# United Stat es Court of Appeals For the First C ircuit

No. 02-2323 IN RE JOAN E. CARP, Debtor.

___________________ RICHARD W. GANNETT, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. JOAN E. CARP, Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge ] [Hon. Joan N. Feeney, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge ]

Before Selya, Circuit Judge , Stapleton* and Baldock,** Senior Circuit Judges . Stephanie L. Moon , with whom Richard W. Gannett and Gannett & Associates were on brief, for appellant. Richard S. Hackel for appellee.

August 18, 2003

_______________ *Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation. **Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.-2- SELYA, Circuit Judge . This appeal ar ises out of a creditor's quest to block a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court decl ine d to default or sanction the debtor for claiming her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, determinedthat she h ad not transgressed the strictures of 11 U. S.C. § 727(a), and granted the discharge. The district c our t affirmed these rulings, and the debtor now appeals.

We agree with the creditor that ther e ar e suspicious circumstances here. As an appellate court, however, we are not free to second-guess the management of pretrial discovery, weigh the evidence a fres h, or make independent judgments about the credibility of witnesses. Instead, our function is to examine the recordwith care, defer to the properly supportedfactual findings of the court of first instance, determine the applicable law, and

en sure that the trier properly applied it to the facts as found. Having performed these tasks, we conclude, as did the district court, that the decision of the bankruptcy court is impervious to the creditor's attack. Consequently, we affirm the judgment below. I. Background The underlying bankruptcy proceeding has been pending since 1995. We do not here attempt to rehearse the entire history of the case, but, rather, offer a synopsis of the facts designed to give needed context to the issues on appeal.-3- Joan E. Carp (the debtor) and her husband, Stephen Carp, fileda joint petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief in February 1995. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784. Among the affected creditors was the appellant, Richard W. Gannett. Gannett fileda timely proof of claim for $82,093.85, plus interest and costs, arising out of the rendition of legal services.

Several months later, Gannett commenced an adversary proceeding, objecting to the Carps' propos ed d ischarge in bankruptcy. He relied on 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) and ( 4), arguing that the Carps had willfully failed to disclose their ow ner ship interests in a number of assets, including a parcel of real property located at 824 Dedham Street, Newton, Massachusetts (the Newton property) and three automobiles. With regard to the Newton property Gannett asserted that the Carps owned an equitable interest in it even though legal title reposed in one Mordechay Pupkin. Gannett further asserted that the Carps were using Pupkin

as a straw in order to defraud creditors; that they ha d fu nded Pup kin's mortgage payments; and that any semblance of rent a l payments was a sham. With re spect to t he cars, Gannett alleged that the Carps had attempted to defraud their creditors by giving their children legal title to the automobiles. He argued that it

was absurd to think that the children owned three vehicles while the parents themselves owned none. The Carps denied the material allegations of Gannett's complaint.-4- To say that matters did not proceed smoothly would be a g ross understatement. Gannett served deposition notic es an d interrogatories in October 1995 andadded a request for production of documents in January of the f ollowing y ear. On February 29, 1 996, he m oved to compel, pointing out that the Carps had not repliedto these discovery requests. The bankruptcycourt granted the motion. When the Carps still did not cooperate, Gannett moved for the entry of a default judgment. The Carps responded that they wouldnot submit to discovery because they were the t argets of a criminal investigation for bankruptcy fraud being conductedby the United States Department of Justice.

On May 16, 1996, the bankruptcy court again ordered the Carps to provide discovery. The court also imposeda $750 monetary sanction and continued Gannett's motion for entry of a default judgment. On August 22, 1996, the bankruptcy court denied that motion. Meanwhile, the criminal investigation went forward. On October 14, 1996, the government filed a criminal information against Stephen Carp, chargin g h im with one count of bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 152, relatedto his alleged failure to disclose an equitable ownership interest in the Newton property. On April1 Following Stephen Carp's admission of guilt, Gannett moved

for summary judgment against him in the pending adversary proceeding . S ee Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056. The bankruptcy court granted this motion and denied Stephen Carp a discharge. Because Stephen Carp' s case is closed, we treat Joan Carp as the sole debtor.

2 The debtor was never criminally charged. -5- 27, 1 997, Stephen Carp pled guilty to this charge. The district court sentenced him the next day. 1

The bankruptcy court had wisely continued the case until the outcome of the criminal prosecution was finally determined. In the interim, the court maintained careful watch, holding no fewer than five status conferences from the fall of 1996 through the spring of 1997. From time to time, Gannett mentioned that he was still awaiting discovery materials but no action was taken. At a status conference held on April 24, 1997, Gannett again raised the issue, and the debtor acknowledged that she had not yet complied with the discovery orders because of her asserted Fifth Amendment privilege. The court statedthat there was no point in attempting to press forw ard with discovery if the debtor was going to plead the Fifth Amendment anddirected the parties to file a joint status report following Stephen Carp's sentencing.

Once the criminal prosecut ion had ended 2 and the adversary proceeding against Ste phen Carp had been resolved, see supra note 1, the ban kruptcy court set a trial date for the adversary pr oceedi ng against the debtor. Prior to the scheduled-6-

start of trial, the trustee in bankruptcy moved to consolidate that proceeding with an adversary proceeding that he (the trustee) had brought against Pupkin. The court consolidated the two actions and vacated the scheduled trial date. The trustee eventually settled with Pupkin, thus undoing the consolidation.

The next bump in this long and winding road occurred in Apri l of 2 001 when the bankruptcy court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the debtor's discharge for October 3 of that year. Gannett dawdled for several months andthen, on August 23, filed a renewedmotion for entry of a default judgment or, in the alt ernative, for additional time to conduct discovery. At a hearing held on September 24, the court denied both prayers on condition that the debtor submit to a deposition prior to trial and produce the previously requested documents before the deposition. The debtor delivered the designated documents and ap pearedfor a deposition on Oct ober 1. A lthough she did not assert her Fifth Amendment privilege, she nonetheless refused to answer cert ain questions pursuant to her counsel's instructions.

Gannett made no further complaint about inad e quate or untimely discovery, and the bankruptcy court conducted the previouslyscheduled bench trial on October 3. Th e debt or testifiedwithout asserting any privilege against selfincrimination. In an ore tenus decision, the bankruptcy court foundthe debtor credible andconcluded that there was insufficient-7-

proof that she had either knowingly concealed property or vouchsafed a false oath. Discerning no basis for the denial of a discharge, the court entered judgment accord ingl y. The district court affirmed, see Gannett v. Carp ( In re Carp ), No. 02-10086 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2002) (unpublished), and this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). II. Standard of Review Notwithstanding the fact that we are the second-in-time reviewers, we cede no sp ecial deference to the district court's determinations. Brandt v. Repco Printers & Lithographics, Inc. ( In

re Healthco Int'l, Inc. ), 132 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1997). Rather, our review directly addresse s the bankruptcy court's decision. Gronan v. Watman ( In re Watman ), 301 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2002). We scrutinize that court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Id.

The application of the Bankruptcy Code to a particular

case poses a m ixed question of law and fact, which this court reviews for clear error unless the bankruptcy court's analysis was basedon a mistaken view of t he legal principles involved. See Miller v. Peterson ( In re Indep. Eng'g Co. ), 197 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1999). Under the clear error standard, the trier's findings of fact and the conclusions dra wn therefr om ought not to be set aside "unless, on the whole of the record, we forma strong,-8-

unyielding belief that a mistake has been made." Cumpiano v. Banco Santander , 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990). It follows that if the bankruptcy court's findings are supportable on any reasonable view of the record, we are boundto uphold them. See Boroff v. Tully ( In re Tully ), 818 F.2d 106, 109 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co. , 900 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1990) (warning that appellate review of "fact-dominated issues cannot be allowedto descend to the level of Monday-morning quarterbacking"). III. The Merits Although Gannett's asseverations are not neatly segregated, we distill them into two principal lines of argument. First, he challenges the bankruptcy court's decision to allow the debtor to testify without penalty after repeatedly having invoked the Fifth Amendment to insulate herself from furnishing discovery

— and he couples this challenge with a more general objection to the court's oversight of the discovery process. Second, he calumnizes the bankruptcy cou rt for its refusal to block the debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). We discuss these two lines of argument sequentially. A. The Fifth Amendment We turn first to those contentions related to the debtor's invocation of the Fifth Amendment. We review a bankruptcy-9-

court's discovery decisions for abuse of discretion — and that discretion is very wide. Brandt v. Wand Partners , 242 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2001). The fact that the Fifth Amendment is implicated in Gannett's litany of discovery-related complaints does not serve t o alte r this standard of review. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena , 882 F.2d 553, 575-77 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Serafino

v. Hasbro, Inc. , 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996). Unless we can fairly say that the bankruptcy court abused this wide discretion, its management of the pretrial discovery process must be respected.

As a matter of law, Gannett's claim that the bankruptcy court should not have allowed the debtor to testify without sanction lacks force. Gannett does not dispute — nor could he — that a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding can invoke the Fifth Amendment. See , e.g. , McCormick v. Banc One Leasing Corp . ( In re McCormick ), 49 F.3d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir. 1995); Martin-Trigona v. Belford( In re Martin-Trigona ), 732 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1984). He does not allege — nor could he on this r ecord — t hat the debtor's invocation of the privilege was chimerical or oth erwise improper. Rather, Gannett's thesis is that pleading the Fifth Amendment in a civil proceeding should yield consequences, and that the condign cons equ ence of the debtor's action should have been preclusion. In other words, the bankruptcy court ought not to have allowedthe debtor to testify because she did not provide discovery until the eve of trial.-10- The short answer to this importuning is that Gannett did not preserve the issue for appeal. After the documents were finally tendered and the deposition held, Gannett never complained to the bankruptcy court that the discovery was either too scanty or too tardy. By the same token, he didnot question the propriety of the objections interposed by the debtor's counsel during t h e deposition. To cap matters, far from asserting that the debtor's testimony should be precluded by her longstanding invocation of the Fifth Amendment, he himself called the debtor to the witness stand. If delayed discovery, once received, is incomplete, inadequate, or timedso as to impede effect ive tr ial preparation, the aggrieved party must object in advance of trial. The failure to do so constitutes a failure to raise the issue at the proper time and in the proper setting. That failure bars the aggrieved party from raising the issue on appeal. See Hemingway Trans., Inc. v. Kahn ( In re Hemingway Trans., Inc. ), 993 F.2d 915, 935 (1st Cir. 1993); LaRoche v. Amoskeag Bank ( In re LaRoche ), 969 F.2d 1299, 1305 (1st Cir. 1992).

To be sure, Gannett did assert a t t he September 24 hearing that the debtor should not be permitted to testify at trial because s he had persistently invoked the Fifth Amendment. In response to that assertion, the bankruptcy court ordered that the debtor produce documents and submit to an immediate deposition. If t his was not a satisfactory ameliorative, Gannett was obli ged t o3 Gannett's claim that the debtor should have been denied a

discharge because of her failure to comply with court orders could have been framed as a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A) rather than as an argument that sanctions were wrongly withheld. But Gannett never advanced such a claim in the bankruptcy court, andhe therefore has forfeited it. -11- renew his complaint following the receipt of the documents and the taking of the deposition. Cf. DesRosiers v. Moran , 949 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that when a party proceeds with trial without complaining about delayed discovery, the court will not permit that party to complain after judgment). He did not do so.

Gannett's fallback position is that the bankruptcy court erred by refusing to enter a default judgment against the debtor. In the last analysis, however, the decision as to whether discovery sanctions are warranted and the choice of what sanctions should be imposedare matters within th e sound discretion of the trial court. 3 Poulin v. Greer , 18 F.3d 979, 984 (1st Cir. 1994). The disallowance of a discharge — which would have been the effective resul t of a def ault judgment in this case — is strong medicine. There is no basis either in the record or in the law for us to second-guess the bankruptcy court's discretionary refusal to prescribe so harsh a penalty.

In a modest variation on this theme, Gannett suggests that the bankruptcy court at least should have drawn a negative inference against the debtor due to her repeated invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. But in a civil proceeding, the drawing4 Gannett's argument that the burden of persuasion shouldhave

shiftedto the debtor as a result of her invocation of the Fifth Amendment is simply a restatement of the argument that the court should have drawn a negative inference against the debtor. Thus, we reject this version of the argument for the reasons discussed above. -12- of a negative inference is a permissible, but not an ineluctable, concomitant of a party's invocation of the Fifth Amendment. See Mulero-Rodríguez v. Ponte, Inc. , 98 F.3d 670, 678 (1st Cir. 1996). While the law does not forbid adverse inferences against civil litigants who refuse to testify on Fifth Amendment ground s, see Baxter v. Palmigiano , 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976), it does not mandate such inferences. When all is said and done, the trial court has discretion over whether a negative inference is an app ropriate response to the invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a particular civil case.

The bankruptcy court, in the exercise of this discretion, chose not to draw such an inference here. The record evinces no special fact ors suggesting that this choice was arbitrary or capricious, and we are hesitant to overturn a trial court's discretionary decision to afford an extra measure of protection to

a litigant's constitutional right against self-incrimination. Cf. Serafino , 82 F.3d at 518 (emphasizing that courts must take special pains to ensure that the Fifth Amendment privilege is safeguarded). There was no error. 4-13- We give short shrift to Gannett's final discovery-related point: that the bankruptcy court failed to balance Gannett's right to a fa ir trial against the debtor's Fifth Amendment interests. Once again, the specter of a procedural default looms. Although Gannett did object generally to the bankruptcy court's management of the discovery process, he never specifically asserted an infr ingem ent of his right to a fair trial. More importantly, he didnot make any claim regarding the unfairness of proceeding after he had secured discovery. Thus, the bankruptcy court had neither the oc casion nor the opportunity to decide whether the discovery that Gannett belatedly recei ved wa s sufficient to cure any prior harm. If that discovery — i.e., the document production and depos ition — had not rectified the situation and restored the balance, Gannett had an affirmative obligation to come forward and request further relief from the court. See Macaulayv. Anas , 321 F.3d45, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that "[a] party who has the opportunity to ask the trial court for relief but fails to do so forfeits the right to claim, on appeal, that the relief should have been granted"); Anderson , 900 F.2d at 397 (similar).

Even were we to reach the merits of this claim, Gannett's

cause would not prosper. He relies chiefly upon our Serafino decision to undergird the argument that the bankruptcy court failed adequately to consider his ri ght to a fair trial. But that-14-

decision simply cannot support the weight that Gannett places upon it. It is true that Serafino stands for the proposition that "one party's assertion of his constitutional right should not obliterate another party's right to a fair proceeding." 82 F.3d at 518. It is also true, however, that the balancing of these factors is left largely to the informed discretion of the trial court. See id. The cour t need not make an elaborate series of written findings. Cf. United States v. LaCruz , 902 F.2d 121, 123-24 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that explicit findings as to the probative worth/prejudicial effect bal ance under Evidence Rule 403 are not always required). What counts is that the court's implicit

conc lusion — that Gannett would receive a fair trial notwithstanding the delayeddiscovery — is satisfactorily anchored in the record. After all, the bankruptcy court made significant efforts to ensure that Gannett could gain access, prior to trial, to the information necessary to prosecute his case. Moreover, Gannett never identified what information he coveted that was not available from other sources. Under these circumstances, we are at a loss to see how Gannett's rights were unfairly impugned. B. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) Gannett next contends that the bankruptcy court erred on the merits in granting the debtor a discharge. As the objecting-15-

party, Gannett had the burden of proving that the debtor should be denied a discharge. See Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Burgess ( In

re Burgess ), 955 F.2d134, 136 (1st Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Fieldv. Mans , 516 U.S. 59, 72-75 (1995). Although the ultimate decision about whether to grant or withhold a discharge is

a mixed question of law and fact, Gannett takes dead aim at the dist rict court's factual findings. Accordingly, we "review only for clear error, with 'due regard . . . to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of witnesses.'" In re Burgess , 955 F.2d at 137 (quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013) (alteration in original).

Gannett identifies two statutory bases for den ying a discharge in this case. We treat these in the ensemble. In doing so, we note that one of the Bankruptcy Code's core purposes is to give w orthy deb tors a fresh start. See Jamo v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union ( In re Jamo ), 283 F.3d 3 92, 398 ( 1st Cir. 2002). Thus, exceptions to discharge should be con str ued narrowly. Rutanen v. Baylis ( In re Baylis ), 313 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2002).

Gannett's first sortie involves section 727(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Cod e, which provides in pertinent part that the bankruptcy court shall withhold a discharge if

the debtor , wi th intent to hinder, delay, or defrauda creditor or an officer of the estate

. . . has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed — (A) pr opert y of the debtor,-16- within one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B) property of t h e estate, after the date of the filing of the petition . . . . 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).

Gannett's second sortie involves section 727(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides in pertinent part that a discharge shall not be granted if "the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in

or in connection with the case — (A) made a false oath or account." Id. § 727( a)(4). Under that proviso, a discharge can be refused only if the false oath "relat[ed] to a material fact." In re Tully , 818 F.2d at 110.

Each of these provisions requires a showing of fraudulent intent. See In re Chavin , 150 F.3d726, 727 (7th Cir. 1998). The bankruptcy court found that Gannett had failed to make this showing. Because the determination of intent depends largely upon

an assessment of the debtor's cre dibi lity, respect for the bankruptcy court's factual findings is particularly appropriate in this context. See In re Burgess , 955 F.2d at 137. Even when the totality of the circumstances might plausibly support an inference of skullduggery, the bankruptcy court's contrary findin g mu st be creditedunless the evidence is so one-sided as to compel the inference of fraud. See Palmacci v. Umpierrez , 121 F.3d 781, 790 (1st Cir. 1997).

Here, the bankruptcy court found the debtor to be completely credible, and Gannett's in sinu ations certainly do not-17-

compel the opposite conclusion. That seemingly ends the matter. In re Burgess , 955 F.2d at 137. Gannett, however, seeks to capsize the bankruptcy court's finding on the ground that intent or culpability should be imputed to th e debtor because her husband actedfraudulently (a fact that is, at this stage, beyond cavil) and she was her husband's alter ego or agent.

We do not reach the merits of the first of these suggestions because Gannett neglected to raise the alter ego theory before the bankruptcy court. See In re LaRoche , 969 F.2d at 1305 (holding that a failure to advance an issue before the bankruptcy court forfeits the right to raise it on appeal). That a party may not advance an argument for the first time on appeal "is a virtually ironclad r ule" in this circuit, Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc. , 328 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003 ), and this case presents no excusatory circumstances sufficient to persuade us to relax the rule.

Gannett's agency theory is properly before us — but it is unavailing. He says, in effect, that the debtor was Stephen Carp's agent because they had been married for over thirty years and had been involved in real estate proje cts t ogether in the past. The bankruptcy court rejected this theory on the merits. That ruling is beyond reproof.

The sins of the husband are not automatically visited upon the wife. Thus, the existence of a marital relationship does5 Of course, marital partners may be each other's agents if

other factors lead to that conclusion. See , e.g. , Fennell , 422 N.E.2dat 1389 (imputing misrepresentation of wife to husband when the couple jointly owned the subject property , t he wife held herself out as able to speak authoritatively as to the condition of the property, and the couple had communicated about the r elevant issues). The record in the case at hand lacks any such evidence. -18- not itself prove an agency relationship. See Rousseau v. Gelinas , 507 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987); Fennell v. Wyzik , 422 N.E.2d1387, 1389 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). 5 Similarly, the fact that the Carps may have done business together in the past is insufficient to show that th e ba nkruptcy court committed clear

error in finding a lack of agency vis-à-vis the Newton property. See Dudley v. Hannafor d Br os. Co. , 333 F.3d 299, 311 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that "[w]hen a [trial] court chooses between two plausible but co nflic ting interpretations of the evidence, its choice cannot be clearly erroneous"); Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista , 254 F.3d 358, 367 (1st Cir. 2001) (similar).

Gannett has yet another string to his bow. In the criminal case, Stephen Carp admitted to being the equitable owner of the Newton property. Building on this foundation, Gannett contends that the debtor also had an undisclosed equitable interest in that property because, under Massachusetts law, Stephen Carp's equitable interest would become a part of their marital estate upon divorce. Gannett insists that the failure to list this interest rendered the debtor's oath false (and, thus, violated 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)).-19- The bankruptcy court found that this circumstance did not compel the conclusion that the debtor erred in not listing that interes t as part of her bankruptcy estate. In this regard, the bankruptcy court noted that the debtor had made no contribution to the purchase of the Newton property and had no interest in it at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings.

As a matter of law, the bankruptcy court was correct. Cf. id. § 541(a)(5)(B) (stating that property received as a result of a property settlement or agreement of divorce is property of the estate if the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire it within 180 day s of the date of filing bankruptcy). Thus, even assuming for argument's sake that Stephen Carp's equitable interest in the Newton property was part of the marital estate — a matter on which we take no view — it was not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate at the relevant time.

At the risk of carting coal to Newcastle, we add that

even were we to classify this contingent interest as property of the bankruptcy estate, that fact alone would not be enough to trigger section 727(a)(4). Gannett would still have to show that the exclusion of the property from the debtor's schedules was done with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. It is not at all difficult to imagine innocent reasons for the failure to mention such a contingent interest — espec ially since the debtor testified(credibly, in the bankruptcy court's estimation) that she-20-

was unaware that she held any such interest. To the extent that Gannett invites us to declare as a matter of law that a spouse's failure to include a contingent and as yet undetermined interest in real property — an interest that will arise only in the event of divorce — in a bankruptcy petition warrants denial of a discharge, we decline the invitation.

Gannett's last-ditch claim is that the debtor should have been denied a discharge because she usedand controlled automobiles that were omitted from her bankruptcy schedules. Th is claim focu ses on the debtor's assertion that she did not own e ven on e car, yet her two children (neither of whom were employed full-time) ownedthree vehicles between them. Gannett arguedvigor ously to the bankruptcy court that the debtor placed the automobiles in her children's names for the purpose of defrauding creditors. The bankruptcy court did not buy the argument.

The situation as to ownership of the vehicles strikes us

as irregular. We are not, however, a court of first instance. The bankruptcy judge saw and heard the witnesses and found the debtor to be credible. The mere fact that the situation seems suspect is not sufficient to justify disregarding this credibilitycall. See In re Burgess , 955 F.2d at 137. The bankruptcy court re asona bly couldhave believed, for example, that the placing of title in the children's names was simply another manifestation of Stephen Carp's scheming, and that the debtor was unaware of his connivance. Given-21-

this record, there is no principled way in which we can disturb the bankruptcy court's judgment. IV. Conclusion We need go no further. It is not enough that reasonable minds might differ regarding either the bankruptcy court's management of pretrial discovery or its evaluation of the evidence presentedat trial. For the reasons elucidated above, we uphold both the bankruptcy court's decision and the district court's affirmance of that decision.

Affirmed.