In th e S u p re m e Co u rt o f Ge o rg ia

De c id e d: Ma rc h 7 , 2 0 1 6

S1 5 A1 5 0 5 . ROLLF v . CARTER.

B L ACKW EL L , Ju stic e

.

Wh e n th e sta tu to ry la w e sta b lish e s d iffe re n t p u n i s h m e n ts fo r th e sa m e

o f f e n s e, c o u rts so m e tim e s a p p ly th e ru le o f le n ity to re so lv e th e sta tu to ry

a m b ig u ity

. P ro p e rly a

p p lie d, th e ru le o f le nity dire c ts th e c o u rts to re so lv e su c h

a m b ig u itie s in fa v o r o f a d e fe n d a n t, a c c ord in g th e d e fe n d a n t th e b e n e fit o f th e

d o u bt a b o ut wh a t p u n ish m e n t th e la w a u th oriz e s in h is c a se , a n d p re su m in g th a t

th e la w wa s m e a n t o n ly to p e rm it th e le sse r pu n ish m e nt. 1 Se e Ba n ta v

. S ta te

, 2 8 1

Ga

. 6 1 5

, 6 1 7 (2 ) (6 4 2 S E2 d 5 1 ) (2 0 0 7 ). Alth o u g h th e ru le o f le n ity p e rh a p s ha s

b e e n a p plie d in Ge o rg ia m o st c o m m o n ly wh e n th e sta tu to ry l a w e sta b lish e d b o th

fe lo ny a n d m isd e m e a no r p u n ish m e n ts fo r th e sa m e o ffe n se , se e , e .g ., Dix o n v

.

S ta te

, 2 78 Ga

. 4

, 7 (1 ) (d ) (5 9 6 S E2 d 1 4 7 ) (2 0 0 4 ), its a p p lic a tio n is n o t lim ite d

1 As we h ave acknowledged bef ore, the rule of

lenity is an interpretative rule of last

resort. It is properly applied only when t h e ordinary rules of statutory interpretation are inadequate to resolve a statutory am biguity

. Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 4 (3) (690 SE2d 804) (2010).to th a t pa rtic u la r c irc u m sta n c e

. In Mc Na ir v

. Sta te

, 2 9 3 Ga

. 2 8 2

, 2 8 5 (7 45 S E2 d

2 8 2 ) (2 01 3 ), th i s C o u r t h e ld th a t th e ru le o f le n ity p ro pe rly m a y b e a p p lie d

wh e n e ve r “ th e re is a

n a m b ig u ity th a t wo u ld re su lt in v a ry in g d e g re e s o f

p u n ish m e n t fo r th e sa m e o ffe n se ”
— e v e n a n a m b ig u ity a s be twe e n d iffe re n t

fe lo ny pu n ish m e n ts

— a

n d we d isa

p p ro v e d se v e ra l d e c isio n s in w h ic h ou r Co urt

o f Ap p e a ls h a d c o n c lu d e d oth e rwise

. To d a y , we c on sid e r wh e th e r ou r d e c isio n

in Mc Na ir m a rk e d a

c h a n g e in th e la w.

In 2 0 0 8

, Ru sse ll De a n Ro llf a ssa u lte d h i s e s t r a n g e d wife with a b u tc h e r

k n ife a n d th e in te nt to k ill he r. He la te r wa s trie d b y a ju ry fo r th a t o ffe n se ,

c o n v ic te d o f a tte m

p te d m u rd e r, a n d se n te n c e d fo r th a t c rim e to i mp r i s o n me n t

fo r a t e r m o f y e a rs. Ro llf a p p e a le d

, an d h e arg u e d th a t th e la w is a m b ig u o u s

a b o u t wh e th e r h i s o f

f en s e wa s p u n ish a

b le a s a tte m

p te d m u rd e r 2 o r o n ly a s

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. 3 Atte m pte d m u rd e r is p u n ish a

b le b y im p riso n m e n t fo r o n e

to th irty y e a rs, se e OCGA § 1 6 -4 -6 (a ), wh e re a s a g g ra v a te d a s s a u l t ord in a rily

2 See OCGA §§ 1 6-4-1 ( “A person com m its the of f ense of crim inal attem

pt when,
with intent to com m it a specif ic crim e, he perf

orm s any act w hich constitutes a s u bstantial
step toward the com m ission of that crim e.”) and 16-5-1 (a) (“A person com m its the of f ense

o f mu r d er when he unlawf ully and with m alice af

orethought, either express o r im plie d

, causes the death of

another hum an being.”).

3 See OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (1) ( “A person c om m its the of f ense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [ w ]ith intent to m urder . . . .”).

2is p u n ish a

ble b y im p riso n m e n t fo r o n e to twe n ty y e a rs. S e e OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 1

(c ). Be c a u se th e la w im

p o se d d iffe re n t p u n ish m e n ts fo r h is o ffe n se , Ro llf

c la im e d

, th e ru le o f le n ity o u g h t t o b e a p p l i e d

, a n d h e sh o u ld h a v e b e e n

c o n v ic te d o f a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt, n o t a tte m p te d m urd e r. Th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls,

h o we v e r, re

je c te d th a t a rg um e n t in Ro llf v

. S ta te

, 31 4 Ga

. Ap p

. 5 96

, 5 98 (2 ) (a )

(7 2 4 SE2 d 8 8 1 ) (2 0 1 2 ), a ffirm in g Ro llf’s c o n v ic tio n fo r a tte m p te d m u rd e r o n

th e gro u nd th a t, e v e n if a tte m p te d m u rd e r a n d a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt we re th e sa m e

o ffe n se , th e ru le o f le n ity d o e s n o t a p p ly a s b e twe e n two fe lo n y p u n ish m e n ts.

A little m o re th a n a y e a r la te r, we d e c id e d Mc Na ir, an d Ro llf w a s a m o n g th e

d e c isio n s o f th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls th a t we disa p p ro v e d

. S e e Mc Na ir, 2 93 Ga

. a t

2 8 4 -2 8 5

.

F o l l o win g o u r d e c isio n in Mc Na ir, Ro llf file d a p e titio n fo r a writ o f

h a b e a s c o rp u s, a sse rtin g th a t th e ru le of le n ity ou gh t to h a v e b e e n a p p lie d in h is

c a se a n d th a t h e sh o u ld h a v e b e e n c on vic t e d o f o n ly a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt with

in te nt to m

u rd e r, n o t a tte m

p te d m u rd e r

. 4 In h a

b e a s pro c e e din g s, h o w e v e r, th e

4 Although Rollf ’s claim

is largely about the punishm ent that the law authorizes f or his o f f ense, it also im

plicates the lawf

ulness of his conviction, inasm uch as he contends that
he should not h a ve been convicted of at t em p ted m urder. His claim is not the sort of “void
sentence” claim that m ay properly be raised in a m o tion to vacate sentence. S ee von Thom as

v. S tate, 293 Ga. 569, 571-572 (2) (748 SE2d 4 46) (2013). His claim is, however, cognizable

3d o c trin e o f re s ju d ic a ta ord in a rily p o se s a p ro c e d u ra l b a r to th e re c o n sid e ra tio n

o f issu e s a lre a d y d e c id e d o n d ire c t a pp e a l, a n d to o v e rc o m e th a t p ro c e d u ra l ba r,

a p e titio n e r m

u st p o in t to a c h a n ge in th e a p p lic a b le la w or m a te ria l fa c ts o f h is

c a se

. 5 Ha ll v

. La n c e , 2 8 6 Ga

. 3 6 5

, 3 7 6 (III) (6 8 7 S E2 d 8 0 9 ) (2 0 1 0 )

. Be c a use

R o l l f so u g h t in h is h a

be a s p e titio n to ra ise th e sa m e c la im th a t th e C o u r t o f

Ap p e a ls h a d re

j e c t e d in h is d ire c t a

p p e a l, Ro llf wa s c on fro n te d with th e

p ro c e d u ra l b a r, a n d so , in a n e ffo rt to o ve rc o m e it, Ro llf p o in te d to o u r d e c isio n

in Mc Na ir a n d a rg u e d th a t it m a rk e d a c h a n g e in th e a p p lic a ble la w. Th e h a

b e a s

c o u rt d isa g re e d a n d d e n ie d th e p e titio n fo r a writ o f h a b e a s c orp u s. Ro llf

a p p e a ls.

