COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Alston and Decker Argued at Richmond, Virginia

HASAAN S. WILLIAMS MEMORA NDUM OPINION  BY v. Record No. 0827-17-2 JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. JUNE 26, 2018 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT O F CHESTERFIELD COUNTY Frederick G. Rockwell, III, Judge Jaclyn Murphy Goad (Gordon, D odson, Gordon & Rowlett, on brief), for appellant. Victoria Johnson, Assistant Atto rney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on bri ef), for appellee.

Hasaan Williams (“appellant”) appeals his convictions from the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County (“t rial court”) for posse ssion with intent to distribute heroin and possession with intent to distribute he roin on school property, asserting that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient. We address th e two convictions separately be low.
B ACKGROUND On April 16, 2016, Officer Jennifer Vittum of the Chesterfield County Police Department was on patrol in her cruiser when s he observed a black Lexus ru n a red light at a high rate of speed. Vittum activated her light s and sirens and pursued the Lexus for “half a mile or [a] mile” before the Lexus turned into t he parking lot of Chalkley Elemen tary School (“elementary school”) and stopped next to the main building. Vittum approac hed the vehicle and observed

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - appellant in the driver’s seat . Appellant told Vittum that he ran the red light because he was in a hurry to take his children to the football game at the elementa ry school. Vittum ran a check on appellant’s license and discovered three active warrants from the Richmond police department. Concerned that appellant would not comply with her instruction s because of his fugitive status, Vittum asked appellant to e xit the running vehicle. Ap pellant then leaned to his right, suggesting to Vittum that he was not complying, so she attempte d to open the driver’s side door of the vehicle but found it locke d. Vittum then reached throug h the open window to open the door from the inside. At that po int, appellant quickly shifted the vehicle into gear and began driving “forward at a high rate of speed.” Vit tum got back int o her cruiser and pursued appellant to the far side of the school’s parking lot, whi ch bordered a l arge, wooded area. Appellant stopped his vehicle and ran into t he wooded area, emerging a fe w moments later and surrendering. Vittum placed appellant under arre st. A search of appellant’s person revealed $859 in cash in increments of $1, $5, $10, $20, and one $50 bill in one pocket and one $100 bill in another. When asked to explai n why he had this much cash, appe llant stated that he had cashed a paycheck for $1,050 from his empl oyer earlier that day but coul d not recall the name of the company he worked for. Police also found two cell phones in ap pellant’s pockets. One was an LG phone in which the battery was dead, and the other was an iP hone that rang and had text message alerts pinging during t he course of the encounter. App ellant said that the LG phone was “his work phone.” Another officer arrived at the scene of the encounter and sear ched the wooded area around the school where appellan t had fled and quickly located “a golf ball sized knotted [baggie]” containing white powde r about 10-15 yards into the wo ods. The baggie was sitting on- 3 - top of the leaves on the ground. Subs equent forensic testing c onfirmed the baggie’s contents as 14.76 grams of heroin. At trial, Det ective Kevin Davis (“Davis ”) testified that this amount of heroin is not consistent with pers onal use and equals approxima tely half an ounce, with a street value of around $1,600. Another detective investigati ng the case ran a software program that extracted the messages from appellant’s cell phones. The LG phone contained a large number of text messages which Davis reviewed. D avis testified that many of th e messages referenced the sale and distribution of drugs. One me ssage read “shit, forgot to a sk – you heard anything on those subs.” Davis explained that “subs ” is a common abbreviation fo r suboxone. Another message read “I have polarized Ray-Bans worth almost $200 – would you t rade me for a gram or less. I’m sick.” Davis indicated that this prospective buyer was att empting to trade an item for drugs and that the buyer may have been s uffering from withdrawal. Da vis testified that the message “[h]ey could I meet you to getta half half” was a reference to half a gram of heroin. One buyer had texted “Yo u think u can look on something for me til like thurs or fri im hurtin right now,” and another wrote “I’m tryna get a gram.” After considering the evidence in a bench trial, the trial cou rt found appellant guilty of both charges 1 and this appeal followed.
A NALYSIS I. Possession with Intent to Distribute Heroin Appellant asserts that the evid ence does not establish that he possessed the heroin with the intent to distri bute. We disagree.

1 Appellant was also convicted of felony eluding, which was not appealed. Additionally, the trial court acquitted a ppellant of possession of a firearm on school property.- 4 - “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the judgment of the trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict.’” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 599, 605, 673 S.E.2d 923, 926 (2009) (quoting Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107, 113, 406 S.E.2d 39, 42 (1991)). “Un der this standard, this Court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at t he trial established guilt beyo nd a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoti ng Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). “Instead, we ask only ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Maxwe ll v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 44 2, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008)). Accordingly, “[w]e may not disturb the trial court’s judgment unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to suppor t it.’” Barlo w v. Commonwea lth, 26 Va. App. 421, 429, 494 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1998) (quoting Beavers v. Commonwealth, 24 5 Va. 268, 282, 427 S.E.2d 411, 421 (1993)). Even though appellant was not a rrested with drugs on his person , the circumstantial evidence established that he actually po ssessed them. “Circumstantial evidence is as c ompetent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is suffici ently convincing to exclude eve ry reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S .E.2d 864, 876 (1983) (citations omitted). “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the ‘combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient initself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusi on.’” Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 273, 257 S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979) (quoting Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 7 64, 99 S.E. 562, 564 (1919)).- 5 - “[T]o sustain a conviction for possession of drugs, the Commonw ealth is required to prove the presence of the drug a nd that it was under the defend ant’s dominion and control.” Harmon v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 440, 447, 425 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1992) (citing Wymer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 294, 403 S.E.2d 702 (1991)). “Knowle dge of the presence and character of the controlled s ubstance may be shown by evidence of the acts, statements, or conduct of the accused.” E ckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 447, 450, 281 S.E.2d 853, 855 (1981). “Although mere proximity t o drugs is insufficient to e stablish possession, it is a circumstance which may be proba tive in determining whether an a ccused possessed such drugs.” Glasco v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 763, 774, 497 S.E.2d 150, 1 55 (1998) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1, 9, 421 S.E.2d 877, 882 (1992) ( en banc )). “Ownership or occupancy of the [location] i n which the drugs are found is lik ewise a circumstance probative of possession. In resolving this issu e, the court must consider ‘ the totality of the circumstances disclosed by the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Womack v. Commonweal th, 220 Va. 5, 8, 255 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1979)) (internal citation omitted). When the police initiated a tra ffic stop of appellant’s vehicle , he attempted to speed away and veered into the parking lot of the nearby elementary school , parking his vehicle close to a wooded area behind a fence. Appell ant then fled on foot into t hat wooded area and emerged a few moments later. An officer s earched the wooded area where appellant had fled, finding a plastic baggie in the bushes about 10-15 yards into the wooded area, sitting on top of the leaves on the ground. The baggie containe d a white, powdery substance , and forensic te sting confirmed that the substance was heroi n. Appellant also possessed a larg e quantity of cash in order of denomination and two cell phones, o ne of which contained text m essages referencing drug transactions.- 6 - Considering the totality of the evidence, a reasonable factfind er could conclude that appellant possessed the drugs on his person when he was in his vehicle, and then fled into the wooded area in an attempt to conc eal the drugs before the polic e caught up with him. Appellant had dominion and control over the drugs, and he demonstrated kn owledge of their illicit nature through his efforts to conceal the m. See Glasco, 26 Va. App. a t 774, 497 S.E.2d at 155. Contrary to appellant’s suggesti ons, the possibility that appel lant had never possessed the drugs yet just so happened to flee int o and immediately emerge from t he exact area where the drugs were eventually found is not a r easonable hypothesis of innocen ce, and the trial court did not err in necessarily rejecting it by finding appellant guilty. See C oleman, 226 Va. at 53, 307 S.E.2d at
