IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0199

Filed April 14, 2021

BALAH H. RUSHING,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Samantha Gronewald, 

Judge.

The applicant appeals the denial of his third application for postconviction 

relief. AFFIRMED.

Peter M. Sand, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee, State.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Greer, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

Balah Rushing appeals the denial of his third application for postconviction 

relief (PCR). In all three PCR applications, Rushing sought a remand for 

resentencing to consider whether imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence 

was appropriate given his age at the time of the criminal conduct. The district court 

summarily dismissed his third application for PCR finding it was barred by res 

judicata. Rushing argues res judicata should not apply because he never had an 

opportunity “to generate a record and get a hearing on the merits.” We agree with 

the district court. We find Rushing’s third application for PCR is barred by res 

judicata because his PCR claims have been raised and rejected in two prior 

postconviction actions. Thus, we affirm the denial of his PCR application. 

Background Facts and Proceedings. 

In 2014, Rushing threatened a taxi driver at gun point and demanded a free 

ride. At the time, he was eighteen years and seven months old. Rushing

eventually pled guilty to second-degree robbery, in violation of Iowa Code section 

711.1 (2014). He was sentenced to ten years in prison and was required to serve 

a mandatory minimum of seven years to be eligible for parole or work release 

pursuant to Iowa Code section 901.12 . Rushing did not appeal his conviction. 

Rushing filed his first PCR application in February 2015, arguing the 

mandatory minimum sentence imposed was “unlawful due to his young age 

and . . . in violation of due process and the cruel and unusual punishment clauses 

in the Iowa Constitution and the United States Constitution.” Rushing v. State, No. 

15-1388, 2017 WL 1102745, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 28, 2017). Rushing’s 

application was denied. On appeal, Rushing asked that we extend the holding of 
3

Lyle1to youthful offenders under age twenty-one. While that appeal was pending

Rushing filed his second application for PCR.

2

 In March 2017, this court affirmed 

the denial of his first PCR application. See id.

In September 2019, Rushing filed his third PCR application, again

requesting we extend the holding of Lyle. The State responded by filing a motion 

for summary judgment arguing Rushing’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. The district court granted the State’s request for summary judgment and 

dismissed Rushing’s third PCR application on res judicata grounds. He appeals. 

Standard of Review.

We may review a challenge that a sentence is illegal at any time. Lyle, 854 

N.W.2d at 382; see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(5)(a). “[W]e review a grant of a 

motion to dismiss a PCR petition for correction of errors at law.” Allison v. State, 

914 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). 

Res Judicata.

In its analysis of the third PCR application, the district court applied the 

doctrine of res judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata prevents a party from 

relitigating a claim or issue that has already been determined by a final judgment.” 

George v. D.W. Zinser Co., 762 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Iowa 2009). For res judicata to 

 

1 State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 (Iowa 2014) held

[A]rticle I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution forbids a mandatory 

minimum sentencing schema for juvenile offenders that deprives the 

district court of the discretion to consider youth and its attendant 

circumstances as a mitigating factor and to impose a lighter 

punishment by eliminating the minimum period of incarceration 

without parole.

2 The district court dismissed Rushing’s second application on summary judgment 

in July 2019. 
4

apply, the following must be established: “(1) The parties in the first and second 

action were the same; (2) the claim in the second suit could have been fully and 

fairly adjudicated in the prior case; and (3) there was a final judgment on the merits 

in the first action.” Arnevik v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. Of Regents, 642 N.W.2d 315, 319 

(Iowa 2002). 

First, the parties in all three PCR filings are the same. As for the issues 

adjudicated, Rushing filed his first PCR application in February 2015, arguing his 

sentence was “unlawful due to his young age and . . . in violation of due process 

and the cruel and unusual punishment clauses in the Iowa Constitution and the 

United States Constitution.” Rushing, 2017 WL 1102745, at *1. Rushing relied 

on our supreme court’s holding in Null for his argument.3 See 836 N.W.2d at 76–

77. The district court denied Rushing’s claim and granted the State’s motion for 

summary judgment, observing “Null and its progeny have only applied to juvenile 

offenders.” Rushing, 2017 WL 1102745, at *1. Rushing appealed, asking this 

court to “exercise its independent judgement” and extend the Lyle holding to 

“youthful offenders under age twenty-one.” Id. This court denied Rushing relief 

because of “controlling supreme court precedent” that was inconsistent with 

Rushing’s claim. Id.

In August 2015, Rushing filed his second PCR application. He raised the 

same claim rejected in his first application. The State moved for summary 

 

3

In State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 76-77 (Iowa 2013), our supreme court held, “[A] 

52.5–year minimum prison term for a juvenile based on the aggregation of 

mandatory minimum sentences for second-degree murder and first-degree 

robbery triggers the protections . . . afforded under Miller,” where the Supreme 

Court required an examination of the “hallmark features of youth” before imposing 

a life sentence. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-78 (2012). 
5

judgment, arguing the challenge was barred by res judicata. The district court 

granted summary judgment for the State, noting Rushing conceded he “made the 

identical argument in a previous [PCR] proceeding.” Because of the preclusive 

effect of the earlier case, the court dismissed the action. No appeal followed.4

Now in his third PCR application, Rushing once again asserts he should be 

resentenced with no mandatory minimum based on an extension of Lyle. This time 

he points to scientific claims as well as authority from other jurisdictions that, if 

followed in Iowa, would reduce his sentence. The district court granted the State’s 

motion to dismiss. Recognizing the claims to be the same, the district court found 

Rushing’s arguments were barred by res judicata because of the prior rulings in

the other PCR application proceedings. 

On appeal, Rushing challenges the denial of his PCR application, arguing 

the “Lyle limitation”5 was not meant to forever bar his argument for extending the 

Null or Lyle holdings, and that courts cannot bar a good faith argument for 

extending these holdings. Rushing again asks us to extend the application of Lyle

to young adult criminal offenders. This argument, however, was already litigated

by Rushing in his first two PCR applications, and both times the applications were 

rejected because his claim was contrary to existing legal precedent. See Arnevik, 

 

4

In September 2017, Rushing moved to correct an illegal sentence, but the motion 

was denied by the district court. Rushing appealed, and our supreme court treated 

it as a petition for writ of certiorari and denied the petition. 

5 The “Lyle limitation” refers to the supreme court’s statement that

[O]ur holding today has no application to sentencing laws affecting 

adult offenders. Lines are drawn in our law by necessity and are 

incorporated into the jurisprudence we have developed to usher the 

Iowa Constitution through time. This case does not move any of the 

lines that currently exist in the sentencing of adult offenders.

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 403.
6

642 N.W.2d at 319. Moreover, in other cases, this court has been asked to extend 

the holding of Lyle and has refused to do so.6

Still, Rushing argues that although he has raised the issue before, he has 

not been allowed to generate a record as to why Lyle should be extended.

Recently, this court rejected a similar claim to Rushing’s in State v. Claybon, 

No. 18-0695, 2020 WL 1879630, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020).7 Because 

Rushing’s argument involves a determination supported by legal precedent, and 

because the elements of res judicata are satisfied, we decline to take another look. 

SeeState v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 584 n.1 (Iowa 2014) (“Generally, it is the role 

of the supreme court to decide if case precedent should no longer be followed.”);

see also Holmes v. State, 775 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“A [PCR]

proceeding is not intended as a vehicle for relitigation, on the same factual basis, 

of issues previously adjudicated, and the principle of res judicata bars additional 

litigation on this point.”) (quoting State v. Wetzel, 192 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa 

1971)). 

Conclusion.

We affirm the district court ruling denying Rushing’s third PCR application. 

AFFIRMED.

 

6 See, e.g., State v. McClain, No. 19-0209, 2020 WL 824144, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. 

App. Feb. 19, 2020) (collecting cases in which the Iowa Court of Appeals declined 

to extend the reasoning of Lyle to an adult offender). 

7

In Claybon, the defendant argued the court should have appointed an expert “to 

present testimony on the most recent studies regarding the development of the 

human brain.” 2020 WL 1879630, at *1. This court held that since there were no 

Iowa cases suggesting that the Lyle protections would be extended to adult 

offenders under the right scientific record, Claybon was not entitled to relief. Id.