J-S63021-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAFIK STILES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 497 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 22, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001997-2013, 

CP-51-CR-0005681-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 10, 2019

Rafik Stiles (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history:

On October 24, 2014, a jury found [Appellant] guilty of two 

counts of first-degree murder, and two counts of Violation of the 

Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) § 6106. On April 28, 2015, after a 

hearing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), 

[Appellant] was sentenced to forty years to life imprisonment for 

the first-degree murder of Kyle Featherstone; [40] years to life 

imprisonment for the first-degree murder of Barbara Crowder; 

and a concurrent sentence of two-and-one half to five years for 

each VUFA conviction. [Appellant] was sentenced to an aggregate 

sentence of forty years to life.

On July 19, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed this [c]ourt’s 

judgment of sentence. [See Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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968 (Pa. Super. 2016)]. On December 6, 2016, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied allocatur.

On May 25, 2017, [Appellant] filed a timely pro se PCRA 

petition. PCRA counsel was appointed to represent [Appellant].

On October 26, 2017, PCRA counsel filed [a petition to withdraw 

as counsel and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)]. 

* * *

On December 21, 2017, this [c]ourt . . . sent [Appellant] a 

Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 

of Intent to Dismiss. On January 09, 2018, [Appellant] filed 

“Petitioner’s Pro Se Motion for Leave to Amend and Objections to 

the Notice of Intent to Dismiss.”

. . . On January 22, 2018, this [c]ourt denied [Appellant]’s 

motion, formally dismissed the PCRA and permitted PCRA counsel 

to withdraw. On February 17, 2018, [Appellant] filed a [pro se]

notice of appeal to the Superior Court. On March 12, 2018, the 

Petitioner filed a 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal. On May 18, 2018, this [c]ourt filed its Opinion.

On January 24, 2019, the Superior Court issued an Order (1) 

directing this [c]ourt to provide [Appellant] with copies of the 

notes of testimony and other documents; (2) permitting the 

[Appellant] to file a supplemental 1925(b) Statement; and (3) 

directing this Court to file a supplemental Opinion. All documents 

were sent to [Appellant] on February 5, 2018.

On February 25, 2019, [Appellant] filed a “Final Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 

1925(b).” In that 1925 (b) Statement, [Appellant] directs: “that 

no claim from his March 12, 2018, 1925(b) Statement will be 

litigated and that his amended claims were all contained in his 

amended 1925 (b) statement dated 10/29/18.”
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PCRA Court Supplemental Opinion, 4/16/19, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).1

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for review:

I. Trial Counsel was ineffective pursuant to the Strickland

standard for failing to request/file a Motion to Remove From 

Criminal Proceedings and request for an expert witness to 

evaluate [Appellant] since he was seventeen (17) years of age at 

the time of the crime and pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322. Such 

proceedings can be instituted, thus, the failure violated 

[Appellant]’s Sixth and [Fourteenth] Amendment Rights.

II. Pursuant to the compulsory process of the Sixth 

Amendment, trial counsel rendered ineffective for failing to 

request that an expert witness evaluate [Appellant] since he was 

a juvenile at the time of the crime and was eligible for such 

proceedings pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322.

III. Pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 

[Appellant] posits that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 is unconstitutional 

on its face as it violates the fundamental principles of Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Moreover, the sentence imposed 

in light of Section 1102.1 (forty (40) to Life) violates the 

prohibition of Miller regarding a mandatory sentencing scheme 

since the plain language of Section 1102.1 contains mandatory 

language that forces the sentencer [sic] to impose a mandatory 

minimum sentence, thus, violating Miller and creating an illegal

sentence.

IV. Direct Appeal Counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

develop, in [Appellant]’s first direct appeal as of right, the claim 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 

conviction of First[-]Degree Murder when he failed to include the 

specific elements he was challenging in the initial 1925(b) 

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1

 On February 17, 2018, Appellant filed a single notice of appeal from the 

two, separate judgments of sentence, which the trial judge entered at two, 

separate docket numbers. In Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 

2018), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a single notice of appeal 

does not suffice for appeals from multiple dockets. The Walker Court, 

however, applied its decision only prospectively. Here, Appellant’s appeal 

predates Walker by several months. Thus, Walker is inapplicable.
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Statement, thus, allowing the Superior Court to deem the claim 

waived and not address the merits.

V. Trial Counsel was ineffective, pursuant to the Strickland

standard, when he failed to request, pursuant to Commonwealth 

v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766 (Pa. 2014)[,] an identification expert to 

establish whether under the circumstances of the identification of 

at least four (4) witnesses, the procedures were duly suggestive.

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

We review the denial of PCRA relief by “examining whether the PCRA 

court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its 

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of 

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

Appellant’s first, second, and fifth issues each allege ineffective 

assistance of Trial Counsel. As the PCRA court, the Commonwealth, and the 

record indicate, Appellant did not raise these issues in his PCRA petition or his 

response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice, and thus, he raises them for 

the first time on appeal. See PCRA Court Supplemental Opinion, 4/16/19, at 

13-14; Commonwealth’s Brief at 5; PCRA Petition, 5/25/17; [Appellant]’s Pro 

Se Motion for Leave to Amend and Objections to the Notice of Intent to 

Dismiss, 1/9/18. “It is well-settled that issues not raised in a PCRA petition 

cannot be considered on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 

1242 (Pa. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised 
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for the first time on appeal.”). Accordingly, as Appellant did not raise his first, 

second, and fifth issues before the PCRA court, he has waived them on appeal.

For his third issue, Appellant argues that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1, the

statute pursuant to which the trial court sentenced Appellant to 40 years to 

life imprisonment, is unconstitutional. Appellant asserts that Section 1102.1 

is unconstitutional because it sets forth a mandatory sentencing scheme for 

juveniles who commit murder in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 

(2012). Consequently, Appellant contends that his sentence is illegal.

Section 1102.1 governs the sentencing of individuals under the age of 

18 for murder and states, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 1102.1. Sentence of persons under the age of 18 for 

murder, murder of an unborn child and murder of a law 

enforcement officer

(a) First degree murder.--A person who has been convicted 

after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the first degree, first degree 

murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer 

of the first degree and who was under the age of 18 at the time 

of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced as follows:

(1) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense 

was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to a term of 

life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, 

the minimum of which shall be at least 35 years to life.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1).

In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held “that mandatory life 

without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates 

the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 

Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. This Court, however, has held that Section 1102.1 
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is not unconstitutional under Miller. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 99 

A.3d 116, 122 (Pa. Super. 2014).

In Lawrence, we explained:

Miller is limited to legislative schemes which “require[ed] that 

all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration 

without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and agerelated characteristics and the nature of their crimes[.]” Miller, 

supra. Section 1102.1 does not contain such a sentencing 

scheme. In fact, Section 1102.1(d) does require the trial court to 

consider various age-related factors before the trial court may 

impose a sentence of life without parole. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1102.1(d).

We do not read Miller to mean that the Eighth Amendment 

categorically prohibits a state from imposing a mandatory 

minimum imprisonment sentence upon a juvenile convicted of a 

crime as serious as first-degree murder.

* * *

Even under Miller, a state still may impose life without parole 

for homicide offenses, preventing a juvenile like Appellant, from 

ever obtaining any hope of release from confinement. Based on 

these considerations, we conclude that Section 1102.1 does not 

offend the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment.

Id. at 121-22 (footnotes and some citations omitted).

Thus, because this Court has held that Section 1102.1 is not 

unconstitutional under Miller, Appellant’s sentence of 40 years to life 

imprisonment is not illegal. Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue fails.

Finally, for his fourth issue, Appellant argues that Appellate Counsel was 

ineffective for failing to preserve his challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence for his first-degree murder convictions for review on direct appeal. 
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Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was the 

individual who shot and killed both Featherstone and Crowder.

With respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, our Supreme 

Court has stated:

It is well-settled that counsel is presumed to have been effective 

and that the petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel’s 

alleged ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 

655, 664 (Pa. 2007). To overcome this presumption, a petitioner 

must establish that: (1) the underlying substantive claim has 

arguable merit; (2) counsel did not have a reasonable basis for 

his or her act or omission; and (3) the petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance, “that is, 

a reasonable probability that but for counsel's act or omission, the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. A 

PCRA petitioner must address each of these prongs on appeal. 

See Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 

2007) (explaining that “appellants continue to bear the burden of 

pleading and proving each of the Pierce elements on appeal to 

this Court”). A petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong of this test 

is fatal to the claim. Cooper, 941 A.2d at 664.

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (citations 

modified).

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

recognize:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it 

establishes each material element of the crime charged and the 

commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 
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and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence 

establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial 

does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with 

the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the 

presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute 

our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the 

evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a 

defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Importantly, “the jury, which

passes upon the weight and credibility of each witness’s testimony, is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 

33 A.3d 602, 607 (Pa. 2011).

Section 2502 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines murder of the 

first degree as follows: “A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first 

degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). 

To obtain a conviction of first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must 

demonstrate:

“[A] human being was unlawfully killed, the defendant perpetrated 

the killing, and the defendant acted with malice and a specific 

intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, M., 986 A.2d 84, 

92 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 959 A.2d 

916, 921 (Pa. 2008)); accord 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2502(a) & (d) 

(defining first degree murder as an “intentional killing,” which is 

further defined as a “[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in 

wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated 

killing.”). The Commonwealth may prove the specific intent to kill 
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necessary for first[-]degree murder wholly through circumstantial 

evidence. Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1009-10 (Pa. 

2007).

Com. v. Ovalles, 144 A.3d 957, 969 (Pa. Super. 2016) (some citations 

omitted or modified).

Rather than challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support any of 

the applicable elements of the offense, Appellant contends that the evidence 

was insufficient to prove that he was the individual that shot and killed both 

Featherstone and Crowder. Consequently, we do not review the evidence to 

determine whether it can support a finding that the Commonwealth proved all 

of the elements of first-degree murder, but focus on the specific sufficiency 

issue raised by Appellant – whether the evidence was sufficient to establish 

that Appellant was the shooter.

Instantly, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to identify 

Appellant as the individual who shot Featherstone and Crowder. With respect 

to Featherstone, the Commonwealth introduced the statement Appellant’s 

sister, Katrina Session (Session), gave to police. In her statement, Session 

told police that she directly observed her brother (Appellant) shoot and kill 

Featherstone. N.T., 10/17/14, at 74-75. Regarding Crowder, the 

Commonwealth introduced the statement Appellant’s girlfriend, Sapphia 

Pressley (Pressley), gave to police. Pressley also told police that she directly 

observed Appellant kill Crowder. N.T., 10/21/14, at 13-14. Although both 

witnesses recanted these statements at trial, the record contains sufficient 
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evidence, if believed by the finder of fact, establishes beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Appellant was the individual who shot and killed both Featherstone 

and Crowder. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1171 (Pa. 

2012) (holding that witnesses’ out-of-court statements to police may be

sufficient to sustain a conviction even if the statements were recanted at trial).

Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

first-degree murder convictions lacks merit. Thus, Appellate Counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to preserve the claim. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 

A.3d 1096, 1115 (Pa. 2012) (“Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing 

to raise a meritless claim.”). 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/10/19