[Cite as State v. Moore, 2023-Ohio-1000.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LORICE MOORE,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 22 MA 0013

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio

Case No. 19 CR 19A

BEFORE:

Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.

Atty. Gina DeGenova, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and Atty. Ralph M. Rivera, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Mahoning County Prosecutor's Office, 21 West Boardman Street, 

6th Floor, Youngstown Ohio 44503, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. John B. Juhasz, 7081 West Boulevard, Suite 4, Youngstown Ohio 44512, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: March 28, 2023
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

HANNI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Lorice Moore, appeals from a Mahoning County

Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of murder and attempted murder, following 

a jury trial. 

{¶2} On November 17, 2018, Christopher Jackson’s father heard him come into 

the house and then leave again between 11:30 p.m. and 11:45 p.m. Just before 2:00 

a.m. on November 18, 2018, two calls were placed to 911 with the callers reporting 

hearing gunshots on Youngstown’s east side. Police found Christopher Jackson dead in 

the front passenger-side seat of Carlos Davis’s car. The car was located in a field near 

the intersection of Stewart Street and Bennington Avenue. Jackson had been shot nine 

times from behind while he was in the car. Police found shell casings and projectiles at 

the scene from at least three different firearms.

{¶3} Police found Carlos Davis on the front porch of a Stewart Street home. 

Davis had been shot twice in the back. Paramedics arrived and transported Davis to the 

hospital. Davis survived his injuries. 

{¶4} Davis initially cooperated with police. After speaking with Davis, police 

began looking into a person with the nickname “Yung Chip.” They were able to determine 

that “Yung Chip” was a man named Stephon Hopkins. In one of his Facebook 

photographs, Hopkins was seen holding a key chain that appeared to be the same key 

chain that was found in the backseat of Davis’s car at the scene of the murder. 

Additionally, one of the keys on the key chain found at the murder scene unlocked the 

back door to Hopkins’s residence. Through Facebook, police learned that Appellant and 

Hopkins were associated with each other. Police also identified Brian Donlow as a third 

suspect.

{¶5} Facebook communications further revealed that Hopkins was in contact 

with Jackson multiple times from 12:59 a.m. on November 18, 2018, until 1:12 a.m. There 

was also a message from Hopkins to Jackson, sent after Jackson was killed. Additionally, 

Facebook records revealed that Appellant had multiple contacts with Hopkins during that 

same time period.
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{¶6} Appellant’s DNA was found on the rear passenger-side interior door handle 

and the rear passenger-side exterior door handle of the car where Jackson’s body was 

found. Stephon Hopkins’s DNA was found on the key chain that was located in the car.

{¶7} During an interview with police, Appellant initially denied knowing Hopkins 

and Jackson. After he was confronted with the fact that his DNA was found in the 

backseat of the vehicle Jackson was killed in, Appellant then admitted knowing Jackson. 

When Appellant was left in the interview room alone, but was still being recorded, 

Appellant could be heard praying to God for forgiveness and stating, “I know I took one 

of your children.” (Tr. 825-826).

{¶8} On January 10, 2019, a Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted Appellant

and Hopkins in a joint indictment on one count of aggravated murder, a special felony in 

violation of R.C. 2903.01(A); one count of murder, a special felony in violation of R.C. 

2903.02(A)(D); one count of attempted aggravated murder, a first-degree felony in 

violation of R.C. 2923.02 and R.C. 2903.01(A); one count of attempted murder, a firstdegree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and R.C. 2903.02(A); one count of felonious 

assault, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)(D); and firearms 

specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.145. The indictment also charged Hopkins with 

having weapons under a disability. Donlow was also indicted.

{¶9} The matter proceeded to a five-day jury trial for Appellant and Hopkins 

beginning on November 8, 2021. Donlow was tried separately in a bench trial. The jury 

found both Appellant and Hopkins not guilty of aggravated murder and attempted 

aggravated murder. It found Appellant and Hopkins both guilty of murder, attempted 

murder, and felonious assault, all with firearm specifications.

{¶10} The trial court later held a sentencing hearing. The court found that, for 

sentencing purposes, the attempted murder and felonious assault convictions merged 

with one another. The state elected to proceed to sentencing on the attempted murder 

conviction. The court then sentenced Appellant to 15 years to life on the murder count, 

with an additional three years for the firearm specification to be served prior to and 

consecutive to the murder sentence. It also sentenced Appellant to 11 years on the 

attempted murder count, with an additional three years for the firearm specification to be 

served prior to and consecutive to the attempted murder sentence. The court ordered 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

Appellant to serve the sentences consecutively to each other for a total sentence of 32 

years to life in prison. 

{¶11} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on December 21, 2021. He now 

raises four assignments of error for our review. 

{¶12} Appellant’s first assignment of error states:

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS, TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL 

JURY, AND EQUAL PROTECTION WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 

PERMITTED THE STATE TO REMOVE A BLACK JUROR WITHOUT 

SOUND CAUSE.

{¶13} Appellant argues the fact that plaintiff-Appellee, the State of Ohio, excused 

one of only two African Americans on the jury panel and one of only three African 

Americans on the venire, established a prima facie case that the state excused the juror 

based on his race. He argues the state’s explanation was pre-textual for excusing Juror 

No. 12. Appellant points out that Juror No. 12 stated that he could follow the court’s 

instructions.

{¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has set out the steps for analyzing a race-based

challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69

(1986), as follows:

First, the opponent of the peremptory strike must make a prima facie case 

of racial discrimination. Second, if the trial court finds that the opponent has 

fulfilled this requirement, then the proponent of the strike must come forward 

with a racially neutral explanation for the strike. * * * The ‘explanation need 

not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.’ [Batson, 

476 U.S.] at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88.

Third, if the proponent puts forward a racially neutral explanation, the trial 

court must decide, on the basis of all the circumstances, whether the 

opponent has proved purposeful racial discrimination. * * * The burden of 

persuasion is on the opponent of the strike.
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

(Internal citations omitted); State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 255-256, 2002-Ohio-796, 

762 N.E.2d 940.

{¶15} An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision of no 

discrimination unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 583, 

589 N.E.2d 1310 (1992). 

{¶16} Here, Appellant made a prima facie case of racial discrimination. When the 

prosecutor indicated that he wished to use a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror No. 

12, Hopkins’s attorney raised a Batson challenge, which Appellant’s attorney joined. (Tr. 

248). Counsel noted that out of 50 potential jurors, three of them were African Americans. 

(Tr. 248). Counsel also noted that of the 12 jurors in the jury box at that time, two of them 

(including Juror No. 12) were African Americans. (Tr. 248). At that time, the trial court 

noted that the burden shifted to the state. (Tr. 249). 

{¶17} Attorney Ingram was one of Hopkins’s attorneys in this case. The 

prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing Juror No. 12 were as follows:

Fairly obviously * * * [Juror No. 12] was, his daughter had a case in 

Mahoning County he did not put on his questionnaire. And understandably 

so. He would, probably forgot about it.

But Attorney Ingram was his daughter’s attorney. So essentially his little 

girl’s freedom was in Attorney Ingram’s hands at one point in time.

Even going further, I didn’t really seem to get a good reaction from * * * 

[Juror No. 12] as far as the Struthers police involvement. He was a bit 

hesitant when I asked him if he was satisfied with the way they did their job.

And he had mentioned something along the lines of she was with another 

guy; it was his stuff. Which also cuts to this case, the complicity implication.

Obviously, the former attorney-client relationship with Attorney Ingram and 

his daughter is my main concern. But there were other things that went into 

this.
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

So if it weren’t for those things I’d actually like him as a juror. But I just don’t 

think we’d be doing our job if we kept him on. Thank you. 

(Tr. 249-250).

{¶18} These reasons provided by the prosecutor for excusing Juror No. 12 

constituted a racially neutral explanation for the strike. The prosecutor was concerned 

that one of the defendants’ attorneys had represented Juror No. 12’s daughter in her 

criminal case. And Juror No. 12 did not initially disclose this information on his 

questionnaire. Additionally, the prosecutor did not feel that Juror No. 12 had a good 

reaction to how the Struthers Police had handled his daughter’s case. Finally, the 

prosecutor expressed a concern regarding how Juror No. 12 felt about complicity 

charges, which were an issue in this case, given his daughter’s case.

{¶19} Because the state put forward a racially neutral explanation for the strike, it 

was then up to the trial court to decide whether Appellant proved purposeful, racial 

discrimination by the state. The trial court found here “that the explanation given by the 

state was reasonable and was clear and was not based on race.” (Tr. 250).

{¶20} The trial court’s decision is dependent upon credibility determinations that

it “must make of the prosecutor and the prosecutor’s articulated assessment of the 

prospective juror’s behavior during voir dire, which the trial court also has the benefit of 

observing.” State v. Dixon, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 185, 2013-Ohio-2951, ¶ 17. 

Here, the trial court was able to observe the prosecutor and judge his credibility. And 

while Appellant takes issue with the prosecutor’s explanation for using a peremptory 

challenge to excuse Juror No. 12, the prosecutor was not required to give an explanation 

that satisfied defense counsel. “A race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge is 

simply ‘an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror.’” State v. 

Baer, 7th Dist. Harrison No. 07 HA 8, 2009-Ohio-3248, ¶ 54, quoting Hernandez v. New 

York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 3953 (1991). The explanation 

requires some relevancy, but it does not need to be “persuasive” or “plausible” as long as 

the reason is not inherently discriminatory. Id., citing Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 

126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006), quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-768, 

115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). Based on the above, we cannot conclude the 

trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

{¶21} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶22} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:

APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS WHEN 

THE STATE WAS PERMITTED TO USE OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE, NOT 

TO PROVE ONE OF THE THINGS LISTED IN THE STATUTE OR THE 

RULE, BUT ON THE THEORY THAT APPELLANT’S CREDIBILITY WAS 

AN ISSUE.

{¶23} Here, Appellant contends the state used “other acts” evidence improperly. 

Specifically, Appellant asserts the court should not have permitted the state to introduce 

evidence: (1) that he lied to Detective Michael Lambert; (2) that in a prayer he told God 

he took one of God’s children; and (3) that in a Facebook message he mentioned a “380” 

and a “40,” presumably in reference to weapons. Appellant asserts the state’s reason for 

introducing this evidence was to impeach his credibility. However, Appellant argues, his 

credibility was not at issue because he did not testify. Appellant contends the fact that he

may have lied was not relevant. Thus, the evidence did not meet Evid.R. 402. Because 

the subjects that he may have lied about to Det. Lambert were not relevant to whether he 

committed the crimes charged, Appellant argues the evidence was inadmissible.

{¶24} The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the trial court's broad 

discretion and this court will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of that discretion.

State v. Mays, 108 Ohio App.3d 598, 617, 671 N.E.2d 553 (1996). Abuse of discretion 

connotes more than an error of judgment; it implies that the trial court's judgment was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 

N.E .2d 144 (1980).

{¶25} Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Evid.R. 402. “Relevant 

evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401.

{¶26} Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible to 

prove the accused acted in conformity with his bad character. State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

St.3d 460, 482, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). But evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 

can be admissible to demonstrate motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Evid.R. 404(B).

{¶27} We will examine each statement Appellant takes issue with in turn.

{¶28} First, Appellant takes issue with Det. Lambert’s testimony that Appellant lied 

during his police interview. During the three-hour interview, Det. Lambert asked Appellant

multiple times if he knew Stephon Hopkins. (Tr. 813, 819). At first, Appellant denied 

knowing Hopkins. (Tr. 816, 819). But after the interview went on for some time, Appellant

admitted that he did know Hopkins. (Tr. 819). Det. Lambert also asked Appellant if he 

knew Christopher Jackson. (Tr. 820). At first, Appellant denied knowing Jackson. (Tr. 

