This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

48155 

Vol. 73, No. 160 

Monday, August 18, 2008 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Office of the Secretary 

6 CFR Part 5 

[Docket No. DHS–2007–0055] 

Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of 

Exemptions; Fraud Detection and 

National Security Data System (FDNS– 

DS) System of Records 

AGENCY: Privacy Office, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security is concurrently establishing a 

new system of records pursuant to the 

Privacy Act of 1974 entitled the 

Technical Fraud Detection and National 

Security Data System (FDNS–DS). The 

USCIS has developed the Fraud 

Detection and National Security Data 

System (FDNS–DS), a case management 

system used to record, track, and 

manage immigration inquiries, 

investigative referrals, law enforcement 

requests, and case determinations 

involving benefit fraud, criminal 

activity, public safety and national 

security concerns. In this proposed 

rulemaking, the Department proposes to 

exempt portions of this system of 

records from one or more provisions of 

the Privacy Act because of criminal, 

civil, and administrative enforcement 

requirements. 

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before September 17, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by docket number DHS– 

2007–0055, by one of the following 

methods: 

• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 1–866–466–5370. 

• Mail: Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy 

Officer, Privacy Office, Department of 

Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528. 

• Instructions: All submissions 

received must include the agency name 

and docket number for this rulemaking. 

All comments received will be posted 

without change to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. 

• Docket: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or 

comments received go to http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

Instructions: All submissions received 

must include the agency name and 

docket number for this notice. All 

comments received will be posted 

without change to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. 

Docket: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or 

comments received, go to http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

general questions please contact: United 

States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services, Privacy Officer, Donald 

Hawkins 111 Massachusetts Avenue, 

NW., Washington, DC 20529. For 

privacy issues please contact: Hugo 

Teufel III (703–235–0780), Chief Privacy 

Officer, Privacy Office, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The Office of Fraud Detection and 

National Security (FDNS) of the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS) has developed a new 

system named the Fraud Detection and 

National Security Data System (FDNS– 

DS). FDNS–DS is a central repository 

that permits specially-trained 

employees to record, track, and manage 

the background check and adjudicative 

processes related to immigration 

applications and petitions with 

suspected or confirmed fraud, criminal 

activity, egregious public safety, and/or 

national security concerns, and cases 

randomly selected for benefit fraud 

assessments (BFAs). The system will 

also have the capability to track the 

following: 

1. USCIS investigative referrals to law 

enforcement agencies (LEAs); 

2. LEA referrals to USCIS concerning 

subjects with pending immigration 

benefit applications or petitions; 

3. background check referrals and 

resolutions associated with suspected or 

confirmed fraud, criminal activity, 

egregious public safety, and/or national 

security concerns; and 

4. any additional inquiries conducted 

in order to confirm that the information 

on file is correct. 

FDNS has created FDNS–DS, a 

centralized data system, in order to 

increase the effectiveness of the United 

States (U.S.) immigration system in 

identifying threats to national security, 

combating benefit fraud, and locating 

and removing vulnerabilities that 

compromise the integrity of the legal 

immigration system. With the 

implementation of FDNS–DS, USCIS’s 

capabilities for detecting and tracking 

benefit fraud and other criminal 

activity—and conducting efficient and 

accurate background check resolutions 

and adjudication of national security 

cases will be increased. 

In order to achieve the goals 

discussed above, FDNS–DS will store 

data related to immigration applications 

involving suspected or confirmed fraud, 

criminal activity, egregious public 

safety, and/or national security 

concerns. The data will include the 

results of required background checks 

conducted in connection with pending 

petitions/applications that result in 

subsequent inquiries conducted to 

resolve the background check results. 

FDNS–DS will also contain the 

following information related to cases 

involving suspected or confirmed fraud, 

criminal activity, egregious public 

safety, and/or national security 

concerns: USCIS investigative referrals 

to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) of 

suspected or confirmed fraud or other 

criminal activity; LEA referrals to USCIS 

related to pending applications; referrals 

to USCIS from the public or other 

governmental entities or fraud case 

referrals from the Benefit Fraud 

Assessment (BFA) process (‘‘other 

referrals’’); adverse information 

identified by USCIS from applications, 

administrative files, interviews, written 

requests for evidence (RFEs) or site 

visits; results of resolution of any of the 

above-described categories of adverse 

information; and adjudicative 

summaries and decisions. 

FDNS–DS will store information 

concerning cases randomly selected for 

BFAs and will track interactions with 

Immigration and Citizenship 

Enforcement (ICE) and other LEAs (e.g., 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

[FBI], the Drug Enforcement 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS
48156 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 160 / Monday, August 18, 2008 / Proposed Rules 

Administration [DEA], and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection [CBP]) 

in cases involving fraud or other 

criminal activity, and the Department of 

State in cases involving fraud related to 

selected types of visas for entry into the 

United States. 

The Privacy Act allows government 

agencies to exempt certain records from 

the access and amendment provisions. If 

an agency claims an exemption, 

however, it must issue a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking to make clear to 

the public the reasons why a particular 

exemption is claimed. 

In this Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking, DHS now is proposing to 

exempt FDNS–DS, in part, from certain 

provisions of the Privacy Act. Some 

information in FDNS–DS relates to 

official DHS law enforcement, 

intelligence, and immigration activities. 

These exemptions are needed to protect 

information relating to DHS activities 

from disclosure to subjects or others 

related to these activities. Specifically, 

the exemptions are required to preclude 

subjects of these activities from 

frustrating these processes; to avoid 

disclosure of activity techniques; to 

protect the identities and physical safety 

of confidential informants and of 

immigration and border management 

and law enforcement personnel; to 

ensure DHS’s ability to obtain 

information from third parties and other 

sources; and to protect the privacy of 

third parties. Disclosure of information 

to the subject of the inquiry could also 

permit the subject to avoid detection or 

apprehension. 

The exemptions proposed here are 

standard law enforcement and national 

security exemptions exercised by a large 

number of Federal law enforcement and 

intelligence agencies. In appropriate 

circumstances, where compliance 

would not appear to interfere with or 

adversely affect the law enforcement 

purposes of this system and the overall 

law enforcement process, the applicable 

exemptions may be waived. 

List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5 

Freedom of information; Privacy. 

For the reasons stated in the 

preamble, DHS proposes to amend 

Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal 

Regulations, as follows: 

PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS 

AND INFORMATION 

1. The authority citation for part 5 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135, 

6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A 

also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552. Subpart B 

also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a. 

2. At the end of appendix C to part 5, 

add the following new paragraph ‘‘7’’: 

Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of 

Records Exempt From the Privacy Act 

* * * * * 

7. The Department of Homeland Security 

United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services Fraud Detection and National 

Security Data System (FDNS–DS) System of 

Records consists of a stand-alone database 

and paper files that will be used by DHS and 

its components. FDNS–DS is a case 

management system used to record, track, 

and manage immigration inquiries, 

investigative referrals, law enforcement 

requests, and case determinations involving 

benefit fraud, criminal activity, public safety 

and national security concerns. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security has 

exempted this system from 5 U.S.C. 

552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), 

(e)(4)(I), and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

552a(k)(2). These exemptions apply only to 

the extent that records in the system are 

subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

552a(k)(2). Exemptions from these particular 

subsections are justified, on a case-by-case 

basis to be determined at the time a request 

is made, for the following reasons: 

(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for 

Disclosures) because release of the 

accounting of disclosures could alert the 

subject of an investigation of an actual or 

potential criminal, civil, or regulatory 

violation to the existence of the investigation; 

and reveal investigative interest on the part 

of DHS as well as the recipient agency. 

Disclosure of the accounting would therefore 

present a serious impediment to law 

enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve 

national security. Disclosure of the 

accounting would also permit the individual 

who is the subject of a record to impede the 

investigation, to tamper with witnesses or 

evidence, and to avoid detection or 

apprehension, which would undermine the 

entire investigative process. 

(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) 

because access to the records contained in 

this system of records could inform the 

subject of an investigation of an actual or 

potential criminal, civil, or regulatory 

violation, to the existence of the 

investigation, and reveal investigative 

interest on the part of DHS or another agency. 

Access to the records could permit the 

individual who is the subject of a record to 

impede the investigation, to tamper with 

witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection 

or apprehension. Amendment of the records 

could interfere with ongoing investigations 

and law enforcement activities and would 

impose an impossible administrative burden 

by requiring investigations to be 

continuously reinvestigated. In addition, 

permitting access and amendment to such 

information could disclose security-sensitive 

information that could be detrimental to 

homeland security. 

(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and 

Necessity of Information) because in the 

course of investigations into potential 

violations of Federal law, the accuracy of 

information obtained or introduced 

occasionally may be unclear or the 

information may not be strictly relevant or 

necessary to a specific investigation. In the 

interests of effective law enforcement, it is 

appropriate to retain all information that may 

aid in establishing patterns of unlawful 

activity. 

(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (e)(4)(H) 

(Agency Requirements) because portions of 

this system are exempt from the individual 

access provisions of subsection (d) which 

exempts providing access because it could 

alert a subject to the nature or existence of 

an investigation, and thus there could be no 

procedures for that particular data. 

Procedures do exist for access for those 

portions of the system that are not exempted. 

(e) From subsection (e)(4)(I) (Agency 

Requirements) because providing such 

source information would impede law 

enforcement or intelligence by compromising 

the nature or existence of a confidential 

investigation. 

(f) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) 

because portions of this system are exempt 

from the access and amendment provisions 

of subsection (d). 

Dated: August 11, 2008. 

Hugo Teufel III, 

Chief Privacy Officer, Department of 

Homeland Security. 

[FR Doc. E8–19034 Filed 8–15–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–10–P 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Agricultural Marketing Service 

7 CFR Part 922 

[Docket No. AMS–FV–08–0052; FV08–922–

1 PR] 

Apricots Grown in Designated 

Counties in Washington; Increased 

Assessment Rate 

AGENCY: Agricultural Marketing Service, 

USDA. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: This rule would increase the 

assessment rate established for the 

Washington Apricot Marketing 

Committee (Committee) for the 2008–09 

and subsequent fiscal periods from 

$1.50 to $2.00 per ton for Washington 

apricots. The Committee is responsible 

for local administration of the marketing 

order regulating the handling of apricots 

grown in designated counties in 

Washington. Assessments upon 

handlers of apricots are used by the 

Committee to fund reasonable and 

necessary expenses of the program. The 

fiscal period for the marketing order 

begins April 1 and ends March 31. The 

assessment rate would remain in effect 

indefinitely unless modified, suspended 

or terminated. 

DATES: Comments must be received by 

September 2, 2008. 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS