[Cite as State v. Chafin, 2019-Ohio-5306.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsJASON CHAFIN 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2019 CA 00014 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Fairfield County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

2018CR377 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 20, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

KYLE WITT ANDREW SANDERSON 

Fairfield County Prosecutor Burkett & Sanderson, Inc. 

239 West Main Street, Ste. 101 738 East Main Street 

Lancaster, OH 43130 Lancaster, OH 43130 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 2 

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jason Chafin [“Chafin”] appeals his conviction and 

sentence after a bench trial in the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} On June 10, 2018, 15-year-old L.L. went to work in the morning at a 

Lancaster, Ohio restaurant. L.L. had a disagreement with her supervisor and left work. 

L.L. could not reach her family and had no ride home. As L.L. walked home a Jimmy 

John’s delivery driver, whom she did not know, offered her a ride. The delivery driver, 

Chafin, told L.L. he had to make a delivery prior to dropping her off near her home. L.L. 

agreed and got into Chafin’s red Honda automobile. 

{¶3} As Chafin and L.L. rode toward the delivery drop off, Chafin told her his 

name was Jason, asked how old she was, and inquired if anyone knew that she was 

walking home alone. After making the delivery in the Dominion Homes subdivision, L.L. 

recognized that Chafin was driving in the opposite direction from which they had entered 

the subdivision. L.L. became fearful. After Chafin pulled away from the delivery location 

and the car was in motion, Chafin asked L.L. if she "liked to flirt.” Chafin told L.L. that she 

was pretty. After telling L.L. she was pretty, Chafin firmly grasped L.L.'s hand causing 

her to jerk her hand away to break his grip. (1T. at 103-1051). L. L. demanded that Chafin 

stop and pulled her hand away from his hand. (1T. 102, 106). When Chafin made no 

attempt to stop, L.L. jumped from the car. (1T. 106, 107). L.L. suffered scratches to the 

palms of her hand when she caught herself after the jump. L.L. testified that the car never 

slowed down even after she jumped from the car. (1T. 114). In fact, L.L. testified that the 

 1 For clarity the Bench Trial that took place on March 11 and 12, 2019 will be referred to by Volume 

and page number as “1T.” or “2T.” 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 3 

car sped off after she had jumped. (1T. at 115). L.L. recalled that she had observed a 

car seat, stickers and items affiliated with Jimmy John’s on Chafin and displayed on the 

car. (1T. 114). 

{¶4} Tracy Wentz, a resident of a subdivision built by Dominion Homes known 

as "River Valley Highlands,” had contact with a neighbor of hers that is hard of hearing. 

The neighbor brought L.L. over to Wentz's residence due to the communication 

difficulties. Wentz observed that L.L. had been sobbing and was breathing heavily. L.L. 

explained she had taken a ride from a delivery driver who had offered to give her a ride 

home. Instead, during a delivery in Wentz's neighborhood, the driver had touched L.L. 

and said things to her that caused L.L. to flee his car. Wentz sat with L.L. on her porch 

until L.L.'s father arrived to pick her up. 

{¶5} L.L.'s father, C. S. arrived at Wentz's home. Earlier that day C.S. had 

dropped L.L. off to work in the morning. When C.S. picked up L.L., he learned that a male 

Jimmy John’s delivery driver had scared his daughter and she jumped from the car. C.S. 

immediately drove to the Jimmy John’s location where he asked about the delivery driver 

and waited in front of the store. C.S., who is a large man, admitted he was angry but 

never saw any male delivery driver pulled into the location while he waited for police. The 

demeanor of C.S. caused the employees of Jimmy John’s to call 9-1-1. 

{¶6} Breanna Richardson was the Jimmy John’s assistant manager on duty on 

June 10, 2018 and was working with Chafin. Richardson encountered C.S. who arrived 

at the store and made a threat to the delivery driver in the red car. Richardson called 

both Lori Wood and Chafin after C.S. arrived. Lori Wood is Chafin’s mother. Jimmy 

John’s also employed her on the date of the incident. Richardson told Chafin to park out 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 4 

back when he arrived and to call her so she could let him in the back of the Jimmy John’s. 

Chafin inquired what was wrong and Richardson told him, "Don't worry about it.” 

Richardson also called Wood and told her to come in to work early as she would need a 

driver and that the problem had something to do with Chafin. Richardson did not recall 

telling Wood any details regarding the allegations in her phone call to Wood. Richardson 

did not tell Chafin to remove or alter his Jimmy John’s work uniform or to park his car in 

a different location. 

{¶7} Valerie Gould was the general manager of the Jimmy John’s restaurant and 

was involved in the process of hiring Chafin. During the hiring process, Gould ensured 

that Chafin knew he must wear Jimmy John’s approved hat and shirt during working hours 

and that his delivery vehicle was required to display the Jimmy John’s sign. The Jimmy 

John’s driver policy banned drivers from picking up any passenger. Gould confirmed that 

Jimmy John’s employs an order tracking system and that during the shift of Chafin on 

June 10, 2018 he made two separate deliveries to a location of 2602 Two Ridge Avenue 

in the Dominion Homes subdivision. Gould explained that Chafin remained employed 

with Jimmy John’s after June 10, 2018 and had explained the situation to her as a 

"misunderstanding." 

{¶8} Lori Wood, Chafin’s mother, confirmed that she had received a phone call 

from Richardson on June 10, 2018. Wood confirmed she, her son Chafin, and a daughter 

were all employed at Jimmy John’s. Wood also confirmed that on the date of alleged 

offense Chafin had told her not to worry because he had, "done nothing wrong.” (1T. 

208). Wood was also questioned if she had any later conversations with her son about 

the events during a recorded call with Detective Underwood. Specifically, within the call 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 5 

Wood reported Chafin told her, "He said he had offered her a ride. He told her that he 

had to make a delivery. She said that was fine. He made his deliver. He was on his way 

out of the housing complex and she said she didn't feel comfortable. And he said to give 

him a minute. He was pulling over to let her out and she tried to get out. And he didn't 

want her to get hurt, so he tried to stop her from jumping out right before he stopped. And 

she got out and he came back — he went on about his — went back to the store, got his 

delivery. He made his delivery to the mall, and then I called him and stopped him from 

going to Crestview.” (1T. 223-224). Although the context of the question from Detective 

Underwood was, "Did you talk with Jason again?” Wood asserted at trial she had 

received some of the information from another son, Kelly, who is a Morgan County 

Sherriff’s deputy. (1T. at 243). 

{¶9} On June 10, 2018 at approximately 12:21 p.m., Officer David Thompson of 

the Lancaster Police Department responded to a dispatch for the Jimmy John’s restaurant 

at 1804 Memorial Drive. He contacted L.L. and her father outside in front of the store. 

Officer Thompson learned that L.L. was alleging something had occurred between her 

and a male Jimmy John’s delivery driver. Officer Thompson observed that L.L. was visibly 

shaken and had a slight injury to her hand. Officer Thompson entered the Jimmy John's 

storefront looking for a male employee but seeing no males made contact with two female 

employees. Officer Thompson learned that C.S. had previously entered the Jimmy John’s 

and as a result, the female employees had called the male delivery driver on duty to return 

to the store. 

{¶10} When back up officers arrived, Officer Thompson walked behind the store 

to see if he could locate the delivery vehicle described; but did not see the vehicle. Officer 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 6 

Thompson later found that the male delivery driver, Chafin, had returned and contacted 

him in the rear Jimmy John’s parking lot. Upon Officer Thompson's initial contact, Chafin 

was found sitting in a black Jeep not fitting the description of the delivery vehicle and not 

wearing any clothing identifying him as a Jimmy John’s employee. 

{¶11} Officer Thompson later located Chafin's red Honda Civic parked in the back 

lot of a Burger King restaurant in close proximity to the Jimmy John’s restaurant. 

Thompson noted numerous things about the interior of the red Civic that matched the 

description of the vehicle given by L.L. such as a distinctive sticker and a baby seat. 

Although Officer Thompson did not initially know of any familial connections at the Jimmy 

John’s, he was able to later determine that Chafin's mother and sister were also employed 

at Jimmy John’s and had spoken with Chafin as he sat in the black Jeep behind Jimmy 

John’s. Officer Thompson would later arrange to have the red Honda Civic towed and 

was surprised to find that the red Honda had been moved from behind the nearby Burger 

King to the back lot of Jimmy John’s. Chafin's mother, Lori Wood had possession of the 

car keys. Police had not requested that anyone move the vehicle. The red Honda was 

impounded with all contents left inside. Officer Thompson additionally canvassed nearby 

locations of other potential witnesses and obtained the morning delivery receipts made 

from Jimmy John’s. 

{¶12} After the police identified Chafin as the delivery driver, he remained with 

Officer Andrew Bennett, the second officer responding to the scene. Officer Bennett 

learned from Jimmy John’s staff that Chafin was sitting in the parking lot behind the 

restaurant. Officer Bennett was wearing an AXON body camera that captured much of 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 7 

his conversation and interaction with Chafin. (1T. 296). Officer Bennett’s interactions 

with Chafin were played during trial and made part of the record as State's Exhibit 11. 

{¶13} During the video clip, Chafin can be observed sitting in a black Jeep and is 

wearing nothing identifying him as a Jimmy John’s delivery driver. Chafin, who appears 

upset and agitated, states several times that he had not picked up anyone in his delivery 

car that day. Specifically, Chafin makes statements on the video such as: "I don't know 

this person"; "I've never met this person."; 'Nothing happened."; "I will be countersuing."; 

"It's one word against another. I've prosecuted several cases myself"; "There is no 

evidence.” and, "There's no way to prove it. It's one against another." 

{¶14} At around eight minutes into the video clip, Chafin's mother, Lori Wood 

approaches Chafin and Officer Bennett. Wood inquires of Officer Bennett if the witness 

(L.L.) has identified Chafin or his car. Officer Bennett responds he does not have that 

level of information, to which, Chafin responds, "Nothing happened." 

{¶15} Chafin never suggests that LL. was ever inside his vehicle. The closest 

Chafin came to acknowledging he gave anyone a ride on June 10, 2018 is in the form of 

a hypothetical he poses to Officer Bennett. Chafin asks, "Hypothetically, say I did give 

her a ride it's still one person's word against another. There is no proof of anything that 

happened so it's just going to get laughed the (expletive) out of court." 

{¶16} Detective Bryan Underwood was the assigned follow-up detective for the 

Chafin investigation. At the time for trial, he had been promoted to a sergeant's position. 

(2T. 314). In addition to directing other investigative activities, Underwood checked 

businesses near the subdivision for surveillance video. Underwood had been on the 

scene at the Jimmy John’s restaurant on June 10, 2018 and had observed Chafin's Jimmy 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 8 

John’s work clothing inside the red Civic. (2T. 322) (Exhibits 2A - 21). Detective 

Underwood noted in his brief conversation with Chafin at the Jimmy John’s location on 

June 10, 2018, Chafin asserted nothing had occurred. (2T. 324-325). Chafin later made 

an utterance that he did not believe it to be against the law to give someone a ride. 

Detective Underwood had Chafin photographed in the clothing he was found to be 

wearing upon his initial officer contact. (2T. 328-329). Detective Underwood also met 

with L.L. at the Lancaster Police station and photographed injuries on her hands. Several 

days later L.L. would accompany Detective Underwood and the two would re-trace the 

route L.L. asserted Chafin had taken inside the subdivision. (2T. 334,335). L.L. was able 

to locate the point in the subdivision where she jumped from the car near two large rocks. 

(2T. 345). 

{¶17} Detective Underwood estimated the point where L.L. had left the vehicle to 

be approximately 100 feet past the last stop sign. (2T. 347). Detective Underwood further 

noted that no exits existed at the back (North) side of the neighborhood, which was the 

direction that Chafin was traveling when L.L. jumped out. (2T. 353,354). However, the 

following exchange occurred during the bench trial, 

THE COURT: Okay. And then another follow-up question. 

Can you exit onto Columbus Street by turning left there on 

Winterbrook, as the Defendant has claimed to have done? 

SERGEANT UNDERWOOD: You can; however, you must go -- you 

must travel northbound onto Winterbrook Street clear to the very back of 

the complex and then make a right. And, Your Honor, I do not have a 

roadway name for you. But then that would continue on around to bring you 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 9 

back around. There's a large circle. I think it's Green Meadows. That's the 

large kind of circle that if you go around it, it'll weave back out. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

2T. at 347-348. 

{¶18} At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court convicted Chafin of the 

lesser-included offense of Attempted Abduction in violation of R.C. 2923.02(A), a felony 

of the fourth degree. The court found the evidence supported that Chafin had taken a 

substantial step in committing the offense of Abduction. 

{¶19} On April 1, 2019, Chafin was sentenced to five-year term of community 

control sanctions with a local sanction of 60 days to be served in the county jail. The trial 

court reserved an 18-month prison term in the event Chafin committed a violation 

sufficient for the trial court to impose a prison term. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶20} Chafin raises one Assignment of Error, 

{¶21} “I. THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS 

OBTAINED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEING PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH 

EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE IN QUESTION.” 

Law and Analysis 

{¶22} In his sole assignment of error, Chafin argues there is simply no evidence 

that Chafin, at any time, exerted any force over L.L. or in any way threatened her in order 

to restrain her liberty. [Appellant’s Brief at 6]. 

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 10 

Sufficiency of the Evidence. 

{¶23} The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, in 

conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of 

a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 

U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616, 

621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). The test for the sufficiency of the evidence involves a 

question of law for resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409, 

2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶30. “This naturally entails a review of the elements 

of the charged offense and a review of the state's evidence.” State v. Richardson, 150 

Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶13. 

{¶24} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not 

ask whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 

N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus: Walker, at ¶30. “The relevant inquiry 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney, 153 Ohio 

St.3d 474, 2018-Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶19. Thus, “on review for evidentiary sufficiency 

we do not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations; rather, we ask whether, ‘if 

believed, [the evidence] would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001), 

quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus (emphasis added); Walker at ¶31. We 

will not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless ‘reasonable minds could 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 11 

not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 

70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 

430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997); State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶74. 

ISSUE FOR APPEAL 

{¶25} A. Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of Chafin's guilt 

on each element of the crime of Attempted Abduction beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶26} Chafin was conviction of attempted abduction. R.C. 2905.02, Abduction, 

states, 

(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly do any of 

the following: 

(1) By force or threat, remove another from the place where the other 

person is found; 

(2) By force or threat, restrain the liberty of another person under 

circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the victim or place the 

other person in fear; 

(3) Hold another in a condition of involuntary servitude. 

(B) No person, with a sexual motivation, shall violate division (A) of 

this section. 

{¶27} R.C. 2093.02 defines “Attempt” as follows, 

(A) No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or 

knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 12 

engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the 

offense. 

(B) It is no defense to a charge under this section that, in retrospect, 

commission of the offense that was the object of the attempt was either 

factually or legally impossible under the attendant circumstances, if that 

offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been 

as the actor believed them to be. 

(C) No person who is convicted of committing a specific offense, of 

complicity in the commission of an offense, or of conspiracy to commit an 

offense shall be convicted of an attempt to commit the same offense in 

violation of this section. 

(D) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the 

actor abandoned the actor's effort to commit the offense or otherwise 

prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete 

and voluntary renunciation of the actor's criminal purpose. 

{¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a criminal attempt occurs when the 

offender commits an act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of an 

offense. State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d 127, 357 N.E.2d 1059(1976), paragraph one of 

the syllabus, overruled in part by State v. Downs (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 

1140; See also, State v. Ashbrook, 5th Dist. No.2004-CA-00109, 2005-Ohio-740, 

reversed on other grounds and remanded for re-sentencing pursuant to State v. Foster, 

109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856; In re: Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 

Ohio St.3d 313, 2006-Ohio-2109. In defining substantial step, the Woods’ Court indicated 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 13 

that the act need not be the last proximate act prior to the commission of the offense. 

Woods at 131-32, 357 N.E.2d 1059. However, the act "must be strongly corroborative of 

the actor's criminal purpose.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. This test “properly 

directs attention to overt acts of the defendant which convincingly demonstrate a firm 

purpose to commit a crime, while allowing police intervention, based upon observation of 

such incriminating conduct, in order to prevent the crime when the criminal intent 

becomes apparent.” Woods at 132, 357 N.E.2d at 1063. In other words, a substantive 

crime would have been committed had it not been interrupted. 

{¶29} R.C. 2923.02(D) provides that: "[i]t is an affirmative defense to a charge 

under this section that the actor abandoned his effort to commit the offense or otherwise 

prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary 

renunciation of his criminal purpose." However, the abandonment must be "complete" 

and "voluntary" in order to exculpate a defendant. Where one abandons an attempted 

crime because he fears detection or realizes that he cannot complete the crime, the 

"abandonment" is neither "complete" nor "voluntary.” Woods, at 48 Ohio St. 2d at 133. 

{¶30} Precisely what conduct will be held to be a substantial step must be 

determined by evaluating the facts and circumstances of each particular case. State v. 

Group, 98 Ohio St.3d 248, 262, 2002-Ohio-7247 at ¶100, 781 N.E.2d 980, 996. 

{¶31} The intent with which an act is committed may be inferred from the act itself 

and the surrounding circumstances, including acts and statements of a defendant. State 

v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60, 1995-Ohio-168, 656 N.E.2d 623, 634; State v. Wallen, 

21 Ohio App.2d 27, 34, 254 N.E.2d 716, 72 (5th. Dist. 1969). 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 14 

{¶32} If there is any substantial evidence to support the decision of the trial court, 

we must affirm such decision. In re Tilton, 161 Ohio St. 571, 577, 120 N.E.2d 445 (1954). 

We are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, even if we were 

disposed to do so. Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 14, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952). 

{¶33} In finding Chafin had commit a substantial step toward the commission of 

the crime of abducting, the trial court noted as follows, 

So you've got these comments. The Defendant has this 

impressionable 15-year old. Holly smokes, when you look at the personality 

of the 15-year old, she is extremely backward, extremely backward, 

extremely impressionable, and extremely vulnerable. She is socially 

awkward. And for a person to make advances on someone like that makes 

him even more so of a predator type. 

The other thing that the Court sees is that the Defendant could have 

easily left Two Ridge after his delivery and made a right-hand turn. As I look 

at State's Exhibit 15, he could have turned east on Two Ridge. And instead 

of going north at the very next turn, he could have gone south, which would 

have taken him into a central loop for direct exit onto North Columbus 

Street. And as a pizza delivery person that's been engaged -- or subs, 

delivery of subs for the last four months, he should have strong knowledge 

of this particular area. Instead, he turned left instead of right, and this took 

him even further away from taking this victim back to where she wanted to 

go. 

* * * 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 15 

This Court is going to find an attempt to commit abduction under the 

circumstances. The Court believes that there was a substantial act in 

furtherance of an abduction. 

The substantiality of the act is confirmed by the Defendant -- sorry -

- the complaining witness' young age, her vulnerability, the Defendant's 

advances, verbal advances upon the 15-year old, the fact that he was 

moving in a direction going against her desired direction. 

The complaining witness had given him the privilege only to deliver 

this one take-out order, delivery order, and the Defendant, by going in the 

wrong direction and by making an advance, both verbally and even 

physically by attempting to touch the complaining witness' hand, that this 

was an attempt to abduct. 

So the Court is finding that the Defendant, in Fairfield County, on or 

about June 10th, 2018, going beyond the privilege that was afforded him, 

did attempt, by force or threat -- mostly by force -- to restrain the liberty of 

[L.L.], under circumstances that did create a risk of physical harm to her. 

She felt that she needed to jump out of a moving vehicle. He injured her 

left hand. And this also caused her to be in fear that something bad was 

coming around the corner. She was leaving the vehicle in order to minimize 

the potentialities of evil that might be forthcoming. 

2T. at 426-429. 

{¶34} In a case involving the element of “force” with respect to the crime of 

robbery, this Court has observed, 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 16 

The use of force element is satisfied “if the fear of the alleged victim 

was of such a nature as in reason and common experience is likely to 

induce a person to part with property against his will and temporarily 

suspend his power to exercise his will by virtue of the influence of the terror 

impressed.” State v. Davis (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 91, 451 N.E.2d 772. The 

test for force is objective and relies on the totality of the circumstances. 

State v. Habtemariam (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 425, 659 N.E.2d 850. A 

victim’s fear of harm must be objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances. State v. Bush (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 146, 694 N.E.2d 

984 

{¶35} After review of the record in this case as set forth above, and viewing the 

totality of the circumstances, we find that the evidence supports a finding under the 

objective test that L.L.’s fear of harm was objectively reasonable. 

{¶36} Viewing the evidence in the case at bar in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Chafin had committed the crime of Attempted Abduction. 

{¶37} We hold, therefore, that the state met its burden of production regarding 

each element of the crime of Attempted Abduction and, accordingly, there was sufficient 

evidence to support Chafin’s conviction. 

{¶38} Chafin’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00014 17 

{¶39} The judgment of the Fairfield Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Hoffman, J., and 

Delaney, J., concur