In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2188

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ramon L. Cruz,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 99-CR-205--Charles N. Clevert, Judge.

Argued November 15, 2000--Decided November 30, 2000

 Before Posner, Easterbrook, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Circuit Judge. The defendant was

sentenced to 75 months in prison for possession

with intent to distribute 156 grams of heroin. 21

U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1). He challenges his sentence

on the ground that he was eligible for a

sentencing discount as a minor or minimal

participant in the conduct that resulted in his

arrest and conviction. See U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.2.

 The defendant carried the 156 grams by train

from New York to Milwaukee, where he was

arrested. It appears that he was part of a larger

operation; he may indeed have been only a

courier; but no one else involved in his offense

was arrested, and as a result he was charged only

with possession with intent to distribute the 156

grams; nor was any other aspect of the larger

operation of which his transportation of the

heroin may have been a part deemed relevant

conduct affecting his sentence.

 When no conduct of other participants in a

criminal scheme is attributed to a defendant for

purposes of sentencing, our cases hold that he is

not entitled to a sentencing discount because he

is a minor or minimal participant in some larger

criminal activity of which the conduct for which

he is being punished is a part. E.g., United

States v. Almanza, 225 F.3d 845, 846 (7th Cir.

2000); United States v. Hamzat, 217 F.3d 494, 497

(7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Isienyi, 207

F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2000). This is the view

of most of the other circuits as well, as noted
in United States v. Almanza, supra, 225 F.3d at

846. Cruz asks us to reexamine our position,

noting that two other circuits reject it. United

States v. Snoddy, 139 F.3d 1224, 1230-31 (8th

Cir. 1998); United States v. Demers, 13 F.3d

1381, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1994). But these

decisions have been discussed and either

distinguished or rejected in the cases in our

court cited above, and so they provide no basis

for overruling those cases. In any event we think

our position is correct. An example will show

why. Imagine two defendants, each a courier for a

drug ring. One of the drug rings is very large,

is in fact international in scope. The other is

very small, is in fact entirely local. Defendant

A, who is part of the large ring, possesses 156

grams of heroin with intent to distribute.

Defendant B, who is part of the small ring,

possesses 156 grams of heroin with intent to

distribute. Both are charged just with that

possession, and in sentencing the judge gives no

weight to the activities of the other members of

the ring. Nevertheless, on Cruz’s submission, A

should receive a lighter sentence than B because

he is part of the larger ring, implying that the

other participants are bigger fry relative to him

than the other participants in B’s conspiracy are

relative to B. We cannot see the logic of that

position. The defendants’ conduct is identical,

and they are being punished just for that conduct

and not for the conduct of anyone else. To

differentiate their punishment on the basis of

activity unrelated to their culpability would be

arbitrary. Indeed, to punish more lightly the

participant in the more serious conspiracy

strikes us as downright perverse.

Affirmed.