NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

______________ 

No. 23-2426 

______________ 

BOANEGRES ISAIAS CASAMALHUAPA MORALES, 

 Petitioner 

V. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 

______________ 

On Petition for Review of a Decision of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(Agency No. A030-358-309) 

Immigration Judge: Tamar H. Wilson 

______________ 

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

July 11, 2024 

______________ 

Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: July 17, 2024) 

______________ 

OPINION∗

______________ 

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

∗

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent. 
2

Boanegres Isaias Casamalhuapa Morales seeks review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal of a final order of removal. 

For the following reasons, we will deny the petition. 

I

Casamalhuapa, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was admitted to the United 

States as a lawful permanent resident. In 2006, he was convicted of endangering the 

welfare of children in the third degree, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a). The 

crimes occurred on different dates in the late 1980s and mid-1990s and involved two 

different girls. He was sentenced to 364 days in jail, five years’ probation, and lifetime 

community supervision. 

Casamalhuapa was thereafter charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)

as a noncitizen convicted of (1) two crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) not 

arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii); (2)

an aggravated felony for the murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor, 8 U.S.C. § 

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); and (3) the crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment

(“crime of child abuse”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Casamalhuapa appeared before an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denied all removability charges, and moved to terminate the 

proceedings, arguing that his convictions did not categorically qualify as CIMTs, 

aggravated felonies, or crimes of child abuse. The IJ sustained the CIMT and child abuse 

removability charges, but not the aggravated felony charge. 

 
3

Casamalhuapa then applied for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of 

removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). After hearing Casamalhuapa’s testimony, the IJ 

denied his applications for relief because his crimes of conviction are CIMTs and crimes 

of child abuse, and constitute particularly serious crimes.1 The BIA dismissed his appeal. 

Casamalhuapa petitioned for review and we granted the Government’s motion to remand 

to allow the BIA to consider the divisibility of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a) in light of 

Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016). On remand, the BIA dismissed the appeal, 

holding, as relevant here, that (1) N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a) was divisible in that it set 

forth two crimes, one based on sexual conduct and a second based on abuse or neglect; 

(2) the relevant documents showed Casamalhuapa was convicted of engaging in sexual 

conduct which would “impair or debauch the morals of the child”; (3) this crime is a 

categorical match with the crime of child abuse and CIMT; and (4) the IJ did not need to 

consider the statute’s divisibility to determine whether the crime of conviction was a 

“particularly serious crime.” Casamalhuapa petitions for review. 

1

 The IJ also held that Casamalhuapa did not warrant a favorable exercise of 

discretion for his cancellation of removal application and that he was not entitled to CAT 

relief because he did not show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured in 

El Salvador were he removed. 
4

II2

A 

To decide whether a state conviction qualifies as a basis for removal, we must 

examine whether the state offense matches an offense listed under the INA. Nunez v. 

Att’y Gen., 35 F.4th 134, 139 (3d Cir. 2022). This so-called “categorical approach” 

requires that we consider only the elements of the crime of conviction. Id. (quoting 

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013); Cabeda v. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 165, 

167 (3d Cir. 2020)). If “the minimum proof required for the state offense . . . satisf[ies] 

each element of the federal generic definition,” then the two offenses are a “categorical 

match,” and no further analysis is necessary. K.A. v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 99, 109 (3d 

Cir. 2021). Some statutes contain multiple crimes and others list different means to 

commit the same crime. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504-05. For statutes that contain multiple 

crimes, we must determine which of those crimes was the basis for the conviction. Id. 

Casamalhuapa was convicted of violating N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a). The BIA 

relied on the version of the statute in effect in 2006, which was the year of conviction. 

That version of the statute provided: 

Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed 

responsibility for the care of a child who engages in sexual conduct which 

2

 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. We have 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision 

and adds its own analysis, “we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions, referring to 

the BIA’s opinion ‘generally’ and to the IJ’s opinion ‘when necessary.’” Luziga v. Att’y 

Gen., 937 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal citation omitted). We review the BIA’s 

legal determinations de novo, Nunez, 35 F.4th at 139. 
5

would impair or debauch the morals of the child, or who causes the child 

harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child . . . is guilty of 

a crime of the second degree. 

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a).3

 The statute has two clauses, separated by “or.” More 

specifically, the statute makes it a crime to: (1) engage in sexual conduct which 

3

 No party challenges the BIA’s reliance on the 2006 version of the statute but 

reliance on it may have been error as the crimes occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, and 

other versions of the statute were in effect at those times. See Spanier v. Dir. Dauphin 

Cnty. Prob. Servs., 981 F.3d 213, 222 (3d Cir. 2020) (“The Due Process Clause requires 

that a criminal statute ‘give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.’” (citation 

omitted)); but see McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 818, 820 (2011) (consulting, in 

an Armed Career Criminal Act case, the 1994 statutes and penalties in effect at the time 

the defendant was convicted for crimes he committed between 1991 and 1994). Even if 

so, the error is harmless, see Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 

2011) (“[H]armless error analysis . . . appl[ies] in immigration cases,” and an error is 

harmless “when it is highly probable that [it] did not affect the outcome of the case.”), as 

the relevant language of the 2006 version is nearly identical to the language of the 1984 

and 1995 versions. Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a) (effective Jan. 17, 1984, to 

Apr. 2, 1992) (“Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has 

assumed responsibility for the care of a child who engages in sexual conduct which 

would impair or debauch the morals of the child, or who causes the child harm that would 

make the child an abused or neglected child as defined in R.S.9:6-1, R.S.9:6-3 and 

P.L.1974, c.119. s.1 (C.9:6-8.21) is guilty of a crime of the third degree. Any other 

person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this subsection to a 

child under the age of 16 is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.”), and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 

2C:24-4(a) (effective June 1, 1995, to May 1, 1999) (providing the same, but replacing, 

from the 1984 version, “third degree” with “second degree” and “fourth degree” with 

“third degree”), with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a) (the 2006 version) (identical to the 

1995 version). The only difference between the current version of the statute, see N.J. 

Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a) (effective Feb. 1, 2018), and that of the 1995 and 2006 versions 

is the formatting, which divides the alternative types of conduct into statutory 

subsections. See N.J. Comm. Rep., 2012 N.J. Sen. B. No. 2493, N.J. 215th Leg. - 2d 

Ann. Sess. (June 6, 2013); Assemb. Comm. Statement, 215th Leg., Assemb. B. 3735 

(June 6, 2013) (showing the division of the statute into these subparts by the New Jersey 

legislature in 2013).
6

would impair or debauch the moral of the child (“the sexual conduct alternative”), 

or (2) cause a child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child 

(“the abused child alternative”). The disjunctive “or” as well as the different 

conduct described demonstrate that the statute contains two crimes. See United 

States v. Williams, 898 F.3d 323, 333 (3d Cir. 2018) (deeming a statute with a 

disjunctive “or” divisible because it “proscribes two alternative forms of conduct: 

either racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debt” (emphasis omitted)). 

Based on this text, the statute is divisible.4 

Because the statute contains more than one crime, we must identify the part of the 

statute that formed the basis for the conviction. To do so, we apply the modified 

categorical approach, which allows us to look at “a limited class of documents” to 

determine under which alternative element was at issue. See Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505-06; 

Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). Casamalhuapa does not contest 

4

 Other sources also show that the statute is divisible. For example, (1) New 

Jersey caselaw distinguishes between the two alternatives, see State v. Hackett, 764 A.2d 

421, 430-31 (N.J. 2001) (discussing, in a case involving a version of § 2C:24-4(a) with 

language identical to the 1995 version, the elements of the crime focused solely on the 

sexual conduct alternative); and (2) the model jury instructions of § 2C:24-4(a) provide 

two distinct alternative elements for both the types of conduct mentioned in the statute—

either “sexual conduct” or conduct that “would make the child abused or neglected”—

and types of harm—sexual “conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the 

victim” or “conduct [that] would cause the victim harm that would make the victim 

abused or neglected,” see N.J. Criminal Jury Instructions, 2C:24-4(a) (approved Nov. 10, 

2003, when the language of the statute matched the version under which Casamalhuapa 

was convicted). 
7

that the record here, including the indictment, demonstrates that he was convicted of the 

sexual conduct alternative of § 2C:24-4(a). 

We next consider whether the sexual conduct alternative of § 2C:24-4(a) 

categorically constitutes a crime of “child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Under the INA, child abuse includes “mental or 

emotional harm, including acts injurious to morals,” Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 

884 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), and the statute’s reference to “the 

morals of [a] child” addresses the type of harm contemplated by the INA. Nunez, 35 

F.4th at 139-41. The sexual conduct alternative of the statute, which expressly addresses 

conduct that would “impair or debauch the moral of the child,” is a categorial match to 
8

the offense of child abuse under the INA, and the BIA correctly held that 

Casamalhuapa’s sexual conduct alternative conviction makes him removable.5

 B6

Casamalhuapa is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under both the 

INA and the CAT because he was convicted of a particularly serious crime. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (withholding of removal under 

the INA); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (withholding of removal under the CAT). IJs have 

“broad discretion to determine whether a prior conviction is a particularly serious crime, 

through a case-by-case adjudication.” Grijalva Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 978 F.3d 860, 

870 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This requires the IJ to 

consider whether the offense’s elements “potentially bring the crime into a category of 

5

 Casamalhuapa asserts that the BIA should have addressed the IJ’s CIMT finding 

because if his offenses were not deemed CIMTs, he could have applied for adjustment of 

status. This argument does not provide him a basis for relief. First, Casamalhuapa did 

not raise this argument before the IJ and, therefore, his request for adjustment of status 

was not exhausted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of 

removal only if the [noncitizen] has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the 

[noncitizen] as of right.”); Mirambeaux v. Att’y Gen. United States, 977 F.3d 288, 293-

94 (3d Cir. 2020) (deeming CAT claim unexhausted where the petitioner did not 

challenge the IJ’s CAT denial before the BIA). Second, the BIA could not grant 

Casamalhuapa an adjustment of status because the crime of conviction constituted a 

CIMT as it was a conviction for sexual conduct with a minor, which is depraved. Thus, 

the BIA’s analysis would have been futile. See Grijalva Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 978 F.3d 

860, 865 n.3 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that “we may forgo review” of a challenged 

removability ground where two removability grounds were established, “if review would 

be ‘futile’” (quoting Ricketts v. Att’y Gen., 955 F.3d 348, 351 (3d Cir. 2020))). 

6

 We review particularly serious crime determinations de novo. Luziga, 937 F.3d 

at 252 n.9. 
9

particularly serious crimes.” Luziga v. Att’y Gen. United States, 937 F.3d 244, 253 (3d 

Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). If so, the IJ then considers “all reliable information[,] . . . 

including the conviction records and sentencing information, as well as other information 

outside the confines of a record of conviction.” Id. (alteration in original). Contrary to 

Casamalhuapa’s assertion, this analysis does not require the BIA to consider whether the 

statute embodying the crime of conviction is divisible. Cf. Bastardo-Vale v. Att’y Gen. 

United States, 934 F.3d 255, 266 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that particularly 

serious crimes are not limited to the elements of the crime but rather, determined on a 

“case-by-case basis”). Because Casamalhuapa does not contend that the IJ improperly 

conducted this analysis, and, given that he engaged in sexual offenses with two of his 

nieces who were five and seven years old at the time of the crimes, and received a jail 

sentence and lifetime supervision, we will leave undisturbed the BIA’s conclusion that he 

committed a particularly serious crime. 

III

 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review.