UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA J OHN L . CORRI GAN, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 08-1403 (RMU)

: v. : Re Docume nt Nos.: 12, 14

: NATI ONAL

TREASURY EMPL OYEES : UNI ON et al. , : : Def endants. : MEMORAN DUM OP INION G R A N T I N G T H E D E F E N D A N T S ’ RE N E W E D M O T I O N S T O D I S M I S S F O R L A C K O F S U B J E C T M A T T E R J U R I S D I C T I O N

I. INTRODUCTION This matter come s befor e the c ourt on the re newe d motions t o dismiss filed by the defe ndants, the National Credit Union Administ ration (“ the NCUA” or “the ag ency”), the National Tre asury

Employ ees Union (“the N TEU” or “the union”) and the Of

fice of Personne l Manag ement (“ the OPM”). The union repre sents the ag ency ’s employ ees in the c ollective barg ainingproce ss. The pro se plaintiff, an e mploy ee of the ag ency , commence d this action in August 2008 challeng ing the validity of ce rtain provisions of a c ollective bar g ainingagree ment (“CB A”) enter ed into by

the ag ency

and the union. The defe ndants previously filed motions to dismiss , which the c ourt denied w ithout prejudice in August 2009. The def endants have now filed re newe d motions t o dismiss . Be cause the cour t concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff’s c laims, the court g rants the de fenda nts’ motions t o dismiss

.II. F ACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND

The pro se plaintiff commenc ed this action ag ainst the union, the ag ency and the OPM in August 2008, and filed an a mended c omplaint shortly there afte r. See ge nerally Compl.; Am. Compl. The plaintiff seeks a decla ratory judgme nt invalidating c erta in portions of the CBA that the ag ency

and the union ente red into in ea rly 2008. Id. Whil e the plaintiff’ s alleg ations are somewhat unc lear , it appear s that he see ks to invalidate the portions of the CB A conc erningthe compensation that ag ency employ ees a

re to re ceive for the time spe nt commuting and tr aveling overnig ht. SeeAm. Compl. ¶ 6. More spec ifically , the plaintiff cla ims that the CBA violates the OPM’s regulations conce rning“hours of work” and that the OPM’s re gulations conce rning “hours of work” are arbitra

ry , capr icious or an a

buse of discr etion. See id. ¶¶ 6, 8. The plaintiff also sug g ests that the CBA’ s provisions concer ning e mploy ees’ trave l reimburseme nts improperly

revised the Fe dera l Trave l Reg ulation (“F TR”). See id. ¶ 7. In two separ ate motions, the three defe ndants moved to dismiss t he ame nded complaint in late 2008, conte nding that the court lac ked subjec t matter over this action as a r esult of the plaintiff’s fa ilure to comply with the g rieva

nce pr ocedur es enume rate d in the CBA. See generally NTEU’ s Renewe d Mot.; NCUA and OPM’s Renewe d Mot. Bec ause ne ither motion attache d the provisions of the CBAconce rningthose proce dures, howe ver, the court wa s unable to conclude that the plaintiff’s cla ims should be dism issed. SeeMem. Orde r (Aug . 3, 2009). Consequently , the cour

t denied without prejudice the def endants’ origina l motions to dismi ss. Id. The union filed a

rene wed motion to dismi ss on Aug ust 10, 2009, see ge nerallyNTEU’ s Renewe d Mot., and the ag ency and the OPM filed a

joint renewe d motion to di smiss on August 14, 2009, see ge nerallyNCUA and O PM’s Renewed Mot. With briefingnow complete, the

2court turns to the a pplicable leg al standar d and the pa rties’ a rguments.

III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard f

or a Mot ion to Dism iss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1) Fe dera l courts ar e cour

ts of limit ed jurisdiction and the law presumes that “a c ause lies outside this li mited jurisdiction.” Kokkone n v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); St. Paul Mercury

Indem . Co. v. Red Cab Co. , 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency , 363 F.3d 442, 448 ( D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that “[a]s a court of limited jurisdiction, we beg in, and end, with an e x amination of our jurisdiction”)

. Be cause “subjec t-matter jurisdiction is an ‘Ar t[ icle] I I I as we ll as a statutory require ment[,] no action of the parties c an conf er subjec t-matter jurisdiction upon a f eder al court.’” Akinsey e v. D istrict of Columbia , 339 F.3d 970, 971 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Lt d. v. Compagnie de s Bauxite de G uinea , 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). O n a motion to dismi ss for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) , the plaintiff bea rs the burden of establishing by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the c ourt has subjec t matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defende rs of W ildlif e , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Be cause subject matter jur isdiction focuses on the c ourt’s powe r to hea r the c laim, howeve r, the c ourt must give the plaintiff’s fa ctual alleg ations closer sc rutiny when r esolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be require d for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Macharia v. U

nited States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 ( D.C. Cir. 2003); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v . Ashcroft , 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D .C. 2001). Thus, the cour t is not limi ted to the alleg ations contained in the c omplaint. Hohri v. United States , 782 F.2d 227,

3241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacate d on other grounds , 482 U.S. 64 (1987). When nec essar y , the cour

t may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts evidence d in the rec ord, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts plus the court’s re solution of disput ed fa cts. Herbe rt v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 ( D.C. Cir. 1992). B. Th e CourtLacks Su bjectMatt er Jurisdiction Over t he P laintif f’s Claims All three de fenda

nts assert that the c ourt lacks subjec t matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cla ims. See ge nerally NTEU’ s Renewe d Mot.; NCUA and OPM’s Renewe d Mot. More spe cifica lly , the ag ency and the OPM conte nd that the plaintiff’s c laims constitute a g rieva nce a nd, as such, a

re g overne d by

the g rieva

nce pr ocedur es set for

th in the CBA. See NCUA and O PM’s Renewed Mot. at 6. Sim ilarly , the union states that althoug h the plaintiff’s claims are difficult to deciphe r, he a ppear s to be arguing e ither that the CB A is contrar y to law or that the union brea ched its duty of fa ir repr esentation by

enter ing into the CB A. SeeNTEU’ s Renewe d Mot. at 6-9. I f the plaintiff is ar g uing the former , he may only raise that claim by

filing a g rieva nce or instit uting a

n unfair la

bor pra ctice pr ocee ding. See id. at 6-7. And if the plaintiff is arguing the latter, that c laim would constitute an alleg ation that the union had eng ag ed in an unfair la bor pra ctice, which could only be ra ised in a non-judicial unf air labor prac tice proce eding

. See id. at 7-9.

1 The plaintiff f

iled near ly

identical oppositions to the defenda nts’ rene wed motions to dismiss

. See ge nerallyPl.’s Opp’n to NTEU’s Rene wed Mot.; Pl.’s Opp’n to NCUA and O PM’s

T he OPM al so c ont end s t hat th e c om pla int again st it sho uldbe dis m is sedfo r f ai lur e t o st at e a 1 cl ai m . See NCUA andOPM ’s Rene wed M ot. at8. Be cau se the cou rt la cks sub j ect m at te r j uri sdi ct ion over t he p la int if f’ s c la ims, howe ver, t he c our t wi ll not add re ss thi s a rgum ent

.

4Renewe d Mot. In these oppositions, the plaintiff asser ts that the g rieva

nce pr ocedur e is not an 2 adequate forum f

or his claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n to NCUA and OPM’s Rene wed Mot. at 1. The plaintiff notes that althoug h he commenc ed an a ction befor e the F eder al L abor Rela tions Authority (“F L RA”), he instit uted this action as we ll because he does not be lieve the F L RA can g rant him the re lief he se eks. See id. at 2. The pla intiff also repe ats his assertion that the a g ency and the union we re pr ohibited from agree ing to a CBA that violates the OPM’s regulations and the FT R. See id. at 2-3. F inally , the plaintiff ar g ues that the OPM re g ulations conce rning“hours of work” are arbitra

ry and ca pricious. See id. at 4-7. Despite the pla intiff’s claims to the contra ry , the def

endants a re c orre ct that the plaintiff may not obtain relief f

or his claims in this court. The CBAdefine s a “grieva nce” as “a

ny complaint . . . by

any employ ee c oncer

ning a ny matter re lating the employ ment of that employ ee” or “by any employ ee . . . c oncer

ning . . . the eff

ect of interpre tation, or claim of br eac h, of [the CBA]; or . . . any

claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule or regulation affe ctingconditions of employ ment.” NTEU ’s Renew ed Mot., Ex. 1 (“CBA” ) Art. 31, § 2. Be cause the plaintiff’s c laims in thi s case relate to his employ ment and conte st the CBA’ s adher ence to applicable la ws and re g ulations, the claims constitute a g rieva nce. See id. In addition, the Civil Service Reform Ac t (“CSRA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et seq. , imposes on ag encie s and unions the duty to neg otiate CBAs in g ood faith “to the e x tent not inconsistent

T he o nly di ff

er enc e be twe en t he p la int if f’ s t wo opp osi ti ons is th at hi s op pos it ion to th e NCUA 2 andth e OPM ’s re newe d motion to di smiss c ont ai ns minoradd it ion s no t c ont ai nedin hi s oppo si ti on t o t he NT EU’s re newe d motion

. Compar e Pl. ’s Opp’ n t o NT EU’s Rene wed M ot. wit h Pl. ’s Opp’ n t o NCUA an d OPM ’s Rene wed M ot. Acc ord ingly, th e c our t wi ll ci te to th e pla int if f’ s op pos it ion to th e NCUA an d t he OPM ’s re newe d motion in summ ar izing th e pla int if f’ s po si ti on. 5with any

Fe dera l law or a

ny Gover nment-wide r

ule or re g ulation.” Id. § 7117(a) (1). Thus, the plaintiff’s conte ntion that the CBA is contra ry to applicable la

ws and re gulations may

also constitute a cla im that the union violated the CSR A by enter ing into the CB A. Be cause the plaintiff’s c laims amount to a g rieva nce, a CSR A cha lleng e, or both, he lacks

a re medy in this court. The CBAstates that the g rieva nce pr ocedur es enume rate d there in are “the exclusive procedur e ava ilable to barg ainingunit employ ees . . . f or re solving a

ny g rieva nce,” subject to exceptions not applicable in this case . CBA Ar t. 31, § 1. The CBAfurther specifie s that “[i] f a grieva

nce a lso constitutes an unfair la bor pra ctice ( ‘ULP’), the ag g rieve d party may seek r edre ss either unde r [the gr ievanc e proc edure s set forth in the CBA ] or through a UL P pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7116, but not bot h.” Id. § 5. The CSRA sets forth a fr amewor k for e nforc ing a

union’s obligation to “barg ain in g ood faith . . . to the extent not inconsist ent with any Fe dera l law or a

ny Gover nment-wide r

ule or regulation.” Filipiczyk v. U nited States , 88 Fe d. Cl. 776, 782-83 (2009) (c iting 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a) (1); Karahalios v. Nat’l Fede ration of Fed. Employee s, Local 1263 , 489 U.S. 527, 532- 35 (1989)) . Fa ilure to comply with § 7117(a) c onstitut es an unf air labor prac tice. See5 U.S.C. § 7116(a) (5), ( b)(5) (establishingthat a par ty ’s fa ilure to barg ain in g ood faith constitutes an unfa ir labor pra ctice) . The Supreme Court has clar ified that the CSRA forec loses a par allel re medy in the district courts in all but three limit ed instance s not applicable he re. Karahalios , 489 U.S. at 532. In other wor ds, no private c ause of action exists t o judicially enfor ce a fede ral e mploy ees union’s duty

to barg ain in g ood faith. Id. at 533; see also Burnett v. W est , 1996 WL471392, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug . 19, 1996) (a ffirmingthe district court’s dismissal beca use “f eder al district courts lac k jurisdiction to adjudicate unfa ir labor c laims arising under the [C ivil S ervic e Refor m]

6Act”) ; Nat’l Treasury Employe es Union , 23 F.L .R.A. 720, 722 (1986) (holdingthat the cour t lacke d subject matter jur isdiction over the plaintiff’ s alleg ations that a CBAviolated applica ble laws, rules or

regulations, and noting that those alleg ations could “be raised in other appropr iate proce eding s (such a s g rieva nce a rbitration and unf

air labor prac tice proc eeding s) and, if the ag ree ment provisions [ wer e] found to be violative of the Statute or a ny other a pplicable law , rule

or re g ulation, they

would be void and une nforc eable ”). I n short, the plaintiff’s objec tions to t he CBA must be ra ised pursuant to the proc edure s set forth in the CBAand the CSRA, and this court lac ks subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.

IV. CONCLUSION For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt g rants the de fenda nts’ rene wed motions to dismi ss the plaintiff’s amended c omplaint. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separ ately and conte mporane ously

issued this 5th day

of Mar ch, 2010.

RI CARDO M. URBI

NA United States District J udg e

7