alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 31.2** **CERTIFICATION    OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER** **PURSUANT    TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**      I, Robert G. Costantini, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on    Form 10-K    of ORBCOMM, Inc.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any    untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material    fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the    circumstances under which such statements were made, not    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and    other financial information included in this report, fairly    present in all material respects the financial condition,    results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of,    and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are    responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls    and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act    Rules 13a-15(e)    and    15d-15(e))    for the registrant and have:     a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or    caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed    under our supervision, to ensure that material information    relating to the registrant, including its consolidated    subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those    entities, particularly during the period in which this report is    being prepared;     b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s    disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report    our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure    controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by    this report based on such evaluation; and     c. Disclosed in this report any change in the    registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that    occurred during the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter that    has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially    affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial    reporting; and     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I    have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal    control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s    auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board    of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):     a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in    the design or operation of internal control over financial    reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the    registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and    report financial information; and     b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves    management or other employees who have a significant role in the    registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. /s/  Robert    G. Costantini    Robert G. Costantini    Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer    (Principal Financial Officer)     Date: March 27, 2007
#### DECAY v. FLUCKE et al.

No. 16419.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

June 1, 1936.

Daniel Wendling, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Habans & Coleman and A. I. Kleinfeldt, both of New Orleans, for appellees.

McCALEB, Judge.

Plaintiff, Louis Decay, filed this suit claiming in substance that on February 12, 1935, while he was in the act of'crossing the downtown intersection of Poydras and Carondelet streets in the city of New Orleans, from the river to the lake side thereof, he was run into and knocked down by a truck owned by the defendant, Albert Flucke, and driven at the time of the accident by Jerome Stern, an employee of the said Flucke. The defendants in the suit are Albert Flucke and Jerome Stern, and while plaintiff does not set forth the nature of his injuries he contends that he has been damaged in the sum of $300.

The defendants answered, and they set forth that on the day of the accident the truck was being driven by Stern on Poy-dras street in the direction of the river; that the said Stern had stopped the truck at the corner of Carondelet street in obedience to a red semaphore light; and that when the semaphore light changed to green, giving him the right of way, the said Stern proceeded forward and made a left-hand turn into Carondelet street. At that time he was following another automobile which was directly in front of him and proceeding in the same direction. It is further averred that when the defendant Stern arrived near the pedestrian crossing of Carondelet street he noticed the plaintiff standing in the middle thereof; that the plaintiff was not moving at the time, but waited until the automobile' preceding defendant’s truck had passed, and just at that moment plaintiff moved forward into the path of defendant’s truck and fell down. The defendant Stern immediately applied his brakes and stopped the truck, which was traveling at about 5 miles per hour.

A trial was had which resulted in a judgment for defendants, and the plaintiff has appealed.

The case involves purely a question of fact, and, as the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses, we are reluctant to disturb his finding unless it is manifestly erroneous.

A careful review of the testimony contained in the record convinces us that the preponderance of the evidence sustains the defendants. We find that the truck, at the time of the accident, was proceeding in an orderly manner at a slow speed of 5 miles per hour, and that the plaintiff gave every indication that he would remain stationary and allow the truck to pass. Much to the surprise of the defendant Stern, the plaintiff moved forward unexpectedly directly into the path of the moving truck, and was either struck by the front end of the truck, or fell down.

*375Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the defendants were guilty of negligence, but, on the contrary, we are of 'opinion that the accident was caused through the fault and carelessness of the plaintiff. We find no error in the conclusion of the trial judge.

The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.
<XBRL>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<!--XBRL Document Created with Wdesk from Workiva-->
<!--Copyright 2022 Workiva-->
<!--r:153073c0-e5f6-46aa-bbbe-dae8abd14ba3,g:d2d17ce0-2361-45ac-9d9e-44fc7dbd46af-->
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:link="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/linkbase" xmlns:chdn="http://www.churchilldowns.com/20220223" attributeFormDefault="unqualified" elementFormDefault="qualified" targetNamespace="http://www.churchilldowns.com/20220223">
  <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" schemaLocation="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/xlink-2003-12-31.xsd"/>
  <xs:import namespace="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/instance" schemaLocation="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/xbrl-instance-2003-12-31.xsd"/>
  <xs:import namespace="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/linkbase" schemaLocation="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/xbrl-linkbase-2003-12-31.xsd"/>
  <xs:import namespace="http://xbrl.sec.gov/dei/2021q4" schemaLocation="https://xbrl.sec.gov/dei/2021q4/dei-2021q4.xsd"/>
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:appinfo>
      <link:linkbaseRef xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:arcrole="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink/properties/linkbase" xlink:href="chdn-20220223_lab.xml" xlink:role="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/role/labelLinkbaseRef" xlink:type="simple"/>
      <link:linkbaseRef xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:arcrole="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink/properties/linkbase" xlink:href="chdn-20220223_pre.xml" xlink:role="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/role/presentationLinkbaseRef" xlink:type="simple"/>
      <link:roleType id="Cover" roleURI="http://www.churchilldowns.com/role/Cover">
        <link:definition>0001001 - Document - Cover</link:definition>
        <link:usedOn>link:presentationLink</link:usedOn>
        <link:usedOn>link:calculationLink</link:usedOn>
        <link:usedOn>link:definitionLink</link:usedOn>
      </link:roleType>
    </xs:appinfo>
  </xs:annotation>
</xs:schema>
</XBRL>
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6845 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6845

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 27, 2022

    Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, 
                      Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To provide for transparent licensing of commercial remote sensing 
                                systems.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Commercial Remote Sensing Amendment 
Act of 2022''.

