## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 21

- 00010

- CV

RICHARD MANNING , TAMMY MANNING, AND ALL OCCUPANTS OF 1036 SUNSET, WACO, TX 76704 , Appellant s V. MAE JOHNSON AND PAT WILLIAMS , Appellee s

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 20200238CV2

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ. Opinion by Justice Stevens2 

### O P I N I O N
Richard Manning appeal s a forcible entry and detainer judgment in favor of his land l o rds , Mae Johnson and Pat Williams

. 1 On appeal, Manning , appearing pro se, argue s that (1) the trial court erred by failing to set aside its final judgment under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines 2 because Manning did not have notice of a f inal hearing, (2) th e trial court erred by imposing attorney fees as a sanction under Chapter 10 of the T exas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, ( 3 ) the trial court ’ s judgment was not supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence , and ( 4 ) the tria l court erred by gr an ting a continuance after it had granted a writ of possession

. We find that we lack jurisdiction to address the issue of possession in this case. Even so, we address the issue of past due rent and attorney fees but conclude that (1) the trial court di d not abuse its discretion in overruling Manning ’ s request for a new trial on those issues based on Craddock , (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the imposition of attorney fees was a proper sanction , an d (3) Manning ha s failed t o adequately brief his remaining issues

. As a result, we affirm the award of past due rent and attorney fees

. I. Factual and Procedural Background Manning leased a property located at 103 6 Sunset in Waco, Texas (t he Property), from Johnson and William s . T he record shows t hat Johnson and Williams sent M anning notice in November 2019 that his monthly lease payment would increase from $850 .00 to $1 , 075 .00

1 Originally appeal ed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pu rsuant t o i ts docket e q u alization efforts. See T EX
. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN . § 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals in deciding this ca se. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 41.3.

2 Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. , 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).3

per month

. I n February 2020 , Johnson and Williams file d a petition to evict M anning and all
occup an ts of the P rop erty for failure to pay rent

. Although the record shows that M anning , who represented him sel f , w as personally served and acknowledged this service in later motions, he did not appe ar for trial in front of the j ustice c ourt
. As a result, t h e j ustice c ourt entered a default judgment in favor of Johnson and Williams on February 18 , which awarded them possession of the P roperty , past due rent , and court costs

. After Manning ackno wl e dge d that the j u stice c ourt had also required him to deposit p ast due rent and rent accrued during any appeal into its registry , he appealed the j ustice c ourt’s decision for trial de n ovo in the Cou nty Court at Law No. 2 of McLennan County (County Cour t )

. Manning chose to represent himself in front of the County Co u rt. M anning originally received notice that the eviction appeal hearing was set for April 17, 2020

. After receiving the notice, M anning argue d that he should have only b een char ged $850 .00 per month, not $1 , 075 .00 per month , and filed a motion for recon s ide ration of the amount of rent that was to be paid in the j ustice c ourt’s re gistry

. On that motion, and throughout the proceedings, M anning lis ted the P roperty add r ess as his address

. 3 Even though the County Court had not ruled on his motion, Manning depo sited $850.00 or less for several months into the regis try. On July 15, Johnson and Williams filed a verifi ed motion arguing that th e j ustice c ourt ’ s wr i t of pos session should no longer be stayed pending the appeal because M anning had failed to conti n ue t o deposit the full amount of rent into the registry as required by S ection 24.0 054 of the Texas P roperty C ode , which states, in relevant part:

3 Manning fil ed letter s and pleadings on June 1, July 30, and August 3 with the Co unty Court li sting the Property as his address

.4 (a

- 4 ) During an appeal of an eviction case for nonpayment of rent, if a tenant fails to pay rent into the j usti ce court or county court registry as the rent becomes due under the rental agreement in accordanc e with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Secti o n 24.0053, the landlord may file with the county court a sworn motion that the tenant failed to pay re n t as required

. . . .

. . . . (c) If the court finds that a tenant has failed to timely pay the rent into the cour t regist ry on more than one occasion:

(1) the tenant is not entitled to stay the issuance of the writ by paying the rent and the landlord ’ s rea s onab le attorney ’ s fees, if an y; and (2) the county court shall immediately issue a writ of possession. T EX
. P ROP
. C ODE A N N
. § 24.0054 (a

- 4), (c). On J u ly 31, M anning move d to recuse the judge and stay the proceedings and filed a motion to dismiss his ow n app eal for want of j urisdiction. In response, Johnson and Williams argued that the recusal motion was untimely a nd groundless and moved for san c t ions in the form of attorney fees and incurred expenses. The recusal motion was overruled. Johnson and Wi l liam s also filed a m otion for continuance due to Manning ’ s recusal motion, which delayed the consideration o f their pretrial motions. John so n and Williams explained tha t they wished for the County C ourt to rule on their motion for a writ of possession

un d er S ection 24.0 05 4 of the Texas P roperty C ode first because they would likely elect not to have Johnson , who lived in California, travel for t he final hearing if the motion were granted

. T he C ounty C ourt granted the motion for continuance on August 5 but did not set the case for final hearing at that time

.5

On August 7, 2020, the C ounty C ourt held a hearing in which Manning admitted to

m a k ing l esser payment s th a n ordered by the j ustice c ourt for several months. Johnson and Williams test ified on the issu e of attorney fees under S ection 24.005 4 with respect to th at motion

. After reviewin g the reg istry , the C ounty C ourt concluded that the a mount of the deficiency of unpaid rent was $1 , 120.40

. By written order on August 11, the C ounty C ou rt found that M ann i ng h ad failed to deposit into the registry the amount of rent as ordered by the j ustice c ourt on a timely basis on more th an one oc c asion and issued a writ of possession in favor of Johnson and Williams

. The C ounty C o urt also ordered M anning to pay Johns o n an d Williams ’s attorney fe es related to the Section 24.0054 motion

. The writ o f possession was executed on August 19, 2020 , and Manning vacated the Property. On September 3, 2020 , M anning moved to se t aside the order issuing a writ of possession becau s e of the “grammatical complexity” of Section 24.0054 of the Texas Propert y Code

. Although he acknowledge d attenda n ce at the hearing, he mislabeled the order issuing writ of possession as a default j udgment. To that motion, M anning a ttached an unsworn de c lara tion listing the P roperty address as his address and inclu ded his email address

. On Sep tember 30 , 2020, Johnson and Williams filed a motion for sanctions for

reas onable expenses and attorney fees under Section 10.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme dies Code for alleged inconvenience, harassment, and out

- of

- pocket expenses incurred or

ca used by t h e litigation and by two appeals filed with the Tenth Court of App eals that were dismissed based on the lack of a final appealable order

.6

Even thou g h th e issue of possession was already decided, the final he aring, which had been rescheduled several ti m es due to the COVID

- 19 pandemic , was ultima tely set for October 2, 2020

. O n September 16, the County Court mailed to the Property M anning ’ s notice of t he f inal hearing. The record shows that the c ounty a dministrator and Johnson and Willia ms’ s

counse l also emailed this notice to Manning on the same day. M anning did not appear for the final hearing. At that hearing, the C ounty C ourt noted that the wri t ten notice of the hearing date had been re turned as undeliverable and that M anning h a d failed to provide an updated address

. Johnson and Williams ’ s cou n sel informed the County Court that he had sen t notice of the hearin g to M anning ’ s email addres s. T he C ount y Court found that M anni ng had received proper notice of th e hearing. At the final hearing, Williams testified that the lease on the P ro perty was executed in January 2017, that it was a tw elve

- month lease o bligating M anning to pay $850 .00 per month, and that M anning remai ned on the P roperty on a month

- to

- mo nth b as i s after the written lease term expired

. William s said that he not ified M anning of an increase in rent to $1 , 075 .00 per month in a November 2019 letter, which he both hand delivered to Mann i ng a nd sent by certified mail. T he original lea se and n otification of increased rent was introduced into evidence

. Willi ams testified that M anning only paid $850 .00 in January and February of 2020 even though the rent ha d increased

. As a result, Willia m s te sti fied that Manning was sent not ices to vacate the property before the forcible entry and detainer pro ceeding was filed with the j ustice c ourt
. Williams also testified that M anning used the P roperty for commercial purposes, including manufacturin g a n d se lling shed s.7

After William s testi f

ied, the C ounty C ourt notice d that he had not yet been sworn. At that time , the County C ourt administered the oath to Williams and, after being properly sworn, Williams testified that his prior testimony was “ tr ue a n d c orrect ” and accurate

. Johnson a nd W i lliams ’ s counsel testified that he had spent twenty

- two hours of time on the case , charging $195 .00 an hour, and that the total amount of attorney fees spent on the case was $4 , 290 .00. Coun sel also asked for $3 , 50 0 .00 in the event of an appeal to the c ou r t of a ppeals and another $3 , 50 0 .00 in the event of an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court

. O n October 5 , the C ounty C ourt entered a judgment awarding Johnson and Williams possession of the P roperty, $3 , 340.40 for u n paid rent, and attorney fees in the amou n t of $11,290 .00, which include d $7,000.00 in conditional awards of appellate attorney fees that would be remitted if the judgment were not app ealed. The judgment included an express finding that the P roperty was u s ed “ for both residential and busines s pu rposes .” Nothing in the ju dgment suggested that the attorney

- fee award was a sanction. M anning move d to set aside the default judgment on the ground th at he was not provided with the notice that was maile d to the P rop erty address

. M anni ng ’ s original and first amend ed motion s did not expressly address whether he had received the notice of the hearing that was emailed by the c ourt a dministrator even though M anning listed that email in his mo tion s to set aside the d e faul t judgment

. Manning also co mplained that the amount s awarded to Johnson and8

Williams for unpaid rent and attorney fees were “ inaccurate, unreasonable [ , ] and excessive. ” Manning lodge d no complaint about the impositi on of attorney fees as sanctions. 4
T he County Court s et t he motion s to set aside its judgment for a hearing in January 2021. At t hat hearing, counsel attached a September 16, 2020, email from the c ourt a dministrator to Manning ’ s email address, whi ch attached notice of the final hearing

. Coun sel also s e p arately forwarded that message to M anning ’ s email address , as shown by the email chain admitted into evidence , and Manning confirmed that the email address used in the email was his

. T he C ounty C ourt denied M anning ’ s m ot ion s. II. We La c k Juri sdiction to Address t he Issue of Possession We first highlight the parameters of our jurisdiction. The trial court found that Manning

was using the Property for residential and commer cial purposes. That findi ng was not ch al lenged by motion for new tria l or on appeal. Section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code states, “ A final judgment of a county court in an eviction suit may not be appealed on the issue of possession unless the pre mises in question are being used for re si dential purposes o n ly. ” T E X
. P RO P
. C ODE A NN
. § 24.007 (Supp. ) . As a result, we do no t have jurisdiction ove r this appeal as it relates to issues of possession. See In re High Pointe Invs., LLC , 552 S.W.3d 384, 38 8 (Tex.

4 “[A]n amended motio n for new trial filed more than thirty days after the trial court sig ns a final judgment is untimely.” Mori tz v. Prei ss , 121 S .W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. 2003 )

. In an unt imely third motion to set aside the judgment, Manning mentioned sanctions for the first time and included claimed meritorious defenses, l ike “Landlord did not terminate tenancy properly,” “Landlord has not pro pe r l y brought the case,” “Ba d housing con ditions,” “Retaliatory Eviction,” “Landlord vio lated the law Texas Property Code 24.0052,” and “Attorney’s fees not part of suit

. ” “A trial court’s order overruling an untimely new trial motion cannot be the basis of a ppel late review, even if the trial court acts within its plenary power peri od.” Id. “[I]f the court denies a new trial, the belated motion is a nul lity and supplies no basis fo r consideration upon appeal of grounds which were required to be set forth i n a tim ely motion , ” i d

. (quoting Kalteyer v. Sneed , 837 S.W.2d 848, 851 (T ex. App.

— Austin 1992, no pet.) (per curiam )) ; “ it is a nullity for purposes of pr eserving issues for appel late review

. ” I d

.9

App.

— Waco 2018, or ig. proceedin g ) ; Rice v. Pinney , 5 1 S.W.3 d 705 , 707

– 08 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2001, no pet.)

. To the extent Manning argue s that Crad dock should be applied to issues of possession, we find that Manning was present at the Aug ust 7, 2020, hearing after which the tr ia l court granted a w rit of possession in f avor of Johnson and Williams. As a result, Manning vacated the Property before the final hearing , and his presence at the final hearing was not required on the issue of p ossession because it had a lready been d ec ided. See M ar s hall v. Hous. Auth. o

f Ci ty o f San Antonio , 198 S.W.3d 782 , 787 (Tex. 2006) ; Holmes v. Al Jaafreh , No. 10

- 11

- 00320

- CV, 2013 WL 2399059, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Waco May 30, 2013 , no pet. ) (mem. op.); McElro y v. Teague Hous. Auth

. , No. 10

- 10

- 00009

- C V, 2012 WL 149 2 27, at * 1

– 2 (Tex. Ap p.

— Wa co J an. 18, 2012 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) ; De La Garza v. Riverstone Apartments , No. 04

- 06

- 00732

- CV, 2007 WL 3270769, at *1 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Nov. 7, 2007 , n o pet. ) (mem. op .)

. We dismiss all a rguments made b y Manning tha t relate to the issue of posses sion of the Property. III. Denying Manning ’ s Motion for New Trial Based on Craddock Was Not a n Abuse of Discretion We next address Manning ’ s complaints rela ted to the trial court’ s denial of a n ew t rial on the iss u e of past due rent and attorney fees. “ We review a trial court ’ s decision to deny a motion for new trial under an abuse [

- ] of

- discretion standard. ” In re Marriage of Lan dry , No. 10

- 13

- 00293

- CV, 20 14 WL 1775501, at *1 (T ex. App.

— Waco Ap r. 1 0, 2014, n o pet
. ) (mem. op.) (citing Waffle House, Inc . v. Williams , 313 S.W.3d 796, 813 (Tex. 2010) )

. “ A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts ‘ “ without reference to any guiding rules or principles ” or , stated10

another way, w hen the trial co urt acts in an arbit r ary and unreasonable manner. ’ ” Id. (q uoti ng City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas C o . , 109 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Te x. 1985) ) ).

“ A trial co urt must set asi de a post

- answ er def a ult judgment when the defendant satisf ies the test articulated in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc

. , 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939 )

. ” Id. “ Under Craddock , the defendant must demonstrate that (1) his failure t o appear
was not int entional o r the r esult of conscious indifference; (2) t here is a meritorious defense; and (3) the granting of a new trial will not operate to cause delay or injury to the opposing party. ” Id. “However, when the defendant did not recei ve actual or con stru ctive noti ce of t rial, he has met the first prong of Cr addoc k , and due process prevents the application of the second and third prongs of the Craddock test.” In re T.J.T

. , 486 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2016 , no pet. ) (quoting Kuykendall v. B ever ly , 436 S .W.3d 8 09, 814 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2014 , no pet. ) ). While we assume that Manning did not receive actual notice of the October 2 hearing, “[a] ctual notice is not the standard for determining wheth er due process had been

a fforded ” because “[d ] ue proc ess req u ires only that the notice given be reasonab ly ca lculated under the circumstances to apprise the party of the trial date. ” Broadway v. Boldes , No. 05

- 00

- 00824

- CV, 2001 WL 1289466, at *2 (Tex. App

. — Dallas Oct. 25, 2001 , n o pet. ) (not des igna ted for publica t io n) (citing Withrow v. Schou , 13 S.W.3d 37 , 40 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied ) ). “ Such notice may be considered constructive notice. ” Id. “[P] arties have a continuing obliga tion under [R] ule 21a of the Texas Rules of C ivil Pro cedure t o keep the court and the other parties appr ised of a correct and current address where11

they may be reached [,] and this obligation cannot be shifted to the court clerk or to an opposing party. ” Id. at *3 (citing Withrow , 13 S.W.3d at 41). “ Te xas c ourts h a ve held that a party that does nothing to p rotec t its due process rights wit h respect to notice of a trial setting should not complain on appeal that those rights have been violated. ” Id. Here, th e record showed that the Property address was the only ma i ling address Manning had provided to the Co unty Court and opposing coun sel. Manning was aware that the case was continued and would be scheduled for a final hearing. Even so, he did n ot update his address w ith the County C ourt or m ake any inquiries about a final setting

. As a result, we decline to fi nd that the County Court abused its discretion in concluding that Manning ’ s “ failure to update [ his ] address in the court ’ s record s or to make inquiries re garding the new tria l se tting d e monstrated that [the] failure to appear at trial

wa s the result of co nscious indifference rather than mistake or accident. ” Id. Also, Rule 57 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states , “ A party not represented by an attorney shal l si gn his pleadings, state his address, telephone number, email ad dress , and, if avai lable , fax number. ” T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 57 (emphasis added). Manning listed the Property address and his email address on pleadings . Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civi l Procedure
state s : (a) Methods of Service

. Every notice requi red by these rules, and ev ery p leading, plea, motion, or other form of request required to be served under Rule 21, other than the citation to be served upon the filing of a cause of action and e xcept as otherw i se expressly provided in these rules, may be served by delivering a cop y to the party to be served, or the party ’ s duly authorized agent or attorney of record in the manner specified below: (1) Documents Filed Electro nically. A docu ment f iled electronic a lly under Rule 21 must be served electronicall y through the electronic filin g manager if the email address of the party or attorney to be served is on file12 with the electronic filing manager. If the email address of t he party or atto rney t o be served is n ot on file with the electronic filing manager, the document may be serv ed on that party or attorney under subparagraph (2). (2) Documents Not Filed Electronically

. A document not filed elec tronically may be served in person, [by] mail, b y co mmercial del i very service, by fax, by email, or by such other mann er as the court in its discretion may direct. T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 21a

. The record shows that Manning ’ s email address was not on file with the electronic filing
manager . As a result , “ R u le 21a allowed t he Notice [of trial setting] to be served by any of the means listed in Ru le 21 a(a)(2), including by mail or by email. ” Brandon v. Rudisel , 586 S.W.3d 94, 102 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2019 , no pet. ) (citing T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 21a(a) ); see Johnson v. H

arris Ct y . , 610 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2020 , no pe t. )

.

“ [ E ] lectronic service is ‘ complete on transmission of the document to the serving party ’ s electronic filing service provider. ’ ” Brandon , 586 S .W.3d at 102 (qu o tin g T EX
. R. C I V
. P

. 21a(b)(3 ) ). The recor d showed that Johnson and Williams’ s counsel an d the c ourt a dministrator emailed the notice of final hearing to Manning ’ s email address listed in his pleadings. At the final hearing, M anning admitte d tha t the email a d dress to which the notice was emailed was his and that he used it during the pertinen t tim e . As a result, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding that Manning received cons tructive notice was an abuse of discretion. See id. ; John son , 610 S.W.3d at 595

– 96.13

IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding t hat the Im posit ion of Attorney Fees W as a Proper Sanction Next, Manning argue s that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fee s as san ctions und er Chapter 10 o f the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code , for several reasons

. 5 We disagree. Manning argue s that the trial court’s order to pay attorney fees as sanctions failed to adequately descri be , with sufficient particularity, the condu ct that the trial c ourt cl aimed was committed . Under the precedent of the Waco Court of Appeals, this iss ue has not been prese rved for review because Manning did not raise it below, even in his timely motio ns for new t rial. Windsor v. Round , 5 91 S.W.3d 654, 673 (T e x . App.

— Waco 2019 , pet. denied). He also complain s that he did not have an opportuni ty to be heard on the issue , bu t the record reflects that Manning was present for the August 7 hearing that consid ered Johnson and W illiams’ s motion f or sanction s , and Manning also presented the issue at the motion for new trial hearing. The only ti mely complaint before the trial cour t on the issue of sanctions was Manning ’ s complaint that they were “ i naccurate, u nreasonable [ , ] and excessi ve. ” “We review the i m p osition of sanctions under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

. . . for an abuse of discretion.” Cox v . Vanderburg , No. 06

- 20

- 00078

- CV, 2021 WL 4055487, at *1 0

5 Although Johnson and Williams filed a Chapter 10 s ancti o ns motion, they argu e that nothing in the record indicates that t he trial court awarded attorney fees on t hat basis. We disagree. Attorne y fees are not generally available in evi ction cases. See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 38.001 (Supp.)

. Under Ch a pter 24 of the Te xas Property Code, a ttorney fees in an evicti on case that are unrelated to Section 24. 0054 motions are only available if, among other things, the landlord’s wri tten demand to vacate the premises or a writ ten lease warns the tenant that th e landlord will se ek attorney fees in suit for fo r cible entry a nd detainer. See T EX
. P ROP
. C ODE A NN
. § 24.006; Tillman v. Lake Pointe Owners Grp., Inc

. , No. 07

- 19

- 00385

- CV, 2020 WL 6253238, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Oct. 22, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. Be c ause attorney fee s were not statutorily authorized, we must pr esume that they were awarded as Chapter 1 0 sanctions.14

(Tex. App.

— Texarkana Se pt. 7, 2021 , pet. f ile d ) ( mem. op.) (quoting Dik e v. Peltier Chevrolet, Inc

. , 343 S.W.3d 179, 183 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (cit ing Low v. Henry , 221 S.W.3d 609, 61 4 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings , 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004)) )

. “ Under this s tandard, courts view the e vidence in the light m o s t favorable to, and indulge every presumption in favor of, the trial court ’ s action.” Id

. (quoting Dike , 343 S.W.3d at 183 ( citing In re Liu , 290 S.W.3d 515, 519 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2009, orig . proceeding )). “An appellate
court m ay reverse the trial c o u rt ’ s ruling only if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, such that its ruling was ar b itrary or unreasonable.” Id

. (quoting Dike , 343 S.W.3d at 183 (quoti ng Low , 221 S.W.3d a t 614 ) ). “A trial court abu ses its disc r e tion in awarding sanctions only if the order is based on an erroneous assessment of the evidence or the law.” Id

. (quoting D ike , 343 S.W.3d at 183 ). “Chapter 10 provides for an award of sanct ions when a party sh ows . . . that the pleading or motion wa s brought for an improper purpose.” Id. (quoting Mobley v. Mobley , 506 S.W.3d 87, 95 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (cit i ng T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 10.001; Low , 221 S.W.3d at 614

– 15 ) ). “ An i mproper purpose includes ‘ to harass or to cause

u n necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. ’ ” Id. (quoting T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 10.001(1) )

. “Chapter 10 specifies that one of the aims for imposition of
sanct ions for t he filing of frivolous or gr oundless p leadings is t o ‘deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.’” Id. (quoting Mobley , 506 S.W.3d at 9 5 (quoting T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 10.004(b)) )

. “We const rue the phr a se ‘imp roper purpose’ as t he equival ent of ‘bad f a ith’ under Rule 13.” Id. (quoting Mobley , 506 S.W.3d at 9515

(quoting Dike , 343 S.W.3d at 183

– 84 ) ). “ Each factual contention must have or be likely to receive evidentiary support after a reasona ble opportun ity for discovery. ” Press ley v. Cas ar , 567 S.W. 3 d 327, 333 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).

“ ‘ [I]mposition of sanctions is just ’ when (1) there is a ‘ direct relationship .

. . betw e en the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed ’ and (2) the sancti ons are not excessive, i.e., ‘ [t]he
pu nishment .

. . fit[s] t h e crime. ’ ” Cox , 2021 WL 4055487, at *1 0 (quoting TransAm

. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell , 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991 ) ). “In d etermining whether sanctions are appropriate, the trial court must ex amine the fa cts available to the litig ant and th e circumstan c e s existing when the litigant filed the pleading.” Id. (quoting Dike , 343 S.W.3d at 184 )

. Typically,

“ [t] he party seeking s a nctions has the burden of showing its right to relief.” Id

. (quoting Dike , 343 S .W.3d at 184 )

. However, t he Waco Co urt of Appea l s has said that , “[i] f the trial court assesses sanctions

. . . and the party upon whom sanctions have been assessed files a m otion for new trial, the party upon whom sanctions have been assesse d has the bur den to show entitlement
to the reque sted relief. ” Beddingfield v. Beddingfield , No. 10

- 15

- 00344

- CV, 2018 WL 6378553, at *19 (Tex. App.

— Waco Dec. 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. o p.) (citing Cocke v. Saks , 776 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Chri sti 1 989, w r it denied ) ). Also, becaus e the tria l court did n o t issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, “ the trial court ’ s judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to suppo r t it. ” Est. of Hines , No. 06

- 20

- 00007

- CV, 2020 WL 5948803, at *5 n.1 4 (Te x. Ap p.

— Texarkana Oct. 8, 2020 , n o pet. ) (m em. op.) (ci t i ng Pharo v. Chambers Cty., Tex

. , 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996) ); Avila v. Lone Star Radiology , 183 S.W.3d 814, 822 (Tex. A p p.

— Waco 2005 , no pet. )

.16

Here, Manning consistently argued that he should not have been charged $1, 075.00 per month in re n t , without presenting any evidence to support his position despite having ample opportunity to do so, including at the August 7 hear i ng when the issue of posses s ion was decided. A review of Manning ’ s pleadings could have led the County Court to con c l ude that he had no meritorious defense to the forcible entry and detainer suit. The County Court here expressly found that Manning viola t ed the j ustice c ourt ’ s order to pay rent of $1,0 7 5.00 per month while the case was pen ding on ap peal. In add i t ion to violating that order, Manning filed several frivolous pleadings, including a motion to dismiss his own suit for want of jurisdiction

. Th e County Court could have found t hat M a nning ’ s recusal motion was groundles s, as was his objectio n to Johnson and Williams ’ s motion for continuance. Manning also filed two interlocutory appeals that were dismissed by the Waco Court of A ppeals for lack of j urisdiction. Johnso n and Wil l iams alleged, and the County Court co uld have f ound, that M anning ’ s motions and arguments were made solely for the purpose of delaying the proceedings and increasing Johnson and Williams’ s costs of litigation . No meritorious defense was rai sed in th e hearing on Manning ’ s timely mot ions for n ew trial. That , c oupled with the written lease, notice of increased rent, and notice to vacate the Property, could have ultimately led the County Court to conclude that the appeal from th e j ustice c ourt was fr iv olous and groundless and that a new tr ial on the issu e of sa n c tions was unwarranted

. As a result, we do not find that the County Court abused its discretion in overruling Manning ’ s motion for new trial complaining of the imposition of sanctions. We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding t hat there was a direct relationship between the filing of groundless and frivolous pleadings made for the purposes of17

delay and increased litigation cost and t he sanction of a ttorney fees ex pended by Johnson and Williams to defe nd those p leadings. As f o r the excessiveness of sanctions, Manning argue s for the first time on appeal that the trial court should have considered a lesser sanction. Because he d id not raise th is com p laint t o the County Count , this issue is unpres erved. Se e Cox , 2021 WL 4 0 5 5487, at *13 (citing T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 33.1; Sanchez v. Fiedler , No. 03

- 14

- 00182

- CV, 2016 WL 4272111, at *9 (Tex. App.

— Austin Aug. 11, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. o p.) ; ( Werley v. Canno n , 344 S.W .3d 527, 535 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2011, no pet.); Akhtar v. Leawoo d HOA, Inc

. , 525 S.W.3d 814, 820

– 21 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet. ) )

. Manning also state s , in a conclusory manner, that the sanction was excessive , b ut he fail ed to m a ke any meaningfu l challenge to the amount of attorney fees award ed at the m o t ion for new trial hearing or on appeal. H e did not challenge th at counsel’s testimony at the final hearing failed to support the amount awarded as atto rney fees. As a resu lt, w e cannot c onclude that the trial court abused it s discreti on in deter m i ning that counsel’s testimony was sufficient to support the sanctions award since “ generally an acknowledgment of the costs and fees incurred as a result of th e sanctionable conduc t is a good
sta rting point.” Kamel v. AdvoCare Int ’ l , L.P

. , No . 05

- 16

- 004 3 3

- CV, 2017 WL 1149669, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Mar. 28, 2017 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (explaining that proof of necessity or reasonable ness of attorney fees under A rthur Andersen & Co. v. Pe r ry Equipm ent Corp

. , 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997) , is n ot require d when f ees are assessed as sanctions) (citing Gorman v. Gorman , 966 S.W.2d 858, 868

– 69 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) ; Low , 221 S.W.3d at 6 20

– 21 )

.18

Because we fi nd no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the attorney fees awarded a s

sanc t i ons, we overrule this point of error. V. Manning Ha s Failed to Brief H is Remaining Arguments Because we have no jurisdiction over possession issues and have alread y affirmed the tria l cour t’s attorney fee award, we next conside r argument s rela t e d to the award of past due rent. In h is last two points of error, Manning lodge s a conclusory com plaint about the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence and arg ue s that the County Court erred by granting a continuance after i t had gran ted a w r it of possession . We find both points inadequately briefed.

“ Initially we must note that pro se litig ants are held to the same standards as licensed
attorn eys and must com ply with all applicable r ules of procedure. ” In re C.N.M

. , No. 10

- 10

- 0017 8

- CV, 2 0 11 WL 1049383, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Waco Mar. 23, 2011, no pet

. ) (mem. op.) (citing Sweed v. City of El Paso , 195 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2006, no pet. ); Strange v. Co nt ’ l Cas. Co

. , 126 S.W.3 d 676, 677 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2004, pet. denied ) ). “ A
pr o se litigant is required to properly present his case on appeal just as he is required to do at the trial court. ” Id. (citing Strange , 126 S.W.3d at 678 )

. “ T his Court has no duty to perform an inde p endent review of the record and applica ble law to deter m i ne whether there was error. ” Id. (citing Strange , 126 S.W.3d at 678 )

. “ Were we to do so, even on behal f of a pro se litigant, we would be forced to stray fr om our role as n eutral adjudicators and b ecome an advocate for that party. ” Id. (citing P lummer v . Reeves , 93 S.W.3d 930, 931 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2003, pet. denied ) (per curiam) ). “ Similarly, we cannot and will no t speculate as to the substance of the19

is sues [an appella nt] urges us to address b ut fails to appropriately include in hi s brief. ” Id. ( c i ting Strange , 126 S.W.3d at 678 )

. “The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure control the required contents and organization for an appellant ’ s brief.” Delta Cty . Appraisal Dist . v. PPF Gin & Warehouse , LLC , 632 S.W.3d 637, 652 (Tex. App.

— Te xarkana 20 21, pe t
. filed ) (quoting Valadez v. Avitia , 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.

— E l Paso 2007, no pet.) ( cit ing T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.1) )

. “ In order to avoid forfeiting a leg al argument for inadequate briefing, an a ppellant ’ s brief must contain ‘ a clear and concis e argu m e nt for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and t he record. ’ ” Id. (quoting T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.1(i) )

. “Failure to cite legal autho rity or provide substantive analysis of t he legal issues presented results in wa iver of th e comp l a int.” Id

. (quoting T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.1(i)). The entire substance of Manning’s le gal and factual sufficiency complaint reads, “ The Courts’ findings of f

act are not legally or factually suffici ent i n that the evidence that was
presen ted were [sic] i n a ccurate and or falsified and the only witness was not even sworn in when he testified. Furth ermore, he was t he plaintiff. Furthermore, his testimony was hea rsay. ” “Bare assertions of error, without ar g ument or authority, waive error.” Petti t v. Tabor , No. 06

- 19

- 00002

- CV, 2020 WL 216025, at *14 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana Jan. 15, 2020 , pet. denied) ( m em. op.) ; see Ken nedy v. Jones , No. 06

- 19

- 00068

- CV, 2020 WL 6202 2, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana Jan. 7, 2020, n o pet. ) (mem. op.) (“B riefing requirement s are not m e t ‘ by merely uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations. ’ ” (quotin g Hollis v. Acclai m Physician Grp., Inc. , No. 02

- 19

- 00062

- CV, 20 19 WL 3334617, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth20

July 25, 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. o p.) ) )

. Thi s rule also applies to complaints about the sufficiency of the evidence. See Coble v. Adams , N o. 01

- 13

- 00562

- CV, 2014 WL 6602480, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] Nov. 20, 2014 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (c i ting Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt , 373 S .W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2011, no pet.) ) ; Martin

Simon v. Womack , 68 S.W.3d 793 , 798 n.5 (Tex. A pp.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)

. Bec ause Manning fail s to provide substantive ana ly sis with appropriate reference to t he record,

w e overrule his legal sufficiency point. We also find that Manning fail ed to provide any relevant auth ority to support his contention that Williams’ s testimony was hearsay or that he was not properl y sworn and overrule those complaints based on th e inadequate briefing. 6 Johnson and Williams also argue that Manning failed to adequat ely brief his point of error related to the trial cou rt’s grant of a continuance. While Manning include s case citations in his ar g ument, h e f

ail s to cite r elevant authority supporting his contention that reversal is warranted because the trial court granted a continu anc e and do es not explain why the issue is not
moot. See Smale v. Williams , No. 06

- 18

- 00055

- CV, 2019 WL 490136, at *4 (T ex. App.

— T exarkana F e b

. 8, 2019 , no pet.) (mem. op.) ; In re Torres , No. 0 3

- 12

- 00156

- CV, 2012 WL 1149301, at *1 (Te x. App.

— Austin Apr. 4, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. He also fail s to address the arguments cited by John son and Williams as to why a continu anc e was nec essary. As a result, we find that the issue is inadequately br iefed, and we decline to address it. See T EX
. R.

6 Even so, we note that sworn testimony averring that a wi tness’s previously unsworn testimony was the truth is sufficient to render t he previously unswor n testimony competent evidence. Stephenson v . Lynch , No. 05

- 99

- 01874

- CV, 2001 WL 1264 03, at *5

– 6 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Feb. 15, 2001, pet

. denied) (not designated fo r publication) ; see Beck v. State , 719 S.W. 2d 205, 213 n.5 (Tex. Crim. Ap p . 1 986) (“ W hen a w itness reaffirms testimony he gave before he was sworn, such testimony becomes compete nt.”).21

A PP
. P. 38.1(h); In re R.F.N

. , No. 10

- 03

- 081

- C V, 2003 WL 23120211, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Waco Dec. 3 1, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). We o ver rule Manning ’ s l a s t two points of error. VII. Conclusion We dismiss all arguments made by Manning th at relate to the issue of possession of the Property fo r want of jurisdiction and affirm the trial court ’ s award s to Johnson and Williams of
pa st due ren t and attor n e y fees

.

Scott E. St evens J ustice Date Submitted: October 4 , 202 1 Date Decided: December 9 , 202 1