Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Steele-Kumi, 2014 IL App (1st) 133068

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 

SCHAKIRA STEELE-KUMI, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, First Division

Docket No. 1-13-3068

Filed November 17, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

Where defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on two 

charges of aggravated battery, the application of consecutive 

sentences in the calculation of the Thiem date for defendant’s 

maximum commitment was prohibited by the language of section 

5-2-4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections; therefore, the trial court 

properly granted defendant’s petition under section 2-1401 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure to reduce her period of maximum 

commitment to three years and six months based on a maximum term 

of seven years for one aggravated battery conviction with a dayfor-day good-conduct credit.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 10-CR-19806, 

10-CR-20203; the Hon. Sharon Sullivan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
- 2 - 

Counsel on

Appeal

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and 

Judy L. DeAngelis, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the 

People.

Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, of Chicago (Mark J. Heyrman, of 

counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment 

and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 The State appeals from an order reducing the maximum commitment period for 

defendant-appellee Schakira Steele-Kumi (defendant), who was found not guilty by reason of 

insanity on two charges of battery. The commitment period reflects the length of time that 

defendant would have served on a single sentence for one charge rather than consecutive 

sentences on both charges. We address whether the statutory provision requiring the 

calculation of an insanity acquittee’s maximum commitment period to reflect “the maximum 

sentence of the most serious crime for which he has been acquitted” is required to be 

calculated so as to incorporate consecutive sentences that would have been imposed had the 

defendant been convicted on multiple charges. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On October 25, 2010, defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated battery for 

allegedly striking a police officer who had responded to a call of a disturbance on a Chicago 

Transit Authority bus. Two days later, while in the custody of the Cook County sheriff and 

awaiting a bond hearing for the October 25 incident, defendant allegedly kicked a deputy 

sheriff in the abdomen. For that October 27, 2010 incident, defendant was again charged with 

aggravated battery. By agreement of the parties, the charges arising from these separate 

incidents were consolidated and tried in a single bench trial. On July 25, 2011, the defendant 

was found not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to both charges. 

¶ 4 On November 1, 2011, at a hearing pursuant to section 5-2-4(a) of the Unified Code of 

Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a) (West 2010)), the trial court determined that the defendant 

was in need of mental health services on an inpatient basis and placed the defendant with the 

Department of Human Services. The court then conducted a hearing on November 7, 2011 to 

determine the maximum period of defendant’s commitment pursuant to section 5-2-4(b), 

which directs the court to assess “the maximum length of time that the defendant would have 

been required to serve, less credit for good behavior *** had he been convicted of and 

received the maximum sentence for the most serious crime for which he has been acquitted 

by reason of insanity.” 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2010). The ending date of the maximum 
- 3 - 

commitment period calculated under section 5-2-4(b) is often referred to as the “Thiem date” 

in reference to People v. Thiem, 82 Ill. App. 3d 956 (1980). 

¶ 5 At the November 7, 2011 hearing, the State argued that the defendant’s maximum 

commitment period should be seven years, and thus the Thiem date should be October 25, 

2017, seven years from the date of defendant’s arrest. The State argued that, had she been 

convicted on the aggravated battery charges, the defendant would have been required to serve 

consecutive sentences under section 5-8-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 

5/5-8-4 (West 2010). Specifically, the State argued that defendant’s battery against a deputy 

sheriff while awaiting a bond hearing would implicate section 5-8-4(d)(8), which requires the 

imposition of consecutive sentences where “a person charged with a felony commits a 

separate felony while on pretrial release or in pretrial detention in a county jail facility or 

county detention facility.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(8) (West 2010). The State contended that, as 

each aggravated battery charge carried a maximum sentence of 7 years, the sentences served 

consecutively would amount to 14 years. Assuming that the time served would be reduced 

due to good behavior, which the parties agreed would be credited on a “day-for-day” basis, 

the State argued that the 14-year period would be reduced to 7 years. Thus, the State 

contended that seven years should be the applicable maximum period of confinement 

assessed pursuant to section 5-2-4(b). The record does not indicate that defendant’s counsel 

at that time, the Cook County public defender, raised any objection at the hearing to the 

State’s calculation. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the defendant’s commitment was 

not to exceed seven years from the date of her arrest, or October 25, 2017. 

¶ 6 Defendant, through the public defender, filed a notice of appeal on November 7, 2011. 

The notice appealed from the July 25, 2011 judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity and 

the “[Thiem] Date of October 25, 2017,” but did not otherwise specify any claimed error. On 

September 26, 2012, the public defender filed, in this court, a motion to dismiss the appeal 

alleging lack of appellate jurisdiction. The public defender cited our supreme court’s holding 

in People v. Harrison, 226 Ill. 2d 427 (2007), that a finding of not guilty by reason of 

insanity is an acquittal and thus not subject to appellate review. The public defender’s motion 

to dismiss the appeal stated that defendant had raised “no appeal from the postacquittal 

adjudication” and concluded that “in light of Harrison, and the non-existence of any 

postacquittal matters, the finding of [not guilty by reason of insanity] is not an appealable 

order.” This court granted the motion to dismiss defendant’s direct appeal on October 4, 

2012. 

¶ 7 According to defendant, she did not consent to the public defender’s motion to dismiss 

her appeal. She subsequently obtained new legal counsel through the Mandel Legal Aid 

Clinic. On May 17, 2013, defendant filed a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure seeking reduction of the seven-year maximum commitment period ordered 

by the trial court. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010). The petition acknowledged the prior 

dismissal of her direct appeal and recognized that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity 

is not an appealable order, but contended that she “only intended to appeal her Thiem date,” 

not the underlying acquittal by reason of insanity. 

¶ 8 Defendant’s brief in support of her section 2-1401 petition argued that section 5-2-4(b) of 

the Unified Code of Corrections does not permit a maximum period of commitment premised 

on consecutive sentences. Defendant argued that under our decision in People v. Hampton, 

121 Ill. App. 3d 273 (1983), the commitment period calculated under section 5-2-4(b) must 
- 4 - 

reflect the sentence for only the single most serious crime charged and thus in her case only 

one of the two battery charges should have been taken into account. As either charge 

implicated a maximum seven-year sentence, which would be reduced by half with credit for 

good behavior, she argued that her maximum commitment period should have been assessed 

as three years and six months, half of the seven-year period ordered by the court. Thus, she 

submitted that her Thiem date should fall on April 25, 2014, not on October 25, 2017. 

¶ 9 The State moved to strike defendant’s petition on June 6, 2013, contending that in 

calculating the Thiem date under section 5-2-4(b), “the trial court must refer to the existing 

sentencing scheme in determining the most severe and punitive punishment that could be 

imposed for a conviction.” The State contended that two separate sentencing provisions of 

the Unified Code of Corrections required the application of consecutive sentences given the 

defendant’s circumstances. Specifically, the State noted that section 5-8-4(d)(8) requires 

consecutive sentences when a felony is committed while in pretrial detention for a prior 

felony, and that section 5-8-4(d)(8.5) also requires consecutive sentences where a person 

commits a battery against a sheriff’s employee while in pretrial detention. 730 ILCS 

5/5-8-4(d)(8), (8.5) (West 2010). Under these sentencing provisions, the State argued, “the 

maximum period of confinement for defendant must be computed based on the two cases 

being run consecutively.” According to the State’s calculation, “the maximum sentence for 

these two cases is 7+7 or an aggregate sentence of 14 years. Because the sentences are served 

with day for day credit, the maximum period of confinement is one half of 14 years, that is 7 

years from October 25, 2010.”

¶ 10 The State further argued that “had the legislature intended to limit the imposition of a 

consecutive sentence” in calculating the Thiem date, “it could have enacted such limiting 

language” and thus the court should not “read a limitation into the statute.” The State further 

argued that defendant’s reliance on Hampton was misplaced because, whereas the Hampton

defendant “was convicted of two counts in a single case, murder and attempt[ed] murder,” 

the defendant here “had two separate cases that under two separate statutes are mandatorily 

consecutive in sentencing.” Thus, the State argued that to not apply consecutive sentences in 

defendant’s Thiem date calculation would “render meaningless the fact that these are separate 

cases on different days.”

¶ 11 Defendant’s response urged that section 5-8-4(d)(8)’s provisions regarding consecutive 

sentences were inapplicable. First, defendant argued that the statute “is only relevant when a 

person has been convicted of at least two crimes,” whereas defendant had been acquitted by 

reason of insanity. Defendant also argued that consecutive sentences were inapplicable 

because “a Thiem date may only be premised on the sentence for a single crime charged” 

under section 5-2-4(b)’s instruction to calculate the commitment period by reference to the 

sentence for “the most serious crime for which [defendant] has been acquitted.” 730 ILCS 

5/5-2-4(b) (West 2010). Because the statute uses the singular term “crime,” defendant 

argued, the Thiem calculation could not consider consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. 

Responding to the State’s claim that Hampton was inapposite, defendant argued that the 

Hampton court had prohibited consecutive sentences in the Thiem date calculation even when 

the underlying crimes were “separate and distinct offenses.” Defendant thus contended that

Hampton had “resolved the exact issue present in the instant case” and held “that a Thiem 

date cannot be premised on consecutive sentences.”
- 5 - 

¶ 12 The trial court heard oral argument on the defendant’s section 2-1401 petition on July 31, 

2013. Defendant’s counsel argued the issue was controlled by section 5-2-4(b)’s language 

that the period of commitment “shall not exceed the maximum length of time that the 

defendant would have been required to serve *** had he been convicted of and received the 

maximum sentence for the most serious crime for which he ha[d] been acquitted by reason of 

insanity.” 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2010). Defendant’s counsel argued that due to the 

singular language of “most serious crime,” as interpreted in Hampton, the trial court could 

not consider more than one crime and thus “consecutive sentences were impermissible” in 

the Thiem date calculation. 

¶ 13 The State emphasized that section 5-2-4(b) requires reference to the sentencing 

provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections, which include consecutive sentencing 

provisions. The State also argued that the legislature could have but did not explicitly bar 

reference to consecutive sentencing in calculation of the Thiem date. The State further argued 

that since application of the extended-term sentencing statute to the Thiem calculation had 

been allowed in other cases, the consecutive sentencing provisions should likewise be 

applicable. 

¶ 14 The State again urged that Hampton did not preclude reference to consecutive sentencing 

provisions because the underlying batteries by defendant comprised “two separate cases.” 

Specifically, the State argued that it could have brought two separate cases against defendant, 

whereas Hampton was “one case in which the defendant committed and was tried at one time 

for a murder and an attempt[ed] murder.” The State thus argued that defendant’s Thiem date 

should reflect “the maximum amount of time she could have received on each of the separate 

case[s] [of] aggravated battery run consecutively as required by the sentencing statute.”

¶ 15 The trial court, although noting “this was a novel issue,” reasoned that “the language is 

actually very clear in section 5-2-4(b) in calculating the [Thiem] date.” The court agreed with 

defendant’s interpretation of the statute, emphasizing that “[t]he plain language states that it 

is the maximum sentence for the most serious crime” and noting that this phrase “is in the 

singular.” The court also agreed that Hampton was the “controlling case” on the question and 

relied on that decision’s conclusion that the phrase “most serious crime” was “singular.” The 

trial court reasoned that under Hampton, “it is inappropriate to allow consecutive sentences 

of commitment following a not guilty by reason of insanity [verdict].” The court remarked 

that Hampton “has been on the books since 1983, has been interpreted as meaning a singular 

offense. And the State legislature has never sought to change that.”

¶ 16 The court thus ruled that “the [Thiem] date should be for the singular [most] serious 

crime” and held the defendant’s maximum period of commitment should be reduced to three 

years and six months to reflect a sentence for only one charge rather than consecutive 

sentences. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order modifying the Thiem date to April 25, 

2014, three and a half years after the defendant’s arrest.

¶ 17 On August 16, 2013, the State filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that “the Court was 

mistaken in not using the mandatory consecutive statutes to determine the Thiem date.” The 

State contended that section 5-8-4(d)(8) mandated consecutive sentences for defendant, as 

she was “charged with a felony while on pretrial release or in pretrial detention” and that 

section 5-8-4(d)(8.5) independently mandated consecutive sentences “where a person 

commits a battery against a county correctional officer while in pretrial detention.” The State 

argued that “under these statutes defendant’s Thiem date must be computed using the 
- 6 - 

maximum sentence that could have been imposed on each case and run consecutively.” The 

State again argued that Hampton’s holding was limited to the “imposition of consecutive 

sentences on two or more counts in the same case,” but did not preclude consecutive 

sentences “for new crimes that a defendant commits while in pretrial detention for another 

case.” The State thus asserted that Hampton did not bar application of consecutive sentences 

to the defendant’s Thiem date calculation because her battery charges comprised different 

“cases.”

¶ 18 The trial court heard argument on the motion to reconsider on September 12, 2013. The 

State reiterated that section 5-2-4(b) requires reference to the broader sentencing scheme, 

which in turn mandated consecutive sentences upon defendant. The State urged that 

Hampton only applied to counts within a single case but did not control here as it “did not 

involve a person who had one case who was in pretrial detention and picked up another new 

case.” Because the defendant “ha[d] two separate cases,” the State urged the court to restore 

the original seven-year commitment period reflecting consecutive sentences. 

¶ 19 In response, defendant’s counsel cited Hampton’s finding that section 5-2-4(b)’s phrase 

“the most serious crime” is singular and thus “even if [defendant] could get a consecutive 

sentence if convicted” of multiple crimes, “that doesn’t matter for [Thiem] dates.” Defendant 

also argued that the statutory language did not distinguish whether or not the crimes were in 

the same “case” and thus this concept was irrelevant to the Thiem date. Defendant argued that 

under Hampton the court must apply the statutory phrase “most serious crime” such that only 

one offense could affect the defendant’s Thiem date calculation. 

