Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Walls, 2020 IL App (2d) 130761-B

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

WILLIE WALLS, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Second District 

No. 2-13-0761

Filed September 29, 2020

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 07-CF-1151; the 

Hon. Fred Foreman and the Hon. Daniel B. Shanes, Judges, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Cause remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Jeffrey Bruce Kirkham, of 

State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Michael G. Nerheim, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino, 

Edward R. Psenicka, and Diane L. Campbell, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Schostok and Hudson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Willie Walls, was found guilty of first degree murder 

(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2006)) and sentenced to 43 years’ imprisonment. In this direct 

appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 

statement to police, on the basis that the statement was not voluntary. Defendant, who was 16 

years old when the offense was committed and 17 years old when he gave his statement, also 

argues that the court improperly imposed a de facto life sentence without determining that 

defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable 

corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. On September 4, 2015, we issued a Rule 23 

order affirming the conviction and sentence (People v. Walls, 2015 IL App (2d) 130761-U; Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 23 (eff. July 1, 2011)). On March 25, 2020, our supreme court entered a supervisory 

order directing us to vacate our 2015 order and to reconsider the sentencing issue in light of 

new authority. People v. Walls, No. 119940 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order). Having 

examined that new authority, we now determine that defendant’s sentencing hearing did not 

comply with the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. 

VIII). Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for 

resentencing.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 After defendant became a suspect in the March 6, 2007, shooting death of Herman Allison, 

he was taken into custody on April 2, 2007, and interviewed by police officers, Detectives 

Dominic Cappelluti and Charles Schletz, from the Waukegan Police Department. Defendant 

made incriminating statements during the interview and was later charged by indictment with 

eight counts of first degree murder.

¶ 4 On February 4, 2010, defendant filed an amended motion to suppress, and a hearing on 

defendant’s motion commenced that day.

¶ 5 A. Suppression Hearing

¶ 6 Cappelluti testified first on behalf of the State. In his 15 years of experience, he had 

interviewed more than 150 homicide suspects.

¶ 7 After defendant was arrested in connection with Allison’s death on April 2, 2007, 

defendant arrived at the police station sometime between 7 p.m. and 10:15 p.m. Cappelluti was 

not advised that defendant was at the station until about 30 minutes prior to the interview, 

which began at 10:46 p.m. Cappelluti escorted defendant from the booking room, asked if he 

needed to use the bathroom, and then took him to the interview room. Defendant had a can of 

soda when he entered the interview room, and Cappelluti thought that either he or Schletz, who 

served as the juvenile advocate, had given it to him. The recorded interview lasted about 40 

minutes.

¶ 8 Cappelluti explained that suspects under the age of 17 were considered juveniles. Because 

defendant was under the age of 17 at the time of the shooting, Cappelluti took the extra 

precaution of advising defendant of his juvenile rights and having a juvenile advocate present.

¶ 9 In the recorded interview, as Cappelluti read defendant his juvenile rights, defendant 

followed along and initialed each one. Defendant appeared to understand his rights and could 
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read and write. The juvenile rights form contained warnings in addition to those given to adult 

suspects, one of which was that defendant could meet with his mother, parent, or guardian. 

When advised that he could speak with a parent or guardian, defendant expressed no desire to 

do so. A second additional juvenile warning was that there was a possibility that the juvenile 

case could be transferred to an adult court. When advised that his case could be transferred to 

adult court, defendant asked “my case can be transferred?” Cappelluti responded:

“At one point, it can be transferred in this case where after, uh, a hearing in 

Juvenile Court, okay? But at this point these are your juvenile rights waiver and, 

uh, just so you understand that’s uh, always a possibility. But the good thing is that 

we’re reading your rights because we’re investigating a case, that’s what you need 

to understand, [defendant]. Do you understand that? Okay.”

Defendant replied “Yeh.”

¶ 10 Cappelluti had defendant read the last paragraph of the juvenile rights form out loud. When 

doing so, defendant had trouble saying the word “coercion,” and Cappelluti helped defendant 

pronounce the word. Cappelluti asked defendant whether he understood the meaning of the 

word, and defendant said that he did not. Cappelluti then explained the meaning, and defendant 

said that he understood.

¶ 11 Cappelluti explained Schletz’s role to defendant, which was to make sure that no promises 

were made and that Cappelluti did not violate any of defendant’s rights. Cappelluti told 

defendant that Schletz was “here on [defendant’s] behalf.” Cappelluti told defendant that 

Schletz was present in case defendant had questions and also that Schletz would let Cappelluti 

know about any questions Schletz did not like. Schletz did not say anything to defendant during 

the interview.

¶ 12 Cappelluti testified that his interview technique was to develop a rapport with defendant 

and ask open-ended questions. Cappelluti’s interview of a witness, Bobby Dodd, as well as 

information from other witnesses and sources, had led to defendant becoming a suspect in the 

case.

¶ 13 Cappelluti summarized the interview at the end. He did so because, from his experience, 

“a motion would come forward that we made promises to him before the videotape started, or 

there was another interview, so I usually attempt to summarize that that was the only time we 

spoke. I usually put that on videotape and avoid any legal issues to come forward.” Cappelluti 

anticipated that defendant would be charged with murder, but he had no opinion as to whether 

defendant would be charged as a juvenile or an adult.

¶ 14 Cappelluti first became aware that defendant’s mother, Wanda Gooden, was at the 

Waukegan police station when the interview was paused for defendant to take a bathroom 

break. Schletz spoke to Gooden, and she did not want defendant to be interviewed further. At 

that point, Cappelluti stopped questioning defendant. Although Cappelluti had planned to show 

defendant some photos of the scene after the interview, he did not show defendant the photos, 

because Gooden was present.

¶ 15 Cappelluti made no promises of leniency, did not promise that defendant would be 

prosecuted as a juvenile, and did not promise that defendant would be out of jail before he 

turned 21 years of age. In addition, there was no portion of the interview that was not recorded.
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¶ 16 Schletz testified as follows. Schletz was advised that defendant had been taken into custody 

on April 2, 2007, but he was not sure what time he was advised of that. It was possible that 

defendant was taken from the booking room to the interview room; Schletz could not recall.

¶ 17 Schletz’s role as juvenile advocate was to make sure that defendant understood his rights 

and that his rights were adequately protected. Given this role, Schletz did not ask any 

investigative questions. Cappelluti explained Schletz’s role to defendant. Schletz admitted that 

he was investigating the case. Nevertheless, it was appropriate to use him as a juvenile advocate 

rather than bring in someone else from a different agency. Schletz admitted writing something 

on his hand during the interview, clearing his throat, and showing his hand to Cappelluti. 

Schletz could not recall what he wrote. Schletz explained that nothing in Schletz’s role as a 

juvenile advocate prevented him from aiding the investigator.

¶ 18 Defendant was advised of his juvenile rights as a precaution, and defendant appeared to 

understand his rights as they were read to him. When defendant asked about the warning that 

anything he said could be used against him in a subsequent adult proceeding, Cappelluti 

adequately answered defendant’s question. For this reason, Schletz felt no need to offer further 

explanation. The same was true when defendant struggled with the word coercion; Cappelluti 

adequately explained the word to defendant. Defendant did not ask to speak to a lawyer or 

parent.

¶ 19 After a break in the interview, Schletz was advised that Gooden was at the station. Schletz 

spoke with her, and she wanted to speak with defendant. When defendant was advised that his 

mother was at the station, he wanted to speak with her. Schletz was not required to contact 

Gooden prior to the interview, because defendant was 17 years old at the time.

¶ 20 Schletz further testified that neither he nor Cappelluti went over details of their 

investigation with defendant before interviewing him, neither promised that defendant would 

be tried as a juvenile, and neither promised that the charges would be reduced if defendant 

admitted involvement.

¶ 21 Gooden testified on behalf of the defense. On April 2, her daughter informed her that 

defendant had been arrested. In the early evening, Gooden drove to the location of the arrest 

and saw defendant in a Waukegan police car. North Chicago police were also present at the 

scene. The police did not permit Gooden to approach the squad car, and she was told not to go 

to the police station, because it was going to be “a while.” As a result, Gooden went home for 

about 30 or 45 minutes. After that, she went to the Waukegan police station and was told that 

defendant was not there. Gooden then went to the North Chicago police station and was told 

that defendant was not there either. Gooden returned home for about two hours and then went 

back to the Waukegan police station around 7 p.m. Again, she was told that defendant was not 

there. From there, Gooden went to the Lake County jail, but defendant was not there. Gooden 

returned home for another two hours and then went back to the Waukegan police station; it 

was after 10 p.m. Gooden spotted the officer who arrested defendant, and he confirmed that 

defendant was there. At that point, Gooden was allowed to talk to defendant.

¶ 22 Defendant testified as follows. Before being interviewed, he was arrested during a traffic 

stop around 6:45 p.m. Defendant remained in a squad car at the scene for about 40 minutes 

before being taken to the Waukegan police station, where he arrived around 8 p.m. Defendant 

was not taken to the booking room; he was taken directly to an interview room. He waited 

there for about 30 minutes before Cappelluti came in and offered him a drink and bathroom 

access. Defendant used the bathroom and was given a soda. He and Cappelluti then returned 
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to the interview room. Cappelluti told defendant not to worry about the case for which he was 

arrested; Cappelluti would be back to talk about another case. Defendant waited alone in the 

interview room.

¶ 23 Next, Cappelluti and Schletz came into the interview room, which was not the same room 

that was shown on the videotape of the recorded interview. Cappelluti said that defendant was 

suspected of committing a homicide, that Dodd had told Cappelluti everything, that Cappelluti 

had defendant’s DNA and photos of the scene, and that he wanted to hear defendant’s side of 

the story. Defendant was not given adult or juvenile Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and this interview lasted 90 minutes. Cappelluti knew that 

defendant was 16 years old at the time of the shooting and said that he would be tried as a 

juvenile. Cappelluti said that, at worst, defendant would be “out” by his twenty-first birthday.

¶ 24 Cappelluti then went to talk to the “big guys” at the station and returned. Cappelluti said to 

go to the other interview room and to shake hands like it was their first meeting. Defendant 

assumed that Cappelluti wanted to shake hands because the second interview would be 

recorded. Cappelluti told defendant to say “the same thing” in the second interview as he said 

in the first interview. Based on what Cappelluti said, defendant believed that his case was a 

juvenile matter and that, if he cooperated with police, he would be out of prison by age 21. 

According to defendant, this was the reason he participated in the recorded interview.

¶ 25 Defendant further testified that the only conversation he had with Schletz was when Schletz 

asked him how he was doing. Defendant was not allowed to speak to his mother until after the

second interview.

¶ 26 On cross-examination, defendant could not recall whether he was given Miranda warnings 

in relation to an attempted murder charge from three years prior (2003). Defendant took high 

school classes in the department of corrections for juveniles.

¶ 27 The State’s rebuttal consisted of the following stipulations. Cappelluti would testify that 

he never made any promises to induce defendant to implicate himself in the shooting of Allison 

and that he never promised that defendant would be released from prison prior to his twentyfirst birthday if he made statements regarding the killing of Allison. Schletz would testify that 

he was present during the recorded interview as a juvenile advocate. Schletz did not hear 

Cappelluti make promises to defendant to induce him to implicate himself and did not hear 

Cappelluti promise defendant that he would be released from prison prior to his twenty-first 

birthday.

¶ 28 The trial court rendered its decision on April 26, 2010. The court began by expressing 

“some concern as to the [defendant’s] understanding of the role” of Schletz, stating that it was 

not “thoroughly explained” to defendant. Though Schletz did not actively question defendant 

during the interview, he did write something on his hand as a reminder to Cappelluti, meaning 

that Schletz served a “hybrid role.” Still, the court found that the detectives’ testimony was 

credible. Both Cappelluti and Schletz testified that there was no rehearsal of statements prior 

to the recorded interview. Defendant’s claim that there was a rehearsal in preparation of the 

recorded interview was “not credible” in comparison to the detectives’ testimony; there was 

no evidence that the detectives contrived the story and forced defendant to give the version of 

events they wanted to hear.

¶ 29 In watching the recorded interview, the court noted that defendant was “intelligent” and 

“understood the questions of the officers.” Defendant did not have an extensive education but 

had attended high school and had prior experience with the court system. In addition, defendant 
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was young and in good physical condition, and the interview was “rather short”; the duration 

of his detention was not extensive. The court saw no open or overt physical or mental abuse; 

there were “no threats or promises, compulsion or inducement for the defendant” to implicate 

himself. The court further noted that the detectives stopped questioning defendant when he 

said that he wanted to speak with his mother. In sum, this was not a situation in which 

defendant’s will was overcome. Accordingly, the court found that defendant’s statement was 

voluntary and denied his motion to suppress.

¶ 30 On August 3, 2010, defendant pled guilty to one count of felony murder. The parties had 

no sentencing agreement, and the court imposed a sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. 

Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea, and the court allowed defendant 

to do so.

¶ 31 B. Jury Trial and Sentencing

¶ 32 A jury trial commenced in May 2013, and the following evidence was adduced. An autopsy 

report indicated that Allison died from a gunshot wound to the chest, and defendant’s DNA 

was found under the fingernails of Allison’s left hand.

¶ 33 Dodd testified that Calvin Hearton, a drug dealer, wanted Dodd and defendant to gather 

information about Allison, another drug dealer who lived next door to Dodd. Dodd arranged 

to buy drugs from Allison while defendant stood behind Allison’s building. As Dodd sat in his 

car and ingested the drugs he had just purchased, defendant got into Dodd’s car. Defendant 

said that Allison had jumped on him and that the gun accidentally discharged; defendant 

thought that Allison was dead. Dodd and defendant drove away, and defendant discarded his 

cell phone out the car window. The police recovered the cell phone.

¶ 34 Defendant’s recorded interview was played for the jury, and the jury was given a transcript. 

During the interview, defendant told Cappelluti that the plan was to rob Allison because 

Allison was a drug dealer with a lot of money. Hearton gave a gun to Dodd, who gave it to 

defendant. Dodd then arranged to buy drugs from Allison while defendant waited in the 

backyard. Defendant, showing his gun, asked Allison for money, and Allison ran inside. 

Defendant chased Allison into the stairwell. Allison was going upstairs and then jumped back 

down and fought with defendant. Defendant tried to run away, but they were already “tussling,” 

and defendant’s gun fired four times. The last shot struck Allison in the chest. Defendant drove 

away with Dodd and threw his cell phone out the car window.

¶ 35 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder in that he knew that his acts created 

the strong probability of death or great bodily harm. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2006).

¶ 36 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.

¶ 37 At the sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence that, in April 2003, defendant had 

shot an individual named Trevor Curry. Defendant was riding in the backseat of a vehicle, and 

the driver had stopped by Curry’s apartment. When Curry approached the vehicle, one of the 

occupants of the vehicle asked him about drugs and made some accusation. Defendant then 

exited the vehicle, pointed a gun at Curry, and made another accusation about drugs. When 

Curry turned away, defendant shot him in the face. The case was transferred to adult court, and 

in June 2004 defendant pled guilty to aggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendant was 

sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for that offense and was on parole for it when he 

committed the instant offense.
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¶ 38 The State also presented evidence regarding defendant’s apprehension in the instant case. 

On April 2, 2007, police conducted a routine traffic stop of a car in which defendant was a 

passenger. There was a gun in the car, and defendant and the driver fled on foot. The gun was 

later recovered in a doghouse on the same street where police located defendant.

¶ 39 Additional evidence presented at the sentencing hearing included defendant’s involvement 

in three fights with other inmates in jail and jail telephone recordings of him attempting to 

facilitate a favorable affidavit from Dodd and later stating that Dodd could not be allowed to 

testify at trial.

¶ 40 Two witnesses testified on defendant’s half. Defendant’s older sister, Monique Walls, 

testified that she and defendant grew up in an abandoned house with no parents and no heat; it 

was a tough life. Defendant wanted things that other people had, like nice clothes and shoes, 

but he associated with the wrong people. Defendant was convinced by two adults to commit a 

crime; he was trapped. However, now that defendant had a son, he was much more mature. He 

also obtained his general equivalency diploma while in prison. Gooden testified that she had 

three daughters and one younger son, defendant. Gooden asked for leniency because defendant 

was a juvenile at the time of the offense and was coerced by two adults, who were never 

charged. Like Monique, she testified that defendant had become more mature and cared deeply 

about his son.

¶ 41 The trial court considered the factors in aggravation and mitigation in fashioning 

defendant’s sentence. It stated as follows. This was a case of “needless violence.” However, 

defendant’s background lacked good role models and all the “things that humanity provides to 

raise its young.” Defendant grew up thinking that a life of violence was normal. As for his 

criminal history, defendant shot Curry when he was 13 years old. Defendant had been on parole 

for six months for that offense when he shot Allison. In addition, the court was not convinced 

that defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; defendant’s 

view on life was “awfully violent.” In addition, there was evidence that defendant had 

attempted to influence Dodd’s testimony. Still, a mitigating factor was that the offense was 

facilitated or induced by someone else, namely Hearton. Also, defendant had a dependent, a 

son, and was only 16 years old at the time of the offense. Based on the above, the court 

sentenced defendant to 43 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 42 Defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied, and defendant timely appealed.

