NO T F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0409n.06 No. 09-1103 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA,

P laintif f-App ellee, ON AP P EA L F RO M THE v. UN ITED STA TES D ISTRIC T COURT F OR THE E ASTERN CHRYSTALIN CARTER, DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN a/k/a Ch rystalin Carte r-Sm ith,

Defendan t-Appellant. _________________________________/ BEF OR E: BOG G S, SU HR HEI NRIC H, a nd R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Chry stali n C ar t er ( “Carte r”) appea ls her convic tions and sente nce f

or her role in t wo conspiracies: (1) bank account fraud, and (2) mortga g e fraud. On appea l, Carter a

rg ues that the dist rict court 1) erroneously ref used t o g ive a jury instruction on good fa ith , 2 ) e rr on e ou sly

re str ic te d th e te sti mo ny

of a de fe ns e wi tne ss, 3) imp os e d a n unr e a so na

ble sentenc e, and 4) used an imprope r method o f j u ry s el ec tion. For the r easons se t forth below, we AF F IRM the convictions and se ntence
. I. Bac kgr ound A. Acc ount Tak eoverConspi racy Th e fi rs t th re e c on vic tions aro se fr om a c on sp ir a c y , d e sig ne d b y Cart e r a nd El ise B e ll (“B ell”), to fr audulently remove $150,000 from the ac count of Donna Cheng (“Cheng ”). Car

ter ha s an extensive criminal history , including c onvictions for embe zz lement, forg ery , uttering and2

publishing, and posse ssion of a firea rm by a fe lon. Be ll, a “g raphic desig ner,” is a long time friend of Carte r’s who ha s used her expertise in gr aphic de sign to c reate forg ed docume nts. Cheng had a mone y

marke t acc ount at Charter One B ank

. I n Dec ember 2004, Samer Be idoun (“B eidoun”) , a teller at Charter

On e , u s e d Ch a r te r One ’s computer

sy stem to acc ess Cheng ’s pe rs on a l in fo rm a tio n at w or k a ft e r ho ur s and wi tho ut a le g iti ma te bu sin e ss purp os e . Ca rt e r a nd B e ll then u s e d th is in f

o r mati o n to o b ta in a $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 c o u n te r f e it c h e c k in Ch e n g ’ s n a me . Next, an acqua intance pr ovided C a r te r w it h th e c o nta c t i n f

o r ma ti o n f o r T e q uila Wil kerson ( “Wilkerson”)—a n assistant manag er at a C omerica Ba nk branc h located in Sterling Heig hts, Michiga n. Carter set up

a me e tin g wi th Wi lke rs on , w ho m Ca rt e r h a d a pp are ntl y ne ve r m e t, p ur

po rt e dly to d isc us s r e a l e state i n v e s t m e n t s . C art e r

an d B e l l , w h o p r e s e n t e d

h e r s e l f a s “ D o n n a , ” m e tw i t h W i l k e r s o na f e w d a ys later. The conver sation at the mee ting eventua lly turned from rea l e state to Wi lkerson’s wor k at the bank. Carte r aske d about Comerica ’s s ec urity sy stems and the bank’ s proce dures f or openingan
acc ount, a

nd Wil kerson answe red these questions in detail. Carter and “Donna ” th en informed Wil kerson that they

would open up ac counts at the ba nk in the coming day s. Sub se qu e nt t o th is m e e tin g , B e ll me t Wilk e rs on a t a Com e ri c a br anc h in

Ste rl ingHe ig hts , Michig an, opene d an ac count, and d e p o s it e d th e $150,000 counte rfe it check. O nce the standard ba nk hold on the ac count expired, Be ll used Cheng ’s name to withdra w the money , and af

ter numer ous transac tions, a substantial amount of that money was dire cted to ac counts controlled by Carter : an
a c c ount at H un tin g ton

B ank in t he name of B re e ze F ina

nc ia l and an a c c ount at Pe op le s T ru st C re dit Union in the name of

Bla que Reig n Contracting . For example, a che ck in the amount of $47,903.47

wa s is su e d f

ro m Ch e ng ’s Com e ri c a ba nk a c c ount an d de po sit e d into t he B re e ze F ina

nc ia l a c c ount, and a c heck in the a

m o u n t o f $ 3 4 , 8 76.47 was issued fr om Cheng ’s Comerica Ba nk acc ount and3

deposited into the Bla que R eig n Contracting acc ount. Throug h these a nd other tra

nsactions, Carter made approximately $91,779.94 from the fra ud. Cheng did not learn a

bout the withdrawa l from her

acc ount for seve ral mont hs. Once she di d, she not ified her bank, at which point bank employ ees a nd law enf orce ment discovere d and unra veled the c onspiracy

. B . Mo rt g a g e Fr a u d S ch eme Th e fo ur th c on vic tio n a

ro se fr om C art e r’s de a lin g s in July 20 03 wi th a

ho me in D e tr oit , Michig an, located at 4095 Tuxedo Street. Two we eks af ter purc hasing this home, Carter e x ecute d

a qu itc la im d e e d of the pr op e rt y to h e rs e lf and he r b oy fr ie nd , K e nn e th P itt s ( “ Pitt s” ), a s jo int te na nts
. I n J uly 2004, they

executed a quitcla im deed for the prope rty to Pit ts alone, and Pitts obtained a $44,000 cash- out mortg ag e on the property

. I n September 2004, the property was sold for $57,000 to “T a z Pe op le s, ” wh o wa s in re a lity Cart e r’ s siste r usi ng an ali a s tha t Car te r ha s use d in

the pa st. For instance, Car

ter attempted to obta in a

n Ohio identification ca

rd in J une 2004 under

the name of Taz Peoples, but was appr ehende d by authorities. B ot h C arter and Pitts were r equire d to sign the deed, de spite the ear lier qui tclaim deed to Pitt s only , beca use t he Jul y

2004 deed ha d not shown up y et in the forma l rec ording rec ords. Taz Peoples financ ed the prope rty with a $51,300.00 mortg ag e, which wa s used to pa

y off the $44,000 mortg ag e. No pa y ments on the $51,300.00 mortg ag e we re made, a nd the prope rty

was soon for eclose d on. Arg ent Mortg ag e and its assig ns lost $51,300.00 plus related e x penses a s a re sult of the transac tion. C. P roce dural Hi story Carter was indicted a

nd tried for

the following char g es: 1) co n spiracy to use a mea

ns of identification of a

nother pe rson to commit acce ss device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(f) ; 2) unauthorized use of an ac cess de vice—a iding a nd abetting , in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§4

1029(a) (2) & 2; 3) conspirac y to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 1349; a nd 4) conspirac y to c ommit wire fra ud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 1349. B eidoun, B ell, and Wil kerson we re a lso i ndicted for the first three counts of the indictment. B eidoun and Wilkerson pled gu i l t y p ri o r to trial. B ell’s wher eabouts a re c urre ntly

unknown. Carter ’s jury

trial beg an on Au g us t 18 , 20 08 , and c on tin ue d un til Au g us t 25 , 20 08

. Wilk e rs on te sti fi e d for th e Go ve rnme nt. Carter testified in her de fense , and the Gove rnment impeac hed her with her prior

convictions. The jur y fo un d Ca rt e r g uil ty on a ll c ounts , and the dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc e d h e r t o c on c ur

re nt 3 7- mon th pri s on terms, followed by three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. The court a lso ordere d her to pa y restitution amounts of $116,503.67to Charter One Ba nk and $53,000.00 to Arg ent Mortg ag e. Carte r appea ls. II. Ana lys is A. Jury Instruction Cart e r a rgue s that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d wh e n it de c lin e d to g ive a

g oo d- fa ithins tr

uc tio n to the jur y . T his c ourt

re vie ws “ a dis tr ic t court ’s fa ilure to g ive a re qu e ste d ju

ry ins tr uc tio n f or a bu se of discre tion.” United States v. Bak er , 197 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir. 1999). “Ge nera lly , a def endant is entitled to an instruction on defense theories that are supported by law and r aised by

the evidenc e prese nted.” United States v. Tarwater , 308 F.3d 494, 510 (6th Cir. 2002) (c i t i n g Un i ted States v. Duncan , 8 50 F .2 d 1 10 4, 11 18 (6 th Cir

. 19 88 ))

. B ut, thi s c ourt re vie ws a jur y c ha rg e “ a s a wh ole to deter mine whether

the cha rg e fa ir l y an d adequa

tely submit[ ted] the issues and law to the jury .” Un ite d Stat es v. H

e ath , 5 2 5 F. 3 d

4 5 1 , 4 5 5 -5 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Buc kley , 934 F .2 d 84, 87 (6 th C ir . 1 99 1) ). “ A tri a l c ourt ’s re fu sa l to g ive a re qu e ste d ju

ry ins tr uc tio n is re ve rs ibl e
err or only if the instruction is (1) cor rec t, (2) not substantially cover ed by the ac tual jury

char g e, and5

(3) so important that failure to give it substantially impairs defe ndant’s def

ense.” Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Sassak , 881 F.2d 276, 279 ( 6th Cir. 1989)). I n sum, this court rever ses a district cour t’s decision “only

if the instructions, viewed a s a whole, w ere confusing , misleading and pre judicial.” Id. at 4 5 6 (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . Cl

ar k , 988 F.2d 1459, 1468 ( 6th Cir. 1993)). As su min g , a

rgue nd o, that Ca

rt e r o ff e re d a “ c or re c t” jury ins tr uc tio n, he r c la im s til l f

a ils beca use her g ood-fa ith de fense was substantially cover ed by

the jury char g e. See Tarwat er , 308 F.3d

a t 51 0, (p roce e din g dir e c tly to a n a na ly sis of the se c on d f

a c tor ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

g a ve a de qu a te instructions beca

use it instructed th e j u ry on the spec ific intent requir ed for a convic tion. As explained by

the trial judge at the hear ing on the motion to stay execution of judg ment and motion fo r b on d p e nd inga

pp e a l: [T] h e j u ry

instructions made cle ar that in order f or the jury

to find the defe ndant g uilty o f t h e char g es the jury would have to f

ind that she knowing ly , willfully and u n l aw f u l l y c o m m i t t e d

t h e o f f e n s e s an d g a v e t h e j u r

y t h e d e f i n i t i o no f kn o w i n g l y, g a v e t h e j u r

y t h e d e f i n i t i o no f w i l l f u l l y, an d g a v e t h e d e f

i n i t i o no f u n l aw f u l l y. This court’s e x planation in Tarwat er , a tax fraud c ase, is a lso ins tr uc tiv e : The district cour

t instructed the jury

on the spec ific i ntent require d for a conviction fo r f ili ngfa lse ta x re tur

ns by statin g : T h e w o r d “ w i l l f u l l y , ” a s u s e d

i nt h i s s t a tu t e , m e an s a v o l u n t ar y, int e n ti o n a l v io lati o no f

a kn o w nle g a l d

u ty
. I no th e r

w o r d s , the defe ndant m ust have acted voluntarily and int entionally and with the sp e c if ic int e nt t o d o s ome thi nghe kn e w the law p ro hib ite d, that is to say , with intent either to disobey or to disreg ard the law. Ne g lige nt conduct is not sufficie nt to constitut e willfulness. Th e jur y ’s c on c lus ion that Ta

rw ate r a c te d wi llf

ull y wo uld ne c e ssa ri ly neg ate a ny possibili ty

of “g ood faith” in filing false ta x returns. Id. (interna l citations omit ted); se e als o Un ite d S tat es v . P om

po nio , 429 U.S. 10, 13 (1 9 7 6 ) ( p er curiam) (holding in a tax fraud ca se that a g ood-fa ith instruction was unnecessa ry beca use t he trial6

judg e a d e qu a te ly

in s tr u c te d th e ju r y o nw il lf u ln e s s )

