1 Because the Defendant pleaded guil

ty to th e possession of drug para phernalia

charge without

reservi ng a certifie d question r

egarding the

legality of his seizure, that conv iction is not before us; thus, our holding does not af fect the Defe ndant's po ssession of drug pa raphern alia conv iction. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. FREDER ICK GONZALEZ Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Williamson County No. I-199-12-B Henry Denmark Bell, Judge

No. M1999-00165-CCA-R3-CD - Filed August 10, 2000

The Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction of simple possession of cocaine. He argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidenceused to convict him because the evidence was the fruit

of an unlawful seizure. We agree; accordingly, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and dismiss the cas

e against him. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgmen

t of the Trial Court

Reversed.
W ELLES , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which S MITH , J., and W ILLIAM S , J., joined. John Conners, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Frederick Gonzalez.
Paul G. Summers, Attorne y General and Re

porter, Lucian D . Geise , Assistant Attorn ey General, Ron Davis, District Attorney General, Jeff Burks, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
The Defendant, Frederick H. Gonzalez, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of o

ver 0.5 grams of c

ocaine with the int

ent to sell and deliver. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained against him as the result of an unlawful seizure, but such motion was denied afte r a hearing. Prior

to trial, the Defendant pleaded guilty to the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, but proceeded to trial on the possession with intent charge. The jury found the Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of

misdemeanor possession of cocaine. From this conviction the Defendant appeals asof right, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We agree; accordingly, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and dismiss that charge. 12 Although Officer Wri ght test ified t hat he smelled an odor

of marijuana when he a

pproached the vehi

cle, t he only m arijuana fo und in th e vehicle w as mariju ana residu e in a wo oden "d ugout" inside the g love com partme nt. -2- FACTS
At the hearing on the moti on to suppress, Off

icer Craig Wrigh

t of the Franklin Poli

c e Department

testified that on December 5, 1998, he was patrolling in a residential area of Franklin. He said that he had been given information around midnight from another officer, who received the information from a confidential informant, that the Defendant was "en route" to purchase cocaine on Cadet Lane. The confidential informant had stated that the Defendant would be a passenger in a blue Ford Taurus with damage to driver's side and that the Defendant would purchase the cocaine. Officer Wright was already familiar with both t he Def endant and the blue Taurus. While not actively looking for the Taurus, Officer Wright testified that he "thought" he woul

d stop the vehicle if he saw it.
Around1:00 a.m. on December 5, 1998, Officer Wright saw the b lue Taurus in the residential area in which he was patrolling. He had not received any additional information regarding th e Defendant,

so he did not know whether th e Defendant had

actually purcha

sed cocaine. Thi

s residential area was not the area in which the confi dential informant said the Defenda

nt would pur chase cocaine. After passing the blue Taurus, which was traveling in the opposite direction , Officer Wright made a U-turn and proceeded to follow t he vehicle. H e observed the vehicle turn rightonto Chickasaw Drive, a dead-end street, without using a turn signal. Upon observi ng the vehicle turn without signaling, Officer Wright decided to stop the vehicle for making an improper turn. However, Officer Wright also testified that the driver of the Taurus made a "quick turn" and that the turn would not have affected his police vehicle.
Officer Wright followed the vehicle onto Chickasaw Drive where he saw the vehicle stop at the dead-end. The

dr iver of the vehicle, Andrew Rayburn, exited the vehicle and approached the police car, at which point

Officer Wright

ordered Rayburn

to get back into

the vehicle and activated his blue lights. Rayburn did as he was ordered, and Officer Wright approached the vehicle. Office r Wright testified that as he approached , he smelled an odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. He made Rayburn exit the car and found a crack pipe and a razor blade a fter "patting down" Rayburn. Rayburn was pl aced under a rrest. Upon discovering that the Defendant, who was Rayburn's passenger, had an outstanding warrant for failure to appear on a fireworks violation, the Defendant

was arrested and placed in the same patrol car as Rayburn. An audio r

ecorder secre

tly recorded the conversation between the Defendant and Rayburn.
A search of Rayburn's vehicle uncovered a small amount of c oca ine and some drug paraphernalia. 2 After Rayburn and the Defendant were rem oved from the police vehicle, a bag containing an additional 0.7 grams of cocaine was discovered under the seat where the Defendant had been sitting.-3-

Andrew Rayburn testified that on December 5, 1998, he and the Defendant passed a police vehicle traveling in the opposite direction, and immediately after they passed the police vehicle, it made an "abrupt" U-turnand began following Rayburn. Rayburn anticipated that the police officer intended to pull him over, so he turned right on t o Chickasaw, a de ad-end road, an

d stopped his vehicle. Rayburn admitted not using a turn signal when he

turned right,

but he testified that there was no traffic

immediately behind or

otherwise near him. Although the police vehicle was behind him, Rayburn testified that it was not yet close enough to have been affected by the turn.
Lieutenant

Darrell Cagle testified that he supplied Officer Wright with information from a confidential informant

that the Defendant was "en route" to purchase cocaine on December 5, 1998. After giving Officer Wright the original infor

mation, Lt. Cagle did not speak with Officer Wright again. He testified that he had rec eived information from the confidential informant before, that prior information from the informant had led to arres ts, and that the informant was being paid for information. Lt. Cagle said that he had recruited the informant to wo

rk with the police a

nd that to his knowledge, the informant had not provided false information. Lt. Cagle did not testify as to how the informant knew the information, but hedid say that the informant was not s omeone who would be at the drug sale.
After hearing the proof, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that if there was a stop, it was a "proper stop" based upon the fai lure to give a t urn signal and the information given

by the confidentia

l informant that the

Defendant was g

oing to purchase d

rugs.
The Defendant now a

sserts that the tria

l court err ed by failing to suppress evidence of the drugs found in Rayburn's vehicle, the drugs found in the police vehicle, and the conversati on between the Def

endant and Rayburn which was secretly recorded while they were in the police cruiser. He argues that all of the evidence against him was the fruit of an unlawful stop of Rayburn's car; thus, the evidenc

e must be suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his right to be free from unreasonab

le searches and

seizures.
STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing t

he grant or den

ial of a motion to supp

ress, [q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party preva iling in the trial court is e

ntitled to the strong

est legitimate view of the evidence ad duced at the suppr ession hearing

as well as all reasonable

and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. So long
as the greater weight of the evidence supports the trial court ’s findings , those fin dings shallbe upheld. In other words, a trial court’s findings of fact in a supp ression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.
Statev. Odom , 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). However, the application of the law to the facts
as found by the trial court is a question of law which the appellate court

reviews de novo
. Statev. Yeargan , 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue , 858-4-

S.W.2d 906, 907 (Ten n. 1993) ). Because the facts presented at the suppression hearing were undisputed, only questions of law are before this Court. Therefore, our review of the record below is de novo
. See State v. Daniel , 12 S.W.3d 420, 423-24 (Tenn. 2000).
UNLAWFUL

"STOP" OR SEI

ZURE
The Fourth Amend

ment to the United Sta

tes Constitution prov

ides as follows: Unreasonable

searches and seizures. – The right of the people to be se cure in their persons, hou ses, papers, and effects , against unrea sonable search

es and seizures, sh

all not be violated, and no wa rrants shall issue

, but upon probable

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be sear ched, and the persons or things to be seized. Similarly, Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees
that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable

searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to se arch suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or person

s not na med, whose offences are not particularly

described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted.
The intent and purpose

of the prohibition a

gainst unreaso

nable searches and seizures found in the Tennessee Constitution has been found to be the same as that found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. S imps on , 968 S.W. 2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998 ) (citing State v. Downey , 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997); Sneed v. State , 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968)). According to the Supreme Court, the intent and pur pose behind the Fo urth Amendment is to “safeguard

the privacy and security of individuals against ar

bi trary invasions of government officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court , 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
Obv iou sly, before theconstitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
com e in to p lay, there must be a search or seizure. The Defendant here challenges the detention of Rayburn and himself in Rayburn's vehicle as a violation of the F ourth Amendment; th

us, as a preliminary

matter, we must determine whether the Defendan t was seized. I t has been repea

tedly held that the stop of an a

utomobile

and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure, even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the detention is brief. Wren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); Delaware v. Pro use , 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); Unites States v. Mar tinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1976); State v. Vineyard , 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997). However, in this case, Officer Wright did not literally "stop" the ve h icle in which the Defendant was riding. The vehicle had already come to a stop before Officer Wrig ht had any

contact with its oc

cupants. This distinction is important because courts have also repeatedly held that an office r may approach an individua l in a public place and a sk questions without implicating constitutional protections, whether the individual is in a parked car or walking in a public place. See Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429,-5-

434 (1991); Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1 983) (plu rality opin

ion); State v. Daniel , 12 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Pulley , 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Te nn. 1993); Statev. Wilhoit , 962 S.W.2d 482, 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Butler , 795 S.W.2d 680, 685 (T enn. Crim. App. 1990)

. Such an occurrence is considered a "consensual" police-citizen encounter. See Bostick , 501 U.S. at 434. The Supreme Court has e xplained the applic

ation and reason

ing of this rule as follows: [L]aw enforcement officers do no t violate the Fourt h Amendment by

merely approaching an individual on the street or in another publi

c place, by

asking him if he is willing to answer some que stions, by putt

ing questions to him

if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a cri minal pro secution his voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer

identifies himself as
a police officer

, with o ut more, convert t

he encounter into

a seizure requir

ing some level of objective justification. The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not,

without more, furnish those grounds. If there is no detention -- no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment -- then no constitutional rights have been infringed. Royer , 460 U.S. at 497-98 (

citations omitted); see also Daniel , 12 S.W.3d at 425. Notwithstanding the right of a police officer to approach an individual in a public place, an encounter between an officer and a citizen will not be considered consen s ual and will instead be considered

a seizure "when the officer, by means of phy sical force or showof

authority, h

as in some way restrained the liberty of

a citizen." Terry v. Oh

io , 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 ( 1968); see also Bostick , 501 U.S. at 434-35. A seizure occurs "'if, in view of all of the circumstances surroun ding th e incident, a rea sonab le person would have beli eved that he was not free to l eave.'" Michigan v. Chesternu t , 486 U.S. 56 7, 573 (198 8) (quotin g United States v. Me ndenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 5 5 4 (1980) (opinion of Stewar t, J.)); see also INS v. Delgado , 46 6 U.S . 210, 215 (1984); Daniel , 12 S.W.3d at 425. "[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the c ircumstance s surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable per

son that the person

was not free to

decline the offi cer's request

or otherwise terminate t he encounter." Bostick , 501 U.S. at 439. Some of the factors to consider include the time, place and purpose of the encounter; the wor ds used by the officer; the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; the officer's statements to others who were present during the encounter; the threatening presence of sever al officers; the display of

a weapon by an officer; and

the physical touching of the person of the citizen. Daniel , 12 S.W.3d at 425-26. The Supreme Court h

as recognized th

at this tes tis necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coer cive eff ect o f police conduct, taken a

s a whole, rather

than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a rest

raint on liberty

prompting a-6-

person to conclude that

he is not free to " leave" will vary, not only with the particular police conduct a

t issue, but also with

the setting in whic

h the conduct occ

urs. [Howe ver,] [w]hile the test is flexible enough to be applied to the wh ol e range of police

conduct in an equa

lly broad ra

nge of settings, it

calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police.
Chesternut , 486 U.S. at 573 (citation omitted).
In Michigan v. Chesternut , the Supreme Court held that the actions of the police in following and then driving their police cruiser alongside the defendant for a short distance did not constitute
a seizure. Id. at 574. In ana lyzing whet

her a reasonab

le person would ha

ve felt free to le

ave, th e Courtnoted that the rec

ord did "not reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; or that they command ed respond ent to halt, or displayed any weapons; or that they operated the car in an aggressive

manner to block responden t's cours e or otherwise c ontrol the directi

on or speed of his movement." Id. at 575. Applying the constitutional standards to the facts presented here, we conclude that the Defendant

was seized when Officer Wright ordered the driver to get back into the vehicle and when he activated the emergency lights. The only persons present were

Officer Wright, Rayburn, and the Defendant,

so the offic

er's ac tions wer e obviousl

y dire cted towa rds the De fendant a nd Rayb urn. We believe that the actions of Officer Wright in activating the emergency lights and in orde ring Rayburn to return to his vehicle constituted a show of authority such that a reasonable person in the position of either the D efendant or Rayburn would not have fel t free to lea ve. In the cont ext of sto pping a moving vehicle, as opposed to a seizure of a parked vehicle, our supreme court has maintained that "[w]hen an officer turn

s on his blue lights,

he or she has cle

arly initiated a stop." Pulley , 863 S.W.2d at 30. We see litt

le d ifference, from the perspective of the occupants in the vehicle, in turning on the blue lights behind a

moving vehicle and turning on the blue lights behind a parked vehicle. The lights still convey the message that the occupants are not free to leave. This conclusion is consistent withthat of courts in other jurisdictions, which have held tha t the activati on of emergenc y lights before approachin g a

parked vehicle constitutes a seizure. See State v. Donahue , 742 A.2d 775, 779- 80 (Conn. 1999); State v. Mireles , 991 P.2d 878, 880 (IdahoCt. App. 1999); Lawson v. State , 707 A.2d 947, 950-51 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); State v. Walp , 672 P.2d 374, 375 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Wallace v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d, 739, 7 41-42. (Va Ct. App . 2000); State v. Burge ss , 657 A.2d 202, 203 (Vt. 1995) ; State v. Stroud , 634 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). As aptly stated by the Mary

land Court of Speci

al Appeals, "Fe

w, if any, r

easonable citize

ns, while par ked, would simply drive away and assume that the police, in turning

on the emergen

cy flasher s, would be communicating someth ing other than for them to remain." Lawson , 707 A.2d at 951. Ordering
an occupant to return to the vehicle, as was done here, serves to enhance that communication. See Daniel , 12 S.W.3d at 426-27 (n oting that initi

a l encounter, whic

h was not seizure, w

as not accompanied

by order to s

top and answer qu

estions, by

drawn weapon, by demand for identification,
or by physical restraint). A

reasonable person would not think that he or she could simply g

et in his
or her vehicle and drive away after being ordered by a police officer to re turn to the ve hicle,-7-

especially when the only persons present are the police officer and the occupants of the vehicle and when the officer has activated the emergency lights.
Thou gh holding that the activation of emergency equipment, coupled with the orde ri ng o f
an occupant to return to his or her vehicle, cons titu tes a seizure, we a re cognizant of t

he difficult decisions police officer

s face daily

in the exercise of

their duties. We re

alize th at whe n officers desire to question citizens without rea sonable suspicion t

o do so, they m

ay also wan

t to activate their emergency

equipment for

their own safety so that they will be visible to others. Likewise, officers may want to keep multipl

e occupants of a

car together i

n that car to

ensure the officers' safety. Under
our decision, police officers who wish to question individuals may be faced with the unsettling choice of whether to act

iva te their emergency equipment for their safety and run the risk of later suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of their questioning or whether to forego questioning the individuals altogether. Such a dilemma does not, however

