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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2014-NMSC-001

Filing Date: December 2, 2013

Docket No. 33,763

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL ALMANZAR,

Defendant-Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI

Neil C. Candelaria, District Judge

Gary K. King, Attorney General

Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender

Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

OPINION

VIGIL, Justice.

{1} In this case we address whether the phrase “at the scene” in NMSA 1978, Section 31-

1-7(A) (1995) authorizes law enforcement officers to make a warrantless arrest for domestic

violence beyond the precise geographic location where the disturbance occurred. In this case,

Daniel Almanzar (“Defendant”) was arrested without a warrant across the street from where

he allegedly battered his girlfriend (“Victim”). When the police searched Defendant pursuant

to his arrest, they found a golf-ball-sized mass of cocaine in his pants pocket. He was

subsequently charged with a drug trafficking offense. Defendant moved to suppress the
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cocaine on the basis that the arrest was unlawful because he was not arrested “at the scene”

as required under Section 31-1-7(A). The district court denied his motion, concluding that

the warrantless arrest was lawful because Defendant was arrested in close proximity to

where the actual incident took place.

{2} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that the warrantless arrest

was not lawfully made because Section 31-1-7(A) specifically limits the authority of law

enforcement officers to make an arrest for domestic battery, a misdemeanor, where the

incident took place. We disagree with this analysis. Our interpretation of the Legislature’s

intent in creating the statutory warrantless arrest exception in Section 31-1-7(A) leads us to

conclude that Defendant’s arrest was lawful because it was reasonably close in proximity

to where the domestic violence took place.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} On December 1, 2007, Defendant and Victim were in the parking lot at Tingley

Coliseum on the New Mexico State Fair grounds in Albuquerque. Defendant and Victim

began quarreling, and he allegedly kicked Victim. After the incident, Victim left the

fairgrounds and walked to a Walgreens drug store across the street on the corner of Central

Avenue and San Pedro Drive, where she called 911. Defendant also left the fairgrounds, but

he walked to a Circle K convenience store across the street on the corner of Central Avenue

and Louisiana Boulevard. The Albuquerque Police Department dispatched officers to both

locations in response to the 911 call.

{4} The officers identified Defendant when they arrived at the Circle K. As the officers

approached Defendant, he put his hands in his pockets and refused to remove them after

being asked to do so. The officers escorted Defendant out of the store, handcuffed him, and

performed a pat-down search. The officer who performed the search felt a hard object in

Defendant’s pocket and removed a golf-ball-sized mass of cocaine. The officers then put

Defendant in the back of a squad car and drove him to the Walgreens where Victim was

located.

{5} When they arrived at Walgreens, Victim identified Defendant as the person who had

battered her. Once Victim identified Defendant, one of the arresting officers made the initial

determination that Defendant would be charged with domestic violence and taken in for

booking. However, Defendant was not charged with the domestic violence offense, but

instead was charged with and indicted on one count of trafficking a controlled substance in

contravention of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-20 (2006).

{6} Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine evidence. He argued that the

search amounted to an illegal pat-down and that it was unlawful because, pursuant to Section

31-1-7(A), the police had no authority to arrest him away from where the incident took place

without a warrant. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the physical

evidence, concluding that the pat-down was lawful and that the arrest was lawful because
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“it was in the general vicinity, certainly in [the] area,” of the scene.

{7} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court on both grounds. State v. Almanzar,

2012-NMCA-111, ¶ 1, 288 P.3d 238. First, it held that the officer who performed the patdown exceed his authority by removing the cocaine from Defendant’s pocket because the

cocaine did not appear to be a weapon. Id. Second, the Court of Appeals held that

Defendant’s arrest was unlawful because the officers did not make the arrest at the precise

location of the alleged battery. Id. Accordingly, it held that the cocaine should have been

suppressed. Id.

{8} The State now asks this Court to address the lawfulness of Defendant’s arrest and

reverse the Court of Appeals on this single issue. It argues that the “at the scene” language

in Section 31-1-7(A) was satisfied because the arrest was made within minutes of the alleged

battery, and the arrest was made across the street from the reported incident. For the reasons

that follow, we conclude that the warrantless arrest was lawful. Therefore, we reverse the

Court of Appeals and affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

{9} The district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence presents a

mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Williams, 2011-NMSC-026, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 729,

255 P.3d 307. This Court reviews factual matters with deference to the district court’s

findings if substantial evidence exists to support them, and it reviews the district court’s

application of the law de novo. Id. Further, since Defendant’s appeal centers on our

interpretation of Section 31-1-7(A), this Court interprets that statute de novo. See Moongate

Water Co. v. City of Las Cruces, 2013-NMSC-018, ¶ 6, 302 P.3d 405 (“Statutory

interpretation is an issue of law that we review de novo.”).

B. The Warrantless Arrest Was Lawful Under Section 31-1-7(A) Because It Was

Made in Close Proximity to Where the Incident Took Place

{10} The central issue is whether Defendant was lawfully arrested without a warrant for

domestic violence when the arrest took place across the street from where the alleged

incident occurred. If Defendant’s arrest was lawful, then the search incident to the arrest falls

within the exception to the constitutional search warrant requirement. See N.M. Const. art.

II, § 10 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from

unreasonable searches and seizures.”); U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated.”); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 371, 188

P.3d 95 (“One of the most firmly established exceptions to the warrant requirement is “the

right on the part of the government, always recognized under English and American law, to

search the person of the accused when legally arrested.” (internal quotation marks and
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citation omitted)). We hold that because Defendant’s warrantless arrest was made within

close proximity to the alleged incident, it was lawful under Section 31-1-7(A). Therefore,

as the district court ruled, the cocaine was found pursuant to a search incident to a lawful

arrest, and Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied.

{11} We begin our analysis by noting the constitutional limitations on the government’s

authority to make an arrest without a warrant and search incident thereto. Article II, Section

10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that “[t]he people shall be secure in their

persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution also provides this guarantee. “Warrantless

[searches and] seizures are presumed to be unreasonable.” Williams, 2011-NMSC-026, ¶ 8

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While our state constitution and its federal

counterpart impose a warrant requirement to ensure that searches and seizures are

reasonable, “our courts have historically recognized that it is not always reasonable to

require a warrant and have developed a number of well-established exceptions to the warrant

requirement.” Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 11.

{12} One such exception is “the right on the part of the government, always recognized

under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested.”

Id. ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Warrantless searches “have been

considered reasonable because of the practical need to prevent the arrestee from destroying

evidence or obtaining access to weapons or instruments of escape, without any requirement

of specific probable cause to believe weapons or evidence are present in a particular

situation.” Id. Thus, our inquiry is whether Defendant was lawfully arrested so that the

officer’s search of his person falls within this exception.

{13} In order to lawfully arrest an individual for a misdemeanor, a police officer must

have a warrant, unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s presence. See City

of Las Cruces v. Sanchez, 2009-NMSC-026, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 315, 210 P.3d 212 (“[I]n New

Mexico, an officer may execute a warrantless misdemeanor arrest only if the offense was

committed in the officer’s presence.”). Section 31-1-7(A) creates an exception to this general

rule for misdemeanor domestic disturbances, such as the one reported here, by providing

that:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, a peace

officer may arrest a person and take that person into custody without a

warrant when the officer is at the scene of a domestic disturbance and has

probable cause to believe that the person has committed an assault or a

battery upon a household member.

There is no dispute that the officers had probable cause in this case; rather, the dispute

centers on whether the officers were “at the scene” of the disturbance when they made the

warrantless arrest. Our task, therefore, is to determine what the Legislature intended by using

the phrase “at the scene” in Section 31-1-7(A).
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{14} In interpreting statutory language, “[o]ur main goal . . . is to give effect to the

Legislature’s intent.” State v. Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 294 P.3d 1235. To discern the

Legislature’s intent, the Court “look[s] first to the plain language of the statute, giving the

words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.”

Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 9, 146 N.M.

24, 206 P.3d 135 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where the language of

a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from

further statutory interpretation.” Diamond v. Diamond, 2012-NMSC-022, ¶ 25, 283 P.3d 260

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

{15} If the relevant statutory language is unclear, ambiguous, or reasonably subject to

multiple interpretations, then the Court should proceed with further statutory analysis. See

State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. (“[W]e exercise caution

in applying the plain meaning rule. Its beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why

a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give

rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute’s

meaning.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We reject a “mechanical

statutory construction when the results would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the

spirit of the statute.” Id. ¶ 10. When interpreting a statute, we are also informed by the

history, background, and overall structure of the statute, as well as its “function within a

comprehensive legislative scheme.” State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001,¶ 13, 134 N.M. 768,

82 P.3d 939.

{16} The authority to make an arrest without a warrant for a domestic dispute is contained

in Section 31-1-7(A), which has two requirements. The arresting officer must be at the scene

of the domestic disturbance, and the officer must have probable cause to believe the arrestee

has committed a domestic assault or battery. Whether the officer had probable cause to arrest

Defendant is not at issue. We are called upon to address only the first element of Section 31-

1-7(A) in this case. Defendant asserts, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the phrase “at

the scene” should be read literally to mean that the arresting officer must make the arrest

where the domestic disturbance occurred. The State argues, and the district court agreed, that

the phrase should be interpreted to mean that the police officer may make an arrest anywhere

near in space and time from where and when the incident occurred. Under the facts of this

particular case, we agree with the latter interpretation.

{17} Defendant’s plain language reading of the statute appears to be that “at the scene”

means at the precise place where the domestic violence occurred. The Court of Appeals

agreed with this narrow interpretation and held that the ordinary meaning of the word scene

is “‘the place of occurrence or action.’” Almanzar, 2012-NMCA-111, ¶ 25 (quoting

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2028 (unabridged ed. 2002)). Defendant’s

interpretation of the phrase “at the scene” uses synonyms such as “place,” “location,” or “the

place of occurrence or action” which we consider unhelpful because these terms fail to

render the statute workable. At oral argument, defense counsel argued that “at the scene”

could be defined to be the same physical address or the same ownership or occupancy unit,
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however, when pressed by the Court, as to whether that meant the fairgrounds was one

“scene,” while crossing the street to call the police took you to a different “scene,” defense

counsel responded that for large areas it should mean “within sight.” This interpretation is

unworkable, and it became obvious with the follow up question of whether stepping behind

a visual obstruction removed one from the “scene,” and thereby from the reach of the law.

{18} The State argues that due to the volatile and dangerous nature of domestic

disturbances, “at the scene” must be read broadly to enable an officer to make a warrantless

arrest within a reasonable time and distance of the incident. The State further asserts that a

narrow reading of the statute would lead to absurd results, such as preventing an officer from

making an arrest if a victim were forced to cross the street from the incident to call the police

and her abuser followed her. Instead, the State argues that the Legislature has recognized the

severity of domestic violence, and has created the warrantless arrest exception to combat the

gravity of domestic violence situations. In our opinion, the difference in each side’s

interpretation of the phrase “at the scene” illustrates the beguiling simplicity with which the

plain meaning rule can literally mask the statute’s true intention. We agree with the State,

however, because its interpretation conforms with precisely what we consider to be the

Legislature’s intent in creating the warrantless arrest exception.