. T h u s , Ca

rte r ’ s c la im

f a il s b e c a u s e th e jury ’s fi nd ingthat sh e ha d th e re qu ir e d me ns re a fo r a c on vic tio n n e g a te d a ny po ssi bil ity

of a g oo d- fa ith defe nse. B. D ism iss al o f Wit ne ss Carter argues that the district cour t erre d when it limited the direct ex amination of Ke ny on J o h n s o n(“ J o h n s o n ”) o nre l ev an cy gro u n d s . T h i s co u rt re v i ew s a d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s ev i d en t i ary ru l i n gs for a n abuse of discretion. United States v. W agner , 3 8 2 F. 3 d

5 9 8 , 6 1 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Bartholomew , 3 10 F .3 d 9 12 , 9 20 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) ). Spe c if ic a lly , “ ‘[b ]ro a d d isc re tio n is g iven to district c ourts in de terminations of admissibili ty based on considerations of r eleva nce . . . and thos e decisions will not be lig htly overr uled.’” Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. J ackson-Randolph , 282 F.3d 369, 376 ( 6th Cir. 2002)). J ohnson testified for the defe nse that he w as a r ealtor w ho spec i alized in refur bishing pr op e rt ie s, and

tha t Ca rt e r wor ked as th e g e ne ra l c ontr a c tor fo r s ome of

his pr oje c ts. Ea

rl y in h is testimony , the Gover

nment objected to his testimony on rele vancy g rounds. After some discussion, Carter ’s counse l conce ded that Johnson had no personal knowledg e of the c onduct at issue at tria l

or o f th e f u n d s f r o m C h e n g ’ s Co me r ic a

B an k a c c o u n t. A f

te r a p r o f f e r b y Ca rte r ’ s c o u n s e l, the district cou rt d i s m i s s ed J ohnson as a witness. The court g ave the following explanation for John so n’ s d ism iss a l: The off ense he re r eg ardingthe Donna Che ng acc ount relates to discrete monies that wer e withdra

wn from the D onna Chengacc ount, and alleg edly the def endant participated by identifying, by making arr ang ements wit h the wit ness from Comeric a that that acc ount be opene d at Comerica and money be put in it and then monies w ere trac ed f ro m t h at account to People' s Ba nk and Hunting ton Ba

nk, and those a

re discrete transac tions. The fac t that the d ef en d ant was eng ag ed other wise in a le g iti ma te bu sin e ss i s n o a rgua ble -- ha s n o a

rgua ble re le va nc e to t he c ha rg e s.7

Cart e r c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld h a ve a llo we d J oh ns on to co nti nu e te sti fy ingbe c a us e his testimony

was re levant to her

g ood-fa ith arg ument. Specif i ca l l y , she maintains that it helped establish that it was customary for Car ter to rec eive larg e amounts of m oney into her acc ounts for ref urbishment projec ts, which she cla ims supports her position that she was a pa ssive rec ipient of these funds. Th e dis mis sa l w a s n ot a

n a bu se of dis c re tio n b e c a

us e , a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt state d, the le g a lity of Carter ’s other business dealing s was not at issue. J ohnson’s testimony is not rele vant t o the deter mination of whether

Carter conspired to commit access de vice f raud, c ommitt ed ac cess de vice fra ud, conspired to commit bank fraud, or conspired to commit wire fraud, which is wher e her g oodfaith def ense c ould find traction. Thus her claim fa ils. Mo re ov e r, e ve n if

the dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re ti on , the e rr or wa s h arm le ss b e c a

us e Carter prese nted her

g ood-fa ith arg ument during her own testimony , making it unlikely that the er ror
m at eria lly

aff ecte d the ver dict. See U

nited States v. Mac key , 2 6 5 F
. 3 d 4 5 7 , 4 6 3 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 1) (er rors re g ardingthe admission of evidenc e ar e subjec t to harmless err or ana ly sis). C. Sentence Carter argues that the district cour t imposed a sentenc e that wa s unrea sonable a nd inconsistent w ith 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a ) and United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). “ Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s mandate in Booke r , we r eview f or re asonable ness a se ntence imposed under an advisory

g uidelines scheme .” United States v. Dix on , 194 F. App’ x 344, 347 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). When this c ourt revie ws a sentenc e, it ensures that the district c ourt committed

no signific ant proce dural e rror s and then c onsiders the substantive re asonable ness of the se ntence8

imposed. United States v. Grossman , 513 F.3d 592, 595 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (qu o t i n g Ga l l v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Carter ’s a rgu m en t s fo cu s o nt h e s u b s t an t i v e r ea s o n ab l en es s o f h er s en t en ce , so this court need not consider whe ther the se ntence was proc edura lly rea sonable. United St ates v. Vallellanes , 339 F. App’ x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2009). “A se ntence is substantiv el y u n reasonable if the district court selec t[ s] t he sente nce a

rbitrar ily , bas[es] t he sente nce on imper missibl e fa ctors, fa il[ s] t o consider pertinent § 3553(a ) fa ctors or g iv[ es] an unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any pertinent fac tor.” Id. (q u o t i n g Un ite d S

tat es v . W

all s , 5 46 F.3 d 728, 73 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 8) ). Th e re is a re bu tta ble presumption of re asonable ness if the sentenc e fa lls withi n the prope rly calc ulated Guidelines r ang e. United States v. Vonne r , 516 F.3d 382, 389 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc). 1. Sentencing Disparity Carter argues that the district cour t erre d when it re fused to conside r the disparity betwee n her se ntence and Wilkerson’s, pursuant to § 3553(a ). A wide disparity does ex ist betwee n these two

se nte nc e s: Wi lke rs on

ha d a Gu ide lin e s range of 15 -21 mon ths , b ut w a s se nte nc e d to on e da y in p ri s o nwi t h cr ed i tfo r o n e d ay s er v edan d

3 y ea rs o f s u

p er v i s edre l ea s e. C ar t er

h ada gu i d el i n es ra n ge of 37-46 months , and was sentenc ed to 37 m onths in prison. Neverthe less, the district court did not

a bu se its dis c re tio n w he n it re fu se d to c omp are the tw o sen te nc e s. As pr e vio us ly e xpla ine d b y thi s
c ourt : Subsection 3553(a) (6) is c oncer ned with national dispa

rities among t h e many de fe nd ants wi th s imi lar c ri min a l ba c kg ro un ds c on vic te d of sim ila r c ri min a l c on du c t. I t is not concerne d with disparities betwee n one individual’s sentenc e and a nother individual’s sentence , despite the fa ct that the two ar e co- defe ndants. . . . A district judge , howeve r, may exercise his or he r d i s cr etion and dete rmine a de f e n d an t' s s e n te n c e in li g h t o f a c o - d e f e n d an t’ s s e n te n c e . T h a t a c ti o n , howeve r,9

wo uld be a dis c re tio na

ry on e be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

is n ot required to consider that ty pe of dispar ity

under § 3553( a)( 6). United States v. Simmons , 5 0 1 F
. 3 d 6 2 0 , 6 2 3

- 2 4 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( c i t at i o n s o m i t t e d )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, Cart e r’ s a rgume nt f a ils be c a us e the re a so na

ble ne ss of Wilk e rs on ’s se nte nc e is not be fo re the c ourt
. See U nited States v. Burley , 241 F. App’ x 290, 299-300 (6th Cir. 2007). Al tho ug h th e a

bo ve ana ly sis is dis po sit ive , it i s w or th n oti ngthat th e re are many re a so na ble

e xplanatio ns fo r the se nte nc ing dis pa ri ty
. Un lik e Cart e r, Wilk e rs on c on fe sse d a nd c oo pe rate d w ith the Gover nment, she wa s only

convicted on the third count of the indictment, she did not have an extensive criminal history , and she w as re cruited into the c onspiracy by Carter

. 2. Le ade r ship Enha nc e m e nt Carter appea ls the 2-point enhanc ement to her off ense le vel bec ause she was “ an org anizer, le a d e r , ma

n a g e r , o r s u

p e r v is o r ” in th e s u

b je c t “ c r im in a l a c ti v it

y . ” U
. S. S. G

. § 3 B 1

. 1 ( c)) . As an ini tia l matte r, the re is a

n o pe n q ue sti on wi th r e g ard

to t he sta nd ard of re vie w: As for the district court’s § 3B 1.1 leg al conc lusions, this court has not settled on the appropr iate standa

rd–de novo r eview or , in light of Buford v. United States , 53 2 U .S. 59, 121 S.Ct . 1276, 149 L .Ed.2d 197 (2001) , s o m ethi ng more de fer ential. United States v. Y

oung , 55 3 F .3 d 10 35 , 10 52 (6 th Cir .2 00 9) (n oti ng“ c on fu sio n w ith in t his ci rc u i t co n ce rn i n g t h e s t an d ar d o f re v i ew t h at s h o u l d b e ap p l i ed t o a d i s t ri ct co u rt 's de c isi on to i mpo se a

le a de rs hip e nh anc e me nt u nd e r § 3B 1. 1” ); see also United States v . A sh iq , 307 Fe d. App’x. 913, 915-16 (6th Cir.2009) (same)

. United States v. Elliot , 327 F. App’ x 540, 544 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ). In Elliot , the cour t “by pass[ed]

s et t l i n g th e s t an d ar d

o f r ev i ew b e c a u s e e v en u n d er d e n o v o re v i ew [ t h e d ef en d an t ’s ] ch al l en ge fail[ed].” Id. L ikewise, we decline to r esolve this dispute beca use Carte r’s claim fa ils under either standard of

revie w.10

He re , th e fo c us of

Cart e r’ s argume nt is not t hat th e 2- po int

e nh anc e me nt w a s unr e a so na ble

on its own; her argument is that it was unrea sonable be cause neither Wilkerson nor B eidoun re ceive d such an enhanc ement. As discussed a bove, the r easona

bleness of the sentenc es re ceive d by Carter ’s co-de fenda

nts is not at is sue. Ne verthe less, even if her a rg ument is c o n s t ru ed t o mean that Wil kerson a

nd Be idoun were the ac tual leade rs of the c onspiracy , it sti ll fai l s beca use it was establ i s h ed at trial that Carte r led the c onspiracy . She rec eived most of the f unds, rec ruited Wil kerson, a

nd planned how to e x ecute the fra ud. 3. Restit ution Carter argues that her restitution amount was unrea sonable whe n compar ed to Wilkerson’s The c ourt did not order W i l k er s o n to pay restitution, even thoug h she testified at trial that she

re c e ived a pp rox im ately

$3 0, 00 0 f

or he r s e rv ic e s; i n c on tr a st, the c ourt or de re d Ca

rt e r t o p a y

to Charter One B ank a r estitution amount of $116,503.67—t he same amount as Beidouin. Ag ain, the

rea sonablene ss of Wil kerson’ s sentence is not at issue. Additionall y , t he aw ard of restitution and the amount awa

rded w ere rea sonable be cause Carter was invol ved in t wo fra

udulent scheme s that led to losses of more tha n $201,300, and she r ece ived a substantial portion of that money

. See Un ite d S tat es v . B og

ar t , 576 F.3d 565, 569 ( “the amount of restitution ordere d by the district court is reviewe d for a

n abuse of

discretion.”) 4. F am ili al O blig at ion s Cart e r a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d w he n it did no t g ive a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e be c a us e sh e is the pr ima

ry c are g ive r o f h e r thr e e c hil dr e n, bu t me nti on e d Wil ke rs on ’s “ e xtra or din ary fa mil y obligations” as a r eason f or her lower se ntence . As alre ady di scussed, the r easona

bleness of Wilk e rs on ’s se nte nc e is n ot a n is su e be fo re the c ourt . F ur the rm or e , the dis tr ic t court a c te d w ith in11

its discretion when it did not impose a downwa rd depa rture f or familial reasons af

ter g iving Car

ter the opportunity to a

rg ue in f avor of a downwa

rd depa rture. Un ite d S

tat es v . H us e in , 478 F.3d 318, 32 6 ( 6th Cir

. 20 07 ) (m e nti on ing that su c h d ow nw a rd de pa rt ur e s are no t on ly

dis c re tio na

ry , b ut a lso discourag ed). Although it is unfortunate that Carter has made choice s that will separate her from her

c hil dr e n, thi s r e a lity

is n ot u nu su al. I n fact , it c ou ld h a ve be e n c le ar e rr or if the dis tr ic t c ourt had issued a downwa

rd depa rture. See U

nited States v. Holme

s , 9 8 3 F
. 2 d

1 0 6 9 (table) , 19 9 2 WL 393583, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec . 31, 1992) (per curiam) (holding t hat despit e the defenda nt’s status as the sole supporter

of his wife and three children, the district court erre d when it g ave a downwar d depar ture for familial obligations because “depar t u re downwar d in sentencingis not just ified [for family rea sons] except in unusual circumstanc es”)

.

5. Tether and Complying w ith the Direc tives of the Court Carter argues, without any

supporting c ase la

w, that the cour

t e rre d when it re fused to issue

a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e fo r t he 24 1 d ay s she sp e nt o n te the r p ri or to t ri a l and fo r h e r c omp lia

nc e wi th

“ the dir e c tiv e s o f t

he Court .” Withre g ard

to t he te the r a

rgume nt: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), “ [a] defe ndant shall be g iven cr edit toward the service of a te rm of i mprisonment for any time he has spent in officia l detention prior to the date th e s e n te n c e c o mm e n c e s ” in tw o s it u a ti o n s : “ ( 1 ) a s a r e s u lt o f th e o f f ense f or which the se ntence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other char g e for whic h the defe ndant was a

rre sted afte r the c ommissi on of the off ense . . . .” United States v. Carpenter , No. 07-4496, 2009 WL4981682, at * 4 (6 t h C ir. Dec . 22, 2009). Howe v er , t h er e i s n o case law that sug g ests that time on tether c an qualify as ser vice of a ter m of imprisonment under the statute, a nd there is no pla

usible argument for why

it would count. Carter’ s “dire ctives of the c ourt” a rg ument, whi ch she doe s not ex pound upon, is too vag ue to war rant consideration, and is thus waived. See D illery v. City of Sandusky , 398 F.3d 562, 569 ( 6th Cir. 2005)12

(“ I t is we ll- e sta

bli sh e d th a t ‘ iss ue s a dv e rt e d t o in a perfun c tor y mann e r, un a c c omp anie d b y so me eff ort at deve loped ar g umentation, are deeme d waived.’ ”). D. Im proper Juror Sele ction Carter alleg es in the “Summary

of the Ar g ument” section of her brief that “[the] district court also err ed whe n is [ sic] ex cused the only black juror throug h questionable blind draw method, even though de fense counsel objec ted.” Car ter ha s not adequately

raised this issue. I t i s not discussed

any wh e re e lse in h e r b ri e f e xce pt f or the a bo ve se nte nc e and

it wa s no t me nti on e d at or a l argume nt. There fore , it too is waived. See id. III . C onc lusi on For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM Carter ’s conviction and se ntence
.