1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 01-2932/01-3709

___________

Beverly Jean Hogan, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

Raytheon, Co., * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 17, 2002

 Filed: September 12, 2002

___________

Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

 

In these consolidated appeals, Raytheon, Co. appeals from the district court's1

orders granting Beverly Hogan's motion for summary judgment, thereby entitling Ms.

Hogan to receive her former spouse's ERISA plan benefits, and awarding attorney

fees to Ms. Hogan. We affirm the district court's decision ordering Raytheon to pay

Ms. Hogan surviving spouse benefits, but we reverse and remand the district court's

decision ordering Raytheon to pay Ms. Hogan attorney fees. 
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I. 

Prior to his death, Robert Hogan was employed by Raytheon and participated

in its ERISA-governed pension plan (the "Plan"). Ms. Hogan was married to Mr.

Hogan from February 1, 1968, to June 5, 1997. Ms. Hogan's marriage to Mr. Hogan

was dissolved by the Chancery Court of Lincoln County, Tennessee, by a divorce

decree filed on June 5, 1997 (the "Decree"). The Decree awarded Ms. Hogan onehalf of Mr. Hogan's "present retirement funds," to be set forth in a separate qualified

domestic relations order ("QDRO"). In June and July of 1997, Raytheon received a

copy of the Decree, acknowledged receipt of the Decree, and instructed Mr. Hogan

about the requirements for a QDRO. 

On March 7, 1998, Mr. Hogan died. At the time of his death, Mr. Hogan was

48, unmarried, and not receiving benefits under the Plan. Section 7.2 of the Plan

allows for a surviving spouse benefit in the event the Plan participant dies before

reaching his retirement date. Two days after Mr. Hogan's death, the Chancery Court

of Lincoln County, Tennessee, entered an order naming Ms. Hogan as the alternate

payee with respect to Mr. Hogan's benefits in the Plan (the "March 9, 1998 Order").

The Plan denied Ms. Hogan's request for benefits. Consequently, Ms. Hogan sued

Raytheon. 

Raytheon argued that Ms. Hogan was not entitled to receive surviving spouse

benefits because a domestic relations order cannot be qualified posthumously. The

district court disagreed and ordered the Plan to pay Ms. Hogan surviving spouse

benefits pursuant to Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of the Plan. Subsequently, the district court

awarded Ms. Hogan attorney fees in the amount of $6,626.28. 

II. 

Raytheon appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in Ms.

Hogan's favor and its award of attorney fees to Ms. Hogan.
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A. 

This court must decide whether the district court's grant of summary judgment,

entitling Ms. Hogan to survivor's benefits under the Plan, was appropriate. We

review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Reidl v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 248

F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2001). Raytheon makes two arguments on appeal contesting

the district court's grant. 

First, Raytheon contends that the district court's conclusion that the Decree

entitled Ms. Hogan to Mr. Hogan's pre-retirement annuity was both erroneous and an

improper de novo interpretation of Plan benefits. We disagree. 

The Supreme Court set forth the appropriate standard of judicial review of

benefit determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators in Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989). The Court held that a denial of

benefits challenge under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) should be reviewed under a de

novo standard unless the benefit plan grants the administrator or fiduciary

discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms

of the plan. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. When a plan grants such authority, the abuse

of discretion standard applies. Id. Thus, Raytheon argues, under Firestone, deference

should be given to the administrator's determination that Ms. Hogan was not entitled

to receive benefits because Section 10.6 of the Plan grants the Plan administrator

discretion to interpret the Plan's terms.

Raytheon's argument misses the mark, however, because the Plan administrator

in this case did not interpret the Plan's terms, but rather interpreted the meaning of a

separate document, i.e., the Decree. In effect, in denying Ms. Hogan's claim, Plan

administrators were required to answer two questions: (1) whether the Decree

constitutes a QDRO for Plan purposes, and (2) if the Decree was not a QDRO,

whether a domestic relations order can be qualified posthumously under ERISA.

These questions do not require an interpretation of the Plan's terms, and therefore de
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novo review was appropriate. See, e.g., Samaroo v. Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185, 189 (3d

Cir. 1999) (holding that the deferential standard of review of a plan interpretation is

appropriate only when the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the

instrument and when the trustee has in fact interpreted the instrument); Dial v. NFL

Player Supplemental Disability Plan, 174 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that

the court should review de novo the administrator's decision that a property

settlement agreement constituted a QDRO because it involves interpretation of a

settlement agreement and statutory construction, not interpretation of the plan).

Moreover, we agree with the district court that the Decree clearly gave Ms. Hogan an

interest in Mr. Hogan's pension plan, which is made up of two components: a pension

benefit and a surviving spouse benefit.

Second, Raytheon argues that the district court erred in finding that a domestic

relations order can be qualified posthumously. We disagree. The district court

correctly held that the March 9, 1998 Order meets the requirements of a QDRO

because Raytheon was put on notice that the Decree had issued and may be a QDRO,

and the March 9, 1998 Order was filed during the eighteen-month period permitted

under ERISA to secure a QDRO. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (1994); Trs. of the

Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415 (9th Cir.

2000). The fact that Mr. Hogan died prior to the entry of the March 9, 1998 Order is

irrelevant. Thus, the district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of

Ms. Hogan and ordering Raytheon to pay Ms. Hogan surviving spouse benefits was

proper. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision with regard to the grant

of summary judgment for Ms. Hogan. 

B. 

Additionally, this court must decide whether the district court's decision to

grant attorney fees to Ms. Hogan was appropriate. Under ERISA, attorney fees may

be awarded to either party at the discretion of the district court. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
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We review grants of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Richards v. Aramark

Servs., Inc., 108 F.3d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1997). 

Subsequent to the district court's award of attorney fees, this court clarified the

applicable law to ERISA's fee-shifting provision: there is no presumption in favor of

a fee award for prevailing ERISA plaintiffs. Martin v. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue

Shield, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The district court applied a

presumption in favor of the plaintiff resulting in the award of attorney fees in Ms.

Hogan's favor. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of attorney fees and

remand the case for resolution in accordance with this court's decision in Martin. 

III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment as to the surviving spouse

benefits, and we reverse the judgment as to the attorney fees and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.