T h e H on or abl e H arold A

. Ack er man , U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or t h e D i s t r i ct of

N ew J er s ey , s i t t i n g by * d esi gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0224n.06 F iled: Marc h 28, 2007 Case Nos. 05- 5187; 05-5472; 05-5473 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. ERNEST D. MILLER, MARYL. MILLE R, RICHARD L. RAM SEY, De fend ant s- App e lla nt s.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFO R E: BA TC HE LD ER, M c K EA G U E, C ir c ui t

J ud g e s ; a nd A C K

ER M A N , District

Judge. * ALICE M . BATCHEL DER, Circ uit Jud ge. Ernest Miller a nd Mary Miller, husband and wife, w ere convicted by a jury on char g es of conspirac y to ma nufac ture and to posse ss with the intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1), 841(b) (1)( C), and 846; aiding and abetting the attempt to manufac ture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)( 1) and 841(b)( 1)(C), a

nd 18 U.S.C. § 2; aiding and ab et t i ng the possession of mater ials to manufac ture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 84 3 (a )(6) and 843(d) (2), a nd 18 U.S.C. § 2; possession of fire arms in furtheranc e of drug traff icking crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);

and po sse ssi on

of fi re arm s h a vin g be e n pre vio us ly c on vic te d of a fe lony in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C.2

§ 922(g )(1) . Richard Ramsey was tried w ith the Millers and convicted of the conspiracy and drug traff icking char g es. All three defe ndants appea l the ir convictions and sente nces. We c onclude that the district court did not commit rever sible err or i n either the pretria l proce eding s or the trial; that sufficie nt evidence supports the conviction of each of the def endants; and that the sentenc e of e ach de fe nd ant i s r e a so na

ble , a nd we a ff ir m. I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound On Novembe r 27, 2002, De puty Scott Wil son of t he Monroe County , Tenne ssee, Sher iff’s Depa rtment, obtained a sear ch war rant fr om a state c ourt judg e for the re sidence of Erne st and Mary Miller, who l iv e d o n p r o p e rty o w n e d b y E r n e s t an d h is mo th e r . T h e w ar r an t w a s s u

p p o rte d by Wil son’s aff

idavit stating that Wil son had obtained and executed a sear ch war rant for these pre mises more than one y ear

ear lier, had f

ound there, am ong other thing s, methamphetamine, dr ug para pherna lia, firea

rms and ammunition, and t hat as a result of that sea

rch, Er nest and Mar

y Miller ha d p le a de d guil ty

duri ngthe pr e vio us we e k to c ri min a l c ha rg e s. Th e a ff

ida vit stated that in September 2002, Wilson had lear ned fr om a co n fi d ential informant ( “CI ”) that the CIhad bee n inside the Miller reside nce where he or she had seen me thamphetamine, f irea rms, and ammunition,

and he ard Er ne st Mill e r ta lki ng a

bo ut manu fa c tur ing me tha mph e tamin e . F ur

the r, the a ff

ida vit sa id th a t w it h in 7 2 h o u r s o f

N o v e mb e r

2 7 , 2 0 0 2 , th e s a me CI

h a d s e e nin th e M il le r s ’ r e s id e nce methamphetamine, c hemicals, a nd para pherna lia used in th e manufa cture of methamphe tamine, including ope n container s of two-lay er liquids, methamphe t am i n e packa g ed for resa le, numerous f i r e ar m s , an d a m m u n i t i o n , an d h a d h e ar d E r n e s t M i l l e r s ay t h a t h e h a d e x p l o s i v e s o nt h e p r o p e rt y. F ina lly , t he aff

ida vit de c lare d th a t th e CI

wa s a c re dib le so ur c e wh o h a d p ro vid e d r e lia ble3

information in the pas t t h at had led to the suc cessf ul discovery

of methamphe tamine and the pr os e c uti on

of a t le a st two ind ivi du a ls o n me tha mph e tamin e c ha

rg e s. The sea rch w arr ant instructed of

fice rs to sear ch t h e (premises)(house or buildings on the pr emises)(ve hicle) loc ated in Monroe County , Tenne ssee a

nd descr ibed as follows: 1950 Corntassel Road, Ma disonvill e, Tn. Fr om the intersec tion of Povo Road and Corntassel, turn r ight onto Corntassel Road, (#426), g o approximately 1⁄2 mile to a very

roug h, rutted drivew ay

on the left hand side whic h leads up a hill to a trailer w ith an addition built on t he fr ont and a workshop to the rig ht. Photo attached. The warra

nt was attached to the affidavit, and instructed of fice rs to sear ch for

“methamphe tamine and all i te ms in

p ar a g r a p h 7 o f a f f id a v it

. ” Pa

r a g r a p h 7 o f th e a f f id a v it c o n ta in s ane xhaustive compilation of the kinds of things that the aff iant, in his experience as a narc otics investigator, has found that drugdeale rs tend to kee p in various locations on their property , including doc umentation

o r re co rd s of drugactivity , firea rms, curr ency , motor vehicles use d to transport controlled

su bs tanc e s, a nd

pa c ka g ingma te ri a ls f

or dr ug s. Sheriff’ s deputies executed the se arc h war rant duringthe ea

rly evening of

November

27, 2002. I nside the trailer , the offic ers f ound Ernest Miller a

nd Mary Miller, Mary ’s daug hter Samantha Moreno, a

nd P h y l l i s E llison. W hen the of fice rs sea rche d Ernest Miller, they

found a c offe e filter containing seven twist-tie ba g g ies of methamphe tamine in one front pocket, 34 rounds of .22 ca liber ammunition in t he other , and a wallet containing $950 in a r ear pocket. The ir sear ch of the trailer y ielded, amongother thing s, two twist-tie bag g ies of met h amphetamine, a bottle of g as line antifre eze, g lass jars of two- lay er and single -lay er liquids, a pla stic jug w ith tubing, two containe rs of re d d evil ly e, stained c offe e filters, a red- stained heat gun, nume rous long g uns – a loade d Mossberg.12 g aug e shot gu n and seve ral other s, both loaded and unloa ded – a loa ded .22 ca liber4

revolve r, a loa ded .35 7 mag num revolver , hundreds of rounds of va

rious kinds of ammunition, dig ita l sc a le s, a

pr op ane tor c h, a c on ta ine r wi th an atta c he d mot or ize d a qu ari um fi lte r, many e mpt y
m at ch b o o k s , as s o rt edj ar s co n t ai n i n g l i qu i d s , an d gl as s j ar s t h at h adb ee nwa s h edan d we re dry i n g. The off icer s also found – inside Mary Miller’s purse – a

shopping list for the Dollar Gene ral Store including c offe e filters, pe roxi de, and Sudafed, and, elsewhe re in the trailer, a rec eipt from the Dollar Gene ral Store dated Novembe r 1, 2002, for purc hases of

three bottles of hy drog en per ox ide, isopropy l alcohol, two boxes of nasal dec ong estant, ey e shadow, birthday candle s, coff ee, ey e liner, and a g ree ting card. On the re ceipt, beside the entrie s for the hydrog en per ox ide, alcohol a nd nasal decong estant, we re the initials “EM”; beside seve ral other entries we re the initi al s “S M”; and attache d to the rec eipt was a note t hat s aid “Mom, I owe y ou $9.50 from 11-1-02. Give it back soon. L ove y ou, Samantha.” Whil e oth e r o ff

ic e rs we re se arc hin g the tr a ile r, De pu ty Jef f V itt a toe , w ho wa s a ssi g ne d to

se c ur e the re ar of the tr a ile r, saw Ric ha rd Ramse y – wh om Vi ttatoe re c og nize d im me diate ly – c ome out of a shed loc ated be hind the trailer. When Vittatoe ide ntified himself as a police office r and pointed his weapon at Ramsey , Ramsey bolted for the ne arby woods, and, a lthough Vittatoe pur sued him, Ramsey

esca ped. Vittatoe r eturne d to the shed and looke d inside, where he discove red pa rt of an oper ating methamphetamine la b. The fume s coming from the she d wer e strongenoug h th at office rs donned r espirator s befor e attemptin g t o enter the shed, a

nd once inside, the y

found a Coleman stove with an oper ating burner heatinga g lass flask conta ining ch em icals. Tape d to the flask was a high heat hose that ran up to the c eiling a nd down to a lar g e bottle filled with wate r and ice.5

Ernest Miller, Mar

y Miller, Samantha More no, Richard Ramsey , and an individual named Steven Bive ns – who had a rrived at the Miller residenc e af ter the se arc h but while the offic ers we re sti ll t he re – w e re ind ic te d on ch arg e s of co ns pir a c y to manu fa c tur e , pos se ss w ithint e nt t o d istri bu te and to distribute methamphetamine, a iding a nd abetting the a t t empt to manufac ture
me tha mph e tamin e , a

nd a idi ngand

a be tti ngthe po sse ssi on

of e qu ipm e nt a

nd ma te rials us ed to

m an u fa ct u re m et h am p h et am i n e, kn o wi n g an d i n t en d i n g t h at t h ey b e u s ed fo r s u ch m an u fa ct u ri n g. Eac h of the Millers and Bive ns were char g ed with possession of fire arms in furthe ranc e of a drug traff icking crime a

nd with be ing a felon in possession of a fire arm. Samantha Moreno wa s char g ed with multi ple counts of p o s s essi on of equipment a nd materia ls used to manufac ture methamphetamine, know ing a nd intending that they be used for such manufa cturing

. After a ser ies of pre -trial motions, the matter proc eede d to jury trial, and the Millers, More no, and Ramsey wer e convicted on a ll of

the counts in which they

wer e name d. Bive ns was convic ted only on the fe lon-inpossession char g e. Ea ch of the Millers and R am s ey were sentenc ed shortly afte r the opinion was handed dow n in United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005); ea ch of the m timely appea led. II. Le ga l A nal ys is A. The Scope of th e Searc h Warrant – Ernest M iller Ernest Miller a

rg ues that the sea

rch w arr ant for the November 27, 2002, sear ch of the trailer did not identify the items to be seized with suf ficient specific ity and that the office rs’ sear ch of the sh e d be hin d the tr a ile r e xce e de d the wa rr ant’ s sc op e . Pr ior

to t ri a l, M ill e r f

ile d a mot ion to s up pr e ss the e vid e nc e fo un d in th e sh e d, c on te sti ng , amon g oth e r t hin g s, the wa

rr ant’ s v a lid ity

fo r f a ilure to identify the shed a s a buildin g t o b e s earche d. The Mag istrate Judge r ecommende d that Miller’s mot ion be de nie d b e c a

us e Mil le r la c ke d sta

nd ing to ob

je c t to the se arc h o f t

he sh e d a nd , in any e ve nt,6

the sea rch did not ex cee d the s cope of the warrant. Miller filed no written obj ections t o this aspect

o f t h e M agi strate’ s Report and Rec ommendation, and the district cour t, after revie wing the ob je c tio ns that Mi lle r d id f

ile , ad op te d the Re po rt in its en tir e ty
. B e c a us e Mil le r fa ile d to ob

je c t to the se fi nd ing s in

the Ma g istrat e J ud ge’ s Re po rt and Re c omm e nd a tio n, he ha s w a ive d th e ri g ht t o raise th em b ef

o re this cour

t on appea l. Tho ma s v . A rn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Althoug h we may excuse Miller’s wa iver in t he intere sts of justice, see id. a t 15 5, we do no t f ind any re a so n to e xcu se the waive r her e. In the proc eeding s befor e the Mag istrate J udg e, Miller objec ted to the sea rch of the outbuilding bec ause it “belong [ed] to someone other than the def endants or the ir family .” Miller’s own obj ection establishes his lack of standing to object to the s ear ch, and the affidavit and wa rra nt
are fac ially

sufficie nt to support the brea dth of the sea rch. B. Th e Confid ential Inf orm ant – Ernest Miller I n his moti on to suppress, Erne st Mill er a rg ued that the Nove mber 27, 2002, searc h war rant
wa s in va lid

be c a us e the su pp or tin g a ff ida vit fa ile d to e sta

bli sh that the CI wa s re lia ble and that hi s inf or ma tio n w a s c ur

re nt. Mil le r m ov e d fo r dis c los ur e of the ide nti ty of the CI , b ut t

he Ma g istrate Judg e de nie d th e re qu e st. Ov e r M ill e r’ s w ri tt en obje c tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt a ff ir me d th e de nia l, ho ldi ngthat “ [i]nf

or ma tio n p ro vid e d b y the c on fi de nti a l sour c e wa s re lia ble and wa s in de pe nd e ntl y
corr oborate d by

law enf orce ment ag ents, as the a ffidavit sets out in detail.” On appe al, Miller ar g ues that the identities of at least three differ ent informants – the CIfrom whom the information in the af fidavit supporting the N o v ember 27, 2002, sear ch wa

rra nt was obtained and two inf

ormants from whom infor mation leading to his earlier dru g co n v i ction was obtained – ar e esse ntial to the fairne ss of the proc eeding s ag ai n s t him. This arg ument bear s no
re la tio ns hip to w hat Mi lle r r a ise d b e fo re the Ma g istra te Judg e or the dis tr ic t c ourt , a nd , in any e ve nt,7

we f ind no merit to the claim. Be cause Miller did not raise any claim reg arding any informants other tha n th e CI re fe rr e d to in t

he No ve mbe r 2 7 a ff

ida vit , w e re vie w f

or pla in e rr or

Mil le r’ s c la im reg ardingthose other infor mants. S e e U n i t e d S t a t es v . Koe be rle in , 161 F.3d 946, 949 ( 6th Cir. 1998). We revie w for abuse of discretion his c laim that the district court er red in de ny ing his motion for disclosure of the CI

. United States v. J enkins , 4 F.3d 1338, 1341 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Miller relies on languag e in Roviaro v. United States , 353 U.S. 53 (1957), in which, a fter noting that “ the informer ’s privileg e is in rea lity the Gover

nment’s privileg e to withhold from disclosure the ide ntity

of per sons who furnish i nformation of violations of law to off icer s char g ed with e nforc ement o f t h at l aw , ” id. at 59, the Supreme Court said: “[w] here the disclosure of an inf or me r’ s id e nti ty , o r o f t

he c on te nts of

his c omm

un ic a tio n, is re le va

nt an d he lpf

ul to the de fe ns e of an a ccuse d, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause , the privi leg e must g ive way .” Id. at 60-61. Miller complains that, as w as t h e ca s e in Ro v iar o , d isc los ur e of the ide nti ty

of the se informants is require d beca use the infor

mation in the affidavits – i.e. , the af fidavits supporting the November

27, 2002, sear ch warr an t and the se arc h war rant e x ecute d the pre vious y ear – de mon str a te s th a t th e se inf or mants we re inv olv e d in the of fe ns e s. We have e xami ne d the a ff ida vit s, and find no indication that the informants wer e in any way involved in the offe nses for w hich Miller

was convicted. We ha

ve held that “[a]n informa nt must be disclosed only upon a showing b y t he defe ndant that disclosure is esse ntial to a fair tr ial.” Un ite d S tat es v . M oo re , 954 F .2 d 3 79 , 3 81 (6 th Cir . 1 99 2) . M ill e r h a s ma de no su c h s ho wi ng , a nd we fi nd ne ith e r a n a bu se of dis c re tio n n or

pla in

e rr or in t he pr oc e e din g s in

the tr ia l c ourt
. C. Jury Voir Dir e – Ernest M iller and Richard Ram sey8

Early in the jury selec tion pr ocess, the attorne y for c o-def

endant Steven B ivens said to the po te nti a l juro rs :

“ Can I pu t on a wi tne ss I kn owis l y ingto d e fe nd

my c lie nt? .

. . I ’m de fe nd ingmy client, I ’m obligated to, but can I put on a witness I k n o w i s l y i ng ? . . . I ’d be disbarre d. . . . All the lawy ers in this courtroom a re not allowed to put on [proof] t hat t h e y t h i n k i s n o tt r u e . A l l r i g h t ?” No pa rt y ob je c te d at th a t time , but pr ior to em pa ne lin g the jur

y , Er ne st Mill e r’ s cou

ns e l move d to strike the entire panel or , alternatively , to sever Miller’ s case , on the grounds that B ivens’s counse l’s state me nt w a s a c omm e nt on a de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht n ot t o te sti fy , a nd it h a d p re jud ic e d th e jur

y a g a ins t Er ne st M ill e r i n th e e ve nt he did no t ta ke the wi tne ss s tand . N on e of the oth e r d e fe nd ants joi ne d in Miller’s motion. The court denied the motion, finding that the stateme nt would not reasona bly be construed by

the jurors a s any

kind of com m en t on whether any defe ndant should or should not te sti fy . E rn e st M ill e r a

nd Ric ha rd Ramse y no w ar g ue that the c omm e nt by B ive ns ’s c ouns e l w a s a violation of Miller’s Fifth Ame ndment rig ht to sil ence . We reviewfor a

buse of discretion the denial of a motion to strike a jury panel or for a mistrial during jury

voir dire. Se e Un ite d S

tat es v . S hr op sh ire , 498 F.2d 137, 139 (6th Cir. 1974) and United States v. Knipp , 963 F.2d 839, 845 ( 6th Cir. 1992). Miller complains that the j ury hear d Bive ns’s counsel’s r ema rk , “a n d wh en Mr. Miller did not testify , this is what they reme mbere d.” B ut the

re c or d r e fl e c ts that B ive ns ’s c ouns e l w a s th e fi rs t to vo ir dir e the jur

y , a nd be fo re any

fu rt he r v oir dir e wa s cond uct ed, Mil le r’ s c ouns e l mo ve d to str ike the pa ne l. T hat mo tio n w a s d e nie d, and if Mil le r’ s c ouns e l – o r a

ny of the de fe ns e c ouns e l – ha d wante d to cor re c t any mis c on c e pti on , he c ou ld surely have done so throug h his own questioning of the potential jurors. Neither he nor a ny other counsel made any

eff ort to do so. We find no abuse of discr etion here

.9 D. Suf fi ciency of the Evidence – Ernest Miller and Richard Ramse y Er ne st M ill e r a

nd Ri char d Ram se y

c la im that th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the ir

c on vic tio ns fo r c on sp ir a c y . T he y do no t c ha lle ng e the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt

the ir

c on vic tio ns on

the oth e r c ha

rg e s. Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction i f, after viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the prosec ution, a ny rational trier of fac t could have f ound the eleme nts of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). To prove a conspirac y

under 21 U.S.C. § 846 to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a )(1) , the Gover nment must prove (1) an ag ree ment to violate 21 U.S.C § 841(a)( 1); (2) know ledg e and intent of the def endants to join the conspirac y ; and (3) defe ndants’ participation in the c onspiracy

. United States v. Martinez , 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005). I mportantly , the Gover nment is not required to provide proof of any formal agr ee m en tam o n g t h e p ar t i es , b u tm ay i n s t ea d p ro v i d e p ro o f o f “a t ac i t o r m at er i al u n d er s t an d i n g” among them. Un ite d Stat es v . A v e ry , 128 F.3d. 966, 970-71 (6th Cir. 1997). F urthermor e, it is not

n e c e s s ar y t h a tt h e g o v e r

n m e n tp r o v e t h a t “ a d e f

e n d an t p art i c i p a t e d

i na l l a s p e c t s o f

t h e c o n s p i r a c y; it need only prove that the defendant was a par ty to the g ener al conspiratorial ag ree ment,” id. at 971, and althoug h t he g overnme nt must prove the ag ree ment itself bey ond a re asonable doubt, “the

connec tion between [a] defe ndant and t h e co n s pirac y need only

be slig ht.” Id. Finally , “[t] he exis tence of a c onspiracy may be infe rre d from cir cumstantial evidenc e that ca n rea sonably

be interpre ted as pa

rticipation in the common plan.” Martinez , 430 F.3d at 330 (internal c itations and quotations omit ted.) We c on c lud e that th e re c or d c on ta ins su ff ic ie nt ev ide nc e to s up po rt the c on vic tio ns of

bo th of these de fenda

nts on the conspirac y char g e. When the s ear ch wa rra nt was executed on N ovember10

27 , 2 00 2, bo th o f t

he Mil le rs and

Sa manth a

Mo re no we re ins ide the tr a ile r t hat w a s th e Mil le rs ’ residenc e, and Ramsey was in the shed – immediately behind the trailer – wher e manuf actur ing of

me tha mph e tamin e wa s in

pr og re ss. Me tha

mph e tamin e and

ma te ri a ls a

nd equ ip ment

us e d to manufa cture methamphetamine wer e found throug hout the trailer, along with loaded fire arms that

a re a so na ble jur or c ou ld i nf

e r w e re pr e se nt t o p ro te c t th e me tha mph e tamin e prod

uc tio n. Er

ne st Miller had on his person $950 a nd seven ba g g ies of m ethamphetamine. And, despit e Ernest Miller’s pro te s tati o n s th a t t

h e s h e d w a s n o t o w n e d

b y h im o r h is f a mi ly , th e r e w a s te s ti mo n y in th e rec ord t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d i nt h e w ar

r an tw a s o w n e d

b y E r n e s tM i l l e r

an d h i s m o t h e r . F i n a l l y, Phy llis Ell ison, who was in the tra iler whe n the war rant wa s executed, testified at trial that she and Ramsey had lived tog ether

for 21 y ear s, althoug h they had never mar ried, a nd that she and Ramse y had both obtained methamphetamine fr om Ernest Miller. Mil le r a rgue s th a t th e e vid e nc e on ly de mon str a te s “ pr e se nc e , pos se ssi on , an d pe rs on a l us e of methamphe tamine,” but not that Miller participated in a conspira cy . Simi larly , Ramsey argues that he wa s merely

prese nt at the sce ne, and that n o ev i dence tied him to the conspiracy . Neither defe ndant is corr ect. When the of fice rs arr ived at the Miller residenc e, Ramsey was inside the she d wher e th e me th a mp h e ta mi n e w a s b e in g p r o d

u c e d

. U p o ns e e in g D e p u ty V ittato e , Ra

msey imm e diate ly fl e d – c on du c t that a re a so na ble jur or c ou ld c e rt a inl y

have vie we d a s e vid e nc e of g uil t. The e quipment and materia ls ty pically used to manufa cture methamphetamine a nd the quantity

of

wea pons and ammunition found i n Ernest Mil ler’s trailer, the testimony of P hy llis Ellison that she had obtained methamphetamine from the M illers, and the evidenc e that Miller was found w ith $950,

se ve n ba g g ie s of me tha

mph e tamin e , and ov e r 30 ro un ds of a mmunit ion

in h is p oc ke ts, su

pp or ts a
rea sonable infe renc e that Miller wa s involved in the manufac ture a nd distribution of the drug . The11

evidence t h at the methampheta mine was be ing ma

nufac tured in quantities beyond those used for persona l consumption, and that the drug s were individually wra pped in s mall plastic bag g ies furthe r supports such an infe renc e. F ro m th e e vid e nc e in thi s re c or d, a ratio na l jur or c ou ld fi nd that the re wa s a n a g re e me nt t o violate the druglaws by

manufa cturing , possessing and distributing methamphetamine; that Miller and Ramsey

intended to join in the conspirac y by operating a methamphetamine la b in the shed; that Ramsey participated in the conspira cy by manufa cturing methamphetamine in the she d; and that Er ne st M ill e r p art ic ipate d in the co ns pi ra c y

by pr ov idi ngma te ri a ls a

nd e qu ipm e nt n e c e ssa

ry to manufa cture met h am p h et am ine, and the dig ital scales to mea sure dr ug quantities for distribution, and by keepingloaded f

i re ar m s throug hout the proper ty to protect the ope ration. Take n toge ther, the evidenc e pre sented at trial was suff icient to permit a rational juror to conclud e b ey ond a

rea sonable doubt that Ramsey and Miller conspire d to manufac ture, possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute methamphetamine.

E. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence – M ary Miller Mary Miller challeng es on the ground of insufficienc y of the e vidence her c onvictions on the conspirac y

count and the 18 U .S.C. § 9 2 4 (c ) and 18 U .S.C. § 922(g) (1) c ounts. Specifically , she

c on te nd s that the Go ve rnme nt did no t e sta bli sh be y on d a re a so na

ble do ub t that (1 ) sh e e nte re d in to

an a g re e me nt w ith he r hu sb and and oth e rs to manu fa c tur e me tha mph e tamin e or to p os se ss m a te ri a ls to manufac ture methamph et am i ne; and ( 2) that she e ither ac tually or construc tively

possessed fi re arm s a s a

c on vic te d f

e lon or in f ur the ra nc e of the dr ugof fe ns e s. 1. Co nspi r ac y t o M anufa c tu r e M e th am phe ta m ine12

As wi th E rn e st M ill e r a

nd Ric ha rd Ramse y , th e Go vernm ent must p ro ve an a g re e me nt t o violate 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)( 1), that the de fenda nt knew of a

nd intended to join the conspiracy ; and that she par

ticipated in the conspira cy . L ike Ernest Miller and R amsey , Mary Miller contends that the evidenc e at trial proved nothing bey ond her “mer e pre sence ” in the tra iler, and this is insufficient to c on vic t he r o f c on sp ir a c y . L ike Er ne st M ill e r a

nd Ramse y , M ary

Mil le r i s in c or

re c t. The Nove mber 1 , 2002, sales re ceipt for purcha ses of thre e bottles of hy drog en per ox ide, iso pr op y l alc oh ol, tw o boxe s of na sa l dec on g e sta nt, c of fe e fi lte rs and

oth e r i te ms, wi th t

he ini tia ls EM beside the hy drog en peroxide and nasal decong estants, attache d to a note that rea d, “Mom, Iowe y o u$ 9

. 5 0 f

r o m 1 1

- 1

- 0 2

. G i v e i tb a c k s o o n . L o v e y o u , S a m an t h a , ” a l l o w s f o r t h e r e a s o n a

ble inf e re nc e tha

t Ma ry Mil le r –

i.e . “ Mo m” – p ur c ha se d it e ms whic h a re c omm on ly

us e d to manufact u re m ethamphetamine. The off icer s executing the sear ch wa rra nt found inside Mary Mil le r’ s p ur se a

sh op pin g lis t in c ludin g i tem s comm on ly us e d to manu fa c tur e the dr ug . Ph y lli s Ellison testi fied that she ha d obtained methamphetamine from Mary Miller. That evide nce, tog ether with the equipment and mate rials commonly used to ma

nufac ture methamphetamine a nd the many loa de d w e a

po ns fo un d thro ug ho ut t

he tr a ile r i n wh ic h Ma

ry and Er ne st M ill e r l ive d, wo uld

pe rm it

a ratio na l juro r t o f

ind be y on d a reas ona ble do ub t th a t th e re wa s a ta c it a g re e me nt a

mon g Er ne st Miller, Mary

Miller, and Richar d Ramsey to violate the druglaws by manufa cturing and distributing methamphetamine on the Miller s’ prope rty , and that Mar y Miller actively

participated in the conspirac y

by procur ing some of the ne cessa ry ingr edients for

the methamphetamine production. 2. P os se ssi on o f a F ir e ar m in F ur th e r anc e of a D r ug Tr affic king Offen se13

Mary Miller argues that the g uns’ mere prese nce in the residenc e she share d with her husband is insufficient to prove be y ond a reasonable doubt that she poss essed them f or purpose s of either

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) or § 922( g )(1)

. We have he ld that a firea

rm is de emed to be possessed “in further ance of” a drug traff icking offe nse, if it promotes or fac ilitates the cr ime. United States v. Mac key , 265 F.3d 457, 461 ( 6th Cir. 20 01 ). Th is m e ans , w e have sa id, that the re mus t be a “ sp e c if ic ne xus be tw e e n the g un and the c ri me char g ed.” Id. at 462. I n order for the possession to be in f urthera nce of a drug crime, the firea rm must be strateg ically

located so that it is quickly and ea sily

available for use . . . . Other f actor s that ma y be re le va

nt t o a de te rm inatio n o f w he the r t he weap on wa s p os se sse d in further ance of the c rime include w hether the g un was loade d, the ty pe of w eapon, the leg ality of its possession, the ty pe of dr ug activity

conducte d, and the ti m e and circ umstances unde r which the fi re ar m was found. . . . T he list of fac tors is not exclusive, but it helps to distingui s h p o s s essi on in further ance of a c rime fr om innocent possession of a wall-mounted antique or a n unloaded hunting rifle locke d in a cupboa

rd. Id . (interna l citations omit ted). Possession of the we apon may be ac tual or constructive, and it may be either e x clusive or joint. United States v. Paige , 470 F.3d 603, 610 ( 6th Cir. 2006). “Proof that the pe rs on

ha s d omi nio n o ve r t

he pr e mis es whe re the fi re arm is l oc a te d is su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh constructive posse ssion.” United States v. Coffee , 4 3 4 F
. 3 d 8 8 7 , 8 9 6 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 6 ) (c itation omitted). The re cord de monstrates that Mar y Miller participated in the conspiracy to manufac ture methamphetamine; that numer ous loaded fir ear ms were strateg ical l y

place d throug hout her

re sid e nc e , e a sil y

ava ila ble fo r u se and in c los e pr oximi ty to m e tha mph e tamin e and

its c omp on e nts ; and that she c onstructively possessed the f

irea rms beca use they wer e found in plac es that we re unde r her – at least joint – control, namely , the kit ch en, the den, and the maste r bedr oom and bath.14

Fur thermore , the ong oing me thamphetamine operation and the strateg ic place ment of the g uns throug hout the trailer is suff icient to permit a rational jur o r t o co n cl u d e that the guns serve d a de fe ns ive purp os e in p ro te c tin g the la b a nd its c on tr a

ba nd fr om thi e ve s, c omp e tit or s, or po lic e . M s. Miller provides an a lternative ex planation for the firearms’ presenc e, contending that her husband is a gunsmith. But the evidenc e at trial demonstrated that there wer e loade d g uns around the tr ailer – in the kitchen, the de n, the bathroom, the be droom night stand – sug g esting that these guns were not merely

part of Miller’ s g unsmithi ng enter prise. The g uns wer e not located in a w orkshop ar ea, or locke d in a safe , or eve n disassembled in the course of being repa ired. The jury was fr ee to – a

nd clea rly did – conclude be y ond a re asonable doubt that Mary Miller was a co-c onspirator in a drug manufa cturing operation in constructive possession of fire ar m s i n furtheranc e of he r traf ficking crime. M ary

M i l l er m en t i o n s t h at t h e e v i d en ce i s i n s u ff i ci en tt o s u

p p o rt h er co n v i ct i o no nt h e c h ar ge of beinga fe lon in possession of a firea rm, but she provides neither argument nor case law to support that claim. “I ssues adver

ted t o in a perfunctor

y manner , unacc ompanied by some eff ort at deve loped argumentation, are deeme d waived. It is not sufficie nt for a party to mention a possible ar g ument in the most skeletal way , leaving the court to .
. . put f lesh on its bone s.” McPhe rson v. Kelsey , 125 F.3d 989, 995- 96 (6th Cir. 1997) (c itation omit ted). And, in any event, the rec ord demonstrates that Miller is a convicted felon for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) and that, as descr ibed above, she

co n s tr u c ti v e ly p o s s e s s e d

f ir e ar ms . Co n s tr

u c ti v e p o s s e s s io nis s u f

f ic ie n t f o r c o n v ic ti o nu n d e r

th at statute. Coffee , 434 F.3d at 895.

F . Ernest Miller ’s and Mary Miller’ s P rior G uilty Pleas15

Ernest a nd Mary Miller argue that the district court e rre d in admitting evidenc e of the ir prior drug convictions under F eder al Rule of Evidence 404(b). Ernest Mil ler a rg ues that the a dmission violated his due proc ess and F ifth Amendment rig hts, and Mary Miller contends that the pr obative

va lue of he r guil ty

ple a wa s su bs tanti a lly

ou tw e ig he d by the da

ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e un de r R

ule 403. We reviewa district cour t’s ruling on Rule 404(b) e vidence for a n abuse of

discretion. United States v. Hay wood , 280 F.3d 715, 720 ( 6th Ci r. 2 0 0 2 ). Ho weve r, if the a ppellant did not object to the introduction of e vidence at trial, the de cision is reviewe d for plain e rror . United States

v . Co war t , 90 F.3d 154, 157 ( 6th Cir. 1996). Pr i o r t o trial, the Gove rnment moved in limine to int ro du c e e vid e nc e of

the pr ior c on vic tio ns . T he Ma g ist rate J ud ge det e rm ine d th a t e a c h o f t he se defe ndants had in fa ct bee n co n v i ct ed of the crime of possession of methamphetamine; that the convictions for posse ssion of methamphetamine w ere admissible to prove spec ifi c int ent in the instant prosecution, but that the timing of the guilty pleas and sentenc ings on the prior offense s was
no t a dmi ssi ble ; th a t th e fi re arm s f ound in t he se arc h le a din g to t

he pr ior c on vic tio ns we re a dmi ssi ble in t he ins tant p ro se c uti on

if the de fe nd ants pla c e d in iss ue the ir int e nt or kn ow le dg e wi th r e sp e c t to the use of the firea

rms found i n the Novembe r 27, 2002, sea rch a nd char g ed in the instant ind ic tme nt; and

tha t th e probative va lue of

thi s e vid e nc e wa s n ot s ub sta nti a lly ou tw e ig he d b y

its pr e jud ic ia l im

pact
. Ove r t

he ob je c tio ns of

the Mil le rs , th e dis tr ic t c ourt a do pte d th e Ma g istrate Judg e ’s fi nd ing s. Ne ith e r E rn e st no r Mar y Mil le r r e ne we d th e ir

pr e tr ia l ob

je c tio ns to t

he Rul e 40 4( b) e vid e nc e a t tr ia l. Rul e 40 4( b) pr ov ide s th a t alth ou g h ev ide nc e of oth e r cr ime s, wr on g s o r a c ts i s n ot a dmi ssi ble to prove a

person’ s char acte r or pr opensity to en g ag e in cr iminal conduct, the evide nce ma y be16

admissi b l e to prove intent, among other leg itimate purposes. F ED . R. E V ID . 404(b). We have

con si dere d th is a

“ ru le of inc lus ion , n ot e xclu sio n, . . . a nd the tr ia l ju dg e ha s b ro a d d isc re tio n in admitting evide nce unde r this Rule.” U n i t e d S t a t es v . M y e rs , 1 0 2 F. 3 d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 1996) (interna l citations omit ted). Rul e 40 3 p r o v i d e s t h a t r e l e v an t e v i d e n c e “ m ay b e e xc l u d e d i f i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e is substantially

outweig hed b y the dang er of unfair pr ejudice, c onfusion of the issues, or misleading the jury .” F ED . R. E V ID . 403. The “ district court is g rante d ‘ver y broad’ discretion in deter mining whether the dange r of unfair prejudice outweig hs the probative va lue of the e vidence .” United States v. Mac k , 258 F.3d 548, 555 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

1. Evid ence of Ernest Miller ’s P rior Dr ug Conviction Ernest Mil ler arg ues t hat t he November 27, 2002, sear ch of his home was the culmination of an ong oing inve stigation into M iller’s activities dating back to the Marc h 2001 sear ch. Acc ording to M ill e r, De pu ty

Wils on kn e w o f M ill e r’ s g uil ty

ple a to a n e arl ie r s e t of

fe lony c ha rg e s r e la te d to methamphetamine, a

nd “wa it[ ed] for Mr. Miller to submit to a felony conviction for the same ty pe of conduc t stil l under investig ation, [and] then [brought] a dditional c harg es and upp[ed] the ante by including conspirac y and fire arms cha rg es in a subseque nt fede ral prose cution . . . .” Miller conte nds that Deputy Wil son intended to “ us[e] the felony conviction to c reate more plea barg ain lever ag e and to bootstrap the prosec ution into an enhance d posture for trial.” Miller claims that Deputy Wil son, wh o w a s b oth

a c ounty sh e ri ff ’s de pu ty and a de pu tize d na rc oti c s a g e nt wi th t

he F B I , c oll ud e d w ith the fe dera l prosecutor s to enhanc e their c ase a g ainst Miller. Arguing f rom dicta in the Seve nth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Long , 852 F.2d 975 (7 th C ir . 1 98 8) , Mille r atte mpt s to per su a de us that the fe de ra l pr os e c uti on he re vio la te d h is r ig ht t o17

du e pr oc e ss a

nd his ri g hts un de r t

he F if th A me ndme nt. B ut Long wa s a c a se in wh ic h th e de fe nd a nt, afte r re ceivingassura

nces f rom the state that he would rec eive particula r sentenc ing c onsideration, divulge d to state authorities his role in some burg laries, includinghis having car ried a g un during

on e of the burg lari e s. Whe n he wa s su bs e qu e ntl y

pr os e c ute d in

fe de ra l c ourt

fo r w e a po ns vio la tio ns , L o n g s o u g h tt o s u

p p r e s s h i s s t a t e m e n tt o t h e s t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s o nt h e g r o u n d t h a t i t w a s n o tv o l u n t a r y. Th e Se ve nth

Cir c uit he ld that L on g ’s state me nt wa s volu nta ry in the c on te xt of the state pr oc e e din g s, and it did not become involuntary simply beca

use L ong was not awar e whe n he made the statement th at fe dera l char g es mig ht ensue. F urther, the court he ld that even if L ong ’s coope ration we re analog ized to a plea ag ree ment, “[a]bsent im proper state or f eder al ac tion or o t h er ev i d ence that L ong ’ s d is c lo s u r e p u r s u an t t o a s tate a g r e e me n t w a s n o t v o lu n ta r il y an d in te ll ig e n tl y

ma d e , the disclos u re i s p roperly

admissible in feder al cour t.” Id. at 980. Miller seizes on the neg ative implications of that statement, and the c ourt’s ea rlier obse rvation t h at “[h] ad the state office rs actively hidden such knowle dg e or c olluded with fede ral off icials, there would be diffe rent circ umstances to conside r,” to a rg ue that his plea of

g uilty in state court to the e arlier

me tha mph e tamin e c ha

rg e s w a s in a dmi ssi ble in t he ins tant p ro c e e din g s. Miller has not provided any evidenc e that state officers colluded with fede ral off icials here , o r th at s t at e of

fi ce rs h i d an y kn o wl ed ge o r o t h erwi s e a ct edi mp ro p er l y . I n d ee d , t h e M agi s t ra t e J u d ge found that althoug h Deputy Wil son serve d wi t h an F BI narc otics task forc e “f

rom time to tim e,” there was no evidenc e that he was serving in his fede ral capa city when he obtained and executed the November

2002 sear ch wa

rra nt, and furthe r dete rmined that “the re is no evide nce of fede ral participation in the obtaining or e x ecution of the war rant.” Miller has given us no reason to conc lude that those finding s are err oneous. Nor has Miller provided any evidenc e that his state-c ourt plea w as18

not intelligently and volunt arily enter ed. Rather, he appea rs to argue that bec ause f

eder al authorities

wer e awa re that he continued to eng ag e in illeg al drugtraff icking activity

throug hout the period fr om his ar re s t o n t h e state law c harg es until he enter ed his g uilty plea to those c harg es, the fe dera l

a uth or iti e s eng a g e d in impr op e r co nd uc t by wa iti ng to ar

re st him fo r that con tin

uin g a c tiv ity

un til he had enter ed his ple a in state cour t. Nothing in Long – e ith e r i n it s h old ingor its dic ta – s up po rt s this arg ument. Neither

due proc ess nor the F ifth Amendment protects Miller from the c onsequenc es of his c on tin

uin gto e ng a g e in c ri min a l c on du c t a fter bein g a pp re he nd e d a

nd pr os e c ute d in

state
c ourt
. E v e n a s s u m i n g arguendo t h at t h er e i s an ar gu m en tt o b e m ad e h er e, t h e M agi s t ra t e J u d ge found that the Marc h 2001 investigation and the Novembe r 2002 investig ation did not constitut e an ong oing inve stigation, a

nd Miller has prese nted nothing to c onvince us otherwise. I ndeed, Miller’ s Novembe r

2 0 , 2 0 0 2 , s tate c o u rt gu il ty p le a r e late d to p o s s e s s io no f

me th a mp h e ta

mi n e f o r r e sale, while the November 27, 2002, sear ch re veale d methamphetamine pr oduction, drug traff icking , and firea rms possession. The Government may use prior act evidence under Rule 404(b) to show intent to commit new, but simi lar unlaw ful condu ct
. Her e, the Ma g istrate Judge c orre ctly ruled that the Go ve rnme nt co uld us e Mil le r’ s g uil ty ple a in t he me tha mph e tamin e -p os se ssi on

c a se to d e mon str a te his intent to p r o d

u c e me th a mp h e ta

mi n e in h is b a c ky ar d , an d th e r e is n o b a s is f o r e xc lu d ing the

e vid e nc e on

du e pr oc e ss o r F if

th A me ndme nt g ro un ds

. 2. Evid ence of Mar y Miller’ s P rior Dr ug Conviction Mary Miller also argu es t h at the district court should have excluded evidenc e of he r prior

conv ic ti o nf

o r p o s s e s s in g me th a mp h e ta mi n e w it h in te n t t o d is tr ib u te u n d e r Ru le 4 0 4 ( b )

. I nh er pretria l motion, M s. Miller argued that in a d d ition to t he 21 months separ ating the offe nses, the19

char g es ar e diffe rent a

nd differ ent i tems wer e found in the t wo s ear ches of her home, and there fore , the pr e jud ic e fr om the jur

y ’s le arn ing that sh e ha d be e n a rr e ste d ne arl y tw o y e ars e arl ie r i n th e same place on drug -re lated cha rg es would substantially

outweig h the minimal prob at i v e v al u e of that information. The Mag istrate Judge disag ree d and af ter findingthat i t s p ro bative value was not substantially

outweig hed by

a dang er of unfair prejudice , found t hat Ms. Miller’s prior c onviction for possession of me thamphetamine f or re sale wa s admissible. As the Mag istrate n o t ed, we have held that “[t] o be admissible, evidenc e of defe ndant’s prior bad acts must be substantially simil ar a nd

rea sonably near in time to the char g ed off ense.” United States v. W ynn , 987 F.2d 354, 357 ( 6th Cir. 1993). He re, de s p i t e t h e two sea rche s’ yielding dif

fer ent quantities of methamphe tamine and d i ff er en td egr ee s o f p ro d

u ct i o n , t h ey

b o t h i n v o l v edm et h am p h et am i n e p o s s es s i o nan d t ra ff i ck i n g. Mo re ov e r, a s th e Ma g istrate a lso no te d, a lth ou g h th e re we re 21 mon ths be tw e e n the tw o s e arc he s, we have found that a two-y ear span did not dimini sh the probative va lue of the pr ior crime in a drug

case . United States v. Hofstatter , 8 F.3d 316, 323 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Althoug h there are differ ence s betwee n the t wo s ets of offenses, we find no err or in the district court’ s conclusion that the Mar ch 2001 possession-for- resa le conviction is “hig hly probative” in the November 2002 case

. G. The Distr ict Court ’s Refusal to AdmitTranscript from M ar y M ill e r ’s St at e Co ur t P le a He ar ing and Expert Testim ony Relative to t hat P lea Mary Mil le r a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s d is cret ion

in r e fu sin g to p e rm it h e r t o introduce the g uilty

p lea tra nscript from he r prior c onviction, or to allow a loca l attorney , Charles Bur k, to testify

as an e x pert witness. “ [A] court of appea ls appl[ies] an abuse-of- discretion standa rd when it ‘re view[s] a trial c ourt’s dec ision to admit or exclude expert testimony .’” Kumho Tire Co.,20

Ltd. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) ( quoting Gen. Ele c. v. J oiner , 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997). At trial, Ms. Miller argued t h at her ple a of guilty to the state cour

t char g es had be en introduced unde r Rule 404(b) to show intent or knowledg e, and to r ebut and r educe the pre judicial impact of that e vidence , she should be per mitted to int roduce the t ransc ripts from the state cour t plea proce eding s and to ca ll Mr. Burk to testify about “some other thing s to consider a bout why a per son mig ht e nte r a plea .” She ma int a ine d th a t sh e did no t se e k to make a

c oll a te ra l a tta c k o n th a t st a te drug conviction, but wanted only to provide the jury with helpful information as to the guilty plea proce ss in order f

or t h e j ury

to better we igh the prior bad a ct evidenc e as it re lated to the issue of kn ow le dg e a nd

int e nt. The district c ourt reje cted this re asoning

. Addre ssing first the attempt to introduc e the plea hear ing tr anscr ipt, the district court held that the tra nscript would not be admitted bec aus e i t was hear say being introduced for t he truth of its content, a nd it was being offe red in a n attempt to present Ms. Mill er’ s testimony

without subjecting he r to cross-e x amination. Remarkingthat the ar g ument Ms. Mill er’ s counsel wa s making was “ inventive,” the court opined that “the Six th Circuit, I am sure,
w i l l h a v e a

g o o d t i m e l o o k i n g a tt h i s a s I d i d

. ” T u r n i n g t o t h e m o t i o nt o i n t r o d u c e e x p e rtt e s t i m o n y, the cour t first noted that the point of that testimony would be to attac k t h e s t at e cour t guilty plea. Th e c ourt a c kn ow le dg e d tha t an ar g ume nt co uld be ma de that su c h te sti mony mig ht b e re le va

nt t o the intent require d for c onviction on the drug traff icking char g es, but conc luded that it could have no rele vance to the firearms charg es t hat were also befor e the jury

. The court there fore excluded the t e s t i m o n y.21

On a pp e a l, M ill e r p e rs ist s in

he r p ro te statio n th a t sh e did no t off er thi s e vid e nc e a s a collater al a t t ack on he r prior c onviction. Rather, she c ontends, this evidence would have be en helpful to the jury

in determining how much weig ht to g ive to that prior convic tion in determining he r i nte nt t o c omm it the dr ugtr a ff ic kin g of fe ns e s f or wh ic h s he wa s b e ing tr ie d, and the c ourt sh ou ld have a llowed it to avoid any further prejudice from the 404( b) evide nce. Even if the tr anscr ipt is not hear say – and we think that the district judge c orre ctly conclude d that it is – the po int of its int ro du c tio n w a s c e rt a inl y

to p e rs ua de the jur

y that th e g uil ty

ple a in s ta te court wa s enter ed for a rea son other than Ms. Miller’ s actua l guilt. The same is true of the testimony of Mr. B urk. Whether we have had as g ood a time re viewing this iss ue as the district court did we decline to sa

y , but we have no difficulty in concluding that

– M s . M i ller’s prote stations to the contra ry notwithstanding – the introduction of this e vidence would constitute a collate ral attack on the c on vic tio n. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

e xclu din g it. H. E r ne stM ill e r ’s Al le ge d Out -o f-C our t S ta te m e nt Mary Mil le r a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

de nyinghe r r e qu e st t o int ro du c e an o ut- of

-c ourt a dmi ssi on

a lle g e dly ma de by Er ne st Mill e r that th e fi re arm s b e lon g e d to him. Ms. Mi ller conte nds that the statement wa s admissible under Fe d er al Rule of Evidenc e 804(b)( 3), and be cause it is inculpatory of Ernest Miller, it is exculpatory of her, and its exclusion violated her

rig ht unde r the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fifth Ame ndment to present a defe nse on her behalf . Ms. Mill er c ontends that she is there fore entitled to a new trial. The district cour t held that the statement wa s not an admission ag ainst interest by a par ty -opponent be ca u s e it was a c odefe ndant, and not the Gove rnment, who soug ht to introduce it. We do not ag ree that the district22

court e rre d in e x cluding the admission, but even if it did, any err or that resulted f rom the exclusion is h arm le ss. Mary Mil le r wa s no t c ha

rg e d w ithill e g a l own e rsh ip of the fir ear ms in her trailer . She was

c ha rg e d w ithill e g a l possession of the fi re arm s, bo th as a fe lon and be c a us e he r pos se ssi on

wa s in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking offe nse. The G overnme nt did not need to prove that Mary Miller owned t he g uns in question, but merely that she illeg ally

possessed them. Mr. Miller’ s alleg ed admission of owner ship, was not exculpatory as t o Mary Miller, beca

use owne rship is not necessa ry to p os se ssi on , n or

are po sse ssi on

and la c k of ow ne rs hip mut

ua lly e xclu siv e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt did not err in de ny ing the statement’s a dmission i nto evidence

. I. Er ne stM ill e r ’s Apprendi Cl aim For his fifth assig nment of er ror, Er nest Miller asks: “When the prosec ution f ails to prove sp eci fi c ity

a s to dr uga mou nts and fi re arm po sse ssi on , d oe s Apprendir e qu i r e a n e w j u r y t r i a l ?” Nowher e in t his section of his brief does Miller mention his sentenc e. The Governme nt responds to this arg ument as if it wer e only a cla im that Miller’ s sentenc e was wrong ly calc ulated. Whatever the nature of this claim, it is wit hout merit. Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), held, a s ind e e d, Er

ne st M ill e r’ s b ri e f c or

re c tly qu ote s: Other tha n the fa ct of a

prior c o n viction, any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be y ond the pre scribed st at u t o ry maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and pr ov e d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Id. a t 49 0. Mil le r p oin ts t o n o a uth or ity , a

nd we are awa

re of no ne , that e ve n imp lie s th a t Apprendi

e nti tle s a de fe nd ant to a ne w tr ia l wh e n the jur y ha s no t ma de sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s w ithre g ard

to f a c ts that would aff

ect the se ntence
. Rather, that case require s, as we have repe atedly held, that “whe re dr ug qu anti ty is no t pr ov e d be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, a de fe nd ant’ s se nte nce cann ot exc eed the23

statutory rang e set forth in § 841(b)( 1)(C).” United States v. Copeland , 321 F.3d 582, 603 ( 6th Cir. 20 03 ) (em ph asi s in or ig ina l) . M ill e r i s n ot e nti tle d to a ne w t ri a l, t he on ly re lie f h e a sk s f

or wi th

re g ard to t his c la im. Th is a ssi g nme nt o f e rr or is f ri vo lou s. J. Richard Ram sey’s Sentence Richard Ramsey appea ls the reasonablene ss of hi s sentence under United States v. Book er . H e a s s e r t s t h a t“ t h e d i s t r i c tc o u r t o n l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e G u i d e l i n e c a l c u l at i o n s an d m a d e o n l y a cosmetic re fer ence to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in fashioning a sente nce a nd failed to indicate that it was

c o n s i d e r i n g a n y o f

t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s l i s t e d

. . . a s r e qu i r e d

b y Booke r .” The district cour

t found that Ramsey ’s base offe nse l evel was 32 and his Criminal History Categ ory was VI . Ramsey ’s counse l did not object to the calc ulation at sentenc ing. T he advisory SentencingGuideline ra

ng e wa s 210 to 262 months. After consider abl e d i s cussi on of Ramsey ’s extensive criminal history , and afte r considering the Gover nment’s reque st that the court impose the highe st possibl e sente nce, the court sente nced Ramsey to 210 months on Counts 1 and 10, and 120 months onCo u n t 1 1 , to r u nc o n c u r r e n tl y . T h is s e n te n c e is a t t h e lo w e n d

o f th e G u id e li n e r a n g e. The c ourt explained that it had arrived at this sentence a fter c onsidering the nature and cir cumstance s of the of fe ns e , th e his tor

y and c ha ra c te ri sti c s of the de fe nd ant, the a dv iso ry natur e of the g uid e lin e s,
and the oth e r f

a c tor s c on ta ine d in

18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ), and wa s satis fi e d that

thi s se nte nc e “ wi ll aff ord ade quate de terre nce a nd provide just punishment.” I n United States v. W

illiams , we made clea

r that a sen t ence within the properly calc ulated g uideline ra

ng e is cr ed i t ed with “a r ebuttable pr esumption of rea sonablene ss.” United States v. W illiams , 436 F.3d 706, 708 ( 6th Cir. 2006). W illiams p ro v i d es t h at al t h o u gh t h e s en t en ci n g j u d ge must consider the list of sentenc ing fac tors articulated i n 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), “ [s] uch conside ration24

. . . need not be evidenc ed ex plicitly . . . .” Id. Her e, Ramsey “fa ils to poi nt to any

indication that the district court ig nored those f actor s.” Id . L ikewise, a s in W illiams , Ramsey

“identifies no f

actor from § 3553(a ) that would re nder his sente nce unrea sonable; i nstead he asks the cour t to conclude that the district c ourt’s failure to e x plicitly discuss eac h fac tor rende red his sente nce unr easona ble.” Id

. As we ha

ve explained, “a sentenc e that falls within the advisory Guidelines ra

ng e is g iven ‘a r ebuttable pr esumption of rea sonablene ss.’” Un ite d Sta te s v . W ar d , 447 F.3d 869, 871 ( 6th Cir. 2006). While we have rec og nized that “ [t ]hi s rebuttable presumption does not relieve the sentenc ing

co u rt o f i t s o b l i gat i o nt o ex p l ai nt o t h e p ar t i es an d t h e r ev i ew i n g co u rt i t s re as o n s fo r i mp o s i n g a particula r sentenc e,” United States v. Richardson , 437 F.3d 5 5 0 , 5 5 3 -5 4 (6th Cir. 2006), we ha ve
a lso he ld t

hat a dis tr ic t c ourt

“ ne e d n ot r e c ite the se [§ 35 53 (a ) ] f a c tor s b ut m

us t art ic ul ate its

rea soning in de ciding to impose a sent en ce in or der to a llow for re asonable appellate revie w.” United States v. Kirby , 418 F.3d 621, 626 ( 6th Cir. 2005). The cour t in this case expressly

indicated that it c on sid e re d th e a

pp ro pr ia te fa c tor s b e fo re iss uin g a se nte nc e tha

t e njo y s a

rebutta ble pr e su mpt ion

of re a so na ble ne ss. Ramse y

ha s p ro vid e d n o in sig ht int o his c la im that hi s se nte nc e is

unrea sonable; nor ha s he intimated which sente ncing fac tor mitigate s ag ainst the sentenc e imposed. We rejec t this claim of error

. K. M ary Miller ’s Sentence Mary Miller appea ls her sente nce, arguing that the di strict court placed undue weig ht on the

a dv iso ry Gu ide lin e s r ang e by

us ingit a s a

sta rt ingpo int fo r se nte nc ing

. Th is cl a im is w ith ou t me ri t. As we ha ve discussed relative to Richa rd Ramsey ’s sentenc ing claim, the sentenc ing c ourt
mus t de mon str a te its c on sid e ratio n o f t he § 355 3( a ) se nte nc ing fa c tor s, bu t it ne e d n ot r e c ite tho se25

fa c tor s o r e xpla in i ts r e a so nin g in app lyingtho se fa c tor s to the de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t. H e re , M s. Mil le r ’ s c o u n s e l s e t o u t th e p arti c u la r c ir c u ms ta

n c e s th a t s h e w an te d th e c o u rt to c o n s id e r, and i n d i ca t edt h at t h o s e we re m o re fu l l y ex p l ai n edi nh er

s en t en ci n g m em o ra n d

u m . T h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge adv i s ed M s. Miller’s counsel that he had conside red he r sentenc ing me morandum, which he considere d to be excellent, and ha d made it par t of the re cord

. T h e co u rt then stated that it “ha s considere d the nature and cir cum s tance s of the off ense, the history

and cha rac teristics of the de fe nd ant a

nd the a dv iso ry

g uid e lin e ra

ng e , a s w e ll a s the oth e r f a c tor s se t f

or th i n T itl e 18 U. S.C. § 3553(a) .” The Prese ntence Report ca lculated a base of fense level o f

2 4 a n d a Criminal History

Categ ory I I . The Guide line rang e for these leve ls is 57 to 71 m onths, with a statutory consec utive sentenc e of 60 months for the firea rm conviction. The c ourt sentenc ed Mar y Miller to a term of 37 months on the drug -re lated char g es, and 60 months on the firea rms char g e to r

un consec utively , for a total sentenc e of 97 months. The court de parte d downwar d from the Guide lines, but indicated its belief “that this sentence will affor d adequate deter renc e and pr ovide just punishment.” Miller argues t hat her sentenc e is unrea sonable be cause the cour t relied on the G uidelines as a startingpoint for its considera tion. We rejec ted this arg ument in United States v. Cage , 458 F.3d 5 3 7 , 5 4 3 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 6 ) , in w h ic h w e h e ld th a t “ th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d id n o t e r r in v ie w ing the Guidelines as a presumptively rea sonable star ting point and ‘ consideringthe SentencingGuidelines and the Guideline rang es befor e the court does any thing e lse.’” ( Citation om itted). I n this case, the

rec ord indicate s that the district cou rt co n s i d ere d the Guidelines, the se ntencingfac tors, and the interests of justice. We find that the district c ourt adequately considere d the Guidelines and the § 3553(a) fac tors, and imposed a r easona ble sentenc e.26 III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the j udg ments of conviction and sentence of eac h of the de fe nd ants
.