Affirmed and Opinion filed February 13, 2024 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00814-CV

IN RE COMMITMENT OF LOUIS GUTIERREZ

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 860003Z

O P I N I O N

The State of Texas filed a petition to civilly commit appellant, Louis 

Gutierrez, as a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. 

See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.001–.051 (SVP statute). A jury unanimously 

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gutierrez is a sexually violent predator. See 

id. §§ 841.003, 841.062(b). The trial court entered a final commitment order under 

the SVP statute. Gutierrez’s sole issue on appeal challenges the legal sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a behavioral abnormality 

making him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence because the

testifying expert failed to test for psychopathy. We affirm. 
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Background

As an adult, Gutierrez has four sexual offense convictions. In 1997, he was 

convicted of indecency with a child. This offense occurred in October 1996, and the 

complainant was a six-year-old female. Gutierrez was sentenced to four years in 

prison. In May 2001, he was convicted of three separate counts of indecency with a 

child. These offenses occurred in October 2000, approximately two months after 

Gutierrez was discharged from prison for his prior conviction. The complainants 

were three female children ages nine, eight, and four. Gutierrez received a 

twenty-two-year sentence for each conviction to be served concurrently. 

The State filed a petition to civilly commit Gutierrez as a sexually violent 

predator. At the time of the civil commitment trial, he was serving his concurrent 

sentences. Dr. Darrel Turner, the State’s expert, testified at the jury trial. Dr. Turner 

opined that Gutierrez suffers from a behavioral abnormality that causes him to be a

sexually violent predator. According to Dr. Turner, he typically uses two actuarial 

instruments to help identify risk factors in determining whether a behavioral 

abnormality exists: Static-99R and Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R). Dr. 

Turner testified that Gutierrez’s Static-99R score was at the highest level, meaning 

that Gutierrez was “three times as likely to be rearrested and reconvicted for another 

sexual offense than the average sex offender.” Dr. Turner admitted that he chose not 

to obtain a PCL-R score in this case because Gutierrez refused to participate in the 

one-on-one evaluation. Also, Dr. Turner believed Gutierrez’s PCL-R score would 

have been “artificially inflated” because his mental illness could mimic 

psychopathy. 

The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gutierrez is a sexually violent 

predator. On that basis, the trial court ordered Gutierrez civilly committed until he 

is no longer likely to engage in predatory acts. Gutierrez filed a motion for new trial, 
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which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed. 

Discussion

In a single issue, Gutierrez challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a finding that he has a behavior abnormality that makes him likely to engage 

in a predatory act of sexual violence. As stated, Gutierrez specifically argues that the 

SVP statute requires the expert to test for psychopathy. 

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting Gutierrez’s civil 

commitment as a sexually violent predator, we use the same legal sufficiency 

standard that we use in criminal cases. See In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 

S.W.3d 665, 674–75 (Tex. 2020); In re Commitment of Harris, 541 S.W.3d 322, 327 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). In so doing, we assess the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder

could have found the statutory elements required for commitment beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 674–75. The jury is the sole judge of the 

witnesses’ credibility and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Harris, 541 

S.W.3d at 327. 

To establish that Gutierrez is a sexually violent predator, the State is required 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a repeat sexually violent offender and 

suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory 

act of sexual violence. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.003(a); 841.062(a).

Gutierrez only challenges the second element here: that he suffers from a behavioral 

abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.1

1 Notwithstanding the fact that Gutierrez does not challenge the finding that he is a repeat 

sexually violent offender, the record undoubtedly indicates that the State introduced, and the jury 

heard, legally sufficient evidence proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is a repeat sexually 

violent offender. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.003(b) (“A person is a repeat sexually 

violent offender . . . if the person is convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and a 
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A behavioral abnormality is “a congenital or acquired condition that, by 

affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to 

commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace 

to the health and safety of another person.” Id. § 841.002(2). A predatory act means 

“an act directed toward individuals, including family members, for the primary 

purpose of victimization.” Id. § 841.002(5). Offenses identified in the SVP statute 

as “sexually violent offenses” are, by their nature, “committed for the primary 

purpose of victimization.” In re Commitment of Hutyra, No. 14-17-00669, 2018 WL 

3911136, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 16, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. 

op.) (citing In re Commitment of White, No. 14-17-00115-CV, 2018 WL 344063, at 

*10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

Gutierrez’s legal-sufficiency challenge attacks Dr. Turner’s failure to test for 

psychopathy. Relying exclusively on section 841.023(a), Gutierrez asserts that the 

evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that he has a behavioral 

abnormality without testing for psychopathy. See Tex. Health & Safety Code 

§ 841.023(a) (providing that the expert used by the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice “shall make a clinical assessment based on testing for psychopathy . . . to aid 

the department in its assessment.”). We disagree.

A similar argument was rejected by this court in Hutyra. 2018 WL 3911136, 

at *6. In that case, Hutyra relied on the fact that the SVP statute requires the initial 

evaluator to test for psychopathy. Id.; see also Tex. Health & Safety Code 

§ 841.023(a). Hutyra alleged that the evidence was legally insufficient because “he 

is not a psychopath.” Hutyra, 2018 WL 3911136, at *6. However, this court 

determined that “[s]ection 841.023(a) applies to the pre-petition administrative 

sentence is imposed for at least one of the offenses.”). In this case, Gutierrez was convicted of four 

sexually violent offenses, and a sentence was imposed for each conviction.
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screening process and is designed to assist TDCJ in its initial determination whether 

an inmate scheduled for release may be a sexually violent predator.” Id., at n.6. In 

finding that Hutyra’s argument lacked merit, this court held that “the only question 

a jury must answer in a civil commitment trial is whether a person suffers from a 

behavioral abnormality that makes that person predisposed to committing sexually 

violent acts.” Id. (citing In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 306 (Tex. 

2012)). Put simply, psychopathy testing is not a requisite finding that must be met

to support civilly committing a sexually violent predator. See id.2

In this case, Dr. Turner was not required to test for psychopathy to determine 

that Gutierrez suffers from a behavioral abnormality. Even if the SVP statute could 

somehow be interpreted to require psychopathy testing prior to civilly committing a 

sexually violent predator, which we hold that it does not, Gutierrez cannot now 

complain that a psychopathy finding was required when he refused to participate in 

the one-on-one evaluation with Dr. Turner. See Tex. Health & Safety Code 

§ 841.061(f) (“A person who is on trial to determine the person’s status as a sexually 

violent predator is required to submit to all expert clinical interviews that are 

required. . . .”). Additionally, Dr. Turner believed that it would be unfair to obtain a 

PCL-R score due to Gutierrez’s mental illness. Dr. Turner explained that many of 

2 Analogous arguments considered by our sister courts concerning the necessity for 

psychopathy testing before a person can be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator have 

been uniformly rejected. See In re Commitment of Born, No. 02-19-00272-CV, 2022 WL 6788213, 

at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] person’s psychopathy is 

not a requisite finding that must be made in support of his commitment as a sexually violent 

predator.”) (quoting In re Commitment of Herbert, 578 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, 

no pet.)); In re Commitment of Wirfs, No. 09-19-00007-CV, 2020 WL 1879473, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Apr. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); In re Commitment of Renshaw, 598 S.W.3d 

303, 313 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 5, 2020, no pet.) (same); In re H.L.T., 549 S.W.3d 656, 660 

(Tex. App.—Waco 2017, pet. denied) (providing that nothing in the SVP statute specifically 

required psychopathy testing by an expert in order to classify a person as a sexually violent 

predator). 
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the symptoms of Gutierrez’s mental illness overlap psychopathic traits assessed by 

the PCL-R test. Thus, the degree of Gutierrez’s psychopathic characteristics would 

have been exaggerated. 

Though the jury did not hear evidence concerning the degree of Gutierrez’s 

psychopathy, the jury nonetheless heard substantial evidence to support its finding, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gutierrez suffers from a behavioral abnormality. 

After detailing his training and experience, Dr. Turner described his careful 

consideration of various research-based factors in arriving at his opinion that 

Gutierrez suffers from a behavioral abnormality, setting out for the jury the precise 

factual underpinning of his assessment, including consideration of Gutierrez’s risk 

and protective factors. Two major risk factors identified by Dr. Turner were sexual 

deviance and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Turner explained that Gutierrez is 

sexually deviant because Gutierrez suffers from pedophilic disorder, a lifelong 

condition. Delineating the circumstances surrounding Gutierrez’s sexual offenses, 

Dr. Turner explained the degree of Gutierrez’s sexual deviance. For example, 

Gutierrez was convicted of two sexual offenses as a juvenile and four as an adult, 

which Dr. Turner characterized as “brazen” and “high risk.” Dr. Turner also 

discussed other sexual offenses involving prepubescent children where Gutierrez 

was not convicted. As evidence of Gutierrez’s antisocial personality disorder, Dr. 

Turner emphasized Gutierrez’s overall lack of remorse, lack of ability to control his 

impulses, and manipulative tendencies—all of which affect Gutierrez’s emotional 

or volitional capacity and predisposes him to commit predatory acts of sexual 

violence. 

Gutierrez has not demonstrated that no evidence supports the jury’s verdict 

that he suffers from a behavioral abnormality. See Harris, 541 S.W.3d at 329 

(concluding that evidence of two biggest risk factors for re-offending—sexual 
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deviance and antisocial personality disorder—was legally sufficient to support the 

jury’s finding that appellant suffers from a behavioral abnormality disorder).

Having rejected Gutierrez’s contention that psychopathy testing is required to 

support a finding that he has a behavioral abnormality and reviewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact 

could have found the statutory elements required for commitment beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.002(2), 841.003(a). 

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial 

court’s judgment. We overrule Gutierrez’s only issue on appeal. 

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s final order of commitment. 

/s/ Frances Bourliot

Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain.