1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200 U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### DAY v . M C 

### DONOUGH, INTERIM SEC RETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTM E NT OF C O RR ECTI O NS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NTH CIRCUI T No. 04–1 32 4. Ar g u ed Feb r u a r y27, 2006 —D ec ided April 25, 20 06 Th e An titer r o r i sm an d Effe c t iv e D e athPen altyAc t of 199 6 (AED PA)

sets a on e-y earlimita t ionp e r i od forfilin ga state pr i s on er ’s feder a l hab e a s corpus pet i t i on, run ning f r om “ t h e da t e on which t h e j u dg

mentb e ca me fina l b yt h e conclus ion of dire ctreview o rt h e expira t i on of th e time forseekin gsuchr e v i ew ,” 28 U. S. C. §2244 (d)(1)(A), bu t stops the one-year clock while the pe tition er ’s “pr o per l y filed” appl i

c ationforstat e postc o n v ic tionr e lief “is pen d in g , ” §2244( d)(2). Un der Eleventh Circuit precedent, which is not challenged here, that to lling period does notinclude t h e 9 0 da ys inw h i c ha petition er mig h t h a v e s o ughtce rt iora ri review in t h is Courtch a llenging s t a t e-courtdenia l of postconviction relief.

Pet i t i oner Day’s Floridat r ia l-courts e nt ence wa s a ffirmed on De

c e mber21, 19 99, an d h i s ti me to seek th i s Cou r t ’s r e v i ewof th e fin a l s t at e-courtdecis i on expired on Ma rch 2 0 , 2 0 0 0

. Da y u n s ucces s f ully sou g h tstate postc o n v ic tionr e lief 353 da y s later

. Th e tr ial c o u r t ’s judgment was affirmed on appeal, effective December 3, 2002. Day petition ed forfeder al h abeas r e lief 36 day s later , onJanu a r y8, 2003. Flor ida’s an s w er asser t ed th at th e peti t i on w a s “ti me ly” bec a u s e it w a s file d af ter35 2 d a y s of u n t olled t i me. In spec tin gth e an sw eran d att ac h m en ts, h o w e v e r , a Feder a l M a g i str ate Ju dg e deter m in ed th at the St ate ha dmisca l culatedthe tol ling ti me: Under the controlling Elev en thCir c u i t pr ec eden t, th e u n t olled time w a s ac tu al ly388 day s , renderin g t h e pet i t i on unt imely. Aft e r a ffording Da y a n opport unit y t o s h ow ca us e why t h e pet i t i on s h ould notb e dismiss e d for fa ilure t o meet AED PA’ s on e-y e ardeadlin e, th e M a g i str ate Ju dg e fou n dpeti

tion er ’s r e spon ses in adequ a te an d r e c o m m en ded dismi ssa l. Th e D i s t r ictCourta d opt e d t h e recommenda t ion, a n d t h e Elevent hCircuita f

-2 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH Sy llabu s fir m ed, c o n c l udin gth at a S tate’s paten t l yer r o n e ou s con c e ssionof t i melines s does notcompromis e adist rictcourt ’s a u t h orit y suaspon te to dismi ss a h abea s petit i onas u n t imely

. Held: In t h eci rcums t a nces h e re pres ent e d, t h e Dis t rict Courtha d dis

cret i on t o corr ectt h e S t a t e ’s erroneous co mput a t ion a n d, a ccordingly , to di smi s s th e h abea s pe tit i onas u n t i m el yu n d erAED PA’s on e-y e ar limit ation

. Pp. 2–11.

(a) A statute of limitations defense is not j uris d ict i ona l , t h erefore c o u r t s ar e u n dern o oblig at ionto r a ise t h e matter sua sponte
. Cf. Kontrickv. Ry an , 540 U. S. 443, 45 8. As a g e n e r a l m a t t e r , a d e f e n d a n t forfeitsastatu t e of li mitation sdefen se n o t asser t ed in its an sw er or in an amen d m en t ther e t o. See F e d e r al Ru le s of Civi l Pr oc edur e 8(c), 12(b) , a n d 15 (a) (m ade appli c abl e to feder al h abeasproceedi ng s b yRu l e11 of th e Ru les gov e rning s uch pr oceeding s)

. An d th e Cou rt w o uld coun t it an abu s e o f di scre tion to ov er rid e a State ’ s d e liber ate w aiv e rof th e limi

tation sdefen se. But, in appr opriate c ircu msta nces, adistr i ct c o ur tmay r a is e a t i m eb ar o n it so w n i n it ia t iv e . Th eDi s tri ct Co urt i n th isca s e confr o n t e d no in te lligen t w a iver on the State’ s p ar t , on ly an evid en t m i sc alc u l a t i onof t i m e . Inth i ss it u at i o nth e Cou rt d e c l in e sto a do p t e i

th e ran inflexible rule requirin g dis m is sal wheneve r AEDPA’s oneyea rclockha s run, o r , a tt h e oppos i t e ext r eme, arul e t r ea t i ng t h e Sta t e’s fa ilu r e in itia llyto plead th e on e-y e arbaras anab solu t e w a iv er . Rath er , th e Cou r tholds th a t adist rictcourtha s dis cret i on t o dec i de w h e th erth e admin i str ationof ju st ic e is betterser v ed by dis

mis s ing t h e cas e on st at ut e of limit at ions grou nds or b y rea ching t h e m e r i t s o f t h e p e t i t i o n . Th is reso lu tion aligns th e statu t e of limitation s withoth e r af firmative defen s es to habeaspetiti on s , n o tab ly exhau s tion of state rem e di es , proc edu r al defau l t , and nonretr oac tivity. I n Granb err yv. Greer, 4 8 1 U

. S

. 1 2 9 , 13 3, th is Cou r th e ld th atfe der a l appe l

la t e court s have dis cret i on to cons ider asta t e pris oner’s fa ilure t o ex haust available state re medies before invoking f e deral habeas ju r i sdic tiondespite th e St at e’s failu r e to i n ter p ose th e ex h a u s tionde

fens e a t t h e dis t rict -courtlevel. S i mila rly, in Caspariv. Bohlen , 5 10 U. S. 383, 389, th e Cou r th e ld th at “a fe der a l c o u r tmay , bu t n e ed n o t, decline t o a p ply [t he nonret r oa ct ivit y rule a nnounced i n Teagu ev. Lane , 489 U. S. 288, 310,] i f th e Sta t e do es n o t ar g u e it.” It w o u l d make sc an t se n s e to distin g u ishAED PA’s time barfr om th ese oth e r th r e sh old c o n s tr ain t s onfeder al h abeas p e tition er s. Wh ile a distr i c t c o u r tis n o t requ ir ed to dou b le-c h e c kthe State’s ma t h , c f

. Pliler v. Ford, 5 4 2 U

. S

. 2 2 5 , 2 3 1 , n o Ru le, statu te, orc o n s titu tion al pr ov ision comma nds ajudge who det e ct s aclea r comput a t ion error t o s u ppres s th at kn ow ledge. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ

. Pr oc . 6 0 (a). Th e Cour t n o tes par

tic u l ar lyth atth e M a g i str ate Ju dg e, in steadof ac tin g sua spo n te , mig h t h a v e in for med th e St ate of it s obv i ou s c o mpu tati oner r o ran d3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s
en ter tain e d a namen dmen t to th e St ate’s an sw er . See, e.g . , Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a). There is no di spositive difference b e tween that r o u t e, an d th e on e takenh e re. Pp. 2–10.

