### INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE ESTERA GRADINARU, Appellant,

STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, Respondent. No. 70138-0-1

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO PUBLISH OPINION



## RespondentWashington State DepartmentofSocial and Health Services and 

## non-party StuartC. Morgan eachfiled amotion to publishthe court's opinion entered March 24, 2014. The courtrequested and appellantfiled ananswertothemotions 

## pursuantto RAP 12.3(e). Afterdue consideration, the panel has determinedthatthe motions should be granted. Now therefore, it is hereby 

### ORDERED that the motions to publish the opinion are granted. 

# Donethis /^clayofMay, 2014. FOR THE PANEL: r»o o o f>o

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Verellen, J. —When a caretaker uses a vulnerable adult's property to further 

### the caretaker's own goal, even ifself-destructive, such use constitutes financial 

### exploitation as defined by former RCW 74.34.020(6) (2010). The Department ofSocial and Health Services (Department) did not err in concluding that Estera Gradinaru financially exploited a vulnerable adult when she used that adult's morphine in a failed suicide attempt. We affirm.
FACTS In October 2010, Gradinaru was the co-owner of an adult family home in Bellevue. Elaine, one of the residents of the home, was in hospice care and had been 

### prescribed "comfortmedications," including liquid morphine, for end oflife treatment.1 On October 12, Gradinaru was emotionally distressed and in physical pain. She took Elaine's morphine with her to a park and ride and ingested one-halfcapful ofthe 

### 1The parties referto Elaine only by herfirst name.No. 70138-0-1/2 morphine, which made her feel sleepy. Her father arrived at the park and ride and Gradinaru was taken to Overlake Hospital. She was admitted to the psychiatric unit after she told the treating staffthat she ingested the morphine in a failed suicide attempt. The Department investigated and made a preliminary finding that Gradinaru 

### financially exploited a vulnerable adult. On appeal, an administrative lawjudge issued

an initial order reversing the Department's finding. The Department petitioned the Board ofAppeals (Board) to review the initial order. In its review decision and final order, the Board concluded that Gradinaru financially exploited a vulnerable adult. Gradinaru appealed to King County Superior Court, which affirmed the Board's review
decision and final order. Gradinaru appeals. DISCUSSION Gradinaru argues that her failed suicide attempt was not "financial exploitation" of 

### avulnerable adult as thatterm isdefined in former RCW74.34.020(6).2 Wedisagree.
2In 2011, the statute was updated. RCW 74.34.020(6) now states: "Financial exploitation" means the illegal or improper use, control over, or withholding ofthe property, income, resources, or trust funds of the vulnerable adult by any person or entity for any person's or entity's profit or advantage other than for the vulnerable adult's profit or advantage. "Financial exploitation" includes, but is not limited to: (a) The use of deception, intimidation, or undue influence by a person or entity in a position oftrust and confidence with a vulnerable adult to obtain or use the property, income, resources, or trust funds of the vulnerable adult for the benefit of a person or entity other than the vulnerable adult; (b) The breach of a fiduciary duty, including, but not limited to, the misuse of a power ofattorney, trust, or a guardianship appointment, that results in the unauthorized appropriation, sale, or transfer ofthe property, income, resources, or trust funds ofthe vulnerable adult for the benefit of a person or entity other than the vulnerable adult; orNo. 70138-0-1/3 

### The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs our review ofthe Board's 

### decision.3 "The burden ofdemonstrating theinvalidity ofagency action is on theparty asserting invalidity."4 Wewill reverseifthe Board "erroneously interpreted orapplied the law."5 Theinterpretation of"financial exploitation" raises a question oflaw and is reviewed de novo under the error of law standard.6 The Abuse ofVulnerable Adults Act (Act) was enacted to protect vulnerable adults who "may be subjected to abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or abandonment 

### by a family member, care provider, or other person who has a relationship with the 

### vulnerable adult."7 Former RCW74.34.020(6) defines "financial exploitation" as "the illegal or improper use ofthe property, income, resources, or trust funds ofthe vulnerable adult by any person for any person's profit or advantage other than for the vulnerable adult's profit or advantage." A finding offinancial exploitation prohibits an individual from being employed in a capacity that would allow him or her to have 

### unsupervised access tovulnerable adults.8

(c) Obtaining or using a vulnerable adult's property, income, resources, or trust funds without lawful authority, by a person or entity who knows or clearly should know that the vulnerable adult lacks the capacity to consent to the release or use of his or her property, income, resources, or trust funds. 

### 3See RCW 34.05.570; Utterv. Dep'tofSoc. andHealth Servs.. 140Wn. App. 293, 299, 165 P.3d 399 (2007). 

### 4RCW34.05.570(1)(a). 5RCW 34.05.570(3)(d). 

### 6RCW 34.05.570(3)(d); Life Care Ctrs. ofAm.. Inc. v. Dep'tofSoc. &Health Servs., 162 Wn. App. 370, 374, 254 P.3d 919 (2011). 

