Filed 1/27/21 Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

NORRIS MORGAN et al.,

Plaintiffs and 

 Respondents,

v.

J-M MANUFACTURING 

COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant and 

 Appellant.

 B297393

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC695605)

APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed in 

part, reversed in part.

Manning Gross & Massenburg, John T. Hugo, Carrie S. 

Lin; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Kent L. Richland, David 

E. Hackett, and Nadia A. Sarkis for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Bowman & Brooke and Jennifer T. Persky for Association 

of Southern California Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on 

behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Simmons Hanly Conroy, Paul C. Cook, Deborah R. 

Rosenthal, and William A. Kohlburn for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

____________________________

Norris Morgan was exposed to asbestos at construction 

jobsites where he worked in the 1970s and 80s. After he was 

diagnosed with mesothelioma in December 2017, Morgan and his 

wife, Lori, sued a number of defendants, including J-M 

Manufacturing Company (J-MM)—Mr. Morgan for his injuries 

and Mrs. Morgan for loss of consortium.1 By the time trial 

commenced in October 2018, only J-MM and another defendant, 

Familian Corp., remained as defendants. Familian settled with 

the Morgans during trial, leaving J-MM as the only remaining 

defendant when the case went to the jury. 

The jury concluded that Morgan was exposed to asbestos 

from products that J-MM sold, and that J-MM was partly (45%) 

responsible for Morgan’s mesothelioma. The jury awarded the 

Morgans a total of $15,270,501 in compensatory damages. The 

jury also concluded that J-MM had acted with malice, oppression, 

or fraud, and awarded an additional $15,000,000 as punitive 

damages. Based on the jury’s apportionment of fault, the trial 

court entered judgment for the Morgans against J-MM for 

$22,213,704.39. J-MM filed motions for judgment 

1 Mr. Morgan passed away on December 12, 2018. Mrs. 

Morgan is Mr. Morgan’s successor-in-interest in this matter. 

(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.11, 377.30.) 
3

notwithstanding the verdict and new trial, which the trial court 

denied. 

J-MM challenges the trial court’s judgment and rulings on 

three grounds. First, J-MM contends that there is no evidence 

that Morgan was exposed to pipe supplied by J-MM. As 

explained below, we disagree with this contention; the record 

contains evidence from which the jury could reasonably have 

concluded that Morgan was exposed to asbestos from pipe 

supplied by J-MM. Second, J-MM contends that the trial court 

erred when it declined J-MM’s request for a jury instruction that 

J-MM was not liable for the conduct of another company—the 

Johns-Manville Corporation. We also disagree with this 

contention; the trial court was not required to give J-MM’s 

requested instruction. Finally, J-MM contends that the jury’s 

punitive damage award is not supported by substantial evidence. 

We agree with this contention, and will reverse the trial court’s 

award of punitive damages.

BACKGROUND

One of the businesses of the Johns-Manville Corporation 

and its related companies (JMC) was manufacturing and selling 

asbestos-cement pipe—sometimes called transite pipe. A 

common application of asbestos-cement pipe is to carry water and 

sewer between water and sewer providers and their customers. 

JMC declared bankruptcy in the early 1980s, and sold its 

asbestos-cement pipe business to two companies that began 

operations on January 1, 1983: J-M A/C Pipe Corporation (J-M 

A/C), which manufactured asbestos-cement pipe, and J-MM, 

which sold asbestos-cement pipe that J-M A/C manufactured. 

Pursuant to a bankruptcy court order, the JMC assets that J-MM 

acquired were “free of . . . all present and future liabilities . . . and 
4

all claims attributable to periods prior to the transfer which 

relate . . . to personal injury or property damage allegedly 

attributable to asbestos-fiber . . . .” 

The asbestos-cement pipe that J-MM sold after January 1, 

1983 was similar to the pipe that JMC sold. According to J-MM, 

“J-M A/C pipe [that J-MM sold] and [JMC] pipe looked alike. 

Both were colloquially referred to as ‘Transite’ and had the same 

stencil label: ‘J-M Transite.’ ” 

Morgan began working in the construction industry in 

1972, including as a construction superintendent from 1979 to 

1985 for Spriggs and Company (Spriggs) and moved in 1985 to 

Bumbarger and Associates. Morgan oversaw day-to-day 

construction activity on jobsites that included retail, industrial, 

and office buildings. 

Among other construction activities, Morgan supervised 

plumbers installing asbestos-cement water and sewer pipe on his 

worksites. To install the pipe, Morgan testified, plumbers “would 

either use a gas or electric saw” to cut the pipe, which “created 

dust.” According to Morgan, each cut took “[a] couple minutes.” 

The plumbers would also bevel the ends of the pipe to make them 

easier to connect—another process that created dust to which 

Morgan was exposed. At two to three projects per year from 1979 

through 1985, Morgan estimated that he observed 20 to 50 cuts of 

asbestos-concrete pipe at each project, and then each pipe was 

beveled on both ends. 

Morgan recalled that when he first began working for 

Spriggs, most of the asbestos-cement pipe came from a company 

called CertainTeed, “[t]hen later for whatever reasons they—

most of my subcontractors went to using J-M Transite pipe.” 

Morgan recalled that he knew the pipe was “J-M Transite” 
5

because of the stencil on the side of the pipe and, he testified, 

from invoices. 

The Morgans filed their complaint in the trial court on 

February 23, 2018. In it, they alleged seven causes of action 

covering Mr. Morgan’s personal injuries and one cause of action 

alleging Mrs. Morgan’s loss of consortium against more than 20 

defendants who had all allegedly supplied asbestos or 

manufactured or supplied products containing asbestos. By the 

time the case was tried in October 2018, all defendants other 

than J-MM and Familian Corp. had either been dismissed or 

settled. 

The matter was tried to a jury in October and November 

2018. After the parties rested and before closing argument, the 

Morgans and Familian announced that they had settled. After 

the case was submitted to the jury, J-MM filed a motion for a 

directed verdict arguing, among other things, that plaintiffs had 

not introduced substantial evidence that Morgan had ever been 

exposed to asbestos supplied by J-MM or that J-MM had acted 

with fraud, malice, or oppression, which would be required to 

support a punitive damage award. The trial court denied the

motion. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Morgans against 

J-MM on November 13, 2018. Among other findings on a special 

verdict form, the jury concluded that Mr. Morgan had been 

“exposed to respirable asbestos from products supplied, 

distributed, or sold by [J-MM],” that Mr. Morgan had suffered a 

total of $14,270,501 in compensatory damages and that Mrs. 

Morgan’s loss of consortium damages were $1,000,000, that the 

fault of Mr. Morgan’s injuries were 45 percent attributable to 
6

J-MM, and that J-MM “acted with malice, oppression, or fraud in 

connection with the conduct which caused [Mr. Morgan’s] 

mesothelioma.” 

The jury returned on November 15, 2018 for a trial 

regarding the amount of punitive damages, and based on the 

evidence it heard awarded Mr. Morgan $15,000,000 in punitive 

damages. 

The trial court reduced the jury’s compensatory damage 

awards based on the jury’s allocation of fault and settlement 

credits to $7,213,704.39. Together with the jury’s punitive 

damage award, the trial court entered judgment for the Morgans 

against J-MM for $22,213,704.39. 

J-MM moved the trial court for judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict and for a new trial on February 14, 2019. The trial 

court denied both motions in an order it issued on April 3, 2019. 

J-MM filed timely notices of appeal from the judgment and 

the trial court’s order denying the motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 904.1, subds. 

(a)(1), (4), 659; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.104(a), 8.108(b).)

DISCUSSION

J-MM challenges the judgment on three grounds. First, 

J-MM contends that Morgan presented no evidence that he was 

exposed to products supplied by J-MM. On that basis, J-MM 

contends that its actions could not have caused Morgan’s 

mesothelioma, and the judgment should be reversed in its 

entirety. Second, J-MM points out that it requested the trial 

court to instruct the jury that J-MM could not be liable for JMC’s 

torts because of the bankruptcy court order referenced in the first 

paragraph of the background section above; the trial court denied 

J-MM’s request. J-MM argues that Morgan convinced the jury 
7

that J-MM was merely a continuation of JMC, and the requested 

jury instruction would have prevented any confusion. Finally, 

J-MM contends that Morgan failed to produce evidence in 

support of punitive damages sufficient to meet Morgan’s burden 

under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b). We address each 

of J-MM’s arguments in turn.

A. Morgan’s Exposure to J-MM Asbestos-Cement Pipe

Our Supreme Court examined causation in asbestos cases 

in depth in Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 

953. “[U]ncertainty frequently exists,” the Supreme Court said, 

“whether the plaintiff was even exposed to dangerous fibers from 

a product produced, distributed or installed by a particular 

defendant.” (Id. at p. 975.) Nevertheless, “plaintiffs [bear] the 

burden of proof on the issue of exposure to the defendant’s 

product.” (Ibid.) “If there has been no exposure, there is no 

causation.” (McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98 

Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103.)

J-MM contends that Morgan has not met that burden 

here—that there was not substantial evidence adduced at trial 

that Morgan had ever come into contact with any J-MM product 

as opposed to a JMC product. J-MM contends the trial evidence 

is “equally balanced” that Morgan was exposed to J-MM asbestoscement pipe as to JMC asbestos-cement pipe. J-MM argues that 

the trial evidence demonstrates that J-MM only ever sold 13-foot 

lengths of asbestos-cement pipe, but that Morgan’s undisputed 

testimony was that he had only ever seen 10-foot lengths of “J-M 

Transite” asbestos-cement pipe. JMC had manufactured 10-foot 

lengths of “J-M Transite” pipe, the argument goes; so either the 

uncontested evidence demonstrates that the “J-M Transite” pipe 

Morgan testified about was JMC pipe, or the evidence can only be 
8

interpreted as equally balanced—that the pipe could have been 

either J-MM pipe or JMC pipe. Under either of those scenarios, 

J-MM argues, the jury would have no way to know whether 

Morgan was exposed to J-MM asbestos-cement pipe.

On appeal from an order denying a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, our standard of review—as was the 

trial court’s standard on the motion—is “whether any substantial 

evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury’s

conclusion.” (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 

25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) We may not reweigh evidence or consider 

witnesses’ credibility. (In re Coordinated Latex Glove Litigation

(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 594, 606.) Rather, we view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we disregard 

conflicting evidence, and we draw all legitimate inferences in 

favor of the verdict. (Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 

Cal.4th 167, 192.)

J-MM’s argument here rests on its assertion that “[b]oth 

[JMC] and J-MM sold asbestos cement pipe marked ‘J-M 

Transite.’ ” “[T]he evidence was undisputed that J-M A/C did not

manufacture ten-foot pipe,” J-MM says, and therefore the pipe 

Morgan encountered at his jobsites could not have been J-MM 

pipe.

J-MM based its argument here on inconsistencies between 

two witnesses’ testimony and the parties’ assertions that 

asbestos-cement pipe manufactured by both JMC and J-MM 

shared the “J-M Transite” stencil marking. J-MM argues that 

Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 868 (Garcia) 

demonstrates why a jury could not have made a determination 

about who was responsible for the “J-M Transite” pipe Morgan 

saw at his worksites.
9

In Garcia, a college student was injured by a fencing 

opponent using a sabre with a tip, according to one witness, 

“much thinner than a proper fencing regulation tip.” (84 

Cal.App.3d at p. 872.) The student who was using the offending 

sabre and his college had both purchased blades from the same 

two companies. (Ibid.) After the injury, the blade was replaced 

in the team bag and was mixed up with other blades—from both 

companies. (Ibid.) No witness could identify which company 

manufactured the blade, and no witness disputed that blades 

from both companies were present. (Ibid.) There was no 

evidence in the case from which a jury might have distinguished 

whose sabre caused the plaintiff’s injury. (Id. at p. 874.)

