SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4529-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RITHEA P. RANDALL,

a/k/a YOLANDA TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted January 26, 2022 – Decided February 10, 2022

Before Judges Hoffman and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 15-08-2292.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

Grace C. MacAuley, Acting Camden County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Rithea Randall appeals the February 27, 2020 order denying 

her petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We 

affirm.

I.

On February 7, 2015, in Lindenwold, defendant requested a woman (the 

victim) to give her a ride, claiming she just had a domestic dispute with her 

boyfriend. Upon entering the victim's car, defendant used a knife to threaten 

her and force her out of the car. Defendant then drove off until the police 

stopped the car a short time later.

In August 2015, a Camden County grand jury charged defendant with 

first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2); first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 

2C:15-2(a)(2); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-5(d); and fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2). 

In April 2016, defendant agreed to a negotiated plea agreement. Pursuant 

to the agreement, defendant pled guilty to first-degree robbery, with the State 

agreeing to dismiss all remaining charges and recommend that defendant be 

sentenced as a second-degree offender to an eight-year prison term with an 

eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early 
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Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In her plea colloquy, defendant 

provided a factual basis and the court accepted defendant's guilty plea. 

In August 2016, defendant appeared for sentencing. The court found 

aggravating factors three (risk of re-offense); six (defendant's prior criminal 

record); and nine (need to deter). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), (6), (9). The court

found no mitigating factors. Concluding that the aggravating factors 

outweighed the mitigating factors, the court sentenced defendant, in accordance 

with the plea agreement, to eight years in prison with an eighty-five percent

parole ineligibility period.

Defendant initially appealed her sentence; however, she later withdrew 

the appeal, which this court dismissed at her request in June 2017. Almost two 

years later, on April 12, 2019, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR, alleging 

her counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a diminished capacity defense 

during plea negotiations and for failing to argue for mitigation during 

sentencing. PCR counsel for defendant then filed a brief supporting her petition. 

In February 2020, Judge David M. Ragonese heard oral argument on 

defendant's petition. The following week, Judge Ragonese issued an order and 

accompanying ten-page opinion denying PCR without an evidentiary hearing. 
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The judge first noted that defendant's argument regarding the 

excessiveness of her sentence could have been raised in the appeal defendant 

withdrew, and therefore it was procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-4. The 

judge next found that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of 

ineffective assistance of counsel to warrant PCR "because defendant's claim that 

her trial counsel failed to investigate is based on nothing more than a bald 

assertion, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that defendant would 

have insisted on going to trial." The judge explained that because defendant 

claimed her trial attorney inadequately investigated her case, she needed to 

assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by 

affidavits or certifications based upon personal knowledge.

With respect to defendant's contention trial counsel failed to investigate 

an intoxication defense, the judge found that defendant's submissions in support 

of her petition were devoid of any certifications or affidavits based on personal 

knowledge describing the amount of intoxicant she had consumed, and over 

what period of time, on the date of the robbery. The judge further noted that 

"defendant did not present any evidence suggesting that a defense of mental 

disease or defect under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 would have been viable." 
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The judge next noted that defendant's argument that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue mitigating factors four, six, and eleven was 

supported by nothing more than bald assertions. Additionally, the judge

determined that even if defendant had shown counsel was ineffective, she failed 

to establish that but for counsel's ineffectiveness, she would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have instead insisted on going to trial. Accordingly, the judge 

found defendant failed to present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, and therefore was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

This appeal followed, with defendant raising the following argument:

POINT ONE 

MS. RANDALL IS ENTITLED TO AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HER CLAIMS THAT 

HER ATTORNEY FAILED TO PURSUE A 

DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE DURING 

PLEA NEGOTIATIONS AND FAILED TO ARGUE 

ADEQUATELY AT SENTENCING.

After carefully considering the record and the briefs, we conclude 

defendant's argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons stated 

by Judge Ragonese in his cogent written opinion issued on February 27, 2020. 

We add the following comments. 
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 II.

The standard for determining whether counsel's performance was 

ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was formulated in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State

v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, defendants must meet a two-prong test by establishing that: (l) 

counsel's performance was deficient and the errors made were so egregious that 

counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution; and (2) the defect in performance prejudiced 

defendants' rights to a fair trial such that there exists "a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Additionally, a defendant is precluded from raising an issue on PCR that 

could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 483

(1997); R. 3:22-4. As explained by the Court in McQuaid, "[a] defendant

ordinarily must pursue relief by direct appeal, see R. 3:22-3, and may not use

post-conviction relief to assert a new claim that could have been raised on direct

appeal." 147 N.J. at 483.
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With respect to the excessive sentencing claim, Judge Ragonese correctly 

found that it was procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-4. The first 

exception to the procedural bar requires that the ground for relief could not 

reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding. Here, defendant's claim 

that the sentencing court overvalued the aggravating factors and failed to 

consider certain mitigating factors could have been raised on direct appeal. This 

claim does not involve allegations or evidence that lie outside of the existing 

trial record, and therefore should have been raised on direct appeal. 

