alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Anthony DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-56614.

D.C. Nos. CV-98-01153-JSR, CR-92-00687-JSR.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 3, 2002.

Decided Jan. 16, 2003.

*177MEMORANDUM *

Defendant Paul Anthony Davis (“Davis”) appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) and for possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Davis first argues that *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), should apply retroactively to his conviction and sentence. Davis contends that under *Apprendi,*he was denied due process of law when the district court enhanced his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) without first submitting the issue of the prior conviction to the jury. This argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent decision in *United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes,*282 F.3d 664, 667-68 (9th Cir.2002). There, we held that *Apprendi*does not apply retroactively on collateral review.

Next, Davis contends that independent of *Apprendi*it was reversible error to apply the ACCA because the prior convictions necessary for sentencing under the ACCA were not alleged in the indictment or proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We considered this same argument in *United States v. Tighe,*266 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir.2001), and rejected it. In *Tighe,*we held that the three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense need not be alleged in a *178felon-in-possession § 924(g) prosecution where the sentence is later imposed under § 924(e)(1). *Id.*at 1191 (“Under the current state of the law, the Constitution does not require prior convictions that increase a statutory penalty to be charged in the indictment and proved before a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”); *see also United States v. Summers,*268 F.3d 683, 688-89 (9th Cir.2001).

*Jones v. United States,*526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) , and *Castillo v. United States,*530 U.S. 120, 120 S.Ct. 2090, 147 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000) , do not support a contrary result. Recidivism factors have been deemed traditional sentencing enhancements. 526 U.S. at 249, 530 U.S. at 128. Neither case supports Davis’ argument that the ACCA is a separate crime with elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt rather than a sentencing enhancement that need not be presented to the jury.

AFFIRMED

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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EXHIBIT 35.1

                    SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)

                        RESIDENTIAL FUNDING COMPANY, LLC

                RALI SERIES 2006-QS4 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized officer of Residential Funding Company, LLC,
as servicer  (the  "Servicer")  pursuant to the Series  Supplement,  dated as of
April 1, 2006, and the Standard Terms of Pooling and Servicing Agreement,  dated
as of March 1, 2006 (as  amended  from  time to time,  the  "Agreement"),  among
Residential  Accredit Loans, Inc., as company,  Residential Funding Company, LLC
(formerly  Residential Funding  Corporation),  as master servicer,  and Deutsche
Bank Trust Company Americas, as trustee, does hereby certify that:

1. A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during  the  period  covered  by the
Issuing Entity's report on Form 10-K and of the Servicer's performance under the
Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled
all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material  respects  throughout
such  period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:    /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
       Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
       Title: Managing Director
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**P&F INDUSTRIES, INC.**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Richard A. Horowitz, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that:

(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| /s/ Richard A. Horowitz     |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Richard A. Horowitz         |
| Principal Executive Officer |
|                        |
|                        |
| August 10, 2007             |

 

----
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Orient Paper, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Zhenyong Liu, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.

 

| Dated: February 1, 2010 | By:           | /s/ Zhenyong Liu                                                     |
|-------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                    |     | Zhenyong Liu

Chief Executive Officer

(principal executive officer) |

 

----
Exhibit 13.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of WNS
(Holdings) Limited (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | the accompanying annual report on Form 20-F of the Company for the year ended March 31, 2017 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: June 29, 2017



|       |  |                              
|------ |  | -----------------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Keshav R. Murugesh       
|Name:  |  | Keshav R. Murugesh           
|Title: |  | Group Chief Executive Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and is
not being filed either as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure statement, and is not to be incorporated by reference into the Report or any other filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless
of any general incorporation language in such filing. The foregoing certification shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to the liabilities of
Section 18 or Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
#### Eric L. SPANN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Colie L. RUSHTON, Warden at McCormick Correctional Institution; Charles Molony Condon, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 02-6928.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 18, 2002.

Decided Nov. 7, 2002.

Eric L. Spann, Appellant Pro Se. Samuel Creighton Waters, Office of the Attorney General of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Eric L. Spann seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and conclude that Spann has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. *See Spann v. Rushton,*No. CA-01-3505 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2002). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6274 

To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to revise the membership 

requirements for the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 14, 2021 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER (for himself, Mr. WILLIAMS of Texas, Mr. BUDD, Mrs. 

WAGNER, Mr. HUIZENGA, Mr. TIMMONS, Mr. MOONEY, Mr. EMMER, Mr. 

LOUDERMILK, Mr. POSEY, Mr. ROSE, Mr. KUSTOFF, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. 

STEIL, Mr. GONZALEZ of Ohio, Mr. GOODEN of Texas, Mr. DAVIDSON, 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH, Mr. MCHENRY, Mr. ZELDIN, Mr. HILL, Mr. 

BARR, Mr. LUCAS, and Mr. SESSIONS) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to revise the 

membership requirements for the Board of Directors of 

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘FDIC Board Account5 ability Act’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6274 IH

1 SEC. 2. FDIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS. 

2 Section 2 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 

3 U.S.C. 1812) is amended— 

4 (1) in subsection (a)— 

5 (A) in paragraph (1)— 

6 (i) in subparagraph (A), by adding 

7 ‘‘and’’ at the end; and 

8 (ii) by striking subparagraphs (B) and 

9 (C) and inserting the following: 

10 ‘‘(B) 4 of whom shall be appointed by the 

11 President, by and with the advice and consent 

12 of the Senate, from among individuals who are 

13 citizens of the United States, 1 of whom shall 

14 have State bank supervisory experience, and 

15 separately 1 of whom shall have demonstrated 

16 primary experience working in or supervising 

17 depository institutions having less than 

18 $10,000,000,000 in total assets.’’; and 

19 (B) by adding at the end the following: 

20 ‘‘(3) NON-VOTING STATUS OF THE DIRECTOR

21 OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTEC22 TION.—The Director of the Bureau of Consumer Fi23 nancial Protection shall serve as a non-voting ob24 server to the Board of Directors of the Corpora25 tion.’’; 

26 (2) in subsection (c)— 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6274 IH

1 (A) in paragraph (1), by adding at the end 

2 the following: ‘‘No individual may be appointed 

3 as a member for more than two terms.’’; and 

4 (B) by adding at the end the following: 

5 ‘‘(4) MAXIMUM LENGTH OF SERVICE.—Not6 withstanding any other provision of this Act, no per7 son shall serve as a member for more than twelve 

8 years in total.’’; 

9 (3) in subsection (d)(2)— 

10 (A) by striking ‘‘Consumer Financial Pro11 tection Bureau’’ each place such term appears 

12 and inserting ‘‘Bureau of Consumer Financial 

13 Protection’’; and 

14 (B) by inserting ‘‘or observer, as the case 

15 may be,’’ after ‘‘member’’; and 

16 (4) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ‘‘or of the 

17 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 99.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT


TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER





In connection with the Quarterly Report of PCA International, Inc.
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended November 3, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Barry Feld, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the
Board of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:    December 18, 2002





By:

/S/    BARRY FELDBarry FeldPresident, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board
208 La. 313

#### LOPEZ v. LOPEZ.

No. 37752.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 29, 1945.

*105James G. Schillin, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Solomon S. Goldman, of New Orleans, for appellee.

PONDER, Justice.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Celine Alleman Lopez, appeals from a judgment dismissing her suit for separation from bed and board. Her suit was dismissed by the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans on a plea to its jurisdiction based on the ground that the domicile of the defendant was in the Parish of East Baton Rouge.

After the appeal in this case was argued and submitted for decision in this Court, the attorney representing the plaintiff appellant moved to remand the case in order to introduce new evidence to establish the true situation. Attached to the motion to remand is a certified copy of a suit for divorce brought by the defendant against the plaintiff herein in the Chancery Court in Union County, State of Arkansas, wherein the defendant alleges that he is a resident of Union County, Arkansas, and has been for more than ninety days prior to the filing of the suit. The copy of the petition filed in the Arkansas court is duly authenticated under the acts of Congress.

Counsel for the defendant opposes the motion to remand on the ground that the lower court was without jurisdiction at the time the suit was tried, and the subsequent acquisition of a new domicile in Arkansas by the defendant could not vest the trial court with jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings.

In view of the fact that the defendant herein does not allege in his petition filed in the State of Arkansas the definite time he became a resident of that state, we are not prepared to state whether he is a bona fide resident of Arkansas, or, if so, when he became such a resident.

This Court cannot receive original evidence nor consider documents not introduced in the trial court. Paul Klopstock & Co., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 171 La. 296, 131 So. 25; State v. Strother, 179 La. 354, 154 So. 22; Stafford’s Estate v. Progressive Nat. Farm Ass’n, 198 La. 122, 3 So.2d 532; Articles 894 and 895 of the Code of Practice.

As the case now stands, the true situation is not presented, and the case should be remanded in the furtherance of justice and the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits. Rhodes v. Cooper, 113 La. 600, 37 So. 527; Mayer v. Barrow, 182 La. 983, 162 So. 748; Drehr v. Guaranty Bond & Finance Co., 184 La. 197, 165 So. 711; Hines v. Schumpert, 199 La. 740, 7 So.2d 39; Article 906, Code of Practice.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court is set aside, and the case is remanded in order that the parties to the litigation may have an opportunity to introduce evidence to show the true situation. All costs to await the final disposition of the suit.

O’NIELL, C. J., is of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant To

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Chyron Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael Wellesley-Wesley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(i) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:  August 10, 2007

| | /s/ Michael Wellesley-Wesley
| | ----------------------------
| | Michael Wellesley-Wesley    
| | President and               
| | Chief Executive Officer     
| |
#### Yuriy VYGOVSKIY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TUV RHEINLAND OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. DefendantAppellee.

No. 01-56555.

D.C. No. CV 00-00901-BTM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*342Submitted Oct. 8, 20021.

Decided Oct. 21, 2002.

Before PREGERSON, RYMER, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

1

. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM 2

Plaintiff-Appellant Yuriy Vygovskiy brought an action under the ADEA and Title VII alleging that he was terminated by Defendant-Appellee TUV Rheinland of North America, Inc. (“Defendant” or “TUV”) because of his age and national origin. Defendant moved for summary judgment, and the district court, holding that the plaintiff failed to make out a *prima facie*case of discrimination under either Title VII or the ADEA, granted the motion. The district court denied Plaintiff Vygovskiy’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the district court’s judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).

Plaintiff-Appellant here appeals the grant of summary judgment and claims abuse of discretion with respect to the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion. While Plaintiff-Appellant Vygovskiy did meet many requirements sufficient to establish a *prima facie*case under the ADEA (member of the protected class, sufficient job performance, and discharge), he failed to establish that he was replaced by anyone, much less one who was substantially younger. Accordingly, his *prima facie*case under the ADEA fails. Likewise, although Vygovskiy did meet many requirements sufficient to establish a *prima facie*case under Title VII (member of protected class, sufficient job performance), he failed to establish that he was replaced. Even so, Plaintiff-Appellant Vygovskiy might have been able to save his *prima facie*claim by offering evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination. However, because he failed to offer such evidence his *prima facie*claim falls.

Because the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) motion was not clearly illogical, we decline to reverse for abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.

2

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited in or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by NINTH CIRCUIT RULE 36-3.