J-S23005-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

THEODORE WOODALL

Appellant No. 1566 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 25, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1208311-2003

BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2017

Appellant, Theodore Woodall, appeals from the order entered on April 

25, 2016, which dismissed his first petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We vacate the 

order of the PCRA court, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand for 

resentencing.

In 2004, a jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of aggravated 

assault and one count each of carrying a firearm on the public streets of 

Philadelphia and possessing instruments of crime; the convictions arose out 

of Appellant shooting one Philadelphia police officer in the neck and shooting 

at another Philadelphia police officer. 

On November 22, 2004, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an 

aggregate term of 21 to 42 years in prison for his convictions. Further, as 
J-S23005-17

- 2 -

the Commonwealth concedes, during “the November 22, 2004[] sentencing 

hearing, [the trial court] indicated that the mandatory minimum sentence of 

five years for offenses committed with firearms, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712, 

applied to [Appellant’s] aggravated assault convictions.” Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 2; see also N.T. Sentencing, 11/22/04, at 3.

Following the nunc pro tunc reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal 

rights, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 2, 2014 

and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal 

on November 13, 2014. Commonwealth v. Woodall, 105 A.3d 781 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum) at 1-24, appeal denied, 104 A.3d 

4 (Pa. 2014).

On February 12, 2015, Appellant filed the current, timely PCRA 

petition. The petition constitutes Appellant’s first petition for post-conviction 

collateral relief under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 

1283 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[w]hen a PCRA petitioner’s direct appeal rights are 

reinstated nunc pro tunc in his first PCRA petition, a subsequent PCRA 

petition will be considered a first PCRA petition for timeliness purposes”). 

The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant and counsel 

filed an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf. Within the amended 

petition, Appellant claimed that his sentence is illegal, as he was sentenced 

under a mandatory minimum sentencing statute that was rendered 

unconstitutional by Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 
J-S23005-17

- 3 -

2151 (2013). See Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 9/17/15, at 2; 

Appellant’s Brief in Support of Amended PCRA Petition, 9/17/15, at 1.

On April 25, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition and 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Appellant raises one 

claim on appeal:

Did the [PCRA] court err in failing to grant PCRA relief 

where [] Appellant had been sentenced pursuant to a 

mandatory minimum sentence law that has been declared 

unconstitutional?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (some internal capitalization omitted).

Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief, as he was sentenced 

under a mandatory minimum sentencing statute that was rendered 

unconstitutional by Alleyne. The Commonwealth concedes that Appellant’s 

sentence is, in fact, illegal and that Appellant is entitled to relief in this case. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 5. We agree with Appellant and the 

Commonwealth. We thus vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and 

remand for resentencing.

We observe our well-established standard of review: “In reviewing the 

denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 

86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Alleyne challenges implicate the legality of a sentence. A 

challenge to the legality of a sentence may be entertained 

as long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction. An illegal 

sentence must be vacated. Issues relating to the legality of 

a sentence are questions of law. Our standard of review 
J-S23005-17

- 4 -

over such questions is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ali, 112 A.3d 1210, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal 

citations, quotations, and corrections omitted).

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States 

Supreme Court held: “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489. Further, in Alleyne, the United States 

Supreme Court expanded “Apprendi’s basic jury-determination rule to 

mandatory minimum sentences.” Alleyne, ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 

2167 (Breyer, J., concurring). Specifically, the Alleyne court held that, 

where an “aggravating fact” increases a mandatory minimum sentence, “the 

fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated crime. [The fact] must, 

therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2162-2163. 

As this Court has held, Alleyne rendered the mandatory minimum 

sentencing statute of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 wholly unconstitutional. 

Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Further, in Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54 (Pa. Super. 2015), this 

Court held that an Alleyne claim is a non-waivable challenge to the legality 

of a sentence that may be raised for the first time on direct appeal or in a 

timely-filed PCRA petition. Ruiz, 131 A.3d at 60; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 

(“persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief”). 
J-S23005-17

- 5 -

We also observed in Ruiz that Alleyne may be applied retroactively to 

cases pending on collateral review so long as the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence was not final when Alleyne was decided. Ruiz, 131 A.3d at 

59-60. In the case at bar, while Appellant was originally sentenced on 

November 22, 2004, Appellant’s judgment of sentence did not become final 

until February 11, 2015. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“A judgment 

becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States . . . , or at the expiration 

of time for seeking the review”); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. Since 

Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013, Appellant is entitled to the benefit of 

Alleyne and the instant case does not implicate an impermissible retroactive 

application of that case.

Based on our review of the procedural background of this case and the 

relevant case law discussed above, we conclude that Appellant is entitled to 

resentencing without consideration of the mandatory minimum sentencing 

provision of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712. Therefore, since the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing Appellant’s petition raising an Alleyne challenge, we vacate the 

order denying Appellant PCRA relief, vacate Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence, and remand for resentencing.

Order vacated. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for 

resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.
J-S23005-17

- 6 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/2017