alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Eonoreble Taylor Cariiale, Fege 3 

where before his eleotloh, he had been empJ.oyed adversely. 

HOUle7er, it iS 8R aholeht OaliOh Of leg81 qthiqa that no attorncig~sha&l rqma.qent adverasor oonilioting intqerseta. 

It.16 8ga$nst ,pablle. poliop r0r a ooaaty attomey to proseoat@ in Q oaso.whan hq hadbmn qrnployqd ~aUvereqly.prlor 

to hie .q~eo@.on,~$rreepeotlvq oi the abasnqq of a prohltdtory statate;erd we think the~ootmts would 80 hold. 

Bpe therefore think that you have very properly 

&$eid, ~yourself iir ,paah oases. 

An assistant - oount y attqrney hae authorltp. bog&k 

atiidavits in hie ~name as ahsiatant Oo+ty sttqney. 

Dlux~V.’ State‘;.35 2. W. 661, Kqllqy v. statq, 38 8, pr. 391 

Noore ‘v..%fetq, 3G S. F..209; Copeland v. State, 38 S. F. 

210, and .kaley v. .&ate, ,224 5.. W. .'771. 

, 

I The aae,e df Pvivis v. State,'58 3. W.. (2) 89, holds 

that an stiaiatant oo&ty attorney ia mug auttrolizs~ ta 00ndaot a oriminel proaeautlon in the name of the State of Texas. 

Artfclq 31, vernoh'e Annotated Texas Code of Crfm-' 

inal Proeqdtixe,‘ reads & r0iith: 

-Art. 31. (38) 139) Attorney pr6 tern 

Vhaaqvar .a~ng ditx&ct.or dounty attorney falls 

to ettdnd,a,nf tqnn of t&e districti, Oounty aZ ja&tioe*d mart, the judge of eaid oourt or auoh jaatles 

nap appoint some ocm tent attorney to pqrfonn tlm 

duties of auoh dlatr r ot qc aounty ettqrn6y,'*tro shall 

bo allowed the aam3 oaPpenratloa.for hls.aarviocre aa 

la allowed the district attorney 01:’ oonnbJ attornay. 

Said appolhtmqnt ohall not extend beyond the te$m OS 

the aourt et whioh it ie made, and @alI be vaekted 

upon the appearease of the diertriot or oounty attorneg." 

The citme of %ete,v. Laokey, 35 T. 357, hold6 Oha* 

an ettorney pro tern. appolnted~ by the oourt hea all the powers 

and.dutles of the reguler proseauting EttOrnsY. 

The above quota& provlsione of Artiale 25. V. 3. C. 

C. TJ., were undoubtedly enacted for the puPpos% of keeping
EXHIBIT 32.1



                       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                        AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
              SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Portsmouth Square, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2005,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I John V. Winfield, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge,
that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
    15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
    Company.


Date: November 10, 2005                         /s/ John V. Winfield
                                                ----------------------------
                                                John V. Winfield, President
                                                and Chief Executive Officer




[A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Portsmouth Square, Inc. and will be retained by Portsmouth
Square, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.]
exv10w8



 






Exhibit 10.8




      



			
	Allergan, Inc.
	 	1989 Incentive Compensation Plan – as amended






Certificate of Restricted Stock Award




Awarded to: Tester B. Two

Social Security Number: ###-##-####

Employee ID: 99902



Award Issued: 4,000 shares

Type of Stock Award: Restricted Stock



Award Number: RSU15

Award Date: February-09-2005

Award Expired Date: February-08-2015



Award Price: $0.00000000




Vesting Start Date: February 09, 2005




This restricted stock award was
granted to you on February 09, 2005
by Allergan, Inc. This award is subject
to the terms and conditions of this
award and the plan itself, copies of
which are available by clicking on the
Client Home Page button of the
Allergan/Smith Barney Stock Plan
Services website. To view the details
and accept this award, click the
button below.




To ACCEPT this award

Go to details




Bottom of Form




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Date of Vest 

	 	Shares Vesting

Over the Period
	 	Vesting in Period

Occurs
	 	Last Date to

Exercise
	 	 
	Feb-09-2009

	 	 	4,000	 	 	End of Period
	 	Feb-08-2015
	 	 






Authorized by:

David E.I. Pyott, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief

Executive Officer
Exhibit (32)



SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Owens Corning (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2005 (the
Report), I, David T. Brown, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ David T. Brown     
|Chief Executive Officer
|                       
|November 2, 2005       



---

Exhibit (32)



SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Owens Corning (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2005 (the
Report), I, Michael H. Thaman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Michael H. Thaman  
|Chief Financial Officer
|                       
|November 2, 2005
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In the Matter of: COBALIS

CORPORATION,

 Debtor,

COBALIS CORPORATION and

MONTENEGREX, by Rey Olsen,

 Appellants,

 v.

