alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
PIPER JAFFRAY COMPANIES INC.

                 STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                    (In Thousands, Except Per Share Amounts)
                                   (Unaudited)

<TABLE>
                                                                     Three Months Ended
                                                                     ------------------ 
                                                                 December 31, December 31,
                                                                      1996       1995
                                                                 ------------ -----------
<S>                                                                 <C>        <C> 

PRIMARY NET INCOME PER SHARE:
Net income .......................................................   $ 1,820   $ 6,654
                                                                     =======   =======

Average number of common and common equivalent shares outstanding:
  Average common shares outstanding ..............................    18,279    17,541
  Dilutive effect of common stock equivalents:
    Book value plan options ......................................       157       198
    Executive incentive stock options ............................       247       263
                                                                     -------   -------
                                                                      18,683    18,002

Primary net income per share .....................................   $   .10   $   .37
                                                                     =======   =======

NET INCOME PER SHARE ASSUMING FULL DILUTION:
Net income .......................................................   $ 1,820   $ 6,654
                                                                     =======   =======

Average number of common and common equivalent shares outstanding:
  Average common shares outstanding ..............................    18,279    17,541
  Dilutive effect of common stock equivalents:
    Book value plan options ......................................       176       205
    Executive incentive stock options ............................       391       291
                                                                     -------   -------
                                                                      18,846    18,037

Fully Diluted net income per share ...............................   $   .10   $   .37
                                                                     =======   =======
</TABLE>
CERTIFICATIONI, Kokmeng Koh, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-Drequired to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K ofPrincipal Life Income Fundings Trust 2006-23 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);  2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as whole, donot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;  3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and otherinformation required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by thisreport is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;  4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s) required inthis report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the ExchangeAct period reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicingagreement(s) in all material respects; and  5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria forasset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment ofcompliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be includedin this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwisedisclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in suchreports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by thefollowing unaffiliated parties: Citibank, N.A. and Bankers Trust Company, N.A.Date: March 28, 2007   /s/ Kokmeng Koh     Kokmeng Koh  Second Vice President
193 La. 179

#### HUNTER v. FORREST.

No. 35361.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 26, 1939.

S. I. Foster, of Leesville, for appellant.

• T. F. Hunter and Hunter & Neilson, all of Alexandria, for appellee.

ODOM, Justice.

There is no merit in the motion to dismiss. The judgment was read and signed in open court on March 10, 1939, and the following minute entry was then and there made:

> “Upon the request of counsel for defendant by letter, in the presence of opposing counsel in open Court, a suspensive and devolutive appeal was prayed for upon behalf. of defendant and granted, made returnable to the Honorable, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, at New Orleans, Louisiana, on Monday, May 8th, 1939, the devolutive appeal bond being fixed by the Court in the sum of $300.00, the suspensive appeal bond being fixed by the Court in the sum of $500.00.

> “Suspensive appeal bond and devolutive appeal bond filed.”

The appeal was lodged in this court within the time specified. Counsel for appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground:

> “That there has been no application for appeal, either by petition or motion in open court, on behalf of the defendant herein, John. M. Forrest. * * *

> “That neither defendant herein nor his counsel have appeared in open court and moved for an appeal herein, nor have they presented a motion for appeal, the appeals herein having been granted merely upon the production of the letter hereinabove referred to.”

Article 573 of the Code of Practice provides that whoever intends to appeal “may do so either *by petition or by motion*in open court, at the same term at which the judgment was rendered”.

Counsel for appellee in support of their motion to dismiss have filed a brief .in which they argue that one desiring an appeal must move for it “personally” or by counsel “in person”. They say:

> “No one else can seek an appeal on his behalf. If he desires the aid of the Appellate Court he must ask for it himself, and in accordance with the established rules of law. * * * His failure so to do evinces satisfaction on his part with the judgment rendered and concludes the litigation.”

As shown by the record, the appeal in this case was sought by appellant through his counsel. While counsel was not personally present in open court, he was represented by the clerk of court, who presented to the judge a letter addressed to him by counsel, requesting that the appeal be granted. There was therefore a motion in open court for the appeal, counsel being represented by the clerk. The judge thought this was sufficient. Counsel for appellee were then present in open court, taking full cognizance of the proceeding. If they had thought that there was any irregularity in the granting of the appeal, then was the time and there was the place to raise the objection.

The motion to dismiss is denied.
Denied and Opinion Filed November 21, 2018 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-01373-CV 

IN RE LOUISE KING, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 254th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DF-08-4995 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Boatright 

Opinion by Justice Boatright 

In this original proceeding, relator seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to 

vacate its order denying relator’s motion to transfer the case and, alternatively, to vacate the order 

compelling the case to arbitration and vacate the arbitrator’s pretrial orders. 

To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show both that the trial court has clearly 

abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 

148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). It is generally inappropriate to grant 

mandamus review of orders compelling arbitration, and parties who believe they are being 

erroneously compelled to arbitrate when they have not agreed to arbitration have an adequate 

remedy by appeal after final judgment. In re Adelphi Group, Ltd., No. 05-16-01060-CV, 2016 WL 

5266655, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 22, 2016, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Gulf Expl., LLC, 

289 S.W.3d 836, 842 & n. 33 (Tex. 2009)). The parties in this case did not agree to arbitrate. 

Because the parties have an adequate remedy by appeal, relator is not entitled to mandamus relief. 
 –2– 

We must deny a petition for mandamus when the relator is not entitled to relief. TEX. R. APP. P. 

52.8(a). Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. 

181373F.P05 

/Jason Boatright/ 

JASON BOATRIGHT 

JUSTICE
**EXHIBIT 32(a)****SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**I, Peter J. Burlage, President and Chief Executive Officer of Peerless Mfg. Co. (the “Company”),certify, that pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code:(1) The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period endedDecember 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, as amended; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operationsof the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in theReport.                                                        /s/ Peter J. Burlage   Peter J. Burlage   President and Chief Executive Officer   Date: February 13, 2007   *The foregoing Certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350; it is notbeing filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, and is not to beincorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the datehereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.*
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6942 

To prohibit the importation of oil and gas products from Russia, Iran, 

or Venezuela, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 7, 2022 

Mr. GREEN of Tennessee introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To prohibit the importation of oil and gas products from 

Russia, Iran, or Venezuela, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON OIL AND GAS IMPORTS. 

4 Beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, 

5 the importation of any petroleum product (as such term 

6 is defined in section 3 of the Energy Policy and Conserva7 tion Act (42 U.S.C. 6202)) originating from Russia, Iran, 

8 or Venezuela into the customs territory of the United 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6942 IH

1 States (as such term is defined in General Note 2 of the 

2 Harmonized Tariff Schedule) is prohibited. 

Æ 


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Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-29892 18-MAY-2011 10:40 AM

SCWC-29892 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI ' I

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, Respondent/Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs. JAMES M. SMITH and ROBERT H. LEE, Petitioners/Defendants/Appellants.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CIVIL NO. 08-1-0192) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 1 (By: McKenna, J., for the court ) The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on April 12, 2011 by James M. Smith and Robert H. Lee, Petitioners/Defendants/Appellants, is hereby rejected.

1 Considered by: Nakayama, Acting C.J., Acoba and McKenna JJ., and Circuit Judge Lee, in place of Rectenwald, C.J., recused, and Circuit Judge Nishimura, in place of Duffy, J., recused.DATED: Honolulu, Hawai ' i, May 18, 2011.

FOR THE COURT: /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna Associate Justice

Of Counsel: MEHEULA & DEVENS, LLP VLADIMIR DEVENS WILLIAM MEHEULA AITCHISON & VICK, INC. WILLIAM AITCHISON (Pro Hac Vice) Attorneys for Petitioners/Defendants/Appellants JAMES M. SMITH and ROBERT H. LEE
#### Paul COLSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Stephen M. DEWALT, Warden, F.C.I. Butner; Harley G. Lappin (Reg.Dir.), Respondents-Appellees.

No. 02-6961.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 13, 2002.

Paul Colson, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILLIAM D. WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM. •

Paul Colson, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). We have reviewed the record and *155find no reversible error. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Colson v. Dewalt,*No. CA-02-810-5-H (E.D.N.C. June 4, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conténtions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
EXHIBIT 31.2
                       CERTIFICATION

I, Neal E. Schmale, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Pacific
Enterprises;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this Quarterly Report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this Quarterly Report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial
information included in this Quarterly Report fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this Quarterly Report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and we have:

a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information relating
to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this Quarterly Report is being
prepared;

b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this Quarterly Report
our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this Quarterly Report, based on such evaluation; and

c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting;

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing
the equivalent function):

a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal controls over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and

b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.

August 7, 2003

/S/ NEAL E. SCHMALE
Neal E. Schmale
Chief Financial Officer
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6564 

To require educational agencies and institutions to provide in-person instruction to students as a condition of receiving Federal education funds, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 2, 2022 

Mr. GREEN of Tennessee (for himself, Mr. DESJARLAIS, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, 

Mrs. MILLER of Illinois, Mr. TIFFANY, Mrs. BOEBERT, Mr. BUDD, Mr. 

MOONEY, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina, Ms. 

