d

71 5, 72 1 ( Te x. 20 03 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt do e s n ot h a ve un bri dle d d isc re tio n to 6 de c ide a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l, but ins te a d must re ly on g uid ing ru le s and pr inc ipl e s in r e a c hin g its decision. Mo sse r v . P lan o Th re e Ve ntu re , 893 S.W .2d 8, 10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no wr it). The Hoope rs contend that, at the hea ring on their motion for new tria l, they showed that fr aud

was c ommitt ed ag ainst the trial cour t by Smallwoo d and per sons relate d to Smallwood, which

nece ssarily

require d or justified g ranting a new trial. The a lleg ed fr aud o n t h e co urt, the Hoope rs

asser t, was per

petrated by

Smallwoo d i n co n t actingone of the Hooper s' experts, Fowler , and convincinghim to not return Mr. Hooper ' s telephone c alls, but to testify for Smallwood ag ainst the Ho op e rs a t tr ia l. T he Ho op e rs ra ise d th e se ma tte rs a t tr ia l, b ut h a d li ttl e inf or ma tio n to bo lst e r t

he ir po sit ion . Be fo re the he ari ngon the Ho op e rs ' mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l, t

he y ob ta ine d d isc ov e ry

a bo ut a number of te lephone c alls that had bee n place d betwee n Fowle r and Smallwood bef ore tria l. The Hooper s argue now that, ba sed on that information, they proved a conspirac y to commit fraud on the tr ia l c ourt and , th us , th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y de nyingthe ir

mot ion fo r n e w tri a l.The wor d "r etain" is defined in re levant par t as " to keep in one' s pay

or ser vice . . . to employ 7 by pay in g a retai ner. " M ER R I AM -W EB S TER ' S C OL L EGI AT E D I C TI ONAR Y 1063 (11th ed. 2006). 20 I n e xten siv e and

he a te d a rgume nts , the Ho op e rs c on ne c t th e a lle g e d f ra ud s o n th e c ourt

wi th

a sse r t e d i mp r o p e r c o n t a c t s w i t h F o w l e r

an d a l l e g e d l y r e s u l t i n g f

a l s e t e s t i m o n y . B u tt h e H o o p e rs '

e xten siv e and

e ne rg e tic e ff

or ts t o atte mpt

t o e xp o s e o p p o s i n g

c o u n s e l' s a lle g e d im

pr op e r c on ta c t w ith F o w l e r is , in th e fi nal anal y si s, "ful l of sou nd and fury , [s ] igni fy in g no th in g." W I L L I AM S H A KESPEARE , T HE T RA G ED Y O F M AC B E TH , a c t 5, sc . 5 . T he un de rl y ingpr ob le m w iththe Ho op e rs ' eff orts reg ardingFowle r is that the evidenc e amply supports, even strong ly sug g ests, the conc lusion t h at Fo wl er

wa s n o ta r et ai n edex p er tfo r t h e H o o p er s . Un l es s Fo wl er wa s t h e H o o p er s ' retained expert witness, contac ts with him by Smallwood's counsel, even if any had been proven, w ould have 7 been e ntirely

proper . Fowle r is a building c ontrac tor in the are a, and ther e is evidenc e that he a nd Mr. Hooper

had persona lly

met and discussed possible c osts to repair the house . Howeve r, the only thing pr ovided by the Ho op e rs in dis c ov e ry in c on ne c tio n wi th F ow le r wa s a lis t of c os ts fo r the vario us repa ir s, which they

indicated wa s Fowle r' s expert report; y et Fowler une quivocally testified that he ha d not prepa red a repor t. F owler was also clea

r that he never ag ree d to be the Hooper s' expert witness. He maintained all alongthat he did not wish to be involved in this dis pute. Se c on d, a lth ou g h the Ho op e rs c omp la in that Fo wl e r' s app e ara nc e a t tria l wa s a surp ri se , it is d if fi c ult to g ive that c omp la int

any c re de nc e : he wa s name d a s a wi tne ss by the Ho op e rs , a s w e ll as by Skinner.21

Th ir d, the re is lit tle that wo uld pr e ve nt the op po sin g pa rt y fr om c on ta c tin g a name d w itn e ss, expert or otherw ise, befor e trial. The only limit ation would forbid opposing counsel fr om contacting

a reta ined expert witness without pe rmission, whic h we have alre ady said was not applica

ble her e. F ourt h, it i s o bv iou s th a t Fo wl e r ha d no c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a tio n, that he ha d n o in sig ht i nto lit ig a t i o ns t r a t e g i e s , o r

e v e nm o r e t h ano n e m e e t i n g w i t h M r . H o o p e r . T h e r e i s n o c o n f i d e n t i a lit y ag ree ment, there was no long -standing specia l relationship, no fee paid, and no attorney work product involved. Fowle r' s testimony

was that, fr om the v er y

beg inning, he had (a

nd articulated that he ha d) no desire to be involved in this litigation. Fowle r had testified at the trial that he had initially thought that the Hooper s wanted only some repa ir work done

. He sa id he had a sked the Hoope rs if there was litigation betwe en them and Smallwood and w as t old there was not. Fowle r t estified that he never ag ree d to be an e x pert for the Hooper s and wa s not paid to be one. He indicated that he told the Hooper s' attorney , when told that they wer e listi ng him a s an expert, that he w ould not act as one , that he did not p re p ar e the report, and that Fowler had initiated contac t with Sm allwood, not the other wa y around. The fa ct that a witness, e ven an e x pert witness, for one side talks willingly to the other side is not nece ssarily improper. There are sever al ca ses discussing the impact of c ontact and disc ussions betwee n experts for one side and counsel or parties from another

. They uniformly find that wher eThis is readily distinguishable f

rom the wrongdoing descr ibed in Rule 4.02(b) of the Rules 8 of Profe ssional Conduct, which provides that "a l aw y er shall not, personally or by repr esentative, cause another

to communicate a

bout the subject of repr esentation with a per son . . . a lawy er know s to be employ ed or retained for the purpose of confe rring with or advising another lawy er about the subject of the repr esentation, unless the lawy er ha s the consent of the other la

wy er or is authorized by law to do so ." T EX . D I S C I PL I NAR Y R. P R OF ' L C ON DU C T 4.02(b) ( emphasis adde d). 22 nonreta ined expert witnesses ar e conc erne d, such meeting s are not imprope r. Du rst v . H ill Cou ntr y 8 Mem 'l Hosp. , 70 S.W. 3 d

2 3 3 ( T e x. A

p p . —San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (de fenda nt's tre ating phy sician

me e tin g a lon e wi th pla int if f' s c ouns e l no t im

pr op e r, tho ug h s ome wo rr ie s a rt ic ulate d a

bo ut p os sib le

re v e a l i n g o f o t h e r w i s e u nr e l a te d a nd c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a tio n und e r d oc tor -p a tie nt p ri vil e g e ); Hogue

v. Kroger Store No. 107 , 8 7 5 S. W. 2 d 4 7 7 ( T e x. A p p . — H o u s to n [1 s t D is t. ] 1 9 9 4 , w r it denied) (s ame ); cf. In re Collins , 224 S.W .3d 798 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2007, no pe t.) (same ; but trial court could issue protec tive order beca use doctors mig ht know nonrele vant and pr ivilege d fac ts). On e re c e nt c a se fr om the Cor pu s Ch ri sti Cou

rt of Ap pe a ls d isc us se s r e ta ine d e xpe rt s a t so me le ng th i n th e c on te xt of

e xpla ini ngwh a t is re qu ir e d to jus tif y dis qu a lif

y ing on e and

re fu sin g to p e rm it him to testi fy

. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Kajima Int'l, Inc. , 2 1 6 S. W. 3 d 4 3 6 ( T e x. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied). I t also is no t d i rectly on point, as it discusses retained experts and conf

idential relationships, caused by providing confide ntial or privi l eg ed information to the e xpe rt by the pa

rt y . Ne ith e r sit

uatio n e xists he re . Ev e n in the c on te xt of ret ain ed expe rt s, howeve r, the Corpus Christi court re cog nized that ex perts should no t b e t oo easily disqualified, be c a us e " un sc ru

pu lou s atto rn e y s ma

y a tte mpt to c re a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t

h n u me ro us po te nti a l e xpe rt s23

at a no mi nal fee ho pi ng to pree mp t th e abi li ty of t hei r adv ers ari es t o o bt ain ex pert ass is tan ce." Id. at 448–49. The contac ts be tween Fowle r and Smallwood have not bee n shown to be wrong ful. Ther e is no evidence that Fowle r cha ng ed his testimony

beca use of Smallwood, other tha n the spec ulative

and ima g inativ e inferences pro po se d b y c ouns e l f

or the Ho op e rs . F ur

the r, pa rt of the Ho op e rs ' argumen t i s b as ed on the unde rly ing notion that opposing counsel wa s involved in some sort of collusion and that Fow ler wa s a re tained expert with some sort of inside knowledg e that was used by counsel for Smallwood's benef it. No evidenc e sug g ests that Fowle r wa s a re tained expert, and both sides acknowle dg e that F owler w ould not even talk to Mr. Hoope r. I t is t h u s unlikely that Fowle r had a cce ss to any

inside or privileg ed information. Fowler ' s ref usal to appea

r for de positions is certa inly

not laudable—in fa ct, he wa s ultim ately held i n contempt for his fa ilure to appe ar—but the evidenc e sug g ests that his behavior shows more a desire not to be involved or a disgust with the entire pr ocee ding tha

n any thing e lse. The H o o p ers f

ocus on ce ll phone rec ords indicating that there wer e twenty -two telephone

c a lls ma de be tw e e n F ow le r a nd Sma llw oo d b e fo re tr ia l, a nd on the c on te nt o f s ome of

tho se c a lls

conce rning the " water t ra p p i n g fl ower beds" and the c reation of a re pair e stimate. The Hoope rs listed the telephone c alls, and provided e vidence , at the hea ring on the motion for new tr ial, from the po st- tr ia l de po sit ion

of F ow le r a nd a tr ans c ri pti on

of an in te rv ie w w ithSma llwood in wh ic h it appea rs that Fow ler a dmitted talking to Smallwood about the house, the problems with the house,24

an d t h e p ro b l em s w i t h t h e d ra i n age . T h e H o o p er s co mp l ai nt h at t h i s i s d i ff er en tfr o m Fo wl er 's testimony at trial: that he ha d only

talked to Smallwood three times about the house

. The testimony , howeve r, is hardly one-sided. T here i s al so evidenc e that a numbe r of the twenty -two ca lls were likely telephone ta g which beg an whe n Fowle r we nt by Smallwood's off

ice and aske d him to call. Acc o rd i ng to the proce ss server ' s aff idavit, he ca lled Fowle r a numbe r of tim e s bef or e tr ia l to ke e p h im u

pd a te d o n w he n tr ia l w ou ld e ve ntu a lly be g in a nd wh e n h e wo uld actua lly need to a ppear . I t seems at lea st possibl e that more than three contac ts occurr ed that had at le a st s ome dis c us sio n o f t he ho us e inv olv e d. Ev e n mu lti ple c on ta c ts, ho we ve r, are no t pr ob le ma tic

un de r t he se fa c ts. Un de r t his e vidence, it is n ot a

pp are nt t hat th e tr ia l c ourt

a c te d o uts ide the sc op e of its dis c re tio n in

de nyingthe mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l. Counse l a lso me nti on s se ve ra l ot he r i te ms whic h a

pp e ar i nte nd e d to su

pp or t hi s e qu ita

ble argument that a new

trial should have be en g rante d in the interest of ju s t ice. He argues that he proved that counsel bre ache d his ethical duties bec ause F owler lied at t ri al about the number of contac ts he had made with Smallwood or hi s counsel, James Rodge rs, and that Rodg ers kne w about the lie and f

ailed to take a ction to corre ct it. There was e vidence at the hea rin g o n t h e mot ion for new tria l to the contrar

y , and also testim ony that, when the proce ss serve r who had served F owler be g an to te ll Ro dgers abo ut Fowle r' s f ur iou s ti ra de a ft e r b e ing

