[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-16045

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00411-WSD-RGV-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CLIFFORD DEANGELO JACKSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

No. 12-16046

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00252-WSD-RGV-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

Case: 12-16045 Date Filed: 08/21/2013 Page: 1 of 7 
2

CLIFFORD DEANGELO JACKSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(August 21, 2013)

Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Clifford Deangelo Jackson appeals his convictions and 194-month total 

sentence in this consolidated appeal. Jackson pled guilty to one count of aiding 

and abetting an attempted armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2113(a), (d), and 2 (Bank Count 1), and one count of aiding and abetting the 

discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), and 2 (Bank Count 2). A jury then convicted Jackson on one 

count of conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery at Weeyums Philly Style 

restaurant (Weeyums), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Weeyums Count 1),

and one count of aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery at Weeyums, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), and 2 (Weeyums Count 2). The district court 

sentenced Jackson to concurrent 74-month sentences for Bank Count 1 and 

Case: 12-16045 Date Filed: 08/21/2013 Page: 2 of 7 
3

Weeyums Counts 1 and 2, followed by a consecutive mandatory minimum 10-year 

sentence for Bank Count 2. 

With respect to the Weeyums Counts, Jackson asserts the district court erred 

in instructing the jury that a minimal effect on interstate commerce was sufficient 

to convict him. He contends even under a de minimis standard, the Government 

failed to present sufficient evidence that the robbery had an effect on interstate 

commerce such that it supported his convictions. As to Bank Count 2, Jackson 

asserts the district court erred in sentencing him to a ten-year mandatory minimum

sentence because he is not accountable for his codefendant’s accidental discharge

of a firearm after they left the bank.1

 After review, we affirm Jackson’s 

convictions and sentences.

Interstate commerce

We review the sufficiency of the evidence of a Hobbs Act violation de novo. 

United States v. Dean (Dean I), 517 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2008), aff’d in 

part, 556 U.S. 568 (2009). “[W]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Government, drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the 

Government’s favor.” United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 

2011) (quotations omitted). We will not overturn a jury’s verdict “if any 

 1 After briefing concluded, Jackson filed supplemental authority citing to the Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), without further 

explanation of how the case applied to his appeal. We deem arguments not fully articulated on 

appeal as abandoned. United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Accordingly, we do not address Jackson’s citation to Alleyne.

Case: 12-16045 Date Filed: 08/21/2013 Page: 3 of 7 
4

reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1291 (quotation omitted).

The Hobbs Act prohibits robbery and conspiracies to commit robbery that 

“in any way or degree obstruct[], delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of 

any article or commodity in commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). To prove a Hobbs 

Act conspiracy, “the government need only prove a robbery and effect on 

commerce.” Dean I, 517 F.3d at 1227-28. As to the interstate commerce element, 

“the government is only required to establish a minimal effect on interstate 

commerce. Id. at 1228 (quotations omitted). “[A] ‘mere depletion of assets’ is 

sufficient proof of an effect on interstate commerce.” Id.

Jackson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the robbery 

element of his Weeyums convictions; thus, the parties’ arguments are limited to the 

interstate commerce element. Jackson’s contention the Government failed to 

present sufficient evidence of an effect on interstate commerce is without merit. 

The Government presented evidence that Jackson’s codefendant took $500-600 

from the cash register at Weeyums, and we have held that “a mere depletion of 

assets” is sufficient evidence of an effect on interstate commerce. See Dean I, 517 

F.3d at 1228. Even if such a depletion of the restaurant’s assets were not 

sufficient, however, the Government also presented evidence that Weeyums had 

interstate customers, ordered supplies from other states, banked with a national 

Case: 12-16045 Date Filed: 08/21/2013 Page: 4 of 7 
5

bank, and closed for at least three days as a result of the robbery. Thus, it 

presented evidence of, at the least, a minimal effect on interstate commerce 

sufficient to support Jackson’s convictions for conspiracy to commit, and aiding 

and abetting the commission of, a Hobbs Act robbery. See id.

We also “review de novo a challenge to the district court’s jury instructions.” 

United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court 

has “broad discretion in formulating jury instructions provided that the charge as a 

whole accurately reflects the law and the facts,” and we will only reverse a 

conviction based on a jury instruction if “the issues of law were presented 

inaccurately, or the charge improperly guided the jury in such a substantial way as 

to violate due process.” Id. (quotations omitted).

As to Jackson’s assertion the district court’s jury instruction was erroneous, 

the district court did not err by instructing the jury that a minimal effect on 

interstate commerce was sufficient, because that charge accurately reflects the law. 

See id.; see also Dean I, 517 F.3d at 1228. Accordingly, we affirm Jackson’s 

convictions for conspiracy to commit, and aiding and abetting the commission of, a 

Hobbs Act Robbery. 

Case: 12-16045 Date Filed: 08/21/2013 Page: 5 of 7 
6

Accidental discharge of firearm

We review “[t]he district court’s legal interpretation of statutes and 

Sentencing Guidelines . . . de novo.” United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 

87 (11th Cir. 2013). Section 924(c) states, in relevant part, that:

[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . 

uses or carries a firearm . . . shall, in addition to the punishment 

provided for such crime of violence . . .--

. . . .

(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and

(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment of not less than 10 years. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii). The Supreme Court has held a defendant’s 

accidental discharge of a firearm is punishable by the ten-year mandatory 

minimum set forth in § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Dean v. United States (Dean II), 556 

U.S. 568, 577 (2009).

Section 2 of Title 18 provides that “[w]hoever . . . aids, abets, counsels, 

commands, induces or procures [the commission of an offense against the United 

States] is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). “Under § 2, the acts of the 

principal become those of the aider and abettor as a matter of law.” United States 

v. Williams, 334 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, a defendant who aided 

Case: 12-16045 Date Filed: 08/21/2013 Page: 6 of 7 
7

and abetted a § 924(c) offense “is accountable for the entirety of the conduct” 

relating to the § 924(c) offense. Id. at 1233. 

The district court did not err in applying the ten-year mandatory minimum 

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) to Jackson. A defendant’s accidental discharge 

of a firearm is punishable by the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Dean II, 

556 U.S. at 577. The indictment charged Jackson with violating

§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 2 by aiding and abetting his codefendants in knowingly 

using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. At 

Jackson’s change-of-plea hearing, he agreed with the Government’s description of 

the attempted bank robbery and admitted that a firearm was discharged from the 

vehicle in which he and his codefendants escaped from the bank. The criminal 

judgment indicates that Jackson was adjudged guilty of violating 

§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 2. On appeal, Jackson does not contest that his 

codefendant discharged his firearm. Moreover, an accidental discharge of a 

firearm is a reasonably foreseeable result of bringing a gun to an attempted bank 

robbery. Accordingly, under § 2, Jackson is accountable for his codefendant’s

accidental discharge of the firearm and he is punishable by the ten-year mandatory 

minimum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; Williams, 334 F.3d at 1232-33. Thus, we 

affirm Jackson’s sentences.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 12-16045 Date Filed: 08/21/2013 Page: 7 of 7