J-S02031-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S.R., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.D., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 991 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree February 25, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000289-2015, 

FID: 51-FN-001-287-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and MOULTON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2017

E.D. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered February 25, 2016 in 

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas by the Honorable Allan L. 

Tereshko, which involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his son, 

A.S.R. (“Child”), born in November 2010, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).1 We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

On November 17, 2010, G.R. gave birth to A.S.R. At 

the time of the delivery, G.R. tested positive for cocaine, 

benzodiazepines and marijuana. The Child, A.S.R.[,] 

tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of G.R. (“Mother”) 

on the same date. Mother has not filed an appeal from the decree 

terminating her parental rights, nor is she a party to the instant appeal. 
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On November 21, 2010, DHS visited the family home 

and determined that it was safe and that G.R. was 

adequately prepared for A.S.R. G.R. agreed to accept 

Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) 

services; however, she failed to make herself available to 

the Extended Assessment Team. She later made phone 

contact to confirm that she had been arrested for 

outstanding bench warrants and that she was incarcerated 

at Riverside Correctional Facility (RCF). G.R. stated that 

the Child, A.S.R.[,] was in the care of his Maternal 

Grandmother, C.R. G.R. provided DHS with the telephone 

number for C.R., as G.R. did not have her address. DHS’ 

efforts to contact C.R. were unsuccessful. 

. . .

In December 2013 and January 2014, DHS received 

allegations that G.R. had recently been released from 

prison; that during her incarceration, A.S.R. had lived with

his maternal grandmother, C.R.; that during this 

timeframe, A.S.R. had visited with his Father, E.D.; that 

A.S.R. may have been sexually abused by Father; that 

G.R. and E.D. had a history of domestic violence; and that 

C.R. lacked medical insurance for A.S.R. 

On February 27, 2014, DHS implemented In-Home 

Services through Community Umbrella Agency CUANortheast Treatment Center (NET). 

On March 28, 2014, CUA-NET held an initial Single Case 

Plan (SCP) meeting. The goal for A.S.R. was to “Stabilize 

Family.” The parental objective established for G.R. was 

to: 1) make her whereabouts known to DHS/CUA-NET. 

The parental objective[] established for E.D. was to: 1) 

make his whereabouts known to DHS/CUA-NET. The 

parental objective for [then putative father] T.M. was to: 

1) make his whereabouts known to DHS/CUA-NET. (Note: 

pursuant to the paternity test of E.D. confirming his 

paternity of the Child, T.M. was dismissed from the case as 

a putative father). None of the parents participated in the 

meeting and their whereabouts remained unknown to DHS 

and CUA-NET.

On June 2, 2014, DHS received a General Protective 

Services (GPS) Report alleging that on May 29, 2014, 

Mother, G.R., went to the home of a male friend, M.G., 
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and stated that she and A.S.R. had been evicted from their 

home and that she and A.S.R. needed somewhere to 

reside. G.R. left A.S.R. in M.G.’s care on May 30, 2014 at 

2:00 p.m. and stated that she was going to the store. 

G.R. failed to return to M.G.’s home for A.S.R. and she also 

failed to respond to any telephone calls. M.G. was unable 

to continue caring for A.S.R. G.R. was believed to have 

substance abuse problems. G.R. has a past criminal 

history and has been arrested for prostitution and drug 

possession. This Report was substantiated.

On June 2, 2014, M.G. contacted the police and stated 

that he was no longer able to care for A.S.R. and that 

G.R.’s whereabouts were unknown.

On June 2, 2014, A.S.R. was transported to DHS by 

Philadelphia Police. 

On June 2, 2014, DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (OPC) and placed A.S.R. in a NET foster home. 

A Shelter Care Hearing was held on June 4, 2014 before 

the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. The Court lifted the 

OPC and ordered the legal custody of the Child to transfer 

to DHS, and the Child be placed in foster care. 

On June 16, 2014, Mother was arrested and charged 

with Unauthorized Use of Motor Vehicle. 

