Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed Ma y 4 , 2021.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 19

- 00921

- CR

PHILLIP ALVARADO JR. , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Caus e No. 1579245

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Phillip Alvarado, Jr

. appeals his conviction for murder. A jury found appellant guilty , and after appellant pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph, the judge assessed punishment at 25 years in p riso n. In a single issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.2 Background On October 23, 201 7 , p olice officers responded to the scene of a shooting at

a motel in Harris County. The r e they discovered c ompl a inant Danny Garcia l ying lifeless on the walkway outside of a motel room. A woman, A.M., was near complainant with bloodstai ns on her shirt , “ yelling and screaming and crying

. ” An autopsy revealed that complainant died from a “ gunsh ot wound of the to r so

. ” The bullet entered through his back and exited through his front.
A.M. testified that she was working as a prostitute at the time and complainant was helping her. On the night in question , they s topped at the motel because A .M. ’ s a cquaintance, L .R. w as s taying there and A.M. needed to use the
restroom. L.R. was sharing the room with appellant. A.M. went to L.R. ’ s room while c omplainant went to talk to a potential client for A.M. A.M. had been to the room a few times before to ha ng out and knew tha t A p pellant used the room to ba g methamphetamines and that L.R. was also working as a prostitute. According to A.M., after she entered the room, complainant returned and knocked on the door to the room. Appellant o pened the door and app ellant and complain ant began arguing

. A.M. did not recall what they were arguing about. A.M. moved between the men and tried to grab complainant and thinks she may have slapped him onc e. S he said she could tell that th e two men were about to fight and she wanted to remo ve c ompl ainant and herself from the situation. L

. R

. began screaming and A.M. “ went deaf

. ” Appellant and L.R. then hurriedly left as complainant fell to the floor and A.M. began to administer CPR.
A.M. said that no one was in the room at the time except ap pell ant, complainant, herself, and L.R. A.M. further explained that although she did not he ar a gunshot, it must have been a gun shot that made her “ go deaf

. ” She w as rais ed around guns and said t hat if a gun fires close to a person it will make them3

go d eaf. Appel lant had been right behind A.M. during the whole brief encounter as she was trying to get complainant to leave. A.M. said that she did not see appellant wi th a gun before or after the sho oting, but she had previously seen that he kept one in a dr awer in th e room. After complainant was shot , A.M. pulled him out of the room to wait for an ambulance with the help of someone from an adjacent

room . Another bystander called 911.
A.M. admitted t hat she was not truthful with police offi cers when first
que stio ned af

ter the shooting, d e nying she knew complainant and telling the officers that she was using the restroom in a bush when she saw two Hispanic men shoot complainant

. She explained her subte rfuge by saying she was scared and in sho ck at the tim e and mad and hu rt that complainant had died . A.M. acknowledged that s he had had something to drink and had taken a Valium before the shooting

. She also had charges pending against her at the time of her testimony, but she said sh e had been willing to t estify and met with the prosecutor before th ose charges

we re filed. In her testimony, L.R. corroborated that she had known A.M. for a short time and o n October 23, 2017 , A.M. came to the room L .R. was sharing with appellant t o use the ba thr oom. L.R . s aid that only she and ap pellant wer e in the room at the time. While A.M. was in the bathroom, complainant began beating on the door. When ap pellant opened the door, complainant began “ scre aming belligerently , ” saying, “ Just pop i t, m

— f

— , just pop it. ” L.R. did not recall any ph y sical confrontation or seeing A.M. become involved , but she said complainant made his way into the room , A.M. yelled , there was a loud gunshot, and
comp lainant crum

pled to the floo r.
L.R. s aid that she ha s never carried a g un a nd did not have one on that d ay, and although she had seen a gun in A.M. ’ s purse before, that played no role in tha t4

night ’ s events. L.R. said that she knew appell ant to have a gun that was readily avail able to him , althou gh s he professed she did not know where he kept it

. After the s hot was fired , appellant told L.R

. , “ Get your s

— and let ’ s go. ” The two then left quickly w ith L.R. barefoot. L.R. said tha t b efore they le ft, she saw A.M. run to complaina n t and put her arms under his arms

. A.M. said she was not going to cal l the cops. L. R. also said that she did not actually see appellant shoot complainant, but before they lef

t , she saw a gun on the end of the bed. As they walked away from the motel room, appella nt told L.R., “ I ’ m sorr y. ”
Video from a security camera that showed the o utsi de of the motel room during the relevant time period was admitted into evidence. Th e video shows two people , identified by an officer as co mplainant and A.M. , pull up to the room

. A .M. goes to the m otel roo m door , and after briefly joining h er, complainant walk s further down the walkway in front of the rooms. A male identified as appellant
open s the door and admit s A.M. A short time later , complainant comes back to the door, an d when the door ope ns, he steps just inside

. T here appears to be a commotion at t hat point between complainant and A.M. A.M. appears to be holding or pushin g complainant back , and he appear s to be w alk ing p ast her into the room. The door closes again , and a minute or so later, ano ther man and an other

w oman, identified as appellant and L .R. , em erg e and quickly walk away, with L.R. apparently barefooted . Several minutes later, A.M. emerges and pulls complainant out onto the walkway with the aid of a ne ighbor. E ventual ly , an EMS t ruck arrive s

on scene.
Other evidence demonstrated that appe llant and L.R. had rented the room where the shooting occurred on con secutiv e nights , including the night of the shooting, and DNA likely belong ing to appellant was recovered fr om a beer can fo und in the room

. A recording of appellant ’ s interview with poli ce was playe d for5

the jury in which appellant asserted he was with his girlf riend on the day in question but then admitted to being at the motel but leaving the girl that he was with there and dri ving away. Appellant also presented an alibi wi t ness who
tes tified that she was appellant ’ s girlfriend and he was with her at the time o f the shooting.
Discussion
In his sole iss ue , app ellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence t o support his convi ctio n . In reviewing evi dentiary sufficiency, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine wheth er, based on that evidence and reasonable inferenc es therefrom , a rational trier of fact could have f ound the challenged ele m ent or elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Whatley v. State , 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; see also Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318

– 19 (1979)

. In reviewing historical facts that support conflict ing inferences, we pres u me that the jury r esolved any conflicts in the State ’ s favor and defer to that resolution. Whatley , 445 S.W.3d at 166

. Each fact ne ed not point directly and independently to appe lla nt ’ s guilt , so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating c ircu m stances is suffici ent to support the conviction. Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt , and circumstantial evidence alone can be su fficient to sustain a c o nviction

. Id

. W e

e xamine events occurring before, durin g , and after the commission of the offense for in criminating evidence

. See i d

. We do not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substi tute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating th e we i ght and credibilit y of the evidence. Isassi v. State , 3 30 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). As judge of the credibility of th e witnesses, a jury may choose to believe all, som e, or n one of the6

testimony presented. Cain v. Stat e , 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 n .5 (Tex. Crim. App

. 1997). Appellant was charged with murder under section 19.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code , which provides that “[ a] person commits an offense if he: (1) intentiona lly or knowingly causes the death of an individual; [or] (2) intends t o

ca u s e serious bodily i njury and commits an act clearly dan gerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” Tex. Penal Cod e § 19.02(b). Appellant argues that the evidence w as insufficient to prove he caused complainant ’ s death ; instead,
appe llant main tains that the evidence poin ted to A.M. as the pers on who killed
comp lainant

. In support of this assertion, appe llant make s reference s to several pieces of evidence or infe rences gle a ned from the evidence, including (1) b ot h A.M. and L.R. sai d th at they did not actually see appellant shoot comp lainant ; (2) A.M. pushed and may have slapped complainant shortly before he was sho t ; (3) L.R. saw a small gun in A.M. ’ s purse the da y before the shooting ; (4) complainant was either A .M. ’ s pimp or an an gry client, which gave her a motive to shoot him; (5) A.M. stated that she was between appellant and complainant when a gun fired ; and ( 6 ) L.R. testified that she saw a gun at the en d of the bed before she and appellant left the room, su ggesting that A

. M. mu st have been the one to dispose of the weapon as no gun was fou nd when the room was searched by police. Although these are all factors the jury could have considered in making its find ing, they do not render the evidence insufficien t.
As set forth above , alt hough neither A.M. nor L.R. saw appellant shoot complainant, the ir testimony , which was corroborated to a degree by the security

cam era video, strongly supports the conclusion that h e did. A .M. testified that appellant and complainan t were in the middl e of a n altercation, with appellan t7

immediately behind her to the point where she could feel him and complainant in front of her to the point where she could touch him. A gun then fired in close proximity to her , causing her to “ go deaf ” and complainant to fal l to the fl oor. L.R. described the scene similarly and said i mmediately before the gunshot, complainant yelled at appellant, “Just p op it, m

— f

— , just pop it.” Both women testified t hat they knew appellant to have a gun close at hand

. A lso , according t o bo th women, appellan t left the scene immediately after the shoo ting , and L.R. said that he told her “ I ’ m sorry ” as they walked away fro m the motel room.
A .M. explained that she was push ing complainant and may have slapped him in her att empts to get compla inan t to leave a v olatile situation. Although L.R. noted that sh e had seen a small gun in A.M. ’ s purse the day before the shooting, she also averred that that gun played no role in the s hoot ing. As judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony, the jury was free to believe this testimony. See Cain , 958 S.W.2 d at 407 n.5

. Also, the fact that L.R. saw a gun at the end of the bed b efore she left the room does not necessarily indic ate that A .M

. d i sp o sed of the gun o r was the shoote r. L.R. did not s ta te o r suggest that A.M. took the gun or shot complainant , and no thing in the record suggests that appellant could not have taken the wea pon with hi m when he left. The fact that A.M. was
repo rtedly between appellant and complainant does n ot mean that appell ant could not have shot complainant. As stated, although the jur y could have considered the points appel lant raises, these arguments do not establish that A .M. shot complainant or o therw ise render the evidence insufficient

. See Whatley , 445 S.W.3d at 166 ; Hoop er , 214 S.W.3d at 13

. Accordingly, we overrule appellant ’ s s ole issue.8

We affirm the trial court ’ s judgment.

/s/ Frances Bourliot Justice

Panel con s ists of Justices B ourliot, Zi mmerer, and Spain. Do N ot Publish

— T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2( b).