¶ 43 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 44 A. Motion to Suppress

¶ 45 Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

suppress. We apply a two-part standard of review when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a 

motion to suppress evidence. People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 271 (2008). Under this two-part 

standard, we give great deference to the trial court’s factual findings and will reverse those 

findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. Still, we remain free 

to undertake our own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues and may draw our own 

conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted. Id. Accordingly, we review de novo 

the trial court’s ultimate legal ruling on whether the evidence should be suppressed. Id.

¶ 46 The basis for defendant’s suppression argument is that his statement to police was not 

voluntary. “In determining whether a defendant’s statements are voluntarily made, a court must 
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look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements.” People v. 

Armstrong, 395 Ill. App. 3d 606, 624 (2009). Circumstances to consider include the 

defendant’s age, education, background, experience, mental capacity, and intelligence; the 

defendant’s physical and emotional condition at the time of questioning; the duration of the 

questioning; and whether the defendant was subjected to physical or mental abuse by the 

police. Id. The “true test of voluntariness” is whether the defendant made the statement freely, 

voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant’s will 

was overcome at the time he confessed. People v. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 55. No one 

factor is dispositive, and each case must be evaluated on its own specific facts. Id.

¶ 47 Before delving into defendant’s arguments, we note that this case presents a unique factual 

situation in that defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense but age 17 at the time he 

was arrested and questioned by police. Therefore, although defendant was a juvenile at the 

time of the offense (see People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 161-62 (2006) (a “delinquent minor” 

under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 2006)) means any minor 

who prior to his or her seventeenth birthday has violated any state law)), he was not a juvenile 

at the time of the questioning (see People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 402-03 (1984) (the Juvenile 

Court Act was enacted to apply to those persons who have not yet attained the age of 17)).1

¶ 48 Given the discrepancy in defendant’s age between the time of the offense and the time of 

the questioning, it is not a certainty that defendant was entitled to the additional safeguards that 

apply to juveniles when questioned by police, which both parties acknowledged at oral 

argument. See In re Marquita M., 2012 IL App (4th) 110011, ¶ 23 (taking the confession of a 

juvenile is a sensitive concern, and courts look at factors such as whether the juvenile had the 

opportunity to consult with an adult before or during interrogation, whether the police 

prevented the juvenile from conferring with a concerned adult, or whether the police frustrated 

the parent’s attempt to talk with the juvenile). Moreover, our research has revealed only one 

case presenting this same factual scenario as to the defendant’s age, and in that case the court 

found it proper to provide the additional juvenile safeguards. See People v. Walker, 61 Ill. App. 

3d 891, 895 (1978) (where the defendant was 16 years old on the date of the offense but had 

turned 17 before he was questioned, it was proper for the officers to call in a juvenile officer, 

who remained until the defendant’s confession had been reduced to writing).

¶ 49 In this case, we need not determine whether defendant was entitled to the additional 

juvenile safeguards when he was questioned by police. Both Cappelluti and Schletz testified 

that defendant was not entitled to be treated as a juvenile during the interview but that, because 

he was 17 years old, they took extra precautions to preempt any legal challenges to the 

proceedings. As a result, defendant was provided a juvenile advocate and admonished as to his 

juvenile Miranda rights. Therefore, because the decision was already made to provide 

defendant these juvenile safeguards, we need not decide whether he was entitled to them.

¶ 50 Indeed, defendant argues that these additional safeguards, when considered collectively 

with his other claims, “perpetuated” his belief that he would be treated as a juvenile. See In re 

Marvin M., 383 Ill. App. 3d 693, 705 (2008) (a factor to consider, for both juveniles and adults, 

is the presence of police trickery and deceit). To this end, defendant argues that the actions of 

1

Section 5-105(3) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 2014)) now defines 

“delinquent minor” as any minor who prior to his eighteenth birthday violates the law. See Pub. Act 

98-61 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014).
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Cappelluti and Schletz reasonably led him to believe that he was a juvenile, subject to the 

special protections afforded a juvenile. Defendant points out that he received juvenile Miranda 

warnings, he was provided a juvenile advocate, when he asked whether his statements could 

be used against him in adult court he was wrongly told that transfer of his case was a 

“possibility,” and Schletz failed to fulfill his role as a juvenile advocate when Cappelluti 

misinformed him about the transfer of his case. In addition, defendant claims that the detectives 

promised that he would be prosecuted as a juvenile and that he would be released from prison 

by age 21, obstructed his mother’s attempts to speak with defendant before questioning, and 

employed a question-first, warning-later method of interrogation that produced incriminating 

statements that were used against him at trial. According to defendant, these acts rendered his 

statement involuntary.

¶ 51 First, the majority of defendant’s argument rests on claims of conduct that allegedly 

occurred outside the recorded interview, claims that the trial court specifically rejected. The 

trial court rejected defendant’s claims on the basis that the detectives, and not defendant, were 

more credible when testifying. See People v. $280,020 in United States Currency, 2013 IL 

App (1st) 111820, ¶ 25 (we examine the evidence with deference to the trial court, which saw 

the witnesses and thus could better assess their credibility).

¶ 52 Contrary to defendant’s claim that the detectives interviewed him twice but did not tape 

the first interview, the court noted that both Cappelluti and Schletz testified that there was no 

rehearsal of statements prior to the recorded interview and there was no evidence that the 

detectives contrived the story and then forced defendant to give the version of events they 

wanted to hear. Though defendant testified that he was never taken to a booking room but 

instead to an interview room where an initial 90-minute interview was not recorded, Cappelluti 

testified that he retrieved defendant from the booking room and then interviewed him once. 

According to Cappelluti, no portion of the interview was not recorded.

¶ 53 In a similar vein, the court did not find credible defendant’s claim that he was promised 

that he would be tried as a juvenile and released by the age of 21. The court found that the 

detectives did not make promises or induce defendant to implicate himself.

¶ 54 In addition, the court found no merit to defendant’s claim that the detectives obstructed 

him from talking to his mother prior to the recorded interview. Rather, the court found that the

detectives stopped questioning defendant as soon as he said he wanted to speak with his 

mother. In addition, defendant was advised of his right to speak with a parent prior to the 

recorded interview, and he expressed no desire to do so. In sum, these factual findings by the 

trial court are entitled to deference, and we cannot say that they were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.

¶ 55 That said, there is merit to defendant’s claim that he was misled when he asked if his case 

could be transferred to adult court. In response to defendant’s question, Cappelluti explained 

that the case could be transferred to adult court after a hearing in juvenile court and that a 

transfer was “always a possibility.” Defendant argues that, because the law requires the transfer 

to adult criminal court of murder cases with 16-year-old defendants, Cappelluti misled him 

with this response. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006) (providing for the automatic 

transfer of a case where the minor was charged with first degree murder); see also In re Marvin 

M., 383 Ill. App. 3d at 719 (a respondent’s statements must not result from deceptive 

interrogation tactics calculated to overcome the respondent’s free will). We agree that 

Cappelluti downplayed the reality that the case would be transferred to adult court in the event 
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that defendant was charged with the first degree murder of Allison. Rather than stating that a 

transfer was a possibility, the better answer would have been to advise defendant that his case 

would automatically be transferred if he was charged with first degree murder.

¶ 56 Still, police trickery or deception will not invalidate a minor’s statement as a matter of law 

but is only one factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances. In re Marvin M., 383 Ill. 

App. 3d at 719. For example, in In re Marvin M., the police told the respondent that several 

witnesses had implicated him in a shooting when in fact only two witnesses had implicated 

him, and this court found that this police trickery or deception was minimal. Id. at 719-20. 

Likewise, in People v. Minniti, 373 Ill. App. 3d 55, 69-71 (2007), the police overstated the 

evidence against the defendant by falsely stating that they had satellite images showing 

someone going from the defendant’s home to the scene of the crime and that they had DNA 

evidence matching the defendant from the inside of the victim. This court held that these 

deceptions did not rise to the level necessary to overbear the defendant’s free will. Id. at 72.

¶ 57 Here, as in In re Marvin M. and Minniti, any deception or misstatement by Cappelluti in 

downplaying the likelihood of the transfer of defendant’s case was but one factor in the totality 

of the circumstances. Again, while the better answer would have been for Cappelluti to advise 

defendant that a transfer was automatic if he was charged with first degree murder, we note 

that Cappelluti did not go as far as telling defendant that his case would not be transferred. 

While we disapprove of Cappelluti’s response and believe that he could have answered

defendant’s question more accurately, it was one of many factors in the totality of the 

circumstances and not sufficient to overcome defendant’s will and render his statement 

involuntary.

¶ 58 Moreover, as the trial court noted, defendant had prior experience with the court system, 

in that four years before, at age 13, he was charged with attempted murder. The attempted 

murder case, which was less serious than the instant case, was transferred to adult criminal 

court, making defendant aware of the increased likelihood that this case would also be 

transferred.

¶ 59 Turning to Schletz, defendant argues that he failed to protect his rights when Cappelluti 

misinformed him about the transfer of his case. Defendant is correct that Schletz said nothing 

when Cappelluti advised defendant that the transfer was “always a possibility.” Even so, we 

have already determined that any deception or misleading by Cappelluti in this regard was but 

one factor in the totality of the circumstances and that it did not rise to the level of overbearing 

defendant’s will.

¶ 60 Defendant further argues that Schletz failed to take any actions on his behalf during the 

entire interrogation. According to defendant, Schletz acted as a detective working to secure his 

statement rather than a concerned adult who was protecting his interests. We note that the trial 

court found that Schletz played a “hybrid role” during the questioning of defendant and that 

his role was not “thoroughly explained.” The court acknowledged that Schletz did not ask 

questions, but it noted that he wrote something down on his hand to assist Cappelluti during 

the interview.

¶ 61 Our supreme court has stated that there is no requirement that a juvenile officer be present 

when a minor is questioned and that the absence of one will not render a juvenile’s statements 

per se involuntary. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 52; cf. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 55 (2000) 

(noting that, while a juvenile’s confession should not be suppressed simply because he was 

denied the opportunity to confer with a parent or other concerned adult before or during the 
- 11 -

interrogation, such a denial was a factor to consider in determining whether a juvenile’s 

confession was voluntary). In addition, as we explain, our supreme court has found a juvenile’s 

statement to be voluntary even when the juvenile officer completely abandoned his role and 

acted as a lead investigator.

¶ 62 In Murdock, for example, the supreme court determined that the juvenile officer abandoned 

his role when he began questioning the defendant, a juvenile, about his role in the offense. 

Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 51. The court noted that the juvenile officer was not merely 

standing by while another officer took the lead in interviewing the defendant; the juvenile 

officer was the lead interviewer. Id. Because the juvenile officer could not act as a concerned 

adult while at the same time compiling evidence against the defendant, the court viewed it as 

though no juvenile officer were present with the defendant. Id. Nevertheless, the court found 

the defendant’s statement voluntary. Id. ¶ 55. The court noted that, while the presence of a 

juvenile officer was a significant factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances argument, there 

was no requirement that such a person be present and that the defendant was given his Miranda 

rights, properly treated, offered food, given access to restroom facilities, and not physically or 

mentally threatened. Id. ¶ 52.

¶ 63 Here, in contrast to Murdock, Schletz never questioned defendant, other than to pose one 

general question as to his well-being. Rather, Cappelluti acted as the sole interviewer. The one 

incident of Schletz writing something on his hand and showing it to Cappelluti is a far cry from 

the situation in Murdock, where the juvenile officer abandoned his role by becoming the lead 

interviewer. In addition, Schletz fulfilled his role as juvenile advocate to the extent that 

defendant was provided his juvenile Miranda rights, properly treated, offered a drink, given 

access to restroom facilities, and not physically or mentally threatened.

¶ 64 Schletz’s role in this case more closely resembles the situation in People v. Patterson, 2014 

IL 115102, ¶ 53, where the juvenile officer did not ask any questions but fulfilled the 

fundamental duties of inquiring whether the defendant needed anything, ensuring that he was 

treated properly while in custody, reading the defendant his Miranda rights, and ascertaining 

that he understood those rights. Though the defendant in Patterson argued that the juvenile 

officer improperly participated in the investigation by helping the investigating officer type the 

defendant’s statement, reading it to the defendant, and obtaining his signature, our supreme 

court disagreed. Id. ¶ 51.

¶ 65 As the Patterson court noted, if neither the complete absence of a juvenile officer nor the 

active, adverse participation of a purported juvenile officer in the questioning of a juvenile (as 

in Murdock) was sufficient to mandate a finding that a statement was not voluntary, then the 

defendant’s argument that the juvenile officer improperly participated in the investigation 

necessarily failed. Id. ¶ 56. Again, we look to the totality of the circumstances in determining 

whether defendant’s statement was voluntary (see Armstrong, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 624), and the 

trial court, despite its finding that Schletz played a hybrid role, still found that defendant’s 

statement was voluntary.

¶ 66 Finally, defendant argues that his personal characteristics require this court to exercise 

great caution when determining whether his statement was voluntary. Defendant points out 

that his IQ was measured to be 65 and his formal education ended in sixth grade. However, 

because this information was elicited at the sentencing hearing and not the suppression hearing, 

the State argues that it should not be considered.
- 12 -

¶ 67 Our supreme court has distinguished seeking to affirm a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress from seeking to overturn it. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶¶ 35-36. For example, the 

Murdock court noted that in People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91 (1999), the defendant relied on 

evidence elicited at trial, not the suppression hearing, to argue that his motion to suppress was 

erroneously denied by the trial court. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 36. In response to the 

defendant’s argument that the reviewing court could consider evidence introduced at trial as 

well as at the suppression hearing, the supreme court disagreed, noting that the defendant was 

seeking not to affirm the trial court’s decision but to overturn it. Id.

¶ 68 Defendant does not respond to the State’s argument in his reply brief, and we decline to 

consider evidence from defendant’s sentencing hearing to overturn the trial court’s decision on 

his motion to suppress. Regarding defendant’s ability to understand what transpired at the 

recorded interview, we note that the court found that defendant was “intelligent” and 

“understood the questions of the officers.” In addition, the court noted that defendant had taken 

high school classes in the department of corrections for juveniles. Both Cappelluti and Schletz 

testified that defendant appeared to understand his rights, and defendant had prior experience 

with the court system. Accordingly, nothing about defendant’s personal characteristics affected 

the voluntariness of his statement.

¶ 69 In sum, the trial court’s credibility and factual findings were not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. We determine that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s 

statement was voluntary and the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress.

¶ 70 B. Sentence

¶ 71 During the initial briefing of this appeal, defendant argued that the trial court abused its 

discretion by sentencing him to 43 years in prison. On September 4, 2015, we issued a Rule 

23 order affirming the judgment. Walls, 2015 IL App (2d) 130761-U. Defendant then 

petitioned for leave to appeal to our supreme court. On March 25, 2020, the supreme court 

denied defendant’s petition but directed us to vacate our judgment. The court further directed 

us to

“consider the effect of this Court’s opinions in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, and 

People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, on the issue of whether defendant’s sentence 

constitutes a de facto life sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and determine if a different result is warranted.” Walls, 

No. 119940.

We allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs.

¶ 72 Defendant now contends that his sentence violates the eighth amendment because the trial 

court imposed a de facto life sentence without sufficiently considering the attendant 

characteristics of defendant’s youth and without making the necessary findings. Specifically, 

defendant maintains that the court “failed to indicate whether it found [his] characteristics as 

showing ‘irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond 

the possibility of rehabilitation’ ” (quoting Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46). Defendant further 

proposes that many of his characteristics that were revealed at his sentencing hearing showed 

a transient immaturity rather than permanent incorrigibility. Defendant thus requests a new 

sentencing hearing.
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¶ 73 The State responds that defendant did not receive a de facto life sentence, so the sentence 

does not violate the eighth amendment. Notwithstanding that argument, the State submits that 

(1) the trial court considered defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics and 

(2) defendant is one of the rare juveniles who deserves a de facto life sentence.

¶ 74 The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states 

through the fourteenth amendment (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)), prohibits 

cruel and unusual punishments. Juvenile offenders are given special consideration for purposes 

of the eighth amendment. For example, unlike adults, juvenile offenders can never be 

sentenced to death (id. at 578) and cannot be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide offense (Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)). In Roper, the Court discerned 

“[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults”: (1) a lack of maturity and 

an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, which can lead to impetuous and ill-considered 

actions and decisions, (2) a higher vulnerability to negative influences and outside pressures, 

and (3) a character that is less well formed. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70. The Court explained 

that even heinous crimes committed by juveniles do not necessarily evidence an “irretrievably 

depraved character.” Id. at 570. Further, the Court observed that “[i]t is difficult even for expert 

psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate 

yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable 

corruption.” Id. at 573. In Graham, the Court added: “To justify life without parole on the 

assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer 

to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles make that 

judgment questionable.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 72-73.

¶ 75 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits 

mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles who commit murder. Miller, 567 U.S. 

at 465. In so holding, the Court explained:

“Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his 

chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, 

and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the 

family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually 

extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances 

of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the 

way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might 

have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 

associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or 

prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own 

attorneys. [Citations.] And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the 

possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.” Id. at 477-

78.

Although the Court did not categorically prohibit sentences of life without parole for juvenile 

homicide offenders, the Court required sentencing judges to consider the offenders’ “youth 

and attendant characteristics” before imposing such penalty. Id. at 483. Because juveniles 

typically have “diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,” the Court 

envisioned that it would be “uncommon” for circumstances to warrant sentencing a juvenile to 

life without parole. Id. at 479.
- 14 -

¶ 76 The characteristics of youth that the Supreme Court mentioned are sometimes referred to 

as the Miller factors. See Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 41. Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified 

Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2018)), which went into effect in 2016, 

requires courts to consider factors adapted from Miller when sentencing juvenile offenders.

¶ 77 Miller left important questions unresolved. One question was whether its holding applies 

retroactively. Both the Illinois Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have 

now recognized that Miller indeed applies retroactively. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, 

¶ 34; Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212, (2016). Another question was whether 

Miller’s holding applies to discretionary life sentences. Our supreme court has answered that 

question in the affirmative. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40. Yet another question was whether 

Miller’s holding applied to de facto life sentences—i.e., sentences for terms of years that are 

the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole. In People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 

119271, ¶¶ 9-10, our supreme court extended Miller’s holding to de facto life sentences. In 

Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40, the court clarified that, “[i]n determining when a juvenile 

defendant’s prison term is long enough to be considered de facto life without parole, we choose 

to draw a line at 40 years.”

¶ 78 Accordingly, under the current legal landscape,

“[t]o prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced for an 

offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a 

life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing 

court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the 

sentence.” Id. ¶ 27.

¶ 79 Defendant’s 43-year prison sentence exceeds the threshold established in Buffer and thus 

constitutes a de facto life sentence. Nevertheless, the State argues that defendant received the 

functional equivalent of an approximately 37-year sentence, because he was given credit for 

2300 days that he spent in custody before he was sentenced. We reject the State’s argument. 

The concern at the heart of Miller—locking up juveniles and throwing away the key—is the 

same whether or not the person spends some of his time in a county jail rather than in prison. 

We note that the appellate court has repeatedly rejected similar attempts by the State to 

circumvent Buffer’s 40-year threshold by relying on sentencing credits. See, e.g., People v. 

Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170677, ¶ 22 (a juvenile offender’s 70-year sentence was a 

de facto life sentence, notwithstanding that he was eligible for day-for-day good conduct 

credit). Here, defendant is not entitled to any good conduct credit, so the State’s argument 

about the functional equivalency of the sentence is even weaker than the argument that it raised 

in Thornton. Accordingly, defendant was subjected to a discretionary de facto life sentence.

¶ 80 The issue thus becomes whether the trial court failed to consider defendant’s youth and its 

attendant characteristics. In Holman, our supreme court offered guidance about what that 

means. Per Holman, a court that sentences a juvenile to a life sentence “must consider 

specifically the characteristics mentioned by the Supreme Court” in Miller. Holman, 2017 IL 

120655, ¶¶ 42-44. To that end:

“[A] juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, but only 

if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, 

permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of 

rehabilitation. The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant’s 

youth and its attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited 
- 15 -

to, the following factors: (1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of 

the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 

appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home 

environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and 

any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile 

defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or 

prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile 

defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.” Id. ¶ 46.

Here, defendant was sentenced before the Illinois legislature enacted section 5-4.5-105 of the 

Unified Code of Corrections. Thus, “any inquiry into the Miller factors is backwards-looking” 

and requires us to “look at the cold record to determine if the trial court considered such 

evidence at the defendant’s original sentencing hearing.” Id. ¶ 47.

¶ 81 Our recent decision in People v. Reyes, 2020 IL App (2d) 180237, is instructive. In Reyes, 

even though the trial court “stated that it considered the Miller factors and *** there was also 

evidence and argument related to those factors,” we vacated the defendant’s de facto life 

sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 31. One problem that we mentioned 

was that the trial court, despite noting the defendant’s age, “never commented on the 

defendant’s immaturity, impetuosity, or ability to understand risks and consequences.” Id.

Another problem was that “[t]he trial court did not specifically address whether the defendant 

was too young or too immature to resist the negative influences surrounding him at the time, 

or whether he was mature enough to maintain control over his actions.” Id. Furthermore, the 

trial court did not discuss (1) “the finding in the [presentence investigation (PSI)] report that 

the defendant was at a medium risk to reoffend,” (2) the fact that the defendant earned 

certificates in prison, or (3) that the defendant expressed remorse. Id. Nor did the record “show 

that the trial court made any determination that the defendant was beyond rehabilitation or that 

the defendant’s conduct reflected permanent incorrigibility.” Id. Under those circumstances, 

we concluded that the trial court improperly imposed a de facto life sentence on the defendant 

without determining whether he was “among the rarest of juvenile offenders whose ‘conduct 

showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the 

possibility of rehabilitation.’ ” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46).

¶ 82 Here, the trial court had evidence before it relating to the Miller factors, and the court 

considered defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense. That, however, is not 

enough to comply with Miller’s mandate. See People v. Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, 

¶ 24 (“[M]ere awareness of a defendant’s age and consideration of a PSI does not provide 

evidence that the circuit court specifically considered defendant’s youth and its attendant 

characteristics.”). As in Reyes, the court here did not explicitly determine that defendant’s 

conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption 

beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. See also People v. Figueroa, 2020 IL App (1st) 

172390, ¶ 37 (where the attorneys discussed the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation but 

the court did not assess those prospects when explaining its ruling, the sentencing hearing did 

not comply with Miller’s mandate). The court here also did not comment on defendant’s 

intellectual limitations, which were documented in the PSI.

