alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. 07-12-00055-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL B

JUNE 5, 2012

AMY NICOLE TALIANI, APPELLANT

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

FROM THE 97TH DISTRICT COURT OF MONTAGUE COUNTY;

NO. 2010-0000122M-CR; HONORABLE ROGER E. TOWERY, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

	Appellant, Amy Nicole Taliani, appeals her conviction for possession of a controlled substance in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams.[footnoteRef:1]  Appellant was sentenced to 15 years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.  Appellant appealed the trial court’s judgment.  We affirm.  [1:  See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 481.115(d) (West 2011).] 

Appellants attorney has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw.  Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 2d 498 (1967).  In support of her motion to withdraw, counsel certifies that she has diligently reviewed the record, and, in her opinion, the record reflects no reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated.  Id. at 744-45.  In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978), counsel has candidly discussed why, under the controlling authorities, there is no error in the trial courts judgment.  Additionally, counsel has certified that she has provided appellant a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw and appropriately advised appellant of her right to file a *pro se* response in this matter.  Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).  The Court has also advised appellant of her right to file a *pro se* response.  Appellant did not file a response.  By her Anders brief, counsel reviewed all grounds that could possibly support an appeal, but concludes the appeal is frivolous.  We have reviewed these grounds and made an independent review of the entire record to determine whether there are any arguable grounds which might support an appeal.  SeePenson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).  We have found no such arguable grounds and agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous.

Accordingly, counsels motion to withdraw is hereby granted and the trial courts judgment is affirmed.[footnoteRef:2] [2:  Counsel shall, within five days after this opinion is handed down, send his client a copy of the opinion and judgment, along with notification of appellants right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review.  See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4.] 

								Mackey K. Hancock

                                                     Justice

Do not publish.

2
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Sentry Petroleum Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the period ended February 29, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Raj Rajeswaran, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated this 3rd day of March, 2009.

| |     |                                                           
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------
| | BY: | RAJ RAJESWARANRaj Rajeswaran, 
Principal Executive Officer







1
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6091 

To repeal the Military Selective Service Act, including the registration 

requirements of the Military Selective Service Act. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 30, 2021 

Mr. PERRY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To repeal the Military Selective Service Act, including the 

registration requirements of the Military Selective Service 

Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Military Selective Serv5 ice Repeal Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT. 

7 (a) REPEAL.—The Military Selective Service Act (50 

8 U.S.C. 3801 et seq.) is repealed. 

9 (b) TRANSFERS IN CONNECTION WITH REPEAL.— 

10 Notwithstanding the proviso in section 10(a)(4) of the 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6091 IH

1 Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. 3809(a)(4)), the 

2 Office of Selective Service Records shall not be reestab3 lished upon the repeal of the Act. Not later than 180 days 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the assets, 

5 contracts, property, and records held by the Selective 

6 Service System, and the unexpended balances of any ap7 propriations available to the Selective Service System, 

8 shall be transferred to the Administrator of General Serv9 ices upon the repeal of the Act. The Director of the Office 

10 of Personnel Management shall assist officers and employ11 ees of the Selective Service System to transfer to other 

12 positions in the executive branch. 

13 (c) EFFECT ON EXISTING SANCTIONS.—Notwith14 standing any other provision of law, a person may not be 

15 denied a right, privilege, benefit, or employment position 

16 under Federal law on the grounds that the person, before 

17 the repeal of the Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. 

18 3801 et seq.) by subsection (a), failed to present himself 

19 for and submit to registration under section 3 of such Act 

20 (50 U.S.C. 3802). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### LEVY v. NEW ORLEANS & NORTHEASTERN R. CO.

No. 18212.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Feb. 26, 1945.

Writ of Certiorari Denied April 30, 1945.

Benjamin Y. Wolf, of New Orleans, for plaintiff and appellee.

Monroe & Lemann and Walter J. Suth-on, Jr., all of New Orleans, for defendant and appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Counsel for plaintiff in an application for rehearing, among other assignments of error, charges that even if we are otherwise correct, we are in error in not allowing recovery for the value of the destroyed automobile, since the Supreme Court in McHenry v. American Employers Insurance Co., 206 La. 70, 18 So.2d 656, 657, held that a husband injured by the negligence of his wife might recover from the insurers of the wife or the. insurers of *156the automobile driven by the wife in spite of the fact that the amount recovered would go into the community in which the wife, herself, is a one-half owner.

