FOURTH DIVISION 

March 31, 2006 

1-04-1109 

In re PHILLIP C., a minor, ) Appeal from the 

) Circuit Court of 

(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Cook County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

Phillip C., ) Honorable 

) Terrence V. Sharkey, 

Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court: 

After his arrest on March 27, 2003, the State filed a 

petition for adjudication of wardship over defendant Phillip C., 

a 16-year-old minor, alleging armed robbery and aggravated 

kidnapping of a minor as the bases for wardship. After a jury 

trial conducted pursuant to the extended juvenile jurisdiction 

prosecutions act (EJJ) (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2002)), 

defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping of Miguel B., a 

17-year-old. 

The circuit court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate 

period of time at the Juvenile Department of Corrections. The 

circuit court also imposed a 20-year adult sentence, which was 

automatically stayed and would not be executed unless he violated 

the conditions of his juvenile sentence (705 ILCS 405/5-

810(4)(ii) (West 2002)). By virtue of his conviction for 
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aggravated kidnapping of a minor, defendant was also required to 

register as a sex offender pursuant to section 2(B)(1.5) of the 

Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 

150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2002)). On appeal, defendant argues that (1) 

the Registration Act is unconstitutional as applied to him and 

(2) the circuit court's imposition of a 20-year adult sentence 

was excessive. For the following reasons, we reject defendant's 

as-applied challenge to the Registration Act and affirm the 

circuit court's imposition of a 20-year adult sentence. 

BACKGROUND 

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. At trial, 

Miguel B. testified that as he was standing by his car on the 

afternoon of March 27, 2003, defendant came up from behind him, 

stuck a black comb-knife in his back, forced him into the car, 

and told him to "drive." As Miguel drove, defendant asked Miguel 

whether he belonged to a gang or had any gang tattoos. When 

Miguel said that he did not, defendant lifted up Miguel's shirt 

and pant legs apparently searching for tattoos. Defendant then 

took Miguel's wallet and told him to drive to the criminal courts 

building at 26th and California. 

As Miguel approached the criminal courts building, he spotted Cook County 

sheriff=s deputy Thomas Scalise parked on the opposite side of the street. Miguel 

swerved toward Deputy Scalise=s car, stopping about two feet shy of hitting the car, and 
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exited his car. Deputy Scalise then arrested defendant. 

Deputy Scalise testified that he was parked outside of the criminal courts building 

when a car suddenly swerved toward him. After the car stopped just short of hitting his 

car, Miguel B. jumped out of the car and told him that defendant, who was sitting in the 

passenger seat, had a gun. Deputy Scalise arrested defendant. Deputy Scalise 

testified that he saw a comb- knife on the car floor in front of the passenger seat. 

Officer Antonio Torres testified that he was assigned to investigate the incident. 

When he arrived at the scene, he was given Miguel=s wallet and a black comb-knife 

from one of the officers already at the scene. 

Defendant presented no evidence. After closing arguments, the jury found 

defendant guilty of aggravated kidnapping and not guilty of armed robbery. 

During the sentencing hearing, the State introduced defendant=s prior admissions 

of guilt to unlawful use of a weapon, unlawful possession of ammunition, aggravated 

robbery, and robbery. The State also noted that defendant had been on probation for 

robbery at the time he kidnaped Miguel B. Defendant presented several character 

witnesses in mitigation. 

After argument, the circuit court discussed each aggravating and mitigating factor 

listed in sections 5-5-3.1 and 5-5-3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-

5-3.1, 5-5-3.2 (West 2002)) and whether each factor was applicable to the case at bar. 

In aggravation, the circuit court noted that defendant=s conduct threatened serious 

harm, defendant had a prior criminal history, the imposed sentence was needed to deter 

others from committing similar acts, and defendant was on probation when he 
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committed the kidnapping. In mitigation, the court found that defendant=s imprisonment 

would entail an excessive hardship for his four-year-old daughter. 

Because of defendant's prior criminal history, the court denied defendant's 

request to be placed on probation and sentenced him to an indeterminate period of time 

in the Juvenile 

Department of Corrections. In determining defendant's adult 

sentence, the court noted that, under the EJJ, should defendant 

violate the terms of his juvenile sentence, the adult sentence 

would kick in and, because defendant was convicted of a Class X 

felony, he would be facing a minimum of six years, which the 

court characterized as a "substantial" amount of time. In order 

to keep defendant "on the straight and narrow," the court imposed 

a 20-year adult sentence, but expressed the hope that that 

sentence would never be executed. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Sex Offender Registry 

Defendant first argues that because there was no evidence of 

sexual conduct or motive in connection with his kidnapping Miguel 

B., requiring him to register as a sex offender violates his 

rights to due process, privacy, and equal protection under both 

the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Defendant asks 

this court to find the Registration Act unconstitutional as 

applied to him. 
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The State concedes that there was no actual "sexual" 

evidence presented in this case, but maintains that the 

legislature had a rational basis for including aggravated 

kidnapping of a minor as a triggering offense under the 

Registration Act. Relying on People v. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d 

728 (2001), the State argues that the offense of aggravating 

kidnapping of a minor can be a "precursor" to other offenses 

which involve the sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. 

It is well established that "[a]ll statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the 

burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the validity of the 

statute to demonstrate clearly a constitutional violation." People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 

400, 406 (2003), citing People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). This presumption 

means that, if possible, we must construe the statute "so as to affirm its constitutionality 

and validity." Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 406, citing People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1999). 

Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo. People 

v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).

In this case, defendant has chosen to attack the 

Registration Act on an "as applied" basis as violative of his 

rights to procedural and substantive due process, privacy, and 

equal protection of the laws. Our supreme court, however, has 

rejected the argument that the Registration Act implicates the 

right to privacy under either the United States or Illinois 

Constitution. See People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 196-97 

(2004); Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 425-26. Moreover, we have found 
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that a defendant challenging whether he should have to register 

as a sex offender is making a due process and not an equal 

protection claim. See People v. Johnson, No. 1-04-1292, slip op. 

at 9 (January 31, 2006) (finding defendant's challenge was "more 

a due process claim than an equal protection claim" where he was 

not "contend[ing] that the classification of some individuals as 

sexual offenders is unconstitutional" "[r]ather, *** that he does 

not belong within the classification"). Even though the 

"standards used to determine the constitutionality of a statute 

under equal protection and due process grounds are identical" 

(see Johnson, slip op. at 9, citing People v. Williams, 358 Ill. 

App. 3d 363, 366 (2005)), we will confine our discussion to 

defendant's substantive and procedural due process arguments. 

A. Substantive Due Process 

To withstand a due process challenge under the rational 

basis test,1

 the statute in question needs to bear only a 

rational relation to a legitimate legislative interest and be 

 1

 Though defendant makes a perfunctory argument that this 

Court should apply strict scrutiny, every court that has 

addressed the constitutionality of the Registration Act has found 

that the Act does not implicate a fundamental right and, thus, 

has applied a rationality level of review. See Johnson, slip op. 

at 9-10; Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 731-32; People v. Malchow, 

306 Ill. App. 3d 665 (1999). 
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neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. People v. Johnson, slip 

op. at 10. In applying this test, the court first identifies the 

public interest the statute is intended to protect, examines 

whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to that 

interest, and then determines whether the method used to protect 

or further that interest is reasonable. People v. Lindner, 127 

Ill. 2d 174, 180 (1989). 

The Registration Act was enacted to protect children from 

sexual assault and sexual abuse by providing the police and 

public with information regarding the whereabouts of convicted 

sex offenders.2

 People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386 (1991); 

Johnson, slip op. at 10, citing People v. Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d 

319, 328-29 (1998); Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 731 ("The 

Registration Act was enacted by the Illinois Legislature 'to 

create an additional method of protection for children from the 

increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual abuse. (84th 

 2

 Under the Registration Act, a "sex offender" is defined as 

anyone (other than a parent of the victim) who commits the 

offense of aggravated kidnapping of a minor. See 730 ILCS 

150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2002). 
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Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 23, 1986, at 208.) The 

Registration Act was designed to aid law enforcement agencies 

***' by making 'the habitual offender's address *** readily 

available to law enforcement agencies.' [Citation.]"). 

