# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas** MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

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- CV Robert C. SINGER , III, Appellant

v. April Marie SINGER , Individually and as Trustee of the Singer Financial Management Trust, Appellee From the 438th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019

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- 03145 Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa , Judge Presiding Opinion by: Beth Watkins , Justice Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios , Justice Beth Watkins , Justice Delivered and Filed: September 29, 2021 REVERSED AND RENDERED This is an appeal of an order denying appellant Robert C. Singer, III’s motion to confirm an arbitration award. We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment confirming the award.
B ACKGROUND Robert and his sister, appellee April Marie Singer, are the settlors and beneficiaries of a revocable trust for which A pril serves as trustee. In 2019, Robert sued April , seeking an accounting, the removal of April as trustee, the appointment of a receiver , and the revocation of04

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- the trust. While April denied Robert’s allegations against he r, she also filed pleading s seeking to dissolve the trust, distribute its assets, and discharge her as trustee. On September 4, 2020, the parties mediated their dispute b efore Thomas J. Smith. They did not resolve their differences during th at mediation, but they both accepted and signed a “Mediator’s Proposal” containing the following paragraphs: 3. All Real Property and Financial Assets divided 50/50 as agreed to by the parties. If the parties are unable to agree on a division of all real property and financial assets, parties agree to submit their respective proposals to Thomas J. Smith for a final, binding division of th e se properties. Lawyers, including Gina Gaedke , will prepare all appropriate deeds, revocation and distribution agreements and other paperwork necessary to effectuate the terms of settlement and revocation/termination of partnerships and the Trust. All such fees and expenses to be paid by Singer Finan cial Management Trust within 10 days of delivery of statement showing balance due. 4. All parties execute MSA, with mutual releases, with everyone paying own fees and expenses through September 4, 2020. This MSA will settle ALL disputes between the partie s. Parties agree to enter Agreed Order of Dismissal, With Prejudice in pending lawsuit. All attorney’s fees and any expert fees incurred by both parties after September 4, 2020 through conclusion of settlement and revocation process will be paid by Singer Financial Management Trust within 10 Days of delivery of statement showing balance due. A court

- appointed appraiser assigned values to several pieces of real property owned by the trust. Based on those appraisals, t he parties submitted their proposals “fo r a final, binding division of th e se properties” to Smith. On October 20, 2020, Smith issued an “Arbitrator’s Ruling” ordering the properties divided between Robert and April as set out in Robert’s proposal

. Smith’s ruling specified , “ C losing

. . . shall t ake place on or before November 2, 2020.” The parties did not close on the propert ies by November 2, 2020 , and o n March 8, 2021, Robert filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award . In response, April argued the award should not be confirmed because “[ t]he parties do not yet have an agreed MSA” and because one of the properties she had been awarded showed signs of environmental contamination. She argued a new appraisal was necessary to account for the contamination and explained that she “believe[d] Mr.04

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- Smith will proper l y adjust the distributions based on the new property appraisals.” Nothing in the record indicates that Smith considered modifying the arbitration award or that April’s contamination claims gave him authority to do so

. 1 On March 16, 202 1, the trial court held a hearing on Robert’s motion. On April 16, 2021, Robert filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Plaintiff’s Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award .” Robert’s motion stated that while the trial court had not yet signed any written orders , it had signed judge’s notes indicating its intent ion to deny his motion to confirm and send the parties “back to the Arbitrator to address unresolved issues.” Robert asked the trial court to reconsider th is ruling because April had neither challeng ed the arbitration award within the time periods specified by the Texas Arbitration Act nor asserted “any of the exclusive grounds” listed in the TAA for the vacatur, modification, or correction of an arbitration award. On April 26, 2021, the trial court

s igned written order s denying Robert’s motion s to confirm and for reconsideration. Robert timely perfected this appeal. A NALYSIS Standard of Review and Applicable Law “Arbitration is generally a contractual proceeding by which the parties to a controversy, in order to obtain a speedy and inexpensive final disposition of the disputed matter, select arbitrators or judg e s of their own choice, and by consent submit the controversy to these arbitrators for determination.” Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex. v. Juneau , 114 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2003, no pet.) (emphasis in original)

. Texas law favors arbitration of disputes. See, e.g. , E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., Inc. v. Werline , 307 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2010). Accordingly,

“ judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow” because such review diminishes

1 See T EX
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. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 171.054 (establishing procedures, standards, and deadlines under which an arbitrator may modify or correct an award).04

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- arbitration’s benefit as an efficient and economical system for resolving disputes. Id. ; see also Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge , 422 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. 2 012). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to confirm an arbitration award de novo, “indulg [ ing ] every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the arbitration award.” GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P. v. Jack Raus, Ltd. , 126 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. App

— S an Antonio 2003 , pet. denied ). Confirmation of an arbitration award “is the default result unless a challenge to the award has been or is being considered.” Hamm v. Millennium Income Fund, L.L.C. , 178 S.W.3d 256, 262 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pe t. denied). Robert argues the TAA governs the parties’ dispute, and April has not challenged that assertion

. The TAA provides that upon the application of a party, a trial court shall c onfirm an arbitration award unless the opposing party presents statutor y grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting the award. T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 171.087; see also T EX
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. P RAC
. &
R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 171.088 (grounds for vacating arbitration award); T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 171.091 ( grounds for mo difying or correcting arbitration award). A party who seeks a trial court judgment vacat ing , modify ing , or correct ing an arbitration award must file an application “not later than the 90th day after the date of delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.” T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. §§ 171.088(b), 171.091(b). Application Smith delivered his ruling in a n Octob er 20, 2020 letter to the parties’ attorneys

. April’s trial counsel emailed Smith on October 28, 2020, and that email establishes April had received the ruling by that point. As a result, April was required to fil e an application to vacate, modify, or

corr ect the arbitration award by January 26, 2021 at the latest

. See id. ; see also Zars v. Davis , No. 04

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- CV, 2006 WL 2955326, at *1 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Oct. 18, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).04

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- April did not assert any challenges to the award in the tri al court until March of 2021. Because April did not file an application to vacate, modify, or correct the award within 90 days o f the date of delivery of th at award , she waived any challenge she may have had

. See Zars , 2006 WL 2955326, at *2 ( noting the “90

- day limitations period set forth in [the TAA] is strictly enforced”); see also New Med. Horizons II, Ltd. v. Jacobson , 317 S.W.3d 421, 4 29

– 31 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) ( holding party waived complaint that arbitration awar d was void by failing to raise it during TAA’s 90

- day limitations period) ; La. Nat. Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc. , 875 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding the similarly worded predecessor to sect ion 171.088(b) show ed “the legislature intended the 90

– day period

. . . to be a limitations period after which a party cannot ask a court to vacate an arbitration award”)

. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying Robert’s motion to confirm the arbitration award

. See New Med. Horizons , 317 S.W.3d at 431. W e therefore sustain Robert’s first issue. Because that issue is dispositive, we need not consider Robert’ s arguments about whether April asserted a proper statutory ground to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.1. C ONCLUSION We reverse the trial court’s order denying Robert’s motion to confirm the arbitration award and render judgment confirming the award. Beth Watkins , Ju stice