(b) Before acting sua spont e , acou r tmus ta ccordt h e p a rt ies fa ir n o tic e an d an oppor t u n i tyto pr esen t th eir position s. It mu st also a s su r e itself th a tth e pe tit i on eris n o tsig n ifi c an tlypr eju d ic ed byth e de

lay e d foc u s on th e li mit atio nissu e, an d“ d eter min e w h e th erth e in

ter e sts of ju st i c e w o u l d be b e tterser v ed” byaddr ess i n gth e mer i ts or bydismi ssin g th e petitiona s time bar r e d. See Gran b er ry, 481 U

. S ., at136

. Her e , th e M a g i str ate Ju dg e g a v eD a ydu e n o tic e an d a fair opport unit yt o s h ow why t h e limit at ion period s h ould notyield dis

miss al. Th e notic e issu ed so me n i n e mon t h s afterth e State’s an sw er . No court p r oceedings or act i on occu rr ed inth e in ter i m, an d n o th in g su g g e sts th at th e State “s tr ateg i c a lly” w i t h h e ld th e defen s e or c h o se to r e lin qu ish it. Fr om al lth atappe ar s inth e r e c o r d , th er e w a s mer e lyanin a dv e r t en t err o r, a misc alc u l ationth at w a s plainu n d er Circuitprecedent , a n d no ab us e of dis cret i on in following Gra nb erry an d Caspari. P. 11. 391 F. 3d 11 92 , affir m ed.

G IN SB U R G , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and K ENNEDY , S OUTER , and ALITO , JJ., joined. S TEVENS , J., filed a nopinion diss ent i ng from the j u dgment , in which B REYER , J., joined. S CALI A , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which T HOMAS and B REYER , JJ., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rma l revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 04–1 32 4 

### PATRIC K DAY, P E TI TIONE R v. JAMES R.

M C 

### DO NO UG H , INT E RIM S E C RETARY , FLO RIDA DEPARTM E NT OF C O RR EC T I O N S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Apr il 25, 20 0 6 ] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G

### delivered the opinion of th e Court. This case concerns the authority of a U. S. Distric t Court, on its own initiative, to dis m iss as untimely a state prisoner’s p e tition for a writ of h abeas corpus. The Anti

terrorism and Effect ive Death Penalty Act of 19 96 (AEDPA), 1 10 Stat. 12 14, sets a one-year limitation period for filing su ch petitions, running from “the date on which the judgme nt became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such r e view.” 28 U. S. C. §2 244(d)(1)(A). The one- year clock i s stopped, however, du ring the tim e the petitioner’s “pro p erly filed” application for state postconvicti on relief “is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). Under Eleventh Circu i t precedent, that tolling period does not include the 90 days in which a petitioner might hav e sought certiorari review in th is Court chal lenging state-court denial of postconviction relief. Coates v. Byrd , 211 F. 3d 1225, 1227 (2000). In the case before us, the State’s answer to the federal habeas petition “agre e [d] the pe tition [was] timely” be

-2 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt 

### cause it wa s “filed after 352 days of untolled time.” App. 24. Inspecting the pleadings and attachments, a Federa l Magistrate Judge deter m ined that the Sta t e h a d miscalcu

lated the tolling time. Under Circuit precedent, the u n tolled time was 388 days, rendering the petition untimel y by some three weeks. After affor d ing the p e titioner an opportunityto show cause why the petition should not be dismissed f o r failure to meet the statutory deadline, an d finding petitioner’s res p onses ina d equate, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the petition. The Dis

trictCourt adopted th e Magistrat e Judge’s r e commenda

tion, and t h e Court of Appeals af firmed, concluding tha t “[a] concession of timel i ness by the state that is patently erroneous does not compromise the authority of a district court sua s p onteto dismiss a hab eas petitionas untimel y, under AE DPA.” Day v. Crosby , 391 F. 3d 1192, 1195 (CA11 2004 ). The question presented is whethera federal c o urt lacks authority, on its own initiative, to dismiss a habeas peti

tion as untimely, once t h e State has answered the petition without co ntesting it s timeliness. Ordina r ily in civi l litigation, a statutory time lim itation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in anamendmen t thereto. Fe d. Rules Ci v. Proc. 8(c), 12(b), and 15(a). An d we would count it an abuse of discretion to override a State’ s deliberate waiver of alimi t ations defe nse. In thi s case, however, the federal court confronted no intelligen t waiver on the State’ s part, only an evident miscalculation of the elapsed time un der a statute designed to impose a tight time constraint on federal habeas petitioners. 1 

### I n

——————

1 Until AEDPA took effect in 199 6, no statu te of limi tat io ns applied to h abeas peti tio n s. See Ma ylev. Felix, 545U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 7)

. Court s invoked t h e doc t rine of “ p rej u dicia ldela y” t o s creen out unreasonably late filings. See gene rally 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman , Feder a l Habe as Cor p u s Pr a c tic e an d Pr oc edu r e §24 (4t hed. 200 1). I n AEDPA, Congres s pres crib e d auniform ru le: “A 1

- yea rp e riod of limit a -Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) 3 Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the circum s tances her e presented, we hold, the federa l court had discretion to corre ct t h e State’s error and, ac cordingly, to dismiss the petiti on as untimely under AEDPA’s o n e-year limitation. I Petitioner Patric kA. Da y was convicted of seconddegree murder and sentenced to 55 years inprison by a Florida tri al court. Day unsu ccessfully appealed the sentence, which was affirmed on December 21, 1999. Day did not seek this Court’s revi ew of the fin a l state-cou r t decision; hi s time to do so expired on March 20, 2000. Three hundred and fifty-three (353) days later, Day unsuccessfully sought state post conviction relief. The Florida trial court’s judgmentdenying relief w a s affirme d on appeal, and the appellate court issued its mandate on December 3, 2002. See Nylandv. Moore , 216 F. 3d 1264, 1267 (CA11 2000) (under Florida law, appellate order “is pending” u n til the mandate issues). Thirty-six (36) days thereafter, on January 8, 2003, Day petitioned for federal habeas reli ef asserting several claims of ineffective assis

tance of trial counsel. A Magistrate Judge, finding th e petition “in proper form ,” App. 21, ordered the State to fil e an answer, id., at 21– 22. In its responsive pleading, the State failed to raise AEDPA’s o n e-year limitation as a defense. S ee supra , at 2. Overl ooking controlling Elev

enth Circuit precedent, see Coates , 211 F. 3d, at 1227, the State calcul ated that the petition had been “fi l ed after 352 days of untolled time,” and was therefore “timely.” App. 24. The State’s answer and attachments, however, re

vealed that, had the State foll owed the Eleventh Circuit’s instruction on computation of elapsed time, the timeliness concession would not h a ve beenmade: Under the Circuit’s

—————— tionsh all ap plyto anapp lic ationfora w r i t of h abeas c o r p u s bya pers on in cus t o dy purs ua ntt o t h e j u dgmentof a Sta t e court .” 28 U. S. C. §2244 (d)(1).4 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt 

### precedent, more than one year, s p ecifically, 388 days of untolled ti me, had passed between the fina lity of Day’s state-court conviction and the filing of his federal habeas petition. 2 

### A newly as signed Mag i strate Jud ge noticed the State’s computation error and ordered Da y to show cause why his federal habeas petition should not be dismissed as u n timely. Id., at 26–30. Determining that Day’s responses did not overcome the time bar, the Magistrate Jud ge recommended dismissal of the petition, App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a–15 a, and the DistrictCo urt adopted that recom mendation, id., at 7a. The Eleventh Circuit granted Da y a certific a te of ap

pealability on the question “[w]h e ther the district court erred in addressing th e timeliness of [Day’s] h abeas corpus petition .

. . after the [State] had conceded that [the] peti

tion was ti mely.” Ap p. 37. In a decision rendered t w o years earlier, Jack sonv. Se cre ta ry for D e pt. of Corre ctions , 292 F. 3d 1347 (2002 ), the Eleventh Circuit had ruled that, “even though the statute of limitations is an affirma

tive defense, the distri ct court ma y review su a sponteth e timeliness of [a federal habeas] petition.” Id. , at 1349. Adhering to Jackson , and satisfied that the State’s conces

-

——————

2 Da y ur ges t h is Courtt o find his petit i on t i mely. He as s e rt s t h att h e Elevent hCircuitmis i nt erpret ed §2 2 4 4 ( d)(2 ) in holding t h a t AEDPA’s t i me limita tion wa s nott o lled duri ng t h e9 0

- da y period he could ha v e petition ed th is Cou r tto r e v i ewth e den i alof h i s mot i onforstate pos t

c o n v ic tion r e li ef. See Br ief forPetition er4 5–5 0. Th is questionw a s n o t “set out in the petition [for certiorari], or fairly included therein,” an d we t h erefo re do notco ns ider ithe re. T h is Court ’s Rule 1 4

. 1 ( a)

. We not e , howeve r, t h a tt h e Courtrecent ly gra n t e d cert iora ri in Lawrenc e v. Florida , No. 0 5–8 82 0 (c er t. g r an ted, M a r. 27, 20 06), w h i c hpr esen ts th e q u es t i on whether AEDPA’s t i me limit at ion is t o lled du ring t h e pend

en c yof a petit i onforcer t iorar ifr om a ju dg men tden y ingstate pos t c o n viction relief. The instant opinion, we emphasize, add r esses only th e au th or ityof th e D i str i c tC o u r tto r a ise AED PA’s ti m e bar , n o t th e corre ct nes s of it s decis i on t h a tt h e limit a t ion period ha d run .5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### sion of timeliness “was patently erroneous,” the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of D a y’s petition. 391 F. 3d, at 1192–1195. 3 

### We granted certiorari sub nom. Dayv. Crosby , 545 U. S. __ (2005), i nview of th e division among the Circuits on the question whether a district cour tmay dismiss a federal habeas peti tion as unt imely under AEDPA, despite the State’ s failure to raise the one-year limitation in its an

swer to the petition or its erroneous conc ession of t h e timeliness i ssue. Com p are, e.g., Long v. Wilson , 393 F. 3 d 390, 401–4 04 (CA3 2004), and 391 F. 3d, at 1194–1195 (case below) , with Scott v. Collins , 286 F. 3d 923, 930–9 31 (CA6 2002), and Nardi v. Stewa r t , 354 F. 3d 1134, 1141– 1142 (CA9 2004). II

A statute of limitations defe nse, th e State acknowledges, is not “juris dictional,” hence courts are under n o obligation to raise the time bar su as p o n te
. See, e.g. , Acostav. Artu z , 221 F. 3d 1 17, 122 (CA2 2000); Hill v. Braxton , 277 F. 3 d 701, 705 (C A4 2002); Davis v. Johnson , 158 F

. 3d 806, 81 0

——————

3 Da y rea d s t h e Elevent hCircuit ’ s opinionin t h is ca s e a s rendering ma nda t o ry adis t rictcourt ’ s sua spo n te application of AEDPA’s oney e arlimita t io n , ev enwh en th e r e spon dent elec ts to w a i v e th e limita

tionan d oppo se th e pe tition solelyon th e mer i ts. See T r . of O r a l Ar g . 6–8. He points to a sentence in the Eleventh Circuit’s brief per cu riam opin ionstat in g : “A feder al c o u r tth at sits inc o llater a l r e v i ewof a crimina l j u dgmentof ast at e courtha s a nob liga t ion t o enforce t h e feder al statu t e of limitat ion s .” 391 F. 3d, at 119 4. We r e ad th e Elev

ent hCircuit ’ s s u mma ry dis p os it ion in line wit ht h a tcourt ’s des cript ion of its c o n t r o lli n gpr ec eden t: “We .

. . r u l ed th at, ‘ev e nth ou g hth e statu te of limitations is an affirmative defens e, t h e dis t rictcourt mayrevie w sua spo n teth e timelin es s of [a feder a l h ab e as] peti tion .’ ” Ibid. (refer

ring t o Jack so nv. Se cre tary for Dept. of Co rre ction s , 292 F. 3d, at 1 3 4 9 (emph asi s a d d e d)); see a l so 3 91 F. 3d, at11 95 ( S ta te’s “pa t en tlyer r o n e ous ” conces s i on of t i meliness “ d oes notcompromis e the authorityof a dis t rictcourt sua spont eto dismi ss a h abeas pe titio nas u n t imel y” under AEDPA’s one-year lim itation (emphasis adde d)).6 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt 

### (CA5 1998); cf. Kont rickv. Ryan , 540 U. S. 443, 458 (2004) (defendant forfeited untimeliness argument “by failing to raise the issue until after [the] complaint was adjudicat e d on the merits”). In th is respect, the limitations defense resembles other threshold barriers—exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, nonretroactivity—courts have typed“nonjurisdictional,” although recognizing tha t those defen s es “implic at[e] values beyond the concerns of the parties.” Acosta , 221 F. 3d, at 123 (“The AEDPA statute of li mitation promotes judi cial efficien cy and con

servation of judicial resources, safeguards the accurac yof state court judgments by requiri ng resolution of constitu

tional quest ions while t h e record is fresh, and lends final

ity to state court judgm e nts within a reasonabl e time.”). On the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine, requiring state prisoners, befor e invoking federal habeas jurisdic

tion, to pursue remedies available in state court, Gra n berr yv. Greer , 48 1 U. S. 12 9 (1 98 7), i s t h e p a t h m a r k i n g case. We h e ld in Gran b erry that f e deral appellate courts have discre tion to consider the issue of exhaustion despite the State’s failure to interpose the defense at the distric t

court level. Id., at 133. 4 

### Later, in Casp ariv. Bohlen , 510 U. S. 383, 389 (1994), we similarly held th at “a federal court may, but need not, dec line to apply [the nonretroac

tivity rule announced in Teaguev. Lane , 48 9 U. S. 288, 310 (1989),] if the State does not argue it.” See also Schiro v. Fa rley , 5 10 U. S. 22 2, 229 (199 4) (declining to a ddres s nonretroactivity defense that State raised on ly in Supreme Court merits brief, “[a] lthough we undoubtedly have the discretion to reach” the argument). While the i ssue remai n s open in this Court, see Tres tv.

——————

4 InAED PA, en ac ted n e ar lya dec a de afte r Granb e rry , Congres s ex pr esslypr ov ided th at “[a] S t ate sh all n o t b e deemed to h a v e w a iv ed the exha us t i on req u irementor b e es t o pped from relia nce upon t h e re q u irementun les s t h e S t ate, t hrou g h co uns el, expres s l y wa ives t h e r e qu ir emen t.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(3).7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Cain , 522 U. S. 87, 90 (1997), 5

### the Courts of Appeals have unanimousl yheld that, in appropriate circumstance s , courts, on their own initiative, may raise a petitioner’s procedural default, i.e. , a petitioner’ s failure properly to present an alleged constitutional error in state court, and the conseq uent adequacy and in dependence of state-la w grounds for the state-court judgm e nt. See Brewe rv. Mar

shall , 119 F. 3d 993, 999 (CA1 1 997); Rosario v. Uni t ed Sta t es , 164 F. 3d 729, 732 (CA2 1998); Swegerv. Chesney , 294 F. 3d 506, 520 (CA3 2002); Yea t tsv. Angelone , 1 66 F. 3d 255, 2 61 (CA4 19 99); Magouirk v. Philli ps , 144 F. 3 d 348, 358 (C A5 1998); Sowell v. Bradshaw , 37 2 F. 3d 821 , 830 (CA6 2 004); Kurzawav. Jord an , 146 F. 3d 435, 440 (CA7 1998); King v. Kemna , 266 F. 3d 816, 822 (CA8 2001) (en banc); Vang v. Nev a da , 329 F. 3d 1069 , 1073 (CA9 2003); United Sta t esv. Wis e man , 2 97 F. 3d 975, 979 (CA1 0 2002); Moo nv. Head , 285 F. 3d 1 301, 1315, n. 17 (CA1 1 2002). Petitioner Day relies heavily on Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States Dis

trict Courts (Habeas Rules), i.e. , the procedural Rules governing federal habeas petitions from state prisoners, i n urging that AEDPA’s li mitation may be raised by a federal court sua s p onteonly at the prea nswer, initial screenin g stage. Hab e as Rule 4 provides th at district courts “must promptly examine” state pr isoner habeas p e titions an d must dismiss the petit i on “[i]f it plainly appears .

. . that the petitioner is not entitledto relief.” Once an answer has been or dered and f iled, Day m a intains, the court loses authority t o rule the petition untimely sua sponte
. 6

### At

——————

5 Tr esth e ld th at a Cou r tof Appeal s w a s n o t oblig ed to r a ise pr oc e dura l defa ult on it s own init ia tive, b u tdeclined t o decide whet h er court s ha ve di s cret i on t o do s o . 5 2 2 U

. S

. , a t 8 9

.

6 Were we t o acceptDa y’s pos i t i on, court s would never ( o r, a tlea s t, hardly eve r) b e positioned to raise AEDPA’s time bar sua spont e . As this Court recognized in Pliler v. Ford, 542 U. S

. 225 , 232 (2004), i nfor

-8 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt 

### that point, according to Day, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure hold sway. See H abea s Rule 11 ( “ The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent tha t they are not inconsistent with any statutoryp r ovisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.”). 7 

### Under the Civil Procedure Rules, a defendant forfeits a statute of limitations defense, see Fed. Rule C i v. Proc. 8(c), not asserted in its answer, see Rule 12(b), or an amend

ment thereto, see Rul e 15(a). The State, on the other hand, points out that the statute of limitations is akin to other affirmative defenses to habeas petitions, notably exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, a n d nonretroactivity. Indeed, the statute of li mitations is explic itly aligned with those othe r defenses u n der the current vers ion of Hab e as Rule 5(b), which pro v ides that th e Stat e’s a n swer to a habeas peti

tion “muststate whether anyc l aim in the petition is barred by afailure to exhaust state remedies, a procedura l bar, non-retroactivity, or a statute of l i mita tions.” Th e considerations of comity, finality, and th e expeditious handling of habeas pr oceedings that motivated AEDPA, 8 

### the State maintains, counsel against an excessively rigid or formal approach to the affirmative defenses now list e d in Habeas Rule 5. Citing Granb erry , 481 U. S., at 131 – 134, as the instructive case, the State urges express rec

ognition of an “interme diate appro a ch.” Brief for Respon

-

—————— mati on essen t ial to th e tim ecal c u l at ion isoften abs en t—asit w a si nth is cas e—un t ilth e S tate hasfil e d, al ong w ith its a n s w er, c o pies of docu men t s fro mth e state- c our t p r oc ee dings.

7 Th e Habeas Ru les w e r e amen ded afterth e pr oc eeding s below

. We cit e t h e curre ntvers ion b e ca us e b o t hpart ies a g ree t h a tt h e a m end

ments to Rules 4 and 11, effective December 1, 2004, wrought no releva nts u b s ta nt ive cha nge .

8 See Rhines v. We b er, 5 44 U. S. 269 , 276 (2005) (AE D PA’s tim ebar “ qu i te p l ain lyse rv e sth e w e l l -r ec ogni ze d in ter e s tinth e f i n a li ty of s t a t e c o u r t ju dg m e n t s ” ; i t“r e du c e s th e p o ten t i a l forde l ay onth e r o a d to fi n al

i ty [

. ] ” ( qu o ti n g Duncanv. W a lk er, 533U. S. 167 , 179(2 001))).9 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### dent 14 (internal quota tion marks omitted); see also id., at 25. In lieu of an inflexible rule requiring dismissal when

ever AEDPA’ s one-year clockhas run, or, at the opposite extreme, a rule treating the State’s failure initially to plead the one-year bar as an absolute waiver, the State reads the st atutes, Rules, and decisions in point to permit the “exercis e [of] discretion in each case to dec i de whether the administration of justice is better served by dismissing the case onstatute of limitat ions grounds or by reaching the merits of the petition.” Id. , at 14. Employing tha t “intermediate approach ” in this particular case, the Sta t e argues, the petition should not be deemed timely simply because a government attorney calculated the days i n between petitions incor r ectly. We agree, noting particularlythat the Magistrat e Judge, instead of acting sua spo n te , might have informed the State of its obvious computatio n error and entertained an amendm ent to the State’ s answer. See F e d. Rule Ci v. Proc. 15(a) (leave to amend “shall be freel ygiven wh en justice so r e quires”); s ee als o 28 U. S. C. §2243 (State’s response to habeas pet i tion may be amended by leave of court); cf. Long , 393 F. 3d, at 402–404 (Di s trict Court raised the statute of limitation s sua sponte , the State agreed with that disposition, an d the Court of Appeal s treated tha tagreement as a cons tructi ve am endment to the State’s answer). Recognizing that an am endment to the State’s answer mig h t have obviated this controversy, 9 

### we see no dispositive differe nce between that route, an d the one tak e n here. S ee Brief forRespondent 24 (“Here , the State di d not respond to the s h ow cause order because its concessi on of timel i ness was based on a nerroneou s calculation and it agre ed the petition should be dismissed as untimel y.”); cf. Slac kv. McDanie l , 5 2 9U. S

. 47 3, 48 7

——————

9The Courtis una nimous ont h is point

. S e e post , at 5, n . 2 (S CALI A , J., dissenting).10 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH Opinion of t h eCourt 

### (20 0 0 ) (a dmoni s hi n g agai ns t i n terpre ta tio nof pro c e d u r a l p r es c ri p tio n s in fe de r a l habea sca s e s to “t r a p the u n w a ry pro sepri s on er” (qu o ti ng Ro sev. Lund y, 4 5 5 U

. S

. 5 0 9 , 520 ( 1 98 2) ))

. In sum, we hold that district courts are per m itted, but not obliged, to consider, sua spo n te , the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition. We so hold, noting that i t would make scant sense to distinguish inthis regard AED PA’s ti me bar fro m other th reshold constraints on federal habeas petitioners. See supra , at 6–7; Habeas Rule 5(b) (placing “a statute of l i mitations” defense on a par with “failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, [and] non-retroactivity”); Lo ng , 393 F. 3d, at 40 4 (“AEDPA’ s statute of l i mitations advances the same co n cerns as those advanced by the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default, and must be treated the same.”). We stress that a district cou rt is not required to doublecheck the State’s ma th. If, as this Cour t has held , “[d]istrict j u dges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants,” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U. S. 2 25, 2 3 1 (2 00 4) , 10

### the n , b y th e sa me to ke n, t h e y su re ly h ave n o obligation to assist attorneys representing the Stat e. Nevertheless, if a judg e does detect a clear c o mputation error, no Rule, statute, or constitutional provision com

mands the judge to suppress that k n owledge. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(a) (clerical errors in the record “arising from oversight oromission may b e corrected by the cour t

——————

10 The pro c edur a lhindra nce i n Pliler was the petitioner’s failure to exha us ts t a t e remedies

. Th e Courtin t h atca s e declined t o rule on t h e propriet y of the s t a y -a nd-ab e ya nce proce d ure t h a twould enab l e a hab e a s pet i t i oner t o rema in in federa l courtwhile exh a us t i ng unex ha us t e d cla i ms in s t at e cou r t
. 5 4 2 U

. S

. , a t 2 3 1

. In a la t e r decis i on, Rhine s, 544 U. S

. , at 278–279 , t h i s C o u r t h e l dt h a t ad i s t r i c tc o u r th a s disc r e tionto staya mix e dpetition( i.e. , on e th at in c l u d es bothex h a u s ted an d u n e xh au sted c l aims) to al l o wa h abeas petition erto pr esen t h i s u n ex h a u s ted c l aims to th e stat e c o ur t inth e fir s t in stan c e , th enr e tur nto feder al c o ur t forr e v i ewof h i s per fec ted petition

.11 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party”). Of course, before acting on its own initiative, a cour t must accor dthe parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions

. See, e.g. , Acosta , 2 21 F. 3d, a t 124–125; McMillanv. Jarvis , 332 F. 3d 244, 250 (CA4 2003). Fu rther, the court must assure itself that th e petitioner is not significantlyprej udiced by the delayed focus on the limitationissue, and “determine whether the interests of justice wo uld be better served” by add r essing the merits or by dismi ssing the p e tition as time barred. See Granberr y, 4 81 U. S., a t13 6. 11 

### Here, the Magistrate Judge gave Day due notice and a fair opportu nity to show why the lim itation period should n o t yield dismissal of th e petition. The notice issued some nine mont hs after th e State answ e red the p e tition. No court p r oceedings or action occu rred in the interim, and nothing in the record suggests th at the Stat e “strategic a lly” withh e ld the de

fense or chose to relin quish it. From all that appears in the record, there was merely an inadvertent error, a mis

calculation that was pl ain under Circuit prece d ent, and n o abuse of discretion in following this Court’s l e ad in Gra nberryand Ca s p ar i , described supra , at 6–7. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

——————

11 A dis t rictcou r t ’ s dis cret i on is confined within t h es e limit s . As ea r lier noted, sh ould a St ate intelligen tly choose to wa ive a st atute of limit ation s def e n s e, a di str i c tc o u r tw o u l d n o t be atliber tyto d i sr eg ar d th at c h o ic e. See supra , at 2. Bu t see post , at 7 (S CALI A , J., dissenting)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) S TEVENS , J., di ssen t in gfr om ju dg men t 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 04–1 32 4 

### PATRIC K DAY, P E TI TIONE R v. JAMES R.

M C 

### DO NO UG H , INT E RIM S E C RETARY , FLO RIDA DEPARTM E NT OF C O RR EC T I O N S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Apr il 25, 20 0 6 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , wi t hwhom J USTICE 

### B R E YER 

### joins, dissenting from the judgment. Although J USTICE 

### B RE YER

### and I disagree on the proper answer to t h e question on which we g r anted certiorari—in my view, J USTICE 

### G IN SBURG 

### ’s opi n ion for the Court cor

rectly decid e s that question, while J USTICE 

### B REYER

### has joined J USTICE 

### S CALI A

### ’s dissentin g opinion—we agree on the proper disposition of this case. In our view, the Cour t should announce its opinion now, but it sho u ld postpone the entry of judgment pending our decision in Law ren cev. Florida , No . 05–8820 (cert. grante d , Mar. 27, 2006). As J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G

### notes, the question whether the Court of Appeals correctlyco ncluded th at Da y’s h abeas corpus petition was barred by the statute of limitat ions willb e answered by our decision in Lawrence

. See ante , at 4, n. 2. It seems im provident to affirm a p o ssibly erro neous Cour t of Appeals judgment th at dismissed Day’s hab eas petition without an evaluation of its merits when we have already granted cer t iorari to a ddress the i ssue on which the Cou r t of Appeals may have erred. Of c o urse, the Court of Ap

peals may avoid a miscarriage of justice by keeping thi s case on its docket unti lafter we decide Law rence , but i t would be better pra ctic e for us to do so ourselves. Accord

-2 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH S TEVENS , J., di ssen t in gfr om ju dg men t 

### ingly, we re spectfully d i ssent from the entry of the Court’s judgment a tthis time._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 04–1 32 4 

### PATRIC K DAY, P E TI TIONE R v. JAMES R.

M C 

### DO NO UG H , INT E RIM S E C RETARY , FLO RIDA DEPARTM E NT OF C O RR EC T I O N S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Apr il 25, 20 0 6 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### , wit hwhom J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### an d J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### join, dissenting. The Court today disregards the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil Rules) in habeas corpus cases, chiefly because it b e lieves thatthis departure will ma ke no differ

ence. See ante , at9. Even if th at were tru e, which it is not, I could not join this novel presumption againsta pply

ing the Civil Rules. The Civil Rules “govern th e procedure inthe Unite d States district courts in all suits of a civil natu r e.” Rule 1. This includes “proceedings for .

. . habeas corpus,” Rule 81(a)(2), but only “to the extentt hat the p r a ctice in suc h proceedings is not s e t forth in s t atutes of the United States [or] the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases [Ha

beas Rules] ,” Civil Rul e 81(a)(2); see also Habeas Rule 11. Thus, “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the context of habeas suit s to th e extent that they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Cor p us Rules,” Woodfordv. Gar ceau , 5 38 U. S. 202, 208 (200 3), and do not contradict or undermine the provisions of th e habeas corpus statute, Gonzalezv. Crosby , 545 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 4–5). As the Cour t notes, the Civil Rules adopt the t r aditional2 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### forfeiture rule for unpleaded limitations defenses. See ante , at 8 (citing Rules 8(c), 12(b), 15(a)). Th e Court does not identify any “incon sisten[cy]” between this forfeiture rule and th e statute, Rules, orhistorical practice of habeas proceedings—because there is n o ne. Forf eiture of t h e limitations defense is demons trably not inconsistent with traditional habeas p r actice, because, as t h e Court ac

knowledges , habeas practice included no statute of limita

tions until 1996. Ante , at 2, n. 1; see also infra, at 3–5. Forfeiture is perfectly consis tent with Habeas Rule 5(b) , which now provides that the State’s “answer .

. . must state whet her any claim in the petition is barred by .

. . statute of limitations.” (Emphasis added.) And forfeiture is also consi s tent with (and indeed, arguably suggested by) Habeas Rule 4, becau s e Rule 4 provides for sua sponte screening and dismiss a l of hab ea s petitions only priorto the filing of the State’s responsive pleading. 1 

### Most importantly, ap plying the forfeiture r u le to the limitations period of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d) does not contra

dict or undermine any provisio n of the hab eas statute. Quite the c o ntrary, onits most natural read ing, the stat

ute calls forthe forfeiture rule. AEDPA ex pressly enacted, without further qualifi c ation, “[a] 1-year peri od of limita

tio n ” for habeas applications by persons in c u stody purs u ant to the j u dgments of state courts. §2244(d)(1) (empha

sis added). We have repeatedly stated that the enactment of time-limi t ation periods such as that in §2244(d), with

out further elaboration, produces defenses t hat are non

-

——————

1 The Courtob s e rves t h a t “ [ w]ere we t o a cceptDa y’s pos i t i on, court s would neve r ( o r, a tlea s t , ha rdly ever) b epos i t i oned t o ra is e AEDPA’ s [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1 996] time ba r sua spo n te ,” bec a u s e “in formationessen t ial to th e tim e c a lc u l ation i s oftenabsen t” at th e Ru le 4 pr esc r e en ingstag e, ante , at 7–8, n

. 6. Bu t to be di str e sse d at th is ph en o m en onis to b e gth e qu esti on—th at is, t o a s s u me t h atcourt s oughtto “be position e dto r a ise AED PA’s time ba r sua spo n te .” T h at is precisely the question before us.3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### jurisdictional and thu s subject t o waiver a n d forfeitur e . See Zipes v. Trans Wor l d Airlines, Inc. , 455 U. S. 385, 393 (1982); see also Eberh artv. United S t ates , 546 U. S. __ _, ___ (2005) (per curi am) (slip op., a t3); Kontri ckv. Ryan , 540 U. S. 4 43, 447 (2004). Absent some affirmative in

compatibility with habeas practice, there is no reason why a habeas limitations period shoul dbe any different. By imposing an unqualifi e d “period of limitation” against the background understan ding that a defense of “limitations” must be raised in the answer, see Civil Rules 8(c), 12(b), the s t atute implies that the usual forfeiture rule i s applicable. Instead of i d entifying an inconsis tency between habea s corpus pra ctice and the usual c i vil forfeiture rule, the Court urges that “it wo uld make scant sense to distinguish in this reg a rd AE DPA’s time bar from other threshold constraints on federal habeas petitioners” that may b e raised sua sponte

