ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Rudy v. People, 2013 IL App (1st) 113449

Appellate Court

Caption

SHARON RUDY, Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of

Elizabeth Ehlert, Deceased, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE PEOPLE OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee.

 District & No. First District, Sixth Division

Docket No. 1-11-3449

Filed January 25, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

The petition for a certificate of innocence filed by deceased defendant’s

estate in order to pursue damages in the Court of Claims for defendant’s

alleged wrongful conviction and subsequent incarceration for the murder

of her newborn child was properly dismissed, since the right to a

certificate of innocence is available only to the person wrongfully

convicted, not to one acting on her behalf, and, furthermore, the Illinois

Supreme Court opinion affirming the reversal of defendant’s conviction

did not find defendant innocent but, rather, stated that the evidence of

defendant’s guilt was “insufficient.” 

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 91-CR-37801; the

Hon. Dennis J. Porter, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Michael B. Bolan, of Chicago, for appellant. 

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and

Peter D. Fischer, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment

and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Elizabeth Ehlert was convicted of first-degree murder

of her newborn infant girl and sentenced to 58 years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s conviction

was reversed on direct appeal. The appellate court determined that the trial court committed

reversible error in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence that defendant had two prior

abortions. People v. Ehlert, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1034 (1995). Following a bench trial on

remand, defendant was again convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 30 years’

imprisonment.

¶ 2 Defendant appealed her conviction and this time the conviction was overturned on the

ground that the evidence was insufficient to show that the infant had been born alive. People

v. Ehlert, 335 Ill. App. 3d 467, 474 (2002). The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently granted

the State’s petition for leave to appeal.

¶ 3 A divided Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, but on grounds

different than those relied upon by the appellate court. People v. Ehlert, 211 Ill. 2d 192

(2004). The supreme court determined that even assuming the infant had been born alive, the

evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the State, was insufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt an essential element of murder, that the baby’s death resulted from

defendant’s criminal agency. Ehlert, 211 Ill. 2d at 209-10. The court noted, however, that

1

its ruling did not imply that defendant was innocent of the crime charged, but only that the

State’s “evidence of criminal agency resulting in death was simply insufficient.” Id. at 215.

¶ 4 Defendant died of cancer on June 20, 2005. Her will was filed in Winnebago County,

where probate is currentlypending. Several prospective executors of defendant’s estate were

“The elements of murder which must be established are: The proof of death and the proof 1

of a criminal agency causing death. Both of these elements must be established by evidence beyond

a reasonable doubt. After these elements, termed in law the corpus delicti, have been proved, then

the law requires that the evidence establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the

criminal agency or put in motion the criminal agency which caused the death of the victim.” People

v. Wilson, 400 Ill. 461, 480 (1948).

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either unable or unwilling to serve as executor. It was determined that the primary asset of

the estate was a cause of action for wrongful incarceration. The probate court of Winnebago

County appointed Sharon Rudy as administrator of the estate with will annexed, in an effort

to recover funds the county had expended for defendant’s medical needs following her

release from prison.

¶ 5 Sharon Rudy filed a petition in Cook County circuit court seeking to obtain a certificate

of innocence in order for defendant’s estate to pursue a claim for damages in the Court of

Claims for defendant’s alleged wrongful conviction and imprisonment pursuant to section

2-702 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2008)).

¶ 6 The trial court denied the petition, and thereafter, denied a motion to reconsider. Sharon

Rudy now appeals on behalf of defendant’s estate. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Section 2-702(b) of the Code provides that “[a]ny person convicted and subsequently

imprisoned for one or more felonies by the State of Illinois which he or she did not commit

may, under the conditions hereinafter provided, file a petition for certificate of innocence in

the circuit court of the county in which the person was convicted. The petition shall request

a certificate of innocence finding that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which

he or she was incarcerated.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(b) (West 2008).

¶ 9 In order to obtain a certificate of innocence under section 2-702 of the Code, a petitioner

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

“(1) the petitioner was convicted of one or more felonies by the State of Illinois and

subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the

sentence;

(2)(A) the judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or

information dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either the petitioner was found not

guilty at the new trial or the petitioner was not retried and the indictment or information

dismissed; ***;

(3) the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information

***; and

(4) the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about

his or her conviction.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g) (West 2008).

See also People v. Fields, 2011 IL App (1st) 100169, ¶ 13.

¶ 10 “If the court finds that the petitioner is entitled to a judgment, it shall enter a certificate

of innocence finding that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was

incarcerated.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(h) (West 2008). A person who secures a certificate of

innocence mayfile a petition in the state’s Court of Claims seeking compensation. Rodriguez

v. Cook County, Illinois, 664 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 735 ILCS 5/2-702(a)

(West 2008)); see also Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[a]

certificate of innocence serves no purpose other than to permit its bearer to sue the

government for damages”).

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¶ 11 Whether or not a petitioner is entitled to a certificate of innocence is generally committed

to the sound discretion of the court. See Betts, 10 F.3d at 1283. Here, however, our inquiry

centers on the legal question of whether a deceased defendant’s estate is entitled to a

certificate of innocence under section 2-702 of the Code. Accordingly, our review is de novo.

Moreover, the interpretation and application of a statute is a matter of law also subject to de

novo review. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 74 (2002).

¶ 12 The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the

legislature’s intent. Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 513 (2007). The best indicator of

legislative intent is the statutory language itself, and if that language is clear and

unambiguous, it must be given effect. Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation

Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 364, 370 (2009).

¶ 13 Our review of the plain language of section 2-702(g) of the Code leads us to conclude

the legislature intended the remedies set forth in this section, allowing a petitioner to obtain

a certificate of innocence, should be personal to the individual who was wrongly convicted

rather than to one suing on his or her behalf. See, e.g., Diamen v. United States, 604 F.3d

653, 656-57 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (deceased defendant’s innocence was never adjudicated in

habeas proceeding, and therefore his estate was not entitled to obtain a certificate of

innocence in order to pursue a damages claim, notwithstanding that defendant might well

have obtained such a certificate himself if he were still living). Accordingly, we find that

defendant’s estate was not entitled to obtain a certificate of innocence to pursue a claim for

damages, notwithstanding that defendant might well have obtained such a certificate herself

were she still living.

¶ 14 Finally, we find that the estate’s petition for a certificate of innocence was also properly

denied where it was based upon language the Illinois Supreme Court used in affirming the

judgment of the appellate court reversing defendant’s conviction for murder. In its opinion,

the supreme court noted that its ruling did not imply that defendant was innocent of the crime

charged, but only that the State’s “evidence of criminal agency resulting in death was simply

insufficient.” Ehlert, 211 Ill. 2d at 215.

¶ 15 These are not the statements of a court finding someone “actually innocent.” Our court

has determined that the “plain language of section 2-702 shows the legislature’s intent to

distinguish between a finding of not guilty at retrial and actual innocence of the charged

offenses.” Fields, 2011 IL App (1st) 100169, ¶ 19. In sum, we find the trial court properly

dismissed the deceased defendant’s estate’s petition for a certificate of innocence.

¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 17 Affirmed.

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