[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13602

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WASEEM DAKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA, 

GEORGIA SECRETARY OF STATE, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA, 

STATE OF GEORGIA, 

SENTENCE REVIEW PANEL, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

USCA11 Case: 20-13602 Date Filed: 04/13/2022 Page: 1 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 20-13602

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-05243-WMR

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, WILSON and 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal returns to us after remand to give Waseem 

Daker, a Georgia prisoner, notice of and an opportunity to respond 

to the entry of a filing injunction. Daker v. Governor of Ga., 796 F. 

App’x 720 (11th Cir. 2020). After allowing Daker to show cause 

why the injunction should not be entered, the district court reimposed its order requiring Daker to post a contempt bond and to 

append to all future filings a list of his litigation history. We affirm.

We review the imposition of a filing injunction for abuse of 

discretion. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008). 

“A district court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect 

legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” 

Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004).

Daker is “a serial litigant who has clogged the federal courts 

with frivolous litigation by submitting over a thousand pro se filings in over a hundred actions and appeals in at least nine different 

USCA11 Case: 20-13602 Date Filed: 04/13/2022 Page: 2 of 5
20-13602 Opinion of the Court 3

federal courts.” Daker v. Jackson, 942 F.3d 1252, 1255 (11th Cir. 

2019) (quoting Daker v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 

1281 (11th Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). His litigation stems from his confinement for convictions in 1996 for aggravated stalking and in 2012 for malice murder, burglary, false imprisonment, aggravated battery, and attempted aggravated stalking. Daker years ago accumulated the requisite three strikes to deny him the right to proceed as a pauper. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Daker, 942 F.3d at 1256 n.4, 1258–59. But 

he has devised means to circumvent that limitation on frivolous 

filings.

To curb Daker’s abusive filings, the district court permanently enjoined him “from filing or attempting to file any new lawsuit or petition in [the] Court without first posting a $1,500.00 contempt bond in addition to paying the required filing fee.” The district court ordered that, “[i]f any of Daker’s future filings is deemed 

frivolous or duplicative, the presiding judge may impose a contempt sanction against Daker to be paid from the contempt bond” 

and he would “not be allowed to file any further lawsuits unless 

and until the contempt bond is replenished to the amount of 

$1,500.00.” “If Daker does not file any cases in [the] Court for a oneyear period, the Clerk will return the contempt bond funds to 

Daker,” but he nonetheless must “file a $1,500 contempt bond in 

connection with any [future] cases he files . . . .” The order also 

requires Daker to “include with every lawsuit he files in this or any 

other court” a copy of the injunction and a list of every “lawsuit, 

USCA11 Case: 20-13602 Date Filed: 04/13/2022 Page: 3 of 5
4 Opinion of the Court 20-13602

habeas corpus petition, and appeal that he has filed in any federal 

court along with [their] final disposition” or else face a summary 

dismissal. In the event that Daker is “unable to afford the $1,500.00 

contempt bond, he [can] move for modification” so long as his motion includes a “comprehensive accounting of his assets and [an] 

affirm[ation] that the accounting is true under penalty of perjury.”

The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering the 

filing injunction. “Federal courts have both the inherent power and 

the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions,”

as is the case when “single litigants . . . unnecessarily encroach[] on 

the judicial machinery needed by others.”Procup v. Strickland, 792 

F.2d 1069, 1073, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc). As the district court

stated, Daker’s “inability to obtain in forma pauperis status” had

not curbed “his ability to clog the Court’s docket.” Daker eluded

that protective process by “frivolously assert[ing] that his claims 

qualify under the ‘imminent danger’ exception to § 1915(g)” or by 

paying the required filing fee. Requiring Daker to post a bond and 

provide detailed information about his past litigation is a permissible next step to combat his vexatious litigation. See id. at 1072–73 

(providing a non-exclusive list of methods to curtail abusive prisoner litigation). We have approved similar restrictions. Id. at 1072 

(submitting a litigation history with every pleading); Copeland v. 

Green, 949 F.2d 390, 391 (11th Cir. 1991) (requiring the clerk to 

mark pleadings “received” instead of “filed” until screened by a

judge); Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (11th Cir. 

USCA11 Case: 20-13602 Date Filed: 04/13/2022 Page: 4 of 5
20-13602 Opinion of the Court 5

1993) (permanently enjoining filings without leave of court and the

submission of litigation history). And the district court protected

Daker’s right to access the courts by providing the means to litigate 

nonfrivolous issues if he is indigent.

Daker’s challenges to the order lack merit. Daker argues that 

the district court lacks jurisdiction to order him to report his litigation history to other courts. But reporting litigation history to 

other tribunals ensures enforcement of the injunction, which “operate[s] continuously and perpetually upon” and is “binding upon 

[Daker] . . . throughout the United States.” Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 451 (1932). Daker’s argument 

that a contempt bond is inappropriate because he has not been held 

in contempt ignores that he has been rebuked repeatedly for abusive filings and has a record of thwarting lesser efforts to curtail his 

vexatious litigation. The district court reasonably decided to “respond [to Daker’s deliberate disobedience of restrictions he knew 

existed] with imaginative new techniques designed to protect the 

court access of all litigants” and “to protect itself against the abuses 

that litigants like [Daker] visit upon it.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073. 

Daker also argues that the injunction violates his constitutional 

rights, but his right of access to the courts is “neither absolute nor 

unconditional,” Miller, 541 F.3d at 1096. The district court did not 

abuse its “[c]onsiderable discretion” by “severely restrict[ing] . . . 

what [Daker] may file and how he must behave in his applications 

for judicial relief.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074.

We AFFIRM the injunction entered against Daker. 

USCA11 Case: 20-13602 Date Filed: 04/13/2022 Page: 5 of 5