alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Harley Maxwell Hughes v. State.

No. 24536.

December 14, 1949.

*Fryer & Milstead,*El Paso, for appellant.

*66
      *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

KRUEGER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted for the offense of driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway in El Paso County, Texas, while intoxicated, and his punishment was assessed at a fine of fifty dollars. From this judgment, he has appealed to this court.

He brings forward two complaints, each by a separate bill of exception, in the first of which he complains of the action of the district attorney in the cross examination of appellant by propounding to him the following question: “You have previously been tried for drunk driving?” Counsel for appellant immediately objected, and during the argument which arose he, appellant, answered, “Well, I don’t remember.” The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury not to consider the same for any purpose whatsoever. Appellant contends, however, that the matter complained of is of such a prejudicial nature that the court could not effectively withdraw it from the minds of the jury and in support of his contention cites us to some authorities which seem to sustain his contention; but, in those cases the accused’s punishment exceeded the minimum prescribed by law for said offenses while in the instant case the jury assessed the minimum punishment.

It appears to us that since the court sustained the objection, instructed the jury not to consider the same and the minimum punishment being assessed by the jury, who had sufficient evidence before them to sustain their conclusion of his guilt, it did not prejudice him or his case with the jury. Appellant cites us to the case of Burton v. State, 149 Texas Crim. Rep. 579, 194 S. W. 2d 398, as sustaining his contention. There is this distinction between that and this case — in that case the court overruled the objection and permitted the jury to consider it while in the instant case the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury not to consider it. We therefore overrule his contention. See Brown v. State, 112 Tex. Cr. R. 92, 14 S. W. 2d 63; Mosley v. State, 108 Tex. Cr. R. 157, 300 S. W. 48; Williams v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. R. 219, 18 S. W. 2d 654; Torres v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 18 S. W. 2d 179; Staglik v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. R. 623, 13 S. W. 2d 376; and Cox v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. R. 260, 12 S. W. 2d 586.

By Bill of Exceptions No. 2 he complains of the action of the trial court in declining to sustain his motion to enter a mistrial. *67What we have said in disposing of Bill of Exceptions No. 1 disposes of this complaint.

No error of a reversible nature appearing in the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of The Pep Boys -Manny, Moe & Jack (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ending October 31,2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”),

 

I,Raymond L. Arthur, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of theCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(i)                                   The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii)                                Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

 
| Date:   December 09, 2009 | by:                                                             | /s/  Raymond L. Arthur |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
|                                | Raymond  L. Arthur                                              |
|                                | Executive  Vice President and Chief Financial Officer           |
|                                | (Principal  Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer) |

 

1

----
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-13-00310-CV

JACKIE RUSSELL KEETER,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 220th District Court

Hamilton County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR06978/CR06361

O R D E R O N R E H E A R I N G

Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted. The Court’s memorandum opinion 

and judgment, dated October 10, 2013, are withdrawn, and this appeal is reinstated.

Appellant’s motion to amend appeal is dismissed as moot because Appellant’s 

Affidavit/Declaration of Previous Filings, accompanied by a certified copy of his 

inmate account statement, was filed on October 28, 2013.
Keeter v. State Page 2

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Order issued and filed March 13, 2014

Do not publish
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN. TEKAS 78711 

February 18, 1977 

The Honorable Ted Butler 

Criminal District Attorney 

Bexar County Courthouse 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Opinion No. H-942 

Re: Application of County 

Civil Service Act to 

secretaries and clerks in 

the juvenile probation 

office. 

Dear Mr. Butler: 

You have requested our opinion concerning whether the 

secretaries and clerks in the Juvenile Probation Office of 

Bexar County are subject to the County Civil Service Act. 

V.T.C.S. art. 2372h-6. 

In Attorney General Opinion H-619 (1975),, we found that 

adult probation officers were not subject to the County 

Civil Service Act, since we believed the control exercised 

by district judges over adult probation was inconsistent 

with the authority of the Civil Service Commission concerning 

employees subject to the Act. In Attorney General Opinion 

H-672 (19751, we decided that juvenile probation officers 

were likewise not subject to the County Civil Service Act, 

since article 5142c-2 required such officers to be appointed 

subject to the approval of the Juvenile Board. Article 

5142c-2 also applies to secretaries and clerks within the 

Juvenile Probation Office and in essence provides for the 

complete management of such office by the judges on the 

Juvenile Board. See V.T.C.S. art. 5139. This control over 

the Juvenile Probzon Office is inconsistent with the 

powers of a County Civil Service Commission. Attorney 

General Opinions H-672 (19751; H-619 (1975). Accordingly, 

in our opinion, secretaries and clerks employed by the Bexar 

County Juvenile Probation Office are not subject to the 

County Civil Service Act. 

p. 3939 
The Honorable Ted Butler - page 2 (H-942) 

SUMMARY 

Secretaries and clerks employed by the 

Bexar County Juvenile Probation Office 

are not subject to the County Civil Service 

Act. 

yery truly yours, 

,,,{# #zfy&j~ 

,/iA~~~r~;,"G~neral of Texas 

~~!jc~ays’a

Opinion Commit&e 

jwb 

P. 3940
#### CONGREGATION OF ST. CATHERINE OF SIENNA ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH v. THIBAUT FEED MILLS et al.*

No. 1238.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Dec. 4, 1933.

See, also, 151 So. 226.

Spearing & McClendon, of New Orleans, and Walter Lemann, of Donaldsonville, for appellants.

C. C. Weber, of Donaldsonville, and Porteous, Johnson & Humphrey, of New Orleans, for appellee.

*

Rehearing denied January 22, 1934.

MOUTON, Judge.

It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment rendered below in favor of plaintiff be and is hereby affirmed.
Exhibit 15




November 11, 1997



Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.  20549


Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are aware that Phelps Dodge  Corporation  has  incorporated  by reference our
report dated October 9, 1997 (issued  pursuant to the provisions of Statement on
Auditing  Standards  No.  71)  in  the  Prospectus   constituting  part  of  its
Registration  Statements  and  post-effective  amendment No. 1 on Form S-3 (Nos.
33-44380,  333-36415) and Form S-8 (Nos. 33-26442, 33-6141, 33-26443,  33-29144,
33-19012,  2-67317,  33-34363,  33-34362 and 33-62648). We are also aware of our
responsibilities under the Securities Act of 1933.


Yours very truly,




Price Waterhouse LLP
Phoenix, Arizona
#### IN RE DISBARMENT OF WILLIAM RUDOLPH LINDQUIST.1

January 14, 1944.

No. 33,728.

*Philip Neville,*for State Board of Law Examiners.

No appearance on behalf of respondent.

1

Reported in 12 N. W. (2d) 719.

Per Curiam.

On October 5, 1943, respondent was convicted in the United States district court of Minnesota, fourth division, of the crime of having failed to report for induction into the armed forces of the United States after having been duly notified by his local draft board so to do.

On November 16, 1943, at 12:55 p. m., an order was served on respondent directing him to show cause before this court on November 26, 1943, at 10 o’clock a. m., why he should not be disbarred and his license to practice law revoked.

By affidavit of the secretary of the state board of law examiners, duly filed herein, it is made to appear that respondent is in default and has in no way appeared herein.

Therefore, It Is Ordered, that respondent, William Rudolph Lindquist, be disbarred as an attorney at law of this state and that his name be stricken from its roll of attorneys.
#### FARRAR et al. v. GUTIERREZ et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division B.

May 11, 1935.

Zewadski & Pierce, of Tampa, for appellants.

McKay, Withers & Ramsey, of Tampa, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

We here review a decree awarding a deficiency judgment in a mortgage case.

The two questions presented by appellants in the brief are stated as follows:

> “First Question. Where the bill of complaint in a mortgage foreclosure contained no special prayer for a deficiency judgment, nor a prayer for general relief, and there was no special application made after Master’s sale for a deficiency judgment, did the court have authority under such circumstances to enter a deficiency decree against the defendants?

> “Second Question. Under the facts disclosed by the record in this case, did the Chancellor abuse his discretion in entering a deficiency decree against the defendants?”

The first question must be eliminated because in the decree appealed from the chancellor says:

> “This cause having been set for this day to be heard upon the Master’s Report of sale and the complainant’s motion for confirmation and for deficiency decree, and the parties being present by their respective solicitors, and evidence having been introduced,” etc.

There being no showing in the record to the contrary, the certificate of the chancellor to the effect that hearing was on complainant’s motion for deficiency decree must be taken as .a verity.

As it is not made clearly to appear that the chancellor abused judicial discretion in entering the deficiency decree for the balance of the adjudicated debt, we must affirm the decree.

It is so ordered.

Affirmed.

ELLIS, P. J., and TERRELL and BUFORD, JJ., concur.

WHITFIELD, G. J., concurs in the opinion and judgment.

DAVIS, J., concurs specially.

' DAVIS, Justice

(concurring).

Appellant’s theory in this case' appears to' comprehend among other things, the idea that when a mortgage is foreclosed, and the secur*395ity Is bid In by the mortgagee complainant, that in such case the mortgagor is entitled to have the security, or the avails thereof, valued as a basis for determination of what is recoverable by way of deficiency judgment, the postulate for this theory being that,, when a creditor holding security reduces such security to his possession through foreclosure and purchase thereof at foreclosure sale, in such cases the creditor "owes” in effect the duty of giving credit on his debt, the admitted or established value of the security, less the judicial sales price bid and paid for it, where it is made to appear that the actual value is much greater than the judicial sales price. The foregoing theory recently has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in a bankruptcy ease involving a mortgage deficiency. See Ivanhoe Building & Loan Ass’n v. Orr, 55 S. Ct. 6S5, 79 L. Ed. —, decided April 29,1935.
Wilshire Credit Corporation
Payments
P.O. Box 30040; Los Angeles, CA  90030-0040
or   P.O. Box 650314; Dallas, TX  75265-0314
Correspondence

P.O. Box 8517; Portland, OR  97207-8517
Phone

(503) 952-7947
(888) 502-0100
Fax

(503) 952-7476
Web Site

www.wfsg.com
Exhibit 31
[Wilshire logo] Exhibit S
SARBANES-OXLEY CERTIFICATION
March 1, 2007
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 250 Vesey Street 4 World Financial Center, 10
th
Floor
New York, New York  10080
U.S. Bank National Association 60 Livingston Avenue Mail Code EP-MN-WS3D St. Paul, Minnesota 55107-2292 Attn: Structured Finance/SURF 2006-BC2
Re:
Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust, Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-BC2,

Pool 1408

I, Ken Frye, Senior Vice President, Loan Servicing, certify that:
1.

I, or persons under my supervision, have reviewed the report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., Depositor (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");
2.

Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3.

Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under
Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;
4.

I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the Servicer and based on my knowledge and the
compliance review conducted in preparing the Servicer compliance statement required by this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the Servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the Servicing Agreement; and
5.

All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for ABS and their related attestation
reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the Trustee, U.S.
Bank National Association, an unaffiliated party.
Wilshire Credit Corporation, as Servicer
By:__/s/__Ken Frye____________ Name: Ken Frye Title: Senior Vice President Loan Servicing (senior officer in charge of the servicing function of the servicer)
#### Marive LIOBHOLD, a Widow, Appellant, v. Norman KUTNER and Helen Kutner, his Wife, Sam Pivar and Kate Pivar, his Wife, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

July 23, 1954.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Motion Granted ; Appeal Dismis s ed and Majority Memorandum Opinion filed October 27 , 20 20

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 20

- 00580

- CR

THOMAS PAINE HAYES , IV, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 25th District Court C olorado Cou n ty, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CR17

- 124

MEMORANDUM OPINION Pending before this c ourt is the State ’ s motion to dismiss th is appeal. The State argues that dismissal is warranted under Texas Rule of Appella te Procedure
42.4. We grant the moti o n and di sm is s the appeal.

Rule 42 .4 pr ovides that we must “ dismiss an appeal on the State's motion, supported by affidavit, showing that the appellan t has escaped from custody pending the appeal and that to the affiant ’ s knowledge, the appellant has not,2 w ithin te n days after escaping, voluntarily returned to lawful custody within the
state. ” T ex. R. App. P . 42.4. In determining whether appellant has escaped for purposes of Rule 42.4, we do not necessarily apply the definition under the Texas
P enal Code, b u t rather a pply the term ’ s “commonly

- accepted meaning.” Luciano v. State , 906 S.W.2d 523, 524

– 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Porras v. State , 966 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 1998, no pet.). O ne commonly

- acc epted meaning of escape is an unauthorized dep a rture fr om cus tody. Luciano , 906 S.W.2d at 524. T he term “ c ustody ” includes actual physical detention or imprisonment, as well as the power to actually imprison or take into phy sical possession. Id . at 524

– 25. “ I mplicit within each example [of custody] is the noti on tha t the individual is not free to exercise his liberty or that his liberties are being restrained via legal process.” Porra s , 966 S.W.2d a t 765. When an individual is released on bond, his liberties are restrained. Ex parte Robinson , 641 S.W.2 d 552,
55 3

– 54 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1982). In the present case, appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced t o prison for four years. He wa s released on bond and ordered to report on July 24, 2020, to begin serving his sentence. Appellant f ailed to appear. A n arrest wa rran t for “Bond Jumping Failure to Appear ” issued Augu st 7, 2020. Because apppellant was on bond at the time , appellant ’ s liberties were restrained. We therefore conclude that appellant escaped from custody for pu rposes of Rule 42.4. See Porras , 966 S.W

. 2d

at 765 (app eal dismissed where affidavit stated defendant disappeared while appeal was pending, bond was surrendered, and warrant for arrest issued) ; see also Ike v.
State , 998 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (appe a l dismi s sed where affi davit stated defendant did not appear for sentencing and bond was forfeited)

. N o response to the motion to dismiss has been filed Nor has appellant3 otherwise opposed the State ’ s motion to dismiss the appeal

. We grant the State ’ s moti o n and d i sm iss the appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Jus tice Frost and Justices Wise and Bourliot

. ( B ourliot, J

. ,
concurs without opinion

. )

Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
#### Alice P. Lyman, Appellant, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Respondent.

Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Exhibit 32(b)





PEOPLES ENERGY CORPORATION AND CONSOLIDATED AFFILIATES



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the combined Quarterly Report of Peoples Energy Corporation (the "Company"), The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company ("Peoples Gas") and North Shore Gas Company ("North Shore Gas") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas A. Nardi, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company, Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas.



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | August 9, 2005
|------------------- |  |  | --------------
|                    |  |  | Date          

Thomas A. Nardi
Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of
Peoples Energy Corporation



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | August 9, 2005
|------------------- |  |  | --------------
|                    |  |  | Date          

Thomas A. Nardi
Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of
The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | August 9, 2005
|------------------- |  |  | --------------
|                    |  |  | Date          

Thomas A. Nardi
Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of
North Shore Gas Company
Exhibit
32.2




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350




In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Imperiali, Inc. (the
“Company”) for the year ended August 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Daniel Imperato,
Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to my
knowledge:




1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




/s/Daniel
      ImperatoDaniel
      ImperatoPrincipal
      Financial OfficerDecember
      15, 2008
Amendment



 EXHIBIT 10.1 

GARY L. PIERCE 

AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT 

WITH 
 STEIN MART, INC.

 This Amendment (this “Amendment”) entered into in the City of Jacksonville and State of Florida between
Stein Mart, Inc., a Florida corporation and its divisions, subsidiaries and affiliates (the “Company”), and GARY L. PIERCE
(“Executive”), is made as of May 5, 2014 (the “Effective Date”) and amends the Agreement between the Company and the Executive dated as of May 1, 2014 (the “Existing
Agreement”). 
 In consideration of the promises and mutual covenants contained herein, the parties, intending to
be legally bound, agree as follows: 
 1. Title, Powers and Responsibilities. Section 2(a) of the Existing Agreement is hereby
modified to read in its entirety as follow: 
 (a) Title. Executive shall be an Executive Vice-President and
Director of Stores of the Company or such other title as designated by the Chief Executive Officer or the Company’s Board of Directors. Executive shall assume those duties on the Commencement Date. 

2. Ratification. Except as expressly modified by this Amendment, the Existing Agreement is hereby ratified and shall continue in full
force and effect. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and Executive have executed this Agreement effective as of the Effective Date.

  

					
	STEIN MART, INC.	 		  	EXECUTIVE
			
	 /s/ D. HUNT HAWKINS
	 		  	 /S/ GARY L. PIERCE

	 Name: D. Hunt Hawkins
 Title: President and
COO
	 		  	Gary L. Pierce
	Date: May 6, 2014	 		  	Date: May 6, 2014