United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10380

Summary Calendar

Kimeka Price, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Andrew Wheeler, Acting Administrator, U. S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:18-CV-686

Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Wiener, Circuit Judge:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Kimeka Price appeals the district court’s summary 

judgment dismissal of her Title VII discrimination, retaliation, and 

harassment claims. We affirm.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 30, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-Appellant Kimeka Price, a female African American, was

employed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”

or “Agency”) in 1996. She became an Enforcement Officer in the Hazardous 

Waste Enforcement Branch, Compliance Enforcement Section, Region 6. In 

March 2018, Price filed suit against then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt,

1

asserting claims of discrimination and harassment on the basis of race and 

gender, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964.2 

Price’s complaint involves factual allegations made in prior complaints filed 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in 2010 

and 2012.

3

 

The instant lawsuit and underlying administrative complaints are 

premised on allegations of more than twenty instances of discrimination, 

1 Andrew Wheeler has since replaced Scott Pruitt as the Administrator of the EPA.

2 Price also raised age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act. The district court dismissed these claims for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, as neither of the underlying administrative complaints included 

allegations of age discrimination. Price does not challenge this conclusion and we will not 

address it further.

3 Price filed EEOC Complaint No. 2010-0064-R06 on June 30, 2010 and EEOC

Complaint No. 2012-7322-R06 on February 28, 2012, which were consolidated on August 

21, 2012. The EEOC Administrative Judge granted summary judgment in the EPA’sfavor. 

Although Price’s administrative appeal was denied, the EEOC Office of Federal 

Operations issued a Reconsideration Decision authorizing Price to file a civil action in 

federal court to review the decision. Price has also filed two EEOC complaints that are 

currently pending before EEOC Miami District Office. 

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harassment, and retalition that Price allegedly suffered while employed by 

the EPA.4

Of the myriad allegations, two specific, related instances form the crux 

of her claims and warrant more detailed discussion: denying sick leave on 

May 9, 2011, and a subsequent 14-day suspension. 

On March 31, 2011, Price was informed by an EPA attorney, Sherry 

Wilson-Brown, that Price was scheduled to testify at a colleague’s EEOC 

hearing at 1:00 p.m. on May 9, 2011. Her appearance had been scheduled by 

an order of the presiding Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) dated March 

29, 2011. On May 4, 2011, Price informed Wilson-Brown that she was unable 

to testify on May 9, but she did not explain why. Wilson-Brown relayed that

message to the ALJ, who refused to reschedule Price’s testimony and 

4 Price characterizes the following alleged acts as evidence of discrimination, 

harassment, and retaliation: (1) asking her to attend a meeting to discuss performance 

issues; (2) withholding of a format necessary to complete a job; (3) selecting a less-qualified 

non-minority to give a presentation; (4) withholding administrative assistance; (5) refusing

to provide information about the prerequisites for obtaining a time-off award; (6) 

reassigning support staff’s duties; (7) excluding her from discussions regarding a particular 

case; (8) cancelling her “flexiplace” work schedule; (9) adding an element concerning 

teamwork to the performance evaluation standard used by the Agency; (10) issuing an oral 

reprimand; (11) refusing to discuss a performance evaluation; (12) inequitably distributing 

awards among staff; (13) excluding her from various enforcement activities; (14) refusing 

to discuss a proposed Standard Operating Procedure; (15) denying sick leave; (16) requiring 

her to travel to hazardous waste sites while pregnant; (17) issuing a 14-day suspension for 

insubordination and absence without leave; (18) rating her as “Fully Successful” on a

performance evaluation; (19) issuing a proposed removal notice; (20) interfering with her

EEOC complaint; (21) denying her training opportunities; and (22) reallocating specified 

assignments.

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informed the agency that it could be sanctioned “unless good cause is shown 

for her failure to appear.” Gary Tidmore, Price’s supervisor, sent her a 

memorandum ordering her to appear at the hearing unless “good cause” for 

her absence existed. Tidmore defined “good cause” as a “medical 

emergency for yourself or an immediate family member,” and warned Price 

that failure to appear without good cause “could result in a disciplinary action 

ranging from written reprimand to a fourteen day suspension.” 

The following day, Price informed Wilson-Brown and Tidmore that 

she would not be available to testify on May 9 “based on medical reasons.” 

She later clarified that she had a doctor’s appointment at the time of her 

scheduled testimony. Tidmore responded that “a doctor appointment is not 

a medical emergency,” and reminded Price of her obligation to appear on 

May 9 at 1 p.m., as the ALJ had ordered. 

Price called in sick on May 9, requesting leave for the entire day. In 

an email, Tidmore approved Price’s sick leave for that morning but denied it 

for the afternoon, citing Price’s obligation to testify at the hearing.5

. Price did 

not appear at the hearing that afternoon, and Tidmore officially placed her 

on Absent Without Official Leave (“AWOL”) status for that period of time. 

Price discussed the incident with her second-level supervisor, Mark Hansen, 

on June 8, 2011, and provided a doctor’s note confirming that she had

attended an appointment on May 9, 2011. On July 21, 2011, the agency 

suspended Price without pay for 14 days for insubordination and 

5 Tidmore officially denied Price leave for the afternoon on May 17, 2011, 

explaining that the “[e]mployee had been ordered by administrative judge and supervisor 

to appear the afternoon of May 9, 2011, for a hearing. Supervisor approved sick leave for 

the morning of May 9, 2011, but reiterated order for employee to appear at 1:00pm, as 

ordered by the judge.” 

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unauthorized absence, specifically citing Price’s failure to appear at the 

EEOC hearing. 

Relevant to the instant appeal is the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment in the EPA’s favor. The district court concluded that 

Price had failed to establish a prima facie claim for discrimination or 

retaliation because (1) none of the alleged instances—save for the 

aforementioned 14-day suspension—constituted adverse employment 

actions, and (2) Price had failed to establish that she was treated differently 

than any similarly situated employee outside of her protected group. 

The district court assumed that Price had established a prima facie 

case of discrimination and retaliation with respect to the 14-day suspension

but concluded that Price had failed to rebut the EPA’s stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and non-retaliatory reason for imposing the suspension—

namely, Price’s failure “to comply with an [ALJ’s] order to attend a 

colleague’s EEOC hearing”—or to demonstrate that the proffered reason 

was pretextual. The district court also dismissed Price’s harassment claims, 

concluding that none of the alleged acts were “sufficiently pervasive,”

threatening, or humiliating to constitute alleged harassment. The district 

court also commented that there was no evidence that the Agency knew or 

should have known about any harassment. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

legal standard as the district court. Petro Harvester Operating Co., L.L.C. v. 

Keith, 954 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate 

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). On review, we must consider “the evidence and inferences from the 

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summary judgment record . . . in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” 

Minter v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of New York, 423 F.3d 460, 465 (5th Cir. 2005). 

III. ANALYSIS

The district court granted summary judgement to the EPA with 

respect to Price’s claims of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; Price 

assigns error to each of those decisions. We consider each in turn.

A. Discrimination

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire 

or to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect 

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 

of such individual’s . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). When, as here, a discrimination case is built on 

circumstantial evidence, we apply the burden-shifting framework set forth in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination 

with evidence that she “(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was 

qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some 

adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by 

someone outside [her] protected group or was treated less favorably than 

other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.” Morris v. 

Town of Indep., 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Willis v. Cleco 

Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 319–20 (5th Cir. 2014)). If the plaintiff establishes a 

prima facie case, the burden “shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 

F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007). If the employer succeeds in doing so, the

plaintiff can only prevail by establishing either that (1) the proffered reason is 

pretextual or (2) “the employer's reason, while true, is not the only reason 

for its conduct, and another ‘motivating factor’ is the plaintiff's protected 

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characteristic.” Id. at 611 (quoting Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 

305, 309 (5th Cir. 2004)).

The district court correctly dismissed Price’s discrimination claims 

because, except for the 14-day suspension, none of the alleged instances of 

discrimination constituted an adverse employment action. An adverse 

employment action is “a judicially-coined term referring to an employment 

decision that affects the terms and conditions of employment.” Thompson v. 

City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014). We have consistently held 

that an adverse employment action is an “ultimate employment decision, 

such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.” 

McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007).

Suspension aside, none of the allegedly discriminatory acts constitute 

an ultimate employment decision. Id. For example, Price alleges that a 

supervisor withheld a particular format needed to complete a task, removed 

specified documents from a database, failed to sign a document that she had

prepared, and declined to meet with her about a particular matter. But

“allegations involv[ing] administrative matters” are generally “not adverse 

employment actions.” Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 377 (5th 

Cir. 1998) (refusing to “micromanage” an employer’s administrative 

decisions). Neither does a loss or addition of (or change in) job 

responsibilities constitute an adverse action unless the change is so drastic as 

to constitute a functional demotion. See Thompson, 764 F.3d at 504 (“In 

certain instances, a change in or loss of job responsibilities—similar to the 

transfer and reassignment contexts—may be so significant and material that 

it rises to the level of an adverse employment action.”); Southard v. Texas Bd. 

of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 555 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Undesirable work 

assignments are not adverse employment actions.”). Therefore, Price’s 

allegation that she was asked at least once to perform administrative tasks 

outside her job description does not further her case.

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Keeping in mind that an adverse employment action must be an 

“ultimate employment decision,” we also reject Price’s contention that the 

decision to ask a less-experienced white male colleague to give a particular 

presentation was discriminatory. This is especially so in light of evidence that 

the presentation was organized by a different branch of the Agency and that 

Price could have, and had in the past, given similar presentations. 

Price also contends that her supervisor’s decision to rate her “Fully 

Successful” rather than “Outstanding,” was discriminatory. Not so. 

Receiving a low performance evaluation does not alone constitute an adverse 

employment action. Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 

F.3d 364, 373 (5th Cir. 1998). Price’s supervisor explained that he rated her 

“Fully Successful” rather than “Outstanding” because her work was “not 

of exceptional quality” and did not “demonstrate the highest levels of 

creativity, skill, and knowledge of subject area.” Although Price contends an 

“Outstanding” rating was warranted because of the types of cases she 

worked on, her subjective belief about her own performance is insufficient to 

demonstrate that her supervisor had a discriminatory motive in assigning her 

a lower rating. Further, to the extent Price alleges that no African American 

employees received higher ratings, she is mistaken. One African American 

woman received an “Outstanding” rating that same year. 

Price also contends that awards were distributed in an inequitable 

fashion. Again, she is mistaken. Although Price received a “Time-off 

Award” rather than a “Superior Accomplishment Award” or a “Divisional 

Core Value Award,” the receipt of an award is clearly not an adverse 

employment decision. And the Agency offered its explanation for the 

decision, noting that, in the view of her supervisor, Price simply did not meet 

the criteria for other types of awards. 

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Price’s contention related to disciplinary measures is similarly 

unavailing. Although she was issued an oral reprimand, reprimands that 

amount to no more than criticism of an employee’s work generally do not 

constitute adverse employment actions. See Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 377.

Price also contends that the agency’s temporary revocation of 

telework privileges and denial of her requested sick leave on May 9, 2011,

constituted adverse employment actions. They did not. Although this circuit 

has yet to conclude definitively whether the revocation of telecommuting 

privileges constitutes an adverse employment action, see Stone v. Louisiana 

Dep't of Revenue, 590 F. App'x 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2014), the instant revocation 

does not resemble an “ultimate employment decision.” The revocation was 

temporary, and the Agency has provided a legitimate reason for needing Price 

in the office at the time. 

With respect to the denial of sick leave on May 9, 2011, we have 

previously held, albeit in unpublished decisions, that “a single denial of leave 

for a specific date and time does not constitute adverse employment action.” 

Ogden v. Brennan, 657 F. App'x 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2016); McElroy v. PHM 

Corp., 622 F. App'x 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2015). Furthermore, the agency 

offered a reasonable explanation for the denial: Price was scheduled to testify 

at a colleague’s EEOC hearing that same day, and the reason Price offered 

for requesting leave did not constitute “good cause” to defy the ALJ’s order 

that she testify at the pre-determined time. 

The 14-day suspension, on the other hand, warrants closer attention. 

The district court assumed, arguendo, that Price had stated a prima facie case 

for discrimination on the basis of the suspension. We make the same 

assumption. See LeMaire v. La. Dept of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 390 (5th 

Cir. 2007) (holding that a two-day suspension without pay was an adverse 

employment action in the retaliation context); see also Hypolite v. City of 

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Houston, 493 F. App'x 597, 607 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a temporary 

suspension without pay is an adverse employment action” in the retaliation 

and discrimination context). 

Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, we must consider 

whether the Agency has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 

for the suspension and conclude that it has. According to the EPA, Price was 

suspended for (1) failing to appear at a colleague’s EEOC hearing on the 

afternoon of May 9, 2011, without good cause and (2) being absent from work 

without authorization. The failure to comply with an order to attend an 

administrative hearing is clearly an insubordinate act that justifies 

disciplinary action. The same is true for failing to come to work despite a 

leave request having been denied. See Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility 

Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The failure of a subordinate 

to follow the direct order of a supervisor is a legitimate nondiscriminatory 

reason for discharging that employee.”).

Since the EPA has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 

for Price’s suspension, we next question whether she has demonstrated that 

the EPA’s reason is pretextual. She has not. Cf. Haire v. Bd. of Sup'rs of 

Louisiana State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 2013)

(holding that a genuine question regarding pretext existed when the plaintiff 

offered evidence that she had been ordered to commit the act of misconduct 

that her employer cited as the “legitimate” reason for denying her a 

promotion). Rather than challenge the underlying facts or establish evidence 

of pretext, Price claims that it was unreasonable for the agency to deny her 

leave request because she provided advanced notice of her unavailability, 

which was related to a medical issue. She also contends that the Agency was 

unreasonable because (1) the hearing lasted multiple days, (2) the ALJ had 

indicated great flexibility over the scheduling of witnesses, and (3) she 

ultimately did testify on May 12, 2011.

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Price’s contentions are of no moment. She was informed of her 

obligation to testify at the hearing more than a month before it began. When 

the ALJ learned that Price would not be available to testify as scheduled, he 

informed the Agency that “Ms. Price will be expected to appear as . . . 

directed unless good cause is shown for her failure to appear” and that 

“[a]bsent her appearance or good cause shown, the agency can be expected 

to be sanctioned.” Price’s supervisor defined good cause as a “medical 

emergency for yourself or an immediate family member,” and denied Price’s 

request for leave to attend a doctor’s appointment related to her pregnancy. 

He did so on the basis that it “did not constitute good cause because the 

appointment was not for a medical emergency.” Although Price later 

provided a doctor’s note confirming that she had been seen on May 9, the 

note contains no information to suggest that Price was experiencing a medical 

emergency at the time. 

As we have previously noted, “[i]n a case in which the employer has 

articulated a rational justification for [taking an adverse action against] an 

employee, and the facts supporting that justification are not seriously 

disputed, the task of proving pretext becomes quite difficult.” Chaney, 179 

F.3d at 168. This warning is apt here. Price has failed to demonstrate that the 

Agency’s legitimate reason for the suspension was pretextual. Summary 

judgment was appropriate on this claim.

B. Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework also applies to 

retaliation claims. See Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 

(5th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by 

adducing evidence that “(1) [she] participated in an activity protected by 

Title VII; (2) [her] employer took an adverse employment action against 

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[her]; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and 

the adverse employment action.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556–57.

Although there is no question that Price participated in protected 

activities—filing complaints with the EEOC, participating in an EEOC 

hearing, and complaining to managers about working conditions—her 

retaliation claims fail for largely the same reason as do her discrimination 

claims: a lack of evidence that the agency took an adverse employment action 

against her. In contrast to a discrimination claim, an adverse employment 

action in the retaliation context is one that “well might have dissuaded a 

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) 

(quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Price’s 

retaliation claims involve the same alleged incidents as do her discrimination 

claims. We agree with the district court that none of the acts, save for the 14-

day suspension, are serious enough to meet the standard stated above.

6

Further, Price has provided no evidence—aside from her own speculation

that these allegedly retaliatory incidents were causally connected to her 

engagement in protected activities. 

Even assuming, as did the district court, that Price successfully 

established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to the 14-day 

suspension,7 we conclude that dismissal of the claim was warranted because

6 We recognize that under Burlington Northern, the scope of prohibited conduct for 

the purposes of a retaliation claim is wider than for a discrimination claim. See 548 U.S. at 

67. We nevertheless conclude that the Price’s allegations fail under either standard.

7 This is a generous assumption, as there is scant evidence that the 14-day 

suspension was causally connected to Price’s engagement in a protected activity. Although 

a causal connection can be inferred from close timing between the employee’s protected 

activity and adverse action taken against her, “once the employer offers a legitimate, 

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Price has failed to rebut the legitimate, non-retaliatory reason offered by the 

agency for the suspension. As previously noted, Price’s refusal to comply 

with an order to appear at a colleague’s EEOC hearing (and her inability to 

provide good cause for her absence) constituted an act of insubordination 

that justified disciplinary action. See Chaney, 179 F.3d at 167. Price has 

offered no evidence to suggest that this reasoning is pretextual or that she 

would not have been suspended “but for” her filing EEOC complaints or 

meeting with management to discuss working conditions. See Long v. 

Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A] plaintiff must show that 

the adverse employment action would not have occurred ‘but for’ the 

protected activity in order to prove unlawful retaliation.”). Accordingly, 

summary judgment rejecting this claim was accordingly justified. 

C. Harassment 

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of harassment based on a 

hostile work environment by adducing evidence that “(1) she belongs to a 

protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the 

harassment complained of was based on [her protected class]; (4) the 

harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of 

employment; (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment 

nondiscriminatory reason that explains both the adverse action and the timing, the plaintiff 

must offer some evidence from which the jury may infer that retaliation was the real 

motive.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 562 (quoting Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 

1188 (5th Cir. 1997)). As explained above, the Agency has offered a legitimate reason for 

the suspension that is completely unrelated to Price’s administrative or work-place 

complaints. Price has offered no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to concluded 

that the suspension was retaliatory in nature. 

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in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.”8 Ramsey v. Henderson, 

286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). For harassment to “affect a term, 

condition, or privilege of employment,” it must be “‘sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an 

abusive working environment.’” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). The harassment “must be both objectively and 

subjectively abusive.” Hockman v. Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 

325 (5th Cir. 2004). The court must consider the totality of the 

8 The parties dispute whether Price was required to set forth evidence that the 

Agency knew or should have known of the harassment in question. It is true that a plaintiff 

need not show that the employer knew about the harassment if the claim involves the acts

of a supervisor. To that extent, an employer is vicariously liable for the actions of its 

supervisory employees. The employer has an affirmative defense to liability or damages in 

this instance with proof that (1) the employer took reasonable care to prevent the harassing 

behavior and (2) the employee failed to take advantage of such preventative or corrective 

opportunities. The employer is not entitled to raise the affirmative defense, however, if the 

harassment takes the form of a tangible employment action. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 

505 (5th Cir. 1999). “A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in 

employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 

benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 

Price has not made allegations of tangible employment action harassment, 

however. In fact, Price first discussed tangible employment actions in response to the 

EPA’s motion for summary judgment, but a claim first made in such a manner is not 

properly before the court. See Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 

113 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only 

in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court.”). In any 

event, even if Price had properly raised the issue, her claim fails because there is no 

evidence that she was harassed in the first place.

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circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 

employee's work performance.” Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th 

Cir. 2000).

Price supports her harassment claims by reference to the same 

incidents she uses to support her discrimination and retaliation claims. The 

district court concluded that Price had not been harassed because none of the 

incidents were severe, pervasive, ongoing, physically threatening, or 

humiliating, nor did they interfere with her work performance. We agree. 

We do not doubt that these events might have been frustrating to 

Price, but she provides no evidence that they were so severe or pervasive as 

to alter the condition of her employment in a fashion that constitutes 

cognizable harassment. Compare Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 

644, 654 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding harassment with evidence that “in this 

workplace, many workers treated other worker profanely, cruelly, and with 

hostility”), with West v. City of Houston, 960 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(concluding that a colleague’s frequently passing gas at the dinner table, 

sleeping in his underwear, occasionally telling racially insensitive jokes, and 

bringing adult magazines to work was “not severe or humiliating under the 

governing standards”). Moreover, nothing about the instant incidents 

suggests that Price was physically threatened or humiliated at work. Neither 

does it appear that her work was unreasonably interfered with. Cf. Johnson v. 

Halstead, 916 F.3d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the alleged 

harassment interfered with plaintiff’s work performance because his 

colleagues routinely boycotted his meetings, ignored his assignments, and 

bullied him). 

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In any event, even if Price had demonstrated that she was harassed at 

work, her hostile work environment claim would fail because there is no 

evidence that any of the incidents were motivated by her race or sex. The 

Agency has provided reasonable explanations for each individual incident

collectively suggesting that Price’s grievances were caused by professional 

disputes, disagreements, and misunderstandings rather than by her 

membership in a protected group. In the absence of such evidence, summary 

judgment was appropriate.

AFFIRMED.

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