alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

                      Statement of Chief Executive Officer
         Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code

         Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, I,
Kenneth A. Swanstrom, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Penn Engineering &
Manufacturing Corp. (the "Company"), hereby certifies that, to the best of my
knowledge:

         1.       The Company's Form 10-Q Quarterly Report for the period ended
                  March 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the
                  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
                  Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

Dated:  May 10, 2005

                            /s/ Kenneth A. Swanstrom
                            --------------------------------------------------
                            Kenneth A. Swanstrom
                            Chairman of the Board  and Chief Executive Officer
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADDEDBY**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection withthe Annual Report of Fox Chase Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission (the “Report”), the undersigned hereby certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. §1350, as added by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)           TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and forthe period covered by the Report.

 

 
|   | /s/ Thomas M. Petro                    |
|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   | Thomas M. Petro                        |
|   | President and Chief  Executive Officer |
|   |                                   |
|   |                                   |
|   | /s/ Roger S. Deacon                    |
|   | Roger S. Deacon                        |
|   | Chief Financial Officer                |

 

Date: March 12,2009

 

----
Exhibit 21.1
 BUCKEYE GP HOLDINGS L.P.
 Subsidiary
    
    Jurisdiction of OrganizationBuckeye GP LLC
    
    DelawareBuckeye Partners, L.P.
    
    DelawareBuckeye Pipe Line Company, L.P.
    
    DelawareBuckeye Pipe Line Holdings, L.P.
    
    DelawareEverglades Pipe Line Company, L.P.
    
    DelawareLaurel Pipe Line Company, L.P.
    
    DelawareWood River Pipe Lines LLC
    
    DelawareBuckeye Pipe Line Transportation LLC
    
    DelawareBuckeye Energy Holdings LLC
    
    DelawareBuckeye Energy Services LLC
    
    DelawareBuckeye Gas Storage LLC
    
    DelawareLodi Gas Storage, L.L.C.
    
    DelawareBuckeye Terminals, LLC
    
    DelawareNORCO Pipe Line Company, LLC
    
    DelawareBuckeye Gulf Coast Holdings I, LLC
    
    DelawareBuckeye Gulf Coast Holdings II, LLC
    
    DelawareBuckeye Gulf Coast Pipe Lines, L.P.
    
    DelawareBuckeye Products Pipe Line, L.P.
    
    DelawareBuckeye Texas Pipe Line Company, L.P.
    
    DelawareGulf Coast Pipe Line, L.P.
    
    DelawareGulf Coast/Products GP Holding LLC
    
    DelawareGulf Coast/Products Holding L.P.
    
    DelawareBuckeye Albany Terminal LLC
    
    DelawareFerrysburg Terminal LLC
    
    DelawareMainLine GP, Inc
    
    DelawareMainLine L.P.
    
    DelawareWesPac PipelinesSan Diego LLC
    
    NevadaWesPac PipelinesReno LLC
    
    DelawareWesPac PipelinesMemphis LLC
    
    Nevada
221 So.2d 687

#### KAISER JEEP CORPORATION and Kaiser Jeep Sales Corporation v. CITMOCO SERVICE, INC.

1 Div. 444, 444A.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 3, 1968.

Rehearing Denied May 1, 1969.

See also, 283 Ala. 165, 214 So.2d 908.

Johnstone, Adams, May, Howard & Hill, Mobile, for appellants.

Cunningham, Bounds & Byrd, Mobile, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants seek a review of the judgment of the circuit court of Mobile County in favor of appellee. The judgment awards damages for breach of a manufacturer’s written warranty with respect to the mechanical condition of a motor vehicle (jeep wagon) manufactured by Kaiser Jeep Corporation and sold by a related corporation, Kaiser Jeep Sales Corporation, to Carr-White Truck Company, Inc., a dealer, (also a defendant), which in turn sold the vehicle to plaintiff.

The transcript does not show that there was any verdict or judgment for or against the defendant, Carr-White Truck Company, Inc., the dealer, but only a verdict assessing damages against appellants, and a judgment in favor of appellee that was responsive to the verdict. The verdict was received and read in open court in the presence of counsel for the parties.

Neither party invoked any ruling of the trial court as to a judicial reception of the verdict, nor objected to it. The record before us fails to show that either party protested or opposed an entry of judgment in response to the verdict.

No motion was subsequently made by appellants to vacate the verdict and judgment, nor in any way did they challenge the same. The trial court was not given an opportunity by appellants to pass upon the validity vel non of the judgment or to entertain any appropriate challenge of the jury’s verdict prior to this appeal.

Appellants argue assignment of error No. 4. This assignment asserts that the trial court erred, after receiving the verdict, in entering judgment for the plaintiff against appellants — the two “Jeep” corporations. Assignments of error not argued in appellant’s brief are waived. Hall v. Esslinger, 235 Ala. 451, 179 So. 639(18); Hillard v. City of Mobile, 253 Ala. 676, 47 So.2d 162(4). There being no argument in appellants’ brief that is addressed to any of the assignments, except assignment of error No. 4, we deem all of the assignments, except assignment of error No. 4, were waived.

We cannot consider assignment of error No. 4 because it fails to refer to any ruling of the trial court; hence, it presents nothing for this court to review. United *53Insurance Company of America v. Pounders, 279 Ala. 410, 186 So.2d 125(8); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. McDaniel, 262 Ala. 227, 78 So.2d 290(2); Andrews v. May, 277 Ala. 248, 168 So.2d 619(5).

In view of this affirmance, we pretermit considering appellee’s cross-assignments of error. Such pretermission is suggested in appellee’s brief.

We hold that the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed. It is so ordered.

The foregoing opinion was prepared by B. W. SIMMONS, Supernumerary Circuit Judge, and was adopted by the court as its opinion.

Affirmed.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, COLEMAN and KOHN, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to 18 United States Code § 1350

The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2003 of Phelps Dodge
Corporation (the Company) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

| |  |                       |  |                                                
| |  | --------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------
| |  | /s/ J. Steven Whisler
| |  | Name:                 |  | J. Steven Whisler                              
| |  | Title:                |  | Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
| |  | Date:                 |  | May 13, 2003                                   



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

The foregoing certification is being furnished in accordance with
Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-47551 and shall not
be considered filed as part of the Form 10-Q.
#### Allyn RAYDENBOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter O’MEARA, Commissioner, Department Of Mental Retardation, Daniel Micari, Steven Staugaitis, Kathleen Egan, Mary Sheehan, Bonnie Meehan, Kenneth Comerford, And Melanie Haber, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 02-7223.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Oct. 31, 2002.

Peter A. Kelly, New Haven, CT, for Appellant.

Holly Jean Bray, Assistant Attorney General, Hartford, CT, (Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, on the brief), for Appellees.

Present VAN GRAAFEILAND, JACOBS and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED *22AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.

Allyn Raydenbow appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for District of Connecticut (Eginton, J.), granting summary judgement against Raydenbow on his claims that defendants had violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the United States and Connecticut constitutions by engaging in actions that constituted a nullification of Raydenbow’s license to operate a Community Training Home (“CTH”), a residence for three or fewer mentally retarded or autistic persons. The district court held, *inter alia,*that Raydenbow could not establish a legitimate claim to any legal entitlement to the placement of individuals in his CTH. Raydenbow appealed.

Raydenbow does not address the district court’s ruling on his equal protection claims, so we deem these claims abandoned. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9) (the appellant’s brief must contain “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them”); *Bozeman v. United States,*780 F.2d 198, 199 n. 4 (2d Cir.1985) (“Mrs. Bozeman did not raise or brief that issue in this appeal and we therefore treat that claim as abandoned.”).

In other respects, we affirm the dismissal of Raydenbow’s due process claims for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion. *See Allyn Raydenbow v. Peter O’Meara, et al.,*3:98CV2074(WWE) (D.Conn. Jan. 22, 2002).

Neither due process nor equal protection considerations require the State to place vulnerable individuals in a CTH that is less than the best available in light of all the circumstances, including the circumstance that Raydenbow is a convicted rapist.

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6466 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to remove all adverse credit 

history related to a loan from the credit history of a borrower who 

has rehabilitated the loan. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 20, 2022 

Ms. WILLIAMS of Georgia (for herself, Ms. ROSS, Ms. STEVENS, Ms. ADAMS, 

Mrs. LAWRENCE, Mr. MOULTON, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mrs. MCBATH, Ms. 

MANNING, Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, Ms. WILSON of Florida, and Ms. 

NORTON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to remove 

all adverse credit history related to a loan from the 

credit history of a borrower who has rehabilitated the 

loan. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Student Loan Rehabili5 tation and Credit Score Improvement Act of 2022’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6466 IH

1 SEC. 2. DEFAULT REDUCTION PROGRAM. 

2 Section 428F(a)(1)(C) of the Higher Education Act 

3 of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1078–6(a)(1)(C)) is amended by strik4 ing ‘‘to remove the record of the default from the bor5 rower’s credit history’’ and inserting ‘‘to remove any ad6 verse item of information relating to such loan from the 

7 borrower’s credit history’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### Wanda M. STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YLI CORPORATION; Phillip Staffing, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-2134.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 13, 2002.

Wanda M. Stewart, Appellant Pro Se. Beverly A. Carroll, Kennedy, Covington, Lobdell & Hickman, L.L.P., Rock Hill, South Carolina; Andreas Neal Satterfield, Jr., Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Greaves, L.L.C., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellees.

*148Before WILLIAM D. WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Wanda M. Stewart seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Defendants in her employment discrimination action. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Stewart’s notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” *Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections,*434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on August 20, 2002. Stewart’s notice of appeal was filed on September 23, 2002. Because Stewart failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the May 29,
1999, financial statements and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-27-1999
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<INVENTORY>                                     385934
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                417816
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<DEPRECIATION>                                 (47475)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  790981
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<SALES>                                         492728
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<CGS>                                           366713
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   366713
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                8909
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   5319
<INCOME-TAX>                                      2503
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               2816
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      2816
<EPS-BASIC>                                     0.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.14


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation byreference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-145869 and 333-137707 on Form S-8 and Registration Statement No. 333-152100 on Form S-3 of our reports dated March 30, 2009, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statementschedule of ICO Global Communications (Holdings) Limited and subsidiaries (a development-stage enterprise) (the “Company”) (which report related to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule expresses anunqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph concerning substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern and emphasis of matter paragraphs relating to the Company being in the development stage, theadoption of Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 157, *Fair Value Measurements*, on January 1, 2008, and the adoption of Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48, *Accounting for Uncertainty inIncome Taxes – an Interpretation of FASB Statement No.109,*on January 1, 2007), and the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting dated March 30, 2009, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K ofICO Global Communications (Holdings) Limited and subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2008. 

/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Seattle, Washington 

March 30, 2009
The H onorable Robert R. Beezer, United States Circuit Judg e 1 for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________ No. 96-3578

____________ Bruce Ring, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Federal National Mortgage * Eastern District of Missouri Association, a Corporation; * First Interstate Commercial * [UNPUBLISHED] Mortgage Company, A * Corporation; Prentis Hall * Corporation Systems, * * Appellees. *

____________ Submitted: June 12, 1997 Filed: September 5, 1997

_____________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, BEEZER and WOLLMAN, 1 Circuit Judges.

____________ Beezer, Circuit Judge. Bruce Ring appeals the district court’s grant of summar y ju dgment in favor of defendants Federal National Mortgag e Association (“FNMA”) and First Interstate Bank (“FIB”). Alleging discriminationin lending, Ring sued FNMA and FIB under the Fai r Housing Act. Because the part ies are familiar with the underlying facts, we do not describe them except as necessary. We hav e jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.Because we affirm on this ground, we need not consider whethe r 2 Ring’s suit was time-barred orwhether Ring failed to show that he was qualified for FNMA financing. 2 I Ring challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgme nt to defendants. We may affirm summary judgment on any basi s supported by the record. United States v. Lohman , 74 F.3d 8 63, 866 (8thC ir.), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 2549 (1996). We affirm th e district court’s grant of summary judgment because Ring failed to submit an application for a loan. 2
II Ring also claims that the district court should have granted him leave to amend his complaint. Given Ring’s numerous previous amendments, the facial inadequacy of his proposed amendment and the prejudice accrued to FNMA and FIB, the district court was withi n its discretion to deny Ring leave to amend. See Pulla v. Am oco Oil Co. , 72 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1995).
III
Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment, we do no t reverse the award of costs to FNMA.
AFFIRMED A true copy.

Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit (99)
                                                                    ------------

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Owens Corning (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the  quarterly  period  ended  September  30,  2002 as  filed  with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, David
T. Brown, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  Information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ David T. Brown
Chief Executive Officer

October 28, 2002




This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### HUMBLE v. TARVER et al.

No. 4417.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 5, 1933.

John C. Hollingsworth, of New Orleans, and W. E. McBride and A. K. Goff, Jr., both of Ruston, for appellant.

Hudson, Potts & Bernstein, of Monroe, for appellee.

MILLS, Judge.

This suit arises out of the same accident which was the basis of the demand in the case of Mrs. Lucy Buie Price v. F. H. Tarver et al. (La. App.) 148 So. 450, this day decided, the present case being consolidated with the Price Case for the purpose of trial and argument. All the issues in the case have been concluded by the judgment in the Price Case, except the quantum of damages.

Mrs. Humble was confined to her bed for two days and to her home for two weeks, undergoing treatment all the time for her nerves. She was badly bruised all over and suffered a hemorrhage from the nose and ear. Her right eye was completely closed from bruises and her lower lip was bruised and lacerated. Her upper chest was bruised and injured and, besides a slight concussion of the brain, she suffered a most severe nervous shock. Her extreme nervousness continued for some time after the accident. For these injuries, and for incidental damages and expenses, the lower court allowed the sum of $500.65.

We do not think this allowance unreasonable and therefore affirm the judgment of the lower court; defendant to pay all costs of both courts.