UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5007

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT BRUFFY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:10-cr-00077-LMB-1)

Argued: December 6, 2011 Decided: February 16, 2012

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the 

majority opinion, in which Judge Motz joined. Judge Gregory 

wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

ARGUED: Shannon S. Quill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeffrey Zeeman, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. 

ON BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, 

Caroline S. Platt, Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Tracy Doherty-McCormick, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

Robert John Bruffy was convicted in a bench trial of 

knowingly failing to register and update his registration as 

required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(SORNA), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Bruffy challenges 

his conviction, arguing first that the reporting requirements of 

SORNA are unconstitutionally vague as applied to individuals 

such as himself who lack a fixed permanent address, and second, 

that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. 

Upon our review of the record and the requirements of SORNA, we 

affirm Bruffy’s conviction. 

I.

Bruffy was convicted in December 2000 of the felony of 

“sexual offense in the second degree” in Anne Arundel County, 

Maryland. As a result of his conviction, Bruffy was required 

under SORNA to register as a sex offender in the state in which 

he resided.

On May 7, 2008, Bruffy filed a Maryland Sexual Offender 

Information Change Form, indicating his intention to move from 

Maryland to Florida. The next week, upon arriving in Florida, 

Bruffy submitted to the Florida authorities a completed Florida 

Department of Law Enforcement Sexual Predator/Offender 

Registration Form (Florida form). 
4

About eight months later, Bruffy made plans to move once 

again. On January 13, 2009, Bruffy filed another Florida sex 

offender registration form with the Florida authorities. On 

this form, Bruffy provided January 13, 2009, as his date of 

departure, and listed his “Current Permanent Address” as 

“Transient, Edge Water [sic], MD 21307,” which is located in 

Anne Arundel County, Maryland. 

Bruffy did not mark the box on the Florida form 

representing that he was leaving his Florida residence and had 

“no other permanent or temporary residence” as of his date of 

departure, nor did he check the box indicating that he had “no 

other permanent or temporary residence at this time.” Bruffy 

did, however, mark the box on the Florida form indicating that 

he did not have a temporary address. This form filed on January 

13, 2009 was the last sexual offender information form that 

Bruffy filed. 

Before Bruffy left Florida, he had arranged to stay in the 

apartment of John Stec and Erica Liller (the Belle Haven 

apartment) in the Belle Haven area of Fairfax County, Virginia. 

Bruffy planned to rent his own apartment after securing 

employment. He sought work with a former employer in Maryland, 

and spoke generally about living in Maryland or living in 

Pennsylvania, where his son and sister lived. 
5

From January 13, 2009 through February 5, 2009, Bruffy

spent almost every night on a couch in the Belle Haven 

apartment. Although he also took showers and ate there, every 

day he removed his belongings from the Belle Haven apartment and 

stored them in his vehicle. Bruffy did not have a key to the 

apartment, but was required to contact either Stec or Liller 

each evening that he planned to stay there in order to gain 

entry. During this period, Bruffy spent a few nights at his 

uncle’s residence in Charles County, Maryland. 

On February 5, 2009, Bruffy committed misdemeanor sexual 

battery on Stec, after which Bruffy no longer slept in the Belle 

Haven apartment. From that date until February 15, 2009, Bruffy 

lived in his car, at various locations in the Belle Haven area 

of Fairfax County, in Washington, D.C., and in Maryland. On a 

number of these days, Bruffy parked his car in the parking lot 

of a church located behind the Belle Haven apartment. He 

returned to the Belle Haven apartment on a daily basis to take 

Liller back and forth to work. There is no evidence that Bruffy 

spent any time in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, during this 

period. 

On February 15, 2009, Bruffy was arrested in Fairfax 

County, about 2.5 miles from the Belle Haven apartment. He 

later was indicted for failing to update his registration as a 
6

sex offender, as required by SORNA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

2250(a). 

Bruffy moved to dismiss the indictment in the district 

court. He argued that SORNA is unconstitutionally vague as 

applied to transients such as himself, because the language of 

SORNA does not clarify where such transients “reside” for 

purposes of compliance with the statute. The district court 

denied Bruffy’s motion to dismiss, and the case proceeded to 

trial. 

In a statement of stipulated facts, Bruffy acknowledged 

that he was aware of the registration requirements of SORNA, and 

that he had not submitted any updated registration information 

since leaving Florida on January 13, 2009. Based on these 

facts, the district court found Bruffy guilty of failing to 

register as a sex offender in Virginia and failing to update the 

information provided to Florida regarding his Virginia 

residency. Bruffy appeals from this conviction.

II.

Bruffy makes two arguments on appeal. First, he asserts 

that SORNA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to transient 

offenders such as himself. Second, Bruffy contends that the 

stipulated facts before the district court were insufficient to 

support his conviction. We address these arguments in turn.
7

A.

Bruffy argues that the definition of “resides” provided in 

SORNA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to transient 

offenders who have vacated one residence but have not yet 

established a new residence in a different state. He asserts 

that SORNA fails to provide fair notice of the point in time 

when presence in a new jurisdiction triggers the registration 

requirement. We review this vagueness argument, which presents 

a question of law, de novo. United States v. Brandon, 298 F.3d 

307, 310 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Bruffy was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (the 

enforcement statute), which punishes violations of SORNA. That 

statute provides:

In general. Whoever—

(1) is required to register under the Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification Act;

(2)

. . .

(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, 

or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian 

country; and

(3) knowingly fails to register or update a 

registration as required by the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 

more than 10 years, or both.
8

18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Bruffy acknowledges that he is required by 

SORNA to register as an offender, and that he traveled in 

interstate commerce. Therefore, the only subsection at issue 

here is the provision addressing the updating of registration 

under SORNA. 

The relevant sections of SORNA provide:

Registry requirements for sex offenders 

(a) In general 

A sex offender shall register, and keep the 

registration current, in each jurisdiction 

where the offender resides, where the offender 

is an employee, and where the offender is a 

student. 

. . . 

(c) Keeping the registration current 

A sex offender shall, not later than 3 business 

days after each change of name, residence, 

employment, or student status, appear in person 

in at least 1 jurisdiction involved pursuant to 

subsection (a) of this section and inform that 

jurisdiction of all changes in the information 

required for that offender in the sex offender 

registry. That jurisdiction shall immediately 

provide that information to all other 

jurisdictions in which the offender is required 

to register. 

42 U.S.C. § 16913 (emphasis added). 

Under SORNA, “[t]he term ‘resides’ means, with respect to 

an individual, the location of the individual’s home or other 

place where the individual habitually lives.” 42 U.S.C. § 

16911(13). Bruffy alleges that this definition of “resides” 
9

renders SORNA impermissibly vague, because the definition does 

not provide fair warning directing transient offenders such as 

himself, who have left a permanent living situation but have not 

yet secured a new one, how to proceed. We disagree with 

Bruffy’s argument. 

In order to address Bruffy’s constitutional challenge, we 

must first classify it appropriately. Although he focuses on 

the facts specific to his case, Bruffy also argues more broadly 

about the application of SORNA’s registration requirements to 

transient offenders generally. However, facial vagueness 

challenges to criminal statutes are allowed only when the 

statute implicates First Amendment rights. United States v. 

Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States 

v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)). Because Bruffy has 

not asserted that his First Amendment rights are affected by 

SORNA’s registration requirements, we will consider only 

Bruffy’s challenge to the statute as it applies to him. 

When considering whether a penal statute violates the Due 

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment on vagueness grounds, we 

consider both whether that statute provides notice to the public 

regarding the activity prohibited, and whether the statute 

operates in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 

discriminatory enforcement. United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 

1284, 1291 (4th Cir. 1993); see Skilling v. United States, 130 
10

S. Ct. 2896, 2927-28 (2010). With respect to the issue of 

notice, a defendant must establish that the statute fails to 

give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity 

to understand the conduct that the statute prohibits. See

United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). 

1.

Although two of our sister circuits have addressed SORNA as 

it applies to defendants without fixed addresses, none has 

addressed the particular vagueness argument Bruffy raises 

challenging SORNA’s term “resides.” However, those decisions 

of our sister circuits nevertheless provide some useful context 

regarding SORNA and its registration requirements as applied to 

sex offenders with no fixed address.

In United States v. Voice, the Eighth Circuit addressed the 

issue whether a transient offender lacking a fixed address was 

required to update his information under SORNA, after he left a 

halfway house in one city in South Dakota and began living at 

various locations in another jurisdiction in the same state. 

