alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### OWERS v. McELVEEN.

No. 1106.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Jan. 24, 1933.

*393Newman & Jones, of Leesville, for appellant.

Woosley & Cavanaugh, of Leesville, for ap-pellee.

MOUTON, J.

Defendant, McElveen, was, in March, 1931, engaged in the construction of a road in Vernon parish.

It is alleged by J. R. Owers that J. D. Owers, his son, then a minor, was employed by defendant as a truck driver in the construction of that project; and that on March 12, 1931, was injured while rendering services in that capacity and in the course of his employment, for which judgment is demanded for $11.70 per week for 400 weeks.

During the pendency of the suit, J. D. Owers, the minor, having attained his majority, was substituted as plaintiff in the case.

The demand was rejected.

It is shown that Nathan Bricker was employed by defendant, McElveen, to haul dirt from a pit for use in the construction of the road, and that defendant was to pay him for his services at the rate of 40 cents per load. There is nothing to show that Bricker was employed by defendant as a contractor or subcontractor to carry out the execution of the work in which the latter was engaged.

The obligation of Bricker, under his contract of employment, was to drive his own truck, to hire the employees he needed to load his truck, and to haul the dirt for the price above stated. It is clearly shown that he had no authority to hire any one for defendant and that all the expenses for the operation of the truck were to be charged to Bricker, and that defendant retained no control or supervision over the operation of his truck. Bricker had no specified amount of work to do, and could have stopped at any time, entitling him to payment according to the loads he carried. Hence he was an independent contractor. Clark v. Tall Timber Lumber Co., 140 La. 380, 73 So. 239; Brown v. Weber King Lumber Co., 3 La. App. 596.

Plaintiff, J. D. Owers, was employed by Bricker to drive the truck for him; while driving towards the pit, the truck turned over, and Owers was injured. He had been hired by Bricker to drive that truck, and-with which defendant, McElveen, had no connection, as Bricker had to drive his own truck and had no authority whatsoever to employ a truck driver for defendant. It is true that, although defendant had nothing to do with choosing the loaders for the truck, he paid for their services, but this was charged to Bricker and was deducted from his earnings. It is shown, however, that defendant never paid the driver of the truck, as this driving was to be done by Bricker, and that Bricker paid or agreed to pay plaintiff for his driving of the truck.

It is therefore clear that plaintiff was an employee of Bricker and not of defendant, with whom he had no contractual relation as an employee. When such relation does not exist between defendant as employer, and plaintiff as employee, the latter cannot recover compensation under the Employer’s Liability Act (Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended). Young v. Petty Stave & Lumber Co., 7 La. App. Second Circuit, page 90.

The demand was correctly denied.

Judgment affirmed.
Exhibit 21.1

Subsidiaries of Porter Bancorp, Inc.



|                           |  |                              |  |                           
|-------------------------- |  | ---------------------------- |  | --------------------------
|Direct Subsidiary          |  | Jurisdiction of Organization |  | Does Business As          
|PBI Bank                   |  | Kentucky                     |  | PBI Bank                  
|Asencia Statutory Trust I  |  | Connecticut                  |  | Asencia Statutory Trust I 
|Porter Statutory Trust II  |  | Connecticut                  |  | Porter Statutory Trust II 
|Porter Statutory Trust III |  | Connecticut                  |  | Porter Statutory Trust III
|Porter Statutory Trust IV  |  | Connecticut                  |  | Porter Statutory Trust IV 
|PBIB Corporation, Inc.     |  | Kentucky                     |  | PBIB Corporation, Inc.    



|                                   |  |                              |  |                                    |  |              
|---------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------- |  | -------------
|Indirect Subsidiary                |  | Jurisdiction of Organization |  | Does Business As                   |  | Parent Entity
|PBI Title Services, LLC            |  | Kentucky                     |  | PBI Title Services, LLC            |  | PBI Bank     
|Durham-Mudd Insurance Agency, Inc. |  | Kentucky                     |  | Durham-Mudd Insurance Agency, Inc. |  | PBI Bank
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 

LABORATORIES, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

JUAN POLO,

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-19-00067-CV

Appeal from the

210th Judicial District Court 

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC#2018DCV2966)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the trial court correctly 

denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment denying 

defendants’ motion to dismiss and remand the cause for further proceedings. We further order 

that Appellee recover from Appellant and its sureties, if any, all costs in this Court. This decision 

shall be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 6TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2020.

JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
#### MILES v. STREUN et al.

No. 6188.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Feb. 4, 1941.

E. W. & P. N. Browne and G. M. Boden-heimer, Jr., all of Shreveport, for appellants.

Coleman •& Morgan and Booth & Lock-ard, all of Shreveport, for appellee.

HAMITER, Judge.