¶ 20 In its ruling, the trial court agreed that section 5-2-4(b)’s phrase “the most serious crime 

for which [defendant was] acquitted by reason of insanity” is “in the singular. It doesn’t say 

crimes. It doesn’t say cases. It doesn’t say offenses. It says singular crime.” The court 

acknowledged that Hampton had reviewed the same phrase and found that “ ‘[t]he most 

serious crime’ is singular, contemplating that there could [be] more than one offense 

committed for which a defendant could be acquitted.” The trial court further cited Hampton’s 

reasoning that if “the legislature had intended to provide for consecutive periods of 

commitment, it could have clarified [section 5-2-4(b)] via express language to that effect,” 

adding that “since [Hampton] came down in 1983, there has been no change in the language 

of that statute.”

¶ 21 In denying the motion to reconsider, the court also found that the State’s argument about 

“whether offenses are within a singular case or separate cases *** misses the point.” 

Concluding that it “ha[d] to follow the clear language of the statute,” the trial court 

reaffirmed its order granting defendant’s petition to modify the Thiem date to three years and 

six months following the defendant’s arrest. On October 1, 2013, the State filed a notice of 

appeal from the orders granting the defendant’s section 2-1401 petition and denying its 

motion to reconsider. 

¶ 22 ANALYSIS 

¶ 23 As the State filed a timely notice of appeal from an order granting relief under a petition 

pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we have jurisdiction under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). As set forth in the State’s appellate brief, 

the issue presented is “[w]hether the circuit court improperly interpreted [section 5-2-4(b)] 

when it determined that, after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, defendant’s 
- 7 - 

maximum period of involuntary commitment, or Thiem date, was April 25, 2014, rather than 

October 25, 2017.” The issue in this appeal is one of statutory interpretation, which is a 

question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 

2d 480, 487 (2004). 

¶ 24 We begin our analysis by reviewing the relevant statutory provisions. Section 5-2-4 of the 

Unified Code of Corrections sets forth the proceedings that follow an acquittal by reason of 

insanity. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4 (West 2010). First, section 5-2-4(a) requires the Department of 

Human Services to conduct an evaluation of the acquitted defendant “as to whether he is in 

need of mental health services” on either an inpatient or outpatient basis and to present such 

evaluation to the court. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a) (West 2010). The court is also required to 

conduct a hearing to determine if the acquitted individual is in need of mental health services 

on an inpatient basis or an outpatient basis or not in need of such services; if the court finds 

that inpatient mental health services are necessary, the court must order the defendant to the 

Department of Human Services. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a) (West 2010). 

¶ 25 Section 5-2-4(b) instructs that “[i]f the Court finds the defendant in need of mental health 

services on an inpatient basis *** the initial order for admission of a defendant acquitted of a 

felony by reason of insanity shall be for an indefinite period of time.” 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) 

(West 2010). This provision requires the court to enter an order specifying the initial 

maximum period of commitment, instructing that: “Such period of commitment shall not 

exceed the maximum length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve, 

less credit for good behavior as provided in Section 5-4-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections, 

before becoming eligible for release had he been convicted of and received the maximum 

sentence for the most serious crime for which he has been acquitted by reason of insanity.” 

Id. In other words, as explained by our supreme court, “section 5-2-4(b) requires the trial 

judge to determine the maximum length of time that the defendant could have been confined 

upon a criminal conviction, and to use that period as the maximum length of the defendant’s 

commitment.” People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 202 (1995). “This maximum length of 

time [of commitment] is known as the defendant’s Thiem date.” Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 

2d 480, 483-84 (2004) (citing People v. Thiem, 82 Ill. App. 3d 956 (1980)). Our supreme 

court has characterized the calculation of the maximum commitment period under section 

5-2-4(b) as “the performance of what is essentially a ministerial task.” Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 

at 201 (noting that the trial court lacks “discretion to select, as a maximum period of 

commitment, a time other than the longest span provided by statute”).

¶ 26 As the State points out, calculation of the Thiem date under section 5-2-4(b) requires 

reference to the sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections in order to 

determine the maximum length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve 

had she been “convicted of and received the maximum sentence for the most serious crime 

for which [s]he has been acquitted by reason of insanity.” 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2010). 

Here, the parties do not dispute that each of defendant’s aggravated battery charges, standing 

alone, would result in a maximum seven-year sentence under the sentencing provisions in 

effect at the time of the commission of the offenses in 2010. See 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18), 

(e)(2) (West 2010) (aggravated battery against a peace officer is a Class 2 felony); 730 ILCS 

5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2010) (Class 2 felony warrants sentence of three to seven years). The 

parties also agree that, taking into account sentencing credit for good behavior as required 

under the section 5-2-4(b) calculation, the actual time served under each count would be 
- 8 - 

reduced by half, from seven years to three years and six months. See 730 ILCS 

5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2010) (providing, subject to certain exceptions, that “a prisoner who is 

serving a term of imprisonment shall receive one day of good conduct credit for each day of 

his or her sentence of imprisonment”).

