IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 07–0452

Filed February 20, 2009

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

VINCENT FITZGERALD WALLS,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. 

Ovrom, Judge.

Defendant appeals his criminal convictions contending the district 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress testimony obtained in 

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the admission of this 

testimony at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant 

Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jeff Noble and 

Susan Cox, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
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Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, and Vincent Walls, pro se, Anamosa, for 

appellant.
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BAKER, Justice.

A jury convicted the defendant, Vincent Walls, of sexual abuse in 

the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.2, 

sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 

709.1 and 709.3, willful injury causing serious injury in violation of Iowa 

Code section 708.4(1), and kidnapping in the second degree in violation 

of Iowa Code sections 902.9 and 902.3 (2004). Walls appealed these

convictions, contending the interrogating officer failed to honor his 

request for counsel in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and his right to counsel, and therefore, the district court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during 

this interrogation. We transferred this case to the court of appeals, 

which determined that the district court should have suppressed the 

defendant’s statements but that any error in admitting them was 

harmless. We granted Walls’ application for further review. We conclude 

that the district court should have suppressed Walls’ statements, and 

the erroneous admission of those statements was not harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Susan Lombard is a substitute teacher from Ankeny, Iowa. In 

2004, Lombard was struggling with alcohol and drug addictions. On the 

weekend of May 5, 2004, she came to Des Moines to buy drugs. In the 

three days that followed, Lombard met drug dealers, loaned her car out 

in exchange for crack cocaine, and attended a drug party in a Des 

Moines hotel room. On Sunday, May 7, Lombard stumbled into the 

home of Nancy Pilcher bloody and disoriented. Lombard told Pilcher that 

she and another woman had been forcibly held against their will by a 
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man, and that she had been pistol-whipped for refusing his sexual 

advances. Responding police were unable to locate the man.

Vincent Walls was arrested by the Des Moines police and brought 

in for questioning regarding Lombard’s assault and kidnapping. After 

explaining the allegations that Lombard and Cathy Riley, the other 

victim, had made against Walls concerning the incident, Officer Bender 

read Walls his Miranda rights and asked him to sign a waiver. Walls 

responded by asking if Bender could get in contact with Roger Owens, 

his attorney. At this point, Bender attempted to clarify Walls’ request for 

an attorney by asking, “Is [getting in contact with him] what you’re 

wanting me to do?” To this Walls replied, “Yeah, because I’d love to talk 

to you but I couldn’t talk to you on that recorder.”

Instead of terminating the interview, Bender continued talking, 

informing Walls that their conversation was being taped in order to 

create a record and protect the rights of both parties. After this 

explanation, Bender asked Walls to once again clarify his request for an 

attorney before Bender proceeded with the interrogation. Walls never 

clearly answered Bender’s second request for clarification; instead, he 

stated, “[s]ee, and then I’ve got to sign this paper.” Bender again 

proceeded with the interrogation, questioning Walls about his 

involvement in Lombard’s kidnapping and assault.

During the interrogation that followed, Walls confessed to some of 

the allegations. The State subsequently charged Walls with first- and 

second-degree sexual abuse, second-degree kidnapping, first-degree 

robbery, and willful injury causing serious injury. Prior to trial, Walls’

attorney moved to suppress his confession on the ground that Officer 

Bender continued to question Walls after he asked for an attorney. The 

district court denied the motion. At trial, the confession was admitted, 
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and the jury found Walls guilty of both counts of sex abuse, kidnapping, 

willful injury, and assault, a lesser included offense of robbery.

Walls appealed the jury’s verdict, challenging the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress his confession. The court of appeals 

affirmed his conviction, concluding that the State violated Walls’ Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination but that the district court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress was harmless error. Walls filed an 

application for further review with this court, requesting that his 

conviction be reversed and he be given a new trial. We granted further 

review.

II. Scope of Review.

We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Peterson, 663 

N.W.2d 417, 423 (Iowa 2003). In assessing the validity of a defendant’s 

Miranda waiver, the State bears the heavy burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was made knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily without intimidation, coercion, or deception. 

State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Iowa 2006) (citing State v. Morgan, 

559 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Iowa 1997)). Our review of the record is de novo,

and we will make our own evaluation of the circumstances. Id.

III. Fifth Amendment Violation.

The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution provides that no 

person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 

himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution makes this right 

binding on the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84, S. Ct. 1489, 

1492, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653, 658 (1964). According to the United States 

Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. 

Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706–07 (1966), pursuant to the Fifth 
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Amendment, a person “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 

freedom of action in any significant way” must first be warned by police 

that “he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make 

may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the 

presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” If at that point, 

the person indicates that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must 

cease until an attorney is present. Id. at 473–74, 86 S. Ct. at 1627–28, 

16 L. Ed. 2d at 723. The Miranda Court dictated that:

If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time 

prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain 

silent, the interrogation must cease. . . . If the individual 

states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must 

cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the 

individual must have an opportunity to confer with the 

attorney and to have him present during any subsequent 

questioning. . . . [The police] must respect his decision to 

remain silent.

Id.

In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 

1884–85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981), the Court further clarified that 

when an individual expresses a desire for counsel, the authorities must 

cease any further interrogation until counsel is present or the accused 

individual has initiated further communication with the police. The 

State carries the burden of proving that the individual “knowingly and 

intelligently waived” these privileges afforded under the Fifth 

Amendment. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628, 16 L. Ed. 2d 

at 724.

After being read his Miranda rights by Bender, Walls stated, “Roger 

Owens. Can you get in contact with him? That’s my attorney.” To this 

Bender asked, “Is that what you’re wanting me to do?” To which Walls 

responded, “Yeah.” This is clearly a request for an attorney. Bender was 
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then required to cease all interrogation until an attorney was present. 

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85, 101 S. Ct. at 1884–85, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 

386; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74, 86 S. Ct. at 1627–28, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 

723. Bender’s decision to proceed with the interrogation was in violation 

of Walls’ Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and to 

counsel. The district court erred in not granting Walls’ motion to 

suppress his interrogation testimony.

IV. Harmless Error.

Most federal constitutional errors, including the erroneous 

admission of evidence in a criminal trial in violation of a defendant’s 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, do not require reversal if 

the error is harmless. State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 10 (2007) (citing 

Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 430). Harmless-error analysis looks to the basis 

on which the jury’s verdict actually rested. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 431. 

“To establish harmless error, the State must ‘prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 

obtained.’ ” Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. 

Ct. 824, 828, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967)).

To determine whether the State has met its burden under the 

harmless-error standard, the court employs a two-step analysis. Id. 

(citing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1893, 114 L. 

Ed. 2d 432, 449 (1991)). First, the court asks what evidence the jury 

actually considered in reaching its verdict. Id. Second, the court weighs 

the probative force of that evidence against the probative force of the 

erroneously admitted evidence standing alone. Id. This step requires the 

court to ask “whether the force of the evidence is so overwhelming as to 

leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that 
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evidence would have been the same without the erroneously admitted 

evidence.” Id.

A. Evidence Jury Actually Considered. In this case, the State 

was required to prove the elements of five separate counts: (1) sexual 

abuse in the first degree, (2) sexual abuse in the second degree, (3) willful 

injury causing serious injury, (4) kidnapping, and (5) assault. Besides 

Walls’ erroneously admitted testimony, the State presented four

witnesses.

Susan Lombard testified in detail regarding the incident. She told 

the jury that she was an alcoholic and crack addict, and had come to 

Des Moines to get drugs. She testified that on the morning of May 7, 

Walls jumped into the backseat of her car, was “very angry,” and kept

yelling about his stolen money and drugs. Lombard testified that he told 

her to drive down an alleyway, that he pulled a gun on her, and that he 

dragged Riley into the backseat, forced her to strip, and put her in the 

trunk. Then Lombard testified that Walls asked her to perform a sex act,

and when she refused, he attempted to force her to do the act, pistolwhipped her several times, stomped on her hand, and attempted to place 

her in the trunk with Riley. She also testified about her escape to Nancy 

Pilcher’s house, the extent of the injuries she suffered due to the 

incident, and that she denied being sexually abused at the hospital 

because she felt the staff was treating her horribly.

Cathy Riley testified that she too was a drug addict. She testified

that she had met Lombard the day before the alleged incident through a 

drug dealer, John Cameron, and that she and Lombard had been 

drinking beer and smoking crack. Riley also testified that Walls got into 

Lombard’s car, that he was very angry, and that after parking in the 

alley, he grabbed Riley’s hair, pulled her into the backseat, made her 
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strip, hit her, and put her in the trunk naked. Riley testified that 

although she could hear Walls hit Lombard and say, “we’re not going to 

stop until you get it right,” and Lombard begging for him to stop, she did 

not see Walls attempting to rape Lombard. Riley stated that she kicked 

through the trunk into the backseat, but when she stuck her head 

through the opening Walls pointed the gun at her and she retreated. She 

testified that when Walls opened the trunk to put Lombard inside, she

escaped.

Nancy Pilcher testified that Lombard came running into her house 

“all bloody and physically hurt.” She then stated that Lombard ran 

around her house looking for a place to hide and stated, “call 911; he’s 

going to kill me,” before collapsing in her entryway. Pilcher also testified 

that Lombard said that she was an alcoholic, that she had come to Des 

Moines to get drugs, and that she had been pistol-whipped by a man 

after she refused his sexual advances.

Alycia Peterson, a Des Moines police officer, testified that when she 

arrived at Pilcher’s home Lombard was in “pretty bad shape.” Peterson 

testified that Lombard said she had been pistol-whipped by a man after 

refusing to perform a sex act. The police recovered physical evidence of 

the attack, including prints, bloodstains, discarded clothing, and took

pictures of the broken backseat. The police also obtained a partially 

corroborating statement from Riley before she was able to discuss the 

incident with Lombard.

During the course of his interrogation with Officer Bender, Walls 

made statements concerning three of the five charges against him. He 

admitted that he got into the backseat of Lombard’s car and forced 

Lombard to drive him to an alley near Tenth Street and Franklin. Walls 

also admitted he wanted to interrogate the women and threatened them 
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with a gun. He further stated that he made Riley swallow some crack, 

forced her to take off all her clothes, and put her in the trunk.

Regarding Lombard’s assault, Walls told Bender that he hit her 

multiple times with his gun, “[b]ecause she wouldn’t tell me what the f___

I wanted to know. Honestly, she wouldn’t tell me what I wanted to 

know.” In response to Bender’s questioning, Walls admitted that he also 

intended to put Lombard in the trunk, and that afterwards he tried to 

clean the gun with bleach, but was unable to get rid of all the evidence. 

He explained how Riley had kicked through the trunk to the backseat 

and described in detail Lombard’s attempts to get him to stop beating 

her. His recital of the statements made by Lombard during the assault 

mirrored her earlier statements to police.

B. Probative Force of Evidence. In weighing the probative force 

of the untainted evidence the jury actually considered against the 

probative force of Walls’ erroneously admitted testimony, the key 

question for this court is “whether we can conclude the erroneously 

admitted statements are so unimportant in relation to everything else the 

jury considered that there is no reasonable possibility they contributed to 

[the defendant’s] conviction.” Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 434 (emphasis in 

original). It is not enough that the State show that the same result is 

probable in the context of a constitutional error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 

508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 189 (1993)

(“The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred 

without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but 

whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 

unattributable to the error.” (Emphasis in original)). The State must 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is “no reasonable possibility”

the falsely admitted statements contributed to Walls’ conviction.
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Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 434. In explaining this test, we stated: “It is 

only when the effect of the incorrectly admitted evidence is comparatively 

minimal to this degree that it can be said . . . there is no reasonable 

possibility that such evidence might have contributed to the conviction.” 

State v. Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Iowa 1995) (emphasis added).

Walls’ admissions were detailed confessions to kidnapping, willful 

injury, and assault. In weighing the probative force of the untainted 

evidence, however, we note one of the victims admittedly spent three 

days drinking and doing drugs, and the second victim was engaged in 

similar activities. In addition, the other witnesses saw the victims only 

after the assault.

The State’s assertion on appeal that the effect of the interrogation 

is comparatively minimal is belied by its use of the testimony at trial. 

The prosecutor emphasized the admissions in the opening statement. 

The entire one and a half hour interrogation was played to the jury at the 

end of the State’s case, capping its case in chief. Finally, Walls’ 

statements became the cornerstone of the State’s closing argument. The 

prosecutor used the statements as proof of almost every disputed 

element of each crime charged. He played excerpts of the interrogation 

at least eight times and commented on each. Quotes were put on slides 

and shown to the jury, again with comments. The State certainly did not 

believe that the admissions were “unimportant in relation to everything 

else.” Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 434.

Walls did not admit to the sexual assault, but was nevertheless 

convicted of sexual abuse, even in light of Lombard’s denial at the 

hospital of being sexually abused and Riley’s testimony that she never 

saw the sexual assault. Given the harmful nature of Walls’ statements 

corroborating the other charges and their use at trial, we cannot say the 
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effect of these statements is so comparatively weak that there is no 

reasonable possibility that such statements might have contributed to 

the conviction for sexual abuse. Further, Walls’ confession virtually 

guaranteed his conviction on the remaining charges. Although the same 

result may have been probable, it would defy credulity to find that there 

was no reasonable possibility the confession contributed to Walls’

conviction. The error was not harmless.

V. Disposition.

We find that the district court should have suppressed Walls’

interrogation testimony and erred in admitting those statements into 

evidence during trial. Such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We therefore vacate the court of appeals decision, reverse the 

district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand the 

case for a new trial.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except Cady, J., who dissents.
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07–0452, State v. Walls

CADY, Justice (dissenting).

I agree the custodial statements made by Walls were improperly 

admitted into evidence at trial, but I would conclude the error was 

harmless. 

We recognize the harmless-error doctrine and follow a two-step 

analysis in the application of the doctrine to a particular case. State v. 

Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Iowa 1995). Under this doctrine, the 

probative force of the evidence considered by the jury in reaching its 

verdict is weighed against the probative force of the evidence that was 

improperly admitted. Id. The error is harmless if the force of the 

properly admitted evidence is so overwhelming that the verdict would 

have been the same without the improperly admitted evidence. Id. There 

must be no reasonable possibility the improperly admitted evidence 

contributed to the verdict. Id. 

The two victims of the crimes in this case, Lombard and Riley, 

detailed the actions of Walls in their trial testimony with remarkable 

consistency. Essentially, they testified Walls pulled a gun on them while 

in Lombard’s car, placed Riley in the trunk of the car after forcing her to 

strip naked, and repeatedly beat Lombard while in the car after she 

resisted his efforts to obtain oral sex. The testimony of Lombard and 

Riley clearly supported the convictions for sexual abuse, willful injury, 

and kidnapping. A witness who observed the bloody and battered 

Lombard immediately after she escaped from the car gave testimony at 

trial that was consistent with both victims’ testimony, including an 

excited utterance by Lombard that she had been pistol-whipped for 

refusing sexual advances. A police officer who arrived at the scene also 

provided testimony consistent with the testimony of Lombard and Riley. 
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Physical evidence gathered by police was also consistent with the 

testimony of Lombard and Riley, including discarded clothing and 

evidence Riley tried to escape from the trunk. 

The improperly admitted evidence essentially consisted of 

statements by Walls that he entered Lombard’s car, threatened the two 

women with a gun, and placed Riley in the trunk of the car after forcing 

her to disrobe. He also said he hit Lombard with the gun and later tried 

to clean the gun with bleach to destroy any evidence. He also made a 

statement that he attempted to place Lombard in the trunk and 

corroborated Riley’s testimony that she tried to escape from the trunk.

The majority essentially concludes the harmless-error test cannot 

be met because the improperly admitted statements were emphasized by 

the prosecutor in opening and closing arguments and were corroborated 

by the testimony of the other witnesses. The majority believes the 

presence of these two factors means the improperly admitted statements 

necessarily contributed to the guilty verdict. This approach is a 

misapplication of the harmless-error doctrine and effectively renders it 

meaningless when applied to improperly admitted incriminating 

statements by an accused. Nearly all confessions admitted at trial 

influence the verdict, and it should come as no surprise that prosecutors 

tend to emphasize confessions and that confessions tend to be consistent 

with the other evidence offered by the prosecution. If the doctrine is 

inapplicable to improperly admitted confessions, we would not have 

applied it in Hensley to find the trial court error harmless. See id. at 384 

(holding improperly admitted statement by defendant that he believed 

the vehicle was stolen was harmless error in a conviction for vehicle 

theft, even though an element of the crime required proof that defendant 

knew or had a reasonable belief the vehicle was stolen). The test is not 
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whether the improperly admitted evidence was consistent with the 

verdict or was emphasized by the prosecutor, but whether the properly 

admitted evidence was so strong that the verdict would have been the 

same without the improperly admitted evidence. The majority has failed 

to properly apply this test by considering the strength of the properly 

admitted evidence and has improperly focused on two factors that do not 

drive the outcome of the test. 

Applying the harmless-error test in this case, the probative force of 

the evidence produced by the State on all four crimes, without 

considering the improperly admitted statements by Walls, was 

overwhelming. Each victim presented very similar testimony, which was 

consistent with the other evidence offered by the State supporting the 

convictions. The majority points out the victims were consuming drugs 

and alcohol in the days prior to the incident, but there is no indication 

this activity adversely impacted their ability to observe and recall the 

incident. On the other hand, the probative force of each statement by 

Walls, weighed against the other evidence of guilt, was minimal. The 

force of this evidence was minimal because the testimony of Lombard 

was corroborated by the testimony of Riley, and vice versa. Additionally, 

the testimony of both women was consistent with the other evidence 

offered by the State. Consequently, other than the statement by Walls 

that he cleaned the gun with bleach, the improperly admitted statements 

were only cumulative, and the outcome of the trial would have been the 

same without the statements. The statement by Walls that he cleaned 

the gun with bleach was minimal and could not have contributed to the 

verdict.