alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4518

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JADONAVAN O’BRYANT JOHNSON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:12-cr-00425-CCE-1)

Submitted: December 19, 2013 Decided: December 23, 2013

Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, William S. 

Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

T. Nick Matkins, Special Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jadonavan O’Bryant Johnson pled guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(2) 

(2012). The district court sentenced Johnson to 204 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, Johnson questions whether his sentence 

is substantively reasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.

Johnson challenges the substantive reasonableness of 

his sentence, which was at the upper-end of the applicable 

Sentencing Guidelines range. We review the sentence for 

reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). A 

sentence is procedurally reasonable if the court properly 

calculates the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gives the 

parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, 

considers the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, does not rely 

on clearly erroneous facts, and sufficiently explains the 

selected sentence. Id. at 49–51.

As to substantive reasonableness, the 204-month 

sentence, within Johnson’s properly-calculated Guidelines range, 

is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, United States v. 

Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012), which Johnson has 

not rebutted. See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 

379 (4th Cir. 2006) (“A defendant can only rebut the presumption 
3

by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” (internal quotation 

marks and alteration omitted)). The district court therefore 

did not abuse its discretion and imposed a reasonable sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906
                       of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


          In connection with the Quarterly Report of Swordfish  Financial,  Inc.
(the  "Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period ended  September 30, 2009 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
the undersigned,  in the capacities listed below, hereby certifies,  pursuant to
18U.S.C.  ss.1350,  as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002,  that: (i) The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934; and (ii) The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                           Swordfish Financial, Inc.

Date: March 5, 2010                        By: /s/ Michael Alexander
                                               ---------------------------------
                                           Michael Alexander
                                           Chief Executive Officer and President
                                           (principal executive officer)

Date: March 5, 2010                        By: /s/ Randy Moseley
                                               ---------------------------------
                                           Randy Moseley
                                           Chief Financial Officer
                                           (principal financial officer)


          A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906
has been provided to Swordfish Financial, Inc. and will be retained by Swordfish
Financial,  Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange  Commission or its
staff upon request.
#### Thomas F. Cosgrove, Plaintiff, *v.*Albert Weierman, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Richmond County,

October 1, 1956.

*Thomas Schleier*for plaintiff.

*Hartsell, Harrington & Jacobs*for Elizabeth M. Weierman, as executrix, appearing specially.

Edward G. Baker, J.

Motion denied. The accident having occurred in New Jersey, section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law has no application. There is no authority, statutory or otherwise, for continuing this action in personam against decedent’s nonresident executrix. *(McMaster*v. *Gould,*240 N. Y. 379; *Bennett*v. *Harrisville Combing Mills,*204 Misc. 279.) In *Leighton*v. *Roper*(300 N. Y. 434), relied upon by plaintiff, the court was concerned with the question of the constitutionality of *799chapter 719 of the Laws of 1945 amending section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. There is nothing in the court’s opinion in that case to support the argument that defendant’s appearance in this action was intended to and did bind his executrix as well as himself.
AGEN-Exhibit 10.3.3 Q1 14




Addendum No. 5 to the Lease Agreement from 01/28/2011 between


4-Antibody AG, Hochbergerstr. 60C, 4057 Basel 
(Sublessee)




and 


Technologie Park Basel AG, Hochbergerstr. 60C, 4057 Basel 
(Principal Lessee)


The two parties named above declare that the following spaces are removed from the leased spaces in Technologie Park Basel (Hochbergerstrasse 60C, 4057 Basel) as of 04/30/2013:


- Lab: C3_17, 3rd Floor, approx. 43 m2, rent costs:


	
			
	 
	per month
	per year

	Rent
	CHF 2,015.65
	CHF 24,187.50

	Incidental costs
	CHF 246.35
	CHF 2,956.25

	VAT (8%)
	CHF 181.00
	CHF 2,172.00

	Total
	CHF 2,443.00
	CHF 29,315.75










	
		
	4-Antibody AG


	Technologie Park Basel AG

	Basel, on [hw:] 06/06/2013


	Basel, on [hw:] 06/24/2013

	[signature]
Dr. Robert Burns
Chief Executive Officer


	[signature]
Samuel Hess
VR1

	[signature]
Melanie Princip
Group Head of HR
	[signature]
Nina Ryser
VR2
#### Wayne RESPER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The State of MARYLAND, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 03-6459.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 14, 2003.

Decided Aug. 20, 2003.

*273Wayne Resper, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Ann Norman Bosse, Office of The Attorney General Of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Wayne Resper seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief without prejudice on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*587 U.S. 822, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,*534 U.S. 941, 122 S.Ct. 318, 151 L.Ed.2d 237 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Res-per has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
180 La. 990

#### STATE v. BAYNHAM.

No. 33001.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 26, 1934.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 1935.