It c a n n o t b e sa id th a t a d e c isio n of th is C o u rt a m o u n ts to a c h an g e in th e

la w if th e d e c isio n wa s d ic ta te d b y o u r o wn p re c e d e nts. Cf. Alfo rd v

. Sta te

, 2 8 7

Ga . 1 05 , 1 0 6 (6 9 5 S E2 d 1 ) (2 0 1 0 ) (c itin g T e a g ue v. L a n e , 4 89 U. S . 2 8 8 (1 0 9

S Ct 1 0 6 0

, 1 03 LE2 d 3 3 4 ) (1 9 8 9 ), a n d h o ld in g th a t “ a c a se a n no u n c e s a n e w ru le

if th e re su lt w a s n o t d ic ta te d b y p re c e d e n t e x istin g a t th e tim e th e d e fe n d a n t’s

in habeas. See id.

5 That the C ourt of A ppeals m ay have erred i n its resolution of the direct appeal is not enough, absent a change in the law or f acts, to o vercom e the procedural bar. See Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353, 354 (1) (466 SE2d 837) (1996).

4c o n v ic tio n b e c a m e fin a l” ). T h a t wa s th e c a se with Mc Na ir. As we e x pla in e d in

Mc Na ir, th is Co u rt h a d “ n e v e r h e ld

. . . th a t th e ru le o f le n ity on ly a p p lie s wh e n

th e p u n ish m e n ts a r e a s b e t w e e n a m isd e m e an o r a nd a fe lo ny .” 2 9 3 G a

. a t 2 8 4

(e m p h a sis in o rig in a l). To th e c o n tra ry , we sa id

, th is Co u rt p r e v i o u sly h a d

“ in dic a te d th a t th e re m a

y b e situ a tio n s in wh ic h th e ru le o f le nity c o u ld a p p ly to

a n a m b ig u ity in v o lv in g sta tu te s wh ic h e x a c t d iffe rin g fe lo n y p u n ish m e n ts fo r

th e sa m e o f

f e n s e

. ” I d

. (c itin g Ha rris v

. S ta te

, 2 8 6 Ga

. 24 5 (6 8 6 S E2 d 7 7 7 )

(2 0 0 9 )). Mo re im

p o rta n t, d e c a d e s b e fo re ou r d e c isio n in Mc N a ir
— a n d lo n g

b e fo re th e Co urt of Ap p e a ls d e c id e d Ro llf
— th is C o u rt a c tu ally a p p lie d th e ru le

o f le n ity to re so lv e a

d isp u te a b o u t two a rg u a

bly c o n flic tin g sta tu te s th a t we re

c o n c e rn e d o n ly with th e p u n ish m e n t o f fe lo n ie s. S e e Ge e v

. S ta te

, 2 2 5 G a

. 6 6 9

,

6 7 5 -6 7 7 (7 ) (1 7 1 S E2 d 2 9 1 ) (1 9 6 9 ). 6 An d in a n o th e r c a se th a t p re da te d Mc Na ir

a n d Ro llf b y m a

n y y e a rs, th is Co u rt in v ok e d th e ru le of le n ity in th e c o u rse o f

d i s c u ssin g a

n a rg u a b le a m b ig u ity a b ou t wh e th e r a c e rta in so rt o f m u rd e r ( a

f e l o n y, o f c o u rse ) wa s p u n ish a b le b y d e a th o r o nly b y life im p riso n m e n t. S e e

6 I n Gee, we addressed a s tatute that explicitly declared a particular sort of drug
of f ense to be a “f

elony ,” a nd we considered whether the f elony sentencing provisions of that

statute (m aking the f

elony punishable b y i m

prisonm ent, a f

ine, o r b oth) conf

licted with a
statute m ore generally p roviding t hat f elonies are “to be punished by death or i m prisonm ent in the penitentiary , and not otherwise.” 225 Ga. at 675-676 (7).

