alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ozeme FRUGE v. D. M. LANGLEY et al.

No. 1090.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

March 7, 1933.

Guillory & Guillory, of Yille Platte, for appellant.

S. W. Gardiner, of Ville Platte, and L. A. Pontenot, of Opelousas, for appellees.

LE BLANC, Judge.

The issue in this ease is the same as that presented in the accompanying case of Buddy Fruge v. Langley (La. App.) 146 So. 486, this day decided.

The plaintiff here is the party who held the mortgage notes bearing on the automobile which was seized, and who it is alleged in the exception referred to in that case intervened in the proceeding in the justice of the peace court. The issue is governed by our decision in the Buddy Pruge Case.

Por the reasons assigned in that ease, it is now ordered adjudged and decreed that the judgment herein sustaining the plea of lis pendens be, and the same is hereby, set aside, avoided, and reversed, and that the case be remanded to the district court for the purpose of having produced before that court and put in the record such evidence as tends to support the plea of lis pendens, or, in default thereof, that the case be proceeded with according to law.

Defendant appellee to pay the costs of this appeal, all other costs to abide the final determination of this suit.
UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

FORM 8-A

FOR REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN CLASSES OF SECURITIES

PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(b) OR (g) OF THE

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Elizabeth Heard HILL, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A.

Nov. 23, 1954.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Moie J. L. Tendrich, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Joseph A. Varón, Hollywood, E. M. Baynes and Sam D. Phillips, Jr., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

MATHEWS, Justice.

The appellee was indicted for murder in the first degree of her husband, John Henry Hill, by a Grand Jury in Broward County. She was tried on pleas of “not guilty” and “not guilty by reason of insanity”. The Jury returned its verdict of guilty of first degree murder with a recommendation of mercy.

In due course, the appellee filed a motion for new trial and the same having been argued and submitted to him, the trial Judge made and entered an order granting a new trial and in such order stated:

> “ * * * it appearing to the Court that a new trial should be granted because the verdict is contrary to law and to the evidence and that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, $ >¡C * *»*

Pursuant to F.S. Section 924.13, F.S.A., the State filed notice of appeal, assignments of error and directions to the Clerk for making up the transcript of the record.

Each assignment of error is directed to the order of the trial court in granting a new trial.

No good purpose would be served by summarizing the evidence in this case. It is sufficient to say that the burden is upon the State to show an abuse of discretion or a reversible error committed by the trial Judge in granting a motion for a new trial. The record and briefs in this case have been carefully examined, and from such examination it appears that the State has failed to show any reversible error.

Affirmed, with directions to the trial Court to proceed to carry out its order granting a new trial.

ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed March

8, 2022.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00669-CV

CAROL MCGEHEE, Appellant

V.

ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 333rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-65389

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from a judgment signed October 7, 2021. On February 22, 

2022, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The 

motion is granted. 

We dismiss the appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Zimmerer, and Hassan.
**EXHIBIT      31.1**

|                                     |                                                                                   |                                |
|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                                     |                                                                                   |
|                                |                                                                              |                           |
| Date:               August 11, 2005 | By:                                                                          | /s/ Barry              J. Feld |
|                                     | Barry              J. Feld                                                             |
|                                     | President,              Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the              Board |
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-353-CR

JORGE CABELLO ARENAS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

After waiving a jury and entering an open plea of guilty, appellant Jorge

Cabello Arenas appeals his conviction and ten-year sentence for possession of

less than one gram of cocaine. We affirm.

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel

1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
avers that, in her professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief

and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California

2

by presenting a

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds for relief. We gave appellant the opportunity to file a pro se brief, and

he has filed one. The State has not filed a brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw

on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of

Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the

record.

3 Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.4

There is no reporter’s record in this case. We have carefully reviewed the

clerk’s record, counsel’s brief, and appellant’s pro se brief. We agree with

counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing

2... 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

3... See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);

Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no

pet.).

4... See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351

(1988).

2
in the record that might arguably support the appeal.

5 Accordingly, we grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; WALKER and MCCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: November 19, 2009

5... See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

3
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 167 (Wednesday, August 27, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 50647]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19844]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the 
ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment; 
Notice of Meeting

    The ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) will hold a meeting on September 30, 2008, Room T-2B3, 
11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.
    The entire meeting will be open to public attendance.
    The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:
    Tuesday, September 30, 2008--8:30 a.m. until the conclusion of 
business.
    The Subcommittee will discuss the draft NUREG-1855, ``Guidance on 
the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed 
Decisionmaking.'' The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold 
discussions with representatives of the NRC staff and the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI) regarding this matter. The Subcommittee 
will gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and 
formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for 
deliberation by the full Committee.
    Members of the public desiring to provide oral statements and/or 
written comments should notify the Designated Federal Official, Dr. 
Harold J. VanderMolen, (Telephone: 301-415-6236) five days prior to the 
meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. 
Electronic recordings will be permitted. Detailed procedures for the 
conduct of and participation in ACRS meetings were published in the 
Federal Register on September 26, 2007 (72 FR 54695).
    Further information regarding this meeting can be obtained by 
contacting the Designated Federal Official between 8:15 a.m. and 5 p.m. 
(ET). Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the 
above named individual at least two working days prior to the meeting 
to be advised of any potential changes to the agenda.

    Dated: August 20, 2008.
Cayetano Santos,
Branch Chief, ACRS.
[FR Doc. E8-19844 Filed 8-26-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
```
E**XHIBIT 32(b)****SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**I, Henry G. Schopfer, III, Chief Financial Officer of Peerless Mfg. Co. (the “Company”), certify,that pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code:(1) The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period endedDecember 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, as amended; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operationsof the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in theReport.                                                        /s/ Henry G. Schopfer, III   Henry G. Schopfer, III   Chief Financial Officer   Date: February 13, 2007   *The foregoing Certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350; it is notbeing filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, and is not to beincorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the datehereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.*
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 20 23

- 0101

_____________________________
P ALM B EACH C OUNTY S CHOOL D ISTRICT and S EDGWICK CMS, I NC

. , Appellant s ,

v.

F RANCES S MITH , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from an order of the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims. Barbara Case , Judge

. Date of Accident: June 29, 2017

.

April 26, 2024

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
L EWIS , R AY , and K ELSEY , JJ.
, concur

.2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Samuel B. Spinner and Hinda Klein of Conroy Simberg, Hollywood, and Yunia DeMicco

- Nadler of De M icco

- Nadler, LLC, Boca Raton
, for Appellant s

. Thomas Warren Sculco and Shannon McLin of Florida Appeals, Orlando
, for Appellee.
#### In the Matter of the Construction of the Will of John Kuehnle, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Queens County,

December 28, 1956.

S. *John Mich*for petitioner.

*Joseph R. D’Arrigo,*special guardian for infant.

*541Anthony P. Savarese, S.

John Knehnle died on November 15, 1949, and left a last will and testament which was admitted to probate on February 20, 1950. Emil Mayer, the nominated and acting executor, has requested a construction of the fifth paragraph of the will which provides as follows: “I hereby devise the other one-half interest in my house located at 84-45 123rd Street, Richmond Hill, Queens, New York, Ronald Weil. If, at the time of my decease, however, Ronald Weil, shall be an infant, then in that event, I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint Emil Mayer and Matilda Mayer, to be the trustees for said Ronald Weil until he shall have reached the age of 21 years.” By the fourth paragraph of his will testator devised to said Emil Mayer and Matilda Mayer the other one-half interest in the afore-mentioned premises. In the sixth paragraph he gave his moneys on deposit in a named savings bank to said Emil Mayer and Matilda Mayer and in the next succeeding paragraph the rest and residue of his estate to them.

It is evident that testator intended to make a complete disposition of his property, real and personal. While the preposition *to*was omitted before the name “Ronald Weil”, testator’s intent was to give him an interest in the designated real property. The case is one where, in order to carry out the evident intent of the testator, the missing preposition can and will be inserted by the Surrogate. The question which remains is the nature of the interest given to said Ronald Weil who is an infant of 14 years of age. The proposed trust is clearly passive as no active trust duties or functions are imposed upon the persons designated as trustees in the will. No estate or interest, legal or equitable, vested in the designated trustees within the provisions of section 93 of the Real Property Law. The legal title to a one-half interest in the“specifically described real property is in the infant Ronald Weil. *(Jacoby*v. *Jacoby,*188 N. Y. 124, 129; *Matter of Berliner,*267 App. Div. 1000; *Matter of Foster,*174 Misc. 933; *Matter of Berkel,*184 Misc. 711, 714.) The estate granted passed directly to the devisee. *(Matter of Cooney,*112 App. Div. 659, 662; *Gueutal*v. *Gueutal,*113 App. Div. 310.) Since the executor, Emil Mayer took no title, his purported conveyance of a one-half interest in the subject realty to the infant devisee did not affect the interest of the infant. Submit decree construing the will accordingly, on notice.
Exhibit
          32.1 – Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to
          Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
  
 I,
          Wm.
          Milton Cox, Chief Executive Officer of Gulf Western Petroleum Corporation
          (the
          "Company"), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
          pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1)
          the
          Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended August 31, 2007 (the "Report")
          which this statement accompanies fully complies with the requirements of
          Section
          13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
 
 (2)  the
          information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
          the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 Dated:
          November 28, 2007
 
 
 /s/
                    Wm. Milton CoxChairman
                    and Chief Executive Officer(principal
                    executive officer)
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.21


Description of Investment Management Contracts

In the ordinary course of business, the Company's registered investment adviser
subsidiaries enter into investment management agreements with open-end and
closed-end registered investment companies (collectively, "Managed Funds") and
with individual accounts (collectively, "Managed Accounts") to which they
provide investment management services. The Company does not consider any single
investment management agreement to be material to its business; however,
collectively these agreements represent virtually all of the Company's revenues.

Investment management agreements with each Managed Fund are approved initially
by the Managed Fund shareholders and their continuance must be approved annually
by the board of trustees which oversees the funds, all but one of whom are
independent of the Company, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(the "40 Act"). These agreements may be terminated by the Managed Fund or the
adviser for any reason upon 60 days' written notice without penalty and
terminate automatically upon assignment (as defined under the Investment Company
Act of 1940), which term includes a change of control of the adviser. The
investment contracts with the Managed Funds collectively provide a majority of
the Company's annual revenues. The termination of all or a significant portion
of the investment management agreements would be material to the Company and its
subsidiaries.

Investment management agreements with Managed Accounts generally provide that
they can be terminated by the client for any reason upon a specified period of
written notice and may not be assigned by the adviser without the client's
consent. Many of the agreements for Managed Accounts involve clients who are
participants in "wrap fee" or other programs sponsored by unaffiliated broker
dealer or investment advisory firms. Under these programs the Company's
subsidiaries may provide their services pursuant to a two-party agreement with
either the program sponsor or client or pursuant to a three-party agreement
including the program sponsor and the client. The program sponsor firms have the
ability to add or remove advisers from their programs in their discretion and if
removed from a program all of the investment management agreements with clients
in the program would be terminated. The Company's investment adviser
subsidiaries participate in numerous such programs.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

NIKHIL SEN SHARMA,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D17-3731

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed May 15, 2018

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit 

Court for Citrus County,

Richard A. Howard, Judge.

Martin P. McDonnell, of Law Offices of 

Martin P. McDonnell, Tallahassee, for 

Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Ortiz v. State, 227 So. 3d 682, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); 

Callaway v. State, 202 So. 3d 901, 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). 

PALMER, LAMBERT and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 169 (Friday, August 29, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 50980]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-20076]



[[Page 50980]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1763-DR]


Iowa; Amendment No. 18 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Iowa (FEMA-1763-DR), dated May 27, 2008, and related 
determinations.

DATES: Effective Date: August 18, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peggy Miller, Disaster Assistance 
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3886.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Iowa is hereby amended to include the following area 
among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the 
catastrophe declared a major disaster by the President in his 
declaration of May 27, 2008.

    Winnebago County for Public Assistance (already designated for 
Individual Assistance).

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) 
are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community 
Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 
97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment 
Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, 
Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households in 
Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially 
Declared Disaster Assistance--Disaster Housing Operations for 
Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster 
Assistance to Individuals and Households--Other Needs; 97.036, 
Disaster Grants--Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared 
Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.)

R. David Paulison,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. E8-20076 Filed 8-28-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-10-P
#### DAVIS v. NICHOLSON.

No. 14612.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

March 12, 1934.

John A. Woodville, of New Orleans, for ap-I>ellant.

John Wagner, of New Orleans, for appel-lee.

WESTERFTELD, Judge.

This is a suit against a negro lodging house proprietor for damages in the sum of $300. Plaintiff’s claim is based upon the alleged retention by defendant of her wearing apparel and other personal effects which were located in the lodgings occupied by her. The defendant admits the seizure of the plaintiff’s property and justified it upon the ground that she was indebted to him for rent for seventeen weeks at $3 per week or $51, and that as an innkeeper he had the right to retain plaintiff’s personal effects under the authority of Act No. 35 of 1896 and Act No. 110 of 1898. He reconvened and asked for judgment for $51 with recognition of his lien and privilege on the property seized.

There was judgment below dismissing both the main and the reeonventional demand, and plaintiff has appealed. No answer to the appeal has been filed by defendant.

In our opinion there is no doubt of the authority of the defendant to retain plaintiff’s belongings in view of the provisions of the acts which have been cited.

“Inn-keepers, hotel, boarding house and lodging house keepers enjoy this privilege on all the property which the sojourner has brought to their place, whether it belongs to him or not, because the property so brought into their place has become pledged to them by the mere fact of its introduction into their place.” Act No. 35 of 1896.

“Innkeepers and all others who let lodgings or receive or take boarders have a privilege, or more properly, a right of pledge on the property of.all persons who take their board or lodging with them, by,, virtue of which they may retain property, and have it sold, to obtain payment of what such persons may owe them on either accounts above mentioned and this privilege shall extend to extras not to exceed Ten ($10) Dollars supplied by the proprietors of hotels, inns and boarding house keepers.” Act No. 110 of 1898.

Plaintiff admits that she had been a tenant of defendant, but s-ays that during the weeks for which rental is claimed she earned the $3 per week by doing some washing for him. The record, however, does not bear her out for the testimony largely preponderates in favor of defendant. Lilly May, Max Scott, and Mary Phillips, occupants of the defendant’s establishment, testified that the plaintiff, Juanita Davis, admitted to them that she was in arrears for rent thus corroborating defendant in his claim. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment of the trial court is correct and should be affirmed.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.