P ursua nt to 5 T H C IR . R . 47 .5, th e C ourthas det ermin ed th at this opinionsho uld not * be publishe d and is not precede nt except und er the limit ed c ircu mstance s set forthin5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 .4. The distric t co urt deni ed Harper’s motionto decl are the Motionti melyan d granted 1 Ameri canAirli nes, Inc.’s (“A A”) motionto strike the Motion. AAa r gues th at the distric t co u rt ’so rd erwa s n ota n“ or de r gra n ti n gor de nyin gc la ss- a ctio nc ertifi cati on” u n de r Ru le2 3 (f ). Bec auseHarpe r’s pe titio n was untimely , we don ot r eachthis argu ment. 

### INTHE U NI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 09- 63 Su m m ar y Cal endar

JA M E S D

. H A R P E R , i n di vi du al l y an d on beh al f of hi m sel f an d allot h ers s im ila r ly s itu a te d , P l ai n t i f f –P et i t i on er v. A M E R IC A N A IR L IN E S , IN C ., D efen d a n t–R esp on d en t

Pet i t i on f

or Leave t o Appeal u n d e r F e d

. R

. C iv. P

. 2 3 (f)

B ef ore B E N A V ID E S , P R A D O , an d S O U T H W IC K , C i rcui t Ju dg es . P E R C U R I A M: * Ja m e s D

. H ar pe r pet i t i o ns unde r F e de r alR ul e of Ci vi l Pr o c e dur e 2 3( f

) a nd F ederal R u le o f A p pel l ate Procedu re 5 f or perm i ssi on t o app eal t h e N ort h ern D istr ict o f T e x a s’s d e n ia l of h is m o t io n fo r c la ss ce rtifica tion (th e “M o tion ”). 1 United States Court of A pp eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D Ma rc h 23, 2010 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I Clerk Case: 09-63 Document: 00511059844 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/23/2010N o. 09- 63

Rule s 23 (f) an d 6(a)(1)(B) were a mended effective December1, 200 9 t o pr ovide for a 2 fourt eendaydea dlin e i ncl udin g Satu rday s, Sun day s, an d l eg al holiday s. The old rul es im po se d at end a yd ea dlin e, e xcl u di n gS a tu rd a y s, Su n day s, a n d le g a l h olid a y s. B ecau se Dece m b e r2 5 , 2 0 0 9w a s al e g a lh o l i d a y , th ed e a d l i n ew o u l dh av eb e e nD e c e m b e r3 1 , 20 09 und er the old rul es. Harper argues that b ecau s e t he Supreme Court granted di scretio n, pursua nt to 2 8 U.S.C. § 2074 (a), for courts to applythe new ru les to pe ndin g cases as “j ust a nd practi cab le,” that we shou ld a pplyth e o ld r ule s to his case. Howev er, his argu ment is n ot persua sive . A

simple change in the cal cul atio n of an appell ate deadlineis not a rul e fo r whi ch we must provide a graceperiod for litig ant s to a dju st, an d th e n ew ru les were i n plac e whe n the d i s t r i c tc o u r te nt e r e dit s o r d e ro nD e c e m b e r1 6 , 2 0 0 9
. Th e r e f o r e , iti s “

j u s tan d pr a ctic ab le” toa pp lyth e n ewru le s. See Unit ed In dus ., I nc. v. S imon-Hart ley, L td

. , 91 F .3d 762 , 766 n.8 (5thC ir. 1 996) (fin ding app licationof new rule s j ust a nd practi cab le where ther e wa s n o le gitim a ter ea so nf ora pp lyin gth e ol d ru le s)

.

2 Bec aus e H ar pe r f

i l e d hi s pet i t i o n af

t e r R ul e 2 3( f

) ’ s f o ur t e e n da y de ad l i ne pa s s e d,
w e d is m is s . R u l e 23(f

) provi des t h at w e m ay p erm i t an app eal on ly “if a p et i t i on f or perm i ssi on t o ap pea l i s f i l ed w i t h t h e ci rcui t cl erk w i t h i n 14 da ys af t er t h e order i s e nt e r e d. ” W he n ca l c ul at i ng t he de ad l i ne , w e m us t “ c o unt e ve r y da y, i nc l udi ng i nt er m edi at e Sat urdays , Su ndays, and l egal hol i days

. ” F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 6( a) ( 1 ) ( B)

. Th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r o n De c e m b e r 1 6 , 2 0 0 9 a nd

2 H ar per ’ s p eti ti on w as f i l ed w i t h t he c i r c ui t c l er k on D ec em ber 31, 2009. Th er ef or e, H ar per ’ s pet i t i on w as unt i m el y. W e ha ve p rev i ou sly h eld t h a t R u l e 2 3 (f )’ s d ea d l i n e for f

i l i n g a pe ti ti on to p e r m it a p p e a l is ju r is d ic tio n a l. McNam ara v. F el d erhof

, 410 F. 3d 277, 279–80 (5 t h C ir . 2 0 0 5 ). A s n o t e d b y o t h e r c ir c u i t s , h o w e v e r , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ’s d e c i s i o n i n E b erh art v. Un i t ed S t ate s , 5 46 U

. S. 1 2 ( 20 05 ) “ c as t s do ubt o n t he
n o tio n th a t t h e tim e lin e s s o f n o tic e s o f a p p e a l g e n e r a lly is ju r is d ic tio n a l.” Car pe nt e rv . Boe i ng , 4 5 6 F .3d 1 1 8 3 , 1 1 9 0 n .1 ( 1 0 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ) ( cita tion s o m itted );
see al so Coc o v . I

nc o r po r at e d Vi l l ag e o f Bel l e Te r r e , New Y ork , 448 F. 3d 490, Case: 09-63 Document: 00511059844 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/23/2010N o. 09- 63

3 491–92 ( 2d C i r . 2006) ( per c uri am ) ( di sc uss i ng E berha rt ’ s e f fe c t o n whet he r t he tim e lin e s s o f a p e tit io n u n d e r R u le 2 3 (f) is ju r is d ic tio n a l). H ow ever, it is abu n da n t l y cl ear t h at w h et h er or not t h e t i m el i n ess req u i rem en t i s j u ri sd i cti on a l , i t is “stri ct a n d m a n d a tory
. ” G u t i err ez v. Joh n son & Joh n son , 523 F. 3d 187, 192 ( 3d C i r . 2008) ( c i t i ng Je nki ns v. B e l l Sout h Cor p. , 4 9 1 F .3 d 1 2 8 8 , 1 2 9 0 (1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 7 )); see al so C oco , 4 48 F. 3d a t 4 91 –9 2 ( f i ndi ng th a t if R u le 2 3 (f) “ is a cla im -p r o c e s s in g ru le , it is q u ite cle a r ly a n ‘ in fle x ib le one’ ” )

. W e cannot al t er the r ul es si m pl y bec ause H ar per m i ss ed t he dea dl i ne by
o n e d a y o r d i d n o t r e a l i z e t h a t t h e n e w r u l e s h a d t a k e n e f fe c t
. Ac c o r d i n g l y , we di s m i s s H ar pe r ’ s pe t i t i o n. DI S M I S S ED

. Case: 09-63 Document: 00511059844 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/23/2010