1997 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-7-1997

Local 787 v. Textron Lycoming

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-7261

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Local 787 v. Textron Lycoming" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 147.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/147
Filed July 7, 1997 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 96-7261 

UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND 

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, 

INTERNATIONAL UNION AND ITS LOCAL 787, 

APPELLANT

v. 

TEXTRON LYCOMING RECIPROCATING ENGINE 

DIVISION, AVCO CORP., 

APPELLEE

On Appeal From the United States District Court 

For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-01918) 

Argued: JANUARY 30, 1997 

Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges, 

BARRY, District Judge.* 

(Filed: July 7, 1997) 

_________________________________________________________________ 

*Honorable Maryanne Trump Barry, United States District Judge for the 

District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
JORDAN ROSSEN, ESQUIRE 

General Counsel 

International Union, United 

 Automobile Aerospace and 

 Agricultural Implement 

 Workers of America, UAW 

8000 East Jefferson Avenue 

Detroit, Michigan 48214 

STEPHEN A. YOKICH, ESQUIRE 

(ARGUED) 

Associate General Counsel 

International Union, United 

 Automobile Aerospace and 

 Agricultural Implement 

 Workers of America, UAW 

1757 "N" Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

Attorneys for Appellant

BARRY SIMON, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 

GARY M. TOCCI, ESQUIRE 

Schnader, Harrison, Segal, & Lewis 

1600 Market Street, Suite 3600 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

CHARLES J. McKELVEY, ESQUIRE 

McNerney, Page, Vanderlin & Hall 

433 Market Street 

P.O. Box 7 

Williamsport, PA 17703 

Attorneys for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT 

BECKER, Circuit Judge. 

This is an appeal by the United Automobile, Aerospace 

and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW") 

and its Local 787 from the district court's order dismissing 

its complaint against defendant Textron Lycoming 

 2 
Reciprocating Engine Division, Avco Corp. ("Textron"), for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 301(a) of the 

Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The 

district court found that the UAW's suit, which seeks a 

declaration that the collective bargaining agreement 

between the parties is voidable because it was secured by 

fraud in the inducement, was not a "[s]uit for violation of [a] 

contract[ ] between an employer and a labor organization 

representing employees" within the meaning of § 301(a). 

The UAW's appeal requires us to consider the scope of 

§ 301(a) and our decision in Mack Trucks, Inc. v.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and

Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 856 F.2d 579 

(3d Cir. 1988). In that case, Mack Trucks sought a 

declaratory judgment that the collective bargaining

agreement between it and the UAW was valid and 

enforceable, after the UAW had threatened to declare that 

there was no agreement between the parties. We held that 

§ 301(a) conferred subject matter jurisdiction, finding that 

Mack Trucks' suit was a "suit for violation of[a] contract[ ]." 

Id. at 588. 

In urging us to affirm the district court's order in this 

case, Textron contends that the suit filed by the UAW, here 

the party seeking to establish jurisdiction, can be

distinguished from Mack Trucks in two respects. First, 

Textron points out that, while the very existence of the 

collective bargaining agreement was at issue in Mack

Trucks, the UAW here acknowledges the existence of the 

agreement, and rather seeks a declaration that the 

collective bargaining agreement between the parties is 

voidable because it was secured by fraud in the 

inducement. Second, while in Mack Trucks the plaintiff 

wished to enforce the collective bargaining agreement, the 

UAW here seeks the power to repudiate the agreement, and 

Textron contends that § 301(a) does not supply jurisdiction 

under such circumstances. Because we disagree with 

Textron and conclude that the UAW's suit is a suit for 

violation of a contract under § 301(a) and Mack Trucks, we 

reverse. 

 3 
I. 

The complaint pleads the following facts which, since we 

deal with a motion to dismiss, we must take as true. The 

UAW represents employees at Textron's Williamsport,

Pennsylvania plant, at which the company manufactures 

and assembles aircraft engines. This dispute arose from the 

collective bargaining agreement between the parties that 

covered the period from April 1, 1994 to April 1, 1997 and, 

more specifically, the negotiations that produced that 

agreement. Prior to the commencement of negotiations, the 

UAW submitted to Textron a request for information to aid 

it in its preparations for the negotiations. One section of the 

request asked whether Textron planned to subcontract out 

any of the work that was being done by the UAW members 

at the plant. The request specifically demanded any written 

documents that Textron had prepared on the subject of 

subcontracting. The UAW twice repeated this request. Prior 

to the negotiations, Textron never disclosed any information 

about plans to move bargaining unit work. 

At the opening of the negotiations, the UAW renewed its 

request that Textron disclose any plans to contract out the 

work. Textron's vice-president for human resources, Frank 

Ratchford, stated that he had no knowledge of any plans for 

subcontracting, and also promised to make sure that his 

knowledge was complete. Neither Ratchford nor any other 

Textron official raised this issue again during negotiations. 

The parties reached a collective bargaining agreement in 

March 1994, which was ratified by the UAW membership at 

the beginning of April 1994. 

The UAW's complaint alleges that, during the 

negotiations, Textron developed a plan to subcontract 

certain bargaining unit work at the plant, but never 

disclosed it to the UAW. According to the UAW's 

submission, the plan was presented to and approved by 

Textron's Board of Directors after the UAW membership 

ratified the collective bargaining agreement. The 

membership learned of the plan in June 1994. 

The UAW alleges that about half of the union's members 

at the plant will lose their jobs as a result of Textron's 

subcontracting plan. It also represents that it would have 

 4 
used a different bargaining strategy had it known of the 

company's subcontracting plan. Instead, relying on the 

company's denial of any such plan, the union made no 

contract demands relating to the issue and did not pursue 

its request for information on the subject. More specifically, 

the union represents that it would not have agreed to the 

"no-strike" provision in the collective bargaining agreement 

had it known of the subcontracting plan. 

The UAW's complaint in the District Court for the Middle 

District of Pennsylvania sought a declaratory judgment that 

the collective bargaining agreement was voidable at the 

UAW's option because it was secured by fraud in the

inducement. The UAW relied on § 301(a) of the Labor

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), for subject 

matter jurisdiction. Textron moved to dismiss the complaint 

on two grounds: (1) § 301(a) failed to confer subject matter 

jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), because the National 

Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") has exclusive jurisdiction 

over the UAW's claims of bad faith bargaining; and (2) the 

UAW failed to state a claim for relief that could be granted, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because it had failed to exhaust the 

grievance process available under the collective bargaining 

agreement. 

The district court granted Textron's motion based on the 

first ground, and, accordingly, did not reach the second 

question. The court first concluded that the UAW sought 

neither to enforce its rights under the collective bargaining 

agreement nor to show that a collective bargaining 

agreement existed; rather, the UAW had requested only a 

declaration that Textron had violated its duty to bargain in 

good faith under § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act 

("NLRA") in negotiating the agreement. Having so 

characterized UAW's suit, the district court found that it 

lacked jurisdiction under § 301, and that the case was 

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 

Moreover, the court reasoned that, while we held in Mack

Trucks that a district court has jurisdiction to determine 

whether a collective bargaining agreement exists, that 

holding was "based on the principle that a district court 

may enforce the parties' rights under a CBA, but may not 

reach a claim which is independent of the contract." The 

 5 
court found that the UAW's claim was independent of the 

terms of the contract. It concluded finally that, "[i]n no way 

can UAW's claim be classified as one for `violation of [a] 

contract[ ] between an employer and a labor organization' 

under § 301(a)." Order at 6. 

The UAW appeals, contending that the district court

erred in concluding that § 301(a), as interpreted by our 

decision in Mack Trucks, does not confer jurisdiction over 

its suit. Our review of the order dismissing the complaint is 

plenary. See Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 

1039, 1044 (3d Cir. 1993). 

II. 

