## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TE XAS

N O

. P D

- 0 4 9 5

- 1 1

N A R A D A H I C K S

, A p p e l l a n t

v

.

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E F O U R T E E N T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

H A R R I S C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e u n a n i m o u s C o u r t

.

O P I N I O N

A p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h i n t e n t i o n a l o r k n o w i n g a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t a f t e r h e a n d

A n g e l o J a c k s o n g o t i n t o a f i g h t o v e r b o r r o w e d s h o e s t h a t e n d e d w i t h A n g e l o b e i n g s h o t i n

t h e l e g

. T h e t r i a l j u d g e i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y o n i n t e n t i o n a l o r k n o w i n g a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

, a s

c h a r g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t

, a n d h e a l s o g a v e a s e p a r a t e i n s t r u c t i o n f o r r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d

a s s a u l t

. T h e j u r y c o n v i c t e d a p p e l l a n t o f r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

h e l d t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e e r r e d i n g i v i n g a n y i n s t r u c t i o n o n r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l tHicks Pag e 2

b e c a u s e ( 1 ) t h e o r i g i n a l i n d i c t m e n t d i d n o t c h a r g e a r e c k l e s s s t a t e o f m i n d

, a n d ( 2 ) r e c k l e s s

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i s n o t a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

. 1

W e g r a n t e d r e v i e w t o r e s o l v e a c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o n w h e t h e r

“ r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t ” i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l o r k n o w i n g

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

. A p p l y i n g t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9 a n d a d h e r i n g t o o u r 2

o p i n i o n i n R o c h a v

. S t a t e

, w e c o n c l u d e t h a t i t i s

. T h e r e f o r e

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t e r r b y 3

i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y o n r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t a s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e

.

I

.

A p p e l l a n t a n d A n g e l o J a c k s o n

, b o t h f r o m N e w O r l e a n s

, m e t i n 2 0 0 5 w h e n t h e y

a t t e n d e d h i g h s c h o o l i n H o u s t o n a f t e r H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a

. T h e t w o b e c a m e f r i e n d s i n 2 0 0 7

w h e n A n g e l o h e l p e d a p p e l l a n t g e t a j o b a t P i z z a H u t

. I n N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 7

, A n g e l o b o r r o w e d

Hicks v . State , __ S.W .3d __, 2011 WL 723507, *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [14 Dist.] 1 t h

2011).

The State a sks,

2

Does the F ourtee nth Court of Appea ls’ deter mination that the offense of ag g rava ted

assault committed by

rec kless conduct is not a lesse r included of fense of the off

ense of

ag g rava ted assault committed by intentional or knowing conduct r un afoul of the plain

lang uag e of A rticle 37.09 a nd the spirit of Grey

v. State , 298 S.W .3d 644 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009).

We also g rante d appellant’ s petition for revie w to decide , if rec kless ag g rava ted assault is

not a lesser -included of

fense , whether

the prope r re medy

is acquittal or re mand for a new tria l.

Be cause of our disposition of the State’s g round for revie w, we ne ed not re ach a ppellant’s cla im,

and we dismiss his petition.

648 S.W .2d 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on re h’g ). 3Hicks Pag e 3

a p a i r o f h i g h

- t o p P r a d a s h o e s f r o m a p p e l l a n t

. 4

A n g e l o t o l d a p p e l l a n t h e w a s g o i n g t o N e w O r l e a n s f o r t h e w e e k e n d a n d g a v e

a p p e l l a n t $ 3 0 f

o r t h e u s e o f t h e s h o e s

. W h i l e A n g e l o w a s i n N e w O r l e a n s

, h i s c a r b r o k e

d o w n

, a n d h e c o u l d n ’ t r e t u r n t o H o u s t o n

. T h r e e m o n t h s l a t e r

, A n g e l o e n l i s t e d i n t h e A r m y

.

A f t e r f i n i s h i n g h i s b a s i c t r a i n i n g

, A n g e l o r e t u r n e d t o H o u s t o n t o v i s i t h i s m o t h e r

.

W h e n h e s t o p p e d h i s c a r a t a s t o p l i g h t i n H o u s t o n o n e d a y

, A n g e l o s a w a p p e l l a n t

s i t t i n g i n a c a r n e x t t o h i m

. T h e y t a l k e d b r i e f l y

, b u t c o r d i a l l y

, a b o u t t h e P r a d a s h o e s

.

A p p e l l a n t s a i d t h a t h e w a n t e d h i s s h o e s b a c k o r w a n t e d t o b e p a i d f o r t h e m

. T h e y a g r e e d t o

m e e t l a t e r i n a W a l

- M a r t p a r k i n g l o t

. A n g e l o d r o v e t o t h e p a r k i n g l o t w i t h h i s f i a n c é e

,

T r o y l y n

. A p p e l l a n t a r r i v e d s o o n a f t e r

. H e w a l k e d u p t o A n g e l o ’ s c a r a n d t a p p e d o n t h e

w i n d o w

. A n g e l o r o l l e d t h e w i n d o w d o w n a n d h a n d e d a p p e l l a n t $ 1 0 0

. A p p e l l a n t t o l d

A n g e l o t o g e t o u t o f t h e c a r

, a n d t h e t w o m e n w a l k e d t o t h e b a c k o f A n g e l o ’ s c a r

.

A p p e l l a n t s a i d t h a t h e w a n t e d m o r e m o n e y a n d p u l l e d o u t a g u n f r o m h i s w a i s t b a n d

. 5

A n g e l o t h o u g h t a p p e l l a n t w a s g o i n g t o r o b h i m

, s o h e r u s h e d f o r w a r d a n d g r a b b e d

a p p e l l a n t ’ s h a n d

. T h e t w o m e n s t r u g g l e d f o r c o n t r o l o f t h e g u n

. T r o y l y n t h e n g o t o u t o f

A n g e l o ’ s c a r t o s e e w h a t w a s g o i n g o n

. A p p e l l a n t p o i n t e d t h e g u n t o w a r d T r o y l y n

, a n d

A n g e l o y e l l e d a t h e r t o g e t b a c k i n t o t h e c a r

. S h e d i d

. T h e t w o m e n c o n t i n u e d t o “ t u s s l e ”

Appellant testified that the shoe s were a g radua tion gift a nd wer e purc hased “ for like 4

[$] 350 with tax ” while Ang elo testified that they had bee n purcha sed online for $150.

Appellant testified that “ the dea l” was f or $200 and tha t Ang elo g ave him only $80. 5

Ang elo testified that “the deal” was for $100 and that he g ave a

ppellant that amount.Hicks Pag e 4

o n t h e g r o u n d

, s t r u g g l i n g f o r c o n t r o l o f t h e p i s t o l

. A n g e l o s a i d t h a t “ a s I w a s s t i l l t u s s l i n g

f o r t h e g u n

, t h e b a r r e l l a n d e d o n m y k n e e

. T h a t ’ s w h e n h e p u l l e d t h e t r i g g e r

. I l e t h i m g o

. ”

A n g e l o s a i d t h a t a p p e l l a n t t h e n s t o o d o v e r h i m

, p o i n t i n g t h e p i s t o l a t A n g e l o ’ s c h e s t

.

A n g e l o c r i e d

, “ N o

, n o

, d o n ’ t

, p l e a b a r g a i n i n g

. . . t e l l i n g h i m n o t t o s h o o t m e

. H e t e l l s m e :

G i v e m e w h a t y o u g o t

. ” A n g e l o g a v e a p p e l l a n t h i s c h a i n a n d w a t c h

, a n d h e p r o m i s e d n o t

t o s a y a n y t h i n g

. A p p e l l a n t r a n o f f w h i l e T r o y l y n c a l l e d 9 1 1

.

A p p e l l a n t ’ s t e s t i m o n y m a t c h e d m o s t o f A n g e l o ’ s

, e x c e p t t h a t a p p e l l a n t c l a i m e d t h a t

i t w a s A n g e l o w h o b r o u g h t t h e g u n a n d t h a t i t w a s A n g e l o w h o t h r e a t e n e d a p p e l l a n t

. A f t e r

t h e g u n a c c i d e n t a l l y “ w e n t o f f ” d u r i n g t h e s t r u g g l e

, A n g e l o t o l d a p p e l l a n t n o t t o c a l l t h e

p o l i c e a n d t o j u s t l e a v e

, s o a p p e l l a n t l e f t t h e s c e n e

. S e v e r a l d a y s l a t e r

, h e t u r n e d h i m s e l f i n

t o t h e p o l i c e

.

A t t h e j u r y

- c h a r g e c o n f

e r e n c e

, t h e j u d g e a d d e d a p a r a g r a p h i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y o n t h e

l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e o f r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

. A p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d o n t h e 6

The jury char g e g iven by

the trial judg e is as follows: 6

Now, if y ou find from the e vidence bey ond a re asonable doubt that in Harris

County , Texas, on or about the 23rd da y of Aug ust, 2008, the defe ndant, Nar ada

Hicks, did then and the re unla wfully , intentionally

or knowing ly

cause bodily

injury to Ang elo J ackson by

using a deadly wea pon, namely , a fire arm, then y ou

will find the defe ndant g uilty of ag g rava ted assault intentionally or knowing ly

causing bodily

injury , as cha

rg ed in the indictment.

Unless y ou so find from the e vidence bey ond a re asonable doubt, or if y ou have a

rea sonable doubt there of, or if y ou are unable to ag ree

, y ou will nex t consider

whether the def endant is g uilty

of the lesse r off

ense of ag g rava ted assaultrec klessly causing bodily

injury

.

There fore , if y ou find from the e vidence bey ond a re asonable doubt that on or

about the 23 day

of Aug ust, 2008, in Harris County , Texas, the defe ndant, rd

Nar ada H icks, did then and ther e unlawf ully , rec klessly

cause bodily

injury toHicks Pag e 5

g r o u n d s t h a t t h e i n d i c t m e n t d i d n o t s p e c i f y a r e c k l e s s c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e

. T h e t r i a l j u d g e

o v e r r u l e d t h e o b

j e c t i o n

, a n d t h e j u r y c o n v i c t e d a p p e l l a n t o f r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

.

