[Cite as Zielinski v. Prewitt, 2016-Ohio-1112.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 WOOD COUNTY 

Jessy J. Zielinski and Paul Dobson, Court of Appeals No. WD-15-011 

Wood County Prosecutor 

 Trial Court No. 2013CV0663 

 Appellees 

v. 

Andrew W. Prewitt DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: March 18, 2016 

* * * * * 

 Ann M. Baronas, for appellee Jessy J. Zielinski. 

 Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Arlen B. de la Serna, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Andrew W. Prewitt, pro se. 

* * * * * 

OSOWIK, J. 

{¶ 1} This is a pro se appeal from a judgment of the Wood County Court of 

Common Pleas that found appellant Andrew W. Prewitt to be a vexatious litigator 

pursuant to R.C. 2323.52. 
2.

{¶ 2} The following undisputed facts are relevant to the issues on appeal. For well 

over ten years, appellant Prewitt and appellee Zielinski have been engaged in continuous, 

highly contentious litigation which originated with a dispute in juvenile court over 

custody of their child in 2004. Since the time of the January 2005 judgment entry 

establishing a shared parenting plan, appellant has filed pro se in the trial court motions, 

pleadings, notices and other documents too numerous to list here, most of which 

demonstrate a refusal to accept the trial court’s orders. Filings and rulings in the trial 

court have led to appellant filing numerous pro se appeals in this court (approximately 18 

between 2008 and 2015) as well as ten pro se affidavits of disqualification (one of which 

was 106 pages long) in the Ohio Supreme Court against three Wood County Juvenile 

Court judges. 

{¶ 3} On November 1, 2013, appellee Jessy Zielinski filed a complaint against 

appellant in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to have 

appellant declared a vexatious litigator. The record does not show that appellant was 

served with summons and a copy of the complaint or that Zielinski’s attorney requested 

service. Appellant was notified of the existence of the complaint through e-mail. 

{¶ 4} On November 12, 2013, appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the 

complaint. His motion did not contain a defense of insufficiency of process/service of 

process. On November 20, 2013, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of appellant 

and filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the juvenile court lacked 

jurisdiction and that appellant had not been served with process. 
3.

{¶ 5} On November 26, 2013, a judge serving by Supreme Court assignment 

denied both motions to dismiss and transferred the case to the general division of the 

Wood County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant filed an answer which included 

affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. 

{¶ 6} Thereafter, Paul Dobson, in his capacity as Wood County Prosecutor, moved 

to intervene as a plaintiff. Dobson’s motion was granted and Zielinski and Dobson filed 

an amended complaint to have appellant declared a vexatious litigator. The amended 

complaint included a certificate of service on appellant’s counsel of record. Appellant, 

through counsel, filed an answer to the amended complaint which included the same 

affirmative defenses as those asserted in the original answer. 

{¶ 7} Appellees asserted in their complaint filed in the trial court that appellant 

“habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds” engaged in vexatious conduct 

as defined by R.C. 2323.52 with civil litigation that included 12 cases filed in the Wood 

County Court of Common Pleas, 20 cases filed in this court and 3 cases filed in the Ohio 

Court of Claims. Appellees also asserted that appellant engaged in vexatious conduct by 

causing, aiding, assisting or permitting his parents to engage in vexatious conduct by 

preparing his documents on his mother’s computer and leaving them there, so that his 

parents could copy them and file their own virtually identical claims in two Wood County 

cases, two Sixth District Court of Appeals cases and three Ohio Supreme Court cases. 

Additionally, appellees asserted that appellant pursued litigation in courts that are not 

governed by R.C. 2323.52 but which shows his wrongful motive or intent in cases where 
4.

the statute applies: i.e., two cases filed in the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Ohio and seven affidavits for disqualification filed in the Ohio 

Supreme Court against three Wood County judges. 

{¶ 8} On October 30, 2014, Dobson filed a motion for summary judgment which 

the trial court denied. On January 2, 2015, appellant’s counsel filed two motions to 

dismiss which were denied. The trial court found that appellant waived any defense of 

insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process when he filed his pro se 

motion to dismiss without including those defenses in the motion. The trial court further 

found that appellant’s second motion to dismiss, filed by counsel, was a nullity as Civ.R. 

12 permits only one pre-answer motion to dismiss. 

{¶ 9} The case proceeded to a two-day bench trial, after which the trial court 

issued its decision declaring appellant a vexatious litigator pursuant to R.C. 2323.52. 

{¶ 10} In its judgment entry filed January 30, 2015, the trial court included the 

following findings of fact: appellant filed 1) numerous groundless motions and appeals 

in a juvenile court custody proceeding that should have concluded in a few months but 

extended for more than ten years unresolved; 2) numerous groundless claims against 

public offices and officials and adverse counsel; 3) duplicative cases against the same 

defendant in the same and different courts; 4) repeated appeals from non-final and nonappealable orders over which the appellate court lacked jurisdiction; 5) an original habeas 

corpus action in an appellate court which failed to assert a claim against anyone who 

allegedly had custody of the supposedly restrained person; 6) repeated motions in an 
5.

appellate court that did not relate to any pending appeal; and 7) repeated cases in the 

Ohio Court of Claims for which that court lacked jurisdiction. 

{¶ 11} The trial court further found that appellant filed his claims, motions and 

appeals solely to delay proceedings. The trial court concluded that the cumulative effect 

of appellant’s persistent vexatious misconduct required the controls that R.C. 2323.52 

affords. The court cautioned appellant to be mindful that any assistance he provides his 

parents in asserting motions or claims may subject him to sanctions for unauthorized 

practice of law and that he and his parents may be subject to monetary sanctions for 

violations of Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51(“frivolous conduct”) if they engage in further 

unwarranted conduct. 

{¶ 12} It is from that judgment that appellant appeals. Appellant sets forth two 

assignments of error: 

 Assignment of Error Number One: 

 The trial court erred and abused its discretion by finding defendantappellant to be declared a vexatious litigator due to improper jurisdiction 

and insufficiency of service without ignitiating [sic] the commencement of 

the civil action. 

 Assignment of Error Number Two: 

 The trial court erred and abused its discretion by finding defendantappellant to be declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to Ohio Revised 

Code 2323.52 is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
6.

{¶ 13} In support of his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial 

court erred by failing to dismiss the vexatious litigator action based on improper 

jurisdiction and failure of service pursuant to Civ.R. 3. 

{¶ 14} A trial court’s decision involving interpretation of the Ohio Rules of Civil 

Procedure presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews de novo. See 

Haskett v. Haskett, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-155, 2013-Ohio-145, ¶ 17. The record 

here reflects that service on appellant was not completed as required by the civil rules 

when Zielinski filed her original complaint. However, based on our review of the record 

and the applicable law, we find that the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to 

dismiss when it found that appellant waived any defense of insufficiency of process or 

insufficiency of service of process when he filed his pro se motion to dismiss without 

including those defenses in his motion, and when it further found that appellant’s second 

motion to dismiss, filed by counsel, was a nullity as Civ.R. 12 permits only one preanswer motion to dismiss. 

{¶ 15} Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by transferring this matter 

from the juvenile court to the general division of the common pleas court. This argument 

is without merit. See Mays v. Mays, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 13544, 1993 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 3031 (June 14, 1993); Civ.R. 1(B). 

{¶ 16} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken. 

{¶ 17} In support of his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial 

court erred by declaring him a vexatious litigator. An appellate court’s review of a 
7.

judgment following a bench trial is subject to the manifest weight of the evidence 

standard of review. Terry v. Kellstone, Inc., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-12-061, 2013-Ohio-441, 

¶ 12. Appellant argues that his conduct does not justify being found a vexatious litigator, 

asserting that he is a conscientious and concerned parent trying to maintain a relationship 

with his daughter and pursuing all legal avenues and remedies within his power. Based 

on our review of the record as summarized above and the law pursuant to R.C. 2323.52, 

and presuming that the findings of the trier of fact are correct, we find that the trial 

court’s decision was supported by competent, credible evidence that he habitually, 

persistently and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious conduct in a civil 

action. See R.C. 2323.52 and C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 

376 N.E.2d 578. Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is not well-taken. 

{¶ 18} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Wood County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant pursuant to 

App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 
8.

 Zielinski v. Prewitt 

 C.A. No. WD-15-011 

Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

Stephen A. Yarbrough, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.