* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 14, 2006 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DEWEY I. COFFMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 05-6218
v. (D.C. No. 02-CV-1625-F) ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture, (W. D. Okla.)

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , McKAY, and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record , this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) terminated Appellant’s employment in May 1997 after two board- certified psychologists determined that he suffered from a delusional disor der and that returning him to-2-

his former position would pose a substantial risk t o himself and to others. No reasonable accommodation could be made for his retu rn to duty. After his termination, Appellant brought two lawsuits in district court alleging discrimination on the grounds of reprisal, disabili ty, and age. The district court in Coffman v. Glickman , CIV-99-1797-F, granted summary judgment to Defend ant Secretary Veneman’s predecessor, finding that the u ncontroverted facts supported the USDA’s decision. In the case before us, the di strict court granted summary judgment on the grounds of claim preclusion and iss ue preclusion, finding that the matters presented were alleged and adjudicated in Coffman v. Glickman

. Claim preclusion prevents parties from re-litigatin g issues that were or could have been raised in an action that has receiv ed a final judgment on the merits. For claim preclusion to apply, the followi ng elements must exist: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior action; (2) identity of parties or privies in the two suits, (3) identity of the cause of action in the two suits; and (4) a full and fair opportunity to litigate the prior action. Nwosun v. General Mills Restaurants , 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997). The districtcourt found that the first, second, and fourth elements had been met. Order, 5 (W.D. Okla. June 7, 2005). As to the third element, whether the instant suit a lleges the same cause of action as in the prior case of Coffman v. Glickman , the court found that complaints in both actions were extremely similar. Id . at 5-6. The district court, in its-3-

extremely detailed review, also considered whether all potential claims alleged in this complaint could have been alleged in the earli er action and concluded: Applying the general rule that all claims arising f rom the same employment relationship constitute the same transac tion or series of transactions for claim preclusion purposes, it make s no difference whether plaintiff first alleged claims based on rep risals for whistleblowing in the instant action; those claims could have been alleged in the 1999 action because they are predicated upon plaintiff’s employment. Id . at 7-8. Finally, the district court found that i ssue preclusion also entitled Defendant to summary judgment. Id . at 16. Although “issue preclusion bars a narrower group of claims” than claim preclusion, th e court, “out of an abundance of caution” analyzed the issue preclusion argument even after finding that claim preclusion was satisfied. Id . at 15. We have carefully reviewed the briefs of the Appell ant and the Appellee, the district court’s disposition, and the record on appeal. We have conducted a de novo review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment, and for substantially the same reasons set forth by the dis trict court in its August 7, 2005, Order, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s comp laint.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge