alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
exv10w18



 






	 	 	 	 	 



Exhibit 10.18




FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE NISOURCE INC.

SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT PLAN




(AS AMENDED AND RESTATED EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2004)





     WHEREAS, NiSource Inc. (the “Company”) maintains the NiSource Inc. Supplemental Executive
Retirement Plan, as amended and restated effective January 1, 2004 (the “Plan”); and



     WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 7.5 of the Plan, the Company deems it desirable to amend the Plan as
described below.



     NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended, effective January 28, 2005, as follows:



     1. The first two sentences of Section 7.5 are amended to read as follows:




“The Committee may amend any provision of the Plan. In addition, the Chairman of
the Board of Directors may amend any provision of the Plan, except for Articles III,
IV and V which may only be amended by the Committee. The Committee may terminate
the Plan at any time, except that any benefits that are payable due to a Retirement,
death, disability, or other termination of employment occurring prior to the
amendment or termination shall not be reduced or discontinued.”



     2. Section 7.7 is amended to read as follows:




“7.7 Action by Company. Any action required of, or permitted by, the
Company under the Plan shall be by resolution of the Committee, or by a person or
persons authorized by resolution of the Committee.”



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this First Amendment to be executed on its behalf, by
its officer duly authorized, this 28th day of January, 2005.


	 	 	 	 	 
	 	NISOURCE INC.

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ S. LaNette Zimmerman
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-41336

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOE GONZALEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:13-CR-1641-1

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Joe Gonzalez appeals his jury trial convictions and concurrent 72-month

sentences for conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver 100 kilograms or more 

of marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), 846, and for possession 

with intent to deliver 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, see §§ 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(B), 846; 18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 13, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-41336 Document: 00513152685 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/13/2015
No. 14-41336

2

We reject Gonzalez’s claim that the district court plainly erred by failing 

to instruct the jury that an agreement with a government agent cannot form 

the basis for a conspiracy conviction. See Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 

142 (5th Cir. 1975). Even if a Sears instruction may have been appropriate, 

we pretermit the question whether the failure to give it was error. See United 

States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 342 & n.28 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United 

States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008). If there was error, 

Gonzalez has not shown that it was “reversible plain error.” Delgado, 672 F.3d 

at 343. 

Gonzalez “never advanced the argument that [he] conspired only with a 

government agent.” Delgado, 672 F.3d at 343. Instead, his argument focused 

on discrediting the Government’s confidential informant, someone the defense 

painted as an untrustworthy felon eager to be remunerated by the Government 

for producing a drug trafficking conviction. Gonzalez’s theory of defense was 

that there was no conspiracy at all—that there was only the informant placing 

and planting ideas in law enforcement agents’ heads. “Thus, the lack of a Sears

instruction did not impede [Gonzalez’s] defense” and provides no “grounds for 

reversal.” Delgado, 672 F.3d at 343 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

We reject also Gonzalez’s contention that the district court abused its 

discretion by propounding a deliberate ignorance instruction. See United 

States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2007). Any error in giving such 

an instruction is harmless if substantial evidence showing actual knowledge 

was adduced at trial, as happened in Gonzalez’s case. See United States v.

McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 341 (5th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-41336 Document: 00513152685 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/13/2015
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-13-00049-CR

Allen Maroyd Deloach, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM DISTRICT COURT OF LAMPASAS COUNTY, 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 8931, HONORABLE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

PER CURIAM

Appellant has filed a notice of appeal from his conviction for evading arrest.

Appellant’s brief was due on June 12, 2013. On July 2, 2013, we notified appellant’s counsel that

the brief was overdue and that if we did not receive a satisfactory response on or before July 12,

2013, a hearing before the district court pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b) would be ordered. To

date, the brief has not been received, nor have we received a response to our notice.

We therefore abate the cause and remand it to the trial court to hold a hearing

in accordance with rule 38.8 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)(2), (3).

The trial court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether appellant still wishes to prosecute

this appeal, whether appellant is indigent, and whether counsel has abandoned the appeal. See id.

If appellant desires to appeal and is indigent, the trial court should make appropriate orders to

ensure that appellant is adequately represented on appeal. See id. A record of the hearing, including
copies of all findings and any orders, shall be forwarded to the Clerk of this Court for filing as a

supplemental record no later than thirty days from the date of this opinion. See id.

