alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
|   | A. | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | B. | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Bank. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:     March      25, 2008 | By:                                          |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
|                                                   | /s/ Robert H.      King                      |
|                                                   | Robert      H. King, Chief Executive Officer |

----
#### BAHAM v. SCHADWELL.

No. 16146.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Jan. 27, 1936.

H. W. & H. M. Robinson, of New ■Orleans, for appellant.

Fred A. Middleton and Sidney I. Goldman, both of New Orleans, for appellee.

JANVIER, Judge.

Ernest Baham alleges that he was employed as a carpenter by Frank P. Schad-well to assist in the remodeling of a certain boat designated as the “OG 250.” He avers that, though he was paid all of the amounts earned during the regular working hours of each day, Schad-well retained the amounts due him for services rendered after the regular hours and refuses to compensate him for these services. In his petition he states that he worked for 2331⁄2 hours in addition to the regular working hours; that it was understood that he was to receive 50 cents per hour for each hour, and he prays for judgment in the sum of $116.75.

Schadwell admits that he employed Ba-ham during the period alleged, but he avers that at the end of each week he paid in full all employees, including Baham, for all services rendered.

In the court, a qua, there was judgment for $112.25, and (defendant has appealed.

Defendant admits that on certain days during the period mentioned in the pleadings the said Baham- worked after the regular working hours, but he states that it was understood that this was done because the said Baham was not well, and agreed that since he might have to rest at times during each day, he would make up after regular hours the approximate loss of time caused by his physical condition.

Though only a question of fact is involved, and though we recognize the existence of the well-settled rule that in such cases there should not be a reversal except where there has been manifest error, we cannot avoid the impression that plaintiff has manifestly and obviously failed to sustain the burden of making his case certain by a preponderance of the evidence.

All of the other employees are shown to have been paid in full at the end of each week, and Baham admits that he, too, received all that was due him for services performed during the regular hours. His testimony concerning the alleged agreement as to overtime is most contradictory and confusing. Furthermore, he testified that he made a very careful record of all overtime, and that for this purpose he kept a memorandum book and made entries at the end of each day, and yet, at another place in his testimony, he stated that the record was kept by his wife, who made memoranda on a calendar which was in their home. There is some confusion in *334the evidence as to whether he kept a record as to the amounts earned as overtime, or a record of the hours worked, but, viewing his testimony as a whole, we deem it unworthy of belief in view of the testimony given by defendant, which is corroborated by all of the circumstances surrounding the situation.

The judgment appealed from is annulled, avoided, and reversed, and plaintiff's suit is dismissed at his cost.

Reversed.
Exhibit
      32




Certification
pursuant to


18
U.S.C. Section 1350,


as
adopted pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002




Marshall
T. Reynolds, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and Larry A. Blount, Chief
Financial Officer of Energy Services of America Corporation (the “Company”) each
certify in their capacity as officers of the Company that they have reviewed the
annual report of the Company on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year ended September
30, 2008 and that to the best of their knowledge:


1.
              the
      report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
              the
      information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





May
      6, 2008
                
                /s/
      Marshal T. ReynoldsDate
                
                Marshall
      T. ReynoldsChairman
      and Chief Executive OfficerMay
      6, 2008
                
                /s/
      Larry A BlountDate
                
                Larry
      A. BlountChief
      Financial Officer




The
purpose of this statement is solely to comply with Title 18, Chapter 63, Section
1350 of the United States Code, as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Energy Services of America Corporation and will be retained by Energy Services
of America Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 167 (Wednesday, August 27, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 50643-50644]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19817]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


Notice of Lodging Proposed Consent Decree

    In accordance with Departmental Policy, 28 CFR 50.7, notice is 
hereby

[[Page 50644]]

given that a proposed Consent Decree in Sierra Club, et al. v. MasTec 
North America, Inc., et al., No. 03-1697-HO (D. Or.), consolidated with 
United States v. MasTec, Inc., et al., No. 06-6071-HO (D. Or.), was 
lodged with the United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
on August 19, 2008.
    This proposed Consent Decree concerns complaints filed by the 
United States against MasTec, Inc. and MasTec North America, Inc. 
pursuant to section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), 
to obtain, among other things, injunctive relief from and to impose 
civil penalties against MasTec, Inc. and MasTec North America, Inc. for 
violating the Clean Water Act by discharging pollutants in violation of 
a permit and without a permit into waters of the United States. The 
proposed Consent Decree resolves certain of the allegations against 
MasTec, Inc. and MasTec North America, Inc. by requiring them to 
provide for environmental mitigation and to pay a civil penalty.
    The Department of Justice will accept written comments relating to 
this proposed Consent Decree for thirty (30) days from the date of 
publication of this Notice. Please address comments to Kent E. Hanson, 
Environmental Defense Section, P.O. Box 23986, Washington, DC 20026-
3986, and refer to United States v. MasTec, Inc., DJ <greek-i> 90-5-1-
1-17191.
    The proposed Consent Decree may be examined at the Clerk's Office, 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Wayne L. Morse 
U.S. Courthouse, 405 East Eighth Avenue, Room 2100, Eugene, OR 97401. 
In addition, the proposed Consent Decree may be viewed at http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/Consent_Decrees.html .

Russell Young,
Assistant Chief, Environmental Defense Section, Environment & Natural 
Resources Division.
[FR Doc. E8-19817 Filed 8-26-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-15-P
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Treasury

# AGENCY:

Financial Management Service, Treasury.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice announces the appointment of members to the Financial Management Service (FMS) Performance Review Board (PRB).

# DATES:

This notice is effective on August 26, 2008.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

David A. Lebryk, Deputy Commissioner, Financial Management Service, 401 14th Street, SW., Washington, DC; telephone (202) 874-7000.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 4314(c)(4), this notice is given of the appointment of individuals to serve as members of the FMS PRB. This Board reviews the performance appraisals of career senior executives below the Assistant Commissioner level and makes recommendations regarding ratings, bonuses, and other personnel actions. Four voting members constitute a quorum. The names and titles of the FMS PRB members are as follows:

## Primary Members

David A. Lebryk, Deputy Commissioner

Rita Bratcher, Assistant Commissioner, Debt Management Services

Sheryl R. Morrow, Assistant Commissioner, Federal Finance

Wanda Rogers, Assistant Commissioner, Payment Management

Charles R. Simpson, Assistant Commissioner, Information Resources

D. James Sturgill, Assistant Commissioner, Govermentwide Accounting

## Alternate Member

Scott H. Johnson, Assistant Commissioner, Management (Chief Financial Officer)

David A. Lebryk,

Deputy Commissioner.

[FR Doc. E8-19767 Filed 8-25-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810-35-M
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) TROY JENNINGS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 11-411 (BAH) ) FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court dismissed this case after the Plaintiff failed to oppose in a timely manner the Defendants’ dispositive motion de spite having been warned by the Court that failure to do so could result in the motion being granted as conc eded. Mem. Op., ECF N o. 26; Order, ECF No. 27. The Plaintiff later moved for reconsideration of that dismissal. See Reconsideration Mot., ECF No. 28 [hereinafter Mot.]. The Court deni ed that motion because the Plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ dispos itive motion but had neither availed himself of that opportunity nor moved for an extension of time within which to file his response. Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 32. The Plaintiff has since filed two documents at ECF No. 33, both of which offer further support to an assertion the Plai ntiff made in a previously filed supplement to his motion for reconsideration: that he was unable to respond to the Defendants’ dispositive motion in part because he was placed in administrative se gregation on July 5, 2011. The Court already considered that assertion when it denied the Pl aintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Mem. Op.2 and Order at 3. The newly filed documents ther efore provide no additiona l reason why the Court should reconsider its dismissal of this case. Accordingly, to the extent that the Plainti ff again seeks reconsider ation of the dismissal of this case based on the new documents he r ecently filed at ECF No. 33, it is hereby ORDERED that such reconsideration DENIED

. SO ORDERED this 3rd day of November, 2011.

/s/ 

# Beryl A. Howell BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge
**Exhibit 33.3**




**Management’s
      Assertion on**


**Compliance
      with Regulation AB Criteria**





**ASSERTION
      OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE SERVICING CRITERIA**








The
      Bank
      of New York and The Bank of New York Trust Company, N. A.(collectively, the
      “Company”) provides this platform-level assessment of compliance with the
      servicing criteria specified in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB promulgated by
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission.





Management
      has determined that the following servicing criteria are applicable in regards
      to the following servicing platform for the following period:





Platform :
      Publicly-issued (i.e., transaction-level reporting initially required under
      the


Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) residential mortgage-backed securities and
      other mortgage-related asset-backed securities issued on or after January 1,
      2006 (and like-kind transactions issued prior to January 1, 2006) for which
      the
      Company provides trustee, securities administration, paying agent or custodial
      services. The platform includes like kind transactions for which the Company
      provided trustee, securities administrator, paying agent or custodial services
      as a result of the Company’s acquisition as of October 1, 2006 of portions of
      JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s corporate trust business, including structured
      finance agency and trust transactions.





Applicable
      Servicing Criteria :
      All
      servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d), to the extent required by the
      related transaction agreements as to any transaction, except for the following
      criteria: 1122 (d) (1)(ii), (iii), (iv), (4) (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii),
      (ix), (x), (xi), (xii) and (xiii).





Period :
      Twelve
      months ended December 31, 2006.





With
      respect to the Platform and the Period, the Company provides the following
      assessment of compliance in respect of the Applicable Servicing
      Criteria:





• The
      Company is responsible for assessing its compliance with the Applicable
      Servicing C riteria.





• The
      Company has assessed compliance with the Applicable Servicing
      Criteria.





•
A s
      of
      December 31, 2006 and for the Period, the Company was in material compliance
      with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.









Ernst
      & Young LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm, has issued an
      attestation report with respect to the Company’s foregoing assessment of
      compliance.








The Bank of New York
            The Bank of New YorkThe Bank of New York Trust
            The Bank of New York TrustCompany,
                N.A.
            Company,
                N.A./s/ Robert L. Griffin
            /s/ Patrick J. TadieRobert L. Griffin
            Patrick J. TadieAuthorized Signer
            Authorized Signer






March
      1,
      2007
#### Malcolm THAMES, Petitioner, v. Euna Creech THAMES, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 19, 1954.

■G. C. Durrance, Okeechobee, Thad H. Carlton, Fort Pierce, for petitioner.

William T. Fussell, Tampa, for respondent.

Before ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, HOBSON and DREW, -JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The facts in this case as disclosed by the record are almost identical with those in the case of Copeland v. Copeland, Fla., 53 So.2d 637. We see no occasion to recede from our opinion and judgment in the Copeland case. Consequently we must grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order entered by the learned chancellor denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss predicated upon.-his plea of privilege to be sued in the county of his residence as provided in Florida Statutes, § 46.01, F.S.A., which order was entered on the 6th day of July, A.D. 1954.

It is so ordered.
#### WASHINGTON PROTECTION, et al., Plaintiff—Appellant, v. EVERGREEN SCHOOL DISTRICT; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 03-35368. D.C. No. CV-03-05062-FDB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 24, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

This preliminary injunction appeal comes to us for review under Ninth Circuit Rule 3-3. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm.

We subject a district court’s order regarding preliminary injunctive relief only to limited review. *Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc.,*198 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir.1999). Our review of an order regarding a preliminary injunction “is much more limited than review of an order involving a permanent injunction, where all conclusions of law are freely reviewable.” *Id.*A decision regarding a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the district court based its *655decision on either an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous factual findings. *Id.*

We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion here. We therefore affirm the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction. Our disposition mil affect the rights of the parties only until the district court renders final judgment. *Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press International,*686 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir.1982).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Harold Eugene NORMAN and Willie Hicks, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

July 23, 1954.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
- 27 -               Exhibit (11)
                                                            
               OWENS CORNING AND SUBSIDIARIES
                              
              COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                              
<TABLE>
<S>                              <C>         <C>        <C>          <C>
                                         Quarter            Six Months
                                          Ended               Ended
                                         June 30,            June 30,
                                   1997         1996     1997        1996
                                 (In millions of dollars, except share data)

Primary:

Net income (loss)                $   63      $  (473)   $  105       $(434)

Weighted average number of 
  shares outstanding 
  (thousands)                    53,283       51,538    52,980      51,512

Weighted average common 
  equivalent shares 
  (thousands):
  Deferred awards                    14            -        14           -
  Stock options using weighted 
    average market price            543            -       625           -

Primary weighted average number 
  of common shares outstanding
  and common equivalent shares 
  (thousands)                    53,840       51,538    53,619      51,512

Primary per share amount         $ 1.17       $(9.19)  $  1.96     $ (8.43)

Fully Diluted:

Net income (loss)                $   65       $ (473)  $   109     $  (434)

Weighted average number of 
  shares outstanding 
  (thousands)                    53,283       51,538    52,980      51,512
Weighted average common 
  equivalent shares
  (thousands): 
  Deferred awards                    14            -        14           -
  Stock options using the 
    higher of average 
    market price or market
    price at end of period          611            -       677           -
  Shares from assumed conversion
    of preferred securities       4,566            -     4,566           -

Fully diluted weighted average 
   number of common shares 
   outstanding and common 
   equivalent shares 
   (thousands)                   58,474       51,538    58,237      51,512

Fully diluted per share amount  $  1.11      $ (9.19)  $  1.87     $ (8.43)


</TABLE>
#### In re Demetric Gray PEARSON, Petitioner.

No. 02-7370.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 15, 2002.

Demetric Gray Pearson, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Demetric Gray Pearson petitions for a writ of mandamus. He seeks orders requiring the Government to show cause and recusing the district court. Pearson also raises claims concerning alleged errors in his state court proceedings.

Mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *See In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir.1988). Further, mandamus is a drastic remedy and should only be used in extraordinary circumstances. *See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *In re Beard,*811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir.1987). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. *See In re United Steelworkers,*595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir.1979).

*171Our review of the district court’s docket reveals the Government filed its response and the district court has ruled; therefore, this issue is moot. As to the remainder of Pearson’s arguments, the relief sought by Pearson is not available by way of mandamus.

Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
EXHIBIT 32





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF


THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002


The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with this report on Form 10-K for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.





Steven J. Johnston, the chief executive officer, and Michael J. Sewell, the chief financial officer, of Cincinnati Financial Corporation each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:


1.    the report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and


2.    the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Cincinnati Financial Corporation.





Date:  February 23, 2023








/S/ Steven J. Johnston


Steven J. Johnston, FCAS, MAAA, CFA, CERA


Chairman and Chief Executive Officer








/S/ Michael J. Sewell


Michael J. Sewell, CPA


Chief Financial Officer, Executive Vice President and Treasurer


(Principal Accounting Officer)
No. 44 SSM 1

David J. Lemieux,

Appellant,

v.

Alton E. Horn et al.,

Respondents.

Aaron D. Fine, for appellant.

James W. Cunningham, for respondents.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules, order affirmed, with

costs. The Appellate Division correctly concluded that defendant established prima facie

entitlement to summary judgment and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether

he suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of

the accident ( see Pommells v Perez , 4 NY3d 566, 573

- 575 [2005]; Franchini v Palmieri , 1

NY3d 536, 537 [2003]). Acting Chief Judge Cannataro and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Wilson,

Singas and Troutman concur.

Decided March 16, 2023