United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3660

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the District

v. * of Minnesota.

*

Scott L. Haynes, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: November 14, 2005

Filed: November 22, 2005

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Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

The Government charged Scott L. Haynes with possession of an unregistered

12-gauge Browning semiautomatic shotgun having a barrel length of less than

eighteen inches, being a felon in possession of a 12-gauge Browning semiautomatic

shotgun with the same serial number, possession of a stolen shotgun, and possession

of a stolen vehicle. A jury convicted Haynes. Citing Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.

Ct. 2531 (2004), Haynes objected at sentencing to the use of facts not decided by the

jury as the basis for increases from the minimum sentence, including the career
*

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnestoa. 

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offender increase in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The district court*

 consulted the Sentencing

Reform Act of 1984, treated the Guidelines as advisory, found Haynes was a career

offender, and sentenced him to 360 months in prison. After Haynes’s sentencing, the

Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)

(Sixth Amendment precludes imposition of sentencing increases based on facts (other

than earlier conviction) not admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt). 

On appeal, Haynes contends the district court enhanced his sentence under the

career offender guideline in violation of Booker. A defendant is a career offender if

the offense of conviction is a felony that is a crime of violence and the defendant has

at least two earlier felony convictions for crimes of violence. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a); see

id. § 4B1.2(a) (defining crime of violence), id. § 4B1.2(c) (defining two earlier felony

convictions). Haynes argues a jury, rather than the district court, should have made

the findings that Haynes’s possession of a sawed-off shotgun and his earlier

convictions for residential burglaries were crimes of violence. We have repeatedly

rejected this argument, however, holding Booker does not apply to the judicial

determination of whether an offense is a crime of violence. See United States v.

Smith, 422 F.3d 715, 723 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Reviewing the issue de novo, we conclude the offenses were crimes of violence

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Smith, 422 F.3d at 722. Possession of a sawed-off

shotgun is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). United States v. Allegree,

175 F.3d 648, 651(8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 330, 334-35 (4th

Cir. 2001). Further, Haynes’s residential burglaries are crimes of violence as defined

in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). United States v. Wright, 340 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2003).
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Haynes did not challenge the documentation regarding his earlier crimes, and the

district court did not have to look beyond the fact of the convictions to determine they

were crimes of violence. See Smith, 422 F.3d at 722-23. 

We thus affirm Haynes’s sentence.

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