UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : : v. : Criminal Action No.: 17-0050 (RC) : DAVID LIEU, : Re Document Nos.: 50, 52 : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM OPINION G RANTING U NITED S TATES ’ M OTION TO A DMIT O THER C RIMES E VIDENCE [50]; D ENYING D EFENDANT ’ S M OTION TO S UPPRESS [52]

I. INTRODUCTION Defendant David Lieu is charge d by Superseding Indictment with one count of distributing child pornogra phy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 225 2(a)(2), and one count of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, in violation o f 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). See Superseding Indictment, ECF N o. 48. The Government alleges tha t Mr. Lieu engaged in a series of electronic communications w ith an undercover de tective who w as posing as a father of a fictitious nine-year-old girl and that Mr. Lieu made arrangemen ts to meet the fictitious father and child for the purpose of engaging i n illicit sexual activity wi th the daughter. This matter is presently before the Court on two r elated evidentiary motions. First, Mr. Lieu moves to suppress a variety of evidence based on his claim that the Government vi olated his constitutional protections under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. See Def.’s Mot. Suppress (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 52. Second, the Government moves to admit evidence tha t Mr. Lieu (1) possessed child pornography at his home, (2) had previously sexually abus ed his stepdaughter, and (3) was communicating with someone, contem poraneous with his conversati ons with the undercover detective, about his sexu al interest in children. See United States’ Mot. Admit (“Gov’t Mot.”),2 ECF No. 50. For the reasons state d below, the Court will deny Mr. Lieu’s motion to suppress and grant the Government’s moti on to admit the evidence of the prior bad acts, subject to a limiting instruction.

II. BACKGROUND A. Allegations of the Instant Offenses The Government intends to prove t he following allegations at tr ial. In the winter of 2016, Detective Timothy Palchak was acting in an underc over capacity as part of the Metropolitan Police Department-Federal Bureau of Investigation (“MPD-FBI”) C hild Exploitation Task Force. In that role, he posted an online advertisement on Craigslist i ntended to attract i ndividuals with a sexual interest in c hildren. The advertis ement read: “Any othe r young perv dads into no limit taboo stuff, shoot me an email or leave me your kik, don’t want to say to[o] much on here.” An individual with the profile name “Dave Loof” answered the ad vi a email, stating “[h]ey, I’m totally a taboo/pervy dad. Yea h, I’m into that. What’s on your mind[?]” Detective Palchak, in his undercover capacity, res ponded, “looking to meet other [you ng] dads that are into [young]/incest, etc.” and asked for the individual’s username o n an instant message platform known as “KIK,” which “Dave Loof” supplied. Thereafter, Detective Palchak i nitiated a conversation on KIK, telling the now-target of the investigation that his name was “John.” The target, whose KIK username was “Dave Ell,” told Detective Palchak that he was a 42-year-old man from “Nova ” 1 interested in “incst/yng.” Detective Palchak asked the tar get whether he had “any lil ones .” Detective Palchak indicated that he himself had a nine-year-o ld daughter. “Dave Ell” respo nded “[w]ow! . . . hot” and noted

1 “Nova” is a common regional sh orthand used to reference “North ern Virginia.”3 that he had two stepchildre n, ages eleven and fourteen. 2 “Dave Ell” then asked the detective for details of any sexual acts tha t the detective had engaged in wi th his supposed nine-year-old. Detective Palchak stated that he and his fictional daughter had engaged in reciprocal acts of oral sex on one another. The target responded “Omfg. . . . . HOT,” asked whether she “like[d] it,” and said that the detective wa s a “lucky dawg.” “Dave Ell” als o asked if the detective had any pictures. Detective Palchak then turned to the subject of “Dave Ell’s” ac tivities. Detective Palchak asked whether “Dave Ell” ever got “any play or p eeks” of his st epdaughters. The target responded that he “used to . . a bout 4 ye[ar]s ago. Less now b ut get peeks.” He also indicated that he did not have any pictur es of his stepdaughters because “mom is watching like a hawk.” Detective Palchak asked whether he had “[p]ics of any of what w e like,” to which the target responded “Plenty. Just not of mine.” “Dave Ell” then raised the po ssibility of meeting in person. H e first asked whether the detective had ever done a meeting before. Detective Palchak st ated that he had come close once before, but it never came to fru ition. He explained that he “w as disappointed because [he] was looking forward to it and she [re ferring to his fictional daugh ter] actually was too.” “Dave Ell” responded “Damn. . . . I’d be more than happy to help out withthat.” Detective Palchak indicated that he “may be inter ested,” but he would have to kno w that “Dave Ell” was “safe” by getting some sort of proof. Det ective Palchak asked, of the pi ctures that “Dave Ell” had, what the age was of the youngest chil d. “Dave Ell” indicated that the youngest was probably six years old.

2 “David Ell” indicated that, for purposes of the chat, he wante d to reference the ages of children using an age multiplier, presumably to obscure the fac t that they were discussing children.4 The two then agreed to trade pi ctures. Although he initially i ndicated that he did not have any pictures of his stepdaught ers, “Dave Ell” indicated th at he “[a]ctually found one” from when one of his stepdaughters wa s seven years old. He then sen t Detective Palchak an image of a naked girl who appeared to be a pproximately seven years old a nd was date stamped May 2009, which is consistent with the actual age of Defen dant’s daughter at that time. Detective Palchak then sent two images of his purported nine-year-old daughter, though the images in actuality were not of a real child. “Dave Ell” responded with comments l ike, “[n]iiice,”“[d]amn hot,” and “[g]od she looks delicious!” He also asked sexually explicit q uestions about the child like, “[d]oes she like getting lick ed” and “[e]ver rub it on her own face?” Detective Palchak noted that he sent the images so that “Dave E ll” would know that he was “real/cool” and indicated t hat “a pic or 2 more from u will be all I need the[n] we can talk about meeting up.” “Dave Ell” res ponded, “let me f ind some mor e proof for ya.” After apparently looking for additional photographs, he stated “[d]amn . . . all the ones I have are on another computer,” whi ch he claimed was “in [his] NY apartment. ” Nevertheless, Dave Loof asked to switch their conversat ion to Yahoo Messenger, where he said he could share “some tamer ones.” The two then moved their convers ation to Yahoo Messenger, where the target used the username “roll8mi.” At that poin t, the target sent Detective P alchak several images of child erotica 3 and three images of child pornogr aphy. Each of the three ima ges of child pornography involved naked pre-pubescent girls between the ages of six and twelve years old posing in

3 Child erotica is generally unders tood to mean materials or ite ms that are sexually arousing to persons having a sexua l interest in minors but that are not necessari ly, in and of themselves, obscene or that do not necessarily depict minors in sexually explicit poses or positions.5 sexually explicit positions. Thereafter, “roll8mi” asked Detec tive Palchak if he had ever seen “vicky videos.” Detective Palch ak understood th e target to be referring to the child pornography series involving the well-known c hild victim “Vicky.” The targ et indicated that he had a few of her videos, but “lost most of the good ones.” Detective Palcha k asked if “roll8mi” had “any of those on [him],” to which “roll8mi” responded, “no . . . in my other computer.” As the conversation progressed, “ roll8mi” began to discuss havi ng sexual contact with his stepdaughter. He claimed tha t he started with his oldest s tepdaughter when she was seven years old. He said it “starte d out when [he] put her to bed on e night.” He claimed that “she put her hand on [his] thigh and start ed creeping up.” He said, “as soon as she did that mydick started creeping to meet her hand” and “ she made contact and played som e that night.” He emphasized that “the anticipation of wha t she would do next was enough to make [his] heart jump out of [his] chest.” The target said that he “took it slow from there but s he never went much further.” Detective Palchak and “roll8mi” then began to arrange a meeting for the next day, when Detective Palchak told the tar get he would have his supposed daughter. The target indicated that he had to be in Owings Mills , Maryland until around 3:00 p.m. o r so, but that he would be free after that. Detective Palcha k stated the he had to work until about 3:30 p.m. and said that they “could meet at a bar near [his] a partment[,] grab a drink and then go back to [his] place and have fun with her.” The target rep lied, “that would be sweet.” Det ective Palchak then asked “roll8mi” what he would be “intere sted in doing.” The target s aid he would “do everything except cross your limits.” Detect ive Palchak said his “only li mit is fucking,” and “everything else is cool.” “Roll8mi” asked i f “rubbing” was alright, to wh ich Detective Palchak indicated that it was, as was “all lick ing sucking and fingering.” “Roll 8mi” replied that he was “good with that” and that he “reallylove[d] licking and tasting anyw ay.” He noted that he hoped they6 could “play for a good long time.” The two then traded cell ph one numbers and noted that they looked forward to meeting one another. The next day, February 4, 2016, the s uspect sent a text message to Detective Palchak stating that he could be at the designated bar in Washington, D .C. around 3:30 p.m. When Detective Palchak indicated that he had told his daughter that he “might have company,” the target responded “[a]wesome . . . . . so she’s expecting to play then :-)” He also expressed great enthusiasm for their upcoming m eeting, making statements like “ damn I’m excited” and that he had “[n]ever been so eager :-)” Later, the suspect sent Detectiv e Palchak a text message statin g that he was leaving and expected to arrive at the de signated bar around 4:00 p.m. The detective described his clothing and stated that he would wait for him inside at the corner of the bar. The target noted that he would be wearing a “light sport co at with blue grey slacks.” A t approximately 4:00 p.m., Defendant Lieu arrived at the bar and immediately approached De tective Palchak. The Detective surmised that Mr. Lieu was the suspect he had been communicatin g with based on the clothes that Mr. Lieu was wearing at thattime. Detective Palchak thenasked if he was “Dave,” to which Mr. Lieu replied yes. Mr. Lieu the n asked whether the detectiv e was “John.” Detective Palchak responded affirmatively and aske d whether Mr. Lieu was looking forward to later, and Mr. Lieu indicated that he was. At that point, members of the Child Exp loitation Task Force placed Mr. Lieu under arrest, searched hi s person, and recovered, among ot her things, a cellular telephone and a driver’s license with a s tated address in Camillus, New Y ork. Based on this alleged conduct, Mr . Lieu is now charged with one count of distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of travel with intent to7 engage in illicit sexual c onduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 423(b). See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 48. B. Subsequent Investigation 1. Mr. Lieu’s Interview with FBI Agents Following Mr. Lieu’s arrest, he w as interviewed by FBI Agent Al icia McShane and FBI Agent Jenny Cutalo-Patterson. At the beginning of Mr. Lieu’s i nterview, and before asking him any questions whatsoever, Agents McShane and Cutalo-Patterson a dvised Mr. Lieu, both orally and in writing, that he had a rig ht to remain silent and that h e had a right to have an attorney present. Mr. Lieu orally repre sented to the agents that he und erstood those rights and that he was “willing to cooperate.” Mr. Lieu initially represented, howeve r, that he wanted to have a lawyer before proceeding with the interview. But moments later, and w ithout prompting from the agents, he indicated that he w anted to “try to have a conversat ion” so long as he could answer only the questions that he was com fortable with. The agents ag reed that he could do so and that, in fact, he was entitled to do so. G iven that he had previousl y requested a lawyer and then asked to have a “conversation,” the ag ents asked whether he was, in f act, waiving his ri ght to a lawyer at that moment. Mr. Lieu said he wanted to “run through the qu estions” and would defer on any questions he felt he could not a nswer on his own. The agents t old Mr. Lieu that they understood this response to mean that he w as waiving his right to an attor ney for the time being and asked Mr. Lieu if their understanding was correct. He indicated that it was. Agents then proceeded to ask Mr. Lieu several questions, some of which Mr. Lieu was will ing to answer and others that he was not. Throughout all of this, the agents emphasized at mult iple points that any refusal to answer questions was within hi s right and would not change anything that would happen to him going forward.8 During the interview, the agents noted that Mr. Lieu had a New York driver’s license. Mr. Lieu affirmed that his primar y residence was in New York an d that he had a wife, two stepchildren, and a biologic al child. Mr. Lieu also explained thathe was in the D.C. metropolitan area on business and had traveled f rom a meeting in Maryland to the District of Columbia to meet “John.” Mr. Lieu was not willing, however, to answer any further questions about how he met “John” or the reasons for which he was meeting him. Based on Mr. Lieu’s unwillingness to answer these types of questions , the agents decided to end the questioning. 