2021 IL App (4th) 210083-U 

NO. 4-21-0083 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

CHAD COIT,

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

CHRIS DOENITZ; TOWNSHIP OFFICERS 

ELECTORAL BOARD FOR MAHOMET TOWNSHIP; 

AARON WHEELER, in His Official Capacity as Chair; 

DAVID PARSONS, in His Official Capacity as Member; 

GREG MILLER, in His Official Capacity as Member; 

and AARON AMMONS, in His Official Capacity as 

Champaign County Clerk, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Champaign County 

No. 21MR70 

Honorable 

Benjamin W. Dyer, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Cavanagh and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) statutory language did not require 

petitioner to file proof of service within five days of filing his petition for judicial 

review in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court, 

(2) petitioner forfeited his argument he did not participate in a partisan caucus on 

the basis he did not follow caucus procedures, and (3) petitioner was ineligible to 

run as an independent candidate after participating in a partisan caucus.

¶ 2 Petitioner, Chad Coit, seeks to run as an independent candidate for the office of 

Mahomet Township highway commissioner in a consolidated election scheduled for April 6, 

2021. After Coit filed his statement of candidacy, respondent Chris Doenitz filed an objection 

with the Mahomet Township Electoral Board (Board), asserting Coit was ineligible to run as an 

independent candidate under section 10-3 of the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 

FILED

April 1, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 

is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances 

allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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2020)) because he participated in the Republican caucus and was defeated by Doenitz. Following 

an evidentiary hearing, the Board entered a written order sustaining Doenitz’s objection and 

ordering Coit’s name removed from the ballot. 

¶ 3 Coit filed a petition for judicial review in the Champaign County circuit court. 

Doenitz filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing the circuit court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction because Coit failed to timely file a proof of service. Coit filed a proof of service

shortly thereafter. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered a written order (1) denying 

Doenitz’s motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) affirming 

the Board’s decision sustaining Doenitz’s objection. 

¶ 4 Coit appeals, arguing the Board’s decision should be reversed because he did not 

participate in the Republican caucus for purposes of the lockout provisions set forth in section 

10-3 of the Election Code. Id. Doenitz argues this court should dismiss this appeal for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, affirm the Board’s decision sustaining Doenitz’s 

objection. We conclude this court has jurisdiction and affirm the Board’s decision. 

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 In November 2020, a notice of caucus was issued by the Republican party in the 

Township of Mahomet, Champaign County, Illinois, stating a caucus was to occur on December 

1, 2020. The notice further stated any candidate intending to seek office must submit their intent 

in writing between November 23, 2020, and November 27, 2020. On November 25, 2020, Coit 

mailed a notarized letter to David Parsons, the Republican party committee clerk, stating he 

intended to seek the Republican nomination for Mahomet Township highway commissioner. 

After mailing his letter but prior to the caucus, Coit posted messages to his Facebook account 

stating he was running for highway commissioner and encouraging his supporters to attend the 
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Republican caucus. Coit also sent letters to registered voters in the community, whose names he 

obtained from the Champaign County clerk’s website, asking for support and encouraging them 

to attend the Republican caucus. 

¶ 7 The Republican caucus was held on December 1, 2020. At the caucus, it was 

announced that two candidates, Coit and Doenitz, had submitted acceptable paperwork 

expressing their intent to run for highway commissioner. Although Coit did not attend the 

caucus, an individual named James Borders nominated him for the position, and Don Hogan 

nominated Doenitz. A woman named Angela Norman volunteered to act as a poll watcher on 

Coit’s behalf. Coit received 17 votes and was defeated by Doenitz, who received 50 votes. 

¶ 8 On December 18, 2020, Coit filed a statement of candidacy with the Champaign 

County clerk, expressing his intent to run as an independent candidate for the office of Mahomet 

Township highway commissioner. On December 28, 2020, Doenitz filed a verified objector’s 

petition arguing Coit was not eligible to run as an independent candidate for highway 

commissioner because he participated in the Republican caucus and was defeated by Doenitz, 

thus triggering the lockout provisions set forth in section 10-3 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 

5/10-3 (West 2020)). Doenitz requested that Mahomet Township convene an Electoral Board, 

find Coit’s nomination papers invalid, and strike Coit’s name from the ballot as a candidate for 

highway commissioner. 

¶ 9 The Board held a series of public hearings on Doenitz’s objector’s petition in 

January 2021, culminating in an evidentiary hearing on January 15, 2021. At the evidentiary 

hearing, Angela Norman testified she attended the caucus at Coit’s request but only to observe 

and not on his behalf. Coit testified he neither asked James Borders to nominate him nor asked 
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Norman to act as his poll watcher. Coit admitted that he never withdrew his nomination, and 

when asked why he did not attend the caucus, stated he “didn’t want to participate.” 