820). The detective specifically asked Appellant if he was ever in a car with Jackson, to 

which Appellant responded “no.” (Tr. 820). Then Det. Lambert informed Appellant that 

his DNA was found in the car where Jackson was murdered. (Tr. 821). At that point, 

Appellant admitted that he had known Jackson. (Tr.821-822). Appellant stated that 

Jackson had dropped him off somewhere but could not remember where. (Tr. 823). 

{¶29} This evidence is relevant to the issues in this case. If Appellant did not know 

Hopkins or Jackson, he likely would not have been involved in the crimes charged. And 

the fact that Appellant denied knowing Hopkins and Jackson until confronted with 

evidence to the contrary, could suggest to the jury that Appellant was attempting to hide 

his connection to those two men and the murder from the police. This is not a case where 

the evidence of Appellant’s lies was being offered “to prove the accused acted in 

conformity with his bad character” as is prohibited by Evid.R. 404(B). Whether Appellant

may be a liar does not prove that he acted in conformity with this bad character trait in 

committing a murder or attempted murder. Because Det. Lambert’s testimony regarding 

Appellant’s inconsistent statements is relevant and is not in violation of Evid.R. 404(B), 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. 

{¶30} Second, Appellant takes issue with a statement that he made while he was 

left alone in the interview room. During Det. Lambert’s interview of Appellant, the 

detective had to leave Appellant alone in the interview room to deal with another matter. 

(Tr. 824). Before leaving Appellant, the detective informed Appellant that he was still 

being video and audio taped. (Tr. 824). After Det. Lambert left the room, Appellant began 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

to pray. (Tr. 825; State Exs. 185 185A). In his prayer, Appellant stated: “God be with me. 

Guide me through (inaudible). Guide me through. I know I took one of your children but 

I also blessed you with plenty more. So if you can just have faith and power to accept 

me and for things to get better than they are, yes.” (Tr. 826; State Exs. 185, 185A). Det. 

Lambert read this statement to the jury and the video was played. Appellant objected to 

the playing of the video but not to the testimony of his statement. (Tr. 827). 

{¶31} Appellant argued to the trial court that, during his prayer, he was talking 

about a baby he had convinced his girlfriend to abort when he was a teenager. (Tr. 734). 

Therefore, he asserted this evidence of a prior bad act was meant to inflame the jury. (Tr. 

734).

{¶32} This statement by Appellant was not used as a prior bad act or “other acts” 

evidence as Appellant asserts. There was no mention whatsoever to the jury about an 

abortion. The testimony was a recitation of what Appellant said when he was left alone 

in the interview room after being questioned for several hours regarding the crime at 

issue. It was up to the jury how to interpret Appellant’s statement. Thus, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in allowing this evidence. 

{¶33} Finally, Appellant takes issue with Det. Lambert’s testimony regarding a 

comment from Appellant’s Facebook account. As part of his investigation, Det. Lambert 

obtained a warrant for Appellant’s Facebook account. (Tr. 808; State Ex. 189). Det. 

Lambert testified that on November 1, 2018 (17 days before the murder), Appellant made 

a statement on Facebook to a man named Dom Phillips that, “Already you to blood n 

whenever Treal give me that 380 tomorrow he might be fakin but you can hold on to that 

bitch since I got the 40.” (Sic.; Tr. 811). Det. Lambert then acknowledged that .380 

caliber shell casings were found in Davis’s car at the murder scene and .40 caliber shell 

casings were found both inside and outside of the car. (Tr. 811-812). Appellant’s counsel 

objected to this testimony. (Tr. 811). 

{¶34} This statement also does not fall into the category of “other bad acts” 

evidence. It was a comment on Appellant’s Facebook account that could be interpreted 

as providing relevant evidence since it appears to reference two of the three types of 

firearms used in this case. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

{¶35} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶36} Appellant’s third assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND DENIED 

APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL BY ALLOWING CARLOS DAVIS TO TAKE 

THE STAND AND ASSERT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE.

