# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 16-4212

___________________________ Pauline Sagoe

lllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner

v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General of the United States

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent

____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

____________ Submitted: October 18, 2017 Filed: April 5, 2018

____________ Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

____________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge. Pauline Sagoe, a native and citizen of Gh ana, entered the United States in May 2000 as the nonimmigrant fiancée of United Stat es citizen Samuel Lassor. Sagoe and Lassor married in July 2000, and she was gran ted lawful permanent resident status on a conditional basis. In December 2002, Sagoe and Lasso r petitioned to remove the conditions. In September 2007, after extensive investigation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denied the pe tition and terminated Sagoe’s permanentresident status, finding that she failed to es tablish that the marriage was bona fide and not entered into primarily to secu re an immigration benefit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(C). DHS then commenced rem oval proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, the immigration judge (IJ) upheldthe termination of permanent resident status and ordered Sagoe removed. Th e Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Sagoe petitions for review of the BIA’s final order of removal. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s decisi on and therefore deny the petition for review. SeeAbuya v. Sessions , 873 F.3d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard of review).

I. The Statutory Framework.

An alien who marries a U.S. citizen may be granted permanent resident status on a conditional basis. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151( b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(a)(1 )(A)(i), 1186a(a)(1). To remove the conditions, the alien and U.S .-citizen spouse must timely file a joint Form I-751 Petition to Remove the Conditions on Residence. In support, the couple must submit facts and information showing that “the qualifying marriage . . . was not entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission as an immigrant,” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(A )(i)(III), and must appear for an interview before a DHS officer, § 1186a(c)(1)(B). “If the S ecretary of Homeland Security determines that such facts and information are not true, the Secretary . . . shall terminate the permanent resident status of an alien spouse.” § 1186a(c)(3)(C). An alien whose permanent resident status is terminated is deportable. § 1227(a)(1 )(D)(i). If the alien spouse seeks review of the Secretary’s determination in removal proceedings, DHS must establish, “by a preponde rance of the evidence, thatthe facts and information described in subsection [§ 1186a(d)(1)] and alleged in th e [I-751] petition are not true with respect to the qualifying marriage.” § 1186a(c)(3)(D).

To prove that a marriage was entered into to “procur[e] an alien’s admission as an immigrant,” DHS must establish the couple did not intend “to establish a life

-2-together at the time they were married.” Abuya , 873 F.3d at 652 (quotation omitted). “Though the couple’s intent at the outset of the marriage is the relevant question, when assessing the couple’s intent, courts l ook to both the period be fore and after the marriage.” Id. at 653 (quotation omitted). Eviden ce of intent can take many forms, including listing one’s spouse “on insurance policies, property leases, income tax forms, or bank accounts . . . [and] othe r evidence regarding courtship, wedding ceremony, shared residence and expe riences.” Matter of Laureano , 19 I. & N. Dec. 1, *3 (BIA 1983). Whether Sagoe’s marriag e to Lassor was a sham is a question of fact. Abuya , 873 F.3d at 652. “[A]dministrative fi ndings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Hassen v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2008).

II. Factual and Procedural Background.

A. The Initial Agency Decision. Sagoe entered the United States on May 13, 2000, arriving in New York on a K-1 fiancée vi sa and staying in New Jersey four days with Theodore Kudayah, whom she described as a family friend, before joining Lassor in Minnesota. Sagoe and La ssor married in a courthouse in Stillwater, Minnesota on July 14, 2000; no family or friends atte nded. In December 2002, Sagoe and Lassor filed an I-751 petition to have Sagoe’s conditional status removed. The couple separated in February 2003. In November 2003, DHS’s predecessor agency issued an I-751 Notice of Intent stating that the evidence submitted with their petition “is not sufficient to warrant favorable consider ation” and requesti ng additional documents “showing joint ownership of assets and jo int responsibility for liabilities.” Lassor died in December 2003 with the I-751 petition pending.

After Lassor’s death, Margaret Abraham, Lassor’s sister who also lived in Minnesota, made the funeral arrangements and was appoint ed personal representative of Lassor’s estate. In early 2004, Sagoe cl aimed to be Lassor’s surviving spouse, and Abraham contacted immigration authorities, alleging that Sagoe and Lassor’s marriage

-3-was a sham and forwarding a copy of Lasso r’s death certificate issued in December 2003 that listed him as “never married.” In June 2004, Sagoe appeared for an I-751 petition interview with DHS Adjudications Officer Jennifer Skwira. Sagoe submitted an amended death certificate issued in March 2004 that listed Lassor as married to Pauline Sagoe. Skwira testified that she believed this di screpancy warranted additional questioning and then undertook a comprehensive investigation into Sagoe and Lassor’s marriage. In September 2007, the Field Office Director issued a letter advising Sagoe that the I- 751 petition was denied. The lengthy letter summarized the results of the agency’s investigation:

- The record included a letter to immigration authorities that Lassor drafted a month before marrying Sagoe, but never sent, stating that“I wish to withdraw my affidavit of support” for Sagoe because sh e had experienced a “change of heart,” rejected his requests to move in with hi m, and concluded that marrying him was “out of the question” because of “irreconcilable differences.”

- Officer Skwira spoke on the phone with Edward Opong, a childhood friend of Lassor identified by Abraham. Opong stat ed that when he visited Lassor in 2000 he learned Sagoe had refused to marry Lassor. Sagoe paidLassor $7,000 to file immigration papers that would enable her to obtain a green card, then wanted nothing more to do with Lassor. She complainedto Opong that Lassor demanded more money to follow through with the arrangement. Opong also described the couple’s problemridden and argumentative relationship, describing a heated argument about the marriage arrangement while the three dined at a steakhouse in the Mall of America. Officer Skwira found Opong’s detailed recollection credible.

- In 2001, Lassor represented himself as either unmarried or single on mortgage documents and did not designate Sagoe as beneficiary on his life insurance policies, 401(k), or pension plan. Sagoe opene d a personal bank account in 2000 without informing Lassor. The couple did not open a joint account until June 2002. From

-4-2001 to 2003, Sagoe’s name was associated w ith four physical addresses but not with Lassor’s two addresses in Woodbury, Mi nnesota. In 2001 and 2002, she listed addresses in Plymouth and Brooklyn Center, Minnesota as her “home address” on employment and health-insurance applications. Lassor’s neighbors declared in affidavits that they did not know Lassor to be married and did not notice a woman residing with him. The Director’s letter stat ed: “The lack of joint assets and shared lifestyle does not support a finding that yourmarriage was entered into in good faith.”

- In an April 2002 medical visit, Lassor represented himself as single. Other Lassor medical records did not mention Sagoe , listing Abraham as a responsible party and one of Lassor’s cousins as an emer gency contact. After Lassor became ill in 2002, Sagoe did not accompany him to medical appointments.

- In February 2003, the month Sagoe and Lassor separated, Sagoe called the police when they got into a heated argument about Lassor’s alleged financial malfeasance and infidelity. The resulting po lice report listed Sagoe as Lassor’s “exwife.” Over a year later, Sagoe asked the Woodbury Police Department to change the report to reflect Sagoe as Lassor’s wife, not his ex-wife.

- Sagoe submitted no evidence supporting her claim that she obtained and submitted an amended death certificate b ecause Abraham had fraudulently obtained the December 2003 certificate listing Lassor as single. His funeral announcement omitted any mention of Sagoe , and Sagoe did not make the funeral arrangements or grant Lassor’s autopsy. The funeral progr am listed other relatives but not Sagoe as his wife. The Director’s letter stated: “Your actions as de scribed above are not typical of an individual who lost their husband.”

B. The Removal Proceedings. Abraham, Officer Skwi ra, and Sagoe were the primary witnesses at an evidentiary h earing held in August and November 2011 to

-5-consider Sagoe’s objection to termination of permanent resident status and whether she should be removed.

Abraham testified that Lassor told Abraham in 1999 he was marrying Sagoe and introduced Abraham to Sagoe when she arrived in 2000. Lassor later told Abraham Sagoe no longer wanted to marry him; Abraham told Lassor to “withdraw [Sagoe’s] papers.” After Lassor becam e ill in 2002, Abraham accompanied him on hospital visits and had friends stay with hi m. After Lassor’s d eath, Abraham arranged the funeral and cleaned out his house, fi nding no evidence a woman lived there. In February 2004, the funeral home told Abraham that Sagoe claimed to be Lassor’s wife. She called Opong, who told her that Sagoe “paid [Lassor] to marry her so [Sagoe] could get papers.” Based on th e marriage certificate, a Minnesota probate court found that Sagoe was Lassor’s surviv ing spouse. Sagoe sued Abraham for conversion of Lassor’s personal property and Opong and Abraham for defamation.

Officer Skwira testified that she inte rviewed Sagoe in J une 2004 regarding the pending I-751 petition and then did “a lot of investigation” before finding that Sagoe’s marriage to Lassor was a sham. Skwira acknowledged that Abraham aided the investigation by supplying documents and identifying people to contact, including Opong. But Skwira relied on Abraham’s information only to the extent it was corroborated by objective evidence and conducte d her own, independent investigation into the bona fides of the marriage. Skwira typed her notes of the phone call with Opong as they talked; she found Opong’s “r eally detailed information” credible because “[t]here was no benefit to him to lie.” She was unable to contact Kudayah in New Jersey about $6,000 he had loaned to Sagoe.