This case requires us to examine again the relationship 

between the jurisdiction of the NLRB and that of the federal 

district courts over labor cases. As we explained in Mack

Trucks, 856 F.2d at 584-85, under the preemption doctrine

of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 

236, 245 (1959), "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to 

§ 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act, the States 

as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive 

competence of the National Labor Relations Board."1 The 

purpose of the Garmon preemption doctrine is both to 

ensure the uniform development of substantive labor law 

rules and to entrust the development of those rules to an 

administrative agency with particular labor law expertise. 

See Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 178-81 (1967); Mack

Trucks, 856 F.2d at 584. 

This doctrine, however, "has never been rigidly applied to 

cases where it could not fairly be inferred that Congress 

intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie with the NLRB." Vaca, 

386 U.S. at 179. In § 301(a) of the Labor Management 

Relations Act, Congress "carved out" such an exception to 

the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over cases arguably 

subject to § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA. Id. This section provides: 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. Section 7 of the NLRA concerns the right of employees to organize and 

to engage in collective bargaining, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and § 8 prohibits 

both employers and unions from committing "unfair labor practices" as 

defined in the statute, id. § 158. 

 6 
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a 

labor organization representing employees . . . may be 

brought in any district court of the United States having 

jurisdiction over the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Hence, a 

federal district court has jurisdiction over suits "for 

violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization representing employees" under § 301(a) even if 

the claimed harm may arguably constitute an unfair labor 

practice under the NLRA. Under these circumstances-- 

when the challenged practice both violates the collective 

bargaining agreement and is arguably subject to the NLRA 

-- the federal district courts and the NLRB are said to 

share "concurrent jurisdiction" over the suit. Mack Trucks, 

856 F.2d at 585. In other words, the NLRB retains 

exclusive jurisdiction over a claim only when the challenged 

conduct is an unfair labor practice that is not also subject 

to § 301(a) jurisdiction. 

The purpose of § 301(a) was to encourage the judicial 

enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. In

enacting § 301, Congress recognized the importance, for 

promoting industrial peace, of " `assuring the enforceability 

of [collective bargaining agreements]' in the courts." Id. at 

587 (quoting Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 

(1962)). Moreover, § 301 "authorizes federal courts to 

fashion a body of law for the enforcement of . . . collective 

bargaining agreements," Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln

Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957), and, accordingly, 

encourages the development of a such a body of law. As the 

Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he strong policy favoring 

judicial enforcement of collective-bargaining contracts was 

sufficiently powerful to sustain the jurisdiction of the 

district courts over enforcement suits even though the 

conduct involved was arguably or would amount to an

unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the National 

Labor Relations Board." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 

424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976). 

III. 

In Mack Trucks, we considered whether § 301(a) supplied 

subject matter jurisdiction over suits about the very 

existence of a collective bargaining agreement, or whether 

 7 
that section was limited to suits that posited the existence 

of the agreement and merely alleged a breach of that 

agreement. The UAW and Mack Trucks had reached an oral 

agreement about the terms of a collective bargaining 

agreement. While the parties were negotiating contract 

language to reflect the oral agreement, the UAWfiled a 

grievance alleging that Mack Trucks had unilaterally 

implemented changes to that agreement. Soon after, the 

union threatened that, unless the parties settled their 

disputes and executed a written agreement within a certain 

period of time, it would declare the agreement void. 856 

F.2d at 582-83. Mack Trucks filed suit in federal district 

court pursuant to § 301(a) seeking a declaratory judgment 

that the new collective bargaining agreement was valid and 

enforceable. 

The UAW, in that case challenging § 301(a) jurisdiction, 

responded that the court lacked jurisdiction because the 

suit did not concern a contract claim, but rather implicated 

only the duties under the NLRA to bargain collectively and 

in good faith and to reduce the terms of an oral agreement 

to writing, which are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 

the NLRB. We rejected this argument, noting that even if a 

suit is subject to the NLRB's jurisdiction, we must

determine whether it is also subject to § 301(a) jurisdiction. 

We found further that Mack Trucks' suit did not turn 

"solely on violations of good faith bargaining, or the duty to 

execute an agreement . . . which would trigger the NLRB's 

exclusive jurisdiction." Id. at 586 (citations omitted and 

emphasis added). 

We then addressed the central question, whether "suits 

for violation of contracts" included suits concerning the 

validity of a labor agreement, or whether § 301(a) 

jurisdiction was limited to suits alleging violations of 

particular contractual provisions in an existing collective 

bargaining agreement. We noted that several courts of 

appeals have limited jurisdiction to suits alleging a breach 

of a particular provision of a collective bargaining 

agreement. See A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. International Union,

United Mine Workers of America, 799 F.2d 142, 146 (4th 

Cir. 1986); NDK Corp. v. Local 1550 of Commercial Workers

Int'l Union, 709 F.2d 491, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1983); 

 8 
Hernandez v. National Packing Co., 455 F.2d 1252, 1253 

(1st Cir. 1972). 

Because § 301(a) "is not free from ambiguity, we 

interpret[ed] § 301(a) in light of its legislative history, 

congressional intent, and underlying policies." Mack Trucks, 

856 F.2d at 586. In view of these sources, we first

concluded that limiting § 301(a) jurisdiction to suits that 

presume the existence of a labor contract "ignores 

Congress' broader concern that the courts -- as opposed to 

the NLRB -- be granted authority to decide disputes of a 

contractual nature." Id. at 588. We held that: 

When, as here, a party seeks enforcement of a labor

agreement, and the other party denies the contract's 

existence, the filing party's declaratory judgment action 

constitutes an `enforcement' action. Congress intended 

that contractual disputes be resolved by the courts

applying `usual processes of the law.' These principles 

of law apply equally to cases involving breach of an 

acknowledged contract and those involving a dispute

over the agreement's existence. 

Id. (citation omitted). In so holding, we distinguished prior 

cases in which we had found no § 301 jurisdiction on the 

ground that the claims in those cases were each somehow 

independent of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 

589. For example, in one case, the plaintiffs claimed that 

their collective bargaining agreement conflicted with a preagreement contract of hire. See Leskiw v. Local 1470, Int'l

Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 464 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1972); see also

Adams v. Budd, 349 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1965); Medlin v.

Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1980). 

IV. 

A. 

The UAW, back before us and this time trying to 

establish jurisdiction, contends that § 301(a) confers federal 

jurisdiction over its complaint, characterizing Mack Trucks

as holding that § 301(a) jurisdiction exists for suits 

involving questions about the enforceability of a collective 

 9 
bargaining agreement. Textron responds that the district 

court properly dismissed the UAW's complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction under § 301(a) and Mack Trucks. 

First, Textron points out that Mack Trucks dealt with 

whether a collective bargaining agreement actually existed

between the parties. Because the UAW's claim here is that 

the collective bargaining agreement is voidable (but not 

void) because it was secured by fraud in the inducement, 

and the UAW has acknowledged the existence of the 

agreement, Mack Trucks does not, Textron submits, compel 

the conclusion that § 301(a) confers jurisdiction. Second, 

even if Mack Trucks establishes § 301(a) jurisdiction for 

some suits that concern the enforceability of a collective 

bargaining agreement, the argument continues, § 301(a) 

supplies jurisdiction only when a party seeks to enforce a 

collective bargaining agreement but not when a party seeks 

to repudiate one, as in this case. 

We agree with the UAW, and conclude that § 301(a), as 

interpreted by Mack Trucks, confers jurisdiction over the 

UAW's fraudulent inducement suit. Taking up first 

Textron's contention that Mack Trucks does not supply 

jurisdiction when the plaintiff seeks to repudiate the 

agreement, we believe that the language of Mack Trucks

itself -- that a suit "involving a dispute over the

agreement's existence" is subject to § 301(a) jurisdiction -- 

compels the result that a party challenging an agreement's 

existence can establish § 301(a) jurisdiction.2 

Moreover, in Mack Trucks, we distinguished a case in 

which the Fourth Circuit held, in a consolidated appeal, 

that § 301(a) supplied jurisdiction over a union's suit for a 

declaration that an existing collective bargaining agreement 

applied to particular employers, but not to an employer's 

suit challenging the existence of that agreement. See A.T.

Massey Coal Co., 799 F.2d at 146. We stated that this "view 

fails to articulate a legal basis to justify jurisdiction in the 

_________________________________________________________________ 

2. We acknowledged as much recently when we stated that the "basis of 

Section 301 jurisdiction in Mack" was a claim that "no contract 

exist[ed]." Beverly Enterprises--Pennsylvania, Inc. v. District 1199C

National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, 90 F.3d 93, 95 

(3d Cir. 1996). 

 10 
union case, but not in the employer's case." Mack Trucks, 

856 F.2d at 588 n.10. 

Additionally, we see no reason why the rationale behind 

Mack Trucks -- that by enacting § 301(a) Congress intended 

that the courts resolve disputes of a contractual nature, 

including disputes over the agreement's very existence -- 

does not also apply when the party who files suit seeks a 

declaration that the agreement is not enforceable. Our 

conclusion is buttressed in policy terms by the UAW's 

argument that jurisdiction lies in this case because the 

union would have raised the fraudulent inducement claim 

as an affirmative defense had it refused to abide by the 

collective bargaining agreement and Textron hadfiled suit 

under § 301 to enforce it: the development of a consistent 

body of law in this area depends, in part, on federal court 

jurisdiction over all claims of a contractual nature, no 

matter who first resorts to court. 

Textron also seeks to distinguish between suits 

concerning the existence of an agreement and those 

concerning its enforceability. As the foregoing discussion 

suggests, we do not believe that there is any difference 

under Mack Trucks between suits about the existence of a 

collective bargaining agreement, i.e., seeking declaratory 

judgment that the agreement is void, and suits, like this 

one, about the enforceability of a collective bargaining 

agreement, i.e., seeking declaratory judgment that an 

agreement is voidable at the will of that party. The UAW's 

suit clearly arises from a contractual dispute: a dispute 

about whether a contract was secured by fraudulent 

inducement is as much a contract dispute as a dispute 

about a contract's existence. As we explained in Mack

Trucks, Congress intended that such suits be"resolved by 

the courts applying `usual processes of the law.' " Mack

Trucks, 856 F.2d at 588. 

The Ninth Circuit has already held that § 301(a) confers 

jurisdiction over fraudulent inducement claims. See

Rozay's Transfer v. Local Freight Drivers, 850 F.2d 1321, 

1326 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Section 301 . . . applies not only to 

suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement once it 

is duly formed, but also to suits impugning the existence 

and validity of a labor agreement, including those alleging 

 11 
improper conduct or mistake during the formation of the 

agreement." (citations omitted)); International Bhd. of

Teamsters v. American Delivery Serv. Co., 50 F.3d 770, 

773-74 (9th Cir. 1995). 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 301(a) 

supplies jurisdiction over the UAW's suit alleging that 

Textron secured the collective bargaining agreement

between the parties by fraud in the inducement. 

B. 

We are also unpersuaded by Textron's contention that 

the UAW's suit does not give rise to § 301(a) jurisdiction 

because it arises from pre-contract rights, that is, rights 

that are "independent" of the collective bargaining

agreement. It bases this conclusion on its understanding 

that the UAW's claims stem from the negotiation of the 

agreement, not from an alleged violation of the terms of the 

agreement itself, and as such, allege only a violation of the 

duty to bargain in good faith under the NLRA. In making 

this argument, Textron relies on several cases which we 

distinguished in Mack Trucks, see 856 F.2d at 589, in 

which we held that § 301(a) did not provide jurisdiction. See

Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1980); 

Leskiw v. Local 1470, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 464 F.2d 

721 (3d Cir. 1972); Adams v. Budd Co., 349 F.2d 368 (3d 

Cir. 1965). In essence, Textron contends that the UAW's 

claim is more akin to the pre-Mack Trucks cases than it is 

to the suit in Mack Trucks. 

In Adams, the plaintiffs, employees subject to a collective

bargaining agreement, sought jurisdiction under§ 301(a) to 

press the claim that the union and Budd had conspired, in 

negotiating the collective bargaining agreement, to deprive 

them of rights contained in their pre-collective bargaining 

agreement "contracts of hire." Recognizing that these 

plaintiffs did not allege a violation of the collective 

bargaining agreement, but rather a "violation by a labor 

contract of rights which they assert were independently, 

and pre-agreement, vested in them by their `contract of 

hire,' " we held that the plaintiffs had not established 

§ 301(a) jurisdiction. Adams, 349 F.2d at 370; accord

 12 
Leskiw, 464 F.2d at 723; see also Medlin, 620 F.2d at 962 

(refusing to exercise jurisdiction under § 301(a) where the 

plaintiffs' claims were based on rights independent of the 

collective bargaining agreement: "[T]hese were not rights 

arising in any way under the collective bargaining 

agreement."). 

We disagree with Textron, because the UAW's suit is not 

akin to the pre-Mack Trucks cases. As we characterized 

them in Beverly Enterprises, those cases held "that federal 

courts lack Section 301 jurisdiction over challenges to 

contracts on the basis that they conflicted with the NLRA or 

some other external agreement." Beverly Enterprises --

Pennsylvania, Inc. v. District 1199C National Union of

Hospital and Health Care Employees, 90 F.3d 93, 95 (3d 

Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the 

plaintiff sought only a declaration that a clause in the 

collective bargaining agreement violated § 8(a)(3) of the 

NLRA). We thus reject Textron's contention that the

plaintiffs in Adams failed to establish§ 301(a) jurisdiction 

because their claim turned solely upon adverse effects 

arising from the negotiation of the collective bargaining 

agreement. While we agreed with the defendant union's 

argument in Adams that the suit had to do with the 

negotiation of the agreement rather than whether the 

agreement had been breached, see Adams, 349 F.2d at 

369, our conclusion that § 301(a) did not confer jurisdiction 

was based on the fact that the plaintiffs' suit alleged a 

violation of their rights contained in a pre-agreement 

contract, not on the fact that the plaintiffs' claim concerned 

the negotiations rather than the collective bargaining 

agreement itself. 

Contrary to the pre-Mack Trucks line of cases, the UAW's 

claim that the collective bargaining agreement was secured 

by fraud in the inducement arises not out of the NLRA or 

another contract, but out of the collective bargaining 

agreement itself. The claim alleges flaws in the basic 

formation of the collective bargaining agreement, and its 

resolution is integral to the question whether the agreement 

is enforceable. In other words, Textron's allegedly

fraudulent conduct goes to the heart of the enforceability of 

the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 

 13 
Thus, the UAW is seeking to enforce rights that exist under 

the collective bargaining agreement. 

In short, the claim here can be adjudicated without

consideration of rights possessed by the parties under any 

other agreement or the NLRA. As such, this case clearly 

does not fall within the pre-Mack Trucks line of cases. 

Hence, even if the UAW's claim could arguably constitute 

an unfair labor practice under § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA, the 

UAW's claim is not solely a claim under the NLRA, and is 

subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of both the federal 

district courts and the NLRB.3 

The order of the district court dismissing the complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be reversed and 

the case remanded for further proceedings.4 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. In this regard, we note that it is not clear that the NLRB actually 

would have jurisdiction over the UAW's fraudulent inducement claim. 

According to the UAW, the duty to bargain in good faith under §§ 8(a)(5) 

and 8(d) of the NLRA is qualitatively different from its fraud in the 

inducement claim. While the claims of bad faith bargaining and of 

fraudulent inducement may overlap both factually and legally, they are 

not identical. 

4. Textron has also argued that the UAW's complaint must be dismissed 

because the union failed to exhaust the grievance procedures contained 

in the collective bargaining agreement before filing suit. The district 

court did not reach this issue when it dismissed the complaint, and 

should do so on remand. 

 14