5Ba n k sto n v

. S ta te

, 25 8 Ga

. 18 8

, 1 8 9 (3 6 7 S E 2 d 3 6 ) (1 9 8 8 ). Ou r d e c isio n in

Mc Na ir wa s d ic ta te d b y th e e a rlie r de c isi o n s o f th is Co u rt, an d it m a rk s,

th e re fo re , n o c h a n g e in th e la w.

Bu t wh a t a

b o u t th e “ la w” u p o n wh ic h th e Co u rt o f A p p e a l s re lie d in

Ro llf? Afte r a ll, Ro llf wa s n o t th e first c a se in wh ic h th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls h a d

sa id th a t th e ru le o f le n ity sim p ly d o e s n o t a

p p ly a s b e twe e n two fe lo n ie s, se e ,

e .g ., S h a b a a z z v

. S ta te

, 2 7 3 Ga

. Ap p

. 3 8 9 (6 1 5 SE2 d 2 1 4 ) (2 0 0 5 ), a n d Ro llf

m e re ly fo llo we d th ose e a rlie r d e c isio n s of th e Co urt o f Ap p e a ls. S e e 3 1 4 Ga

.

Ap p

. a t 5 98 (2 ) (a ), n

. 8

. Th e a n s w e r i s t h a t th e d e c isio n s o f th e Co u rt o f

Ap p e a ls o n wh ic h Ro llf re lie d n e v e r we re b in din g p re c e d e nts. Th e d e c isio n s o f

th is Co u rt a re b in d in g d e c isio n a l la w in a ll oth e r Ge o rg ia c o urts. S e e G a

. Co n st.

o f 1 9 8 3

, Art. VI, S e c

. V I, P a ra

. VI (“ Th e d e c isio n s o f th e S u p re m e Co u rt sh a ll

b in d a ll o th e r c o urts a s p re c e d e n ts.” ). T h e d e c isi o n s o f th e Co urt o f Ap p e a ls,

h o we v e r, a re bin d in g d e c isio n a l la w o n ly to th e e xte n t th a t th e y a r e n o t

in c o nsiste nt with th e d e c isio n s o f th e S u p re m e Co u rt. S e e Ga . Co n st. o f 1 9 8 3

,

Art. VI, Se c

. V, P a ra

. III (“ Th e de c isio n s o f th e Co u rt of Ap p e a ls in so fa r a s n o t

in c o n flic t with th o se o

f th e S u p re me Co urt sh a ll bin d a l l c o urts e x c e p t th e

S u p re m e Co u rt a s p re c e d e n ts.” ) (e m p ha sis su p p lie d ). A d e c isio n o f th e Su p re m e

6Co u rt d isa p p ro v in g d e c isio n s o f th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls th a t we re in c o n siste n t

with e a rlie r d e c isio n s o f th e S u p re m e Co u rt — M c Na ir wa s th a t so rt o f d e c isio n

— is n o c h a n g e in th e la w. Cf. Bru c e v . S m ith , 2 74 Ga

. 4 32

, 4 34 -4 3 5 (2 ) (5 5 3

S E2 d 80 8 ) (2 0 0 1 ) (o v e rru lin g o f e a rlie r d e c isio n s o f th is Co u rt wa s a c h a n g e in

th e la w).

Be c a u se Mc N a ir m a rk e d n o c h a n g e in th e la w, it d o e s n o t he l p R o l lf to

o v e rc o m e th e p ro c e d u ra l b a r in th is ha b e a s c a se

. Th e re b e in g no c ha n g e in th e

a p p lic a b le la w o r fa ct s , t h e e a rlie r d e c isio n in Ro llf is re s ju d ic a ta

, a n d th e

h a b e a s c o u r t p ro p e rly d e n ie d th e p e titio n fo r a writ o f h a b e a s c o rp u s. Th e

ju d g m e n t o f th e h a

b e a s c o u rt is a ffirm e d.

Ju d g m e n t a ffirm e d . All th e Ju stic e s c o n c u r.

7