United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 17, 2017 

Decided March 22, 2017 

Before 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 16-3976 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SHAWN D. TAYLOR, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 4:07-CR-40032 

David R. Herndon, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Shawn Taylor was convicted in 2008 of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute 

methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). Initially he was sentenced to 10 years’ 

imprisonment and 8 years’ supervised release, but he cooperated with the government 

and was rewarded with a reduced prison term of 80 months, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b). 

Taylor completed that term in 2012, but in 2014 the district court revoked his supervised 

release, principally because of harassing Facebook messages sent to the owner of a local 

bar. The court ordered him to serve another 10 months in prison to be followed by 

8 years’ supervised release. Taylor was released again in late 2015, but less than a year 

later his probation officer again sought revocation. This time Taylor admitted 

possessing drugs including methamphetamine, and the court sent him back to prison 

for 48 months, longer than the guidelines reimprisonment range of 12 to 18 months. The 

court did not impose a new term of supervised release. Taylor filed a notice of appeal 

from the latest revocation, but his appointed attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous 

and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 16-3976 Page 2 

A defendant facing revocation of supervised release does not have a 

constitutional right to counsel unless he challenges the appropriateness of revocation or 

asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 

778, 790–91 (1973); United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Taylor 

did not do either. Thus, Anders does not govern our review of counsel’s motion to 

withdraw, though we follow its safeguards to ensure consideration of potential issues. 

See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987); United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 

856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses 

potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. We invited 

Taylor to comment on counsel’s motion, but he has not responded. See Cir. R. 51(b). 

Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we focus our review on the subjects 

he discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. 

Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Counsel first evaluates whether Taylor could argue that the district court 

incorrectly categorized his violations of supervised release and thus miscalculated the 

reimprisonment range under the applicable Chapter 7 policy statements. See U.S.S.G. 

ch. 7, pt. B. Taylor had admitted possessing and using methamphetamine and other 

illegal drugs multiple times, failing to submit monthly reports to his probation officer, 

quitting his job without finding another, and failing to complete required treatment for 

substance abuse. The court concluded that possession of controlled substances was the 

most serious category of violation, a Grade B under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2). Revocation of 

supervised release and reimprisonment is mandatory for possession of a controlled 

substance. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Criminal conduct punishable under federal or state law by more than a year in 

jail constitutes at least a Grade B violation of supervised release (though not relevant to 

this case, felony gun crimes and some violent crimes and serious drug offenses are 

Grade A violations). U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1), (2). In Illinois, possessing methamphetamine 

even for personal use is a felony punishable by more than a year in prison. See 720 ILCS 

646/60(b)(1); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(a); People v. Fredericks, 14 N.E.3d 576, 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2014); People v. Schmidt, 938 N.E.2d 559, 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). That is enough to make 

an appellate claim about the Class B categorization frivolous. We add, however, that 

under federal law simple possession of methamphetamine is also punishable by more 

than a year in prison for anyone who, like Taylor, has a prior conviction for a drug 

offense. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857–58; United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 
No. 16-3976 Page 3 

1150, 1151 (7th Cir. 2001). It follows that an appellate challenge to the policy-statement 

range of 12 to 18 months in prison likewise would be frivolous given Taylor’s criminal 

history category of IV. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). 

Counsel next considers whether Taylor could argue that the district court 

overstated the maximum term of reimprisonment allowed by statute. In Taylor’s 

underlying case, the sentencing court found that the conspiracy had involved 472 grams 

of a substance containing methamphetamine. That quantity, coupled with an 

enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851 based on Taylor’s previous conviction for a felony 

drug offense, yielded a statutory maximum of life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(B). The prospect of a life sentence made the underlying crime a Class A 

felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1), thus allowing for another 5 years in prison after 

revocation of Taylor’s 8-year term of supervised release, id. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. 

Ford, 798 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). The district court’s imposition of a 48-month term 

of imprisonment was thus within the statutory limit. 

Counsel finally questions whether Taylor could argue that the district court 

imposed an unreasonable term of reimprisonment since it is significantly higher than 

the Chapter 7 range. While a district judge must consider policy statements, the 

recommended range is not binding. United States v. Pitre, 504 F.3d 657, 664 (7th Cir. 

2007); United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2005). In most revocation 

proceedings the district court must also consider the pertinent factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a), see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Brown, 823 F.3d at 394; although we have not decided 

whether this is true for a mandatory revocation, see United States v. DuPriest, 794 F.3d 

881, 885 n.3 (7th Cir. 2015); Jones, 774 F.3d at 404. The district judge did discuss 

information relevant to the § 3553(a) factors, however, after acknowledging the 

policy-statement range, but then decided that Taylor should be reimprisoned above that 

range. The judge reasoned that supervision had been ineffective for Taylor, noting that 

Taylor was treated with leniency at his first revocation when instead he could have 

been reimprisoned above the policy-statement range in light of his sentence reduction 

under Rule 35(b). See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.4; United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106, 1109 

(7th Cir. 2014). The court added that Taylor posed a danger to the community based on 

his history of defiance and verbal abuse toward authority figures. Thus, it would be 

frivolous to claim that the court abused its discretion. See Clay, 752 F.3d at 1109; 

United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438–39 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bungar, 478 

F.3d 540, 544–46 (3d Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.