Defendant does not question the legitimacy of the 

Registration Act's purposes (i.e., protecting children from sex 

crimes and aiding law enforcement by letting them know where 

sexual offenders live). He only questions whether, in this case, 

those purposes are furthered by requiring him to register as a 

sex offender; in other words, under the rational basis test, 

whether the method used to protect or further the legislature's 

interests (requiring him to register as a sex offender) is 

reasonable. See Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. Two panels of this 

court have addressed this very issue but have come to two 

divergent results.3

 3

 In People v. Hall, our supreme court had granted a 
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petition for leave to appeal in a case where the defendant was 

arguing that the Registration Act was "unconstitutional as 

applied to him because there [was] no evidence that his offense 

[of aggravated kidnapping of a minor] was sexually motivated." 

See People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324 (2005). The court did not 

address the issue, however, and decided the case on a procedural 

ground. See Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324. 
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In Fuller, the defendant stole a van with two children in 

the back. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 730. Instead of 

immediately releasing the children, the defendant drove around, 

stopping twice to view Christmas lights. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 

3d at 730. When the van was stopped at a light, the children 

opened the van's unlocked door and ran to a nearby service 

station. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 730. At no point did 

defendant touch the children, though he spoke briefly with them 

in response to their questions. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 730. 

 Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and ordered to 

register as a sex offender. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 729-30. 

On appeal, the defendant argued "that section 2(B)[(105)] of 

the Registration Act violat[ed] due process because the 

definition of sex offender is overly broad" and "there is no 

rational relationship between the offense of aggravated kidnaping 

and the legislative intent of the Registration Act." Fuller, 324 

Ill. App. 3d at 731. The court rejected defendant's arguments. 

Finding that the purpose of the Registration Act was to "help law 

enforcement protect children from sexual assault and sexual 

abuse," the court found a rational connection between the offense 

of aggravated kidnapping and that purpose. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 

3d at 732. The court went on to note: 

"It is particularly disingenuous for the defendant to 

argue that there is no rational relationship between 

the kidnaping of a child and the purpose of protecting 
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children from the increasing incidence of sexual 

assault and sexual abuse. The most obvious connection 

between the offenses listed in section 2(B)(1.5) and 

the purpose of the Registration Act is that kidnaping 

or unlawful restraint of a minor is often a precursor 

offense to juvenile pimping or exploitation of a child, 

which are, indisputably, within the purview of the 

Registration Act's purpose." Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d 

at 733. 

The court also noted that when asked what he had planned to do 

with the children, the defendant " 'stated he was going to find a 

hotel room and ask the girl if she had any friends.' " Fuller, 

324 Ill. App. 3d at 733. 

Recently, a different division of this court disagreed with 

Fuller. See People v. Johnson, No. 1-04-1292 (January 31, 2006). 

 In Johnson, the defendant and four other men kidnaped a 20-

month-old girl in order to collect a ransom from her grandfather. 

Johnson, slip op. at 1. After defendant pleaded guilty to 

aggravated kidnapping, he was sentenced to 17 years in the 

Illinois Department of Corrections and ordered to register as a 

sex offender. Johnson, slip op. at 1-2. On appeal, the 

defendant argued that the Registration Act was unconstitutional 

as applied to him where his offense was not sexually motivated 

and had no sexual purpose. Johnson, slip op. at 2-3. 

A majority of the court agreed, noting that "[t]he record 
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indicate[d] that defendant's offense of aggravated kidnaping was 

not sexually motivated" and "[t]here were no allegations of any 

kind that defendant or codefendants committed or attempted to 

commit any sexual assault against the minor." Johnson, slip op. 

at 11. Specifically, the court found: 

"[T]here is no rational basis for requiring 

defendant to register as a sex offender where he has no 

history of committing sex offenses and his offense of 

aggravated kidnaping was not sexually motivated and had no 

sexual purpose. Consequently, defendant has met his burden 

of establishing that the Registration Act, as applied to 

him, violates his substantive due process rights under the 

state and federal constitutions where his designation as a 

sex offender bears no rational relationship to the State's 

interest in protecting the public from convicted sex 

offenders." Johnson, slip op. at 12. See State v. Reine, 

No. 19157 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. 2003); State v. Robinson, 

873 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004); People v. Moi, 8 Misc. 3d 

1012(A) (N.Y. County Ct.2005). 

The majority distinguished Fuller by arguing that there was 

evidence in that case that the crime was sexually motivated: 

"The facts in Fuller indicated that the crime was 

sexually motivated, as shown by the reviewing court's 

following observations and comments: 

'In defendant's own case, the arresting 
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police officer testified that when the officer asked 

defendant what he planned to do with the children, 

defendant "stated he was going to find a hotel room and 

ask the girl if she had any friends." This statement, 

eerily suggestive of the nature of defendant's plans 

for the children, in conjunction with defendant's 

conduct in failing to release the children themselves, 

supports the logical nexus between the act of kidnaping 

a child and the very real possibility of subsequent 

sexual exploitation of that child.'" Johnson, slip op. 

at 11-12, quoting Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733-34. 

Justice Wolfson, however, dissented. Agreeing with Fuller's 

"precursor" argument, he found that "[i]t is the nature of the 

crime - kidnaping a child - that triggers the Registration Act 

provisions." Johnson, slip op. at 14 (Wolfson, J., dissenting). 

 He went on to argue: 

"It does not take much imagination to add to the 

list of reprehensible acts an offender might commit. 

Once an offender makes the decision to commit the 

aggravated kidnaping of a child, there is a very real 

possibility the child will become a victim of sexual 

abuse. Our reports are filled with such cases. 

In this case the crime was interrupted while it 

was in progress. The child was being held in a stolen 

van when the police arrived. The legislature has the 
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authority to protect children from such an offender. 

Requiring him to register his name and address with law 

enforcement officials does not offend due process of 

law." Johnson, slip op. at 15 (Wolfson, J., 

dissenting). 

We agree with both the holding in Fuller and the views espoused 

by Justice Wolfson in his dissent in Johnson. 

 The legislature clearly intended that individuals who commit 

the offense of aggravated kidnapping of a minor register under 

the act as a sex offender. We, like the Fuller court, believe 

there to be a rational connection between the interests the 

Registration Act seeks to further (protecting children and others 

from sex offenders and aided law enforcement) and the method used 

to protect or further those interests (in this case, making 

kidnapers of children like defendant register as a sex offender), 

regardless of whether there was any "sexual" evidence in a 

particular case. See Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733. 

Though there is no evidence that defendant sexually 

assaulted Miguel or that his motivation in kidnapping Miguel was 

sexual in nature, we find that the legislature could rationally 

conclude that kidnapers of children pose such a threat to 

sexually assault those children as to warrant their inclusion in 

the sex offender registry. See Johnson, slip op. at 15 (Wolfson, 

J., dissenting); Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733; State v. Brown, 

273 Wis. 2d 785, 680 N.W.2d 833 (2004); but see Johnson, slip op. 
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at 12, citing State v. Reine, No. 19157 (Ohio App. 2d Dist.2003); 

State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004); and People v. 

Moi, 8 Misc. 3d 1012(A), 801 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. County Ct. 2005); 

People v. Bell, 3 Misc. 3d 773, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837 (2003). 

B. Procedural Due Process 

Defendant also argues that the Registration Act violates his 

right to procedural due process because the registration 

requirement is automatic under the Act and there is no 

opportunity to challenge that requirement. 

An attack based upon procedural due process focuses upon the 

specific procedures employed in a statute and whether that 

statute provides both an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 

time and in a meaningful manner. See People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 

328, 353 (1989). In order to implicate this right, the defendant 

must first show that the registration and notification statutes 

at issue deprive him of a protected liberty or property interest. 

 See Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 332. 

Even assuming that the Registration Act implicates a 

protected liberty or property interest (cf. People v. Stork, 305 

Ill. App. 3d 714 (1999) (finding section 9.3 did not implicate 

any protected liberty interests)), defendant had a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard at trial (see In re J.R., 341 Ill. App. 

3d at 784, 796-97 (2003); Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 332-33). 

As defendant points out, a sex offender is not permitted to 
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live or be within 500 feet any school building or public park. 

See 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a), (b), (b-5) (West 2002); 720 ILCS 5/11-

9.4 (a), (b), (b-5) (West 2002). Sex offenders are also not 

permitted to "operate, manage, be employed by, volunteer at, be 

associated with, or knowingly be present at any facility 

providing programs or services exclusively directed towards" 

minors. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4(c) (West 2002). 

However, defendant had the opportunity at his trial by jury 

to challenge whether he committed aggravated kidnapping. 

Defendant has not indicated what more process is "due." See In 

re J.R., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 796-97; see also Connecticut 

Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 155 L. Ed.2d 

98, 105, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98 (2003) (finding that 

even if liberty interest is implicated by sex offender registry, 

no need for further process than trial that had been provided). 

 

II. Adult 20-year Sentence 

Defendant next argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it 

imposed a 20-year adult sentence because the court had offered an 8-year sentence for 

both the aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery during the pretrial Rule 402 

conference (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) and defendant was acquitted of the latter charge; the 

court had noted that the minimum sentence defendant was facing for committing a 

Class X felony was "substantial and;" the court indicated it was imposing a 20-year 
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sentence to ensure defendant would comply with his juvenile sentence. 

Under the EJJ, the circuit court is required to impose both a juvenile sentence 

and "an adult criminal sentence in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of the 

Unified Code of Corrections." 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii) (West 2002); In re Matthew M., 

335 Ill. App. 3d 276 (2002); see 730 ILCS 5/1-1-2 (West 2002) (stating the objectives in 

fashioning a sentence should be to "(a) prescribe sanctions proportionate to the 

seriousness of the offenses and permit the recognition of differences in rehabilitation 

possibilities among individual offenders; (b) forbid and prevent the commission of 

offenses; (c) prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons adjudicated offenders 

or delinquents; and (d) restore offenders to useful citizenship"). The "adult sentence" 

does not kick in unless and until the defendant violates the provisions of his juvenile 

sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii) (West 2002). 

Initially, though not raised by the parties, we question whether defendant has 

standing to complain about the conditional adult sentence imposed by the circuit court. 

See In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1, 15 (2004) (finding the defendant's constitutional 

challenge to the revocation of the stay provision was "premature until a petition to 

revoke the stay is filed"). As noted above, that adult sentence is automatically stayed 

and will not be executed unless defendant violates the terms of his juvenile sentence. 

See 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii) (West 2002). Thus, defendant has it within his own 

power to determine whether the adult sentence will kick in. 

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that defendant has standing, we find that 

the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the 20-year adult sentence. 
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 As defendant notes, because aggravated kidnapping is a Class X felony (720 ILCS 

5/10-2(b) (West 2002)), he was facing no less than 6 years and no more that 30 years 

in prison (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2002)). In fashioning the sentence, the circuit 

court painstakingly discussed each statutory aggravating and mitigating factor and 

whether any of those factors were applicable. 

First, the 20-year sentence that the circuit court imposed, being within the 

statutory range, is presumed proper. See People v. Malin, 359 Ill. App. 3d 257, 264-65 

(2005). Second, though the circuit court noted that the minimum sentence for a Class 

X felony was "substantial," the court in no way indicated that the minimum sentence 

was the appropriate sentence for defendant. Nor does defendant cite any case where 

such a comment has been held to lock the circuit court into imposing that sentence. 

Third, though the 20-year sentence was intended to deter defendant from violating his 

juvenile sentence, defendant cites no case where the use of the carrot/stick approach to 

sentencing has been found to be improper, much less an abuse of discretion. 

Attempting to deter the individual from committing further crimes is as much an 

appropriate sentencing objective as is restoring him to useful citizenship. 730 ILCS 5/1-

1-2 (a) through (d) (West 2002). 

In light of defendant=s prior criminal history, including the fact that he was on 

probation for robbery when he kidnaped Miguel B., we find that the 20-year adult 

sentence was neither excessive nor an abuse of discretion. 

Affirmed. 

GREIMAN and MURPHY, JJ., concur.