O n d i r e c t a p p e a l

, a p p e l l a n t c l a i m e d t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e e r r e d i n s u b m i t t i n g t h e j u r y

i n s t r u c t i o n o n r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a g r e e d

, h o l d i n g t h a t r e c k l e s s

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t w a s n o t a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e

, a n d i t r e m a n d e d t h e c a s e f o r a n e w

t r i a l

. W e g r a n t e d r e v i e w o f t h i s c a s e b e c a u s e t h e l o w e r c o u r t ’ s h o l d i n g c o n f l i c t s w i t h o u r 7

o p i n i o n i n R o c h a a n d w i t h t w o u n p u b l i s h e d o p i n i o n s b y t h e F o r t W o r t h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s

,

w h i c h h e l d t h a t r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l o r

k n o w i n g a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

. 8

I I

.

A t r i a l j u d g e m a y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y o n a n y l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h t h e r e i s

s o m e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d t o r a t i o n a l l y c o n v i c t t h e d e f e n d a n t o f t h e l e s s e r o f

f e n s e

. A r t i c l e 9

3 7

. 0 9 o f t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e p r o v i d e s t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d

o f f e n s e

. “ A n o f

f e n s e i s a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e i f :

Ang elo J ackson by

using a deadly wea pon, namely

a fire arm, then y ou will find

the def endant g uilty

of ag g rava ted assault–re cklessly causing bodily injury

.

Hicks , 2011 WL 723507, at *5. 7

In the Matter of R.H. , No. 2-05-340- CV, 2006 WL 1653171 (Tex. App.–For t Worth 8

J une 15, 2006, no pet.) (not desig nated f or publication); Orlando v. State , No. 2-08-038- CR,

2009 WL 1565046 (Tex. App.–For t Worth S ept. 23, 2009, pet. re f’d ) (not desig nated f or

publication).

Hampton v. State , 109 S.W .3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), abrogated on other 9

grounds by Grey

v. State , 298 S.W .3d 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).Hicks Pag e 6

( 1 ) i t i s e s t a b l i s h e d b y p r o o f o f t h e s a m e o r l e s s t h a n a l l t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e d t o

e s t a b l i s h t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d ;

( 2 ) i t d i f

f e r s f r o m t h e o f

f e n s e c h a r g e d o n l y i n t h e r e s p e c t t h a t a l e s s s e r i o u s i n j u r y

o r r i s k o f i n

j u r y t o t h e s a m e p e r s o n

, p r o p e r t y

, o r p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s u f f i c e s t o

e s t a b l i s h i t s c o m m i s s i o n ;

( 3 ) i t d i f

f e r s f r o m t h e o f

f e n s e c h a r g e d o n l y i n t h e r e s p e c t t h a t a l e s s c u l p a b l e

m e n t a l s t a t e s u f

f i c e s t o e s t a b l i s h i t s c o m m i s s i o n ; o r

( 4 ) i t c o n s i s t s o f a n a t t e m p t t o c o m m i t t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d o r a n o t h e r w i s e

i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e

. ” 1 0

U n d e r t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h i s s t a t u t e

, i f a n o f f e n s e m e e t s a n y o n e o f t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s

, t h e n

i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e t o t h e o f

f e n s e c h a r g e d

. A t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e i s

S u b s e c t i o n ( 3 )

, r e g a r d i n g a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e f o r a “ l e s s c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e

. ” T h e

f o u r l e v e l s o f c u l p a b i l i t y a r e s e t o u t a n d d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 6

. 0 3 o f t h e P e n a l C o d e

. B y 1 1

d e f i n i t i o n

, “ r e c k l e s s ” i s a l o w e r l e v e l o f c u l p a b i l i t y t h a n “ k n o w i n g

, ” a n d “ k n o w i n g ” i s a

l o w e r l e v e l o f c u l p a b i l i t y t h a n “ i n t e n t i o n a l

. ” T h u s

, a “ k n o w i n g ” a s s a u l t i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d 1 2

o f f e n s e o f a n “ i n t e n t i o n a l ” a s s a u l t

, a n d a “ r e c k l e s s ” a s s a u l t i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f a

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 37.09. 1 0

“I ntentional” is define d, in part, as a cting with the “consc ious objective or de sire” to 1 1

eng ag e in the prohibited c onduct or c ause the prohibited result. T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 6.03(a)

. “Knowing ” is define d, in part, as a cting with awar eness of the nature of conduc t or that the

conduct is “r easona

bly cer tain to cause the prohibited re sult.” Id. , § 6.03(b). “ Recklessne ss” is

define d, in part, as c onduct committed by a per son who “is awa

re of but consciously

disreg ards a

substantial and unjustifiable risk” that his conduc t will cause the pr ohibited result. Id. , § 6.03(c)

. “Criminal neg lige nce” is defined, in par t, as conduc t where a per son “oug ht to be awa re of a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the cir cumstance s exi st or the re sult will occur .” Id. , §

6.03(d).

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 6.02(d).

1 2Hicks Pag e 7

“ k n o w i n g ” a s s a u l t

. C o n v e r s e l y

, p r o o f o f a h i g h e r l e v e l o f

c u l p a b i l i t y c o n s t i t u t e s p r o o f o f 1 3

a l o w e r l e v e l o f c u l p a b i l i t y

. T h u s

, p r o o f o f a d e f e n d a n t ’ s i n t e n t i o n a l a c t a l s o p r o v e s 1 4

r e c k l e s s n e s s

. 1 5

A s w e e x p l a i n e d i n R o c h a

, a j u r y c h a r g e t h a t i n c l u d e d a n i n s t r u c t i o n f o r t h e l e s s e r

i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t b y r e c k l e s s l y c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y w a s p r o p e r e v e n

t h o u g h r e c k l e s s n e s s w a s n o t o n e o f t h e c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e s a l l e g e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l

i n d i c t m e n t

. A f

t e r a n a l y z i n g t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f b o t h A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9 a n d S e c t i o n 6

. 0 2

, 1 6

P r e s i d i n g J u d g e O n i o n c o n c l u d e d t h a t “ [ t ] h e f a c t t h a t t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t m a y b e c o m m i t t e d b y t h e ‘ a d d i t i o n a l ’ c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e o f ‘ r e c k l e s s ’

d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e a c h a r g e t h e r e o n e v e n t h o u g h s a i d c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e i s n o t a l l e g e d i n

t h e i n d i c t m e n t

. ” T h a t c o n c l u s i o n w a s r e i n f o r c e d b y t h i s C o u r t ’ s r e a s o n i n g i n s e v e r a l o t h e r 1 7

Rocha v . State , 648 S.W .2d 298, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on re h’g ) (“ For the 1 3

purposes of the submissi on to the jury of the lesse r included of

fense of ag g rava

ted assault, we

hold the culpable me ntal state of ‘ rec kless’ is included under the ca nopy of the hig her c ulpable

mental states of ‘ intentional’ and ‘know ing’ alleg ed in the indictment for the g rea ter off ense of

attempted murde r.”) ; see also Ethridge v. State , 648 S.W .2d 306, 307-08 (Te x . Crim. App. 1983)

(following Rocha and holding that the trial judg e did not err in submit ting the le sser-inc luded

offe nse of “ rec kless” ag g rava ted assault eve n though de fenda nt was not cha

rg ed with having a

“re ckless” c ulpable mental state ).

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 6.02(e) ; see, e .g.

, W asylina v. State, 275 S.W .3d 908, 910 (Tex. 1 4

Crim. App. 2009) (“I f the State prove s the cha rg ed off ense, it nec essar ily

proves a ll lesserincluded off

enses” ; jury

could prope rly

convict def

endant of criminally

neg lige nt homicide even

though the State had cha

rg ed manslaug hter a

nd proved a

“re ckless” c ulpability ).

See F lores v. State , 245 S.W .3d 432, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“[P] roof of intent 1 5

would, as a ma tter of law , establish rec klessness as we ll.”).

Rocha , 648 S.W .2d at 302. 1 6

Id. 1 7Hicks Pag e 8

c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s c a s e s d i s c u s s e d i n R o c h a

. 1 8

T h i s s a m e r u l e r e g a r d i n g l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s h a s b e e n a p p l i e d t o t h e i n j u r y

- t o

- a

c h i l d s t a t u t e b y n u m e r o u s T e x a s c o u r t s

. L i k e t h e a s s a u l t s t a t u t e

, t h e i n j u r y- t o

- a

- c h i l d s t a t u t e 1 9

l i s t s m u l t i p l e l e v e l s o f c u l p a b i l i t y i n d e f i n i n g t h e o f

f e n s e

. T h e a s s a u l t s t a t u t e b e g i n s w i t h 2 0

“ A p e r s o n c o m m i t s a n o f f e n s e i f t h e p e r s o n

. . . i n t e n t i o n a l l y

, k n o w i n g l y

, o r r e c k l e s s l y c a u s e s

b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r [

. ] ” T h e i n j u r y

- t o

- a

- c h i l d s t a t u t e b e g i n s w i t h “ A p e r s o n c o m m i t s 2 1

a n o f f e n s e i f h e i n t e n t i o n a l l y

, k n o w i n g l y

, r e c k l e s s l y

, o r w i t h c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e

. . . c a u s e s

t o a c h i l d

. . . s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y

. . . o r b o d i l y i n

j u r y

. ” A l t h o u g h t h e c u l p a b l e m e n t a l

2 2

s t a t e s a r e a l l s e t o u t i n a s i n g l e l i s t

, s e p a r a t e d w i t h c o m m a s

, T e x a s c o u r t s h a v e u n i f o r m l y h e l d

t h a t r e c k l e s s b o d i l y i n

j u r y t o a c h i l d i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l o r k n o w i n g

b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a c h i l d

. 2 3

Id. at 302-03. 1 8

See

, e.g

., Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W .3d 706, 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (re fer ring to 1 9

rec kless serious bodily

injury to a child as a

lesser- included off

ense of intentional serious bodily

injury to a child); Gay v . State , 235 S.W .3d 829, 831-32 (Te x . App.–For t Worth 2007, pet. ref’d) ;

Thompson v. State, 227 S.W .3d 153, 163 (Tex. App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, pet. re f d); Torres

v. State , 979 S.W .2d 668, 670 n.2 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Brunson v. State, 764

S.W .2d 888, 892 (Tex. App.–Austin 1989, pet. ref ’d); Mills v. State, 742 S.W .2d 831, 833 (Tex.

