IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–1607

Filed March 20, 2015

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

MICHAEL J. CROSS,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission reports respondent committed numerous 

violations of the rules of professional conduct and recommends 

suspension. LICENSE SUSPENDED.

Charles L. Harrington, Des Moines, for complainant.

Michael J. Cross, Hampton, pro se.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) 

charged attorney Michael J. Cross with violations of several of our ethical 

rules governing an attorney’s management of client trust accounts after 

an audit revealed numerous trust account irregularities. The Board also 

charged Cross with violations of several other ethical rules for failing to 

file employee-payroll-withholding-tax declarations and pay these taxes 

for years 2009 through 2011, for failing to file state and federal income 

tax returns for years 2009 through 2011, and for failing to supply the 

Board with requested documentation concerning these alleged tax 

violations. Finally, the Board charged Cross with improperly practicing 

under a trade name in violation of our ethical rules. After a hearing, a 

division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa 

found Cross violated a number of our ethical rules. The commission

recommended we suspend Cross’s license for one year. It also 

recommended that we require Cross to demonstrate he has satisfied all 

outstanding payroll and income tax liabilities due state and federal 

taxing authorities as a condition of reinstatement. Upon our de novo 

review, we concur in most of the findings of rule violations, and agree 

with the commission that a one-year suspension is appropriate.

I. Factual Background.

Cross was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1973. He currently 

works in Hampton, Iowa, as a solo practitioner. This case turns on an 

audit performed by the Client Security Commission on Cross’s client 

trust account and accounting records in 2012. The audit showed 

noncompliance with a number of our rules.

A. The 2012 Audit. On May 22, 2012, an auditor with the Client 

Security Commission contacted Cross by phone. This call was made in 
3

response to a report received by the Client Security Commission 

expressing concern about Cross’s financial and physical health and the 

potential risk to his clients. The auditor made an appointment to meet 

with Cross at his office for May 30. During their conversation, Cross 

informed the auditor that his records were not up to date but that he 

would spend the weekend preparing them for review.

When the auditor arrived for the May 30 meeting, Cross informed 

the auditor that he had not performed any trust account reconciliations 

since November 2009. At that time, Cross had experienced difficulties 

with his accounting software and simultaneously discovered a $99.60 

difference between the bank balance and the total of the client 

subaccounts, which he could not explain. Cross also informed the 

auditor that he had failed to maintain contemporaneous client ledgers 

since November 2009. While Cross had attempted to reconstruct the 

client ledgers over the preceding weekend using bank statements, he had 

been unsuccessful in completing the task. He was also unable to provide 

the auditor with a check register. Over the course of the next several 

months, Cross was able to reconstruct several client ledgers. However, 

these reconstructed ledgers comprised only a sample of the ledgers that 

should have been available, and Cross never provided a complete set of 

client ledgers to the auditor.

In performing the audit, the auditor identified three bank accounts 

relevant to Cross’s client-trust-account management practices: (1) the 

client trust account; (2) the Cross Law Firm account; and (3) a bank 

account in the name of MJC Services, Inc. (MJC). The Cross Law Firm 

account was the primary business operations account for Cross’s 

practice until 2010. However, when Cross opened the MJC account in 

2010, it became the primary business operations account for the firm. 
4

Cross used the MJC account to protect his assets from levies by 

creditors.

Due to the complete lack of record keeping, the auditor was

required to reconstruct a journal for the trust account from bank 

statements. The auditor then conducted an extensive audit by crossreferencing the reconstructed journal with the few client ledgers provided 

by Cross and bank statements from the other accounts. Based on the 

audit, the auditor concluded “Cross completely lost control and 

accountability for client funds deposited in his trust account” and 

“generally treated all the funds in the accounts as his funds to do with as 

he chose without regard to whether his fees had been earned or not and 

without notifying clients of withdrawals.” The auditor further concluded, 

“Cross . . . committed nearly every wrong possible in handling client 

funds and managing an attorney’s trust account,” and enumerated the 

following list of deficiencies:

(1) “Failed to perform monthly reconciliations”;

(2) “ ‘Borrowed’ from the trust account”;

(3) “Paid personal and business expenses from the trust 

account”;

(4) “Overdrawn specific client subaccounts”;

(5) “Overdrawn the trust bank account”;

(6) “Withdrawn cash from the trust account”;

(7) “Failed to maintain client subaccounts”;

(8) “Failed to deposit client funds in [the] trust account 

when required”;

(9) “Taken fees before they were earned”;

(10) “Commingled trust funds with non-trust funds”;

(11) “Withheld and failed to deposit a portion of cash 

receipts”;

(12) “Failed to provide clients with written notification of 

withdrawal of trust funds”; and

(13) “Failed to maintain trust account records for six years.”
5

Specifically, the audit revealed that as of November 2009, eight 

client subaccounts had negative balances, totaling $11,736.80. One 

subaccount, entitled “Cross Law Firm,” had a negative balance of 

$11,132.64, and another subaccount, entitled “MJC Services,” had a 

negative balance of $80.10. The subaccount names and negative 

balances suggested that as early as November 2009, Cross had been 

withdrawing unearned fees from the trust account. Also significant, on 

February 23, 2011, Cross transferred $8500 by check from the MJC 

account to the trust account so the trust account would balance.

The audit also revealed that on 102 separate occasions between 

2009 and 2012, Cross used the trust account to pay personal credit card 

bills by electronic transfer. On four separate occasions in 2010, these 

payments resulted in the trust account being overdrawn. The audit 

further established that at various times Cross used the trust account to 

pay personal and business expenses, including heating bills, cell phone 

bills, office telephone bills, office supply bills, and the corporate filing fee 

for the incorporation of MJC in 2009.

The audit further revealed that after the MJC account was opened 

in 2010, Cross stopped using the Cross Law Firm account almost 

entirely. Additionally, he began using the MJC account for the receipt 

and disbursement of client funds, without regard to whether he should 

handle such funds through the trust account. With respect to eleven 

identifiable clients, the audit demonstrated that Cross deposited advance 

fee payments and prepaid expenses in the MJC account as opposed to 

the trust account. For example, as it relates to K.A., whom Cross 

represented in a dissolution of marriage action, the audit revealed that as 

of November 12, 2010, Cross had earned sixty dollars in his 

representation of her. However, on that same date, Cross deposited a 
6

$600 fee payment from K.A. into the MJC account. Additionally, the 

audit established that Cross systematically failed to provide clients with 

contemporaneous written notifications and accountings of withdrawals 

from the trust account, with the exception of several real estate closings 

and probate matters.