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Field

Abated

Filed: August 14, 2013

Do Not Publish

2
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7043 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7043

 To prohibit United States recognition of the claims of sovereignty of 
       South Ossetia or Abkhazia within the Republic of Georgia.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 9, 2022

  Mr. Perry introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit United States recognition of the claims of sovereignty of 
       South Ossetia or Abkhazia within the Republic of Georgia.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Republic of Georgia Sovereignty 
Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF THE CLAIMS OF 
              SOVEREIGNTY OF SOUTH OSSETIA OR ABKHAZIA WITHIN THE 
              REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States not 
to recognize the claims of sovereignty of the following areas within 
the Republic of Georgia:
            (1) South Ossetia.
            (2) Abkhazia.
    (b) Prohibition.--In accordance with subsection (a), no Federal 
department or agency may take any action or extend any assistance that 
implies recognition of the claims of sovereignty of South Ossetia or 
Abkhazia within the Republic of Georgia, or any other closely-related 
successor entities.
                                 <all>
```
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GURVIR SINGH SAMRA,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney

General,

Respondent. No. 14

- 72854

Agency No. A098

- 515

- 911

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 8, 2017 **

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS , Circuit Judges.

Gurvir Singh Samra , a native and citizen of India, petitions pro se for review

of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an

immigration j udge’ s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 16 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 72854

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the

agency’s factual finding s

, Silaya v. Mukasey , 524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008),

and we deny the petition for review.

The agency found Samra established past persecution, but his presumption

of a well

- founded fear of future persecution was rebutted with evidence that Sa m r a

could safely and reasonably relocate within India to avoid harm. Substantial

evidence supports this finding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) ; Gonzalez

- Hernandez

v. Ashcroft , 336 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir . 2003) (internal relocation finding

supported even in the face of somewhat contradictory or ambiguous background

information) . We reject Sa mra ’s contentions that the agency’s analysis was

insufficient. Thus, his asylum claim fails.

In this case, because Samra failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he

failed to satisfy the standard for withholding of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales

,

453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Finally, s ubstantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Sa mra ’s CAT

claim becau se Sa mra did not demonstrate it is more likely than not he would be

tortured in India by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government. See

Alphonsus v. Holder , 705 F.3d 1031, 1049

- 50 (9th Cir. 2013)

.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### Robert Roth, Appellant, v American International Life Assurance Company of New York, Respondent.

In an action to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Nahman, J.), dated October 11, 1988, as denied his motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendant has offered evidence raising questions of fact concerning possible material misrepresentations regarding the *379decedent’s medical history which were disclosed in his application for a life insurance policy *(see, Berger v United States Life Ins. Co.,*158 AD2d 440; *Leamy v Berkshire Life Ins. Co.,*39 NY2d 271; *Wittner v IDS Ins. Co.,*96 AD2d 1053). Additionally, there are questions of fact as to whether the defendant would have insured the decedent had it known of his condition *(see, Meagher v Executive Life Ins. Co.,*148 AD2d 426; *Di Pippo v Prudential Ins. Co.,*88 AD2d 631; *Wittner v IDS Ins. Co., supra).*Therefore, summary judgment was properly denied. Brown, J. P., Lawrence, Kooper and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1



                       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                        AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
              SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Portsmouth Square, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2007,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I John V. Winfield, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge,
that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
    15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
    Company.


Date: May 11, 2007                              /s/ John V. Winfield
                                                ----------------------------
                                                John V. Winfield, President
                                                and Chief Executive Officer




[A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Portsmouth Square, Inc. and will be retained by Portsmouth
Square, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.]
Filed 3/22/11 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2011 ND 43

Yellow Book Sales and 

Distributing Co., Inc., Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Bolinske Partnership, 

Robert V. Bolinske, individually 

and Robert V. Bolinske, Jr., 

individually, Defendants

Robert V. Bolinske, Appellant

No. 20100283

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable John E. Greenwood, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Dennis William Lindquist (argued), 41 7th Street SE, P.O. Box 1783, Dickinson, ND 58602-1783, for plaintiff and appellee.

Robert V. Bolinske (submitted on brief), self-represented, 515 East Broadway, Suite 103, Bismarck, ND 58501, defendant and appellant.

Yellow Book Sales v. Bolinske Partnership

No. 20100283

Per Curiam.

[¶1]Robert V. Bolinske appeals the district court’s order denying him a new trial and the district court’s judgment, entered after a jury trial, awarding Yellow Book Sales and Distributing Company damages.  The judgment is supported by substantial evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion.  We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3) and (4).

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Mary Muehlen Maring

Carol Ronning Kapsner

Dale V. Sandstrom
**Exhibit
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of SRKP 10, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
      10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard A.
      Rappaport, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
      ss.
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
                    Richard A. RappaportRichard
                        A. Rappaport
                      Principal
                        Executive Officer
                      March
                        14, 2007
(173 La. 688)

#### TRI-STATE TRANSIT COMPANY OF LOUISIANA, Inc., v. E. A. CONWAY, Supervisor of Public Accounts.

No. 31318.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 3, 1931.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1931.

Peyton R. Sandoz, of New Orleans (Robert J. O’Neal, of Shreveport, of counsfel), for the State ánd E. A. Conway, Supervisor of Public Accounts of Louisiana.

Dickson & Denny, of Shreveport, for TriState Transit Company of Louisiana, Inc.

ODOM, J.

There are involved in this suit the same issues as were disposed of in the cases of State of Louisiana v. W. H. Johnson, Receiver (La. Sup.) 138 So. 503, and State of Louisiana v. Tri-State Transit Co. of Louisiana, Inc. (La. Sup.) 138 So. 507, this day decided.

Here it is alleged that the state, through its agents, is interfering with plaintiff’s business of carrying interstate passengers and freight in motor buses and trucks by attempting to collect a tax on the gasoline used as fuel for that purpose, alleging that the state has no authority to collect such tax and that the act of the Legislature under which the tax for such purpose is levied is unconstitutional. Plaintiff prayed that the state be permanently enjoined from further attempts to collect the tax.

There was judgment in the district court granting the injunction as prayed, and the state appealed.

Under our holding in the two cases above referred to, the judgment appealed from is erroneous and must be reversed.

For the reasons assigned in the cases of State of Louisiana v. W. H. Johnson, Receiver, and State of Louisiana v. Tri-state Transit Co. of Louisiana, Inc., hereinabove referred to and this day decided, it is ordered and decreed that the judgment appealed from be reversed and set aside, and that the injunction sued out be dissolved and plaintiff’s demands rejected and its suit dismissed at its costs.
Exhibit
32.1
 
 Certification
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Swordfish Financial, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the
undersigned, in the capacities listed below, hereby certifies, pursuant to
18U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:  (i) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (ii) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 Swordfish
      Financial, Inc.Date:
      December 28, 2009
              By:
      /s/ Mike AlexanderMike
      AlexanderChief
      Executive Officer and President(principal
      executive officer)Date:
      December 28, 2009
              By:
      /s/ Randy MoseleyRandy
      MoseleyChief
      Financial Officer(principal
      financial officer)
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Swordfish Financial, Inc. and will be retained by Swordfish Financial, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T DU AN E DI XO N, P la in tif

f - A p p e llan t, v. DE P AR T ME NT OF C OR R E C T I ON S A N D R E H A B I L I T A T I O N ; e t a l., D efen d an t s - A p p el l ees. N o. 11- 16778 D. C. No . 1 : 1 0 - c v - 0 1 2 2 5 - LJ O- DLB ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e E a s te rn D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia L aw r e nc e J . O ’ N e i l l , D i s tr i c tJudge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d O c t obe r9, 2012 ** B efo re: R A W L IN S O N , M U R G U IA , an dW A T F O R D , C i rcu i tJu d g es. D uane D i xo n, a C al i forni a s t at e pri soner, appeal s pro se fr om the di stri ct c o u rt’s ju d g m e n t d is m is s in g h is 4 2 U .S .C . § 1 9 8 3 a c tio n a lle g in g th a t d e f e n d an ts w er e del i berat el y i nd i ff er entt o h i s s er i ou s m edi ca l needs w i th res pectt o h i s hea d 

# FI LED OC T 16 2012 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS11- 16778 2 w ound. W e have j ur i s di c t i on unde r28 U . S . C . § 1291. W e r e vi e w de novo a d is m is s a l u n d e r2 8 U .S .C . § 1 9 1 5 A . R es ni ck v. H ayes , 21 3 F . 3d 44 3, 44 7 (9th C i r. 2000) . W e r e vi e w f

oran abus e of

di s c r e t i on ade c i s i on t o di s m i s s ac om pl a i nt w ith o u t le av e to a m e n d . L o p ezv . Sm ith , 20 3 F . 3d 11 22 , 11 30 (9th C i r. 20 00 ) ( en banc ) . W e va c a t e and r e m and. D i s m i s s a l w i thoutl e ave t o am e nd w a s pr e m a tur e be c aus e i ti s not

“ abs ol ut e l yc l e ar ” tha tthe de f i c i e nc i e s of

the c om pl a i ntc oul d notbe c ur e d by a m e n d m e n t. W

ei lb u rgv. Sh a

p i ro , 4 8 8 F .3 d1 2 0 2 , 1 2 0 5 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 7 ) ; see a l so Jones v . B ock , 54 9 U . S . 19 9, 21 6 (20 07 ) ( ho l di ng thatfa i l ure t o exh austi s an af fi rm at i ve defense un der the P ri son L i t i gat i on R ef orm A ctand thati nm at es ar e n o treq u i redt o sp eci al l y p l eado r d em o n strat e ex h au st i o n i n th ei r co m p l ai n t s) . A cc ordi ng l y, w e vac at e the j ud gm entand rem and t o al l ow D i xo n t o fi l e an a m e n d e dc o m p la in t. V A C A T E D a n d R E M A N D E D .
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Securities
and Exchange Commission Form 10-Q for the six-months ended June 28, 1998 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                    1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               Jun-28-1998
<CASH>                                          37,700
<SECURITIES>                                    12,600
<RECEIVABLES>                                  524,900
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (35,300)
<INVENTORY>                                    544,200
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,388,200
<PP&E>                                       1,882,700
<DEPRECIATION>                              (1,377,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,120,300
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,088,100
<BONDS>                                        300,100
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        75,400
<OTHER-SE>                                     365,200
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,120,300
<SALES>                                        855,300
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               855,300
<CGS>                                          498,800
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  863,500
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                10,500
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,600
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (8,200)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (2,900)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (5,300)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (5,300)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.12)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.12)
        

</TABLE>