¶ 27 The crux of the parties’ dispute is whether the Thiem date calculation under section 

5-2-4(b) should incorporate sentences for one or both counts of aggravated battery for which 

defendant was acquitted by reason of insanity. The State argues that since convictions on the 

battery counts would mandate imposition of consecutive sentences under the Unified Code of 

Corrections, the maximum commitment period must reflect the time that would be served on 

two consecutive sentences. The State argues that the circumstances of defendant’s second 

battery would implicate two provisions of section 5-8-4(d) of the Unified Code of 

Corrections, which sets forth circumstances when a court is required to impose consecutive 

sentences upon conviction of multiple offenses. First, section 5-8-4(d)(8) provides: “If a 

person charged with a felony commits a separate felony while on pretrial release or in pretrial 

detention in a county jail facility or county detention facility, then the sentences imposed 

upon conviction of these felonies shall be served consecutively regardless of the order in 

which the judgments of conviction are entered.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(8) (West 2010). 

Separately, section 5-8-4(d)(8.5) provides: “If a person commits a battery against a county 

correctional officer or sheriff’s employee while serving a sentence or in pretrial detention in a 

county jail facility, then the sentence imposed upon conviction of the battery shall be served 

consecutively with the sentence imposed upon conviction of the earlier misdemeanor or 

felony ***.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(8.5) (West 2010). Under either provision, the State argues, 

conviction on defendant’s battery charges would require her to serve 2 consecutive 7-year 

terms, totaling 14 years. After reducing for good behavior credit on a day-for-day basis, the 

State argues that the maximum period of commitment under section 5-2-4(b) should be seven 

years. 

¶ 28 In its appeal, the State asserts that the trial court “completely disregarded the legislature’s 

clear dictate” requiring consecutive sentences when it recalculated defendant’s Thiem date to 

reflect only one of the two battery charges. The State argues that by not incorporating 

consecutive sentences in the calculation, the trial court improperly ignored the consecutive 

sentencing provisions of section 5-8-4(d) and thus violated section 5-2-4(b)’s mandate to 

refer to the Unified Code of Corrections to determine the maximum commitment period. The 

State contends that under the governing sentencing scheme, seven years was the “ ‘maximum 

length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve less credit for good 

behavior’ ” for “the two separate crimes” for which defendant was found not guilty by reason 

of insanity. 

¶ 29 For the reasons that follow, we reject the State’s arguments and agree with the trial court 

that the Thiem date calculation under section 5-2-4(b) should reflect the maximum sentence 

that would result from conviction on only one of the two battery charges against defendant. 

We thus affirm the reduction of the maximum commitment period from seven years to three 

years and six months. 

¶ 30 We are persuaded, as was the trial court, that this issue is governed by the plain language 

of section 5-2-4(b) regarding calculation of the maximum commitment period, specifically 

the instruction to apply “the maximum sentence for the most serious crime for which 

[defendant] has been acquitted by reason of insanity.” 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2010). We 
- 9 - 

conclude here, as we did in the Hampton decision issued in 1983, that this singular phrase in 

section 5-2-4(b) precludes the incorporation of consecutive sentences in the Thiem date 

calculation. 

¶ 31 As Hampton was expressly relied upon by the trial court, we discuss that decision in 

detail. In Hampton, the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the murder 

of one victim and the attempted murder of another. Hampton, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 274. 

Following the acquittal, the trial court “found the murder and attempted murder to be 

separate and distinct offenses committed at a different time and place for which consecutive 

sentence[s] would be appropriate,” and the court calculated a maximum period of 

commitment of 22 years and 6 months. Id. Defendant argued on appeal “that this period of 

commitment actually represented *** two consecutive 11-year 3-month periods of maximum 

commitment for both murder and attempted murder, since the court had previously found 

these offenses to be separate and distinct acts.” Id. at 275. Defendant asserted that the murder 

and attempted murder, which had occurred only minutes apart, “constituted a single 

psychotic episode, not subject to consecutive sentences or consecutive commitments.” Id.

¶ 32 The State in Hampton argued that the murder and attempted murder offenses, “although 

related in time, involved separate elements and separate victims, and therefore the imposition 

of consecutive sentences would have been proper had the defendant been found guilty.” Id. 

The State contended that “since these separate offenses would be subject to consecutive 

sentences, they should also be subject to separate periods of commitment.” Id.

¶ 33 On appeal, our court “agree[d] that the defendant’s actions constituted two separate and 

distinct offenses” as urged by the State. Id. Nevertheless, upon reviewing the statutory 

language, we “disagree[d] that section 5-2-4(b) authorizes the imposition of consecutive 

periods of commitment for these offenses.” Id. We emphasized that “[t]he terms of section 

5-2-4(b) provide a maximum commitment formula ‘for the most serious crime for which 

[defendant] has been acquitted by reason of insanity.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 276 

(quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-2-4(b)). Noting that the “language of this statute 

shall be given its plain meaning,” we held that the phrase “ ‘[t]he most serious crime’ is 

singular, contemplating that there could be more than one offense committed for which a 

defendant could be acquitted.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. We reasoned that if “the legislature 

had intended to provide for consecutive periods of commitment, it could have clarified this 

statute via express language to that effect,” but that “[a]bsent any express intent to the 

contrary, we must read section 5-2-4(b) to be in accord with the ordinary use and meaning of 

its terms.” Id. 

¶ 34 Noting that “the prime consideration in construing [a] statutory enactment is to give 

effect to the intent of the legislature,” our decision in Hampton also discussed the purpose of 

the commitment period called for by section 5-2-4. Id. We recognized that the United States 

Supreme Court had recently “held that the purpose of commitment, following an insanity 

acquittal, is the treatment of the committed acquittee’s mental illness ***, as well as the 

protection of both acquittee and society from the acquittee’s potential dangerousness.” Id.

(citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)). We noted that whereas a 

postconviction sentence of incarceration implicates “factors of retribution, deterrence and 

rehabilitation,” “different considerations are involved when a defendant is committed 

following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,” as such “an acquittee has not been 

convicted and should not be punished.” Id. at 277 (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 369). 
- 10 - 

¶ 35 We concluded, “given the plain language of [section 5-2-4(b)], that it was the intent of 

the legislature to provide for a period of involuntary commitment which concentrated on the 

treatment of the mentally disturbed acquittee.” Id. We then reasoned that: “[S]ection 5-2-4(b) 

does not permit consecutive involuntary commitments, as this would be contrary to the 

legislature’s intent to provide an indefinite period of commitment for the treatment of the 

acquittee’s mental illness. It follows, therefore, that the statute references the maximum 

period of commitment to the most serious crime, as all offenses result from the same mental 

illness.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 277-78. Holding that section 5-2-4(b) required 

calculation of “the most punitive sanction *** for the most serious crime charged,” we 

vacated the trial court’s order applying consecutive sentences and reduced the defendant’s 

commitment period to reflect the time that would be served upon conviction for the single 

charge of murder. Id. at 278. 

¶ 36 Notably, this court in 1986 confirmed Hampton and applied its logic to nearly identical 

language in section 104-28(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which limited the 

confinement period of an individual found unfit to stand trial to the time the defendant would 

have served had he been “ ‘convicted of the most serious offense charged and had he 

received the maximum sentence therefor.’ ” Kulak v. Belletire, 148 Ill. App. 3d 268, 269-70 

(1986) (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 104-28(a)). The Kulak plaintiff appealed from a 

trial court’s decision permitting consecutive sentences in determining this period. Id. at 

270-71. Relying on our discussion of the singular phrase “most serious crime” in Hampton, 

we held that application of consecutive sentences likewise conflicted with the phrases 

“ ‘most serious offense charged’ ” and “ ‘maximum sentence’ ” in section 104-28(a). Id. at 

272-73. We held that if the legislature had intended the period to reflect multiple offenses, “it 

would have used the words ‘offenses’ and ‘sentences,’ ” and thus the “failure to use the 

plural *** is a clear indication that it intended to determine the maximum period *** based 

on only one offense and one sentence.” Id. at 273. Thus, “in light of our interpretation of 

substantially identical language in Hampton,” we held that “consecutive sentencing is also 

prohibited under section 104-28(a).” Id.

¶ 37 The logic of Hampton, reaffirmed in Kulak, also applies to this appeal. That is, the 

singular phrase “most serious crime” simply cannot be reconciled with the application of 

consecutive sentences. As we said in Hampton, this phrase “contemplat[es] that there could 

be more than one offense committed for which a defendant could be acquitted” (Hampton, 

121 Ill. App. 3d at 276), but the statute’s plain language limits the Thiem calculation to a 

single sentence for a single crime. 

