alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 16 - 00115 - CR

JAMES CLAYTON GARRET T APPELLANT
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM CRIMINAL DISTRI CT COURT NO. 1 OF TA RRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1419 884D

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant James Clayton Garrett ent ered an open plea of guilty to robbery causing bodily injury and pleaded true to a repeat offender notice

. Following the preparation of a pre sentence investigation report, the trial court conducted a punishment hearing, convicted Garrett of the underlying offense, and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

Garrett ’s court
- appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel avers that in h is professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s b rief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of
the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State , counsel notified Garrett of his motion to withdraw, provided him a copy of the motion and brief, informed him of his right to file a pro se response, informed him of his right to seek discretionary review should this court hold the appeal is frivolous, a nd took concrete measures to facilitate Garrett ’s review of the appellate record. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court informed Garrett that he may file a pro se response to counsel’s brief , and he did so. The State did not
submit a brief. Once an appellant’s court

- appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders , this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See Staffo rd v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State , 904 S.W.2d 920, 922

– 23 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw . See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 82

– 83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). We have carefully reviewed t he record , counsel’s brief, and Garrett’s pro
se response, and w e agree with counsel that this appeal is who lly frivolous and3

without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal

. See Bledsoe v. S tate , 178 S.W.3d 824, 827

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State , 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, w e grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Bill Meier BILL MEIER JUSTICE PANEL: MEIER, GA BRIEL, and SUDDERTH, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 22 , 201 6
NO. 07-06-0253-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL B JULY 27, 2006

______________________________ RICARTE G. GONZALEZ, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A PPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE 364 TH DISTRIC T COURT O F LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2001-436822; H ONORABLE BRAD LEY S. UND ERWOOD, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Appellant, Ricarte G. Gonzalez, appeals h is con viction for indecency with a child and sentence of incarceration in the Institutional D iv ision of the Texa s Department of Criminal Justice for a p erio d of 15 ye ars, and fine of $3,000. We dismiss for lack of jurisdict ion. Followi ng jury tr ial, appellant was conv icted of indecency with a child and sentence was imposed on Mar

ch 22, 2006. Appel lanttimelyfiled a Motion for New Tri al on April 21, 2006. As such, appel lant’s notice of appeal was due by June 20, 2006. See T EX . R. A PP .2

P. 26.2. Appellant

filed his noti ce of appeal on June 23, 2006. Appellant has not filed a motion for extens ion of time to file not ice of appeal in t his cause. Texas Rule of Appellat e Procedure 26.2 requiresa notice of appeal to be f iled within 30 days after s entence is impos ed unless the defendant timely file s a motion for new trial. T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.2(a). If the defendant timely fil es a motion for new trial, the notice of appeal is due within 90 days of the im pos ition of sentence. Id . While the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not establish thejurisdic

tion of cou rts of app eals, the Rul es do provide procedures which must be followed to i nvoke a cour t’s juris diction ov er a particu lar appeal. Olivo v . State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex.Cri m.App. 1996). If the jurisdi ction of a court of appeals i s not properl y invo ked, the power of the appellate cour

t to act is as absentas if it did not exist and the appeal will be dismissed f or lack of jurisd iction

. See State v. Riewe , 13 S.W.3d 408, 413-14 (Tex. Crim.App. 2000) ; Olivo , 918 S.W.2d at 523. An untimely notice of appea l is insufficient to invoke an appe llate court ’ s jurisdi ction to address the merits of the a ppeal and the cour t can take no act ion other than todismiss the appeal. Slaton v. State , 981 S.W .2d 208, 210 (Tex.Crim.App . 1998). As appellant’s n otice of appeal was untimely, this court’ s jurisdi ction has not been invoked. Accordingl y, we dismiss thi s appeal for lack of jurisdict ion.

Mackey K. Hancock Justice Do not publis h.
EX-10.1






Exhibit 10.1




FISCAL 2005 COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO NON-MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS




On March 2, 2005, the Board of Directors of Collegiate Pacific Inc. approved the payment of
the following compensation to each non-management director of the Board in respect of his service
to the Board in fiscal 2005, which ends on June 30, 2005:




(1) an annual retainer of $7,500 payable at the end of fiscal 2005;




	 	(2)	 	a stock option grant of 5,000 shares per non-management director on March 2,
2005; and






	 	(3)	 	reimbursement of customary expenses for attending Board, committee and
shareholder meetings.
#### Rodney Mon et al., Respondents, v City of New York et al., Appellants.

Judgement of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lewis R. Friedman, J.), entered June 8, 1989, after jury trial, upon a verdict which awarded damages to plaintiffs Rodney and Andre Mon in the amounts of $12,625.50 and $1,000,000, respectively, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

This litigation arose out of an argument between plaintiffs and an off-duty police officer, who ultimately shot both of them. The jury found that neither shooting was justified, but determined that 50% of Rodney Mon's injuries were attributable to his own acts.

On appeal, the city contests the submission to the jury of the question of whether or not the city ratified the arrest of Andre Mon. We note that this case is distinguishable from *Stavitz v City of New York*(98 AD2d 529), cited by the city. There is no evidence here that the police officer assumed the role of complaining witness by signing a complaint or making a statement at the scene upon which the arrest was based. Indeed, the officer refused to give a statement later that night when interviewed by an Assistant District Attorney. Under these circumstances, the jury could have found that the city, which placed Andre Mon under police guard at the hospital after the shooting, adopted the arrest initiated by Shankman at the scene.

There was also sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the issue of whether or not the city was negligent in hiring Shankman. An employer may be required to answer in damages for a tort committed by an employee against a third party when the employee was hired with knowledge of his propensity for the sort of behavior which resulted in injury *(Detone v Bullit Courier Serv.,*140 AD2d 278, 279, *lv denied*73 NY2d 702). When it hired Shankman, the city was aware of his prior arrest and conviction for disorderly conduct which arose from the shooting out of a store window by a codefendant. Moreover, the city was aware of the scathing remarks made by the arresting officer in that case concerning Shank-man’s bad attitude toward authority and disregard for the seriousness of the offense. It was also aware of allegations that the shooting was motivated by revenge against Shankman’s prior employer. The city’s failure to conduct a further investigation, particularly in view of Shankman’s initial failure to disclose this conviction, gave rise to a jury question on the issue of negligent hiring.

We find that, in view of the serious nature of the gunshot *213wound to Andre Mon, the attendant pain and suffering and the permanency of his impairment, the jury’s verdict was not excessive.

We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Milonas, Ellerin, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 42,595,549
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</TABLE>
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-18-0000327

16-MAY-2019

08:00 AM
| (1)   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  August 5, 2010 | /s/Kenneth R. Burk                                   |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
|                            | Kenneth R. Burk                                      |
|                            | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Henry Hightower, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), rendered April 14, 1988, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We find no merit to the defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly exercised its discretion in its *Sandoval*ruling that the People could inquire as to the defendant’s past five out of seven convictions *(see, People v Aguilera,*156 AD2d 698; *People v Ortiz,*143 AD2d 107; *People v Magee,*126 AD2d 573, 574; *see also, People v Pavao,*59 NY2d 282, 292). The defendant’s convictions demonstrated his willingness to place his own interests ahead of those of society, and were therefore directly relevant to the issue of his credibility had he testified *(see, People v Ortiz, supra; People v Sandoval,*34 NY2d 371). Moreover, as we have noted previously, inquiry into the underlying facts of charges dismissed in satisfaction of a defendant’s plea of guilty to other charges is permissible *(see, People v Magee, supra; People v Capone,*114 AD2d 373).

Furthermore, although it was improper for the trial court to rule that the prosecutor could cross-examine the defendant as to his use of aliases in prior convictions unrelated to the crimes in question, this error was harmless in view of the overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt based on the trial testimony by undercover police officers of two separate sales of cocaine by him *(see, People v Jimenez,*79 AD2d 1012, *mod on other grounds*55 NY2d 895; *People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230).

To the extent that the *Sandoval*ruling permitted inquiry into the defendant’s recent arrest for which no disposition had been made, the error, if any, was harmless *(People v Boyd,*149 AD2d 939).

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J. P., Rubin, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.
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<CASH>                                         411,706
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  844,423
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  4,721,141
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,993,151
<PP&E>                                       5,290,659
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,706,085
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,036,285
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,036,285
<SALES>                                      2,744,327
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               579,990
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</TABLE>
#### Ralph T. Williams, Plaintiff, *v.*Olena E. Williams, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

December 4, 1956.

*David B. Silverman*for Ida H. Faucett, petitioner.

*Leonard M. Wacker*for plaintiff.

Owen McGivern, J.

This is an application *for ■*an order pursuant to section 1171-b of the Civil Practice Act to enter judgment for arrears.

A decree of divorce was entered in this court on June 6, 1935 in favor of plaintiff husband. The decree directed plaintiff to pay to the maternal grandmother, the petitioner in this application, the sum of $6 weekly for the support of the infant issue, of the marriage. Said child attained the age of 21 years on June 29, 1951. The application seeks entry of judgment for the arrears due from June 6, 1935 to June 29, 1951, a period of 835 weeks. It is alleged aqd nowhere denied that no payments were made by plaintiff during this period. Plaintiff asserts that the moving party has no standing in this court, she not being a plaintiff or defendant; that section 1171-b was enacted for the benefit of the wife and not a third party; that upon information and belief, the child was self-supporting before he attained the age of 21. However, section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act provides in part that the court, upon the application of either party, or any other person having the care, control and custody of a child, may vary or modify the terms of an order regarding maintenance of children. Section 1171-b provides in part that where the husband in a matrimonial action makes default in payment of any sum required by the judgment, the court in its discretion may make an order directing the entry of judgment for the amount of the arrears. The language used in this section does not limit such relief to the wife. The clear intention is to grant relief to whomever is entitled thereto in accordance with the previous order or judgment of the court. Plaintiff in effect is asserting that the court has made a meaningless, unenforcible order. But the plaintiff’s child was in petitioner’s custody pur*733suant to order of this court and provision for the support of the child duly made. Plaintiff then made no payment whatever. Accordingly, this court determines that the application should be granted. All other grounds asserted by plaintiff in opposition to the application are held to have no basis in law or fact and are overruled. The application is granted. Petitioner may enter judgment for the amount of the arrears together with appropriate interest. Settle order.
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 171 (Wednesday, September 3, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51534-51535]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20478]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Sunshine Federal Register Notice

Agency Holding the Meetings:  Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Date:  Weeks of September 1, 8, 15, 22, 29, October 6, 2008.

[[Page 51535]]

Place:  Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.

Status:  Public and Closed.

Week of September 1, 2008

    There are no meetings scheduled for the week of September 1, 2008.

Week of September 8, 2008--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the week of September 8, 2008.

Week of September 15, 2008--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the week of September 15, 2008.

Week of September 22, 2008--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the week of September 22, 2008.

Week of September 29, 2008--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the week of September 29, 2008.

Week of October 6, 2008--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the week of October 6, 2008.
    *The schedule for Commission meetings is subject to change on short 
notice. To verify the status of meetings, call (recording)--(301) 415-
1292. Contact person for more information: Michelle Schroll, (301) 415-
1662.
    The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the Internet 
at: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/policy-making/schedule.html.
    The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with 
disabilities where appropriate. If you need a reasonable accommodation 
to participate in these public meetings, or need this meeting notice or 
the transcript or other information from the public meetings in another 
format (e.g. braille, large print), please notify the NRC's Disability 
Program Coordinator, Rohn Brown, at 301-492-2279, TDD: 301-415-2100, or 
by e-mail at [email protected]. Determinations on requests for reasonable 
accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis.
    This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred subscribers; 
if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like to be added to the 
distribution, please contact the Office of the Secretary, Washington, 
DC 20555 (301-415-1969). In addition, distribution of this meeting 
notice over the Internet system is available. If you are interested in 
receiving this Commission meeting schedule electronically, please send 
an electronic message to [email protected].

    Dated: August 28, 2008.
R. Michelle Schroll,
Office of the Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-20478 Filed 8-29-08; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laura BORADERS, a/k/a Lisa Stringer, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-4362.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 15, 2002.

Chiege Ojugo Kalu Okwara, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas Richard Ascik, Office of the United States Attorney, Ashville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a valid plea agreement, Laura Boraders pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and to utter counterfeit securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1344, and 513(a). Boraders received a 10 month prison term. Boraders’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Counsel states that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but asserts the *652district court erred by refusing to grant Boraders a two-point downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 3El.l(a) (2000). Finding no error, we affirm.

We review a district court’s decision to deny a reduction to the offense level for acceptance of responsibility for clear error. *United States v. Pauley,*289 F.3d 254, 261 (4th Cir.2002). Because Boraders committed an identical state offense within three weeks of the time she entered her plea agreement, and claimed she was innocent at sentencing, we find the district court did not err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Even if the district court had committed error in not granting a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Borader’s sentence is within the recommended guidelines range had the district court granted the reduction, and thus she was not prejudiced.

Accordingly, we affirm Borader’s conviction and sentence. As required by *Anders,*we have reviewed the record and conclude that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*