IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-30399

MARK HANNA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DELMER MAXWELL, JANE WOMACK, TIM WILKINSON, TODD 

THOMAS, MONA HYSE, LIONEL TELSEE, RICHARD STALDER, LINDA 

RAMSEY, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC. No. 1:09-CV-1230

Before DAVIS, GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Mark Hanna appeals from the dismissal of his retaliation claim 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as time barred under the one-year statute of limitations 

applicable under Louisiana law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 6, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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In 2008, Mark Hanna, Louisiana prisoner # 132872, filed a 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint against eight defendants, including corrections officers, 

wardens, and other officials with the Louisiana Department of Public Safety 

and Corrections (LDOC). He sought damages for various claims, including 

allegations that, during a 2003 disciplinary hearing, he was wrongfully 

convicted of defiance in retaliation for refusing a medical procedure and 

threatening to sue prison officials. As a result of this defiance conviction, 

Hanna served 10 days in isolation and forfeited 180 days of good time credit, 

which prolonged his sentence by 90 days. His defiance conviction was later 

overturned based on insufficient evidence.

Before service of process on the defendants, the district court dismissed 

Hanna’s § 1983 action for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Hanna appealed, raising various arguments. See Hanna v. 

Maxwell, 415 F. App’x 533, 534-37 (5th Cir. 2011). This court affirmed in 

part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings after concluding 

that Hanna had stated a retaliation claim. Id. at 535-37. With respect to 

Hanna’s other arguments, the court found no error or abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s decision. See id. 535-37 nn.1, 3. Thus, only Hanna’s 

retaliation claim remained extant.

On remand, the magistrate judge issued a report on September 30, 2011 

recommending dismissing Hanna’s § 1983 retaliation claim as barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations. Specifically, the magistrate judge found 

that Hanna’s retaliation claim accrued in January 2003 when he was 

disciplined and that the applicable statute of limitations under Louisiana law 

expired a year later in January 2004. Hanna did not file timely objections to 

the report and recommendation, and on October 21, 2011, following the 

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deadline for such objections, the district court issued a judgment concurring

with the magistrate judge’s report and dismissing Hanna’s action with 

prejudice.

On November 14, 2011, 24 days after entry of the district court’s 

judgment, Hanna filed a motion for an extension of time to file a response to 

the magistrate judge’s report, asserting that a mailman had placed the report 

in a neighbor’s mailbox, that he did not receive it until after the time for filing 

timely objections had passed, and that he disagreed with the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation. On December 13, 2011, Hanna filed another motion 

to extend the time for filing objections to the report. On December 15, 2011, 

the magistrate judge issued an electronic order, without an attached 

document, declaring Hanna’s postjudgment motions moot because the case had 

already been dismissed.

On January 10, 2012, Hanna filed his late objections to the magistrate 

judge’s report. On the same day, he appealed to the district court for review 

of the magistrate judge’s denial of his requests for an extension of time to file

the objections. On February 9, 2012, Hanna filed a motion to expedite his 

appeal to the district court. On February 10, 2012, the district court denied 

this motion, finding no exceptional circumstances which might warrant

expedited consideration. On March 29, 2012, Hanna filed a motion reurging 

his previously denied motion for an expedited appeal of the magistrate judge’s 

decisions.

On April 5, 2012, the district court issued an Order addressing Hanna’s

reurged motion, in which it construed the motion as a motion for 

reconsideration and addressed the merits of Hanna’s appeal of the magistrate 

judge’s decisions. The district court concluded: “There is no basis to 

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reconsider our decision dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, even taking into account

Mr. Hanna’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation.” In denying the motion, the district court again observed 

that Hanna’s retaliation claim under § 1983 was time barred. The court 

additionally denied as moot Hanna’s appeal from the magistrate judge’s denial 

of his motion to extend.

On April 17, 2012, within 30 days from entry of this final order, Hanna 

filed a notice of appeal to this court.

II.

As a threshold issue, this court must first examine the basis of its 

jurisdiction. See Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). A timely 

“notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. 

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). A notice of appeal in a civil action must be 

filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment from which the appeal is taken. 

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). However, certain postjudgment motions, including 

a motion to alter or amend the judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), may 

extend the time for filing an appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). A

motion for reconsideration of a district court’s judgment is treated as a Rule 

59(e) motion for purposes of FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4), regardless of the label 

applied to the motion, if it is made within the 28-day time limit for filing Rule 

59(e) motions. Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) 

(applying the former 10-day period for filing a motion under Rule 59(e)). A 

timely appeal from the denial of Rule 59 relief is treated as an appeal from “the 

underlying judgment when the intent to do so [is] clear.” In re Blast Energy 

Servs., Inc., 593 F.3d 418, 424 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010).

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Although Hanna did not file a notice of appeal until nearly six months 

after entry of the October 21, 2011 judgment dismissing his § 1983 retaliation 

action, he filed the notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the district court’s 

order disposing of his appeal to the district court of the magistrate judge’s 

decisions. If Hanna’s motion is construed as a Rule 59(e) motion, then his 

notice of appeal filed within 30 days of its final resolution is deemed timely.

Hanna’s pleadings at the district court were not models of precision, but 

we construe them liberally because he is proceeding pro se. See, e.g., United 

States v. Weathersby, 958 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir. 1992) (construing a pro se motion 

improperly invoking 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as one instead invoking 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255); United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Mindful of 

the liberality accorded pro se filings, we therefore elect to construe Santora’s 

ill-styled Rule 35 pleading as a request for relief under § 2255.”). However 

Hanna labeled his motion, it clearly evinced a desire for the court to reconsider 

its judgment, and it was filed within the 28-day time limit for filing Rule 59(e) 

motions.

In addition, this court has liberally construed postjudgment objections to 

a magistrate judge’s report as a motion capable of tolling the time for filing a 

notice of appeal. See United States v. Gallardo, 915 F.2d 149, 150 & n.2 (5th 

Cir. 1990) (construing objections to the report, filed in a criminal case after 

entry of the final judgment, as a motion for reconsideration that tolled the time 

for filing a notice of appeal until after entry of the court’s order disposing of the 

motion). As in Gallardo, the district court’s judgment herein “had already 

been entered” at the time Hanna filed his motion for an extension. Unlike in

Gallardo, Hanna initially did not file his specific objections to the report, only 

a motion for an extension of time to file those objections. However, he later 

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filed his specific objections, which the district court considered when it issued

its final order on April 4, 2012. A district court has discretion to hear 

objections filed after the deadline, Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 277 (5th 

Cir. 1988), and the district court exercised that discretion here.

We find that Hanna timely filed what was, in substance, a motion for 

reconsideration under Rule 59(e) and that we possess jurisdiction to hear this 

appeal.

III.

This court conducts a de novo review of the time-bar dismissal of a § 1983 

action. See Price v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 431 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 

2005). Federal courts look to federal law to ascertain when a § 1983 action 

accrues and the limitations period begins to run; however, “state law supplies 

the applicable limitations period and tolling provisions.” Harris v. Hegmann, 

198 F.3d 153, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1999). In Louisiana, the applicable limitations 

period is one year. See Clifford v. Gibbs, 298 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2002); 

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. ART. 3492.

Here, the parties do not dispute the applicable limitations period; rather, 

they dispute when Hanna’s action accrued. In general, a § 1983 action does 

not accrue until a plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is 

the basis of the action.” Harris, 198 F.3d at 157 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). This general analysis is altered, however, when a 

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for damages stems from an allegedly unconstitutional 

disciplinary conviction. If a judgment in favor of a plaintiff would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction or affect the duration of 

confinement, the accrual date of the claim is deferred or delayed until the 

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conviction is overturned. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); 

Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (applying Heck

holding to a disciplinary conviction). The Heck doctrine is inapplicable, 

however, when a § 1983 action does not implicate the validity of a conviction 

or the duration of confinement. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751-52, 

754-55 (2004).

