UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 99-1788
M O SES R E N T I H OL L I DAY , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued January

18, 2001 Dec ided Fe bruar y 22, 2001 )

Michae l P. Horan , o f Wa sh ing ton , D .C. , f or the a pp e lla nt.
Cat he rin e A. Cha se , w ithwh om Leigh A. Bradley , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , Assistant Gene ral Counsel; and

Joa n E . Mo ria rty , Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel, all of Washington, D.C., wer e on the plea dings, f

or the a ppellee.
Ri c ha rd C. K ing , J r. , w ithwh om Jeffrey

A. Stonerock, both of W ashing ton, D.C., was on the brief, f or the Vie tnam Veter ans of Ame rica as amicus c uriae

. Ro be rt V . Ch ish olm , o f P r o v ide nc e , Rh od e I sla nd , f or the Natio na l O rg anizatio n o f V e te ra ns ' Advocates as amicus c uriae

. Ste ph e n L. Pu rcell , of Washington, D.C., wa s on the brief for the D isabled Amer ican Veter ans and the Veter ans of F oreig n Wars of the United States a s amici curia e. Clark Evans , of Sear cy , Arka nsas, was on the brief a s amicus cur iae.
Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and STEI NB ERG and GREENE, Judges

. KRAMER, Chief Judge , filed the opinion of the Court. STEI NB ERG, Judge , filed a concur ring opinion. KRAMER, Chief Judge : The appe llant appea led pro se a September 30, 1999, de cision of the B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls ( B VAor

B oa rd ) that de nie d inc re a se d V A d isa bil ity ratin g s f or his2

se rv ic e -c on ne c te d s e ns or

y imp a ir me nt a nd hy pe re sth e sia

wi th t ri g e min a l nerv e dama g e , r e sid ua ls of a f rac ture of the left orbital floor, sinu s i t i s , d i plopia, and lac eration of the left upper ey elid. Record ( R.) at 4, 19. On Oc tober 12, 2000, the Court, in a sing le-ju d ge m emora ndum decision, aff irmed the B VA dec ision. On November 1, 2000, the appe llant filed pro se a timely motion for

rec onsideration or, in the a lternative, f or a p an el d ec i s ion. See U. S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 35(a). In a Dec ember

1, 2000, order , the Court, in view of rec ent Congr essional ena ctments (discussed be low), withdrew the October

12, 2000, single -judg e memora ndum decision, g rante d the appe llant's motion for a panel de cision, and orde red the parties, a nd any interested amici curia e, to s ubmit suppl emental briefs a ddressing sever al enumer ated que stions. Hol l i d ay v. G ober , 14 Vet.App. 197 ( 2000) (pe r
c ur iam or de r) . T he a

pp e lla nt, thr ou g h c ouns e l, a

nd the Se c re tary

filed s up ple me nta l br ie fs in response to the C ourt' s Dec ember 1, 2000, order

. I n his supplemental brief, the Secre tary moved for

a full court dec ision and that motion has been denie d by the full Court. The Vietnam Veter ans of Americ a (V VA); the N ational Org anization of Veter ans Advoc ates (N OVA) ; Clar k Evans, Esquire ;
and the Di sa

ble d Ame ri c an Ve te ra

ns , tog e the r wit

h Ve te ra ns of F or e ig n War s of the Un ite d St a te s,
eac h filed an amicus curiae brief in response to that order . Ora l argument was he ld on J anuar y 18, 20 01 , at wh ic h c ouns e l fo r the a pp e lla nt, the Se c re tary , the VV A, and NO VApr e se nte d a

rgume nt. This appea l is ti mely , and the Court has jurisdiction pursua nt to 38 U.S.C . §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a ). For the re asons that follow, the Court w ill vac ate the decision of the Boa rd and r emand the matter.

I. BACKG ROUND The a ppellant serve d on active duty in the U.S

. Navy from J une 7, 1973, to November 23, 1973. R. at 22. On J une 23, 1973, he struc k his left ey e on a shower head and fe ll to the floor. R. at 25, 43. The injuries that he sustained as a result of that incide nt led to a re fer ral to a N aval medic al bo ard t hat di agnos ed h im as h a v i n g t h e f o ll owi ng: ( 1) "Or

bi tal Blo w-Ou t Fra ctu re, Left Ey e"; (2) "Fibr os is a

nd /or En tr a pme nt o f L e ft

Me dia l Re c tus Mu sc le and L e ft I nf e ri or Re c tus Mu sc le"; (3) "Par ti al Obs tr

uct io n or Dy sfu nct io n of the L acri mal Drai nage Sy st em, L ef t E y e "; (4) " En o p hthalmos, L eft Ey e" ; and (5) " L ace ration, L eft Uppe r L id." R. at 28. Subsequently , a Na va l phy sic a l e va luatio n b oa rd de te rm ine d th a t he wa s unf it f or milit ary du ty du e to t he se3

diag nosed conditions. R. at 29. He wa s permane ntly retire d from ac tive duty

in November

1973 (R. at 22, 31) with a N aval r etireme nt disabilit y rating of 30% ( R. at 33). I n Marc h 1974, a VA r eg ional office (R O) granted service connec tion for the following conditions and assig ned the following rating s: (1) Double vision (" diplopia") of the lef t ey e (10% ); (2) f rac ture of the left orbital floor (0%) ; a nd (3) lace ration of the left upper ey elid (0%)

. R. at 72. I n 1996, the appe llant sought incr ease d disability rating s for his se rvice -conne cted conditions (R. at 76), and the RO denied his claims for incre ased r ating s (R. at 102-04). The appellant f iled a Notice of Disag ree ment as to the R O denials. R. at 115. He also amended his cla im to include claims for service connec tion for hea dache s as a condition seconda ry to his service- connec ted injuries and f or damag e to the l eft side of his fac e and f or sinusitis. R . at 111. I n J uly 1997, the RO g rante d service

c on ne c tio n f

or " se ns or y imp a ir me nt a nd hy pe re sth e sia wi th t

ri g e min a l ne rv e dama g e " and " sin us iti s with heada ches, f

rac ture of ma x illary sinus," and assig ned a 10% disability rating for e ach c ondition. R. at 143-46. The a

ppellant appe aled to the B VA the d enial of inc rea sed disability rating s. R. at 19 6. I n th e Se pte mbe r 1 99 9 B oa rd de c isi on he re on a

pp e a l, t he B VAg ra

nte d in c re a se d d isa

bil ity rating s to 30% for se nsory impairment and hy pere sthesia with trig eminal ner ve dama g e (R. at 6- 9) and 1 0 % f

o r a p a in f u l h e a le d in

ju r y a s s o c iate d w it

h th e p o s to p e r a ti v e r e s id

u a ls o f th e le ft orbital fl oo r f ra c tur e (R . at 9- 11 ). Th e B oa rd de te rm ine d "t

hat the ve te ra

n' s cla ims are we ll g ro un de d w ith in the me anin g of

38 U. S.C. § 5 10 7( a ), " a s th e n e xtan t, b ut d e nie d o n th e me ri ts i nc re a se d d is ability rating s for diplopia, sinusitis wit h heada ches, and a laceration of t he left upper ey elid. R. at 4, 19. The a ppellant appe aled that B VA dec ision to t he Court, and the Court, o n October 12, 2000, aff irmed that dec ision. Subsequent to the Court' s October12, 2000, decision, Cong ress e nacte d sever al laws reg ardingveter ans bene fits claims. First, on Oc tober 30, 2000, the F loy d D. S p ence National Def ense Authorization Act for Fisca l Yea r 2001, Pub. L . No. 106-398, 114 Stat. 1654, app. § 1611 (Oc t. 3 0 , 2000) [hereina fter N DAA § 1611], amende d 38 U.S.C. § 5107 to provide "CLARI FI CATI ON OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AF FAI RS DUTY TO ASSI ST." That amendment to § 5107(a ), inter a lia, eli m i n ated the well-g rounded- claim re quirement. The n, on November 1, 2000, the Veterans Bene fits and Health Care I mprovement Act of 2000, Pub. L . No.4

106-419, 114 Stat. 1822 (Nov. 1, 2000), w as ena cted, with the f ollowing co o rdination provision [he re ina ft e r " c oo rd inatio n p ro vis ion " ]:

I f the Veterans Claims Assistance Ac t of 2000 is enac ted bef ore the provisions of t h e Fl o y d D. Spence National De fense Authorization Act for F iscal Yea r 2001 ar e ena cted into law, se ction 1611 of the F loy d D. S pence National Def ense Authorization Act for Fisca l Y ear 2001, including the amendments made by that se c tio n, sh a ll not take e ff e c t. I f t he Ve te ra ns Cla ims As sis tanc e Ac t of 20 00 is enac ted af ter the pr ovisions of the Floy d D. Spence National Def ense Authorization Act fo r Fiscal Yea

r 2001 ar e ena cted into law, then as of the enactme nt of the Veterans Cl aims Assistance Act of 2000 , the amendme nts made by section 1611 of the Floy d D. Spence National De fense Authorization Act for F iscal Ye ar 2001 sh all be dee med for all purposes not to have tak en effec t and that section shall cease to be in effect

. Id . at § 104(c )(2) , 114 Stat. at 1828 (empha sis a dded). Finally , on November 9, 2000, the Vete rans Claims Assis tance Act of 2000, Pub. L . No. 106- 4 7 5 , 1 1 4 S t at. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000) [hereinaf ter VCAA], was enac ted "[t]o amend title 38, United States Code, to r eaf firm and cla

rify the duty of the Secre tary of Ve tera

ns Affa irs to assist claimants for bene fits u n d er laws administere d by the Secre tary , and for

other purpo s es
. " 1 46 Cong. Rec . H9912 (da ily ed. Oc t. 17, 2000) (stateme nt of Rep. Stump); see 146 Cong. Rec . S9205 (daily ed . Sept. 25, 2000) (stateme nt of Sen. Br ownbac k for Sen. Specter ). The VCAA made a series of amendments to c hapter 51 (" CL AI MS, EFFE CTI VE DATES, AND PAYMEN TS") of title 38, U.S. C ode, which, a s discussed inf ra , included adding 38 U.S.C. § 5100 to de fi n e t h e t er m "c laimant"; amending 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) to addr ess the Secre tary ' s duty

to notify claimants of r equire d information and e vidence ; a dding 38 U .S.C. § 5103A to a dd re ss t he Se c re tary ' s d

uty to a ssi st c la ima

nts ; a nd a me nd ing38 U. S.C. § 5 10 7( a ) t o e lim inate the well-g rounded- claim re quirement. VCAA §§ 2, 3( a), 4. A s to the eff ective date of the A ct, the VCAA provided in section 7(a): "T he provisions of sec tion 5107 . . . as amende d by section 4 of [the VCAA], apply

to any claim .

. . filed befor e the date of the ena ctment of [the VCAA] and not final

a s o f t hat date ." VC AA§ 7 (a )( 2) . With r e g ard to d e nia ls o f c la ims fo r l a c k o f w e ll g ro un de dn e ss that had bec ome final " during the per iod beg inning on July 14, 1999, and ending on the date of the

enac tment of [the VCAA]," sec tion 7(b) provided that such claims may be re adjudicate d "unde r chapte r 51 of [titl e 38], as amende d by [t he VCAA] , as i f t he denia l or dismissal had not been made ." VCAA § 7(b) (1), ( 2). The V CAA did not specify expressly whether other amendments made by the5

VCAA to cha

pter 51, including amende d section 5103 and ne w sec tions 5100 and 5103A, are to be

a pp lie d r e tr oa c tiv e ly

to c la ims pe nd ingon

the date of

its e na c tme nt. Th e fu ll te xts of ND AA § 16 11 , the c oo rd inatio n pr ov isi on , and the VC AA are se t f or th i n the Appendix (Appx .) to this opinion.

II. AN AL YSI S A
. P o t e nt ia l A pp li c a bi li t y o f N e w L a ws The fir st question that the Court will address is whether NDAA § 1611 and any

provisions of the VCAA pote ntially

may apply to the appellant' s claims. I n this reg ard, w e note that the Court has held in Karnas v. Derwinski , 1 Ve t.A pp . 3 08 , 3 13 (1 99 1) , th a t wher e t h e l aw or regulation chang es af ter a claim has be en filed or

reope ned but befor e the a dminist rative or judicial appea l proce ss ha s been conclude d, the ver sion mos t f a vo ra ble to [the ] ap pe lla

nt s ho uld and we so ho ld wil l app ly un le ss C on g re ss pr ov ide d o the rw ise or

pe rm itt e d th e Se c re tary

of Ve te ra ns Af fa ir s to do otherwi se and the Sec reta

ry did so.
Se e als o 38 U. S.C. § 7 29 1( a ) ( date a ft e r w hic h Co ur t d eci si on be c ome s f

ina l) ; Tay lor

v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 206, 207 (1998) (appe al re mained " pending " be fore Court after decision wa s issued but prior to entry

of judg ment); U.S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 35(d)(1) , 36. 1. NDAA § 1611 Section 1611 of the NDAA beca me eff ective upon its e nactment a nd was e nacte d befor e the VC AA . T he re fo re , th e Court mus t de te rm ine wh e the r ND AA § 16 11 ha s any po te nti a l a

pp lic a bil ity to the appellant' s claims. To do so, we examine the italicized operative la ng uag e in the last sentenc e of the c oordination provision, as shown in t he quote in Part I , an te . " ' Th e sta rt ingpo int

in in ter pret in g a st atu te i s i ts lan guage.'" Le e v. W est , 1 3 Ve t

. Ap p
. 3 8 8 , 3 9 4 (2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Good Sa ma rit an Ho sp ita l v . S

ha lal a , 508 U.S. 402, 409 ( 1993)). The "pla in meaning must be g iven ef fec t unless a ' literal application of [t he] statute will pro d u ce a result demonstrably at odds with the in ten ti on of i ts draf

ter s. '" Gardner v. D erwinski , 1 Vet.App. 584, 586- 87 (1991) ( citations omitt ed), aff 'd su b n om . G ar

dn e r v . B ro wn , 5 F.3d 1456 ( Fe d

. Cir. 1993), a ff 'd , 513 U.S. 115 (1994). Deter mining the plain meaning of a statute "r equire s examining the specific lang uag e at issue a nd th e ov eral l s tr

uct ure o f t he s tat ut e." Gardner , 1 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 5 8 6 (c i t i n g Bet h es d a Hos pital Assn.6

v. Bowen , 485 U. S. 3 99 (1 98 8) ); se e als o D e gm e tic h v . B ro wn , 104 F.3d 1328, 1332 (F ed. Cir. 1997) ( w h e ni n t e r

p r e t i n g s t a t

u t e s , c o u rti s r e qu i r e d

t o l o o k a tc o n t e x tan d

p r o v i s i o n s o f

l aw a s w h o l e )

. " ' If th e in ten t o f C on gress is cle ar, t hat is th e endof th e ma tt er'" ( Le e, s up ra (q u o t i n g Sk

inn e r v . B ro wn , 27 F.3d 1571, 1572 ( Fe d. Cir. 1994))), an d t h er e wo u l d thus be no nee d to consider leg islative history , the abse nce of

which as to the c oordination provision is nonetheless noted. Although the phrase "a s of the ena ctment" in the coordination pr ovision could be interpre ted to make the nullification of NDAA § 1 6 1 1 eff ective only

afte r the e nactment of

the VCAA, thus leavingNDAA § 1611 e ffe ctive for the nine-da

y period be fore the ena ctment of t h e VC AA , the lang uag e that follows that phra se and that is italiciz ed above (" shall be deem ed for all purposes not to have t a ke n ef

f ec t a nd that section shall cease to be in e ffect ") expli citly

prec ludes such an interpre tation. This is so because that italicized langua g e cove rs both the nine-da y period a nd the period that follows the e nactment of the VCAA. The phrase "de emed for all purposes not to have taken e ffe ct" can r elate only to the period of time be g inning on the date of the e nactment of NDAA § 1611 and bef

ore the enac tment of the VCAA (bac kwar d looking)

. The phrase "sha ll c ease to be in effe ct" can relate only to that period of time beg inning on the date of the e nactment of the VCAA (for war d looking) . To interpre t bo t h p h ra s es as f orwa rd looking would make one of them

s u p er fl u o us, and the Court will theref ore not a dopt such an interpr etation. S e e S m i t h ( Wi l l i a m)

v. Br own , 35 F

. 3d 1 516 , 152 3 ( Fe d. C i r . 199 4) ( i n const r ui ng s t at ut e, cour t m ust

st r i ve t o gi ve all po rt ion s m ea n in g an d n o t rea d o n e p art i n iso lation fr o m an o th er) . A ft e r e xami nin g the pla in meaningof all the phra ses of the coordination provision it is clear that Congr ess intended that, upon the VC AA ' s e na c tme nt, the a me ndme nt to tit le 38 ma de by ND AA § 16 11 wa s to be tr e a te d f or a ll purposes not eve r to have taken e ffe ct. See G ardner and Lee , both su

pra . There fo re , t h e C ourt conclude s that, as of the date of the V CAA' s enac tment, NDAA § 1611 has no continuing eff ect a nd thus no potential applicability to the appellant' s claims. 2. 38 U.S.C. § 5107, as amended by the VCAA I n section 7(a ) of the V CAA, Congr ess explicitl y provided that " the provisions of sec tion 51 07 of tit le 38 , Uni te d Stat e s Code , as am e nd e d by se c tio n 4 of [the VC AA ], app ly to a ny c la im . . . filed bef

ore the date of

the ena ctment of [the VCAA] and not fi n al as o f that date ." V CAA § 7 (a )( 2) ; see Luyster v. Gobe r , 14 Vet.App. 186 (2000) (per curiam order). Thus, there c an be no7

do ub t th a t ame nd e d s e c tio n 5 10 7 a pp lie s to the a

pp e lla nt' s c la ims , w hic h w e re pe nd ingon the date of the VCAA' s enac tment. 3. Other pr ovisions of the VCAA Congr ess did not, howev er , expli citly state whe ther VCAA pr ovisions other than the

am en d m en t s t o s ec t i o n5 1 0 7 we re t o b e ap p l i ed t o c l ai m s p en d i n g o nt h e d at e o f t h e V C AA 's

enac tment. See Appx., inf ra . For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that such provisions are pote ntially applicable retroa ctively

to pending claims. First, the ex plicitly

stated purpose of the VCAA, w ithout li mitation to any cate g ory of

c la ima nts , in c lud ingtho se wi th p e nd ingc la ims ( se e inf ra Part I I .B., __ Vet.App. at __, slip op. at 12 (discussion of " Third" rea son)), is to "r eaf fi rm an d cl arify

the duty of the Sec reta

ry of Ve tera

ns A f f a ir s to a s s is t c la im an ts

. " 1 4 6 Co n g
. Re c
. H 9 9 1 2 ( d a il y e d

. O c t. 1 7 , 2 0 0 0 ) ( s tate me n t of Rep. Stu mp) . T o th a t e nd , th e VC AA , in te r a lia , ame nd e d 3 8 U .S. C. § 51 07 , w hich p ri or to i ts

a me ndme nt h a d p ro vid e d in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) Ex cept when otherwise provided by the Secre tary in acc ordanc e with the provisions of this ti tle, a per son who submits a claim for be nefi t s u n der a law administered by

the Secr etar

y shall have the burden of submitting evidenc e suff icient to justi fy a belief by a fa ir and impartial individual that the cla im is well grounde d. The Sec reta

ry shall assist such a cla imant in develop i n g the fa cts pertinent to the claim.
Under that provision, both this Court and the U.S. Court of Appe als for the Fe dera l Circuit (Fe dera l Circuit) had he ld that the Secre tary ' s duty t o as sist a claimant was not trig g ere d until a claimant submitt ed a w ell-g rounded c laim. See Epps v. Gobe r , 126 F.3d 1464, 1469 (F ed. Cir. 1997), a ff 'g Ep ps v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 3 4 1 (1 9 96). As ame nded by the VCAA, sec tion 5107(a) no long er contains a r equire ment that a cla imant submit a we ll-g rounded c laim. VCAA § 4 (ame nding 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) to provide: "Except as other wise provided by

law, a c laimant has the responsibility

to present and support a c laim for bene fits under law s administered by the Secr etar

y .")

. The VCAA a lso removed the duty -to-assist provision from section 5107 and added t o title 38 a new section 5103A, in which the duty to assist is not conditioned upon t he subm ission of a well-g rounded claim.8

Be cause VCAA § 7(a ) made the amendme nts to section 5 1 0 7 ex plicitly retroa ctive, any

c la ima nt w ho se c la im f

or tit le 38 be ne fi ts w a s p e nd ingon the date of the VC AA ' s ena c tme nt w ou ld b e en t i tled to have that c laim rea djudicated unde r newsection 5107 if that cla im had been de nied as not well g rounded. See Luyste r, supra. Ho we ve r, if the VC AAwe re c on str

ue d s o th a t on ly

the

am en d m en t s t o s ec t i o n5 1 0 7 we re t o b e ap p l i edt o a c l ai m p en d i n g o nt h e d at e o f t h e V C AA 's

enac tment, then upon rea djudication of such a claim, the Secr etar y would have no sta tutor

ydu ty to

as sis t beca use ame nded sec tion 5107 does not contain a duty -to-assist provisi o n , t h at provision having been tr ansfe rre d to new sec tion 5103A. I ndeed, the revise d s ec t ion 5107 places upon the

c la ima nt " the re sp on sib ili ty

to p re se nt a

nd su pp or t a c la im. " VC AA§ 4 (am end ing38 U. S.C. § 5107(a) ). The Court notes especia lly that, without the applicability of newsection 5103A a

nd the other title 38 sections ame nded or added by the VCAA (other than sec tion 5107), a re adjudication under se ction 5107 would be an exercise in futility beca use, althoug h the claim could no long er be denied f or a la ck of well g roundedne ss, without additional development or notification obligations on the par t of the Secr etar

y , it would sim ply

be denie d on the merits. Second, Cong ress c lear ly

provided that those c laims that were denied or dismiss ed, by

VA

or a c ourt , " be c a

us e the c la im w a s n ot w e ll g ro un de d" and the de nia l or

dis mis sa l of

wh ic h b e c a me final " during the per iod beg inning on J uly 14, 1999, and ending on the date of the ena ctment of [the VCAA]," may be " rea djudicated un de r c ha pte r 5 1 o f [ title 38 ] , as amende d by [ the VCAA ], as if the denial or dismissal had not bee n made." VCAA § 7(b) (1), ( 2) (e mphasis added) . The italicized l an g u a g e e x p r e s s e s t h a t , a s t o s u c h f i n a l l y d e n i e d

c l a i m s , a l l o f

t h e V C A A a m e n d m e n t s w o u l d a p p l y,
no t ju st s e c tio n 5 10 7. Thus , if the VC AA we re to be c on str ue d so as t o a

pp ly on ly se c tio n 5 10 7 to pe nd ingc la ims , a

hig hly inc on g ru ou s p ara do x wou ld re su lt i n w hic h c e rt a in c la ima nts wi th f ina lly denied c laims would be entitled to more fa vorable treatment than would be cla imants with pending

c la ims . T he re fo re , th e c on c lus ion is ine sc a pa ble that c le arl y a

bs ur d re su lts wo uld

ob ta in u nle ss a ll provisions of t h e VC AA are re troac tive in their potential applica bility

. See U

nited States v. XCitement Video, Inc ., 51 3 U.S. 64 , 68- 69 (1 99 4) (" Som e a pp lic a tio ns of

re sp on de nts ' po sit ion

[as to the pr op er c on str

uc tio n o f T he Pr ote c tio n o f C hil dr e n A g a ins t Se xua l E xploi ta tio n A c t] wo uld pr od uc e re su lts that w e re no t me re ly od d, bu t po sit ive ly

a bs ur d.

. . . We do no t a ssume that Co ng re ss, in p a ssi nglaws , in te nd e d s uc h r e su lts ." ); Timex V.I., I nc. v. United States , 157 F.3d 879, 886 ( Fe d.9

Cir. 199 8 ) (" s t at u t ory

construction that ca

uses absurd r esults is to be avoided if at a ll possibl e" (c i t i n g Haggar Co. v. Helv ering , 3 08 U. S. 3 89 , 3 94 (1 94 0) (r e a din g of statut e that " wo uld

le a d to

a bs ur d re su lts is to be a vo ide d wh e n [it] c an be g ive n a re a so na ble a pp lic a tio n c on sis te nt w ith[its] words and with the leg isla t i v e p u rp o se" ))) ; Fa us t v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 342, 350 ( 2000) (VA

re g ulatio n inte rp re te d s o a s to a vo id a bs ur d r e su lt) ; see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bon j orno , 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990) (in de termining whether statute should be applied retroa ctively , "w here the congr essional i ntent is clear , it gove rns" ). See ge nerally Brown v. Gardne r , 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (" interpre tive doubt is to be resolved in the ve tera n' s favor ")

. Third, as to Karnas , su

pra , there can be no question that Congr ess, which is pre sumed to be

awa re of that opinion and its proge ny at the time of enac ting the VCAA, clea rly did not provide the

s p e c i f i c i t y r e qu i r e d

b y Karnas to disavow retr oactivity

. Se e ge ne ra lly G o o dy ea r A t o mi c Corp

.
v. Mil ler , 4 8 6 U .S

. 1 7 4 , 1 8 4 -85 (1 9 8 8 ) ("[w ]e ge n era lly pre su m e th at C o n g ress is k n o w led g ea b le ab o u t ex isti n g law pe rt in en t

t o leg islation it

en ac t s"); Lo r ill ar d v

. Pons , 434 U

. S. 575 , 580
- 81 (1 9 7 8 ) (" C o n g re s s is p re s u m e d to b e a w a re o f a n a d m in is trativ e o r ju d ic ia l in ter p re tatio n o f a
statu t e a n d t o ad o pt th at in t erp retat ion w h en it re-en ac t s a statute w ith o u t ch an g e. S o t o o , w h ere

. . . C ongre ss adopt s a new l aw i ncor por at i ng s ect i ons of a pr i or l aw , C ongre ss norm al l y can b e p resu m ed t o h av e h ad k n o w led g e of th e in t erp retat ion g ive n t o th e in co rpo rated law

. . . ." (citat ion s o m it

t ed )). Th e re fo re , th e Court

ho lds that a ll p ro visio ns of th e VC AAare po te nti a lly a pp lic a ble to

c la ims pe nd ingon

th e dat e of the VC AA ' s e na c tme nt. Th e Court tr us ts that th e Se c re tary , in promulg ating regulations to im plement the VCAA, w ill reconc ile the VCAA regulations w ith any other curre ntly eff

ective V A issuance s. Se e Kar na s, su pra ; Fugere v . Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 103, 106-08 (1990)

. B . De te rmi n a ti o n o f

W h et h er VC AA i s Ap p l i ca b l e t o Ap p el l a n t' s Cl a i ms Be cause the VCAA wa s enac ted af ter issuanc e of the BVA decision here on appea l (and the BV A t h u s d i d

n o th av e t h e o p p o rt u n i t y t o ad dre s s t h e V C AA 's ap p l i cab i l i t y t o t h e ap p el l an t 's

c la ims ), the pr e lim ina

ry inq uir y is w he the r the Court sh ou ld de c ide VC AAa pp lic a bil ity in t he fi rs t instance. In this reg ard, the Court notes that the appe llant essentially req u es t s t h at t he matter

be

rema nded for VA to de termine whether his c laims f all within the purview of the VCAA' s provisions10

(Appe llant's B rief ( Br .) at 12-16) , wher eas the Secre tary urg es t he C ourt to decide in the first instance that th e a pp e lla nt' s c la ims do fa ll w ith in t he scop e of

the VC AA , to de te rm ine that th e VC AAis more fa vorable to the appellant than pr e-V CAA law ( se e Kar na s, su pra ), and to re mand the matter for r eadjudica

tion under the VCAA' s provi s i o n s (S ec reta ry ' s Br . at 12-13, 16-18, 21) . For the following rea sons, the Court holds that, at l east at this t ime, it may not determine V CAA applicability

or inapplica

bility in the first instance. F ir st, purs ua

nt to 38 U. S.C. § 5 11 (a ), " [t]he Se c re tary sh a ll decideall questions of l aw and fact nece ssary

to a decision by the S ecr etar y under a law that aff

ects the provision of benef its by the Secre tary to vetera

ns or the depe ndents or survivors of vetera ns." ( Emphasis added.) Under 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), " [a] ll questions in a matter which under s ection 511(a) .

. . is subject t o decision by the S ecr etar

y shall be subjec t to one revie w on appea l to the Secre tary . Final de cisions on such appea l shall be made by

the B oard." (Emphasis adde d.) This Court "ha s exclusive jurisdiction to

r evie w d e c is io n s o f th e B o ar d

. " 3 8 U

. S. C. § 7 2 5 2 ( a ) ( e mp h a s is a d d e d )

. I nrevie wing BV A decisions, the Court, in acc ordanc e with 38 U.S

. C

. § 7 261, may "hold unlaw ful and set a side decisions, finding s . . . , conclusions, rules, a nd regulations issued or adopted by the Secr etar

y , the [Board], or the Chairma

n of the B oard," but "[ i ] n n o event sha ll findings of f act made by

the Secre tary or the [Boa

rd] be subject to trial de novo by the Court." 38 U .S.C. § 7261(a)(3) , (c)

. Second, two re cent de cisions of the F eder al Circuit (albe it made in the con text of the now repe aled doc trine of we ll gr oundedness) strong ly sug g est that, un d er t h e st atutory framework ref ere nced in the prec eding para g raph, the Court may not make a de novo leg al deter mination in the first instance w here such a c onclusion of law, e ven o n e i n v o l v ing nonpr ejudicial er ror unde r 3 8 U. S.C. § 7261(b), would in any way be base d on a fa ctual pre dicate. H e n s l e yv
. W e st , 21 2 F. 3d 12 55 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 0) ; W inters v. Gober , 21 9 F .3 d 13 75 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 0) . Sp e c if ic a lly , in Hensley , the Fe dera l Circuit concluded: [B]ot h statute and jud i ci al doctrine c onstrain the appe llate re view proc ess. . . . Appellate c ourts can " revie w" only that which has happene d in the past, while the term " de novo" may be understood to mean ane w, without refe renc e to what ha s g one befor e. To the e x tent that "de nov o " connotes judicial re view ane w and without re fe re nc e to w hat ha s g on e be fo re , the te rm fa ils to a c c ur a te ly de sc ri be the a

pp e llate proce ss, and par

ticularly [t his is so] when it is applied t o revie w of iss ues upon which any measure of def

ere nce is a ccor ded to the dec ision under re view.11

Hensley , 212 F.3d at 1263 (citations omitted). The Hensley c ourt the n h e ld: [W h e r e an ] u lt im a te c o n c lu s io n is a qu e s ti o n o f la w , b u t th a t c o n c lu s ion r ests on fac tual matters the deter

mination of which by

the ag ency

fac t-finder s is entitled on revie w to substantial defe renc e[ , s ] ee, e .g. , 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)[,]

. . . it is i ncorr ect to describe appellate revie w of . . . [such a c onclusion] as "de novo."

. . .

. . . . Th e statut or

y provis ion s are c on sis te nt w iththe g e ne ra l r ule tha t a pp e llate trib u n a ls ar e n o t a

p p r o p r iate f

o r a f o r in it ia l f a c t f in d in g
. T h u s , th e Su

p r e me Court has held that whe n a court of appeals reviews a district court decision, it may rema nd if it believes the district court failed t o make findings of fac t essential to the dec ision; it may set aside f

indings of f

act it d et er m i n es to be clea rly err oneous; or it may reve rse incorrec t judgments of law based on pr oper f actua l findings . . . . . . . [T] he prope r cour se [is] to remand t h e ca s e to t he B VA for further development a

nd application of the correct law

. Hensley , 212 F.3d. at 1263-64 (empha sis added). Fur ther, in W

int e rs , su pra , the Fe dera l Circuit noted that, while Mr. Winters' a ppeal wa s p e n d i n g b e f

o r e t h i s C o u rt , t h e r e h a d b e e na c h an g e i nl aw b r o u g h ta b o u tb y Ho dg e v . W

est , 155 F.3d 1356 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998), which ha d overr uled the test s et forth in Colvin v. Derwinski , 1 V e t.A pp . 1 71 (1 99 1) , f

or de te rm ini ngwh e the r n e w a nd ma te ri a l evi de nc e ha d be e n pre se nte d to reope n a previously

and fina lly

disallowed cla im. W

int e rs , 219 F .3 d at 13 77 . T he F e de ra l Cir c uit

rea soned: [T]hi s c a se pr e se nts iss ue s si mil ar t o th os e in t he re c e nt d eci sio n o f t

his c ourt in Ma gg itt v . W est , 202 F.3d 1370 (F ed. Cir. 2000) . I n Ma gg itt , we or dere d the Court of Ap pe a ls f

or Ve te ra ns Claim s to re mand

to t he B oa rd Mr . M a g g itt ' s r e qu e st t o re op e n h is c la im. Th e B oa rd ha d a na ly zed Mr

. Ma g g itt ' s re qu e st to r e op e n h is c la im under the Col

v in sta nd ard , and

de nie d th e re qu e st b e c a

us e thi s st and ard

wa s n ot m e t. Whil e his appe al to the Court of Appea ls f or Veter ans Claims was pending , this court issued its decision in Hodge . M r. Ma g g itt re qu e ste d a

re mand fo r t he B oa rd to rec onsider his reque st under the ne w Hodge standard, but the C ourt of Appeals for Veter ans Claims refuse d and instead uphe ld the Board on the m erits. On appe al, we he ld t hat, b e c a us e of the c ha

ng e in t he law, the Court

of Ap pe a ls f or Ve te ra ns Cla ims should have g rante d Mr. Mag g itt's re quest fo r a re m and. Se e Ma gg itt , 202 F.3d at 1380. A similar analy sis applies to the prese nt case , with the same re sult: t he Court of Appe als for V eter ans Claims should h av e re m anded Mr . Wint ers' s claim to the Boa rd for rec onsideration in light of Hodge

.12

W int e rs , 219 F.3d at 1379. I n other wor ds, the W int e rs Court admo nis he d th a t th is C ourt sh ou ld have remande d to VA for application of the l eg al s tandar d set forth in Hodge to the fa c tua l pr e dic a te

cre ated by

the addition of evidence to the body of evidence pr esent at the time of the pre vious final denial. Additionally , the Fe dera l Circuit stated in W int e rs : T h ere is a furthe r re ason why the Court of Appe als for V eter ans Claims's a c tio n in the pr e se nt case c ann ot b e a ff ir me d. Th e re op e nin g statut e , 3 8 U .S. C. § 5108, states that if the ve tera n prese nts new and material e vidence , "the Secre tary shall reope n the claim." Thus, under the statute, only the DVA ( actingon behalf of the Secr etar

y ) has the a

uthority to reope n a cla im. The statute does n o t give the Court of Appea ls for Ve tera ns Claims t hat pow er , an d the Court of Appe als for Veter ans Claims theref

ore e x c e e de d its sta tutory au th ority when it assumed Mr. Wint ers' s claim to be re opened in or der to make its determination that the re opened claim was not well grounde d.

. . . The Cou rt of Ap pe als for Ve te ra ns Cla im s sh ou ld not assess whether a claim is well grounded until and unl ess the DVA rule s on the issue afte r the c laim is properly reope ned . . . .
W int e rs , 219 F.3d at 1379-80 (e mphasis added) (citations omitted). I n W int e rs , th e F e de ra l Cir c uit the n h e ld t

hat " [b]e c a

us e the Court

of Ap pe a ls fo r Ve te ra

ns Cla ims e xce e de d it s st a tut or y a uth or ity wh e n it a dd

re sse d w he the r M r. Wint e rs ha d p re se nte d a we ll[- ]g ro un de d c la im a

nd pr e jud ic e d h im by basing its decision on a g round diffe rent from that relied on by the B oard, the decision must be vacat ed. " Id . at 1380. Third, t he S ecr etar

y , in his supplemental brief, invited the C ourt to decide in the first instance t h at t h re e c l as s e s o f c as es p en d i n g b ef o re t h e C o u rt d o n o tfa l l wi t h i nt h e s co p e o f t h e V C AA 's provisions. Secreta

ry ' s Br . at 13-15. Eve n assum i n g t hat, despite the F eder al Circuit doctrine enunciated above , the C ourt would not be pre cluded f rom doing so, at oral a

rg ument, the Secr etar

y
conce ded both that the VCAA pote ntially applies to all claimants and that any such cla ssifications of nonapplica

bility would have to be considera bly more na rrow tha n had been asserted i n his brief. To the extent that the former conce ssion does not swallow t he latter conce ssion, as to the latter the Se c re tary a c kn ow le dg e d th a t, c on tr ary to h is b ri e f, c la ims fo r a c c ru e d b enefits (u nd e r 3 8 U .S. C. § 5121) and of

clea r and unmistakable err or (CUE) (under 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109A, 7111) could not be

un ive rs a lly

e xclu de d f

ro m c ov e ra g e un de r t

he VC AA ' s noti c e (3 8 U .S. C. § 51 03 ) a nd du ty -t o- a ssi st (3 8 U .S. C. § 51 03 A) pr ov isi on s.13