We were familiar with that decision though it had not been cited by counsel. It is true that in that case the court held that the husband might recover from the insurers of the wife or of the automobile driven by the wife for injuries sustained by him even though the recovery would form a part of the community and even though the injuries were caused by the negligence of the wife. The court held that in such a case the community is not profiting as a result of the negligence of the wife but is merely being permitted to obtain reimbursement for a loss already sustained. There, however, the automobile, which the wife was driving, was not being operated by her in the interest of the community, since from the statement of facts it appears “* * * that at the time of the accident she (the wife) was acting within the scope of her employment (by Welcome Wagon Service Co.) and had begun a mission in the interest of her said employer.”

Here we have h§ld that the plaintiff cannot contend that the car was not being used on a community errand and we think that it would be stretching the very liberal doctrine of the McHenry case beyond the breaking point to hold that the community might recover for loss caused by the negligence of a member of the community while engaged on a community mission.

For these reasons, the application for rehearing made by plaintiff is denied.

The application of defendant is also denied.
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed February 17, 2016

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D14-1821

Lower Tribunal No. 04-13073

________________



### Jose Cisneros-Gonzalez

, Appellant,

vs.



### The State of Florida

, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William

Thomas, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Hemmendinger, Assistant

Public Defender

, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jay E. Silver, Assistant Attorney

General

, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, C.J., and EMAS and LOGUE, JJ.

ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

LOGUE, J.A jury convicted Jose Cisneros-Gonzalez of kidnapping, sexual battery, and

attempted second-degree murder. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the

trial court failed to conduct an adequate Nelson 1 hearing; and (2) whether the trial

court fundamentally erred when it instructed the jurors that intent to kill was an

element of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

Finding no error on the first issue, we affirm Cisneros-Gonzalez’s

convictions of sexual battery and kidnapping. However, based on the State’s

proper confession of error pursuant to Griffin v. State

, 160 So. 3d 63 (Fla. 2015),

we reverse and remand for a new trial on the attempted second-degree murder

conviction. Like the defendant in Griffin

, the defendant here was convicted of a

crime one step removed from the erroneous manslaughter instruction, and he did

not concede the issue of intent.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for a new trial on the

attempted second-degree murder charge.

1 Nelson v. State

, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).

2
**Exhibit 31.1****CERTIFICATION**I, C.E. Andrews, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filedin respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of SLMStudent Loan Trust 2006-4 (the“Exchange Act periodic reports”);     2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not containany untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution, servicing and other information required to beprovided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Actperiodic reports;     4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required under this reportunder Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, theservicer and administrator have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreement andadministration agreement, as applicable, in all material respects; and     5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backedsecurities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicingcriteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit tothis report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliancedescribed in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K. In giving thecertifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by Deutsche Bank TrustCompany Americas, as indenture trustee.Date: March 23, 2007   /s/ C.E. Andrews   C.E. Andrews  Chief Financial Officer  SLM Funding LLC
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 15

- 00325

- CR

CONRAD VONBOSE APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 36 2ND DISTRICT COURT O F DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. F

- 2012

- 0916

- D

------------



### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 

### AND JUDGMENT

----------

We have considered “ Appellant ’ s Motion t o Dismiss Appeal , Pursuant to

T.R.A.P. 42.2(a)

, ” which is unopposed. The motion complies wi th rule 42.2(a) of

the rules of appellate procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a). No decision of this

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

court having been delivered before we received this motion, we grant the motion

and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a), 43.2(f).

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

J USTICE

PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App

. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: April 7, 2016
| **Commitments And Contingent Liabilities (Narrative) (Details) (Maximum, USD $)** | 12 Months Ended                                                                              |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| Maximum                                                                           |                                                                                         |
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| X                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| - Definition
Estimate for which the risk of loss is more than remote
+ References
No definition available.
+ Details**Name:**cinf_EstimateForWhichRiskOfLossIsMoreThanRemote**Namespace Prefix:**cinf_**Data Type:**xbrli:monetaryItemType**Balance Type:**debit**Period Type:**duration |
**EXHIBIT 31**

**WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP. **

**OFFICER’S CERTIFICATE**

I, Thomas G. Lehmann, certify that:

1.         I have reviewed this report on Form 10–K and all reports on Form 10–D required to be filed in respect of the periodcovered by this report on Form 10–K of Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series 2006-4 Trust (the ‘‘Exchange Act periodic reports’’);

2.         Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a  materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.         Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10–D for theperiod covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4.         Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except asdisclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreement(s) in all material respects; and

5.         All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestationreports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a–18 and 15d–18 have been included as an exhibit to thisreport, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10–K. 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:  Greenpoint MortgageCompany.