2. Execution of Search Warrants On February 8, 2016, based on the fac ts alleged above, a United States Magistrate Judge from the Northern District of N ew York issued a warrant authori zing law enforcement officials to execute a search of Mr. Lieu’ s home in New York. Pursuant t o the warrant, law enforcement sought evidence that Mr. Lieu po ssessed child pornography in vi olation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A and were permitted to seize, among other things, comp uters and other electronic media devices that might contai n such evidence. That same day, the warrant was executed and several computers and other electronics were seized, including an external hard-drive that contained 397 images and 19 vide os of child pornography, includ ing approximately 41 media files of the “Vicky Series.” In addition to the search of Mr. L ieu’s home, federal agents al so secured a warrant authorizing the forensic exa mination of the phone that official s seized from Mr. Lieu’s person upon his arrest. That examinati on revealed the conversation th at had taken place with Detective Palchak, but also electronic comm unications that Mr. Lieu had w ith another individual, hereinafter referred to as John D oe. These other communication s began on February 3, 2016, the same day that Mr. Lieu began c orresponding with the undercover detective.9 This conversation, like the one w ith the undercover agent, was initiated by Mr. Lieu in response to an advertisement pos ted on Craigslist that sought o ther individuals who were interested in “taboo.” In his initial email to John Doe, Mr. L ieu emphasized that he was into “young” and “taboo.” During this conversation, Mr. Lieu and Jo hn Doe exchanged stories of sexually abusing minors and enthus iastically discussed their mu tual sexual desires involving children. For his part, Mr. Lieu admitted that he had had an “ experience” with his stepdaughter when she was approximately sevenyears old and stated that he “ wish[ed] it coulda gone further than it did.” And although she w as now older, he claimed that he still caught “glimpses” of her and stated that the child “[s]eems to have amnesia about it all .” Mr. Lieu also told John Doe that he was supposed to meet with anine-year-old that evening. Mr. Lieu indicated that he was “[v]ery excited about it” and that he “was almost shivering uncontrollably” the ni ght before. Mr. Lieu told JohnDoe, that if it went “well,” he would “see about expanding [the] c ircle to include” him. Mr. L ieu and John Doe ultimately exchanged personal email addres ses and made plans to meet in pe rson after Mr. Lieu’s

encounter. 3. Interview with Mr. Lie u’s Oldest Stepdaughter Based on Mr. Lieu’s statements that he had sexually abused his oldest stepdaughter, law enforcement officials in New York decided to interview the chil d. The child initially told investigators that, one time, whe n she was in the fifth grade, she was getting out of the shower when she noticed that Mr. Lieu w as in the bathro om with her. S he claims that he looked at her naked body and told her that she was beautiful. The child also recounted other even ts that occurr ed starting fr om the time she was about seven years old. The child told i nvestigators that, at that ti me, Mr. Lieu began something he10 called “national naked day.” On these “national naked days,” M r. Lieu would apparently have the child run around the house na ked and then later they would both lay naked in bed together. Mr. Lieu allegedly warned the ch ild that she was not allowed to tell anyone about these exploits. Investigators asked her if Mr . Lieu had ever touched her during one of these days, but she initially claimed that she coul d not remember anything else. S everal months later, however, she asked to speak with police again. This time, she informed them , consistent with Mr. Lieu’s accounts, that Mr. Lieu had engage d in sexual acts with her fro m the time that she was seven years old until she was approximately ten. Specifically, she c laimed that Mr. Lieu would “tuck her in” at night and have her touc h his unclothed penis before bed. This behavior suddenly stopped, however, after the chi ld began openly taking about “na tional naked day.” C. The Current Motions This case comes before the Court on two evidentiary motions. F irst, Mr. Lieu claims that the Government violated his cons titutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and that, therefore, certain evide nce must be suppressed. Specific ally, Mr. Lieu seeks suppression of his cellular telephone, statements that he made to federal agen ts following his arrest, and the various electronic devices that were seized from his home. The Government, on the other hand, moves to admit evidence of Mr. L ieu’s prior acts under Rules 41 4 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Specificall y, the Government seeks to intro duce evidence that Mr. Lieu (1) sexually abused his step-daughter w hen she was between the ages of seven and ten years old, (2) possessed 397 images and 19 videos depicting child pornography, and (3) communicated simultaneously with someone else about his sexual interest in c hildren at the same time he was communicating with the undercover agent. Gov’t Mot. at 1. Both motions have now been briefed and on January 18, 2018, the C ourt heard oral argument from the parties.11 III. ANALYSIS The Court first considers Mr. L ieu’s motion to suppress. In br oad strokes, Mr. Lieu essentially presents three argum ents for why certain evidence s hould be suppressed. First, Mr. Lieu argues that, notw ithstanding what was said in the communic ations to Detective Palchak, the agents had neither a warrant nor probable cause when they arres ted him because they could not at that time have been sure he was the person who had generated the messages in question. Accordingly, he argues that thi s arrest violated his Fourth Ame ndment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and that any evidence stemming from his arrest is fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. Second , Mr. Lieu argues that the agents violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment because he invoked his rights under Miranda v. Arizona . For this reason, he argues that his pos t-arrest statements must be suppressed. Finally, he argues th at, because his post-arrest statements were us ed to support the warrant applica tion for his home and the application did not declare that the statements had been obtain ed in violation of his rights, the warrant application was necessari ly defective and any evidence obtained as a result of that search warrant should be suppressed. For the reasons stated below, the Court rejects each of Mr. Lie u’s contentions. Specifically, the Court finds that the circumstances known to the agents at the time of Mr. Lieu’s arrest were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Therefore, there was no violation of Mr. Lieu’s Fourth Amendment right s with respect to his arrest o r the search of his person. Moreover, the Court finds that there was no violation of Mr. Li eu’s Fifth Amendment rights because, after being advised of his right to remain silent and his right to an a ttorney, Mr. Lieu made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those righ ts when he decided to speak with the federal agents. For that reason, the affidavit supporting the warrant to search Mr. Lieu’s12 home was not defective and, in any e vent, the warrant contained sufficient factual underpinnings to support a probable ca use determination even in the absence o f Mr. Lieu’s post-arrest statements. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to suppress any evidence and consequently denies Mr. Lieu’s motion. The Court then addresses the Government’s Motion to admit evide nce of certain prior acts under Rules 414, 404(b), and 40 3 of the Federal Rules of E vidence. Specifically, the Government seeks admission of evidence that (1) Mr. Lieu posses sed child pornography at his home, (2) Mr. Lieu had previousl y sexually abused his stepdaugh ter, and (3) Mr. Lieu, contemporaneous with his communications with the undercover det ective, was also communicating with someone else about his sexual interest in ch ildren. The Court finds that each of these categories of evide nce is variously admissible un der Rules 404(b) and 414 as to each of the charges currently pend ing against Mr. Lieu. Howeve r, the Court will endeavor to ensure that the admission of this evidence is not unduly prejud icial by instructing the jury concerning the purposes for whic h they may consider this eviden ce. A. Mr. Lieu’s Arrest and Seizure of Items from His Person Mr. Lieu argues that the agent s “lacked both a warrant and prob able cause to seize, search[,] and arrest Mr. Lieu.” Def.’s Mot. at 4. For this re ason, Mr. Lieu argues that any evidence seized from his person, any statements that he subsequ ently made to police, and any other evidence that might have f lowed from his arrest must be s uppressed. See Def.’s Mot. at 4. For the reasons set forth below , Mr. Lieu’s arguments fail. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the “right of the people t o be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Thus, all seizures must be13 “founded upon reasonable, objectiv e justification.” United States v. Gross , 784 F.3d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitte d). “[W]hen the government conducts an unconstitutional search or seizure, the Court must exclude any evidence obtained as the ‘fruit’ of that search or seizure.” United States v. Sheffield , 799 F. Supp. 2d 22, 28 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). Courts have expressed a judicial preference for arrests that oc cur as a result of warrants, where probable cause has been e valuated dispassionately by a ma gistrate judge. However, a “warrantless arrest of an indivi dual in a public place for a fe lony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, is cons istent with the Fourth Amendm ent if the arrest is supported by probable cause.” Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (citing United States v. Watson , 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976)). “Whether probable cause exists depe nds upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting of ficer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck , 543 U.S. at 152, (citing Pringle , 540 U.S. at 371). “The quantum of information which constitutes probable cause —evidence which would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that a felony has been committed—must be measure d by the facts of the particular case.” Wong Sun , 371 U.S. at 479 (quoting Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). In this case, the various comm unications between Detective Palc hak and the target of the investigation gave l aw enforcement reasonable grounds to believ e that the suspect with which they had been conversing had distri buted child pornography and intended to engage in sexual relations with a minor. Mr. L ieu does not dispute this. Rathe r he argues that the officers were unreasonable in believing that he was the person who sent the m essages. Mr. Lieu premises his argument on the fact that, prior to his arrest, law enforcement did not know exactly what he looked like. But, the confluen ce of several fac tors made it em inently reasonable for officers to14 believe that he was the person r esponsible. To start, Mr. Lieu arrived at the designated location at the designated time. Once in side, Mr. Lieu immediately proc eeded to a specif ied location in the bar and approached the det ective—a man that Mr. Lieu obviou sly did not know. Moreover, the target of the inve stigation had indicat ed that he would be wearing a “light sport coat with blue grey slacks,” which matche d the clothing that Mr. Lieu was wearing at that time. Furthermore, in the short convers ation that then ensued, Mr. Li eu confirmed that his name was “Dave”—the same name the target gave to the detective—and asked if the detective’s name was “John”—the fake name that the detective had supplied. And when Detective Palchak—again, a stranger to Mr. Lieu—asked whe ther he was “looking forward to l ater,” Mr. Lieu affirmed that he was. Law enforcement theref ore had every reason to believe that Mr. Lieu was the same person with whom they had been messaging. But Mr. Lieu argues that the name s “Dave” and “John” are relati vely common names and that the clothing description is too general to support the connection that the agents made. Mr. Lieu’s argument fails to recognize, however, that the standard of probable cause “deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. ” Pringle , 540 U.S. at 371. “[P]robable cause does not re quire certainty, or proof beyond areasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Cardoza , 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (“Finely-tuned standards such as pro of beyond a reasonable doubt or by a pr eponderance of the evidence . . . have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.”). I nstead, all that is required is “the kind of ‘fair probability’ on which ‘reasonable and prudent [pe ople], not legal technicians, act.’” Florida v. Harris , 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (quoting Gates , 462 U.S. at 238). So, even if any one factor described above might prove too common or innoc uous to support a finding of pro bable cause when viewed in15 isolation, when viewed together i n the aggregate, they at the v ery least create a “fair probability” that Mr. Lieu was the same indi vidual with whom agents had beencommunicating. Cardoza , 713 F.3d at 660 (finding probable caus e to arrest defendant for drug charges, even though “it remained possible that Cardoza would turn out not to be a drug dealer” (emphasis in original)). Therefore, based on all of the circumstances known to law enfor cement at the time, they had probable cause to place Mr. Lieu under arrest. This finding necessarily leads t o the inexorable conclusion tha t the subsequent search of Mr. Lieu’s person and the seizu re of his cellular telephone wer e both proper. It is well established that, following a l awful arrest, officers are permi tted to search “the arrestee’s person and the area within his [or her] immediate control.” Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (quoting Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), abrogated by Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 (2011)). That is preci sely what happened here and , in doing so, officers came across Mr. Lieu’s cellular tele phone. Believing the device to contain relevant evidence, agents were permitted to seize and secure the device. See Riley v. California , 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014). The law enforcement officers s ubsequently obtained a search wa rrant authorizing a forensic examination of the phone , which did in fact contain Mr . Lieu’s communications with Detective Palchak and Mr. Lieu’ s communication w ith John Doe. Mr. Lieu makes no argument that the search incident to arrest, the seizure of his phone, o r the subsequent examination of the phone pursuant to a warrant were in any way improper or violate d Mr. Lieu’s rights. Accordingly, evidence of Mr. L ieu’s cellular pho ne and the datathat it contained need not be suppressed.16 B. Mr. Lieu’s Post-Arrest Statements and Evidence Seized from His New York Home Mr. Lieu also seeks to suppress hi s post-arrest statements and evidence seized from his home in New York on additional grounds. The premise of Mr. Lie u’s argument is that, during his post-arrest interview with A gents McShane and Cutalo-Patter son, he invoked his right to an attorney. Thus, according to Mr. Lieu, any post-arrest stateme nts he made must be suppressed. Furthermore, he argues that “ [e]ven though the [G]overnment obt ained a warrant to search Mr. Lieu’s New York home, agents di d not have a good faith basis to rely on the warrant” because, according to Mr. Lieu, the agents “misled the Court by not disc losing that they procured the statement on which they were rel ying [in the warrant applicatio n] despite Mr. Lieu’s invocation of Miranda rights.” Def.’s Mot. at 5. T he Court is unpersuaded for sever al reasons. 1. Mr. Lieu’s Post Arrest Statements First, it is clear that any st atements obtained from Mr. Lieu a fter his arrest were obtained only after Mr. Lieu voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights. The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n ]o person . . . shall be compelled i n any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V. In 1966, the United States Supreme Court issued the landmark decision Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which announced a set of prophylactic measures intended to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right from the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation. Id. at 467. In that case, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[u]nless adequate protective devic es are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodi al surroundings, no statement obt ained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” Id. at 458. Thus, under Miranda , prior to questioning, a suspect “must be warned that he h as a right to remain silent, t hat any statement he does make may be used as evidence againsthim, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either17 retained or appointed.” Id. at 444. If at any time the suspect stat es that he wishes to remain silent the interrogation must cease. See Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U.S. 98, 104 (2010) (citing Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444). Likewise, if the suspect states that he wants a lawyer, the interrogation must immediately s top and it may not resume “unti l counsel has been made available to him” or “the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). But “after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation.” Id. at 484; see also North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 372– 76 (1979). It is the Government’s burden, however, to show tha t “the defendant ‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently’ waived his rights.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina , 564 U.S. 261, 269–70 (2011) (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 475–76). Based on the audio recording of Mr. L ieu’s interview with feder al agents, the Court has no difficulty finding that the Gove rnment has met its burden indemonstrating a valid waiver. 4

4 Because Mr. Lieu’s waiver of rights is so clear from the recor d, the Court assumes for purposes of this opinion that all of the questions asked consti tuted “interrogation” under Miranda . However, there may be good r eason to doubt that assumption f or at least some of the questions asked of Mr. Lieu give n that they ar guably sought onl y basic identifying information. Standard questions that are unlik ely to elicit incriminating re sponses, such as “where do you live,” are not typical ly considered coercive enough to be const itute an “interrogation.” See e.g. , United States v. Edwards , 885 F.2d 377, 385–86 (7th Cir. 1989) ( “In our opinion, questi ons such as ‘what is your name?’ and ‘where do you live?’ will not usual ly constitute interrogation within the meaning of Miranda ,” even if these questions are a sked at the time of arrest, rat her than during the booking process); United States v. Guiterrez , 92 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir.1996) (“Prior to or after arresting a suspect, l aw enforcement officers may a sk preliminary questions as to identity, but they may not conduct a custodial interrogation”); United States v. Foster , 227 F.3d 1096, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a definition of interrogation t hat included any question posed by a police officer would be broader than that required to impleme nt the policy of Miranda itself; [o]nly questions reasonably likel y to elicit an incriminating r esponse from the suspect amount to interrogation”) (citations and quot ation marks omitted; punctua tion altered for clarity). While other courts have not foreclosed the possibility that such ques tions may, under certain circumstances, be interrogative in nature, see United States v. Knope , 655 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2011), the Court need not necessar ily resolve that question her e because, even if Mr. Lieu’s18 First, Mr. Lieu’s decision to s peak with the agents was both kn owing and intelligent. A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it was “m ade with a full awareness o f both the nature of the right being abandoned and the conseque nces of the decision to abandonit.” Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). Federal agent s advised Mr. Lieu of his r ight to remain silent and his right to an attorney, both orally and i n writing, before asking Mr. L ieu any questions. Mr. Lieu then represented that he understood tho se rights. Moreover, the aud io recording reveals no apparent language barrier impeding Mr. Lie u’s ability to communicate with the agents, it ap pears that Mr. Lieu had no trouble grasping any con cepts presented to him, and he spoke intelligently and discerningly throughout his int erview. In addition, Mr. Lieu f urther demonstrated his understanding of the consequences of waiver when he agreed to s electively answer only some questions but not others. And Mr . Lieu himself makes no argume nt that he either did not understand his rights or that he did not understand the consequ ence of waiver. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Lieu’s wa iver of rights was both knowing a nd intelligent. See Colorado v. Spring , 479 U.S. 564, 575 (1987) (holding tha t “trial court was indis putably correct in finding that [defendant]’s waiver was made knowingly and intelligently within the meaning of Miranda ” because “there [was] no allega tion that [defendant] failed to u nderstand the basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment [,] [n]or [was] there any alle gation that he misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely t o the law enforcement official s”). Moreover, the facts and circumst ances surrounding Mr. Lieu’s de cision to speak with agents after his arrest sugge st that it was a voluntary choice and not one borne out of any undue coercion. “Voluntariness turns on whether the ‘defendant’s wil l was overborne’ when he gave

