2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-16-2011

Contant v. Sabol

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-1806

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Recommended Citation

"Contant v. Sabol" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1083.

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DLD-202 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-1806

___________

ISAN CONTANT,

Appellant

v.

MARY SABOL; JENNIFER ROGERS, Counselor;

VALERIE KREPPS, Counselor; LOIS, Counselor; RICHARD J. HODOROVIC;

OFFICER JOHN DOE (“#800”); DEPUTY WARDEN DOLL;

DEPUTY WARDEN JOHN DOE

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-00075)

District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 3, 2011

Before: BARRY, FISHER and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: June 16, 2011)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM
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Isan Contant, an immigration detainee, appeals pro se from the District Court’s 

order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss his civil rights complaint. For the 

reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

In January 2010, while confined in the York County Prison, Contant filed a 

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that prison officials improperly 

placed him in the Behavioral Adjustment Unit (“BAU”) rather than the Intensive Care 

Unit (“ICU”) after he was charged with assaulting another inmate, violated his due 

process rights at a disciplinary hearing by relying on a report that incorrectly listed the 

time of the alleged assault, and refused to issue a check from his prison account to pay a 

“business entity.”1

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court 

exercises plenary review over the District Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to 

 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the motion, concluding that 

Contant’s placement in the BAU was not punishment, that there was sufficient evidence 

to support the disciplinary finding, and that “[w]hatever limits the due process clause may 

put on a prison’s control of inmate or detainee accounts, it was not breached here by” the 

refusal to issue a check to pay a business entity. Contant appealed.

 1 Contant also complained that officials improperly confiscated photographs which 

had been mailed to him. After Contant filed his complaint, officials at the York County 

Prison determined that the photographs did not violate prison policy and released them to 

Contant. Contant agreed that his claim related to the photographs had been rendered 

moot.
3

dismiss. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). We 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint and draw reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) 

(per curiam). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007)).

Because Contant was an immigration detainee at the time of the alleged 

constitutional violations, he is entitled to the same protections as a pretrial detainee. See

Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000). “[W]hen pretrial detainees 

challenge their conditions of confinement, we must consider whether there has been a 

violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 

538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has instructed that “the proper 

inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). To determine whether challenged conditions of 

confinement amount to punishment, the “Bell Court mandated a pragmatic approach . . . 

and formulated the ‘reasonable relationship’ test . . . .” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 

62, 67 (3d Cir. 2007). Under that test, “if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial 

detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, 

without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Of course, “[e]nsuring 

security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the 
4

facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates, or both.” Id. at 561. In this case, 

Contant was placed in the BAU on December 25, 2009, immediately after being charged 

with assaulting an inmate. Contant complained that his placement in the BAU, as 

opposed to the ICU, was an excessive response to his disciplinary infraction. Notably, 

however, Contant fails to allege that the defendants had an express intent to punish him, 

that placement in the RHU was excessive under the circumstances, or that the defendants 

were not acting to ensure institutional security. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (“Absent a 

showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that 

determination generally will turn on ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the 

restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 

excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’” (quoting Kennedy v. 

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963))).

Contant further alleged that his due process rights were violated at the disciplinary 

hearing. A pretrial detainee who is transferred to more restrictive housing for 

disciplinary infractions is entitled to the due process protections applicable to sentenced 

inmates. Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70-71 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 

(1974)). Those protections include written notice, adequate time to prepare a defense, a 

written statement of the reasons for action taken, and a limited ability to present 

witnesses and evidence. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561-70. Contant did not allege that he was 

denied these protections. Instead, he claimed that the Disciplinary Board members 

improperly relied on an incident report which contained inaccurate information. 
5

According to Contant’s complaint, the incident report was prepared by “Officer 790,” 

who claimed that he witnessed Contant assault an inmate at 9:40 a.m. on December 25, 

2009. Contant testified at the hearing, however, that he was not awake at that time and 

that “Officer 790” was not on duty during the assault. The Disciplinary Board concluded 

that the report was more credible than Contant’s testimony, reasoning that “Officer 790” 

mistakenly provided the wrong time on the incident report. Because the record contained 

evidence to support the conclusion that Contant had assaulted an inmate, we conclude 

that Contant’s due process rights were not violated. See Superintendent, Mass. 

Correctional Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985) (holding that Fourteenth 

Amendment due process requires that a disciplinary finding be supported by “some 

evidence” in the record).

Finally, Contant complained that the defendants refused to issue a check or money 

order from his prison account to a “business entity.” We have recognized that inmates 

have a property interest in funds held in their prison accounts. Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 

F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, “inmates are entitled to due process with 

respect to any deprivation of [] money” from their accounts. Id. Here, however, Contant 

did not allege that any money was seized or assessed from his account, and he failed to 

identify how the refusal to issue a check deprived him of a protected property interest for 

due process purposes. Burns v. PA Dept. of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 2008); see 

also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (“[C]ertain privileges and rights 
6

must necessarily be limited in the prison context.”). Therefore, we will affirm the 

District Court’s dismissal of this claim.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 

this appeal. See I.O.P. 10.6. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

judgment.