, alter our resul

t. We must follow the directives of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and the Tenne ssee Su preme Court. Under those directives, the test for determining whether a

seizure occurs examines the circumstances from the standpoint of the citizen, notthe police officer. See Chesternut , 486 U.S. at 573; Daniel , 12 S.W.3d at 425. I f a reasonable person would not

feel free to leave

due to an officer's show of authority, that constitutes a seizure, regardless of why the officer made a show of authority.
REASONABLENESS OF SEIZURE Having found that

the Defendant was seized, calling into play the protections of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, we must now determine whether that seizure was reasonable. Under both the United State

s and Tennesse

e C onstitutions, a search or seizure conducted without
a warrant is

presumed unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Simps on , 968 S.W.2d at 780; State v. Watkins , 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992). Ther efore , evidence seized as a result of a search or seizure conducted without a warrant must be suppressed unless the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the search was reasonable. Id.
Gen eral ly, for the seizure o f an automobile and occupants to be reasonable, there must be
sometype of

i ndividualized suspicion of wrongdoing justifying the seizure. It has be en deemed reasonable

to seize an automobi

le and its occupan

ts if an officer ha

s probable cause

to believe that
a criminal offense

has occurred

or that a traffic violation has occurred. See Wren , 517 U.S. at 810; Prouse 440 U.S. at 655, 659; Vineyard , 958 S.W.2d at 734. If the officer has pro bable cause to believe that a violation of the traffic code has occurred, the seizure will be upheld even if it is a complete pretext for the officer's subjective motivations in making the stop. Wren , 517 U.S. at 813- 17; Vineyard , 958 S.W.2d at 734-35. Similarly , it has bee

n deemed r

easonabl e to tempor

arily s eize
an aut omobile and occupants for investigation in the absence of probable cause if a police off ice r has re asonable

suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the occupants have been involved in or

are about to be involved in criminal activity. See Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996); Terry v. Oh io , 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); Simpson , 968 S.W.2d at 780; Vineyard , 958 S.W.2d at 734.-8-

The State urges us to

conclude that

the seizure was justified (A) because Officer Wright had probable cause to believe that

the driver of the vehicle in which the Defendant was riding violated
a prov ision of the traffic code by failing to give a signa l when turning and (B) because O ffice r Wright had reasonable suspicion, based on the information from the informant,

that the Defendant had been involved

in criminal activit

y. We rejec

t both contentions.
A. PROBABLE

CAUSE
The relevant section of our traffic code governing turning movement s provides as follo

ws: Turning movements. -- (a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadwa y as required in § 55-8-140, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct
course or move right

or left upon a roadway, unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate

signal in the manner provided in §§ 55-8-143 and 55-8-144 in the event any other traffic may

be affected by such movement

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-1 42 (emphasis adde d). Similarly, another secti on, entitled "Signals for turns," provides : Every driver who intend

s to start, stop or tur

n, or partly

turn from a direc

t line, shall first see that such movement can be made in safety, and whenever theoperation of any other vehicle may be

affected by such movement , shall give a sig

nal required in this section, plainly

visible to the driver of such other vehicle of the intention to make such movement.
Id. § 55-8-143(a) (e

mphasis added). T

hus, a turn signa

l is only requir

ed by law wh

en another vehic

le may be affected by

the turn. Here, Rayburn testified th at there was no traffic directly behind or around his vehicle. He further testified that

the officer's vehicle would not have been affected by the turn. Officer Wright also testified that he was not affected by Raybur

n's turn. Because no other vehicles could have been affected by Ray burn's movement

, Rayburn did

not violate any

provision of the tr

afficcode by failing to give a signal.

It follows that

Officer Wright

, by reason

of his observation

s, did not have prob

able
cause to believe that a traff ic violati on had occur red. Therefo re, Officer W righ t did not have probable cause to seize the Defendant and Rayburn in Raybur n's vehicle. See State v. Ronald Wayne Smith , No.M1999-0 1439- CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1103492, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec. 7, 1999).-9-

B. REASONABLE SUSPICION Likewise, Officer Wright did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that the Defendant was involved in criminal activity , thereby ma

king the seizure l

awful. It is we

ll established that

the facts forming the basis fo r the of ficer’s probable cause or reasonable suspicion need not rest upon the personal knowledge or observation of the officer. See Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S.143, 147 (1972); Simpson , 968 S.W.2d at 780. How ever, when a se

iz ure is based on the tip of an informant, the danger of false reports becomes a concern. Pulley , 863 S.W.2d at 31. Con seq uen tly, we must apply tests for det erm ini ng th e rel iab ili ty of an infor mant’s tip. Id. Under Tennesse e law, to establish probable cause based on an informant’s tip, there must be a showing of both the i nformant ’s credibility

and his or her basis of knowledge. See State v. Jacumin , 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989). Although reasonable suspicion “requires ‘a lower quantum of proof than probable cause,’ ” these Jacumin

factors are use

ful in considering

the reliability

of an informant’ s tip for establishing reasonable

suspicion as well as probable cause. Pulley , 863 S.W.2d at 31 (citation omitted). The difference

is that reasonable suspicionmay be established by tips that are less reliable. See id. ; State
v. Kelly , 9 48 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Our supreme court has maintained tha t “while independent polic

e corroboration

could make up deficiencies in either prong [of the test for reliabili ty],each prong represents an independently important consider ation that ‘must be sepa

rately considered and satisfied in some way.’” Jacumin , 778 S.W.2d at 436 (citation omitted). In examining independent police corroboration of an informant's tip, [i]t is difficult to def

ine with precisio n the quantity

of corroboratio

n necessary

to demonstrate

the informant's veracity [or basis of knowledge]. Certainly, more than the corroboration of a few minor elements of the story is n ecessary , especially

if those elements involve non-suspect behavior. It is equally certain, thoug h, that the police need not corr oborate e very detai l of an informant'

s report to establi

sh sufficie nt eviden ce of his v

eracity [or basis o

f knowled

ge].
Statev. Moon , 841 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 199 2) (quotin g United States v. Bu sh , 647 F.2d 357, 363 (3rd Cir. 1981)). Here, there was limited evidence as to the informant's credibility, but absolutely no evidence as to the informan

t's basis of knowledge. L

t. Cagle testified that he h

ad recruited the

informant to work for the police, that

the informant had provided information in the past, and that the information had been reliable. L

t. Cagle did

not, however, reveal howthe informant knew the Defendant was going to buy cocaine. Had Officer Wright corrobora ted more of the information p rovided by the informant, then perhaps he w ould have had rea

sonable suspicion to seize the Defen dant, but he did notdo so. The only

informa tion corroborate

d was that the Def

endant was in a blu

e Taurus with damage to the driver's side, with another individual. This information, s tanding a lone, was completely

innocent. See State v. Coleman , 791 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that the fact that a car identified by an informant was registered in the na me of the person implicated by the inf

ormant was "innocent in and of itself"). Officer Wright testified that he kn ew th e Defendant

and that he was familiar with the blue Taurus as a v ehicle that would contain the-10-

Defendant. Officer Wright did not see the Defendant in the Taurus in the area of Franklin where the informant said the Defendant was going to purchase cocaine. Also, Officer Wright did not see the Defendant until an hour after he had been informed that the Defendant was "en

route" to purcha

se cocaine. Upon these facts, we cannot find that the informant's information was suff ic iently corroborated. Because the State failed to establish both the informant's

credibility

and his basis of know ledge, we conclude that the informant's tip d

id not provide Off

icer Wright with r

easonable suspicion to believe that the Defendant had been involved in criminal activity. Therefore, the seizure of the Defendant

violated both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, and the fruits of that seizure must be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtaine d against the Defendant. All of the evidence agains t the Defen dant, incl uding the dr ugs found in Rayburn's vehicle, the drugs found in the police vehicle, and the conversation secretly recorded inside the police cruiser, was obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against unre asonab le searches and seizures. Therefore, we reverse the Defendant's conviction for s imple possession of cocaine and dismiss the case against him.

_______________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE