alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50372

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

WILLIAM GONZALEZ-RAMIREZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:17-CR-58-1

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

William Gonzalez-Ramirez appeals his conviction for illegal reentry, in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving 

the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. 

Gonzalez-Ramirez asserts that the indictment was invalid because the removal 

order was void due to a defective notice to appear that failed to specify the date 

and time for his removal hearing. He concedes that the issue is foreclosed by 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 28, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-50372 Document: 00515289143 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/28/2020
No. 19-50372

2

United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. 

filed (U.S. Nov. 6, 2019) (No. 19-6588), and Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684 

(5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 16, 2019) (No. 19-779), but he 

wishes to preserve it for further review. The Government has filed a motion 

for summary affirmance, agreeing that the issue is foreclosed under PedrozaRocha and Pierre-Paul. Alternatively, the Government requests an extension 

of time to file a brief.

In Pedroza-Rocha, we concluded that the notice to appear was not 

rendered deficient because it did not specify a date or time for the removal 

hearing, that any such alleged deficiency had not deprived the immigration 

court of jurisdiction, and that Pedroza-Rocha could not collaterally attack his 

underlying removal order without first exhausting his administrative 

remedies. 933 F.3d at 496-98. Because the Government’s position “is clearly 

right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the 

outcome of the case,” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 

(5th Cir. 1969), the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is 

GRANTED, the Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to 

file a brief is DENIED, and the judgment is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 19-50372 Document: 00515289143 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/28/2020
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of SoOum Corp. (the "Company") for the quarter ending September 30, 2015, I, William Westbrook, Chief Executive Officer of the Company hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:

1.

Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2015, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2015, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated:  November 17, 2015

SoOum Corp.



By: /s/ William Westbrook

William Westbrook
#### Delilah Y. Franqui, an Infant, by Her Mother and Natural Guardian, Brunilda R. Franqui, et al., Respondents, v City of New York et al., Defendants, and New York City Housing Authority, Appellant.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert E. White, J.), entered January 10, 1990, which upon renewal and/or reargument, granted, on default, the cross motion of defendant New York City Housing Authority for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and dismissed the action, without prejudice, unanimously modified, on the law, to eliminate the "without prejudice” provision and, except as thus modified, affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Appeal from the order of the same court and Justice, entered on or about March 15, 1989, which, *inter alia,*denied the Housing Authority’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, dismissed as subsumed by the appeal from the aforesaid order.

*46In a prior decision in this same case, involving defendant New York Telephone Company *(Franqui v City of New York,*152 AD2d 482), we concluded that the deposition testimony of plaintiffs’ notice witness was insufficient to demonstrate an issue as to constructive notice. Accordingly, we granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint as against that defendant. On the basis of that determination, the Housing Authority sought renewal/reargument of the IAS court’s earlier order, previously appealed by New York Telephone Company, which had denied both defendants’ summary judgment motions. Plaintiffs failed to oppose the renewal/reargument motion, as a result of which the court granted the motion and dismissed the action on default. The dismissal, however, was "without prejudice.” This was error. Since it is clear that plaintiffs are unable to prove notice, their action is demonstrably without merit and should have been dismissed without condition. We modify accordingly. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Carro and Milonas, JJ.
**Exhibit 13.4**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

Inconnection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 20-F of KabelDeutschland Vertrieb und Service GmbH & Co. KG for the annual periodended March 31, 2007, I, Paul Thomason, Chief Financial Officer of theCompany, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to thebest of my knowledge the Annual Report fully complies with the requirements ofsection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934and the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.
| /s/    PAUL THOMASON |   |
|------------------------------------------|--------|
| **Paul Thomason**                        |
| ***Chief Financial Officer***            |
| Date: July 26, 2007                 |

 

17

----
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We consent tothe incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-164289) and related Prospectus and in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-169816) of Westway Group, Inc. of our report dated March 31, 2011 withrespect to the consolidated financial statements of Westway Group, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) of Westway Group, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2010. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

March 31, 2011
BLD

- 231 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 17

- 1536

___________ IN RE: RONNIE VAUGHN , Petitioner

____________________________________ On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 1

- 16

- cv - 01072 )

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

May 11, 2017 Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circ uit Judges

( Opinion filed: July 11, 2017 )

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM In June of 2016, Ronnie Vaughn filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in the District Court, claiming that his due process rights had been violated at a parole hearing when the hearing examiner “proceeded fo rward with the hearing without all of the information that was submitted to the Parole Commission . . . to score [him] correctly.” He filed an

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

amended petition in December of 2016 , claiming that “[t]he United States Parole Commission conducted the hearing in an unconstitutional manner by not applying the 1987 Regulations and 1991 Guidelines to [his] initial hearing.” In April of 2017, the District Court denied Vaughn’s request for counsel

— observing that “it is not clear that the petition has arguable meri t”

— but has yet to resolve his § 2241 petition. Meanwhile, in March of 2017, Vaughn filed this mandamus petition, claiming that “[h]ad the parole board properly scored [him] he would have received parole on July 27, 2015.” He argues that the District Court ’s delay in resolving his petition is “tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction,” and apparently seeks an order from this Court directing the District Court to resolve it. While we “ may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that undue delay is
tan tamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction,” Madden v. Myers , 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), only five months have passed since Vaughn filed his amended § 2241 petition. We also note that the District Court, just weeks ago, denied his request for

coun sel. Though the five

- month delay is concerning, it does not warrant mandamus relief. See id

. We are confident that the District Court will rule on his petition without undue delay. His mandamus petition will be denied.
EX-35 (b)
(logo) AVELO
       MORTGAGE


Avelo Mortgage,

Annual Compliance Statement


Re: The Flow Servicing Agreement dated as of January 1, 2006 (the "Agreement"),
among Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company and Avelo Mortgage, LLC and GSAA Home
Equity Trust 2006-8


1. A review has been completed of Avelo Mortgage, LLC's ("Avelo") servicing
activities and its performance under the servicing agreement during the period
from February 24, 2006 through December 31, 2006. This review was completed
under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, Avelo has fulfilled all of
its obligations under the agreement in all material respects, except as
described in the item below:

For a period of time in 2006, bank accounts were not reconciled in strict
compliance with Section 1122(d)(2)(vii) of Reg AB which provides as follows:

*  Reconciliations are prepared on a monthly basis for all asset-backed
   securities, related bank accounts, including custodial accounts and related
   bank clearing accounts. These reconciliations are (A) mathematically
   accurate; (B) prepared within 30 calendar days after the bank statement
   cutoff date, or such other number of days specified in the transaction
   agreements; (C) reviewed and approved by someone other than the person who
   prepared the reconciliation; and (D) contain explanations for reconciling
   items. These reconciling items are resolved within 90 calendar days of their
   original identification, or such other number of days specified in the
   transaction agreements.


The bank account reconciliations were current as of December 31, 2006, and no
issues were found or arose from the delay in reconciling the bank accounts.

I certify this information to be true and correct to the best of my ability.


/s/ James Weston Moffett
Name:  James Weston Moffett
Title: President and CEO
Date:  February 28, 2007


600 E. Las Colinas Blvd.  Suite 620  Irving, TX 75039  972.910.7000
F. 972.910.7099
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 668 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 668

  To direct the Secretary of Labor to fund youth workforce investment 
      activities for certain local areas, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 1, 2021

   Mr. Rush introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To direct the Secretary of Labor to fund youth workforce investment 
      activities for certain local areas, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Jobs Now Youth Employment Act''.

SEC. 2. YOUTH WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES.

    (a) In General.--From the amount made available under subsection 
(e) for a fiscal year, the Secretary shall make allotments to local 
areas pursuant to subsection (b) for youth workforce investment 
activities under section 129 of the Workforce Innovation and 
Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3164).
    (b) Formula.--The allotment to a local area under subsection (a) 
shall be made on the basis of the relative number of long-term 
unemployed individuals in each local area, compared to the total number 
of long-term unemployed individuals in all local areas.
    (c) Data Collection.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary 
shall--
            (1) beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
        shall collect long-term unemployment rates for local areas; and
            (2) identify local areas that have long-term unemployment 
        rates above the national average for the year for which such 
        data is collected.
    (d) Definition.--In this section:
            (1) Local area.--The term ``local area'' has the meaning 
        given such term under section 3 of the Workforce Innovation and 
        Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3102).
            (2) Long-term unemployment.--The term ``long-term 
        unemployment'', used with respect to a local area, means the 
        number of individuals in such local area who have been 
        unemployed for 15 weeks or more.
            (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of Labor.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out the activities described in subsection (a) 
$10,000,000,000 for each year in the 10-year period beginning on the 
date that is the first fiscal year that commences following the 
existence of data collected under subsection (c).
                                 <all>
```
183 La. 535

#### McDONALD et al. v. LIEBER et al.

No. 33496.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 1935.

Albert P. Garland and William W. McDonald, both of Shreveport, for appellants.

Frank E. Murphy and Blanchard, Gold-stein, Walker and O’Quin, all of Shreveport, for appellees.

HIGGINS, Justice.

The defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ appeal on the ground that the record of a previous suit between the parties, which was offered in evidence by the plaintiffs, had not been copied into the transcript of this case and that plaintiffs refused to enter into a stipulation to supplement the transcript by having the record, offered in evidence, attached to and made a part of the transcript.

In answer to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs state that for more than fifteen years it has been the practice in preparing transcripts not to copy the records of other suits offered in evidence where appeals had been taken in such suits and transcripts mad^ of such records and filed in the Supreme Court.

Section 12 of the rules of this court reads as follows:

> “Where there is a subsequent appeal in a case, or growing out of a case, theretofore appealed to this court, the transcript already lodged here may, on leave of the court, be used for the purposes of such subsequent appeal, and the copying of its contents dispensed with.”

The record shows that the Shreveport Mutual Building Association foreclosed a mortgage against Mr. and Mrs. William W. McDonald, plaintiffs herein, and that they instituted a suit against the association to enjoin an attempt to eject and dispossess them. This court reversed the decision of the lower court and held that the sale of the property under foreclosure proceedings was null and void, because the advertisement of the sale of the property was made in a newspaper, which did not have the status of a legal publication. McDonald v. Shreveport Mutual Building Association, 178 La. 645, 152 So. 318.

In the present suit, it is alleged that while the former proceedings were pending, the president of the homestead association, in speaking about the litigation, slandered and defamed plaintiffs herein by referring to them as “Communists,” and that they are entitled to recover the sum of $100,000 for the defamation.

Therefore, the present litigation grew out of the suit formerly appealed, the *334record of which was offered in evidence in this action, and under the express provisions of the above rule, it - is unnecessary to copy into the present transcript the record of the other suit.

Counsel for the defendants have referred us to the case of Lawrence v. Lawrence, 172 La. 587, 134 So. 753. That case is not in point, because the *motion to*dismiss the appeal there was predicated upon the fact that the record was incomplete, as certain depositions had not been copied into the transcript, the originals thereof being annexed to one copy of the transcript. There had been no previous transcript and appeal in that matter, and, consequently, the case is not apposite here.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
302 CERTIFICATION

EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, William T. Foly, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report of ESCO, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual
report;

4. I am the President and Chief Financial Officer and I am responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the small business issuer, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business
issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal
quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors of the small
business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.

Date: April 15, 2008

ESCO, Inc.


By: /s/ William T. Foley
    ------------------------------------
Name: William T. Foley
Title: President
#### Edwin Arthur JONES, II, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C.A. TERHUNE, Director, California Department of Corrections; G.A. Mueller, Warden, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 01-16119.

D.C. No. CV-99-20986 JW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 15, 2002.

Decided Nov. 5, 2002.

*361Before KOZINSKI and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM**

Petitioner Edwin Jones, II, appeals the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. We have jurisdiction and affirm.

Petitioner made several arguments that his trial counsel was ineffective. Under the facts of this case, reviewed under the deferential standard mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, even if counsel committed unprofessional errors, none of Petitioner’s arguments establishes that there is a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been different. *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Petitioner argues that unconstitutional limitations were placed on the presentation of defense evidence. We are bound by the state court’s interpretation of its law of evidence, and must therefore accept the ruling that the evidence of the victim’s aggression could be initially excluded under state law. *Estelle v. McGuire,*502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). We cannot say that this ruling was so “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the purposes [it was] designed to serve” that it violated the constitution. *See United States v. Scheffer,*523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998). The state court’s determination that applying the rule did not infringe Petitioner’s privilege against self-incrimination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law. *See Williams v. Florida,*399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970).

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on unreasonable self-defense. The evidence, as well as the jury’s verdict of premeditation, could reasonably have been seen as inconsistent with self-defense. The district court, therefore, properly denied habeas relief on this issue. *Penry v. Johnson,*532 U.S. 782, 792-93, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001).

Finally, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by communicating with the jury outside the presence of Petitioner and counsel. Although the trial judge erred by not notifying counsel before communicating with the jury, the state court could reasonably have believed that error was harmless. It is not clearly established that such a minor violation could be structural error.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0248

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

REGINA LEE THOMPSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including October 31, 2021, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 29 2021

09/29/2021

Case Number: DA 21-0248