alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6267 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6267

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 15 Chestnut Street in Suffern, New York, as the ``Sergeant Gerald T. 
                    `Jerry' Donnellan Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SERGEANT GERALD T. ``JERRY'' DONNELLAN POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 15 Chestnut Street in Suffern, New York, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Sergeant Gerald T. `Jerry' Donnellan Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Sergeant 
Gerald T. `Jerry' Donnellan Post Office''.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 28, 2022.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
117th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 6267

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 15 Chestnut Street in Suffern, New York, as the ``Sergeant Gerald T. 
                    `Jerry' Donnellan Post Office''.
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Eduardo RAMOS-COTA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-50460.

D.C. No. CR-00-00374-JNK.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 8, 2002.*

Decided Nov. 7, 2002.

Before HUG, BRUNETTI and O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

*374MEMORANDUM**

Eduardo Ramos-Cota appeals his conviction and sentence under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 for importation of marijuana. Ramos-Cota first argues the district court erred in denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea because it was entered without knowledge of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Ramos-Cota then contends the district court committed error by refusing to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege type and quantity of controlled substance as an element of the charge. We affirm the district court on both counts.

Ramos-Cota’s first argument fails because *Apprendi*is not implicated where the defendant is sentenced below the prescribed statutory maximum. *See id.*at 490. *See also United States v. Carranza,*289 F.3d 634, 643 (9th Cir.2002). Under 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(4), Ramos-Cota was subject to a statutory maximum of five years imprisonment. He received a twenty-four month sentence. Accordingly, *Apprendi*does not provide a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e).

Ramos-Cota also argues that the district court should have dismissed the indictment because the government failed to allege quantity and type of controlled substance. First, the government explicitly alleged quantity and type of drug in the indictment. Further, the drug sentencing statutes at issue in this ease have been held to be facially constitutional. *See United States v. Mendoza-Paz,*286 F.3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir.2002) (rejecting constitutional challenge to § 960). *United States v. Valera-Rivera,*279 F.3d 1174, 1175 n. 1 (9th Cir.2002) (rejecting constitutional challenge to § 952). Finally, to the extent Ramos-Cota argues the district court erred by failing to require proof of mens rea as to type and quantity of controlled substance, this argument is foreclosed by our decision in *United States v. Carranza,*289 F.3d 634, 643-44 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that government need not prove drug type or knowledge of drug quantity). The district court is therefore affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 32

                         CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                          18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
               SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant  to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section  906  of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned certifies that this
periodic  report fully complies with the requirements of Section  13(a)  or
15(d),  as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that  the
information  contained  in  this  quarterly  report  on  Form  10-Q  fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results  of
operations of Spartech Corporation.


                                        Date: March 11, 2005


                                        /s/Bradley B. Buechler
                                        Bradley B. Buechler
                                        Chairman, President and Chief
                                        Executive Officer


                                        /s/Randy C. Martin
                                        Randy C. Martin
                                        Executive Vice President -
                                        Corporate Development and Chief
                                        Financial Officer
#### Ex Parte John E. Holder.

No. 24726.

February 8, 1950.

Relator represented himself.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

This cause arises by reason of an application filed originally in this court by relator to secure his release from the penitentiary.

Presiding Judge Hawkins certified the questions involved to the Honorable W. S. Barron, Judge of the District Court of Robertson County, with the request that evidence be taken and submitted to this court on the questions as to whether or not relator was tried originally without counsel; whether or not he expressly waived the appointment of counsel; and, in the event *256he did not have counsel, Judge Barron was instructed to hear evidence on the subject of his age, education, the nature and gravity of the crime, his acts in the conduct of the trial of his case, and his intellectual ability, in order that the question may be considered under all of the circumstances of the case.

Judge Barron appointed counsel to represent relator, brought him personally before the court, heard his evidence and that of other witnesses brought before him, and he returned the evidence to this court in the manner directed.

It affirmatively appears that relator did not have counsel to represent him in the trial of his case and that he desired the court to appoint counsel, but the court refused to do so on the ground that it was not a capital case as contemplated in Article 494, C. C. P. It is further shown that appellant was convicted of incest, the victim being his daughter, and that he did not receive the highest penalty provided by law for this offense. He was approximately 46 years of age at the time of his trial. The statement of facts reflects that there was quite a lengthy hearing on the subject of his intellectual capacity. If we are able to correctly appraise this evidence, he was a man of ordinary intelligence for his age. Such evidence was produced by the state. Relator had the burden, with the aid of counsel appointed for him, to show a lower state of intellect if he could, but this the record fails to do. The evidence on the subject is quite lengthy. It is technical in its nature and produced by expert testimony. There is no evidence indicating that relator was innocent of the crime or that his failure to have proper representation was the cause of his conviction.

We feel called upon, in this case, to follow the statutory provisions of our state and conclude that, in as much as the charge against him was not a capital felony, the court was warranted under all of the facts developed in this hearing to refuse to appoint counsel for him. Article 494, Vernon’s Ann. C. C. P. and annotations thereunder; Holton v. State, 143 Tex. Cr. R. 419, 158 S. W. 2d 772 (certiorari denied, 316 U. S. 703); Thomas v. State, 132 Tex. Cr. R. 552, 106 S.W. 2d 290; Loggins v. State, 136 Tex. Cr. R. 426, 125 S. W. 2d 565; Parsons v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. R. 157, 218 S. W. 2d 202.

The application is refused and relator is remanded to the warden of the state penitentiary to serve the sentence imposed on him.

Hawkins, Presiding Judge, absent.
2014.03.31 Ex 10.5






	
	
	 




EXHIBIT 10.5
 


Description of USVI Relocation Program of Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc.
(as amended on March 31, 2014)
In order to enable Ocwen Financial Corporation (the “Company”) to recruit top talent and incentivize key personnel to relocate, the Company offers a relocation package to individuals at the director level and above relocating to the United States Virgin Islands (“USVI”) to work for Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“OMS”).  
The USVI relocation program includes relocation benefits such as moving expenses, home sale support, a housing allowance for up to five years, payment of children’s school tuition fees, payment of “home leave” travel for return trips to the continental United States and tax gross ups on certain taxable benefits, in each case subject to certain limits and exceptions. 
In addition, upon a participant’s retirement or involuntary termination without cause, such participant is eligible to receive reimbursement for relocation costs back to the continental United States. 
In addition to the benefits and payments described above, in the event a participant at the level of executive vice president is involuntarily terminated without cause, such participant is eligible to receive a severance payment equal to one year’s base salary if such termination of employment occurs within the first year and six months’ base salary thereafter.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>       5
<MULTIPLIER>    1,000,000
       
<S>                                                 <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                   DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                      JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                        MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                             3-MOS
<CASH>                                                       90
<SECURITIES>                                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                                             2,375
<ALLOWANCES>                                                175
<INVENTORY>                                                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                          2,474
<PP&E>                                                   28,840
<DEPRECIATION>                                           16,979
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           14,757
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                     2,980
<BONDS>                                                   5,370
<COMMON>                                                    225
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                         0
<PREFERRED>                                                   0
<OTHER-SE>                                                4,119
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             14,757
<SALES>                                                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                          2,489
<CGS>                                                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                             1,795
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                              0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                           98
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                             599
<INCOME-TAX>                                                239
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                         360
<DISCONTINUED>                                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                0
<CHANGES>                                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                                                360
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                 0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                 0

        

</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-50140 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus KORNELIA CHRISTINA LOCKWOOD, also known as Kornelia Christina Haffner, also known as Kornelia Christina Stacer, Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-00-CR-1161-ALL-H

________________________________________

October 31, 2001 Before POLITZ, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Kornelia Christina Lockwood appeals the 41-month term of imprisonment imposed following her conviction of being found in the United States following removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. She contends that the district court erred by increasing her offense level 16 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)1 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , 262 F.3d 479 (5th

Cir. 2001).

2 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
2 based on her prior felony conviction of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”). She notes that under this court’s decision in United States v. Chapa-Garza 1 that a Texas felony DWI conviction is not a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus is not an aggravated felony for the purpose of a 16-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The Government has filed an unopposed motion to remand for resentencing acknowledging that the district court, which did not have the benefit of Chapa-Garza when it sentenced Lockwood, erred in applying the 16- level adjustment. The motion is GRANTED. Lockwood also contends that the district court erred by enhancing her sentence based on her prior aggravated felony conviction because the fact of that conviction was not alleged in her indictment. Lockwood’s contention is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States 2 and is moot in light of the resolution of her previous argument. The Government’s motion is GRANTED, the sentence is VACATED, and this case is REMANDED for resentencing in light of Chapa-Garza

.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 659 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 659

  To repeal the limitation on the construction of new public housing, 
       known as the Faircloth Amendment, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 1, 2021

Ms. Ocasio-Cortez introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                  the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To repeal the limitation on the construction of new public housing, 
       known as the Faircloth Amendment, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Repeal the Faircloth Amendment Act 
of 2021''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF FAIRCLOTH AMENDMENT.

    Section 9(g) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 
1437g(g)) is amended by striking paragraph (3) (relating to limitation 
on new construction).
                                 <all>
```
Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350   In connection with the Annual Report of Proper Power and Energy, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Lior Segal, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, to my knowledge that:  (i)  the accompanying Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Act); and  (ii)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  PROPER POWER AND ENERGY, INC.  /s/:  Lior Segal LIOR SEGAL, Chief Financial Officer   March 31, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DARRYL (DEWS) WEST,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 124 EAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DARRYL DEWS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 125 EAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DARRYL DEWS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 126 EAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM[ 124 EAL 2020, 125 EAL 2020 and 126 EAL 2020 ]

- 2

AND NOW , this 26th day of August, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
E**XHIBIT 32(b)****SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**I, Henry G. Schopfer, III, Chief Financial Officer of Peerless Mfg. Co. (the “Company”), certify,that pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code:(1) The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period endedDecember 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, as amended; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operationsof the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in theReport.                                                        /s/ Henry G. Schopfer, III   Henry G. Schopfer, III   Chief Financial Officer   Date: February 11, 2008   *The foregoing Certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350; it is notbeing filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, and is not to beincorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the datehereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.*
(No. 24153.

#### The Northern Trust Company *et al.*Trustees, Appellees, *vs.*William E. Meyers *et al.*Appellants.

*Opinion filed October 15, 1937*

Rehearing *denied Dec. 8,*1937.

Charles P. R. Macaulay, for appellants.

Helmer, Moulton, Whitman & Holton, (Roland D. Whitman, and Herbert R. Tews, of counsel,) *for*appellees.

Mr. Justice Stone

delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellants seek a review of a decree of the circuit court of Cook county foreclosing a trust deed and decreeing a deficiency judgment. They say that section 16 of the act relating to mortgages, which authorizes the entry of a de*309ficiency decree in such a case, is invalid, as in contravention of sections 2 and 5 of article 2 of our constitution and the due process clauses of both Federal and State constitutions. Thus the appeal is brought directly here.

The facts, briefly, are, that the original mortgagors, Antionette Jacobson and her husband, gave a note in the sum of $15,000, dated June 1, 1927, due in three years with interest coupons bearing interest at seven per cent after maturity, and executed a trust deed on real estate to secure the note. The rents of the property conveyed under the trust deed were also assigned to the trustee. On June 1, 1930, an agreement was entered into extending the note for a period of three years. Appellants purchased the property on August 11, 1930, and assumed and agreed to pay the debt represented by the trust deed. On default, foreclosure proceedings were instituted. On December 9, 1936, a decree for foreclosure and sale was entered and sale was had pursuant thereto, resulting in a deficiency in the sum of $3134. The court approved the sale and entered a decree for the deficiency. This decree was entered over the objection of the appellants.

The questions here raised are controlled by the decision in *Martin*v. *Strubel, (ante,*p. 21,) decided at the June term of this court, where it was held that section 16 of the Mortgages act is not repugnant to section 2 or section 5 of article 2 of our constitution, and does not fail to provide due process, as required by the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. The decision in that case disposes of the main contentions of appellants here. Appellants also say that the court erred in including in the amount found due on foreclosure of the trust deed, certain attorney’s fees and cost of certificates of title. It is a sufficient answer to this objection to say that such were provided for in the trust deed.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

*Decree affirmed.*