1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not

precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50165

Summary Calendar

ORELIOUS WASHINGTON,

Pl aintiff-Appellant,

versus

WILLIAM J. HENDERSON, Postmaster General

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. SA-97-CA-0038

December 1, 1998

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge, : 1

Plaintiff-appellant Orelious Washington appeals the district court’s decision granting

Defendant-appellee William J. Henderson’s Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. This

case arises out of Washington’s empl o yment discrimination claims that his employer, the United

States Postal Service, discriminated against him when it did no t promote him. Washington also

alleged that there was a pattern and practice of discrimination and a hostile work environment against

black employees at the San Antonio branch of the U.S. Postal Service. The district court dismissed2

his employment discrimination claims because Washington produced no evidence that was qualified

for the job o f which he complains, and dismissed his remaining claims because he had failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. Washington argues on appeal that the district court erred when

it found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Washington’s lack of qualifications. He

does not appear to argue that the distric t co urt erred in dismissing his remaining claims. For the

foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss and grant summary judgment

upon Washington’s claims.

F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND

Washington began his full-t ime employment with the United States Postal Service as a letter

carrier in Inglewood, California in 1970. While in California, he changed jobs twice within the Postal

Service. First, he was reassigned as a maintenance mechanic, known as an MPE-7, in 1982. Second,

he was promoted from MPE-7 to become an electronic technician, known as an ET-8, in 1985.

In September 1993, Washington requested that he be transferred to San Antonio, Texas. The

reques t was vo luntary, and in making this request, Washington indicated he would accept

reassignment into the position of MPE-6, MPE-7, or ET-8. The Postal Service granted his request,

and he accepted a position in San Antonio as an MPE-7, effective April 30, 1994.

In October 1993

, while still in California, the ET-8 position was eliminated, and everyone

(including Washington) in that position was upgraded to ET-9. Thus, when Washington arrived in

San Antonio in April, 1994, he was downgraded, pursuant to his voluntary request, from an ET-9 to

an MPE-7.

Less than a year later, on February 9, 1995, the Postal Service in San Antoni o posted two

announcements entitled “Notice of Intent to Fill a Vacancy,” stating that two ET-9 positions were3

to be filled. The manner in which such vacancies are filled in the Postal Service is a fairly mechanical

one. Promotion eligibilit

y registers (PERs) are created for several positions, including the ET-9

–the

one at issue in this case. A PER is a list of employees, ranked according to score, who are eligible

for a particular position. There are three components that make up this score: (1) a written

examination; (2) a supervisor evaluation; and (3) a review panel evaluation. The three components,

when completed, are submitted to the National Test Administration C ent er, which scores the

individual elements and generates a numerical score for the employee. Candidates who are rated as

eligible for a particular position are ranked. When a vacancy occurs, management is required to offer

the vacant position to t he person at t he top of the list on the applicable PER, and if that person

declines, to the next person listed, and so on.

The filling of these vacancies were governed by the Maintenance Selection System (“MSS”)

as set forth in the National Agree ment and in the Management Instructions implementing that

Agreement. The MSS was first implemented on July 2, 1985. Importantly, the MSS provided that

previous PERs made prior to that date were abolished, and were replaced with new ones. In other

words, a person who had before July 1985 appeared on a PER would have to reapply anew in order

to be placed on a PER.

In this case, the job vacancy posting was in accordance with the procedures set forth in the

National Agreement and the applicable Management Instructions. Eight people were listed on ET-9

PER in February 1995. As required, the highest ranked person on the list was offered the first of the

two ET-9 openings. The first person declined the promotion, however. Accordingly, the next two

highest ranked persons on the ET-9 li s t, Tom Branigan and Jesse Stieffel, were offered the4

promotions. Both accepted. Critically, Washington was not on the ET-9 PER in San Antonio at the

time the two ET-9 positions were offered.

P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND

On March 7, 1995, Washington filed an informal complaint of discrimination with the EEO

office of the Postal Service. In this informal complaint, he alleged that he was discriminated against

on the basis of

“race, color, age (54), national origin, black male.” Specifically, Washington

complained about the fact that he was not considered or selected for either of the two ET-9 positions.

On May 2, 1995, Washington filed this formal complaint of discrimination in this case. In his formal

complaint, he alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of race and age. His complaint

was investigated, and after an administrative hearing on June 13, 1996, the EEOC administrative

judge issued a finding of no discrimination.

On January 8, 1997, Washington filed his original complaint in federal district court, seeking

damages for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the C ivil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-

794a. Both claims were based on the Postal Service’s failure to promote him in February 1995. In

addition, he alleged that there was a pattern and practice of discrimination, as well as a hostile work

environment, against black employees at the Postal Service.

On January 15, 1998, the district court granted Defendant-appellee’s motion to dismiss and

for summary judgment on all of Washington’s claims. The district court dismissed his employment

discrimination claims because Washingto n produced no evidence that was qualified for the job of

whic h he complains, and dismissed his remaining claims because he had failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies.2 Washington argued to the district court that it was the Postal Service’s fault he was not on

the PER because it failed to locate his MSS records from California prior to the posting of the

vacancies. As the district court pointed out, however, these lost records have no bearing on this case.

When the MSS took effect in July 1985, it abolished previous PERs and scores associated with them.

Washington’s only PER score was generated prior to that date, and so the records the Postal Service

failed to locate could have had no effect on his qualifications for the posted job vacancies.

5 D ISCUSSION

I.

We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant summary judgement on Washington’s

Title VII and ADEA employment discrimination claims. S ee, e.g., Sherrod v. American Airlines

, 132

F.3d 1112, 1119 (5 th Cir. 1998). To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, a plaint iff must

show, among other things, that he was qualified for the position. S ee, e.g, Waggoner v. City of

Garland

, 987 F.2d 1160, 1163 (5 th Cir. 1993). The same requirement applies when a plaint iff attem pts

to make a prima facie case of age discrimination on a failure to prom ote or non-selection claim. S ee,

e.g., Lindsey v. Prove Corp. , 987 F.2d 324, 326-27 (5 th Cir. 1993).

As the court observed, Washington conceded that he was not on the applicable PER when

the vacancies were filled. Washington therefore cannot establish that he was “qualified” for the

positions of which he complains. 2 It is well established that a plaint iff bears the burden of proving

a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a summary judgment m ot ion, and failure to do so

mandates the entry of summary judgment. See, e.g., Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 14 F.3d 1082,

1084-85 (5 th Cir. 1994). Washington therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of race or age

discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA respectively. We thus must affirm the district court’s

decision.

II.6

We need not review the district court’s decision to dismiss Washington’s remaining claims

of a pattern and practice of discrimination and a hostile work environment against black employees

at the San Antonio branch of the U.S. Postal Service. The district court’s decision was based on the

observation that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on these claims before bringing

this suit in federal court. We need not reach the merits of this decision as Washington failed to brief

the exhaustion of administrative remedies issue. An appellant abandons all issues not raised and

argued in its initial brief. See, e.g., Webb v. Investacor, Inc. , 89 F.3d 252, 257 n.2 (5 th Cir. 1996).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decisions in this matter.