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[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6452 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6452

To require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National 
  Intelligence Estimate on escalation and de-escalation of gray zone 
     activities in great power competition, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 20, 2022

Mr. Krishnamoorthi introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
             the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National 
  Intelligence Estimate on escalation and de-escalation of gray zone 
     activities in great power competition, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Gathering and Reporting Assessments 
Yielding Zero Overlooked Nefarious Efforts Act''.

SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION 
              OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The conventional power of the United States has driven 
        foreign adversaries to a level of competition that does not 
        always depend on military confrontation with the United States.
            (2) Rather than challenging the United States in a manner 
        that could provoke a kinetic military response, foreign 
        adversaries of the United States have turned to carrying out 
        gray zone activities to advance the interests of such 
        adversaries, weaken the power of the United States, and erode 
        the norms that underpin the United States-led international 
        order.
            (3) Gray zone activity falls on a spectrum of attribution 
        and deniability that ranges from covert adversary operations, 
        to detectible covert adversary operations, to unattributable 
        adversary operations, to deniable adversary operations, to open 
        adversary operations.
            (4) To adequately address such a shift to gray zone 
        activity, the United States must understand what actions tend 
        to either escalate or de-escalate such activity by our 
        adversaries.
            (5) The laws, principles, and values of the United States 
        are strategic advantages in great power competition with 
        authoritarian foreign adversaries that carry out gray zone 
        activities, because such laws, principles, and values increase 
        the appeal of the governance model of the United States, and 
        the United States-led international order, to states and 
        peoples around the world.
            (6) The international security environment has demonstrated 
        numerous examples of gray zone activities carried out by 
        foreign adversaries, including the following activities of 
        foreign adversaries:
                    (A) Information operations, such as efforts by 
                Russia to influence the 2020 United States Federal 
                elections (as described in the March 15, 2021, 
                intelligence community assessment of the Office of the 
                Director of National Intelligence made publicly 
                available on March 15, 2021).
                    (B) Adversary political coercion operations, such 
                as the wielding of energy by Russia, particularly in 
                the context of Ukrainian gas pipelines, to coerce its 
                neighbors into compliance with its policies.
                    (C) Cyber operations, such as the use by China of 
                cyber tools to conduct industrial espionage.
                    (D) Provision of support to proxy forces, such as 
                the support provided by Iran to Hezbollah and Shia 
                militia groups.
                    (E) Provocation by armed forces controlled by the 
                government of the foreign adversary through measures 
                that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, such 
                as the use of the China Coast Guard and maritime 
                militia by China to harass the fishing vessels of other 
                countries in the South China Sea.
                    (F) Alleged uses of lethal force on foreign soil, 
                such as the 2018 attempts by Russia to poison Sergei 
                Skripal in London.
                    (G) The potential use by an adversary of technology 
                that causes anomalous health incidents among United 
                States Government personnel.
    (b) National Intelligence Estimate.--
            (1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
        acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce 
        a National Intelligence Estimate on how foreign adversaries use 
        gray zone activities to advance interests, what responses by 
        the United States (or the allies or partners of the United 
        States) would tend to result in the escalation or de-escalation 
        of such gray zone activities by foreign adversaries, and any 
        opportunities for the United States to minimize the extent to 
        which foreign adversaries use gray zone activities in 
        furtherance of great power competition.
            (2) Matters included.--To the extent determined appropriate 
        by the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence 
        Estimate produced under paragraph (1) may include an assessment 
        of the following topics:
                    (A) Any potential or actual lethal or harmful gray 
                zone activities carried out against the United States 
                by foreign adversaries, including against United States 
                Government employees and United States persons, whether 
                located within or outside of the United States.
                    (B) To the extent such activities have occurred, or 
                are predicted to occur--
                            (i) opportunities to reduce or deter any 
                        such activities; and
                            (ii) any actions of the United States 
                        Government that would tend to result in the 
                        escalation or de-escalation of such activities.
                    (C) Any incidents in which foreign adversaries 
                could have used, but ultimately did not use, gray zone 
                activities to advance the interests of such 
                adversaries, including an assessment as to why the 
                foreign adversary ultimately did not use gray zone 
                activities.
                    (D) The effect of lowering the United States 
                Government threshold for the public attribution of 
                detectible covert adversary operations, unattributable 
                adversary operations, and deniable adversary 
                operations.
                    (E) The effect of lowering the United States 
                Government threshold for responding to detectible 
                covert adversary operations, unattributable adversary 
                operations, and deniable adversary operations.
                    (F) The extent to which the governments of foreign 
                adversaries exercise control over any proxies or 
                parastate actors used by such governments in carrying 
                out gray zone activities.
                    (G) The extent to which gray zone activities 
                carried out by foreign adversaries affect the private 
                sector of the United States.
                    (H) The international norms that provide the 
                greatest deterrence to gray zone activities carried out 
                by foreign adversaries, and opportunities for 
                strengthening those norms.
                    (I) The effect, if any, of the strengthening of 
                democratic governance abroad on the resilience of 
                United States allies and partners to gray zone 
                activities.
                    (J) Opportunities to strengthen the resilience of 
                United States allies and partners to gray zone 
                activities, and associated tactics, carried out by 
                foreign adversaries.
                    (K) Opportunities for the United States to improve 
                the detection of, and early warning for, such 
                activities and tactics.
                    (L) Opportunities for the United States to 
                galvanize international support in responding to such 
                activities and tactics.
            (3) Submission to congress.--
                    (A) Submission.--Not later than 1 year after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall 
                submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the House of Representatives the 
                National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph 
                (1), including all intelligence reporting underlying 
                the Estimate.
                    (B) Notice regarding submission.--If at any time 
                before the deadline specified in subparagraph (A), the 
                Director determines that the National Intelligence 
                Estimate produced under paragraph (1) cannot be 
                submitted by such deadline, the Director shall (before 
                such deadline) submit to the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select 
                Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
                Representatives a report setting forth the reasons why 
                the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted 
                by such deadline and an estimated date for the 
                submission of the National Intelligence Estimate.
                    (C) Form.--Any report under subparagraph (B) shall 
                be submitted in unclassified form.
            (4) Public version.--Consistent with the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the 
        Director submits to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
        the House of Representatives the National Intelligence Estimate 
        under paragraph (1), the Director shall make publicly available 
        on the internet website of the Director an unclassified version 
        of the key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate.
            (5) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                    (A) Gray zone activity.--The term ``gray zone 
                activity'' means an activity to advance the national 
                interests of a State that--
                            (i) falls between ordinary statecraft and 
                        open warfare;
                            (ii) is carried out with an intent to 
                        maximize the advancement of interests of the 
                        state without provoking a kinetic military 
                        response by the United States; and
                            (iii) falls on a spectrum that ranges from 
                        covert adversary operations, to detectible 
                        covert adversary operations, to unattributable 
                        adversary operations, to deniable adversary 
                        operations, to open adversary operations.
                    (B) Covert adversary operation.--The term ``covert 
                adversary operation'' means an operation by an 
                adversary that--
                            (i) the adversary intends to remain below 
                        the threshold at which the United States 
                        detects the operation; and
                            (ii) does stay below such threshold.
                    (C) Detectible covert adversary operation.--The 
                term ``detectible covert adversary operation'' means an 
                operation by an adversary that--
                            (i) the adversary intends to remain below 
                        the threshold at which the United States 
                        detects the operation; but
                            (ii) is ultimately detected by the United 
                        States at a level below the level at which the 
                        United States will publicly attribute the 
                        operation to the adversary.
                    (D) Unattributable adversary operation.--The term 
                ``unattributable adversary operation'' means an 
                operation by an adversary that the adversary intends to 
                be detected by the United States, but remain below the 
                threshold at which the United States will publicly 
                attribute the operation to the adversary.
                    (E) Deniable adversary operation.--The term 
                ``deniable adversary operation'' means an operation by 
                an adversary that--
                            (i) the adversary intends to be detected 
                        and publicly or privately attributed by the 
                        United States; and
                            (ii) the adversary intends to deny, to 
                        limit the response by the United States, and 
                        any allies of the United States.
                    (F) Open adversary operation.--The term ``open 
                adversary operation'' means an operation by an 
                adversary that the adversary openly acknowledges as 
                attributable to the adversary.
    (c) Requirement To Develop Lexicon.--
            (1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
        acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall develop 
        a lexicon of common terms (and corresponding definitions for 
        such terms) for concepts associated with gray zone activities.
            (2) Considerations.--In developing the lexicon under 
        paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Council shall include 
        in the lexicon each term (and the corresponding definition for 
        each term) specified in subsection (b)(5), unless the National 
        Intelligence Council determines that an alternative term (or 
        alternative definition)--
                    (A) more accurately describes a concept associated 
                with gray zone activities; or
                    (B) is preferable for any other reason.
            (3) Report.--
                    (A) Publication.--The Director of National 
                Intelligence shall publish a report containing the 
                lexicon developed under paragraph (1).
                    (B) Form.--The report under subparagraph (A) shall 
                be published in unclassified form.
                                 <all>
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