alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
Note:  This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1997 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001029303
<NAME> THE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          35,110
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   22,028
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,186
<INVENTORY>                                     68,658
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               106,105
<PP&E>                                          87,561
<DEPRECIATION>                                  52,448
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 351,654
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           68,519
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     11,249
<COMMON>                                            53
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   351,654
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                63,842
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   68,596
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,523
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,277)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,496)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (7,781)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (7,781)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        
<PAGE>

</TABLE>
Exhibit
      32.1




Certification
      Pursuant To


18
      U.S.C.
      Section 1350,


As
      Adopted Pursuant To


Section
      906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002








In
      connection with the Annual Report of Somerset International Group, Inc. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the twelve months ending December 31, 2006 as
      filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Lord Dr.
      Masaaki Ikawa, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and the results
      of operations of the Company.






/s/
                Lord Dr. Masaaki Ikawa
              -----------------------------
              Lord
                Dr. Masaaki Ikawa
              Chief
                Executive Officer
              Chief
                Financial Officer





Dated:
      March 16, 2007
|             |
|------------------|
| **EXHIBIT 32.1** |

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Applera Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Tony L. White, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|   | (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                                                                                                                                                     |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

/s/ Tony L. White                    Chief Executive OfficerDate: February 13, 2004

 

 

 

----
Exhibit 99.1

                      Statement of Chief Executive Officer
         Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code


         Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the
undersigned, Kenneth A. Swanstrom, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of Penn Engineering & Manufacturing Corp. (the "Company"), hereby
certifies that to his knowledge:

1.   The Company's Form 10-Q Quarterly Report for the period ended March 31,
     2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated:  May 15, 2003
                                          /s/ Kenneth A. Swanstrom
                                          ----------------------------
                                          Kenneth A. Swanstrom
                                          Chairman of the Board and
                                          Chief Executive Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided by the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 10, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-50995 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus MANUEL CERA-GONZALEZ, also known as Juan Zamarron-Gonzalez, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-03-CR-510-ALL-PRM

-------------------- Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Manuel Cera-Gonzalez appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United Statesafter deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. CeraGonzalez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have beenNo. 03-50995 -2- alleged in his indictment. Cera-Gonzalez maintains that he pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for that offense.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Cera-Gonzalez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       4,024,308
<SECURITIES>                                18,460,859
<RECEIVABLES>                               25,756,368
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,000,000
<INVENTORY>                                 27,929,129
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            78,736,702
<PP&E>                                      94,714,762
<DEPRECIATION>                              38,035,518
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             137,815,946
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       14,020,370
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        89,381
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                 116,900,985
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               137,815,946
<SALES>                                    119,224,887
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           119,893,416
<CGS>                                       82,801,504
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              103,774,213
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             129,143
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             15,990,060
<INCOME-TAX>                                 5,985,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         10,005,060
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                10,005,060
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.35
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.35
        

</TABLE>
#### Haggerty *v.*Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, Appellant.

*Negligence*— Street *railway*— Switch—Absence *of switch bar*— ■ *Car jumping track*— Pedestrian *on sidewalk*— Presumption *of negligence*— Case *for jury.*

In an action against a street railway company to recover ¿images for personal injuries, the case is for the jury and a verdict and judgment for plaintiff will be sustained where it appeared that after the front truck of one of defendant’s cars had passed a switch at a point where the tracks of the company intersected, the rear truck turned on the switch, thereby throwing one end of the car onto the sidewalk and striking the plaintiff who was standing near the curb, where there was testimony on behalf of plaintiff tending to show that an iron bar was used to keep the tongue of such switch in place, that a bar or similar appliance was necessary for that purpose and was out of place at the time of the accident. The bar being under the exclusive management of defendant its absence gave rise to a presumption of negligence sufficient to take the case to the jury.

Argued Jan. 8, 1914.

Appeal, No. 223, Jan. T., 1913, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 4, Philadel*108phia Co., March T., 1909, No. 4257, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Margaret Haggerty v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company.

Before' Fell, C. J., Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.

Affirmed.

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before Willson, P. J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

Verdict for the plaintiff for $4,000, and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.

*Errors assigned*were in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant and in dismissing defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v.

*Harold B. Beitler,*for appellant.

*H. Horace Dawson,*for appellee.

February 9,1914:

Per Curiam,

The defendant’s track on Chestnut street crosses at right angles its track on Seventh street and at the intersection of these streets the tracks are connected by a switch. The front truck of a car running east on Chestnut street passed the switch but the rear truck turned south on the switch, in consequence of which one end of the car was thrown onto the sidewalk and injured the plaintiff, who was standing near the curb. There was testimony on behalf of the plaintiff tending to show that an iron bar was used to keep the tongue of the switch in place; that the use of a bar or similar appliance was necessary for that purpose; that the bar was out of place at the time of the accident. The cause of the accident was thus shown. The bar was under the exclusive management of the defendant and its absence gave rise to the presumption of negligence sufficient to take the case to the jury.

The judgment is affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

TROY JENNINGS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil Action No. 11-411 (BAH) 

 ) 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Court dismissed this case after the Plaintiff failed to oppose in a timely manner the 

Defendants’ dispositive motion despite having been warned by the Court that failure to do so 

could result in the motion being granted as conceded. Mem. Op., ECF No. 26; Order, ECF No. 

27. The Plaintiff later moved for reconsideration of that dismissal. See Reconsideration Mot., 

ECF No. 28 [hereinafter Mot.]. The Court denied that motion because the Plaintiff had an 

opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ dispositive motion but had neither availed himself of 

that opportunity nor moved for an extension of time within which to file his response. Mem. Op. 

and Order, ECF No. 32. 

The Plaintiff has since filed two documents at ECF No. 33, both of which offer further 

support to an assertion the Plaintiff made in a previously filed supplement to his motion for 

reconsideration: that he was unable to respond to the Defendants’ dispositive motion in part 

because he was placed in administrative segregation on July 5, 2011. The Court already 

considered that assertion when it denied the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Mem. Op. 
2 

and Order at 3. The newly filed documents therefore provide no additional reason why the Court 

should reconsider its dismissal of this case. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Plaintiff again seeks reconsideration of the dismissal 

of this case based on the new documents he recently filed at ECF No. 33, it is hereby 

ORDERED that such reconsideration DENIED. 

SO ORDERED this 3rd day of November, 2011. 

/s/Beryl A. Howell 

BERYL A. HOWELL 

 United States District Judge
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EXHIBIT 23.1

 

Consent of Independent Accountants

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-01861) of Chyron Corporation of our report dated March 20, 2002, relating to the consolidated financial statements and consolidated financial statement schedule which appears in Chyron Corporation's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2001.

 

 

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Melville, New York

November 14, 2002
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pharez Charles PRINCE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-5017.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 26, 2002.

Decided Nov. 18, 2002.

Kenneth W. Ravenell, Erin C. Murphy, Schulman, Treem, Kaminkow, Gilden & Ravenell, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas E. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Tarra DeShields Minnis, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Pharez Charles Prince was convicted of bank robbery following his conditional guilty plea and sentenced to 151 months in prison. Prince reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant on his residence and vehicle and has appealed that order. Prince asserts the affidavit supporting the search warrants was insufficient to establish probable cause. Finding no such error, we affirm.

In reviewing the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence, we review the factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and review the legal conclusions de novo. *United States v. Kitchens,*114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir.1997). Thus, we review de novo the legal question of whether a search warrant and its supporting affidavit are legally sufficient, while according substantial deference to a neutral and detached judge’s finding of probable cause. *United States v. Oloyede,*982 F.2d 133, 138 (4th Cir.1992). We must simply ensure that the judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. *Illinois v. Gates,*462 U.S. *178218, 246, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). According substantial deference to the issuing magistrate judge, we conclude that the affidavit established sufficient probable cause to search Prince’s home and vehicle.

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of Prince’s motion to suppress. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### First National Bank of Bangor, Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. William H. Brooks and Mary C. Brooks, as Executors, etc., of Charles F. Brooks, Deceased, and William H. Brooks, Individually, Respondents.

Order affirmed, with ten. dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory HOOTEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-7263.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 14, 2002.

*640Gregory Hooten, Appellant Pro Se. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAM D. WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Gregory Hooten seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). An appeal may not be taken to this court from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court on the merits absent a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). As to claims dismissed by a district court solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(l)‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’ ” *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)). We have reviewed the record and conclude for the reasons stated by the district court that Hooten has not satisfied either standard. *See United States v. Hooten,*Nos. CR-97-109; CA-00-50 (W.D.N.C. July 18, 2002). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
**Exhibit 35.2**

** **

**WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.**

** **

**OFFICER’S CERTIFICATEANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**

 

            I, Barbara Campbell, an authorized officer of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. (the “AdministrativeAgent”), do hereby certify to Long Beach Securities Corp. (the “Depositor”) and Washington Mutual Bank (the “Servicer”), pursuant to the Administrative Agent Agreement dated as of January 1, 2005 (the “ServicingAgreement”) by and between Long Beach Mortgage Company, as servicer and predecessor in interest to the Servicer, and the Administrative Agent the following with respect to Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4 for the 2006 fiscal year  (the“Relevant Year”):

 

1.        A review of the activities of the Servicer during the Relevant Year and of performance under the ServicingAgreement has been made under my supervision.

2.        To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under theServicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the Relevant Year.

 

Dated as of February 22, 2007.

 
|  

__/s/ Barbara Campbell________________

Name:  Barbara Campbell

Title:    First Vice President |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, December 02, 2019.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, December 02, 2019

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A20D0158. MARK W. FORSLING et al. v. PAMELA THOMPSON et al. .

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

CE1801114