alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 167 (Wednesday, August 27, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 50625]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19982]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION


Deletion of Agenda Items From August 22, 2008, Open Meeting

August 21, 2008.
    The following items have been deleted from the list of Agenda items 
scheduled for consideration at the August 22, 2008, Open Meeting and 
previously listed in the Commission's Notice of August 15, 2008, 73 FR 
49200, August 20, 2008. Item No. 3 has been adopted by the Commission.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Item No.             Bureau                   Subject
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1...................   Wireless Tele-    Title: Reexamination of
                        Communications.   Roaming Obligations of
                                          Commercial Mobile Radio
                                          Service Providers (WT Docket
                                          No. 05-265).
                                         Summary: The Commission will
                                          consider a Memorandum Opinion
                                          and Order on Reconsideration
                                          addressing petitions for
                                          reconsideration of the Report
                                          and Order.
 3...................   Media..........   Title: Carriage of Digital
                                          Television Broadcast Signals:
                                          Amendment to Part 76 of the
                                          Commission's Rules.
                                         Summary: The Commission will
                                          consider a Fourth Report and
                                          Order concerning issues
                                          related to mandatory cable
                                          carriage of digital broadcast
                                          television signals after the
                                          conclusion of the digital
                                          (``DTV'') transition.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-19982 Filed 8-25-08; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
|     |                                                                                                                       |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |  |  |  |
| Date:  | June 8, 2011  | By:   | /s/ Randy C. Martin |
|   |   |   | Randy C. Martin |
|   |   |   | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 19

- 00408

- CV

I N THE I NTEREST OF R.W. AND H.W.,

C HILDREN §

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 322nd District

Court

of Tarrant County (322

- 597027

- 16)

February 6, 2020

Opinion by Justice Birdwell

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Wade Bir dwell

Justice Wade Birdwell
No. 72-5835.

#### Martin *v.*Florida.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

April 1, 2013

p0325

Order 

April 1, 2013

146388

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 146388

COA: 305357

Wayne CC: 10-011439-01-FC

JAMES ALLEN BROOKS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 23, 2012 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
Note:  This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1997 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001029389
<NAME> QUALINK, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          35,110
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   22,028
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,186
<INVENTORY>                                     68,658
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               106,105
<PP&E>                                          87,561
<DEPRECIATION>                                  52,448
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 351,654
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           68,519
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     11,249
<COMMON>                                            53
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   351,654
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                63,842
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   68,596
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,523
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,277)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,496)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (7,781)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (7,781)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        
<PAGE>

</TABLE>
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 97-KA-00433-SCT**  **JERRY MYERS**

**v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI** 
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 2/18/97 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARCUS D. GORDON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: EDMUND J. PHILLIPS, JR. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: KEN TURNER NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 3/18/99 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: 4/14/99

**BEFORE PRATHER, C.J., SMITH AND MILLS, JJ.**

**MILLS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:**

¶1. Jerry Myers was convicted in the Circuit Court of Scott County, Mississippi, for the sale of crack cocaine within one thousand (1,000) feet of a public park. The trial judge sentenced Myers to serve fifteen (15) years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections and pay a $5,000 fine. Myers appeals to this Court asserting that the jury verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented at trial. At trial, three witnesses, including undercover agent Shelley Arnold, confidential informant Stacy Porter, and narcotics agent Jimmie Nichols, identified Myers as the man who sold the cocaine to Shelley Arnold. ¶2. We have repeatedly held that matters of weight and credibility of the evidence are to be left up to the jury. **Cooper v. State** , 639 So. 2d 1320, 1324 (Miss. 1994). Only in cases "when the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice" will a reviewing court disturb it on appeal. **Herring v. State** , 691 So. 2d 948, 957 (Miss. 1997) . We find sufficient proof in the record to support the jury verdict. Therefore, we find the Appellant's argument is without merit and affirm the decision of the trial court. ¶3. **CONVICTION OF SALE OF COCAINE WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF PUBLIC PARK AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI** **DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND PAYMENT OF A $5,000.00 FINE AFFIRMED.**

**APPELLANT IS GIVEN CREDIT FOR JAIL TIME SERVED. PRATHER, C.J., SULLIVAN AND PITTMAN, P.JJ., BANKS, McRAE, SMITH AND**  **WALLER, JJ., CONCUR.**
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6280 

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to exempt certain employees 

engaged in outdoor recreational outfitting or guiding services from maximum hours requirements. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 14, 2021 

Mr. O’HALLERAN (for himself, Mr. STEWART, and Mr. MOORE of Utah) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to exempt 

certain employees engaged in outdoor recreational outfitting or guiding services from maximum hours requirements. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6280 IH

1 SECTION 1. EXEMPTION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN EM2 PLOYEES ENGAGED IN OUTDOOR REC3 REATIONAL OUTFITTING OR GUIDING SERV4 ICES. 

