# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 10, 2021

Decided June 10, 2021

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1326

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

ROBIN HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 14-20013-002

Michael M. Mihm, J udge

.

O R D E R

After serving two years in prison fo r conspiring to defraud the federal government, 18 U.S.C. § 286, Robin Harris began a three-year term of supervised release. Two years in, Harris, who worked at a nursing home, stole a resident’s checkbook and withdrew over $14,000 from the ba nk account. Harris pleaded guilty to state forgery charges, and the government moved to revoke her supervised release in federal court. At the revocation hearing , Harris pleaded guilty to violating the mandatory condition that she not commit anot her federal, state, or local crime. The district court revoked her supervised releas e and sentenced her to one year in prison and two years of supervised release. Harris filed a notice of appeal, but her appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 20-1326 Page 2

California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We agree with counsel and therefore grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

At the outset we note that the Constitu tion does not entitle a defendant to counsel in revocation proceedings if, as he re, she concedes the alleged violations and does not assert a substantial argument in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 789–90 (1973). We nonetheless analyze coun sel’s motion to withdraw under the Anders framework to ensure careful consideration of potential issues. See United States v.
Brown , 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief appears thorough; it explains the nature of the case and addresses the issu es that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. We notifi ed Harris of counsel’s motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), and she did not respond. We therefore focus our revi ew on the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey , 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel does not address whether Harri s wants to challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of the admissions on which her revocation was based. He should have consulted with Harris about this and discusse d the revocation only if she wished to
contest it. See United States v. Wheeler , 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). In any event, counsel correctly concludes that such a cha llenge would be frivolous. Before accepting Harris’s plea, the district court ensured sh e had received a copy of the charge and understood her right to a hearing, and it ga ve her an opportunity to present evidence and a statement in mitigation. See F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 32.1(b)(2). We note that the court, in informing Harris of the possible penalties of her violation (which was not required under Rule 32.1), explained only the guidel ine range of imprisonment, U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1, 7B1.4, and not the statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Even so, any claim that Harris did not knowingly plead guilty would be baseless: The court made sure that Harris had reviewed and discussed with her attorney the probation report stating that the statutor y maximum was two years. See Wheeler , 814 F.3d at 858. And even without Harris’s plea, the government proved by a preponderance of evidence that she committed forgery by submitting re cords of the state-court conviction and testimony from the victim’s son and a detect ive who, in reviewing surveillance videos, watched Harris withdraw money from the victim’s bank account. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Falls , 960 F.3d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 2020).

Next, counsel contemplates, and rightly re jects, a challenge to Harris’s one-year prison term on the basis that it exceeds the guideline range of four to ten months.
See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. We would vacate a sentence of reimprisonment after the revocation of supervised release only if it were plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Allgire

,No. 20-1326 Page 3

946 F.3d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 2019). Harris’s prison term is not. It does not exceed the statutory maximum of two years, 18 U.S.C. § 3583( e)(3), and, in arrivi ng at it, the court reasonably weighed the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Smith , 929 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2019). The court observed that Harr is’s forgery crime was not an isolated incident but a “series of separate criminal acts” against an elderly resident.
See § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C). The court was also “worried about the adequate deterrence of [her] problem,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), noting that she sh owed “no remorse” at the hearing and, months earlier, had obtained a $12,000 loan without her probation officer’s approval, even though she owed over $30,000 in restitution. Given the court’s explanation, Harris could not plausibly argue that her one-year prison term was plainly unreasonable.

Next, although counsel does not discu ss whether Harris could challenge her two-year term of supervised release, we conclu de that such a claim would be frivolous. Again, we would reverse only if the term of supervised release were plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Jones , 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014)

. The statute authorized a combined sentence of three years, and the district court had sentenced Harris to one year in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), (h). Plus, Harris’s combined three-year term did not exceed her original three-year term of supervised release.
See United States v. Russell , 340 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factor s adequately supports both components of her sentence. See United States v. Armour , 804 F.3d 859, 868 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus, Harris could not tenably argue that her two-year term was plainly unreasonable.

Last, counsel considers whether Harris could argue that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Harris coul d not bring such a claim because she did not have a constitutional right to coun sel for the revocation proceedings. See Gagnon

, 411 U.S. at 789–90; United States v. Clayton , 811 F.3d 918, 921–22 (7th Cir. 2016).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GR ANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.