622 F.3d 870, 874-75 (8th Cir. 2010). The court held that SORNA 

does require that a transient offender update his information, 

and further stated that “[w]e reject the suggestion that a savvy 

sex offender can move to a different city and avoid having to 

update his SORNA registration by sleeping in a different shelter 

or other location every night.” Id. at 875.
11

In support of its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit observed 

that while a convicted sex offender may lack a residence 

address, this fact does not prevent the offender from updating 

his registration information. See id. The court quoted from 

the Attorney General’s SORNA Guidelines, stating: 

Such sex offenders cannot provide [a] residence 

address . . . because they have no definite ‘address’ 

at which they live. Nevertheless, some more or less 

specific description should normally be obtainable 

concerning the place or places where such a sex 

offender habitually lives—e.g., information about a 

certain part of a city that is the sex offender’s 

habitual locale, a park or spot on the street (or a 

number of such places).

Id. (quoting National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration 

and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,055 (July 2, 2008)). 

In another case addressing SORNA, United States v. Van 

Buren, 599 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit discussed 

the importance of SORNA’s registration requirements as they 

pertain to defendants with no fixed address. In that case, a 

convicted sex offender had left his residence in New York and 

was arrested at his mother’s house in North Carolina about 

fifteen days later. Id. at 171-72. At no time during this 

fifteen day period did the defendant update his sex offender 

registration with New York or register in North Carolina. Id. 

The Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that 

because he had not established a “new residence,” he was not 

required to update his registration information under SORNA. 
12

Id. at 174. The court stated that under SORNA, “it is clear 

that a registrant must update his registration information if he 

alters his residence such that it no longer conforms to the 

information that he earlier provided to the registry. Without 

accurate registration information, SORNA would be ineffective.” 

Id. at 175.

The Second Circuit also explained that in enacting SORNA, 

Congress intended to establish a nationwide system requiring the 

registration of sex offenders, to ensure that “sex offenders 

could not avoid all registration requirements just by moving to 

another state.” Id. (quoting United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 

83, 91 (2d Cir. 2010)). Additionally, by requiring a sex 

offender to register within three business days of relocating 

his place of abode, Congress has enabled the authorities where 

the offender has relocated to ask pertinent questions about the 

offender’s future plans. Id. 

In the present case, Bruffy informed the jurisdiction he 

was departing that he intended to be transient in one state, but 

was found several weeks later in a different state where he had 

lived for an extended period of time without registering with 

the authorities. We conclude that the statute is not 

unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts in Bruffy’s 

case. 
13

The plain language of the enforcement statute provides that 

whoever “knowingly fails to . . . update a registration as 

required by” SORNA is subject to prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 

2250(a)(3). Between January 13, 2009, and February 5, 2009, 

Bruffy lived in the Belle Haven apartment almost every day. 

Although he did not have unrestricted access to the Belle Haven 

apartment, and did not purport to settle there with any 

permanence, his tenure there was ongoing during that period. 

Additionally, while Bruffy did not live in the Belle Haven 

apartment between February 5, 2009 and February 15, 2009, he 

returned there on a daily basis and occasionally lived in his 

car in a parking lot behind the apartment. Thus, while Bruffy 

may have been “transient” during the period between January 13, 

2009 and February 15, 2009, Bruffy was not “in transit” during 

this time. That is to say, Bruffy was not merely passing 

through the Belle Haven area in uninterrupted travel, which 

would pose a question quite different than the one we face here. 

For that month, Bruffy was transient in a defined 

jurisdiction. To the exclusion of any other location, Bruffy 

habitually lived in the Belle Haven area of Fairfax County, 

Virginia. Thus, regardless of the ultimate destination that 

Bruffy may have contemplated when leaving Florida, a transient 

person of ordinary intelligence would have recognized after four 

weeks of living in and around the Belle Haven area of Fairfax 
14

County, Virginia, that he was habitually living there and was 

required by SORNA to update his registration information. 

Therefore, we conclude that the word “resides,” as used in the 

language of SORNA’s registration requirements, does not render 

the enforcement statute unconstitutionally vague when applied to 

Bruffy during the one month period at issue. 

2.

We now consider Bruffy’s argument that SORNA’s use of the 

word “resides” is so vague that it will likely lead to arbitrary 

or discriminatory enforcement. Because Bruffy does not offer a 

substantive analysis in support of this contention, we cannot 

address his argument in great detail. However, our review of 

the language of SORNA in the context of the facts of this case 

satisfies us that arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is not 

a meaningful concern. 

The only persons subject to the enforcement statute are sex 

offenders required to register under SORNA. SORNA provides an 

offender three days following relocation to register. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 16913(c). Given the narrow class of persons subject to the 

statute, the clearly defined timeframe before enforcement may 

commence, and the facts surrounding Bruffy’s case, enforcement 

in this case was consistent with the “core concerns” underlying 

SORNA and did not lead to arbitrary or discriminatory 

enforcement. See Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 749 (2d 
15

Cir. 2010) (holding in “as applied” challenge that, even where 

enforcement guidelines may not have been clear in hypothetical 

situations, the actions of the defendants were in clear 

violation of the statute). Accordingly, we conclude that the 

language of SORNA provides sufficient guidance to withstand 

Bruffy’s vagueness challenge. 

B.

Bruffy next argues that the evidence presented was 

insufficient to support his conviction. He contends that the 

stipulated facts do not establish that he resided in Virginia, 

within the meaning of SORNA’s registration requirements. 

When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, an 

appellate court must affirm the district court’s judgment if 

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States 

v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard is met when 

there is “substantial evidence” in the record, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the government, to support the district 

court’s judgment. Id.

Bruffy asserts that he complied with SORNA by giving notice 

to Florida that he would be transient upon leaving Florida. He 

contends that this fact distinguishes him from the defendant in 

Voice, who failed to inform any authorities of his relocation. 
16

622 F.3d at 873-74. He also argues that he complied with 

SORNA’s requirements to the extent that he was able, and that he 

cannot be required to satisfy additional reporting obligations 

not contained in the statute. We disagree with Bruffy’s 

arguments. 

Although Bruffy is correct that his situation is not 

identical to that of the defendant in Voice, the similarities 

are nevertheless instructive. Like the defendant in Voice, 

Bruffy left the location where he last had registered, began 

habitually living in a new location, and did not provide the 

authorities in the jurisdiction in which he was arrested any 

notice that he was habitually living there. Voice, 622 F.3d at 

874-75. Also like the defendant in Voice, Bruffy had not yet

decided that the location in which he was arrested was the 

location where he intended to reside permanently. Id. Thus, 

under circumstances similar to those presented in this case, the 

Eighth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to find 

that a transient offender violated SORNA. 

We reach the same conclusion here. We must affirm Bruffy’s 

conviction if any rational fact finder, here a federal district 

judge, could have found that Bruffy violated the law. 

Certainly, it is possible that when Bruffy initially made plans 

to stay at the Belle Haven apartment, he harbored no intent to 

remain there, habitually or permanently. But, we cannot say 
17

that a rational trier of fact could not conclude that Bruffy 

later developed the intent to remain in Belle Haven for some 

indefinite period of time such that he was required by SORNA to 

update his registration status. Indeed, the stipulated facts 

demonstrate that the day after his arrest in this case, Bruffy 

himself expressed an interest in moving into a newly vacant room 

in the Belle Haven apartment. That fact, in combination with 

the facts that Bruffy spent most nights and some portion of 

nearly every day in or around Belle Haven between January 13 and 

February 15, 2009, constitute sufficient evidence for us to 

affirm Bruffy’s conviction.

In effect, Bruffy’s argument would reduce to a nullity the 

statutory obligation of a transient offender to update his SORNA 

registration. The act of labeling oneself as a transient upon 

departing a particular state does not provide an offender a 

license to relocate to an unspecified location. Contrary to the 

form that he had filed with the Florida authorities, Bruffy was 

not transient in Edgewater, Maryland, nor had he ever been by 

the time he was arrested on February 15, 2009. Thus, Bruffy was 

required to update his registration information, because his 

residence no longer conformed to the information he earlier had 

provided to the SORNA registry. See Van Buren, 599 F.3d at 175. 

Instead, in violation of this registration updating requirement, 

Bruffy had terminated his Florida residence and had not provided
18

accurate information regarding his whereabouts for an entire 

month, effectively evading the requirements of SORNA. 

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 

support Bruffy’s conviction under the enforcement statute.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

 AFFIRMED
19

GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part:

While I agree with the majority that SORNA is not 

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Bruffy,* I would hold that 

 * Unlike the majority, I do not believe that we must find 

that Bruffy habitually lived in the Belle Haven region of 

Alexandria, Virginia, to find that the statute is not 

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Bruffy.

To be constitutional, “a penal statute [must] define the 

criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 

people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a 

manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement.” Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927-

28 (2010) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1982), 

alterations in Skilling); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 

527 U.S. 41 (1991) (finding a loitering ordinance 

unconstitutionally vague because it “fails to give the ordinary 

citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is 

permitted”).

There are objective criteria that an ordinary person would 

understand to be indicators of whether she “habitually lives” in 

a particular location. Some indicators include whether that 

person is currently owning or renting a living space, where the 

defendant keeps her possessions, where she intends to return to 

each night, and so forth. That there is a disagreement here as 

to whether the government has met its burden in proving that 

Bruffy habitually lived in Belle Haven, Alexandria, Virginia, is 

beside the point. What’s relevant is that there are easily 

understandable criteria that an ordinary person could utilize to 

assess her behavior under the statute.

Nor does the statute encourage arbitrary or discriminatory 

enforcement. The difference with Morales is informative. 

Morales held that a loitering statute was unconstitutional 

because police officers had to determine whether someone was 

standing on a street with no “apparent purpose” and such a term 

lacked objective indicia to guide enforcement. 527 U.S. at 56-

59. When determining whether someone “resides” at a particular 

location, again, a series of objective factors can be taken into 

consideration, as recounted above. The inquiry is certainly 

less subjective than determining the difference between a 

(Continued)
20

the government has not met its burden of proof in this case, and 

I would vacate Bruffy’s conviction.

I.

SORNA states that whoever “knowingly fails to . . . update 

a registration as required by” SORNA is subject to prosecution. 

18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3). SORNA requires that an offender update 

his registration in those jurisdictions “where the offender 

resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the 

offender is a student.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c). No contention is 

made that the latter two categories are at issue. Unlike the 

majority, however, I would hold that Bruffy did not “reside” in 

Virginia for purposes of SORNA as a matter of law.

The disagreement boils down to an interpretation of 

“resides,” which the statute defines as “the location of the 

individual’s home or other place where the individual habitually 

lives.” Id. § 16911(13). Although Bruffy was certainly living 

in the northern Virginia, D.C. metropolitan, and southern 

Maryland region for the disputed time period, Bruffy did not 

“habitually live” in any one of these areas. His duty to update 

his SORNA registration was therefore never triggered, and there 

 

person’s residence and domicile -- a longstanding distinction in 

our jurisprudence.
21

cannot be sufficient evidence to convict him of a SORNA 

violation.

There is no suggestion that Bruffy did not comply with the 

updating provision when he left Florida. Because he was no 

longer going to habitually live in Florida, he was required to 

notify the jurisdiction he was leaving within three business 

days. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c). Bruffy complied with that 

requirement by noting that he would be transient in the 

Edgewater, Maryland region, which is where he intended to move. 

But because he did not have a permanent address -- a new place 

where he would habitually live -- Bruffy wrote that he would be 

“transient.” The majority doesn’t say that he violated SORNA 

when he left Florida; instead, the violation supposedly came 

after he had spent some nights in Alexandria.

Furthermore, even though Bruffy had no residence, according 

to the majority he was supposed to appear in person at a 

jurisdiction involved and update his registration. The statute 

tells us that even “jurisdiction” is defined with reference to 

“where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, 

and where the offender is a student.” Id. § 16913(a), (c). 

Again, under the statute we cannot even say that Bruffy could 

have reported to a Virginia jurisdiction without first 

establishing that Bruffy in fact habitually lived in Virginia.
22

Even though I would find that the definition of “habitually 

lives” is not so vague as to be unconstitutional, the definition 

is not pellucid. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has issued 

guidelines to assist jurisdictions in understanding and 

implementing SORNA. The guidelines define “habitually lives” as 

“any place in which the sex offender lives for at least 30 

days.” National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,062 (July 2, 2008). The 

guidelines admit that “[d]efining changes in such matters as 

residence and employment may present special difficulties in 

relation to sex offenders who lack fixed residence or 

employment.” Id. at 38,065. The guidelines also state that 

jurisdictions are not required to treat as a change in residence 

every time that a sex offender sleeps on a different park bench, 

and the guidelines specify that a transient offender can comply 

with the statute by providing a description of the area in which 

she habitually lives. Id. at 38,030, 38,055, 38,065. While we 

are not bound by the DOJ guidelines, I would find their 30-day 

benchmark persuasive given that the meaning of “habitually 

lives” is ambiguous and subject to interpretation. See

Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (deferring 

to agency guidelines inasmuch as they are persuasive).

Whatever “habitually lives” may mean, it is clear to me 

that from February 5, 2009, to February 15, 2009, when Bruffy 
23

lived in his car, he had no fixed address, and he did not 

habitually live anywhere. According to the jointly stipulated 

facts, in that time period, Bruffy “slept and lived in his car 

at various locations in Northern Virginia (Belle Haven region), 

Washington D.C., and Maryland.” J.A. 100. Likewise, from 

January 13, 2009, to February 5, 2009, while Bruffy spent 

“almost every night” at the apartment, there were nonetheless 

“approximately a few” nights where he did not; he “stayed for 

approximately a few days at his uncle’s residence in Waldorf, 

Charles County, Maryland.” J.A. 100. Bruffy’s 23-day, noncontinuous, stay at the Belle Haven apartment does not meet the 

30-day standard recounted in the DOJ guidelines.

Under the DOJ guidelines, the 30-day benchmark for 

“habitually lives” “does not mean that the registration of a sex 

offender who enters a jurisdiction to reside may be delayed 

until after he has lived in the jurisdiction for 30 days.” 

National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. at 38,062. In other words, a 30-day 

stay is sufficient, but not necessary to constitute “habitually 

living.” Earlier registration is required when “a sex offender 

. . . enters a jurisdiction in order to make his home or 

habitually live in the jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Importantly, the government does not contend that Bruffy 

intended to live at the Belle Haven apartment. When Bruffy left 
24

the Belle Haven apartment, he took all of his possessions with 

him. There was no address to which he had a legal right to 

return. And all the while, the stipulated facts show that “with 

respect to the defendant’s future plans, [Bruffy’s roommate] 

felt that everything revolved around Maryland. Defendant tried 

to find work with someone he used to work for in Maryland, and 

spoke generally about living in Maryland and Pennsylvania, where 

his son and sister lived.” J.A. 100. Bruffy did not intend to 

return to Belle Haven. Whether under the DOJ guidelines’ 30-day 

theory or its intent-based theory, Bruffy cannot be convicted of 

the instant SORNA offense.

II.

Even if I were to conclude that the DOJ regulations are not 

persuasive, I would find that under the plain language of the 

statute, Bruffy could not be convicted for the instant SORNA 

violation. First, as already noted, the 23-day period, even if 

considered to be unbroken by Bruffy’s stay in Maryland, does not 

rise to the 30-day period suggested by the DOJ guidelines to 

constitute “habitually lives,” and so it provides some evidence 

that Bruffy, under a plain-meaning theory, did not “habitually 

live[]” in Alexandria, Virginia. See id. at 38,062. Second, as 

discussed above, Bruffy did not intend to return to the Belle 

Haven apartment. A lack of intent to return to a location tends 
25

to show one does not habitually live in that location. Third, 

the circumstances surrounding his stay in the apartment likewise 

demonstrate that he did not habitually live there as a matter of 

law.

For most people, breaks in sleeping arrangements -- like 

Bruffy’s stay at his uncle’s residence -- would be unremarkable. 

But the backdrop for Bruffy is a situation of instability. The 

undisputed facts show that Bruffy spent most of the nights in 

that date range at the Belle Haven apartment, where he would 

shower, eat his meals (which he paid for and prepared), and 

carry his belongings (including a blanket and a pillow) to and 

from his car daily. He didn’t have a key to the apartment; he 

didn’t receive calls there; and he informed the residents of his 

return to the apartment each day so that they could let him into 

the apartment. Bruffy obtained advance permission to stay at 

the Alexandria apartment, although it was understood that this 

was “a week-by-week situation” because Bruffy intended to rent 

his own residence in Maryland as soon as he got a job.

The key to the plain-language analysis is the word 

“habitually.” There is nothing habitual about Bruffy’s living 

situation. It is true that one of the occupants believed Bruffy 

could stay “a couple of weeks until [he] became situated.” Id. 

While a stay of a couple of weeks might rise to the level of 

“resides” and “habitually lives,” under the plain meaning 
26

definition (though likely not under DOJ’s guidelines), this was 

clearly not such a case. Bruffy had called in advance to 

determine whether he could stay at the apartment, but no time 

frame was discussed for how long he could stay. It appears that 

he knew he could be refused entry at the Alexandria apartment 

any day. Bruffy knew that his stay was not contingent solely on 

whether he could find a job and an apartment of his own, but 

also upon the daily consent of the Alexandria apartment tenants. 

A situation so unstable cannot be termed habitual.

III.

As the majority notes, the federal case that comes the 

closest to the present facts is United States v. Voice, 622 F.3d 

870, 873 (8th Cir. 2010), in which a sex offender registered at 

a halfway house in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, left Sioux Falls, 

and relocated to Fort Thompson, South Dakota. While the court 

refused to address “whether some travelers are so transient that 

a jury could not reasonably find a change of residence during 

extended travels,” the court found that the evidence presented 

to the jury was sufficient to convict Voice. Id. at 874.

While the facts of Voice are similar to the present case, 

they are distinguishable. After moving to Fort Thompson, Voice 

first stayed for ten days at a friend’s house, where he would 

receive mail, eat dinner, and shower; Voice then slept on a 
27

cement slab near an abandoned comfort station in Fort Thompson, 

where he kept his belongings. Id. at 873-74. Voice habitually 

lived in the Fort Thompson area for two months -- well beyond 

the 30-day DOJ guidelines -- without updating his registration 

to show that he had left the Sioux Falls area. Most 

importantly, Bruffy updated his registration to note he would be 

transient when he left Florida. Furthermore, Bruffy spent some 

nights in Alexandria but other nights in Maryland over a 23-day 

period, then he spent a few nights in his car in the 

metropolitan D.C. area. Another telling indicator is that Voice 

kept his possessions in the comfort station -- a fixed location 

to which he returned nightly to sleep -- whereas Bruffy kept his 

in his car.

More on point are a number of state court cases that have 

found insufficient evidence to convict transient sex offenders 

under state analogues to SORNA. In Jeandell v. State, 910 A.2d 

1141 (Md. 2006), the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the 

lower court’s interpretation of “residence,” which the district 

court found to mean “living location.” Id. at 1144. The court 

found that the defendant, a homeless man, who was “staying 

wherever he could,” could not be convicted under the state’s 

sex-offender registration statute. Id. at 1144-45. 

Particularly relevant is Twine v. State, 910 A.2d 1132 (Md. 

2006), which also vacated a conviction of a homeless man, 
28

stating that “residence” only exists if the registrant “has a 

fixed location at which the registrant is living, and to which 

the registrant intends to return upon leaving it.” Id. at 1140; 

see also Santos v. State, 668 S.E.2d 676, 679 (Ga. 2008) (sex 

offender registration statute unconstitutionally vague as 

applied to homeless offender because statute requires a street 

or route address). During the disputed dates, Bruffy was 

“staying wherever he could,” Jeandell, 910 A.2d at 1144-45, and 

he did not have a “fixed location at which he was living and to 

which he intended to return upon leaving it,” Twine, 910 A.2d at 

1140.

IV.

The majority is correct about Bruffy’s actions in one 

respect. He certainly could have done more. He could have 

changed his registration to more accurately reflect the 

geographic area in which he spent the majority of the time. But 

even though his actions did not constitute best practices, 

Bruffy complied with SORNA because his duty to update his 

registration was never triggered. What’s left is the conclusion 

that Bruffy’s only crime was being a homeless sex offender.

Whether analyzed under the DOJ guidelines or the plainmeaning of the statute, I would find that Bruffy did not 

habitually live in the Belle Haven region of Alexandria, 
29

Virginia, from January 13, 2009, until February 5, 2009, and 

therefore I would also find that his duty to update his 

registration under SORNA was never triggered. I respectfully 

dissent.