UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4498

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SANA LEE SANFORD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, 

Jr., District Judge. (2:99-cr-00197-1)

Submitted: November 30, 2010 Decided: January 6, 2011

Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Christian M. 

Capece, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Appellate Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. 

Booth Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, Monica L. Dillon, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM: 

Sana Lee Sanford appeals the fifteen-month sentence 

imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised release. 

Sanford argues on appeal that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court failed to provide a 

sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed. We affirm. 

We will not disturb a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed 

statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States 

v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this 

determination, we first consider whether the sentence is 

unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry takes a more 

deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the 

exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines 

sentences.” United States v. Moulden

The district court’s discretion is not unlimited, 

however. 

, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 

2010). For instance, the district court commits procedural 

error by failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence or by 

not providing an individualized assessment based on the facts. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Although “[a] 

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 

revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
3

conviction sentence, . . . it still must provide a statement of 

reasons for the sentence imposed. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judge also 

must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he 

has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis 

for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United 

States v. Carter

Sanford does not challenge the revocation of his 

supervised release or the calculation of his policy statement 

range. His sole contention is that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court failed to provide a 

sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed and that this

procedural error rendered his sentence plainly unreasonable.

, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). 

∗

 

Sanford did not request a sentence outside the policy statement 

range. Therefore, we review his challenge to the adequacy of 

the explanation for the within-policy statement range sentence 

for plain error. Cf. United States v. Lynn

 ∗ Sanford questions this court’s use of the plainly 

unreasonable standard as provided in Crudup. However, as 

Sanford acknowledges, a panel of this court cannot overrule the 

precedent set by another panel. United States v. Foster, 507 

F.3d 233, 251 n.12 (4th Cir. 2007).

, 592 F.3d 572, 580 

(4th Cir. 2010) (finding error not preserved where defendant 

failed to seek sentence outside guidelines range).
4

“To establish plain error, [Sanford] must show that an 

error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error 

affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad, 

478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Sanford satisfies 

these requirements, “correction of the error remains within [the 

court’s] discretion, which [the court] should not exercise . . . 

unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

In the sentencing context, an error affects 

substantial rights if the defendant can show that the sentence 

imposed “was longer than that to which he would otherwise be 

subject.” 

(internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (third alteration in 

original). 

United States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834, 849 (4th 

Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 

also United States v. Miller

Here, Sanford does not dispute that the policy 

statement range was properly calculated and he was sentenced at 

the bottom of that range. Sanford failed to present any 

arguments for deviating from that range. Therefore, regardless 

of whether the district court committed an error and whether any 

, 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009) 

(“In the sentencing context, an error was prejudicial only if 

there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have 

received a lighter sentence but for the error.”). 
5

such error was plain, Sanford cannot show that the court’s 

failure to more thoroughly explain the supervised release 

revocation sentence affected his substantial rights. Therefore, 

he cannot establish plain error.

Accordingly, we conclude that Sanford’s sentence is 

not plainly unreasonable and affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED