alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
185 La. 1083

#### STATE v. CARL THE CLEANER, Inc.

No. 33860.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 30, 1936.

L. R. Wertheimer, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Charles J. Rivet, of New Orleans, for the State.

ROGERS, Justice.

Carl The Cleaner, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the business of steam cleaning, steam dyeing, and steam pressing in the city of New Orleans. When sued by the Supervisor of Public Accounts for license taxes for the years 1933, 1934, and 1935, the corporation filed an exception of no cause of action in which it alleged that the taxing statutes, Act No. 190 of 1932 and Act No. 15 of the 3rd Extra Session of 1934, as amended by Act No. 5 of the 1st Extra Session of 1935 and Acts Nos. 7 and 10 of the 4th Extra Session of 1935, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana and enforced by the officers charged with 'their enforcement, violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that the exemption of working owners from the tax denies defendant equal protection of the law, rendering the statutes, as interpreted and enforced, unconstitutional. The court below overruled the exception and, after a trial on the merits, rendered judgment in plaintiff’s favor as prayed for. From that judgment the defendant has appealed.

The evidence and the legal principles applicable thereto bring the case within the rule announced in State v. Tung, 183 La. 281, 163 So. 101, 100 A.L.R. 1030; State v. Crescent City Laundries, 184 La. 17, 165 So. 315; and State v. Banner Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 184 La. 997, 168 So. 127.

The case of State v. Banner Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., was appealed by the defendant to the Supreme Court of the United States. But at the October, 1936, term of the court, the appeal was dismissed (57 S.Ct. 20, 81 L.Ed. -), after argument of counsel, on a motion to dismiss filed by the State of Louisiana.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6698 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to repeal the requirement 

that States establish a Medicaid Estate Recovery Program and to limit 

the circumstances in which a State may place a lien on a Medicaid 

beneficiary’s property. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 9, 2022 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY (for herself, Ms. MATSUI, Ms. CLARKE of New York, Ms. 

DELAURO, Mrs. DINGELL, Mr. QUIGLEY, Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. 

POCAN, Ms. SCANLON, Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. GARCI ́A of 

Illinois, and Ms. PRESSLEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to repeal 

the requirement that States establish a Medicaid Estate 

Recovery Program and to limit the circumstances in 

which a State may place a lien on a Medicaid beneficiary’s property. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Unfair Medicaid 

5 Recoveries Act of 2022’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6698 IH

1 SEC. 2. LIENS, ADJUSTMENTS, AND RECOVERIES FOR MED2 ICAL ASSISTANCE. 

3 (a) LIENS.—Section 1917(a) of the Social Security 

4 Act (42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)) is amended— 

5 (1) in paragraph (1)— 

6 (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph 

7 (A), by striking ‘‘plan, except—’’ and inserting 

8 ‘‘plan, except, subject to paragraph (4),—’’; 

9 and 

10 (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘in 

11 the case of’’ and inserting ‘‘with respect to liens 

12 imposed before the date of the enactment of the 

13 Stop Unfair Medicaid Recoveries Act of 2022, 

14 in the case of’’; and 

15 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

16 ‘‘(4) Notwithstanding any preceding provision of this 

17 subsection, not later than 90 days after the date of the 

18 enactment of this paragraph, a State shall withdraw any 

19 lien imposed under paragraph (1)(B) that is in effect as 

20 of such date.’’. 

21 (b) ADJUSTMENTS AND RECOVERIES.—Section 

22 1917(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)) 

23 is amended— 

24 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘except that’’ 

25 and inserting ‘‘except that, subject to paragraph 

26 (6),’’; and 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6698 IH

1 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

2 ‘‘(6) Notwithstanding any preceding provision of this 

3 subsection, no adjustment or recovery of any medical as4 sistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under 

5 the State plan may be initiated, maintained, or collected 

6 on or after the date of the enactment of this paragraph. 

7 Not later than 90 days after such date, a State shall with8 draw any lien in effect as of such date with respect to 

9 such medical assistance correctly paid.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

- 11009 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
MILTON EUGENE ROBINS , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:90

- CR

- 127

- 1

Before JOLLY, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Previously, this court determined that Milton Eugen e Robins 1 was eligible for a sentence reduction under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Robins , 703 F. App ’ x 271, 272

- 74 (5th Cir. 2017). We remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at 274. On remand, the district court granted the motion for a sentence reduction and reduced the sentence of imprisonment to 389 months.

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

1 Federal prisoner # 02993

- 078. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED March 28, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 18-11009 Document: 00514892552 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/28/2019No. 18

- 11009

2 Although Robins initially expressed his gratitude for the district court ’ s grant of relief , he s ubsequently filed a mo tion styled Nunc Pro Tunc Motion for Error Correction , asserting that the original sentence and the adjusted sentence were not comparable because the original sentence was within the original guidelines range of 360 months to life and the adjusted sentence varied upward from the adjusted guidelines range of 292

- 365 months. A comparable sentence, he contended, would have been within the adjusted guidelines range. The motion was denied, and Robins ’ s motion for reconsideration was also denied. Robins has ap pealed both orders

. We have construe d Robins ’ s Nunc Pro Tunc Motion for Error Correction

a s a successive motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Calton , 900 F.3d 706, 71 0

- 1 1 (5th Cir. 2018). The district court was not obligated to reduce Robins ’ s sentence at all and was therefore “ under no obligation to reduce it even further within the recalculated range. ” United States v. Evans , 587 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 2009). The record shows that the district court gave due consideration to the motion as a whole and considered the statutory sentencing factors; thus, there is no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Whitebird , 55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . The district court ’ s orders are AFFIRMED. Case: 18-11009 Document: 00514892552 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/28/2019
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6233 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6233

  To extend the period for adjustment of status for certain Liberian 
                   nationals, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 9, 2021

 Mr. Phillips (for himself and Mr. Cicilline) introduced the following 
       bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To extend the period for adjustment of status for certain Liberian 
                   nationals, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Liberian Refugee Fairness Extension 
Act''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN 
              LIBERIAN NATIONALS.

    Section 7611(b)(1)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (8 U.S.C. 1255 note; Public Law 116-92) is amended by 
striking ``2 years'' and inserting ``3 years''.
                                 <all>
```
#### PETTEWAY v. SHREVEPORT RYS. CO.

No. 7357.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 30, 1949.

Freyer, Goode, Nelson & Freyer, Shreveport, for appellant.

Stephens & Allen, Bryan E. Bush, Jos. H. Stephens, Jr., Shreveport, for appellee.

HARDY, Judge.

This is a suit for damages by plaintiff, who seeks to recover individually and for the use and benefit of his minor child, Harold Petteway. The case was one of four consolidated cases. Our findings are set forth in the opinion of this Court in suit entitled Moch v. Shreveport Railways Company, 41 So.2d 741.

There was judgment below rejecting the individual demands of plaintiff, together with the reconventional demand of the defendant, but allowing judgment for plaintiff for the use and benefit of his minor son in the sum of $200.00. Plaintiff has answered the appeal, praying for judgment on his individual demands and for an increase in the judgment awarded for the use and benefit of his minor son from the amount of $200.00 to $1,500.00.

For the reasons assigned in our opinion in the above numbered and entitled case, having found plaintiff liable by reason of contributory negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident, it necessarily follows that his individual demands were properly rejected.

Examination of the record, in our opinion, fails to establish the fact that the 14 year old minor suffered injuries of a severe, serious or permanent nature. Our appreciation of the facts does not justify an increase in the amount awarded by the lower court, which appears to us to be adequate.

Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellant’s cost.
Order filed April 16, 2020. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-19-00967-CV

NO. 14-20-00231-CV

____________

RAHUL K. NATH M.D., Appellant

V.

BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE AND TEXAS CHILDREN’S 

HOSPITAL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 215th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2006-10826

ORDER

On December 5, 2019, Rahul K. Nath, M.D., filed a premature notice of 

appeal. The appeal was assigned to this court under our appellate number 14-19-

00967-CV. On March 19, 2020, Rahul K. Nath, M.D., filed a second notice of 

appeal. The appeal was assigned to this court under our appellate number 14-20-
00231-CV. The final judgment from which both appeals arise was signed on 

December 27, 2019.

On March 25, 2020, appellees Baylor College of Medicine and Texas 

Children’s Hospital filed a motion to consolidate the appeals. Appellant responded. 

The motion is GRANTED and we issue the following order:

We order the appeals pending under our appellate case numbers 14-19-

00967-CV and 14-20-00231 CONSOLIDATED.

Appellees further request each party be limited to a single brief and the 

establishment of a briefing schedule. The motion is GRANTED.

In appeal number 14-19-00967-CV, appellant’s brief has been filed and 

appellees’ brief is due April 27, 2020. In appeal number 14-20-00231-CV, the 

record is due April 27, 2020.

Appellant’s amended brief, to be filed in appeal number 14-19-00967-CV 

and 14-20-00231-CV, is due thirty (30) days after the record is filed appeal number 

14-19-00967-CV. Appellee’s brief will be due thirty (30) days after appellant’s 

brief is filed. Appellee’s reply brief, if any, will be due twenty (20) days after 

appellee’s brief is filed. The parties are directed to include the appellate case 

numbers of both appeals on their briefs and all filings in this court.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Wise, and Spain.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kim Lancaster, Also Known as Kim Broadhead, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rotker, J.), rendered October 26, 1988, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon a finding that she had violated a condition thereof, after a hearing, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon her previous conviction of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

Ordered that the amended judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention with respect to the sufficiency of her plea allocution has not been preserved for appellate review as she did not move to withdraw her plea under CPL 220.60 (3) or to vacate the judgment of conviction under CPL 440.10 *(see, People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662; *People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636). Furthermore, by pleading to a lesser crime than that charged in the indictment, the defendant forfeited the right to challenge the factual basis of the plea *(see, People v Adams,*57 NY2d 1035; *People v Rivera,*143 AD2d 783).

The sentence imposed upon the finding that the defendant had violated the previously imposed sentence of probation was not an improvident exercise of the court’s discretion *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Balletta and Miller, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>


         EXHIBIT 15 - LETTER RE UNAUDITED INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION


The Board of Directors
Polaroid Corporation

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Re:  Registration Statements No. 33-36384 on Form S-8, No. 33-44661 on Form S-3,
     No. 33-51173 on Form S-8, No. 333-32283 on Form S-8, No. 333-32285 on Form
     S-8, No. 333-67647 on Form S-3 and No. 333-96051 on Form S-3 of Polaroid
     Corporation

With respect to the subject registration statements, we acknowledge our
awareness of the use therein of our report dated April 16, 2001, except as to
Note 4 which is as of May 16, 2001 related to our review of interim financial
information.

Pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933 ("the Act"), such
report is not considered part of a registration statement prepared or certified
by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the
meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.


                                             Very truly yours,

                                             /s/ KPMG LLP


Boston, Massachusetts
May 16, 2001
UNITED STATES


SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549





_______________








FORM 8-K








CURRENT REPORT,


PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF


THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934








DATE OF REPORT (Date of earliest event reported): January 25, 2013








CHYRON CORPORATION


(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)








New York
01-09014
11-2117385(State or Other Jurisdiction

of Incorporation)
(Commission File Number)
(I.R.S. Employer

Identification No.)








5 Hub DriveMelville, New York
11747(Address of Principal Executive Offices)
(Zip Code)








Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (631) 845-2000











Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions:





[ ] Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)


[ ] Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)


[ ] Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))


[ ] Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))


































Item 8.01. Other Events.





On January 29, 2013, Chyron Corporation (the “Company”) issued a press releaseannouncing it received notification from the NASDAQ Stock Market (“NASDAQ”) that it has regained compliance with the NASDAQ Listing Rule 5450(a)(1) (the "Minimum Bid Price Rule") requirement for continued listing on NASDAQ, as the bid price of the Company’s common stock closed at or above $1.00 per share for a minimum of 10 consecutive business days.





The Company received notice on November 7, 2012 that it was not in compliance with the Minimum Bid Price Rule for continued listing on NASDAQ, as the bid price of the Company's common stock closed below the minimum $1.00 per share for the 30 consecutive business days prior to the date of the letter.





The letter from NASDAQ, received on January 25, 2013 stated that the Company’s common stock closed at or above $1.00 per share for a minimum of 10 consecutive business days (from January 10, 2013 to January 24, 2013). Accordingly, the Company has regained compliance with the Minimum Bid Price Rule and this matter is now closed.


























SIGNATURES





Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Registrant has duly caused this report on Form 8-K to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.











CHYRON CORPORATIONDate: January 29, 2013
By:
/s/ Jerry KieliszakName:
Jerry KieliszakTitle:
Senior Vice President andChief Financial Officer





January 29, 2013
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

A. S. J., )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. )

) Case No. 2D18-383

C. I., )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed November 21, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas 

County; Susan St. John, Judge.

Adrian S. Johnson, pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

KELLY, SLEET, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1000

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                    NOV-26-1999
<PERIOD-END>                         MAY-28-1999
<CASH>                                     1,663
<SECURITIES>                               3,849
<RECEIVABLES>                              3,625
<ALLOWANCES>                                (517)
<INVENTORY>                                5,679
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                          14,752
<PP&E>                                     1,888
<DEPRECIATION>                             1,721
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      2,055
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                            1,561
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</TABLE>
#### Robert Sanders, Plaintiff, *v.*Victor H. Raisman, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Queens County,

December 10, 1956.

*Robert Sanders,*plaintiff in person.

*Martin, Clearwater & Bell*for defendant.

Nicholas M. Pette, J.

Motion by plaintiff for leave to reargue defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by the Statute of Limitations. In addition, plaintiff moves also for a trial by jury. As to the latter motion plaintiff could automatically demand a jury at the time he files his note of issue if this action is not dismissed. Accordingly, the motion for a trial by jury is denied as academic. Reargument of the motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.

The complaint alleges acts of malpractice occurring in 1952. The Statute of Limitations in malpractice actions is two years (Civ. Prac. Act, § 50). Since plaintiff was an infant at the time the cause of action arose his time within which to commence the action was extended by the period of his disability, *735that is, until two years after he became of age (Civ. Prac. Act, § 60), namely, July 26, 1956. The summons and complaint were not served until September, 1956 which was too late.

On this reargument plaintiff alleges (1) that he had complained of defendant to various medical grievance committees, as well as to the Governor of the State of New York, before the expiration of the time to start suit, and (2) that he filed his complaint on July 25, 1956, one day before his time expired. Plaintiff was apparently under the impression that filing the complaint constituted commencement of the action which, of course, is not the fact. *‘ '*A civil action is commenced by the service of a summons ” (Civ. Prac. Act, § 218).

Nor does it avail plaintiff that he had made earlier complaints to various other governmental agencies. This court has no power to extend the time within which an action at law may be commenced.

Plaintiff further alleges, however, that on July 25, 1956, he hired a process server to serve the defendant, but that defendant was on a trip to Europe at the time and service was not effected until September 25, 1956. It appears that defendant was absent from the State from June 15, to August 1, 1956. Since the period of his absence was less than four months it did not extend plaintiff’s time to commence the action (Civ. Prac. Act, § 19). Plaintiff could have extended his own time for 60 days by delivering the summons to the Sheriff, during which time he could have commenced service by publication or effected substituted service (Civ. Prac Act, § 17). Since plaintiff is acting as his own attorney, it is understandable that he may not be familiar with all these provisions of the Civil Practice Act. This court, however, is powerless to extend the time within which a suit may be brought. The court must, therefore, adhere to its original decision. Submit order.