J-S34006-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

WILLIAM E. RIDENBAUGH 

 Appellant No. 981 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 8, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-16-CR-0000166-2006 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OTT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JANUARY 14, 2015 

 William E. Ridenbaugh appeals from the order entered on May 8, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County, after a hearing, denying 

him relief on his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.

1

 Ridenbaugh claims trial counsel was 

ineffective for (1) failing to properly advise him on entering a guilty plea; 

and (2) failing to file a motion to suppress statement made during custodial 

interrogation. After a thorough review of the submissions by the parties, 

relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Ridenbaugh was convicted by a jury of third-degree murder and related 

offenses. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28-56 

years’ incarceration. 
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 We rely upon the factual statement found in the PCRA court’s decision 

of May 8, 2013. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not 

reiterate them herein. Rather, we refer to pages two through six of the 

PCRA court opinion. 

 Initially, we note: 

Our standard of review of a trial court order granting or denying 

relief under the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the 

determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of 

record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court's findings will 

not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record. 

Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 394 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 

 Additionally, 

[I]n order to obtain relief based on [an ineffective assistance of 

counsel] claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying 

claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for 

counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3) petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel's error such that there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different absent such error. 

Trial counsel is presumed to be effective, and Appellant bears 

the burden of pleading and proving each of the three factors by 

a preponderance of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). Finally, “[c]ounsel is not ineffective for failing to raise 

meritless claims.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 149 (Pa. 

2008). 
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 In Ridenbaugh’s first issue, he argues counsel was ineffective for 

failing to properly advise him on the “risks, hazards and prospects”2 of his 

case. Because of this failure, Ridenbaugh claims he refused a negotiated 

plea offer that would have resulted in the imposition of a 10-20 year term of 

incarceration. Ridenbaugh specifically argues counsel improperly informed 

him that if he accepted the offer, he would likely serve all of it. But for this 

advice, Ridenbaugh claims he would have accepted the terms of the 

negotiated plea, including the requirement he testify against his codefendant. 

 Regarding the circumstances surrounding a guilty plea, Ridenbaugh 

correctly notes: 

The decision whether to plead guilty or contest a criminal charge 

is probably the most important single decision in any criminal 

case. This decision must finally be left to the client's wishes; 

counsel cannot plead a man guilty, or not guilty, against his will. 

But counsel may and must give the client the benefit of his 

professional advice on this crucial decision, and often he can 

protect the client adequately only by using a considerable 

amount of persuasion to convince the client that one course or 

the other is in the client's best interest. Such persuasion is most 

often needed to convince the client to plead guilty in a case 

where a not guilty plea would be totally destructive. 

Commonwealth v. Copeland, 554 A.2d 54, 60 (Pa. Super. 1988) (citation 

omitted). 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Appellant’s Brief at 7. 
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However, in Copeland, trial counsel failed to convey the existence of 

an offer to his client. That is not the instant situation. The record 

demonstrates that Ridenbaugh knew of the Commonwealth’s plea offers. 

His claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that counsel failed to fully 

discuss the options. 

Ridenbaugh is complaining about counsel’s failure to discuss a plea 

offer of 10-20 years’ incarceration, however, this claim ignores the fact that 

the Commonwealth had previously offered him a 7 to 20 year sentence, 

which counsel recommended he accept, and which Ridenbaugh refused, 

claiming he did not commit the crime and would not accept any jail time due 

to his poor health. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 11/21/2012, at 9, 24-28. 

Additionally trial counsel testified he fully discussed the strengths and 

weaknesses of the case and gave Ridenbaugh his professional opinion, 

specifically, because Ridenbaugh had just been convicted of illegal drug and 

weapons offenses in a different case, he would likely serve the majority of 

the offered sentence.3

____________________________________________ 

3

 Having reviewed the certified record, we see nothing to indicate that the 

strengths and weaknesses of Ridenbaugh’s case changed between the first 

offer of 7 to 20 years’ incarceration and the subsequent offer of 10 to 20 

years’ incarceration. Moreover, Ridenbaugh has not claimed there was any 

change in circumstances between the two plea offers. Therefore, any 

discussions regarding the first plea would be applicable to the second. 
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Based upon this evidence, the PCRA court determined trial counsel had 

properly discussed the plea offers with Ridenbaugh and, therefore, 

Ridenbaugh’s decision not to accept the plea was fully informed and not the 

product of ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court did not abuse 

its discretion or commit an error of law in denying this claim. 

Ridenbaugh’s second claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a motion to suppress statements made to the police during his 

August 12, 2005 and September 1, 2005 interviews. Ridenbaugh claims 

both instances were custodial interrogations. In the first, he argues he was 

not provided his Miranda4 rights; in the second, he argues he was 

represented by counsel in a different case and therefore could not validly 

waive his Miranda rights without access to that counsel. Both of these 

claims fail. 

Miranda warnings are only required when a defendant is subject 

to a custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 564 Pa. 

505, 769 A.2d 1116, 1125 (2001); Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 556 Pa. 216, 727 A.2d 1089, 1100 (1999); 

Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d 143, 149 

(1998); Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 683 A.2d 

1181, 1188 (1996). A person is in custody for purposes of 

Miranda only when the objective circumstances suggest that

she was physically deprived of her freedom or was in a situation 

where she reasonably could have believed that her freedom of 

movement was being restricted. See Commonwealth v. 

Gibson, 553 Pa. 648, 720 A.2d 473, 480 (1998); 

Commonwealth v. Rucci, 543 Pa. 261, 670 A.2d 1129, 1139 

____________________________________________ 

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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(1996). See also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 

114 S.Ct. 1526, 1528-29, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam) 

(“‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a formal 

arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 

associated with a formal arrest’”) (quoting California v. 

Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 

L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)) (further citation omitted). The fact that 

the officer questioning a person has “focused” on that individual 

does not in itself prove custody for Miranda purposes. See 

Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 

1144, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Beckwith v. United States, 425 

U.S. 341, 347-48, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). 

Similarly, the fact that the officer subjectively believes that the 

individual being interviewed is a suspect is irrelevant to the 

question of custody, if the officer has not communicated the fact 

to the individual. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324, 114 S.Ct. at 1530 

(“Save as they are communicated or otherwise manifested to the 

person being questioned, an officer's evolving but unarticulated 

suspicions do not affect the objective circumstances of an 

interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda

custody inquiry.”); Gibson, 720 A.2d at 480 (“[T]he test for 

custodial interrogation does not depend upon the subjective 

intent of the law enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, the 

test focuses on whether the individual being interrogated 

reasonably believes his freedom of action is being restricted.”) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 539 Pa. 61, 650 A.2d 

420, 247 (1994)). 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 836 A.2d 5, 18 (Pa. 2003). 

 Regarding the first interview, conducted on August 12, 2005, the PCRA 

court concluded Ridenbaugh was not subject to a custodial interrogation, 

and therefore, was not entitled to Miranda warnings. Our review of the 

certified record leads us to agree with the PCRA court’s determination. The 

PCRA court opinion states: 

Ridenbaugh argues that when he as picked up by Trooper Powell 

and transported to the Clarion barracks for an interview he was 

in custody and should have been given his Miranda warnings. 
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He points to the fact that he was transported to the barracks by 

Trooper Powell and had no way of leaving on his own and the 

total time between when he was picked up and dropped off was 

over five hours. Ridenbaugh asserts that during the interview, 

he was detained in a locked interrogation room with multiple 

officers present.[5] He believes the totality of the circumstances 

show the interview was so coercive that he was in fact in 

custody. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Ridenbaugh is 

incorrect. Prior to the August 12, 2005 interview, Ridenbaugh, 

by his own admission, had met voluntarily with police on 

multiple occasions. On June 5, 2005, one of those voluntary 

meetings took place at the Clarion barracks. 

On August 12, 2005, Trooper Powell was not overly coercive 

when he picked up Ridenbaugh. He spotted him riding his 4-

wheeler down the road and asked him to get in the police car. 

Ridenbaugh complied. Trooper Powell told him to push the 4-

wheeler behind a tree and Ridenbaugh got in the front seat of 

the police car. He was not handcuffed or touched in any way. 

It is not clear exactly how long Ridenbaugh was at the barracks 

being interviewed, but Trooper Powell testified he was not 

interviewed for the entire five hours. During the interview, both 

the troopers and Ridenbaugh agreed that one of the main topics 

of conversation was Jesse McFadden. Ridenbaugh agreed to 

wear a wire and to discuss the murder with McFadden. The 

troopers spent time during the interview going over the 

procedures of him wearing the wire. On the night of August 12, 

2005, Ridenbaugh did in fact wear a wire during his interactions 

with Jesse McFadden. He wore the wire again on two more 

occasions. He was also given a cell phone to contact the 

troopers. 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Trooper Powell testified the interview took place in the “Crime Unit”, a 

room “probably 24 feet wide and some 30 feet long, a couple of desks and 

so forth in there.” See N.T. PCRA Hearing at 71. Additionally, “You can 

leave by just pushing the door, but to get in you have to have somebody 

push the button.” Id. 
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With Jesse McFadden being the primary subject of the interview 

it is reasonable to conclude that Ridenbaugh was present at the 

barracks as a witness and not as a suspect. He was working 

with the troopers in the general investigation and specifically 

their investigation of Jesse McFadden. 

Approximately forty one minutes of the August 12, 2005 

interview was recorded. The first question Trooper Felmlee 

asked Ridenbaugh on the record was, “Bill you understand that 

you’re here voluntarily?” Ridenbaugh responded, saying “That’s 

correct.” He then proceeded to give a statement to the police 

which strongly implicated Jesse McFadden in the murder, while 

reiterating that he never had left his house. 

It is true Ridenbaugh had no ride to get back to his home from 

the barracks other than the troopers, however, at no time did 

Ridenbaugh refuse to answer any questions, refuse to cooperate, 

or communicate in any way that he wished to end the interview 

and be transported home. It appears from the conduct of the 

officers that had he made such a request, the interview would 

have ended and the police would have transported him back 

home without delay. 

This court finds that Ridenbaugh was not prejudiced by attorney 

Vrobel’s [defense counsel] failure to present a suppression 

motion regarding the August 12, 2005 interview because 

Ridenbaugh was not in custody and he would not have prevailed 

on his motion. 

Additionally, Ridenbaugh failed to meet the prejudice prong of 

the test regarding the August 12, 2005 interview because he 

failed to demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for attorney Vrobel’s error, the outcome of the trial would have 

been different. Ridenbaugh has failed to point to any statement 

he gave during the August 12, 2005 interview that prejudiced 

him at trial. In fact, the record shows that at the interview he 

was working with the troopers in their investigation of Jesse 

McFadden. He agreed to wear a wire to obtain additional 

incriminating evidence against McFadden. Any statement he did 

give at the August 12, 2005 interview affirmed that Jesse 

McFadden committed the murder on his own while Ridenbaugh 

remained at his residence. Having failed to meet the prejudice 
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prong of the test for ineffectiveness, Ridenbaugh’s claim 

regarding the August 12, 2005 interview fails. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/2013 at 11-14. 

 Based on our review, the record fully supports the PCRA court’s 

findings and, in light of the standard set forth in Smith, supra, we discern 

no error of law in the determination that Ridenbaugh was not entitled to 

relief on this claim. We agree with the PCRA court’s findings that under the 

totality of the circumstances, it appears that the August 12, 2005 meeting 

was in the nature of an interview with a cooperating witness, and further, 

Ridenbaugh has pointed to no statement from the August 12, 2005 interview 

that prejudiced him a trial. 

 Regarding the September 1, 2005, interview, Ridenbaugh admits he 

was given the Miranda warnings and signed a waiver. However, he claims 

that because he had been appointed counsel for a separate (drug) crime, the 

police were required to question him only in the presence of counsel and 

therefore, the signed waiver was invalid. This claim would have arguable 

merit if Ridenbaugh had, at any time, claimed he had invoked his Fifth 

Amendment right to counsel in his drug case. Because he did not, he cannot 

prevail. 
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 Here, the PCRA court correctly notes the difference between a person’s 

Fifth Amendment right to counsel and a Sixth Amendment right to counsel,6

and the import of that difference to the outcome of this matter. By way of 

background, at the time of the September 1, 2005 interview, Ridenbaugh 

had been arrested and was in custody on drug charges that were unrelated 

to the murder charge instantly at issue. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, 

Ridenbaugh had been appointed counsel to defend him against the drug 

charges. However, because he had not been arrested for murder, no Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel attached to that case. Further, the PCRA court 

correctly notes that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific, 

and cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions. See 

Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 669 A.2d 954, 956 (Pa. Super. 1996) citing

United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 104 S.Ct. 2922 (1984). It is 

undenied that Ridenbaugh invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for 

his drug charge. However, he had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel for 

the murder charge because he had not been charged with that crime. 

Therefore, the fact that Ridenbaugh was represented by counsel in a 

different matter is not, by itself, helpful to Ridenbaugh. 

____________________________________________ 

6

 The Fifth Amendment right to counsel is based upon due process rights and 

the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. The Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel is based on the explicit language that “In all criminal 

prosecutions the accused shall have the right...to have the Assistance of 

Counsel for his defense.” U.S.Const., Amend VI. 
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 Therefore, the Miranda waiver must be examined under the Fifth 

Amendment. A person’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel is not offense 

specific. Wyatt, supra, 669 A.2d at 957, citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 

U.S. 675 (1988). Further, Wyatt acknowledges that once a person invokes 

his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the police may not initiate any further 

questioning of the defendant in the absence of counsel. Id., citing Edwards 

v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981). Wyatt holds that once a 

person invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, that invocation 

operates, pursuant to Roberson, to prevent the police from questioning a 

defendant on any offense unless counsel is present. Id. Accordingly, for 

Ridenbaugh to prevail on this claim, he was required to demonstrate that he 

had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel in his drug case. 

Ridenbaugh never asserted, much less proved, that he had invoked his Fifth 

Amendment right to counsel in his drug case. Therefore, the fact that he 

was represented in the drug case, without ever invoking his Fifth 

Amendment rights in that case, did not prevent the troopers from 

questioning him regarding the murder. Because the troopers were entitled 

to initiate questioning, Ridenbaugh was entitled to waive his Miranda rights 

without counsel being present. 

Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court that the waiver was valid 

and Ridenbaugh would not have prevailed in an attempt to suppress any 

statements or other evidence that was a product of the September 1, 2005, 
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interview. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion. 

Wright, supra. 

Ridenbaugh’s final two issues were impliedly rejected in the prior 

appeal;7 however, we will briefly discuss them. 

Ridenbaugh argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to hearsay evidence presented at trial. However, the PCRA court 

noted in both the order denying the petition without a hearing, 3/11/2011, 

and in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 5/10/2011, that Ridenbaugh failed to 

identify any specific hearsay statement. PCRA Court Opinion at 2. 

Additionally, the PCRA court reviewed the notes of testimony and failed to 

locate any such objectionable testimony. The PCRA court speculated 

Ridenbaugh might have been complaining about the testimony of Corporal 

Felmlee, who testified about what Ridenbaugh told Trooper Davis during an 

interview. However, Corporal Felmlee was present at that interview, and so 

was testifying from first-hand knowledge, not hearsay. Id. The record 

supports this determination and Ridenbaugh is not entitled to relief on this 

issue. 

____________________________________________ 

7

 In the prior appeal, the PCRA court had denied all of Ridenbaugh’s claims 

without a hearing. A panel of this Court remanded for hearing on the two 

issues discussed above. That memorandum implied that the other issues 

were properly disposed of by the PCRA court. However, the prior decision 

did not expressly affirm the PCRA court on the remaining issues. Therefore, 

in an abundance of caution, we expressly affirm the PCRA court on the 

remaining issues. 
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Finally, Ridenbaugh claims PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate and request a hearing on the above discussed issues. However, 

counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue meritless claims. See 

Wright, supra. See also, Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604 

(Pa. 2013) (no PCRA hearing required when there are no genuine issues of 

material fact, defendant is not entitled to relief and no legitimate purpose 

would be served by a hearing). 

Having determined that all issues raised by Ridenbaugh in both the 

initial PCRA petition and those issues addressed pursuant to the remand are 

meritless, we affirm the denial of PCRA relief. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/14/2015