J-A35018-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

CHRISTINE LAYTON, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

DWAYNE DREAKFORD, 

 Appellee No. 303 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order entered August 12, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, 

Civil Division, at No(s): F.C. No. 12-90349-D 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES and ALLEN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2014 

 Christine Layton (“Appellant”) appeals from the trial court’s order 

dismissing her complaint for divorce against Dwayne Dreakford 

(“Dreakford”). We affirm. 

 On May 23, 2012, Appellant filed a complaint in divorce, in which she 

requested the trial court to determine that she and Dreakford had previously 

entered into a common law marriage. Appellant also filed a separate 

complaint for support. In response, on March 13, 2013, Dreakford filed a 

petition for declaratory judgment, in which, among other things, he denied 

that a common law marriage existed between the parties. On May 10, 2013, 

the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which the parties, as well as 

Appellant’s father, testified. 

 The trial court made the following findings of fact: 
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 [The parties] met and began dating in 1991. [They] 

began living together in 1994. The idea of marriage first 

came up in June of 1997, according to Appellant, after she 

found out she was pregnant with the parties’ first child. 

She then testified that the parties began telling family 

members that they intended to be married. Appellant 

continued to testify that she and [Dreakford] did research 

on different options they had in order to be married—

traditional church wedding, courthouse, or a common-law 

marriage. 

 The parties have three children together: [ages fifteen 

to ten]. In August of 1997, while pregnant with their first 

child, the couple took a trip to Jamaica. The parties agree 

that the trip was taken, but differ on the purpose of the 

trip. Appellant testified that the couple considered the trip 

to Jamaica to be their honeymoon and that, prior to

leaving the country, they exchanged vows whereupon she 

stated, “I agree to be your Wife now and forever,” and 

[Dreakford] reciprocated. No witnesses were present 

during this exchange. [Dreakford], on the other hand, 

testified that there had never been an exchange of vows 

and that the trip was taken merely as an opportunity for 

the two to relax before the birth of their first child. 

Furthermore, [Dreakford] testified that the parties never 

discussed getting married and that he had never proposed 

to Appellant. 

 Appellant further testified that she had consulted a 

family law attorney who gave her the requirements for a 

valid marriage, [but] she could not remember the 

attorney’s name. She could not recall details such as the 

weather in Pittsburgh or Jamaica on the day of her alleged 

wedding. Prior to their trip to Jamaica, Appellant had a 

small bridal shower with her co-workers. About a dozen of 

her co-workers took her out to a restaurant and gave her 

some small gifts, however, Appellant could not recall all of 

the names of the women who were present, nor could she 

recall the name of the restaurant. Similarly, Appellant 

could not remember the location of the jewelry store 

where she claimed the couple went to buy wedding rings, 

nor could she recall any of the locations where she and 

[Dreakford] allegedly celebrated their anniversaries. The 

Court finds that Appellant was not credible. 
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 Appellant’s father, Mr. Layton, testified that, 

subsequent to the trip to Jamaica, he found out about the 

parties’ marriage from Appellant. He did not have 

knowledge as to where the parties exchanged their vows. 

It was Mr. Layton’s testimony that, after the parties’ trip to 

Jamaica, their family did not believe the parties were just 

boyfriend and girlfriend anymore. Lastly, Mr. Layton 

testified that he holds himself out to be [Dreakford’s] 

father-in-law. 

 By March or April of 1998, the parties moved to North 

Carolina. During [Dreakford’s] testimony, he stated that 

he believed that by law once he lived with Appellant for 

seven years, they were married. Therefore, they held 

themselves out to family members as being married, but 

they did not start doing that in 1997, as [] Appellant had 

testified. As to the wedding rings, [Dreakford] asserted 

that he purchased a ring for Appellant for Christmas of 

2000. Appellant picked out her own ring from White Hall 

Jewelers in St. Augustine, Florida. [Dreakford] testified 

that the rings were attributed to the fact that the parties 

had been telling co-workers and people that they were 

married. Two rings were produced to the Court by 

Appellant—one square-cut diamond ring and one plain,

thin gold band. 

 The parties began filing taxes “married filing jointly” in 

1998 for the 1997 tax year, even though, at that point in 

time, [Dreakford] did not believe the parties to be married. 

Appellant [and Dreakford both] enrolled in a Jackson 

Hewitt tax preparation course to “ensure that the federal 

government would recognize a common law marriage.” 

[Appellant] did not attend any preparation courses until 

after the parties returned from Jamaica. [Dreakford] 

testified that the purpose for enrolling in the course was to 

earn extra income by having the ability to prepare tax 

returns. He did not finish the course. He never spoke to a 

tax professional because he felt Appellant was a 

professional after she completed the tax preparation 

course. Appellant advised [Dreakford] that, if the parties 

filed their taxes jointly, they would be able to save money, 

and that is what they decided to do. 

 Moreover, [Dreakford] testified that he avoided 

questions in regards [sic] to an anniversary date because 
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he did not know when their anniversary was, as they did 

not have a wedding date because they never had a 

wedding. 

 The parties purchased their home together in North

Carolina, whereby [Dreakford] listed Appellant as his wife. 

When the parties moved to Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, [Dreakford] also added Appellant to his health 

insurance and benefits plan that he received from work. 

He testified that he felt this was appropriate since they 

were already filing their taxes jointly. Likewise,

[Dreakford] testified that the parties “almost certainly” had 

joint car insurance from 1998 forward. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/14, at 2-5 (footnotes omitted). 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued an order 

requiring the parties to submit legal briefs on the status of common law 

marriage in Pennsylvania. By order entered August 12, 2013, the trial court 

struck Appellant’s divorce action and dismissed her divorce complaint 

against Dreakford with prejudice.1 The trial court further ordered the 

separate support complaint filed against Dreakford dismissed with prejudice. 

This appeal follows. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 Appellant raises the following issues: 

I. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in 

determining that no common law marriage existed despite 

the overwhelming evidence otherwise and both [parties’] 

testimony that they believed they were married. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The Butler County Prothonotary did not docket this order properly until 

January 24, 2014. Thus, the instant appeal is timely. 
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II. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in not 

admitting certain marital documents that the [parties] 

drafted together, and was the error harmless. 

III. Did the trial court err in limiting the testimony on the 

discussion and steps the [parties] took when attempting to 

divide the assets they believed to be marital. 

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (emphasis removed).2 

 In Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998), our 

Supreme Court addressed the concept and continued viability of “common 

law” marriage in Pennsylvania: 

 Marriage in Pennsylvania is a civil contract by which a 

man and woman take each other for husband and wife. 

There are two kinds of marriage: (1) ceremonial; and (2) 

common law. A ceremonial marriage is a wedding or 

marriage performed by a religious or civil authority with 

the usual or customary ceremony or formalities. 

 Because claims for the existence of a marriage in the 

absence of a certified ceremonial marriage present a 

fruitful source of perjury and fraud, Pennsylvania courts 

have long viewed such claims with hostility. Common law 

marriages are tolerated, but not encouraged. While we do 

not today abolish common law marriages in Pennsylvania 

we reaffirm that claims for this type of marriage are 

disfavored. 

Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d at 1019-20 (citations omitted). 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Appellant acknowledges her third issue was not preserved by raising a 

timely objection, and therefore concedes this issue is waived. See 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. She provides no argument in support of this waived 

claim. 
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 In 2004, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the Domestic Relations 

Code, effective January 24, 2005, with regard to “common law” marriages, 

as follows: 

§ 1103. Common-law marriage 

No common-law marriage contracted after January 1, 

2005, shall be valid. Nothing in this part shall be deemed 

or taken to render any common-law marriage otherwise 

lawful and contracted on or before January 1, 2005,

invalid. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103. Given its clear terms, the abolition of common law 

marriage in Pennsylvania applied only prospectively. Thus, parties claiming 

to have entered into a common law marriage prior to January 1, 2005, 

would have to establish the existence of a valid marriage contract. In 

Staudenmayer, our Supreme Court clarified the burden of proving a 

common law marriage as follows: 

 A common law marriage can only be created by an 

exchange of words in the present tense, spoken with the 

specific purpose that the legal relationship of husband and 

wife are created by that. 

 *** 

 The common law marriage contract does not require 

any specific form of words, and all that is essential is proof 

of an agreement to enter into the legal relationship of 

marriage at the present time. 

 The burden to prove the marriage is on the party 

alleging the marriage, and we have described this as a 

heavy burden where there is an allegation of common law 

marriage. When an attempt is made to establish a 

common law marriage without the usual formalities, the 

claim must be viewed with great scrutiny. 
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 Generally, words in the present tense are required to 

prove common law marriage. Because common law 

marriage cases arose most frequently because of claims 

for a putative surviving spouse’s share of an estate, 

however, we developed a rebuttable presumption in favor 

of a common law marriage where there is an absence of 

testimony regarding the exchange of verba in praesenti. 

When applicable, the party claiming a common law 

marriage who proves: (1) constant cohabitation; and (2) 

a reputation of marriage which is not partial or divided but 

is broad and general, raises the rebuttable presumption of 

marriage. Constant cohabitation, however, even when 

conjoined with general reputation are not marriage, they 

are merely circumstances which give rise to a rebuttable 

presumption of marriage. 

Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d at 1020-21 (citations and footnotes omitted). 

 The high court further addressed whether the rebuttable presumption 

arises in the factual circumstances “when both parties are alive and able to 

testify regarding the formation of the marriage contract.” Staudenmayer, 

714 A.2d at 1021. Our Supreme Court explained: 

 We have stated that the rule which permits a finding of 

marriage duly entered into based upon reputation and 

cohabitation alone is one of necessity to be applied only in 

cases where other proof is not available. The necessity 

that would require the introduction of evidence concerning 

cohabitation and reputation of marriage is the inability to 

present direct testimony regarding the exchange of verba 

in praesenti. . . . Where there is no such proof available, 

we held the law permits a finding of a marriage based 

upon reputation and cohabitation when established by 

satisfactory proof. 

 We have not, however, dispensed with the rule that a 

common law marriage does not come into existence unless 

the parties uttered the verba in praesenti, the exchange of 

vows in the present tense for the purpose of establishing 

the relationship of husband and wife. We have allowed, as 

a remedial measure, a rebuttable presumption in favor of a 
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common law marriage based on sufficient proof of 

cohabitation and reputation of marriage where the parties 

are otherwise disabled from testifying regarding verba in 

praesenti. However, where the parties are available to 

testify regarding verba in praesenti, the burden rests with 

the party claiming a common law marriage to produce

clear and convincing evidence of the exchange of words in 

the present tense spoken with the purpose of establishing 

the relationship of husband and wife, in other words, the 

marriage contract. In those situations, the rebuttable 

presumption in favor of common law marriage upon 

sufficient proof of constant cohabitation and reputation for 

marriage, does not arise. 

 By requiring proof of verba in praesenti where both 

parties are able to testify, we do not discount the

relevance of evidence of constant cohabitation and 

reputation of marriage. When faced with contradictory 

testimony regarding verba in praesenti, the party claiming 

a common law marriage may introduce evidence of 

constant cohabitation and reputation of marriage in

support of his or her claim. We merely hold that if a 

putative spouse who is able to testify and fails to prove, by 

clear and convincing evidence, the establishment of the 

marriage contract through the exchange of verba in 

praesenti, then that party has not met its heavy burden to 

prove a common law marriage, since he or she does not 

enjoy any presumption based on evidence of constant

cohabitation and reputation of marriage. 

Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d at 1021 (citations and footnotes omitted). 

 Here, both Appellant and Dreakford were available, and testified about 

the existence of the marriage contract, i.e., verba in praesenti. In her first 

issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion 

when concluding that no common law marriage existed, given the 

“overwhelming evidence otherwise,” as well as “both parties’ testimony that 
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they believed they were married.” Appellant’s Brief at 5 (emphasis 

removed). 

 When making its factual findings, the trial court expressly stated: 

“The Court found Appellant’s testimony regarding the exchange of verba de 

[sic] praesenti not credible and [Dreakford’s] testimony credible.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 7/21/14, at 5. The trial court further explained: 

 In the instant case, the testimony was contradictory as 

to whether an express agreement was made. To support 

her claim that a common law marriage existed, Appellant 

testified that the parties had a discussion about marriage 

shortly after she found out she was pregnant with their 

first child. She testified that the parties had told family 

members that they were going to be married. 

Furthermore, she testified that she researched common 

law marriage as well as reached out to a family law

attorney. She, however, did not learn that the parties 

could declare their intentions before two witnesses, nor 

could she remember the name of the family law attorney 

with whom she consulted. Prior to the alleged wedding 

date, Appellant testified that some friends from work held 

a bridal shower for her, however, she could not remember 

the name or specific location of the restaurant in which the 

bridal shower was held nor the names of friends who

attended. Appellant further recounted that, on August [1], 

1997, the parties were in their apartment, packing for their 

trip to Jamaica, when they exchanged vows. She could 

not testify as to what the weather was like in Pittsburgh on 

that day. 

 [Dreakford], on the other hand, testified that, upon 

finding out Appellant was pregnant, he merely discussed 

the pregnancy with her. He stated he was concerned that 

she would not keep the baby as she had two previous

abortions, one of which would have been his child. He 

further testified that, after the parties concluded that they 

would keep the baby, their trip to Jamaica was one last 

chance for the parties to relax as a couple before the birth 

of their first child. 
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 To further support her claim of common law marriage, 

Appellant testified that [Dreakford] purchased two 

“wedding rings” for her after the Jamaica trip. She 

produced to the Court two rings. It is undisputed that 

there was not an exchange of rings prior to or during the 

trip to Jamaica. [Appellant] could not recall the name of 

the store or any other details around the selection of the 

rings. 

 [Dreakford] testified that he purchased rings for the two 

of them as a Christmas present in 2000 and that the rings 

were purchased at Whitehall Jewelers in St. Augustine, 

Florida. Appellant had chosen the ring with the square-cut 

diamond, which was presented to the Court. [Dreakford] 

could not testify to the plain, thin gold band produced to 

the Court by Appellant as he had never seen it before. 

 The Court found [Dreakford’s] testimony that no 

express words were exchanged between the parties 

articulating a present intent to enter into the legal 

relationship of marriage to be credible. The Court found 

Appellant’s contradictory testimony not credible. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/14, at 7-8 (footnote omitted). 

 Because the parties presented contradictory testimony regarding verba 

in praesenti, the trial court next considered evidence of constant 

cohabitation and reputation for marriage as an aid to its credibility 

determination. The trial court explained: 

 The relevant testimony as to this issue was, for the 

most part, not disputed. 

 There is no dispute that the parties constantly 

cohabitated from 1994 to 2011. At the suggestion of 

Appellant, the parties began filing their taxes as “Married 

Filing Jointly.” [Dreakford] added Appellant to his 

employment benefits package and his automobile 

insurance. When the parties purchased a home in North 

Carolina, [Dreakford] added Appellant to the deed as “his 

wife.” 
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Mr. Layton, Appellant’s father, testified that Appellant 

informed him the parties got married in Jamaica. He was 

unable to testify as to whether or not the parties 

exchanged verba in praesenti with the intent to create a 

marriage. Mr. Layton further testified that [Dreakford] 

never told him the parties were married, however he has 

held himself out to be [Dreakford’s] father-in-law.

 Appellant’s testimony was in general verbose. Her

specific testimony asserting verba in praesenti was not 

credible. The veracity of the testimony supporting

reputation was not sufficient to overcome the credibility 

issue of verba in praesenti. So while there was evidence 

of constant cohabitation and reputation, there was not 

clear and convincing evidence of verba in praesenti, 

without which there can be no common law marriage. 

 In her [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement], Appellant seems 

to assert that because both parties “believed they were 

married” there was sufficient evidence to support a

common law marriage. Appellant testified that there was a 

specific date, time and place where the parties exchanged 

verba in praesenti and, if believed, this occurred in 

Pennsylvania sometime around August 1, 1997. This 

would be her basis of “believing” the parties were married. 

[Dreakford] testified that he “believed” they were married 

as an operation of law after cohabitating for seven years. 

In 1998, less than a year after the trip to Jamaica, the 

parties resided in North Carolina which does not recognize 

common law marriage. [Dreakford’s] “belief” was a 

mistaken understanding of the law. A mistaken 

understanding for which he believed he had no remedy 

until he consulted with an attorney. There is no evidence 

on the record that [Dreakford] ever intended to enter into 

a marriage contract. 

 The Court considered in its analysis that [Dreakford] 

“believed” he was married. The Court considered that he 

took certain actions, including, but not limited to, 

discussions of distribution of property between the parties. 

However, the Court found no authority to support the 

formation of a marital contract based upon the mistaken 

“belief” of a party as to the status of the law (not a 

mistake of fact). [Dreakford’s] testimony as to why he 

believed the parties were married was credible. 
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 Appellant had a heavy burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parties by their express 

agreement entered into a common law marriage. As in the 

Staudenmayer case, both parties were “available to 

testify,” and did testify, concerning the exchange of verba 

in praesenti. Appellant “simply did not do so convincingly, 

and therefore did not meet her burden.” [Staudenmayer, 

714 A.2d at 1022]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/14, at 8-10 (footnote omitted). 

 Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusions. As 

recognized by the trial court, because both parties testified at the 

evidentiary hearing, the rebuttal presumption discussed in Staudenmayer, 

supra, does not arise. Moreover, as our Supreme Court further noted in 

Staudenmayer, the trial court “as factfinder, makes determinations 

concerning the credibility of witnesses and its conclusions of law based on 

those determinations will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Staudenmeyer, 714 A.2d at 1022. We discern no such abuse of discretion. 

Thus, we agree with the trial court that, based on the trial court’s credibility 

determinations, Appellant failed to meet her heavy burden of establishing a 

common law marriage. 

 In her remaining claim, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred 

and/or abused its discretion in refusing to admit as exhibits “certain marital 

documents that the [p]arties drafted together.” Appellant’s Brief at 5 

(emphasis removed). Within her brief, Appellant asserts, “[i]n 2011, 

Dreakford created and emailed [Appellant] a Separation Agreement and then 

the parties created a QDRO together, both documents containing August 1, 
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1997 as the agreed upon date of marriage.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. 

According to Appellant: 

The trial court excluded these documents as evidence 

despite argument that they were an opposing party’s

admission. Pa.R.E. 803(25). It also appears that had they 

been admitted, they would have been considered a prior 

inconsistent statement of Dreakford once he testified. In 

the Opinion issued by the trial court, it appears that the 

trial court acknowledges that their exclusion was an error; 

however, claiming it was harmless. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 Our review of the record refutes Appellant’s claim. Initially, we agree 

with Dreakford’s assertion that Appellant’s argument regarding this issue is 

not sufficiently developed. See Dreakford’s Brief at 19. As noted by the 

trial court, in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant failed to 

specifically identify the specific exhibits to which she refers. Moreover, 

Appellant’s appellate brief is devoid of case authority and any pertinent 

discussion of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Thus, Appellant’s claim is 

waived. See generally, Lawson v. Lawson, 940 A.2d 444, 448 n.5 (Pa. 

Super. 2007). 

 Even absent waiver, Appellant’s claim fails. “[T]he admission of 

evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed 

only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.” 

Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012). At the evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court refused to admit the documents at issue because 

Dreakford denied he had drafted certain parts of them. See N.T., 10/25/13, 
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at 53-57. “The ultimate question is whether the authentication testimony is 

sufficiently complete so as to persuade the [trial] court that it is improbable 

that the original item has been exchanged with another or altered in any 

material respect.” Webb v. Commission (PennDot), 934 A.2d 178, 185 

(Pa.Cmwlth. 2007) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]estimony of a witness 

with personal knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be may be 

sufficient to authenticate the evidence.” Id. (citing Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1)) 

(emphasis added). Here, because there was argument that the email at 

issue was “editable,” the trial court refused to admit it into evidence. N.T., 

10/25/13, at 53. In other words, the trial court believed Appellant’s 

testimony did not sufficiently authenticate it. As noted supra, the trial court 

repeatedly stated that Appellant’s testimony was not credible. Thus, as 

stated by the trial court, even had the exhibits been admitted, they would 

not alter the trial court’s conclusion that “the credible facts showed that no 

vows were exchanged, and [Dreakford] never had an intent or purpose to 

create a legal relationship of husband and wife[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 

7/21/14, at 11. 

 In sum, because the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that 

Appellant did not meet her burden of proving that a common law marriage 

existed between the parties, we affirm the trial court’s order striking and 

dismissing her divorce complaint with prejudice. 

 Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 12/29/2014