alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09

- 1 8

- 0 0257

- CV

________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.D.B. III

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 3 17 th District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. C

- 227,217

- A

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On August 3, 2018, appellant filed a statement of inability to afford payment

of court costs, and this Court abated the appeal and remanded the cause to the trial

court for a determination of appellant’s ability to pay court costs. The trial judge

signed an o rder in which he found that appellant is not indigent. Appellant

subsequently filed a motion with this Court alleging his financial circumstances had

materially changed and seeking reconsideration of the issue of his indigency. This

Court denied appellant’ s motion, and on February 8, 2019, th e Court notified the2 parties that the filing fee had not been paid and warned that the appeal would be

dismissed unless the appellant remitted the filing fee for the appeal.

Appellant has not shown that he is entitled to proceed without payment of

costs. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1. There being no reasonable explanation for the failure

to pay the filing fee for the appeal, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution.

See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

___________________________ CHARLES KREGER

Justice

Submitted on March 6, 2019

Opinion Delivered March 7, 2019

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Hort on , JJ.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
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                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

                    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the Neuroendocrinology, Neuroimmunology, and Behavior Study Section, October 7, 2008, 8 a.m. to October 8, 2008, 5 p.m., Sir Frances Drake Hotel, 450 Powell Street, San Francisco, CA, 94102 which was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on August 25, 2008, 73 FR 50046-50048.                

The meeting will be held one day only October 7, 2008. The meeting time and location remain the same. The meeting is closed to the public.

      ( print page 51640)    
Dated: August 27, 2008.

Jennifer Spaeth,

Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

 [FR Doc. E8-20435 Filed 9-3-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 171 (Wednesday, September 3, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 51483]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20333]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES


Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology; American Health Information Community Consumer Empowerment 
Workgroup Meeting

ACTION: Announcement of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces the 29th meeting of the American Health 
Information Community Consumer Empowerment Workgroup in accordance with 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C., App.).

DATES: September 16, 2008, from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m. [Eastern].

ADDRESSES: Mary C. Switzer Building (330 C Street, SW., Washington, DC 
20201), Conference Room 1114. Please use the C Street entrance closest 
to 3rd Street and bring photo ID for entry to a Federal building.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/ahic/consumer/.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Workgroup will continue its discussion 
on how to encourage the widespread adoption of a personal health record 
that is easy-to-use, portable, longitudinal, affordable, and consumer-
centered.
    The meeting will be available via Web cast. For additional 
information, go to: http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/ahic/consumer/ce_instruct.html.

    Dated: August 5, 2008.
Judith Sparrow,
Director, American Health Information Community, Office of Programs and 
Coordination, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology.
[FR Doc. E8-20333 Filed 9-2-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4150-45-P
#### KENNER v. MILNER.

No. 1970.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

June 6, 1939.

For prior opinion, see *187*So. 309. .

Hiddleston Kenner, of Bay St. Louis, Miss., in person, for appellant.

Purnell M. Milner, of New Orleans, in person, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff in his petition for rehearing chiefly complains that we have failed to pass on the question of whether or not the presiding judge erred in his ruling on his motion for recusation of the trial judge.

In his original brief on the appeal before us, plaintiff failed to point out that he was complaining of the ruling of the lower court on his motion to have the trial judge recused, his only reference therein to the trial judge being the following statement:

> “The judgment appealed from is not to be considered as having been rendered by an unbiased and impartial tribunal, but by a judge whose views and mental attitude must have been colored and warped by his confidential association with the defendant as attorney and client. Judge Jones would be more than human if his appreciation of the facts and legal aspects of the case were not governed to a large measure by his previous employment as the attorney for the defendant.”

We took this to mean that it was plaintiff’s contention that the trial judge was biased and that consequently the general rule that a judgment of a lower court should not be reversed on questions of fact unless manifestly erroneous should not be applied in reviewing the case-.

In his brief, plaintiff only prayed for reversal of the judgment upon the merits and on the record, and did not voice, and obviously waived, any objection he may have had to the actual hearing of the case or the introduction of evidence.

It is noted that the motion for recusation was not filed by plaintiff until after the filing by him of other pleadings before the same trial judge whom he sought to have recused.

It is noted, also, that after the ruling by a judge from an adjoining district, plaintiff failed to reserve a bill of exception, but filed additional pleadings and went to trial without making further objection to the trial judge.

It seems to us that had plaintiff had serious grounds to urge for the recusation of the trial judge that, first, he would have made a motion for recusation at the outset, and second, at the time of the unfavorable ruling on his motion, he would have reserved a bill of exception1 and would at -that time have appealed to the Supreme Court in its supervisory jurisdiction of all courts for a writ of prohibition to the trial judge.

We feel that for him to seriously urge this matter, after the trial and determination of his case, for the first time before this court on application for rehearing is untimely.

On the question of the merits, we failed to find any error in our former judgment.

Rehearing refused.
EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this quarterly report of Possis Medical, Inc. on Form 10-Q
for the period ended January 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Robert G. Dutcher, Chief
Executive Officer of Possis Medical, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of Possis Medical, Inc.




Date: March 9, 2007                          By:  /s/ Robert G. Dutcher
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  ROBERT G. DUTCHER
                                                  Chairman, President
                                                  and Chief Executive Officer
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

MARCOS RODRIGUEZ-ESQUEDA,

a.k.a. Jose Alejandro-Esqueda, a.k.a. Jose

Esqueda-Martinez,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 10-10390

D.C. No. 2:07-cr-01044-ROS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Roslyn O. Silver, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 25, 2011** 

Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Marcos Rodriguez-Esqueda appeals from the district court’s order denying

his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for reduction of sentence. Pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Rodriguez-Esqueda’s counsel has filed a brief

FILED

OCT 26 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-10390

stating there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel

of record. We have provided the appellant with the opportunity to file a pro se

supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been

filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80-81 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the district

court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 23.1





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Registration Statement on Form S-3 of our report dated February 25, 2020, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of Cincinnati Financial Corporation and subsidiaries (“the Company”) and the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2019, and to the reference to us under the heading “Experts” in the Prospectus, which is a part of this Registration Statement.








/s/Deloitte & Touche LLP


Cincinnati, Ohio


November 16, 2020
Order entered March 13, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

No. 05

- 12

- 01702

- CR
TIMOTHY DECHEY JOHNS ON, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F06

- 38616

- W


### O RDER The Court has received the clerk’s record in this case. The record reflects that although appellant was represented by court

- appointed counsel during the adjudication proceedings, counsel has not been appointed to repr esent appellant on appeal. The reporter’s record is overdue, and the court reporter has informed the Court that no request was made for the record. Finally, we note that none of the boxes is marked on the trial court’s certification of appellant’s right to appeal. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the trial court to make findings of fact regarding whether appellant has been deprived of the reporter’s record because of ineffective counsel, indigence, or for any other reason.• The trial court shall first determi ne whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal. If the trial court determines that appellant does not desire to prosecute this appeal, it shall make a finding to that effect.

• If the trial court determines that appellant desires to prosecute the app eal, it shall next determine whether appellant is indigent and entitled to proceed without payment of costs for the reporter’s record. If appellant is entitled to proceed without payment of costs, the trial court shall make a finding to that effect. More over, if appellant is indigent, the trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which may include appointment of new counsel. If the trial court finds appellant is not indigent, it shall determine w hether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal.

• The trial court shall next determine: (1) the name and address of each court reporter who recorded the proceedings in this cause; (2) the court reporter’s explanation for the delay in filing the reporter’ s record; and (3) the earliest date by which the reporter’s record can be filed.

We ORDER the trial court to transmit a supplemental record, containing the written findings of fact, any supporting documentation, and any orders, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. We further ORDER that the supplemental record contain a completed certification of appellant’s right to appeal that accurately reflects the trial court proceedings. The appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with this order. It shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the supplemental record is received,
whichever is earlier.

/s/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 166 (Tuesday, August 26, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 50391]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19774]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM


Forms Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for 
Extension of Clearance

AGENCY: Selective Service System.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following forms have been submitted to the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) for extension of clearance in compliance with the 
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35):

SSS Form I

    Title: The Selective Service System Registration Form.
    Purpose: Is used to register men and establish a data base for use 
in identifying manpower to the military services during a national 
emergency.
    Respondents: All 18-year-old males who are United States citizens 
and those male immigrants residing in the United States at the time of 
their 18th birthday are required to register with the Selective Service 
System.
    Frequency: Registration with the Selective Service System is a one-
time occurrence.
    Burden: A burden of two minutes or less on the individual 
respondent.

SSS Form 2

    Title: The Selective Service System Change of Information Form.
    Purpose: To insure the accuracy and completeness of the Selective 
Service System registration data.
    Respondents: Registrants are required to report changes or 
corrections in data submitted on the SSS Form 1.
    Frequency: When changes in a registrant's name or address occur.
    Burden: A burden of two minutes or less on the individual 
respondent.
    Copies of the above identified forms can be obtained upon written 
request to the Selective Service System, Reports Clearance Officer, 
1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209-2425.
    Written comments and recommendations for the proposed extension of 
clearance of the form should be sent within 30 days of the publication 
of this notice to the Selective Service System, Reports Clearance 
Officer, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209-2425.
    A copy of the comments should be sent to the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer, Selective Service 
System, Office of Management and Budget, New Executive Office Building, 
Room 3235, Washington, DC 20503.

    Dated: August 8, 2008.
Ernest E. Garcia,
Deputy Director.
[FR Doc. E8-19774 Filed 8-25-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8015-01-M
199 La. 9

#### STATE v. CONLEY.

No. 36361.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 1, 1941.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 22, 1941.

Eugene Stanley, Atty. Gen., Niels F.Hertz, Asst. Atty. Gen., and H. L. Hughes, Dist. Atty., of Natchitoches, for plaintiff-appellee.

S. R. Thomas and Russell E. Gahagan, both of Natchitoches, for defendant-appellant.

HIGGINS, Justice.

The accused was indicted for the offense of “unlawfully keeping a banking house and banking game at a place or house called ‘The 71 Club’, located on the U. S. Highway No. 71, between Campti and Clarence, Louisiana, Natchitoches Parish, and did then and there feloniously and unlawfully keep a banking game, to-wit: a game commonly called dice or ‘craps’, at which money was bet and hazarded, and the said A. R. Conley, did then and there feloniously and unlawfully aid and assist in keeping the aforesaid banking game and banking house contrary to the form of the Statute of the State of Louisiana, * * He filed a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it did not set forth any crime denounced by a constitutional statute of the State, and specially pleaded the unconstitutionality of Section 2 of Act No. 12 of 1870, Rev.Stat. § 911, on the ground *368that the title of the statute, under which he was indicted, was defective. Apparently, in view of the holding of this Court in State v. Kilshaw, 158 La. 203, 103 So. 740 and State v. Hudson, 162 La. 543, 110 So. 749, the defendant has abandoned this part of his defense.

Bills of exception Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were reserved to the ruling of the trial court in permitting the State to prove that the accused had been running a dice game where chips were used and bet. The objection to this testimony was based on the ground that the accused was only charged with keeping a banking or dice game where money was bet and hazarded and not where chips were bet. The trial judge, in his per curiam, pointed out that the evidence showed that the chips were used as a convenience in playing the game and actually represented money. In other words, the chips were purchased from the dealer of the game, with cash, and if the player was successful, they were redeemed with money.

It is our opinion that the trial judge was correct in permitting this testimony to go into the record and that the charge in the indictment was adequate to cover it.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction and the sentence of the court are affirmed.
#### Michael McGrath, as Administrator, etc., of John McGrath, Deceased, Respondent, *v.*Murtha *&*Schmohl Company, Appellant.

First Department,

October 23, 1908.

Action — dismissal for failure to prosecute — failure to excuse delay.

Where an action to recover for negligence causing death has never been placed on the calendar, and junior issues have been tried, the complaint should be dismissed' for failure to' prosecute where the only excuse of the plaintiff’s attorney is that his managing clerk directed his assistant not to place the cause on the calendar and the matter was not called to the attorney’s attention -and there is nothing to show that the action was not abandoned or that the delay was not the voluntary act of the plaintiff.

Appeal by the defendant, the Murtha *&*Schmohl Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in tbe office of the clerk of the. county of New York on tbe 7th day of August, 1908, denying tbe defendant’s motion to dismiss tbe complaint for failure to prosecute tbe action.

*George W. Smyth,*for the appellant.

*Thomas J. O’Neill,*for the respondent.

Ingraham, J.:

This.action was commenced on the l5th of November, 1906, and issue was joined tbe 12th of December, 1906. The case was never placed on the calendar and issues of a later date have been tried. The action is to recover $10,000 damages caused by tbe death of the plaintiff’s intestate. Tbe only excuse offered was that tbe plaintiff’s attorney found an entry on bis register dated August 29,1906, that bis managing clerk had directed his assistant not to place tbe case on the calendar and the matter was not called to bis attention. No affidavit of tbe plaintiff was presented and nothing to show that this direction was not the result of a determination' by the plaintiff to abandon tbe action or that tbe delay was not tbe voluntary act of the plaintiff. The defendant having brought itself within tbe provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 822) and the General Rules of Practice (Rule 36) which justify the court in dismissing the complaint for failure *279to prosecute where younger issues have been tried, and ho excuse having been offered for the delay, the motion should have been granted.

The order is, therefore, reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion granted, with ten dollars costs.

Patterson, P. J., Laughlin, Clarke and Scott, JJ., concurred.

Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted, with ten dollars costs.