Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

_________________________

CR-2022-0571

_________________________

Kenneth Alan Vandusen

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court

(CC-21-84)

McCOOL, Judge.

Kenneth Alan Vandusen appeals his convictions for abuse of a 

corpse, a violation of § 13A-11-13, Ala. Code 1975, and obstructing justice 
CR-2022-0571

2

by using a false identity, a violation of § 13A-8-194, Ala. Code 1975.1 The 

trial court sentenced Vandusen, as a habitual felony offender, to 

concurrent sentences of 20 years' imprisonment and then split the 

sentences, ordering Vandusen to serve 5 years' imprisonment, to be 

followed by 5 years' probation.

Facts

Devin Posey testified that, on July 29, 2020, he received a telephone 

call from Vandusen and that Vandusen "was in a state of panic" (R. 95) 

and told him that he "need[ed] his help" (R. 96) because he had "killed 

[Stephanie Sikes]" (id.) after "she pulled [a] gun on [him]." (R. 97.) 

According to Posey, Vandusen specifically said that he needed help 

moving Sikes's body and said that, "if [Posey] wasn't able to help him, he

would have to cut [Sikes] up and move her." (R. 97-98.) However, Posey

refused to help and, instead, "told [his] mother everything" (R. 98), and 

his mother telephoned the police.

1Vandusen was also convicted of tampering with physical evidence, 

a violation of § 13A-10-129, Ala. Code 1975, but he has not challenged 

that conviction on appeal. Vandusen was acquitted of murder, a violation 

of § 13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975.
CR-2022-0571

3

Sgt. Corey Parks of the Randolph County Sheriff's Office was then 

dispatched to conduct a welfare check at Sikes's house, and, as he "was 

pulling up in the driveway, Vandusen was approaching [his] vehicle." (R. 

137-38.) Sgt. Parks asked Vandusen to identify himself, and, according 

to Sgt. Parks, Vandusen twice "gave [him] the name of Devon Posey." (R. 

138.) Police officer Roy Brown of the Wedowee Police Department, who 

also responded to the scene, confirmed that Vandusen had "stat[ed] that 

his name was Devon Posey." (R. 173.) At that point, Sgt. Parks 

telephoned Posey's mother "to get some more information" (R. 144), and, 

while he was on the telephone, Officer Brown conducted a pat-down 

search of Vandusen and "found a Colorado ID belonging to a Kenneth 

Vandusen" (R. 176); that identification card included Vandusen's 

photograph. Sgt. Parks then handcuffed Vandusen and placed him into 

his patrol car.

After securing Vandusen, Sgt. Parks and Officer Brown conducted 

a "protective sweep" of Sikes's house. (R. 146.) During that protective 

sweep, Sgt. Parks discovered a trial of blood that wound through the 

residence, onto the back porch – which was covered by "dog or animal 

feces everywhere" (R. 152) – down the porch steps, and through the 
CR-2022-0571

4

backyard. That blood trail ultimately led to Sikes's body, which was 

found near the back of her property beside "a chain-link fence at the wood 

line" (R. 183), and her body, which had sustained multiple gunshot 

wounds, "was in a wheelbarrow or ... gardening wagon, and there was a 

blanket over the wagon or wheelbarrow." (R. 184.) In addition to being 

covered by a blanket, Sikes's body could not be seen from her house 

because it was concealed by bushes (id.), a gate and "tall grass" (R. 189), 

and a table. (R. 190.)

Discussion

Vandusen raises two claims on appeal that, he says, entitle him to 

relief. We address each claim in turn.

I.

Vandusen argues that the State's evidence was not sufficient to 

sustain his convictions for abuse of a corpse and obstructing justice by 

using a false identity. In reviewing this claim, this Court " '"must accept 

as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all 

legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution." '" Wilson v. State, 142 So. 3d 732, 809 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Ballenger v. State, 720 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Ala. 
CR-2022-0571

5

Crim. App. 1998), quoting in turn Faircloth v. State, 471 So.2d 485, 488 

(Ala. Crim. App. 1984)). If, " '"viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder of fact could have found 

[Vandusen] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," '" then the evidence was

sufficient to sustain Vandusen's convictions. Wilson, 142 So. 3d at 809 

(quoting Nunn v. State, 697 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), 

quoting in turn O'Neal v. State, 602 So. 2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1992)).

A. Abuse of a Corpse

Section 13A-11-13(a) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person 

commits the crime of abuse of a corpse if, except as otherwise authorized 

by law, he knowingly treats a human corpse in a way that would outrage 

ordinary family sensibilities." According to Vandusen, the State failed to 

prove that he violated § 13A-11-13 because, he says, the State "failed to 

provide any evidence that [he treated Sikes's] corpse ... in any manner 

that would outrage ordinary family sensibilities." (Vandusen's brief, p. 

15.) In support of that argument, Vandusen contends that there was no 

evidence indicating that Sikes's corpse "had been disfigured or altered" 
CR-2022-0571

6

or any other evidence "regarding the specific condition or treatment of 

the body." (Id. at 14, 15.)

Except for one exception not relevant here,2 the Alabama Criminal 

Code does not provide any guidance as to what treatment of a corpse will 

generally "outrage ordinary family sensibilities." § 13A-11-13(a). There 

are also no Alabama cases that expressly address that issue, and the few 

cases that mention § 13A-11-13 in other contexts involved treatment of a 

corpse that obviously violates the statute. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 889 

So. 2d 623 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (sexual intercourse with a corpse); and 

State v. Stephens, 203 So. 3d 134 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (burying a corpse 

in an unmarked grave and later digging up the corpse, dismembering it, 

and setting it on fire). However, cases from other jurisdictions, which 

have similar abuse-of-a-corpse statutes, provide some guidance in this 

appeal.

In Dougan v. State, 322 Ark. 384, 912 S.W.2d 400 (1995), the 

Arkansas Supreme Court considered whether there was sufficient 

2Section 13A-11-13(a) provides that abuse of a corpse "may include 

knowingly and willfully signing a certificate as having embalmed, 

cremated, or prepared a human body for disposition when, in fact, the 

services were not performed as indicated."
CR-2022-0571

7

evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction for abuse of a corpse under 

§ 5-60-101(a)(2), Ark. Code Ann., which, at that time, prohibited a person 

from "knowingly ... [p]hysically mistreat[ing] a corpse in a manner 

offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities." In that case, the 

evidence indicated that the defendant gave birth to a stillborn baby in a 

van and then instructed her 16-year-old daughter to drive the van to a 

dumpster, where the defendant instructed her daughter to leave the 

baby's body wrapped in a sheet. In considering whether § 5-60-101(a)(2) 

encompassed such conduct, the Court first looked at § 250.10 of the Model 

Penal Code, which provides that a person commits abuse of a corpse if he 

"treats a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage ordinary family 

sensibilities." Citing the commentary to the Model Penal Code, the Court 

noted that such language was "'sufficiently broad'" enough to include 

"'physical abuse, mutilation, gross neglect, or any other sort of 

outrageous conduct.'" Dougan, 912 S.W.2d at 403 (quoting Model Penal 

Code § 250.10, Comment 2 (1980)) (some emphasis omitted). The Court 

also noted that the Arkansas Legislature had provided similar 

commentary, explaining that § 5-60-101 had been drafted in language 

broad enough to encompass not only "assaults on dead bodies but also 
CR-2022-0571

8

lesser forms of mishandling, abuse, or even neglect." Dougan, 912 S.W.2d 

at 405 (some emphasis omitted). Thus, the Court held "that the 

legislature intended that § 5-60-101 cover [the defendant's] placement of 

her baby's corpse in a dumpster, as such an act constituted a form of 

mishandling, abuse or neglect," and affirmed her conviction. Dougan, 

912 S.W.2d at 405.

In Dailey v. State, 101 Ark. App. 394, 278 S.W.3d 120 (2008), the 

Arkansas Court of Appeals also held that there was sufficient evidence 

to sustain the defendant's conviction for abuse of a corpse. In that case, 

the evidence indicated that, after killing the victim in the defendant's 

home, the defendant "wrapped the corpse in garbage bags and hid it 

[under a tarp] in a 'junk room' where it began decomposing." Dailey, 278 

S.W.3d at 122. The defendant argued on appeal that his conviction 

should be overturned because, he said, he had "t[aken] no action which 

was damaging to [the victim's] corpse." Id. at 121. The Court concluded, 

however, that the facts of that case were "similar to Dougan in that both 

charged parties attempted to hide dead bodies." Id. at 122. Thus, the 

Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that "attempt[ing] to 

hide [a] dead bod[y] ... involve[s] the mishandling or neglect of a corpse 
CR-2022-0571

9

constituting physical mistreatment that would offend a person of 

reasonable sensibilities." Id.

The Arkansas Supreme Court returned to this issue in Williams v. 

State, 468 S.W.3d 776 (Ark. 2015). In that case, the evidence indicated 

that the victim had been asphyxiated, and, although the defendant 

denied killing the victim, he admitted that he had "carried her outside of 

his house and buried her." Id. at 778. The defendant argued, however, 

that there was no evidence indicating that he had "mutilated" or 

"mistreated" the corpse – a fact that, he said, indicated that he had not 

committed the offense of abuse of a corpse. Id. at 778. The Court rejected 

that argument and affirmed the defendant's conviction for abuse of a 

corpse, explaining that the jury could have found that, by burying the 

corpse on his own property, the defendant had "conceal[ed] [the victim's] 

body" in a way that was "outside the normal practices of handling or 

disposing of a corpse." Id. at 782.

More recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reached the same 

conclusion in Cone v. State, 654 S.W.3d 648 (2022). In that case, the 

evidence indicated that the defendant murdered the victim in the victim's 

residence and then "cover[ed] her with bedding" and left her in the 
CR-2022-0571

10

residence. Id. at 656. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that such 

evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for abuse of 

a corpse because, the Court reasoned, the defendant had "conceal[ed] the 

victim in her residence by covering her with bedding," and his "decision 

to leave [the victim] on the chaise lounge, decomposing, could reasonably 

be found by a jury to be a course of conduct that would be offensive to a 

person of reasonable sensibilities." Id.

At least two other courts outside Arkansas have also held that 

evidence indicating that the defendant had concealed a corpse was 

sufficient to sustain a conviction for abuse of a corpse.

In Commonwealth v. Hutchison, 164 A.3d 494 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), 

the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered whether there was 

sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction for abuse of a

corpse under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5510, which prohibits a person from

"treat[ing] a corpse in a way that [the defendant] knows would outrage 

ordinary family sensibilities." Before addressing the evidence, the Court 

noted that it had previously considered whether "'a person who 

knowingly leaves a corpse to rot, without making arrangements for a 

proper burial[,] has treated a corpse in a way that she knows would 
CR-2022-0571

11

outrage ordinary family sensibilities'" and had held that such treatment 

constituted abuse of a corpse. Hutchison, 164 A.3d at 498 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 389 Pa. Super. 606, 611, 567 A.2d 1070, 1073

(1989)). This was so, the Court had previously reasoned, because § 5510

had been drafted "'in very broad and general language ... to ensure that 

offenses such as concealing a corpse came under the purview of the 

statute.'" Hutchison, 164 A.3d at 498 (quoting Smith, 567 A.2d at 1073). 

Thus, the Court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the 

defendant's conviction in Hutchison because the evidence indicated that, 

after discovering that his roommate had died of a drug overdose in their 

apartment, the defendant had waited two days to notify the police and, 

by doing so, had "concealed [the roommate's] corpse from authorities so 

that she could not receive a proper burial." Id. at 498.

In State v. Whitaker, [No. 2019-1482, Aug. 18, 2022] ___ Ohio St. 

3d ___, ___, ___ N.E.3d ___, ___ (Ohio 2022), the Ohio Supreme Court 

considered whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the 

defendant's conviction for abuse of a corpse under § 2927.01(B), Ohio Rev. 

Code Ann., which prohibits a person from "treat[ing] a human corpse in 

a way that would outrage reasonable community sensibilities." In that 
CR-2022-0571

12

case, the evidence indicated that the defendant raped the victim in a 

vacant house, murdered her, and then left her corpse in a closet. The 

defendant argued that his conviction for abuse of a corpse should be 

overturned because, he said, there was "no evidence showing that he 

inflicted any injury on [the victim's] corpse." Whitaker, ___ Ohio St. 3d 

at ___, ___ N.E.3d at ___. The Court explained, however, that §

2927.01(B) "'proscribes a broad range of conduct'" that encompasses "an 

attempt to conceal a body" and thus affirmed the defendant's conviction 

based on the evidence indicating that he had left the victim's corpse in 

the vacant house. Id. (quoting State v. Condon, 152 Ohio App. 3d 629, 

648, 789 N.E.2d 696, 711 (2003)). See also State v. Nobles, 106 Ohio App. 

3d 246, 267, 665 N.E.2d 1137, 1150 (1995) (noting that "abuse of a corpse 

can apparently be found in any attempt to conceal a body").

We find the reasoning of these courts to be persuasive. A defendant 

who knowingly conceals a corpse, "without making arrangements for a 

proper burial[,] has treated a corpse in a way that [he or] she knows 

would outrage ordinary family sensibilities." Hutchison, 164 A.3d at 498 

(citation omitted). Thus, by proscribing any treatment of a corpse that

"would outrage ordinary family sensibilities," § 13A-11-13(a), the 
CR-2022-0571

13

Alabama Legislature used language broad enough to "ensure that 

offenses such as concealing a corpse c[o]me under the purview of the 

statute." Hutchison, 164 A.3d at 498 (citation omitted). We therefore 

hold that evidence indicating that a defendant knowingly concealed a 

corpse is evidence that will support a finding that the defendant violated 

§ 13A-11-13.

Returning to the case at hand, the evidence indicated that 

Vandusen intended to conceal Sikes's corpse because he told Posey that, 

"if [Posey] wasn't able to help him, he would have to cut [Sikes] up and 

move her." The evidence also indicated that, after Posey refused to help 

him, Vandusen dragged Sikes's corpse out of her house, across the back 

porch, down the porch steps, and through the backyard to the rear of the 

property, where he left the corpse in a wheelbarrow, hidden from view by 

a blanket and other objects. That evidence was sufficient to prove that 

Vandusen knowingly concealed Sikes's corpse and was therefore 

sufficient to sustain his conviction for abuse of a corpse. Although 

Vandusen claims that there was no evidence indicating that he 

"disfigured or altered" Sikes's corpse, we agree with those courts that 

have concluded that such evidence was not required. Vandusen's 
CR-2022-0571

14

concealment of Sikes's corpse was sufficient, in and of itself, to support a 

conviction for abuse of a corpse.

We do note, however, that there was additional evidence to support 

Vandusen's abuse-of-a-corpse conviction. As we have already noted, the

evidence indicated that Vandusen dragged Sikes's corpse across her back 

porch, and Sgt. Parks testified that animal feces were "everywhere" on 

the porch. Thus, a reasonable inference to draw from the evidence was 

that Vandusen dragged Sikes's corpse through the animal feces. See

Wilson, 142 So. 3d at 809 (noting that, in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence, this Court must "accord the State all legitimate inferences" 

from the evidence (citations omitted)). Certainly, a defendant's act of 

dragging a human corpse through animal feces is conduct that "would 

outrage ordinary family sensibilities." § 13A-11-13(a). For this reason 

as well, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Vandusen's conviction for 

abuse of a corpse.

We acknowledge Vandusen's argument that "[n]o family members 

of the deceased testified at trial to ... any outrage regarding the ... 

treatment of [Sikes's] body." (Vandusen's brief, p. 15.) However, § 13A11-13(a) provides that a person violates the statute if his treatment of a 
CR-2022-0571

15

corpse "would outrage ordinary family sensibilities." (Emphasis added.) 

In other words, § 13A-11-13(a) sets forth an objective standard by which 

to judge the defendant's treatment of a corpse, which means that the 

State is not required to present evidence indicating that the deceased's 

family was in fact subjectively outraged by the defendant's conduct. See

Dougan, 912 S.W.2d at 403-04 (noting that, in determining whether the 

defendant's treatment of a corpse is outrageous, "'[t]he standard is 

objective; it does not vary either to exculpate on the basis of the actor's 

unusual callousness or to condemn for outraging an excessively delicate 

relative of the deceased'" (quoting Model Penal Code, § 250.10, Comment 

2)). Here, we have already concluded that the evidence supported a 

finding that Vandusen concealed Sikes's corpse, as well as a finding that 

he dragged the corpse through animal feces, and such treatment of a 

corpse, judged objectively, constituted abuse of a corpse, regardless of 

whether Sikes's family was in fact outraged by Vandusen's conduct.

B. Obstructing Justice by Using a False Identity

Section 13A-8-194(a) provides that "[a] person commits the crime of 

obstructing justice using a false identity if he or she uses identification 

documents or identifying information of another person or a fictitious 
CR-2022-0571

16

person to avoid summons, arrest, prosecution, or to impede a criminal 

investigation." In this case, the evidence indicated that Vandusen twice 

provided another person's name when Sgt. Parks arrived at Sikes's house 

and asked him to identify himself. Vandusen argues, though, that 

providing another person's name to Sgt. Parks did not violate § 13A-8-

194 because, he says, "no actual obstruction" of justice occurred, given 

that Officer Brown quickly ascertained his true name, at which point he 

"was promptly arrested, and law enforcement's investigation continued." 

(Vandusen's brief, p. 17.)

However, § 13A-8-194 "applies ... to actions that are done for the 

purpose of avoiding summons, arrest, or prosecution or to impede a 

criminal investigation." Hyshaw v. State, 893 So. 2d 1239, 1242 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2003) (emphasis added). In other words, the question is not 

whether the defendant successfully obstructed justice but, rather, 

whether the defendant attempted to obstruct justice. Indeed, the plain 

language of § 13A-8-194 provides that a person violates the statute if he 

uses false information to obstruct justice, not that he violates the statute 

if he uses false information and does obstruct justice. See Hyshaw, 893 

So. 3d at 1245 (holding that the defendant violated § 13A-8-194 by giving
CR-2022-0571

17

a false name to law enforcement officers in an attempt to avoid arrest, 

even though the officers later determined that the name was false).

In this case, Posey testified that Vandusen telephoned him and 

admitted to killing Sikes. Later that day, Sgt. Parks went to Sikes's 

house to conduct a welfare check, and Vandusen, who was already there,

twice told Sgt. Parks that his name was Devin Posey. Given that 

evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that, when Vandusen 

saw Sgt. Parks arrive, he knew Posey had reported Sikes's death and that 

he used Posey's name in order to appear as though he was the person who

had reported her death and to avoid being arrested for her murder. Thus, 

the evidence was sufficient to sustain Vandusen's conviction for 

obstructing justice by using a false identity.

II.

Vandusen argues that the trial court imposed illegal split sentences 

for his abuse-of-a-corpse conviction and his obstructing-justice-by-usinga-false-identity conviction. The State concedes that the split portions of

those sentences are illegal and that remand is necessary for the trial 

court to correct the sentences. We agree.
CR-2022-0571

18

Abuse of a corpse and obstructing justice by using a false identity 

are Class C felonies. See § 13A-11-13(b) and § 13A-8-194(b). As noted, 

the trial court sentenced Vandusen to 20 years' imprisonment for his 

convictions for those offenses and then split the sentences, ordering him 

to serve 5 years' imprisonment, to be followed by 5 years' probation. 

However, the Split Sentence Act, codified at § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, 

provides that, when a defendant is convicted of a Class A, Class B, or 

Class C felony and receives a sentence "of greater than 15 years but not 

more than 20 years," the trial court may order that the defendant "be 

confined in a prison, jail-type institution, or treatment institution for a 

period of three to five years for Class A or Class B felony convictions and 

for a period of three years for Class C felony convictions." § 15-18-8(a)(2) 

(emphasis added).

"Based on the plain meaning of subsection 15-18-8(a)(2), ... [w]hen 

[the trial court] decided to split [Vandusen's] 20-year sentences for his 

[C]lass C felony convictions, the [trial] court had to impose 3-year split 

terms on those sentences." Smith v. State, 334 So. 3d 250, 257 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 2020). Thus, we must remand the case to the trial court for that 

court to limit the split portion of each of Vandusen's 20-year sentences to 
CR-2022-0571

19

3 years. See Bishop v. State, [Ms. CR-20-0976, Sept. 2, 2022] ___ So. 3d 

___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2022) (holding that the defendant had been 

illegally ordered to serve a split sentence of 5 years' imprisonment on a 

20-year sentence for a Class C felony and remanding the case for the trial 

court to "limit the split portion of [his] sentence to three years"). We note, 

though, that Vandusen's base sentences of 20 years' imprisonment are 

legal (because he was sentenced as a habitual felony offender, see § 13A5-9, Ala. Code 1975), and therefore may not be changed. Born v. State, 

331 So. 3d 626, 638 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020). The trial court shall take all 

necessary steps to ensure that due return is made to this Court within 

42 days of the date of this opinion, and the return to remand shall include 

a transcript of the sentencing hearing and the court's amended 

sentencing order.

Conclusion

Vandusen has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief from 

his abuse-of-a-corpse conviction or his obstructing-justice-by-using-afalse-identity conviction. Thus, we affirm those convictions. However, 

because the split portions of Vandusen's sentences exceed three years, we 
CR-2022-0571

20

remand the case for the trial court to impose split sentences that comply

with § 15-18-8(a)(2).

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED 

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum, J., concur. Cole and Minor, JJ., concur 

in the result.