In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19-2026

CARL CASTETTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DOLGENCORP, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:17-cv-00227-TLS — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 12, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 25, 2020

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Carl Castetter brings this appeal

against his former employer, Dolgencorp, LLC, d/b/a Dollar

General (“Dollar General”), for disability discrimination in

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(“ADA”). Dollar General contends Castetter was terminated

for policy violations. The district court granted summary
2 No. 19-2026

judgment in favor of Dollar General and for the following

reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Carl Castetter underwent treatment for various forms of

cancer during his employment with Dollar General. After

returning from a few months of medical leave, he applied, but

was not hired as a District Manager. Three months later, he

secured a District Manager position in Fort Wayne, Indiana.

Castetter was responsible for managing stores and store

managers in his district. His responsibilities included recruiting, training, and ensuring that proper employee paperwork

and background checks were completed.

Castetter reported to two regional managers: Jerry Chupp

for a few months, but at all other times to Mark Hubbs. During

his time with Chupp, Chupp instructed Castetter to locate a

missing GPS device. After three days of searching, an employee informed Castetter that Chupp had already located the

GPS device and instructed her to not inform Castetter it had

been found. Later, Chupp identified deficiencies in Castetter’s

stores, including items that were out of stock, high employee

turnover, and stores that were not customer ready. Chupp

implemented a performance plan for Castetter to improve the

stores in his district.

Castetter wrote a letter to Hubbs describing Chupp’s

improper characterization of both the plan and his performance as District Manager. He further detailed Chupp’s

unprofessional conduct. The letter did not include any references to cancer, medical leave, disability, or discrimination.

Hubbs claims he did not receive the letter. 
No. 19-2026 3

Castetter testified that when Hubbs returned, Hubbs

mocked and demeaned him. He cites instances where Hubbs

made Castetter get on his hands and knees to straighten a

product slightly out of alignment. Hubbs made various

unprofessional comments, including “I am going to sit here in

a lounge chair and watch you work until you drop” and “I

know [sic] three people who had what you had, and they all

died.”

In January 2016, Hubbs and Brittany Smith from human

resources reviewed Castetter’s performance and issued a Final

Written Counseling detailing Castetter’s unprofessional

conduct, discussions, and violations of Dollar General’s

policies. In April 2016, Sarah Price from human resources

reported Castetter’s policy violations, and recommended he

be terminated. The violations included employees who had

not completed the hiring process and were working without

pay, insufficiently trained employees, understaffed stores,

high employee turnover, and a cash discrepancy. She cited

concerns that Castetter failed to process various employment

documents and background checks.

After reviewing this information and the past improvement

plan, Dollar General placed Castetter on another improvement

plan, providing benchmarks for the stores in his region. In a

subsequent visit to the store, human resources discovered

numerous ongoing violations, including a non-employee

attending an employee meeting and the failure to process

employment documents. Castetter attempted to delegate this

task to his subordinate, who had no authorization to hire

individuals for other district stores. 
4 No. 19-2026

Another unpaid non-employee whose paperwork was

incomplete was given security access without passing background and drug tests and was found to be stealing food from

the store. The non-employee admitted he stole food because he

hadn’t been paid for three weeks due to his employee paperwork not being processed. Dollar General terminated Castetter,

believing Castetter was unwilling to take responsibility and

remedy the violations in his stores.

Castetter brought a disability discrimination action against

Dollar General. The district court granted summary judgment

in favor of Dollar General, which Castetter now appeals. The

parties do not dispute that Castetter’s cancer is a disability. The

issue on appeal is whether a reasonable jury could determine,

based on the evidence in the record, that Castetter’s disability

was the cause of his termination. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Elec.

Constr. Indus. Prefunding Credit Reimbursement Program v.

Veterans Elec., LLC, 941 F.3d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 2019). The

movant must show there is “no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the party opposing a motion for

summary judgment. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760,

762 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Employers may not discriminate against a “qualified

individual” based on his disability. A disability discrimination

claim under the ADA requires proof that: (1) the plaintiff was

disabled; (2) the plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform
No. 19-2026 5

essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation;

and (3) disability was the “but for” cause of the adverse

employment action. Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th

Cir. 2019) (citing Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495,

503–04 (7th Cir. 2017)).

Plaintiffs are entitled to seek burden-shifting framework.

Here, Castetter does not seek the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). Instead, Castetter elects to pursue an Ortiz approach

of “whether the evidence [considered as a whole] would

permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude” that Dollar General

terminated Castetter because of his cancer. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at

765.

The parties agree that Castetter’s cancer diagnosis is

considered a disability under the ADA. The parties further

agree that he was otherwise qualified to perform essential

functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation regarding his disability. Therefore, we consider whether

Dollar General terminated Castetter due to his disability. 

Castetter contends that the evidence, as a whole, would

lead a reasonable jury to find Dollar General terminated him

due to his disability. Castetter first claims that comments and

actions from Hubbs and Chupp provide a discriminatory

animus regarding cancer. However, isolated comments

must be contemporaneous with termination or causally related

to the termination process in order to be probative of discrimination. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277

(O’Connor, J., concurring). Castetter states Hubbs and Chupp

were the only two in Dollar General to discriminate against
6 No. 19-2026

him but provides no evidence that the comments or conduct

from his supervisors were contemporaneous with or part of the

decision to terminate him. Castetter fails to meet the requisite

showing of discriminatory intent by showing a causal nexus

between the unprofessional remarks and the decision to

terminate him. Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7th Cir.

1996).

Next, Castetter claims that Dollar General discriminated

against him when they terminated him and did not terminate

his subordinate for the same reason. Castetter delegated his

district manager responsibilities of hiring and completing

payroll documents to a subordinate. Because she could not

complete the hiring paperwork, the applicants remained nonemployees and remained unpaid. Dollar General argues that

management decisions cannot be delegated to a subordinate.

The termination resulting from his failure to adhere to his

District Manager responsibilities cannot be compared with

discipline of a subordinate whose District Manager imposed

responsibilities beyond the scope of her employment. Therefore, the district court accurately concluded Castetter failed to

show a discriminatory animus by Dollar General.

Castetter also contends that Dollar General’s reason for

firing him was pretextual. “The only concern in reviewing an

employer's reasons for termination is the honesty of the

employer's beliefs.” Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d

416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse

Engine Division, 328 F.3d 309, 323 (7th Cir. 2003)). To show

Dollar General’s beliefs to not be credible, Castetter must

provide evidence that he was fired for reasons other than those

provided, the reasons had no grounding in fact, or were
No. 19-2026 7

insufficient to warrant termination. Senske v. Sybase, Inc., 588

F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 2009). He must show that “but for”

his cancer, he would not have been terminated. Id. Dollar

General argues it terminated Castetter for violations concerning compliance with processing employment documents,

providing key authorizations to individuals without performing proper background checks, and failure to discover a cash

discrepancy in one of his stores. At the time of his termination,

Dollar General did not believe Castetter was performing

his role as a District Manager adequately. Castetter has not

provided evidence that Dollar General’s reason for termination

is pretextual. He has failed to rebut the voluminous evidence

showing his deficiencies as District Manager. The district court

correctly determined the honesty of Dollar General’s beliefs

and its reason for firing Castetter was not pretextual. 

Finally, Castetter does not cite any evidence that would

allow for a reasonable inference that his employer did not have

honest concerns about his professionalism and work ethic.

Taken as a whole, Castetter’s claims are insufficient to meet the

level of proof that Castetter’s disability was the “but for” cause

of his termination. 

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s proper grant of summary

judgment.