United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-3141EM

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, *

*
v. * * John McFarland, also known as Buggy, * * Appellant. *

_____________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern No. 96-3278EM District of Missouri.

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, *

*
v. * * Darryl Warren, also known as Monk, * * Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: March 11, 1997 Filed: June 5, 1997

_____________ Before FAGG, HEANEY, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.-2- _____________ FAGG, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted John McFarland a nd Darryl Warren of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (1994), and also found McFarland guilty of interstate travel in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1994). No purpose would be served by reciting at length the facts of this case. The testimony of polic e offic ers, postal inspectors, and unindicted coconspirators painted a picture of a five

yea r-long scheme, involving McFarland, Warren, and ten others, to transport larg e qua ntities of illegal drugs from California for distribution in and around St. Louis , Missouri . Warren appeals his conviction and McFarland appeals his convictions and sentence. We affirm.
Warren challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him by contending the testimony of coconspir ator witnesses who linked him to the conspiracy was unworthy of belief. Witness credibility i s for the jury to decide, not for us. See United States v. Rogers , 91 F.3d 53, 57 (8th Cir. 1996). Warren also urges reversal because th e evidence does not eliminate every possibility that Warren is innocent. To be sufficient, however, the evidence need not do so. See United States v. McMurray , 34 F.3d 1405, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994). As long as “there is an interpretation of the evidence that would per mit a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” the jury’s verdic t stands. Unite d States v. Maza , 93 F.3d 1390, 1399 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 1008 ( 1997). Where, as here, the evidence establishes the existence of a conspiracy, only slight evidence connecting Warren to the conspiracy is enough t o sustain his conviction. See id.

The Gove rnment introduced far more than slight evidence against Warren

. Besides coconspirator testimony linking Warren to McFarland’s drug business in 1994-3-

and 1995, the jury heard about a 1990 police stop of Warren, McFarland, and a third person in a vehicle containing a ki logram of cocaine. Questioned separately, the three told police conflicting stories about where they had been and with whom they ha d stayed. The jury also learned about the substantial and unexplained gap betwee n Warren’s spending and his reported income. Further, when police searched Warren’s bedroom they found $9,000 in cash, along with a drug ledger similar to one o f McFarland’s, a photograph of Warren and a coconspirator, the California address of another coconspirator, and California addresses and phone numbers for McFarland

. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, see Rogers , 91 F.3d at 57, we conclude it amply supports Warren’s conviction.
We turn now to McFarland’s appeal. McFarland first contends the district court wrongly denied his mot

ion to suppress evidence gathered during warrantless searches of his re sidence and a storage locker rented in his name. At the time these searche s
were carri ed out, McFarland was on parole from a California prison, subject to thi s condi tion: “You and your residence and any property under your control may b e searched without a warrant at any time by any agent of the Department of Corrections
or any law enforcement officer.” McFarland’s parole officer, Linda Arizaga , authorized both searches and was present for the locker search, but police officer s alone carried out the residential search. McFarland argues that Arizaga was helpin g police d odge the warrant requirement instead of pursuing her own parole-relate d purposes. See United St ates v. Harper , 928 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1991). We agree that a parole search is unlawful when it is nothing more than a ruse for a polic e investigation. See id. ; United States v. Martin , 25 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 1994 ) (probation search); United States v. Coleman , 22 F.3d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1994); Shea v. Smith , 966 F.2d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 1992); Unite d States v. Cardona , 903 F.2d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1990). Pa

role and police officers may work together, however, provided the parole officer is pursuing parole-related objectiv es and is not merely a “stalking horse” for the police. See Harper , 928 F.2d at 897.-4-

In this case, the district court found Arizaga authorized the police to carry out the challenged searches to determine if McFarland was violating his parole . This factual finding is not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Richardson , 849 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1988). Ariz aga was already concerned McFarland was violating a condition of his parole before the police contacted her seekin g permission to search McFarland’s residence. Arizaga then consulted with her supervisor before giving the police the goahea d. When the police later asked for authorization to search McFarland’s storag e locker, Arizaga insisted on be ing present for the search. These circumstances support the distri ct court’s finding that Arizaga authorized the searches for parole, not police, purposes, and so the district court properly denied McFarla nd’s motion to suppress. As a separate matter, although the police-only parole search of Mc Farland’s residence was proper under California law, see Cal. Penal Code § 3052 (West 1997); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2511(b)(4); People v. Burgener , 714 P.2d 1251, 1271 (Cal. 1986), McFarland has not asked us t o decide whether California’s parole-search law satisfies the Fourth Amend ment’s reasonableness requirement, see Griffin v. Wisconsin , 483 U.S. 868 , 872-73 (1987) (holding probation search lawful bec ause search conformed to state law itself reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes). We leave this unbriefe d constitutional question for another day. McFarla nd’s remaining claims merit little discussion. McFarland waived hi s right to assert a Speedy Trial Act violation by faili ng to move for dismissal before trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (19 94); United States v. Kime , 99 F.3d 870, 881 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 1015 (1997). Only a little over seven months elapsed between McFarland’s indictment and trial, too brief a delay to trigger review of hi s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. See Doggett v. United States , 505 U .S. 647, 651- 52 & n.1 (1992). McFarland’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the drug conspiracy count is without merit. The jury could also reasonably find that the testimony of Linda Jackson, one of McFarland’s coconspirators, established the elements of a Tr avel Act violation by McFarland beyond a reasonable doubt. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3); United States v. Brown , 956 F.2d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1992).-5-

As for McFarland’s sentence, the district court properly relied on trial testimony t o esta blishthe drug quantities attributable to McFarland for sentencing purposes. Se e United States v. Delpit , 94 F.3d 1134, 1154 (8th Cir. 1996). Actually, McFarlan d failed to object specifically to any of the drug-quantity calculations contained in hi s presentence report (PSR), and so the district court could have relied directly on th e PSR. See United States v. LaRoche , 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Final ly, McFarland’s challenge to the four-level increase of his offense level fo r organizing or le ading a criminal activity involving five or more participants is without merit.

We affirm Warren’s conviction and McFarland’s convictions and sentence.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.