1 2 1

- 2947

- cv Ryan v. Comm issione r of Soc ial Sec urity



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC D ATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION

“ SUMMARY ORDER ” ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 1 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2 2 7 t h da y of D e c e m b e r , two thousand twenty

- two

. 3 4 P resent : 5 J OHN M. W ALKER , J R ., 6 E UNICE C. L EE , 7 A LISON J. N ATHAN , 8 Circuit Judges

. 9

_____________________________________ 10 11 A MANDA J EANNE R YAN , ON BEHALF OF V.D.C., 12 13 Plaintiff

- Appellant
, 14 15

v. 2 1

- 2947

- cv 16 17 C OMMISSIONER OF S OCIAL S ECURITY , 18 19 Defendant

- Appell ee

. 20

_____________________________________ 21 22 For Plaintiff

- Appellant: A LECIA A. E LSTON , Segar & Sciortino, 23 Rochester , N Y

. 24 25 For Defendant

- Appellee : N AHID S OROOSHYARI ( Michelle L. Christ & 26 Kelly Z. Toledano, Special Assistant United 27 States Attorneys ; Ellen E. Sovern, Regional 28 Chief Counsel

– Region II, Social Security 292 Administration ; Trini E. Ross
, United States 30 Attorney, Western District of New York, on 31 the brief )
, United States Social Security 32 Administration, Office of the General 33 Counsel, Baltimore
, M D

. 34 35 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New 36

York ( Sinatra
, J .)

. 37

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION , IT IS HEREBY ORD ERED, ADJUDGED, AND 38

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. 39

Plaintiff Amanda Jeanne Ryan, on behalf of her then

- minor child V.D.C. , appeals from the 40

October 7, 2021 district court judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of 41
her Supplemental Security Income (SSI) application. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 42
underlying fact s , the proceedings below , and the arguments on appeal. 43

When re viewing an appeal from a denial of Social Security benefits, we focus on the 44
administrative decision instead of the opinion of the district court. Estrella v. Berryhill , 925 F.3d 45
90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) . This Court reviews the entire administrative record to determine whether 46

the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 47
149 (2d Cir. 2014)

. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla. ” Richardson v. 48

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quo tation marks omitted) . “ It means such relevant 49
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id

. (internal 50
quotation marks omitted). 51

Part of t he multi

- step process for determin ing a child’s disability under the Social Sec urity 52

Act requires that their impairments

— either alone or in combination

— meet, medically equal, or 53
functionally equal the severity of a listed impairment

. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.902 (h) , 416.906, 416.92 4
, 543 416.926a

. If the child’s impairments do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the 1
agency will then examine whether their impairments functionally equal any listing. Id. § 2
416.926a(a). Functional equivalence is assessed under six “domains”: (i) acquiring a nd using 3
information; (ii) attending and completing tasks; (iii) interacting and relating with others; (iv) 4
moving about and manipulating objects; (v) caring for oneself; and (vi) health and physical well

5
being. Id. § 416.926a(b)(1) ; SSR 09

- 3 p, Title XVI: Determining Childhood Disability

— The 6
Functional Equivalence Domain of “Acquiring and Using Information,” 74 Fed. Reg. 7511 ( Feb

. 7

1 7 , 2009)

. 8

A child’s impairments functionally equal the severity of a listed impairment if they result 9

in “marked” limitations in at least two domains or an “extreme” limitation in at least one domain. 10

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). A marked limitation “ interferes seriously with [the child’s] ability to 11
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. ” Id. § 416.926a (e) (2). It is “more than 12

moderate” but “less than extreme.” Id. “It is the equivalent of the functioning we would expect to 13
find on standardized testing with scores that ar e at least two, but less than three, standard deviations 14

below the mean.” Id. An extreme limitation , on the other hand, “ interferes very seriously with [the 15

child’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. ” Id. § 416.9 26a (e)(3). It is 16
“more than marked” and “is the rating [th at the Social Security r egulations ] give to the worst 17

[functional] limitations. ” Id. “It is the equivalent of the functioning we would expect to find on 18
standardized testing with scores that are at least thre e standard deviations below the mean.” Id. 19
On appeal, Ryan argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that V.D.C. has marked limitation 20
only in the domain of attending and completing tasks and not also in the domain of acquiring and 21
using information

. S he argues that V.D.C.’s combined impairments

— Attention Deficit 224 Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), anxiety, unspecified mood disorder, learning disorder, and 1
traumatic brain injury (“TBI”)

— established marked limitation in acquiring and using information. 2

She also contends that the ALJ failed to adequately explain his conclusion regarding this domain

. 3
We address each argument in turn. 4
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that V.D.C. had less than ma rked 5
limitation in acquiring and using information. The ALJ carefully assessed the complete record, 6

which includes s chool records, hearing testimony, treatment notes , and medical opinion evidence

. 7
Following discussion of the evidence
, the ALJ reasoned that V.D.C. passed to every grade level 8
without being held back
, that he showed improvement with academic grades and intellectual tests
, 9
on which he scored at or near the average range
, and that no consultative examiner determined that 10

V.D.C. had marked or ext reme limitation in acquiring and using information. We therefore believe 11

there is “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion regarding 12
V.D.C.’s ability to acquire and use information. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal quot ation 13
marks omitted)

. 14

We also independently reviewed the record and discern no error

. None of the purportedly 15

contrary evidence that Ryan highlights , such as the December 2015 Teacher Questionnaire 16
prepared by Teresa Singh, would require a reasonable factfinder to conclude that V.D.C. had at 17
least a marked limitation in acquiring and using information

. Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r
, 18
683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[O]nce an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a 19

reaso nable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” (internal quotation marks and emphasis 20
omitted) ). We are unable to remand on this basis. 215 Ryan also mistakenly contends that the ALJ breached a duty to explain his rationale. “An 1

ALJ does not have to state on the record every reason justifying a decision” and “ is not required 2
to discuss every single piece of evidence submitted. ” Id. Here, the ALJ thoroughly discusse d the 3
pertinent evidence and then explain ed his rationale , albeit briefly, regarding V.D.C.’s lack of 4

functional limitations in acquiring and using information

. Even assuming, arguendo , that the ALJ 5
failed to provide an express rationale for his conclusion s , we would not be prevented from 6
upholding them so long as we are “ able to look to other portions of the ALJ’s decision and to 7
clearly credible evidence in finding that his determination was supported by substantial evidence.” 8
Berry v. Schweiker , 675 F.2d 464, 46 9 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam)

. W e therefore decline to reman d 9
for a clearer explanation because , looking at the whole decision
, we are not “‘ unable to fathom the 10

ALJ’s rationale in relation to evidence in the record. ’ ” Cichocki v. Astrue , 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d 11
Cir. 2013) (quoting Berry , 675 F.2d at 469). 12
Upon consi dering Ryan’s other arguments, we find them to be without merit. We affirm 13
the judgment of the district court. 14

15

FOR THE COURT: 16
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 17