Four t h , pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5100, as added by VCAA § 2, a " claimant" includes " any in d i v i d u al ap p l y ing f

or, or submitting a

claim for, a

ny benef it under the law s administered by the Secre tary ." T he Secr etar

y , at ora l argument, as i ndicated above, recog nized that there is no subset of " claimants" to which the Secr etar y ' s duties under the VCAA would not be potentially applicable

. Th e se du tie s e sse nti a lly

fa ll i nto tw o cate g or ie s: I nv olv e me nt i n th e c oll e c tio n o f e vid e nc e that c ou ld

re su lt i n a su c c e ssf ul c la im ( see 38 U.S.C. § 5103A) and g iving notification to a claimant as to what is r e qu ir e d f

or a c la im t o b e su c c e ssf

ul (see 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § § 5 1 0 2 ( b ) , 5 1 0 3 ( a ) )

. A s t o t h e f i r s tc a t e g o r

y, the Secr etar

y is directed to pr escr ibe re g ulations, which h e h as n o t y et done, to ca rry out section 5103A, and that in doing so he is expressly au t h o rized by new se ction 5103A(g ), and thus may decide , t o provide more assistance than would otherw ise be re quired by law. See 38 U. S.C. § 5103A(e ), (g ). F if th, a s to the se c on d c a te g or y , e ve n a ssumin g tha

t th e Court

c ou ld d ivi ne in the fi rs t ins tanc e on

the pa rt ic ular fact s of a pa

rt ic ula r c a se that no a mou

nt o f a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e c ou ld chang e an a dverse outcome, the Court could not obviate in the first i nstance the re quirement for the Secre ta r y to p r o v id e n o ti c e
. I n th is r e g ar d , s e c ti o n 5 1 0 3 ( a ) , a s a me n d e d b y th e V CAA, now pr ov ide s: Up on re c e ipt of a c omp le te or

su bs tanti a lly

c omp le te a

pp lic a tio n, the Se c re tary

sh a ll notify the claimant

and the c laimant' s repr esentative, if any , of any information, and any me dical or lay ev idence , n ot p re vio us ly pr ov ide d to the Se c re tary that is ne c e ssa ry to sub sta nti a te the c la im. As pa

rt of that no tic e , th e Se c re tary

sh a ll i nd ic a te which portion of tha t i n fo rm ation and evide nce, if any , is to be provided by the claimant and which portion, if any , the Secr etar y , in acc ordanc e with sec tion 5103A of this titl e and a

ny other a pplicable pr ovisions of law, will attempt t o obtain on be ha lf of the c la ima

nt. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (e mphasis added) . The Sec reta ry indicated at oral ar g ument that VA has not y et formulate d a cle ar policy as to what the se ction 5103(a) notice will contain. In that reg ard, howeve r, t he S ecr etar

y did state t hat, i n addition to notify ing a claimant of a

ny require d evidenc e and routine administrative infor mation (such as date of birth , Social Security number, a ddress), the notice, at lea st in some circumstance s, may be re quired to include " information" as to the state of the law on a pa

rticular issue. The S ecr etar y sug g ested, for example, that where a cla imant asserts CUE, the se c tio n 5 10 3( a ) n oti c e mig ht h a ve to inc lud e an expla natio n as to w hat w ou ld b e re qu ir e d to state14

a valid C UE cl ai m u nder Fu go v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 40, 44 ( 1993). In addition, the Secre tary acknow ledg ed at or al ar g ument that section 5103( a) m i g ht require a continuing notice oblig ation duri ngthe pe nd e nc y

of a c la im, i.e ., mul tip le no tic e s at dif fe re nt sta g e s of the c la im rathe r tha n ju st

on e a ft e r t he a pp lic a tio n b e c ome s " c omp le te or su bs tanti a lly c omp le te ." 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 3( a ). Un til the Secre tary has addre ssed these signific ant uncer tainties reg ardingwho g ets what kind of a notice and whe n pursuant to § 5103(a) (it is the Secre tary who "ha s the authority to prescr ibe all rules a nd regulations which are nece ssary or appr opriate to c arr y out the laws administere d by the Depa rtment

and are c on sis te nt w ith th os e laws ," 38 U. S.C. § 5 01 (a )) , a nd we have ha d th e op po rt un ity " to revie w" (38 U.S.C. § 7252(a)) such a policy for its consistency with section 5103(a) , the Court has no basis for r ender ing a

decision as to the applicability (or nonapplicability ) of that notice pr ovision to t he a pp e lla nt' s c la ims

. Si x t h , b o t h the Fe dera l Circuit's a nd this Court's ca selaw r equire us to ensure c ompliance with fair pr ocess. See Au sti n v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 547, 551 (1994); Thu rb e r v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 119 (1993) (" entire thrust of the VA' s nonadver sarial claims sy stem is pr edicated upon a struc ture wh ic h p ro vid e s f

or no tic e and

an o pp or tun ity to b e he ard

a t vi rt ua lly e ve ry ste p in the pr oc e ss" ); see als o Ha y re v . W est , 188 F.3d 1327, 1333 ( Fe d. Cir. 1999) (g rave proce dural e rror vitiates finality

of RO de c isi on ); Su tto n v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 553, 566 (1996) (discussing a nd applying V A proc edura l protec tions and remanding for " Boa rd to consider

and discuss . . . whe ther the ve tera n had bee n g iven adequate notice of

the nee d to present arg ument and further e vidence on the merits of his claim and

an a de qu a te op po rt

un ity to a pp e ar at a he ari ng " ); Ar c hb old

v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 124, 129 ( 1996) (f un dame nta l r ig ht t o r e c e ive a pp e llate ri g hts and

State me nt o f t

he Ca se ); Cur

ry v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 59, 66- 67 (1994) ( discussing and apply ing V A fa ir proce ss principles and a nnouncing fa ir pr oc e ss r ule s) ; Be rn ar

d v . B ro wn , 4 Ve t.A

pp
. 38 4, 39 2- 94 (1 99 3) (h old ingthat V A c la ima nts must be aff

orded " full benef

its of . . . proce dural saf

eg uards" aff

o rd ed b y statutory and re g ulatory provisions establishing " extensive procedur al requirements t o ensure a claimant's rights to full and fair a ssistance a

nd adjudication in the VA claims adjudication proce ss")

. I n this re g ard, the Fe dera l Circuit stated as an a dditional rationale for its decision in W

int e rs : This result is also supported by fundame ntal principles of f airne ss. . . .15 Rather than rema

nd Mr. W inters' s case to the DVA, the Court of Appea ls for Ve te ra ns Cla ims

. . . d e pr ive d M r. Wint e rs of his ri g ht, un de r [p re -V CA A] 3 8 U .S. C. § 5103(a) , to an ex planation of what evidence was missing f rom his claim and an op po rt un ity to s up ply su c h e vid e nc e . Such ac tio n b y the c ourt is i nc on sis te nt w ith g ene ra l p ri n ciples of f

airne ss, and it is particularly unwar rante d in view of the f

act t h at "t h e char acte r of the ve tera ns' benef its statutes is s trong ly

and uniquely

procla im ant ."
W int e rs , 219 F.3d at 1379-80; see Nolen v. Gobe r , 222 F.3d 1356, 1361 ( Fe d. Cir. 2000) (sug g esting that f a ilure to p ro vid e re qu ir e d n oti c e vio la te s " g e ne ra l pr inc ipl e s o f f a ir ne ss, and is p articu lar ly

unwar rante d in view of the f

act that ' the cha

rac ter of the veter ans' b en ef i t s statute is strongly

and uniquely pro-c laimant' ") . These case s strong ly sug g est that for this Court to rende r a de termination as t o VCAA applicability (or nonapplicability) where no section 5103(a ) notice ha s been pr ovided by VAwo uld

vio la te pr inc ipl e s o f f

a ir pr oc e ss.

III . C ON CL USI ON Th e Court ho lds that ND AA § 16 11 ha s no po te nti a l a pp lic a bil ity to the a

pp e lla nt' s c la ims

. T h e C o u rt fu rt h er

h o l d s t h at al l p ro v i s i o n s o f th e VC AA ar e p o t en t i al l y ap p l i cab l e t o t h e ap p el l an t 's

c la ims . We c on c lud e , h ow e ve r, a t le a st at th is t ime , th a t th is Court may no t de te rm ine in t

he fi rs t instance the specific applicability of t he VCAA. Be cause of this Court's scope of re view, the F eder al Circuit jurisprudence interpre ting that statutory framework, the Secre tary ' s acknow ledg ments at oral argument, the " strong ly

and uniqu el y p ro-c laimant" nature of ve tera ns law, the a

bsence of VA imp le me nti ngre g ulatio ns , a nd the c on c e rn s of fund a me nta l fa ir ne ss an d fa ir pr oc e ss, the Cou rt mus t avoid cutti ng off an appellant' s rig hts under the VCAAby prematurely

injecting itself into the VA

a dju dic a tio n pr oc e ss and makin g de te rm inatio ns on iss ue s th a t w e re no t a dd

re sse d b y VAin t he fi rs t ins tanc e . M or e ov e r, we str e ss t hat ou r c on c e rn a bo ut n ot a c tin g pr e c ipi tou sly is pa rt ic ula rl y a c ute here , w h e r e th e e n a c tm e n t o f th e V CA A

- - w h ic h c o u ld b e th e mo s t f

ar - r e a c h in g Co n g r e s s ional

enac tment reg ardingclaims adjudication since the Ve tera ns' J udicial Review Act, Pub. L . No. 100- 68 7, 10 2 St a t. 4 10 5 (19 88 ) (w hic h c re a te d th is C ourt )- -c a me a bo ut l arg e ly

be c a us e Con g re ss perc eived that ju d i ci al d ecisions had f ar too na rrowly define d the Secr etar

y ' s authority

to provide assistance ( see E x p l an at o ry S t at em en t o f C o m m i t t ee s o nVe t er an s ' Af fa i rs (B ac k gro u n d ), 1 4 6 C o n g. Rec. H9913 ( daily

ed. Oc t. 17, 2000)), an d wh ere the Court, by rende ring any

decision as to the16

applicability

of that law to the a

ppellant' s cl ai m s , wo u l d risk abridg ing ( or eve n usurping ) the Se cr et ar y 's s tatutory

authority to implement that law and to re nder suc h decisions under it as the Secre tary considers a

ppropriate

. See 38 U. S.C. §§ 50 1( a ) , 51 1( a ); se e als o McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969) (" The ag ency , like a trial c ourt, is cre ated f or the purpose of applying a statute in the first instance." ). I ndeed, f or this Court to determine in the first instance who' s in and wh o' s o ut u

nd e r t he e no rm ou sly

fa r- re a c hin g a dju dic a tio n s a fe g ua rd s e na c te d in the VC AAwo uld be to ac t not as a re viewing judicial tribunal but as an e x ecutive a g ency that is promulgating

re g ula tio ns
. T h i s w e c an n o t d o
. R a t h e r , w e w i l l v a c a t e t h e B V A d e c i s i o n an d r e m an d f o r VA to

m ak e a det er m i n at i o n as t o t h e ap p l i cab i l i t y o f th e va ri o u s VC AA p ro v i s i o n s t o t h e a p p el l an t 's claims. Upon consider ation of t he above, t he S eptember 30, 1999, BV A dec ision is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.

STEI NB ERG, Judge , concur

ring : I join fully in Chief J udg e Kr amer ' s excellent opinion. I wish to amplify

sever al points, however

. First, although I ag ree with the conc lusion in part I I .A.1. of the Court' s opinion, I wish to add the following analy sis reg ardingthe def easa nce of the ephe mera l amendment to 38 U.S.C. § 5107 made by the Floyd D. Spence National De fense Authorization Act for Fisca l Yea r 2001, Pub. L . No. 106-398, 114 Stat. 1654, app. § 1611 (Oc t. 30, 2000) [ here inafter NDAA § 1611], as a result of the

enac tment of the coor dination pr ovision in the Veter ans Be nefits and Hea lth Car e I mprovement Ac t of 2000, Pub

. L

. No

. 1 0 6-419, § 104(c )(2) , 114 Stat. 1822, 1828 (Nov. 1, 2000) [hereina fter coordination provision] , and the Ve tera ns Claims Assi stance Act of 2000, Pub. L

. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2 09 6 (N ov . 9, 200 0) [he re ina ft e r V CA A], a ll thr e e of wh ic h la ws we re e na c te d to ov e rt

ur n th is Court's opinion in Mo rto n v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 477 ( finding cer tain Depa rtment of Ve tera

ns Affa irs (VA) issuances not bindi n g o n VA), en banc re view denie d , 13 Vet.App. 205 ( 1999) (pe r cur iam order ), vacate d and remande d sub nom. Morton v. Gobe r , _

_ F

. 3 d 2 0 0 0 _

_ , N o
. 9 9

- 7 1 9 1 , 2 0 0 0 WL 1229051 (F ed. Cir. Aug
. 17, 2000) (table ), opinion wi thdrawn and appeal dismiss ed , 14 Vet.App. 174 (2000) ( per c uriam orde r).17

The Court' s rea ding of

the l ang uag e in the effec tive-date coordination provision is butt resse d by sim ila r l e g isl a tiv e a c tio n b y

Con g re ss i n 1 99 8 in con nec tio n w iththe e na c tme nt o f 3 8 U .S. C. § 1103, relating to cla ims based upon the ef fec ts of tobacc o products. Interna l Revenue Ser vice Re str uc tur ingand

Re fo rm Ac t of 19 98 , Pub. L

. No. 1 05 -2 06 , § 90 14 , 1 12 Stat. 6 85 , 8 65 -6 6 ( July 22 , 1 99 8)

. Th e ne w se c tio n 11 03 wa s ma de e ff e c tiv e pr os pe c tiv e ly , th a t is , w ithre sp e c t to c la ims

rec eived by

VA af ter the date of that e nactment. Id ., 112 Stat. at 866 (subsec tion ( b) of newsection 8202). Approximately

six wee ks ear lier, Co n gress ha d amende d 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 1131, dealing somewhat differe ntly with the s ame subject matter; t hose amendments wer e to be effe ctive with respec t to any

claim for c ompensation rec eived by VA at any tim e (e xce pt not in a cas e in which VA ha d befor e that enac tment a war ded service connec tion ba sed on use of tobacc o products). Transpor tation Equity

Act for the 21st Century , Pub. L . No. 105-178, § 8202, 112 Stat. 107, 492-93 (June 9, 1998). I n the later enac tment, Congre ss provided that the "a mendments made by

[t he ea rlier

enac tment] shal l be tre ated f or all purpose s as not having been ma de" . Pub. L . No. 105-206, § 9 01 4( a ), 11 2 St a t. at 86 5. Th a t ra the r str a ig htf or wa rd and br ie f c oo rd inatin g pr ov isi on e ff e c tiv e ly nullified the ea

rlier e nactment f

rom its very

outset. I n c o n t r a s t , t h e s i tu a t i o n w e c o n f r o n t r e g ar d i n g t h e c o mp e t i n g a m e n d m e n t s t o 3 8 U. S.C. § 5107 is far more complicated as a re sult of the fac t that Congre ss electe d to place the nullification langua g e (c oo rd inatio n p ro vis ion ) i n a law ( Pub . L . N o. 10 6- 41 9) tha t w a s ena c te d be tw e e n th e date of ena ctment of th e provision to be nullified (ND AA § 1611) a nd an anticipated future date of

enac tment of the super seding provision (VCAA § 4). In order to achie ve ex actly the s ame effe ct as

was a chieve d in the case of the tobac co-pr oducts provisions -- nullification of the first ena ctment from its in ception -- mor e c omp lic a te d null if ic a tio n leg isl a tio n ha d to be cr a ft e d be c a us e no t on ly

we re the re thr e e se pa

rate laws inv olv e d but al so be c a us e the pr ov isi on

re g ard ingthe e ff

e c tiv e date of the nullification of N DAA § 1611 wa s enac ted b ef o re t h e superseding provision itself (in the VCAA) a nd, hence , befor e any

null i fi ca tion could actually occur . The e x tra phra ses used in the coordination provisi o n , "a s of the ena ctment" and " shall cea se to be in ef fec t", we re ne cessa

ry beca use of the nine-da

y period betwee n the enac tment of NDAA§ 1611 and the VCAA ' s enac tment date, no matter

that the forme r wa s l ater to be re trospectively

nullified by

operation of the coordination provision as of the date that the VCAA wa s enac ted. Unlike in the cur rent situation,18

the t obacc o-produc ts nullify ing provision was enacte d in the same la w as the c oordinating provision,

so the re wa s n o ti me g a

p a nd , th us , n o p ro vis ion

wa s n e c e ssa

ry a s to " sh a ll c e a se to b e in e ff e c t" in

or de r t o p re c lud e e ve n th e sli g hte st p os sib ili ty of any re sid ua l e ff e c t; n or wa s t here any ne e d to provide languag e to spec ify operative for ce "as o f" a specific date. In our situation, any VA adjudicative a ction taken dur ing the nine day s duringwhich NDA A § 1611's amended version of

s e c ti o n5 1 0 7 w a s in

e f f e c t w o u ld , a s a

th e o r e ti c a l m a tt e r , h a v e h a d to h a v e b e e nta

k e nin th e c o n te xt of se c tio n 5 10 7 a s it

ha d at th a t po int

be e n ame nd e d b y

ND AA§ 1 61 1; h ow e ve r, the ph ra se " sh a ll

cea se to have ef

fe ct " in the coordination provision makes absolutely clea r that Cong ress intende d (notwithstanding the absenc e of a ny leg islative history

to that effe ct) to pre clude a ny reme dy afte r the VCAA' s enac tment for any adjudicative failure to ha ve taken into a ccount the nine -day version of sec tion 5107. Second, I wish to ex pand somewhat on the Court's c autionary statement at the end of par t I I .A.3. of the opinion re g ardingthe nee d for the V CAA regulations to be rec onciled with any

c ur re ntl y e ff e c tiv e VAiss ua

nc e s. B e c a

us e the VC AA is p ote nti a lly a pp lic a ble to p e nd ingc la ims , VA will be re quired to dete rmine, under Karnas v. De rwinski , in e ach case whether any regulations that it issues to i mplement the VCAA provide a more favor able result to a claimant than w ould have been provided under the law (including binding VA issuances) that exis ted prior t o t h e V C AA, unless VA ca

n demonstrate c lear ly

that as a g ener al matter the VCAA and its subsequent implementing r eg ulations provide a more favor able r esult in all instances. Karnas , 1 Vet.App. 308, 313 (1991) ( "w here the law or regulation chang es af

ter a claim has been filed or reopened but before the administrative or judicia l appea l pr ocess ha s been c oncluded, the ve rsion most favora ble to the appellant should apply

unless Congr ess provid ed o t h erwise or per mitted the [ Secre tary ] t o do otherwise a

nd the Secr etar

y did so" ). I n this re g ard, I note (without expressing an opinion a s to the

me ri ts o f) the a

pp e lla nt' s p os iti on that subs tanti ve ri g hts we re c re a te d by vir tue of tw o " F a st L e tte rs " (F ast L etter, 0 0 -9 2 (Dec. 13, 2000); F ast L etter 00- 87 (Nov. 17, 2000)) issued, subsequent to the VCAA, by

the Director of Compensation and P ension in the VA Veter ans Benef its Admini stration to provide VCAA gui d an ce (a n d that wer e not subject to notice or comment, se e Fu

ge re v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 103, 106-08 (1990) (discussing applicability of Administrative Procedur e Ac t, 5 U. S.C. § 5 51 e t se q. , to VA )) . I f t he a pp e lla nt i s c or re c t, t he n a VA ad ju di cat io n ma de in19

acc ordanc e with those VCAA- implementing r eg ulations could provide a less favor able result to a claimant than would have been provided by an adjudication in a ccor dance with s u ch p re ex isting substantive require ments in the Fa st L etters. Such a result is also possible as to VA i ssuance s that pr e date the VC AA , s ho uld a VA a dju dic a tio n un de r t

he imp le me nti ngre g ulatio ns pr ov ide a re su lt less favor able than w ould have be en provide d under those pr e-V CAA i s s u an ce s. See , e.g. , McCormick v. Gobe r , 14 Vet.App. 39 (2000) (holding that VB A L etter 20- 99-60 wa s binding VA iss ua nc e a lth ou g h n ot a do pte d a ft e r no tic e and op po rt un ity fo r pu

bli c c omm e nt) ; Morton , su pr a (as to withdrawa l of opinion); Pa tto n v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 272, 277-84 (1999) (holding cer tain parts of VAAd jud ic a tion Pr oc e dure Manu a l, M 21 -1 , w e re bin din g on VA ); Coh e n (

Do ug las ) v . B ro wn , 1 0 Ve t

. Ap p
. 1 2 8 , 1 3 9 (1 9 9 7 ) ( s am e)

. I nt h i s re gar d , In o t e t h e r ec o g n i t i o n b y t h e S ec re t ary 's repr esentative at ora l argument that pre-VC AA duties should be conta ined in the VCAA imp le me nti ngre g ulatio ns
. Finally , Inote that, althoug h the appellant has reque sted a rema nd under the VCAA, there by specific ally

invoking a

ny rig hts that he may have under the VCAA, t he question of wa iver of V CAA rig hts may

arise be fore VA in the adjudication proce ss there following our remand of the case. Cf

. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304(c) (2000) (expressly permitting claimant to w aive r emand f rom BV A to RO for issuance of

Supplemental Statement of the Case whe n additional pertinent e vidence is submit ted by

c la ima nt) ; Su tto n v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 553, 567- 69 (1996).