inf or me d th a t he wa s n a me d a s a witness in the case, R odg ers told J im Chadwick that he wanted t o hear nothing about what Fow ler had to say

except from the stand.25

Counsel for the Hoope rs complains beca use t he process server (Chadwick) used by Rodge rs talked to Fow ler repe atedly befor e trial. Chadwic k is married to Smallwood' s daug hter. Ag ain, as previously discussed, Fowler was not a re tained expert. I f F owler w as willing to talk, ther e wa s no

e thi c a l or le g a l im pe dim e nt t o k e e p a

n inve sti g a tor

fr om t a lki ngto h im. Counsel for the Ho o p er s complains about Rodg ers' leadingquestioning of Fowle r, but provides no re al ar g ument. I t appea rs t hat counsel is attempting to use t hat as some sort of support for his main complaint, that Rodg ers necessa rily knew what Fowle r was g oing to testify to and was havin g to l e a d h im i nto it. Th e H o o p e r s a ls o s u g g e s t t h a t c o u n s e l f

o r Sk inn e r , Je r

r y E w in g , a c te d

in a ma n n e r th at supported the c onspiracy beca use he opposed p o s t -trial discove ry . I n fac t, the trial court twice quashed a

subpoena a

nd ref used t o "pr oduce doc uments indicating the nature of the F owler

c on sp ir a c y ." Ew ingwa s q ue sti on e d at th e he a

ri ng , b ut h is s ta te me nts we re inn oc uo us . Counsel for the Hoope rs also complains that, duringa bre ak in Fowle r' s cross-e x amination at trial, Rodg ers pulled F owler a side and talke d to him. The rec ord shows counsel questioning Fowle r about this, with the following exchang e: Q. . . . Dur in g th e b r e a k f r o m 1 0 :0 0 to 1 0 :2 0

– e xc u s e me 1 0 :2 0 to 1 0 :22 y ou ta lke d to Mr . Ro dg e rs ? A. Rig ht. Q. What di d y ou

ta lk a bo ut? A. What di d I

ta lk a bo ut?26

Q. Yes, sir. A. He w as kind of conc erne d about y ou wer e [sic] trying to make me say that they [S mallwood] had contacte d me. I haven' t talked to any

of these pe ople. Th e re wa s n o o the r d is cus si on , no c omp la int ra ise d, c ouns e l me re ly

c on tin ue d o n w ithhis questioning. N either e rror nor ha rm i s shown, and c ounsel' s attempts to show the exi stence of a conspirac y

from such slende r comments is at the ve ry least imag inative. The Hoope rs also complain because their witness (who they did not call) was ca lled to testify by Smallwood without prior warning . They seem t o ar gu e that this is inappropriate be cause the parties ha d ag ree d to tell each othe r who they wer e g oing to c all and the sequenc e on the day befor e

e a c h w a s c a lle d to te sti fy . H ow e ve r, Sma llw oo d h a s d ir e c te d u s to dir e c t state me nts by the Ho op e rs '

c ouns e l th a t, a lth ou g h th e tr ia l c ourt ha d a sk e d th e m to re a c h s uc h a n a g re e me nt, the y

ha d n ot. The Hooper s also complain that Smallwood had not identified Fow ler a s a trial witness as

re qu ir e d by an inte rr og a tor y . Ho we ve r, it ap pe ars that Sk inn e r h a d d on e so , a nd ha d th e Ho op e rs ' counsel c omplained about thi s failure in a ti mely fashion, the witness could s till have been br oug ht beca use of Skinner' s desig nation. No thi ngsh ow s any imp ro pr ie ty by Rod g e rs . We ar e no t convin c e d, e ith e r b y the argume nts raised nor by the larg e number

of unre lated comments made by counsel for

the Hooper s, that the trial court a bused i ts discretion by denying the motion for ne w trial. The c ontention of err or is overr uled.27

We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.

J o s h R

. M o r r i s s , III Chief J ustice Date Submitted: Aug ust 13, 2008 Date D ecide d: October 22, 2008