[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Beavercreek Towne Station, L.L.C. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio4300.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4300

BEAVERCREEK TOWNE STATION, L.L.C., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. GREENE 

COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Beavercreek Towne Station, L.L.C. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4300.] 

Real-property valuation—Standing—Property owner may authorize tenant to 

pursue tax appeal on property owner’s behalf—Decision vacated and cause 

remanded. 

(No. 2016-1713—Submitted July 17, 2018—Decided October 25, 2018.) 

APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2015-1488, 2015-1496, and 

2015-1544. 

____________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} At issue in this property-tax appeal is the 2014 tax valuation of a 

shopping center consisting of five separate real-estate parcels. The auditor had 

assigned an aggregate value to the parcels of $22,233,850 as of the tax-lien date, 
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January 1, 2014. In October 2014, the center was sold as part of a “portfolio sale” 

along with other properties. A single conveyance-fee statement was filed for the 

five parcels allocating $47,479,830 to those parcels from the total amount paid 

under the sale agreement. Appellee Beavercreek City School District Board of 

Education (“school board”) filed a valuation complaint, and at the school board’s 

instigation, both appellee Greene County Board of Revision (“BOR”) and the 

Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) valued the individual parcels by reference to the 

aggregate price of $47,479,830. But the two boards differed in how they allocated 

the total to each of the five parcels. 

{¶ 2} Appellant property owner, Beavercreek Towne Station, L.L.C., and 

one of its tenants, appellant Kohl’s Illinois, Inc. (Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc.), 

argue that because the properties were subject to leases, the sale price did not reflect 

what the buyers in the market would pay for the unencumbered real estate. 

Moreover, Beavercreek contends that the appraisals presented at the BTA show that 

the sale price does not reflect the property’s unencumbered value as required by 

amended R.C. 5713.03. On appeal, Beavercreek argues that the BTA’s failure to 

give proper consideration to the appraisal evidence calls for vacating its decision 

and remanding the cause on the recent authority of Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin 

Cty. Bd. of Revision, 150 Ohio St.3d 527, 2017-Ohio-4415, 83 N.E.3d 916, and 

Bronx Park S. III Lancaster, L.L.C. v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Revision, ___ Ohio St.3d 

___, 2018-Ohio-1589, ___ N.E.3d ___. Additionally, Beavercreek and Kohl’s 

contend that the BTA erred by excluding Kohl’s as a party and excluding the 

appraisal evidence concerning the value of the Kohl’s parcel. 

{¶ 3} We agree that the BTA erred by excluding evidence offered to show 

the value of the Kohl’s parcel, and we reverse that ruling. We also agree that the 

BTA’s failure to fully consider the appraisal evidence calls for vacating the BTA’s 

decision and remanding the cause pursuant to Terraza 8 and Bronx Park. 

 
January Term, 2018 

3

I. Proceedings before the BOR 

{¶ 4} The auditor had valued all five parcels for tax year 2014, a reappraisal 

year in Greene County, at an aggregate value of $22,233,850; that valuation 

included assigning $5,606,900 to the Lowe’s parcel and $6,197,150 to the Kohl’s 

parcel. 

{¶ 5} The proceedings before the BOR commenced when the school board 

filed a complaint against the 2014 valuation as to all five parcels, contending that 

their proper aggregate value was the 2014 sale price of $47,479,830, derived from 

the price set forth on a conveyance-fee statement for the five parcels that was filed 

on October 27, 2014. 

{¶ 6} The BOR held a hearing attended by counsel for Beavercreek and the 

school board. The BOR adopted the sale price as the aggregate value of the five 

parcels and allocated it to the individual parcels by using the ratio of individual 

parcel value to aggregate value derived from the auditor’s valuation. See FirstCal 

Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 125 Ohio St.3d 485, 

2010-Ohio-1921, 929 N.E.2d 426, ¶ 4, 11, 20, 32, 35 (affirming allocation of 

aggregate sale price reported on conveyance-fee statement to individual parcels in 

accordance with each individual parcel’s share of the original aggregate valuation 

by the auditor). The BOR issued five decision letters, each setting forth the amount 

of the sale price allocated to each particular parcel. The Lowe’s parcel was valued 

at $11,973,400 and the Kohl’s parcel at $13,233,800. 

II. Proceedings before the BTA 

A. The three appeals and the appraisal evidence 

{¶ 7} Beavercreek, through attorney Ryan Gibbs, appealed the BOR’s 

decision as to the Lowe’s parcel to the BTA. Through attorney Karen 

Bauernschmidt, Beavercreek and its tenant Kohl’s jointly appealed the BOR’s 

decision as to the Kohl’s parcel to the BTA. Finally, the school board filed a crossappeal as to all five BOR decisions. 
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{¶ 8} The BTA consolidated the three appeals and held a hearing at which 

Beavercreek and Kohl’s presented three appraisals prepared by Richard Racek Jr., 

MAI, while also offering Racek’s supporting testimony. Racek’s appraisal of the 

Lowe’s parcel determined a 2014 value of $7,300,000, based on the salescomparison and income-capitalization approaches. His appraisal of the Kohl’s 

parcel determined a 2014 value of $5,930,000 based on the sales-comparison and 

income-capitalization approaches. And his appraisal of the remaining three parcels 

determined a 2014 value of $22,075,000 for those parcels based on the salescomparison and income-capitalization approaches. 

{¶ 9} Racek’s aggregate valuation of the shopping center amounted to 

$35,305,000—well below the allocated portfolio sale price of $47,479,830. 

B. The contract allocation of the sale price to the five parcels 

{¶ 10} At the BTA hearing, the school board offered three exhibits, 

including a copy of the 2014 purchase agreement for the sale of the five 

Beavercreek Towne Station parcels and parcels at a nearby shopping center. The 

agreement contained an appendix that allocated the sale price to the parcels of the 

two shopping centers involved in the sale. 

{¶ 11} The contract called for a sale of the Beavercreek center along with 

another shopping center as part of one transaction. On the pages showing the 

allocation of the overall sale price, there was an apparent error. One of the parcel 

numbers from the other shopping center was listed both as a component of that 

shopping center and as a component of Beavercreek. Additionally, the parcel 

number of the Lowe’s parcel in Beavercreek was absent altogether. 

{¶ 12} In addition to the documentary evidence, the school board offered 

the testimony of a subpoenaed officer of Beavercreek with respect to the allocation 

of the portfolio sale price of multiple properties. 

 
January Term, 2018 

5

C. The school board’s motion to exclude 

{¶ 13} Shortly before the BTA hearing, the school board moved to exclude 

Kohl’s as a party on the grounds that Kohl’s had no standing as a lessee separate 

from that of the property owner, Beavercreek. The school board renewed that 

motion at the hearing, and the board examiner deferred ruling on the motion until 

the ultimate decision. In response, Kohl’s strenuously argued in favor of its own 

separate standing based on both the authorization from its landlord Beavercreek 

and the contention that, because as tenant Kohl’s is responsible for paying property 

taxes under the lease, it qualifies as the real party in interest. 

D. The BTA’s decision 

{¶ 14} In its decision, the BTA first granted the school board’s motion to 

exclude Kohl’s as a party, explaining that as a mere lessee, Kohl’s lacked standing 

as a complainant under R.C. 5715.19 and as an appellant to the BTA pursuant to 

R.C. 5717.01. BTA Nos. 2015-1488, 2015-1496, and 2015-1544, 2016 WL 

6434037, at *2 (Oct. 25, 2016). The BTA then struck from the record the appraisal 

evidence offered by Kohl’s. 

{¶ 15} Turning to the merits, the BTA began by noting that Beavercreek’s 

objections to using the sale price were premised not primarily on the recency or 

arm’s-length character of the sale, but on two other circumstances: the sale 

involved the “leased fee interest” in the property, and the purchase price involved 

a portfolio sale including additional properties. Id. at * 3. Although the tax year 

2014 was at issue and amended R.C. 5713.03 calls for valuing the “fee simple 

estate, as if unencumbered,” the BTA rejected Beavercreek’s leased-fee argument 

by citing case law restricting rebuttal of the sale price to impugning the recency or 

arm’s-length character of the transaction. Id. The BTA also rejected, both factually 

and as a legal objection to using the sale price, the contention that the property was 

not exposed to the open market in connection with the sale. Id. at * 4. 
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{¶ 16} Next, the BTA addressed and rejected Beavercreek’s contention that 

no portion of the sale price should be allocated to the Lowe’s parcel because the 

Lowe’s parcel number was absent from the contractual allocation of the sale price. 

The BTA inferred from the totality of the evidence that the omission of the Lowe’s 

parcel number was a typographical error and concluded that the Lowe’s parcel was 

part of the transfer referred to in the contract. Id. at *4-5. 

{¶ 17} The BTA then addressed the issue of allocating the total sale price 

to the five individual parcels. The BTA invoked the property owner’s “burden to 

rebut the propriety of [the] allocation” and found that Beavercreek had failed to 

rebut the validity of the allocation in the purchase agreement. Id. at *6. 

Accordingly, the BTA adopted the contractual allocation, which substantially 

changed the proportionate share of the aggregate tax burden borne by the Lowe’s 

and Kohl’s parcels. 

{¶ 18} Here are the values found by the BTA as opposed to those 

determined by the BOR: 

 BOR value BTA value 

Lowe’s parcel $11,973,400 $13,698,600 

Kohl’s parcel $13,233,800 $11,155,410 

Other parcels $22,272,700 $22,625,820 

Aggregate $47,479,9001

 $47,479,830 

 

{¶ 19} Two notices of appeal were filed from the BTA’s decision. One was 

filed by attorney Gibbs on behalf of Beavercreek, and the other was filed by 

attorney Bauernschmidt on behalf of both Beavercreek and Kohl’s. 

 

 

1

 The small discrepancy between the aggregate numbers may be attributed to rounding that was part 

of the BOR’s computation of allocated value. 
January Term, 2018 

7

III. Analysis 

A. Because Beavercreek authorized the tax appeal in relation to the 

Kohl’s parcel, the BTA erred by excluding the evidence of value of 

that parcel 

{¶ 20} The BTA correctly determined that as a tenant, Kohl’s had no 

standing independent from its landlord Beavercreek to challenge the valuation of 

its parcel. That determination is well grounded. R.C. 5715.19(A) permits certain 

public officials to challenge property values along with “[a]ny person owning 

taxable real property in the county.” Lessees are not mentioned and are therefore 

not authorized to file valuation complaints. Likewise, rights to appeal from BOR 

decisions to the BTA are confined to certain officials or boards, plus a “taxpayer 

authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complaints against 

valuations or assessments with the auditor.” R.C. 5717.01. Lessees are not 

permitted to appeal to the BTA in their own right. Finally, R.C. 5717.04 authorizes 

appeals to this court in BOR cases by “any of the persons who were parties to the 

appeal before the [BTA],” along with specified other persons. Lessees, who are 

not properly parties below in their own right, cannot claim a right of their own to 

appeal to the court—and here the BTA did in fact explicitly exclude Kohl’s as a 

separate party below (but did not dismiss the joint appeal to the BTA by Kohl’s and 

Beavercreek). Accordingly, Kohl’s could file an appeal from the BOR decision to 

the BTA only as an agent of Beavercreek, not in its own right. It follows that the 

BTA did not abuse its discretion by excluding Kohl’s as a separate and independent 

party to the appeal. 

{¶ 21} Having granted the school board’s motion to exclude Kohl’s as a 

party, the BTA regarded it as a mere logical extension of that ruling to strike from 

the record “the appraisal evidence offered by Kohl’s,” as well as “any written 

argument filed by Kohl’s.” BTA Nos. 2015-1488, 2015-1496, and 2015-1544, 

2016 WL 6434037, *2. That additional ruling ignores the following facts relevant 
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to jurisdiction: (1) the appeal from the BOR’s valuation of the Kohl’s parcel was 

prosecuted not only by Kohl’s but by Beavercreek itself, (2) the school board did 

not ask for and the BTA did not grant a dismissal of the appeal of the valuation of 

the Kohl’s parcel, and (3) Beavercreek allegedly conferred authority on Kohl’s to 

pursue the appeal of the value of the Kohl’s parcel on Beavercreek’s behalf because 

the owner was not on its own initiative going to raise that challenge. 

{¶ 22} We need not determine whether there was sufficient evidence that 

Beavercreek authorized Kohl’s to pursue the appeal as its agent because attorney 

Bauernschmidt also filed the appeal on behalf of Beavercreek directly. The notice 

of appeal from the BOR decision relating to the Kohl’s parcel was explicitly 

prosecuted as a joint appeal of “Beavercreek Towne Station LLC and Kohl’s 

Illinois, Inc. (Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc.).” It was signed by “Karen 

Bauernschmidt, Esq.” who gave her attorney-registration number along with her 

contact information—and she signed as “Appellant or Representative.” There is no 

dispute that Beavercreek itself had authority as property owner to appeal the 

valuation of the Kohl’s parcel, and the exclusion of Kohl’s as an independent party 

did not prevent attorney Bauernschmidt from prosecuting the appeal to the BTA in 

a representative capacity on behalf of Beavercreek itself. 

{¶ 23} We have held, “ ‘When an attorney files an appeal, it is presumed 

that [she] has the requisite authority to do so.’ ” T. Ryan Legg Irrevocable Trust v. 

Testa, 149 Ohio St.3d 376, 2016-Ohio-8418, 75 N.E.3d 184, ¶ 15, quoting State ex 

rel. Gibbs v. Zeller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 9170, 1985 WL 7625, at *1 (Jan. 24, 

1985). That presumption attached to Bauernschmidt in this case based on the form 

of submission of the notice of appeal to the BTA, and it is the backdrop for viewing 

her authority to act on behalf of Beavercreek at the BTA hearing. Bauernschmidt 

filed the appeal to the BTA directly under Beavercreek’s name, thereby asserting 

her authorization to pursue the appeal on behalf of the property owner. 
January Term, 2018 

9

{¶ 24} The school board argues that the only evidence of authorization 

consists of statements of the lawyers who are seeking a value reduction, which are 

not themselves evidence. But this argument rests on a misunderstanding of the 

burden of proof. Based on the notice of appeal relating to the Kohl’s parcel, 

attorney Bauernschmidt was presumed to possess authorization from Beavercreek 

as well as Kohl’s; accordingly, the burden lay on the school board to offer 

“substantial proof” that such authorization was lacking. T. Ryan Legg Irrevocable 

Trust at ¶ 17. Far from containing such proof, the record supports the authorization 

of attorney Bauernschmidt by Beavercreek.2

 At the BTA hearing, attorney Gibbs, 

who represented Beavercreek with respect to the Lowe’s parcel, strongly confirmed 

the authorization of Kohl’s and attorney Bauernschmidt to litigate on behalf of 

Kohl’s that parcel’s value, and at oral argument, both attorneys confirmed that 

Beavercreek had authorized attorney Bauernschmidt to appeal at the BTA and to 

this court. 

{¶ 25} Because attorney Bauernschmidt presented evidence of the value of 

the Kohl’s parcel on behalf of Beavercreek, it was error for the BTA to exclude that 

evidence. We therefore reverse the BTA’s exclusion of that evidence. 

 

 

2. Earlier during this appeal, we denied the school board’s motion to dismiss the notice of appeal 

filed by Bauernschmidt on behalf of Beavercreek and Kohl’s. 148 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2017-Ohio1427, 72 N.E.3d 655. Our denial of the motion was justified both by Kohl’s independent standing 

to appeal its own exclusion as a party, see Southside Community Dev. Corp. v. Levin, 116 Ohio 

St.3d 1209, 2007-Ohio-6665, 878 N.E.2d 1048, ¶ 11, and by Bauernschmidt’s presumptive authority 

to file on behalf of Beavercreek. Additionally, we note that Beavercreek’s filing two separate 

notices of appeal from the same BTA decision is not good practice and parties should avoid it. 

However, we do not perceive a jurisdictional defect under these circumstances, given that both 

notices of appeal separately invoked the court’s jurisdiction as of the time they were filed. Accord 

Soyko Kulchystsky, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 141 Ohio St.3d 43, 2014-Ohio-4511, 

21 N.E.3d 297, ¶ 30 (jurisdiction over a valuation complaint is determined when the complaint is 

filed). 
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B. The BTA did not abuse its discretion by inferring a typographical 

error 

{¶ 26} The brief filed on behalf of Beavercreek by attorney Gibbs argues 

that there is no evidence in the record to show that the Lowe’s parcel was part of 

the portfolio sale, with the result that the sale price cannot properly be allocated to 

the Lowe’s parcel. Gibbs bases this contention on the contractual allocation 

attached to the purchase agreement: the Lowe’s parcel number is not one of the 

five parcel numbers listed for Beavercreek. 

{¶ 27} As discussed, the BTA found that other evidence, such as the deeds 

and property-record cards, confirmed that the Lowe’s parcel was sold as part of the 

total Beavercreek sale and that the fifth parcel number on the contractual allocation 

was a typographical error. BTA Nos. 2015-1488, 2015-1496, and 2015-1544, 2016 

WL 6434037, at *5. The record contains substantial indicia that the Lowe’s parcel 

was part of the sale, including the conveyance-fee statement, which does reference 

the Lowe’s parcel number, and the testimony of Beavercreek officer Joseph 

Schlosser that the sale did contain the Lowe’s parcel. Additionally, the appraiser 

himself testified that the actual Lowe’s parcel number was part of the sale. 

{¶ 28} Under the case law, we reverse the BTA’s findings of fact only when 

there is a total absence of evidence to support a particular finding. HealthSouth 

Corp. v. Testa, 132 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-1871, 969 N.E.2d 232, ¶ 14. Here, 

ample evidence supports the BTA’s inference of a typographical error. 

C. The BTA erred by failing to give full consideration to the appraisal 

evidence 

{¶ 29} As Beavercreek points out, the BTA’s merits decision exhibits a 

defect similar to its decisions in Terraza 8, 150 Ohio St.3d 527, 2017-Ohio-4415, 

83 N.E.3d 916, and Bronx Park, ___ Ohio St.3d __, 2018-Ohio-1589, ___ N.E.3d 

___. Namely, the BTA adopted an allocated aggregate sale price of leased 
January Term, 2018 

11 

properties as the property value of each parcel without giving proper consideration 

to the appraisal evidence. 

{¶ 30} Particularly notable in this case is that the appraiser, Richard Racek, 

testified that the contract rent of the Lowe’s and Kohl’s parcels exceeded the market 

rent derived from rent comparables. With respect to the Lowe’s parcel, Racek 

opined that the prices for leased parcels were significantly higher than the prices 

for unencumbered parcels because “properties that are leased generally sell for far 

more per square foot than ones that are not leased.” Thus, the appraiser evidence 

could, if properly considered, substantiate a finding that the sale price might not 

indicate the value of the unencumbered fee-simple estate. 

{¶ 31} Accordingly, we vacate the BTA’s decision and remand the cause to 

the BTA for further proceedings, including full consideration of the appraisal 

evidence of the value of the parcels at issue. To the extent that the BTA adopts an 

allocated sale price on remand, the BTA shall also give full consideration to the 

propriety of the allocation in light of all the evidence in the record. But the BTA 

shall decide the case based on the existing record and not receive new evidence. 

Bronx Park, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-1589, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 13. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the BTA’s decision and remand 

for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

Decision vacated 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, DEWINE, and

DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 

FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 

_________________ 

 The Gibbs Firm, L.P.A., Ryan J. Gibbs, and Geoffrey N. Byrne, for 

appellant Beavercreek Towne Station, L.L.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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 Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Karen H. Bauernschmidt, Nicholas 

M.J. Ray, and Steven L. Smiseck, for appellants Beavercreek Towne Station, 

L.L.C., and Kohl’s Illinois, Inc. 

 Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., and Kimberly G. Allison, for appellee 

Beavercreek City School District Board of Education. 

_________________