J-S14024-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LEROY ELMER DOLLEY,

Appellant No. 1328 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 2, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001360-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2017

Appellant, Leroy Elmer Dolley, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his convictions of one count of rape of a child, two counts 

of aggravated indecent assault, one count each of indecent assault, criminal 

attempt, endangering the welfare of children, false imprisonment, and 

corruption of minors.1 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121, 3125, 3126, 4304, 901, 2903, and 6301, 

respectively.
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While [Appellant] was living with the victim and her family, 

the victim reported that [Appellant] sexually abused her by 

having vaginal sex with her, fondling her breasts and fondling 

her genitals. These instances of sexual abuse were reported to 

have occurred on three separate occasions. The victim was 

around seven (7) years old when the first incident of abuse 

occurred, and around eight (8) years old when the last incident 

of abuse occurred.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[Appellant] was charged with one count of Rape of a Child 

(F1), two counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child (F1), 

one count of Endangering the Welfare of Children (F3), one 

count of Indecent Assault (M1), one count of False 

Imprisonment, one count of Criminal Attempt/Indecent Assault 

(M1) and one count of Corruption of Minors (M1). A preliminary 

hearing was held for this matter on August 20, 2015. At the 

preliminary hearing, the victim testified that [Appellant] sexually 

abused her on three different occasions.

Although [Appellant] had the opportunity to request and 

receive a continuance on the matter, [Appellant] chose to list his 

case for trial. A jury was selected on December 7, 2015. 

[Appellant’s] trial was scheduled to take place on December 10, 

2015. On December 9, 2015, [Appellant] came before the 

[c]ourt, and defense counsel indicated that [Appellant] was 

considering firing his current defense counsel and seeking a 

continuance. At that time, [Appellant] and his counsel met 

privately to discuss how to move forward from that point, and 

ultimately, [Appellant] decided to enter an Open No Contest 

Plea.

[Appellant] requested to withdraw his plea at sentencing, 

and the [c]ourt denied [Appellant’s] request. On March 2, 2016, 

[Appellant] was sentenced to 10 to 40 years in a state 

correctional institution. [Appellant] must also register as a 

sexual offender. [Appellant] timely filed a Post Sentence Motion.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/16, at 2-3. The trial court held a hearing on 

Appellant’s post-sentence motions, and ultimately entered an order denying 

the motions on July 29, 2016. This timely appeal followed.
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Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Did the trial court judge impose an illegal and/or unreasonable 

sentence?

II. Should Appellant have been allowed to withdraw his NoContest Plea?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the sentence imposed by the trial 

court. Appellant’s Brief at 6-9. Although Appellant purports to challenge the 

legality of his sentence, in actuality, his argument is limited to a challenge of 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. In this regard, Appellant presents 

the following argument:

On December 9, 2015, Appellant appeared for a criminal 

jury trial before the Honorable Charles T. Jones, Jr., Judge, and 

entered an Open No Contest Plea to one count of Rape of a Child 

(F1), two counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault (F1), one count 

of Endangering the Welfare of Children (F3), one count of 

Indecent Assault (M1), one count of Criminal Attempt/Indecent 

Assault (MI), one count of Corruption of Minors (M1), and one 

count of False Imprisonment. On March 2, 2016, Appellant was 

sentenced by Judge Jones to an overall term of confinement of 

ten (10) years to forty (40) years in a state correctional 

institution. The sentence imposed on the above captioned action 

number was unduly harsh given Appellant’s lack of a prior 

criminal record and the length of time that had elapsed since the 

date of the alleged offenses. The sentence imposed in the 

instant case is, therefore, unreasonable as defined above.

Appellant’s Brief at 9. Accordingly, we will address this issue strictly as a 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing.

We note that our standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing 
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judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest 

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 

(Pa. Super. 2006).

Where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

there is no automatic right to appeal, and an appellant’s appeal should be 

considered to be a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. 

W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. Super. 2007). As we observed in 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

[a]n appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, 

see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue 

was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion 

to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 

2006)). Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally 

waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to 

modify the sentence imposed. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 

A.2d 788 (Pa. Super. 2003)). See also Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 

A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding challenge to discretionary aspect of 
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sentence was waived because appellant did not object at sentencing hearing 

or file post-sentence motion).

Moreover, where an appellant fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) 

and the Commonwealth objects, the issue is waived for purposes of review. 

Commonwealth v. Farmer, 758 A.2d 173, 182 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

However, a failure to include the Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement does not 

automatically waive an appellant’s argument; rather, we are precluded from 

reaching the merits of the claim when the Commonwealth lodges an 

objection to the omission of the statement. Commonwealth v. Roser, 914 

A.2d 447, 457 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Love, 896 

A.2d 1276, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2006)).

Herein, the first two requirements of the four-part test are met 

because Appellant brought a timely appeal and raised the challenge in his 

post-sentence motion. However, Appellant failed to include in his appellate 

brief the necessary separate concise statement of the reasons relied upon 

for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). The Commonwealth 

has failed to object to this error. Therefore, we will not consider the issue to 

be waived due to the omission. Accordingly, we next determine whether 

Appellant raises a substantial question requiring us to review the 

discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Appellant argues that the trial court imposed an unduly harsh sentence 

in light of the fact that Appellant did not have a prior criminal record and the 
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length of time that had elapsed since the date of the offenses. Considering 

this claim to be an allegation that the sentencing court failed to consider 

factors set forth under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b),2 we conclude that, in this 

instance, Appellant has raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth 

v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding that the 

appellant raised a substantial question where it was alleged that the trial 

court failed to properly consider the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9721(b)). Because Appellant has stated a substantial question, we will 

address this claim on appeal.

It is undisputed that sentencing is a matter vested in the sound 

discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Fullin, 892 A.2d at 847. In 

this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in 

judgment. Id. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the 

record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, or arrived at a 

manifestly unreasonable decision. Id.

Indeed, the sentencing judge has broad discretion in determining the 

proper penalty, and this Court accords the sentencing court great deference, 

____________________________________________

2

 We note that the factors to be considered under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) 

include the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact 

on victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
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as it is the sentencing court that is in the best position to view the 

defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance, indifference, and the 

overall effect and nature of the crime. Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 

957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted).3 As previously 

noted, when imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider “the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs 

of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). As we have stated, “a court is 

required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the 

character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 

____________________________________________

3

 The Walls Court instructed the following:

In making this “unreasonableness” inquiry, the General 

Assembly has set forth four factors that an appellate court is to 

consider:

(d) Review of the record.—In reviewing the record the appellate 

court shall have regard for:

(1) The nature of the circumstances of the offense 

and the history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to 

observe the defendant, including any pre-sentence 

investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Walls, 926 A.2d at 963.
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(Pa. Super. 2002). “In particular, the court should refer to the defendant’s 

prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his potential for 

rehabilitation.” Id. In addition, “[o]ur Supreme Court has determined that 

where the trial court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed 

that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and 

considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion 

should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 

1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12 

(Pa. 1988)).

Appellant asserts that, in fashioning his sentence, the sentencing court 

failed to consider properly Appellant’s lack of a criminal record and the 

amount of time that had elapsed since the crimes occurred. Appellant’s Brief 

at 9. However, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the 

sentencing court.

Our review of the record reflects that the sentencing court reviewed 

Appellant’s presentence report, read a victim impact statement, received 

testimony from the parents of the victim in relation to Appellant’s attempt to 

withdraw his plea, heard Appellant’s allocution and expression that he is not 

guilty of the crimes, and heard argument from Appellant’s counsel prior to 

imposing Appellant’s sentence. N.T., 3/2/16, at 17-30. In addition, the trial 

court offered the following discussion in addressing the sentencing issue in 

Appellant’s post-sentence motions:
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This Court finds that the sentence imposed was within the 

