Nos.  1-97-1560 & 1-99-2026  

      (Consolidated) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

		Plaintiff-Appellee,

	v.

LADIUS STEVENS, 		  

		Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County

Honorable 

Loretta Hall-Morgan 

and 

Mary Ellen Coghlan, 

Judges Presiding.

	MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING

	JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court1:

	Ladius Stevens (Stevens) was charged with multiple counts of

murder, felony murder, aggravated possession of a stolen motor

vehicle, possession of a stolen motor vehicle and burglary.  These

charges stem from Stevens having stolen a Ford Explorer and leading

the police on a high-speed chase culminating in the Explorer

striking another vehicle.  As a result of that collision, Guadalupe

Guzman, the driver of the other vehicle, was killed.  Defendant

pled guilty to two counts of murder and one count of aggravated

possession of a stolen motor vehicle.  The trial court sentenced

defendant to 27 years in prison for murder and a concurrent sentence of 10 years on the aggravated possession of a stolen motor

vehicle count.  On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court

should have granted his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and,

in the alternative, his sentence was excessive.  For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.      			

						   I

	Prior to trial commencing on January 8, 1997, the parties

participated in a plea conference in July of 1996 with the trial

judge, the late Honorable Loretta Hall-Morgan. During this

conference, the judge informed defense counsel that upon defendant

pleading guilty to the charges, she would sentence the defendant to

20 years in prison.  The defendant rejected this offer and elected

to be tried in a bench trial before Judge Hall-Morgan.  Prior to

the start of trial, the State dismissed the burglary and the felony

murder charge based on burglary.  After the presentation by the

State of the first two witnesses, Stevens moved to change his plea 

to guilty.  Judge Hall-Morgan advised the defendant repeatedly that

she did not feel bound by the prior offer of 20 years and she could

sentence the defendant to a longer sentence, if he pled guilty. 

Defendant persisted in his request to plead guilty and the court

accepted his plea to one count of murder based on the defendant

knowing his actions created a strong probability of death or great

bodily harm to Guzman; one count of felony murder based on aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and one count of

aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle.  When he next

appeared in court, Stevens indicated he wanted to withdraw his

guilty plea, claiming he had been misrepresented by his trial

counsel and that he did not fully understand the nature of his

plea.  The trial court denied Stevens' motion to withdraw.

	The trial court, after a hearing in aggravation and

mitigation, sentenced Stevens to 27 years on the charge of first

degree murder and 10 years on the charge of aggravated possession

of a motor vehicle.  These sentences were to be served

concurrently.  Fifteen days after the sentencing hearing, Stevens

filed a  pro  se4 mpro se motion to withdraw the guilty plea and to vacate the sentence.  Stevens also filed a motion to reconsider the sentence,

claiming in part that his actions resulting in Guzman's death were

reckless and not knowing or intentional.  The trial court denied

both motions, finding they had not been timely filed as Stevens had

filed his notice of appeal the day after he was sentenced, thereby

depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to hear motions.

	The first appeal, docketed under appellate No. 1-97-1560,

raised numerous legal issues including the trial court's inadequate

admonishments as to defendant's right to appeal, abuse of

discretion in failing to allow Stevens to withdraw his guilty plea

and an excessive sentencing argument.  In the published opinion of People v. Stevens, 297 Ill. App. 3d 408 (1998) (Stevens I), this court remanded the matter back to the trial court so that Stevens

could be adequately advised of his rights to appeal under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 605(b)(145 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)) and, if he so

elected, to file a new motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  The

opinion in Stevens I contemplated that, if Stevens' motion to withdraw his plea was denied, he would be allowed to appeal the

denial pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d)(145 Ill. 2d

R. 604(d)) and consolidate it with the remaining issues in the

previous appeal, over which this court specifically retained

jurisdiction.  The State's Attorney's office appealed this court's

ruling to the Illinois Supreme Court under case number 85862.  The

supreme court denied that appeal.

	Stevens, upon the remand back to the trial court, appeared

before the Honorable Mary Ellen Coghlan2 and was properly notified of his appeal rights.  Shortly thereafter, Stevens filed another

pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  After a hearing, the trial court denied said motion, which led to Stevens' second

appeal, docketed by this court as No. 1-99-2026.  In accordance

with its prior ruling, this court consolidated the appeal of the

most recent denial of Stevens' motion to withdraw his guilty plea into the remaining issues of the original appeal, over which this

court had retained jurisdiction.

						II

	Stevens argues on appeal that the trial court abused its

discretion in refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea

prior to sentencing.  Stevens claims the discretion of the trial

court is not absolute where the defendant has a defense worthy of

consideration or where the ends of justice would better be served

in allowing the cause to proceed to trial.  He argues that the

public policy preferring a trial to a plea in a criminal case is

overcome only in the face of a countervailing policy.  Here,

according to Stevens, the entry of a plea was not made in order to

extort concessions from the State.  Stevens argues that the fact

that the State dismissed duplicative charges before the plea was

entered constituted no concessions by the State since the facts

would show there was only one victim and one collision.  Stevens

points out that, even if the State prevailed at every stage, it

could not have secured more than the charges that were ultimately

brought against him because there cannot be more than one

conviction for each physical act by a given defendant.  Stevens

argues that the trial court's ruling on remand that Stevens was

attempting to withdraw his guilty plea as "gamesmanship" is misplaced.  He argues that, in order to support a claim of

"gamesmanship," it would require a finding that Stevens, by his

actions, extracted favorable concessions from the State.  While

defendant was initially charged with burglary and felony murder

predicated on burglary, these charges were dropped by the State

prior to the commencement of the bench trial.  Stevens also argues

that the State was not really prejudiced by the prospect that it

would have to plan for a trial.

	In denying Stevens' motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the

trial court on remand commented that Stevens may or may not have

had defenses to bring at a trial on the merits.  Stevens argues

that the trial court's comments suggests the case was close. 

Accordingly, Stevens argues that, for the trial court on remand to

have decided that this is essentially a close case yet steadfastly

refused to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea is a manifest

abuse of the trial court's discretion.  

	The State argues that the trial court's decision to deny the

motion to withdraw the plea was not an abuse of discretion.  The

State contends that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and

that the actions of engaging in a high-speed chase with the police

created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm and that

the sentence of 27 years is not an abuse of discretion.  The State

also argues that the trial court's finding that Stevens was engaging in gamesmanship was correct.  It also argues that there is

no real suggestion of the existence of reasonable doubt here and

the sentence imposed is well within the statutory limits.  It

argues there is no reason to invalidate the plea and force a trial

which will ultimately yield nothing new or different from the

result thus far.  Additionally, it argues that it is wrong to

characterize the trial court's comments that Stevens may or may not

have had a defense to assert at trial as a finding that this is a

close case.  The trial court never specifically found the existence

of a meritorious defense.  While the trial court did say “the

defendant may have meritorious defenses to the charges on this

case.  On the other hand, he may not,” this statement is taken out

of context.  A thorough review of the record shows that the trial

court actually said the following:

		Having reviewed all of the documents in this case,

I find absolutely no basis upon which I could

legitimately conclude that the defendant's plea was

involuntary.  I find no evidence to support the assertion

that he was misrepresented by trial counsel. 

		And although your arguments concerning the interest

of justice are particularly stated and well taken, the

same interest of justice shall apply to the State in this

case.

		The defendant may have meritorious defenses to the

charge in this case.  On the other hand, he may not.

		Certainly I think that if nothing else, it is safe

to state that the law on the issues raised so eloquently

by you, Mr. Jacobs, is not for lack of a better way of

describing it in a state of certainty.  Certainly arguments can be made in support of your position.  And

you concede that People v. Thomas,3 certainly at a minimum arguably could support the State's position.

		With respect to the blind plea issues that nothing

was extracted from the State, my review of the transcript

indicates that certain counts were nollied after the

blind plea or pursuant to the blind plea being entered. 

Certainly I think the argument could be made that that

was something that was extracted from the State.  

	* * *

		Certainly based on my review of the transcript and

the fact that there were extensive plea negotiations and

a trial commenced and then a blind plea entered and then

a change of mind, certainly there is evidence to support

that there has been some gamesmanship on the part of the

defendant in these proceedings.

		There is absolutely no evidence to support his

allegations that he was not aware of the fact he was

entering a blind plea.  He was thoroughly admonished by

Judge [Hall-]Morgan.

	* * *

		He was properly advised as to the penalties that

could apply to the charges at hand.  He was properly

advised with a range of sentences.  He was properly

advised of the rights he was giving up by entering the

plea.

		He stated that no one had threatened or forced him

to enter the plea.

		There was sufficient factual basis for the plea.

		And again, the defendant's claim that he had no idea

that he was taking a blind plea is quite frankly not

supported by the record.

		For all those reasons, the motion to withdraw guilty plea is denied.

	Stevens next claims that he should be allowed to withdraw his

guilty plea because aggravated possession of a motor vehicle is not

a forcible felony under the felony murder statute.  He argues that,

since jurisdiction was reserved to consider this issue, it is

properly before this court even through the trial court on remand

did not consider it.

	The State responds that the transcript of the plea and the

mittimus and half-sheets show the sentence was not based on a

conviction for felony murder.  Though it argues that this should

dispose of the issue, the State also asserts that aggravated

possession of a motor vehicle can be the basis for felony murder.

	Stevens finally argues that the sentence imposed is an abuse

of discretion because his actions were reckless and he did not

intend the consequences of the accidental vehicular collision.  He

argues that while there is evidence he was driving recklessly,

there is no evidence that he intended to kill anybody with the car.

	The State responds that the evidence of Stevens' guilt is

overwhelming because of the strong probability of death or great

bodily harm involved in what Stevens did.  The State directs this

court to the language of the murder statute, section 9-1(a)(2) of

the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2992)), which

provides that, to convict a defendant of first degree murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew

that his or her actions created a strong probability of death or

great bodily harm.  The State argues that any reasonable person

would find that driving over 100 miles per hour, running red

lights, driving on the wrong side of the street, and driving

through crosswalks against the light are acts that support a

finding that the defendant knew his acts created a strong

probability of death or great bodily harm.  

	Leave to withdraw a plea of guilty is not granted as a matter

of right, but as required to correct a manifest injustice under the

facts involved.  People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 39 (2000).   A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea and bears

the burden of showing the necessity for withdrawal.  People v. Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d 914, 917 (2000), citing People v. Artale, 244 Ill. App. 3d 469, 475 (1993).  "A court should allow a defendant to withdraw his plea where the plea was entered based on

a misapprehension of the facts or the law or because of

misrepresentations by counsel, where there is doubt of the

defendant's guilt, where he has a defense worthy of consideration,

or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting

the case to a jury."  Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 918.  It is important to note "[s]ubjective impressions alone are not

sufficient grounds to vacate a guilty plea absent some objective proof that the subjective impressions were justified."  Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 918, citing People v. Wilson, 295 Ill. App. 3d 228, 236 (1998).  The general rule is that it is within the sound

discretion of the trial court to determine whether a guilty plea

may be withdrawn, and, on appeal, this decision will not be

disturbed unless the decision is an abuse of that discretion. 

People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 244 (1991);  People v. Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127, 143 (1991); People v. Hirsch, 312 Ill. App. 3d 174, 179 (2000).  As to the decision of Judge Hall-Morgan, the

standard of abuse of discretion clearly applies because the trial

was held before her.  Even though Judge Coghlan only reviewed the

record and entertained argument when hearing the second motion to

withdraw the guilty plea, the abuse of discretion standard would

still apply.  But for the death of Hall-Morgan, she would have

heard the motion as she heard the trial.  Coghlan reviewed the

record to determine if Hall-Morgan's ruling was within her judicial

discretion.  Our review of Coghlan's review of Hall-Morgan's

determination would be de novo, but the motion itself before Coghlan would have to be held to the abuse of discretion standard

by Hall-Morgan or by Coghlan. 

	Though Stevens claims his guilty plea was not knowingly and

voluntarily made, the record is silent as to a basis under which

such a belief would be objectively reasonable.  In fact, in light of the lengthy discussions having taken place before the trial

court accepted the guilty plea, the record clearly demonstrates

that Stevens was made well aware of the consequences of the

decision he made.  In July of 1996, the defendant participated in

a conference with the trial court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402).  The trial court offered to sentence the

defendant to a term of 20 years in prison if the defendant pled

guilty to the charges.  Prior to participating in the Rule 402

conference, the trial court allowed the defendant to consult with

his mother.  The defendant rejected this offer and the case was

eventually set for a bench trial.  The bench trial commenced on

January 8, 1997.  After two witnesses testified, defense counsel

indicated that defendant wished to plead guilty to the charges. 

Prior to accepting the plea, Judge Hall-Morgan repeatedly

admonished the defendant that she did not feel bound by the prior

offer of 20 years.  Judge Hall-Morgan admonished the defendant that

he must not think that he could plead guilty on that day and then

file a motion to withdraw that plea later, unless there was a basis

for withdrawing the plea.  The defendant persisted in his desire to

plead guilty.  The court then read the three counts to which

defendant was pleading.  The court accepted the defendant's plea

and continued the case for sentencing, ordering a presentence

investigation be conducted.

	On February 13, 1997, before the hearing in aggravation and

mitigation began, the defendant indicated to the court that he

wanted to withdraw his plea of guilty.  Judge Hall-Morgan ordered

a forensic psychiatric exam of the defendant in order to determine

whether the defendant knew what he was doing when he pled guilty.

	On April 1, 1997, the case was again before Judge Hall-Morgan. 

The defendant told the judge that he never pled guilty to the

charges and he did not know what was going on during the plea. 

Judge Hall-Morgan reminded defendant of what had transpired on the

day of the plea and defendant acknowledged that he remembered

pleading guilty.  Judge Hall-Morgan distributed the report of the

psychiatric exams which indicated that at the time he pled guilty,

defendant knew the consequences of that plea.  The case was

continued to April 7, 1997.

	On April 7, 1997 the trial court denied the defendant's

request to withdraw his plea and proceeded to a hearing in

aggravation and mitigation.  After the evidence and arguments of

counsel, the judge commented that when she had offered the

defendant a sentence of 20 years, she was unaware that he had been

adjudicated a delinquent for an attempted armed robbery and that

she was unaware that his prior conviction for attempted murder

involved firing a gun at a police officer from two feet away. 

Judge Hall-Morgan then sentenced defendant to 27 years in prison.  Defendant immediately filed a motion to reconsider his sentence,

which the court denied that same day.  Some 15 days later,

defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and a

motion to reconsider his sentence.  Judge Hall-Morgan denied these

motions, finding that she no longer had jurisdiction of the case as

defendant had filed a notice of appeal.

	Judge Hall-Morgan considered the evidence presented and found

Stevens' desire to withdraw his plea to be disingenuous.  Judge

Coghlan reviewed the record made before Judge Hall-Morgan and

entertained oral argument on these issues.  Though Stevens goes to

great lengths to interpret Judge Coghlan's comments so as to show

a basis for the withdrawal of the plea, he has failed to show a

fair and just reason by which this court can substitute its

judgment for the discretionary authority of the court below.

"Entering a guilty plea is *** accurately described as a 'grave and

solemn act.'" People v. Evans, 174 Ill 2d 320, 326 (1996), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (1970).  It is not a temporarily and

meaningless formality reversible at the defendant's whim.  United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  Leave to withdraw a plea of guilty is not granted as a matter of right, but

as required to correct a manifest injustice.  People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326 (1996), citing People v. Hillenbrand, 121 Ill. 2d 537, 545 (1988).  This record does not support Stevens' argument

that a manifest injustice has occurred.  This conclusion is

supported by the results of the psychiatric evaluation conducted by

the Forensic Clinical Services Department, which found that Stevens

understood the possible ramifications of the actions he took when

he pled guilty.

	Finally, Stevens claims that he should be allowed to withdraw

his guilty plea because he pled guilty to felony murder based upon

the offense of aggravated possession of a motor vehicle, which is

not a forcible felony.  On remand the trial court did not comment

on whether or not felony murder could be based upon aggravated

possession of a motor vehicle.  Though Stevens requests a ruling

from this court on the issue of whether aggravated possession of a

motor vehicle is a forcible felony for purposes of the felony

murder statute, we decline to do so because Stevens was not

sentenced on that charge.  As demonstrated by the mittimus, Stevens

was convicted and sentenced for first degree murder based on the

defendant knowing that his actions created a strong probability of

death or great bodily harm and a concurrent sentence for the

aggravated possession of a motor vehicle.  There is no final

judgment in a criminal case until the imposition of a sentence,

and, in the absence of a final judgment, an appeal cannot be

entertained.  People v. Childress, 321 Ill. App. 3d 13, 26 (2001), citing People v. Campbell, 241 Ill. App. 3d 782, 789 (1992).  Since no sentence was imposed on the felony murder count, there can be no

appeal of defendant's conviction on this count.

	Defendant's guilty plea to first degree murder based on his

knowing that his actions created a strong probability of death or

great bodily harm is supported by the record. The record,

consisting of the testimony of two witnesses and the facts

stipulated to by the defendant during his plea, shows that

defendant drove a stolen car at speeds in excess of 100 miles an

hour, drove it on the shoulder of an expressway, weaved through

traffic, refused to stop for marked police units, and drove it into

the rear of the victim's vehicle.  This caused the victim's vehicle

to crash into a retaining wall and flip over five times.  The

defendant committed these acts while his passenger begged him to

stop the car.  The defendant refused, saying he was never going

back to jail.  "It is not necessary to directly prove that

defendant had the intent to murder; all that needs to be shown is

that defendant voluntarily and willfully committed an act, the

natural tendency of which was to cause death or great bodily harm." 

People v. Lee, 256 Ill. App. 3d 856, 861 (1993).

	In People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d 914 (1994), this court affirmed the defendant's conviction for first degree murder where

the defendant drove a car containing stolen goods at a high rate of speed while being pursued by police.  The defendant drove through

heavy traffic and through a red light, striking another vehicle,

killing its occupants.  This court held that these facts supported

the jury's factual finding that the defendant knew his acts created

a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.  People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 926-27.  Similarly, the defendant's actions in the instant case support Judge Hall-Morgan's acceptance

of defendant's plea to first degree murder and Judge Coghlan's

denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.  

						III

	As to defendant's argument that his sentence is excessive, it

is well settled that the trial court has broad discretionary powers

in imposing a sentence.  People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000).  The trial court's sentencing decision is entitled to great

deference.  Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209.

		"The trial court is granted such deference because

		the trial court is generally in a better position 

		than the reviewing court to determine the appro-

		priate sentence.  The trial judge has the opportu-

		nity to weigh such factors as the defendant's 

		credibility, demeanor, general moral character,

		mentality, social environment, habits, and age."	

		People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991).

The reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of

the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors

differently.  Streit, 142 Ill. 2d at 19.

	Since the sentence imposed by the trial court was within the

bounds of that court's discretion, there is no reason to disturb

that sentence based upon the totality of the record presented to

this court.  

	In light of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is

affirmed.

	Affirmed.	  

Quinn, P.J. and Campbell, P.J., concur.