AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 22, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-22-00190-CR

No. 05-22-00191-CR

No. 05-22-00192-CR

STEVE ERIC ROBERSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F-2051158-Q, F-2051159-Q, and F-2051160-Q

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel

Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III

A jury found appellant guilty of two charges of aggravated assault. The trial 

court sentenced appellant to sixty years’ confinement for one offense and twenty 

years’ confinement for the other. Additionally, the jury found appellant guilty of 

causing serious bodily injury to an elderly person. The trial court assessed punishment

at sixty years’ confinement therefor. Appellant brings eight issues on appeal

challenging all three judgments. We affirm the three judgments.
–2–

BACKGROUND

All three complaining witnesses testified at appellant’s trial.

The record contains the following testimony of Antwaneequa Anderson: She 

met appellant in 2008 or 2009. They had children together and lived together but did 

not marry. She subsequently resided with her parents, Jacqueline Anderson and Alton 

Anderson. On January 6, 2020, she was with her parents in their apartment. Appellant 

knocked at the door. She opened it, and appellant walked in. He told her, “I want you 

to come back home. You gonna come back home.” She replied, “No.” He hit her face 

with his fist. She threatened to call police, and he replied, “I’m gonna go in here with 

your mom and daddy.” He walked toward her parents’ room and pulled out a firearm. 

She heard gunfire. Appellant was by the kitchen area at the entrance to her parents’ 

bedroom. She couldn’t remember how many times he fired. She went to a bookshelf 

where she kept her pistol. “Then I reach for my gun, and I get it down, and I start 

shooting at him.” She fired at appellant and missed. He turned and fired at her. 

Appellant shot her. She tried to block appellant from their son’s room. Appellant was 

still shooting at her. He left the apartment. She had been shot in the hand, arm, and 

shoulder. She ran into her parents’ room. Her father was lying on the floor. He was 

unresponsive, and she thought he was dead. Antwaneequa had been shot in the hands, 

shoulder, and arm. The prosecutor asked her, “You’re a hundred percent sure that 

Steve Eric Roberson shot your dad, your mom, and you on January 6, 2020?” She 

replied, “Yes.”
–3–

The record contains the following testimony of Alton Anderson: Alton 

Anderson was seventy-one years old on January 6, 2020. On that date, he was asleep 

in his bed. He awoke and saw appellant standing in the doorway of his bedroom and 

raising his hand to shoot. Appellant had a pistol and fired at him. He thought he was 

shot three times. He tried to stand up and lean on a dresser when appellant shot him 

in the arm. He fell to the floor and thought he would die. The prosecutor asked, “[T]his 

man here in the courtroom Steve Roberson is the one that shot you on January 6, 

2020?” Alton replied, “Yes.” 

Antwaneequa’s mother, Jacqueline Anderson, testified as follows: She was 

sixty-four years old on January 6, 2020. On that date, she was in her bedroom at her 

apartment. She heard a knock at the apartment door and heard Antwaneequa say, 

“Why you going in my mother’s room?” Then appellant was at her bedroom door. 

She “quickly” recognized it was appellant because she had known him for years. He 

had a gun in his hand. Appellant’s hand went up, and “all of a sudden I saw flashes.” 

Appellant shot Alton twice and then shot her twice. She was hit on an arm and on her 

back. She fell to the floor, and appellant shot Alton again. She saw Alton and 

Antwaneequa were injured. The prosecutor asked, “And just to be clear, the individual 

seated at this table over here, Mr. Roberson, is the one that did that to all three of 

y’all.” She responded, “Yes. Yes, he did.”
–4–

The jury convicted appellant for aggravated assault of Antwaneequa Anderson,

1

for which the trial court assessed punishment at sixty years’ confinement. The jury 

convicted appellant of injury to an elderly individual for shooting Alton Anderson,2

and the trial court assessed punishment therefor at sixty years’ confinement. The jury 

convicted appellant of aggravated assault of Jacqueline Anderson, and the trial court 

assessed punishment therefor at twenty years’ confinement.

This appeal followed.

 

1

Section 22.02 of the Texas Penal Code provides:

(a) A person commits an offense if the person commits assault as defined in § 22.01 and the 

person:

(1) causes serious bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse; or

(2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.

PENAL § 22.02. Section 22.01, defining assault, in part provides: “(a) A person commits an offense if the 

person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person’s 

spouse . . . .” PENAL § 22.01(a)(1). Section 22.02(b)(1)(A) provides aggravated assault is a first-degree felony 

if “the actor uses a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault and causes serious bodily injury to a 

person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b) . . . Family 

Code.” PENAL § 22.02(b)(1)(A). 

2

Section 22.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides:

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal 

negligence by act . . . causes to a . . . elderly individual:

(1) serious bodily injury;

(2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury; or

(3) bodily injury.

Section 22.04(c)(2) defines “elderly individual” as “a person 65 years of age or older.” Section 22.04(e) 

provides, “An offense under Subsection (a)(1) or (2) . . . is a felony of the first degree when the conduct is 

committed intentionally or knowingly. . . .”
–5–

APPELLANT’S REMOVAL FROM THE COURTROOM 

DURING VOIR DIRE

Appellant complains in his first three issues on appeal of his removal from the 

courtroom during jury voir dire proceedings. He complains, 

Appellant’s Issue 1: The trial court erred in removing the defendant 

from the courtroom during jury selection thereby violating his 

constitutional right to be present during every phase of the trial 

proceedings against him as afforded by the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Appellant’s Isssue 2: The trial court erred in removing the defendant 

from the courtroom during jury selection thereby violating his 

constitutional right to be present during every phase of the trial court 

proceedings against him as afforded by Article I, Section 10 of the 

Texas Constitution.

Appellant’s Issue 3: The trial court erred in removing the defendant 

from the courtroom during jury selection thereby violating his 

constitutional right to be present during every phase of the trial 

proceedings against him as afforded by Article 33.03 of the Texas Code 

of Criminal Procedure.

A pretrial hearing on February 16, 2022, concerned appellant’s decision of 

whether the trial court or the jury would assess possible punishment. The trial court 

explained the law, and appellant interrupted the trial judge and said, “That’s a lie.” 

The trial court responded, “That’s what the law says.” Appellant responded “That ain’t 

what no law say.” The trial court stated, “There is no way that I can put Mr. Roberson 

back in the holdover. The microphone’s not working back there, but I’ve decided to 

go ahead and let him come out here and just spew whatever he wants to say . . .” 

Appellant interrupted the trial court, “Cause you lyin. You lyin and I know it.” 
–6–

Appellant continued to interrupt the trial court. At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial 

court stated, “You are shooting yourself in the foot with your behavior.” Appellant 

responded, “You shooting yourself in the foot.”

The next day, the trial court stated proceedings were on the record. Appellant 

continued to interrupt and attempted to argue with the trial court. He interrupted the 

trial court again and said, “You lyin.” Appellant continued to interrupt. Subsequently, 

the trial court stated to the court reporter, “Make sure it’s clear that he’s talking while 

I’m talking . . .” Appellant interrupted, “I can speak. You gonna tell me I can’t?” 

Appellant continued to interrupt. The trial court discussed with counsel how to 

conduct proceedings if appellant were removed from the courtroom: 

THE COURT: Mr. Ashford, how did y’all do it before [when] you had 

somebody that had to [be] put outside? We’re gonna try to get this done. 

We are gonna try this if I have to stand on my head.

MR. ASHFORD: There was a laptop right there at the—at the glass.

MR. SEARCEY: We had to stream it to him.

THE COURT: I’ll get my laptop.

The proceedings moved to the central jury room. The trial court began jury voir 

dire. Appellant soon interrupted the trial court as it introduced the jury to the court 

reporter. The trial court said, “Mr. Roberson, please.” He continued to interrupt. The 

trial court said: “Mr. Roberson, if you would, please. We’ve talked about this. Work 

with us, Mr. Roberson.” Appellant responded, “I am working with you.” Soon after, 

appellant again interrupted the trial court, which stated, “Please, Mr. Roberson, 
–7–

please.” The trial court stated to the court reporter, “Kendra, take what you can, and 

take me when there’s—when there are two of us talking.” Soon after, appellant 

interrupted the trial court and stated, “That’s a lie.” The trial court responded, “Mr. 

Roberson, please.” Appellant continued to interrupt the trial court, which stated to the 

court reporter, “Take what you can, Kendra, and when you can’t and you have two 

choices, take me.” Appellant continued to interrupt the trial court and stated, “I can 

talk. Freedom of speech, right?” After additional interruption by appellant, the trial 

court stated,

All right. We’re gonna do the best we can. The law also requires that an 

individual charged with a crime be present. Be present at all hearings, at 

all proceedings, absolutely be present during jury selection. 

So I am going to do the best I can, including stand on my head maybe 

before it's over, to try to see that Mr. Roberson remains out here so that 

he can see you and see what the attorney for the State says and what the 

attorney for the defendant says and be able to assist his attorney as the 

law also contemplates in handling the case. I'm gonna do the best I can 

to keep Mr. Roberson out here, and I'm really hoping that he will 

cooperate with that so that we can talk to y'all and let a lot of y'all go.

Subsequently, appellant interrupted and attempted to argue with the trial court 

at length. Eventually, another exchange occurred, ending as follows: 

THE COURT: Mr. Roberson, if you'll wait just a second.

THE DEFENDANT: Then you put a different clerk on there, which ain't 

no DA. Don't lie in front of these motherfucking people. Tell the truth.

THE COURT: Out we go. 

THE DEFENDANT: Bitch, tell the truth, ho. 
–8–

THE COURT: Out we go. 

THE DEFENDANT: What the fuck you talking about? Tell the 

motherfucking truth, bitch. Fuck you talking about? Don't lie. You heard 

what the fuck I said. Fuck you lying for? 

The court reporter’s record indicates appellant then was removed from the courtroom.

The trial judge then addressed potential jurors, saying in part:

And so, please know that many things have gone on before today, and 

people in the court system are often unhappy. I understand that. You 

are still gonna be asked as a jury—obviously, we don't wipe things out 

of our mind, and I do not know what's gonna happen up in the 

courtroom, certainly don't know what's gonna happen when witnesses

begin to testify, but I'm gonna do the best I can to see that he is in the 

courtroom, if we're able to do that, but we're gonna still ask you, even 

though you're not required to wipe your mind, I don't know how you do 

that, how anybody can do that but still required to ask you to look at the 

witness, to consider the law, to base your verdict on what comes out 

because this isn't evidence. 

This is not evidence. You are entitled to consider any number of things 

in making a decision, but as far as guilty or not guilty of two aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapons and injury to an elderly person, that's got 

to come from the evidence, and I promise I'll be right back.

The trial court subsequently stated appellant could view voir dire proceedings 

via video in another courtroom. It said, “We’re about to—we’re about to log him on 

up in—upstairs in the courtroom.” The trial court explained how court personnel 

would arrange for appellant’s remotely viewing and listening to the proceedings. The 

trial court stated, “[W]e are doing everything we can to be sure that he’s able to watch 

in the absence . . . Doing the best we can to make sure that he has access, and at least 

it’s there.” The trial court then resumed voir dire proceedings.
–9–

The trial court admonished potential jurors:

Presumption of innocence. You—I know we've had a couple little 

things happen this morning, and there is a likelihood that we can have 

some more happen. I am gonna ask you, as adults who have had 

experiences in life and who know how things work and how upsetting 

situations can be, I'm going to ask you, despite what the unhappiness 

of—of Mr. Roberson, who clearly he is unhappy and angry, I'm gonna 

ask you to, despite any of those kind of things, to presume him innocent 

at the beginning of the trial because he is. 

At this point, he is presumed innocent of these three offenses. Why? 

Because you hadn't heard anything. You hadn't heard a witness. You 

hadn't seen a document. You haven't seen a videotape. You haven't 

heard from any of these people. 

He's not guilty right now if you were asked to decide, but you have to 

be able to say, regardless of what I saw this morning, which is 

unfortunate, and Mr. Roberson has—we have many times tried to say, 

this is what you wanted. Here you are. Please don't. This is hurting you, 

but I'm asking you now to despite that, to please give Mr. Roberson a 

fair trial. 

Listen to his—listen to the evidence. If you think he's not guilty, despite 

any unhappy behavior, anger, disruption, find him not guilty. If you 

believe he is guilty, find him guilty. That's all we're asking—all we're 

asking you to do.

Appellant argues his exclusion from the courtroom violated the Sixth and 

Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, section 10 of the

Texas Constitution, and Article 33.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See 

U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 33.03.

We review a trial court's decision to exclude a criminal defendant from trial for 

an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Kessel v. State, 161 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Tex. App.—
–10–

Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343

(1970) (courts must be given sufficient discretion to determine the appropriate manner 

of handling a disruptive defendant in the courtroom). We will uphold the trial court's 

ruling so long as it is “within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Kessel, 161

S.W.3d at 44.

The Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation requires any defendant 

threatened with the loss of liberty to be physically present at all phases of the criminal 

proceedings against him. Allen, 397 U.S. at 338; Miller v. State, 692 S.W.2d 88, 90 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see also Sanchez v. State, 702 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1985, pet. ref'd) (criminal defendant has a fundamental right to be present at 

every stage of his trial). The Texas Constitution provides the defendant with a similar 

right to be present in the courtroom during his trial. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; 

Sanchez, 702 S.W.2d at 259.

The Court in Allen held removal from the courtroom would be warranted if, 

after being warned by the trial court of the possibility of removal, the defendant 

continues to conduct himself “in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful 

of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.” 397 U.S. at 

343. For constitutional purposes, the defendant need only be present in the courtroom 

at the commencement of trial, which includes any time after the voir dire process has 

begun, and may thereafter voluntarily absent himself from the trial, either expressly 

or through his disruptive conduct. See Sumrell v. State, 326 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex.
–11–

App.—Dallas 2009, pet. dism’d); see also Miller, 692 S.W.2d at 91 (defendant who 

is present at the time voir dire begins, but who thereafter voluntarily removes himself 

from the courtroom, forfeits his Sixth Amendment rights); Tracy v. State, 14 S.W.3d 

820, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. ref'd) (defendant's Sixth Amendment rights 

were not violated when he voluntarily absented himself from trial after the 

commencement of voir dire, but before jury was selected); Ashley v. State, 404 S.W.3d 

672, 680 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (“After commencement of trial 

proceedings, a defendant may voluntarily absent himself from the trial without a 

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to be present during all phases of the trial.”).

Appellant’s conduct after commencement of voir dire proceedings, quoted 

above, was so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial could 

not be carried on with him in the courtroom. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343; Sumrell, 326 

S.W.3d at 624. The trial court indicated prior to appellant’s removal from the 

courtroom that it considered his possible removal due to his conduct, as addressed 

above. Consequently, we conclude appellant’s removal from the courtroom during 

jury voir dire was not constitutionally improper. See Barrier v. State, Nos. 05-20-

00088-CR, 05-20-00089-CR, 05-20-00090-CR, 05-20-00091-CR, 05-20-00092-CR, 

05-20-00093-CR, 2021 WL 2562145, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 23, 2021, pet. 

ref’d) (memo op., not designated for publication) (appellant’s removal from 

courtroom during voir dire due to his behavior did not violate the Sixth Amendment 

of the U.S. Constitution or Article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution).
–12–

In Texas, however, a defendant is given additional protection by statute and has 

an absolute right to remain in the courtroom until the jury has been selected. Sumrell,

326 S.W.3d at 623, n.2 (“[t]his right is codified under state law in article 33.03 of the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which is even more protective of a defendant's 

rights than the constitutional provisions because the right to be present cannot be 

waived before the jury is selected.”) (citing Miller, 692 S.W.2d at 91). Article 33.03 

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part: 

In all prosecutions for felonies, the defendant must be personally 

present at the trial ... provided, however, that in all cases, when the 

defendant voluntarily absents himself after pleading to the indictment 

or information, or after the jury has been selected when trial is before a

jury, the trial may proceed to its conclusion.

CRIM. PROC. art. 33.03.

Although a defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to be present in 

the courtroom after trial commences, under Article 33.03, “an accused's right to be 

present at his trial is unwaivable until such a time as the jury has been selected.” 

Miller, 692 S.W.2d at 89. Similarly, as this Court has concluded, while a defendant's 

Sixth Amendment rights are not violated when the defendant voluntarily absents 

himself after his trial has commenced, his statutory rights are violated when the trial 

court holds jury selection in his absence, because the “right to be present until 

selection of the jury cannot be waived.” Tracy, 14 S.W.3d at 826; Ashley, 404 S.W.3d 

680 (distinguishing between the constitutional right to be present at trial that may be 

forfeited, and the statutory right to be present through jury voir dire, which may not 
–13–

be waived); see also Bledsoe v. State, 936 S.W.2d 350, 351 n.2 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

1996, no pet.) (given the mandatory language of the statute, it is error to proceed with 

a trial if the defendant is absent during jury selection regardless of the reasons for the 

absence).

However, to the extent appellant’s removal during voir dire violated article 

33.03, we conclude any error was not reversible error. Because the error was statutory, 

we may not reverse unless we determine the error affected a substantial right. See 

Tracy, 14 S.W.3d at 827. A substantial right is affected when the error (1) had a 

“substantial and injurious” effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict or (2) 

leaves one in grave doubt whether it had such an effect. See id. A substantial right is 

not affected and the error is harmless if, after reviewing the entire record, the appellate 

court determines the error did not influence, or had only a slight influence, on the 

trial’s outcome. See id. The court of criminal appeals has held no violation of 

substantial rights occurs during voir dire unless the record shows the defendant was 

denied a fair and impartial jury. See id. “In this case, the record does not show the jury 

selected in appellant’s absence was unfair or partial.” Barrier, 2021 WL 2562145, at 

*5. Appellant does not argue to the contrary. Therefore, even though appellant’s 

statutory right to be present during all portions of voir dire was violated, the error did 

not affect a substantial right. Accordingly, we disregard the error. See TEX. R. APP. P.

44.2.

We overrule appellant’s first, second, and third issues.
–14–

ACCESS TO VOIR DIRE PROCEEDINGS

In his fourth appellate issue, appellant complains the trial court erred in 

removing him from the courtroom during jury selection without providing him access 

to listen to the proceedings. He asserts the record “does not contain any indication” he 

was able to listen to voir dire proceedings during removal. As addressed above, the 

record indicates appellant was provided the ability to contemporaneously view and 

listen to proceedings after his removal. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s fourth 

issue on appeal.

COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL

In his fifth issue on appeal, appellant asserts, “The trial court abused its 

discretion and reversibly erred in continuing the trial of these cases when evidence of 

Appellant’s incompetency was revealed by his conduct in the courtroom that caused 

the trial judge to remove him from the courtroom on several occasions.” Appellant 

asserts the trial court should have made an informal inquiry with the commencement 

of the jury selection.

We review a trial court's decision not to conduct an informal competency

inquiry for abuse of discretion. See Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2009), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Turner v. State, 

422 S.W.3d 676, 692 & n.31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We do not substitute our 

judgment for that of the trial court, and we will not reverse its decision unless it is 

arbitrary or unreasonable. See id.
–15–

A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient 

present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against the person. See CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a). A trial court must conduct an 

informal competency inquiry if evidence comes to the court's attention suggesting the 

defendant may be incompetent. See id. art. 46B.004(b).

At the informal inquiry stage, there must be “some evidence from any source 

that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” 

Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting article

46B.004(c) of the code of criminal procedure). This standard requires more than a 

scintilla of evidence that rationally may lead to a conclusion of incompetency. See id.

at 564. The trial court must consider only evidence of incompetency, and it must not 

weigh evidence of competency against the evidence of incompetency. See id. Further, 

some evidence must be presented at the informal inquiry stage to show that a 

defendant's mental illness is the source of his inability to participate in his own 

defense. See id. It is not enough to present evidence of either a defendant's mental 

illness alone or his refusal to assist counsel; there must be some evidence indicating 

that the defendant's inability to rationally engage with counsel is caused by mental 

illness. See id.

Evidence suggesting need for an informal inquiry may be based on observations 

made in relation to one or more of the factors described by Article 46B.024 or on any 
–16–

other indication that the defendant is incompetent. See Ware v. State, 05-19-00365, 

2020 WL 4499797, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (citing article 46B.004(c-1) of the code of criminal 

procedure). The article 46B.024 factors include the defendant's capacity to: (a) 

“rationally understand the charges against the defendant and the potential 

consequences of the pending criminal proceedings”; (b) “disclose to counsel pertinent 

facts, events, and states of mind”; (c) “engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies 

and options”; (d) “understand the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings”; (e) 

“exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior”; and (f) “testify.” Id. art. 46B.024(1)(A)–

(F). Considerations also include whether, “as supported by current indications and the 

defendant's personal history,” the defendant suffers from a mental illness and, if so, 

how it affects the defendant's capacity to reasonably and rationally participate in his 

own defense. See id. art. 46B.024(2), (4).

Appellant asserts:

 “Appellant was disruptive and acted out spontaneously and erratically.”

 “. . . [Appellant] engaged in frequent outbursts before and during trial, and 

refused to communicate with his attorney and the trial court.”

 “[Appellant’s] behavior was inconsistent with someone that was presumed 

competent.”

 “[Appellant’s] competency should have been called in question by his 

behavior.” 
–17–

Based on our review of the record, we find no evidence from any source to

suggest to the trial court that appellant was incompetent to stand trial. See Boyett, 545 

S.W.3d at 563-64. We see no evidence that appellant was mentally ill, that he was 

unable to assist counsel, or that he was unable to rationally engage with counsel due 

to mental illness. See id. Appellant’s outbursts and interjections generally were 

responsive to the trial court’s statements, showing his understanding of the 

proceedings. See Cahill v. State, Nos. 05-21-00504-CR, 05-21-00505-CR, 05-21-

00506-CR, 05-21-00507-CR, 05-21-00508-CR, 05-21-00509-CR, and 05-21-00510-

CR, 2022 WL 17828927, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 21, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) (rejecting argument, made by appellant here, that 

repeated outbursts during trial should have raised doubts as to his competency). We 

see no evidence that appellant’s conduct was “truly bizarre.” Silvey v. State, No. 05–

11–01443–CR, 2013 WL 398742, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 31, 2013, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication). Rather, “His failure to comply with the 

trial court’s directions concerning proper courtroom decorum is more consistent with 

obstinacy than incompetence.” Cahill, 2022 WL 17828927, at *4; see Turner, 422 

S.W.3d at 691 (“Indeed, even a mentally ill defendant who resists cooperating with 

his counsel may nevertheless be found competent if the manifestations of his 

particular mental illness are not shown to be the engine of his obstinacy.”). Appellant’s 

conduct was consistent with the trial court’s assessment of it as angry, unhappy, and 

disruptive. Moreover, the fact that appellant made outbursts during trial is not 
–18–

evidence of an inability to communicate with counsel or to appreciate the proceeding 

against him. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). If such 

actions were enough to demonstrate incompetency, a defendant could easily avoid 

prosecution through immature behavior. See id.

Additionally, appellee’s counsel asserts he must correspond with appellant and 

that “The Texas Department of Corrections-Institutional Division lists Appellant 

being incarcerated at the Skyview Unit, which is a Psychiatric Unit.” He argues, 

“[T]his is easily verifiable on the internet and suggest[s] that Appellant should have 

been examined contemporaneously with the commencement of jury selection as 

competency can be a very fluid mental state.” We may not consider counsel’s assertion 

because it is not in the appellate record. See Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866, 872 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (appellate court may not consider factual assertions that are 

outside record); Hailey v. State, 413 S.W.3d 457, 491 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, 

pet. ref'd) (“Mere assertions in a brief not supported by the record will not be 

considered on appeal.”). Moreover, the mere fact of appellant’s residence at a 

psychiatric unit—even if we could consider such non-record assertions—would not 

trigger a trial court’s obligation to conduct an informal inquiry. See Turner, 422 

S.W.3d at 691 (mental illness does not by itself suggest incompetency; there must also 

be evidence raising the possibility that the defendant's mental illness “operates in such 

a way as to prevent him from rationally understanding the proceedings against him or 

engaging rationally with counsel in pursuit of his own best interest.”).
–19–

Reviewing the record only for possible evidence of incompetency, we 

determine there was no evidence from any source that would suggest to the trial court 

that defendant might have been incompetent to stand trial. See Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 

563 (quoting article 46B.004(c) of the code of criminal procedure).

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sua sponte 

inquire into appellant’s competency to stand trial. Accordingly, we overrule 

appellant’s fifth issue. 

ADMISSION OF VIDEO EVIDENCE

In his sixth issue, appellant complains, “The trial court abused its discretion and 

reversibly erred in overruling appellant’s objection to the state’s exhibit numbers 144 

and 145 depicting appellant in police station video interview room.” Appellant 

objected at trial to their admission based on rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.

See TEX.R.EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly 

presenting cumulative evidence.”).

Appellant argues the videos are of (1) “appellant misbehaving in the interview 

room”; (2) appellant “kicking at the door”; (3) appellant “being confronted by 

officers”; (4) appellant’s not wearing a shirt; and (5) appellant “being manhandled and 

tased by the officers.” 

The record contains unobjected-to testimony of two Dallas Police officers who 
–20–

testified about events depicted in exhibits 144 and 145 prior to the exhibits’ admission 

as evidence. Dallas Police Officer Reininger testified he was at Dallas Police 

Department Headquarters. He testified appellant shouted “very loudly.” He testified 

appellant attempted to kick down the door “so hard that, you know, the door was 

moving and the wall was moving, even when we were trying to hold it.” He testified 

that he and another officer had to enter the room to try to handcuff appellant. He 

testified: “We tried to talk to him for a little while to calm him down, but he ended up, 

you know, not responding to any commands, not turning around, and he started balling 

his fists and moving forward a little bit, so we had to go hands on.” He testified 

appellant wanted to speak with Antwaneequa Anderson. He testified he tased 

appellant. He testified appellant was taken downstairs at headquarters and then by 

ambulance to Parkland Hospital. Dallas Police Officer Purkey also was at Dallas 

Police Department Headquarters after appellant had been taken there. He testified 

appellant “started banging on the door and wall” in the interview room at headquarters. 

He testified he entered the room to handcuff appellant because “it looked like he was 

gonna bust the door.”

As noted, the officers’ testimony provided evidence of events depicted in 

exhibits 144 and 145 and identified by appellant in his argument here. Appellant did 

not object to the testimony of Reininger and Purkey. In these circumstances, even if 

admission of the video evidence was erroneous, which we assume here only for 

purposes of analysis, “erroneously admitting evidence ‘will not result in reversal when 
–21–

other such evidence was received without objection, either before or after the 

complained-of ruling.’” Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); 

see Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (any error in 

admission of exhibit was harmless in light of proper admission of “very similar” 

evidence without objection); Hill v. State, No. 05-08-01011-CR, 2020 WL 2124520, 

at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). Accordingly, even if admission of exhibits 144 and 145 was erroneous—

which we expressly do not decide—we conclude any such error was harmless.

We overrule appellant’s sixth issue.

ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY

In his seventh issue, appellant complains, “The trial court erred in overruling 

appellant’s objection to the state questioning witness Antwaneequa Anderson about 

how she felt about members of appellant’s family questioning her about paternity of 

her child.” Appellant complains of admission of the following testimony:

Q. Okay. And how did you feel when they questioned the paternity of 

your kid?

MR. ASHFORD: Objection, relevance. 

THE COURT: How did you feel?

MR. SEARCEY: Yes, Judge. I'm just asking her perception of what was 

going through her mind.

THE COURT: Okay. Overruled. Go ahead. You may answer. 

A. I was kind of mad.
–22–

Appellant argues on appeal the objected-to evidence should have been excluded 

under Texas Rule of Evidence 403.

Appellant’s trial objection, however, was “relevance.” See id. 401 (evidence is 

relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the claim); see id.

402 ([R]elevant evidence is admissible unless certain identified legal authority

provides otherwise. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.).

This Court has consistently held a trial objection on the ground of relevance

does not preserve for appellate review an issue under Rule 403. See, e.g., Crenshaw 

v. State, No. 05-11-01550-CR, 2022 WL 6194236, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 

2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Kindle v. State, No. 05-

19-01268, 2021 WL 2281665, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 4, 2021, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Hiatt v. State, No. 05-19-00564-CR, 

2020 WL 7021539, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (relevance objection does not preserve Rule 403

complaint)); Jackson v. State, No. 05-16-00706-CR, 2017 WL 2472838, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (a

specific rule 403 objection must be raised to preserve error because such an objection 

is not implicitly contained in relevancy objection); and see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 

(requiring specific objection and ruling to preserve issue for review unless objection 
–23–

is obvious from the context). We are bound to faithfully apply our own precedent. See 

Tiller v. State, No. 05-21-00653-CR, 2022 WL 2093008, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

June 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“We are bound to 

follow our own precedent unless it conflicts with an opinion of the Court of Criminal 

Appeals.”). Appellant failed to preserve a Rule 403 objection for our review.

Consequently, we overrule appellant’s seventh issue.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his eighth issue, appellant argues, “The evidence is insufficient to support 

the conviction in each cause number for the offense of aggravated assault.”3

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based 

on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2014). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact 

fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. A 

 

3 As addressed above, appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of injury to 

an elderly individual. We interpret appellant’s eighth issue as attacking all three judgments.
–24–

proper review of evidentiary sufficiency considers the cumulative force of the 

evidence. See Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

When considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, a reviewing court does 

not sit as the thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Isassi v.

State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The jury is permitted to draw 

reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at trial. See Metcalf v. State, 597 

S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Additionally, the jury may use common 

sense, common knowledge, personal experience, and observations from life when 

drawing inferences. See Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

However, “juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation 

or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 

15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the hypothetically correct 

jury charge, defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging instrument. 

See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically 

correct jury charge is one that accurately states the law, is authorized by the 

indictment, does not increase the State's burden of proof, and adequately describes the 

offense with which the defendant is charged. See id.

The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is the 

person who committed the offense charged. See Nelson v. State, No. 05-21-00945-
–25–

CR, 2023 WL 6425689, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 8, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication). Identity may be proved by either direct or 

circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that evidence. 

See id. The testimony of a single eyewitness may be sufficient evidence to identify a 

defendant as a perpetrator. See id. 

Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove he is the person who 

committed the crimes for which he was convicted. He argues a defendant, even the 

most likely defendant, is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is established 

beyond a reasonable doubt. He quotes final argument in the trial court in support of 

his appellate argument.

Each of the three victims had known appellant before the shootings. Each of the 

three eye-witnesses positively and without equivocation identified appellant as the 

person who shot them. Based on this direct evidence from the three complaining 

witnesses, we conclude a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant was the person who assaulted them. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; 

Nelson, 2023 WL 6425689, at *3.
–26–

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

220190f.u05

220191f.u05

220192f.u05

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

/Bill Pedersen, III/

BILL PEDERSEN, III

JUSTICE
–27–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

STEVE ERIC ROBERSON, 

Appellant

No. 05-22-00190-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-2051158-Q.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Pedersen, III. Justices Molberg and 

Miskel participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 22nd day of November, 2023.
–28–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

STEVE ERIC ROBERSON, 

Appellant

No. 05-22-00191-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-2051159-Q.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Pedersen, III. Justices Molberg and 

Miskel participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 22nd day of November, 2023.
–29–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

STEVE ERIC ROBERSON, 

Appellant

No. 05-22-00192-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-2051160-Q.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Pedersen, III. Justices Molberg and 

Miskel participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 22nd day of November, 2023.