B. Tax Matters. In the audit report, the auditor also noted that 

Cross’s secretary reported that Cross had been making only net payrolls 

for some time. That is, while withholding taxes from employee wages 

were calculated and shown as withheld, Cross failed to file employeepayroll-tax declarations, failed to segregate these funds, and failed to pay 

these taxes to the appropriate taxing authorities. Cross admitted this 

during the audit. Cross also admitted that he had not filed his federal or 

state income tax returns for the years 2009 through 2011, and that his

combined payroll and income tax debt exceeded $100,000.

C. Client Security Commission Form. For the years 2009 

through 2012, Cross completed and signed a “Combined Statement and 

Questionnaire” for the Client Security Commission. Despite his lack of 

record keeping and the audit findings to the contrary, Cross certified that 

he kept all client funds and retainers in a separate account from his 

own, he performed monthly reconciliations of the trust account with 

bank statements and client ledgers, he preserved client-trust-account

records for six years, and he never overdrew the trust account.1

II. Procedural History.

On September 25, 2013, the Board requested that Cross provide it 

with documentation concerning his employment-payroll taxes and 

1With respect to Cross’s alleged tax misconduct, the client security 

questionnaires in the record do not contain Cross’s responses concerning whether he 

had filed his state and federal income tax returns.

 
7

income taxes. On October 24, Cross responded to the Board indicating 

that he needed more time to respond to its request. Cross never supplied 

the Board with the requested documentation.

Based on the completed audit, the Board filed its complaint against 

Cross on March 4, 2014. The complaint alleged numerous violations of 

the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct and the Iowa Court Rules. In his 

original answer, Cross denied many of the allegations in the complaint 

and maintained he had not violated any of our ethics rules. His original 

answer, however, admitted several factual allegations forwarded by the 

Board. Specifically, with respect to the Board’s charge that he 

improperly commingled client funds with his own, Cross’s answer stated:

Respondent admits he did not use his trust account solely 

for unearned fees or funds of clients, but did deposit earned 

fees into said account to avoid creditor levy [and] paid office 

expenses and personal expenses out of the trust account 

. . . .

The Board also filed and served Cross with a request for admissions. 

Cross failed to respond to this request.

On March 17, the Board served Cross with requests for production 

of documents and interrogatories. He did not respond to them. On May 

16, the Board filed a motion to compel responses to the document 

requests, interrogatories, and prior request for admissions. Cross did 

not resist the motion, and the commission ordered him to serve 

responses no later than June 16. The commission threatened to impose 

sanctions if Cross failed to comply with the June 16 deadline.

Additionally, the commission deemed admitted the requests for 

admissions Cross had failed to answer.

Cross failed to respond to the Board’s document requests or 

interrogatories by the June 16 deadline. As a result, on July 14, the 
8

commission imposed sanctions. Specifically, Cross was precluded at the 

hearing from offering any witnesses or evidence other than his own 

testimony, objecting to any of the Board’s exhibits, cross-examining any 

witnesses presented by the Board, and testifying other than in 

mitigation. In addition, several facts alleged in the Board’s complaint 

were deemed established for the purposes of the action. Specifically, the 

commission ruled as established: (1) Cross failed to deposit unearned 

fees and prepaid expenses into the trust account with respect to eleven 

separate clients; (2) Cross failed to maintain a check register for the trust 

account since November 2009; (3) Cross failed to perform trust account 

reconciliations since 2009; (4) several clients had negative balances in 

their subaccounts at various times, indicating other client funds had 

been used for their purposes; (5) the trust account was overdrawn on 

four separate occasions in 2010; and (6) Cross’s client security 

questionnaires for years 2009 through 2012 were not truthful.

In July, an evidentiary hearing was held before the commission. At 

the hearing, Cross filed an amended and substituted answer in which he 

admitted all but one of the factual allegations in the Board’s complaint, 

and all but one of the alleged rule violations in the Board’s complaint. 

Specifically, Cross denied that he had failed to deposit unearned fees into

the trust account and improperly taken fees before they were earned. 

Consequently, Cross maintained he had not violated any of our ethical 

rules prohibiting such conduct. However, as noted above, the 

commission had already ruled this conduct as established for the 

purposes of the action.

At the hearing before the commission, Cross did not testify. 

Instead, he made a “professional statement” in which he noted he had 

“admitted each and every violation except the violation concerning 
9

depositing unearned fees.” Cross attempted to explain that it was his 

general practice in dissolution cases to charge a flat fee of approximately 

$500 after he met with a client for the second time but prior to the filing 

of the petition. Prior to these second meetings, Cross generally prepared 

documents including “the petition, original notice, confidential 

information form[s], statistical report[s], and discovery documents.” 

Cross asserted that during these second meetings, he would typically

review these documents with the client. Therefore, while the audit and 

records demonstrated that he had deposited client funds in the MJC 

account prior to filing the petition—possibly indicating he had failed to 

deposit unearned fees into the trust account—those funds had in fact 

been earned by the conclusion of the second meeting. Cross admitted, 

however, that in each of the instances in which he charged a flat fee, he 

“requested $185 towards the filing fee, which [he] never . . . deposit[ed] in 

the trust account.”

The commission issued its written findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and recommended sanction on September 26. It concluded that in 

2008 Cross developed financial difficulties around the same time his 

secretary took leave due to an auto accident. These financial difficulties 

were further aggravated when several creditors asserted a levy against 

the Cross Law Firm account. The commission also found that around 

this same time Cross experienced difficulties with his accounting 

software. However, the commission did not consider Cross’s financial, 

personnel, or technological excuses sufficient to justify his

mismanagement of the trust account. Specifically, it noted, “It is a 

practitioner’s duty to maintain the records required regardless of the 

specific media on which the records are kept.” The commission credited 

Cross, however, noting that no clients had filed a complaint against him 
10

and that “no client was cheated out of funds.” Ultimately, the 

commission concluded that Cross violated all of the rules alleged by the 

Board and recommended that we suspend his license for one year. It

also recommended that we require Cross to demonstrate he has satisfied 

all outstanding payroll and income tax liabilities due state and federal 

taxing authorities as a condition of reinstatement.

III. Standard of Review.

Our review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy, 845 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 

2014). The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence, a burden greater than a preponderance of 

the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 844 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Iowa 

2014). We give the commission’s findings and recommendations 

respectful consideration, but we are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 2014). 

“Upon proof of misconduct, we may impose a greater or lesser sanction 

than the sanction recommended by the commission.” Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010).

IV. Review of Alleged Ethical Violations.

The Board has alleged numerous violations of the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct and the Iowa Court Rules. In his amended and 

substituted answer, Cross admitted each paragraph of the Board’s 

complaint, except as it relates to factual allegations and rule violations 

concerning the improper deposit and withdrawal of unearned fees. 

