alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6304 

To amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to prohibit 

any emergency temporary standard that includes a vaccine or drug mandate. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 16, 2021 

Mrs. HARTZLER (for herself, Mr. GIBBS, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. MAST, Mr. 

BISHOP of North Carolina, Mr. GOSAR, Mr. MCKINLEY, Mr. BABIN, Mr. 

CRENSHAW, Mrs. WAGNER, Mr. POSEY, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, Mrs. 

MCCLAIN, Mr. VAN DREW, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. 

PALMER, Mr. TIFFANY, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. BIGGS, Mrs. HINSON, Mrs. 

BICE of Oklahoma, Mr. NORMAN, Mrs. LESKO, Mr. SCHWEIKERT, Mr. 

FITZPATRICK, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, Mr. CLINE, 

Mr. LONG, and Mrs. MILLER of Illinois) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 

to prohibit any emergency temporary standard that includes a vaccine or drug mandate. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Federal Vaccine 

5 Mandates for Employees Act’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6304 IH

1 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STAND2 ARDS. 

3 Section 6(c)(1) of the Occupational Safety and 

4 Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 655(c)(1)) is amended by 

5 adding at the end the following: ‘‘No such emergency 

6 standard under this subsection may require any drug (as 

7 defined in section 201(g)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, 

8 and Cosmetic Act) or vaccine or other biological product 

9 (as defined in section 351(i)(1) of the Public Health Serv10 ice Act) to be administered to any employee.’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with this QuarterlyReport on Form 10-Q of The Pep Boys - Manny, Moe & Jack (the “Company”)for the quarterly period ending October 30, 2010, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),

 

I, Raymond L. Arthur, ExecutiveVice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(i)                                     The Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

(ii)                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, inall material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company andwill be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

 
| Date: December 7, 2010 | by:                                                   | /s/ Raymond L. Arthur |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                             | Raymond L. Arthur                                     |
|                             | Executive Vice President and  Chief Financial Officer |
|                             | (Principal Financial Officer)                         |

 

1

----
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-6729
In Re: ROBERT MOSES WILKERSON, Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CR-96-167-5) Submitted: September 24, 2002 Decided: October 11, 2002 Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert Moses Wilkerson, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Robert Moses Wilkerson has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus from this court seeking to have this court direct the district court “to respond” to a 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2000) motion filed on March 19, 2001. The record reveals that the district court denied this motion by order filed November 20, 2001. Accordingly, we grant Wilkerson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis but deny as moot his petit ion for mandamus relief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-30268 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus CLARENCE F. REED, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CR-10018-1

- - - - - - - - - - December 30, 1998 Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Clarence F. Reed appeals his conviction and sentence for distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Reed argues that the district court erred in determining that there was a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea, sentencing him pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines’ provision for cocaine base under § 2D1.1, denying his right of allocution at sentencing, and failing to verify whether he had read the Presentence Report (PSR) and discussed it withNo. 98-30268 -2- his attorney in accordance with F ED . R. C RIM . P. 32(c)(3)(A). These arguments were not raised before the district court. We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties and find no error. Reed has not met the standard in United States v. Johnson , 1 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), with respect to his assertion that there was an insufficient factual basis for his guilty plea. It was not plain error for the district court to sentence Reed under the Sentencing Guidelines’ provision for cocaine base in § 2D1.1. See United States v. Brewster , 137 F.3d 853 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 247 (1998). Reed availed himself of the ample opportunity for allocution that the district court allowed him at sentencing. See United States v. Myers , 150 F.3d 459, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1998). Any error with respect to the district court’s inquiry as to the PSR was harmless. See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 52(a). AFFIRMED.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20A0261. HARVEY v. THE STATE.

On December 27, 2017, Jimmy Edward Harvey filed a notice of appeal from

the trial court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The appeal was

docketed on August 22, 2019, and Harvey’s brief of appellant was due on September

11, 2019. 

Almost two months have passed since the due date, and Harvey has not filed

a brief of appellant. Accordingly, his appeal is hereby DISMISSED. See Court of

Appeals Rule 23 (a).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

November 14, 2019

11/14/2019
The Honorable Jerome Farris, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for *

the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 08a0437n.06

Filed: July 22, 2008

No. 07-5878

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

Before: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and FARRIS, Circuit Judges. *

PER CURIAM. Johnson Controls, Inc., filed this action seeking to declare its former

employee, Carolyn Thomas, ineligible for workers’ compensation. The district court dismissed the

complaint because Thomas already initiated state-court proceedings seeking benefits from Johnson

Controls. We affirm the district court’s judgment but not its reasoning inasmuch as it grounded the

dismissal on Colorado River abstention when it should have invoked its Declaratory-Judgment-Act

discretion. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) (holding that Colorado River

abstention is inapplicable to actions requesting declaratory relief). 

It suffices for disposition of this appeal to say that the district court acted well within its
No. 07-5878

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Thomas

- 2 -

discretion in declining to decide this issue of an employee’s right to state workers’ compensation

benefits. See id.; see also Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 554 (6th Cir. 2008). Such

a case has no business in federal court, particularly after the state court has reached a decision

inconsistent with the requested federal relief. Johnson Controls cited not one example of a federal

court entertaining the merits of a state workers’ compensation claim. And when confronted at oral

argument with the frivolous nature of this case—and worse yet, this appeal—appellant’s counsel

failed to offer anytenable justification, even when given the opportunityto defend against sua sponte

sanctions with a post-argument brief. 

We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint.
CERTIFICATIONI, Kokmeng Koh, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-Drequired to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K ofPrincipal Life Income Fundings Trust 2006-19 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);  2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as whole, donot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;  3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and otherinformation required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by thisreport is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;  4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s) required inthis report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the ExchangeAct period reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicingagreement(s) in all material respects; and  5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria forasset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment ofcompliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be includedin this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwisedisclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in suchreports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by thefollowing unaffiliated parties: Citibank, N.A. and Bankers Trust Company, N.A.Date: March 28, 2007   /s/ Kokmeng Koh     Kokmeng Koh  Second Vice President
#### Martha E. Keesey, Adm'x, v. Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company.

1. *Railroads—Accident at Country*Crossing.—Where defendant’s engineer and fireman were at their respective posts, properly discharging their duties, the road crossing was in the country and at a place where defendant had the right to move its trains at thirty miles or more per hour, the crossing signals required by the statute were given, and the noise of the train could be heard a long distance, it is not guilty of negligence contributing to the death of one who does not appear to have exercised that care for his own safety which the law requires, but drives at full speed upon the track in a top buggy with the top up.

Trespass oil the Case.—Death from negligent act. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Foi'd County; the Hon. John H. Moffett, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1902.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed November 1, 1902.

A. L. Phillips, attorney for appellant.

Cloud & Moffett, attorneys for appellee; John B. Cock-rum, of counsel.

Mr. Justice Harker

delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by appellant to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of B. F. Keesey. There was a trial by jury and a verdict rendered for the defendant in compliance with a peremptory instruction given by the court at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence.

Keesey was killed at a public road crossing while attempting to cross in front of a passenger train running at a speed of thirty miles per hour. He was riding in a top buggy, with the top up, and was driving a team of two horses. The evidence shows that one of his horses had a bad habit of starting into a run on reaching an up grade and was at times hard to hold. At the point in question, there is an abrupt rise to the railroad track. When deceased reached there, his team started up suddenly, and when seen by appellant’s fireman, it was running at full speed within a few feet of the track. It was impossible to stop the train *620or do anything to avoid the collision which occurred and from which Keesey was killed.

We are unable to see from the evidence upon what ground appellee could be held liable. The engineer and fireman were at their respective posts, properly discharging their duties. The road crossing was in the country and at a place where appellee had the right to move its trains at thirty miles or more per hour. The crossing signals ' required by the statute were given and neither engineer nor fireman appear to be guilty of any negligence which caused or contributed to the unfortunate accident. On the other hand, the deceased was not, in our opinion, in the exercise of that care for his own safety which the law requires. It does not appear that he exercised his senses in the least to learn of the approach of the train. The noise of the train could be heard a long distance. One witness, "who was riding on a load of corn far in the rear of deceased, heard the moving train and the crossing signal.