App.–Dallas 1987, no pe t.).

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 22.04(a)

. 2 0

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 22.01(a) (1). Sec tion 22.02(a) de fines an a g g rava ted assault as one 2 1

in which the per son commits assault under Section 22.01 and he cause s serious bodily injury or

uses or e x hibits a deadly

wea pon during the assault.

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 22.04(a)

. 2 2

“Thus, we hold as a matter of law tha t rec kless bodily injury to a child . . . is a lesser 2 3

included off

ense of intentional or knowing bodily injury to a child[.] ” Gay

, 235 S.W .3d at 832;Hicks Pag e 9

O n e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i n j u r y- t o

- a

- c h i l d s t a t u t e a n d t h e a g g r a v a t e d

- a s s a u l t s t a t u t e

i s t h a t t h e l a t t e r p r e s c r i b e s a s i n g l e r a n g e o f p u n i s h m e n t f o r a l l l e v e l s o f

c u l p a b i l i t y

– i n t e n t i o n a l

, k n o w i n g

, o r r e c k l e s s

– w h i l e t h e i n j u r y

- t o

- a

- c h i l d s t a t u t e s p e c i f i e s

d i f f e r e n t p u n i s h m e n t s f

o r i n t e n t i o n a l o r k n o w i n g i n j u r i e s

, r e c k l e s s i n

j u r i e s

, a n d n e g l i g e n t

i n j u r i e s

. H o w e v e r

, t h e c r i t e r i a f o r d e c i d i n g i f o n e o f

f e n s e i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f 2 4

a g r e a t e r o f

f e n s e i n A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9 f

o c u s o n l y o n t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s c u l p a b i l i t y

, h i s c o n d u c t

, o r

t h e h a r m c a u s e d

. D i f

f e r e n c e s i n t h e l e v e l

, r a n g e

, o r m a n n e r o f p u n i s h m e n t a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o

t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n

. A t l e a s t f o u r d i f f e r e n t c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s h a v e h e l d t h a t

, u n d e r t h e p l a i n 2 5

l a n g u a g e o f A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9

, a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a l e s s e r p u n i s h m e n t

r a n g e

. W e a g r e e w i t h t h e s e d e c i s i o n s a n d t h e i r r e l i a n c e u p o n t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e

2 6

Tissi er v. State, 792 S.W .2d 120, 124 (Tex. App.–Houston [1 Dist.] 1990 pet. re f’d) (“We st

conclude that the lesser

included off

enses of rec klessness and ne g lige nce simply require a less

culpable me ntal state than doe s an off ense w hich re quires proof of an intentional a ct.”)

.

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 22.04(e) , (f) , (g ). 2 4

The de termination of whe ther a n offe nse is a lesser -included of fense of the off

ense 2 5

char g ed “is made without reg ard to punishment; one off ense ma y be a le sser-inc luded offe nse of

another even if it carr ies the same pe nalty .” Mello v. State , 806 S.W .2d 875, 878 (Tex. App.–

Eastland, 1991, pet. r ef’ d).

See id .; see also Stockton v. State , 756 S.W .2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.–Austin 1988, no 2 6

pet.) (holding that unag g rava ted deliver y of methamphe tamine was le sser-inc luded offe nse of

delivery of methamphe tamine to minor; punishment rang e does not de termine whe ther one

offe nse is a lesser -included of fense of anothe r); Nejanoui v. State , 44 S.W .3d 111, 118 (Tex.

App.–Houston [14th Dis t.] 2001, pet. re f’d) (“The included off ense ne ed not be ‘ lower’ in the

sense that it provides a

lesser punishment. The word ‘le sser’ doe s not refe r to the punishment

rang e but to the fa ctor that distinguishe s the included off ense f rom the off

ense c harg ed, i.e., less

than all fa cts, less serious injury or risk of ha

rm, less culpable mental state, or a n attempt.”);

Johnson v. State , 828 S.W .2d 511, 515 (Tex. App.–Waco 1992, pet. re f’d) (same)

.Hicks Pag e 10

s t a t u t e

.

W i t h t h a t g e n e r a l l e g a l b a c k g r o u n d

, w e t u r n t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e

.

I I I

.

A p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t b y i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r k n o w i n g l y c a u s i n g

b o d i l y i n j u r y w i t h a d e a d l y w e a p o n

. A n g e l o J a c k s o n ’ s t e s t i m o n y s u p p o r t e d a f i n d i n g t h a t

a p p e l l a n t b r o u g h t a n d b r a n d i s h e d a p i s t o l w h e n s e e k i n g p a y m e n t f o r h i s p u r l o i n e d P r a d a s

,

a n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r k n o w i n g l y c a u s e d b o d i l y i n j u r y b y s h o o t i n g A n g e l o

. B u t

i t w a s a l s o r e a s o n a b l e

, i n l i g h t o f a p p e l l a n t ’ s t e s t i m o n y

, f o r a j u r y t o f

i n d t h a t h e r e c k l e s s l y

,

r a t h e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r k n o w i n g l y

, c a u s e d t h a t i n j u r y

. A p p e l l a n t ’ s t e s t i m o n y r a i s e d t h e

l e s s e r c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e

.

T h e t r i a l j u d g e

, f

o l l o w i n g A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9 ( 3 )

, i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t i t c o u l d f i n d t h e

a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y o f t h e l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t b y r e c k l e s s l y c a u s i n g

b o d i l y i n j u r y

. T h e t r i a l j u d g e ’ s s u b m i s s i o n o f t h i s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n w a s s u p p o r t e d b y t h e p l a i n

l a n g u a g e o f A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9 a n d o u r p r i o r d e c i s i o n i n R o c h a

, a s w e l l a s t w o u n p u b l i s h e d

o p i n i o n s b y t h e F o r t W o r t h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s

. A l t h o u g h w e d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h o s e o p i n i o n s

a s p r e c e d e n t

, w e m a y c o n s i d e r t h e i r r e a s o n i n g

.

I n I n t h e M a t t e r o

f R

. H

. , a j u v e n i l e w a s c h a r g e d w i t h a s s a u l t f o r “ i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r 2 7

k n o w i n g l y c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y ” a n d w a s u l t i m a t e l y a d j u d i c a t e d f

o r t h e l e s s e r o f

f e n s e o f

No. 2-05-340- CV, 2006 WL 1653171 (Tex. App.–For t Worth J une 15, 2006, no pet.) 2 7

(not desig nated f

or publication).Hicks Pag e 11

r e c k l e s s l y c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y

. O n a p p e a l

, t h e j u v e n i l e a r g u e d t h a t h i s a d j u d i c a t i o n w a s 2 8

i m p r o p e r b e c a u s e r e c k l e s s n e s s w a s n o t c h a r g e d i n t h e p e t i t i o n a n d a r e c k l e s s a s s a u l t i s t h e

s a m e o f f e n s e a s a n i n t e n t i o n a l a s s a u l t o r a k n o w i n g a s s a u l t

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s r e j e c t e d 2 9

t h a t a r g u m e n t

, p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t a r e c k l e s s a s s a u l t i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e b e c a u s e

“ r e c k l e s s i s a l e s s c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e t h a n i n t e n t i o n a l o r k n o w i n g

. ” L i k e w i s e

, t h e c o u r t 3 0

f o l l o w e d p r e c e d e n t i n s t a t i n g

, “ A n o f f e n s e c a n b e a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f t h e c h a r g e d

o f f e n s e e v e n i f i t c a r r i e s t h e s a m e r a n g e o f p u n i s h m e n t a s t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e

. ” 3 1

T h e F o r t W o r t h c o u r t f

o l l o w e d t h e r e a s o n i n g o f R

. H

. i n O r l a n d o v

. S t a t e

, w h e n i t 3 2

r e v i e w e d a c o n v i c t i o n f o r r e c k l e s s l y c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y d u r i n g a r o b b e r y

. T h e d e f e n d a n t

a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e w a s a “ f a t a l v a r i a n c e ” b e t w e e n t h e i n d i c t e d o f f e n s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a u s i n g

b o d i l y i n j u r y a n d t h e p r o o f o f r e c k l e s s n e s s p r e s e n t e d a t t h e b e n c h t r i a l

. T h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e d 3 3

t h a t A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9 a u t h o r i z e d t h e t r i a l j u d g e t o f i n d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c e d t o p r o v e t h a t

t h e d e f e n d a n t r e c k l e s s l y c a u s e d b o d i l y i n j u r y

. B e c a u s e r e c k l e s s l y c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y i n 3 4

Id. at *1. 2 8

Id. 2 9

Id. 3 0

Id. (citing Mendoza v . State , 959 S.W .2d 321, 327 n.3 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997, pet. 3 1

ref ’d))

.

No. 2-08-038- CR, 2009 W L 1565046 (Tex. App.–For t Worth J une 4, 2009, no pet.) 3 2

(not desig nated f

or publication).

Id. at *1. 3 3

Id. at *6. 3 4Hicks Pag e 12

t h e c o u r s e o f c o m m i t t i n g a t h e f t d i f f e r e d f r o m t h e o f

f e n s e a l l e g e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l r o b b e r y

i n d i c t m e n t o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o a l e s s e r c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e

, i t w a s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d

o f f e n s e

. 3 5

I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h e l d t h a t t h e j u r y c h a r g e w a s i m p r o p e r

b e c a u s e r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i s n o t a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l o r k n o w i n g

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

. T h e c o u r t r e l i e d o n t h i s C o u r t ’ s l a n g u a g e i n L a n d r i a n v

. S t a t e t h a t 3 6

d e s c r i b e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r k n o w i n g l y c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y a n d r e c k l e s s l y c a u s i n g b o d i l y

i n j u r y a s “ c o n c e p t u a l l y e q u i v a l e n t ” a s s a u l t i v e o f f e n s e s

. T h e c o u r t a l s o r e l i e d o n t h e f a c t t h a t 3 7

a l l t h r e e o f t h e c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e s l i s t e d u n d e r t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s t a t u t e ( i n t e n t i o n a l

,

Id. (citing Rocha ). 3 5

268 S.W .3d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). I n Landrian , we e x plained that, for some 3 6

proce dural issues, the of

fense of re ckless ag g rava ted assault and tha t of intentional ag g rava ted

assault ar e “c onceptua lly

equivalent.” Id. at 537. I n Landrian , the trial judg e submitted two

application par ag raphs, one of which r ead tha t the defe ndant “intentionally or knowing ly

cause [d] bodily

injury by using a deadly wea pon” and the other that the de fenda nt “re cklessly

cause [d] serious bodily

injury .” Id. at 534 n.5. The jury returne d a g ener al ver dict. On appe al,

the def endant a rg ued that he w as entitled to a una nimous verdict on one of

the two applica tion

para g raphs. We held that the jur y need not be unanimous as to the means by which the de fenda

nt

committed the ag g rava ting e lement–“a g g rava ted assault with a de adly wea pon” or “ ag g rava

ted

assault ca using se rious bodily

injury ”–bec ause e ach involved the use of a deadly wea pon. Id. at

538. Fur ther, the jury

did not need to be una

nimous on which culpable me ntal

state–intentionally , knowing ly , or re cklessly –it found beca

use “the Penal Code explicitl y states

that proof of

a g rea ter c ulpability

is also proof of a

ny lesser c ulpability [.] ” Id. at 537. Thus, for

purposes of jur

y unanimity

the three culpable me ntal states ar e conc eptually equivalent be cause

all of the juror s must find one of the thre e culpa ble mental states a

nd proof of

the g rea ter

culpable me ntal state of intent would nec essar ily suffice to show both knowledg e and

rec klessness bec ause the latter two a re le sser-inc luded culpable mental states. Id

.

Hicks , 2011 WL 723507, at *4. 3 7Hicks Pag e 13

k n o w i n g

, a n d r e c k l e s s ) c a r r y t h e s a m e r a n g e o f p u n i s h m e n t

. T h u s

, t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e 3 8

t r i a l j u d g e ’ s i n s t r u c t i o n d e s c r i b i n g r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t a s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e

w a s e r r o r

. 3 9

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s t o o k L a n d r i a n ’ s “ c o n c e p t u a l l y e q u i v a l e n t ” d i s c u s s i o n o u t o f

c o n t e x t

. L a n d r i a n d i d n o t a d d r e s s t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s u n d e r A r t i c l e

3 7

. 0 9

. R a t h e r

, t h e l a n g u a g e c i t e d b y t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a p p l i e d t o t h e i s s u e o f j u r y

u n a n i m i t y

. A s w e e x p l a i n e d i n L a n d r i a n

, t h e j u r y n e e d n o t b e u n a n i m o u s o n w h e t h e r t h e

d e f e n d a n t i n t e n t i o n a l l y

, k n o w i n g l y

, o r r e c k l e s s l y c o m m i t t e d t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

“ [ b ] e c a u s e t h e P e n a l C o d e e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s t h a t p r o o f o f a g r e a t e r c u l p a b i l i t y i s a l s o p r o o f o f

a n y l e s s e r c u l p a b i l i t y [

. ] ” E x a c t l y

. R e c k l e s s l y i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e o f 4 0

k n o w i n g l y w h i c h i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e o f i n t e n t i o n a l l y

. S o

, f o r 4 1

p u r p o s e s o f j u r y u n a n i m i t y

, t h e t h r e e c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e s a r e “ c o n c e p t u a l l y e q u i v a l e n t ”

b e c a u s e p r o o f o f t h e g r e a t e r c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e i s n e c e s s a r i l y p r o o f o f t h e l e s s e r o n e s

. B u t

t h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h e y a r e c o n c e p t u a l l y e q u i v a l e n t f o r a l l p u r p o s e s

. I n d e e d

, A r t i c l e

3 7

. 0 9 ( 3 ) e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s

, t h r o u g h i t s d e f i n i t i o n s

, t h a t t h e y a r e n o t e q u i v a l e n t f o r p u r p o s e s

Id. 3 8

Id

. 3 9

268 S.W .3d at 537. 4 0

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 6.02(e) (“Proof of a hig her de g ree of culpa bility than that cha

rg ed 4 1

constitutes proof of the culpability char g ed.”) ; see Flore

s v. State , 245 S.W .3d 432, 440 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (noting that “proof of intent would, as a ma tter of law , establish rec klessness

as we ll.”).Hicks Pag e 14

o f t h e s u b m i s s i o n o f a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n

.

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a l s o r e l i e d o n R e e d v

. S t a t e i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t r e c k l e s s 4 2

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i s n o t a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e

. I n R e e d

, t h i s C o u r t r e v e r s e d a 4 3

c o n v i c t i o n f

o r a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t b e c a u s e t h e i n d i c t m e n t a l l e g e d o n l y t h e c u l p a b l e m e n t a l

s t a t e s o f “ i n t e n t i o n a l ” o r “ k n o w i n g

, ” b u t t h e s i n g l e a p p l i c a t i o n p a r a g r a p h r e a d “ i n t e n t i o n a l l y

o r k n o w i n g l y o r r e c k l e s s l y c a u s e [ d ] b o d i l y i n j u r y

. ” T h i s w a s i m p e r m i s s i b l e b e c a u s e i t

4 4

a l l o w e d f

o r c o n v i c t i o n o f a b r o a d e r o f f e n s e t h a n t h a t a l l e g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t

. I n R e e d

, 4 5

h o w e v e r

, w e e x p l i c i t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h a t s i t u a t i o n f r o m R o c h a i n w h i c h s u b m i s s i o n o f

r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t a s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e t o t h e o f

f e n s e c h a r g e d w a s p r o p e r

. 4 6

W e d i d n o t a p p l y R o c h a i n t h e R e e d c a s e

, h o w e v e r

, “ b e c a u s e n e i t h e r p a r t y r e q u e s t e d a l e s s e r

i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n a n d t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e i s s u e w a s n o t r a i s e d a t

t r i a l [

. ] ” T h u s

, w e d e c l i n e d t o d e c i d e t h e R e e d c a s e “ b a s e d o n a n i s s u e t h a t w a s n o t

4 7

117 S.W .3d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 4 2

Hicks , 2011 WL 723507, at *4. 4 3

Ree d , 117 S.W .3d at 265. 4 4

Id. 4 5

Id. at 263 (noting Litt le v. State , 659 S.W .2d 425, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) and 4 6

Rocha in concluding that “the inclusion of a lower c ulpable mental state in the jury instructions

may ref er to a lesser inc luded offe nse of the of fense char g ed in the indictment.”) ; id. at 264

(stating that, “[i] n Rocha , howeve r, we held that it was not err or to submit a char g e author izi ng

conviction of the le sser include d offe nse upon a f inding of the lower culpable me ntal state of

rec klessness.”)

.

Id. at 264. 4 7Hicks Pag e 15

p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r p r e s e r v e d f o r a p p e a l

. ” B e c a u s e n o s e p a r a t e l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d

4 8

o f f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s g i v e n

, R o c h a d i d n o t a p p l y

. B u t a s e p a r a t e l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d 4 9

i n s t r u c t i o n w a s g i v e n i n t h i s c a s e

, a n d t h e j u r y a c q u i t t e d a p p e l l a n t o f t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e

( i n t e n t i o n a l o r k n o w i n g a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t ) b e f o r e u n a n i m o u s l y f

i n d i n g a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y o f

t h e l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e o f r e c k l e s s a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

.

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a l s o n o t e d t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t a n d r e c k l e s s

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t h a v e a n i d e n t i c a l r a n g e o f p u n i s h m e n t a s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e y a r e t h e s a m e

o f f e n s e

. H o w e v e r

, a s n o t e d a b o v e

, t h e r a n g e o f p u n i s h m e n t i s i r r e l e v a n t i n d e c i d i n g 5 0

w h e t h e r a n o f

f e n s e i s a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9

. “ T h e w o r d ‘ l e s s e r ’ d o e s 5 1

n o t r e f e r t o t h e p u n i s h m e n t r a n g e b u t t o t h e f a c t o r t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e

f r o m t h e o f

f e n s e c h a r g e d

, i

. e

. , l e s s t h a n a l l f a c t s

, l e s s s e r i o u s i n

j u r y o r r i s k o f h a r m

, l e s s

c u l p a b l e m e n t a l s t a t e

, o r a n a t t e m p t

. ” T h e d i s p o s i t i v e i s s u e i n e v a l u a t i n g a l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d 5 2

o f f e n s e i s w h e t h e r t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s c a l l e d f o r u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 7

. 0 9

, n o t w h e t h e r t h e o f f e n s e

e n t a i l s a l e s s e r p u n i s h m e n t

.

A p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t b y i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r k n o w i n g l y c a u s i n g

b o d i l y i n j u r y b y u s i n g a d e a d l y w e a p o n

. B a s e d o n a p p e l l a n t ’ s t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l t h a t t h e g u n

Id. 4 8

Id. at 265. 4 9

Hicks , 2011 WL 723507, at *4. 5 0

Mello , 806 S.W .2d at 878; Stockton , 756 S.W .2d at 876. 5 1

Johnson , 828 S.W .2d at 515. 5 2Hicks Pag e 16

“ a c c i d e n t a l l y w e n t o f

f ” d u r i n g t h e s t r u g g l e

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t i t c o u l d

f i n d t h e a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y o f t h e l e s s e r

- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t b y r e c k l e s s l y

c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n

j u r y

. T h e t r i a l j u d g e ’ s i n c l u s i o n o f t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n w a s p r o p e r u n d e r A r t i c l e

3 7

. 0 9 a n d o u r p r i o r d e c i s i o n i n R o c h a

. H e d i d n o t e r r

.

W e t h e r e f

o r e r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a n d r e m a n d t h e c a s e t o t h a t

c o u r t t o a d d r e s s a p p e l l a n t ’ s r e m a i n i n g p o i n t s o f e r r o r

.

D e l i v e r e d : J u n e 2 7

, 2 0 1 2

P u b l i s h