[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-14177

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cr-00020-LGW-BWC-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROBERT IRA ANDERSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

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(May 22, 2020)

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Robert Ira Anderson challenges his sentence for maintaining a drug-involved 

premises and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. He 

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argues that the district court erred in calculating his guideline range and that counsel 

provided ineffective assistance at sentencing. After review, we affirm.

I.

In March 2018, Anderson pled guilty to one count of maintaining a druginvolved premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), and one count of possession 

of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A). In the plea agreement, Anderson agreed that he used and maintained 

a house in Hortense, Georgia, for the purpose of others to distribute 

methamphetamine, and that he possessed a revolver in furtherance of that crime. 

According to Anderson’s presentence investigation report (“PSR”), his wife, 

Susan Anderson, distributed methamphetamine from their shared residence in 

Hortense. Anderson knew that his wife used the residence to distribute 

methamphetamine, and he assisted her by driving her to purchase methamphetamine 

on November 5, 2015, and by constructing hidden compartments in the residence in 

which methamphetamine and cash were stored. In addition, multiple firearms were 

found during a law-enforcement search of the Andersons’ residence, including the 

revolver he admitted to possessing in furtherance of the § 856(a)(1) offense.

In calculating Anderson’s guideline range, the PSR recommended a base 

offense level of 31 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8. According to that guideline, the base 

offense level for a conviction under § 856(a)(1) is either “[t]he offense level from 

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§ 2D1.1 applicable to the underlying controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.8(a)(1), or, “[i]f the defendant had no participation in the underlying 

controlled substance offense other than allowing use of the premises,” four levels 

less than the applicable § 2D1.1 offense level, but not greater than level 26, U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.8(a)(2). The PSR applied the more severe subsection, § 2D1.8(a)(1), using a 

converted drug quantity of 15,038 kilograms of marijuana, and derived a base 

offense level of 34, which it then reduced by three levels because Anderson received 

a minor-role adjustment. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)(B)(ii), (c)(3). 

The PSR also applied a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for 

the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(12), and a two-level reduction for a minor role, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, for a 

total offense level of 31. Combined with a criminal-history category of II, the 

resulting recommended guideline imprisonment range for the § 856(a)(1) count was

121 to 151 months. The § 924(c) count required a mandatory consecutive term of at 

least 60 months of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).

Anderson filed multiple objections to the PSR, two of which are relevant here. 

First, he argued that his base offense level should have been calculated under 

§ 2D1.8(a)(2), rather than § 2D1.8(a)(1), because, in his view, he had no 

participation in his wife’s drug-distribution activities other than allowing use of the 

premises. Second, he objected to the two-level enhancement for maintaining a drugCase: 18-14177 Date Filed: 05/22/2020 Page: 3 of 10
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involved premises under § 2D1.1(b)(12) because “he has already entered a plea of 

guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), and his sentence is governed by U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.8(a)(2).” In an addendum to the PSR, the probation officer disagreed with 

Anderson’s arguments and concluded that § 2D1.8(a)(1) applied because Anderson

participated in the underlying offense and that the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement 

“would not be considered ‘double counting’ as the defendant seems to suggest.”

When Anderson appeared for sentencing, defense counsel indicated that 

Anderson wished to withdraw most of his objections to the PSR. The district court 

questioned Anderson and defense counsel in detail and asked specifically whether 

they wanted to withdraw his objections to the calculation of the base offense level 

under § 2D1.8(a)(1) and to the enhancement for maintaining a drug-involved 

premises under § 2D1.1(b)(12). Anderson confirmed that he had read and discussed 

the PSR and the addendum with counsel and that he wanted to withdraw these 

objections. After he did so, the government recommended a reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, which it previously had opposed. 

Ultimately, the district court granted Anderson a three-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility and calculated a total offense level of 28 and a criminal 

history category of II. This established a guideline imprisonment range of 87 to 108 

months, plus a consecutive term of 60 months for the § 924(c) offense. After 

granting the government’s motion for a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, 

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the district court imposed a total term of 120 months of imprisonment, consisting of 

a 60-month term as to the § 856(a)(1) offense and a consecutive 60-month term as 

to the § 924(c) offense. The court advised that, regardless of the resolution of 

guideline-application issues, it “would have pronounced the exact same sentence 

based on simply the 3553 factors,” including the nature of the offense and the

offender. Anderson now appeals.

II.

Anderson first argues that the district court erred in calculating his guideline 

range. He contends that the district court should have applied § 2D1.8(a)(2), rather 

than § 2D1.8(a)(1), because he did not participate in his wife’s drug-trafficking 

activities other than to maintain the shared residence from which she distributed 

methamphetamine. He also asserts that the court engaged in impermissible double 

counting by applying the enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) because his sole drug 

conviction was premised on the same underlying conduct as the enhancement. 

Ordinarily, we review the district court’s interpretation of the guidelines de 

novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its application of the guidelines to the 

facts with due deference. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir.

2010). Issues not timely raised below are generally reviewed for plain error only, 

which requires the defendant to show that an obvious error affected his substantial 

rights. United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2013).

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But “we have held that a defendant waives a sentencing objection where he 

expressly withdraws the objection before the district court.” United States v. Cobb, 

842 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2016); see United States v. Horsfall, 552 F.3d 1275, 

1283–84 (11th Cir.2008); United States v. Masters, 118 F.3d 1524, 1525–26 (11th 

Cir. 1997). In other words, the “plain error doctrine is inapplicable” in a situation 

where a defendant knowingly withdraws an objection at sentencing. Masters, 118 

F.3d at 1526; see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1993) (explaining 

that “waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” and 

that waived issues are not reviewable).

