IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-41202

Summary Calendar

DWIGHT SULLIVAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

STEPHANIE G. DERAMCY; SERGEANT BOBBY J. HANNA; SERGEANT

RICKY JUDD; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 5 NINA L. BURGESS; DAVID

COLEMAN; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 3 LORI A. PRICE, 

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:08-CV-168

Before GARZA, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

DwightSullivan, Texas prisoner # 437084, appeals from the district court’s

summary judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. He had argued

that prison officials violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 10, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 10-41202

interfering with his mail, taking his property, retaliating against him, filing

false disciplinary cases, and failing to properly investigate a grievance.

On appeal, Sullivan reiterates his claims and asserts in general terms

that, by rejecting those claims, the district court undermined his right to

fundamental fairness and failed to afford him all of the safeguards to which he

was due. He also contends that we should apply “the conscience of the court” to

his case. Those arguments are based on the propriety of the summary judgment

ruling, and are subsumed by consideration of Sullivan’s underlying § 1983

claims.

Sullivan also asserts that the defendants were barred by collateral

estoppel from relitigating issues that were presented in , Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.

Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982),

modified in part, 688 F.2d 266 5th Cir. (1982); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d

855 (S.D. Tex.), rev’d 178 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1999) and United States v. Taylor,

487 U.S. 326 (1988). However, the Ruiz decree, by itself, does not create

constitutional rights that may be vindicated in Section 1983 suits by individual

prisoners. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1123 (5th Cir. 1986). Sullivan

has not shown that Taylor has any bearing on his case. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at

327-28.

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). If the moving party meets

this initial burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific

evidence to support his claims. Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362, 371 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 355 (2010). If, as in this case, a party asserts

immunity, the burden shifts to the opposing party to rebut that assertion. 

See Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007). When a defendant

pleads qualified immunity, the court must determine whether the facts alleged

by the plaintiff set forth a violation of a constitutional right and whether the

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constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

misconduct. Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir.

2009). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Dillon v. Rogers, 596

F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010).

A review of the record reveals that the district court did not err in rejecting

Sullivan’s claims and granting the defendants summary judgment based on their

Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity from suit. Sullivan’s

use of force complaints fail because the evidence shows that Sullivan provoked

the use of force by the guards and received either minor or no injuries. See

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Sullivan’s claim that the defendants

took his personal property fails because he had adequate post-deprivation

remedies. See Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 2004). To the extent

that the property was removed from his possession because it was contraband,

Sullivan’s claim fails because he did not have a protected interest in that

property. See McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation

omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531-33

(1984). Sullivan failed to raise a material fact issue on his complaints of

retaliation, the filing of false disciplinary cases, and interference with his mail

sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. See Douglass v. United

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc); Woods v. Smith,

60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995). Finally, Sullivan’s claim that his grievance

was not properly investigated fails because he has no protected liberty interest

in having prison grievances resolved to his satisfaction. See Geiger v. Jowers,

404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005).

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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