* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no

precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled

principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 95-30134

Summary Calendar

_______________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAY JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(94-CR-32-A-M2)

_________________________________________________________________

November 28, 1995

Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Johnson, serving a term of 97 months

imprisonment and other penalties for conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and unlawful use of

a communications facility, appeals his conviction and sentence on

several grounds. Finding none persuasive, we affirm.
2

1. Johnson asserts that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress evidence, because there was no basis

to conduct a warrantless search of the house where the cocaine was

found. The court held, however, that under the doctrine of

inevitable discovery, the search was justified. United States v.

Wilson, 36 F.3d 1298, 1304 (5th Cir. 1994). Johnson does not

challenge this conclusion, so this issue is deemed abandoned.

Evans v. City of Marlin, Texas, 986 F.2d 104, 106 n.1 (5th Cir.

1993). In any event, the district court's conclusion of inevitable

discovery was supported by the record.

2. Johnson argues that the jury should have been

instructed on the defense of entrapment. The testimony did not

make "a prima facie showing that government conduct created a

substantial risk that an offense would be committed by a person

other than one ready to commit it." United States v. Hudson, 982

F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 100 (1993)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). Johnson voluntarily

accepted the U.P.S. package and admitted that he hid only the two

baby powder cans containing cocaine after he discovered the

government's transmitter.

3. Johnson challenges the prosecutor's use of the slang

term "key" for a kilo of cocaine in his closing arguments. Under

the total circumstances, this comment did not constitute misconduct

warranting a new trial. The court did not abuse his discretion in

failing to grant a new trial.
3

4. To the extent we understand Johnson's argument

concerning the constitutionality of the statute prohibiting the

distribution of controlled substances, it is meritless. He does

not argue that his conduct could not have been described as illegal

possession with intent to distribute cocaine; he contends only that

the law does not distinguish his conduct from that of DEA agents,

lab workers, and the UPS delivery man who were also involved in the

case. This is nonsense. The law sufficiently defines the criminal

conduct that it prohibits. To the extent that Johnson argues

selective prosecution, this must fail, because there is no

similarity between him and the law enforcement officers and helpers

who engaged in the controlled delivery here.

5. Johnson finally asserts that he did not obstruct

justice within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines when he

testified falsely at trial. Although it is true that not every

misstatement by a defendant will supply grounds for an obstruction

of justice sentence enhancement, the district court here found that

Johnson's false testimony could have misled the jury as to whether

he had guilty knowledge of the package's contents. This finding,

which supports an obstruction of justice enhancement, is not

clearly erroneous.

The judgement and sentence are AFFIRMED.