Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 

Keenan, JJ., and Cochran, Retired Justice 

FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 

OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

v. Record No. 950827 

 March 1, 1996 

FELICIA L. DONALD 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of 

Appeals erred in ruling that, under the facts of this case, the 

trial court had the authority to award attorney's fees. 

 The proceedings and relevant facts are undisputed. On 

October 23, 1991, the Fairfax County Department of Human 

Development (the County) filed a petition in the Fairfax County 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, alleging that 

Felicia L. Donald "abused and/or neglected" her two minor 

children. Following an ore tenus hearing, the district court, by 

order entered November 18, 1991, dismissed the petition with 

prejudice. 

 On December 20, 1991, the County appealed the case to the 

Circuit Court of Fairfax County for a de novo hearing. Following 

an extensive trial, the circuit court, by order entered July 8, 

1993, ruled that the County's appeal was untimely and dismissed 

the petition. By the same order, the circuit court also denied 

Donald's request for attorney's fees, reasoning that an award of 

fees was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 

 Donald appealed the denial of attorney's fees to the Court 

of Appeals, and, on August 23, 1994, a three-judge panel of the 

Court of Appeals, by memorandum opinion, affirmed the circuit 
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court's judgment. The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en

banc and, thereafter, reversed the circuit court's judgment and 

remanded the case to the circuit court "for a determination of 

reasonable attorney fees to be fixed together with costs." 

Donald v. Fairfax County, 20 Va. App. 155, 162, 455 S.E.2d 740, 

744 (1995). We awarded the County an appeal, having determined 

that the decision of the Court of Appeals involves matters of 

significant precedential value. Code § 17-116.07(B). 

 The jurisdiction, practice, and procedure of juvenile and 

domestic relations district courts are wholly statutory and are 

set forth in Title 16.1, Chapter 11 of the Code (Code § 16.1-226 

et seq.). Walker v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 223 Va. 557, 562, 

290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982). An appeal from a district court to a 

circuit court may be taken within ten days from the entry of a 

final judgment or order of the district court, Code §§ 16.1-132 

and -296, and shall be heard de novo in the circuit court, Code 

§§ 16.1-136 and -296. The circuit court, in all such cases on 

appeal, shall have all the powers and authority granted by 

Chapter 11 to the district court. Code § 16.1-296. 

 In 1991, the General Assembly specifically addressed 

district courts' authority to award attorney's fees. Acts 1991, 

c. 534. Code § 16.1-278.19 provides that, "[i]n any matter 

properly before the [district] court, the court may award 

attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of any party as the court 

deems appropriate based on the relative financial ability of the 
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parties." This Code section is the sole authority granted to 

district courts for awarding attorney's fees.1

 Circuit courts have those powers and authority that are 

granted to district courts, but district courts are empowered to 

award attorney's fees only in matters "properly before [them]." 

We read the statutes to apply the same jurisdictional 

prerequisite to a circuit court's authority to award attorney's 

fees as applies to a district court's authority to award fees. A 

matter may not be properly before a circuit court, and thus 

ineligible for an award of attorney's fees, even though it 

originally was properly before the district court. 

 In the present case, the appeal was not taken within ten 

days from the district court's final order; therefore, the 

circuit court was without jurisdiction, and the matter was not 

"properly before" the circuit court. Thus, the circuit court 

lacked authority to award attorney's fees. Consequently, we hold 

that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's 

judgment and in remanding the case to the circuit court for an 

award of reasonable attorney's fees.2

 1Donald relies on Code § 16.1-296 as authority for awarding 

attorney's fees. That section states that "[c]osts, taxes and 

fees on appealed cases shall be assessed only in those cases in 

which a trial fee could have been assessed in juvenile and 

domestic relations court and shall be collected in the circuit 

court." Donald's reliance is misplaced because Code § 16.1-296 

does not relate to attorney's fees. 

 2In view of the decision we reach, we express no opinion 

with respect to the circuit court's reliance upon the doctrine of 

sovereign immunity for its refusal to award attorney's fees. 
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 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals and enter final judgment in favor of the County. 

Reversed and final judgment.