JMC ceased operations in December 1982 and J-MM began 

operating on January 1, 1983. This case is distinguishable from 

Garcia. No testimony places both JMC “J-M Transite” pipe and 

J-MM “J-M Transite” pipe at any of Morgan’s worksites at the 

same time for any but a very narrow window of time. To the 

contrary, for all of 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and whatever time in 

1987 Morgan continued to work at Bumbarger, he testified that 

he continued to be exposed to “J-M Transite” pipe. During all of 

that time, the evidence establishes that there was only one 

supplier of “J-M Transite” pipe—J-MM.

J-MM’s arguments about the length of the pipe conclusively 

establishing that it could not have been J-MM pipe is unavailing. 

J-MM’s argument suggests, at best, that Morgan’s memory was 

not flawless regarding the length of pipe he encountered in the 

mid-1980s and testified about in 2018. 

Witnesses are not required to have perfect memories. 

J-MM’s argument concerns Morgan’s credibility and the weight 

the jury might have given his testimony, not its sufficiency as 
10

evidence. (See Izell v. Union Carbide Corp. (2014) 231 

Cal.App.4th 962, 974.) It is “the province of the jury to resolve 

the conflicts in the evidence and to pass upon the weight to be 

given the evidence. [Citations.] It is well settled that the trier of 

fact may accept part of the testimony of a witness and reject 

another part even though the latter contradicts the part 

accepted.” (Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 67; 

see Moran v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 

500, 518.) The jury could have reasonably concluded that 

Morgan did not recall the length of the pipe he saw, regardless of 

how confident he was about his memory. And at the same time, 

the jury could have reasonably concluded that he recalled seeing 

“J-M Transite” asbestos-cement pipe on jobsites as late as 1985, 

1986, and 1987.

Morgan’s testimony is evidence sufficient to support the 

jury’s conclusion that he was exposed to asbestos in products sold 

or supplied by J-MM.

B. J-MM’s Requested Johns-Manville Jury Instruction

J-MM’s argument suggests, at best, that Morgan’s memory 

was not flawless regarding the length of pipe he encountered in 

the mid-1980s and testified about in 2018. JMC filed a petition 

for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code in 1982. (Green v. 

Travelers Indemnity Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 544, 548.) In 

December 1982, the bankruptcy court approved the sale of JMC’s 

asbestos-pipe cement business to J-MM and J-M A/C. According 

to the bankruptcy court’s order, the J-MM’s acquisition of JMC’s 

assets was to be “free of . . . all present and future liabilities . . . 

and all claims attributable to periods prior to the transfer which 

relate . . . to personal injury or property damage allegedly 

attributable to asbestos-fiber . . . .”
11

At trial, J-MM requested the following special jury 

instruction:

“In this case, the following is true:

“Johns-Manville and J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. are 

not the same entity.

“In late 1982, J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. purchased 

certain portions of the pipe operations of Johns-Manville and 

began to do business on January 1, 1983.

“J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. is not liable to 

Plaintiffs for any exposure to asbestos as a result of work 

performed with or around Johns-Manville products before 

January 1, 1983.

“No other proof is needed and you must accept these facts I 

have read to you as true in this trial.” 

The trial court did not give the requested instruction.

“A party is entitled upon request to correct, 

nonargumentative instructions on every theory of the case 

advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence. 