The award of $617 made in favor of this plaintiff, Joe Miles, for his injuries and medical expenses resulting from the accident described in Stevens v. Streun, La.App., 200 So. 182, is warranted by the evidence adduced; and for the reasons assigned in the opinion of that cause, the judgment is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6594 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6594

    To require that the headquarters for any entity of the Federal 
 Government located in the National Capital region shall remain in the 
 National Capital region unless relocation legislation is enacted, and 
                          for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 3, 2022

Ms. Norton (for herself, Mr. Trone, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, Mr. Raskin, 
  and Mr. Brown of Maryland) introduced the following bill; which was 
           referred to the Committee on Oversight and Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To require that the headquarters for any entity of the Federal 
 Government located in the National Capital region shall remain in the 
 National Capital region unless relocation legislation is enacted, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Federal Agencies and 
Employees from Political Interference Act of 2022''.

SEC. 2. AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS LOCATED IN THE NATIONAL 
              CAPITAL REGION.

    (a) Headquarters.--The headquarters for any entity of the Federal 
Government located in the National Capital region on the date of 
introduction in the House of Representatives of this Act shall remain 
in the National Capital region unless legislation is enacted into law 
approving or otherwise providing for relocation.
    (b) Employee Stations.--Any employee position with a duty station 
in the National Capital region on the date of introduction in the House 
of Representatives of this Act shall remain stationed in the National 
Capital region unless legislation is enacted into law approving or 
otherwise providing for relocation.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of
Scout Acquisition, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), I, Scott Baily, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
my knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
      Scott BailyScott
      BailyPrincipal
      Executive OfficerMarch
      30,
2010
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

CHARLES ALTON GARY,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-12-00046-CR 

Appeal from the

30th Judicial District Court 

of Wichita County, Texas 

(TC# 51,463-A) 

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the 

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. This decision shall be certified 

below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 18TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2013.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
|Exhibit 12                                                      
|----------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                
|                                                                
|Peoples Energy Corporation and Subsidiary Companies             
|                                                                
|Statement Re:  Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
|(Dollars in Thousands)                                          
|                                                                
|                                                                
|                                                                
|                                                                
|                                                                
|                                                                
|Net Income Before Preferred                                     
|Stock Dividends, as reported                                    
|                                                                
|Undistributed earnings from equity investees                    
|                                                                
|Add - Income Taxes                                              
|Fixed charges excluding capitalized interest                    
|                                                                
|Earnings                                                        
|                                                                
|Fixed charges including capitalized interest                    
|                                                                
|Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
Exhibit 15.1

                         [Letterhead of KPMG LLP]



                       Independent Auditors' Report



     The Board of Directors
     Payless Cashways, Inc.:


     We have  reviewed  the  accompanying  condensed  balance  sheets of Payless
     Cashways,  Inc.  as of  February  26,  2000 and  February  27, 1999 and the
     related  condensed   statements  of  operations  and  cash  flows  for  the
     thirteen-week  periods then ended. These condensed financial statements are
     the responsibility of the Company's management.

     We conducted our reviews in accordance  with  standards  established by the
     American  Institute of Certified  Public  Accountants.  A review of interim
     financial   information   consists   principally  of  applying   analytical
     procedures to financial  data and making  inquiries of persons  responsible
     for financial and accounting  matters.  It is  substantially  less in scope
     than an audit  conducted in accordance  with  generally  accepted  auditing
     standards, the objective of which is the expression of an opinion regarding
     the financial statements taken as a whole.  Accordingly,  we do not express
     such an opinion.

     Based on our reviews,  we are not aware of any material  modifications that
     should be made to the accompanying  condensed financial statements for them
     to be in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.

     We have previously  audited, in accordance with generally accepted auditing
     standards,  the balance sheet of Payless Cashways,  Inc. as of November 27,
     1999 and the related  statements of operations,  shareholders'  equity, and
     cash flows for the fiscal year then ended (not  presented  herein);  and in
     our report dated January 14, 2000, we expressed an  unqualified  opinion on
     those financial  statements.  In our opinion,  the information set forth in
     the accompanying  condensed balance sheet as of November 27, 1999 is fairly
     presented,  in all material respects, in relation to the balance sheet from
     which it has been derived.

                                  /s/KPMG LLP

     Kansas City, Missouri
     March 10, 2000
#### Earl Rice v. State

No. 24583.

January 11, 1950.

Rehearing Denied February 22, 1950.

*320
      *Ben F. Mooring,*Paris, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted by the jury of driving an automobile while intoxicated and was fined $300.00 and sentenced to 30 days in jail.

There is but one bill of exceptions in the record and that relates to certain alleged argument of the county attorney wherein it is alleged that such attorney stated to the jury that appellant had testified that “He drank on the road from Galveston.” This bill is qualified by the trial court to show that no such objection was made thereto when the statement was made, but that during such attorney’s address to the jury a written objection thereto was handed to the trial judge. The qualification further states that such statement was a logical conclusion from the testimony found in the record, and it seems to be such to us. We see no error shown in this bill, it being the only one, in the record, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.

WOODLEY, Judge.

Upon again examining the record, we remain convinced that the argument complained of was a logical conclusion of the county attorney from the testimony found in the record, as certified by the trial judge in his qualification of appellant’s lone bill of exception.

Upon this holding, the judgment was affirmed and the motion for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion approved by the court.
**Exhibit32.1**

 

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES - OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

In connection with theAnnual Report of Protection One, Inc. and Protection One Alarm Monitoring, Inc.(the “Companies”) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2005  (the “Report”), which this certificationaccompanies, I, Richard Ginsburg, in my capacity as President and ChiefExecutive Officer of the Companies, certify that to the best of my knowledgethe Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Companies.

 

 
| Date: March 20, 2006 | /s/                                                                                                    | Richard Ginsburg |   |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------|
|                 | Richard Ginsburg                                                                                       |
|                 | President and Chief Executive Officer, Protection One, Inc. and  Protection One Alarm Monitoring, Inc. |
|                      |                                                                                                        |                  |        |  |

 

 

Theforegoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Companiesas part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document for purposes ofSection 18 or any other provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended.

 

----
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-10310 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus TIMOTHY FORD, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:96-CR-97-A-1

- - - - - - - - - - December 9, 1997 Before BARKSDALE, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Court-appointed counsel for Timothy Ford has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the brief and record discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
#### Vincent MCGRAW, Appellant, v. Marshall REED, Warden, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction; Max Mobley, Deputy Director, PHP, Arkansas Department of Correction; Thomas D. Gensler, Regional Director, Correctional Medical Services; Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellees.

No. 02-3159.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 5, 2003.

Decided Aug. 6, 2003.

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Vincent McGraw appeals the district court’s1 adverse judgment following an evidentiary hearing in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which McGraw claimed he was subject to retaliatory discipline and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. For reversal, McGraw argues that the hearing procedure was inconsistent with his constitutional right to a jury trial and the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The pretrial hearing conducted in this case was consistent with our case law. *See Johnson v. Bi-State Justice Ctr.,*12 F.3d 133, 135-36 (8th Cir.1993) (approving use of pretrial evidentiary hearing if consistent with plaintiffs right to jury trial; standard is whether evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to jury, or whether evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as matter of law). And contrary to McGraw’s contentions on appeal, we find that he was adequately apprised, through the magistrate judge’s pre-hearing orders, that he risked dismissal of his case if he did not present evidence to make a submissible jury ease.

Upon our de novo review of the record, we agree with the district court that McGraw’s evidence, viewed most favorably to him, did not support a finding of direct or supervisory liability against any of the named defendants. *See Farver v. Schwartz,*255 F.3d 473, 475 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (actionability of false, retaliatory disciplinary charges under § 1983); *Sherrer v. Stephens,*50 F.3d 496, 497 (8th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (no liability for delay in medical treatment unless defendant ignored acute or escalating situation, or *605unless delay adversely affected prognosis); *Boyd v. Knox,*47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (no supervisory liability under § 1983 absent personal involvement or unless supervisor knew about unconstitutional conduct and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned blind eye to it).

Accordingly, we affirm.

1

. The Honorable Stephen M. Reasoner, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable H. David Young, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
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                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration 

          - [TA-W-62,227] 

                    In accordance with Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2273), and Section 246 of the Trade Act of 1974 (26 U.S.C. 2813), as amended, the Department of Labor issued a Certification Regarding Eligibility to Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance and Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance on November 16, 2007, applicable to workers of Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., Fowlerville Division, Fowlerville, Michigan. The notice was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on December 10, 2007 (72 FR 69710).                 

At the request of the State agency, the Department reviewed the certification for workers of the subject firm. The workers are engaged in the production of injection molded automotive plastic parts. 

New information shows that as the result of a change in ownership on July 1, 2008, Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., Fowlerville Division, Fowlerville, Michigan, is currently known as JCIM, LLC. 

Accordingly, the Department is amending this certification to include workers of the subject firm whose Unemployment Insurance (UI) wages are reported under the successor firm, JCIM, LLC. 

The amended notice applicable to TA-W-62,227 is hereby issued as follows:

All workers of Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., Fowlerville Division, currently known as JCIM, LLC, Fowlerville, Michigan, who became totally or partially separated from employment on or after September 17, 2006, through November 16, 2009, are eligible to apply for adjustment assistance under Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974, and are also eligible to apply for alternative trade adjustment assistance under Section 246 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Signed at Washington, DC, this 14th day of August 2008. 

Linda G. Poole, 

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance. 

[FR Doc. E8-19406 Filed 8-20-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P