{¶37} In this assignment of error, Appellant asserts that because Davis refused to 

testify at Donlow’s trial, the trial court should have held a hearing outside of the jury’s 

presence to determine whether Davis was going to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination and refuse to testify at this trial. Appellant argues that by 

allowing the state to call Davis to the stand only to assert his privilege not to testify 

implicitly suggested to the jury that Davis was shot by Appellant and Hopkins but was 

afraid to testify. 

{¶38} A trial court has discretion to excuse a witness from testifying to protect the 

witness’s privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Linkous, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 

12CA3517, 2013-Ohio-5853, ¶ 57. Therefore, we review the trial court’s decision here 

for abuse of discretion. 

{¶39} At the beginning of the trial, the state informed the court and Appellant that 

it intended to call Davis to the stand but that if Davis refused to testify, it would move on 

to call its other witnesses. (Tr. 23-27). Neither the state, the defense, nor the trial court 

considered the issue to be one relating to the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. (Tr. 23-27). Instead, the court addressed the parties’ concerns that the 

state might try to elicit Davis’s statements to Det. Lambert by way of the forfeiture to 

wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule. (Tr. 23-27). This is the course the state took 

in the Donlow trial when Davis refused to testify there. (Tr. 23-24). Pursuant to Evid.R. 

804(B)(6), the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception permits the admission of: “A 

statement offered against a party if the unavailability of the witness is due to the 

wrongdoing of the party for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or 

testifying.” The trial court stated here that if the issue were to arise, it would deal with it 

at that time. (Tr. 25-26). The state indicated in this case that it did plan to call Davis to 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

testify, but that if Davis refused, it would not solicit his statements by way of Det. Lambert 

as it had in the Donlow trial. (Tr. 25). 

{¶40} When the state called Davis to the stand, Appellant objected on a limited 

basis arguing that Davis should not be permitted to testify as to an identification in a photo 

lineup. (Tr. 447-449). The court overruled that objection. (Tr. 449). Davis then took the 

witness stand and the following took place between the prosecutor and Davis:

Q. On November 18th, 2018, Carlos, were you shot?

A. I plead the Fifth.

Q. You plead the Fifth? We’ve been through this before, Carlos, right?

A. I plead the Fifth.

Q. You plead the Fifth. Does this mean you’re not going to 

answer any questions, Carlos?

A. I plead the Fifth.

MR. YACOVONE: All right. Your Honor, at this time I’m going to ask 

the witness be declared hostile.

* * * [off-the-record discussion]

THE COURT: Okay. I’m going to excuse Mr. Davis at this time.

(Tr. 451-452). 

{¶41} In support of his argument here, Appellant relies on State v. Kirk, 72 Ohio 

St.3d 564, 651 N.E.2d 981 (1995), at paragraph one of the syllabus, which held that a

“trial court may exclude a person from appearing as a witness on behalf of a criminal 

defendant at trial if the court determines that the witness will not offer any testimony, but 

merely intends to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” But 

the Supreme Court specifically held that the trial court may exclude a person from 

testifying when the person intends to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, not that it 

must exclude the person. Thus, while the trial court here was permitted to excuse Davis 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

if it knew ahead of time that he was going to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, it was 

not required to do so. 

{¶42} Given Davis’s refusal to testify at the Donlow trial, the parties and the trial 

court in this case were on notice that Davis would likely refuse to testify at this trial as 

well. While the trial court was not required to do so, the better practice in this situation 

would have been to hold a hearing outside of the jury’s presence to determine whether 

Davis would actually testify in this case. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude the trial court 

abused its discretion in this matter. The parties brought the potential issue to the court’s 

attention prior to the start of trial. The court addressed it, seemingly to the parties’ 

satisfaction. And when the state called Davis to testify, Appellant did not raise an 

objection except to the limited issue of a photo lineup.

