alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31(a)

I, Thomas M. Patrick, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Peoples Energy Corporation;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date: August 13, 2003

/s/ Thomas M. Patrick
EXHIBIT 35.1
                  SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                        RESIDENTIAL FUNDING COMPANY, LLC
              RFMSI SERIES 2006-S4 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized officer of Residential Funding Company, LLC,
as servicer  (the  "Servicer")  pursuant to the Series  Supplement,  dated as of
April 1, 2006, and the Standard Terms of Pooling and Servicing Agreement,  dated
as of January 1, 2006 (as amended  from time to time,  the  "Agreement"),  among
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities I, Inc., as company, Residential Funding
Company, LLC (formerly Residential Funding Corporation), as master servicer, and
U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee, does hereby certify that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under the Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled  all of its  obligations  under  the  Agreement  in all  material
     respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:  /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
     -------------------------
    Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
    Title:    Managing Director
#### George W. Cole, etc., Respondent, v. Foster Pump Works, Appellant.

Judgment of the Municipal Court-affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Woodward, Hooker, Gaynor, Rich and Miller, JJ., concurred.
Filed 3/23/16 In re Ruth D. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re RUTH D., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RUTH D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D068905

 (Super. Ct. No. J237416)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert J. 

Trentacosta, Judge. Affirmed.

David R. Greifinger for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In July 2015 a petition was filed in the juvenile court alleging that Ruth D. (the 

Minor) possessed methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), a 

misdemeanor. It was also alleged the Minor possessed paraphernalia related to tobacco 

and controlled substances (Pen. Code, § 308, subd. (b)), an infraction. 
2

The Minor was granted informal supervision pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 654.2. The court ordered the Minor to submit to a drug test to establish a 

baseline.

The Minor filed a timely notice of appeal.

Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 

Cal.3d 436 (Wende) indicating he has been unable to identify any reasonably arguable 

issue for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks this court to review the record for error as 

mandated by Wende. We offered the Minor the opportunity to file her own brief on 

appeal, however, the Minor has not responded.1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On June 1, 2015 police stopped the Minor and several friends in a car about 

3:30 a.m. Police discovered methamphetamine in the Minor's purse.

DISCUSSION

As we have noted, appellate counsel has not identified any reasonably arguable 

issues for reversal of the juvenile court's order. In order to assist this court in our review 

of the record, and as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), 

appellate counsel has identified the following possible, but not reasonably arguable issue:

Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering a baseline drug test as 

a condition of granting informal supervision.

 

1 The facts of the underlying offenses are not relevant to the analysis of possible 

error based on this record. Therefore, we will omit the traditional statement of facts.
3

We have reviewed the entire record as mandated by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, 

and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and have not discovered any reasonably arguable issue 

for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has represented the Minor on this appeal.

DISPOSITION

The order granting informal supervision, based on the stated conditions, is 

affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

AARON, J.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-40090

Summary Calendar

 

RICHARD R. OPIO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

K. JANUARY ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:97-CV-726

- - - - - - - - - -

October 19, 1998

Before DAVIS, DUHE’ and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Richard Opio, Texas prisoner #593560, challenges the

dismissal of his pro se prisoner’s civil rights action as

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Opio alleges, inter alia,

that the district court erred in concluding that he had no

protected liberty interest in his good-time credits and in

remaining in the general population. He further contends that

his right to due process was violated when he was not permitted 
No. 98-40090 

-2-

to attend his own disciplinary board hearing or to call witnesses

on his own behalf.

The district court did not err in concluding that Opio has

no protected liberty interest in his good-time credits or in

remaining in the prison’s general population. See Madison v.

Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768-69 (5th Cir. 1997). Opio’s claim that

he was not permitted to attend his disciplinary hearing is

unavailing because he has not demonstrated that prison officials

were obligated to permit him to attend the hearing in light of

his disruptive behavior. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

564-65 (1974). Finally, no hearing pursuant to Spears v.

McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 179-180 (5th Cir. 1985) was required in

this case because Opio was given the opportunity to, and did,

file a more definite statement of his claims. See Eason v.

Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).

We do not consider the remainder of Opio’s points because

they are either inadequately briefed or are raised for the first

time on appeal and do not amount to plain error. See Yohey v.

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.

Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

Accordingly, Opio’s appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See

Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. His motion for

summary judgment, jury trial, and an injunction is DENIED.

APPEAL DISMISSED.
##### 



Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to 18 United States Code § 1350 The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2004 of Phelps Dodge
Corporation (the Company) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ J. Steven WhislerName:
    
    J. Steven WhislerTitle:
    
    Chairman and
Chief Executive OfficerDate:
    
    April 27, 2004
 The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2004 of Phelps Dodge
Corporation (the Company) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ Ramiro G. PeruName:
    
    Ramiro G. PeruTitle:
    
    Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial OfficerDate:
    
    April 27, 2004
Exhibit 34.1

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of DirectorsAmerican Honda Finance Corporation:

We have examined American Honda Finance Corporation’s (the Company) compliance with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB for Asset Backed Notes, Series 2006-1, except for the servicing criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(2)(vi), 1122(d)(4)(ix), 1122(d)(4)(x), 1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii), 1122(d)(4)(xiii), and 1122(d)(4)(xv), which the Company has determined are not applicable to the activities it performs with respect to the asset-backed securities transactions being serviced as of March 31, 2006 and for the four-day period from March 28, 2006 (the date of issuance of the Honda Auto Receivables 2006-1 Owner Trust) through March 31, 2006. Management is responsible for American Honda Finance Corporation’s compliance with those servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on American Honda Finance Corporation’s compliance based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the servicing criteria specified above and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’s compliance with the servicing criteria.

Our examination disclosed the following material noncompliance with 1122(d)(1)(i) and 1122(d)(1)(ii) applicable to American Honda Finance Corporation during the four-day period ended March 31, 2006. There were no policies and procedures instituted to monitor any performance or other triggers and events of defaults in accordance with the transaction agreement. There were no policies and procedures instituted to monitor third-party performance and compliance with servicing activities.

In our opinion, except for the material noncompliance described in the third paragraph, American Honda Finance Corporation complied, in all material respects, with the aforementioned servicing criteria for the four-day period ended March 31, 2006.

/s/ KPMG LLP

Los Angeles, California

March 21, 2007

----
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6456 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6456

   To prohibit the provision of Federal funds to a local educational 
agency that requires any student at the schools served by the agency to 
        wear a face covering or be vaccinated against COVID-19.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 20, 2022

  Mrs. Miller of Illinois (for herself, Mr. Good of Virginia, and Mr. 
   Gohmert) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To prohibit the provision of Federal funds to a local educational 
agency that requires any student at the schools served by the agency to 
        wear a face covering or be vaccinated against COVID-19.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDS FOR CERTAIN LOCAL EDUCATIONAL 
              AGENCIES.

    (a) In General.--No Federal funds shall be provided to a local 
educational agency that requires a student at a public elementary 
school or secondary school under the jurisdiction of the local 
educational agency to wear a face covering or be vaccinated against 
COVID-19.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``elementary school'', 
``local educational agency'', and ``secondary school'' have the 
meanings given such terms in section 8101 of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801).
                                 <all>
```
#### Joan WHITLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA; Don Cameron, Executive Director; Gary W. Plum, individually and in his official capacity; Calix Jones, Section 8 Specialist, individually and in her official capacity; Stephen Wright, Lieutenant, Public Housing Unit Supervisor, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-2026.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 13, 2002.

John Whitley, Appellant Pro Se. Eugene Patrick Corrigan, III, Grimball & Cabaniss, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before WILLIAM D. WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Joan Whitley appeals the district court’s order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Whitley that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Whitley failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation, provided the parties have been warned that failure to object will waive appellate review. *See Wright v. Collins,*766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir.1985); *see also Thomas v. Am,*474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Whitley has waived appellate review by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Exhibit
        32.1
  
 **CERTIFICATION
      OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
        TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
  
 In
        connection with the Annual Report of Arotech Corporation (the “Company”) on Form
        10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2006 filed with the Securities and
        Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Robert S. Ehrlich, Chairman and Chief
        Executive Officer of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
        adopted
        pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, hereby certify
        that
        the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
        of the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Report
        fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
        of operations of the Company.
  /s/
            Robert S.
            Ehrlich
 Robert
            S. Ehrlich,
            Chairman and CEO
 (Principal
            Executive
            Officer)
 Date:
              April 30, 2007
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Don RAMEY, Defendant, *282Elwood Ramey, Movant-Appellant.

No. 01-6547.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Nov. 5, 2002.

Before MERRITT and GILMAN, Circuit Judges, and TARNOW, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM.

In this case, Elwood Ramey appeals from a district court order denying his amended motion to set aside a final decree and order of forfeiture. The parties have expressly waived oral argument, and this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a).

Appellant filed a $20,000 cash bond in the Johnson County, Kentucky Circuit Court on behalf of his brother, Don Ramey. The bond related to state charges brought against Don Ramey prior to the return of the federal indictments against Don Ramey. When the federal indictment was returned, it included counts of drug trafficking and Social Security fraud and mentioned the $20,000 as proceeds from the drug trafficking. After the state charges against Don Ramey were dropped, the $20,000 was seized from the Johnson Country Sheriff pursuant to a seizure warrant issued July 20, 2000.

When Don Ramey entered a guilty plea to the federal charges and agreed to forfeiture of his interest in the $20,000, the government published notice to third parties. On April 13, 2001, Elwood Ramey filed a claim to the $20,000 pursuant to the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), claiming a superior interest in the bond money. The parties conducted discovery and the ancillary hearing was held July 2, 2001.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Elwood Ramey’s counsel requested permission to file a brief rather than make a closing statement. Instead of filing a brief, Elwood Ramey filed a motion for a new hearing, asserting that a witness at the previous hearing had offered perjured testimony. The government objected to the new hearing and moved to strike Elwood Ramey’s claim based upon the evidence in the record. At that point, the district court issued an order striking Elwood Ramey’s claim to the $20,000 bail money.

In the order dismissing Elwood Ramey’s claim, the district court said only that “it is hereby ordered that the claimant’s claim is stricken for lack of standing under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6).” We are not clear as to the reason for this decision on standing. Perhaps it means that Elwood Ramey lacks standing because he has not suffered an injury-in-fact. However, the evidence is uncontested that Elwood Ramey put up the money, regardless of the source of the funds. The opinion of the district court contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding why Elwood Ramey has no interest in the bail money and therefore lacks standing. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND with instructions that the district court make findings of fact and conclusions of law after conducting further proceedings, if necessary, to determine the source of the $20,000 bail money and exploring whether it should be forfeited.