¶ 83 We recognize that, even though the trial court did not use these precise words when 

sentencing an offender, a reviewing court may infer from the trial court’s comments that the 

trial court determined that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent 
- 16 -

incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. In People v. 

Walker, 2018 IL App (3d) 140723-B, ¶ 34, for example, the appellate court interpreted the 

following comments by the trial court as evincing an opinion that the defendant showed no 

potential for rehabilitation: he “ ‘would kill for the joy of it and seriously does not care at all 

about a human life[;] it makes no difference to him whatsoever.’ ” See also Holman, 2017 IL 

120655, ¶¶ 17, 50 (the defendant’s original sentencing hearing passed constitutional muster 

where the defendant presented no mitigating evidence, there was significant evidence 

regarding aggravating factors, and the trial court concluded that the defendant “ ‘cannot be 

rehabilitated’ ”). Here, however, the trial court’s comments at defendant’s sentencing hearing 

do not reflect an explicit or implied determination that defendant’s conduct showed 

irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the 

possibility of rehabilitation.

¶ 84 The trial court expressed mixed feelings about defendant’s maturity at the time of the 

offense, telling him:

“I can’t get around the fact that you were 16 years old at the time that this happened. 

In some ways, you were an incredibly adult 16-year-old. In some ways, you have a 

lot of growing up to do. But I find your being 16 mitigatory.”

Given that the court believed that defendant had “a lot of growing up to do,” it is not evident 

that the court determined that defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent 

incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.

¶ 85 Furthermore, when announcing defendant’s sentence, the court stated that it “considered 

all the statutory and non-statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation as well as the 

constitutional command to fashion a sentence that facilitates the defendant’s rehabilitative 

potential and restores them to useful citizenship.” (Emphasis added.) With this comment, the 

trial court arguably implied that defendant possessed at least some rehabilitative potential. 

Under the law as it presently stands, if the court believed that defendant had rehabilitative 

potential, it could not sentence him to a prison term exceeding 40 years. See People v. Murphy, 

2019 IL App (4th) 170646, ¶ 48 (a trial court’s express finding that a defendant has 

rehabilitative potential “contravenes any conclusion defendant was permanently incorrigible 

or irretrievably depraved and is, therefore, unconstitutionally at odds with a de facto life 

sentence without parole for a juvenile offender”).

¶ 86 We also deem it significant that the trial court found that defendant might not have intended 

to commit murder and that he acted at the encouragement of another individual:

“The law tells me to look at whether your criminal conduct was induced or 

facilitated by someone other than yourself. I find that it was. To the extent there was 

clear evidence on this, it suggests that Mr. Hearton was involved and encouraging you 

to commit this offense, or at least an offense.

It’s possible that you set out intending to kill Mr. Allison that day. It’s equally, if 

not more possible, you didn’t. It doesn’t really matter too much. It’s equally possible 

that you had absolutely no intent that anybody would get shot that day. But that’s what 

felony murder is. Someone goes to commit an offense, a felony, and someone dies. 

And at a minimum, that’s what happened in this case.”2

2

As previously mentioned, defendant was found guilty of murder in that he knew that his acts 

created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2006). He was 
- 17 -

If defendant did not intend to commit murder and his crime was induced or facilitated by 

another person, it is not a foregone conclusion that the trial court determined that defendant’s 

conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption 

beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.

¶ 87 Additionally, although the trial court was unable to conclude that defendant’s criminal 

conduct was the result of circumstances that were unlikely to recur, the court recognized that 

defendant was a byproduct of his horrific upbringing. The court said:

“I believe you have grown up in jail. But I also believe that based upon 

circumstances beyond your control, your view on life is awfully violent. I hope 

circumstances like this would never happen again, but I can’t say that they wouldn’t.”

Elsewhere in its ruling, the court likened defendant’s background to a Charles Dickens tragedy, 

commenting that defendant was “left without all of those things that humanity provides to raise 

its young.” Even so, the court believed that defendant was now in a stronger position in life by 

virtue of having the support of his family members, who testified on his behalf at the sentencing 

hearing:

“Also, mitigatory, or in your favor, I find, we talked about it before, the many 

hardships you had growing up, though it does not excuse the violence that you’ve 

engaged in. And at the same time, today, you’re blessed with family and friends who 

will be here for you. That’s actually important in court because a person who has the 

support of friends and family is more likely to do well in life than someone who doesn’t. 

You proved that. You didn’t have that blessing growing up, and it led to some 

problems. You do have it now which is in your favor.”

The trial court thus recognized that defendant, at the time of sentencing, had a support network 

that he lacked at the time of the offense. Such comments further support our reluctance to infer 

that the trial court determined that defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, 

permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.

¶ 88 Despite the fact that the trial court never explicitly made the determination that is required 

by Holman and despite the fact that such determination cannot be inferred from the trial court’s 

comments, the State insists that defendant deserved a de facto life sentence. It is for the trial 

court, not this court, to make that determination. See Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46 (“Under 

Miller and Montgomery, a juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without 

parole, but only if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable 

depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of 

rehabilitation.” (Emphasis added.)). We note that the case law has evolved significantly since 

the trial court sentenced defendant.

¶ 89 We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing, at which 

defendant is entitled to be sentenced in accordance with section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code 

of Corrections. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 47. We express no view about what sentence would 

be appropriate, and we do not foreclose the trial court from imposing a de facto life sentence 

again. We reiterate, however, that the trial court may impose a de facto life sentence only if it 

makes a determination that is consistent with Holman.

not found guilty of felony murder. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2006). We interpret the trial court 

as commenting here that defendant’s conduct, at a minimum, constituted felony murder, even though 

the jury found him guilty of murder pursuant to a higher mental state.
- 18 -

¶ 90 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 91 For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction. We vacate defendant’s 

sentence and remand for resentencing.

¶ 92 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

¶ 93 Cause remanded.