The trial court may not force the litigant to rely on abstract 

generalities, but must instruct in specific terms that relate the 

party’s theory to the particular case.” (Soule v. General Motors 

Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572 (Soule).) “The giving of an 

instruction argumentative in form,” however, “is error.” (Slayton 

v. Wright (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 219, 238.) “An instruction that 

goes too elaborately into the particular facts relied on by one of 

the parties is an argumentative instruction. An instruction 

should state rules of law generally, rather than elaborate matters 

of evidence. [Citation.] Any attempt to stress, overemphasize, or 

unduly make prominent selected portions of the evidence is in 

violation of the rule that instructions should not focus the jury’s 
12

attention on particular items of evidence; ‘[T]he vice in any such 

instruction is that it unduly emphasizes one portion of the 

evidence, puts the court in the position of making an argument to 

the jury, and misleads the jury into thinking that because the 

court has specifically mentioned certain testimonial facts they 

are of undue importance or that the court believed them to be 

true.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)

J-MM argues that the proposed instruction was “a neutral 

recitation regarding the binding impact of a court order on the 

scope of J-MM’s liability.” But the trial court pointed out in its 

order denying J-MM’s post-trial motions that “J-MM did not ask 

the Court to instruct on the elements of successor liability.” The 

trial court viewed the instruction as an “invit[ation] . . . to bolster 

[J-MM’s] closing argument by underscoring certain undisputed 

facts.” Indeed, as the trial court pointed out in its post-trial 

ruling, J-MM argued at the parties’ jury instruction conference 

that “these are not facts in dispute in any way, shape or form.” 

The trial court responded that “if it is undisputed, then you can 

argue it. But in the absence of a stipulation, I’m not going to 

instruct the jury as to particular facts.”

We agree with the trial court’s analysis. The trial court 

reasoned that Morgan never raised or argued successor liability, 

that J-MM did not request an instruction on the elements of 

successor liability, and that J-MM remained free at all times to 

draw the distinction for the jury between J-MM and JMC. 

Refusing to give J-MM’s requested special instruction was not 

error.

Moreover, the special verdict form and the jury’s allocation 

of fault reflect that the jury understood the difference between 

the two companies and allocated fault accordingly. The questions 
13

regarding J-MM’s liability all specifically referred to “J-M 

Manufacturing Company, Inc.,” and never to JMC. And when the 

jury was asked to allocate fault, it allocated fault to both “Johns 

Manville”—one percent—and to “J-M Manufacturing Company, 

Inc.”—45 percent. The jury also allocated fault among Morgan—

12 percent—and 16 other entities and individuals, including both 

of the companies for whom Morgan testified he worked when he 

was exposed to asbestos contained in products that J-MM sold or 

supplied.

The jury’s allocation of fault between J-MM and JMC is 

consistent with Morgan’s testimony regarding his exposure to 

“J-M Transite” pipe. He testified that early in his time at Spriggs 

and Company, he was exposed more to asbestos-cement pipe from 

CertainTeed. Later in his time at Spriggs and Company, “most of 

[Morgan’s] subcontractors went to using J-M Transite pipe.” 

From 1979 to 1985, Morgan testified, he “saw mostly CertainTeed 

and somewhere in the late ‘70s, don’t know why, they got J-dashM Transite pipe became the pipe of choice, and [he] saw it show 

up on [his] job sites more and more.” At Bumbarger—from 1985 

until 1987—Morgan recalled only J-M Transite pipe. 

“A refusal to instruct the jury is reversible error if it is 

probable that the error prejudicially affected the verdict.” 

(Douglas v. Fidelity National Ins. Co. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 392, 

408; accord Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580.) Based on the jury’s 

specific allocation of fault and its linear correlation with Morgan’s 

testimony regarding the timing and extent of his exposure to J-M 

Transite pipe, we would find no prejudice even if the trial court 

had erroneously refused J-MM’s special instruction.
14

C. Exemplary Damages

J-MM contends that the evidence before the jury was 

insufficient to support the jury’s punitive damage award.

“In an action for breach of an obligation not arising from 

contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that 

the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the 

plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages 

for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. 

[¶] . . . An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to 

subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, 

unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of 

the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard 

of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the 

wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was 

personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to 

a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious 

disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, 

or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing 

agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b).)

Our review is for sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

jury’s decision to award punitive damages. (Colucci v. T-Mobile 

USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442, 451.) “[W]hen presented 

with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with 

a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, [we] must 

determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains 

substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could 

have made the finding of high probability demanded by this 

standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 

1005.) The clear and convincing evidence standard of proof 
15

“ ‘requires a finding of high probability’ ” that the fact is true. 

(Id. at p. 998.)

The primary focus of J-MM’s argument is that there is no 

evidence in the record that a J-MM officer, director, or managing 

agent authorized or ratified any conduct. J-MM contends that at 

trial, Morgan “treated J-MM as a monolithic entity” and referred 

to the company—in its entirety—as “they,” without ever 

identifying who “they” referred to. “[O]f the few J-MM employees 

whose conduct was specifically identified at trial,” J-MM argues, 

“none even qualified as officers, directors or managing agents of 

J-MM during the relevant time period.” 

Morgan does not argue that there is evidence identifying 

any act of any particular J-MM officer, director, or managing 

agent. Morgan’s argument is that “the entire organization was 

involved in the acts giving rise to malice,” and therefore it need 

not introduce clear and convincing evidence that any particular 

officer, director, or managing agent had the requisite state of 

mind. Morgan’s argument relies on and quotes from Romo v. 

Ford Motor Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1115 (Romo), vacated on 

other grounds by Ford Motor Co. v. Romo (2003) 538 U.S. 1028.

In Romo, the court found sufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s punitive damage award. The court could identify no case 

“in which a series of corporate actions and decisions, such as the 

design, production, and marketing of an automobile, has been 

found inadequate to support an award of punitive damages on 

the basis that the multitude of employees involved in various 

aspects of the process were not high enough in the corporate 

chain of command. When the entire organization is involved in 

the acts that constitute malice, there is no danger a blameless 

corporation will be punished for bad acts over which it had no 
16

control, the primary goal of the ‘managing agent’ requirement. 

[Citation.] [¶] There is no requirement that the evidence 

establish that a particular committee or officer of the corporation 

acted on a particular date with ‘malice.’ A corporate defendant 

cannot shield itself from liability through layers of management 

committees and the sheer size of the management structure. It is 

enough if the evidence permits a clear and convincing inference 

that within the corporate hierarchy authorized persons acted 

despicably in ‘willful and conscious disregard of the rights or 

safety of others.’ ” (Romo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1140-

1141.)

But Morgan only relies on part of the Romo decision. The 

Romo court went on to explain that a plaintiff can satisfy the 

“managing agent” requirement “through evidence showing the 

information in possession of the corporation and the structure of 

management decisionmaking that permits an inference that the 

information in fact moved upward to a point where corporate 

policy was formulated. These inferences cannot be based merely 

on speculation, but they may be established by circumstantial 

evidence, in accordance with ordinary standards of proof.” 

(Romo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141, italics added.) The 

court explained that “[i]t is difficult to imagine how corporate 

malice could be showing in the case of a large corporation except 

by piecing together knowledge and acts of the corporation’s 

multitude of managing agents.” (Ibid.)

It may be that J-MM’s officers, directors, and managing 

agents acted with the requisite state of mind to support an award 

of punitive damages in an appropriate case. A plaintiff may be 

able to provide evidence at trial to “piec[e] together knowledge 
17

and acts of [J-MM’s] multitude of managing agents.” But that 

did not happen here.

That the defendant is a large company does not relax a 

plaintiff’s burden of proof to the point Morgan argues here. We 

have reviewed the record for evidence from which the jury could 

have concluded that an officer, director, or managing agent—

someone responsible for J-MM’s corporate policy—had the 

requisite state of mind to support a punitive damage award. We 

found none.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed with respect to the jury’s punitive 

damage award. On remand, the trial court will vacate its 

judgment and enter judgment consistent with this opinion. The 

trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. The 

parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

FEDERMAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.