We think that the court properly directed a verdict for the defendant.

Judgment afiirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       2,528,940
<SECURITIES>                                   273,343
<RECEIVABLES>                               11,118,660
<ALLOWANCES>                                   719,102
<INVENTORY>                                  2,144,978
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            21,208,743
<PP&E>                                       8,564,721
<DEPRECIATION>                               6,408,239
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              24,114,090
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,236,705
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     1,459,992
<OTHER-SE>                                  13,417,393
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                24,114,090
<SALES>                                     22,665,368
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            22,665,368
<CGS>                                       15,170,512
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               15,170,512
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,620,144
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                26,705
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              20,486
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,126,983
<INCOME-TAX>                                   401,314
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            725,669
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   725,669
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.50
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.50


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1
------------




                    Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to
                            18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                             As Adopted Pursuant to
                 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Petrie Stores Liquidating Trust (the
"Trust") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Stephanie
R. Joseph, as Chief Executive Officer of the Trust, and H. Bartlett Brown, as
Chief Financial Officer of the Trust, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, to the best of her or his knowledge, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Trust.



/s/ Stephanie R. Joseph
-----------------------------
Stephanie R. Joseph
Chief Executive Officer
August 9, 2004


/s/ H. Bartlett Brown
-----------------------------
H. Bartlett Brown
Chief Financial Officer
August 9, 2004


This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Trust for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Trust and will be retained by the Trust and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3986

_____________________________

F.W.J., a child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Eric C. Roberson, Judge.

August 10, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. 

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and ROWE and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Archie F. Gardner, Jr., and 

Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for 

Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of Buckeye GP Holdings L.P. ("BGH") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Forrest E. Wylie, Chief Executive Officer of MainLine Management LLC, the general partner of BGH,
hereby certify, to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of BGH.

|                     |  | MAINLINE MANAGEMENT LLC,
as general partner of BGH         
|-------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 14, 2008 |  | /s/FORREST E. WYLIEForrest E. Wylie Chief Executive Officer

---



QuickLinks
#### S. R. ROSIER and Emma Rosier, his wife, Appellants, v. Walter H. BRYAN and Doril H. Bryan, his wife, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division B.

Feb. 9, 1955.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Philip Adler v. Philip & William Ehling Brewing Company.

Motion granted, with ten dollars costs.
#### Caroline E. McManus, Respondent, v. The City of Troy, Appellant.

Motion denied.
EXHIBIT 12.2

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS
COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
(Dollars in millions)

|                                          | 1996
------ | 1997
------ | 1998
------ | 1999
------ | 2000
------ | For the six months ended June 30, 2001
------
|----------------------------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ---------------------------------------------
|Fixed Charges:                            |             |             |             |             |             |                                              
|Interest                                  | $88         | $88         | $81         | $62         | $72         | $35                                          
|Interest Portion of Annual Rentals        | 5
------    | 5
------    | 4
------    | 3
------    | 4
------    | 2
------                                     
|Total Fixed Charges For Purpose of Ratio  | $93
======  | $93
======  | $85
======  | $65
======  | $76
======  | $37
======                                   
|Earnings:                                 |             |             |             |             |             |                                              
|Pretax income from continuing operations  | $349
------ | $416
------ | $287
------ | $383
------ | $390
------ | $185
------                                  
|Add: Fixed charges (from above)           | 93          | 93          | 85          | 65          | 76          | 37                                           
|Less: Fixed charges capitalized           | 2
------    | 1
------    | 1
------    | 2
------    | 2
------    | 1
------                                     
|Fixed charges net of 
capitalized charges | 91
------   | 92
------   | 84
------   | 63
------   | 74
------   | 36
------                                    
|Total Earnings for Purpose of 
Ratio      | $440
====== | $508
====== | $371
====== | $446
====== | $464
====== | $221
======                                  
|Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges        | 4.73
====== | 5.46
====== | 4.36
====== | 6.86
====== | 6.11
====== | 5.97
======