Here, Anderson waived any argument he may have had challenging the 

calculation of his base offense level under § 2D1.8(a)(1) or the application of the 

enhancement under § 2D1.1. See Cobb, 842 F.3d at 1222; Horsfall, 552 F.3d at 

1283–84; Masters, 118 F.3d at 1525–26. At sentencing, Anderson clearly and 

expressly withdrew his objections, which presented essentially the same grounds as 

he raises on appeal, to these guideline issues. By knowingly withdrawing these 

objections, Anderson waived appellate review, even for plain error. See id.

In any event, even if Anderson had not waived these arguments, they would 

still fail under plain-error review. See Madden, 733 F.3d at 1321. As to the base 

offense level, the record shows that Anderson “participat[ed] in the underlying 

controlled substance offense” beyond simply “allowing use of the premises.” See 

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U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a)(1). He drove his wife to conduct a methamphetamine 

transaction and constructed hidden compartments in the residence in which 

methamphetamine and cash were stored. And beyond that, Anderson admitted in 

his plea agreement that he possessed a firearm in furtherance of the crime of 

maintaining a drug-involved premises. Cf. id. § 2D1.8, cmt. n.1 (“[S]ubsection 

(a)(2) would not apply to a defendant who possessed a dangerous weapon in 

connection with the [underlying controlled substance] offense.”). Altogether, this 

conduct is sufficient to show that Anderson “assisted in the commission of the 

underlying controlled substance offense.” Id. Accordingly, § 2D1.8(a)(2) does not 

apply based on the undisputed facts of the PSR and the facts Anderson admitted by 

pleading guilty. See United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 1356 (11th Cir. 1989) 

(“The findings of fact of the sentencing court may be based on . . . facts admitted by 

a defendant’s plea of guilty, undisputed statements in the presentence report, or 

evidence presented at the sentencing hearing.”).

As to the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement, Anderson points to no decision from 

this Court or any other court holding that applying this enhancement where a 

defendant is convicted of an offense under § 856(a)(1) without an accompanying 

drug-trafficking conviction constitutes impermissible double counting. See United 

States v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013) (“An error is not plain 

unless it is contrary to explicit statutory provisions or to on-point precedent in this 

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Court or the Supreme Court.” (quotation marks omitted)). So he cannot establish 

that any error was “plain.” See id.

Moreover, the guideline for § 856(a)(1) offenses, § 2D1.8, expressly directs 

courts to use “the offense level from § 2D1.1 applicable to the underlying controlled 

substance offense,” without further limitation. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a)(1). And the 

harm the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement accounts for—the maintenance of a premises 

for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance—is not otherwise accounted 

for by § 2D1.1. See United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 

2006) (stating that double counting a factor is permitted if the Commission intends 

that result and each guideline sentence in question concerns conceptually distinct 

notions related to sentencing). So we cannot say it is plain or obvious that the 

Sentencing Commission did not intend for the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement to apply 

where a defendant is convicted under § 856(a)(1) without an accompanying drugtrafficking conviction. See id. at 1227.

III.

Finally, Anderson maintains that his attorney was ineffective for withdrawing 

his guideline-calculation objections.1

 To prove a claim of ineffective assistance, the 

defendant must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he 

1 “An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim presents a mixed question of law and fact, 

which this Court reviews de novo.” Payne v. United States, 566 F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009).

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was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

Unless the record is “sufficiently developed,” we ordinarily will not entertain claims 

for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. United States v. Patterson, 

595 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010). The preferred method for raising such claims 

is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Id. 

Anderson asserts that the record is sufficiently developed to decide these 

claims. Insofar as counsel’s performance is at issue, we disagree, as the record does 

not fully reflect the strategic reasons behind counsel’s decisions or the substance of 

his advice to Anderson. 

As to prejudice, however, the record is sufficiently complete to conclude that 

Anderson cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result. Initially, 

we are not persuaded that these objections were meritorious, for the reasons 

discussed above. And “a lawyer’s failure to preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot 

prejudice a client.” United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992).

But even if we assume that both objections would have been sustained if 

advanced by counsel, the district court’s comments show that there is not a 

reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a different sentence. The 

court expressly stated that it would have imposed the same sentence in light of the 

§ 3553(a) factors regardless of its guideline-range calculations. See Osley v. United 

States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2014) (relying on the district court’s 

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comments at sentencing to hold that the defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s 

failure to assert a sentencing objection).

Nor is there a reasonable probability that Anderson would have prevailed on 

appeal if the district court had rejected his arguments. Because the court stated that 

it would have imposed the same sentence without regard to the guideline range, we 

likely would have reviewed Anderson’s sentence for harmlessness on appeal, asking 

whether “the sentence would be reasonable even if the guidelines issue had been 

decided in the defendant’s favor.” United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 

(11th Cir. 2006). If the two guideline-application issues had been resolved in 

Anderson’s favor, his total offense level at best would have been 23,

2 yielding a 

guideline range of 51 to 63 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a)(2); Id. § 2D1.1(b)(12). 

Anderson’s sentence was still within this guideline range, “so we expect [it] to be 

reasonable,” United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1351 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation 

marks omitted), and he does not otherwise identify factors suggesting that a 60-

month sentence for the § 856(a)(1) offense was unreasonable. 

For these reasons, Anderson cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

alleged ineffectiveness at sentencing. 

AFFIRMED. 

2 We note, however, that if Anderson maintained his objection to the base offense level, 

the government likely would have opposed a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which, in 

turn, may have increased Anderson’s total offense level. 

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