IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA16-1307

Filed: 1 August 2017

Mecklenburg County, No. 16 CVS 3613

MOLLY SCHWARZ, Plaintiff,

v.

ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC., ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC., DUKE UNIVERSITY, 

DUKE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., ERIC DELISSIO, TED COLE, and 

THOMAS J. WEBER, JR., Defendants.

Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 21 September 2016 by Judge Carla N. 

Archie in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 

2017.

Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, LLP, by Harvey L. Kennedy and 

Harold L. Kennedy III, for plaintiff-appellant. 

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Keith M. Weddington, and Dorsey &

Whitney LLP, by Meghan Des Lauriers, for defendant-appellees St. Jude 

Medical, Inc. and St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. 

ELMORE, Judge.

The Mecklenburg County Superior Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint 

against her former employer, St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc., and its parent company, St. 

Jude Medical, Inc., because the forum-selection clause in the employment agreement 

designates Ramsey County, Minnesota, as the exclusive venue to litigate plaintiff’s 

claims. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 (2015), “any provision in a contract 
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entered into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution of any action . . . that 

arises from the contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against public 

policy and is void and unenforceable.” Because the employment agreement was 

“entered into in North Carolina,” not Texas as the trial court concluded, the forumselection clause is void and unenforceable under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3. Reversed. 

I. Background

Plaintiff Molly Schwarz is a resident of Mecklenburg County. Defendants St. 

Jude Medical and St. Jude Medical S.C. are Minnesota corporations doing business 

in Mecklenburg County. St. Jude Medical S.C. has its principal office in Austin, 

Texas. 

Plaintiff was employed as a clinical specialist with St. Jude Medical S.C. from 

2004 to 2009. St. Jude Medical S.C. employs a sales team that sells medical devices 

to hospitals, clinics, and other medical providers. In her role, plaintiff supported the 

sales representatives and their provider accounts, including Duke University and 

Duke University Health Systems, Inc. (collectively, Duke), where Dr. Thomas J. 

Weber Jr. was employed.

After her first term of employment ended, plaintiff re-applied for the same 

position. On 27 August 2012, she executed an at-will employment agreement with 

St. Jude Medical S.C. and began working. The agreement addresses standard 
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employment issues including duties, compensation, and termination. It also contains 

the following choice-of-law and forum-selection provisions: 

Governing Law. This Agreement will be governed by the 

laws of the state of Minnesota without giving effect to the 

principles of conflict of laws of any jurisdiction.

Exclusive Jurisdiction. All actions or proceedings relating 

to this Agreement will be tried and litigated only in the 

Minnesota State or Federal Courts located in Ramsey 

County, Minnesota. Employee submits to the exclusive 

jurisdiction of these courts for the purpose of any such 

action or proceeding, and this submission cannot be 

revoked. Employee understands that Employee is 

surrendering the right to bring litigation against SJMSC 

outside the State of Minnesota.

Plaintiff signed the agreement in North Carolina and faxed it to a representative of 

St. Jude Medical S.C. in Austin, Texas, where, on 13 September 2012, Keith Boettiger 

executed the agreement on behalf of St. Jude Medical S.C. By its terms, the 

agreement was effective as of 4 September 2012.

Plaintiff’s sales team worked primarily with Duke. In July 2014, plaintiff 

reported to management that Dr. Weber was involved in an extramarital affair with 

one of plaintiff’s co-workers. When Ted Cole, a manager for St. Jude Medical S.C., 

spoke with Dr. Weber about the allegations, Dr. Weber was “irate.” He told Cole that 

plaintiff was in his clinic “talking to his staff members around patients” about his 

personal life. Dr. Weber demanded a letter of apology and informed Cole that plaintiff 
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was no longer welcome in the Duke-Raleigh system, which comprised more than 85 

percent of St. Jude Medical S.C.’s Raleigh territory. 

Seven months later, on Friday, 27 February 2015, Cole received an e-mail from 

a patient who reported feeling “very uncomfortable” during an appointment with 

plaintiff. The patient complained that plaintiff read the film backwards, exposed the 

patient to unnecessary radiation, and several times during three visits she was 

“loud,” “argumentative,” and asked “the same questions over and over again.” Cole 

forwarded the e-mail to his manager, Eric Delissio, who in turn sent the e-mail to 

human resources. Plaintiff was terminated the following Monday.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in Mecklenburg County Superior Court alleging 

claims of wrongful discharge from employment in violation of public policy and libel 

against St. Jude Medical and St. Jude Medical S.C.; tortious interference with 

contractual rights and libel against Cole and Delissio; and tortious interference with 

contractual rights against Duke and Dr. Weber.

St. Jude Medical and St. Jude Medical S.C. (collectively, the St. Jude 

defendants) moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the 

North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The St. Jude defendants argued that venue 

in Mecklenburg County was improper because the forum-selection clause in the 

employment agreement provides that all claims related to the agreement must be 

 

1 The St. Jude defendants also moved to dismiss plaintiff’s wrongful discharge and libel claims 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
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litigated in the state or federal courts located in Ramsey County, Minnesota. 

Although out-of-state forum-selection clauses are void and unenforceable in North 

Carolina, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3, the St. Jude defendants averred that the 

contract was not formed in this State.

The trial court granted the St. Jude defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper 

venue. The court concluded that the agreement was formed in Texas, rather than 

North Carolina, because Boettiger’s signature was the “the last essential act.” As 

such, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 did not apply and the forum-selection clause was valid, 

reasonable, and enforceable. The court also concluded that requiring plaintiff to 

prosecute her claims in Minnesota “is not seriously inconvenient” and would not 

effectively deprive her of her day in court. Plaintiff timely appeals.

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction 

We first address whether plaintiff has vested jurisdiction in this Court to 

review her appeal on the merits. “An order . . . granting a motion to dismiss certain 

claims in an action, while leaving other claims in the action to go forward, is plainly 

an interlocutory order.” Pratt v. Staton, 147 N.C. App. 771, 773, 556 S.E.2d 621, 623 

(2001). “An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which 

does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order 

to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 
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357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (citation omitted). “Generally, there is no right 

of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders or judgments.” Goldston v. Am. Motors 

Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). An appeal may be taken only 

from those “judgments and orders as are designated by the statute regulating the 

right of appeal.” Veazey, 231 N.C. at 362, 57 S.E.2d at 381; see, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 1-277 (2015); id. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b); id. § 7A-27(b). 

Plaintiff appeals from an interlocutory order dismissing her claims against the 

St. Jude defendants while allowing her other claims to move forward against 

defendants Cole, Delissio, Duke, and Dr. Weber. While the order was “a final 

judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b), the trial court did not certify the order for immediate 

appellate review. By virtue of the substantial right doctrine, however, plaintiff has 

provided an alternative basis to appeal the interlocutory order.

First, as plaintiff correctly notes, “our case law establishes firmly that an 

appeal from a motion to dismiss for improper venue based upon a jurisdiction or 

venue selection clause dispute deprives the appellant of a substantial right that 

would be lost.” Mark Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. Still, 151 N.C. App. 565, 566 n.1, 566 S.E.2d 

160, 161 n.1 (2002) (citations omitted), quoted in Cable Tel Servs., Inc. v. Overland 

Contracting, Inc., 154 N.C. App. 639, 641, 574 S.E.2d 31, 33 (2002); see also US Chem. 

Storage, LLC v. Berto Constr., Inc., No. COA16-628, slip op. at 5 (N.C. Ct. App. May 
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2, 2017) (“[T]he validity of a forum selection clause constitutes a substantial right.”

(citing Cox v. Dine-A-Mate, Inc., 129 N.C. App. 773, 776, 501 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1998))). 