¶ 10 On January 21, 2021, the Board entered a written order finding Coit participated 

in and was defeated by Doenitz at the Republican caucus and was therefore not eligible to run as 

an independent candidate for highway commissioner. Accordingly, the Board sustained 

Doenitz’s objection and directed the Champaign County clerk to strike Coit’s name from the 

ballot as an independent candidate for highway commissioner. 

¶ 11 On January 22, 2021, Coit filed a petition for judicial review in the Champaign 

County circuit court, arguing the Board’s decision should be reversed because he did not 

“participate” in the Republican caucus and therefore the lockout provisions set forth in section 

10-3 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2020)) did not foreclose his eligibility to run as 

an independent candidate. On February 1, 2021, Doenitz filed a motion to dismiss under section 

2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)), arguing the circuit court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Coit failed to file a proof of service with the circuit 

clerk within five days after service of the decision of the Board, citing section 10-10.1(a) of the 

Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1(a) (West 2020)). On February 2, 2021, Coit filed a proof of 

service with the circuit clerk. Coit additionally filed a response to Doenitz’s motion to dismiss, 

arguing he was not required by statute to file the proof of service within five days of service of 

the Board’s decision and any jurisdictional defect was cured when he filed the proof of service. 

¶ 12 On February 5, 2021, the circuit court held a combined hearing on Doenitz’s 

motion to dismiss and Coit’s petition for judicial review. On February 8, 2021, the circuit court 

entered a written order finding it had jurisdiction and affirming the Board’s decision, concluding 
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Coit participated in the Republican caucus and therefore was not eligible to run as an 

independent candidate. 

¶ 13 This appeal followed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, Coit argues this court should reverse the decision of the Board because 

he was not a “participant” in the Republican caucus and therefore the lockout provisions set forth 

in section 10-3 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2020)) do not prohibit him from 

running as an independent candidate. Specifically, Coit argues he was not a participant because 

(1) he did not sign an affidavit stating he was a registered voter and member of the Republican

party as required by the Township Code (60 ILCS 1/45-50(c)(3) (West 2020)) and (2) he did not 

attend or vote at the caucus. Doenitz asserts this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and this 

appeal should be dismissed, or alternatively, this court should affirm the Board’s decision. We 

conclude this court has subject matter jurisdiction and affirm the Board’s decision.

¶ 16 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 17 We first address Doenitz’s argument this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

because Coit failed to file a proof of service with the circuit clerk within five days of service of 

the Board’s decision and therefore failed to comply with the special jurisdictional requirements 

set forth in section 10-10.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2020)). Coit does not 

dispute he did not file a proof of service within five days of service of the Electoral Board’s 

decision but argues he was not required to do so. 

¶ 18 Section 10-10.1 sets forth four jurisdictional requirements for a party seeking 

judicial review of the Board’s decision. The party seeking review “must file a petition with the 

clerk of the court and must serve a copy of the petition upon the electoral board and other parties 
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to the proceeding by registered or certified mail within 5 days after service of the decision of the 

electoral board as provided in Section 10-10 [of the Election Code].” Id. The petition for judicial 

review must set forth the basis for reversing the Board’s decision. Id. Finally, the party seeking 

judicial review “shall file proof of service with the clerk of court.” Id. Strict compliance with the 

requirements of section 10-10.1 is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the 

reviewing court. Bettis v. Marsaglia, 2014 IL 117050, ¶ 16, 23 N.E.3d 351. 

¶ 19 Doenitz asserts Coit was required to file a proof of service with the clerk of court 

within five days of service of the Board’s decision in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction 

on the circuit court. We disagree. In Kowalski McDonald v. Cook County Officers Electoral 

Board, 2018 IL App (1st) 180406, ¶ 30, 117 N.E.3d 218, the First District held that the “plain 

language of section 10-10.1 requires service within five days of the Board’s final order and the 

filing of a proof of service; it does not require that a proof of service be filed within the same 

five-day period.” (Emphasis in original.) See also Carlasare v. Will County Officers Electoral 

Board, 2012 IL App (3d) 120699, ¶ 17, 977 N.E.2d 298 (“[A]lthough [section 10-10.1] requires 

that proof of service be filed, it does not require that the filing take place within five days.”).

When construing a statute, we give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary 

meaning. Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 181, 874 N.E.2d 1, 8

(2007). Although the statute should be construed as a whole (id.), courts may not add to the 

requirements listed in the statute. Bettis, 2014 IL 117050, ¶ 32. Because there is no time period 

referenced in section 10-10.1 for the filing of proof of service, we conclude Coit was not 

required to file proof of service within five days of the Board’s decision in order to confer 

subject matter jurisdiction on the reviewing court.
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¶ 20 In support of his claim that section 10-10.1 imposes a deadline for filing proof of 

service, Doenitz relies on Nelson v. Qualkinbush, 389 Ill. App. 3d 79, 89 (2009), abrogated on 

other grounds by Bettis, 2014 IL 117050. In Qualkinbush, the First District was called upon to 

construe an earlier version of section 10-10.1. That version of the statute read: 

“The party seeking judicial review must file a petition with the clerk of the court 

within 10 days after the decision of the electoral board. The petition shall contain 

a brief statement of the reasons why the decision of the board should be reversed. 

The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition upon the electoral board and other 

parties to the proceeding by registered or certified mail and shall file proof of 

service with the clerk of the court. No answer to the petition need be filed, but any 

answer must be filed within 10 days after the filing of the petition.” 10 ILCS 

5/10-10.1 (West 2008).

The Qualkinbush court held that a petitioner’s failure to file proof of service within 10 days after 

filing the petition for judicial review supported a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Qualkinbush, 

389 Ill. App. 3d at 90. 

¶ 21 Like the First and Third Districts, we decline to follow Qualkinbush. See 

McDonald, 2018 IL App (1st) 180406, ¶ 30; see also Carlasare, 2012 IL App (3d) 120699, ¶ 17. 

We agree with the McDonald court that the plain language of section 10-10.1 does not require 

that proof of service be filed within the five days after service of the Board’s final 

order. McDonald, 2018 IL App (1st) 180406, ¶ 30. The statute does not impose any deadline for 

the filing of proof of service—it only requires that one be filed. We decline to impose a 

jurisdictional requirement not found in the statute. 
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¶ 22 Here, the Board served its decision on Coit on January 21, 2021, and Coit filed a 

proof of service on February 2, 2021. We conclude Coit fulfilled the special jurisdictional 

requirements of section 10-10.1 when he filed the proof of service. Accordingly, the circuit court 

correctly denied Doenitz’s motion to dismiss, and this court has subject matter jurisdiction. See

Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 23 B. Participation in Republican Caucus

¶ 24 We turn next to the merits of this case. Coit claims he was not a participant in the 

Republican caucus for two reasons: (1) he did not follow caucus procedures as required by the 

Township Code (60 ILCS 1/45-50(c)(3) (West 2020)) and (2) he did not attend the caucus or 

vote. 

¶ 25 1. Applicable Law

¶ 26 “Where *** an electoral board’s decision is challenged in court pursuant to 

section 10-10.1 of the Election Code [citation], the proceeding is in the nature of administrative 

review.” Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners, 2015 IL 

118929, ¶ 19, 28 N.E.3d 170. “On appeal, we review the Board’s decision rather than that of the 

circuit court.” Schmidt v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL App (4th) 160189, ¶ 10, 68 

N.E.3d 950. “Additionally, where the ‘facts are admitted or established and the only dispute 

concerns whether the governing legal provisions were interpreted correctly,’ we apply a de novo

standard of review.” Id. (quoting Jackson-Hicks, 2015 IL 118929, ¶ 20). 

¶ 27 At issue in this case is section 10-3 of the Election Code, which states the 

following: “A candidate seeking election to an office for which candidates of political parties are 

nominated by caucus who is a participant in the caucus and who is defeated for his or her 

nomination at such caucus, is ineligible to be listed on the ballot at that general or consolidated 
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election as an independent candidate.” 10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2020). The Election Code does not 

define “participation” in a partisan caucus. The parties agree that whether Coit is eligible to run 

as an independent candidate hinges on whether he “participated” in the December 1, 2020,

Republican caucus and thus triggered the lockout provision set forth in section 10-3. 

¶ 28 In asking this court to construe whether Coit “participated” in the Republican

caucus, the parties turn to one of the few cases to address this issue, McCarthy v. Streit, 182 Ill. 

App. 3d 1026, 538 N.E.2d 873 (1989). In McCarthy, a slate of Republican candidates attended a 

caucus wherein an election judge determined they were defeated by the “Streit” slate. Id. at 1029. 

The defeated “McCarthy” slate attempted to reorganize and run as a new party. Id. at 1030. The 

Streit slate filed objections, arguing the McCarthy candidates were precluded from running as a 

new party because they participated in and were defeated at the caucus. Id. at 1031. Several of 

the McCarthy candidates appealed, arguing they did not participate in the caucus because they 

did not (1) sign an affidavit confirming their participation, (2) sign in at the caucus, (3) actively 

seek nomination, (4) make nominations, or (5) vote. Id. at 1030.

¶ 29 The McCarthy court held that “in the context of a caucus, the individuals claimed 

to have participated must either have voted or done something more active than simply being 

present and observing.” Id. at 1035. Furthermore, a candidate’s mere failure to withdraw his 

name from nomination is not enough to find he participated in the caucus under section 10-3. Id.

Rather, the lockout provisions set forth in section 10-3 “should only be implemented where there 

are specific, provable, documented actions of a candidate which would be fatal to a third-party 

candidacy.” Id. at 1036. Under this framework, the court concluded the McCarthy candidates, by 

taking no affirmative actions to share in the caucus process, did not participate in the caucus and 

were not foreclosed from seeking third-party candidacy. Id. at 1035. 
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¶ 30 2. This Case

¶ 31 a. Caucus Procedures

¶ 32 As stated above, Coit first argues he was not a “participant” under section 10-3 

because he did not file an affidavit stating he was a registered voter and a member of the 

Republican party as required by statutory caucus procedures. See 60 ILCS 1/45-50(c)(3) (West 

2020) (“Individuals participating at an established political party township or multi-township 

caucus shall *** sign an affidavit that he or she is a registered voter and affiliated with the 

established political party holding the caucus.”). Coit argues this section of the Township Code

defines caucus participation for purposes of section 10-3 of the Election Code.

¶ 33 Here, Coit has forfeited this argument because he failed to raise it before the 

Board. “[I]ssues or defenses not presented to the administrative agency will not be considered for 

the first time on administrative review.” Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers 

Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 214, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1020 (2008); see also Let Forest Park 

Vote on Video Gaming v. Village of Forest Park Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 2018 IL 

App (1st) 180391, ¶ 25, 101 N.E.3d 152 (stating objector to a referendum petition forfeited 

argument petitioner failed to comply with Election Code by failing to raise it before the Board).

In response to Doenitz’s forfeiture argument, Coit does not offer any reason why this court 

should excuse his forfeiture, arguing only that this argument is a “red herring” because “[t]he one 

and only argument in front of the Electoral Board, the Trial Court and this Appellate Court 

revolves around the definition and interpretation of ‘participant.’ ” While Coit is correct that the 

Board’s interpretation of “participant” is the central issue in this case, he fails to acknowledge 

that the Board was never presented with any argument based on the Township Code. We 

reiterate that our review in this case is limited to the record before the Board. See Cinkus, 228 Ill. 
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2d at 214 (“[A]dministrative review is confined to the evidence offered before the agency.”).

Because this argument was never before the Board and Coit provides no compelling reason why 

his forfeiture should be excused, we honor his forfeiture. See id. at 214-15. 

¶ 34 b. Coit’s Participation in the Republican Caucus

¶ 35 Finally, Coit argues he was not a participant in the Republican caucus because he 

did not attend the caucus or vote. He additionally argues that sending a letter of intent to seek the 

Republican nomination and campaigning via Facebook and mail did not rise to the level of 

“participation.” We disagree.

¶ 36 Here, we agree with the Board and circuit court that Coit was a participant in the 

Republican caucus. Unlike the third-party candidates in McCarthy, Coit took “specific, provable, 

documented actions” towards seeking the Republican nomination which were “more active than 

simply being present and observing.” See McCarthy, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 1035-36. We agree with 

the circuit court that the moment Coit submitted his letter of intent, an action which was required 

by Mahomet Township to seek candidacy, his participation in the caucus commenced. Although 

his failure to withdraw his name alone is not dispositive of his participation, it undermines his 

argument when coupled with the fact he actively campaigned for the nomination in the days 

leading up to the caucus. In other words, not only did he never withdraw; he did the exact 

opposite by campaigning. The exhibits admitted at the Board’s evidentiary hearing showed Coit 

sought votes from his connections on Facebook and sent out letters to Mahomet Township 

registered voters, whose names he obtained from the county clerk’s website. It appears that Coit 

wished to run for the Republican nomination risk-free by abiding by all of the requirements 

necessary to secure it, but by merely not attending, ensure he could still run as an independent in 
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the event of his defeat. Unfortunately for Coit, the legislature decided to prohibit this behavior

when it enacted the lockout provisions set forth in section 10-3 of the Election Code. 

¶ 37 In conclusion, Coit participated in the Republican caucus and was defeated by 

Doenitz. Due to his defeat, he is ineligible to run as an independent candidate. We affirm the 

Board’s decision.

¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment affirming the 

Board’s decision. 

¶ 40 Affirmed.