Joseph S. Guerriero, of Monroe, for appellant.

G. L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., James O’Connor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Prank W. Hawthorne, Dist. Atty., of Bastrop, and George W. Lester, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Monroe (Lessley P. Gar-diner, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., of counsel), for the State.

HIGGINS, Justice.

The appellant was charged in a bill of information with burglary of a grocery store in the nighttime. The jury found him guilty.

Appellant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground “that the verdict and judgment herein rendered is contrary to law and evidence.” The trial court overruled the motion, and appellant reserved a bill of exception. Appellant then filed another motion for a new trial, on the ground that Mike Adams and Garland Kennedy, codefendants, who pleaded guilty to the same charges and were sentenced to one year in the penitentiary, testified against Charlie Nash, another code-fendant, but the jury acquitted him, and that *363therefore the verdict of the jury in appellant’s case is shown to have been contrary to the law and evidence and he is entitled to a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and appellant reserved a second bill of exception. The district judge imposed a sentence of eighteen months in the state penitentiary at hard labor, and appellant appealed.

In the case of State v. Laracca, 114 La. page 700, 141 So. page 381, this court said:

“The rule is too well settled in this state to need citation of authorities to the effect that an appeal to this court solely upon the ground that the verdict of a jury is contrary to the law and the evidence presents nothing for review.” State v. McKee, 170 La. 630, 128 So. 658; State v. Robertson, 133 La. 806, 63 So. 363; State v. Lewis, 175 La. 696, 144 So. 423.

Aside from the settled jurisprudence to this effect, article 516 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:

“Neither the appellate nor supervisory jurisdiction of the Sunreme Court can be invoked to review the granting or the refusal to grant a new trial *except for error of law.”*(Italics ours.)

For the reasons assigned, the verdict and sentence appealed from are affirmed.
#### VILCE v. TRAVELERS INS. CO.

No. 2779.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

March 11, 1946.

For former opinion, see 24 So.2d 485.

Cline, Thompson, Lawes & Cavanaugh, of Lake Charles, for appellant.

M. R. Stewart and Coleman D. Reed, both of Lake Charles, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Both plaintiff and defendant filed an application for a rehearing. We have considered both applications, and- do not consider it necessary to make further comment, except with reference to one point urged by the defendant in its application.

One of .the contentions made by the defendant is that, in no event, should the compensation for partial disability extend beyond July, or at most, beyond December, 1944, as there is nothing to show that plaintiff was disabled after those dates. As we stated in our last opinion (reported in 24 So.2d 485) plaintiff testified that the last time his foot swelled up was in December, 1944, but he also testified that he was doing light work under Mr. Austin, further stating: “Everytime I have a lot of bending to do on my foot, it swells up and hurts”.

Dr. Morris testified that the swelling in plaintiff’s foot had disappeared when he discharged him in July, 1944, and his foot had improved, but the doctor was of the opinion that he could then discharge only limited duty. The doctor expressed the opinion that if plaintiff’s foot swelled in December (as plaintiff and Austin testified it did after the doctor had treated plaintiff in July), the swelling was a recurrence of the injury; that the kind of injury plaintiff has tends to become chronic.

It is too well settled to require citation of authority that where a claimant is shown to be partially or totally disabled at the time of the trial and there is no evidence on which to fix a definite period for the continuance of the disability, compensation should be fixed-so as not to exceed the maximum number of weeks. We found, and adhere to that finding, that the evidence shows that plaintiff was partially disabled from the injury at the time of the trial, and there is no way by which we can determine just when that partial disability will cease. The defendant is protected by the provision in the statute which permits a review of the judgment at six month periods.

As we find no reason to change our last decree, it must stand as the final judgment of this court.

Both applications for a rehearing are therefore refused.
EXHIBIT 32.2



---



CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT

I,
David M. Gandossi, Chief Financial Officer of Mercer International Inc. (the "Company"), certify pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



|                      |  |  |                                                              
|--------------------- |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: August 9, 2004 |  |  |                                                              
|                      |  |  |                                                              
|                      |  |  | /s/DAVID M. GANDOSSIDavid M. Gandossi
Chief Financial Officer



---

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Mercer International Inc. and will be retained by Mercer International Inc. and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---



QuickLinks
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         5
<LEGEND>
         This schedule contains summary financial information extracted 
         from the Liquidating Trust's statement of net assets in liquidation 
         at September 30, 1997 and the Liquidating Trust's statement of 
         changes in net assets in liquidation for the three months ended 
         September 30, 1997, and is qualified in its entirety by reference 
         to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                   1,000
       
<S>                                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                           SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           819
<SECURITIES>                                 280,231
<RECEIVABLES>                                      0
<ALLOWANCES>                                       0
<INVENTORY>                                        0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   0
<PP&E>                                             0
<DEPRECIATION>                                     0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                281,050
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          46,851
<BONDS>                                            0
<COMMON>                                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<OTHER-SE>                                    234,199
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  281,050
<SALES>                                            0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                6,143
<CGS>                                              0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  17,204
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                10,870
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            10,870
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                   10,870
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .21
        

</TABLE>
#### CAMPBELL v. MARSHALL.

No. 6933.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Dec. 12, 1946.

Philo Coco, of Marksville, for appellant.

White, Holloman & White, of Alexandria, for appellee.

HARDY, Judge.

From a judgment in favor of defendant dissolving a writ of sequestration sued out by plaintiff and awarding $250 damages as attorney’s fees, plaintiff prosecutes this appeal. A motion to dismiss the appeal has been filed by defendant, which motion sets forth six reasons in support thereof.

The reasons advanced by defendant in support of his motion to dismiss are all comprehended by the contention that the record does not contain any transcript of the testimony taken on trial, nor any statement of facts either by joint agreement of counsel or by the judge of the trial court.

An examination of the record discloses the unquestionable correctness of the facts upon which the motion to dismiss the appeal is based. There is no transcript of testimony; nor is there any agreed statement of facts; nor is there any statement by the Court; nor, indeed, is there any evidence of any attempt to procure any one of these evidences of testimony or any explanation as to why any such form is omitted from the record.

Under the circumstances we are of the opinion that the disposition of this motion may be determined under the pronouncements of this Court in a case in which the facts were analogous, namely, Chelette v. Roberts, et al, La.App., 185 So. 678.

In the above cited case Judge Taliaferro, as the organ of this Court, referred to the holding in Williamson v. Enterprise Brick Co., 190 La. 415, 182 So. 556, quoting the following extract therefrom: “The appellate court must dismiss appeal, where record filed therein contains no transcript of testimony or statement of facts, agreed to by parties or furnished by trial judge, and correctness of judgment appealed from depends on verbal testimony heard. Code Prac., arts. 601-603.” [185 So. 679.]

It is contended by learned counsel for plaintiff that the appeal in the instant case should not be dismissed but rather that the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in the event the record before us on appeal should be found so incomplete as to fail to provide sufficient information upon which to base an opinion as to the merits of the appeal.

We cannot subscribe to. this contention. The point involved herein does not concern the incompleteness of the record, but rather a failure to conform to the provisions of law prescribing the several modes by *297which testimony of witnesses may he made a part of the record on appeal.

To remand this case would be equivalent to forcing the trial court to hear again the same matter which it has already determined, to the prejudice of the prevailing party.

For the reasons set forth, we find the motion to dismiss the appeal to be well grounded, and, accordingly, it is ordered that the appeal be dismissed at plaintiff’s cost.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Kevin Hogge, Chief Financial Officer of CRC Health Corporation (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| |  |  | the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 24, 2010



/s/    KEVIN HOGGEKevin Hogge Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to CRC Health Corporation and will be retained by CRC Health Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
198 La. 1026

#### WREN v. BROCK.

No. 36231.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 1, 1941.

Ellis & Bostick, of Amite, for applicant.

Ponder & Ponder, of Amite, for respondents.

FOURNET, Justice.

The appeal taken by the relatrix from the judgment of the Twenty-first Judicial District Court having been dismissed ex proprio motu by the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit because of the lack of certain documents in the record, including the original judgment appealed from (a certified copy of this judgment was in the record), she moved for a rehearing, alleging that the documents had been omitted through no fault of hers or of her attorneys, and asked that the case be remanded to the district court so that the transcript might be completed. This rehearing was denied and the relatrix applied to this court for and was granted a writ of certiorari in order that the judgment of the Court of Appeal might be reviewed.

The Court of Appeal was without authority, under the express provisions of Act No. 234 of 1932, to dismiss the appeal in this case without first having grant*324ed the appellant “at least two additional days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, to cure and correct any and all the in-formalities and irregularities” in the record. Sanders v. Wyatt, 187 La. 80, 174 So. 161; and Nunez v. Serpas, 198 La. 415, 3 So.2d 673. See, also, Stockbridge v. Martin, 162 La. 601, 110 So. 828.

For the reasons assigned, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed, costs of this writ to be borne by the respondent.