Furthermore, this court has generally found that challenges to excessive 

sentences are not appropriate for PCR, but rather best suited for direct appeal. 

See State v. Pierce, 115 N.J. Super. 346, 347 (App. Div. 1971); see also State v. 

Vance, 112 N.J. Super. 479, 481 (App. Div. 1970) ("[S]entences claimed to be 

excessive are only reviewable on direct appeal and not by post-conviction 

application."); State v. Clark, 65 N.J. 426, 437 (1974) ("[M]ere excessiveness 

of sentence otherwise within authorized limits, as distinct from illegality by 

reasons of being beyond or not in accordance with legal authorization, is not an 

appropriate ground for post-conviction relief and can only be raised on direct 

appeal from the conviction."); State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 595 (App. 

Div. 1988) ("[Q]uestions concerning the adequacy of the sentencing court's 
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findings and the sufficiency of the trial court's weighing of the aggravating and 

mitigating factors should be addressed only by way of direct appeal.").

Defendant also argues that she established a prima facie showing that trial 

counsel's failure to pursue a diminished capacity defense during plea 

negotiations amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. This argument lacks 

merit. 

As reviewed by Judge Ragonese, our Supreme Court in State v. Cameron, 

104 N.J. 42, 56 (1986), set forth six factors relevant to an intoxication defense: 

the quantity of intoxicant consumed, the period of time 

involved, the actor's conduct as perceived by others 

(what he said, how he said it, how he appeared, how he 

acted, now his coordination or lack thereof manifested 

itself), any odor of alcohol or other intoxicating 

substance, results of any test to determine bloodalcohol content, and the actor's ability to recall 

significant events.

[Cameron, 104 N.J. at 56.]

In addition, the judge noted that, in order for intoxication to diminish "the 

capacity to act purposely or knowingly, the intoxication must be of an extremely 

high level; it must have caused a 'prostration of faculties' in the defendant." 

State v. Sette, 259 N.J. Super. 156, 170 (App. Div. 1992). Here, defendant failed 

to support her petition for PCR with any affidavits or certifications 

demonstrating that defendant's intoxication caused a "prostration of faculties"; 
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put another way, defendant provides no evidence suggesting that her alleged 

intoxication would negate the knowing and purposeful mens rea for robbery. 

Furthermore, defendant provided no information regarding the amount of 

intoxicant consumed, the period of time involved, or defendant's conduct as 

perceived by others. 

In addition, defendant argues that she suffers from bipolar disorder, which 

further compromised her judgment. To the extent defendant argues that trial 

counsel's failure to pursue a diminished capacity defense based on mental defect 

under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2

1

amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel, this 

argument likewise fails. As noted by Judge Ragonese, defendant offered no 

expert witnesses who would testify to the existence of a mental defect, and 

defendant presented no affidavits regarding past diagnosis or treatment of a 

mental defect. 

In sum, defendant's arguments are supported by nothing more than bald 

assertions and fall short of establishing a prima facie claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Notably, even if trial counsel's representation is 

1 N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 provides: "Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental 

disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant 

did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. In the absence 

of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease 

or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense."
10 A-4529-19

considered objectively deficient, defendant nevertheless cannot prove that, but 

for counsel's ineffective assistance, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. She received a favorable sentence by pleading guilty to a first-degree 

crime under a plea agreement that provided for her to be sentenced as a seconddegree offender. Had defendant proceeded to trial, she would have faced up to 

twenty-years imprisonment, while she was ultimately sentenced to only eight 

years. 

Lastly, defendant contends that trial counsel's failure to argue for 

mitigating factors four, six, and eleven amounted to ineffective assistance of 

counsel. This argument too fails.

With respect to mitigating factor four, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4), the court 

may consider whether "there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or 

justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to establish a defense." As noted, 

defendant fails to provide support for her claim of intoxication at the time of the 

offense. Instead, defendant merely states that she was intoxicated at the time of 

the offense, and suffers from bipolar disorder, which again, amounts to nothing 

more than bald assertions. 

As to mitigating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6), which allows the court 

to consider defendant's attempt at restitution, and mitigating factor eleven, 
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N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11), which allows the court to consider whether 

incarceration would cause excessive hardship to defendant's dependents, Judge 

Ragonese found that the sentencing court was aware of both factors and 

ultimately chose not to apply them. During the plea colloquy, the judge had 

defendant acknowledge that restitution would remain open for the State to 

pursue at sentencing. The judge considered each of the mitigating factors 

separately and was "unable to conclude that any of the mitigating factors apply." 

In sum, defendant failed to present a prima facie case of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. She did not show that trial counsel's performance was 

deficient or how the alleged deficiency prejudiced her defense. The record 

reveals that trial counsel was able to negotiate a favorable plea agreement in 

considering the charges brought. Judge Ragonese properly dismissed 

defendant's petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Affirmed.