United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 12, 2017

Decided May 12, 2017

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 17-1196

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK HARDER, also known as MARK 

JAMES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 14-cr-67-jdp-1

James D. Peterson,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Mark Harder pleaded guilty in 2014 to failing to register as a sex offender, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 2250, and was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment and 5 years’

supervised release. Harder had completed his prison term and was on supervised 

release when, in 2017, the government sought revocation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), 

alleging that Harder violated the conditions of his release by associating with a minor 

without approval of his probation officer, lying to his probation officer, and possessing 

drug paraphernalia. After Harder admitted the violations, the district court revoked his 

supervised release and imposed another year of imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised 

release. Harder filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserts that the 

appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17-1196 Page 2

We note that there is no constitutional right to counsel in revocation proceedings 

when, as here, the defendant admits violating the conditions of his supervision and 

neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and 

complex grounds in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973); 

United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1171 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus we are not compelled to use the 

Anders safeguards for our review of counsel’s motion to withdraw, though we follow 

that decision as a matter of policy to ensure consideration of potential issues. 

See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987); United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 

856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). Harder opposes counsel’s motion to withdraw. See CIR. R. 51(b). 

Because counsel’s brief appears to be thorough and addresses issues that an appeal of 

this kind might be expected to involve, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel 

discusses, along with the contentions in Harder’s response. See United States v. Bey, 

748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 

1996).

Counsel first considers whether Harder could challenge the revocation. But 

Harder admitted that he violated the conditions of his release during the revocation 

proceeding, so any argument that the revocation was unfounded would be frivolous. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (allowing revocation when court finds by a preponderance of 

the evidence that defendant violated a condition of release); United States v. Flagg, 481 

F.3d 946, 948–51 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming revocation when defendant admitted 

violations). In his Rule 51(b) response, Harder argues that his due-process rights were 

violated because no one investigated his justifications for the violations. But that 

contention is belied by his colloquy with the district judge, who ensured that Harder

understood the proceedings, the alleged violations, and the possible penalties. See FED.

R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(3); United States v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511, 515–17 (7th Cir. 1999).

Counsel also considers challenging Harder’s term of reimprisonment as plainly 

unreasonable, but rightly concludes that this claim would be frivolous. The term 

imposed is below the statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3), (k). Also, the 

district court applied the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), taking into account 

Harder’s history of repeatedly failing to comply with the terms of his supervision, the 

need to deter him from future misconduct, and the need to protect the public. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.