Ap p el l an ti s i d en t i fi edas Cranda ll Medic al C o n s u l t i n g S er v i ce s , I n c. , i nHa rr el l ’s p l ea d i n gs 1 and the f inal summary

judgme nt, but appellant r efe rs to itself as “Cra ndall Medica l Consult ing, I nc.” or “CMC” in its briefing to this C ourt. Appellant ha s not alleg ed a p leadingdefe ct. See Te x. R. C i v . P
. 9 1 (s p ec i al ex ce p t i o n s t o ch al l en ge p l ea d i n g d ef e c t s ) , 9 3 (v er i fi edp l ea d i n g t o ch al l en ge defe ct of pa

rties). 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 689 -CV

Cr anda ll M e dic al C ons ult ing Se r vic e s, Inc . , A ppe lla nt
v. John A. Harrell , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 274TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. C2007 -01 09C , HO NORAB LE JACK A. ROB ISO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant C ra n d all Medica l Consult ing Ser vices, Inc., (“ CMC”) appea ls the trial 1 court’s g rant of summary judgme nt in favor of appe llee John A. Harre ll and the denial of summary judgme nt in its favor . The trial c ourt order ed spec ific per formanc e of the contra ct for the sale of r eal pr op e rt y be tw e e n the part ies and awa rd e d d a ma g e s and

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. I n tw o is su e s, CMC contends that the tria l court er red in g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of Har rell bec ause he failed to deposit additional ear

nest money of $100 as required by the contra ct and that CMC was entitled to summary

judgme nt beca

use it timely terminated the contra ct. Be cause we conclude the tr ial court did no t e rr in g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r of Ha

rr e ll, we a ff

ir m the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND CMC and Harr ell executed the c ontrac t for the sa le of re al prope rty (the “ Contract”)
on or aro un d N ov e mbe r 1 7, 20 06 . C MC a g re e d to se ll a nd Ha rr e ll a g re e d to buy

re a l pr op e rt

y located in the c ity

of Ne w B raunf

els in Comal Count y for $253,000 on or befor e J anuar y 26, 2007. The Cont rac t provided that “[t] ime is of t he esse nce in this contra ct.” I t also provided for attorney ’s fee s to the preva iling par t y i n an y l ega l proce eding related to the transa ction and the r emedy of specific perf

ormanc e in the eve nt that either pa rty was in def

ault. Th e Con tr a c t r e qu ir e d H arr e ll t o d e po sit e arn e st m on e y

wi th a tit le c omp any . H a rr e ll
a g re e d to de po sit e arn e st mon e y of $2 00 0 with in thr e e da y s of the Con tr a c t’ s e ff

e c tiv e date and

to d ep o s it “additional ear

nest money ” of $100 on or befor e the 14th day

afte r the fe asibility

period expired. During the thirty -day fea sibili ty period, Harre ll had the rig ht to terminate the Contrac t for
any re a so n a nd re c ov e r h is e arn e st m on e y de po sit le ss $ 10 0. Ha

rr e ll d e po sit e d $20 00 wi th t he tit le company in acc ordanc e with the Contrac t, but he did not deposit the additional earne st money of $100 prior to closing his part of the Contra ct on J anuar y 26, 2007. I n D e c e mbe r 2 00 6, CMC r e qu e ste d th a t th e c los ingdate be e xten de d. Ha rr e ll responde d that he would ag ree to the extension provided that CMC ag ree d to pay ren t for eve ry month that CMC occupie d the property afte r t he closing. The pa rties ultimately

wer e unable to ag ree to a n e xten sio n, a

nd Ha rr e ll n oti fi e d th e tit le c omp any by le tte r d a te d D e c e mbe r 2 9, 20 06, to

“ pr oc e e d w iththe ne c e ssa ry pa pe rw or k s o we may c los e on or be fo re Janu ary 26 , 2 00 7 a s n ote d in the orig inal terms of the Contra ct.”Dora Crandall, M.D., is the pre sident of CMC. She neg otiated and e x ecute d the Contract 2 on be ha lf of CMC and se nt the no tic e of te rm inatio n wi th a le tte r a nd a re le a se of

e arn e st m on e y

to t h e t i t l e c o mp an y. I n his second ame nded petition, Har rell st ates: “On or about J anuar y 4, 2007, the Plaintiff 3 rec eived notice from [the titl e compa ny ] t hat Def

endant had attempted to terminate the contrac t and had instructed [t he title c ompany ] to disburse the ear nest money to the Plaintiff.” I n h i s o ri gi n al petition, Ha

rre ll attached a copy of Crandall’s letter to the title company , the “Notice of Ter mination of Con tr a c t,” and

a “ Re le a se of

Ea rn e st M on e y ” a s e xhibi ts.

3 On or a bo ut Janu ary

3, 20 07 , D r. Do ra

Cr and a ll on behalf

of CMC s ent a “Notice 2 of Ter mination of Contract” to the title compa ny . Har rell does not dispute t hat he rece ived a c opy
o f t h e n o t i c e f

r o m t h e t i t l e c o mp an y. The notice states that “Seller notifies Buy er that the Contract 3 is terminated” a

nd direc ts the titl e compa ny to relea se the e arne st money to Harr ell. On or a round January

9, 2007, Har

rell’s attorney notified CMC and the titl e compa ny that, in his opini on, CMC di d not have a leg al rig ht to terminate the Contract, that Ha rre ll had the leg al rig ht to enforc e spec ific per formanc e, and t h at Ha rre ll would procee d with the closing . On J anuar y 26, 2007, Har

rell closed his side of

the Contract a

nd t ender ed the pur chase price of $253,000 by cashie r’s chec k to the title c ompany in the amount of $64,029.01 and a rea l estate lien note on the bala

nce. T here afte r, Ha

rre ll b ro u gh t t h is suit t o enfor ce spe cific pe rfor mance of the Con tr a c t and

fo r d a ma g e s. The pa rt i es fi l edco mp et i n g m o t i o n s fo r s u m m ary j u d gm en tand re sponses to the other party ’s motion. In his moti on for summary judgme nt, Harr ell contende d that there wer e no g enuine issues of mater ial fac t that the C ontrac t was valid as a matter of law and subjec t to enforc ement by specific perf

ormanc e. I t w as undisputed that the Contract wa s valid and enf orce able whe n executed, that H arr e ll t ime ly

de po sit e d e a

rn e st m on e y

of $2 00 0, that H arr e ll t ime ly te nd e re d th e purc ha se4

price , and that CMC refuse d to convey the re al prop er t y . Ha rrell’s summary judgme nt evidence included the Contrac t and af fidavits from Ha

rre ll , L ac i e Or s ak, Yerg er H ill, I I I , and Ke nneth D. Br azle. Har

rell ave rre d that he had c losed his portion o f the Contract a nd that, beca

use the re al proper ty was unique, he did not have an a dequate reme dy at law if CMC wa s not r equire d to convey the re al prope rty . Orsak, a commer cial lende r, ave rre d to her a ppraisal of

the re al prope rty , opining that the value of

the re al prope rty

on J anuar

y 23, 2007, was $254,072. Hill an d Br az l e, Har rell’s attorney s, aver

red a nd opined to Har

rell’s incur

red attorney ’s fe es. CMC re sponded to H arr ell’s summary judgme nt motion and filed its own moti on for summary judgme nt in the same pleading
. I n response to H arr ell’s motion, CMC c ontended that there
we re g e nu ine iss ues of mate ri a l f a c t a s to its c ounte rc la im f or br e a c h o f f

idu c iary du ty and its aff irmative def

enses of duress a nd estoppel. In its mot ion for summary judgme nt, CMC contende d that it was entitled to judgme nt a s a matter of law bec ause the “uncontr adicted summar y judgme nt evidenc e esta

blishes that the contra ct on which [Harr ell] relie s ex p i red on his rece ipt of written notice of c ance llation from Seller [CMC ] on or about J anuar y 3, 2007.” CMC also filed a
su pp le me nta l mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt se e kin g its a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and a su pp le me nta l r e sp on se to Harr ell’s moti o n fo r summary judgme nt raising the additional af firmative de fense that the Contract wa s unconscionable
.

CMC’ s summa

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e inc lud e d th e a ff ida vit s of CM C’ s c ouns e l, Crandall, Miche lle Sand er s , and B arba ra Par rish. Crandall ave rre d to her re lationship and communications wi t h Har rell conc erningthe Contract a nd that she “g ave f

ormal notice of termination of the a g ree ment ” on January 3, 2007. CMC also attached de position ex cer pts fromCMC d oe s n ot challen g e the tr ia l c ourt ’s su mma ry jud g me nt r

uli ng s b a se d o n it s 4 aff irmative def

ense of brea ch of f

iduciary duty
. 5 Har rell in which he testified that the title c ompany forwa rded the notice of termination to him and that he did not deposit the “a dditional $100” of e ar n es t m o n ey prior to closing the transa ction. San d e r s an d Pa

r r is h a v e r r e d to in te r a c ti o n s th a t th e y w it n e s s e d b e tw e e n Cr an d a ll an d H ar r e ll and Ha rr e ll’ s r e pr e sent a tiv e . CM C’ s c ouns e l ave rr e d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. CMC atta c he d to its supplemental response t he affidavits of J ohn Welch who performed a n appra isal of the prope rty and Doug las Cottle who aver

red to a conver sation that he over hear d at Cranda ll’s office
. Har rell there afte r filed a

reply to CMC ’s re sponses an d specia l exceptions and objections to and motion to strike CMC’s summary judgme nt e vidence and its responses to Har rell’s motion for summary judgme nt. As to Crandall’s affidavit, Harre ll soug ht to exclude it on severa l g rounds, including that it was conc lusory , argumentative, and “ so in confl i ct with her swor n deposition testimony ” that it was unre liable. Har rell also soug ht to ex clude CMC’s evidenc e that addre ssed def

enses that CMC had not pleaded
. C M C ’s live pleading , its first amended or igina l
ans we r a nd c ounte rc la im, did

no t in c lud e br e a c h of fi du ciar y du ty a s a c ounte rc la im o r d

ur e ss, estoppel, or unconsciona

bility as affirmative de fense s. CMC asserted bre ach of fiduciar y duty as an
a ff ir mat iv e defens e , a

nd , a lso a s an a ff

ir ma tiv e de fe ns e , th a t th e Con tr a c t w a s une nf or c e a ble “bec ause it t erminate d under its own terms whe n Def endant g ave c ontrac tual Notice of Termination on J anuar y 3, 2007.” 4 The trial c ourt held a he aringon Har rell’s motion for summary judgme nt. At that tim e , CM C di d n ot s e t it s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt, and

CMC do e s n ot d isp ute that it s6

pleading s did not include brea ch of fiduciar y duty as a counter claim or the aff irmative def

enses of dure ss, e sto pp e l, o r u

nc on sc ion a

bil ity . Awe e k lat er, CM C fi led a m oti on fo r l e a ve to a

me nd its ple a din g s to inc lud e its de fe ns e s ra ise d in its re sp on se s to Har re ll’ s motio n for

su mma ry jud g e me nt. The district cour

t denied CMC’s motion for leave to a mend its pleading s. There afte r, the trial c ourt enter ed its final summary judgme nt, ord er i n g s p ecif ic per formanc e of the Contract and a war ding damag es and attorney ’s fe es to Har rell. The trial court also sustained Harr ell’s spec ial exceptions
and ob je c tio ns to a

nd mot ion to s tr ike CM C’ s summ ary jud g me nt e vid e nc e and

its re sp on se s to Ha rr e ll’ s mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt, and de nie d CM C’ s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt. Th is appea l followed.
AN AL YSI S

I n two issues, CMC contends that the t rial court err ed in g ranting Har rell’s summary judgme nt and in denying CMC’s summary judgme nt. I n its first issue, CMC contends that the trial court e rre d in gr anting Har rell’s summary

judgme nt beca

use Ha rre ll’s “s u m m ar y j u dg ment proof failed to prove that he had te ndere d the additional ear nest money

require d by

the Contract a s a matter of law.” I n its second issue, CMC contends that the trial cour t err ed in deny ing its motion for
su mma ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e Ha rr e ll’s “un con tr ov ert ed s um mar y ju dgmen t pro of

pr ov e d th a

t [Ha rr e ll] failed to de posit the additional e arne st mone y and that [C MC] had timely terminated the Contract.”
Stan dard of Revie w

We re vie w the tr ia l court ’s de c isi on to g ra nt s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo
. Valence Ope ra ti ng Co. v . D or

se tt , 1 6 4 S. W. 3 d

6 5 6 , 6 6 1 ( T e x. 2 0 0 5 )
. T o p r e v a il o na s u mm ar y ju d g ment7

mot ion , th e mov ant m

us t de mon str a te that the re are no g e nu ine iss ue s of ma te ri a l fa c t and that it is
e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a

ma tte r of law . T e x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); City of Houston v. Clear Creek B a s i n Au th
. , 5 8 9 S.W .2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979) (movant must conclusively prove a ll “essential
e le me nts of

his c a us e of a c tio n o r d e fe nse as a mat ter of law ” ). I n d e c idi ngwh e the r t he re is a disputed material fact iss ue precluding summary judgme nt, we must take e vidence favor able to the nonmovant as true, indulg e eve ry rea sonable infe renc e in f avor of the nonmovant, a

nd resolve a

ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. D o r s e tt , 1 64 S.W. 3d

a t 66 1; Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgm t. Co. , 69 0 S. W.2 d 5 46 , 5 48 -4 9 ( Te x. 19 85 ). Whe re the tr ia l c ourt do e s n ot s pe c if y the g ro un ds fo r i ts summary judgme nt, we must aff

irm the summary

judgme nt if any

of the theor ies p re s en ted to the trial court and prese rved for appellate revie w are meritorious. See Provident Life & Acc ident Ins. Co.

v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003).

I f t he mov ant s ho ws tha

t it is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a ma tte r of law, the burd e n s hif ts to the no nmo va

nt t o p re se nt e vid e nc e to r a ise a ma te ri a l f a c t is su e that pr e c lud e s summa ry jud g me nt. See City of Houston , 589 S.W .2d at 678-79. As to a n o n -m o v ant’s af firmative de fense s, once a
mov ant e sta

bli sh e s it s r ig ht t o s umm ary jud g me nt a s a ma tte r o f l aw o n it s c la ims , th e burd e n s hif ts to t he no nmo va

nt t o pr e se nt e vid e nc e ra isi ng a g e nu ine iss ue of ma te ri a l fa c t on e a c h e le me nt o f i ts
a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e s; a

me re ple a din g of

an a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e wi ll no t ave rt su mma ry jud g me nt. KPM G P e at M ar wic k v . H arris on Cou nty

Ho us . F in. Cor p ., 988 S.W
. 2 d 7 4 6 , 7 4 9 (Tex. 1999); Brownlee v. Brownlee , 665 S .W.2d 11 1, 11 2 ( Te x. 19 84 ); Parker v . Dodge , 98 S.W .3d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2003, no pet.). When both parties move for summary judgme nt on the same issues a

nd the trial cour

t gr ants one mot ion and denie s the other one , the re viewing court8

considers the summary j u d gm ent evidence pr esente d by both sides, determines a ll questions prese nted, and, if the revie wing court deter mines that the trial court e rre d, rende rs the judg ment that the trial cour

t should have re ndere d. Do rse tt , 164 S.W .3d at 661. CMC’ s is su e s a dd

re ss m a tte rs of

c ontr a c t c on str

uc tio n. “ [A] c ourt

int e rp re ts a contra ct by

asce rtaining the true objective i ntentions of t he par ties, based on the c ontrac t lang uag e.” SA S I ns t., In c . v . B re ite nfe ld , 1 6 7 S
. W
. 3 d 8 4 0 , 8 4 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Coker v. Coke r , 65 0 S. W.2 d 3 91 , 3 93 (T e x. 19 83 ))
. A co ur t con str ue s wr itt e n instrume nts a s a who le in an e ff or t to harmonize and g ive ef