5 Section 13(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 

6 U.S.C. 213(b)) is amended by inserting after paragraph 

7 (3) the following: 

8 ‘‘(4) any employee principally engaged in out9 door recreational outfitting or guiding services and 

10 employed by an employer principally engaged in the 

11 business of providing such outfitting or guiding serv12 ices that— 

13 ‘‘(A) does not operate for more than seven 

14 months in any calendar year; or 

15 ‘‘(B) had average receipts for any six 

16 months of the preceding calendar year that 

were not more than 331 17 ⁄3 per centum of its av18 erage receipts for the other six months of such 

19 year; or’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-20959

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CANUTO GUZMAN GAITAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-97-CR-35-7

- - - - - - - - - -

September 23, 1998

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Canuto Guzman Gaitan has appealed his guilty-plea sentence

for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute it, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Gaitan contends that the district

court erred (1) by concluding that it could not depart downward

from the sentencing guideline range, and (2) by sentencing him as

a “career offender.” 
No. 97-20959

-2-

Gaitan’s plea agreement provides that he has waived his

right to appeal his sentence unless it is the result of an upward

departure. Our review of the record convinces us that the waiver

was informed and voluntary, so it is binding on Gaitan. See

United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1994). 

His waiver bars Gaitan from presenting his two appellate claims. 

Accordingly, Gaitan’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of arguable

merit. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

APPEAL DISMISSED.
**Exhibit
      99.2**





CERTIFICATE
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the Annual Report (the “Report”) on the Form 10-KSB of Mortlock
      Ventures Inc. (the “Company”) for the period from September 19, 2006 (date of
      inception) to June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
      Commission on the date hereof, I, Michael Laidlaw, Chief Executive Officer,
      President and Director, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best
      of
      my knowledge and belief:





1.
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or
                15 (d) of
                the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
                and





2.
            The
                information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
                Company.





August
      3,
      2007





MICHAEL
      LAIDLAW


Michael
      Laidlaw


Chief
      Executive Officer,


President
      and
      Director








-1-
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-3018

___________

James Kelley, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

Jim White, Individually and In His * District of Arkansas.

Official Capacity as Chief of Police of *

the City of McGehee, Arkansas, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 29, 2012

Filed: March 5, 2012

___________

Before MURPHY, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

James Kelley appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment

in his civil rights action arising out of his termination from employment. After

carefully reviewing the record de novo, see Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1075,

1077 (8th Cir. 1998), we have found no basis for reversal. 

1

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.
First, to the extent Kelley’s complaint may be construed as asserting a

retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, we conclude that Kelley failed to provide

sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Takele v. Mayo

Clinic, 576 F.3d 834, 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2009) (setting forth prima facie elements of

retaliation claim); Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (mere

allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond a nonmoving party’s

own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment); cf. Kiel

v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (antidiscrimination statutes do not insulate employee from discipline for violating

employer’s rules or disrupting workplace; generally, more than temporal connection

between protected conduct and adverse employment action is required to present

genuine factual issue on retaliation).

Second, as to Kelley’s equal protection claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

we agree with the district court that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to

establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was treated differently than

other persons who were similarly situated in all relevant respects. See Flowers v. City

of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 2009) (to establish violation of Equal

Protection Clause, plaintiff had to show he was treated differently than other persons

who were similarly situated in all relevant respects).

Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________

-2-
18363.

#### FENNELL *v.*FENNELL.

Submitted October 13, 1953

Decided November 9, 1953.

*Killebrew & McGahee,*for plaintiff in error.

*Peebles & Burnside, Samuel E. Tyson,*contra.

*154Wyatt, Presiding Justice.

The question here presented is whether or not in a proceeding for contempt on account of a failure to pay alimony, where the defendant in that proceeding is held not to be in contempt, and the custody of a minor child is changed, and that judgment is reversed, the trial court can enter a decree without another hearing and the introduction of testimony. No case has been brought to our attention where the factual situation was the same as in the instant case, and we have found none.

Webster’s New International Dictionary (2nd edition) defines “reversed” as follows: “To revoke, to annul, to overthrow by a contrary decision, to make void, to undo and annul forever as to reverse a judgment, sentence, or decree.” 37A Words & Phrases 291 makes use of the following language: “The term reversed as used in opinions, judgments, and mandates has received by long usage in the courts a settled construction and means setting aside, annulling, or vacating.” In 3 Am. Jur. 690, § 1184, we find the following language: “To reverse is to vacate or set aside, but it does not include any other affirmative action unless specifically directed by the appellate court.” At page 697, § 1191, “the appellant is restored to the position in which he was before the judgment was pronounced against him." And at page 707, § 1204, “But if the court is of the opinion that other evidence may be produced on a new trial, or is unable to say that such evidence may not be produced, it will not render final judgment, but will remand the case for a new trial.” In 77 C. J. S. 335, we find the following language: “Reversed. To overthrow, set aside, make void, annul, repeal, or revoke; to change to the contrary, or to a former condition; more specifically, to vacate a decree or judgment, and leave it as though it had never been rendered.”

We conclude that the effect of the judgment of reversal in *Fennell*v. *Fennell,*supra, was to leave the case as though the judgment there under review had never been rendered. This court in that case reversed the judgment of the trial court sitting without a jury. The judgment of reversal was tantamount to the grant of a new trial.

It follows, the action of the trial court in rendering the judg*155ment now under review without the introduction of any evidence was error.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Duckworth, C. J., not participating.*
EXHIBIT 31(b)

I, Thomas A. Nardi, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date:  May 10, 2005

  /s/  Thomas A. Nardi