SEC. 2. ANNUAL REPORTS.

    (a) Deadlines.--
            (1) In general.--Section 60121(c) of title 51, United 
        States Code, is amended by striking ``120'' and inserting 
        ``60''.
            (2) Conforming amendment.--Section 60126(a)(1)(E) of title 
        51, United States Code, is amended by striking ``120'' and 
        inserting ``60''.
    (b) Notifications.--Section 60126(a)(2) of title 51, United States 
Code, is amended by striking ``section 60122; and'' and inserting 
``paragraphs (5) and (6) of section 60122(b);''.
    (c) Conditions.--Section 60126(a) of title 51, United States Code, 
is amended--
            (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
            (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
            ``(3) all terms, conditions, or restrictions placed on 
        licensees pursuant to section 60122; and''.
    (d) Tiers.--Section 60126(a)(1) of title 51, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and'' at the end; 
        and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(F) a list of all applications submitted and 
                licenses granted in accordance therewith, listed by 
                tier as defined in regulation, as well as the rationale 
                for each tier categorization;''.
    (e) Sunset.--Section 60126 of title 51, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``September 30, 2020'' and inserting ``September 
30, 2030''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 26, 2022.

            Attest:

                                             CHERYL L. JOHNSON,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### Woodlaurel, Inc., Appellant-Respondent, v Robert Wittman et al., Respondents-Appellants.

In a summary proceeding to recover possession of certain real property, (1) the tenants appeal, by permission, from so much of an order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts, dated September 26, 1988, as, upon modifying a judgment of the District Court of the County of Nassau, First District (Decker, J.), entered January 7, 1987, adjudged them to be in arrears for 26 monthly rental payments, and (2) the landlord cross-appeals, by permission, from so much of the same order as, *inter alia,*modified the judgment of the District Court, by reducing an award in its favor from $18,200 to $12,800.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements, for rea*385sons stated at the Appellate Term. Mangano, P. J., Brown, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

**CONSENT OFINDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the use in theProspectus Supplements filed pursuant to Rule 424(b) dated September 27, 2006 toRegistration Statement 333-133184 and Registration Statement 333-136297 on FormS-1 and Registration Statement 333-133186 on Form S-4 of our report datedSeptember 25, 2006, relating to the consolidated financial statements andfinancial statement schedule of Neiman Marcus, Inc., and management’s report onthe effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting appearing inthis Annual Report on Form 10-K of Neiman Marcus, Inc. for the year ended July29, 2006.

 
| /s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP |   |
|-------------------------------|--------|
|                          |   |
| Dallas, Texas                 |
| September 25, 2006       |

 

1

----
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6765 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6765

 To amend the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 with 
   respect to the application of the Spill Prevention, Control, and 
     Countermeasure rule to certain farms, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 18, 2022

 Mr. Crawford (for himself, Mr. Rouzer, Mr. Higgins of Louisiana, Mr. 
   Bost, Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois, Mr. Kustoff, Mr. Mullin, Mr. 
   Palazzo, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Valadao, Mr. Womack, Mr. Gosar, and Mr. 
  Newhouse) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 with 
   respect to the application of the Spill Prevention, Control, and 
     Countermeasure rule to certain farms, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Farmers Undertake Environmental Land 
Stewardship Act'' or the ``FUELS Act''.

SEC. 2. APPLICABILITY OF SPILL PREVENTION, CONTROL, AND COUNTERMEASURE 
              RULE.

    Section 1049 of the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 
2014 (33 U.S.C. 1361 note) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``20,000'' and 
                inserting ``42,000'';
                    (B) by amending paragraph (2)(A) to read as 
                follows:
                    ``(A) an aggregate aboveground storage capacity 
                greater than 10,000 gallons but less than 42,000 
                gallons; and'';
                    (C) in paragraph (3)--
                            (i) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as 
                        follows:
                    ``(A) with an aggregate aboveground storage 
                capacity of less than or equal to 10,000 gallons; 
                and''; and
                            (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; 
                        and'' and inserting a period; and
                    (D) by striking paragraph (4);
            (2) in subsection (c)(2)(A)--
                    (A) in clause (i), by striking ``1,000'' and 
                inserting ``1,320''; and
                    (B) in clause (ii), by striking ``2,500'' and 
                inserting ``3,000''; and
            (3) by striking subsection (d).
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1030

PAUL YONGO,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

HARRIS TEETER, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (5:07-cv-00092-F)

Submitted: May 9, 2008 Decided: June 2, 2008

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul Yongo, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Paul Yongo appeals the district court’s order accepting

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his civil

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2000). We have reviewed

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm

for the reasons stated by the district court. See Yongo v. Harris

Teeter, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-00092-F (E.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2007). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Humberto Soto, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant Humberto Soto’s contention that the indictment must be dismissed because it was the product of a defective Grand Jury proceeding is without merit. Specifically, he claims that the indictment had been filed by a Grand Jury whose term had expired and had not been extended by court order *(see,*CPL 190.15 [1]). This issue has not been preserved for our review *(see,*CPL 210.20 [2]; 255.20; *People v Lawrence,*64 NY2d 200). Were we to reach the issue, we would find that the claim has no merit. The record establishes that the Grand Jury had been legally constituted and extended by court order. Even if its term had not been extended, the failure to do so is only a technical error which would not result in dismissal unless there is a showing of prejudice and that the fundamental integrity of the Grand Jury process had been impaired *(see,*CPL 210.35 [5]; *People v Williams,*73 NY2d 84, 90). There has been no such showing here.

The court did not err in denying defendants Anselmo Soto and Humberto Soto’s request to cross-examine the court-ap*890pointed interpreters. The interpreters were examined on their qualifications in the presence of the jury and were cross-examined by defense counsel. There was no objection to their qualifications. Thereafter, transcripts of the tape-recorded conversations were prepared in the presence of and with the help of all parties. Despite this effort, defendants objected to the accuracy of the final transcripts. The transcripts were adjudged by the court to be sufficiently accurate to permit the jury to use them as an aid to understanding the tapes *(see, People v Gandy,*152 AD2d 909, *lv denied*74 NY2d 896; *People v Kuss,*81 AD2d 427). The court cautioned the jury that they were to consider the transcripts only as an aid *(People v Gandy, supra)*and informed defense counsel that they would be afforded the opportunity to call the interpreters on their direct case and to present their own version of the transcript if they so desired *(see, People v Dessis-Carbuecia,*145 AD2d 902, *lv denied*74 NY2d 663). In fact, defendants called one of the interpreters as a witness on their direct case. Under the circumstances, the record does not support defendants’ arguments that the court abused its discretion in submitting the transcripts to the jury and that their constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated.

We have examined defendants’ remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. (Appeal from judgment of Oneida County Court, Buckley, J.—criminal sale of controlled substance, first degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Green, Balio and Lowery, JJ.
173 La. 1075

#### O’DWYER v. NATAL.

No. *31437.*

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 4, 1932.

Richard A. Dowling, of New Orleans, for appellant.

O. A. Buchler and Ernest M. Conzelmann, both of Gretna, for appellee.

O’NIBLL, C. J.

In a suit brought by Joseph O’Dwyer for a divorce, judgment was rendered in favor of the wife, rejecting the husband’s' demand and giving the wife a decree of separation from bed and board, as prayed for in her reconventional demand. After a year had elapsed the wife sued for and obtained a divorce,- on the ground that there had been no reconciliation between the parties during the separation from bed and board. In the judgment of divorce, the judge decreed that, inasmuch as neither of the parties to the suit had prayed for the permanent care and custody of their minor children, Louis and Elizabeth O’Dwyer, they should be placed in the care and custody of their maternal aunt, Mrs. Joseph Hecker. Mrs. O’Dwyer has appealed from the judgment, complaining only of that part of it which denies her the care and custody of her children, and which orders them placed in the care and custody of Mrs. Hecker.

It is true that Mrs. O’Dwyer did not pray for the care and custody of her children in her petition for the final divorce; but she did so pray in her reconventional demand in her answer to her husband’s suit for a divorce. Mrs. Hecker was not a party to this suit, or referred to anywhere except in the judgment of divorce. Article 157 of the Oivii Code, as amended by Act No. 74 of 1924, p. 114, declares: “In all eases of separation and of divorce the children shall be placed under the care of the party who shall have obtained the separation or divorce unless •the judge shall, for the greater advantage of the children, order that some or all of them shall' be entrusted to the care of the other party. The party under whose care a child or children is placed, or to whose care a child or children has been entrusted, shall of right become natural tutor or tutrix of said child or children to the same extent and with the same effect as if the other party had died.”

Our opinion therefore is that Sirs. O’Dwyer was entitled to have her children placed under her care, on the failure of the judge to find that it was for the greater advantage of the children that they or either of them should be intrusted to the care of their father. If the mother is unworthy of or unfit for this trust, the situation may be dealt with in another proceeding; perhaps in the juvenile court.) There is no evidence of such unworthiness or unfitness in this suit.

The judgment appealed from is amended by adding thereto that the minor children, Louis and Elizabeth O’Dwyer, shall be placed under the care and in the custody of their ■mother, Mrs. Agnes Natal O’Dwyer; and, as thus amended, the judgment is affirmed.