Date:  March 15, 2007

  /s/ Thomas G. LehmannName:  Thomas G. LehmannTitle:    President
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6476 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6476

   To amend the International Financial Institutions Act to provide 
     instructions with respect to the U.S. policy on co-financing 
   arrangements at the multilateral development banks, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 25, 2022

    Mr. Torres of New York introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the International Financial Institutions Act to provide 
     instructions with respect to the U.S. policy on co-financing 
   arrangements at the multilateral development banks, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. U.S. POLICY ON CO-FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS AT THE MULTILATERAL 
              DEVELOPMENT BANKS.

    Title XVI of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 
U.S.C. 262p et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 1632. U.S. POLICY ON CO-FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS AT THE 
              MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.

    ``The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States 
Executive Directors at the multilateral development banks (as defined 
in section 1701(c)(4)) to use the voice and vote of the United States 
to vote against any program or project at the respective institution if 
it includes joint or parallel financing provided by the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank unless the Secretary of the Treasury has 
certified to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank--
            ``(1) has the authority and the resources to provide grants 
        and concessional assistance to countries eligible to borrow 
        from the International Development Association on terms similar 
        to those provided to these countries by the International 
        Development Association; and
            ``(2) has demonstrated a track record of providing such 
        assistance to these countries.''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This financial data schedule contains summary financial information extracted
from the consolidated financial statements included in P & F Industries, Inc.'s
quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 1999 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         367,409
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,393,098<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 21,785,557
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            32,709,581
<PP&E>                                      17,952,658
<DEPRECIATION>                               6,724,040
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              52,270,544
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       17,289,344
<BONDS>                                      8,305,967
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        3,499,345
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  22,684,888
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                52,270,544
<SALES>                                     34,764,725
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            35,200,425
<CGS>                                       24,205,190
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               24,205,190
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             601,637
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,777,431
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,062,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,715,431
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,715,431
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .52
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .46
<FN>
<F1>ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE ARE NET OF ALLOWANCE
</FN>


</TABLE>
#### Salvatore GIOVE, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent.

No. 02-3045.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

DECIDED: Nov. 7, 2002.

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, SCHALL and DYK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Salvatore Giove seeks review of the September 5, 2001, decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board, 89 M.S.P.R. 560, dismissing the appeal of his removal as barred by res judicata. We *affirm.*

A board decision must be affirmed unless it is found to be: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000).

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits prevents the same parties or their privies from relitigating the same claims that were raised before. *Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,*439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); *Case Inc. v. United States,*88 F.3d 1004, 1011 (Fed.Cir.1996). Under a collective bargaining agreement, Giove filed a grievance contesting his removal for, inter alia, the misuse of government information, as protected disclosures pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Act. *See*5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1994). In January of 1999, the arbitrator denied his grievance and upheld his removal. This court affirmed the arbitrator’s decision. *Giove v. Department of Transportation,*230 F.3d 1333 (Fed.Cir.2000). Because Giove seeks relief for claims based on the same set of facts against the same party in which a final decision has already been reached, the board properly dismissed this appeal as res judicata.

Giove argues that nevertheless he is entitled to de novo consideration of his appeal before the board under the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act of the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. -61 (2000) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g)(3)) (“Ford Act”). The Ford Act retroactively reinstated Federal Aviation Administration employees’ rights, which had been divested in 1996, to appeal adverse agency personnel actions to the *422board. The Ford Act covers Giove’s 1998 removal from the Federal Aviation Administration. Giove asserts that the reinstatement of his right to appeal the merits of his case to the board cannot be negated by his prior decision to arbitrate. We do not agree.

By its terms the Ford Act does not negate res judicata or otherwise create an independent basis for appeal. Because Giove’s case has already reached a final judgment here, it is barred from further review.