{¶43} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶44} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states:

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE 

FAILED TO DIRECT A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CHARGE 

OF FELONIOUS ASSAULT, AND APPELLANT WAS THEREAFTER 

CONVICTED OF THE SAME BY A JURY. 

{¶45} In his final assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court should 

have directed a verdict of acquittal on the felonious assault and attempted murder 

charges. He contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him of these charges.

{¶46} Crim.R. 29 provides for the defendant to make a motion for acquittal if the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. An appellate court applies the same test 

when reviewing a challenge based on a denial of a motion for acquittal as when reviewing 

a challenge based on the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Thompson, 127 Ohio 

App.3d 511, 525, 713 N.E.2d 456 (8th Dist.1998).

{¶47} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine 

whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as a 

matter of law to support the verdict. State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 

668 (1997). Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict 

is a question of law. Id. In reviewing the record for sufficiency, the relevant inquiry is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 113. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to 

prove the elements, it must be remembered that circumstantial evidence has the same 

probative value as direct evidence. State v. Thorn, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 16 BE 0054, 

2018-Ohio-1028, ¶ 34, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272-273, 574 N.E.2d 492 

(1991) (superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds).

{¶48} The jury found Appellant guilty of attempted murder in violation of R.C 

2903.02(A) and R.C. 2923.02(A). R.C. 2903.02(A) provides: “No person shall purposely 

cause the death of another[.]” And R.C. 2923.02(A) provides: “No person, purposely or 

knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of 

an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the 

offense.” 

{¶49} The jury also found Appellant guilty of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(2), which provides: “No person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause or attempt to 

cause physical harm to another or to another's unborn by means of a deadly weapon or 

dangerous ordnance.”

{¶50} The jury was given a complicity instruction pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), 

which provides in relevant part: “No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for 

the commission of an offense, shall * * * [a]id or abet another in committing the offense[.]” 

To “aid and abet” is “‘[t]o assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its 

accomplishment.’” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 243, 2001-Ohio-1336, 754 

N.E.2d 796, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (7 Ed.Rev.1999) 69. This can be inferred 

from the circumstances surrounding the crime. Participation in criminal intent may be 

inferred from one's presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense 

is committed. Id. at 245, citing State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34, 273 N.E.2d 884 

(4th Dist.1971). 

{¶51} Thus, we must consider the evidence presented at trial to determine if it was 

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. 
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{¶52} Thomas Toporcer was one of the paramedics who responded to the scene 

where Davis was found. Toporcer testified that he arrived at 2:00 a.m. to 1622 Stewart 

Street where he found Davis lying on the front porch. (Tr. 456). Toporcer noticed two 

gunshot wounds to Davis’s right upper back. (Tr. 456). 

{¶53} The 911 call supervisor identified the tape of the 911 calls placed that night. 

He confirmed that the woman caller stated that she saw two people leaving the area of 

the car (Davis’s car). (Tr. 445). 

{¶54} Youngstown Police Officer Anthony Marzullo responded to the scene. He 

stated the field where Davis’s car was found was located across an intersection from 1662 

Stewart Street. (Tr. 490). He testified that there were blood spots on the sidewalk and 

driveway of the Stewart Street house. (Tr. 491, 493; State Ex. 11). He also testified a 

.40 caliber Hornady shell casing was found there. (Tr. 493; State Ex. 57). And he testified 

several .40 caliber Hornady shell casings were found in and around Davis’s vehicle. (Tr. 

504; State Exs. 58-61). Officer Marzullo next testified that .22 caliber CCI shell casings 

were found in the car. (Tr. 505-506; State Exs. 62, 63). And he testified that .380 caliber 

Winchester shell casings were also found in the car. (Tr. 506; State Exs. 64, 65). 

{¶55} Joshua Barr, a forensic scientist at the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 

Identification and Investigation (BCI), testified regarding firearms identification. Barr 

testified that based on the shell casings submitted, there were at least three different 

firearms used in this case, a .40 caliber, a .380 caliber, and a .22 caliber. (Tr. 596-598). 

{¶56} Lindsey Nelsen-Rausch is a forensic scientist in BCI’s forensic biology 

section. She tested the DNA samples from this case. Nelsen-Rausch stated that her 

testing revealed that Appellant’s DNA was a major contributor (with an estimated 

frequency of one in 500 billion) to the DNA recovered from the rear passenger door 

interior handle. (Tr. 631-633). She also testified that Appellant’s DNA was a major 

contributor (with an estimated frequency of rarer than one in one trillion) to the DNA 

recovered from the rear passenger door exterior handle. (Tr. 633-634). 

{¶57} Dr. Joseph Felo, a forensic pathologist, testified that Jackson suffered nine 

gunshot wounds. (Tr. 678). Dr. Felo also stated that the gunshot wounds were consistent 

with the shooters being behind Jackson when he was shot. (Tr. 704). 
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{¶58} Youngstown Police Detective Michael Lambert was the final witness. Det. 

Lambert was able to determine that the car Jackson was found in belonged to Davis. (Tr. 

764). He stated that a blood trail led from the street to 1622 Stewart Street where Davis 

was discovered on the porch. (Tr. 767). The detective learned that on the night in 

question, Jackson had left his car at Davis’s girlfriend’s house and Jackson and Davis 

had left together in Davis’s car. (Tr. 770). 

{¶59} After Det. Lambert and other officers spoke with Davis, Det. Lambert began 

looking at a particular suspect who went by the nickname “Yung Chip.” (Tr. 775). “Yung 

Chip” is Hopkins’s nickname. (Tr. 777). After BCI determined that Appellant’s DNA was 

located both on the interior and exterior door handles of Davis’s car, Det. Lambert then 

added Appellant as a suspect. (Tr. 784). Det. Lambert determined through social media 

that Appellant and Hopkins were associated with each other. (Tr. 785-786). Det. Lambert 

then spoke with Davis again and, after that conversation, Appellant remained a suspect 

in the case. (Tr. 786). 

{¶60} Det. Lambert next testified regarding what he found during his Facebook 

search. The detective obtained search warrants for Appellant’s and Hopkins’s Facebook 

accounts. He found that Hopkins communicated by phone with Jackson on November 

18, 2018, at 12:07 a.m., 12:36 a.m., and 12:59 a.m. (Tr. 794-795). These calls were 

followed by three messages between Hopkins and Jackson at approximately 1:00 a.m. 

(Tr. 796-797). The messages were then followed by two more calls at 1:04 a.m. and 1:12 

a.m. (Tr. 797). Police were dispatched to the homicide scene at 1:52 a.m. (Tr. 796). 

Hopkins then sent a message to Jackson’s account at 2:11 a.m., after Jackson was killed. 

(Tr. 798). Det. Lambert testified that Hopkins was also communicating with Appellant

during the same time with messages/calls to Appellant at 11:29 p.m. on November 17, 

2018, and 12:00 a.m., 1:00 a.m., and 2:18 a.m. on November 18, 2018. (Tr. 802-804). 

And Det. Lambert testified that on November 2, 2018, Appellant made a comment on 

Facebook to Dom Phillips stating, “Already you to blood n whenever Treal give me that 

380 tomorrow he might be fakin but you can hold on to that bitch since I got the 40.” (Sic.; 

Tr. 811). The detective confirmed that both .380 caliber and .40 caliber shell casings 

were found inside and outside of Davis’s car. (Tr. 812). 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

{¶61} Det. Lambert also testified regarding his interview of Appellant. He stated 

that Appellant initially denied knowing Hopkins or Jackson. (Tr. 816-820). Det. Lambert 

stated that Appellant eventually admitted to knowing Hopkins after the detective showed 

him Facebook pictures with the two of them. (Tr. 817-819). Appellant admitted to 

knowing Jackson only after Det. Lambert informed Appellant that his DNA was found in 

Davis’s car. (Tr. 820-822).

{¶62} Det. Lambert stated that he had to leave the interview room to deal with 

another matter. (Tr. 824). Before leaving, he warned Appellant that he was still being 

video and audio recorded. (Tr. 824-825). While Appellant was alone in the interview 

room, he began to pray. (Tr. 826). Det. Lambert read to the jury from a transcript of what 

Appellant said: “God be with me. Guide me through (inaudible). Guide me through. I 

know I took one of your children but I also blessed you with plenty more. So if you can 

just have faith and power to accept me for things to get better than they are, yes.” (Tr. 

826). 

{¶63} Finally, Det. Lambert testified that in a phone call Appellant made from jail, 

after Appellant knew police had found his DNA at the scene, Appellant stated, “I didn’t 

touch him, I never touched him.” (Tr. 830; State Ex. 188).

{¶64} While there was no direct evidence to support Appellant’s conviction for 

attempted murder/felonious assault, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence. 

Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence have the same probative value. State v. 

Dodds, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05 MA 236, 2007-Ohio-3403, 2007 WL 1897774, ¶ 88, 

citing Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 272, 574 N.E.2d 492. “A conviction based on purely 

circumstantial evidence is no less sound than a conviction based on direct evidence.” 

State v. Begley, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA92-05-076, 1992 WL 379379, *2 (Dec. 21, 1992), 

citing State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 27, 514 N.E.2d 394 (1987).

{¶65} From the evidence, the jury could deduce the following. Appellant and 

Hopkins were in contact with each other and Jackson in the hours and minutes leading 

up to the shooting. Davis and Jackson were in Davis’s car together in the hours leading 

up to the shooting. Jackson was found dead in the front passenger seat of Davis’s car. 

Jackson had been shot nine times from behind. Davis was found at a house near the 

field where his car was located. A trail of blood led from the street and up the driveway 
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Case No. 22 MA 0013

to Davis. Davis had been shot twice in the back. From this evidence, it is reasonable to 

conclude that the person, or persons, who shot Jackson, also shot Davis.

{¶66} Further, the evidence demonstrated that Appellant’s DNA was found on 

Davis’s car on the rear passenger-side door interior and exterior handles, indicating that 

at some point, Appellant entered and exited Davis’s backseat. From the shell casings left 

behind, it was reasonable to conclude that at least three different firearms were used 

during the shooting, supporting the idea that there were three shooters. Just weeks 

before the shooting, Appellant commented about having a “40” and not needing the “380”. 

A .40 caliber and .380 caliber were identified as two of the firearms used in this shooting. 

And when Appellant was left alone in the interview room after hours of questioning by 

Det. Lambert regarding the shooting, he prayed to God admitting that he “took one of 

[God’s] children.” Finally, after learning that his DNA was found on Davis’s car and being 

arrested, Appellant stated on the phone that he “never touched him.”

{¶67} This circumstantial evidence, taken as whole and construed in favor of the 

state as we are required to do, was sufficient to convict Appellant of the attempted 

murder/felonious assault of Davis. Whether Appellant acted as the principal or in 

complicity with the principal, the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate he was one of three 

shooters that night. This court previously found that when 15 shots were fired into a car 

carrying four victims, it was sufficient from the number of shots fired into the single car to 

find that the Appellant intended to cause the death of everyone inside the car. State v. 

Heard, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0064, 2019-Ohio-1227, ¶ 32. Additionally, we have 

found: “‘The mere act of driving away from the scene of a shooting perpetrated by a 

passenger of a vehicle has been held to be sufficient to uphold a conviction based on 

complicity where the circumstances show the driver knew shots were being fired by the 

passenger.’” State v. Gilbert, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 206, 2012-Ohio-1165, ¶ 60, 

quoting State v. Garner, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-474, 2008-Ohio-944, ¶ 21.

{¶68} Consequently, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in overruling 

Appellant’s motion for acquittal on the attempted murder and felonious assault charges. 

{¶69} Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled.
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{¶70} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.
[Cite as State v. Moore, 2023-Ohio-1000.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of errors

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs are waived.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.