DA 15-0048

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2015 MT 322N

CITY OF HELENA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

COLTON A. HOFSTETTER,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDC-2014-279

Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Carl B. Jensen Jr., Law Office of Carl B. Jensen Jr., LLC; Great Falls,

Montana

For Appellee:

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Brenda K. Elias, Assistant

Attorney General; Helena, Montana

Thomas J. Jodoin, Helena City Attorney, Iryna O’Connor, Deputy

City Attorney; Helena, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: September 9, 2015

 Decided: November 17, 2015

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

November 17 2015

Case Number: DA 15-0048
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Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports.

¶2 Colton Hofstetter appeals from the order of the Montana First Judicial District 

Court, Lewis and Clark County, affirming his Helena Municipal Court judgment finding 

him guilty of violating § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA, driving under the influence of alcohol. 

We affirm.

¶3 On November 22, 2013, at about 12:30 a.m., Helena police officer Bryan Kern 

observed a vehicle parked in an alley near Ewing Street and Sixth Avenue in Helena. 

The vehicle’s alarm system was activated, the keys were inserted in the ignition, and the 

vehicle’s engine was running. As Officer Kern approached the vehicle he noticed a male 

seated in the driver’s seat, apparently unconscious. After some attempt, he awakened the 

man, whom he later determined to be Hofstetter. Officer Kern smelled the odor of 

alcohol emanating from the vehicle and he testified Hofstetter was rather disoriented. 

Officer Kern questioned Hofstetter who admitted to drinking alcohol earlier that evening 

but stated he had not been driving. Instead, Hofstetter stated he got into and started his 

vehicle in order to stay warm only after he discovered he was locked out of his 

apartment. Officer Kern then conducted DUI testing, and subsequently arrested 

Hofstetter upon suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. In fact, Hofstetter’s 
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later blood alcohol analysis revealed an intoxication of 0.194 g/mL, over twice the legal 

limit.

¶4 On June 18, 2014, Hofstetter was tried in a bench trial before the Helena 

Municipal Court and found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation 

of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. At trial Hofstetter conceded the evidence of his blood alcohol 

results, but asserted the defense of necessity. After his sentencing, Hofstetter properly 

appealed his conviction in the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark 

County. On January 5, 2015, the District Court affirmed Hofstetter’s conviction.

¶5 On appeal, Hofstetter argues the Helena Municipal Court erred by failing to issue 

written findings of fact after it found Hofstetter guilty of driving under the influence of 

alcohol. He states without written findings of fact his conviction cannot be supported.

¶6 When reviewing a municipal court decision a district court functions as an 

intermediate appellate court. We review a district court’s determination as though 

the appeal was originally filed with this Court. State v. Ellison, ¶ 8, 2012 MT 50, 

364 Mont. 276, 272 P.3d 646. We examine the record independently of the district 

court’s decision. We review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal 

conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Ellison, ¶ 8.

¶7 The procedural aspects of a criminal case in a municipal court are governed by 

statute. Title 46, chapter 17, MCA. Specifically, § 46-17-401, MCA, sets forth, except 

as otherwise provided, “the proceedings and practice in municipal court shall be the same 

as in district court.” We have previously held a district court in a criminal bench trial is 

under no statutory duty to make written findings, except in death penalty cases, which is 
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specifically provided by statute. State v. Price, 191 Mont. 1, 10, 622 P.2d 160, 165 

(1980); State v. Duncan, 181 Mont. 382, 396, 593 P.2d 1026, 1034 (1979); see

§ 46-18-306, MCA.

¶8 Furthermore, we review a defendant’s conviction for sufficiency of the evidence. 

State v. Granby, 283 Mont. 193, 199, 939 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1997). Upon viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution we look to see whether “any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Granby, 283 Mont. at 199, 939 P.2d at 1009. This is the case for 

findings of fact made by a jury in a jury trial or by a judge in a bench trial. Granby, 

283 Mont. at 199, 939 P.2d at 1010.

¶9 Despite Hofstetter’s assertions to the contrary, it is clear under Montana law, the 

municipal court was under no obligation to enter written findings of fact. Thus, the 

inquiry can turn to whether the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous and 

whether upon the record there is sufficient evidence to support Hofstetter’s conviction.

¶10 Hofstetter was charged with the violation of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. In order to 

be found guilty of violating this statute one must be 1) under the influence of alcohol and 

2) either driving or in actual, physical control of a vehicle upon a state roadway. Section 

61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. Despite the conflicting testimony as to whether it was necessary 

for Hofstetter to seek shelter inside his running vehicle or find alternative 

accommodations, it is undisputed that on the night in question Hofstetter’s blood alcohol 

content was above the legal limit, and he was alone, seated inside of a running vehicle, 
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parked in a city alleyway. Thus, based on the record, it can be implied that all of these 

were findings of fact made by the court, and none of which are clearly erroneous.

¶11 Moreover, it is the duty of the judge, sitting as the trier of fact, to evaluate the 

evidence presented for both weight and credibility. As stated, the evidence of whether 

Hofstetter was under the influence of alcohol or in control of a vehicle was not in dispute. 

It can be inferred by Hofstetter’s conviction itself that the judge then evaluated the 

evidence of the remaining issues in dispute and determined the evidence supported 

finding Hofstetter guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol. When viewed in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

Hofstetter was both under the influence of alcohol and in actual, physical control of a 

vehicle upon a state roadway; thus in violation of the statute. Therefore, based on review 

of the record, we conclude the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and there is 

sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that Hofstetter was guilty of violating 

§ 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA.

¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of 

our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion 

of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear 

application of applicable standards of review.

¶13 Affirmed.

/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
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We Concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

/S/ BETH BAKER