Sagoe testified that a mutual acquainta nce introduced her to Lassor in 1995. They courted over the next four years. Lassor visited Ghana in 1999 to finalize their engagement, and sent her gift s and money to assist with visa-related expenses. Opong brought her $500 in Ghana, and she met him again in Minnesota. She was not asked

-6-whether she refused to marry Lassor, then paid him $7,000 to file immigration papers that would enable her to obtain a green car d, as Opong told Officer Skwira in their phone call.

Sagoe testified that Lassor knew she was staying with Kudayah, a family friend, during her first days in the United States . When she arrived in Minnesota, Sagoe discovered Lassor had misledher about his employment and had a reputation as an “an alcohol user [and] womaniz[er].” Sagoe was “brokenhearted, because [she] . . . didn’t know what [she] was getting [herself ] into.” After the two argued and Sagoe spent the night with a friend, Lassor draf ted the letter withdrawing his immigration support as a threat, but the letter did not infl uence her decision to return home. After they married, Lassor was physically abusiv e, unfaithful, and mismanaged their finances. Concerned about her financia l and physical security, Sagoe opened a separate bank account using a nother address, leased a ne w apartment, and borrowed money to buy a car from Kuda yah who also co-signed he r credit card. Though it was a troubled marriage with many short separations, the couple maintained joint accounts and resided at the home Lassor co-owned w ith Abraham until they separated in early 2003. Sagoe submitted affidavits from acqua intances who declared they had seen Sagoe and Lassor living togeth er and a copy of her Minnesota driver’s license, which listed Lassor’s home address.

Sagoe testified that, after Lassor became ill, he thought she was too young to deal with the stress of his medical pr oblems and wanted Abraham involved because she was a pharmacist. After he died, Sa goe offered to help Abraham arrange the funeral, but Abraham and La ssor’s family chose not to involve her. The probate controversy and other lawsuits followed.

On November 18, 2013, the IJ upheld the I-751 denial, finding that “[Sagoe] did not have a bona fide marriage with he r husband.” The IJ found that neither Sagoe nor Abraham was credible; because of th eir “extreme animosity” and competing

-7-financial interest in Lassor’s estate, si gnificant elements of their testimony were implausible or self-serving. The IJ gave the altered death certificate and police report submitted by Sagoe little weight. The IJ fo cused instead on documents Lassor filled out; documents from outside sources such as medical records, thir d party agreements, and tax filings; affidavits from Lassor’s neighbors who were not connected to his family; and the testimony of Officer Skwira, which the IJ found credible. The IJ found that the government has “shown by a preponderance of the credible evidence that [Sagoe] did not have a bona fide marri age with her husband.” On appeal, the BIA ruled that the IJ “properly consideredthe evidence regarding the commitment of [Sagoe] and [Lassor] to the marital relati onship,” noting “myriad” contradictions in the record. However, the BIA remanded for application of the correct burden of proof under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(D) -- whether DHS has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that “facts and information . . . alleged in the [I-751] petition are not true with respect to the qualifying marriage.”

On remand, because no new evidence was submitted and “the BIA did not disturb the [IJ’s] credibility findings,” the IJ incorporated her first decision, including findings that Abraham and Sagoe were not cr edible and Officer Skwira was “generally credible.” In a lengthy opinion, the IJ found that the letter Lassor drafted to immigration authorities prior to the marriage, corroborated by other evidence including what Opong told Skwira, which the IJ found credible, provided strong evidence that Sagoe came to th e United States to marry La ssor, changed her mind, and then “entered into the marriage for i mmigration purposes.” The IJ acknowledged some evidence of joint assets and liabilitie s, but found they “were most likely created for immigration purposes and do not out weigh the other strong indications that [Sagoe] and her husband did not intend to share a life together when they got married.” The IJ also found that Sagoe and Lassor “were not living together during their marriage,” despite some evidence to the contrary. The IJ concluded DHS met its burden to prove that statements in th e I-751 petition reciting that the marriage “was not entered into for the purpose of procur ing an alien’s admission as an immigrant”

-8-were untrue. Accordingly, the IJ de nied the I-751 petition, terminated Sagoe’s permanent resident status, and ordered her removed.