{19} The Family Violence Protection Act (“the Act”), NMSA 1978, §§ 40-13-1 to -12

(1987, as amended through 2013) illuminates our inquiry into the Legislature’s intent. When

Section 31-1-7(A) is viewed in light of the Act, the Legislature’s intent is clarified. See

Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 26, 309 P.3d 1047 (“[A]ll provisions of a statute,

together with other statutes in pari materia, must be read together to ascertain the legislative

intent.”). For instance, the Act states that “[a] local law enforcement officer responding to

the request for assistance shall be required to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary

to protect the victim from further domestic abuse.” Section 40-13-7(B). It then goes on to

list several measures that an officer may take to ensure victim safety, such as: advising of

the remedies available to the victim under the Act; informing the victim about the

availability of shelter, counseling, or medical care; transporting the victim to a medical

facility or shelter; accompanying the victim to the victim’s residence to obtain clothing and

personal effects; helping the victim possess a dwelling or enforcing an order of protection;

arresting the alleged perpetrator; and, advising about the right to initiate criminal

proceedings. Id.

{20} These measures reflect that the Legislature’s first priority in addressing domestic

disturbances is ensuring a victim’s safety. With this clear purpose in mind, we conclude that

Section 31-1-7(A) was enacted to enable an officer to ensure a victim’s safety by allowing

the officer to arrest an aggressor who is still at the scene of the incident without a warrant.

Thus, the test for whether an officer was “at the scene” for purposes of the statute is one of

reasonableness. The police must make the warrantless arrest reasonably close to the scene

both spatially and temporally. We infer that the Legislature used the language “at the scene”

to strike a reasonable balance between preventing harm to the victim and protecting the

rights of the accused. If the police arrive at the scene of a domestic disturbance within a
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reasonable time after the violence is alleged to have occurred, such that the evidence of the

violence is still fresh, and if the aggressor is still physically close enough to the victim to be

able to reinitiate violence, then Section 31-1-7(A) empowers law enforcement to incapacitate

the aggressor and protect the victim by making a warrantless arrest.

{21} Section 31-1-7(A) gives law enforcement officers an effective tool with which to

ensure a victim’s safety and to diffuse what is often a dangerous situation. A rigid,

geography-based interpretation of Section 31-1-7(A) conflicts with these express purposes.

To read the language “at the scene” of Section 31-1-7(A) as restricting the officer’s ability

to arrest Defendant across the street from, and within minutes of, the domestic disturbance

would be contrary to the Legislature’s intent. Had this incident occurred at the home shared

by Victim and Defendant, it would be unreasonable if the police could not arrest Defendant

without a warrant simply because he crossed the street or went to a neighbor’s home.

Similarly, in this case it would contravene the Legislature’s intent to interpret the statute as

requiring the officers in this situation to arrest Defendant in the parking lot of Tingley

Coliseum, rather than where Defendant was located across the street. Such a rigid

interpretation of the statute would defeat the purpose of the warrantless arrest exception.

{22} In this case, we interpret “at the scene,” as used in Section 31-1-7(A), to authorize

law enforcement officers to make a warrantless arrest within minutes of the incident, at a

location directly across the street from the incident. This interpretation is consistent with the

Legislature’s intent and the purpose of Section 31-1-7(A). The record reflects that the police

responded to the convenience store within minutes of the 911 call, and the store was situated

directly across the street from where the alleged physical altercation took place. Under these

circumstances, we conclude that because the officers made the arrest within minutes and

within close proximity to the alleged disturbance, the officers were “at the scene” at the time

of the arrest. Therefore, we hold that the arrest was lawful under Section 31-1-7(A).

III. CONCLUSION

{23} We hold that the warrantless arrest of Defendant was lawful and valid under Section

31-1-7(A), and because Defendant was lawfully arrested, the officer’s search of Defendant

incident to that arrest was valid. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm

the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.

{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

BARABARA J. VIGIL, Justice 

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
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PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice

____________________________________

RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice

____________________________________

EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice

____________________________________

CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice

Topic Index for State v. Almanzar, No. 33,763

APPEAL AND ERROR

Standard of Review

CRIMINAL LAW

Battery

Controlled Substances

Domestic Violence

Misdemeanor

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Motion to Suppress

Warrantless Arrest

Warrantless Search 

STATUTES

Interpretation

Legislative Intent