“Factual matters admitted by an attorney in an answer are deemed 

established, regardless of the evidence in the record.” Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 2013). 
11

However, an attorney’s stipulation to a violation of our ethical rules is not 

binding on us. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kelsen, 855 

N.W.2d 175, 181 (Iowa 2014). We turn now to consider the individual 

rule violations alleged by the Board.

A. Trust Account Violations. The Board alleges Cross violated 

Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a), (c), and (f) and Iowa Court 

Rules 45.1(1), 45.2(3), and 45.7(3) and (4) as a result of his management 

of the trust account.2 The Board also alleges Cross violated Iowa Rule of 

Professional Conduct 32:8.4(c) by falsely certifying on his client security 

questionnaire that he properly managed the trust account. We address 

these alleged rule violations together because they all relate to Cross’s 

trust account practices.

1. Trust account management. Rule 32:1.15(a) requires a lawyer 

to “hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s 

possession in connection with a representation separate from the 

lawyer’s own property.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(a). Funds must

be kept in a separate account and “[c]omplete records of such account 

funds . . . shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period 

of six years after termination of the representation.” Id. A comment to 

the rule states, “A lawyer should maintain on a current basis books and 

records in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice and 

comply with any recordkeeping rules established by law or court order.” 

Id. cmt. 1.

Rule 32:1.15 also incorporates chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules, 

which directs an attorney on how to properly maintain a client trust 

2All references to the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct and to the Iowa Court 

Rules are to the current version, unless otherwise specified.

 
12

account. See id. r. 32:1.15(f); Iowa Ct. R. ch. 45. Similar to Iowa Rule of 

Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a), rule 45.1 also prohibits attorneys from 

commingling their own funds with client funds. See Iowa Ct. R. 45.1. 

Specifically, rule 45.1 requires that an attorney maintain a clearly 

designated trust account to hold funds received from clients or third 

parties. Id. “No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be 

deposited in this account,” with the exception of “[f]unds reasonably 

sufficient to pay or avoid imposition of fees and charges that are a 

lawyer’s or law firm’s responsibility.” Id. r. 45.1(1).

Rule 32:1.15(c) governs a lawyer’s conduct with respect to advance 

fee and expense payments. Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(c). Pursuant 

to this rule, “A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees 

and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the 

lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.” Id. Rule 45.7 also

governs a lawyer’s treatment of advance fee and expense payments. Iowa 

Ct. R. 45.7. This rule defines advance fee payments as “payments for 

contemplated services that are made to the lawyer prior to the lawyer’s 

having earned the fee.” Id. r. 45.7(1). Advance expense payments are

defined as “payments for contemplated expenses in connection with the 

lawyer’s services that are made to the lawyer prior to the incurrence of 

the expense.” Id. r. 45.7(2). “A lawyer must deposit advance fee and 

expense payments from a client into the trust account and may withdraw 

such payments only as the fee is earned or the expense is incurred.” Id. 

r. 45.7(3).

Rule 45.2(3)(a) dictates that financial records including ledger

records, bank statements, check registers, copies of monthly trial 

balances, and monthly reconciliations of the client trust accounts, must 

be maintained by an attorney for six years following the termination of 
13

representation of a client. Id. r. 45.2(3)(a). Finally, rule 45.7(4) requires 

an attorney to notify a client in writing and provide a contemporaneous 

written accounting when withdrawing funds for fees or expenses from the 

trust account. Id. r. 45.7(4).

Applying these rules to the facts of this case, we find Cross has 

violated all of the rules alleged by the Board with respect to the 

management of his trust account and his handling of client funds. First, 

we find Cross violated rules 32:1.15(a) and (f) and rule 45.1 by 

commingling personal and business funds with client funds. “We have 

previously determined an attorney failed to hold his own property 

separate from that of his clients when he ‘used the trust account to 

deposit personal funds and to pay personal and business expenses.’ ” 

Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 697 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Hall, 728 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 2007)). Here, Cross admitted in 

his original answer, in his substituted and amended answer, and during 

his professional statement at the hearing before the commission that he 

commingled personal and business funds with client funds and used the 

trust account to pay personal and business expenses. See Nelson, 838 

N.W.2d at 532.

Further, there is clear evidence in the record to support these 

violations. The record clearly established that Cross failed to hold his 

own property separate from his clients’ property and used the trust 

account to pay personal and business expenses. The audit revealed that 

Cross frequently used the trust account to pay personal credit card bills, 

along with a number of other personal and business expenses. The audit 

also showed that after Cross opened the MJC account in 2010, he began 

regularly depositing client funds into that account, without regard to 

whether he should handle such funds through the trust account. While 
14

Cross has forwarded a number of excuses for his conduct, including

financial difficulties that began in 2008, we decline to deem Cross’s 

asserted personnel, financial, and technological difficulties sufficient 

excuses. See Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 695, 698, 700 (finding rule 

32:1.15(a) and rule 45.1 violations when attorney experienced “financial 

problems related to unpaid medical bills” and commingled personal and 

client funds to avoid creditors from levying his bank account, and 

declining to deem attorney’s financial problems a legitimate excuse); 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 

126, 126–127 (Iowa 1999) (finding violation of Iowa Code of Professional 

Responsibility for Lawyers DR 9–102(A), the forerunner to rule 

32:1.15(a), when attorney used his trust account for the deposit of 

earned fees and payment of both personal and business expenses to 

“hide funds from the federal internal revenue service which had levied on

his business account for two unpaid payroll tax obligations,” and 

declining to deem attorney’s “pressing financial problems” a legitimate 

excuse). We find Cross violated rules 32:1.15(a) and (f) and rule 45.1(1).

Second, we find Cross violated rules 32:1.15(c) and (f) and rule 

45.7(3) by failing to deposit advance legal fees and expenses into the 

trust account and by withdrawing fees and expenses before they were 

earned.3 We begin by noting that as a result of Cross’s failure to respond 

3Although we find Cross failed to deposit advance legal fees and expenses into 

the trust account, and withdrew fees and expenses before they were earned, we do not 

find this conduct amounts to misappropriation. As noted above, the Board’s complaint 

alleges violations of various trust account rules, including rule 32:1.15. Complaints 

filed by the Board with the commission must be “sufficiently clear and specific in their 

charges to reasonably inform the attorney against whom the complaint is made of the 

misconduct alleged to have been committed.” Iowa Ct. R. 35.5. “Because attorney 

disciplinary actions are ‘quasi-criminal’ in nature, ‘the charge[s] must be known before 

the proceedings commence.’ ” Kelsen, 855 N.W.2d at 183 n.3 (alteration in original) 

(quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117, 122 

(1968)).