Sagoe appealed to the BIA, arguing the IJ improperly relied on evidence obtained from third parties who did not testify, such as Opong; improperly found Officer Skwira credible when a docum ent obtained through Sagoe’s FOIA request revealed agency bias in favor of Abraham; gave improper weight to evidence presented by Abraham; and failed to consid er evidence presented by Sagoe to support her claim. The BIA dismissed the app eal. The BIA concluded the IJ properly considered the evidence, upheld the IJ’s credibility findings, and rejected the allegation of agency bias.

III. Discussion.

On appeal, Sagoe argues DHS did not pr ove by a preponderance of the evidence that she married Lassor to se cure an immigration benefit. First, DHS ignored the couple’s long courtship and the issuance of a K-1 fiancée visa evidencing their intent at the time of the marriage. Second, the BIA “erred when it determined that [Lassor’s] post-marital actions outweighed the couple’s intent at the time of their marriage.” 1 Third, the BIA failed to consider eviden ce in Sagoe’s favor -- the Minnesota Probate Court’s finding that Sagoe was the surv iving spouse under Minnesota law; the outcome of her settled defamation suit agai nst Abraham; the evidence of Skwira’s possible bias; and Sagoe’s testimony thatindependent actions she took were in response to Lassor’s abusive and spendthrif t behavior. Fourth, the BIA improperly relied on biased witnesses, Skwira and Opong, and on documents executed by Lassor

1 Lassor’s numerous unilateral representati ons that he was single or unmarried were relevant to whether “ the qualifying marriage . . . was not entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s ad mission as an immigrant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(III) (emphasis added); see Abuya , 873 F.3d at 653.
-9-over which Sagoe had no control. Fifth, the BIA gave undue weight to Lassor’s unsent letter, to medical records, and to the amended police report.

Our task on appeal is not to reweigh the evidence, as Sagoe urges, but to determine whether substantial evidence on the administrative record as a whole supports the agency’s finding that Sagoe a nd Lassor did not intend to establish a life together at the time th ey were married. See Abuya , 873 F.3d at 655. Here, there is substantial direct evidence of the couple’s intent atthe time of marriage: Lassor’s unsent letter to immigration authorities; Sa goe’s testimony that the letter was written when she left his home upon learning he had deceived her; and Opong relating to Skwira that Sagoe paid Lassor $7,000 to help her get a green card, all support a finding -- not inconsistent with the prior i ssuance of a K-1 visa -- that Sagoe came to the country intending to marry Lassor, cha nged her mind, and th en entered into a sham marriage for immigration purposes. In addition, DHS introduced substantial documentary and other evidence that the coupl e lived independent, se parate lives after the marriage, maintaining just enough joint activity to support a claim of a valid but troubled marriage.

In conducting our review of the eviden ce, “[w]e defer to credibility findings that are supported by specific, cogent reasons because the IJ sees the witness testify and is therefore in the best position to determine his or her credibility.” Abuya , 873 F.3d at 655 (quotation omitted). “An IJ may base adverse credibility determinations on the lack of corroborating evidence combin ed with inconsistencies, contradictory evidence, or inherently improbable testimony.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the IJ found Sagoe not credible because her explanations were im plausible and much of her evidence self-serving. The IJ also di scredited Abraham’s testimony, except when supported by objective evidence, because of her financial interest in the issue. The IJ credited Officer Swkira’s testimony and findings, including Skwira’s decision to credit the information Opong provided in th eir phone call. The IJ had a sufficient basis to credit Opong’s account, which was consistent with the unsent letter Lassor

-10-drafted and showed to Sagoe before their marriage. The BIA car efully explained why Sagoe’s reliance on an unidentified intern al agency memorandum did not provide a basis for reversing the IJ’s finding that Offi cer Skwira “testified in a credible manner which was consistent with the informati on and evidence discusse d in the [agency’s] I-751 denial.”

The additional contrary evidence cite d by Sagoe on appeal does not persuade us that “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to reject the agency’s findings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The probate court’s ruling that Sagoe was Lassor’s lawful surviving spouse under Minneso ta law did not address the issue before the BIA, whether the couple inte nded to establish a life together at the time of their marriage. Abraham’s decision to settle th e defamation litigation did not establish the truth of Sagoe’s allegations, and in a ny event the IJ did not credit Abraham’s testimony unless it was objectively corroborated.

In sum, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and the BIA’s finding that DHS met its burden to show that Sagoe and Lassor did not intend to establish a shared life at the time of their marriage and therefore th e statements to the contrary in their I-751 petition were not true. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review of the BIA’s decision denying the I-751 petition, terminati ng Sagoe’s permanent resident status, and ordering Sagoe’s removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i).

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