Prior decisions have applied this principle to review the denial of a motion to dismiss 

for improper venue. See, e.g., Hickox v. R&G Grp. Int’l, Inc., 161 N.C. App. 510, 511, 

588 S.E.2d 566, 567 (2003) (“Although a denial of a motion to dismiss is an 

interlocutory order, where the issue pertains to applying a forum selection clause, our 

case law establishes that defendant may nevertheless immediately appeal the order 

because to hold otherwise would deprive him of a substantial right.” (citation 

omitted)). The same substantial right is implicated by the court’s partial dismissal 

in this case because an “order denying a party the right to have the case heard in the 

proper court would work an injury to the aggrieved party which could not be corrected 

if no appeal was allowed before the final judgment.” DesMarais v. Dimmette, 70 N.C. 

App. 134, 136, 318 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1984).

Second, “[a] party has a substantial right to avoid two trials on the same facts 

in different forums where the results would conflict.” Clements v. Clements ex rel. 

Craige, 219 N.C. App. 581, 585, 725 S.E.2d 373, 376 (2012) (citing Hamby v. Profile 

Prods., L.L.C., 361 N.C. 630, 639, 652 S.E.2d 231, 237 (2007)), quoted in Callanan v. 

Walsh, 228 N.C. App. 18, 21, 743 S.E.2d 686, 689 (2013). Plaintiff’s claims against 

defendants arise out of the same set of factual circumstances surrounding her 

termination. The libel claim against Cole and Delissio is pending in Mecklenburg 
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County Superior Court but the libel claim against the St. Jude defendants, alleged

on the theory of respondeat superior, was dismissed for improper venue. Dismissing 

the appeal and allowing plaintiff to prosecute the same claims in different forums

“creat[es] the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.” Estate of Harvey v. Kore-Kut, Inc., 

180 N.C. App. 195, 198, 636 S.E.2d 210, 212 (2006). Because plaintiff has shown that 

the interlocutory order affects a substantial right that would be jeopardized absent 

review prior to a final judgment on the merits, Goldston, 326 N.C. at 726, 392 S.E.2d 

at 736, we have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal. 

B. Dismissal for Improper Venue 

1. Claims “Relating to” the Employment Agreement

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint 

under Rule 12(b)(3) because her tort claims against the St. Jude defendants are not 

“related to” the employment agreement and are not subject to the forum-selection 

clause. 

Under our choice-of-law principles, “the interpretation of a contract is governed 

by the law of the place where the contract was made.” Tanglewood Land Co. v. Byrd, 

299 N.C. 260, 262, 261 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1980). But if “parties to a contract have 

agreed that a given jurisdiction’s substantive law shall govern the interpretation of 

the contract, such a contractual provision will be given effect.” Id.; see, e.g., Tohato, 

Inc. v. Pinewild Mgmt., Inc., 128 N.C. App. 386, 390, 496 S.E.2d 800, 803 (1998) 
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(applying Texas law to determine enforceability of arbitration clause where choice-of 

law provision stipulated contract “shall be governed by and construed under the laws 

of the State of Texas”). By virtue of the choice-of law provision in the agreement, this 

issue involves the application of Minnesota law. 

Whether a forum-selection clause applies to a plaintiff’s claim is a question of 

law, reviewed by the Minnesota courts de novo. Alpha Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Silicon 

Graphics, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). 

“Whether tort claims are to be governed by forum selection provisions depends upon 

the intention of the parties reflected in the wording of particular clauses and the facts 

of each case.” Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 1997)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), cited with approval in Alpha 

Sys. Integration, Inc., 646 N.W.2d at 907, 908 (examining language of contract to 

determine whether forum-selection clause applied to claims arising out of 

agreement). 

The forum-selection clause at issue is broadly worded to encompass “all actions 

or proceedings relating to” the agreement. (Emphasis added.) “Relating to” implies 

merely “some connection or relation.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary 1225 

(5th ed. 2014). While plaintiff’s claims may sound in tort, they still have “some 

connection” to the employment agreement. Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim 

directly implicates the employer-employee relationship created by the agreement. 
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The same can be said of the libel claim, in which plaintiff alleged that “to instigate 

the termination of plaintiff from St. Jude Medical S.C.,” Cole and Delissio published 

“false and defamatory statements” implying plaintiff was incompetent. As additional 

evidence of its breadth, the clause provides: “Employee understands that Employee 

is surrendering the right to bring litigation against SJMSC outside the state of 

Minnesota.” Such language indicates that all claims by an employee against the 

employer are subject to the forum-selection clause whether in contract, tort, or 

otherwise. Because the clause reflects an intention to litigate plaintiff’s claims in 

Minnesota, the trial court did not err in finding implicitly that the claims are subject 

to the forum-selection clause.

2. Forum-Selection Clause

Next, plaintiff argues that the forum-selection clause is void and unenforceable 

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3, which provides in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, any provision 

in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires 

the prosecution of any action . . . that arises from the 

contract to be instituted or heard in another state is 

against public policy and is void and unenforceable.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 (2015). Plaintiff maintains that the employment agreement 

was “entered into in North Carolina” because her signature was the last act necessary

to the formation of the contract. She contends, therefore, that the forum-selection 

clause is void and enforceable as a matter of law, and that venue in Mecklenburg 
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County was proper.

As previously noted, plaintiff and the St. Jude defendants agreed that the 

contract “will be governed by the laws of the state of Minnesota.” Nevertheless, our 

courts have not honored choice-of-law provisions in contracts when

“application of the law of the chosen state would be 

contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a 

materially greater interest than the chosen state in the 

determination of the particular issue and which . . . would 

be the state of applicable law in the absence of an effective 

choice of law by the parties.”

Cable Tel Servs., Inc., 154 N.C. App. at 643, 574 S.E.2d at 34 (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971), cited with approval in Behr v. Behr, 46 N.C. 

App. 694, 696, 266 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1980), and Torres v. McClain, 140 N.C. App. 238, 

241, 535 S.E.2d 623, 625 (2000)). Because the application of Minnesota law would be 

contrary to a fundamental policy of this state, which has a materially greater interest

in determining the validity of the forum-selection clause, we apply North Carolina 

law to decide the place of contract formation. See Szymczyk v. Signs Now Corp., 168 

N.C. App. 182, 186, 606 S.E.2d 728, 732 (2005) (applying North Carolina law in 

reviewing place of contract formation to resolve validity of out-of-state forumselection clause). 

As a “determination requiring the . . . application of legal principles,” In re 

Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (citations omitted), the 

place of contract formation is a conclusion of law, reviewed de novo on appeal, see, 
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e.g., Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 227, 176 S.E.2d 784, 787 

(1970).

“The essence of any contract is the mutual assent of both parties to the terms 

of the agreement . . . .” Snyder v. Freeman, 300 N.C. 204, 218, 266 S.E.2d 593, 602 

(1980) (citing Pike v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 161 S.E.2d 453 (1968)); 

see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981) (“[T]he formation of a contract 

requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the 

exchange . . . .”); id. § 3 (“An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the 

part of two or more persons.”). 

Mutual assent of the parties “is operative only to the extent that it is 

manifested.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 18 cmt. a. The manifestation of 

mutual assent “requires that each party either make a promise or begin or render a 

performance,” id. § 18, and “is normally accomplished through the mechanism of offer 

and acceptance,” Snyder, 300 N.C. at 218, 266 S.E.2d at 602; see also Normile v. 

Miller, 313 N.C. 98, 103, 326 S.E.2d 11, 15 (1985) (“[A]ssent . . . requires an offer and 

acceptance in the exact terms.”); T.C. May Co. v. Menzies Shoe Co., 184 N.C. 150, 152, 

113 S.E. 593, 593 (1922) (“[T]he mutual assent of the parties . . . generally results 

from an offer on the one side and acceptance on the other.”). As the Restatement 

instructs: 

Ordinarily one party, by making an offer, assents in 

advance; the other, upon learning of the offer, assents by 
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accepting it and thereby forms the contract. The offer may 

be communicated directly or through an agent; but 

information received by one party that another is willing to 

enter into a bargain is not necessarily an offer. The test is 

whether the offer is so made as to justify the accepting 

party in a belief that the offer is made to him.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 23 cmt. a; see also T.C. May Co., 184 N.C. at 152,

113 S.E. at 593–94 (“The offer . . . is a mere proposal to enter into the 

agreement, . . . but when it is communicated, and shows an intent to assume liability, 

and is understood and accepted by the party to whom it is made, it becomes at once 

equally binding upon the promisor and the promisee.”); 1 Samuel Williston & Richard 

A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 4:3 (4th ed. 2007) (“[I]t is typically the 

case that one making an offer assents in advance to the proposed bargain, after which 

all that is required to complete the mutual assent necessary is the assent of the 

offeree.” (footnote omitted)). 

The manifestation of mutual assent is judged by an objective standard:

The apparent mutual assent of the parties, essential to the 

formation of a contract, must be gathered from the 

language employed by them. The undisclosed intention is 

immaterial in the absence of mistake, fraud, and the like, 

and the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding 

to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. It judges 

of his intention by his outward expressions and excludes 

all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his 

words or acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest 

an intention to agree in regard to the matter in question, 

that agreement is established, and it is immaterial what

may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind on the 

subject, as mental assent to the promises in a contract is 
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not essential. . . . The question whether a contract has been 

made must be determined from a consideration of the 

expressed intention of the parties––that is, from a 

consideration of their words and acts. . . . [T]he test of the 

true interpretation of an offer or acceptance is not what the 

party making it thought it meant or intended it to mean, 

but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties 

would have thought it meant.

Howell v. Smith, 258 N.C. 150, 153, 128 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1962) (citations omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 

cmt. b (“The phrase ‘manifestation of intention’ adopts an external or objective 

standard for interpreting conduct . . . . A promisor manifests an intention if he 

believes or has reason to believe that the promisee will infer that intention from his 

words or conduct.”); Williston & Lord, supra, § 4:1 (“In the formation of contracts, 

however, it was long ago settled that secret, subjective intent is immaterial, so that 

mutual assent is to be judged only by overt acts and words rather than by the hidden, 

subjective or secret intention of the parties.”); id. § 4:2 (“As long as the conduct of a 

party is volitional and that party knows or reasonably ought to know that the other 

party might reasonably infer from the conduct an assent to contract, such conduct 

will amount to a manifestation of assent.”).

“Under North Carolina law, a contract is made in the place where the last act 

necessary to make it binding occurred.” Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 

N.C. 361, 365, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986); see also Thomas v. Overland Exp., Inc., 101 
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N.C. App. 90, 97, 398 S.E.2d 921, 926 (1990) (noting that our courts employ the “last 

act” test to determine where a contract was made) (citing Fast v. Gulley, 271 N.C. 

208, 155 S.E.2d 507 (1967)). 

The last act necessary to contract formation usually occurs at the place of 

acceptance. In Goldman, the defendant, a Texas corporation with its principal office 

in Dallas, sent the plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, a letter detailing the terms of 

a proposed employment contract. 277 N.C. at 225–26, 176 S.E.2d at 786. Upon 

receipt, the plaintiff signed the contract in Greensboro and mailed it to the defendant 

in Dallas. Id. at 226, 176 S.E.2d at 786. Our Supreme Court determined that the 

contract was made in North Carolina: “The letter . . . constituted an offer. The final 

act necessary to make it a binding agreement was its acceptance, which was done by 

the plaintiff by signing it in Greensboro . . . and there depositing it in the United 

States mail properly addressed to defendant.” Id. at 226–27, 176 S.E.2d at 787. 

Relying on Goldman, our Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Tom 

Togs, 318 N.C. at 365, 348 S.E.2d at 785. The defendant, a clothing distributor 

incorporated in New Jersey with its principal place of business in New York City, 

submitted to the plaintiff, a clothing manufacturer in North Carolina, a purchase 

order for shirts. Id. at 362–63, 348 S.E.2d at 784. The plaintiff accepted the order 

“by sending the shirts to defendant within the time specified.” Id. at 363, 348 S.E.2d 

at 784. Resolving the jurisdictional issue in a subsequent breach of contract claim, 
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filed by the plaintiff in Wake County Superior Court, the Supreme Court concluded 

that the contract was “made in this State” because the plaintiff’s acceptance in North 

Carolina was the “last act necessary” to form a binding contract. Id. at 365, 348 

S.E.2d at 785. 

In some instances, a contract may not be formed until the offeror manifests 

assent through a counter-signature. In Parson v. Oasis Legal Finance, LLC, 214 N.C. 

App. 125, 715 S.E.2d 240 (2011), the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the 

defendant for an advance of funds to pay the plaintiff’s legal fees. Id. at 126, 715 

S.E.2d at 241. The plaintiff completed a funding application and faxed it to the 

defendant. Id. at 130, 715 S.E.2d at 243. On the same day, the defendant faxed the 

plaintiff an unsigned draft agreement for a $3,000 advance. Id. Notably, the 

agreement asked how the plaintiff would like to receive his requested amount, i.e., 

“by check or as requested by the purchaser,” and included a release allowing the 

defendant to receive a copy of the plaintiff’s credit report. Id. at 130, 715 S.E.2d at 

244. The plaintiff signed the agreement and faxed it back to the defendant. Id. Upon 

receipt, the defendant’s representative signed the agreement in Illinois and then 

mailed the plaintiff a check for $2,972. Id. Under the circumstances, the Court 

concluded: “The last act essential to . . . affirming the mutual assent of both parties 

to the terms of the agreement was the signing of the agreement by [the defendant’s] 

representative.” Id. Because the defendant’s representative signed the agreement in 
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Illinois, the Court determined that the contract was made in Illinois. Id. at 130–31, 

715 S.E.2d at 244 (citing Bundy v. Comm. Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 

(1931); Szymczyk, 168 N.C. App. at 187, 606 S.E.2d at 733).

Other decisions have distinguished between acts which are necessary to form 

a binding obligation and those which are merely administrative. In Murray v. 

Ahlstrom Industrial Holdings, Inc., 131 N.C. App. 294, 506 S.E.2d 724 (1998), this 

Court determined that the defendant made an offer of employment when it 

telephoned the plaintiff at his home in North Carolina. Id. at 296–97, 506 S.E.2d at 

726. Upon the plaintiff’s acceptance, the defendant informed him that he “was hired 

and that he should report to work in Corinth, Mississippi immediately.” Id. at 297, 

506 S.E.2d at 726. Despite the incomplete employment paperwork, the Court 

concluded:

At this point the contract for employment was 

complete. Relying upon this employment contract, plaintiff 

packed up his family and moved to Mississippi for the 

duration of the project. Although the paperwork filled out 

by plaintiff was required before he could begin work, this 

seems to be, and in fact was admitted by [the defendant] to 

be, mostly administrative. The paperwork appears to be 

more of a consummation of the employment relationship 

than the “last act” required to make it a binding obligation.

Id. at 297, 506 S.E.2d at 726–27 (citing Warren v. Dixon & Christopher Co., 252 N.C. 

534, 114 S.E.2d 250 (1960)). Because the plaintiff’s acceptance was the last act 

necessary to form a binding obligation, the Court concluded that the contract was 
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made in North Carolina. Id. at 297, 506 S.E.2d at 727; cf. Szymczyk, 168 N.C. App. 

at 187, 606 S.E.2d at 733 (concluding that franchise agreement was made in Florida 

because once terms were discussed with the defendant’s representatives and form 

agreement was signed by the plaintiffs in North Carolina, agreement was returned 

to Florida where it was signed by the defendant’s president).

Analogizing to Goldman and Tom Togs, we agree with plaintiff that the 

contract in this case was made in North Carolina. By presenting the employment 

agreement to plaintiff on her first day at work, St. Jude Medical S.C. undeniably 

signaled a willingness to enter into a bargain, offering plaintiff employment under 

the terms set forth in the agreement. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 

(“An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to 

justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and 

will conclude it.”). In contrast to Parson, where the plaintiff had to sign a release of 

his credit report and indicate on the draft agreement his desired method to receive 

funds, here plaintiff was only required to sign the proposed agreement. There were 

no terms left to negotiate. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 (“The fact that 

one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a 

manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an 

acceptance.”). Because plaintiff did not propose amended or additional terms, her 

signature and delivery constituted acceptance.
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Defendant maintains that its blank signature line on the last page of the 

agreement is evidence that plaintiff’s acceptance would not conclude the deal; the 

agreement required further assent by defendant. Based on the language in the 

agreement and the conduct of the parties, however, defendant’s signature was merely 

a “consummation of the employment relationship,” as the Court concluded in Murray, 

131 N.C. App. at 297, 506 S.E.2d at 727, instead of the last act necessary to form a 

binding agreement. The agreement contains no clause similar to the one in Bundy, 

200 N.C. at 513, 157 S.E. at 862, which provided: “This agreement shall not become 

effective until accepted by its duly authorized officers of [the defendant] at Baltimore, 

Md.” The fact that plaintiff worked for nearly two weeks before Boettiger signed the 

agreement, moreover, indicates that defendant intended to be bound when plaintiff 

reported to work and executed the agreement. Defendant’s manifestation of assent 

is found in its proposal of the agreement to plaintiff which, upon acceptance, became 

binding upon both parties. On these facts, we conclude that the contract was made

in North Carolina and the forum-selection clause is void and unenforceable under 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3.

III. Conclusion

The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claims against the St. Jude 

defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The last act necessary to the formation of the employment agreement was plaintiff’s 
SCHWARZ V. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC.

Opinion of the Court

- 20 -

signature and delivery in North Carolina rather than Boettiger’s signature in Texas, 

which can be more aptly described as a “consummation of the employment 

relationship.” Because the contract was “entered into in North Carolina,” the 

Minnesota forum-selection clause is void and unenforceable pursuant to N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 22B-3. We reverse the court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s claims against the 

St. Jude defendants for improper venue.

REVERSED.

Judge DILLON concurs.

Judge ARROWOOD concurs by separate opinion.
No. COA16-1307– Schwarz v. St. Jude Med., Inc.

ARROWOOD, Judge, concurring by separate opinion.

I concur in the majority opinion that the Minnesota forum-selection clause is 

void and unenforceable pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 because the contract was 

entered into in North Carolina, and therefore, that the trial court’s order dismissing 

plaintiff’s complaint must be reversed. However, I reach that result by a somewhat 

different analysis. I believe that the contract was entered into in North Carolina for 

the following reasons: When defendant made its offer of employment to plaintiff, the 

proposed Employment Agreement contained the following language:

C. Modification Prior to Full Execution. No modifications 

may be made to the terms of this Agreement prior to the 

full execution of the Agreement without the prior 

approval of an authorized representative of SJMSC.

The Employment Agreement also provided that: 

TO WITNESS THEIR AGREEMENT THE PARTIES 

HAVE SIGNED BELOW AS OF THE FIRST DAY 

WRITTEN ABOVE.

The “first day written above” was designated as 4 September 2012.

“The question whether a contract has been made must be determined from a 

consideration of the expressed intention of the parties – that is from a consideration 

of their words and acts.” Normile v. Miller, 313 N.C. 98, 107, 326 S.E.2d 11, 17 (1985) 

(citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to challenge any terms 

of the Employment Agreement or propose any additional terms. In addition, there 

does not appear to be any dispute in the record that plaintiff commenced work on the 
SCHWARZ V. ST. JUDE MED., INC.

Arrowood, J., concurring by separate opinion.

2

date set forth in the Agreement and that the parties operated under the terms of the 

proposed Employment Agreement for more than a week prior to the signing of the 

Employment Agreement by defendant’s representative. The outward expressions of 

both plaintiff and defendant demonstrated that a mutual agreement had been 

established as of 4 September 2012. In conclusion, I believe that the non-negotiable 

language of the Employment Agreement, when combined with the Agreement’s 

effective date language and the actions of both parties, shows that the contract was 

formed no later than when plaintiff commenced work and that the last act necessary 

for formation of the contract occurred in North Carolina.