TENNEY, and Ms. MACE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To require educational agencies and institutions to provide 

in-person instruction to students as a condition of receiving Federal education funds, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Keep Schools Open 

5 Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6564 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDING FOR EDU2 CATIONAL AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS 

3 THAT DO NOT PROVIDE IN-PERSON INSTRUC4 TION. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date of the en6 actment of this Act and subject to subsection (b), no Fed7 eral education funds may be provided to an educational 

8 agency or institution unless the educational agency or in9 stitution— 

10 (1) demonstrates to the Secretary of Education 

11 that the agency or institution provides in-person in12 struction to students; and 

13 (2) certifies to the Secretary that the agency or 

14 institution will not discontinue in-person instruction 

15 for students due to COVID–19. 

16 (b) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition in subsection (a) 

17 shall not apply to an educational agency or institution that 

18 provides distance education or other virtual instruction to 

19 students in the regular course of operations for reasons 

20 unrelated to COVID–19. 

21 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

22 (1) The term ‘‘educational agency or institu23 tion’’ means the following: 

24 (A) An elementary school (as such term is 

25 defined in section 8101 of the Elementary and 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6564 IH

1 Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 

2 7801)). 

3 (B) A secondary school (as such term is 

4 defined in such section 8101). 

5 (C) A local educational agency (as such 

6 term is defined in such section 8101). 

7 (D) A State educational agency (as such 

8 term is defined in such section 8101). 

9 (E) An institution of higher education (as 

10 such term is defined in section 101 of the High11 er Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001)). 

12 (2) The term ‘‘Federal education funds’’ means 

13 any funds made available— 

14 (A) under the Elementary and Secondary 

15 Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et 

16 seq.); 

17 (B) under the Higher Education Act of 

18 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.); or 

19 (C) for purposes relating to education 

20 under any other provision of Federal law. 

Æ 


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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-6736

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOEL DEVON ARTIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-6739

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOEL DEVON ARTIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:12-cr-00091-D-1; 5:12-cr-00342-D-1)

Submitted: March 3, 2021 Decided: March 8, 2021
2

Before WYNN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Banumathi Rangarajan, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Joel Devon Artis appealed the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release. While the appeals were pending, 

Artis died on December 20, 2020. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals as moot. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
#### Anonymous, Respondent, v Anonymous, Appellant. Anonymous, Appellant, v Anonymous, Respondent. Anonymous, Respondent, v Anonymous, Appellant. Anonymous, Respondent, v Anonymous, Appellant.

[677 NYS2d 573]

Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Fern Fisher-Brandveen, J.), entered August 8, 1997, which, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant husband’s cross motion to dismiss plaintiff wife’s cause of action for annulment for failure to state a cause *697of action; entered September 2, 1997 and March 5, 1998, which, insofar as appealed from, awarded plaintiff interim counsel fees; and entered February 18, 1998, which awarded plaintiff temporary maintenance for the purpose of purchasing furniture for the apartment in which she and the parties’ child have taken up residence, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Order, same court and Justice, entered March 20, 1998, which granted defendant’s motion to renew and reargue a prior order, entered August 14, 1997, declaring a prenuptial agreement to be unenforceable, to the extent of granting reargument on the issue of whether the absence of an acknowledgment is curable, and, upon such reargument, declared the prenuptial agreement to be enforceable, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, the motion to renew and reargue is denied, and the order of August 14, 1997 is reinstated insofar as it held the agreement to be unenforceable.

Defendant’s motion to renew and reargue should not have been granted, based as it was, on evidence, namely, a certificate of acknowledgment, that defendant could have but did not submit on the original motion (see, *Foley v Roche,*68 AD2d 558, 568). In any event, we would not permit defendant to cure this defect in the agreement by an alleged acknowledgement in affidavit form which was executed and which surfaced some 12 years after the fact in the midst of a contested matrimonial action in light of the required formalities of Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (3) *(cf., Matisoff v Dobi,*90 NY2d 127).

Concerning the cause of action for annulment, the complaint sets forth facts sufficient to give defendant notice of the behavior claimed to constitute incurable mental illness under Domestic Relations Law § 7 (5) and § 140 (i), and there is no merit to defendant’s claim that Domestic Relations Law § 7 (5) violates the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act *(see, Kapner v Kapner,*1996 US Dist LEXIS 8541 [ED Pa, June 18, 1996, Green, J.]). Any perceived inequities in the awards of interim counsel fees and temporary maintenance should be remedied at trial *(see,*241 AD2d 353). Concur — Lerner, P. J., Milonas, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.2

                     SCHEDULE OF INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS

The Company has entered into indemnification agreements with the following
individuals:

-    Thomas W. Huseby

-    Kenneth E. Jones

-    William H. Largent

-    Curtis A. Loveland

-    Gerard B. Moersdorf, Jr.

-    Richard W. Oliver

-    John D. Riedel

-    Alexander B. Trevor