Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 168 / Thursday, August 28, 2008 / Notices 50819 

(1997); YKK (U.S.A.) Inc.,116 F.T.C. 628 (1993); AE 

Clevite, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 389 (1993); Quality Trailer 

Products,115 F.T.C. 944 (1992); FTC v. Mead 

Johnson & Co., Civ. No. 92-1366 (D.D.C. June 11, 

1992), press release available at (http:// 

www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F93/mead-ahp24.htm.) 

7 This category is illustrated by the cases 

involving minimum advertised prices for CDs. See 

BMG Music, Docket No. C-3973 (Aug. 30, 2000); 

Capital Records, Docket No. C-3975 (Aug. 30, 2000); 

Sony Music Entertainment, Docket No. C-3971 

(Aug. 30, 2000); Time-Warner, Inc., Docket No. C3972 (Aug. 30, 2000); Universal Music and Video 

Distribution, Docket No. C- 3974 (Aug. 30, 2000). 

See also FTC v. Mead Johnson & Co., supra. 

8 Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) 

(misrepresentation of patent rights to a standardsetting body); Negotiated Data Solutions (‘‘N-Data’’), 

File No. 051-0094 (press release Jan. 23, 2008) 

(provisionally accepting consent subject to public 

comments) (reneging on prior commitment made to 

a standard setting body). 

9 II P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 

¶ 302h (2nd ed. 2000 Supp. 2007) (proposing this 

interpretation of Section 5). 

facilitate collusion or collusion-like 

results in the absence of an agreement;7

and misconduct relating to standard 

setting.8 Because the complaints in 

these matters did not allege all the 

elements of a Sherman Act violation, 

the Commission’s theory of liability 

rested on a broader reach of Section 5. 

As consents, none of these matters have 

been reviewed by a court. 

The workshop will examine three 

topics: (1) the history of Section 5, 

including Congress’s enactment, the 

FTC’s enforcement, and the courts’

response; (2) the range of possible 

interpretations of Section 5; and (3) 

examples of business conduct that may 

be unfair methods of competition 

addressable by Section 5. The 

Commission particularly seeks the input 

of the business community in preparing 

this last topic. 

The Commission invites public 

comment on questions relevant to these 

topics, including: 

1. What principles concerning the 

scope of Section 5 can be garnered from 

Supreme Court and appellate court 

decisions? 

2. What legal, economic, and policy 

concerns are important when 

interpreting Section 5’s prohibition 

against ‘‘unfair methods of 

competition?’’ What is the role of 

Section 5 in protecting nonprice 

competition? 

3. Is Section 5 coterminous with the 

Sherman Act? How has the courts’

development of the Sherman Act over 

time altered its relationship to Section 

5? Does the Sherman Act encompass all 

conduct that is truly harmful to 

competition? 

4. Does Section 5 authorize the FTC 

to fill technical gaps in the coverage of 

the other antitrust statutes? 

5. Can Section 5 reach externallydefined business torts where they 

threaten to bring about a future 

lessening of competition? 

6. Should Section 5 be interpreted to 

reach practices that pose at least a 

moderate threat to competition and few 

offsetting benefits to consumers, (e.g., 

reduced costs, improved products, or 

other efficiencies), where enforcement is 

limited to the FTC and relief is limited 

to an injunction prohibiting or undoing 

the challenged conduct?9

7. Does the FTC’s use of Section 5, 

independent of the Sherman Act, make 

it less likely that treble damages could 

be assessed in follow-on actions? If so, 

should that fact influence the 

interpretation of Section 5’s scope, or its 

application? 

8. What limiting principles should be 

applied to the definition of ‘‘unfair 

methods of competition?’’ How can 

‘‘unfair methods of competition’’ under 

Section 5 be defined to avoid capturing 

benign or procompetitive conduct while 

allowing for sufficient guidance and 

predictability for business? 

9. If Section 5 captures conduct 

falling outside the Sherman Act, what 

economic evidence and analysis would 

be useful in identifying violations? 

What economic evidence and analysis 

would be useful in identifying the 

proper limiting principles for the 

enforcement of Section 5? 

10. Was the Commission’s use during 

the last two decades of Section 5 claims 

in settled complaints that did not allege 

all the elements of a Sherman Act 

violation beneficial and principled or 

harmful and unbounded? How might 

courts have evaluated these claims? 

11. What are examples of business 

conduct that may be unfair methods of 

competition addressable by Section 5? 

How does that conduct harm 

competition and consumers? 

By direction of the Commission. 

Richard C. Donohue, 

Acting Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E8–20008 Filed 8–27–08: 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6750–01–S 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health; Designation of a 

Class of Employees for Addition to the 

Special Exposure Cohort 

AGENCY: National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH), Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS). 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) gives notice of a 

decision to designate a class of 

employees at the Y–12 Plant in Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee, as an addition to the 

Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) under 

the Energy Employees Occupational 

Illness Compensation Program Act of 

2000. On August 15, 2008, the Secretary 

of HHS designated the following class of 

employees as an addition to the SEC: 

All employees of the Department of Energy 

(DOE), its predecessor agencies, and DOE 

contractors or subcontractors who worked at 

the Y–12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee from 

March 1, 1943 through December 31, 1947 for 

a number of work days aggregating at least 

250 work days occurring either solely under 

this employment or in combination with 

work days within the parameters established 

for one or more other classes of employees 

in the Special Exposure Cohort. 

This designation will become 

effective on September 14, 2008, unless 

Congress provides otherwise prior to the 

effective date. After this effective date, 

HHS will publish a notice in the 

Federal Register reporting the addition 

of this class to the SEC or the result of 

any provision by Congress regarding the 

decision by HHS to add the class to the 

SEC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Larry Elliott, Director, Office of 

Compensation Analysis and Support, 

National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health (NIOSH), 4676 

Columbia Parkway, MS C–46, 

Cincinnati, OH 45226, Telephone 513–

533–6800 (this is not a toll-free 

number). Information requests can also 

be submitted by e-mail to 

OCAS@CDC.GOV. 

Dated: August 22, 2008. 

Christine M. Branche, 

Acting Director, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health. 

[FR Doc. E8–19966 Filed 8–27–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4160–17–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health; Designation of a 

Class of Employees for Addition to the 

Special Exposure Cohort 

AGENCY: National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH), Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS). 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) gives notice of a 

decision to designate a class of 

employees at the Spencer Chemical 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES