alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
177 La. 792

#### BIRI v. BIRI.

No. 32317.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 29, 1933.

Rehearing Denied July 7, 1933.

Hugh M. Ansley, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Soloman S. Goldman, of New Orleans, for appellee.

BRUNOT, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered on a rule nisi. The judgment orders the cancellation and erasure from the mortgage records of the parish of Orleans of two certain recorded notices of lis pendens. There is nothing in the transcript 'filed in this court except copies of the rule, the judgment thereon, the motion for a devolutive appeal, the order of appeal, the appeal bond, and the clerk’s certificate. The allegations in the rule, however, sufficiently show that in proceedings, the nature of which are not disclosed, Mrs. Annie T. Biri caused certain property to be seized and advertised for sale; that pending the proceedings which resulted in the seizure and advertisement of the property for sale, the notices of lis pendens, which were ordered canceled by the judgment appealed from, were recorded; that Mr. Nich-' olas Biri proceeded by rule to have the order' for the seizure and sale of the property recalled and vacated; and that he appealed devolutively from an adverse judgment rendered in that proceeding, on September 15, 1932.

It is shown that the property was advertised to be sold on October 6, 1932, and, as there is nothing in the transcript to the contrary, we must assume that it was sold on •that day. We must also take judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Biri’s appeal from the judgment rendered September 15, 1932, has been abandoned because the transcript of appeal therefrom was not filed in this court timely and no application was made to this court for an extension of the return day.

 Under these circumstances the appel-lee has moved to dismiss the appeal alleging eleven reasons therefor in her motion to dismiss. Several of said reasons are allegations of facts not disclosed by the record, but two of which are sufficient for the purposes of the motion, viz.:

“That a previous appeal was taken from the judgment rendered September 15, 1932, but that said appeal was abandoned by Appellant’s failure to file the transcript on the return day (Nov. 21,1932) nor within the days of grace.

> “That the appeal from the judgment of October 3, 1932, presents only a moot question, the issue of the validity of the seizure having been finally determined by the judgment rendered September 15, 1932, which judgment is final.”

For the reasons stated, the appeal is dismissed, at appellant’s cost.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 84 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 84

   To prohibit the importation into the United States of sugar from 
                 countries that import sugar from Cuba.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

 Mr. Diaz-Balart introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To prohibit the importation into the United States of sugar from 
                 countries that import sugar from Cuba.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, sugars, syrups, and 
molasses, that are the product of a country that the President 
determines has imported sugar, syrup, or molasses that is the product 
of Cuba, shall be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, 
into the customs territory of the United States, unless the condition 
set forth in section 2 is met.

SEC. 2. CONDITION FOR REMOVAL OF PROHIBITION.

    The prohibition set forth in section 1 shall cease to apply to a 
country if the country certifies to the President that the country will 
not import sugar, syrup, or molasses that is the product of Cuba until 
free and fair elections, conducted under the supervision of 
internationally recognized observers, are held in Cuba. Such 
certification shall cease to be effective if the President makes a 
subsequent determination under section 1 with respect to that country.

SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

    The President shall report to the Congress all determinations made 
under section 1 and all certifications made under section 2.

SEC. 4. REALLOCATION OF SUGAR QUOTAS.

    During any period in which a prohibition under section 1 is in 
effect with respect to a country, the President may reallocate to other 
countries the quota of sugars, syrups, and molasses allocated to that 
country, before the prohibition went into effect, under chapter 17 of 
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 23

       We  consent  to  the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  registration
statements of Churchill  Downs  Incorporated  on Forms S-8 (File Nos.  33-85012,
333-62013, and 33-61111) of our report, dated February 24, 1999 on our audits of
the  consolidated  financial  statements and  consolidated  financial  statement
schedule of Churchill Downs  Incorporated as of December 31, 1998, 1997 and 1996
and for each of the three  years then ended  which  report is  included  in this
Annual Report on Form 10-K.




/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopersC
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Louisville, Kentucky
March 29, 1999
#### Johnny Henry Edward Garrett v. State.

No. 24936.

November 1, 1950.

*215
      *Wilson M. Rutherford,*Kerrville, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for felony theft with a sentence of five years in the penitentiary assessed by the court.

Appellant was charged with stealing an automobile of the value of over fifty dollars. When his case was called for trial the present district judge of the 38th Judicial District Court of Kerr County had called Judge Tom Ferguson from another district to try the case for him, because of the fact that he Judge Ross Doughty, was district attorney of the district at the time the offense was alleged to have been committed. Appellant filed a motion to quash the indictment with the contention that Judge Doughty did not have authority to qualify and impanel the grand jury which returned the indictment.

Witnesses were called who testified that Judge Doughty, as district attorney, took no part in making the investigation. Under this state of facts he would not be disqualified. Utzman v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 426, 24 S.W. 412; Wilks v. State, 27 Tex. App. 381, 11 S. W. 415. The evidence further shows that Judge Doughty did nothing more than to receive the indictment and make such preliminary orders as were necessary. He was not disqualified to do these things. Oxford v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 321, 94 S.W. 463.

Appellant then makes the argument in his brief that unless Judge Doughty was disqualified to try the case the calling of Judge Ferguson to act in his stead was without authority of *216law and the judgment should be held to be void. In the state of the record, we are unable to sustain this contention.

Appellant pleaded guilty and asked permission to waive a jury. All of the prerequisites of the law seem to have been complied with and his plea was received by the court who assessed the penalty. We find nothing irregular in the procedure and find it unnecessary to discuss the several bills of exception which appear in the record.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
218 La. 291

#### HENWOOD et al. v. COLLECTOR OF REVENUE.

No. 39051.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 6, 1950.

Wilkinson, Lewis & Wilkinson, Shreveport, for plaintiff and appellant.

Stephen B. Rodi, Lamar F. Miller, Robert L. Roland, Baton Rouge, for respondent and appellee.

FRUGE, Justice ad -hoc.

This case involves an alleged income tax deficiency in the amount of $1,455.28, with interest of $320.16, or a total claim of $1,-775.44. Since only a question of prescription is involved, and the legality or constitutionality, vel non, of the tax is not at issue jn this case and the amount claimed is less than $2,000.00, this court is without appellate jurisdiction. Const, of 1921, Art. VII, Sec. 10.

It is ordered that this case be transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 19 of 1912, provided that the record shall be filed in that court within 30 days from the date on which this decree shall become final, otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed. The appellant is to pay the costs of this Court, and all other costs shall abide the final disposition of the case.
195 La. 277

#### VOGT et al. v. JANNARELLI et al.

No. 35489.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 29, 1940.

Raymond H. Kierr, of New Orleans, for plaintiffs and appellees.

Claude L. Johnson, of New Orleans, for defendant and appellant.

ROGERS, Justice.

Dr. A. B. Jannarelli appeals from a judgment awarding $300 as damages to Mrs. Sadie Vogt, wife of Otto Vogt. The suit, was brought jointly by Mrs. Sadie Vogt and her husband, Otto Vogt, to recover $3,000 damages from Dr. A. B. Jannarelli and Anna Newman. Plaintiffs’ claim is predicated on defendants’ alleged unlawful invasion of their rights as occupants and lessees of a certain apartment in a building owned by Dr. Jannarelli and operated by him in association with his co-defendant, Anna Newman.

In our examination of the pleadings, our attention has been attracted to the fact that we have no jurisdiction of this appeal. The sum of $3,000, claimed as damages by plaintiffs, is made up of two separate amounts, viz., $1,750 for damages suffered by Mrs. Sadie Vogt and $1,250 for damages suffered' by Otto Vogt.

In cases in which the jurisdiction of this Court is to be determined by the amount in dispute, that amount must exceed $2,000; exclusive of interest to vest it with jurisdiction. Const, art. 7, § 10. Since the amount of damages claimed by Mrs. Sadie Vogt, plaintiff and appellee, is less than $2,000, it is obvious that this Court has no jurisdiction of the amount in dispute.

 As this Court has no jurisdiction of this appeal, we must decline to entertain it, even though no motion to dismiss has been made. Under the provisions of Act 19 of 1912, we are authorized to transfer the appeal to the proper Court rather than to dismiss it. Baker v. Duson, 192 La. 391, 188 So. 40. However, it has been suggested that we should dismiss the appeal instead of transferring the case. Landry v. Gonzales, *347142 La. 577, 578, 77 So. 287, is cited in support of th-e suggestion. It is true that under the provisions of Act 19 of 1912, this Court is not compelled to transfer cases to the Court of Appeal if we find that we have no jurisdiction, but ordinarily we exercise our right to transfer the case instead of dismissing the appeal, especially when there is no doubt of the appellate jurisdiction of the •Court of Appeal.- We so held in Bacher v. Krauss, 179 La. 675, 154 So. 733. In that case, Landry v. Gonzales, together. with other cases, was considered and not followed.

The Court of Appeal is clearly-vested with appellate jurisdiction in this ca'sV and we think that we should exercise' our right to transfer the case in order that the Court of Appeal may proceed with it in the same manner as if the appeal had been originally taken to that Court.

For the reasons assigned, this case is ordered transferred to the Court of Ap-’ peal for the Parish of Orleans, provided that the appellant shall file the record -in; that Court within thirty days from the-date on which this decree shall become final;, otherwise, the appeal shall stand dismissed. The' appellant is to pay the costs of the appeal to this Court; all other costs are to await the final disposition of the case.

O’NIELL, C. J., does not take part.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-6890
JEFFREY ALAN TAYLOR, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Respondent - Appellee.
No. 00-7081
JEFFREY ALAN TAYLOR, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Respondent - Appellee.Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (CA-99-1359-2) Submitted: November 22, 2000 Decided: December 6, 20002 Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jeffrey Alan Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Linwood Theodore Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Jeffrey Alan Taylor seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). We have reviewed the record, the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistratejudge, and the district court’s order denying Taylor’s postjudgment motions, and we find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeals on the reasoning of the district court. See Taylor v. Angelone , No. CA99-1359-2 (E.D. Va. May 24, 1999; July 13, 2000). We also deny Taylor’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis in No. 00-7081. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
#### State of North Dakota v. William Gerhart.

Opinion filed March 6, 1905.

Criminal Law — Appeal —: Record.

This court cannot review alleged errors of the trial court in the absence of a .proper and sufficient record of the facts upon which the trial court acted in making the orders and rulings complained of.

Appeal from District Court, Bottineau county; *Palda,*J.

William Gerhart was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors, and appeals.

Affirmed.

*V. B. Noble, E. B. Goss, H. S. Blood,*and *G. A. Bangs,*for appellant.

*A. G. Burr,*State’s Attorney, for respondent.

Young, J.

The defendant was tried and convicted in the district court of Bottineau county of the crime of selling intoxicating liquors. The abstract upon which his appeal is submitted does not present the facts upon which the trial court acted in making the rulings and order upon which he relies for a reversal, and for this reason we are not able to consider them. It is found upon an examination of the transcript returned by the clerk of the district court that the record itself is likewise insufficient. The abstract cannot, therefore, be cured by amendment. The defendant was indicted by the same grand jury and tried at the same term of *664court as the defendant in the case of State v. Scholfield, 103 N. W. 878, in which the opinion has just been handed down. The record in this case is in all substantial respects in the same condition and has the same fatal defects as the record in that case, and there has been the same delay in the presentation and prosecution of the appeal. It follows, for the reasons pointed out in that case, that a hearing cannot be had upon the merits.

(103 N. W. 880.)

The judgment is affirmed.

All concur.
Exhibit 32.1
------------




                    Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to
                            18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                             As Adopted Pursuant to
                 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Petrie Stores Liquidating Trust (the
"Trust") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2005, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Stephanie
R. Joseph, as Chief Executive Officer of the Trust, and H. Bartlett Brown, as
Chief Financial Officer of the Trust, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, to the best of her or his knowledge, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Trust.



/s/ Stephanie R. Joseph
--------------------------------
Stephanie R. Joseph
Chief Executive Officer
August 5, 2005

/s/ H. Bartlett Brown
--------------------------------
H. Bartlett Brown
Chief Financial Officer
August 5, 2005


This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Trust for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Trust and will be retained by the Trust and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### THEODORE v. J. G. McCRORY CO.

No. 13801.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Nov. 3, 1931.

W. H. Sellers, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Johnston Armstrong, of New Orleans; for appellee.

WESTERFIELD, J.

This is a suit by a customer against the proprietor of a retail store for damages for physical injuries caused by the unsafe condition of the floor of the storehouse and resulting in plaintiff striking his foot against a splinter, which penetrated his skin. He claims $300. The answer denies all charges of negligence, and, in the alternative, pleads contributory negligence, in that “instead of wearing the proper shoes, fully protecting his feet, he (plaintiff) was at the time alleged wearing upon his left foot a shoe on which there was a large circular hole directly under the ball of the foot. The said, hole acted twofold in causing plaintiff injury. First in that the edge around the hole acted as a sharp tool prying the piece of wood up from the flooring board and secondly the hole allowed the sliver of wood to pierce plaintiff’s ‘right foot.”

There was judgment below in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $150, and defendant has appealed.

Plaintiff’s evidence consists of his own testimony to the effect that he was a customer in defendant’s store, a'nd that, in walking out after making his purchases, he struck his foot on a splinter about the size of a match; that he stumbled and fell and was taken to a doctor, where two small incisions were made and the splinter removed; that he was more or less incapacitated for several weeks, and feared tetanus infection, but finally completely recovered. He is corroborated by the doctor who treated him and by an individual who saw him fall. Defendant offered no proof whatever in support of the defense made in his answer, and, in this court, in argument and in brief, relies solely upon the contention that it was necessary for plaintiff to have alleged and proven prior knowledge on the part of defendant of the defective condition of the floor. We have been referred to no authority which would apply to the situation presented by this case, and we know of none. It is very certain, having been the subject of repeated adjudication, that a store proprietor must afford his patrons a safe place in which to trade with him, and, under the facts of this case, he must be presumed to know the premises were dangerous, for a wooden floor which has so far decayed as to' split up in fragments is manifestly unsafe. There is no showing that plaintiff saw the splinter before walking on it, and, as has been said, there is no testimony on the part of defendant or anybody else giving any explanation whatever of the cause of plaintiff’s accident, or any reason for the presence of the splintered flooring.

Under the circumstances, we believe that defendant is liable, and are also of the opinion that the amount allowed below is correct.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.
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| CHYRONHEGO CORPORATION                                                   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)                         |
|                                                                     |
| (Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant) |

|   | (1) | Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:                                                                                                                                   |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | (2) | Aggregate Number of securities to which transaction applies:                                                                                                                                      |
|   | (3) | Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined): |
|   | (4) | Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:                                                                                                                                                  |
|   | (5) | Total fee paid:                                                                                                                                                                                   |

|   | (1) | Amount Previously Paid:                       |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------|
|   | (2) | Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.: |
|   | (3) | Filing Party:                                 |

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#### GRAY v. MASUR.

No. 7302.

Court of Appeal of *Louisiana.*Second Circuit.

April 29, 1949.

Joseph S. Guerriero, of Monroe, for appellant.

Thompson, Thompson & Sparks, of Monroe, for appellee.

*249KENNON, Judge.

Plaintiff in this suit seeks damages of defendant in the sum of $15,000 for humiliation, embarrassment, shame and loss of credit; all allegedly resulting from defendant’s derogatory utterances, in hearing of others, concerning plaintiff.

Since the suit before us is for an amount in excess of $2,000 and is not for personal injuries or workmen’s compensation, the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction of the appeal. See Paragraph 10 of Article 7 of the Constitution of Louisiana. .

Therefore, in accordance with Act 19 of 1912, it is ordered that the appeal in this case be transferred to the Supreme Oou'rt of Louisiana. The appellant is hereby granted a period of sixty days from the date this decree becomes final to file the necessary transcript and perfect her appeal, and should she fail to do so within this sixty day period, the appeal is to stand dismissed. Appellant to pay the costs of this appeal; ' all other costs to await the final outcome of the litigation.
#### Frank Mackowiak, Respondent, v. Buffalo and Lake Erie Traction Company, Appellant.

Judgment and order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. Held, that the verdict of the jury is contrary to and against the weight of the evidence. All concurred, except Robson, J., who dissented.