COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

JOHN PRICE, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0261-98-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 JANUARY 26, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 

Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge 

 Barrett R. Richardson (Richardson and 

Rosenberg, LLC, on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 John Price, Jr. (appellant) appeals his bench trial 

conviction for petit larceny, third offense, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-104. The sole issue raised is whether the Commonwealth 

laid a proper foundation to introduce into evidence certified 

copies of appellant's prior larceny convictions. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

 I. 

 The facts are undisputed. On October 6, 1995, Carl Scott, a 

loss prevention manager at Wal-Mart, observed appellant remove 

his shirt, take a different shirt from a store rack, put it on, 

and then put his own shirt over the new shirt. Appellant took 

another shirt and concealed it in a Wal-Mart bag that he was 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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carrying. He then took two pairs of sweatpants to the men's 

fitting room, and when he exited he no longer had the pants. 

Scott testified that "you could tell by looking at [appellant] 

that he had three or four other pants on other than the pants he 

came in with." 

 After appellant left the store, Scott confronted him in the 

parking lot and identified himself as store security. Appellant 

attempted to flee but was apprehended by Scott still wearing the 

store's clothing. Its value was $65.75. 

 At trial, the Commonwealth attempted to introduce two 

certified orders of prior petit larceny convictions. Appellant 

objected on the basis that a proper foundation had not been 

established to show that he was the same person as listed on the 

conviction orders. The trial court overruled appellant's 

objection, and the two orders were admitted into evidence to 

establish the necessary predicate for the felony offense. The 

Commonwealth rested, and appellant offered no evidence. The 

trial court found appellant guilty of petit larceny, third 

offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-104. 

 II. 

 On appeal, appellant contends that the Commonwealth did not 

lay a proper foundation for the introduction of the certified 

copies of the two prior larceny convictions because it failed to 

establish that appellant was in fact the person named in the 

conviction orders. We disagree. 
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 "The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Pavlick v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 219, 232, 497 S.E.2d 920, 926 (1998) 

(citing James v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 746, 753, 446 S.E.2d 

900, 904 (1994)). 

 The decision in Cook v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 225, 372 

S.E.2d 780 (1988), is dispositive. In Cook, the Commonwealth 

offered into evidence two certified copies of court orders which 

reflected that "a person with the same name and birth date as the 

defendant" had been convicted of the respective prior crimes. 

Id. at 230, 372 S.E.2d at 783. The trial court admitted the 

records into evidence over the objection of defense counsel. See

id.

 On appeal, Cook argued that the court orders were 

inadmissible because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was 

the person named in the orders. Rejecting defendant's argument, 

we wrote: 

 Identity of names carries with it a 

presumption of identity of person, the 

strength of which will vary according to the 

circumstances. In this case, authenticated 

conviction records bore the defendant's exact 

name and birth date. Courts in many other 

jurisdictions have held that identity of the 

name of a defendant and the name of a person 

previously convicted is prima facie evidence 

of identity of person and, absent contrary 

evidence, supports a finding of such 

identity. 

 Because the name of the defendant in 

each of the two certified conviction orders 

was the same as the defendant's name and 
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because the orders bore his birth date, they 

were properly admitted by the trial court. 

Id. at 230-31, 372 S.E.2d at 783 (citations omitted) (emphasis 

added). 

 In the instant case, the certified copies of the prior 

convictions bore appellant's exact name and birth date. When he 

was arraigned, appellant confirmed that his full name was "John 

Price, Jr."; he was thirty-eight years old; and his date of birth 

was "8-12-58." Appellant also acknowledged that he was the 

person charged in the indictment with "third offense petit 

larceny from Wal-Mart on October 6, 1995." The two proffered 

petit larceny conviction orders, which contained appellant's 

exact name and birth date, is "prima facie evidence of identity 

of person and, absent contrary evidence, supports a finding of 

such identity." Id. at 230, 372 S.E.2d at 783.1 Although 

appellant objected to the admission of the two prior petit 

larceny conviction orders, he offered no evidence that he was not 

the individual named in the documents. Thus, the trial court had 

sufficient evidence to establish that appellant was the person 

named in the conviction orders and did not abuse its discretion 

in their admission. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's felony 

conviction. 

 

 1Additionally, the arrest warrants attached to the 

conviction orders contained appellant's Social Security number, 

and an individual's height, weight, race, eye color and hair 

color. The trial court could have appropriately used these to 

further bolster the identification of appellant. 
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 Affirmed.