alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  D EMETRIOUS E. T HOMPSON ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-1518



#  G ENERALE LECTRIC C APITAL C ORPORATION ; G ENERALE LECTRIC C APITALC ARD , Defendants-Appellees. 

# 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge.

(CA-00-593-3-H) Submitted: November 25, 2002 Decided: December 20, 2002 Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL R. Frost Branon, Jr., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. W. T. Cranfill, Jr., Robert B. Meyer, MCGUIREWOODS, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION
PER CURIAM: Demetrious E. Thompson appeals the district court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by General Electric ("GE"), and denying relief on his employment discrimination action, filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986).First, Thompson, an African American Muslim, asserts he was subjected to a hostile work environment. This claim is meritless. Thompson cannot establish he was subjected to severe and pervasive discrimination. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); Conner v. Scharader-Bridgeport, Int’l, Inc. , 227 F.3d 179, 193 (4th Cir. 2000). Second, Thompson asserts he was subjected to retaliatory treatment for engaging in a protected activity, filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This claim is meritless. Thompson establishes that he engaged in a protected activity, Carter v. Ball , 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994), but he does not show this caused him to be subjected to retaliatory treatment. Gibson v. Old Town Trolley Tours of Washington, D.C., Inc. , 160 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998). 2 T HOMPSON v. G ENERAL E LECTRIC C APITAL C ORP
.Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to GE. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

3 T HOMPSON v. G ENERAL E LECTRIC C APITAL C ORP
.
#### Ex Parte John Henley.

No. 24797.

May 10, 1950.

*559
      *John W. Laird,*Austin, for relator.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

This application was filed in the Criminal District Court No. 2, Harris County, Texas, seeking to secure the release of the petitioner John Henley from confinement in the state penitentiary. The court heard the evidence and certified same to this court. It is, therefore, considered by us as if filed originally in this court.

The ground alleged is based upon his contention that he was forced to trial without counsel; that he was incapable of representing himself adequately; that he was taken advantage of in the absence of his counsel under circumstances showing that his trial was in violation of the due process of law.

The petition sets out at length the procedure relied on. The Honorable Langston King heard the evidence on the issues thus raised and certified the same to this court for action. From the evidence found in the record there was quite a controverted issue as to whether or not appellant was represented by counsel. Honorable Sam Hill, an attorney, who filed a motion for a new trial and appealed the case to this court, as shown in Henley v. State, 117 Tex. Cr. R. 228, 36 S. W. 2d 1018, was called as a witness. He recognized his handwriting on the pleadings, but had no personal recollection of what occurred. The prosecuting witness in the original trial testified at this hearing that a heavy-set man sat by appellant while he was on trial and that he stood before the jury, after the evidence was in, and talked in favor of Henley.

As an aggravating circumstance the petition alleges that he had employed counsel through a bondsman but did not know the name of the attorney. He says that when his case was called for trial the attorney failed to appear and that he filed a motion for a continuance until he could procure the services of an attorney. Documentary evidence introduced fails to indicate that such a motion was filed. It was not alleged as a ground for a new trial. Evidence which we consider conclusive on the issue as to whether or not he was represented by an attorney *560is found in the court’s judgment dated October 9, 1930, which reads as follows: “This day this cause was called for trial, and the State appeared by her District Attorney, and the Defendant, John Henly, appeared in person and by Counsel, and both parties announced ready for trial.”

The question attempted to be raised at this time could have been presented on appeal, but it was not. In consequence of the foregoing, it is our conclusion that the evidence fails to sustain the allegation. By this we do not mean to indicate that the allegations, within themselves, are sufficient, if proven, to warrant an order releasing relator from custody. Since the grounds alleged were not proven it is not necessary to discuss the question of law.

The application for writ of habeas corpus is refused.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6467 

To amend title 46, United States Code, to make certain improvements to 

the project selection criteria for grants under the port and intermodal 

improvement program, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 21, 2022 

Mr. GIMENEZ (for himself, Ms. WILSON of Florida, Mr. YOUNG, Ms. SALAZAR, Mr. PETERS, Mr. MAST, and Mrs. MURPHY of Florida) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 46, United States Code, to make certain 

improvements to the project selection criteria for grants 

under the port and intermodal improvement program, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PORT AND INTERMODAL IMPROVEMENT PRO4 GRAM. 

5 (a) PROJECT SELECTION CRITERIA.—Section 

6 54301(a)(6)(A)(i) of title 46, United States Code, is 

7 amended— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6467 IH

1 (1) by striking ‘‘movement of goods through a 

2 port or intermodal connection to a port’’ and insert3 ing ‘‘movement of—’’; and 

4 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub5 clauses: 

6 ‘‘(I) goods through a port or 

7 intermodal connection to a port; or 

8 ‘‘(II) passengers through an 

9 emission mitigation measure under 

10 paragraph (3)(A)(ii)(IV) that provides 

11 for the use of shore power for vessels 

12 to which sections 3507 and 3508 

13 apply.’’. 

14 (b) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Section 3513 of the Na15 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 

16 (Public Law 117–81) is amended by striking subsection 

17 (c). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### Rena Edwards v. State.

No. 25256.

April 4, 1951.

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of the liquor laws in Wheeler County and assessed a fine of $500.00.

The facts show a sale of six bottles of beer to an agent of the Texas Liquor Control Board for the sum of $3.00.

There are no bills of exception in the record. However, there appears in the transcript an affidavit of one of the jurors in which he states that he took into consideration the appellant’s failure to testify therein in arriving at his verdict. This is the effect of such affidavit.

A juror cannot be allowed to impeach his own verdict. See Hill v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 415, 157 S.W. (2d) 369 Bell v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 106, 161 S.W. (2d) 109; Arnold v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. R. 310, 186 S.W. (2d) 995; Hill v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. R. 105, 217 S.W. (2d) 1009; Franco v. State, 141 Tex. Cr. *591R. 246, 147 S.W. (2d) 1089; Flanagan v. State, 142 Tex. Cr. R. 177, 151 S.W. (2d) 803; Jureczki v. State, 152 Tex. Cr. R. 88, 211 S. W. (2d) 231.

No error being shown, the judgment will be affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Lourdes HERNANDEZ-HERNANDEZ, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-10351.

D.C. No. CR-00-05409-AWI.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 27, 2002.*

Decided Feb. 24, 2003.

*205Before SKOPIL, BOOCHEVER and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Lourdes Hernandez-Hernandez pled guilty to one count of being a deported alien found in the United States without permission to reenter in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. She filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of due process at her deportation hearing, when the immigration judge failed to advise her of her eligibility for a waiver of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The district court denied the motion, and Hernandez-Hernandez appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment de novo, *United States v. Muro-Inclan,*249 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir.2001), and we affirm.

The government conceded that Hernandez-Hernandez’s due process right was violated. To prevail on her motion to dismiss the indictment, however, Hernandez-Hernandez had to show prejudice, by demonstrating that she had a “plausible” ground for relief from deportation. *Id.*at 1184. Such a showing requires “extreme hardship,” or “great actual or prospective injury or extreme impact on the citizen family member, beyond the common results of deportation.” *Id.*(quotations omitted); *see United States v. Arrieta,*224 F.3d 1076,1080 (9th Cir.2000).

Hernandez-Hernandez showed only that of her four United States citizen children, three adults lived in the United States, and the one minor child had relocated to Mexico to live with Hernandez-Hernandez’s relatives. Her sole argument was that separation from the children caused extreme hardship because they were used to her being close and she had a strong and loving relationship with her family. She submitted greeting cards and brief letters from the adult children written during her incarceration for illegal reentry, relating everyday news and expressing that they loved and missed her.