An Adjudicatory Hearing was held on June 16, 2014 

before Judge Kevin M. Dougherty. The Court discharged 

the temporary commitment, adjudicated A.S.R. Dependent 

and committed him to DHS. The Court ordered that CUANET move A.S.R. to an appropriate placement, that DHS 

complete a parent locator search for A.S.R.’s father(s); 

and that Mother and Maternal Grandmother, C.R., be 

referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a 

forthwith drug screen, dual-diagnosis assessment and 

monitoring. Supervised visits with Mother shall occur at 

the Agency, once she makes herself available to DHS. 

Grandmother may receive visitation once a negative drug 

screen has been provided. CUA to ensure Child receives a 

full medical evaluation, dental and eye examination, 

forthwith. CUA to ensure Child attends appointment at 

Elwyn. Child to be referred to BHS for an evaluation. 

(Autism) 
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. . .

A Permanency Review Hearing was held on September 

15, 2014 before the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko. The 

Court held that the Child shall remain in the legal custody 

of DHS, and remain in foster care through the NET CUA. 

. . .

A Permanency Review Hearing was held on November 

6, 2014 before the Honorable Kevin M. Dougherty. The 

Court held that the Child shall remain in the legal custody 

of DHS, and remain in foster care through the NET CUA. 

Mother’s visitation is bi-weekly Supervised at the Agency. 

Child receives speech therapy through Elwyn, and attends 

daycare. . . . Father’s name is E.D., date of birth is 

9/11/1966. DHS is to use Parent Locator Services (PLS) 

on Father. Mother is referred to the Clinical Evaluation 

Unit (CEU) for a forthwith drug screen, dual-diagnosis 

assessment, monitoring, and three randoms prior to the 

next Court date. CUA to refer Mother to ARC. CUA is to 

have a forthwith single case plan meeting, to include Child 

Advocate.

On November 7, 2014, CUA-NET held an SCP revision 

meeting. The goal for Child was “Return to Parent”. The 

parental objectives for Father, E.D., were: 1) make 

whereabouts known to DHS/CUA-NET; and 2) comply with 

paternity testing. No parental objectives were established 

for T.M. as he confirmed to CUA-NET that he was not the 

biological father of the Child. Mother was invited to the 

meeting, however, she failed to participate. E.D. and T.M. 

failed to participate in the meeting and their whereabouts 

remain unknown to DHS and CUA-NET. 

A Permanency Review Hearing was held on February 2, 

2015 before the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko. The Court 

held that the Child shall remain in the legal custody of 

DHS, and remain in foster care through Second Chance. . . 

. 

On March 13, 2015, CUA-NET held a SCP revision 

meeting. The parental objectives established for Father, 

E.D. were to: 1) make whereabouts known to DHS /CUANET, and 2) comply with paternity testing. No parental 

objectives were established for T.M. as he confirmed to 
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CUA-NET that he was not the biological father of the Child. 

E.D. and T.M. failed to participate in the meeting and their 

whereabouts remained unknown to DHS and CUA-NET. 

. . .

E.D. has failed to achieve full and continuous 

compliance with the established FSP objectives to facilitate 

reunification with his Child. [H]e has also failed to 

consistently visit, plan for, and provide for the Child 

throughout his time in placement. 

A Permanency Review Hearing was held on May 18, 

2015 before the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko. The Court 

held that the Child shall remain in the legal custody of 

DHS, and remain in a pre-Adoptive Home through Concilio 

- supervised by CUA-NET.

The Court ordered a paternity test for E.D., who was 

referred to the Genetic Testing Unit, 9th floor, Room 968. 

A Paternity Test Report (DNA Test Report) was received 

in the chambers of the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko. The 

results indicate that probability of paternity is 99.9999% 

for this putative father, E.D. 

TERMINATION HEARING

On February 25, 2016, this Court held a Goal 

Change/Termination Hearing and heard testimony on 

DHS’s Petition to terminate Fathers rights as to his Child, 

and change the Permanency Goal to Adoption. Father was 

present and represented by his attorney.

The Assistant City Solicitor first presented the testimony 

of Lauren Spearman, Social Work Supervisor for NET[-] 

CUA[], who was the Case Manager. She testified the Child 

was currently with the pre-adoptive foster parent, C.B. 

though Concilio, where he has been since June 2014. She 

testified Father has been involved with the Child recently 

as he reached out to CUA in December 2015. She stated 

for the first year that Child was in care, Father was not 

available for CUA services. 

Ms. Spearman testified that Father’s paternity was

established in June 2015, and from that time until 
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December 2015, Father did not reach out to her agency 

and he had no involvement with the Child. 

She further testified Father does not have appropriate 

housing for reunification, and has not established any type 

of parental bond or relationship with his Child. She also 

stated her agency set up visits for Father but he did not 

show up to the first one or two, and then visitation was set 

up in January 2016. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Spearman stated the Child 

has a strong bond with his foster mother, and believes it 

would be detrimental to remove the Child from the foster 

parent. She stated the Child looks to the foster parent, 

C.B., as his mother, and refers to her as “Mom.” The 

foster family includes other children and they all refer to 

A.S.R. as their little brother. 

Ms. Spearman further stated A.S.R., who is currently 

five years old, is in love with his foster mother. He follows 

her, and she has the protective capacities as a mother 

would have and if she steps out of the room, he follows 

her, and wants to be with her. She opined it would be 

detrimental if the Child was removed from this home. 

Further on cross-examination, Ms. Spearman testified 

A.S.R. is doing phenomenal in the foster home and is up to 

date on medical and dental care. He receives therapeutic 

services through the Northeast Treatment Center (TSS 

Services). 

She admitted she was not aware of who the Father of 

the Child was from August 2015, when she first received 

the case, because she did not have the results of the 

paternity test. She further admitted she did not conduct 

any investigation as to who the father was. She stated 

Father made contact with her and visits were scheduled in 

January 2016 after she got an email from the Child 

Advocate and the City Solicitor in December 2015. 

On re-direct examination, Ms. Spearman stated that 

between the time the Child came into care in June 2014 

until May of 2015, Father’s only objectives were to make 

his whereabouts known, and he did not. Further, when 

Father became aware he was the biological father of A.S.R. 
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in June 2015, he failed to make contact or do outreach to 

her from that time until December 2015. 

The Father, E D , was next to testify. He stated he took 

the Mother to the hospital when A.S.R. was born. He 

indicated that he and Mother did not live together but that 

mother would entrust him to take the Child at times 

because she was still using. He further stated that he 

cared for him in an apartment in South Philadelphia and 

then took him to his apartment. He fed him, changed his 

diapers and everything because his mother was using 

drugs.

He testified he visited his Child three or four times a 

week when the Child lived with his Mother and Maternal 

Grandmother. A.S.R.’s mother left him in maternal 

grandmother’s care when the Child was between nine 

months and a year old. Maternal Grandmother called 

Father and told him. 

He stated he did not see his Child from December 2013 

until December 2015 because of the Mother and Maternal 

Grandmother’s false accusations that he had tried to 

molest his son. He became aware the Child was placed 

when a social worker on his son’s case, G.M., contacted 

him. 

Father further testified he was unaware of the family 

service plan goal objectives until after G.M. had contacted 

him and packages of mail started arriving at his address at 

1425 West Erie Ave., Apt. 3. 

On cross-examination, Father stated he did not have 

any contact with his Child between June of 2015, when the 

DNA test results came in, until December 2015. He did 

not know what to do, and when he received paperwork 

from Community Net with Ms. Spearman’s information on 

it, he contacted her. He admitted he has seen his Child 

only two times in two years. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/16, at 1-11 (internal citations omitted) (“1925(a) 

Op.”). 
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On February 25, 2016, the same day as the hearing, the trial court 

entered a decree terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 

sections 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b).

On March 22, 2016, Father timely filed a notice of appeal, together 

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. (a)(2)(i) and (b).

Father raises six questions on appeal:

1. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1)?

2. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)?

3. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(5)?

4. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(8)?

5. Whether the Trial Court erred by finding, under Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511(b), that termination of [Father’s] parental rights best 

serves [Child’s] developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare?

6. Whether DHS failed to use reasonable efforts to reunite 

[Child] with [Father]?

Father’s Br. at 5.2

____________________________________________

2 Although Father challenges the trial court’s decision to terminate 

under sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), the court terminated 

Father’s parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b) only, and did 

not terminate under sections 2511(a)(5) and (8).
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We consider Father’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of 

fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they 

are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the reason for 

applying an abuse of discretion to termination decisions:

[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, 

where the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even 

where the facts could support an opposite result, as is 

often the case in dependency and termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the 

trial court and impose its own credibility determinations 

and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so 

long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (internal citation 

omitted).
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The petitioner has the burden of proving by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 

2009).

This Court need only agree with any one subsection of section 

2511(a), along with section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of 

parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc). We conclude that the trial court properly terminated Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as 

follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . . 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied 

by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 
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described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To terminate parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

This Court has stated that a parent is required “to make diligent efforts 

toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” 

In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 2002) (quoting In re J.W., 578 

A.2d 952, 959 (Pa.Super. 1990)). Further, “[t]he grounds for termination 

due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of 

refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” Id. at 337. “[A]

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness 

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected 

as untimely or disingenuous.” Id. at 340. 

This Court has stated that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold 

in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 
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responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa.Super. 

2008). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and 

rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her 

parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment 

of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., 

N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

As Father’s second and sixth questions on appeal arise out of section 

2511(a)(2), we will address them together. Father argues that the trial 

court erred in terminating his parental rights to Child under section 

2511(a)(2) because the evidence presented by DHS was not so clear and 

convincing as to establish sufficient grounds for termination of his parental 

rights. We disagree.

We find the following portion of the trial court’s opinion relevant to our 

inquiry with regard to section 2511(a)(2):

When questioned by the Court regarding paternity testing, 

Father admitted he did not ask for a paternity test until 

May 2015 when he asked for the test through [Greg 

Morgan], the social worker. He further stated he did not 

come to court to file a custody petition, although he 

believed he was the father of the Child.

The Court reasoned that although Father claimed he cared 

for the Child, he did not contact the agency, nor did he try 

to remedy the conditions that brought the Child into care. 

Father admitted he has seen his Child only two times in 

two years.

After hearing the credible testimony of the DHS Social 

Worker, the Court found by clear and convincing evidence, 

that her observations and conclusions regarding Father’s 
J-S02031-17

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lack of ability to fulfill his parental responsibilities were 

persuasive.

1925(a) Op. at 17 (citations omitted). 

Father testified that he agreed to help Maternal Grandmother (“C.R.”) 

raise Child because Mother was still using drugs, and he would keep Child for 

a designated period of time and then return Child to C.R. N.T., 2/25/16, at 

32. Father further testified that this arrangement lasted “basically for three 

years.” Id. Father stated that this arrangement ended, and he did not see 

Child from December 2013 until December 2015, because Mother and C.R. 

falsely accused him of attempting to molest Child. Id. at 33. Father further 

testified that he did not know Child was in DHS custody until May 2015 when 

Mr. Morgan contacted him. At that time, he requested a paternity test. Id.

at 39. 

On cross-examination, Father stated that he did not have any contact 

with Child between June 2015, when paternity was established, and 

December 2015, because he did not know what to do, and that it was not 

until he received paperwork from CUA-NET with Ms. Spearman’s information 

that he reached out to CUA-NET. Id. at 39. He admitted, however, that he 

had Mr. Morgan’s contact information, but did not attempt to reach him. Id.

at 40.

Spearman testified that Father’s paternity was established in June 

2015, and Father did not reach out to CUA-NET until December of 2015. Id.

at 9-10. Spearman continued that Father has not had sufficient visits to 

establish a relationship with Child because Father missed visits for failing to 
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confirm the visits on time. Id. at 11. Ms. Spearman further testified that 

Father lacks the appropriate housing for reunification. Id. at 25-26. 

Instantly, the trial court notes that although Father claims he cares for 

Child, Father did not contact CUA-NET and did not try to remedy the 

conditions that brought Child into DHS care. 1925(a) Op. at 17. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found:

I think [F]ather clearly had a reasonable belief that this 

child was his and did nothing about it and in fact walked 

away from the child for a substantial period of time in this 

child’s life when the child was most vulnerable and the 

child’s most formable periods. The father in fact 

abandoned this child. And for father to come in now and 

suggest that he resume a role in the child’s life that he 

abandoned many years ago, falls on deaf ears of this 

Court. Father has failed to remedy any of the issues that 

brought the child into care.

N.T, 2/25/16, at 43. 

We conclude that the trial court’s credibility and weight determinations 

are supported by competent evidence in the record. See In re M.G., 855 

A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004). We further conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in finding grounds for termination of Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2).

Additionally, we reject Father’s contention that his parental rights 

should not have been terminated because CYS failed to provide him with 

reunification services. Our Supreme Court recently held that reasonable 

reunification efforts are not necessary to support a decree terminating 
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parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 

672-73 (Pa. 2014). We have discussed the In re D.C.D. decision as follows:

In In re D.C.D., ___ Pa. ___, 105 A.3d 662 (2014), our 

Supreme Court analyzed the language of Section 2511(a)(2) of 

the Adoption Act, as well as Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. The Court reasoned that, while “reasonable 

efforts may be relevant to a court’s consideration of both the 

grounds for termination and the best interests of the child,” 

neither of these provisions, when read together or individually, 

requires reasonable efforts. The Court also concluded that 

reasonable efforts were not required to protect a parent’s 

constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child. 

In re Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1055 (Pa.Super. 2015) (some 

internal citations omitted). Although it is unclear from the record why 

Father was not contacted following the positive paternity test, the agency’s 

steps are but one consideration. Father, after being a part of Child’s life for 

three years, did not take steps to remain in Child’s life, and, for six months 

after receiving confirmation that he was Child’s father, failed to take any 

steps to re-establish contact with Child. Further, in the two months after reestablishing contact, Father showed inconsistent visits with Child.

The trial court must also consider how terminating Father’s parental 

rights would affect the needs and welfare of Child under section 2511(b). 

The focus under Section 2511(b) is not on the parent, but on the child. In 

re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). 

Pursuant to section 2511(b), the trial court must consider whether 

termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical 
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and emotional needs of the child. See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-

87 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

With respect to section 2511(b), this Court has explained that 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in 

the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287. Further, 

the trial court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child 

bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing that bond.” Id. However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence 

of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 

A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008). 

With regard to Child’s bond with Father, the trial court emphasized 

“Father’s failure to contact and maintain a relationship with his Child as 

demonstrated by the lengthy period between the DNA test results became 

available until the time he contacted the social worker to begin 

communication. This demonstrates his refusal to maintain a bond with 

[Child].” 1925(a) Op. at 18.

Spearman stated that Child is doing “phenomenal” in his foster home. 

N.T., 2/25/16, at 13, and that Child refers to his Foster Mother as “Mom.” 

Id. at 12. Spearman further testified that Foster Mother’s family members 

fully accept Child, and call Child their little brother. Id. Spearman stated 

that Child is up to date on his medical and dental care, and is receiving 
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therapeutic services through Northeast Treatment Center. Id. at 13. 

Spearman concluded that it would be detrimental if Child was removed from 

Foster Mother’s care because Child loves Foster Mother, and wherever Foster 

Mother is, Child wants to be with her. Id. 

Further, our review of the record reveals no evidence of a bond 

between Father and Child. Father admitted that he has only seen Child two 

times in two years. Id. at 40. We find that the competent evidence in the 

record supports the trial court’s determination that there was no bond 

between Father and Child which, if severed, would be detrimental to Child, 

and that the termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of Child. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74. 

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2017