### 7RCW 74.34.005(1) (legislative findings). 8FormerRCW 74.39A.050(8) (2011).No. 70138-0-1/4 Gradinaru contends that her use ofthe morphine did not constitute an 

### "advantage" to her because attempting suicide is not medically beneficial. The term "advantage" is not defined inthe Act. Undefined words in a statute are 

### accorded theirordinary meanings.9 Thedictionary defines "advantage" as "amore 

### favorable orimproved position orcondition
. . . benefit, profit, orgain ofany kind."10 In the context of this statute, a person engaging inthe unauthorized use of a vulnerable 

### adult's property receives an advantage when that use benefits or facilitates the goals of the person using the property, whether or not that goal is wise or healthy. 

### Anyattempt at suicide is troubling, but the question presented here is whether the use ofElaine's property benefited Gradinaru by allowing her to further her goal,
even ifself-destructive, and thus was a use prohibited underthe statute. Gradinaru's 

### goals were advanced by gainingaccess to Elaine's morphine. Gradinaru did not have to spend her own money or timefinding some other source of morphine. And it is undisputed that Gradinaru's use of Elaine's morphine did notprofit oradvantage Elaine. Gradinaru argues that it is not reasonable to construe an attemptto commit suicide as an acttaken forthe benefit or gain ofthe actor because itresults in medical 

### harm. But nothing in the statute requires the court or the Departmentto consider 

### whether the illegal or improper use of the victim's medication was helpful orharmful to the individual who used the medication. The focus ofthe statute is to protect vulnerable 

### adults. Allowing an exception for using a vulnerable adult's property in a way that is

9State v. Standifer. 110 Wn.2d 90, 92, 750 P.2d 258 (1988) ("Words are given 

### the meaning provided by the statute or, in the absence of specificdefinition, their ordinary meaning."). 

### 10Webster's Third New International Dictionary 30 (2002).No. 70138-0-1/5 

### harmful would lead to an absurdresult.11 Forexample, ifadrug addict steals a vulnerable adult's medication for his own illicit use, he should not evade a finding of 

### financial exploitation because his drug use ismedically harmful tohim.12 Gradinaru argues that the Board's interpretation leads to absurd results. Specifically, she contends that, under the Board's interpretation, any person who attempts to commit suicide using property stolen from a vulnerable adult (a gun, a rope, etcetera) will be liable for financial exploitation. But this result is consistent with the purpose ofthe statute: to protect a vulnerable adult who is unable to protect herselfby penalizing an individual who improperly or illegally uses that vulnerable adult's property for her own purpose in a way that does not benefit the vulnerable adult. Next, Gradinaru argues that the Board's interpretation ofthe statute is improper because itdoes not require a "financial" benefitto the user, as implicitly required by the term "financial exploitation." Gradinaru argues that "financial" extends only to a 

### vulnerable adult's"liquid" resources.13 Butherargument ignores that"financial exploitation" is defined by the statute to expressly include the use of "property, income, resources, or trust funds." It is not limited to liquid assets. In this case, the morphine



### 11 Hanqartnerv. City of Seattle. 151 Wn.2d 439, 448, 90 P.3d 26 (2004) ("We will not interpret a statute in a manner that leads to an absurd result."). 

### 12 Gradinaru argues thatcomparison to a drug addict isinappropriate because (1) the drug addict benefits financially because he saves money by using stolen medications rather than buying them, and (2) the drug addict harms the vulnerable adult because those medications are no longer available for the vulnerable adult's use. 

### Because she arguably benefited financially by using Elaine's morphine rather than buying her own and because her use ofthe morphine potentially deprived Elaine from using it inthe future, Gradinaru's distinction is not persuasive. 

### 13 Appellant's Br. at 9.No. 70138-0-1/6



### was Elaine's property. Whether Gradinaru chose to sell or use that property, itwas to her own advantage rather than Elaine's advantage and constituted financial exploitation. Finally, Gradinaru argues that the examples of "financial exploitation" provided in 

### thestatute support herargumentthat only useof"financial assets"is prohibited.14 We note that the nonexclusive list ofexamples were not part ofthe statute when the 

### Departmentdetermined thatGradinaru committedfinancial exploitation.15 Even so, the examples include the use of a vulnerable adult's "property, income, resources, or trust 

### funds," and are notlimited to "financial assets."16 Therefore, the recently added examples do not support a different result. 

### Financial exploitation extends to the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable 

### adult's property to further a goal ofthe person who took that property. The Department did not err inconcluding that Gradinaru's illegal taking and use of a patient's morphine
was an act of financial exploitation as defined by the statute. We affirm.

WE CONCUR: 

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14Appellant's Br. at 9-10. 15 Loeffelholz v. Univ. ofWashington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 271, 285 P.3d 854 (2012) 

### (courts presume that a statute applies prospectively, unless the legislature intends otherwise or the amendment is remedial in nature). 

### 16 RCW 74.34.020(6)(c).