This does not constitute extreme hardship. There is no evidence regarding extreme hardship at the time of deportation *206in 1997. Further, there is no evidence that beyond the usual difficulties of separation, her children are dependent on her support and presence in the United States. *Compare Arrieta,*224 F.3d at 1082 (extreme hardship where defendant had “critical role” in raising his siblings, mother’s sense of loss was severe, and family unity would be disrupted).

We AFFIRM.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-14-00122-CV

Alberto's Produce LLC

v.

Maxim Production Co. Inc.

On Appeal from the

329th District Court of Wharton County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 46,918

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against 

appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

August 14, 2014
#### Ex Parte Neal Harter.

No. 24945.

November 1, 1950.

*Bracewell & Wright,*Huntsville, for relator.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

This is an original application by Neal Harter who is confined in the state penitentiary by virtue of judgment of the 70th Judicial District Court, Midland County, of date March 11, 1949, assessing a term of five years in the state penitentiary on a charge of felony theft.

Appellant entered a plea of guilty before the court, who entered on his docket an order for judgment of five years in the penitentiary. By error in entering the judgment, it provided that he serve not less than two nor more than five years.

When this application was presented to Presiding Judge Hawkins, on the 19th day of June, 1950, he directed the Honorable Paul Moss, District Judge, to hear evidence and report to this court his findings, together with certified copy of the *217judgment, sentence, and such other orders as may be of record pertaining to this cause, including any subsequent nunc pro tunc order which may have been entered, together with all docket entries relied upon as basis for such nunc pro tunc orders.

This requirement has been complied with, which shows that proper nunc pro tunc order has been entered, in accordance with the law, correcting the judgment which is now definite, assessing a term of five years. It may be observed that in sentencing the defendant it is provided that same should not run concurrent with any other sentences against him. We have frequently held such orders to be ineffective and appellant should be given the benefit of such holding, in determining his time, in the event other sentences prior to this one should be held against him.

Considering the record as it is now presented, appellant is remanded to the authorities of the penitentiary to serve his sentence.
#### Travis Ross v. State.

No. 24548.

December 14, 1949.

*R. P. Watson, Jr.,*Marshall, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Driving an automobile while intoxicated is the offense; the punishment, a fine of $100.

Whether appellant was the driver of the automobile, as alleged, was the disputed issue before the jury.

A statement of the facts is not deemed called for in the light of the following bill of exceptions which is approved without qualification, viz.:

> “Be it remembered that upon the trial of the above entitled and numbered cause, the defendant moved the court for an instructed verdict of ‘Not Guilty’, and the court refused same and submitted the case to the jury. The jury found the de*80fendant ‘Guilty’ of the offense of driving while intoxicated upon a public highway, and assessed his penalty as $100.00 fine. The court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion of ‘Not Guilty’, because the evidence on the part of the State is insufficient to convict the defendant as charged, to which the defendant duly and timely excepted and tenders this Bill of Exception No. 2, which is approved by the Court and ordered filed.”

In approving this bill of exception the trial court certifies as a fact tht he erred in overruling the motion for new trial, because the evidence was insufficient to convict the appellant. The approval of this bill of exception constitutes a certification by the trial court that the facts do not sustain the conviction.

We are bound by the record as made and certified to us, and have no authority to disregard this certificate of error. Cooper v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. R. 569, 24 S. W. 2d 427 Jeters v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. R. 444, 77 S. W. 2d 231; Rehm v. State,, 128 Tex. Cr. R. 59, 78 S. W. 2d 983; Hart v. State,, 135 Tex. Cr. 565, 122 S. W. 2d 193; Gomez v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 219, 162 S. W. 2d 428.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Opinion approved by the court.
Exhibit 10.29  AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDED AND RESTATED EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT  This Amendment to the Amended and Restated
Employment Agreement is made as of December 5, 2008 by and between FGX
International Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company) and Steven Crellin,
a resident of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (the Employee).  WHEREAS, the Company
and the Employee are parties to a certain amended and restated Employment
Agreement dated as of February 18, 2008 (the Agreement);  WHEREAS, pursuant to
and in accordance with Section 22 of the Agreement, the Company and the
Employee desire to amend the Agreement to, among other things, comply with the
provisions of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Section 409A).  NOW THEREFORE, in
consideration of the foregoing promises and agreements contained herein, and
for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, the Company and the Employee agree as follows:  1.Section 9(e) shall be amended in
its entirety to read as follows:  (e)Resignation for Good Reason.  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
within this Agreement, if the Company substantially changes the terms and
conditions of Employees employment by either (i) unilaterally materially reducing
his Base Salary or (ii) materially reducing or materially adversely
changing his job responsibilities without his consent, then Employee shall have
the right to terminate his employment with the Company for Good Reason.  Prior to doing so, the Employee shall be
required to provide notice to the Company in writing, within ninety (90) days
following the initial existence of the purposed Good Reason condition, of the
specific circumstances which the Employee contends justify his resignation for Good
Reason, and the Company shall have thirty (30) business days in which to cure
such changes which led to the Employees determination to that he had the right
to resign for Good Reason.  The
Employees resignation for Good Reason shall occur within two years following
the initial existence of the purported Good Reason condition  If the Employee resigns for Good Reason, he
shall be entitled to the severance benefits as if he had been terminated
without cause as described in subsection (g) below.  2.Section 9(g) shall
be amended to add the following sentence to the end thereof:  Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, each severance
payment shall be deemed to be a separate payment within the meaning of Section 409A
of the Code and the regulations thereunder.  3.Section 17
shall be amended by deleting the word disability therefrom.


4.Except
as expressly provided herein, no other modifications or amendments to the
Agreement are being made and, with the exception of the amendment set forth
herein, the terms and conditions of the Agreement are hereby ratified and
confirmed.  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first written
above.  FGX
  INTERNATIONAL INC.By:
  /s/ Alec TaylorTitle: Alec Taylor, CEOEMPLOYEEBy:
  /s/ Steven Crellin  2
#### James Doran, Appellant, v Ransomes America Corp. et al., Respondents, and Aniano Equipment Sales and Repair, Inc., Appellant.

[675 NYS2d 312]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff, James Doran, and the defendant Aniano Equipment Sales and Repair, Inc., separately appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Ain, J.), dated August 8, 1997, which, upon the motion of the defendant Ransomes, Inc., granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Ransomes America Corp.

Ordered that the appeal of the defendant Aniano Equipment Sales and Repair, Inc., is dismissed, since that defendant is not aggrieved by the order appealed from; and it is further,

*450Ordered that on the appeal of the plaintiff, the order is reversed, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated insofar as asserted against the defendant Ransomes America Corp., arid it is further,

Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.

The appeal of the defendant Aniano Equipment Sales and Repair, Inc. (hereinafter Aniano), must be dismissed. The order appealed from dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against Ransomes America Corp. The order did not dismiss Aniano’s cross claims. Accordingly, Aniano was not aggrieved by the order appealed from (see, *Hauser v North Rockland Cent. School Dist. No. 1,*166 AD2d 553; *Nunez v Travelers Ins. Co.,*139 AD2d 712; *Schultz v Alfred,*11 AD2d 266, 268).

We agree with the plaintiff’s contention that the court erroneously granted the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Ransomes America Corp., an alleged designer, manufacturer, tester, inspector, and seller of the lawn mower involved in the accident *(see, Robinson v Reed-Prentice Div.,*49 NY2d 471). The plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of issues of fact as to whether the lawn mower was negligently designed *(see, LaPaglia v Sears Roebuck & Co.,*143 AD2d 173; *McAvoy v Outboard Mar. Corp.,*134 AD2d 245; *Lopez v Precision Papers,*107 AD2d 667, *affd*67 NY2d 871).

The respondents’ remaining contentions are without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Ritter and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Orient Paper, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Zhenyong Liu, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.





Dated: March 23, 2011
By:
/s/Zhenyong LiuZhenyong Liu

Chief Executive Officer

(principal executive officer)