[s]entencing guidelines. Before sentencing [Appellant], the 

[c]ourt reviewed the pre-sentence report and took into 

consideration all relevant factors. The [c]ourt weighed all 

mitigating factors and relevant information before sentencing 

[Appellant]. The [c]ourt also finds that [Appellant] was advised 

of all the sentencing guidelines before he entered into his plea, 

and after being advised of the sentencing guidelines, [Appellant] 

knowingly, willingly and intentionally pled no contest.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/16, at 7.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the sentencing court, 

having been informed by a presentence report, presented adequate reasons 

for imposing the standard range sentences upon Appellant. There is no 

indication that the court ignored any relevant factors in fashioning the 

sentence. Accordingly, it is our determination that there was no abuse of 

discretion on the part of the sentencing court. Thus, we conclude this claim 

lacks merit.

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his request 

to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere.

4

 Appellant’s Brief at 9-11. 

Appellant claims that he entered his plea under duress and that the 

Commonwealth will not be substantially prejudiced in bringing his case to 

trial. Id. at 11.

____________________________________________

4

 This Court has explained that in “terms of its effect upon a case, a plea of 

nolo contendere is treated the same as a guilty plea.” Commonwealth v. 

Laszczynski, 715 A.2d 1185, 1187 n. 3 (Pa. Super. 1998) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Nelson, 666 A.2d 714, 717 (Pa. Super. 1995)).
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A trial court may, in its discretion, allow a defendant to withdraw a 

guilty plea at any time before his sentence is imposed. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 

591(A) (“At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court may, in its 

discretion, permit, upon motion of the defendant, or direct, sua sponte, the 

withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the substitution of a 

plea of not guilty”). The standard of review that we employ in challenges to 

a trial court’s decision regarding a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea is well settled:

A trial court’s decision regarding whether to permit a guilty plea 

to be withdrawn should not be upset absent an abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion exists when a defendant 

shows any fair and just reasons for withdrawing his plea absent 

substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. In its discretion, a 

trial court may grant a motion for the withdrawal of a guilty plea 

at any time before the imposition of sentence. Although there is 

no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, properly received by 

the trial court, it is clear that a request made before sentencing 

should be liberally allowed. The policy underlying this liberal 

exercise of discretion is well-established: The trial courts in 

exercising their discretion must recognize that before judgment, 

the courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to 

undo a waiver of all constitutional rights that surround the right 

to trial—perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our 

constitution. In [Commonwealth v.]Forbes, [299 A.2d 268 

(Pa. 1973)] our Supreme Court instructed that, in determining 

whether to grant a pre[-]sentence motion for withdrawal of a 

guilty plea, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness 

and justice.

Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 261–262 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Forbes and Commonwealth v. Randolph, 718 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 

1998), our Supreme Court articulated that a defendant’s bare assertion of 
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innocence, standing alone, required that a defendant be permitted to 

withdraw his guilty plea if sentence has not been imposed. The strictures of 

Forbes and Randolph, mandating the grant of a pre-sentence motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea upon a bald assertion of innocence, were abrogated 

by the companion cases of Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 

1284 (Pa. 2015), and Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 

2015).

In Carrasquillo, the Court stated that a “bare assertion of innocence 

is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason to require a court to grant” a presentence request to withdraw a guilty plea. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 

1285. Our Supreme Court then clarified the ruling in Forbes, stating the 

following:

there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; trial courts 

have discretion in determining whether a withdrawal request will 

be granted; such discretion is to be administered liberally in 

favor of the accused; and any demonstration by a defendant of a 

fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless 

withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the 

Commonwealth.

Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1291–1292 (footnote omitted). More specifically, 

the Court was “persuaded by the approach of other jurisdictions which 

require that a defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible to 

demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence 

withdrawal of a plea.” Id. at 1292. However, the Supreme Court concluded 

that “a per se approach” to allowing pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea 
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on a mere assertion of innocence “is unsatisfactory.” Id. The Carrasquillo

Court noted that in evaluating a pre-sentence request to withdraw a guilty 

plea, courts could consider the timing of the innocence claim. See id. 

(quoting the statement in Forbes that “[o]bviously, the appellant, by his 

assertion of innocence—so early in the proceedings, i.e., one month after the 

initial tender of a plea—offered a ‘fair and just’ reason for withdrawal of the 

plea.” (brackets omitted)). The Court in Carrasquillo announced that “the 

proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is whether the 

accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, 

such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and 

justice.” Id.

The trial court offered the following analysis in analyzing Appellant’s 

request to withdraw his plea:

The Court finds that [Appellant] fully understood that if he 

entered the no contest plea, he would not be able to withdraw it 

minus extreme circumstances. On December 9, 2015, before 

the Court accepted [Appellant’s] signed plea, the following 

transaction between the Court and [Appellant] occurred:

The Court: And because we have picked a jury and 

everybody was ready to go to trial and we, in fact 

have that jury ready to try this case tomorrow, we 

are now at 5:11 p.m....once this plea goes through 

there is not going to be a trial, and barring some 

unforeseen circumstance that I believe merits 

withdrawing this plea, you are going to get 

sentenced on this charge. Do you understand 

that?[]

[Appellant]: I do understand that, Your Honor. 

(Notes of Testimony: December 9, 2015, page 42-

43).
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The Court also finds that [Appellant’s] argument that he 

was under duress and forced to sign the plea agreement due to 

the ineffectiveness of his counsel is without merit. In Lebanon 

County, both [Appellant] and the Commonwealth are entitled to 

two continuances each that will be granted without challenge by 

the opposing side or by the Court. On November 24, 2015, at 

Call of the List, [Appellant] made the decision not to use his 

remaining continuance. [Appellant] signed a Certificate of Trial 

Readiness at that time. The day before the trial was scheduled 

to take place, [Appellant] claimed that counsel was ineffective, 

and sought a continuance.

When [Appellant] came before the Court on December 9, 

2015 to address these issues, [Appellant] claimed that his 

counsel was not ready for trial, was confused and was unable to 

represent him due to counsel’s conversation with two people 

who had been struck from the array during jury selection and 

counsel’s assessment of the case. The Court questioned 

[Appellant] and counsel regarding these issues.

[Defense Counsel]: ...The piece that [Appellant] doesn’t 

like is my assessment of the evidence against him, and this is 

the crux of all issues here. I think if we boiled it down and 

distilled it, at the end of the day, he doesn’t like my assessment 

of the evidence and my assessment of where we stand with the 

case, and that’s the part that displease[s] him most.

The Court: Did that Change since the Call of the List 

when he indicated he was ready to go to trial?

[Defense Counsel]: My assessment of the evidence?

The Court: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: No, it’s- - frankly, on a number 

of levels it’s remained quite possibly as negative as 

could be. (Notes of Testimony: December 9, 2015, 

page 19).

After speaking with the Court and his counsel, [Appellant] 

decided to enter a no contest guilty plea. At that time, the 

following exchange between the Court and [Appellant] took 

place:

The Court: Are you satisfied with your attorney and 

the way you have been represented?

[Appellant]: I am, Your Honor.
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The Court: Knowing all things that we have 

discussed, do you still wish to enter a plea of no 

contest to the charges as the[y] have been 

presented?

[Appellant]: I do, Your Honor. (Notes of Testimony: 

December 9, 2015, page 46-47).

[Appellant] was asked specifically by the Court whether 

[Appellant] was satisfied with his representation. At that time, 

directly after entering the no contest plea, [Appellant] said he 

was satisfied. It was not until [Appellant] came for sentencing 

that [Appellant] claimed he was forced to enter the plea.

On December 9, 2[01]5, [Appellant] and counsel came into 

court for the purpose of determining whether counsel would be 

excused and whether a continuance was needed. At that time, 

the Court went over all of the options with [Appellant], and 

[Appellant] stated that he understood everything and ultimately 

was satisfied with his representation and his decision to sign the 

no contest plea. (Notes of Testimony: December 9, 2015).

This [c]ourt finds that [Appellant] was not forced into 

entering a no contest plea, and [Appellant] entered into the no 

contest plea knowing that absent unforeseen circumstances, 

[Appellant] would not be allowed to withdraw that plea because 

a jury had been selected, witnesses subpoenaed and both 

attorneys were ready for trial. [Appellant] was satisfied with his 

representation on the day that he entered the plea.

Further, this Court finds that [Appellant] fails to meet the 

two prong test set out in Commonwealth v. Forbes. The two 

prong test regarding withdrawal of a guilty plea is: (1) the 

defendant has provided a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal of 

his plea; and (2) the Commonwealth will not be “substantially 

prejudiced in bringing the case to trial.” Commonwealth v. 

Forbes, 299 A.2d 268 (1973). In this case, [Appellant] has not 

provided a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal because every 

reason [Appellant] is claiming entitles him to [withdraw] his plea 

[was a reason] that he had [given] on December 9, 2015, before 

he ultimately decided that he was satisfied with his counsel and 

wanted to [enter] a no contest plea. [Appellant] knew of and 

addressed these issues before he entered into the no contest 

plea, therefore, these issues are not new to [Appellant] and 
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cannot suddenly be used by [Appellant] as a reason to 

[withdraw] his plea.

The second prong of this test is also not satisfied because 

the Commonwealth would be substantially prejudiced in bringing 

the case to trial after [Appellant] entered a no contest plea 

because the victim has already started to move on. Bringing this 

case to trial at this time would cause significant emotional harm 

to the young victim. For these reasons, [Appellant’s] Motion to 

withdraw his plea is denied.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/16, at 11-13. 

Our review of the certified record reflects that Appellant did not meet 

either of the two prongs of the pertinent test. As the trial court concluded, 

“[Appellant] has not provided a ‘fair and just reason’ for withdrawal.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 7/29/16, at 13. Indeed, Appellant merely asserted his 

innocence immediately before sentencing and alleged that he entered his 

plea because he was not satisfied with defense counsel. N.T., 3/2/16, at 8-

9. Appellant entered his guilty plea in the late afternoon of December 9, 

2015, after a jury was chosen and the witnesses assembled. N.T., 12/9/15, 

at 37-53. However, Appellant did not seek to withdraw his plea until the 

morning of sentencing, three months later. N.T., 3/2/16, at 3. In so doing, 

Appellant simply averred that he was innocent and that he entered his plea 

under duress. Id. at 8-9. Such assertions in a last-minute motion to 

withdraw a plea do not amount to a colorable claim of innocence or suggest 

that Appellant should have been permitted to withdraw the plea in the 

interest of justice.
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Moreover, as the trial court aptly notes, “[Appellant] knew of and 

addressed these issues before he entered into the no contest plea, therefore, 

these issues are not new to [Appellant] and cannot suddenly be used by 

[Appellant] as a reason to [withdraw] his plea.” Trial Court Opinion, 

7/29/16, at 13. As the record reflects, the trial court conducted an 

extensive plea colloquy prior to accepting the plea at which time Appellant 

stated that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation. N.T., 12/9/15, at 

46-47. In addition, Appellant completed a written colloquy in which he 

affirmed that he was satisfied with the representation he received from 

defense counsel and that he had ample opportunity to consult with his 

attorney. Plea Colloquy, 12/9/15, at 4. Hence we discern no abuse of 

discretion by the trial court in concluding that Appellant failed to assert a 

plausible claim of innocence or to show that permitting withdrawal of the 

plea would promote fairness and justice.5

____________________________________________

5

 Because Appellant did not demonstrate the first prerequisite, we need not 

consider whether the withdrawal of the plea would substantially prejudice 

the Commonwealth. However, as previously indicated, Appellant entered his 

plea after a jury was chosen and witnesses assembled to proceed with his 

trial. As a result of the plea, the jury was released and the witnesses were 

dismissed. Our Supreme Court has found substantial prejudice and affirmed 

the denial of a defendant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea 

where the Commonwealth dismissed numerous key witnesses in reliance on 

the plea. Commonwealth v. Ross, 447 A.2d 942 (Pa. 1982).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2017