alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### PIERRE v. TEMPLEMAN BROS., Inc.

No. 16122.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Dec. 2, 1935.

Henry J. Wyman, of Gretna, for appellant.

Maurice B. Gatlin, of New Orleans, for appellee.

JANVIER, Judge.

Plaintiff, a laborer, claims that, while standing on a wharf on the river front in the city of New Orleans, he was struck by the rear wheel of a truck and trailer belonging to defendant and operated by one of defendant’s employees. He alleges that the vehicle was negligently operated, and that defendant, is therefore liable.

Defendant corporation denies that its employee operating the truck was in any way at fault.

In the court below there was judgment for defendant, and plaintiff has appealed.

The trailer in question rested on two rear wheels, the front being attached to the truck by a king-pin, the truck itself having four wheels.

Plaintiff states that with his back towards the vehicle, which was making a turn, he was standing on the outside of the arc of the curve on which the truck was turning. Thus, his contention is that although the front and rear wheels of the tractor passed him, the rear wheel of the trailer swung out to such an extent as to come into contact with his heel.

The record shows conclusively that the vehicle was moving slowly. One of plaintiff’s witnesses stated that “it was not running fast.” Another of his witnesses testified that it “was running about three or four miles an hour, something like that.”

It is conclusively shown that the surface on which the truck was being operated was dry, and it also appears that the rear end of the trailer was not wider than its front end or wider than the truck which was pulling it. It was, therefore, physically impossible for the rear end to swing further out than did the front end.

*260In Masaracchia v. Inter-City Express Lines, 162 So. 221, 224, we said: “The physical fact that the rear portion of a vehicle which is making a turn cannot, unless it skids or unless it is wider than the front, describe an arc outside that described by the front portion is obvious.”

The judge of the court, a qua, supervised a test which was made with the same tractor and trailer, and, after doing so, made the following statement: “After the demonstration, the court is of the opinion that it would be physically impossible for the wheel in question to have run over the heel of the plaintiff unless it would have been shown that the roadway was slippery and that the truck was operated at a fast rate of speed and had skidded and there is no evidence in this record to that effect.”

Whether the plaintiff moved backwards into the trailer, we are unable to determine from the record, but it is quite evident that the accident did not occur as he claims that it did. The conclusion reached below seems to be based on a clear preponderance of the evidence. At any rate, it is certainly not manifestly erroneous.

It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be, and it is, affirmed at the cost of appellant.

Affirmed.

McCALL, Judge ad hoc, participating in absence of LECHE, Judge.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin Morris WANGRUD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 75-3347.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

April 1, 1976.

David M. Rothman, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Brendan D. Lynch, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

Before WRIGHT, CHOY and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges.

PER. CURIAM:

Mr. Wangrud appeals his conviction on two counts of wilful failure to make an income tax return. 26 U.S.C. § 7203. For the tax years in question the defendant received checks from the State Farm Insurance Company as compensation for his services. He now argues that he did not receive money, since the checks could be cashed only for federal reserve notes and that these are not redeemable in specie. We publish this opinion solely to make it clear that this argument has absolutely no merit. We affirm this conviction.

By statute it is established that federal reserve notes, on an equal basis with other coins and currencies of the United States, shall be legal tender for all debts, public and private, including taxes. 31 U.S.C. 8 392 (Supp.1976). This statute is well within the constitutional authority of Con*496gress. U.S.Const. art. I, § 8. It so completely disposes of appellant’s argument that it is unnecessary for us to invoke other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which would be equally dispositive, defining as income compensation received in forms other than money. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 61.

We have considered appellant’s other argument and we find it to be without merit.

The conviction is affirmed.
Exhibit 31.2  CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002  I, Mark Marlow, certify
that:  1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K
of Virtual Radiologic Corporation;  2.Based on my knowledge, this report does
not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;  3.Based on my knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;  4.The registrants other certifying officer
and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))
for the registrant and have:  (a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;  (b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the
registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report
our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and  (c)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case
of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;
and  5.The registrants other certifying officer
and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control
over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee
of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):  (a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses
in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which
are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting.   Date:
  March 17, 2008
  By:
  /s/ Mark MarlowMark MarlowChief Financial Officer
**CMF** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 19 - 0564 STATE OF MONTANA ,

P la intiff and Appellee , v. RYAN WILLIAM MCCAULEY ,

Defendant and Appellant .

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30 - day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time to and including October 1 8 , 2020 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief

.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 15 2020

09/15/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0564
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JASON MARR,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 13-35189

D.C. Nos. 1:12-cv-00185-BLW

 1:10-cr-00182-BLW-5

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 9, 2014** 

Seattle, Washington

Before: PAEZ, BYBEE, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Jason Marr appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 motion to vacate his plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute

500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Marr contends that law enforcement

FILED

OCT 15 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
withheld impeachment evidence from him in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). We review de novo a district court’s denial of defendant’s 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion and we review for clear error its factual findings. United

States v. Guess, 203 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

To determine whether a Brady violation has occurred, the court considers

whether the evidence was: (1) “favorable to the accused,” (2) “suppressed by the

government,” and (3) “material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” United

States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Evidence is

material if its admission would have created a “reasonable probability” of a

different result. Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). In this

case, the Government concedes that law enforcement suppressed evidence and that

this evidence was favorable to Marr. Thus, the only issue in dispute is whether the

evidence was material.

The Government had substantial evidence showing Marr’s participation in

the distribution conspiracy. First, surveillance officers witnessed Marr conduct

drug transactions with two methamphetamine distributors on nine separate

occasions during a 19-day period. Officers monitoring the distributors’ cell phones

also identified multiple phone calls between Marr and the distributors. Second,

these two distributors confessed to, and were willing to testify about, their

2
agreement to supply Marr with four ounces of methamphetamine per week. And

finally, Marr twice confessed to purchasing methamphetamine from these

distributors and then reselling it at a profit. All of this evidence would have been

admissible through witnesses other than the persons about whom law enforcement

withheld impeachment evidence. Given the strength of the evidence against Marr

and the admissibility of the evidence through other witnesses, the district court did

not err in concluding that the withheld impeachment evidence was not material to

Marr’s decision to plead guilty. 

AFFIRMED.

3
EX-10.90



 Exhibit 10.90 
  

			
	 Steven R. Lacy
 Senior Vice President,
Administration,
 General Counsel and Secretary
	  	





  

			
		  	 Koppers Inc.
 436 Seventh Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1800
 Tel 412 227 2889

Fax 412 227 2333
 LacySR@koppers.com

www.koppers.com


 April 24, 2014 
 Via Email 

Mr. Brian H. McCurrie 
 [Home address] 

Subject: Transitional Position 
 Dear Brian: 

In follow-up to our conversation this afternoon, this letter describes the terms and conditions of the transitional assignment we discussed. As I mentioned,
Koppers Inc. (the “Company”) will, if you so agree, transfer you to the position of Senior Vice President, Business Development, effective tomorrow, April 25, 2014. You will remain in that position for a transitional period of no more than
three months, (the “Transitional Period”); during the Transitional Period, you will report to the Company’s President and Chief Executive Officer (the “CEO”) and will be expected to discharge all of the duties and
responsibilities assigned to you by the CEO. You will also be expected to assist the individual succeeding to your prior position as Senior Vice President, Global Carbon Materials and Chemicals with his transition into that position. At the
conclusion of the Transitional Period, your employment with the Company will terminate. 
 As you know, you previously entered into an employment contract
with the Company, which contract has been amended from time to time (as amended, the “Employment Contract”). The Company agrees to treat your termination of employment at any time during the Transitional Period as a termination under
Section 7(b) of the Employment Contract. Section 7(b) of the Employment Contract provides, among other things, that the Company may terminate your employment without Cause (as defined in the Employment Contract) by giving you written Notice of
Termination (as defined in the Employment Contract). This letter will serve as your written Notice of Termination under Section 7(b) of the Employment Contract. In addition, the Company agrees that if you voluntarily resign from your employment with
the Company at any time during the Transitional Period, your resignation will be treated as a termination under Section 7(b) of the Employment Contract. 

Other than as described above, your continued employment by the Company during the Transitional Period will be subject to all applicable terms of the
Employment Contract. 
 Sincerely, 
 /s/ Steven R. Lacy 

Steven R. Lacy 
  

	cc:	Walter W. Turner 

 Daniel R. Groves
## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD

- 0943

- 19

GERARDO ALONZO LOPEZ , App ellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

ECTOR COUNTY

Y EARY , J., filed a dissenting opinion in which S LAUGHTER , J., joined

.

DISSENTING OPINION

For the reasons set out in my dissenting opinion in Dulin v. State , ___ S.W.3d ___,

No s . PD

- 0856

- 19 & PD

- 1857

- 19 , 2021 WL 1202400 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2021), I

respectfully dissent to the Court’s disposition of the State’s petition for discretionary

r eview.

FIL ED: May 12, 2021

DO NOT PUBLISH
```
                         [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                         ____________________


No. 97-1813


                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                               Appellee,

                                  v.

                          ALEJANDRO SAVINON,

                         Defendant, Appellant.

                         ____________________


             APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

            [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge]

                         ____________________

                                Before

                         Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                     Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                       and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

                         ____________________

    M. Kristin Spath, Assistant Federal Defender, on brief for
appellant.


                         ____________________
                           March 26, 1998

                          ____________________




      Per Curiam.  Alejandro Savinon appeals from his conviction
    and sentence for conspiring to possess with intent to
    distribute and to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. 
    Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
    California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and a motion to withdraw. 
    Counsel has notified Savinon of his right to file a
    supplemental brief, but Savinon has not done so.  After
    thoroughly examining the entire record, we agree that there is
    no meritorious ground for appeal.
        Savinon pled guilty at a plea hearing which conformed
    substantially to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 requirements.  The
    presentence report ("PSR") provides factual support for the
    district court's calculation of the applicable guideline
    imprisonment range.  Moreover, Savinon's own version of the
    facts -- which was filed with the sentencing court -- accepts
    the PSR's quantities of cocaine powder and cocaine base as
    accurate.  In recognition of Savinon's admission to those
    facts, the government moved for -- and the court granted -- a
    three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under
    section 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and
    a downward departure from the applicable guideline imprisonment
    range under � 5K1.1.  The court's failure to depart further
    does not provide a meritorious ground for appeal.  See United
    States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1993).
    
        Savinon's conviction and sentence are summarily affirmed.
    See Loc. R. 27.1.  Appellate counsel's motion to withdraw is
    granted.
```
---

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 40-F for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2006 of Energy Metals Corporation (the Company) as
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) on the
date hereof (the Report) and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Paul Matysek, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify that to the best of my knowledge:

| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of
      Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
      and                   
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                 
| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.

Date: September 28, 2006

/s/ Paul Matysek
  _____________________________
  Paul Matysek
  Chief Executive Officer

---
PROJCS["NAD_1983_HARN_StatePlane_Oregon_North_FIPS_3601_Feet_Intl",GEOGCS["GCS_North_American_1983_HARN",DATUM["D_North_American_1983_HARN",SPHEROID["GRS_1980",6378137.0,298.257222101]],PRIMEM["Greenwich",0.0],UNIT["Degree",0.0174532925199433]],PROJECTION["Lambert_Conformal_Conic"],PARAMETER["False_Easting",8202099.737532808],PARAMETER["False_Northing",0.0],PARAMETER["Central_Meridian",-120.5],PARAMETER["Standard_Parallel_1",44.33333333333334],PARAMETER["Standard_Parallel_2",46.0],PARAMETER["Latitude_Of_Origin",43.66666666666666],UNIT["Foot",0.3048]]
#### In the Matter of Beekman Paper Company, Inc., Petitioner, v Shirley Fingerhood, Respondent.

Application pursuant to CPLR article 78 for a writ of mandamus is granted to the extent of directing respondent to entertain and decide petitioner’s motion in writing, without costs or disbursements.

*239Petitioner is entitled to have its motion considered by the court and a decision rendered thereon in writing *(Matter of Grisi v Shainswit,*119 AD2d 418). In that regard, even if petitioner’s motion is procedurally defective, as respondent contends, the court is still required to state in writing the reason for its denial; a motion submitted on papers may not be summarily rejected. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Carro, Milonas, Asch and Wallach, JJ.
#### Mrs. Eva BROWNE v. R. L. HALL et al.

No. 3790.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Jan. 29, 1954.

Stone & Toomer, Lake Charles, for appellant.

Plauche & Plauche, Lake Charles, for' appellees.

CAVANAUGH, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in the case of Browne v. Hall, 70 So.2d 199, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed at the cost of the appellant.
#### JOHNSON BONDING COMPANY, Inc. Petitioner, v. Earl F. ASHCRAFT, Judge Lee Circuit Court, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 30, 1972.

*119Charles W. Curry, Lexington, for petitioner.

STEINFELD, Chief Justice.

Petitioner, Johnson Bonding Company, Inc., executed a bail bond in the amount of $2,500 to guarantee the appearance of Ernest McNabb who had been charged with crime. When McNabb did not appear for trial the Commonwealth moved for bond forfeiture, which motion was sustained. The matter was set for hearing to determine whether judgment should be entered for the whole amount of the bond or if remittance in whole or in part should be granted.

After hearing evidence, the court adjudged that the entire bond in the amount of $2,500 should be forfeited. The Johnson Bonding Company, Inc., timely gave notice of appeal and took the necessary steps to perfect that appeal. Twenty-seven days after the judgment appealed from had been entered and before decision by the appellate court, petitioner again moved to remit wholly or in part the sum specified in the judgment. Petitioner claims that this procedure is authorized by RCr 4.28(2), which refers to a judgment against the surety and provides in part:

> “After entry of judgment the court for sufficient cause may remit wholly or in part the sum specified in the bail bond.”

Respondent has failed to rule on the current motion to remit and petitioner has sought mandamus here to require the trial court to rule on the motion. Among other things, respondent answers that “Respondent does not have jurisdiction of petitioner’s motion which was filed * * * after petitioner had filed notice of appeal.”

The general rule, with certain specific exceptions, is that the trial court loses jurisdiction over matters that have been appealed until mandate has issued. It is our opinion that RCr 4.28(2) is inapplicable to matters in which an appeal is pending on the judgment forfeiting the bond in whole or in part. For that reason the response is sufficient and the writ of mandamus denied.

All concur.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 6, 2022

No. 04-22-00108-CR

IN RE Frediz DE LA CRUZ De La Cruz and Elio Enay Rudamas,

Relators

Original Proceeding1

ORDER

On February 21, 2022, Relators filed a petition for writ of mandamus. After considering 

the petition and the record, this court concludes Relators are not entitled to the relief sought. 

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).

It is so ORDERED on April 6, 2022.

_____________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 6th day of April, 2022.

_____________________________

Michael A. Cruz, Clerk of Court

1 This proceeding arises out of Relators’ efforts to have the Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Presiding Judge of the Sixth 

Administrative Judicial Region, Kerr County, Texas, to reinstate three county court at law judges “to alleviate the 

crowded dockets in Kinney County.”