[Cite as Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, 2016-Ohio-3211.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MERCER COUNTY 

 

GORSUCH HOMES INC., 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 10-15-18 

 v. 

PAMELA LEMASTERS, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Celina Municipal Court 

Trial Court No. 2015-CVG-00709 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: May 31, 2016 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Debra A. Lavey for Appellant 

 James A. Tesno for Appellee 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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SHAW, P. J., 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Pamela LeMasters, appeals the judgment of the 

Celina Municipal Court finding in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, Gorsuch Homes, 

Inc. (“Gorsuch Homes”), on Gorsuch Homes’s complaint for eviction. On appeal, 

LeMasters argues that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing Gorsuch Homes to rely 

upon grounds not cited in the notice of termination; (2) finding that Gorsuch 

Homes proved material noncompliance of the lease by a preponderance of the 

evidence; and (3) failing to weigh the equitable considerations in favor of 

LeMasters. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶2} On October 5, 2015, Gorsuch Homes filed a complaint for eviction in 

the Celina Municipal Court against LeMasters. In its complaint, Gorsuch Homes 

alleged that LeMasters had “unlawfully and forcibly held over the [lease] term, in 

that she [had] violated the terms of the Lease and by reason thereof [Gorsuch 

Homes] is entitled to restitution of the premises.” (Docket No. 1, p. 1). Gorsuch 

Homes attached the following as exhibits: the lease agreement entered into 

between Gorsuch Homes and LeMasters, including the “Community Rules & 

Regulations”; and the notice to leave the premises that was served to LeMasters. 

The terms of the lease provided, in part: 

13. General Restrictions: 

The Tenant agrees not to: * * * use the unit for unlawful 

purposes; engage in or permit unlawful activities in the unit, in 

the common areas or on the project grounds; * * * make or 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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permit noises or acts that will disturb the rights or comfort of 

neighbors. * * * 

* * * 

23. Termination of Tenancy: 

* * * 

c. The Landlord may terminate this Agreement for the 

following reasons; 

(1) the Tenant’s material noncompliance with the terms of 

this agreement; 

* * * 

(6) criminal activity by a tenant, any member of the tenant’s 

household, a guest or another person under the tenant’s 

control: 

(a) that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 

enjoyment of the premises by other residents (including 

property management staff residing on the premises); 

* * * 

(10) if the Landlord determines that the tenant, any member of 

the tenant’s household, a guest or another person under 

the tenant’s control has engaged in the criminal activity, 

regardless of whether the tenant, any member of the 

tenant’s household, a guest or another person under the 

tenant’s control has been arrested or convicted for such 

activity. 

* * * 

d. 

* * * 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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 The term material noncompliance with the lease includes: 

(1) one or more substantial violations of the lease; (2) 

repeated minor violations of the lease that (a) disrupt the 

livability of the project; (b) adversely affect the health or 

safety of any person or the right of any tenant to the quiet 

enjoyment to the leased premises and related project 

facilities, [sic] (c) interfere with the management of the 

project, [sic] or (d) have an adverse financial effect on the 

project[;] (3) failure of the tenant to timely supply all 

(including, but not limited to, failure to meet the 

disclosure and verification requirements for Social 

Security Numbers, or failure to sign and submit consent 

forms for the obtaining of wage and claim information 

from State Wage Information Collection Agencies), [sic] 

and (4) Non-payment of rent or any other financial 

obligation due under the lease beyond any grace period 

permitted under State law. 

* * * 

e. If the Landlord proposes to terminate this Agreement, the 

Landlord agrees to give the Tenant written notice and the 

grounds for the proposed termination. * * * All 

termination notices must: * * * state the grounds for 

termination with enough detail for the Tenant to prepare a 

defense * * * 

f. If an eviction is initiated, the Landlord agrees to rely only 

upon those grounds cited in the termination notice 

required by paragraph e. 

(Docket No. 1, Ex. A, p. 4, 9-10.) 

{¶3} The notice of termination of the lease stated that LeMasters was being 

evicted due to “Material Non-Compliance of the Lease Agreement in that [sic] 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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Allowing a non-trespassed [sic] individual onto the property continually.” 

(Capitalization sics.) (Docket No. 1, Ex. B, p. 1.) 

{¶4} A hearing on the merits was held on October 26, 2015. 

{¶5} Sabrina Bailey was the first to testify. Bailey testified that she worked 

as the manager for Gorsuch Homes, specifically at Williamsburg Square 

Apartments. She stated that LeMasters moved into her apartment in March 2014. 

Bailey identified McMasters’s lease agreement with Gorsuch Homes and the 

eviction notice served to LeMasters, which were later admitted into evidence. 

She added that she prepared both documents. 

{¶6} Bailey testified that LeMasters was being evicted for material 

noncompliance with the lease. Next, counsel asked, “Specifically in what 

manner?”, and Bailey replied, “Specifically criminal activity by a visitor.” Trial 

Tr., p. 8. At that time, LeMasters, acting pro se, objected on the grounds that 

Gorsuch Homes was relying upon grounds outside of the eviction notice, which 

was directly contrary to the language of the lease. The eviction notice, as drafted 

by Bailey, stated that LeMasters was being evicted due to material noncompliance 

with the lease agreement, specifically “Allowing a non-tresspassed [sic] individual 

onto the property continually.” Trial Tr., Plaintiff’s Ex. B, p. 1. In response, 

counsel for Gorsuch Homes stated, “Your Honor, I believe the testimony will get 

to the fact that there was a criminal activity by a person who was told they were 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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not allowed to be at the premises, which is a non trespassed [sic] individual, which 

is specifically what’s noticed in the or stated in the Notice.” Trial Tr., p. 8. The 

court took LeMasters’s objection under advisement, and the testimony continued. 

{¶7} Bailey testified that the specific activities that gave rise to the eviction 

notice were separate occasions when James LeMasters (“James”), LeMasters’s 

husband, trespassed on Gorsuch Homes’s property after being served with a no 

trespass order. Bailey explained that she drafted a no trespass order after law 

enforcement was called out to the property because of disturbances involving 

LeMasters and James. She stated that she served the no trespass order on 

LeMasters, mailed a copy to James, and delivered copies to the Celina Police 

Department and the Mercer County Sheriff’s office sometime in July. Bailey 

added that LeMasters appeared grateful and promised that James would no longer 

step foot on the property. She testified that she saw James on the property after 

serving the no trespass order. 

{¶8} Bailey stated that she next spoke with LeMasters after she served 

LeMasters the eviction notice. According to Bailey, LeMasters did not deny that 

James had been on the property, but tried to explain that she could not get him to 

leave because she was financially reliant on James. 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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{¶9} Bailey testified that she was aware of two accounts of criminal activity 

committed by James at LeMasters’s apartment. Then, the following exchange 

took place between counsel for Gorsuch Homes and Bailey: 

Q: And, in fact, were you aware that criminal charges were filed? 

A: After they were filed, yes. 

Q: Were those charges for domestic violence? 

A: Yes. 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at p. 13-14. 

{¶10} Bailey concluded her direct testimony by stating that she discussed 

the notice of eviction with LeMasters, listened to what LeMasters had to say, and 

then passed that information on to the appropriate people in the chain of 

command. 

{¶11} On cross-examination, Bailey explained that she did not meet with 

LeMasters in person to discuss the eviction notice. Rather, she stated that she 

spoke on the phone with LeMasters regarding the eviction notice. During this 

phone conversation, Bailey testified that she told LeMasters that she had no 

control over the eviction and that LeMasters had to take her complaints up with 

corporate. 

{¶12} Sally Prater was the next witness to testify on behalf of Gorsuch 

Homes. Prater testified that she was the maintenance technician for Gorsuch 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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Homes. Prater stated that she knew LeMasters and James. She explained that she 

knew LeMasters because she had worked in LeMasters’s apartment while 

LeMasters was residing there. Further, she explained that she knew James due to 

the instances that gave rise to the no trespass order. 

{¶13} Prater testified that she witnessed two instances involving LeMasters 

and James. Regarding the first incident, Prater stated that she was walking down 

the sidewalk of the apartment complex one day and heard yelling. She explained 

that she initially continued on her way, but then she heard someone screaming “get 

off of me, get off of me” and a child crying. Id. at p. 20. Prater testified that she 

banged on LeMasters’s door until LeMasters opened the door. Prater recalled 

asking LeMasters if LeMasters wanted her to call the police and LeMasters told 

her not to call the police because James was leaving. Prater added that she stayed 

there until James left the premises. During the ordeal, Prater explained that she 

called another employee, Rhonda Caudill, to witness the event. The second 

incident occurred sometime in July 2015. Prater testified that she watched 

LeMasters’s door open up and that James had been the one that opened the door. 

LeMasters and James then left in her vehicle. 

{¶14} Prater stated that she was aware that James was not to be on the 

premises because Bailey had informed the staff of the situation. She testified that 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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she had also witnessed James bring fast food in to LeMasters’s apartment and 

drive LeMasters’s car on and off the property, but could not remember the dates. 

{¶15} On cross-examination, Prater admitted that she could not recall when 

the first incident occurred. 

{¶16} Rhonda Caudill was the final witness to testify on behalf of Gorsuch 

Homes. Caudill testified that she was employed by Gorsuch Homes and that her 

duties including housekeeping, grounds and office assistance for the apartment 

complex. Caudill stated that she knew LeMasters and James. 

{¶17} Caudill testified that she witnessed part of the first incident that 

Prater testified to witnessing. She recalled that Prater called her over to the 

apartment. When Caudill arrived, she remembered seeing that a child was crying 

and that LeMasters appeared to be in distress. 

{¶18} Caudill recalled a second incident involving LeMasters and James 

where she was able to overhear the two arguing. She admitted that she never saw 

either one of them, but could recognize each person’s voice. 

{¶19} On cross-examination, Caudill admitted that the only time she 

actually saw James on the property was the first incident. She stated that she knew 

that the second incident occurred after the no trespass order was served, but could 

not remember the date. 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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{¶20} At this point in the hearing, Bailey was allowed to testify, out of 

sequence, to establish that the no trespass order was served on June 12. 

{¶21} Given this additional information, Caudill could not remember the 

date of the second incident. 

{¶22} At the conclusion of Caudill’s testimony, Gorsuch Homes rested. 

{¶23} Then, the court told LeMasters the following: “Why don’t you do a 

combination of testifying and closing at once and mitigation. And I’ll listen to it 

all, put it in the package.” Id. at p. 31. 

{¶24} LeMasters stated that it had been several months since any incidents 

had occurred involving James at the apartment. She did not deny the fact that 

instances had occurred involving James that led neighbors to call the police. 

LeMasters added that she did not seek criminal charges against James at the time 

because she was scared. Further, she explained that her only source of income 

was the child support paid by James and that she was afraid that if he were to go to 

prison, then the child support payments would stop. 

{¶25} LeMasters explained how she had reconnected with her family and 

that since this happened James has not set foot in the apartment. She stated that 

she has not had contact with him. At the conclusion of her statements, LeMasters 

rested. 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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{¶26} The court found in favor of Gorsuch Homes on its complaint for 

eviction and ordered that LeMasters vacate the premises within 27 days. After 

acknowledging its sympathy for LeMasters and stating that James was the one at 

fault, the court stated, 

I have to have you move. I have to have you move. I’m going to do 

something I normally don’t do. I’m going to give you more time 

than I normally would give you to move. * * * Really not supposed 

to be more than ten days. * * * What I’m going to do, and this is 

quite a bit more than I would, I’m going to give you until Sunday 

November the 22nd. Now that’s really about three weeks. 

Id. at p. 40-41. The court concluded by telling LeMasters, “I think you’ve done all 

you can.” Id. at p. 41. The court memorialized its decision in an entry filed on 

October 26, 2015. 

{¶27} LeMasters filed this timely appeal, presenting the following 

assignments of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

APPELLEE RELIED UPON GROUNDS NOT CITED IN THE 

NOTICE OF TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE 

LEASE, FEDERAL LAW AND THE HUD HANDBOOK. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

APPELLEE FAILED TO PROVE MATERIAL 

NONCOMPLIANCE OF THE LEASE BY A 

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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Assignment of Error No. III 

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO WEIGH EQUITABLE 

CONSIDERATIONS IN FAVOR OF MS. LEMASTERS. 

{¶28} Due to the nature of LeMasters’s assignments of error, we elect to 

address some of them together.

Assignments of Error Nos. I & II 

{¶29} In her first and second assignments of error, LeMasters argues that 

the trial court erred by allowing Gorsuch Homes to rely upon grounds not cited 

within the notice of termination and, therefore, Gorsuch Homes failed to prove its 

case by a preponderance of the evidence. We disagree. 

{¶30} It is well established that “the due-process protections of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are applicable to 

landlords who lease federally subsidized housing to low-income tenants[.]” 

Heritage Court, L.L.C. v. Merritt, 187 Ohio App.3d 117, 2010-Ohio-1711, ¶ 26 

(3d Dist.), citing Showe Mgt. Corp. v. Hazelbaker, 12th Dist. Fayette No. 

CA2005–11–031, 2006-Ohio-3619, ¶ 14; Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. Wooten, 73 

Ohio App.3d 426 (2d Dist.1992), citing Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Harris, 

1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C–820540, C–820541, 1983 WL 8893 (June 15, 1983); 

Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (C.A.4. 1973); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza S., 

Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (C.A.2. 1974); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 

F.2d 853 (C.A.2. 1970); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mtge. 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (C.A.9. 1974). Further, “tenants receiving federal 

housing-assistance payments have a constitutionally protected property interest in 

their continued occupancy of subsidized housing.” Id.

{¶31} Additionally, private landlords offering federally subsidized housing 

must comply with all applicable federal rules and regulations. Id. at ¶ 27, citing 

Ivywood Apts. v. Bennett, 51 Ohio App.2d 209, 214 (10th Dist.1976). 

{¶32} 24 C.F.R. 880.607(c) requires a landlord to give “written notice of 

any proposed termination of tenancy, stating the grounds and that the tenancy is 

terminated on a specified date and advising the family that it has an opportunity to 

respond to the owner.” Moreover, the regulations require that if a judicial action is 

initiated to evict the tenant/s, then “the [landlord] may not rely on any grounds 

which are different from the reasons set forth in the notice.” Id. 

{¶33} This court has found that the “manifest purpose [of the notice of 

termination] is to afford procedural due process to tenants in federally subsidized 

housing to protect tenants against discriminatory and arbitrary eviction 

procedures.” Real Properties Servs. Mgt. v. Harigle, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-96-

21, 1997 WL 430773, *3 (July 30, 1997). Moreover, “due process requires a 

federally-funded landlord to pursue an eviction only on the grounds listed in the 

termination notice. This must be so ‘to insure that the tenant is adequately 

informed of the nature of the evidence against him so that he can effectively rebut 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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that evidence.’ ” Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-130161, 2013-Ohio-5323, ¶ 17, quoting Escalera, 524 F.2d at 862. 

{¶34} Here, Gorsuch Homes, in its notice of termination, alleged that 

LeMasters had materially failed to comply with the lease by “allowing a nontrespassed individual onto the property continually.” It should be noted that both 

counsel and this court at oral argument on appeal discussed whether the term 

“non-trespassed individual” used in the notice of termination was a confusing and 

poor choice of wording, creating a possible impression that James was in fact, not

a trespasser as opposed to a trespasser. To be clear, this court continues to believe 

the term “non-trespassed individual” constitutes an extremely poor choice of 

words for any written legal document. 

{¶35} However, it should also be noted that there was no issue raised in the 

trial court in this regard and in fact, the transcript demonstrates that all parties and 

the court at trial were fully apprised, prepared and proceeded with the clear 

understanding that the notice and termination of the lease was based upon James’ 

continued entry onto the common and private areas of the apartment complex as a 

trespasser, in violation of a no trespass order placed upon him. 

{¶36} Nevertheless, on appeal, LeMasters now complains that Bailey and 

other representatives of Gorsuch Homes were erroneously permitted to testify that 

LeMasters was being evicted due to “criminal activity” by James including prior 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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instances of domestic violence against LeMasters on the premises, all of which 

was outside the limited allegation of “trespass” contained in the written notice of 

termination. We disagree. 

{¶37} In the first place, trespass itself would constitute a “criminal activity” 

so the mere characterization of the trespass as such by any witness would not 

necessarily be erroneous or outside the scope of the written notice. LeMasters 

disputes this citing authority that an owner of an apartment complex cannot 

prohibit guests invited by the tenant from being present in the tenant's apartment. 

See, State v. Hites, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-2000-22, 2000 WL 1114809, *2 (Aug. 8, 

2000). However, this ignores the fact that in the present case, James was also seen 

on multiple occasions trespassing in violation of the landlord’s no trespass order, 

not only within LeMasters’s apartment but upon the common areas of the 

apartment complex owned and controlled by the landlord, not the tenant. Thus, it 

is clear that LeMasters was evicted due to her willing participation in James’ 

multiple and unlawful violations of the landlord’s no trespass order. As a result, 

the record also demonstrates and supports the trial court’s determination that 

James’ conduct resulted in multiple violations of Section 13 of the lease 

prohibiting tenants from allowing guests to engage in unlawful activity. 

{¶38} More importantly, however, it is clear from the record that all of the 

witnesses who testified as to alleged criminal activity by James, including the 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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testimony about at least two prior instances of domestic violence by James against 

LeMasters, introduced that testimony merely as an explanation of the 

circumstances which led to the reason for the no trespass order and not as an 

independent ground for the termination as alleged by LeMasters. It is also clear 

that in this bench trial, the trial court also regarded this testimony in such a context 

only and not as an independent or supplemental basis for its ruling to uphold the 

termination. 

{¶39} Additionally, the evidence of domestic violence on at least two 

occasions also further demonstrated the need for the no trespass order by 

illustrating the consequences of the trespass violation by James in terms of 

inconvenience, disturbance of peaceful enjoyment by and danger posed to the 

other tenants and in particular to the employees of the landlord, two of which 

testified that they were unavoidably forced into the untenable and unacceptable 

position of having to personally intervene in and mediate at least one altercation 

between James and LeMasters on the premises. 

{¶40} For the foregoing reasons, LeMasters’s argument raised for the first 

time on appeal, that the trial court’s order and termination was in fact based upon 

the instances of domestic violence, and thereby violated the Violence Against 

Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 under 42 U.S.C. 14043e-11(b)(2)(A), is not 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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an accurate characterization of the trial court's order and is without merit in this 

instance. 

Assignment of Error III 

{¶41} Finally, we note the record shows that LeMasters in many, if not all 

instances enabled, aided and abetted the continued trespass by James onto both the 

common and private areas of the premises, thereby creating the disturbance and 

risk to the other tenants and employees of Gorsuch Homes described above. As a 

result, LeMasters’s argument in her third assignment of error that in making its 

ruling, the trial court failed to sufficiently weigh other equitable considerations in 

favor of LeMasters, is also without merit. 

{¶42} For all of the foregoing reasons, the first, second and third 

assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

PRESTON, J., concurs. 

 

ROGERS, J. dissenting. 

{¶43} Tenants with federally subsidized housing are given more protections 

than if they were in a normal landlord-tenant relationship. Two of these 

protections include that the landlord agrees to rely only upon the grounds stated in 

its notice of eviction and that the grounds stated in the notice will be specific to 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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provide the tenant with an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense. Because the 

majority ignores these two fundamental principles, I dissent. 

{¶44} Regarding the first principle, Gorsuch Homes, in its notice of 

termination, indicated that it was evicting LeMasters due to noncompliance with 

the lease, specifically “allowing a non-trespassed individual onto the property 

continually.” At the eviction hearing, Bailey testified that LeMasters was being 

evicted due to “criminal activity by a visitor.” Trial Tr., p. 8. LeMasters objected 

and argued that Gorsuch Homes was attempting to rely on grounds not contained 

in its notice. At this juncture, counsel for Gorsuch Homes explained that the 

criminal activity was allowing a “non-trespassed individual” onto the property, 

which would be consistent with Gorsuch Homes’s position in its notice. However, 

there are several holes in Gorsuch Homes’s argument that require reversal. 

{¶45} The first is the definition of “non-trespassed individual.” There is a 

clear dispute between both parties as to what this term means. The majority also 

believes that “the term ‘non-trespassed individual’ constitutes an extremely poor 

choice of words for any written legal document.” (Majority Opin., at ¶34). But 

rather than defining the phrase “non-trespassed individual,” the majority simply 

concludes that there was no harm because everyone, including LeMasters, was 

aware that LeMasters was being evicted because of James’s actions. 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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{¶46} R.C. 2911.21(A)(1) defines “trespass” as when a person “without 

privilege to do so, * * * [k]nowingly enter[s] or remain[s] on the land or premises 

of another.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines the prefix “non” as “[n]ot; no” while 

it is also defined as “not” in other dictionaries. Black’s Law Dictionary 1212 

(10th Ed.2014); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1535 (2002). 

Thus, using the plain meaning of the terms, a “non-trespassed individual” would 

be someone who has not knowingly entered on to the land of another without 

privilege to do so. Or in other words, a “non-trespassed individual” is not a 

trespasser. 

{¶47} With this definition in mind, Gorsuch Homes clearly was not relying 

on the grounds stated in its notice because a “non-trespassed individual” is not 

committing criminal activity by being on the property. Therefore, reversal was 

warranted. 

{¶48} Second, even if one were to take Gorsuch Homes’s bizarre 

conclusion that “non-trespassed individual” means someone that has committed 

criminal trespass, reversal would nonetheless be required because no criminal 

activity constituting a trespass occurred. In support of her argument, LeMasters 

cited State v. Hites, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-2000-22, 2000 WL 1114809 (Aug. 8, 

2000), for the proposition that a guest of a tenant cannot be convicted of criminal 

trespass for being on the property without the landlord’s permission. The majority 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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distinguishes Hites by saying that Hites only stands for the position that a guest 

cannot be convicted while being present in the tenant’s apartment and that a guest 

could be convicted for being present in areas controlled and owned by the 

landlord. Therefore, because Gorsuch Homes was evicting LeMasters for the 

instances where James was seen in the parking lot and the common area, James’s 

conduct could be construed as criminal trespass. The problem is that Hites does 

not support what the majority claims. 

In Hites, 

The trial court found that although lessees generally have the right to 

invite ‘any person of their choosing inside their residence as long as 

such visitation [does] not interfere with the rights of other tenants or 

violate [the] lease agreement, * * * it is without question that the 

landlord can control access to common areas and prohibit those 

persons not allowed on the premises from being in those areas. 

Hites at *2. Thus, the trial court concluded, like the majority here, that a guest can 

be convicted of criminal trespass for being in the common areas if the landlord 

does not want him there. However, this court disagreed. Rather, this court 

adopted the Eleventh District Court of Appeals decision and reasoning in City of 

Kent v. Hermann, 11th Dist. Portage No. 95-P-0042, 1996 WL 210780 (Mar. 8, 

1996), that an “owner may not preclude tenants from inviting guests onto the 

premises, including the common areas.” (Emphasis added.) Id. This court also 

agreed that just as “ ‘a landlord gives up his possessory interest in the rental unit[,] 

* * * the landlord’s rights in limiting common ingress and egress ways to guests of 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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the tenant must also be generally qualified so as to permit access to the renter’s 

apartment.’ ” Id., quoting Hermann at *3. Given that we are bound by our 

precedent in Hites, I would find that the trial court erred by finding in favor of 

Gorsuch Homes. Although it can be argued that James’s presence during the two 

instances allegedly involving domestic violence might have resulted in the loss of 

quiet enjoyment and use of the property of other tenants, the instances for which 

LeMasters was evicted did not interfere with that right. Thus, Gorsuch Homes 

failed to present any evidence that LeMasters was in material noncompliance with 

the lease. 

{¶49} In regard to the second protection, Gorsuch Homes’s notice clearly 

lacks the specificity required to allow a tenant, such as LeMasters in this case, to 

adequately prepare a defense.1

 

{¶50} 24 C.F.R. 247.4(a) requires, amongst other things, that a landlord 

“state the reasons for the landlord’s action with enough specificity so as to enable 

the tenant to prepare a defense[.]” “Termination notices have been found to be 

insufficient where they contain only one sentence, are framed in vague and 

conclusory language, or fail to set forth a factual statement to justify termination.” 

 

1

 It is my position that this argument would not require an analysis under plain error because although 

LeMasters did not specifically argue that the notice was insufficient as to specificity, she did argue that the 

notice was insufficient as Gorsuch Homes relied upon something other than what was contained in the 

notice. Both arguments invoke due process concerns. Further, it has been found that when a tenant makes 

broad due process objections without naming the specific statute, regulation, or other right being violated 

he sufficiently preserves the argument for appeal. See Commons v. King, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 13159, 

1992 WL 288781, *4 (Oct. 14, 1992). 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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Cuyahoga Metro. Hos. Auth. v. Younger, 93 Ohio App.3d 819, 825 (8th 

Dist.1994). The following notices have been found to have been insufficient: 

“[s]erious, repeated damage to unit. Repeated disturbance.” Assoc. Estates Corp. 

v. Bartell, 24 Ohio App.3d 6, 10 (8th Dist.1985); “Repeated incidents of 

intoxication and irresponsible use of the kitchen facilities in your Unit [which] 

have imposed a threat [to] the peaceful enjoyment and safety of your neighbors.” 

Hous. Auth. of DeKalb Cty. V. Pyrtle, 167 Ga.App. 181, 183, 306 S.E.2d 9 (1983); 

“Record of antisocial activities and arrests of your son, Fred, Jr., constituting a 

threat to the peace and safety of the community * * * [and] [i]llegal acts of Mr. 

Humphrey, having an adverse effect on the project and its tenants.” Escalera v. 

New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 858 (2d Cir.1970). In Younger, the 

appellate court found that the notice was insufficient because it contained vague 

and broad allegations, lacked facts to support those allegations, failed to notify the 

tenant of the dates of the incidents supporting the allegations, and failed to identify 

the individuals involved in the alleged incidents. 93 Ohio App.3d at 826. 

Moreover, the court found that including a specific lease provision violation is 

insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. Id.

{¶51} All it takes is a quick review of the notice of termination in this case 

to find that such notice was clearly insufficient. The grounds for termination in 

this case were “Material Non-Compliance of the Lease Agreement in that [sic] 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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Allowing a non-trespassed [sic] individual onto the property continually.” 

(Capitalization sic.) (Docket no. 1., Ex. B, p. 1). The notice fails to identify the 

alleged “non-trespassed individual.” This is not a minor oversight as even the 

majority is still confused as to the true meaning of the term. Further, the notice 

fails to provide any specific dates that the “non-trespassed individual” was on the 

property at LeMasters’s behest. Rather, the notice contains merely vague and 

broad allegations. Such statements are plainly insufficient to notify LeMasters of 

Gorsuch Homes’s argument so as to allow her the opportunity to prepare a 

defense. 

{¶52} The majority attempts to combat this argument by saying that there 

was no harm because LeMasters was well apprised of why she was being evicted, 

but that is irrelevant to the analysis because the due process concern is not that a 

tenant will not be able to present a defense if there is insufficient notice. Rather, 

the due process concern arises from the tenant’s inability to prepare an adequate 

defense to the alleged charge. See, e.g., Gold Key Realty/Senior Village Apts. v. 

Phillips, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26450, 2015-Ohio-2555, ¶ 25, quoting 

Northland Village Apts. v. Hamp, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 12407, 1991 WL 

108717, *1 (June 20, 1991). 

{¶53} Further, some courts have gone so far as to find that such 

deficiencies in notices of termination remove jurisdiction from the trial court. See 
Case No. 10-15-18 

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Riverview Towers Associates v. Jones, 358 N.J.Super. 85, 90, 817 A.2d 324 

(2003); Glastonbury Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, Conn. Sup. No. 82600, 1995 WL 

621849, *2 (Oct. 16, 1995); Central Brooklyn Urban Development Corp. v. 

Copeland, 471 N.Y.S.2d 989, 992 (1984). Even though jurisdiction has not been 

raised by either party, this court is “bound to raise any jurisdictional questions not 

raised by the parties.” Levinsky v. Boardman Twp. Civ. Serv. Comm., 7th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 04 MA 36, 2004-Ohio-5931, ¶ 26. I would find that such an 

inadequate notice would never invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, I 

would reverse on this separate ground. 

{¶54} Federally subsidized housing is a constitutionally protected right for 

those in the program. Landlords, such as Gorsuch Homes, cannot be allowed to 

continue to evict tenants, such as LeMasters, using vague and overly broad 

statements contained as the grounds for eviction. Rather, their notices must be 

specific as to allow each tenant the right to adequately prepare a defense to the 

charges. Only then can we, as a reviewing court, say that the tenant’s due process 

rights were adequately protected. 

{¶55} Accordingly, I dissent. 

/jlr