This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. 33,570 4 JULIO CHAVEZ-VALDEZ, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Jacqueline D. Flores, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 Sergio J. Viscoli, Assistant Public Defender 13 Albuquerque, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 HANISEE, Judge. 172 {1} Defendant appeals from the district c ourt’s on-record review and affirmance 1 of his conviction for battery on a household member following a jury trial in 2 metropolitan court. This Court issued a cal endar notice proposing to affirm. Defendant 3 has filed a memorandum in opposition to this Court’s proposed disposition, which we 4 have duly considered. U npersuaded, we affirm. 5 Sufficient Evidence of “Household Member” 6 {2} Defendant maintains that there was in sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 7 conclusion that the victim was a “hous ehold member” as defined in NMSA 1978, 8 Section 30-3-11 (2010). Defendant’s memorandum in opposition asserts that the 9 metropolitan court judge denied Defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the basis 10 that Officer Beck had testified that he had personal knowledge thatDefendant and the 11 victim had a boyfriend-girlfriend relations hip. [MIO 6] To the extent Defendant 12 argues that this Court “too broadly construe[d] the definition of household member” 13 [MIO 5], a boyfriend-girlfrie nd relationship satisfies the definition of “household 14 member.” See Section 30-3-11 (defining “househol d member” to include “a person 15 with whom a person has had a continui ng personal relationship,” and defining 16 “continuing personal relationship” as “a dating or intimate relationship”). To the 17 extent Defendant continues to argue thatthe basis for Officer Beck’s testimony that 18 Defendant and the victim had a boyfriend-girlfriend relati onship was not established 193 at trial, this Court pointed out in its no tice of proposed disposition that the lack of 1 evidence establishing the basis for OfficerBeck’s testimony is a matter of weight. 2 This Court does not reweigh evidence on appeal. See State v. Barrera, 2001-NMSC3 014, ¶ 12, 130 N.M. 227, 22 P.3d 1177 (“[I]t is the role of th e trial court, and not the 4 appellate court, to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.”). 5 Accordingly, we conclude th at Defendant has not demonstr ated error in this regard. 6 Pre-Miranda Statements 7 {3} Defendant also maintains that fundamental error occurred when his pre8 Mirandastatements were admitted as part of Officer Beck’s testimony. This Court 9 proposed to conclude that Mirandawarnings were not required because Defendant 10 was not subject to a custodial interrogati on where he was ques tioned while standing 11 on a public street near his vehicle, was not restrained, and was never told he was not 12 free to leave. Defendant takes i ssue with this Court’s reliance on State v. Sanchez , 13 2001-NMCA-109, ¶ 22, 131 N.M. 355, 36 P.3d 446, arguing that Sanchezinvolved 14 a routine traffic stop and, here, Defendant was not a mo torist. [MIO 8-9] Defendant 15 also contends that the questions in this case were geared towards a possible criminal 16 investigation. [MIO 9] We note, however, that traffic stops also include questions 17 geared towards a possible criminal investigation. See id. ¶ 22 (“Historically, police 18 have been allowed to ask preliminary que stions regarding a driver's license and 194 registration, and even to make ‘reasonable reque sts . . . to perform field sobriety tests,’ 1 without rising to the level of custodi al interrogation, which would require Miranda 2 warnings.” (quoted authority omitted)) . Consequently, weare unpersuaded by 3 Defendant’s argument, and conclude that Defendant has not demonstrated 4 fundamental error. 5 Suspended License Testimony 6 {4} Defendant contends that the admi ssion of testimony by Officer Beck about 7 Defendant’s suspended licenseconstitutes fundamental erro r. In this Court’s notice 8 of proposed disposition, we proposed to conc lude that without a showing of prejudice, 9 Defendant had failed to de monstrate error, much less fundamental error. See State v. 10 Fernandez , 1994-NMCA-056, ¶ 13, 117 N.M. 673, 875 P.2d 1104 (“In the absence 11 of prejudice, there is no reversible erro r.”). Defendant has responded by arguing that 12 the source of the error was the State’s witn ess, the error was onl y mentioned once, and 13 that it had no relevance to the case at hand. [MIO 12] We concludethat Defendant has 14 not established any prejudicial error sufficient to rise to the level of fundamental error. 15 See State v. Barber , 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633 (providing 16 that fundamental error only occurs in “cases with defendants who are indisputably 17 innocent, and cases in which a mistake in the process makes a conviction 18 fundamentally unfair notwithstanding the apparent guilt of the accused”). 195 {5} Consequently, for the reasons stated above and in this Court’s notice of 1 proposed disposition, we affi rm Defendant’s conviction. 2 {6} IT IS SO ORDERED. 3

__________ __________________________ 4 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 5

WE CONCUR: 6

___________________________________ 7 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 8

___________________________________ 9 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 10