fec t to all the provisions of the in s t ru m en t s o that none will be re ndere d meaning less. Do rse tt , 164 S.W .3d at 662; Sh e ll O il Co
. v. Khan , 138 S.W .3d 288, 292 (Tex. 2004). No sing le provision taken a lone will be g iven controlling eff ect; rathe r, all the provisions must be considere d with refe renc e to the whole instrument. Khan , 138 S.W .3d at 292. Contract terms ar e g iven t heir “plain, ordinary , and gene rally acc epted meaning s unless the contract itself shows them to be used in a

technica l or diffe rent sense .” Do rse tt , 164 S.W .3d at 662. When a cour t concludes that contra ct lang uag e ca n be g iven a c erta in or defini t e m ea n i ng , then the languag e is not ambig uous, and the c ourt will construe the c ontrac t as a matter of law. Coker , 650 S.W .2d at 393.
Additi onal E arnest Mon ey of $100 I n its first issue, CMC contends that trial c ourt err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt bec a u s e H ar r e ll ’ s “ s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t p r o o f

f a il e d to p r o v e th a t h e h a d

te n d e r e d th e additional
ear nest money

require d by

the Contract a s a matter of law.” CMC contends th at t he re medy of specific en f

o r c e me n t r e qu ir e d H ar

r e ll to “ s h o w th a t h e h a s d il ig e n tl y an d ti me ly p e r f o r me d or tender ed per formanc e of a ll obligations under the contra ct” and that he did not do so bec ause it wa s9

undisputed that he did not deposit the $100 of additional ea rnest money . CMC arg ues that Ha rre ll’s failure t o d ep o sit the additional earne st money of $100 wa s a def

ault under the Contract, and “[h] aving so defa

ulted, Har rell di d not satisfy one of the conditi ons prer equisite to the invocation of his contrac tual rig ht to specific pe rfor mance .” Th e law of c on tr a c ts an d the e qu ita ble pr inc ipl e s of spe c if

ic pe rf or manc e c on tr ol a
co ntrac t to sell real estate that re quires an e arne st money pay ment. S e e H u d s o n v . W a k e fie ld , 6 4 5 S
. W
. 2 d 4 2 7 , 4 3 0 (T ex . 1 9 8 3 ) ( ci t i n g Cowman v. All en Monuments, Inc. , 500 S.W .2d 223, 226 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 19 73 , n o w ri t) ). “ Spe c if ic pe rf or manc e of a c on tr a c t fo r the sa le of re a lty is o rd ina ri ly g ra nte d w he re the su it is bas e d o n a va lid c on tr a c t, b ut i t is no t a

re me dy wh ic h e xists
as a matter of r ight.” Kress v. Soules , 2 61 S.W. 2d 70 3, 70 4 ( Te x. 19 53 ); see W ils on v . Kl e in , 71 5 S. W.2 d 8 14 , 8 19 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 86 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) (sp eci fic pe rf or manc e is equitable r emedy

). A par ty may av o i d en forc ement of its contra ctual oblig ations based on the othe r party ’s mater ial brea ch. See M ustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipe line Co. , 134 S.W .3d 195, 198 (T e x. 20 04 ) ( pa

rt y re le a se d f

ro m f ur the r c on tr act ual ob lig a tio ns wh e n th e oth e r p art y ma te ri a lly br eac he d) ; Hudson , 645 S.W .2d at 430 (plaintiff not e ntitled to specific per formanc e if it has
c o m m i t t e d

a m a t e r i a l b r e a c h ) ; Ad

vanceCom

po ne nts , I

nc . v . G oo ds te in , 608 S.W .2d 737, 739 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 1980, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (whe n “‘non- compliance does not g o to the essenc e of t h e c o n t ra ct , ’” re m ed y

o f s p e c i fi c p er fo rm an ce av ai l ab l e; qu o t i n g Fa rri s v . B e nn e tt’

s E x e c uto rs , 26 Tex. 568, 572 (1863)). This theory of avoidanc e is an aff

irmative def

ense. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 94As part of its second issue, CMC contends that the t rial court err ed in excluding Cra ndall’s 5 aff idavit, part i cular ly

her state ment that she terminate d the Contract. B eca use Ha rre ll does not dispute that he re ceive d the notice of termination from the title c ompany and we c onclude that the Con tr a c t di d n ot a llo w C MC t o te rm inate ba se d o n H arr e ll’ s f a ilure to d e po sit

a dd iti on a l e a rn e st money of $100 prior to the closing , we need not addre ss CMC ’s ar g ument that the trial cour t erre d in excluding Cranda ll’s affida vit. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.1(a) ; 47.1. Whether the other party ’s brea ch is material to excuse a pa rty ’s per formanc e of a

contra ct 6 ordinarily i s a fa ct question. See M ustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipe line Co. , 134 S.W .3d 195, 198-99 (Te x . 2004). In Mustang , the jury returne d a ver dict th at b o th parties bre ache d the a g re e me nt, bu t th e jur

y wa s n ot a sk e d to de te rm ine wh e the r the re sp e c tiv e br e a c he s w e re ma te ri a l. Id
. at 197. The supreme c ourt conc luded that the def endant’ s brea ch wa s material a s a matter of law to excuse the plaintiff’s pe rfor mance . Id
. at 19 9. Th e su pr e me c ourt

lis te d f a c tor s to c on sid e r i n de te rm ini ngma te ri a lity : 10 (m a tters c on sti tut inga vo ida nc e are a ff

ir ma tiv e de fe ns e s) ; Mustang , 1 34 S.W. 3d a t 19 7 ( “ I n th e ir respe ctive answ ers, both par ties raised the other’s material bre ach a s an af firmative de fense .”). I mportant to the resolution of this issue is what CMC does not dispute, challeng e, or
c on te nd and CMC’ s ple a din g s. CMC doe s not d isp ute that th e Con tr a c t w a s v a lid and e nf or c e a ble when e x ecute d, that it is unambiguous, that Har rell timely deposited ear

nest money

of $2000, and that Har rell tende red the full purcha se price prior to the contr actua l closin g d at e. C M C does not challeng e the tria l court’s de nial of its motion for lea ve to amend its plea dings to a ssert the de fense s t h at i tra i s edi ni t s re s p o n s es t o Ha rr el l ’s m o t i o n fo r su m m ary j u d gm en t
. C M C d o es n o tch al l en ge the trial court’s ruling sustaining Ha rre ll’s special e x ceptions and obje ctions to and motion to st rike CMC’s summ ary

judgme nt evidence and its responses to Ha rre ll’s motion for summary judgme nt
e xce pt a s to Cr and a ll’ s a ff ida vit
. CMC did not plead as an affirmative defense and does not c ontend 5 otherwise that Har

rell’s failure to de posit a dditional e arne st mone y of $100 wa s a mater ial brea ch of the Con tr a c t or that CMC wa s pre jud ic e d or dama g e d in

any wa y by Ha rr e ll’ s f a ilure to d e po sit
a d d i t i o n a l e a r

n e s tm o n e y. On this recor d, we c onclude that Ha rre ll was not require d to present 6(a) the exte n t t o w h ic h th e in ju r e d p arty w il l b e d e p r iv e d

o f th e b e n e f

it w h ic h he re a so na bly e xpe c te d; ( b) the e xten t to whichthe inj ur e d p art y c an b e a de qu a te ly compensated for the part of that benef it of which he will be depr ived; (c) the extent to which t he party failing to perfor m or to offe r to perf

orm will suffer

forf eiture; (d) the lik e lih oo d th a t th e pa rt y fai li ngto p e rf

or m or to o ff e r t o p e rf or m w ill c ur e his fa ilure , ta kin g a c c ount o f t

he c ir c ums tanc e s in c lud ingany re a so na ble a ssu ra nc e s; [and] (e) the extent to which the behavior of the pa rty failing to perfor

m or to offe r t o p er fo rm co mp o rt s wi t h s t an d ar d s o f go o d fa i t h an d fa i r d ea l i n g. Id . (citing Restatement (Sec ond) of Contrac ts § 241 (1981)). CMC did not plead materia l brea ch by Har rell to excuse its perfor

mance , but, even if it had, it fa iled to pr esent summary judgme nt evidence that would support a finding in its favor on any of the supreme court’s enumer ated f actor s. See id. The dissent conc ludes that we uphold the s ummary judgme nt on a basis not pre sented by 7 Har rell to the trial cour

t beca use Ha rre ll did not s eek summar y judgme n t on the basis that he brea ched the Contract but that his brea ch was not material. B ut the burden w as on CMC to plead materia l brea ch by

Har rell as a n aff irmative defe nse and to pr esent summary judgme nt e vidence that H ar r e ll mate r ia ll y b r e a c h e d th e Co n tr a c t to p r e c lu d e s u mm ar y ju d g ment. S

ee id. ; KPMG Peat Ma rwi c k v . H arris on Cou nty

Ho us . F in. Cor p ., 988 S.W .2d 746, 749 (Tex. 1999) (once movant establishes rig ht to summary judgme nt, bur den on nonmovant to pr esent evidenc e ra ising fa ct issue on aff irmative def

ense)
. 11 summary judgme nt evidence that he had deposited a dditional earne st money of $100 prior to c losing his portion of the Contract to prove the “esse ntial e lements of his cause of action” a nd that he met his burden to prove that he wa s entitled to summary judgme n t as a matter of law
. See Te x. R. C i v . P
. 1 6 6 a ( c ); C i t

y o f Ho uston , 589 S.W .2d at 678. The issue the n is whether CMC prese nted evidenc e to ra ise a mate ri al fac t issue to preclude summary judgme nt. See City of Houston , 589 S.W .2d at 678-79. 7

CMC relies on its int erpr etation of the Contract’s e arne st money provisions and the pr ov isi on tha t ti me wa s o f t

he e sse nc e to su

pp or t that Ha rr e ll’ s fa ilure to d e po sit

a dd iti on a l e a rn e st money prec luded summary

judgme nt in Ha

rre ll’s f avor and the r emedy

of spec ific per formanc e of the Con tr a c t. We tur

n the n to a re vie w of the Con tr a c t and the se pr ov isi on s. Pur su ant t o th e e a rn e st12

money provisions, Harr ell was re quired to deposit ea rnest money

of $2000 with the title company within three da

y s of the Contrac t’s eff

ective date and a dditional earne st money of $100:
No t late r t ha n 3 da y s a ft e r t he e ff e c tiv e date , B uy e r m

us t de po sit

$2 ,0 00 .0 0 a s e arn e st mon e y wi th [the tit le c omp any ] at [the tit le c omp any ’s a dd

re ss]. B uy e r wi ll d e po sit additional ear

nest money

of $100.00 on or befor e [ ] the 14th day afte r B uy er’ s rig ht to terminate unde r [the fea sibili ty period provision] ex pires.
The Contrac t also provides that “[t] ime is of the essenc e in this contrac t. The par ties require strict
c omp lia nc e wi th t he tim e s f or pe rf or manc e .” We c on c lud e tha t th e se pr ov isi on s are no t ambi g uo us , and we interpre t them as a matter of law. See Cok

er , 650 S.W .2d at 393. CMC relies on Li e d

e k e r v . G r ossman , 206 S.W .2d 232 (Tex. 1947), and W ilson

v . Kl e in , 715 S.W .2d 814, to contend that Ha rre ll was strictly bound to comply with the Contract and that, w he n h e fa ile d to do so by no t dep os iti ng the a dd iti on a l earn e st mon e y , he wa s not e nti tle d to specific perf

ormanc e. In Li e d

eke r , the par

ties ag ree d that time was of the e ssence and that the contra ct to convey

land wa s t o b e clos ed within 20 day s. 206 S.W .2d at 232. The supr eme c ourt de nie d s pe c if

ic pe rf or manc e , o bs e rv ingthat it

wa s und isp ute d th a t th e te rm s of the c on tr a c t w e re to be ca rried out within twenty

day s and that did not happen. Id. at 234. I n W ilson , this Court denied spec i fi c p erformanc e to enf orce a re al estate contra ct that containe d a stipulation that tim e wa s of the essenc e whe n it was undisputed that the buy er ne ver ma de an “ actua l tender—a n unconditional of fe r t o p ay the c or re c t amou nt. ” 71 5 S. W.2 d at 82 2- 23 . U nli ke the pa rt ie s in Liedeke r and W ilson , it i s und isp ute d tha t Harr e ll ac tua lly te nd e re d th e fu ll p ur c ha se pr ic e wi thi n th e “ e sse nti a l ti me lim it” presc ribed by

the contra ct—“on or

befor e January

26, 2 0 0 7 .” See City of Houston ,13

58 9 S. W.2 d at 67 8; Liedeke r , 206 S.W. 2d a t 234 (“ e sse nti a l time lim it” that “pa rt ie s c omp ly

wi th their oblig ations under the c ontrac t” by closing date)
. CMC’s int erpr etati on of the Contrac t would allow it to avoid its contra ctual obligation to convey

the re al prope rty

at the same time that CMC acknow ledg es that Ha rre ll tendere d the full purcha se price prior to the closing date a nd that CMC was not har med or pre

judiced by

the amount of ea

rnest money

on deposit at any

time. See H

ohenberg Bros. Co. v. G eorge E. G ibbons & Co. , 5 3 7 S
. W
. 2 d

1 , 3 (T ex . 1 9 7 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Henshaw v. Texas N atural Res. Found. , 216 S.W .2d 56 6 ( Te x. 19 49 )) (“ fo rf

e iture s ar e no t fa vo re d” and “ ‘[i ]f the te rm s o f a c on tr a c t are fa ir ly

su sc e pti ble
o f an i n t erpretation which will prevent a forf eiture, the y

will be so construed.’ ”). In light of our int e rp re ta tio n of the Con tr a c t, C MC f a ile d to ra ise a

ma te ri a l f

a c t is su e ba se d o n H arr e ll’ s f a ilure to de po sit a dd iti on a l e arn e st m on e y of $1 00 to p re c lud e su mma

ry jud g me nt an d th e re me dy of sp e c if ic enfor ceme nt. We conclude that the t rial court did not err in g ranting Har rell’s motion for summary judgme nt. We overrule CMC’s first issue.
CMC’s Term inati on of the Con tract

I n its second issue, CMC conte nds that the trial cour t erre d in denying its motion for
su mma ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e the “ un c on tr ov e rt e d” su mma ry ju dg me nt e vid e nc e pr ov e d th a t CM C tim e ly te rm inate d the Con tr a c t wh e n Ha rr e ll fa ile d to de po sit the a dd iti on a l e arn e st m on e y . CM C contends that it terminated the Contract after Harre ll failed to deposit the additi onal ea rnest money with the title company

by J anuar y 2, 2007—within 14 day s after the fe asib i l i t y p eriod e x pired. H ar r e l l d o e s n o td i s p u t e t h a th e r e c e i v e d a c o p y o f t h e n o t i c e o f t e r m i n a t i o n f

r o m t h e t i t l e c o mp a n y. I n its first amended a

nswer, CMC alleg ed as a

n aff irmative def

ense that “the contr act that wa s made14

the basis of Plaintiff’s petition is unenfor cea ble beca use it ter minated under its own te rm s when Def endant g ave c ontrac tual Notice of Termination on J anuar y 3, 2007.” See Tex. R. C iv. P. 94. To be e nti tle d to su mma

ry jud g me nt o n its affirm a tiv e de fe ns e , th e burd e n w a s o n CM C to pr ov e its defe nse as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P . 166a(c ). As it is disposi tive, we be g in by revie wing the Con tr a c t to de te rm ine if it a llo we d CM C to ter mina te ba se d o n H arr e ll’ s f a ilure to d e po sit additional ear

nest money

of $100. CMC relies on the ea

rnest money

and the de fault provisio n s o f th e Contra ct to support its c on tr a c tua l r ig ht to te rm inate the Con tr a c t wh e n H arr e ll d id n ot t ime ly de po sit a dd iti on a l e a rn e st money of $100. The e arne st money provisions allowed CMC to terminate the Contrac t by providing
wr itten no ti ce i f H arr e ll f a ile d to de po sit

“ the e arn e st m on e y ” and , in that e ve nt, to e xer c ise its
re me die s und e r t

he Con tr a c t’ s d e fa

ult pr ov isi on s:
I f B uy er f ails to tim ely

deposit the ea

rnest money , Seller may terminate this contra ct by providing writ t en n o tice to B uy er be fore Buy er de posits the earne st money and ma y e xe r c is e Se ll e r ’ s r e me d ie s u n d e r [th e d e f a u lt p r o v is io n s ].
We conclude that these provisions are not ambiguou s , and we interpre t them as a matter of law. See Cok er , 650 S.W .2d at 393. CMC con t ends that the re fer ence to “the ea rnest money” in the sente nce a llowing CMC t o terminate inc luded both the initial d ep o s i t of $2000 and the additional deposit of $100, validating CMC’s termination o f t h e Contrac t when Ha rre ll failed to deposit the additional $100. The plain languag e, howe ver, in this sente nce r efe rs to “the e arne st money ” sing ularly and allows C M C t o t e r

m i n a t e o n l y before Har

rell deposited “the earne st money ,” supporting an interpr etationThe fe asibility period provision allowe d Har rell to terminate the Contract for any rea son 8 “within 30 day s after

the ef fec tive date” by

providing written notice to CMC. 15 that the par

ties’ intent was to allow CMC to t er m i n ate only if Har rell fa iled to deposit the initi al amount of $2000. See Do rse tt , 164 S.W .3d at 662 (c o n t rac t terms g iven plain meaning ). I nterpre ting “ the ea

rnest money” to re fer

to the initial deposit also is consistent with the purpose of
ear nest money

—“to show a g ood-fa ith i n tention to complete the tra nsaction.” See B lack’

s Law Di c tio na ry

525-26 (7th Ed. 1999). By depositing the ear nest money , Har

rell showed his intention to complete the tra

nsaction. Ha d H arr e ll f

a ile d to de po sit e arn e st mon e y , CMC wo uld no t ha ve be e n c on tr a c tua lly obligated to take a

ny actions or e x pend any funds. CMC could have proc eede d with the Contract wi tho ut a n e arn e st m on e y

de po sit , o r i t c ould hav e so ug ht a va ila ble re me die s und e r t

he de fa ult pr ov isi on s, inc lud ingsp e c if ic pe rforma nce or

liq uid a te d d a ma g e s. I n c on tr a st, a ft e r H a rr e ll de po sit e d e arn e st m on e y of $2 00 0, the pa

rt ie s c on tr a c tua lly

we re re qu ir e d to take a c tio ns in prepa ration for the closing , further

supporting that the parties did not intend to give CMC another opportunity

to terminate the Contra ct af ter the f easibility period ha d expired based on the a dditional
ea rn est money

deposit of $100. We conclude that the sentenc e in the ea rnest money

provisions 8 pr o v id in g CM C th e r ig h t to te r mi n a te f o r H ar r e ll ’ s f a il u r e to d e p o s it “ th e e ar

n e s t mo n e y ” d id not
a llo w C MC t o te rm inate the Con tr a c t ba se d o n H arr e ll’ s f a ilure to d e po sit

the “ a dd iti on a l e a rn e st money ” of $100 pr ior to his tender of the purcha se price
.

CMC also contends that the defa ult provisions allowed C M C t o terminate the Contract by

Har rell’s fa ilure to deposit the additional ear nest money of $100. CMC contends that16

“ Ha rr e ll’ s f a ilure to de po sit the a dd iti on a l e arn e st mon e y c on sti tut e d a de fa ult un de r t he Con tr a c t” and that an a

vailable r emedy

to CMC for “ a def

ault” wa s termination. The de fault provisions pr ov ide the fo llo wi ngre me die s f or the oth e r p a

rt y ’s fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th t he Con tr a c t:
A
. If B u ye r f a i l s t o c o mp l y w i t h t h i s c o n t r a c t , B u ye r i s i nd e f a u l tan d S e l l e r m ay: (1) terminate this contra ct and re ce ive the ear nest money as liquidated damag es, there by

rele asing the par

ties from this contrac t; or (2) enfor ce specific perf ormanc e, or se ek other

relief as may be provided by law, or both. B. I f, without fault, Seller is unabl e within the time allowed to deliver the e s t o p p e l c e rt i f

i c at e s o r t h e c o m m i t m e n t , B u ye r

m ay: (1) terminate this contra ct and r ece ive the ear n est money , less any independe nt consideration under [the fea sibili ty period provision], as the sole re medy ; or (2) extend the time for per formanc e up to 15 day s and the closing will be e x t e n d e d a s n e c e s s ar

y. C. Exc e pt a s p ro vided in P arag ra ph[ ]B, if

Se lle r f a ils to c omp ly

wi th t his c o n t r a c t , S e l l e r

i s i nd e f a u l tan d B u ye r m ay: (1) terminate this contra ct a n d rec eive the e arne st money , less any independe nt consideration under [the fea sibili ty period provision], as liq uid a te d da ma g e s, the re by re le a sin g the pa rt ie s f ro m th is c on tr a c t; or (2) enfor ce spe cific pe rfor mance , or see k such other r elief a s may be provided by

law, or both.
We conclude that these provisions are not ambiguous, a nd we inter

pret them a s a m atter of

law. See id.The dissent conte nds that the “e nforc eability of the ter mination provision

— i
. e. whe ther 9 [C MC] had the r ight to te rminate the contra ct” wa s not adjudicated a s a question of lawor fa ct. B ut CMC raised the issue befor e the trial cour t in its motion for summary judgme nt, which motion the tr ia l c o urt denied. S

ee Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005) (r e vie wi ngc ourt

c on sid e rs iss ue s r a ise d in c omp e tin g mot ion s) . T he tr ia l c ourt do e s n ot s ta te its g rounds for de ny ing CM C ’s m o t i o n for summary judgme nt, but it could have interpre ted the Contract to conclude that it was unambiguous and enfor cea ble and that it had not expi red ba sed on CMC’s noti ce of

termination. See Coker v. Coke r , 650 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (interpr etation of unambig uous contrac t is as a matter of law). 17 CMC’ s in te rp re ta tio n of the Con tr a c t w ou ld m od if y the law o f c on tr a c ts a

nd sp e c if ic perf ormanc e to allow CMC to t er m i n at e the Contrac t no matter how immateria l the brea ch. See H u d s on , 6 45 S.W. 2d

a t 43 0; see also Hohe nberg Bros. Co. , 537 S.W .2d at 3. CMC’s 9 i n t erp re tation also is inconsistent with t he contr act a s a whole. See Khan , 1 3 8 S. W. 3 d a t 2 9 2 (no sin g le pr ov isi on

take n a lon e wi ll be g ive n c on tr oll inge ff e c t) . B y the pa rt ie s’ e xpre ss r e fe re nc e in the e arn e st m on e y

pr ov isi on s to CMC’ s r ig ht to se e k re me die s und e r the de fa ult pr ov isi on s if H a rr e ll fa i l e d t o d e p o s i t “ t h e e ar n e s t m o n e y , ” t h e p art i e s ’ i n t e n t w a s n o t t o i n c l u d e thi s sa me
reme dy —reme dies under the defa ult provisions—as to the “additional ear nest m o n ey ” of $100. Se e id
. (cour

ts a re to ha rmonize the provisions of a contra ct to give eff ect to all provisions). We conclude that the defa ult provisions di d not allow CMC t o terminate the C o n trac t based on Har rell’s fa ilure to deposit the additional earnest money of $100 prior to his timely tender of the purcha se price
. CMC relies on Lim esto ne Gr ou p, In c . v . S

ai T ho ng , L. L.C. , 107 S.W .3d 793, 796-97 (Tex. Ap p . — Am arillo 2003, no pet.), to support its interpre tation of the Contrac t that the parties mod if ie d th e g e ne ra l rig ht to se e k s pe c if ic pe rf or manc e of a re a l e state c on tr a c t a s lo nga s th e pa rt y is not in m ater ial brea ch. In Limestone , o ur sis te r c ourt

a ff ir me d th e tr ia l court ’s de nia l of a re qu e stTh e Con tr a c t pr ov ide s th a t e arn e st mon e y “ wi ll be a pp lie d fi rs t to any c a sh do wn pa y me nt, 10 then to Buy er’ s closing c osts, and any excess will be ref

unded to B uy er.” Th e dis se nt c on te nd s th a t it wa s und isp ute d tha t CMC te rm inate d the Con tr a c t. Ha rr e ll, 11 ho we ve r, c on te nd s th a t, a lth ou g h CM C a tte mpt e d to ter mina te the Con tr a c t, C MC f a ile d to do so be c a us e it d id n ot p ro vide w ri tt en notic e of te rm inatio n in

c omp lia nc e wi th t

he Con tr a c t. I

n h is second a mended pe tition, Harrell states: “D efe ndant neve r sent notice to Plaintiff as re quired by
. . . the c on tr a c t, o f a

ny a tte mpt to t e rm inate the c ontr a c t.” B e c a us e we c on c lud e that the Con tr a c t di d not allow CMC t o terminate ba sed on Ha rre ll’s failure t o deposit the additional ea rnest money

of $1 00 , w e ne e d n ot a dd

re ss wh e the r CMC pr ov ide d wr itt e n no tic e of te rm inatio n in c omp lia nc e wi th the Contract. Te x . R. App. P. 47.1.
18 fo r s pe c if ic pe rf or manc e to e nf

or c e a re a l e state c on tr a c t a ft e r t he buy e r, wh o w a s se e kin g sp e c if ic perf ormanc e, had de posited ear nest money of $25,000 out of the contra ctually

require d amount of $75,000. Id . at 79 5, 79 7. Th e de fa ult pr ov isi on

of the c on tr a c t pr ov ide d th e purc ha se r t he ri g ht t o
e nf or c e the c on tr a c t by

sp e c if ic pe rf or manc e bu t on ly

if “ Purch aser shal l no t be in d e fa ult here under.” Id
. at 796. I n contra st, unlike the defa ult provision in Limestone , Har rell’s c ontrac tual rig ht to enfor ce the contra ct by specific perf ormanc e did not contain similar lang uag e—it was not conditioned on Har

rell “not be [i ng ] i n defa

ult hereunde r.” See id. Additionally , at the t i m e t hat Har rell soug ht specific perf

ormanc e, he had te ndere d the full purcha se price , which amount included
e arn e st m on e y

de po sit s. 10 I n light of our

interpre tation of the Contrac t and t he undis puted facts, we c onclude that CM C di d n ot h a ve the c on tr a c tua l rig ht to ter min a te the Con tr a c t bas e d o n H arr e ll’ s f a ilure to de po sit a dd iti on a l e arn e st m on e y of $1 00 . We, the re fo re , co nc lud e that the tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in denying CMC’s motion for summary judgme nt. We overrule CMC’s sec ond issue. 1119 CO NC LU SION Be cause we c onclude that the trial court did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of

Har rell and in denying summary judgme nt in favor of C MC, we af firm the trial c ourt’s jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Waldrop and H enson Dissenting O pinion by J ustice Waldrop Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 5, 2009