 
15

to the Board’s document requests and interrogatories, the commission 

deemed as established that Cross failed to deposit unearned fees and 

prepaid expenses into the trust account with respect to eleven separate 

clients. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.517(2)(b)(1); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Iowa 2011) (noting this 

sanction is similar to sanctions authorized by Iowa Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1.517(2)(b)(1)); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Moonen, 706 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Iowa 2005) (same). Cross further 

admitted during his professional statement at the hearing before the 

commission that he frequently failed to deposit advance expenses into 

the trust account.

Moreover, there is again clear evidence in the record to support 

these violations. With respect to eleven separate clients, the audit 

chronicled numerous instances in which Cross either failed to deposit 

We recently revoked an attorney’s license for misappropriation of client funds for 

personal use despite the Board’s failure to allege that specific misconduct in its

complaint. See id. at 183 n.3, 186. In that case, “the Board’s complaint did not 

expressly allege [the attorney] had misappropriated client funds.” Id. at 183 n.3. It did, 

however, “clearly cover [the attorney’s] handling and misuse of [a specific client’s] 

$7500.” Id. There, the complaint alleged the attorney failed to deposit the client’s 

$7500 check in his trust account, had spent the money before the client asked for it 

back one week later, and violated rule 32:1.15. Id. In determining revocation was the 

appropriate sanction, we concluded “[the Board’s] allegations were sufficient to put [the 

attorney] on notice that the Board believed [he] had not safeguarded his client’s $7500 

as required by rule 32:1.15.” Id. We further recognized that the attorney in that case 

clearly “understood the centrality of the colorable claim question” because “[m]uch of 

his testimony . . . was devoted to trying to establish a colorable claim defense.” Id.

In this case, unlike in Kelsen, Cross was never put on notice that he faced 

sanctions for misappropriating any client funds. While the Board has alleged a 

violation of rule 32:1.15, it has not alleged Cross has ever stolen client money or has 

been unable to return any funds to clients upon request. In fact, the record established 

that no clients are known to have filed a complaint against Cross. Further, the Board 

did not suggest that Cross misappropriated any client funds at the hearing before the 

commission. Finally, the commission has not suggested that revocation is the 

appropriate sanction in this case, and it expressly noted, “no client was cheated out of 

funds.” Consequently, we will not consider whether Cross misappropriated client 

funds.

__________________________________
16

advance fees and expenses into the trust account, or withdrew fees and 

expenses before they were earned. While Cross now attempts to justify 

the deposit and withdrawal of these fees, claiming that in all instances 

the fees were earned, he has provided no documentation supporting this 

claim. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin, 857 

N.W.2d 195, 210 (Iowa 2014) (“While Baldwin now attempts to justify 

these fees, he has never accounted for them.”). Further, the audit 

showed the following as of November 2009: eight client subaccounts had 

negative balances, totaling $11,736.80; on four separate occasions in 

2010, Cross overdrew the trust account; and after Cross opened the MJC 

account in 2010, he began regularly depositing client funds into that 

account, without regard to whether he should handle such funds 

through the trust account. These facts support the conclusion that 

Cross both failed to deposit advance legal fees and expenses into the 

trust account, and withdrew fees and expenses before they were earned. 

We find Cross violated rules 32:1.15(c) and (f) and rule 45.7(3).

Finally, we find Cross violated rules 45.2(3)(a) and 45.7(4) by 

failing to maintain proper financial records and notify numerous clients 

in writing and provide contemporaneous written accountings when 

withdrawing funds for fees and expenses from the trust account. There 

is no question Cross failed to maintain a check register or client ledgers, 

and did not regularly perform reconciliations. Cross told the auditor at 

the start of the audit he had failed to maintain client ledgers or perform 

reconciliations since 2009. He was also unable to provide the auditor

with a check register. The commission deemed these facts as established

due to Cross’s failure to respond to the Board’s document requests and 

interrogatories. Cross again admitted these deficiencies in his 

substituted and amended answer. We find Cross violated rule 45.2(3)(a).
17

Cross also systematically failed to notify clients in writing and 

provide contemporaneous written accountings when withdrawing client 

funds for expenses and fees from the trust account. The record 

established that during the audit the auditor was unable to uncover any 

evidence that Cross provided clients with contemporaneous written 

notifications and accountings of withdrawals from the trust account, 

with the exception of several real estate closings and probate matters. 

Cross admitted these deficiencies in his substituted and amended 

answer. We find Cross violated rule 45.7(4).

2. Dishonesty. Rule 32:8.4(c) provides, “It is professional 

misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). To 

establish a rule 32:8.4(c) violation the Board must show “the attorney 

acted with some level of scienter greater than negligence.” Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d 415, 421 (Iowa 

2012).

Here, we find Cross violated rule 32:8.4(c). The record established 

that for each of the years 2009 through 2012, Cross submitted a client 

security questionnaire certifying that for the preceding calendar year he 

complied with all rules and accounting practices required of Iowa lawyers 

in the handling of client funds and trust accounts. We find that Cross 

intended these statements to mislead the Client Security Commission. 

In fact, Cross has failed to maintain client ledgers, maintain a check 

register, and perform reconciliations since 2009. The audit also 

established, contrary to Cross’s certifications on his client security 

questionnaires, that he repeatedly failed to keep all client funds and 

retainers in an account separate from his own personal funds and that 

the trust account was overdrawn on four separate occasions in 2010. 
18

Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 698–99 (finding rule 32:8.4(c) violation when 

attorney falsely certified that he kept all client funds in a separate 

account from his personal funds, performed monthly reconciliations, and 

preserved client fund records for six years, but it was apparent he failed 

to “keep client ledgers, retain copies of bank statements, or perform 

monthly reconciliations” and he “later admitted he did not keep a check 

register . . . and . . . regularly kept personal funds in [the] account”); 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 656–

57 (Iowa 2013) (finding rule 32:8.4(c) violation when attorney falsely 

certified that all retainers had been deposited into the trust account); 

Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d at 421 (finding rule 32:8.4(c) violation when 

attorney falsely certified she kept client funds separate from her own and 

performed monthly reconciliations, but the record showed she could not 

have reconciled the accounts because of the inadequacy of her records). 

We find Cross violated rule 32:8.4(c).

B. Tax Matters. The Board also alleges Cross violated Iowa Rules 

of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b), (c), and (d) as a result of his failure to 

file employee-payroll-withholding-tax declarations and pay these taxes 

for years 2009 through 2011 and his failure to file state and federal

income tax returns for tax years 2009 through 2011. Additionally, the 

Board alleges Cross violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.1(b) 

for his failure to supply the Board with requested documentation 

regarding these alleged tax violations. We address these alleged rule 

violations together because they all apply to the handling of his tax 

matters.

1. Payroll tax and income tax violations. Rule 32:8.4(b) prohibits 

the commission of “a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 

honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Iowa 
19

R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(b). A lawyer need not be charged or convicted of 

a crime in order to be found in violation of this rule. Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 2010).

As discussed above, rule 32:8.4(c) prohibits an attorney from 

“engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). “[A] lawyer makes 

a misrepresentation in violation of our ethical rules when his income 

exceeds the sums requiring the filing of a tax return and he fails to file a 

return.” Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d at 299. However, as we have previously 

explained, “In the cases in which we have found the existence of a 

misrepresentation, the respondent had willfully failed to file returns, had 

committed a fraudulent practice, or had made a false statement.” Id. at 

300 (collecting cases). This is consistent with the general rule that 

“ ‘misrepresentation requires intent to deceive to support an ethical 

violation.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sobel,

779 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 2010)).

Rule 32:8.4(d) prohibits an attorney from engaging in “conduct 

that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:8.4(d). “There is no typical form of conduct that prejudices 

the administration of justice.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Iowa 2011). Acts that we have generally 

considered prejudicial to the administration of justice have “hampered 

the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems 

upon which the courts rely.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Wright, 758 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Iowa 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Examples of conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice include paying an adverse expert witness for 

information regarding an opponent’s case preparation, 
20

demanding a release in a civil action as a condition of 

dismissing criminal charges, and knowingly making false or 

reckless charges against a judicial officer.

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 768. “The mere commission of a criminal act 

will not constitute a violation of rule 32:8.4(d) unless that conduct 

somehow impedes the operation of the justice system.” Lustgraaf, 792 

N.W.2d at 300.

Applying these rules to the facts of this case, we find Cross violated 

rule 32:8.4(b), but not rules 32:8.4(c) and (d). First, we find Cross 

violated rule 32:8.4(b) by failing to file employee-payroll-withholding-tax 

declarations and pay the required taxes for years 2009 through 2011 and 

by failing to timely file his state and federal income tax returns for years 

2009 through 2011. Cross clearly failed to file quarterly withholding-tax 

declarations with respect to employee payroll taxes and failed to make 

appropriate deposits. He admitted these facts in his amended and 

substituted answer. He further admitted that he had failed to file state 

and federal income tax returns from 2009 through 2011 in violation of 

26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2006). This conduct reflects adversely on his fitness 

as a lawyer. See Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d at 299; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 2010). We find

Cross violated rule 32:8.4(b).

However, we do not find this same conduct violated rule 32:8.4(c). 

Here, the Board has not alleged or presented any evidence that Cross’s 

improper tax practices were willful, done with an intent to defraud, or 

otherwise deceitful. Nor did the Board allege or present evidence that 

Cross made any false statements in connection with this conduct.4 

4Again, with respect to Cross’s alleged tax misconduct, the client security 

questionnaires in the record do not contain Cross’s responses concerning whether he 

had filed his state and federal income taxes.

 
21

Thus, on this record, we cannot conclude Cross engaged in 

misrepresentation in connection with his tax practices. See Lustgraaf, 

792 N.W.2d at 300 (finding no rule 32:8.4(c) violation when Board failed 

to allege or present any evidence that attorney’s “failure to file the 

returns was willful, done with an intent to defraud, or otherwise 

deceitful,” or that the attorney made any false statements in connection 

with asserted failures). Thus, the Board failed to prove Cross violated 

rule 32:8.4(c).

Similarly, we do not find this same conduct violated rule 32:8.4(d). 

Here, there is no evidence in the record that Cross’s actions affected any 

particular court proceeding or any ancillary system supportive of any 

court proceeding. Cross’s behavior, even if criminal, is not the sort of 

conduct that prejudices the administration of justice within the meaning 

of rule 32:8.4(d). Id. (finding no rule 32:8.4(d) violation when attorney 

failed to file tax returns and there was no showing the failure affected 

any court proceeding or an ancillary system supportive of any court 

proceeding). Thus, the Board failed to prove Cross violated rule 

32:8.4(d).

2. Failure to respond to the disciplinary authority. Rule 32:8.1(b) 

provides that a lawyer may not “knowingly fail to respond to a lawful 

demand for information from . . . [a] disciplinary authority.” Iowa R. 

Prof’l Conduct 32:8.1(b). “Knowingly” is defined as “actual knowledge of 

the fact in question” and “may be inferred from circumstances.” Id. r. 

32:1.0(f); accord Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799 

N.W.2d 524, 534 (Iowa 2011).

Here, we find Cross violated rule 32:8.1(b). On September 25, 

2013, the Board requested that Cross provide it with information 

concerning his employee payroll taxes and his income tax filings. On 
22

October 24, Cross responded to the Board, indicating he was aware of 

the request but that he needed more time to formulate a response. Cross 

never supplied the Board with the requested information. We find Cross 

knowingly failed to respond to a lawful demand for information from a 

disciplinary authority in violation of rule 32:8.1(b). See Dunahoo, 799 

N.W.2d at 534 (finding rule 32:8.1(b) violation when attorney was aware 

of the Board’s request and failed to comply).

C. Practicing Under a Trade Name. Rule 32:7.5(e) in relevant 

part provides:

A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade 

name, a name that is misleading as to the identity of the 

lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name, or a firm

name containing names other than those of one or more of 

the lawyers in the firm.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:7.5(e) (July 2009).5

A trade name (or tradename) is a “name, style, or symbol used to 

distinguish a company, partnership, or business (as opposed to a 

5This rule prohibiting the use of trade names is no longer in force in Iowa. 

Compare Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:7.5(e) (July 2009), with Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct

32:7.5(a). In 2012, we adopted a new version of rule 32:7.5. See Iowa Supreme Court 

Order, In the Matter of Amendments to the Iowa Court Rules Governing Lawyer 

Advertising (Aug. 29, 2012), available at http://www.iowacourts.gov 

/wfdata/frame5862-1235/File83.pdf. Effective January 1, 2013, the new rule provides, 

in relevant part:

A trade name . . . may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does 

not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or 

charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise in violation of 

rule 32:7.1.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:7.5(a).

As the comment to the rule explains,

A firm may be designated . . . by a trade name such as the “ABC Legal 

Clinic.” . . . Use of trade names in law practice is acceptable so long as it 

is not misleading. . . . The use of such names to designate law firms has 

proven a useful means of identification.

Id. r. 32:7.5 cmt. 1.

 
23

product or service).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1633 (9th ed. 1990). As the 

comment to the rule explains, 

The use of a trade name or an assumed name could mislead 

laypersons concerning the identity, responsibility, and status 

of those practicing under a trade name or an assumed name; 

therefore, such a practice is not permitted by this rule.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:7.5 cmt. 1 (July 2009).

Here, we do not find the Board presented sufficient evidence to 

prove Cross practiced under a trade name in violation of rule 32:7.5(e). 

It is undisputed that Cross incorporated MJC in 2009 and began

depositing client funds into the MJC account in 2010. However, the 

Board presented no evidence showing that Cross ever held himself out to 

the public or any clients as “practicing” under this name. There is no 

evidence in the record that Cross ever used the name MJC in connection 

with his law practice. The rule does not require that the Board make an 

affirmative showing that an assumed trade name is misleading to sustain 

a violation. However, the rule still requires that the allegedly offending 

trade name actually be used as a trade name. The stated purpose of the 

rule, which is to protect the public from being misled, requires that there 

be at least some nexus between the attorney’s use of the allegedly 

offending name and the public. Here, there is no such nexus.6 

6We are unable to find a single case in which a court has found a violation of a 

comparable rule without some evidence an attorney held himself out to clients or the 

public under the allegedly offending trade name. See, e.g., In re Loomis, 905 N.E.2d 

406, 407 (Ind. 2009) (finding violation of rule prohibiting use of trade names when 

name was used in “professional documents, communications, signage, telephone 

directory listings, numerous advertisements, and an internet website”); In re Oldtowne 

Legal Clinic, P.A., 400 A.2d 1111, 1115 & n.4 (Md. 1979) (refusing to approve proposed 

trade name as in violation of rule prohibiting use of trade names when firm intended to 

use the name “so that . . . clients would not know that there was any connection 

between it” and another law office); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Kathman, 748 N.E.2d 1091, 

1094 (Ohio 2001) (finding violation of rule prohibiting use of trade names when name 

was used on letterhead); Garcia v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 03-05-00413-CV, 

2007 WL 2141246, at *5–6 (Tex. Ct. App. July 26, 2007) (finding violation of rule

 
24

Consequently, we do not find Cross violated Iowa Rule of Professional 

Conduct 32:7.5(e) (July 2009).

V. Consideration of Appropriate Sanction.

Having found the foregoing rule violations, we now consider the 

appropriate sanction. The commission recommended we suspend 

Cross’s license for one year and require that Cross demonstrate he has 

satisfied all outstanding payroll and income tax liabilities due state and 

federal taxing authorities as a condition of reinstatement. We give 

respectful consideration to the commission’s recommendation. Ricklefs, 

844 N.W.2d at 699. However, the issue of appropriate sanction is 

exclusively within this court’s authority. Id.

“There is no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct, 

and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately determine an 

appropriate sanction based on the particular circumstances of each

case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d 

301, 308 (Iowa 2009). As we have previously stated, 

In considering an appropriate sanction, this court considers 

all the facts and circumstances, including the nature of the 

violations, the attorney’s fitness to practice law, deterrence, 

the protection of society, the need to uphold public 

confidence in the justice system, and the need to maintain 

the reputation of the bar.

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 

463 (Iowa 2014). “Where there are multiple violations of our disciplinary 

rules, enhanced sanctions may be imposed.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 

prohibiting use of trade names when name was used on letters, letterhead, business

cards, email address, and signage); Rodgers v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 151 

S.W.3d 602, 611 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (finding violation of rule prohibiting use of trade 

names when attorney used name in telephone books, obtained a copyright on the name, 

and registered a service mark for a phone hotline associated with the name and 

received more than fifty percent of his business from the hotline).

__________________________________
25

Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Alexander, 574 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Iowa 1998). 

Further, we “consider mitigating and aggravating circumstances, 

including companion violations, repeated neglect, and the attorney’s 

disciplinary history.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66.

In this case, Cross violated a number of our ethical rules relating 

to the management of his trust account. He also made 

misrepresentations on his client security questionnaires. Finally, he 

engaged in numerous tax violations and knowingly failed to cooperate 

with the Board in supplying it with requested information related to his 

tax misconduct. We turn now to address the specific sanction warranted 

by Cross’s conduct.

Sanctions for trust account and accounting violations span from “a 

public reprimand when the attorney, in an isolated instance, failed to 

deposit funds into his trust account because he believed the fees to be 

earned” to “suspensions of several months where the violations were 

compounded by severe neglect, misrepresentation, or failure to 

cooperate.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 

431, 442 (Iowa 2012) (collecting cases). In cases warranting more 

serious discipline, additional violations or aggravating circumstances 

were present. See id.

We draw guidance from the following attorney discipline cases 

involving trust account violations. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board v. Morris, we suspended an attorney’s license for six 

months. 847 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Iowa 2014). In Morris, the attorney’s 

trust account mismanagement was “severe and . . . persisted over a long 

period of time even after the Client Security Commission intervened with 

an audit and provided information that should have facilitated 

compliance with the applicable rules.” Id. at 436. We did not find the 
26

attorney failed to deposit advance fees and expenses into the trust 

account or withdrew fees and expenses before they were earned. Id. at

434. However, the attorney in that case did engage in dishonesty by

representing that he regularly reconciled his trust account on his client 

security questionnaire. Id. at 435. Further, several aggravating factors 

led us to conclude the attorney’s misconduct warranted sanctions at the 

long end of the spectrum. Id. at 436–37. Specifically, we considered the 

pervasiveness of the trust account violations, the attorney’s twenty-five 

years of experience, and the attorney’s three prior suspensions. Id.

In Ricklefs, we suspended an attorney’s license for three months. 

844 N.W.2d at 702. The attorney in that case “improperly handled his 

trust account, commingled client funds with his own, failed to maintain 

proper records, and also knowingly misrepresented that he was engaged 

in appropriate trust account practices.” Id. at 700. The Board had not 

alleged, and in turn we did not find, the attorney failed to deposit 

advance fees and expenses into the trust account or withdrew fees and 

expenses before they were earned. See id. at 697–98. We considered as 

aggravating factors the fact the attorney failed to cooperate with the 

Board in its investigation, had received two prior public reprimands, and 

failed to shore up his trust account deficiencies despite an earlier audit 

bringing the noncompliance to his attention. Id. at 700. We considered 

the fact that there were no indications any clients suffered harm and that 

the attorney took responsibility for his actions before the commission 

and admitted his violations as mitigating factors. Id.

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Powell, we 

suspended an attorney’s license for three months. 830 N.W.2d 355, 360

(Iowa 2013). In that case, the attorney “basically ignored the rules and 

procedures for maintaining a trust account over a prolonged period of 
27

time.” Id. at 357. He deposited client funds into his operating account, 

frequently paid funds to himself when he needed money before the fees 

were actually earned, and failed to adequately manage the bookkeeping 

practices of the firm. Id. While no client funds were ultimately lost, 

there were “years of utter disregard . . . for the trust [account] rules and 

practices.” Id. at 357, 359. Due to a $43,000 trust account shortage, we 

had previously temporarily suspended the attorney and appointed a 

trustee to take control of the trust account. Id. at 356. In crafting the 

proper discipline, we considered the prior seven-month interim 

suspension and the attorney’s other prior unethical conduct. Id. at 359.

In Parrish, we considered a sixty-day suspension the appropriate 

sanction when an attorney “withdrew funds from his trust account before 

they were earned, failed to promptly notify his clients of the withdrawals, 

did not earn the amounts withdrawn, and did not return the remainder 

of funds upon request.” 801 N.W.2d at 583. The attorney had 

previously received six private admonitions, all of which related to a 

“failure to provide an itemization of services provided,” and at least two of 

which involved withdrawal of funds in excess of the fees earned. Id. at 

589. We concluded the attorney’s conduct over a period of ten years had 

“developed into a pattern of violating the Iowa Rules of Professional 

Conduct and the rules of this court relating to the administration of trust 

accounts.” Id. We considered the attorney’s refusal or inability to return 

client funds as an aggravating factor, but we considered as mitigating 

factors the attorney’s taking responsibility for his actions, taking steps to 

correct the accounting issues, community involvement, and pro bono 

work. Id.

In Kersenbrock, we encountered a pattern of pervasive trust 

account violations. 821 N.W.2d at 422. We approved a thirty-day
28

suspension. Id. The attorney in that case failed to deposit client

retainers into a trust account, kept inadequate trust account records, 

prematurely withdrew fees in a probate case, and misrepresented her 

trust account practices on her client security questionnaire. Id. at 419–

21. We considered as mitigating factors that no clients were harmed, the 

attorney had no disciplinary history, and the attorney acknowledged the 

inadequacies in her accounting practices and had taken steps to correct 

the problems. Id. at 422. However, due to her systematic failure to 

maintain any records, we concluded a suspension was the appropriate

sanction. Id.

In Boles, we found an attorney’s “flagrant, multiyear disregard for 

the billing and accounting requirements of our profession” warranted a 

thirty-day suspension. 808 N.W.2d at 441, 443. The attorney in that 

case “withdrew unearned fees, delayed responding to client requests for 

accurate billings, and failed to promptly refund unearned fees.” Id. at 

441. The situation was compounded by neglect of a client matter. Id. 

We considered as an important mitigating factor evidence the attorney 

had “corrected his practices to avoid reoccurrence,” and noted that the 

attorney had no trust account problems in the approximately four years 

leading up to his hearing. Id. at 442. Additional mitigating factors 

included the attorney’s full cooperation with the Board’s investigation, 

his extensive pro bono practice, and the fact that no clients were 

harmed, “apart from the delayed refunds.” Id.

In Sunleaf, an attorney used his trust account as a repository for 

personal funds to avoid creditor claims against his personal assets. 588 

N.W.2d at 126. The attorney also falsified responses on his client 

security questionnaire. Id. at 127. There was no evidence of 

misappropriation of client funds, and the misconduct was “an 
29

aberration, wholly out of plumb with [his] many years of practice which

. . . [had] been honorable.” Id. We approved a public reprimand, while 

indicating the case was a close call between a reprimand and a 

suspension. Id. at 126–27.

We believe this case requires a stiffer sanction than we imposed in 

Kersenbrock, Boles, or Sunleaf. In Kersenbrock, Boles, and Sunleaf,

many mitigating factors were present that are not present here. See 

Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d at 422; Boles, 808 N.W.2d at 442; Sunleaf, 588 

N.W.2d at 127. Morris, Ricklefs, Powell, and Parrish are closer parallels. 

As in this case, each of the attorneys in those cases engaged in 

numerous trust account violations that persisted over a prolonged

period. See Morris, 847 N.W.2d at 436; Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 700; 

Powell, 830 N.W.2d at 357; Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at 589. Here, Cross 

mismanaged the trust account, commingled client funds with his own, 

failed to deposit unearned fees and expenses into the trust account, 

withdrew fees and expenses before they were earned, failed to maintain 

proper records, and failed to provide clients with contemporaneous 

written notifications and accountings of withdrawals from the trust 

account. These violations persisted for over four years. As the auditor

aptly put it in the audit report, “Cross completely lost control and 

accountability for client funds deposited in his trust account” and 

“committed nearly every wrong possible in handling client funds and 

managing an attorney’s trust account.”

As in Powell and Parrish, Cross failed to deposit advance fees and 

expenses in the trust account and withdrew fees before they were earned. 

See Powell, 830 N.W.2d at 357–58; Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at 586–87. This

also warrants the imposition of sanctions on the higher end of the 

spectrum. See Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 702 (noting that the withdrawal 
30

of funds before they are earned is “an arguably more serious matter than 

running personal funds through a trust account”). Additionally, as in 

Morris and Ricklefs, Cross engaged in dishonesty in his representations 

on his client security questionnaire. See Morris, 847 N.W.2d at 435; 

Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 698–99, 702 (noting that trust account related 

misrepresentations “potentially justify a more severe sanction”).

Additionally, here we also have a number of rule violations relating 

to payroll taxes and federal and state income taxes. As we recently 

explained with respect to tax-related misconduct,

In prior reported disciplinary cases involving failure to 

file tax returns, we have imposed suspensions ranging from 

sixty days to three years. In our prior cases imposing a 

suspension for failing to file tax returns, the attorney 

engaged in a willful failure to file, a fraudulent practice, or 

other more serious misconduct involving issues of 

dishonesty.

Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d at 301 (citations omitted) (collecting cases).

We draw guidance from the following attorney discipline cases 

involving tax violations. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary 

Board v. Iverson, we suspended an attorney’s license for one year. 723 

N.W.2d 806, 812 (Iowa 2006). There, the attorney had “pled guilty to the 

crimes of fraudulent practice in the second degree (a class ‘D’ felony) and 

fraudulent practice in the third degree (an aggravated misdemeanor) in 

connection with his failure to pay his taxes and file his returns.” Id. at 

809. The attorney in that case failed to file his federal or state income 

tax returns for a period of almost ten years and had a total outstanding 

tax liability of close to $400,000. Id. at 809–10. We found this conduct

violated Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1–102(A)(3) 

prohibiting illegal conduct involving moral turpitude; DR 1–102(A)(4)

prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
31

misrepresentation; DR 1–102(A)(5) prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial 

to the administration of justice; and DR 1–102(A)(6) prohibiting conduct 

that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law. Id. at 810. We 

considered as an aggravating factor the attorney’s almost ten-year failure 

to file the required tax returns, which we characterized as “a pattern of 

conduct justifying an increased sanction.” Id. We considered as 

mitigating factors that the attorney had no prior ethical violations, was 

well respected within the legal community, and was devoted to the 

profession. Id. at 811. The attorney in that case also fully cooperated 

with the Board and the commission in their investigations of the matter. 

Id.

In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. 

O’Brien, an attorney failed to file required Iowa income tax returns for a 

period of two years. 690 N.W.2d 57, 57 (Iowa 2004). The attorney’s 

conduct resulted in a criminal conviction for fraudulent practices in the 

third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor. Id. We found the attorney 

violated Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers DR 1–

102(A) and concluded that a six-month suspension was the appropriate 

sanction. Id. at 57, 59.

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Lustgraaf, we 

issued a public reprimand. 792 N.W.2d at 302. There, the attorney 

failed to file tax returns for a period of four years, despite having 

sufficient income to trigger the filing requirement. Id. at 298–99. We 

found the lawyer’s conduct violated rule 32:8.4(b) prohibiting the 

“commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 

honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.” Id. at 299 However,

the attorney had not pled guilty to or been convicted of any crimes in 

connection with his failure to file his tax returns, and the Board failed to
32

otherwise show he had engaged in any misrepresentations with respect 

to his tax misconduct. Id. at 299–300. As a result, we found the Board 

failed to show the attorney acted dishonestly in failing to file his tax 

returns, and instead found that the attorney’s conduct only amounted to 

negligence. Id. at 300. Further, we did not find the attorney’s conduct 

was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Id. In considering the 

appropriate sanction, we considered the attorney’s less-culpable state of 

mind a significant distinguishing fact from our prior cases, which had 

imposed substantially harsher penalties for similar violations. Id. at 301. 

We also considered the attorney’s good reputation in the legal 

community, pro bono work, and lack of a prior disciplinary record as 

mitigating factors. Id.

In this case, Cross engaged in numerous tax violations. He failed 

to file employee-payroll-withholding-tax declarations and pay the 

required taxes for a period of three years. He also failed to timely file 

state and federal income tax returns for a period of three years. These 

violations reflect adversely on Cross’s fitness to practice law. Unlike in 

Iverson and O’Brien, Cross has not pled guilty to or been convicted of any 

crimes in connection with his failure to file these tax returns, and the 

Board has not shown that he made any false statements in connection 

with this conduct. See Iverson, 723 N.W.2d at 807; O’Brien, 690 N.W.2d 

at 57. Thus, as in Lustgraaf, his less-culpable state of mind is certainly 

one factor we consider in crafting the appropriate sanction. See 792 

N.W.2d at 301. Notwithstanding, many of the mitigating factors that led 

us to conclude a less severe sanction was appropriate in Lustgraaf are 

not present here. See id. at 301–02. In addition, Cross knowingly failed 

to cooperate with the Board in supplying it with requested information 

related to his tax misconduct. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 
33

Bd. v. Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 2007) (“We expect and 

demand attorneys to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.”). 

Consequently, coupled with his trust account misconduct, we find that 

enhanced sanctions are warranted in this case. See Alexander, 574 

N.W.2d at 327.

Finally, in crafting the proper punishment we must consider 

aggravating and mitigating factors. Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66. Here, 

several aggravating factors, and the absence of mitigating factors,

counsel in favor of imposing a stiffer sanction. First, Cross’s past 

disciplinary history could be considered an aggravating factor. See

Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 700 (considering, in disciplinary matter involving 

trust account violations, attorney’s prior public reprimands for neglect 

and lack of diligence in representing a client as an aggravating factor). In 

1981, we publicly reprimanded Cross for neglect of client matters in 

repeatedly failing to meet appellate deadlines. However, because of the 

age of this prior discipline, we do not consider this an aggravating factor. 

Second, the fact that there are multiple violations of our ethics rules is 

an aggravating factor. See Alexander, 574 N.W.2d at 327; Parrish, 801 

N.W.2d at 588 (noting that the presence of multiple violations is as an 

aggravating factor). Third, Cross’s over forty years of practice experience 

is an aggravating factor. See Morris, 847 N.W.2d at 436 (considering 

attorney’s over twenty-five years of experience an aggravating factor). 

Finally, Cross’s failure to cooperate with the Board in its investigation is 

another aggravating factor we consider in crafting the appropriate 

sanction. See Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 700 (considering failure to 

cooperate with Board as an aggravating factor).

As to mitigating factors, Cross presented no evidence of any 

mitigating factors. However, the record here does not suggest that any 
34

clients suffered harm. We consider this a mitigating factor. See id.

(considering lack of client harm as a mitigating factor); Kersenbrock, 821 

N.W.2d at 422 (same). Additionally, Cross ultimately took responsibility 

for his actions before the commission and admitted his violations. This 

is also a mitigating factor. Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 700 (considering

attorney’s taking responsibility for his actions as a mitigating factor); 

Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d at 422 (same).

The commission recommended we suspend Cross’s license for one 

year. Having considered the particular circumstances in this case, and 

after our de novo review of the record, we agree with the commission that 

a one-year suspension is appropriate. Additionally, the record 

established that Cross currently has outstanding payroll and income tax

liabilities. On this record, we are unable to ascertain the exact amount 

of this current tax liability. Accordingly, as a condition of any 

reinstatement, Cross shall satisfy this court that he has entered into a 

repayment plan with the appropriate taxing authorities and that he is 

current with his repayment plans at the time of any application for 

reinstatement.

VI. Conclusion.

We suspend Cross’s license to practice law with no possibility of 

reinstatement for one year from the date of the filing of this opinion.

Upon application for reinstatement, Cross shall have the burden to show 

he has not practiced law during the period of suspension and that he 

meets the requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.14. Cross must notify all 

clients pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.23.

Additionally, as a condition to any reinstatement, Cross shall 

satisfy this court that he has entered into a repayment plan with the
35

appropriate taxing authorities and that he is current with his payment 

plans at the time of any application for reinstatement.

Costs are taxed to Cross pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.27.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.