2024 IL App (1st) 220725-U

No. 1-22-0725 

Order filed August 30, 2024 

Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

ISSA AMER, d/b/a Amer Enterprises,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

HAROLD D. RIDER, JR., Individually and as Receiver 

under Order of Court Dated July 18, 2016; REALTY & 

MORTGAGE CO.; REALTY & MORTGAGE 

BUILDING SERVICES CO.; and CARY G. SCHIFF, 

d/b/a Cary G. Schiff & Associates,

Defendants-Appellees. 

)

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 20 CH 7460 

Honorable 

Anna Helen Demacopoulos, 

Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s amended complaint with 

prejudice. 

¶ 2 After Harold D. Rider, Jr., (Rider) was appointed as receiver in a mortgage foreclosure 

action, his court-authorized agent, Realty & Mortgage Co. (Realty), filed a forcible entry and 
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detainer action to obtain possession of a property that Issa Amer, doing business as Amer 

Enterprises (Amer), leased. Following the eviction court entering an ex parte order of possession

for Amer’s premises, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office executed an eviction on the premises. 

Later, Amer filed the instant lawsuit against Rider, both individually and as court-appointed 

receiver, Realty, Realty & Mortgage Building Services Co. (Building Services), and Cary G. 

Schiff, doing business as Cary G. Schiff & Associates (Schiff, and collectively, defendants), for

various causes of action related to the eviction. On defendants’ joint motion, the circuit court 

dismissed all five counts of Amer’s amended complaint with prejudice. Amer now appeals that 

dismissal and contends that the court erred for several reasons by dismissing his amended 

complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court’s dismissal of Amer’s amended 

complaint with prejudice. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. The Underlying Litigation 

¶ 5 In March 2015, Amer leased a warehouse located at 12613 South Kroll Drive in Alsip, 

Illinois, which was a part of a larger industrial complex, from “Amazy-Alsip Centre.” Amer’s 

lease listed “Issa Amer Amer Enterprises” as the lessee. According to the lease, the purpose of 

leasing the warehouse was for the “storage of equipment.” Thereafter, the industrial complex 

became subject to foreclosure proceedings in the circuit court of Cook County (Case No. 16 CH 

7652). In July 2016, the foreclosure court entered an order appointing Rider as receiver to manage 

the industrial property while the foreclosure action remained pending. The appointment order 

granted Rider all of the powers enumerated in the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Foreclosure 

Law) (735 ILCS 5/15-1101 et seq. (West 2016)) and the authority to “collect all rents relating to 

the property.” As part of the appointment order, the foreclosure court authorized Rider to retain 
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Realty to assist him in managing the property, including lease management, tenant relations, and 

rent billing and collections, pursuant to section 15-1704(c) of the Foreclosure Law (id. § 15-

1704(c)). The appointment order also stated that Rider could not employ legal counsel without 

explicit court approval. Three months later, Rider filed his first receiver’s report, which described

his actions as receiver for the first three months of his appointment. According to a document 

attached to Rider’s first receiver’s report, Amer’s property was known internally as “A+A World 

of Furnishing & Remodeling.” The foreclosure court approved the report and granted Rider’s oral 

motion to employ Schiff as “eviction counsel.” 

¶ 6 In November 2016, “Realty & Mortgage Co. as Agent” filed a forcible entry and detainer

action in the municipal division of the circuit court of Cook County against “Furnishing & 

Remodel A+A World Of” (Furnishing & Remodel) “and all unknown occupants” for allegedly 

unlawfully withholding possession of the warehouse that Amer leased (Case No. 16 M1 720792). 

Schiff was listed on the complaint as Realty’s attorney. Thereafter, the clerk of the circuit court 

issued summonses. Multiple attempts at service through the Cook County Sherriff’s Office and a 

special process server were made at the property Amer leased, but each attempt was unsuccessful. 

Ultimately, Realty filed an affidavit for service by posting. In turn, the Cook County Sheriff’s 

Office posted notice of the lawsuit at three different governmental offices in Chicago and sent a 

notice to each defendant at the address of Amer’s property. On January 4, 2017, the eviction court 

granted an ex parte order of possession in favor of Realty and against Furnishing & Remodel and 

all unknown occupants for the property listed on Amer’s lease. 

¶ 7 Later that month, the foreclosure court approved Rider’s second receiver’s report, in which 

he stated that one of the five pending eviction actions was “AA World of Furnishing,” which had 

the same address as the property Amer leased. In March 2017, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office 
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performed an eviction of the property listed on Amer’s lease. According to an eviction worksheet, 

the Cook County Sheriff’s Office made a forced entry. The worksheet further asserted that 

possession of the property was tendered to Rosie Stephens, an agent of Realty. The following 

month, the foreclosure court approved Rider’s third receiver’s report, in which he stated that “AA 

World of Furnishing” with the same address listed on Amer’s lease had been evicted from the 

industrial complex. Also that month, according to Amer’s amended complaint, Amer orally 

demanded Realty return his personal property, but the company failed to do so. 

¶ 8 In October 2017, an attorney for Amer sent a demand letter to Schiff, on behalf of Realty

and Building Services, asserting that Realty and Building Services, or their agents, wrongfully 

entered Amer’s warehouse, and destroyed or appropriated his personal property. Amer’s attorney 

requested Realty and Building Services return the appropriated property, provide damages for any 

property destroyed, and provide an accounting of the items appropriated and destroyed. According 

to Amer’s amended complaint, Realty and Building Services failed to return his personal property. 

¶ 9 B. The Instant Litigation 

¶ 10 In December 2020, Amer initiated the instant lawsuit against Realty and Building Services

in the chancery division of the circuit court of Cook County. Relevant here, Count I of his 

complaint sought a declaration that the ex parte order of possession was void for a lack of 

jurisdiction. On Realty and Building Services’ joint motion, the circuit court dismissed Amer’s 

complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 

2020)). The court, however, granted Amer leave to file an amended complaint and added that 

“[n]othing in this order shall preclude [Amer] from filing a [section 2-1401] petition *** to vacate” 

the ex parte order of possession in the eviction court. 
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¶ 11 Amer evidently chose not to pursue relief in the eviction court and instead, he amended his 

complaint and added as defendants, Rider, both individually and as court-appointed receiver, and 

Schiff. In Count I of the amended complaint, which was again for a declaratory judgment, Amer 

requested a declaration that the ex parte order of possession was void for a lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction because Realty, the named plaintiff, had no authority to bring the forcible entry and 

detainer action. Additionally, Amer posited that Schiff had no authority to represent Realty in the 

eviction action. Count II was for trover and conversion based on Rider, Realty, Building Services, 

or agents thereof, allegedly destroying or converting approximately $250,000 worth of personal 

property belonging to Amer that he had stored in the premises. Count III and Count IV were for 

trespass and a violation of section 9-101 of the Code (id. § 9-101), respectively, based on Rider, 

Realty, Building Services, or agents thereof, allegedly unlawfully making forcible entry into

Amer’s property. Lastly, Count V was for an accounting of the personal property of Amer’s that 

Rider, Realty, Building Services, or agents thereof, allegedly took or destroyed. Although not clear 

from the amended complaint, it appears Schiff is a defendant for all five counts 

¶ 12 Defendants subsequently filed a joint motion to dismiss Amer’s amended complaint. First, 

they argued that, under section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code (id. § 2-619(a)(1)), the circuit court did not 

have jurisdiction because a claim brought against a court-appointed receiver and his agents must 

be brought in the court that created the receivership, i.e., with the judge in the foreclosure case.

Defendants also argued that, under section 2-615 of the Code (id. § 2-615), Amer’s amended 

complaint was insufficient at law because he relied on conclusory allegations unsupported by 

specific facts. In response, Amer contended that the court had jurisdiction and defendants had 

failed to provide any legal authority authorizing Realty to bring the initial forcible detainer action. 
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Lastly, Amer argued that his amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts supporting his various 

causes of action. 

¶ 13 Following the parties’ briefing, the circuit court dismissed all five counts of Amer’s 

amended complaint with prejudice under section 2-615 of the Code (id.). Concerning Count I, the 

court stated: 

“the requested relief *** for Declaratory Judgment is a collateral attack on a 

previous judgement and does not seek to declare the rights of the parties going 

forward and is therefore an inappropriate Declaratory Judgments cause of action. 

[The count] is dismissed with prejudice because plaintiff can never allege sufficient 

facts as an independent cause of action to declare a previously entered judgement 

void in a collateral proceeding.” 

Concerning Counts II through V, the court stated it: 

“takes judicial notice of the court orders appointing the receiver and approving the 

receivership reports in the foreclosure action, Case No. 2016-CH-07652, and the 

attachments to the complaint that contradict the allegations in the complaint and 

therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff could never state a cause of action for Counts 

II-V.”

¶ 14 This appeal followed. 

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 Amer contends for various reasons that the circuit court erred by dismissing his amended 

complaint.1 A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 “challenges the legal sufficiency of a 

1 Schiff is the only appellee to have filed an appellee brief in this matter.
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complaint based on defects apparent on its face.” Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 

429 (2006). The question on review from such a dismissal “is whether the allegations of the 

complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and taking all well-pleaded 

facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts as true, are sufficient to 

establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 

229 Ill. 2d 296, 305 (2008). We review a section 2-615 dismissal de novo. Id. Additionally, we 

may affirm the court’s dismissal on any basis supported by the record. American Freedom 

Insurance Co. v. Garcia, 2021 IL App (1st) 200231, ¶ 32. 

¶ 17 A. Count I 

¶ 18 We first turn to Count I of Amer’s amended complaint. In Count I, Amer alleged the ex 

parte order of possession from the eviction court was void for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

However, on appeal, Amer contends that the circuit court should have considered that the order 

was void for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a lack of personal jurisdiction because he 

was never properly served. Although Amer can raise a new theory of voidness for the first time on 

appeal (see Casteel v. Jiminez, 2022 IL App (1st) 201288, ¶ 23), he did argue in briefing below 

that the eviction court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to a lack of service. 

¶ 19 Whether an order is void “depends on whether the court entering the challenged order 

possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 

2d 169, 174 (1998). Where there is a lack of jurisdiction, any ensuing order from the court is void. 

Id. In Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 105 (2002), our supreme court 

asserted that “petitions seeking relief from void judgments [or orders] are section 2-1401 

petitions.” Id. And thus, following Sarkissian, this court has stated that pleadings to challenge a 

judgment or order as void “must be brought under section 2-1401 [of the Code].” OneWest Bank, 
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FSB v. Topor, 2013 IL App (1st) 120010, ¶ 14; see also Cook v. Burnette, 341 Ill. App. 3d 652, 

660 (2003) (asserting that “because the banks’ petitions were filed for the purpose of seeking to 

vacate a void order, we must categorize them as” petitions under section 2-1401).

¶ 20 Section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2020)) permits a party to seek 

relief from a final judgment or order more than 30 days after its entry through filing a petition. 

PNC Bank, National Ass’n v. Kusmierz, 2022 IL 126606, ¶ 15. Although “[t]he petition must be 

filed in the same proceeding in which the order or judgment was entered,” it “is not a continuation 

thereof.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b) (West 2020). Rather, the petition commences a new proceeding. 

Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 102. As a general rule, a section 2-1401 petition must be filed within two 

years after the entry of the challenged order or judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2020)), and 

allege: “(1) due diligence in presenting the defense or claim, (2) due diligence in filing the petition, 

and (3) a meritorious defense.” Kusmierz, 2022 IL 126606, ¶ 15. However, these general 

requirements do not apply to a petition brought on voidness grounds (Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 

104), and a party may challenge a void order at any time. EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 

113419, ¶ 15. 

¶ 21 In the instant case, Count I of Amer’s amended complaint sought a judgment declaring the 

eviction court’s ex parte order of possession void for a lack of jurisdiction. Amer indisputably did 

not reference section 2-1401 of the Code, which was the proper vehicle to challenge the allegedly 

void order. See OneWest, 2013 IL App (1st) 120010, ¶ 14; Cook, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 660. More 

importantly, Amer filed Count I of his amended complaint in the present case, not the eviction 

action. As discussed, a section 2-1401 petition “must be filed in the same proceeding in which the

[challenged] order or judgment was entered,” even though the petition “is not a continuation 

thereof.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b) (West 2020). 
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¶ 22 Amer’s misstep is similar to the defendants’ mistake in First Midwest Bank v. Allen, 2023 

IL App (5th) 220143-U. There, during a mortgage foreclosure action, the defendants filed a section 

