IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

TIMOTHY SCOTT BRAULICK, 

Plalntiff and Respondent, 

V. 

HATHAEAY MEATS, INC., 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Kenneth R. Ne~ll, Judge presiding. 

COLWSEL OF RECORD: 

For z4ppellant: 

Jeffrey T. McAllister, Conklin, Nybo, Le-veque & Lanning, P.C.; 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

J. Kim Schulke; Linnell. Newhall. Martin & Schulke, P C ; 

Great Falls, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: January 23, 1999 

Decided: Mruch 23. 1999 
Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion ofthe Court. 

71 Hathaway !Meats9 Inc., appeals from the S3l$M judgment entered against it after a 

jury in the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, found for Hathaway's former employee, 

'I'imorhy Scott Braulick, in this wrongful discharge action. We affirm. 

72 ,I The iss~~e is whether the District Court ened in denying Hathaway's motions for 

judgment as a matter of law and submitting the case to the jury. 

'13 In October 1994, Hathaway, a wholesale meat distributing business in Spokane, 

Washington, purchased the Great Falls, Montana, wholesale meat distributing business for 

which Braulick worked as a warehouseman and delivery truck driver. Braulick was 

dischatgcd from Hathas-ayes empioy in February 1996, ostensibly as part of downsizing of 

the business. Braulick filed this action approximately one year later, in January 1997. 

74 At trial, Braulick's theory was that he was discharged not because of downsizing, but 

because he was resented for his absence froin work due to a December 1905 nonwork-related 

injury to his hand, and for the costs to Hathaway of providing health insurance for himself 

and his family. Following Braulick's presentation of his case, Hathaway moved for judgment 

as a matter of iaw pursuant to Rule SO1 1M.K.Civ.P. Hathaway argued that Braulick had failed 

to provide evidence establishing that he ;vas not terminated for good cawc. The court dcnicd 

the motion, as it did Hathaway's second motion for judgment as a inatter of law at the close 

of trial. The jury reached a verdict for Brauliclc. awarding him about half the amount of 

damages he requested. Hathaway appeals. 
51d the District Court crr in denying Hathanay's motion forjudgment as a matter of 

lam and suhmitr~ng the case to the jury? 

36 k motion for judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if it appears as a matter 

of Ian that 3 party could not preva~l upon any view of thc ewdence, including the leg~timate 

infeiences to be drawn therefrom. Km,oIaizd v. Luzerrac Amencn, Inc , 1998 itlT 130.7 53, 

961 P 2d 725,T 53.55 St Rep. 531.11 53 In other words, a motion for judgment as a matter 

of law 1s properly granted only when there IS a complete absence of any ecidence to uarrant 

submission to a jury. Kneeland, at 7 53. Conflicts in the evidence, including witness 

credibility, arc properly resolved by the finder of fact. Cumemit v. Mercer, !998 MT 134, 

7 18, 960 P.2d 302,T 18. 55 St. Rep. 531.1 18. 

77 A discharge is wrongful under Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act 

if it uas not for good cause and the employee has completed the employer's probationary 

per~od. Section 39-2-904(2), MCA. if the discharge mas for a legit~mate business reason, 

it docs not amount to wrongful discharge. In Buck Y. Billings hlorztmza Clzew.olet, Itrr. 

(i90l), 248 Mont. 270. 81 i P.2d 537, we stared: 

A !egitimate business reason is a reason that is neither false, whimsjcal, 

arbitrary [nlor capricious, and it must have some logical relationship to the 

needs of the business. In applying this definition, one must take into account 

the right of an employer to exercise discretion over who it u-ill employ and 

keep in employment. Of equal importance to this right, however, is the 

legitimate interest[] of the employee to secure employment. 

Buck, 248 Mont. at 281-82,8i 1 P.2d at 540 
qS Hathaway gave several justifications for raulick's tcnninatian. Onc was that a 

reduction in the amount of stock it warehoused in Great Falls reduced the neec! for 

warehousemen in Great Falls, According to Braufick's testimony on direct examination, 

however, tl~e majority of his time was spent as a delivery driver. 

9 Randy Bogden, the manager of I-latllaway's Great Falls operation, testified during 

Braulick's presentation of his case-in-chief that business was siow at the time Hail~away 

terminated Braulick's employment. However, Braulick testified that Bogden called him 

several times to ask him to work in January, saying that they were "really busy." Bogden 

acknowledged that after Braulick was terminated, Hathaway contracted \vith another 

company to do some of the deliveries Braulick had done and hired part-time and temporary 

employees to do others. Braulick elicited evidence that Hathaway thereby incurred expenses 

totaling Sl,P78 per month as compared with Braulick's salary and benefits of $2,244 per 

month. 

710 On several points, the jury had to decide whether to believe testimony by Braulick or 

testimony by Bogden or Hathaway's ownerl Mike Hathaway. As another example, Braulick 

tcstitied that Bogden told him when he was discharged that it would be cheaper to pay 

son1ec;ne else to do his work. Bogden denied saying that. Determining witness credibility 

is a classic jury function. Cmzeron, at ./ 18. 

11 1 1 Hathaway contended it made sense to get rid of Braulick because he was not cel-tified 

to drive the large truck the company used to make twice-weekly delivery runs to Missouia, 

Montana. However, Braulick testified that at Hathaway's request he used the smaller truck 

4 
to make the Missoula run t'itice at the end ofJanuary 1996. Thus. thcrc was cvidencc that 

the truck which Braulick was certified to drive could be used for the Missoula runs. 

C112 On cross-examination during Hathaway's case-in-chief; Mike Hathaway admitted that 

the deliveries znd customers which the business had before the Great Falls warehouse 

reduction were similar after the warehouse reduction. This, again, supported Braulick's 

position that the reduction in warehouse inventory in Great Falls did not reduce the need for 

drivers. 

113 Hathaway asserted that the Great Falls operation made a net protit of only $1,977 for 

the fiscal year May 1995 to April 1996 and that this provided a legitimate business reason 

to terminate BrauIick. However, as Brauiick pointed out, he was terminated in February 

1996, at least two months before those fiscal year figures were available. Braulick fitrther 

demonstrated from Hathaway's financial records that the bulk of Hathaway's business loss 

was attributable to its larger Spokane, Washington, operation. Braulick argued that it would 

have been more logical to make larger cutbacks in Spokane than to fire him. 

r14 The record includes evidence supporting Hathaway's position that its termination of 

Braulick's e~nplo}~ was justified by legitimate business reasons. However: that is not a 

sufficient basis for a judgment as a matter of law. The standard is whether Branlick failed 

to introduce any evidence at all in support of his contentions. Weighing of the evidence is, 

again, a classic jury function. Cutrteron, at 7 18. 

11 5 Based upon the record, we conclude that both after presei~tation of his case-in-chief 

and at the close of the evidence, Braulick met the minimal standard set forth in Kneeland that 

5 
unless there is a complete absence of evidence to support a verdict for the nonmoving party, 

judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate. We therefore affirm the District Court's 

denial of Hathaway's motions for judgment as a matter of law. 

'1 6 in his ansxver brief and by separare motion, Branlick asks that this Court award him 

damages under Rule 32, M.K.App.P., on the basis that Hathaway has taken this appeal 

without merir. Such damages are only proper when there is evidence that the appeal was 

taken without substantial reason or grounds or that the arguments were not made in good 

faith. Sorenson v. hfassev-Fergusen, fnc. (19961, 279 Wont. 527, 531, 927 P.2d 1030, 

1032-33. There is no such evidence in this case. We therefore decline to award damages 

under Rule 32, 34.R.App.P. 

$1 17 Affirmed. 

We Concur: