NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0258n.06 09-1775 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
RUSHANDA MI Z E, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. RAL PH TEDFO RD and the CI TY OF FL I NT,
De fe nd a nts -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : G UY , B OG GS a nd SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. The district c ourt awa rded Rushanda Mize $350,000 on her § 1983 sexual-assault claim ag ainst former police off

icer Ralph Tedfor d but found no liability on the par

t of the City

of F lint. Mi ze appea ls, arguing that the damage s ag ainst Tedfor d should have include d punitive damag es and tha t the city ’s fa ilure to supervise T edfor d cause d the assault. We af firm.
I.
I n the ea rly morning of September 2 , 2 0 0 7 , T edford stopped Mize when her car swerve d
a c ro ss t he lane . T e df

or d d ro ve Mize to a

n e mpt y po lic e min i- statio n, te lli ng he r that he c ou ld a rr e st her but also telling her “how sexy [she] looked and all of that stuff.” R.26-3 27. Then, a ccor ding to Miz e, Te dford f

orcibly rape d her.09-1775

Mi ze v . Te dfo rd

- 2 - L ater that day , Miz e we nt to the hospital, where a social worke r called the police to re port the ra pe. Two de tectives c ame to the hospital to talk with Miz e, who identified Tedf ord fr om a book of phot og raphs. That after noon, the police g ather ed evide nce a t the mini-station where the incident had occ urre d, and ea

rly the next mo rn i n g two Flint Police office rs and one Michig an State Police office r interviewe d Tedfor d. Tedfor d painted a somewhat more consensua l pic ture of the e ncounter but did not deny that he inappropriately had sex with Miz e. At the conc lusion of the interview, the office rs pl ace d Tedfor d on administrative leave , taking his badg e, g un and cr uiser. Te dford late r
re sig ne d a

nd ple a de d g uil ty

to w ill fu l ne g le c t of

du ty , r e c e ivi ng a

se nte nc e of

60 da y s in ja il.
I n F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 8 , M i z e f

i l e d t h i s § 1 9 8 3 l a w s u i t a g a i n s t T e d f o r d a n d t h e C i t y

of F lin t in fede ral c ourt, alleg ing that Tedfor d’s rape violated her civil r ights and that the city ’s policies ca used the ra pe. Althoug h Miz e ser

ved Te dford with her

complaint i n M ar ch 2 0 0 8 , and althoug h she deposed him in April 2009, Tedf ord fa iled to enter a

n appea ranc e or othe rwise de fend the case . The court issued a

defa ult judgment ag ainst him in the amount of $350,000. The c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt in favo r o f t he city , holding that Mize could not establish “a constitutionally

defic ient failure to supervise” Tedfor d. Miz e appe als.
II.
Miz e first a

rg ues that the dist rict court should have broke n down the judg ment into puniti ve and compe nsatory

damag es. Althoug h courts may awa rd punitive da

mag es under § 1983, se e Sm ith09-1775

Mi ze v . Te dfo rd

- 3 - v. W ade , 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983), s h e n o tes that the cour t’s judgme nt simpl y

states “$350,000,” without specifying how

much of the sum, if a

ny , constitutes punitive damag es.
Th e c ourt ’s a

w a r d o f d a m a g e s , h o w e v e r , i s c o n s i s te nt w ithMize ’s g e ne ra lly ph ra se d r e qu e sts
. Al tho ug h s he br ie fl y

ra ise d th e po ssi bil ity

of “ pu nit ive a nd e xemp la ry dama g e s” in h e r c omp la int , R.1 at 7, she neve r mentioned them ag ain. Her motion for defa

ult judgment and the acc ompany ing brief both e nded with an entreaty for “a def ault judgme nt . . . in the amount of Thre e Million Five Hundre d Thousand Dollar s ($3,500,000),” without specifying the ty pe of dama g es soug ht. R.28 at 2, 5. Neither

document said any

thing about punitive damag es, and the brief f ocused on the ty

pical g rounds for c ompensatory , not punitive, damag es, desc ribing the har m to the pla intiff rathe r than the need f or punishing the defe ndant or de terringsimil ar w rong doing in the f uture. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v . Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. , 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (ex plaining the differ ence ). At the hear ing on the motion , M ize’s counsel also foc used on the ha rm to the plaintiff instead of the conduct of

the def endant. When the court a sked for an explanation of the damag es she r equeste d, her c ounsel did not seek punitives but simply responde d, “[w]ell, i t ’s a request, Your Honor. . . . [W]e are no t ta lki ng . . . in te rm s o f h a rd

dama g e s. Th e re is no thi ng , no thi ng I thi nk that c a n r e a lly be blac k-boar ded.” R.47 a t 34–35.
We kn ow of no pr e c e de nt, a nd ne ith e r a pp a re ntl y do e s Mi ze, re qu ir inga

c ourt ind e pe nd e ntl y to a wa rd punit ive dama g e s e ve n w he n th e pla int if f does no t ask for th e m and do e s n ot p re se nt a theory for a war ding the m. We see no re ason to invent any such rule now
.09-1775

Mi ze v . Te dfo rd

- 4 - To the extent Miz e mea ns to arg ue that the district cour t should have g iven her mo re dama g e s, wh e the r c omp e ns a tor y or pu nit ive , w e dis a g re e . Af te r a c c ounti ng fo r t

he fa c ts o f t

his c a se and v a r io u s c o mp a r a

b le v e r d ic ts , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt r e a c h e d a n u mb e r o f $ 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 , r o u g hly in the middle of the ra

ng e of the other ve rdicts it examined. The co u rt ’s d am ages w ere lower tha n the
a mo u n t M iz e r e qu e s te d

a n d b e lo w th e a mo u n t in s e v e r a l c a s e s M iz e h a s s u b s e qu e n tl y

f o u n d ( M iz e prese nted no examples of compar able damag e awa rds to the district c ourt), but that does not make the awa rd er ro n eo u s and ce rtainly notc le ar ly

err oneous, the standa

rd for reve rsal. See M

oorer v. Ba pti st Me m’ l H

e alt h Ca re Sy s. , 39 8 F .3 d 4 69 , 4 85 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) . We a ff ir m th e de fa

ult jud g me nt.
III
. Mize se pa rate ly c on te sts the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion that the City of F lin t be a rs no lia

bil ity for Te dford’ s wrong . To survive a motion for summary judgme nt on municipal liability , Miz e had to show that the evidenc e would allow a rea sonable jury

to conclude that Miz e suff ere d a constitutional injury and that the city ’s “policy or custom . . . inflict[ed] the injury .” Monell v. D ep’t of S oc . S e rv s. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). She ca nnot meet this last requireme nt.
Fa r fr om “inflict[ing]” Tedfor d’s assault on Miz e, the city ’s police de partment for bade suc h conduct. The internal investigation of the incident found that Te dford ha d violated no fe wer than fo ur te e n d e pa rtme nta l po lic ie s. Te df

or d h ims e lf

un de rs too d that he “wo uld [g e t] intr ou

ble ” if
ca u gh t
. R
. 3 1 -3 at 6 8
. An d t h e d ep ar t m en t p ro m p t l y re m o v ed h i m fr o m d u t y , fo rc ed h i m t o re s i gn and obtained a

commitment from him that he would never serve in law enf

orce ment ag ain.09-1775

Mi ze v . Te dfo rd

- 5 - A c kn o w le d g in g th a t t

h e d e p a rtm e n t d id

n o t e n c o u r a g e o r

c o n d o n e T e d f

o r d ’ s b e h a v io r , M iz e
ma int a ins that th e de pa

rtme nt’ s la c k o f s up e rv isi on a llo we d the inc ide nt t o h a pp e n. Th is “ fa ilure to supervise” theory

of municipal liability

is a rar e one. Most ag ree that it exis ts and some alleg e they have se en it, but few a ctual spec imens have be en prove d. I t appea rs t o rela te t o two more c ommon theories of municipal liability : an inade quate- training theory , see, e .g. , Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cle v e lan d M

un . S c h. Di st. , 4 5 5 F
. 3 d 6 9 0 , 7 0 0 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) , o r a n “ a c q u i e s c e [ n c e ] ” t h e o r

y, e.g. , Le ac h v. Sh e lby Cou nty

Sh e rif f , 891 F.2d 1241, 1246, 1248 (6th Cir. 1989). We need not de velop a precise classification, however, because Miz e’s claim ag ainst the city , whateve r its form, ca nnot
succe ed.
Howeve r char acte rized, Miz e’s c laim must m eet the “ rig orous standar ds of culpability and
causation” that the Supreme Court ha s require d when a plaintiff clai m s t h at a municipality has indirectly cause d a violation of fe dera l rig hts in spit e of its “f acia lly lawful” policies. Bd

. o f Co un ty Com m’ rs of Bry an Cou nty v . B ro wn , 52 0 U. S. 39 7, 40 5, 40 7 ( 19 97 ). She mus t sh ow that th e c ity acte d with “ deliberate indiffer ence ” to the risk of sexual a ssault a nd that its deliberate indiff ere nce was the “ moving f

orce ” behind the a ssault. Id. a t 40 4, 40 7; City of C an ton v . H

arris , 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989). To put it another way , she must show that the rel ev an t p o l i cym aker , whether the polic e ch i ef or the may or, disreg arde d a “know n or obvious conseque nce of his action,” whic h
cause d the constitutional violation. Br y an Cou nty , 520 U.S. at 404, 410.
No re asonable jury co u l d find that Tedf ord’s super iors wer e deliber ately indiffer ent to the dang er tha t he might r ape some one like Mize. Tedfor d had no history of misconduct that g ave the09-1775

Mi ze v . Te dfo rd

- 6 - depar tment notic e o f t he risks of putting him on patrol duty . He ha d serve d the depa rtment for eig hteen y ear s, all the wh i l e m ai n taining a g ood reputa tion and a cle an re cord. The Flint Police Depa rtment did not have a

pattern of sexual assaults by its office rs, as the pr ece ding two de cade s saw
no more than a handful of sexual-assault alleg ations ag ainst its officer s. And uncontested e vidence showed that the de partment investig ated e very alleg ation and, as in Tedfor d’s case, fired the off icer in q ue sti on if it f ound su bs tanc e be hind th e a lle g a tio n. Wha t w e sa id i n a pr ior c a se a pp lie s w ith
e qu a l f or c e he re :
There is no ba s is to c o n c lu d e o n th is r e c o r d
. . . th a t th e r e w a s a “ h ig h d e g r e e of predic tability ” that [Tedfor d ] or any other e mploy ee w as likely to rape any one, especially consideringthat [Tedford’s] backg round does not re veal a ny inclination to assault another

sexually . The int en t i o nal, violent act that a [pol ice of

fice r] pe rf or me d f a r o uts ide the sc op e of

his du tie s c a nn ot be so me thi ng that wa s “ ob vio us ” to occur
. Do e v . M ag off in C ou nty Fi sc al C ou rt , 1 7 4 F. Ap p ’x 9 6 2 , 9 7 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( q u o t i n g Bryan Cou nty , 520 U.S. at 409–10).
Miz e r es p onds that the depa rtment did not supervise Te dford c losely and that, had the depar tment give n him less free rein, he might not have ha d the opportunity to rape her. Ma

y be so. But opportunity

alone, without re ason to suspect that it will lead to a constitutional viol ation, does not establish delibera te indiffer ence . At best, it establishes neg lige nce, which “will n o t suffice .” Br y an Cou nty , 52 0 U. S. at 40 7; see id. at 421 (Souter, J ., dissenting) (“The Court is certainly corr ect in emphasizing the need to show more than mere neg lige nce.” ). The Supre me Court has re quired the hig her standa

rd pre cisely

beca use of c ases like this one, re cog nizi ng that “[i] n virtually ever y09-1775

Mi ze v . Te dfo rd

- 7 - instance w here a per son has had his or her constitutional rig hts violated by a city employ ee, a

§ 1983 pla int if f wi ll b e a

ble to p oin t to so me thi ng the c ity ‘c ou ld h a ve do ne ’ t o p re ve nt t he un fo rt un a te incident.” City of Cant on , 489 U.S. at 392. To allow s uch claims, without more, would cre ate the kind of “ de fac to r esp on de at s up e rio r lia bil ity ” that the Court

ha s ma de c le a r d oe s n ot e xist in thi s
are a. Id.
Miz e adds tha t her e x pert c oncluded that the de partment “ ratifi[ed] . . . mi sconduct” by Te df or d a nd the me mbe rs of his un it. Mize B r. a t 27
. Ye t ne ith e r M ize no r h e r e xpe rt sp e c if y thi s

“ mis c on du c t,” a nd the re c or d tur ns up lit tle
. Mize no te s that Te df or d of te n fa ile d to c he c k in

wi th police dispatch a s require d and did not even w ork during some shifts. Fo r ex am p l e, the investigators, in following up on Miz e’s rape acc usations, f ound him a t home when he was supposed to be working . On a br oader scale , Tedfor d’s supervisor r emember ed four to five c omplaints made ag ainst Tedfor d’s fe llow inspectors in his unit, rang ing f rom “pa rking in a wr ong spot behind the po lic e statio n” to h a vin g “ too many c a rs a t a re sta

ur a nt. ” R.3 0- 4 a t 48
. Pe rh a ps the se fa c ts s ug g e st that the depar

tment “ ratifi[ed]” skipping work or par king imprope rly , but none sug g est a da ng er of
ra pe , mu c h le ss r a tif

ic a tio n o f s uc h e g re g iou s con du c t. On thi s re c or d, a jur y c ou ld n ot r e a so na

bly
c on c lud e that thi s a dmi tte dly e g re g iou s a ssa ult ste mme d fr om the c ity ’s de lib e rate ind if fe re nc e to Miz e’s c onstitut ional rig hts.
I V.
F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.