2-1401 petition seeking relief from an allegedly void order that had been entered in an earlier 

foreclosure case involving the same parties. Id. ¶ 4. The circuit court found that the defendants’ 

section 2-1401 petition had not been filed in the proper case, but went on to deny the petition on 

its merits. Id. ¶ 13. On appeal, the appellate court acknowledged that Sarkissian had relaxed certain 

requirements of a section 2-1401 petition challenging an allegedly void order or judgment, but 

observed that our supreme court “did not indicate *** the requirement that the petition be filed in 

the same proceeding in which the challenged order or judgment was entered” was “not applicable 

to a section 2-1401 petition attacking a void order.” Id. ¶ 18. As such, the appellate court concluded

that the defendants’ section 2-1401 petition had been filed in the wrong action. Id. ¶ 20. 

¶ 23 Like the defendants in Allen, Amer filed Count I of his amended complaint improperly in 

this action rather than in the eviction action. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b) (West 2020); Allen, 2023 

IL App (5th) 220143-U, ¶ 20. Amer did this despite the circuit court not so subtly directing him to 

file a section 2-1401 petition in the eviction court when it dismissed his initial complaint. Given 

the relief Amer seeks in Count I, the court correctly concluded that he could never obtain such

relief through the filing of a declaratory judgment in the instant case. As such, the court properly 

dismissed Count I of Amer’s complaint with prejudice. See Smith v. Central Illinois Regional 

Airport, 207 Ill. 2d 578, 584-85 (2003) (dismissal with prejudice is proper when “it is clear that 

no set of facts can be proved under the pleading which would entitle the plaintiff to relief”).

¶ 24 B. Counts II through V 
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¶ 25 Amer next contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the various court orders in 

the foreclosure action and the attachments to his amended complaint contradicted the allegations 

of his amended complaint such that he could never state a cause of action in Counts II through V. 

¶ 26 When the circuit court reviews a motion to dismiss under section 2-615, it may consider 

matters that are subject to judicial notice. Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 2012 IL 112219, ¶ 47. And 

the court may take judicial notice of orders from closely related proceedings. See In re Marriage 

of DeBow, 236 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1040 (1992); Goad v. Evans, 191 Ill. App. 3d 283, 291 (1989).

Furthermore, “[a]n exhibit attached to a complaint becomes part of the pleading for every purpose, 

including the decision on a motion to dismiss.” Gagnon v. Schickel, 2012 IL App (1st) 120645, ¶ 

18. And “[w]here an exhibit contradicts the allegations in a complaint, the exhibit controls.” Id.

¶ 27 Nevertheless, Schiff posits that Amer could not bring Counts II through V in the instant 

case. Relying on section 2-415(c) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-415(c) (West 2020)), Schiff argues 

that Amer had to file these causes of action in the court that created the receivership, i.e., the 

foreclosure case. Section 2-415(c) of the Code provides that: 

“Every receiver of any property appointed by any court of this State may be sued 

in respect of any act or transaction of the receiver in carrying on the business 

connected with the property, without the previous leave of the court in which the 

receiver was appointed; but the action shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court 

in which the receiver was appointed, so far as the same is necessary to the ends of 

justice.” Id.

¶ 28 As a preliminary manner, we take judicial notice that the foreclosure court discharged 

Rider as receiver in July 2017, which is the same month that the foreclosure proceedings were 

completed. See In re Marriage of DeBow, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1040. Despite this, Schiff fails to 
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explain how a third party could re-open a foreclosure case to assert causes of action against a 

discharged receiver and related entities. Regardless, Schiff’s interpretation of section 2-415(c) is 

too narrow. A judge in the circuit court of Cook County appointed Rider as receiver, and Amer 

filed his lawsuit against Rider and related entities in the circuit court of Cook County. Amer 

properly complied with the requirements of section 2-415(c). See Wolfe v. Illini Federal Saving & 

Loan Ass’n, 158 Ill. App. 3d 321, 324 (1987) (where a receiver had been appointed during 

mortgage foreclosure proceedings in the circuit court of Madison County, the appellate court 

interpreted section 2-415(c) as “permit[ting] an original action against [the] receiver” in a separate 

case filed in the circuit court of Madison County and noted that, “in practice an original action 

against a receiver has been permitted after discharge by the circuit court”). 

¶ 29 Having concluded that Amer properly filed Counts II through V of his amended complaint 

in the instant case, we now turn to the propriety of the circuit court’s dismissal of those counts, 

beginning with Count II. Therein, Amer raises a cause of action for trover and conversion based 

on Rider, Realty, Building Services, or agents thereof, allegedly taking and destroying 

approximately $250,000 worth of Amer’s personal property that he had stored on the premises.

“The modern action for the tort called conversion is descended from the old common law action 

of trover.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965); see also In re Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d 255, 

259 (1985) (citing to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965)). As such, our analysis of 

Count II can be accomplished solely through the common law cause of action of conversion. 

“Conversion is any unauthorized act that deprives a person of their property permanently or for an 

indefinite amount of time.” Wei Quan v. Arcotech Uniexpat, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 180227, ¶ 12. 

To plead a claim for conversion, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege “that (1) he has a right to the 

property; (2) he has an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the 
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property; (3) he made a demand for possession; and (4) the defendant wrongfully and without 

authorization assumed control, dominion, or ownership over the property.” Cirrincione v. Johnson, 

184 Ill. 2d 109, 114 (1998). Though a tenant has been evicted from his premises, he still has a right 

to his personal property therein such that a claim for conversion could potentially succeed. See 

Mayle v. Urban Realty Works, LLC, 2022 IL App (1st) 210470, ¶¶ 1, 77, 81. 

¶ 30 In the instant case, the allegations in Count II of Amer’s amended complaint are insufficient 

to state a claim for conversion. We acknowledge that Amer sufficiently alleges that he stored 

personal property on the premises, made both an oral and written demand to Realty and Building 

Services for the return of such property, and Rider, Realty or Building Services failed to return his 

property. Moreover, nothing in the exhibits attached to Amer’s amended complaint—the lease, the 

various orders from the foreclosure action and eviction action, and his attorney’s written demand 

for the return of his personal property—or other court orders in the record from the foreclosure 

action and eviction action subject to judicial notice contradict the allegations of his amended 

complaint. But, critically, Amer’s amended complaint does not identify the personal property 

allegedly converted. All the pleading does is generally allege that Amer’s personal property, which 

he stored on the premises, had been taken or destroyed. Such an allegation is insufficient to state 

a claim for conversion, as “the subject of conversion is required to be an identifiable object of 

property of which the plaintiff was wrongfully deprived.” In re Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d at 260; see also 

Mid-America Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Middleton, 127 Ill. App. 3d 887, 892 (1984) 

(asserting that “conversion will lie only for a specific chattel”).

¶ 31 Although we liberally construe a pleading (see Papadakis v. Fitness 19 IL 116, LLC, 2018 

IL App (1st) 170388, ¶ 21) and recognize that Amer made a demand for an accounting of his 

personal property that was allegedly taken or destroyed, such a vague allegation by Amer does not 
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suffice. In a conversion action, a plaintiff’s allegations will be insufficient to state a claim when 

he does not “identify[ ] who was responsible for the removal of [his] personal property from [an] 

apartment.” Mayle, 2022 IL App (1st) 210470, ¶ 79. It follows logically then that a plaintiff’s 

allegations will be insufficient to state a claim for conversion when he does not identify the 

personal property allegedly taken or destroyed. Consequently, Amer’s allegations are insufficient 

to state a claim for conversion against defendants. 

¶ 32 Additionally, because Amer has not argued that the circuit court’s dismissal being made 

with prejudice was in error nor is there any evidence in the record that he requested leave to file a 

second amended complaint, we have no choice but to find the court properly dismissed Count II. 

See Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d 414, 435 (2004) (“The general rule is 

that where a trial court dismisses a complaint and plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, the cause 

of action must stand or fall on the sufficiency of the stricken pleading.”). 

¶ 33 Turning to Count III of Amer’s amended complaint, wherein he claims that defendants 

committed trespass based on Rider, Realty, Building Services, or agents thereof, unlawfully 

making entry onto his property. “A defendant commits the tort of trespass by entering onto a 

plaintiff’s land without permission, invitation, or other right.” Schweihs v. Chase Home Financial 

LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 191779, ¶ 30. “[A] defendant can be liable in trespass not only for his own 

entry onto the plaintiff’s land but also if he causes a thing or third person to enter onto it.” Id. 

¶ 34 But here, the exhibits attached to Amer’s amended complaint demonstrate that he cannot 

state a claim for trespass. See Gagnon, 2012 IL App (1st) 120645, ¶ 18 (asserting that “[w]here an 

exhibit contradicts the allegations in a complaint, the exhibit controls”). In the foreclosure action, 

the foreclosure court appointed Rider, as receiver, to manage the industrial complex where Amer’s 

premises was located while the foreclosure action remained pending, which the Foreclosure Law 
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allowed. See 735 ILCS 5/15-1704(a) (West 2016). Pursuant to that appointment, the Foreclosure 

Law granted Rider “full power and authority to operate, manage and conserve such property,” 

including, but not limited to, the power to “collect the rents *** from the mortgaged real estate.” 

The appointment order also granted Rider the same authority regarding the collection of rent. In 

addition, the appointment order authorized Rider to retain Realty to assist him in managing the 

property, including lease management, tenant relations, and rent billing and collections, which the 

Foreclosure Law allowed. See id. § 15-1704(c) (providing that “[a] receiver may *** delegate 

managerial functions to a person in the business of managing real estate of the kind involved who 

is financially responsible, not related to the mortgagee or receiver and prudently selected”). And 

during foreclosure proceedings, the foreclosure court granted Rider’s motion to employ Schiff as 

eviction counsel, which the Foreclosure Law allowed. See id. § 15-1704(b)(4) (providing that a 

court-appointed receiver “shall have the *** authority to *** employ counsel”).

¶ 35 Together, the foreclosure court orders and the Foreclosure Law allowed Realty, as Rider’s 

agent, to institute an eviction action at the commercial property using Schiff as eviction counsel. 

See Bleck v. Cosgrove, 32 Ill. App. 2d 267, 275 (1961) (where, during foreclosure proceedings, a 

receiver was appointed and the appointment order authorized him “ ‘to take charge of the real 

estate—and to collect the rents,’ ” the appellate court concluded that “[t]he authority to collect rent 

is not confined to prayful begging on bended knee at the door of the tenant but includes the right 

to institute appropriate legal action,” which authorized eviction proceedings against a tenant). To 

this end, Realty, as Rider’s agent, had the authority to file the eviction action against Furnishing

& Remodel and all unknown occupants at the address of Amer’s property. That eviction action, in 

turn, led to the eviction court granting an ex parte order of possession for Amer’s premises and the 

Cook County Sheriff’s Office executing an eviction of Amer’s premises. 
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¶ 36 It is true that Amer’s lease generally entitled him to possession and control of the subject 

premises to the exclusion of all others, including the lessor. See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. 

Michigan Central R.R. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 462, 477 (1958). But Realty, as Rider’s agent, prevailed 

in the forcible entry and detainer action, resulting in it obtaining an order of possession for Amer’s 

premises. The purpose of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (Forcible Entry Act) (735 ILCS 5/9-

101 et seq. (West 2016)) “is to provide a speedy remedy to allow a person who is entitled to the 

possession of certain real property to be restored to possession.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Watson, 

2012 IL App (3d) 110930, ¶ 14. It is a “mechanism for the peaceful adjudication of possession 

rights in the trial court.” Circle Management, LLC. V. Oliver, 378 Ill. App. 3d 601, 608 (2007). 

Because Realty, as Rider’s agent, obtained an order of possession for Amer’s premises through a 

forcible entry and detainer action, the eviction court concluded that Realty, as Rider’s agent, 

legally had the right to enter and possess Amer’s property. Therefore, Realty, as Rider’s courtauthorized agent, had the legal right to enter Amer’s premises, and Amer’s cause of action for 

trespass necessarily fails. Consequently, the circuit court properly dismissed Count III with 

prejudice. See Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 435. 

¶ 37 Turning to Count IV of Amer’s amended complaint, wherein he claims that defendants 

violated section 9-101 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2020)). This section provides that 

“[n]o person shall make an entry into lands or tenements except in cases where entry is allowed 

by law, and in such cases he or she shall not enter with force, but in a peaceable manner.” Id. The 

crux of Amer’s allegations in Count IV is that Rider, Realty, Building Services, or agents thereof, 

unlawfully made entry into Amer’s property in a nonpeaceful manner, which resulted in damage 

to his personal property. 
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¶ 38 In the instant case, Amer attempts to bring an independent cause of action for a violation 

of section 9-101 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2020)) outside forcible entry and detainer 

proceedings. But this section does not provide an independent cause of action, but rather regulates 

the appropriate way of restoring possession under forcible entry proceedings. See Bush v. Cooper, 

2017 IL App (1st) 160746-U, ¶ 24 (“[S]ection 9-101 does not provide a cause of action, but 

regulates the proper way of restoring the possession of a property under the Code; namely, if a 

party is entitled to the possession of the property under the Code, she shall enter in a peaceable 

manner”). Moreover, while a plaintiff may bring “an action for an improper eviction” pursuant to 

the Forcible Entry Act, the remedy is “re-possession but not *** tort damages.” (Emphasis in 

original.) Bozek v. Bank of America, N.A., 2021 IL App (1st) 191978, ¶ 91. Count IV of Amer’s 

amended complaint seeks tort damages for defendants’ alleged violation of section 9-101 of the 

Code, which is impermissible. See id. ¶¶ 91-92. Consequently, the circuit court properly dismissed 

Count IV of Amer’s amended complaint with prejudice. See Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 435. 

¶ 39 Lastly, Count V of Amer’s amended complaint is a cause of action for an accounting. In 

that count, Amer alleges that Rider, as a receiver, was a fiduciary and he, by and through his agents 

Realty, Building Services or their agents, breached that fiduciary duty by unlawfully entering his 

premises and destroying or converting his personal property. Amer further claims that he had no 

adequate remedy at law for that breach.

¶ 40 “An accounting is a statement of receipts and disbursements to and from a particular 

source.” Tufo v. Tufo, 2021 IL App (1st) 192521, ¶ 93. “The right to an accounting is not an 

absolute right, but one which should be accorded only on equitable principles.” Tarin v. Pellonari, 

253 Ill. App. 3d 542, 555 (1993). To plead a cause of action for an accounting, a plaintiff must 

sufficiently allege “that there is no adequate remedy at law and one of the following: (1) a breach 
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of a fiduciary relationship between the parties, (2) a need for discovery, (3) fraud, or (4) the 

existence of mutual accounts that are of a complex nature.” MacLeod v. Commonwealth Edison, 

2024 IL App (2d) 230237, ¶ 39. However, courts “typically do not enforce the requirement that 

there be no adequate legal remedy when the accounting is based on a breach of fiduciary duty.” 

Chicago Architectural Metals, Inc. v. Bush Construction Co., 2022 IL App (1st) 200587, ¶ 61.

Amer’s cause of action for an accounting, as pled, thus rests upon a breach of a fiduciary 

relationship between Rider and him. 

¶ 41 In order to breach a fiduciary duty, one must exist in the first place. Neade v. Portes, 193 

Ill. 2d 433, 444 (2000). “A receiver is considered an officer of the court that appointed him,” and 

he “owes fiduciary duties to the parties in the litigation.” City of Chicago v. Jewellery Tower, LLC, 

2021 IL App (1st) 201352, ¶ 48. In other words, a receiver appointed in a mortgage foreclosure 

action owes a fiduciary duty to the parties involved in the mortgage foreclosure action. And indeed, 

Amer cites PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 978 (1979), aff’d in part, 

rev’d in part, 86 Ill. 2d 291 (1981), for this proposition. But to the extent that Rider, as a courtappointed receiver, owed a fiduciary duty to Amer as a third party outside of the foreclosure 

proceedings, Amer fails to provide any case law supporting that proposition. “This court is not a 

repository for an appellant to foist the burden of argument and research.” Graham v. Lakeview 

Pantry, 2019 IL App (1st) 182003, ¶ 26. When a party fails to cite authority in support of an 

argument, he forfeits that argument. Id. As Amer’s cause of action for an accounting is premised 

upon a fiduciary duty existing between him and Rider, and he failed to provide any authority to 

support that proposition, Amer has forfeited his argument that the circuit court erred in dismissing 

his cause of action for an accounting. See id. Consequently, the circuit court properly dismissed 

Count V of Amer’s amended complaint with prejudice. See Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 435. 
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¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 44 Affirmed.