alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


EXHIBIT 10.1




AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




This Amendment (this “Amendment”) dated the 1st day of May, 2014 to the Employment Agreement, dated May 15, 2013 (the “Employment Agreement”), as amended on January 20, 2014, by and between Heat Biologics, Inc. (the “Company”) and Matthew Czajkowski (“Executive”). Capitalized terms used herein without definition shall have the meanings assigned in the Employment Agreement.  




WHEREAS, Employee was retained under the Employment Agreement by the Corporation to serve as its Chief Financial Officer; and 




WHEREAS, the Corporation desires to amend the base salary set forth in the Employment Agreement to reflect the fact that Employee has been devoting 80% of his professional time to providing services to the Corporation. 




NOW THEREFORE, for the mutual promises contained herein and for ten dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree to amend the Employment Agreement as follows: 




1. Commencing May 1, 2014, the Base Salary of One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($135,000) set forth in Section 3(a) of the Employment Agreement, as amended, shall be increased to One Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($180,000).




2. The reference to 50% in Section 3(c) shall be increased to 80%.




3. The provisions of this Amendment are severable and if any part or it is found to be unenforceable the other paragraphs shall remain fully valid and enforceable. 




4. All other terms of the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. The Employment Agreement, as amended by this Amendment, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter thereof. 

 

5. This Amendment may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original but both of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.




6. This Amendment is made and shall be construed and performed under the laws of the State of North Carolina without regard to its choice or conflict of law principles and the parties agree to North Carolina as the exclusive venue for any disputes arising hereunder. 












































IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be duly executed as of the day and year first above written. 




			
	 
	HEAT BIOLOGICS, INC.


	 
	 
	 

	 
	By: 

	/s/ Jeffrey Wolf


	 
	Name: 

	Jeffrey Wolf


	 
	Title: 

	President and Chief Executive Officer


	 
	 
	 

	 
	/s/ Matthew Czajkowski


	 
	MATTHEW CZAJKOWSKI
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7037

CHARLES WOODLAND-EL,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

THOMAS R. CORCORAN, Warden, Maryland House of

Correction Annex; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson E. Legg, District Judge. (CA-96-

3923-L)

Submitted: November 25, 1997 Decided: January 26, 1998

Before HALL, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Woodland-El, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr.,

Attorney General, Annabelle Louise Lisic, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on

his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.

1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Woodland-El v. Corcoran, No. CA-96-3923-

L (D. Md. May 20, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Perini Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Kenneth R. Burk, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

| Date:  November 7, 2008 | /s/Kenneth R. Burk                                |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
|                    | Kenneth R. Burk                                   |
|                    | Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Perini Corporation and will be retained by Perini Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Ford T. JOHNSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-1240.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 17, 2002.

Decided Nov. 6, 2002.

Ernest P. Francis, Ernest P. Francis, Ltd., Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L. Greene, Karen D. Utiger, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Ford T. Johnson, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States on Johnson’s claim for refund of the 100% penalty assessed against him under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2000), and the United States’ counterclaim for the remainder of the penalty, for the third and fourth quarters of 1994 *114and the first quarter of 1995. We have reviewed the record, including the district court’s opinion, as well as the parties’ briefs and find no reversible error. The evidence before the district court established that Johnson “willfully” failed to pay over the payroll taxes at issue, within the meaning of § 6672. *See Plett v. United States,*185 F.3d 216 (4th Cir.1999). To the extent that Johnson challenges the government’s alleged attempts to double-collect the unpaid taxes at issue, the district court’s opinion clearly states that “no double recovery ... shall be permitted.”

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Johnson v. United States,*No. CA-98-3050-S (D.Md. Jan. 29, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Harold W. LEWIS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mattie V. Lewis, v. MINERAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department Of Labor; Old Republic Insurance Company, Incorporated, Respondents.

No. 01-2359.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 24, 2002.

Decided Nov. 15, 2002.

James Hook, Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, for Petitioner. Mark E. Solomons, Laura Meteoff Klaus, Greenberg Traurig, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.

*647Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Harold W. Lewis seeks review of the Benefits Review Board’s decision and order affirming the administrative law judge’s denial of black lung benefits pursuant to 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945-(2000). Our review of the record discloses that the Board’s decision is based upon substantial evidence and is without reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the Board. *See Estate of Mattie Lewis v. Mineral Dev. Co.,*No. 00-1170 BLA (BRB Oct. 15, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Willie Foy, Appellant.

[678 NYS2d 516]

Appeal by the defen*890dant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), rendered June 19, 1996, convicting him of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Bruno, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the evidence elicited at the suppression hearing established that the police possessed probable cause to arrest him *(see, People v Martinez,*80 NY2d 444). The record also establishes that the defendant unequivocally abandoned the vehicle which was seized *(see, People v Martinez, supra; People v Bloomfield,*156 AD2d 572). Further, since the defendant failed to demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the items seized, he lacked standing to contest the seizure of the vehicle and the search of the garage where other property was recovered *(see, People v Strunkey,*202 AD2d 610). Consequently, the hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

The defendant contends that the prosecutor’s reference to certain identification testimony in her opening statement constituted prejudicial error. The defendant did not request any further instructions or request a mistrial and, consequently, his contention that the remark deprived him of a fair trial is unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Medina,*53 NY2d 951). In any event, while the comments in question were clearly improper, the court’s prompt curative instructions ameliorated any prejudice *(see, People v Ferrara,*220 AD2d 612).

The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding prosecutorial misconduct are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J. P., Thompson, Pizzuto and Altman, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant To

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Chyron Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael Wellesley-Wesley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(i) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:  November 12, 2008

| | /s/ Michael Wellesley-Wesley
| | ----------------------------
| | Michael Wellesley-Wesley    
| | President and               
| | Chief Executive Officer     





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Mary R. VESTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, William J. HENDERSON; United States Postal Service, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-1154.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 25, 2002.

Decided Nov. 6, 2002.

K. Kent Lively, III, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Gill P. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Mary R. Vester appeals a district court’s order granting the summary judgment motion of the Postmaster General of the United States (“Employer”) in this employment discrimination action. We affirm.

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. *Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,*863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,*477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,*477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the materials presented in the joint appendix, and the district court’s opinion, and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.**Vester v. Postmaster Gen.,*No. CA-99-355-1 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before *111the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*

*

 Because we affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment to Employer, we need not consider whether Employer is liable for punitive damages.
#### IBERVILLE TRUST & SAVING BANK v. CITY CAFÉ et al.

No. 1207.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Dec. 4, 1933.

For former opinion, see 150 So. 95.

Borron, Hebert & Owen, of Plaquemine, for appellant.

Schwing & Obier, of Plaquemine, and Lay-cock & Moyse, of Baton Rouge, for appellees.

MOUTON, Judge.

The original petition in this case was filed in May, 1931, the second in September, 1932.

In our original opinion (143 So. 73) we held that plaintiff had not set out a cause of action against the City Café, and, as to that defendant, dismissed its suit.

In the judgment by us in the second suit (150 So. 95), we held! that plaintiff had filed an amended petition which had no legal effect, as, legally speaking, there was no petition in the original suit because it did not show a cause of action, hence, there was nothing to amend, citing in support of this conclusion, Tremont Lumber Co. v. May, 143 La. 399, 78 So. 650.

Counsel for plaintiff in their application for a rehearing contend that we fell into an error in 'holding that the second petition was an amendment of the original petition.

The district judge, in his written opinion, says that the supplemental petition, it seems: to him, does not change the issues of the origr inal demand, and for that reason maintained the exception of no cause or right of action.

We, however, accepted the supplemental petition as an amendment, but for lack of essential allegations to give it the character of a new suit, the judgment below was maintained.

For these reasons and those given in our second opinion, the application for a rehearing is refused.

ELLIOTT, J., dissenting.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TRAVISWILFORD BOWLES, Petitioner, vs. THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE;AND THE HONORABLE CONNIE J. STEINHEIMER, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents. No. 85448 

# LED
OCT 13 2022

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA ORDERDENYING PETITION
This is an original pro se petition for a writ ofmandamus or in the alternative to show causeper NRS 34.160 et. seq. seekingto compelthe district court to reinstate his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted in 2012 ofsix counts oflewdness with

a child under the age of 14 years. In 2013, petitioner filed in the district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in 2015, petitioner supplemented his petition. The State moved to dismiss the petition and supplemented petition, and in 2016, after holding a hearingon the motion, the district court dismissed petitioner's habeas action. The district court order of dismissal indicates that the district court considered petitioner's claims for relief and determined that they did not warrant an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner now seeks a writ from this court directing the district court to reinstate his habeas action.

This court has originaljurisdiction to issue writ ofmandamus, and the issuance of such extraordinary relief is within this court's sole discretion. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 468,


# z351C.J. Parraguirre

J. 474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736-37 (2007). A writ of mandamus is available to compeltheperformance ofan actwhichthe lawrequiresasa dutyresulting from an office, trust, or station. NRS 34.160. Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted. Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 841. 844 (2004).

Having considered the petition, we conclude that our extraordinary relief is not warranted. A district court's dismissal of a postconviction habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing is not procedurally improper, NRS 34.770(2) ("Ifthe judge or justice determines that thepetitioner is not entitled to reliefand an evidentiary hearingisnot required, thejudge orjustice shalldismissthe petition without ahearing."), and the challenged district court order expressly determined that no evidentiary hearing was warranted. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the district court's determination was improper or that petitioner's habeaspetition shouldbe reinstated. See NRS 34.160. Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

Hardesty 

# A/ksy;^-Q J. Stiglich

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA cc: Hon. Connie J. Steinheirner, District Judge

TravisWilford BowlesAttorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA
III) 104, A 3
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 168 (Thursday, August 28, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 50779-50780]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19954]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

RIN 0648-XK02


North Pacific Fishery Management Council; Public Meetings

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of public meetings.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The North Pacific Fishery Management Council's (Council) Gulf 
of Alaska (GOA) and Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BS/AI) groundfish plan 
teams will meet in Seattle, WA.

DATES: The meetings will be held September 22-24, 2008. The meetings 
will begin at 9 a.m. on Monday, September 22, and continue through 
Wednesday, September 24, 2008.

ADDRESSES: The meetings will be held a the Alaska Fisheries Science 
Center, 7600 Sand Point Way N.E., Building 4, Observer Training Room 
(GOA Plan Team) and Traynor Room (BS/AI Plan Team), Seattle, WA.
    Council address: North Pacific Fishery Management Council, 605 W. 
4th Ave., Suite 306, Anchorage, AK 99501-2252.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jane DiCosimo or Diana Stram, North 
Pacific Fishery Management Council; telephone: (907) 271-2809.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Agenda: Principal business is to prepare and 
review the draft Economic Report, the

[[Page 50780]]

draft Ecosystems Consideration Chapter, the draft stock assessments for 
some target-categories, and recommend preliminary groundfish catch 
specifications for 2008/09. Agenda posted on website at: http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/.
    Although non-emergency issues not contained in this agenda may come 
before this group for discussion, in accordance with the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), 
those issues may not be the subject of formal action during these 
meetings. Actions will be restricted to those issues specifically 
identified in this notice and any issues arising after publication of 
this notice that require emergency action under section 305(c) of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act, provided the public has been notified of the 
Council's intent to take final action to address the emergency.

Special Accommodations

    These meetings are physically accessible to people with 
disabilities. Requests for sign language interpretation or other 
auxiliary aids should be directed to Gail Bendixen, (907) 271-2809, at 
least 5 working days prior to the meeting date.

    Dated: August 25, 2008.
Tracey L. Thompson,
Acting Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Marine 
Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. E8-19954 Filed 8-27-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-S
ORIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

CASSANDRA A. LARUE, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JENNIE HANSEN, Warden, 

Respondent 

OP 22-0472 i4:iLtLe 

SEP 0 6 2022 

Bowen C3reenwood 

Clerk of Supreme Court State of Montana 

ORDER 

Representing herself, Cassandra A. LaRue has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. Upon review, we deem it appropriate to require a response to LaRue's Petition. 

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Attorney General or counsel for the Departinent of 

Correction is GRANTED thirty days from the date of this Order in which to prepare, file, 

and serve a written response to the petition for a writ of habeas corpus together with 

appropriate documentary exhibits. 

The Clerk of the Supreme Court is directed to provide a copy of this Order to the 

Attorney General; to counsel for the Department of Corrections; and to Petitioner 

personally. 

DATED this 6 °1— day of September, 2022. 

09/06/2022

Case Number: OP 22-0472