When retaliation is alleged, an inmate need not show that a disciplinary 

conviction has been overturned. See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 

(5th Cir. 1995). A retaliation claim focuses not on the merits of the 

disciplinary proceeding but on the retaliatory “interference, asking only 

whether there has been an obstruction of the exercise of a constitutional right.” 

Id. at 1165. The “concern is whether there was retaliation for the exercise of 

a constitutional right, separate and apart from the apparent validity of the 

underlying disciplinary” conviction. Id.

As noted, the only remaining claim in this action following this court’s 

prior decision was Hanna’s retaliation claim. See Hanna, 415 F. App’x at 535-

37. At the time of the earlier appeal, the applicable limitations period was 

not at issue, see id. at 534-36, but it is now squarely before this court. We find 

that the district court correctly dismissed his lawsuit as time barred because 

Hanna filed the instant action in 2008, five years after the relevant 

disciplinary action in 2003.

IV. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

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EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

I concur in the judgment, as it follows from the correct application of Woods v. 

Smith, 60 F.3d 1161 (5th Cir. 1995). In Woods, we explained that § 1983 

retaliation claims are not subject to a favorable termination requirement, 

since, according to the panel, such claims only allege retaliatory “interference” 

with a constitutional right, and do not challenge a disciplinary conviction on 

the merits. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164–65. Here, Hanna’s remaining claim 

alleges that his disciplinary sanctions—ten days in isolation and the loss of 180 

days of good-time credit—were retaliation for his exercising his constitutional 

right to refuse medical treatment. Hanna v. Maxwell, 415 F. App’x 533, 535–

36 (5th Cir. 2011) (Hanna I). Accordingly, under Woods, reversal of Hanna’s 

disciplinary conviction was not a prerequisite to bringing his retaliation claim. 

The claim thus accrued in 2003 and is now time-barred. 

I write separately to suggest that an en banc court reconsider Woods. Two 

years after Woods, the Supreme Court held in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 

641 (1997), that a prisoner is barred from bringing a § 1983 procedural 

challenge that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a 

disciplinary conviction resulting in the forfeiture of good-time credits, unless 

that conviction is first reversed. Id. at 646. In that case, prisoner Balisok 

alleged that the procedures used in his disciplinary proceeding violated his 

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. He contended that he was not 

given any chance to put on a defense or call witnesses and that the hearing 

officer was biased. Balisok did not challenge the conviction as a substantive 

matter, and thus claimed that the favorable termination requirement of Heck 

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), did not bar his claim. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 

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643–47. However, the Court concluded that Heck still applied because 

Balisok’s procedural challenge would, if successful, “necessarily imply the 

invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits,” given the gravity of the 

due process violations alleged. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 646.1

Like Balisok’s due process claims, Hanna’s retaliation action, if successful, 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction resulting in 

the forfeiture of good-time credits. Hanna challenges the sanctions resulting 

from his defiance conviction. Hanna I, 415 F. App’x at 536. Crucially, these 

sanctions included the “deprivation of . . . good-time credits.” Balisok, 520 

U.S. at 646.2 Hanna’s claim thus falls squarely within the ambit of Heck and 

Balisok. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Hanna’s retaliation claim did not 

accrue until his disciplinary conviction was reversed,3 and the lower court’s 

time-bar dismissal, while consistent with Woods, runs counter to the Supreme 

Court’s teaching in Heck and Balisok.

Woods and many subsequent decisions in this Circuit have established a broad 

1 The disciplinary conviction at issue in Woods did not result in a loss of good-time credit. 

Subsequently, however, the en banc court applied Woods to a retaliation claim that did 

involve such a conviction and held that Heck still did not apply. See Clarke v. Stalder, 154 

F.3d 186, 187 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (reinstating panel’s analysis of retaliation claim in 

Part IV of Clarke v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 222, 231 (5th Cir. 1997)).

2 See USCA5 R. 10–11, 26–27 (complaint seeking damages for allegedly “wrongful, 

unconstitutional, prolonged and/or intensified incarceration” imposed pursuant to 

disciplinary conviction (emphasis added)). Hanna’s ten days in isolation, standing alone, 

would not have triggered Heck, since the isolation was merely a change in the conditions, 

not the length, of his incarceration. Cf. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754–55 (2004) 

(holding that Heck was inapplicable to prisoner’s claim alleging retaliatory prehearing lockup, because claim did not necessarily imply invalidity of conviction or of loss of good-time 

credits).

3 The parties agree that when Heck bars a claim, the accrual date of an action is delayed 

until the favorable termination requirement is satisfied. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 

384, 393 (2007) (“[The Heck rule] delays what would otherwise be the accrual date of a tort 

action until the setting aside of an extant conviction which success in that tort action would 

impugn.”). 

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exemption from Heck’s favorable termination requirement: So long as a 

prisoner alleges retaliation for his exercise of constitutional rights, he can 

bring his claim immediately, even if the alleged retaliation consisted of a 

disciplinary conviction that deducted good-time credits. 4 By contrast, the 

Supreme Court recognizes no distinction between challenges to retaliatory 

interference and those targeting disciplinary convictions themselves—between 

the impact and merits of a conviction.5 Rather, the sole inquiry under Heck 

4 In the wake of Clarke v. Stalder, supra n.1, which applied Woods, our jurisprudence on

the question of Heck’s applicability to retaliation claims has developed through conflicting 

unpublished opinions. Many opinions, in line with this panel’s and Clarke’s reading of 

Woods, have held that § 1983 claims alleging retaliatory disciplinary action are 

categorically exempt from Heck. See, e.g., Lynn v. Cockrell, 86 F. App’x 700 (5th Cir. 2004) 

(unpublished); Kelly v. Sanders, 260 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished). Other 

opinions conclude that certain retaliation claims targeting the validity of disciplinary 

convictions are Heck-barred. See, e.g., Peterson v. Peshoff, 216 F.3d 1079 (5th Cir. 2000) 

(unpublished) (applying Heck and Clarke to bar retaliation claim “to the extent that [the 

prisoner] seeks to challenge the disciplinary proceedings against him”); Hodges v. Frasier, 

176 F.3d 479, at *3 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (concluding that “substantive retaliation 

claims [alleging false disciplinary charges and due process violation, in addition to 

retaliatory motive] were properly dismissed under the rule in Heck” (emphasis added)). 

Still other unpublished opinions have distinguished between § 1983 claims alleging false 

disciplinary charges or due process violations in disciplinary proceedings, which are subject 

to Heck, and claims alleging retaliatory motive in bringing disciplinary charges, which are 

not. See, e.g., Digges v. Jeffcoat, 149 F.3d 1177 (5th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (holding that 

Heck barred claims attacking “false disciplinary charges,” but distinguishing these claims 

from “retaliation claim,” which was not subject to Heck); Sherman v. Quintanilla, 149 F.3d 

1173 (5th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (same). In all of these cases, we have lost sight of the 

central inquiry of Heck and Balisok—whether a successful § 1983 claim would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of a conviction resulting in a sentence change or loss of good-time 

credits. Furthermore, even if we were to follow the above opinions and read Woods as 

saving only non-“substantive” retaliation claims from Heck, Hanna’s claim was in fact 

substantive in nature. He alleged that the disciplinary charges against him were false and 

ungrounded—that “no written or established prison disciplinary rule . . . prohibits 

[inmates] from refusing invasive medical treatment or from verbally threatening to sue 

prison officials . . . .” USCA5 R. 15. To read Hanna’s claim as challenging solely the 

interference with his rights, without regard for the validity of the disciplinary conviction, 

would be a rather strained and artificial exercise.

5 Cf. Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 752–55 (holding that a § 1983 retaliation claim was not 

Heck-barred, not by virtue of its being a retaliation claim, but because the allegedly 

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and Balisok is whether a successful claim would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of a conviction resulting in the loss of good-time credits. An en banc 

court should revisit Woods and resolve this conflict between our precedents 

and Supreme Court jurisprudence.

retaliatory disciplinary conviction resulted only in prehearing lock-up and not necessarily 

in the loss of good-time credits).

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