876. Additionally, ample evidence als o established that appellant in tended to distribute the drugs. Appellant attempted to c laim that the money in his poss ession was from a paycheck he had cashed earlier but could not provide the name of his suppos ed employer from whom he allegedly received the paychec k. Appellant also stated that th e paycheck was for $1,050 but only $1,009 was found on him. Appellant’s LG cell phone contained a substantial number of text messages that referred to drug transactions. Possession of cas h separated by denomination and the possession of two cell phones are evidence of an intent to distribute. See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 423-24, 799 S.E.2d 494, 500-01 (2017). Moreover, as the Court has prev iously held, “[e]vidence of flig ht is ‘a circumstance proper to be laid before the [f actfinder] as having a tendency to prove [a defendant’s] guilt.’” Langhorne v. Commonw ealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 102, 409 S.E.2d 476, 477 (1991) (quoting Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 499 (1896 )). The trial court d id not err in inferring that appellant fled into the woods to dispose of or conceal the drugs. Appell ant’s argument that “none of the- 7 - officers ever saw appellant th rowing anything into the woods or digging into his pockets attempting to retrieve somethi ng and toss it away” ignores the significance of the circumstantial evidence. For those reasons, the trial c ourt was not plainly wrong in fin ding that appellant possessed the heroin and that he intended to distribute it. II. Possession with Intent to Dis tribute Heroin on School Prop erty Appellant also asserted in his as signment of error that the evi dence was insufficient to support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute h eroin on school property. We find that this argument is proce durally defaulted under Rule 5A:20. Rule 5A:20 simply requires the opening brief to contain . . . (3) “[a] clear and concise statem ent of the facts that relate t o the assignments of error, with referen ces to the pages of the trans cript, written statement, record, or appe ndix”; (4) “the standard of r eview and the argument (including prin ciples of law and authorities) relating to each assi gnment of error.” Calloway v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 253, 258, 746 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2013). A court of review is entitled t o have the issues clearly define d and to be cited pertinent authorit y. The appellate court is not a depository in which [appellant] may dump the burden of argument and research. To ignore such a r ule by addressing the case on the merits would require this [C]our t to be an advocate for, as wel l as the judge of the correctness of, [appellant’s] position on the issues he raises. On the other hand, str ict compliance with the rules permits a reviewing court to asce rtain the integrity of the par ties’ assertions[,] which is essential to an accurate determination o f the issues raised on appeal. Jones v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 730, 734-35, 660 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2008) (quoting People v. Trimble, 537 N.E.2d 363, 364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)). “Statements unsupported by argument , authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration. [The Court] will not search the recor d for errors in order to interpret- 8 - [appellant’s] contention and corr ect deficiencies in a brief.” Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992) (citations omitted). Pursua nt to Rule 5A:26, “[i]f an appellant fails to file a brief in compliance with [Rule 5A:20] , the Court of Appeals may dismiss the appeal.” Calloway, 62 Va. App. at 258, 746 S.E.2d at 75 (i nternal quotations omitted). Appellant advanced a single assi gnment of error challenging tha t “[t]he evidence was insufficient to convict [] appellant of . . . possession of a S chedule I or II controlled substance with intent to distribute on sc hool property.” Appellant’s bri ef contains no legal authority nor any specific arguments on the sc hool property issue, thus his b rief does not comply with Rule 5A:20. The only mention of the issue is within the text o f the assignment of error itself. At oral argument, the Commonwealt h noted that it did not address t he school property argument in its brief in opposition because appellant neglected to provide any authority or analytical perspective for this argument within his brief. The purpose of Rule 5A:20 is to put the opposing party on notice of the specific ar guments that will be raised i n the appeal. The Commonwealth objected to the Court’s considera tion of this issue on the meri ts. Accordingly, the portion of appe llant’s appeal relating to the school property charge is hereby dismissed. Affirmed in part a nd dismissed in part.