YA GLOBAL INVESTMENTS LP,

 Appellee.

No. 13-57078

D.C. No. 8:13-cv-00269-JLS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 9, 2016

Pasadena, California

FILED

FEB 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: BERZON, DAVIS**, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. 

Appellants Cobalis Corporation and Montenegrex appeal from the district

court’s dismissal of their bankruptcy appeal as equitably moot. “In evaluating a

dismissal on equitable mootness grounds, we review factual findings for clear error

and legal conclusions de novo.” JPMCC 2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v.

Transwest Resort Props., Inc. (In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc.), 801 F.3d 1161,

1168 (9th Cir. 2015). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount

them here. We affirm.

This court has set out four considerations to determine whether an appeal is

equitably moot: (1) “whether a stay was sought, for absent that a party has not fully

pursued its rights”; (2) “whether substantial consummation of the plan has

occurred”; (3) “the effect a remedy may have on third parties not before the court”;

and (4) “whether the bankruptcy court can fashion effective and equitable relief

without completely knocking the props out from under the plan and thereby

creating an uncontrollable situation for the bankruptcy court.” Motor Vehicle Cas.

Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869, 881 (9th

 ** The Honorable Andre M. Davis, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.

2
Cir. 2012); see also Rev Op Grp. v. ML Manager LLC (In re Mortgages Ltd.), 771

F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Here, these considerations weigh in favor of equitable mootness. Appellants

did not seek a stay and were not otherwise diligent in challenging the bankruptcy

court’s underlying orders, and their own inaction permitted developments to

proceed without their participation. See In re Mortgages Ltd., 771 F.3d at 1217

(noting that the appellant “sat on its rights, which weighs strongly towards

equitable mootness”). Moreover, the bankruptcy court’s underlying orders have

been substantially consummated. See In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d at

881. In particular, as to the dissolution, the trustee has taken the steps required of

her. Finally, granting Appellants the relief they seek would unravel the settlement

agreement, and “knock[] the props out from under” the related bankruptcy court

orders, “thereby creating an uncontrollable situation for the bankruptcy court.” Id. 

AFFIRMED.

3
CERTIFICATIONS




I, Andrew
Leszczynski, certify that:




1. I have
reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A and all reports on Form 10-D required to be
filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K/A of SACO I
Trust 2006-5 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);




2. Based
on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this report;




3. Based
on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information
required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is
included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;




4. I am
responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicers and based on
my knowledge and the compliance reviews conducted in preparing the servicer
compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB,
and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have
fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements; and




5. All of
the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance
with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in
this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules
13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as
otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance
described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form
10-K/A.




In giving
the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me
by the following unaffiliated parties: EMC Mortgage Corporation, as servicer;
LandAmerica Tax and Flood Services, Inc., as vendor; American Security Insurance
Company, Standard Guaranty Insurance Company, and Safeco Financial Institution
Solutions, Inc. (affiliates of Assurant Inc.), each as vendor; GMAC Mortgage,
LLC, as servicer; GMAC Bank, as vendor; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as
custodian.




Date:
July 22, 2008




LaSalle
Bank National Association, as Master Servicer




/s/ Andrew
Leszczynski


Andrew
Leszczynski


First
Vice President
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of The Pep Boys -Manny, Moe & Jack (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ending May 2,2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”),

 

I,Michael R. Odell, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(i)                                     TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

 
| Date: June 10,  2009 | by:                            | /s/ Michael  R. Odell |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
|                           | Michael  R. Odell              |
|                           | Chief  Executive Officer       |
|                           | (Principal  Executive Officer) |

 

1

----
#### G. P. LAYNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. et al., Defendants-Appellees. *

No. 4970.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Dec. 13, 1935.

For former opinion, see 161 So. 29.

Warren Hunt, of Rayville, for appellant.

Hudson, Potts & Bernstein, of Monroe, for appellees.

*

 Judgment amended on rehearing, see 164 So. 672.

MILLS, Judge.

After carefully reconsidering this case on rehearing, we are of the opinion that our former decree is correct.

It is accordingly reinstated and made the judgment of this court.
#### KNIGHT v. STATE.

4 Div. 135.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

May 14, 1935.

Sollie & Sollie, of Ozark, for appéllant.

A. A. Carmichael, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BRICKEN, Presiding Judge.

The duty devolves upon this court to consider all questions apparent .on the ree* ord. So far as the record shows in this case, the defendant has been tried and- eonvieted *458solely upon a complaint filed by- the solicitor in the circuit court, and this complaint is not predicated upon or supported by any affidavit as the law requires.

It is stated that this prosecution originated in the county court. But nowhere in the record does there appear any affidavit or warrant or other process necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the county court to try this defendant, nor is there any appeal bond in the record. And so far as this court can know, the defendant, if tried in' the county court, was tried upon oral complaint of some alleged aggrieved party, and this the law does not provide. The only manner provided by law for the commencement of a prosecution in this state is by the finding of an indictment or by the swearing out a warrant based upon probable cause of the officer issuing same. The statute provides a party aggrieved, or desiring to bring a charge of misdemeanor before the county court, may apply to the judge thereof, or to some justice of the peace of the county, for a warrant of arrest, and, upon making affidavit in writing that he has probable cause for believing, and does believe, -that an offense (designating the misdemeanor by name, or by some other phrase which in common parlance designates it) has been committed in said county by the accused on the person or property, as the case may be, of Á. B. (naming the person injured), then the judge of said court or the justice of the peace shall examine the affiant under .oath and other witnesses, if he so desires, touching the offense charged in the affidavit, and if the court or justice of thq peace has probable cause for believing that the offense alleged in the affidavit has been committed, he shall issue his warrant of arrest.

In this case, before submission, the Attorney General, representing the state in this court, having noted the insufficiency of the record, applied for and obtained a certiorari seeking to complete the record, but in response thereto the clerk of the lower court certifies: “After the appeal was made to the circuit court from the judgment rendered in the county court, and all the county court papers had been transferred to the circuit court holder, this warrant was lost probably during of after the trial had been had of this cause in the circuit court of this county.”

There is nothing to show that this prosecution was had upon the requisite affidavit and warrant, and as this must affirmatively appear in order to show jurisdiction in, the lower courts, the judgment of conviction based solely upon a complaint filed by the solicitor is void and will not support an appeal. Therefore, this appeal must be dismissed, and the defendant discharged from further custody in this proceeding.

Other questions presented need not be con•sidered.

Appeal dismissed.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, the undersigned officer of THE POTOMAC EDISON COMPANY (the “Company”), hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2006 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

|                       | /s/ Paul J. Evanson                         |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
|  

Date. May  8, 2006 | Paul  J. EvansonPrincipal Executive Officer |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

KHASHION M. GARLAND,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 24 EAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 5th day of June, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6969 

To prohibit the importation of petroleum products from Iran, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 8, 2022 

Mr. BANKS (for himself, Mr. PFLUGER, Mrs. MILLER of Illinois, Mr. 

CAWTHORN, Mr. MCKINLEY, Mr. WALTZ, Mrs. BOEBERT, Mr. 

LATURNER, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. LAMALFA, Mr. C. SCOTT FRANKLIN of Florida, Mr. COLE, Mr. GOHMERT, and Mr. RUTHERFORD) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways 

and Means 

A BILL 

To prohibit the importation of petroleum products from Iran, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No Oil From Terror5 ists Act’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6969 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF IRANIAN PE2 TROLEUM PRODUCTS. 

3 (a) PROHIBITION.—The President shall prohibit the 

4 importation of all petroleum products (as such term is de5 fined in section 3 of the Energy Policy and Conservation 

6 Act (42 U.S.C. 6202)) originating from Iran into the cus7 toms territory of the United States (as such term is de8 fined in General Note 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Sched9 ule). 

10 (b) PENALTIES.—The President is authorized to use 

11 appropriate authorities to impose such civil or criminal 

12 penalties as may be necessary to enforce the prohibition 

13 under subsection (a). 

14 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 

15 For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con16 gressional committees’’ means— 

17 (1) the Speaker of the House of Representa18 tives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate; 

19 (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com20 mittee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed 

21 Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

22 and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

23 of the House of Representatives; and 

24 (3) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com25 mittee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 

26 Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and NatVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:19 Apr 07, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6969.IH H6969

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6969 IH

1 ural Resources, and the Select Committee on Intel2 ligence of the Senate. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-7677

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MARK JAMES KONSAVICH, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge. (5:05-cr-00019-gec-mfu-1; 5:08-cv-80100-gec)

Submitted: December 16, 2009 Decided: January 19, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark James Konsavich, Appellant Pro Se. Jeb Thomas Terrien, Assistant United States Attorney, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Mark James Konsavich seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) motion and denying his motion for reconsideration. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. MillerEl v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and Konsavich’s arguments on appeal and conclude Konsavich has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED