In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 97-3870

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

William J. Stoecker,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

No. 95 CR 118--Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

Argued February 9, 2000--Decided June 1, 2000

 Before Bauer, Easterbrook, and Ripple,

Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. On March 4, 1997,

a jury found William Stoecker guilty on

numerous counts of bank fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 1344, making

false statements to financial

institutions in violation of 18 U.S.C.

sec. 1014, and giving or receiving bribes

in exchange for procuring loans in

violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 215. Stoecker

was sentenced to 90 months imprisonment,

to be followed by three years of

supervised release, and $121,652,607.00

in restitution. He appeals his conviction

and sentence.

 Stoecker was the sole owner of the

Grabill Corporation. Grabill held stock

for four other holding companies (Camdon

Companies, Inc., the Techna Group, Ltd.,

Windsor-Hamilton, Ltd., and Foxxford

Group, Ltd.), which in turn owned

subsidiary or operating companies. As a

result of a major bank fraud scheme,

eight banks loaned Grabill $150 million.

Stoecker’s scheme consisted of presenting

false financial statements and pledging

the same stock as collateral to more than

one bank. By December 1988, Grabill could
not meet its loan repayment obligations.

When the bankruptcy trustee sold the

companies assets and distributed the

resulting proceeds, the banks were left

with a loss of more than $82 million.

 Stoecker first argues that the district

court improperly limited his crossexamination of the government’s witness,

Richard Bock. Stoecker wanted to question

Bock about an administrative complaint

filed against him by the Illinois

Department of Registration and Education

(DRE). The DRE terminated its complaint

against Bock after he voluntarily gave up

his real estate license. Stoecker claims

that this evidence went to Bock’s

credibility as a witness. The district

court deferred its ruling until a voir

dire of the witness was held.

 During voir dire, Bock testified that he

was the senior vice-president of finance

for the real estate brokerage firm

Quinlan & Tyson. While he was working

there, the DRE conducted an audit of the

firm and found a $300,000 shortfall in

the escrow accounts. As a result, the DRE

filed a complaint against Quinlan &

Tyson, Bock, and William Jennings, owner

of the firm. Jennings surrendered his

license and three months later committed

suicide. Bock maintained his innocence

but voluntarily agreed to give up his

real estate licence. The DRE then dropped

its complaint against Bock. Based on this

testimony, the district court found the

testimony regarding the DRE complaint

inadmissable.

 Limitations on cross-examination are

reviewed for abuse of discretion when

there are no implications of the

defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.

United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907,

920 (7th Cir. 1999).

 In Saunders, the court did not permit

cross-examination of the government

witness on a report that he had been

investigated for bias in favor of the

government by the Department of Justice

Office of Inspector General. Id. at 918.

The court, in making its determination,

stated that "specific instances of

conduct may, in the discretion of the

court, be introduced for the purpose of

attacking a witness’ credibility, the

probative value of such evidence must

still outweigh the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury." See Fed.R.Evid.

608(b)./1 Because the Department of

Justice did not take disciplinary action

against the agent, the court denied the

defense request. 

 In this case, the district court

determined that the prejudicial value of

the DRE complaint outweighed the

probative value of the evidence for

impeachment purposes. The evidence was

unrelated and far too remote to be

probative and it would have been unfairly

prejudicial. In fact, the DRE complaint

was over fifteen years old, no final

assessment of guilt was ever made, nor

was Bock ever required to pay

restitution. Further, even if there had

been a conviction, it would have been

inadmissible. The court would not have

allowed the prior conviction into

evidence pursuant to section 609(b) of

the Federal Rules of Evidence,/2 which

provides that any conviction over ten

years old is inadmissable unless its

probative value substantially outweighs

its prejudicial value. We find that the

district court did not abuse its

discretion in preventing Stoecker from

cross-examining Bock about the complaint.

 Stoecker next argues that the district

court erred in admitting Bock’s 1991

statements to FBI investigators as a

prior consistent statement under federal

rule 801(d)(1)(B). Bock testified about

the fraudulent activities of Stoecker and

the Grabill Corporation. As the chief

financial officer for Grabill, Bock knew

of and assisted Stoecker in making

misrepresentations to banks for the

purpose of obtaining loans from them.

Because of a plea agreement, Stoecker

urged on cross-examination that Bock had

an incentive to testify falsely. 

 Following the cross-examination, the

government moved to admit the plea

agreement and prior consistent statements

of Bock. The government argued that the

1991 statements were made several years

before the plea agreement and before Bock

had any motive to lie. The court ruled

that in order to enter the prior

consistent statements, the government had

to redirect Bock. Before doing so, the

court permitted defense counsel to

conduct a voir dire examination of Bock.

Following the voir dire, the judge denied
the admissibility of the plea agreement

but did admit the prior consistent

statements.

 Evidentiary rulings of the trial judge

are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110,

1114 (7th Cir. 1992). A four-part test

has been established to allow the

admission of prior consistent statements

under Federal Rules of Evidence

801(d)(1)(B) to rehabilitate a witness:

1) the declarant testifies at trial and

is subject to cross- examination; 2) the

prior statement is consistent with the

declarant’s trial testimony; 3) the

statement is offered to rebut an express

or implied charge of recent fabrication

or improper motive; and, 4) the statement

was made before the declarant had a

motive to fabricate.

Id. at 1114; United States v. Lewis, 954

F.2d 1386, 1391 (7th Cir. 1992). Stoecker

contends that the third and fourth

criteria have not been satisfied.

 The third prong permits admission of

prior consistent statements if there has

been an express or implied charge of

recent fabrication. Between the questions

on cross-examination and voir dire, the

court correctly inferred that the

questions were designed to imply that

Bock fabricated his testimony. During

voir dire, Stoecker asked Bock several

times if he knew the implications of his

trial testimony under the plea agreement.

Specifically, that any reduction in his

sentence was up to the government. The

court correctly found that Stoecker’s

intent was to imply Bock was acting in

his own self interest. 

 As for the final prong, the rule

requires that the statement have been

made before the declarant had a motive to

fabricate. Here, the statements in

question were made in 1991, approximately

four years before the original indictment

and five years before the plea agreement. 

Because these statements were made

several years earlier, the court

determined that Bock did not have a

motive to fabricate. The court reasoned

that to do so would imply that everyone

who makes a statement to law enforcement

officers has reason to fabricate. The

court relied on United States v. West,
670 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1982), to admit

the statements only through the redirect

of Bock, not through the FBI agent to

whom they were made. Because, as we said

in Fulford, reasonable minds can differ

as to when one first possessed a motive

to fabricate, the court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the prior

consistent statements. Fulford, at 1114.

 Stoecker argues that Fulford is no

longer instructive because of the Supreme

Court’s decision in United States v.

Tome, 513 U.S. 150, 154. The court in

Tome did not allow admission of the prior

consistent statements because the

statements were made after the witness

had a motive to lie. Id. But the court

specifically stated that a consistent

statement that predates the motive is a

square rebuttal to implication that the

witness had a motive to lie. Id. at 158.

That is exactly what happened here. The

judge determined that the statements Bock

made predated the plea agreement by

approximately five years. The court found

that the plea agreement could establish a

motive and did not allow that to be

admitted into evidence. Further, Stoecker

had the opportunity to re-cross-examine

Bock, unlike Tome, where witnesses other

than the declarant were questioned. We

believe that the court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the prior

consistent statements of Bock.

 Stoecker next contends that the district

court erred in admitting five stock

pledge charts into evidence. The charts

detailed which stocks Grabill pledged as

security for its loans and revealed that,

in several instances, the same stock was

pledged to more than one bank. The

government suggested that the charts were

a summary of the witness testimony

regarding dates and pledges that the jury

might forget during the course of a long

trial. The court admitted the charts

under section 1006 of the Federal Rules

of Evidence which provides:

The contents of voluminous writings,

recordings, or photographs which cannot

conveniently be examined in court may be

presented in the form of a chart,

summary, or calculation. The originals,

or duplicates, shall be made available

for examination or copying, or both, by

other parties at reasonable time and

place. The court may order that they be
produced in court.

Fed. R. Evid. 1006.

 In United States v. Swanquist, 161 F.3d

1064 (7th Cir. 1998), we upheld the

admission of charts to the jury comparing

the defendant’s "disclosed" loans with

his "actual outstanding loans." Id. at

1070. The jury was then instructed that

the charts were to be used only as an aid

in evaluating the other evidence. Id. at

1073. In United States v. Robbins, 197

F.3d 829, 837 (7th Cir. 1999), we stated

"the basic purpose of the summary exhibit

was to recapitulate the numerous and

voluminous exhibits that had already been

introduced into evidence and that were

difficult to sort out." The same is true

here and the court properly instructed

the jury to analyze the underlying

evidence on which the charts were based.

Therefore the court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the pledge

charts.

 Finally, with respect to restitution,

Stoecker argues that the court did not

take into account his ability to pay res

titution nor did it inquire into the

determination of the bankruptcy court.

Once more, we review the district court’s

calculation of restitution for an abuse

of discretion. United States v. Newman,

144 F.3d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1998).

 In Newman we explained that the

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of

1996, 18 U.S.C. sec. 3663A, discarded the

discretionary balancing system. Id. The

court no longer has discretion as to

whether or not to impose restitution on a

defendant who has an inability to pay.

Newman, at 537. The court went on to say

that the defendant’s ability to pay will

only be addressed when setting up a

payment schedule. Id. Because the MVRA

applies to any conviction imposed on or

after April 24, 1996 and Stoecker was

convicted in 1997, his arguments must

fail. The district court did not abuse

its discretion in ordering Stoecker to

pay restitution.

 For the foregoing reasons the district

court is affirmed.

/1 Rule 608(b) provides: Specific instances

of conduct. Specific instances of the

conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness’

credibility, . . . may not be proved by

extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in

the discretion of the court, if probative

of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be

inquired into on cross-examination of a

witness (1) concerning the witness’

character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the

character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness of another witness as to

which character the witness being

cross-examined has testified.

/2 Rule 609(b) provides: Time limit.

Evidence of a conviction under this rule

is not admissible if a period of more

than ten years has elapsed since the date

of the conviction or of the release of

the witness from the confinement imposed

for that conviction, whichever is the

later date, unless the court determines,

in the interests of justice, that the

probative value of the conviction

supported by specific facts and

circumstances substantially outweighs its

prejudicial effect.