United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted June 10, 2021 

Decided June 10, 2021 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1326 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROBIN HARRIS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 14-20013-002 

Michael M. Mihm, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

After serving two years in prison for conspiring to defraud the federal 

government, 18 U.S.C. § 286, Robin Harris began a three-year term of supervised 

release. Two years in, Harris, who worked at a nursing home, stole a resident’s 

checkbook and withdrew over $14,000 from the bank account. Harris pleaded guilty to 

state forgery charges, and the government moved to revoke her supervised release in 

federal court. At the revocation hearing, Harris pleaded guilty to violating the 

mandatory condition that she not commit another federal, state, or local crime. The 

district court revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to one year in prison 

and two years of supervised release. Harris filed a notice of appeal, but her appointed 

counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-1326 Page 2 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We agree with counsel and therefore grant the 

motion and dismiss the appeal. 

At the outset we note that the Constitution does not entitle a defendant to 

counsel in revocation proceedings if, as here, she concedes the alleged violations and 

does not assert a substantial argument in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 

778, 789–90 (1973). We nonetheless analyze counsel’s motion to withdraw under the 

Anders framework to ensure careful consideration of potential issues. See United States v. 

Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief appears thorough; it explains 

the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be 

expected to involve. We notified Harris of counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), and she 

did not respond. We therefore focus our review on the subjects that counsel discusses. 

See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel does not address whether Harris wants to challenge the knowing and 

voluntary nature of the admissions on which her revocation was based. He should have 

consulted with Harris about this and discussed the revocation only if she wished to 

contest it. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). In any event, 

counsel correctly concludes that such a challenge would be frivolous. Before accepting 

Harris’s plea, the district court ensured she had received a copy of the charge and 

understood her right to a hearing, and it gave her an opportunity to present evidence 

and a statement in mitigation. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2). We note that the court, in 

informing Harris of the possible penalties of her violation (which was not required 

under Rule 32.1), explained only the guideline range of imprisonment, U.S.S.G. 

§§ 7B1.1, 7B1.4, and not the statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Even so, any 

claim that Harris did not knowingly plead guilty would be baseless: The court made 

sure that Harris had reviewed and discussed with her attorney the probation report 

stating that the statutory maximum was two years. See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 858. And 

even without Harris’s plea, the government proved by a preponderance of evidence 

that she committed forgery by submitting records of the state-court conviction and 

testimony from the victim’s son and a detective who, in reviewing surveillance videos, 

watched Harris withdraw money from the victim’s bank account. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3); United States v. Falls, 960 F.3d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Next, counsel contemplates, and rightly rejects, a challenge to Harris’s one-year 

prison term on the basis that it exceeds the guideline range of four to ten months. 

See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. We would vacate a sentence of reimprisonment after the revocation 

of supervised release only if it were plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Allgire, 
No. 20-1326 Page 3 

946 F.3d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 2019). Harris’s prison term is not. It does not exceed the 

statutory maximum of two years, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), and, in arriving at it, the court 

reasonably weighed the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Smith, 929 F.3d 828, 830 

(7th Cir. 2019). The court observed that Harris’s forgery crime was not an isolated 

incident but a “series of separate criminal acts” against an elderly resident. 

See § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C). The court was also “worried about the adequate deterrence of 

[her] problem,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), noting that she showed “no remorse” at the hearing 

and, months earlier, had obtained a $12,000 loan without her probation officer’s 

approval, even though she owed over $30,000 in restitution. Given the court’s 

explanation, Harris could not plausibly argue that her one-year prison term was plainly 

unreasonable. 

Next, although counsel does not discuss whether Harris could challenge her 

two-year term of supervised release, we conclude that such a claim would be frivolous. 

Again, we would reverse only if the term of supervised release were plainly 

unreasonable. See United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014). The statute 

authorized a combined sentence of three years, and the district court had sentenced 

Harris to one year in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), (h). Plus, Harris’s combined 

three-year term did not exceed her original three-year term of supervised release. 

See United States v. Russell, 340 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the district 

court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors adequately supports both components of 

her sentence. See United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 868 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus, Harris 

could not tenably argue that her two-year term was plainly unreasonable. 

Last, counsel considers whether Harris could argue that she was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel. Harris could not bring such a claim because she did not 

have a constitutional right to counsel for the revocation proceedings. See Gagnon, 

411 U.S. at 789–90; United States v. Clayton, 811 F.3d 918, 921–22 (7th Cir. 2016). 

 Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.