¶ 38 As we observed in Hampton, the legislature could have easily employed language 

encompassing the potential sentences for all charged crimes rather than limiting the 

calculation to “the maximum sentence for the most serious crime.” For instance, the statute 

could have instructed the court to calculate the maximum sentence for “any crimes for which 

he was acquitted,” “all crimes for which he was acquitted,” or simply “the crime (or crimes) 

for which he was acquitted.” But the modifying term “most serious,” coupled with the 

singular “crime,” makes clear that the sentence for only one crime is to be considered in the 

calculation. Likewise, the legislature could have omitted the phrase “most serious crime” and 

directed calculation of the Thiem period based on the “maximum sentence sought by the 

prosecution” or simply the “maximum potential,” “maximum permissible,” or “maximum 

possible” sentence. Such language could encompass multiple offenses. Nevertheless, the 
- 11 - 

legislature chose the singular “most serious crime.” Indeed, as the legislature has elected not 

to modify this phrase in the over 30 years since we analyzed it in Hampton, our conclusion 

that the legislative intent of “most serious crime” is singular is all the more supported.

¶ 39 Notably, the State does not dispute that the phrase “most serious crime” is singular or 

attempt to argue how it could be reconciled with application of sentences for multiple crimes. 

Nor does the State contend that Hampton was wrongly decided. Rather, the State argues 

Hampton is distinguishable on other grounds. First, the State notes that Hampton’s facts did 

not implicate the mandatory consecutive sentencing provisions that would apply to 

defendant’s battery of a sheriff’s officer while detained on a prior battery charge. 

Accordingly, the State argues that the trial court “completely ignored” these sentencing 

provisions and violated the legislature’s intent when it determined that it could not apply 

consecutive sentences in defendant’s Thiem calculation. 

¶ 40 This arguments fails in light of section 5-2-4(b)’s unequivocal language governing 

calculation of the Thiem date based on the single most serious crime. We recognize that, had 

defendant been convicted on both battery charges, the defendant’s alleged battery of an 

officer while awaiting a bond hearing might require imposition of consecutive sentences 

under either or both section 5-8-4(d)(8) and section 5-8-4(d)(8.5).1 Nevertheless, our holding 

that section 5-2-4(b) precludes reference to consecutive sentences does not ignore or 

contradict these statutory provisions. While the section 5-2-4(b) calculation of the “maximum 

sentence for the most serious crime” requires reference to other provisions of the Unified 

Code of Corrections, its plain language refers to one sentence for one crime. Application of 

consecutive sentences necessarily involves sentences for multiple crimes and would thus be 

contrary to section 5-2-4(b)’s “most serious crime” calculation. Thus, consecutive sentences 

simply cannot factor into the Thiem date determination, regardless of whether the underlying 

facts may have justified consecutive sentences if the defendant had been convicted of the 

charged offenses. 

¶ 41 We also address the State’s contention that the failure to apply consecutive sentencing 

statutes to defendant’s Thiem calculation contradicts case law permitting application of other 

sentencing statutes in setting the Thiem date. The State relies heavily on our supreme court’s 

holding that the Thiem date for an insanity acquittee with a prior criminal record may reflect 

an enhanced sentence under section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. 

Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-3.2(b)(1)), which “allow[ed] the imposition of an 

extended-term sentence on a felon who *** has previously been convicted of committing a 

felony.” People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 196 (1995). 

¶ 42 We do not find Pastewski applicable, as it did not concern whether multiple sentences are 

permitted in the section 5-2-4(b) calculation. Pastewski involved defendants who had been 

convicted of burglary prior to their acquittal by reason of insanity on unrelated charges. 

 

1

Since we hold that consecutive sentences are inapplicable to the Thiem calculation due to the 

express language of section 5-2-4(b), we need not decide whether defendant’s battery while awaiting 

bond hearing falls within the scope of “pretrial detention in a county jail facility or county detention 

facility” under section 5-8-4(d)(8) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(8) (West 2010)), or whether the battery was 

committed “against a county correctional officer or sheriff’s employee while serving a sentence or in 

pretrial detention in a county jail facility” under the language of section 5-8-4(d)(8.5) (730 ILCS 

5/5-8-4(d)(8.5) (West 2010)). 
- 12 - 

“[T]he trial court determined that the defendants’ prior criminal records would have qualified 

them for extended-term sentences under section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) *** if the defendants had been 

found guilty of the present charges.” Id. at 193-94. The Pastewski defendants argued that 

application of the extended-term provision was “punitive” in nature and “inconsistent with 

the nature of an insanity acquittal.” Id. at 196. Our supreme court disagreed and found “no 

conflict between the successful assertion of an insanity defense and use of the recidivism 

provision of the extended-term statute in determining the maximum commitment period.” Id. 

at 197. 

¶ 43 Pastewski does not alter our conclusion here. Whether other provisions of the Unified 

Code of Corrections may enhance the single hypothetical “maximum sentence” under section 

5-2-4(b) is a distinct question from whether the calculation may incorporate multiple 

sentences for different offenses. Although Pastewski held that prior convictions could be 

taken into account in determining the “maximum sentence,” it did not address whether the 

calculation could reflect sentences for multiple charges for which the defendant has been 

acquitted by reason of insanity. Accordingly, the Pastewski holding has no bearing on 

whether section 5-2-4(b) permits the maximum commitment period to reflect consecutive 

sentences. 

¶ 44 Likewise, the State’s reliance on People v. Cross, 274 Ill. App. 3d 159 (1995), is also 

unavailing. In Cross, the trial court determined that “a natural life sentence [was] to be 

utilized as the maximum period of defendant’s involuntary commitment” under section 

5-2-4(b) after defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity for two murders. Id. at 

161. The sole issue on appeal was whether a term of commitment for natural life was 

permissible under section 5-2-4(b). Id. In holding that “a sentence of natural life may be 

utilized as the maximum period of commitment” under section 5-2-4(b) (id. at 163), we noted 

that a separate provision of the Unified Code of Corrections mandated a term of natural life 

imprisonment for a defendant “found guilty of murdering more than one victim.” Id. (citing 

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c)). Although Cross approved a single sentence 

of natural life as the basis for the Thiem calculation, it did not address the use of multiple

sentences and thus does not impact our holding that consecutive sentences are inapplicable in 

assessing the “maximum sentence for the most serious crime” under section 5-2-4(b). 

¶ 45 Finally, we address the State’s argument that Hampton is inapplicable because it 

concerned crimes committed in the “same case,” whereas the batteries committed by 

defendant occurred on separate days and could have been prosecuted as separate cases. The 

State implies that, had defendant been found not guilty by reason of insanity in separate 

proceedings on both battery incidents, she would be subject to two consecutive periods of 

commitment. As the State did not elect to bring separate cases, we are not faced with and 

need not address that hypothetical situation. However, we note the State cites no 

post-Hampton decision permitting consecutive periods of commitment after separate 

prosecutions and insanity acquittals. 

¶ 46 Moreover, the State’s reliance on the concept of separate “cases” is undermined by the 

Hampton decision itself. Indeed, the State in Hampton unsuccessfully asserted a nearly 

identical argument in seeking consecutive commitment periods for the charges of murder and 

attempted murder. The State “contend[ed] that these offenses, although related in time, 

involved separate elements and separate victims, and therefore the imposition of consecutive 

sentences would have been proper had the defendants been found guilty of the offenses.” 
- 13 - 

Hampton, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 275. “[S]ince these separate offenses would be subject to 

consecutive sentences,” the State argued, “they should also be subject to separate periods of 

commitment.” Id. Although the Hampton court expressly agreed that the murder and 

attempted murder were “two separate and distinct offenses” (id.), we nevertheless held that 

application of consecutive sentences would conflict with section 5-2-4(b)’s directive to 

consider only the single most serious crime. Id. at 276. Given our holding in Hampton that 

even “separate and distinct offenses” do not justify use of consecutive sentences in 

calculating the maximum commitment period, we see no reason to depart from its logic 

based on whether the State could have prosecuted offenses in separate cases. 

¶ 47 Instead, we agree with the trial court that the State’s reliance on whether the offenses 

could constitute multiple cases “misses the point” in light of the clear statutory language that 

the maximum period of commitment is to be gauged by the “maximum sentence for the most 

serious crime for which he has been acquitted by reason of insanity.” We note that this 

language appears in the current version of section 5-2-4(b) just as it did when Hampton was 

decided. Thus, a plain reading of the statute leads to the same conclusion that the phrase “is 

singular” and that if “the legislature had intended to provide for consecutive periods of 

commitment, it could have clarified this statute via express language to that effect.” Id.

¶ 48 After reviewing this question of statutory interpretation de novo, we agree with the trial 

court that application of consecutive sentences in the Thiem date calculation is prohibited by 

the plain language of section 5-2-4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections. As we held in 

Hampton, the statutory directive to assess the maximum commitment period by reference to 

the “maximum sentence for the most serious crime for which [defendant] has been acquitted 

by reason of insanity” (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2010)) is singular and does not permit 

consideration of consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. Accordingly, independent 

provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections regarding consecutive sentences upon 

conviction do not factor into the Thiem date calculation upon acquittal by reason of insanity. 

We thus agree with the trial court that the defendant’s maximum commitment calculation 

under section 5-2-4(b) should reflect only one of the two battery charges for which she was 

acquitted by reason of insanity. Thus, the trial court correctly granted defendant’s section 

2-1401 petition to reduce the maximum commitment period from seven years to three years 

and six months and correctly denied the State’s motion to reconsider that order.

¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 50 Affirmed.