NO. 91-175 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1991 

LAURA J. McCA", 

Respondent and Appellant, 

-vsTRUSTEES, DODSON SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Petitioner and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Phillips, 

The Honorable B.W. Thomas, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Emilie Loring; Hilley & Loring, Missoula, Montana. 

For Respondent: 

Catherine Swift; Erdmann Law Office, Helena, 

Montana. 

Submitted on briefs: July 16, '991 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The District Court for the Seventeenth Judicial District, 

Phillips County, granted summary judgment for the Trustees of 

Dodson School District (school district) in this action for 

attorney fees pursuant to 5 49-2-505(4), MCA. Laura J. McCann 

appeals. We reverse. 

The issue is whether the District Court abused its discretion 

in awarding attorney fees to the school district as the prevailing 

defendant in the underlying discrimination case filed under the 

Montana Human Rights Act. 

The school district brought this action in District Court to 

recover from Laura J. McCann (McCann) its attorney fees incurred 

in defending against her complaint of unlawful discrimination. 

McCann filed her complaint with the Montana Human Rights Commission 

in August 1986. She alleged that the school district, her 

employer, had discriminated against her on the basis of race and 

sex when she, a Caucasian female, was paid less for her combination 

teacher/aide position than was a Native American male for his 

comparable position. The Human Rights Commission hearing examiner, 

while agreeing that McCann had established a prima facie case of 

employment discrimination, nevertheless concluded that a basis 

other than gender and race had been shown to explain the salary 

differential. The hearing examiner concluded that the school 

district was justified in paying the male more because he was 

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available to work as an athletic director and coach, for which he 

was also paid an additional stipend. The Human Rights Commission 

affirmed the hearing examiner's decision. McCann did not appeal 

that final administrative determination. 

The school district then initiated a district court action for 

attorney fees under 5 49-2-505(4), MCA: 

The prevailing party in a hearing under this 

section may bring an action in district court 

for attorneys' fees. The court in its discre- tion may allow the prevailing party reasonable 

attorneys' fees, . . . 

The parties filed and briefed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

Concluding that "there is a lack of supporting evidence here, 

[McCann] carried on her litigation too long, and her action was not 

reasonable, I' and that "[plublic policy is advanced by discouraging 

claims of limited merit," the District Court granted the school 

district's motion for summary judgment. The parties stipulated to 

the amount of attorney fees, just under $5,000. McCann appeals. 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding 

attorney fees to the school district as the prevailing defendant 

in the underlying discrimination case filed under the Montana Human 

Rights Act? 

Until now, no standard has been authoritatively set forth to 

guide a district court's discretion in deciding whether attorney 

fees should be awarded to a successful defendant in an action filed 

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under the Montana Human Rights Act. However, this Court has 

affirmed a denial of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant based 

on the district court's determination that the case was not 

"frivolous or factually baseless. It Breese v. Steel Mountain 

Enterprises, Inc. (1986), 220 Mont. 454, 458, 716 P.2d 214, 216. 

This Court has stated that the Montana Human Rights Act "is 

closely modeled after Title VII, and reference to pertinent federal 

case law is both useful and appropriate. 'I Snell v. Montana-Dakota 

Utilities Co. (1982), 198 Mont. 56, 62, 643 P.2d 841, 844. Here, 

the parties and the District Court cite the standard set forth in 

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978), 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 

694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648, as appropriate in deciding whether a successful defendant in a Human Rights Act case is entitled to attorney 

fees. Christiansburq addressed the question of when attorney fees 

should be awarded to a successful defendant in a Title VI1 action. 

The Christiansburq standard is that 

a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds 

that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or 

groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to 

litigate after it clearly became so. 

Christiansburq, 434 U.S. at 422. 

The reasons for the above limitation on the allowance of 

attorney fees to successful defendants in Title VI1 actions are 

also present in cases decided under the Montana Human Rights Act. 

The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, 

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religion, color, sex, physical or mental handicap, age, or national 

origin is a civil right specifically recognized by law. Section 

49-1-102, MCA. Civil rights acts depend upon private individuals 

to uphold the public policy set forth in the law. To avoid 

discouraging the filing of meritorious claims under the Montana 

Human Rights Act, we adopt the standard set forth in Christiansburq 

as the measure for whether attorney fees should be granted to 

prevailing defendants under 5 49-2-505(4), MCA. 

Both parties cite federal circuit court cases decided under 

Christiansburq. However, as they acknowledge, none of those cases 

control and all are factually distinguishable. We do note that, 

in contrast to most cases in which this Court defers to a trial 

court's discretion on the grounds that the trial court has the 

unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and 

witnesses, this action was decided on summary judgment after administrative action. Therefore, the District Court did not have 

the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties or witnesses. 

We conclude that the Christiansburq standard has not been 

met here. Based primarily on the hearing examiner's finding that 

McCann made a prima facie case, we disagree with the District 

Court's statement that there is a lack of supporting evidence and 

that McCann's action was not reasonable. "If the plaintiff 

established a prima facie case . . . this will generally defeat a 

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prevailing defendant's request for fees." Larson, Employment 

Discrimination, vol. 3, § 58.12, pp. 11-104 through 11-106.1 

(1990). Additionally, we do not accept the District Court's 

reasoning that McCann's case is "of limited merit." There is 

nothing in the record to indicate that McCann's case was filed or 

pursued in bad faith. The school board points to McCann's parallel 

pursuit of separate federal administrative proceedings, her 

eventual loss of this case, and her apparent refusal of a compromise offer from the school district. But we are unwilling to 

hold that the pursuit of administrative remedies is grounds for a 

ruling of unreasonableness. McCann did not further pursue the 

action after being unsuccessful in the administrative proceedings. 

Despite the school district's protestation that it is a small 

entity and that the attorney fees incurred in defending this case 

present a hardship to it, we conclude that, in light of the strong 

public policy of encouraging possibly meritorious claims filed 

under the Montana Human Rights Act, the school district must pay 

its own attorney fees. 

Reversed. 

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We concur: 

7 
August 13, 1991 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the 

following named: 

Emilie Loring 

Hilley & Loring 

500 Daly Ave. 

Missoula, MT 59801 

Charles E. Erdmann 

Erdmann Law Office 

P.O. Box 5418 

Helena, MT 59604 

Patricia D. Peterman and Kyle A. Gray 

Holland & Hart 

175 No. 27th St., Ste. 1400 

Billings, MT 59101 

Bruce W. Moerer 

Montana School Boards Assc. 

1 S. Montana Ave. 

Helena, MT 59601 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA