J-S59027-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

CHRISTOPHER LEE REAMS, :

:

 Appellant : No. 346 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 5, 2013, 

Court of Common Pleas, Clearfield County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-17-CR-0000824-2012 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

CHRISTOPHER LEE REAMS, :

:

 Appellant : No. 347 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 5, 2013, 

Court of Common Pleas, Clearfield County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-17-CR-0000822-2012 

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and FITZGERALD*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2015 

 Appellant, Christopher Lee Reams (“Reams”), appeals from the 

judgment of sentence entered on September 5, 2013 by the Court of 

Common Pleas of Clearfield County, Criminal Division, following his guilty 

plea to rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, 

aggravated indecent assault of a child, statutory sexual assault, sexual 
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assault, indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, and 

indecent exposure.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows: 

These cases were initiated by the filing of 

[c]riminal [c]omplaints by Trooper Terry Jordan of 

the Pennsylvania State Police, on October 5, 2012. 

The [a]ffidavit of [p]robable [c]ause, for docket 

number CP-17-CR-822-2012, states that [Reams] 

sexually abused a young boy[,] eight years of age, 

named “S.H.,” on multiple occasions. These 

incidents included, inter alia, anally raping the boy 

and performing oral sex on S.H. The [a]ffidavit of

[p]robable [c]ause, for docket number CP-17-CR824-2012, avers that [Reams] sexually abused 

“E.H.,” a five-year-old girl. It was alleged, among 

other incidents, that [Reams] had anal sex with E.H. 

on one occasion and inserted one of his finger[s] into 

her vagina and anus on another. 

For the purposes of trial[,] these two cases were 

consolidated. Jury selection was scheduled for this 

matter on February 7, 2013. However, on that day, 

[Reams] entered into and signed a [n]egotiated 

[p]lea [a]greement and [g]uilty [p]lea [c]olloquy. 

Also, on February 7, 2013, [Reams] appeared before 

this [c]ourt and entered his plea into the record. 

Furthermore, the [c]ourt conducted an oral colloquy

on the record. During the course of these events, 

[Reams] was fully and competently represented by 

counsel and was advised of certain mandatory 

minimum sentences associated with his charges. 

Consequentially, jury selection for that day was 

cancelled. 

 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 3125(b), 3122.1, 3124.1, 3126(a)(7), 

3127(a). 
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On April 16, 2013, the [c]ourt issued an [o]rder 

dictating that the State Sexual Offenders’ 

Assessment Board evaluate [Reams], pursuant to 

the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4(a). The 

assessment indicated that [Reams] met the criteria 

of a “Sexually Violent Predator” (hereinafter “SVP”) 

as defined by statute.2 The [c]ourt scheduled a 

Megan’s Law Hearing for September 5, 2013, to 

determine if [Reams] should be deemed a SVP. 

In the meantime, [Reams] had been scheduled 

for sentencing on July 9, 2013. [Reams], via 

counsel, made an oral [m]otion for a continuance 

due the pending Megan’s Law Hearing. The [c]ourt 

granted said [m]otion and scheduled sentencing for 

September 5, 2013, to follow the Megan’s Law 

[h]earing. [Reams] then filed a [p]etition to 

[w]ithdraw [p]lea on July 17, 2013. The [c]ourt held 

a [h]earing on this [m]otion on August 13, 2013, at

which time the [c]ourt denied [Reams]’s request to 

withdraw his plea. 

On September 5, 2013, the [sentencing hearing] 

was held pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.4, at 

which time [Reams] was classified as a SVP. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/15, at 1-3 (footnote omitted). 

 

2

 An SVP under Pennsylvania’s version of Megan’s 

Law is defined as follows: 

A person who has been convicted of a 

sexually violent offense as set forth in 

section 9795.1 (relating to registration) 

and who is determined to be a sexually 

violent predator under section 9795.4 

(relating to assessments) due to a 

mental abnormality or personality 

disorder that makes the person likely to 

engage in predatory sexually violent 

offenses. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9792. 
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 The same day, the trial court sentenced Reams to an aggregate term 

of twenty to forty years of incarceration. On September 16, 2013, Reams 

filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the trial 

court denied on October 21, 2013. On November 22, 2013, Reams filed a 

notice of appeal, which this Court quashed as untimely on April 28, 2014. 

On October 14, 2014, Reams filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, in which he 

averred that his appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely 

notice of appeal. On February 12, 2015, the PCRA court granted Reams’ 

PCRA petition, reinstating his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Reams 

received new appointed counsel during the PCRA proceedings. 

 On February 12, 2015, Reams filed a timely notice of appeal. On 

March 6, 2015, the trial court ordered Reams to file a concise statement of 

the errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. On March 18, 2015, Reams filed 

a timely Rule 1925(b) statement. 

 On appeal, Reams raises the following issue for our review: “Whether 

the [trial court] improperly denied the [Reams’] request to withdraw his 

[guilty plea?]” Reams’ Brief at vi. Reams asserts that the trial court erred 

in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he 

claimed that he was innocent of the allegations against him and because 
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there would be no prejudice to the Commonwealth’s case if the trial court 

permitted Reams to withdraw his plea.3 See id. at 1-3. 

We acknowledge the following standard for reviewing a trial’s denial of 

a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea: 

The standard of review that we employ in 

challenges to a trial court’s decision regarding a 

presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is wellsettled. “A trial court’s decision regarding whether 

to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn should not be 

upset absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion exists when a defendant shows any ‘fair 

and just’ reasons for withdrawing his plea absent 

‘substantial prejudice’ to the Commonwealth.” In its 

discretion, a trial court may grant a motion for the 

withdrawal of a guilty plea at any time before the 

imposition of sentence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A). 

“Although there is no absolute right to withdraw a 

guilty plea, properly received by the trial court, it is 

clear that a request made before sentencing ... 

should be liberally allowed.” The policy underlying 

this liberal exercise of discretion is well-established: 

“The trial courts in exercising their discretion must 

recognize that ‘before judgment, the courts should 

show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to undo 

a waiver of all constitutional rights that surround the 

right to trial – perhaps the most devastating waiver 

possible under our constitution.’” 

Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 

3

 We note that Reams also sought to withdraw his guilty plea after 

sentencing. See Post-Sentence Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence 

Nunc Pro Tunc, 9/16/13, ¶¶ 5-13. Reams, however, does not challenge the 

denial of this motion on appeal. Therefore, we will only address his 

presentence motion to withdraw. 
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In Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1973), our 

Supreme Court instructed that 

in determining whether to grant a pre-sentence 

motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, “the test to be 

applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice.” If 

the trial court finds “any fair and just reason,” 

withdrawal of the plea before sentence should be 

freely permitted, unless the prosecution has been 

‘substantially prejudiced.’ 

Id. at 271. 

 In recent years, this Court has adopted a per se approach to innocence 

claims by defendants, holding that “[our] Supreme Court [in Forbes] held 

that the mere articulation of innocence was a ‘fair and just’ reason for the 

pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea unless the Commonwealth has 

demonstrated that it would be substantially prejudiced.” Commonwealth 

v. Katonka, 33 A.3d 44, 49 (Pa. Super. 2011). In so doing, this Court has 

limited a trial court’s discretion in granting or denying a presentence motion 

for withdrawal of a guilty plea by foreclosing credibility determinations 

relative to a defendant’s assertion of innocence. See Commonwealth v. 

Randolph, 718 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Pa. 1998) (finding that our Supreme 

Court condemned “rendering a credibility determination as to the 

defendant’s actual innocence.”). Specifically, this Court previously held that 

a trial court may not deny a defendant’s presentence withdrawal based on 

the fact that the defendant entered the guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly and 

intelligently, see Commonwealth v. Pardo, 35 A.3d 1222, 1229 
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(Pa. Super. 2011), or its belief that the withdrawal is being used as a 

dilatory tactic, see Commonwealth v. Unangst, 71 A.3d 1017, 1022 

(Pa. Super. 2013). 

 Recently, however, in Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 

1284 (Pa. 2015) and Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 

2015), our Supreme Court altered its position on a trial court’s discretion 

regarding presentence withdrawals of guilty pleas. Specifically, the Supreme 

Court “determined that a bare assertion of innocence ... is not, in and of 

itself a sufficient reason to require a court to grant such a request.” Hvizda, 

116 A.3d at 1107 (citing Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1285). In 

Carrasquillo, our Supreme Court explained: 

[T]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty 

plea; trial courts have discretion in determining 

whether a withdrawal request will be granted; such 

discretion is to be administered liberally in favor of 

the accused; and any demonstration by a defendant 

of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a

grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial 

prejudice to the Commonwealth. The perfunctory 

fashion in which these principles were applied ... lent 

the impression that this Court had required 

acceptance of a bare assertion of innocence as a fairand-just reason. 

Id. at 1291-92 (footnote and citations omitted). Therefore, our Supreme 

Court set forth the following standard for determining whether to permit a 

presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea: 

[T]he proper inquiry on consideration of such a 

withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made 
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some colorable demonstration, under the 

circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of 

the plea would promote fairness and justice. The 

policy of liberality remains extant but has its limits, 

consistent with the affordance of a degree of 

discretion to the common pleas courts. 

Id. at 1292. 

 We conclude that in this case, the trial court did not err in determining 

that Reams failed to make a colorable demonstration that permitting 

withdrawal of his plea would promote fairness and justice. Here, the 

certified record reflects that Reams did not assert his innocence either in his 

petition to withdraw his guilty plea or during the hearing on that petition. To 

the contrary, in his petition to withdraw his guilty plea, Reams provided no 

reason whatsoever as to why the trial court should permit him to withdraw 

his guilty plea. See Petition to Withdraw Plea, 7/17/13. Furthermore, at the 

hearing on his petition to withdraw his guilty plea, the sole basis Reams 

provided to the trial court for the withdrawal of his plea was: “I think I can 

do a better deal on my plea and all that stuff.” N.T., 8/13/13, at 3. 

Therefore, not only did Reams fail to assert a “fair and just” reason for the 

withdrawal of his guilty plea, but he did not even provide a bare assertion of 

innocence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Reams petition to withdraw his guilty plea. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/6/2015