—ante , at 10—namely, exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, nonretroactivity, an d (prior to AEDPA) abuse of the writ. See Granb erryv. Gre er , 481 U. S. 129, 133 (1987) (exhaustion); Caspariv. Bohlen , 510 U. S. 383, 389 (1994) (nonretroactivity). Bu t unlike AEDPA’s statute of limi t ations, these defens es were all created by the habeas courts themselves, inth e exercise of their tra ditional equitable discretion, see With row v. William s , 507 U. S. 680, 717–718 (1993) (S CALI A 

### , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), because they we re seen as necessary to prot ect the inte r ests of comity and finality that fed e ral collateral review of state criminal proceedings ne cessarily implicates. See McCleskeyv. Zan t , 499 U. S. 467, 489–491 (1991) (abuse of the writ); Wain wri ghtv. Sykes , 433 U. S. 72, 80–81 (197 7) (procedural default); Te ag uev. La ne , 489 U. S. 288, 308 (1989) (nonretroactivity); Rosev. Lundy , 45 5 U. S. 509, 515 (1982) (exhaustion of state remedies). Unlike these other defenses, no ti me limitati o n—not even equitabl e4 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### laches—was imposed to vindic ate comity and finality. AEDPA’s 1

- year limitations pe riod is entir e ly a recent creature of statute. See ante , a t2, n. 1. If comity an d finality did not compel any time limitation at all, it follow s a fortiori that they do not compel making alegislativel y created, forfeitable time limitation nonforfeita b le

. In fact, p r ior to the e nactment o f AE DPA, we affirma

tively reject ed the notion t hat habeas courts’ traditionally broad discr e tionary po wers wo uld support their imposition of a time bar. Historically , “th ere [wa]s no statute of limitations governing federal habeas, and the only laches recognized [wa]s that which affects the State’s ability to defend against the clai ms raised on habeas”

—which wa s imposed by Rule, and not until 1977. Brechtv. Abrah a m son , 507 U. S. 619, 63 7 (1993); s ee also United Sta t esv. Smith , 331 U. S. 469, 475 (1947); 1 7 A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practi ce and Procedu r e §4268.2, p. 497–498 (2d ed. 198 8) (hereinafter Wrigh t& Miller). We repeatedly asserted thatthe passage of time alone could not extinguish the habeas c o rpus rights of a person subject to unconstitut ional incarceration. See Pennsy l

vania ex rel . Hermanv. Claudy , 350 U. S. 116, 123 (1956); Chessm anv. Te ets , 354 U. S. 156, 164–165 ( 1957). For better or for worse, this do ctrine was so well entrenched that the lower cou rts regularl y e n tertained petitions filed after even extraordinary delays. See, e.g. , Ha wkins v. Bennett , 42 3 F. 2d 948, 949 (CA8 1970) (40 years); Hamil

to nv. Wat k ins , 436 F. 2d 1323, 13 25 (CA5 19 70) (at least 36 years); Hannonv. Maschner , 845 F. 2d 1553, 155 3– 1555 (CA10 1988) (at l e ast 24 yea r s). And in1977, when enactment of the former Habeas Rule 9(a) “ i ntroduce[d ] for the firsttime an element of laches into habeas corpus,” 17A Wrigh t& Miller §4268.2, a t498—by adopting the rule against “ ‘preju dicial delay’ ” to which the Court refers, ante , at 2, n. 1—even that limited doctrine was treatedas subject to t h e very sa me plea din grequirements and forfei

-5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### ture rule that the Cour t reje cts tod a y for the stricter limi

tations period of §2244 (d). See Smithv. Secretary of New Mexico Dep t. of Correc tions , 50 F. 3d 801, 82 1–822, n. 3 0 (CA10 1995); see also McDonnell v. Estelle , 6 66 F. 2d 246, 249 (CA5 1982). There is, therefore, no support for the notion that the traditional equitable discre tion that governed habeas proceedings permitted the dismissa l of habeas petitions on the sole gro und of untimeliness

. Whether or not it shou ld have, see Collins v. Byrd , 510 U. S. 1185, 1186–118 7 (1994) (S CA LIA 

### , J., dissenting), it did not. The Court’s reliance on pre-existingequi table doctrines like procedural default and nonretroactivity is, therefore, utterly m i s placed. N o thing in our tradi tion of refusi n g

to dism iss habeas peti tions as un timely justifies the Court’s decision to beef up the presumptively forfeitable “lim itations pe

riod” of §2244(d) by making it the subject of sua s p onte dismissal. In what appears to be the chief ground of it s decision, the Court also observ es that “th e Magistra te Judge, in

stead of acting sua spo n te , might have informed the State of its obvious computation error and entertained an amendment to the State’s answer” under Civil Rule 15(a)

. Ante , at 9. “Although an amendm ent to the State’s answer might have obviated this con trover s y,” the Co urt concede s , “we see no dispositive difference between that route, and the one tak e n here.” Ibid. But this consideration cuts in the opposite direction. If ther e tr uly were no “dispositive difference” between fol l owing and disregarding the rules that Cong r e ss has enacted, the n a tural conc lusion would be that there is no compelling reas on to disregardt h e C i v il Rules. 2 

### Legislatively enacted rules are surely entitled t o

——————

2 I agree with t h e Court that today’s decision will have little im pact on the outcome of district court procee ding s . In pa rticula r , I a g ree t h at “if a[dis tr ic t] ju dg e does d e tec ta c l e a rc o mpu tatione r r o r, n o Ru le ,6 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### more respect thanthi s apparent presumption that, when nothing substantial hangs on the point, they do notappl y as writ t en. And, unli k e the novel regime tha tthe Court adopts toda y, which wi ll apparently require the develop

ment of new rules from scratch, there already exists a well-developed body o f law to go vern the di strict court s ’ exercise of discretion under Rule 15(a). See 6 Wright & Miller §§14 84–1488 (2 d ed. 1990 and Supp. 2005). Ock

ham is offe nded by today’ s decision, even if n o one e l se is

. But, in fact , there are at least tw o notable differences between the Civil Rules and the sua s p ont er e gi m e o f s u c h cases as Granber r yand Casp ari—both of which involve sufficiently significant departures from ordinary civil practice as to require c l ear authorization from the statu t e, the Rules, or historical habeas practice. First, the Granberryregim e allows the forfeited procedural defense to be raised for t h e first tim e on appeal, either by the State o r by the app e llate court sua s ponte
. See 481 U. S., at 13 0, 133; Schiro v. Farley , 510 U. S. 222, 228–229 (1994). Ordinar y ci vil practice does not allow a forfeited affirma

tive defens e whose u nderlyingfacts were not develope d below to be raised for the first time on appeal. S ee Weinbe rgerv. Salfi , 4 22 U. S. 749, 764 (1975); Metropo li

tan Housing Developm ent Corp. v. Arlington Hei ghts , 558 F. 2d 1283, 1287 (CA7 1977). The ability to raise even

—————— s t at ut e, or cons t i t u t i onal provis ion comma nds t h e j u dge t o s u ppres s th at kn ow ledg e,” ante , at 10. Rath er , a ju dg e mayc a ll t h e timelin es s issu e to th e State’s a tten t io nan d inv ite a motionto amen d th e plead

ings under Civil Rule 1 5 ( a) , under which“ l ea ve s h a ll b e freely give n when j u s t ice s o req u ires .” In fa ct , in p r oviding fo r l e a v e whene ve r “ju s tic e so r e q u ir es,” Ru le 1 5 (a), th e Civ i l Ru les fu llyac c o mmodate th e c o mityan d fin a lityin ter e s t s th at th e Cou r t th in ks r e qu i r e a depar t u r e from the Civil Rules, see ante , at 6–7, 10. Requ ir in gthe State to tak e the affirmativ e step of amen ding its own plea ding a tleas tobs e rves t h e forma lit ies of our a dvers a r y s y s t em, which is anontrivia lva lue in itself. See United S tate s v. Burk e , 504 U. S. 229, 246 (1 992) (S CALIA , J., conc urri ng inj u dgment).7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### constitutional errors in criminaltrials for the first time on appeal is narrowly cir c umscri bed. See Fed. Rule Crim

. Proc. 52(b); United Statesv. Olano , 507 U. S. 725, 73 2 (1993). Comity and finality justified this departure fro m ordinary pr actice for historica lly rooted equitable defen se s such as exhaustion. See Granbe rry , supra, at 134. Bu t limitations was not such a defense. Also, Gran b erryand the like raise the possibility tha t the courts can impose a procedural defense over the State’ s affirmative de cision to waive that defense. Th e Court ta kes care to point out th a t this is not such a case , an te , a t11, butitin vi te s su chc a ses in the fu tu r e . Af te r all , the principal justification for a llowing such defenses to be raised sua sponteis th at they“ ‘i mplicat[e] values beyond the concerns of the parties,’ ” including “ ‘judicial efficiency and conservation of j u dicial resources’ ” and“the expedi

tious handli ng of habeas proceedings.” Ante , a t6, 8 (quot

ing Acostav. Artuz , 221 F. 3d 117, 123 (CA2 2000)). There are many reasons why the State may wish to disregard the statute of limitations, includin g the simpl e bel i ef tha t it would be unfair to impose the limitations defense on a particular d e fendant. On the Court’s reasoning, a district court would not abus e its discretion in overriding th e State’ s conscious waiver of the defense in order to protect such “ ‘valu e s beyond t h e concerns of the parties,’ ” ante, at 6. 3

### Under the Civil Rul e s, by contrast, amending a pa rty’s

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3 In orde r t o a v oid t h is s e emingly u n a v oidab l e conclus ion, t h e Court asser t s, w ith ou t r e lev a n tc itationorr e as on in g , th at “s h o u ld a St ate intelligently choose to wa ive a statute of limit ation s defense, a district c o u r tw o u ld not be a tli ber t yto di sr eg ar d th atc h o ic e.” Ante, at 1 1, n . 11. Th is asser tionis c o n tr ar yto ou r state men t in Granb e rryv. Gre er , 481 U. S. 129, 1 34 (1 987)— ac a se w h i c h , onth e Cou r t ’s v i ew , i t ma kes “ s ca nt s e ns e t o dis t in guis h,” ante , at 1 0 —th a tan appell ate c o u r t maydis mis s a nu n e x h au sted petition sua spontein “ c a s es in which t h e State fails, wheth er inadv e rten tly or oth erwi se , to r aise anar g u ably merit o rious nonexha u s t ion d efens e.” (Empha s i s a dded.) To s u pportit s a s s e rt ion, t h e Courtcit e s not h ing b u tits own ea rlier s t at ement : “ Ordi

-8 D A Y v. M C DONOUGH S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### pleading over his objec t ion would constitute a clear abuse of the trial court’s disc r e tion. In sum, applying the ordinary ru le of forfeit u re to the AEDPA statute of li mitations creates no i n consistency with the H abeas Rules. On the c o ntrary, it is the Court’s unwarran t ed expansion of the ti meliness rule enacted by Congress that is incons istent with the statute, the Habeas Rules, the Civil Rules, and tradit i onal practice. I would hold that t h e ordinaryforfeiture rule, as codified in the Civil Rules, applies to the limitations period of §2244(d). I respectfullydissent.

—————— narily in civil litigat ion, a st atu tor ytime l i mit i s for feite dif n o t r a ised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendm ent thereto. Fed. Rules Civ. Pr oc . 8(c ) , 12(b), an d 15( a). An d w e w o u l d c o u n tit an abu se of d i sc r e tion to override a State ’s d e liberate waiv er of a limitations defense. ” Ante, at 2. Bu t as th e s tate men titse lf sh ow s, th e “or d in ar y” in abilityto ov er r i de th e State’s “in t e llig en t” w a iv eris c o u p led w i than“or d in ar y” automatic forf e it of the defe nse if itis no tt i mely ra is ed. T h e Court does n o t sayw h yit makes sen s e, for th e statu te of limita t ionof §2244(d)(1)(A) , to reject (as it does ) the first part of the ordinary prac

tic e (au t omat i c for feitu r e ), w h ile embr ac in gth e sec o nd (in abili tyto override intelligent waiver). The reason for rej e ct ingt h e firs tpa rt s urely a pplies j u s t a s well to t h e s e cond: S e ct ion 2 2 4 4 ( d)(1 )(A) s u ppos edly “ ‘ implicate[s ] va lues b e yond t h e concer n s of t h e pa rties , ’” including “‘judicial efficiency ,’” “‘conse r vationof judicial resources’” and “expedi

tious handling of habeas proceedings.” Ante , at 6, 8.