*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

98-50815

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

AGUSTIN BARRON-SALAZAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(DR-98-CR-6-1)

______________________________________________

June 17, 1999

Before GARWOOD, DUHÉ and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Agustin Barron-Salazar appeals from his conviction

on two counts of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8

U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). On appeal, appellant raises the claim

that the stop of the vehicle in which he was riding was not

justified We disagree and affirm the judgment of the district

court.

A Border Patrol agent conducting a roving patrol may make a

temporary investigative stop of a vehicle only if he is aware of
2

specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from

those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicle is

involved in, or its occupant engaged in, criminal activity. See

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-22 (1981).

Factors relevant to whether a Border Patrol agent acted with

reasonable suspicion include:

(1) known characteristics of a particular

area, (2) previous experience of the arresting

agents with criminal activity, (3) proximity

of the area to the border, (4) usual traffic

patterns of that road, (5) information about

recent illegal trafficking in aliens or

narcotics in the area, (6) the behavior of the

vehicle's driver, (7) the appearance of the

vehicle, and (8) the number, appearance and

behavior of the passengers.

United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 722 (5th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1998).

Reasonable suspicion is to be determined by considering the

totality of the circumstances. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 421-22; United

States v. Kohler, 836 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1988). Although any

single factor standing alone may be insufficient, under the

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the absence of a particular

factor will not control a court's conclusion. United States v.

Cardona, 955 F.2d 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1992).

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

government, there were several specific articulable facts and

rational inferences from those facts supporting a reasonable

suspicion that the vehicles' occupants were engaged in the criminal

activity of illegally transporting aliens.
3

The truck in which appellant was a passenger and a white

Lincoln which was also stopped were traveling north in tandem

twenty-two miles from the border on a road with little traffic.

This route north from the border on which the truck traveled would

circumvent a permanent check point. The Border Patrol agent that

stopped the vehicles had three years of experience and stated that

he had performed about twenty-five arrests in the area of the stop

the prior year. Before stopping the vehicles, the agent

ascertained that the two vehicles were registered to owners in the

same city living on the same street. The agent had observed

occupants of the white Lincoln slouch down trying to hide.

Finally, the vehicles were inconsistent with the types of ranch

vehicles commonly used on a road which usually had little traffic.

Viewing the totality of the circumstances presented here, we find

that the Border Patrol agent acted with reasonable suspicion in

stopping the truck in which appellant was riding as well as the

white Lincoln. Having rejected appellant's only claim, we

pretermit a determination of the government's other arguments in

support of the judgment of conviction.

AFFIRMED