IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 6, 2018 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HORATIO LAMONT HARRISON

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 17-26 Kyle C. Atkins, Judge

No. W2017-01798-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Horatio Lamont Harrison, was indicted for driving under the influence 

(DUI), failure to yield,1violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the 

implied consent law. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-131, -10-401, -10-406, -12-139. The 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence gathered during his traffic stop. The 

trial court concluded that the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause, granted 

the Defendant’s suppression motion, and dismissed the indictments. On appeal, the State 

contends that the trial court erred in granting the Defendant’s suppression motion. 

Following our review, we conclude that the trial court erred by not considering the 

State’s alternative theory attempting to establish that the stop was supported by probable 

cause or a reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court 

and remand the case for a new suppression hearing.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Reversed; 

Case Remanded

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L.

EASTER and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Zachary T. Hinkle, Assistant 

Attorney General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Matthew Floyd, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

 

1

The indictment incorrectly charged the Defendant with violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 

55-8-130, failure to yield the right-of-way “at the entrance to a through highway.” It is apparent from the 

record before us that the Defendant was alleged to have violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 

55-8-131, failure to yield the right-of-way when entering a highway “from a drive, private road, or private 

driveway.”

01/23/2019
-2-

Harold E. Dorsey, Alamo, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellee, Horatio Lamont 

Harrison.2

OPINION

The Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence gathered during his traffic 

stop because the stop “was conducted without probable cause.” The State filed a 

response, arguing that the officer had probable cause to believe that the Defendant had 

violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-131 by failing to yield the right-of-way 

and Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-123 by crossing the fog line.

At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that he was driving on 

Whitehall Street in a marked patrol car when the Defendant “pulled out into the roadway” 

from a parking lot. The officer further testified that he had to “move from [his] lane of 

travel to the left to avoid . . . hitting the [Defendant’s] vehicle.” After passing the 

Defendant, the officer entered the parking lot and turned around to follow the Defendant. 

The officer also noted that the Defendant had “a tinted license plate cover over [his] 

license plate” and that he eventually cited the Defendant for that. The officer’s dash 

camera video was played for the trial court during the suppression hearing.

The officer admitted that he stopped the Defendant because the Defendant “almost 

pulled out in front” of him. However, the following exchange occurred during the 

suppression hearing:

[Prosecutor]: Okay. And after reviewing the video did you also see 

whether or not [the Defendant] -- the vehicle driven by [the Defendant] 

ever crossed the fog line?

[Officer]: It crossed over to the right-hand side of the road, which is on the 

east side of the road.

[Defense counsel]: I’m going to object to the relevance. If -- if the crossing 

over the fog line -- if that wasn’t part of the probable cause, then what he 

saw on the videotape later, it -- it’s just not relevant. It doesn’t matter.

[Prosecutor]: Well, [y]our Honor, if it’s -- if it’s the basis for -- [i]f it can be 

argued as a basis for a valid stop, even though the officer did not notice at 

the time, it could --

[Trial court]: What was the basis of the stop?

[Prosecutor]: At the time, [y]our Honor, it was the fact that he pulled out in 

front of -- I’m sorry, that [the Defendant] pulled out in front of . . . [the 

 

2 After the notice of appeal was filed, defense counsel filed a motion in this court to withdraw, noting that 

he had not been retained to represent the Defendant on appeal. The motion was granted and the 

Defendant proceeded pro se in this matter.
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officer].

[Trial court]: Okay. So he can’t use something he saw on a videotape last 

night for his probable cause, so I’ll sustain that.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court granted the 

Defendant’s suppression motion. The trial court concluded that the Defendant “pulled 

out into the lane of traffic maybe three or four, five inches” and that the officer appeared 

on the video from his dash camera to be “moving pretty quickly.” The trial court opined 

that the Defendant “didn’t see [the officer] for the shadow” caused from a “slight 

obstruction” nearby and that he stopped when he finally saw the officer’s patrol car. 

The trial court concluded that the officer lacked probable cause that the Defendant 

had violated section 55-8-131 because the Defendant “did yield the right-of-way.” The 

trial court credited the officer for being honest about his reason for the stop and noted that 

if the officer had said that he had stopped the Defendant for crossing the fog line, the trial 

court would “have probably had no choice” but to deny the suppression motion.

The State now appeals to this court. The State contends that the trial court erred in 

granting the suppression motion. The State argues that the Defendant’s act of pulling out 

onto the highway, however slight, was sufficient to give the officer probable cause or a 

reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had violated section 55-8-131. The State also 

argues that the fact the Defendant had “a tinted license plate cover over [his] license 

plate” provided the officer probable cause to stop the Defendant.3

On appellate review of suppression issues, the prevailing party “is entitled to the 

strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as 

all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” State v.

Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 

(Tenn. 1996)). Questions about “the assessment of witness credibility, the weight and 

value of evidence, and the resolution of evidentiary conflicts are entrusted to the trial 

court” as the trier of fact. State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2008). When the 

trial court “makes findings of fact in the course of ruling upon a motion to suppress, those 

findings are binding on appeal unless the evidence in the record preponderates against 

them.” Id. Conversely, a trial court’s conclusions of law, along with its application of 

the law to the facts, are reviewed de novo without any presumption of correctness. Id.

Both the federal and state constitutions offer protection from unreasonable 

searches and seizures with the general rule being “that a warrantless search or seizure is 

presumed unreasonable and any evidence discovered subject to suppression.” Talley, 

 

3

The pro se Defendant failed to file a response brief despite this court’s numerous attempts to contact 

him and this court’s having sua sponte ordered two extensions of time for the filing of said brief.
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307 S.W.3d at 729 (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7). As has often 

been repeated, “the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches [or 

seizures] conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 

magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject to only a few 

specifically established and well delineated exceptions.’” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 

403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); 

see also State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007).

“Individuals do not lose their constitutional protections against unreasonable 

searches and seizures by getting into an automobile.” State v. Smith, 484 S.W.3d 393, 

400 (Tenn. 2016). However, if the officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion 

to suspect that a motorist has committed a traffic offense, a traffic stop will “pass 

constitutional muster.” Id. 400-02. In reviewing whether an officer had probable cause 

or a reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist, “the officer’s subjective state of mind is 

irrelevant.” Id. at 402. Rather, courts review the validity of a traffic stop “from a purely 

objective perspective” and “may consider relevant circumstances demonstrated by the 

proof even if not articulated by the testifying officer as reasons for the stop.” Id. When 

opposing a defendant’s suppression motion, the State “is not limited . . . to the grounds 

ostensibly relied upon by the officer if the proof supports the stop on other grounds.” Id.

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in not allowing 

the State to present its alternative theory that the Defendant’s crossing of the fog line 

violated section 55-8-123 and provided probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to 

justify the traffic stop. In doing so, the trial court did not make any factual findings or 

conclusions of law on that theory. The parties were also prevented from addressing

important factual issues regarding this theory, such as whether the officer activated his 

blue lights before or after observing the Defendant cross the fog line. Accordingly, we 

reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new suppression 

hearing. See State v. Hannah, 259 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tenn. 2008) (remanding for a new 

suppression hearing when the trial court erroneously halted the hearing without 

considering “the State’s alternative arguments”); State v. Alberts, 354 S.W.3d 320, 

321-23 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (remanding for a new suppression hearing when the trial 

court failed to consider “an alternative theory” that a search was valid as a warrantless 

search).

Upon consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of 

the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

_________________________________ 

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE