alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                    5
<LEGEND>                     This schedule contains summary financial
                             information extracted from Hondo Oil & Gas
                             Company's Form 10-Q for the period identified
                             below.  This information is qualified in its
                             entirety by reference to such financial
                             statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                          1,000
       
<S>                          <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-TYPE>                         3-MOS
<CASH>                                   62
<SECURITIES>                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                           439
<ALLOWANCES>                              0
<INVENTORY>                               0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        691
<PP&E>                               44,114
<DEPRECIATION>                            0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       48,313
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 7,234
<BONDS>                             109,130
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<COMMON>                             13,788
<OTHER-SE>                         (110,174)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         48,313
<SALES>                                 143
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        147
<CGS>                                     0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           316
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    1,979
<INCOME-PRETAX>                      (3,213)
<INCOME-TAX>                              0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                  (3,213)
<DISCONTINUED>                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<CHANGES>                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                         (3,213)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                         (0.23)
<EPS-DILUTED>                         (0.23)
        




















</TABLE>
#### Anita ZUMEL, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. ROSS STORES INC.; et al. Defendants—Appellees.

No. 03-15329. D.C. No. CV-02-05256-JW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 24, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Anita Zumel appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of her 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, *Sommatino v. United States,*255 F.3d 704, 707 (9th Cir.2001), and we affirm.

Federal courts are required to examine *sua sponte*the basis of their jurisdiction. *See B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist.,*192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir.1999); *see also*Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (‘Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). Zumel concedes that the only basis for federal jurisdiction over her action is her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but she does not allege facts indicating that any defendant’s conduct interfered with her ability to make or enforce a contract. *See Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co.,*976 F.2d 1303, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. *See Bruns v. National Credit Union Admin.,*122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir.1997).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Cause 2015-00499J

Texas DEPARTMENT FAMILY PROTECTION SERVICES

VS HARRIS COUNTY TEXAS

HUONG BUI

Motion to recuse judge

FILED fN

1ST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

DEC 16 2015

CHRISTOPHER /"VRINE

CLERK

IRISTOPHER/OfF

LCAL DIDTRIC CQHBT

In the mater of Texas department of family protective services

VS

Huong Bui

In the interest of minor child

THIS MOTION IS BROUGHT ON BY PETITIONER WHO RESPECTFULLY ASK FOR THE

REMOVAL OF HONORABLE MICHEAL SCHNEIDER FROM CAUSE 2015-00499J

DUE TO THE LACK OF UNFAIRNESS IN THE CASE WE RESPECTFULL ASK FOR THE

REMOVAL ON THE ABOVE JUDGE AND ASK THAT ARE CASE BE MOVED TO A

DEFFERNT COURT TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO FUTHER CONFLICTS OF

INTEREST AND THAT THE PETITIONERS RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED UNDER THE LAWS

OF STATE OF Texas CIVIL PROCEDURES
WE FURTHE FEEL THAT THE JUDGE SHOWED FAVORTIZEM TO THE COURT STAFF

AND THE P-LAINTIFFS IN THE ABOVE STYLE CAUSE NEGLECTING THE RIGHTS OF

DUE PROCESS TO THE RESPONDENTS

FRUADU LENT ACTIVITY HAS ACURED IN THE PROCEEDING AND HAVE JEOPARDIZE

THE RESPONDENT ABLITY TO DEFEND THEM SELFS IN A FAIR LEAGAL MANNER

DESCRIBED BY LAW THOUGH COLOR OF LAW THE RESPONDENTS HAVE BE

UNABLE TO OBTAIN A PROPPER DEFENSE AND THE COURT HAS NOT MADE GOOD

ON IT DUTTIES TO ENFORCE COMPLYANCE OF STATES OFFICIALS IN THIS MATER

THEREFORE HAS LED TO WEAK DEFENSE BY RESPONDENTS IT IS THE JUDGES WHO

WE THE PEOPLE IN TRUST TO UP HOLD THE DUTTIES OF WHAT WE KNOW TO BE

THE LAWS RULES CODES AND PROCEEDURES WE STRONGLY HAVE LOST FAITH IN

OUR RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS THAT ARE WRITTEN TO PROTECT US IN SUCH

TIMES AS IN THE CAUSE ABOVE WITH DUE RESPECT WE SEEK JUSTICE AND THE

PROTECTION UNDER LAWS OF STATE OF Texas

RESPECTFULLY ASK YOUR HONORBALE MICHEAL SCHNEIDER TO RECUSE HIMSELF

FROM ANY FUTHER LIDIGATION OF THIS CAUSE

SINCIRLY

HUONG T BUI

WALTER F SALINAS

12-15-2015
HON.MICHEAL SCHNEIDER JR

MOTION GRANTED

DATE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HERE BY DECLAIR THAT I HAVE PROVIDED A TRUE AND CORECT COPY TO ALL

PARTIES WITH INTREST IN THE ABOVE STYLE CAUSE AS PROOF BY THE TEXAS CIVIL

CODE OF PROCEDURES TO MY SIGNING BELOW

DEUVERDTO

PHONE

ADDRESS DATE

METHOD OF DELIVERY

HUONG BUI ± (A/m DATE
EXHIBIT 31(b)

I, Thomas A. Nardi, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date:  May 7, 2004

  /s/  Thomas A. Nardi
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 638 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 638

   To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to provide that any 
   estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office or the Joint 
  Committee on Taxation shall include costs relating to servicing the 
                  public debt, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 1, 2021

Mr. Cloud (for himself, Mr. Biggs, Mr. Perry, Mr. McClintock, Mr. Budd, 
  Mr. Palmer, Mr. Brooks, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Higgins of Louisiana, Mrs. 
Hinson, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Williams of Texas, Mr. Wright, Mrs. Lesko, Mr. 
Roy, Mr. Donalds, Mr. Bishop of North Carolina, Mr. Buck, Mr. Bergman, 
 Mr. Hice of Georgia, Mr. Taylor, and Mr. Gooden of Texas) introduced 
 the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Rules, and 
    in addition to the Committee on the Budget, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
  of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
                               concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to provide that any 
   estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office or the Joint 
  Committee on Taxation shall include costs relating to servicing the 
                  public debt, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Cost Estimates Improvement Act''.

SEC. 2. CBO AND JCT ESTIMATES TO INCLUDE DEBT SERVICING COSTS.

    (a) In General.--The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
section 406 the following:

 ``estimates to include debt servicing costs and a list of duplicative 
                               activities

    ``Sec. 407.  (a) Cost of Debt Service.--Any estimate prepared by 
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402, and 
any estimate prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, shall 
include, to the extent practicable, the costs (if any) of servicing the 
public debt.
    ``(b) List of Duplicative Activities.--Any estimate prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office or the Joint Committee on 
Taxation shall include a list of any Federal agencies, programs, and 
initiatives with fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative goals or 
activities covered by the legislation.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 402 the 
following:

``407. Estimates to include debt servicing costs and a list of 
                            duplicative activities.''.
                                 <all>
```
Order entered June 9, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01178-CR

GEORGE GUO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F19-00090-M

ORDER

Before the Court is the State’s June 4, 2021 second motion for an extension 

of time to file its brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER the State’s brief, 

received with the motion, filed as of the date of this order.

/s/ ERIN A. NOWELL

JUSTICE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

319 

KA 14-01511 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BRYANT P. SANFORD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

CHARLES J. GREENBERG, AMHERST, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

CINDY F. INTSCHERT, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WATERTOWN (KRISTYNA S. MILLS OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson County Court (Kim H.

Martusewicz, J.), rendered June 30, 2014. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of burglary in the third degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of burglary in the third degree (Penal Law

§ 140.20). We agree with defendant that the waiver of the right to

appeal was not valid inasmuch as the “inquiry made by [County] Court

was insufficient to establish that the court engage[d] the defendant

in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to

appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Beaver, 128 AD3d

1493, 1494 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v McCullars,

117 AD3d 1480, 1480-1481, lv denied 23 NY3d 1040). Although defendant

signed a written waiver of the right to appeal, “[t]he court did not

inquire of defendant whether he understood the written waiver or

whether he had even read the waiver before signing it” (People v

Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 262; see People v Donaldson, 130 AD3d 1486,

1486-1487; Beaver, 128 AD3d at 1494). In any event, a valid waiver of

the right to appeal would not preclude defendant’s contention that his

plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary (see People v

Wisniewski, 128 AD3d 1481, 1481, lv denied 26 NY3d 937), but defendant

failed to preserve that contention for our review because he did not

move to withdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction (see

People v Laney, 117 AD3d 1481, 1482). Furthermore, this case does not

fall within the rare exception to the preservation requirement

inasmuch as nothing in the plea colloquy casts significant doubt on

defendant’s guilt or the voluntariness of the plea (see People v

Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666; People v Brinson, 130 AD3d 1493, 1493, lv

denied 26 NY3d 965).
-2- 319 

KA 14-01511 

Finally, we conclude that defendant’s contentions that his

attorney at the time of his plea had a conflict of interest and that

the attorney was ineffective because of that conflict concern matters

outside the record on appeal and thus must be raised by way of a

motion pursuant to CPL article 440 (see People v Jackson, 108 AD3d

1079, 1079, lv denied 22 NY3d 997; People v Pagan, 12 AD3d 1143, 1144,

lv denied 4 NY3d 766).

Entered: April 29, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
February 19, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

CARLOS ROMERO, Appellant

NO. 14-15-00049-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the motion of the appellant to withdraw notice of 

appeal. Having considered the motion, the Court orders the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order appellant pay all costs expended in the appeal.

We further order the mandate be issued immediately.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
EXHIBIT 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of ONLINE  ORIGINALS,  INC. (the "Company")
on Form  10-KSB  for the  period  ended  November  30,  2006,  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, Gaye
Adams,  Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: March 23, 2007


By:       /s/ Gaye Adams
         ---------------
         Gaye Adams
         Chief Executive Officer, principal executive officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial  information extracted from the May 27,
2000, financial statements and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-25-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-27-2000
<CASH>                                            1135
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     374111
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                391770
<PP&E>                                          414267
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (81467)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  735344
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           136057
<BONDS>                                         407881
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           200
<OTHER-SE>                                      149089
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    735344
<SALES>                                         421730
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                422601
<CGS>                                           311818
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   311818
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 95515
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               10636
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   4632
<INCOME-TAX>                                      3398
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               1234
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      1234
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.06


</TABLE>
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 736

To delay enforcement of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 until

such time as Congress appropriates funds to implement such Act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 30, 1995

Mr. LINDER (for himself, Mr. ROBERTS, and Mr. FUNDERBURK) introduced

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on House Oversight

A BILL

To delay enforcement of the National Voter Registration

Act of 1993 until such time as Congress appropriates

funds to implement such Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT IMPLE4 MENTATION.

5 The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (42

6 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.) is amended—

7 (1) by redesignating section 13 as section 14;

8 (2) by inserting after section 12, the following

9 new section 13:
2

•HR 736 IH

1 ‘‘SEC. 13. FEDERAL FUNDING.

2 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall

3 make grants to the States sufficient to implement this Act.

4 ‘‘(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There

5 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are nec6 essary to carry out this section.’’; and

7 (3) by amending section 14—

8 (A) in paragraph (1)—

9 (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking

10 ‘‘or’’;

11 (ii) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of

12 subparagraph (B), and inserting ‘‘or’’; and

13 (iii) by adding the following new sub14 paragraph:

15 ‘‘(C) 180 days after the date on which

16 Congress appropriates funds pursuant to sec17 tion 13(b); and’’; and

18 (B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as

19 follows:

20 ‘‘(2) with respect to any State not described in

21 paragraph (1), the later of—

22 ‘‘(A) January 1, 1995; or

23 ‘‘(B) 180 days after the date on which

24 Congress appropriates funds pursuant to sec25 tion 13(b).’’.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-1795

ZEBIBA KEBEDE SEID,

Petitioner,

versus

ALBERTO R. GONZALES,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A95-898-783)

Submitted: February 15, 2006 Decided: March 7, 2006

Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Oti W. Nwosu, THE LAW OFFICE OF OTI W. NWOSU, Arlington, Virginia,

for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, M.

Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Assistant Director, Michele S. Greif, Office

of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
*

Insofar as Seid seeks to challenge the Board’s order of April

21, 2005, which denied her petition to reopen immigration

proceedings, we are without jurisdiction because Seid failed to

file a petition for review of that order within the thirty-day time

period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2000). This time period is

“jurisdictional in nature” and is not tolled by filing a motion to

reconsider with the Board. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394, 405

(1995).

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Zebiba Kebede Seid, a native and citizen of Ethiopia,

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“Board”) denying her motion to reconsider its previous

order, which denied her motion to reopen immigration proceedings.*

A denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2005); Jean v. Gonzales, 

F.3d , , 2006 WL 205041, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2006). The

Board ruled that Seid did not warrant the exercise of favorable

discretion because she did not assert an error in fact or law in

its decision denying reopening of her immigration proceedings. We

have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that the Board

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly,

we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the

Board. See In re: Seid, No. A95-898-783 (B.I.A. June 30, 2005).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED