alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CHERON v. CABIBI.

No. 16296.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

March 9, 1936.

Robert J. Ourso and Edw. K. Wunder-lich, both of New Orleans, for appellant.

Prowell & McBride, of New Orleans, for appellee.

JANVIER, Judge.

Alta Cheron alleges that at about 5:15 o’clock on the afternoon of June 18, 1935, as he was passing the residence of Frank Cabibi, he was attacked and severely bit*493ten by a large dog belonging to and harbored by the said Cabibi, and that he sustained serious injuries as the result of the bite and also suffered great physical pain and mental anguish. He charges that the said dog had previously exhibited to the said Cabibi and to other persons vicious characteristics, and he prays for judgment against the said owner and harborer of the dog in the sum of $300 with interest.

Defendant admits that he owns a dog such as that described in plaintiff’s petition, but he denies that it has ever exhibited vicious tendencies, and he particularly denies that the said plaintiff was bitten by it.

In the court below, there was judgment for defendant.

There is no controversy concerning the law which is applicable to cases of this character. It is conceded that in order to sustain a recovery, plaintiff must show that he was bitten, that the dog either belonged to or was harbored by defendant, that it had previously exhibited vicious tendencies, and that defendant knew or should have known of its characteristics. Woulfe v. D’Antoni (La.App.) 158 So. 394.

In an effort to prove that Cabibi knew or should have known of the vicious character of his dog, plaintiff placed upon the witness stand four witnesses, each of whom testified that he had previously been attacked by the dog and three of whom stated that they had been actually bitten by it. These witnesses testified that they had called upon defendant and had warned him that his dog was vicious.

Defendant contends that he had never been so notified, and further states that he had no knowledge that the dog had ever attacked any one. Other witnesses said that they were present when the dog attacked plaintiff, and they fixed the exact time and place at which the attack is said to have been made.

On the other hand, witnesses placed on the stand by defendant stated that they were present at that time and place and that no such occurrence had taken place.

Were the matter one in which we had not before us the finding of our brother below, it would present a question of fact very difficult of solution. He, however, saw all of the witnesses and was in a better situation than are we to determine just which group is mistaken.

His conclusion is not obviously erroneous. On the contrary, it would appear from the record that plaintiff has slightly overstated his case. If three other persons were bitten by the dog and one other was attacked and very much frightened by it, it is difficult for us to believe that some other suit would not have resulted. We find no fault with the judgment rendered by our brother below.

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be, and it is, affirmed at the cost of appellant.

Affirmed.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED SEPTEMBER 20, 2023

NO. 03-22-00100-CV

Rosita Johnson, Appellant

v.

Raymond Nicholas Kimbrough, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 20TH DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES BAKER, KELLY, AND THEOFANIS

REVERSED AND REMANDED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE BAKER

This is an appeal from the order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship signed by the 

trial court on January 5, 2022. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court 

holds that there was reversible error in the court’s order. Therefore, the Court reverses the trial 

court’s order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship and remands the case to the trial 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellee shall pay all costs relating to 

this appeal, both in this Court and in the court below.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6814

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MONTE MOORE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen, 

District Judge. (4:12-cr-00104-AWA-LRL-1; 4:15-cv-00062-AWA)

Submitted: October 18, 2016 Decided: October 21, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Monte Moore, Appellant Pro Se. Eric Matthew Hurt, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Monte Moore seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order 

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Moore has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

JUAN PABLO RINCON-LOPEZ,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 10-30251

D.C. No. 3:09-cr-05452-RJB-23

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert J. Bryan, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 6, 2012** 

Seattle, Washington

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Juan Rincon-Lopez (“Rincon-Lopez”) appeals the district court’s denial of

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to Possession of Methamphetamine with

Intent to Distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.

FILED

FEB 21 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

In order to withdraw a plea before sentencing, a defendant need only show a

“fair and just reason” for the withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United

States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2005). Although this standard is

generous and must be applied liberally, United States v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980, 983

(9th Cir. 2011), a “change of heart” is not a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a

plea, United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir. 1990). 

On appeal, Rincon-Lopez contends that his appearing before the court for

the plea colloquy so soon after being advised of the plea agreement, coupled with

the failure of the court to advise him of a $100 assessment and of the possibility of

prosecution for perjury should he lie, created confusion that led him not to

understand the nature and consequences of his plea. He also contends that his

lawyer improperly pressured him into pleading guilty.

 As the district court observed, the defendant had adequate notice of the

change of plea hearing and the transcript gives no indication of confusion, lack of

understanding, or involuntariness. The court that heard the plea patiently

endeavored to ensure that Rincon-Lopez understood the plea and its consequences. 

Rincon-Lopez does not contend that a proper instruction on perjury “could have at

least plausibly motivated a reasonable person in [his] position not to have pled

guilty.” Bonilla, 637 F.3d at 986. Although the court did not refer to the $100
3

assessment at the plea hearing, the government did when it summarized, at the

court’s request, the elements of the offense and the penalties.

The district court did not err in concluding that Rincon-Lopez had not given

a “fair and just” reason for withdrawing the plea. The record of the plea colloquy

contradicts the reasons he did give.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32(b)



PEOPLES ENERGY CORPORATION AND CONSOLIDATED AFFILIATES

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the combined Quarterly Report of Peoples Energy Corporation (the "Company"), The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company ("Peoples Gas") and North Shore Gas Company ("North Shore Gas") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas A. Nardi, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company, Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas.



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | May 10, 2005
|------------------- |  |  | ------------
|                    |  |  | Date        

Thomas A. Nardi
Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of
Peoples Energy Corporation



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | May 10, 2005
|------------------- |  |  | ------------
|                    |  |  | Date        

Thomas A. Nardi
Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of
The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | May 10, 2005
|------------------- |  |  | ------------
|                    |  |  | Date        

Thomas A. Nardi
Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of
North Shore Gas Company
EXHIBIT 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  1.
    
    The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2009 (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Robert L. Parker Jr.Robert L. Parker Jr.Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
NO. 12-10-00077-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

$10,439.00 U.S. CURRENCY, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS ' APPEAL FROM THE 273RD

V. ' DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS, ' SHELBY COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

This appeal is being dismissed for want of jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 42.3(a). The trial court’s judgment was signed on January 26, 2010. 

Under rule of appellate procedure 26.1, the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty 

days after the judgment is signed. Appellant, Terica Jackson, did not file a motion for 

new trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a) (providing that notice of appeal must be filed 

within ninety days after judgment signed if any party timely files motion for new trial). 

Therefore, her notice of appeal was due to have been filed no later than February 25, 

2010. Appellant did not file her notice of appeal until March 23, 2010. Because the 

notice of appeal was not filed on or before February 25, 2010, it was untimely, and this 

court has no jurisdiction of the appeal.

On March 25, 2010, this court notified Appellant pursuant to Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 37.1 and 42.3 that her notice of appeal was untimely and there was 

no timely motion for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal as permitted by 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3. Appellant was further informed that unless the 

record was amended on or before April 5, 2010 to establish the jurisdiction of this court, 

the appeal would be dismissed. The deadline for responding to this court’s notice has 

expired, and Appellant has neither responded to the notice nor established this court’s 

jurisdiction. 
2

Because this court is not authorized to extend the time for perfecting an appeal 

except as provided by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 26.3, the appeal is 

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

Opinion delivered April 7, 2010.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 659 

To repeal the limitation on the construction of new public housing, known 

as the Faircloth Amendment, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 1, 2021 

Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To repeal the limitation on the construction of new public 

housing, known as the Faircloth Amendment, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Repeal the Faircloth 

5 Amendment Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF FAIRCLOTH AMENDMENT. 

7 Section 9(g) of the United States Housing Act of 

8 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437g(g)) is amended by striking para9 graph (3) (relating to limitation on new construction). 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1178

JOHN B. LASCHKEWITSCH, as Administrator for the Estate of 

Ben Laschkewitsch,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

LINCOLN LIFE AND ANNUITY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., d/b/a Lincoln 

Financial Group,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:13-cv-00315-BO)

Submitted: September 17, 2015 Decided: September 23, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John B. Laschkewitsch, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Nis Leerberg, 

SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina; Robert R. 

Marcus, SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

John B. Laschkewitsch seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order granting summary judgment in Defendant’s favor. We 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice 

of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the 

district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the 

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the 

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). If a party files 

in the district court any of the motions listed in Rule 

4(a)(4)(A), the 30-day appeal period runs from the entry of the 

order disposing of the last such motion. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(4)(A). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a 

civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 

551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on 

September 16, 2014. Laschkewitsch timely filed a Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 59(e) motion to amend the judgment, which the district court 

denied on January 15, 2015. The notice of appeal was filed

thirty-five days later, on February 19, 2015. Because 

Laschkewitsch failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to 

obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we 

dismiss the appeal. We deny as moot the parties’ pending 
3

motions. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The undersigned, David Gorodyansky, the Chief Financial Officer of INTELLIGENT BUYING. INC.  (the "Company"), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:



1. The Company's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this statement this 14th day of April 2008.



/s/ David Gorodyansky

------------------------------------

David Gorodyansky

Principal  Financial Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Intelligent Buying, Inc. and will be retained by Intelligent Buying, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS
OF INCOME, CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS, AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH
FLOWS, AND QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                    1,383,550
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                     13,671
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         396,472
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        20,015
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                  62,736
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,876,444
<COMMON>                                       278,926
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                            0
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                            466,810
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 745,736
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           527,039
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                        0
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                 603,669
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                1,876,444
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                    1,157,567
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            66,448
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     952,457
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                   1,018,905
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                        138,662
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               2,774
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                 141,436
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        28,952
<NET-INCOME>                                   112,484
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          0
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                  112,484
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        48,614
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       26,792
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                         182,566
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     3.22
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     3.22
        

</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50421

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JORGE LORENZO GRACIDA-INFANTE,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CR-317-1

Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The district court’s order granting the Government’s motion to detain 

Jorge Lorenzo Gracida-Infante and reversing the magistrate judge’s order 

setting conditions of bond is AFFIRMED. This court applies a deferential 

standard of review when considering a district court’s pretrial detention order. 

United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. 

Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1989). Reviewing the record as a whole under 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 6, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-50421 Document: 00514986498 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/06/2019
No. 19-50421

2

this deferential standard of review, we hold that Gracida-Infante has not 

established his entitlement to relief.

 Case: 19-50421 Document: 00514986498 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/06/2019
Exhibit 32.3



Statement of Chief Executive Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of Southern California Gas Company (the "Company") certifies that:



(i)

the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended September 30, 2006 (the "Quarterly Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii)

the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







November 2, 2006



/S/  Debra L. ReedDebra L. ReedChief Executive Officer
Exhibit 24.3

POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT, that the undersigned, Patrick J. Lavelle, constitutes and appoints Yehoram Uziel and Robert E. Kassel, or either of them, his
true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent, each with full power of substitution and resubstitution, for him and in his name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to
sign the Form 10-KSB, Annual Report of Soligen Technologies, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2001, and any amendments or supplements
thereto, and to file this Power of Attorney and the Form 10-KSB, with all exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection therewith with the Securities and Exchange Commission
granting unto each of said attorney-in-fact and agent full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about
the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that each of said attorney-in-fact and agent, may do
or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

Dated
this 22st day of June 2001

|Signature                                          |  |  |  | 
|-------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 
|                                                   |  |  |  | 
|/s/ Patrick J. LavellePatrick J. Lavelle, Director |  |  |  | 

---

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