statements were the product of a custodial interrogation, his r esponses were made after a voluntary, knowing, intelligent waiver of his rights.19 his statement.” United States v. Murdock , 667 F.3d 1302, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). “[T]he test for this is whether the statement was a ‘product of an essentially free and unconstrain ed choice by its maker.’” Id. (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut , 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). To assess this question, a court must consider the “totality of a ll the surrounding circumstance s—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 226. Among other factors, courts should consider “the defendant’s age and educat ion, the length of detention, whether the defendant was advi sed of his rights, and the nature of the questioning.” Murdock , 667 F.3d at 1305–06 (citing Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 226). But “[a]n e xpress written or oral statement of waiver of the rig ht to remain silent or of the rig ht to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver.” Butler , 441 U.S. at 373. Here, although Mr. Lieu initially r equested a lawyer before pro ceeding with the interview, he then—only moment s later and without prompting fro m the agents—asked that they have a “conversation” and “run through the questions” without t he presence of his lawyer. 5

5 In the interview, agents asked M r. Lieu to sign a written waiv er of rights after they had orally advised him. This document formed the basis of Mr. Lieu ’s Miranda challenge because it appears that, at some point, som eone wrote the word “INVOKED” o n the signature line. This notation seems to refer to the f act that Mr. Lieu initially stated he would not answer questions without his lawyer present. How ever, it does not appear to acc ount for the fact that he then changed his position and invited the agents to proceed with the interview. The Supreme Court has stated that police may resum e an interrogation after a defe ndant invokes his right to counsel if “the accused himself initiates further communication, exchan ges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards , 451 U.S. at 484–85. That is, he must “evince[] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion a bout the investigation.” Oregon v. Bradshaw , 462 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983) (plurality). A careful rev iew of the audio from Mr. Lie u’s interrogation demonstrates that this is precisely what happened here. Indeed, Mr. Lieu made it quite clear to agents that he was inviting conversation about the c ircumstances of his arrest and that he wished to proceed with the interview without his lawyer pr esent. The Court has no reason to believe that Mr. Lieu spoke with agents involuntarily or that agents acted in any way impro per by proceeding with the interview. Accordingly, the C ourt has no reason to believe tha t this document evidences a contravention of Mr. L ieu’s rights under Miranda

.20 When the agents asked for clari fication, Mr. Lieu confirmed tha t he was waiving his right to an attorney at that moment. Throughout Mr. Lieu’s interview, the agents treated Mr. Lieu with both kindness and respect. The agents attempted to ensure that he w as comfortable and spoke with him in a calm and conversational tone. They also repeatedly re assured Mr. Lieu that he was permitted to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights at any time and that he would suffer no ill consequences for doing so. And Mr . Lieu, in fact, did refuse t o answer several questions during the interview. Mr. Lieu’s abil ity to discern which questions h e wanted to answer is further evidence that his will was not ove rborne and that his post-arre st statements to the agents were made voluntarily and were not t he product of undue coercion. F inally, Mr. Lieu himself makes no argument that he was coerced, intimidated, tricked or cajole d into making any waiver or statement during the interview w ith agents. For all of these r easons, the Court finds that Mr. Lieu’s waiver of his righ ts was made voluntarily. Because Mr. Lieu’s statements were made only after he was advis ed of his rights and after Mr. Lieu decided to vol untarily, knowingly, and intellige ntly waive those rights, the Court finds no reason to suppress Mr. Lieu’ s post-arrest statements. 2. Evidence Seized from Mr. Lieu’s New York Home The Court’s conclusion that Mr. L ieu’s Fifth Amendment rights w ere not violated necessarily resolves, Mr. Lieu’ s other argument—that the affida vit supporting the warrant application, which sought authori zation to search Mr. Lieu’s Ne w York home, was defective because it, in part, relied on those statements. But even if M r. Lieu’s statements had been obtained in violation of Miranda —which they were not—the Court would nonetheless find that the warrant was valid.21 Mr. Lieu’s argument is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Franks involved a defendant’s challenge to a warrant affidavit that, according to the defendant, cont ained false statements. Id. at 157–58. The Court held that “where the defendant makes a s ubstantial preliminary showing th at a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckle ss disregard for the truth, wa s included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the all egedly false statement is nece ssary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requi res that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.” Id. at 155–56. Entitlement to a so-called Franks hearing, however, requires a showing that “(1) the affidavit contained false stateme nts; (2) the statements were m aterial to the issue of probable cause; and (3) the false stateme nts were made knowingly and int entionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Becton , 601 F.3d 588, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The D.C. Circuit “has extended Franks to apply not only where the Government is alleged to have m ade false statements but also wh ere a defendant alleges that the Government ‘knowingly and intentionally (or with reckless disre gard) omitted a fact that would have defeated probable cause.’” United States v. Williams , 827 F.3d 1134, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Glover , 681 F.3d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Here, Mr. Lieu argues that “[t]h e agents misled the Court by no t disclosing that they procured the statement on whic h they were rely ing despite Mr. L ieu’s invocation of Miranda rights.” Def.’s Mot . at 5. But, as discussed above, Mr. Lieu made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights during his interview with agents. Thus, the Court find s that the Defendant has not identified any misstatement or omiss ion in the warrant affidavit, let alone an omission that was knowi ng, intentional, or made with r eckless disregard. Accordingly, Mr. Lieu’s challenge fail s on this basis alone.22 But even if there was an omi ssion, the omission was not materia l to the issue of probable cause. The Supreme Court has de scribed the assessment of probable cause for purposes of a search warrant as “a practical, c ommon-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that c ontraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Judges “need not confine their evaluations with in rigorous leg alistic boundaries but instead may use their common sense.” United States v. Davis , 617 F.2d 677, 692 (D.C.Cir.1979). More over, courts “ordinari ly do not suppress evidence seized purs uant to a search warrant un less the warrant affidavit was ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official beli ef in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” United States v. Cardoza , 713 F.3d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). Here, the warrant application at issue contained sufficient gro unds to believe that there may be evidence of a crime at Mr. Lieu’s home, even if the Court were to purge Mr. Lieu’s statements from the affidavit. The warrant application sought authorization to search Mr. Lieu’s New York home for evidence thatMr. Lieu had received or posses sed child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 a nd 2252A. The only statements from Mr. Lieu’s interview reported in the warrant applica tion were Mr. Lieu’s confirmatio n that he lived in New York with his wife, two stepchildren, and bi ological daughter and that he was in the D.C. area on business when he was arrested. The sole i mport of this information for purposes of the probable cause determination would seem to be tha t he lived in New York—the pl ace to be searched. But even without Mr. Lieu’s statements, the affidavit supportin g the warrant application gave ample reason to believe that there may be evidence of a cr ime at his New York residence. During Mr. Lieu’s conversation w ith the undercover agent, Mr. L ieu apparently sought to23 provide Detective Palchak image s of child pornography as a mean s of demonstrating that he was not law enforcement or otherwise to prove that he was serious about meeting with the supposed father. Mr. Lieu wrote “ok . . . . let me find some more proof for ya,” but stated that “all the ones [he] [had] are on another computer ,” which he indicated were “i n [his] NY apartment.” Likewise, during their discuss ion of a series of child pornographic videos known as “Vicky videos,” Mr. Lieu indicated tha t he had one such video “in [his ] other computer.” According to the affidavit, at the time of M r. Lieu’s arrest, he was in poss ession of a valid New York state driver’s license, which indicated a current address in Camillus , New York. Aff. ¶ 24. Subsequent investigation confirme d that all of Mr. Lieu’s vehic les were registered at that address and a woman living at the addre ss confirmed that she was marrie d to Mr. Lieu. Aff. ¶ 25. Consequently, the other details of the affidavit provided ample support for a finding of probable cause and issuance of the warrant, even when discounted for Mr. Lieu’s statements. Thus, the Court finds that the items and mat erials seized from Mr. Lieu’s home were properly seized pursuant to a valid warrant and that Mr. Lieu has not identifie d any legitimate basis upon which the items should be suppressed. C. Admissibility of Mr. Lieu’s Prior Acts Having found no violations of the defendant’s constitutional ri ghts and no reason therefore to suppress any evide nce, the Court must now address the question raised by the Government’s motion: whether evi dence of certain prior bad acts may be admitted for a permissible purpose under the Fed eral Rules of Evidence. The G overnment seeks to introduce evidence pertaining to three matters that it claims are relevan t to the charges against Mr. Lieu. First, the Government seeks admission of evidence that Mr. Lieu sexually abused his stepdaughter when she was betweenthe ages of seven and ten yea rs old. See Gov’t Mot. at 1.24 Second, the Government wishes t o introduce evidence showing tha t Mr. Lieu possessed 397 images and 19 videos depicting c hild pornography on an electron ic media storage device at his home. See Gov’t Mot. at 1, 9. Lastly, the G overnment would like to intro duce evidence that, at the same time that Mr. Lieu was communicating with the undercov er agent, he was simultaneously communicating with someone else about his sexual interest in children. See Gov’t Mot. at 1. The Court finds that evidence concerning all of these matters may be properly introduced variousl y under Rules 404(b) a nd 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, subject to a limiting jury instruction. 1. Rules 404(b) The Court first considers the admissibility of the proposed evi dence under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) generally prohibits a dmission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove that the defendant has a propensity to commit the charged crime . However, evidence of those other acts may be admissible fo r other purposes, including prov ing motive, intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mista ke. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). “Altho ugh the first sentence of Rule 404(b) is framed restrictively, t he rule itself is quite permis sive, prohibiting the admission of other crimes evidence in but one circumstance—for the purpose o f proving that a person’s actions conformed to his character.” United States v. Bowie , 232 F.3d 923, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, Rule 404(b) is properly regarded as one of “inclusion rather than exclusion.” Id. at 929. In addressing admissibility of pr ior acts under the Federal Rul es, this Circuit employs a two-step analysis. “Under the first step, which addresses Rule 404(b), ‘[the court] must determine whether the evidence is relevant to a material issue other than character.” United States v. Burch , 156 F.3d 1315, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Mitchell , 49 F.3d25 769, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). “‘If so, [the court] proceed[s] to the second inquiry,’ under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, ‘whether th e probative value is substanti ally outweighed by the prejudice.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell , 49 F.3d at 775). In this case, Mr. Lieu is cha rged with distribution of child po rnography and travel with intent to engage in illicit sexua l conduct. Importantly, the d istribution charge r equires that the Government demonstrate that Mr. Lieu sent the images of child p ornography to Detective Palchak “knowingly” and the trave l offense requires that he tra veled to the District “for the purpose of engaging in [] illicit sexual conduct with another p erson.” Consequently, Mr. Lieu’s state of mind at both the time th at he sent the images to Detec tive Palchak and then later traveled to the District of Columbia is likely to be a central issue at trial. Indeed, it is often true that, in cases such as this, a defendant’s mental state is a highly cont ested issue and usually a key aspect of the accused’s defense at tri al. “Federal courts repeatedly have held that the government may offer evidence in its case-in-c hief in anticipat ion of an expec ted aspect of the defense.” United States v. Curtin , 489 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2007). Upon consideration of the categories of evidence that the Government seek s to admit, the Court is persu aded that the proposed evidence is relevant to material issues other than character with regard to all charges against Mr. Lieu— namely, motive, intent, know ledge, and absence of mistake. “A prior bad act does not have to involve the exact same intent of the charged offense in order to be relevant.” United States v. Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing United States v. Long , 328 F.3d 655, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (emphasis in original). “Evidence of a similar act must meet a thres hold level of similarity in orde r to be admissible to prove intent,” but that evidence is not required to have “exact congruence.” Long , 328 F.3d at 661. Indeed, “admissible bad acts evidence need not show incidents identical to the events charged so long as26 they are closely related to the offense, and are probative of i ntent rather than mere propensity.” Id. Moreover, “to be relevant, the Government’s proposed Rule 404 (b) evidence does not have

to prove the Defendant’s intent, it ne ed only make it more probable that the Defendant possessed the requisite intent.” Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (emphasis in original). “What matters is that the evidence be relevant ‘to s how a pattern of operation that w ould suggest intent’ and that tends to undermine the defendant’s innocent explanation.” Long , 328 F.3d at 661. In the context of crimes invol ving sexual exploitation of minor s, it is generally accepted in this Circuit and elsewhere, that “evidence of a defendant’s sexual attraction to children (or teenagers) is probative of the s pecific intent element of crimi nal statutes invol ving sexual activity with minors.” Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (citing United States v. Chambers , 642 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2011)). Indeed, “[w]hether or not the Defendant is s exually attracted to children, though not necessarily dispositive, is relevant to the broader question” of whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to engage in a crime involving s exual predation of children. Id. (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Sebolt , 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2006) (evidence demonstrating “se xual interest in children . . . serv e[s] as evidence of the defendant's motive to commit a charged offens e involving the sexual exploit ation of children”); United States v. Moore , 425 F. App’x. 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[E]vidence of other sexual offenses committed by the defendant does not need to be similar in every respect to the charged offense”—it only “needs to be proba tive as to some element of t he charged offense.” (citing United States v. Dillon , 532 F.3d 379, 389 (5th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Curtin , 489 F.3d 935, 952 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[C]ontextual and circumstantial evid ence becomes acutely relevant to a defendant’s material state of mind ‘prior to his contact’ wit h the object of his sexual attention and . . . such evidence is not only admissible, but may be crit ical.”). In this case, each of the27 prior acts that the Government s eeks to introduce demonstrates Mr. Lieu’s sexual attraction to children and are therefore relev ant to questions of intent and knowledge with respect to each of the crimes with which he is charged. a. Collection of Child Pornography There is, of course, an obvious conn ection between Mr. Lieu’s p ossession of child pornography and his state of mind w ith respect to the charge in volving the distribution of child pornography. Indeed, Mr. Lieu’s possession of other child porn ography demonstrates a sexual interest in children that tends to make it more probable that M r. Lieu distributed images of child pornography knowingly and that it was not merely a mistake. See e.g., United States v. Brown , 862 F.2d 1033, 1038 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding “ no difficulty withthe admission into evidence of the child pornography found . . . in [de fendant]’s home” in cas e involving charge of knowing receipt of child pornography because it was relevant to show “p roof of . . . intent, . . . knowledge, . . . or absence of mistake or acc ident.” (quoting Fed. R. Evid . 404(b) (alterations in original)); Long , 328 F.3d at 663 (“It hardly can be denied that ‘in cases wher e a defendant is charged with unlawful possession of something, e vidence that he possessed th e same or similar things at other times is often quite relevant to h is knowledge and intent with regard to the crime charged.’” (quoting United States v. King , 254 F.3d 1098, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). Likewise, Mr. Lieu’s collection i s relevant to the travel charg e and the question of Mr. Lieu’s “purpose” in meeting Detec tive Palchak. In cases where the charged crime involves a question of whether the defendant intended to have sexual conta ct with a minor, courts routinely find that possession of such materia l is admissible under Rule 404(b) as probative of the defendant’s sexual attraction to children. See e.g., Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (“Defendant’s access to child pornography is relevant to the Defendant’s inte nt in this case insofar as it is28 probative of his sexual attraction to children” in case involvi ng two counts of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor.); United States v. Hardy , 520 F. App’x. 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2013) (admission of evidence of defe ndant’s prior possession of child pornography under Rule 404(b) was not an abuse of discretion be cause “possession of child pornography depicting young boys and the charged offense involve t he same mental state, as both involve a sexual interest in young boys[,]” which “makes it more likely that he intended to persua de, induce, entice, or coerce a 12- year-old boy to engage in se xual activity with him”); United States v. Brand , 467 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he fact that [d efendant] had images of chil d pornography on his computer made it more probable than it w ould be without the evidence tha t [defendant]’s intent was to travel to New York to engage i n illicit sexual activity and to attempt to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.” (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted)). In his opposition to the Government’s motion, Mr. Lieu makes a rather puzzling argument concerning his access to the child pornography. He ar gues that the child pornography is not relevant because he did “not have [] access to images an d videos found on a computer in New York . . . because the government alleges that he was in th e Districts of Columbia and Maryland.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. Mr . Lieu emphasizes that, while the hard drive was found in his home, it is a home that he “sh ared . . . with other people.” P l.’s Opp’n at 1. As we know, those other people were his wife, t wo stepdaughters, and biological d aughter. Mr. Lieu does not seriously contend that the mate rials in fact belonged to any of them. Indeed, there is every reason to find that Mr. Lieu was in constructive possession of the child pornography because it was found in his home and he specifically linked himself to it when he told Detective Palchak that this material could be found there. See United States v. Dorman , 860 F.3d 675, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Constructive posse ssion of contraband found in a shared space in the defendant's29 home can be shown only where it was kept in plain view . . . or where there is additional evidence, including the defenda nt’s presence and conduct at the time of the search or an item in his control, linking him to the c ontraband.” (internal citation s omitted)). More importantly, whether Mr. Lieu had immediate physical access to the material at the exact moment of his alleged offenses does not detract from its relevance on the iss ues related to his state of mind. His possession alone is indicative of his sexual interests in child ren and it is especially probative of his state of mind as to the c harged offenses because, during hi s conversation with Detective Palchak, he specifically referen ced his interest in these photo graphs and videos. While the Court finds that the im ages likely have significant p robative value, the Court will at this time reserve judgment as to the extent of their admissibility under Rule 403 because the Government has not yet identif ied the images that it wishes to present at trial or the form in which it wishes to present them. As discussed above, a defendant’s possession of child pornography is generally admissi ble under Rule 404(b) in cases such as this because such evidence is regarded to be proba tive of matters of motive, inte nt, knowledge, and absence of mistake. Moreover, the probati ve value of such material may be heightened if they are, for example, representative of the conduct at issue in the case. See Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (“The revised exhibit should include images accessed in 2012 to the extent they are representative of the type of sexual conduct the Defendant disc ussed with JP.”). On the other hand, the Government has identif ied literally hundreds of photo graphs and nearly twenty videos depicting sexually exp licit images of child ren. Thus, there is a rather apparent danger that presentation of each photograph a nd video would likely be needl essly cumulative. And while “the risk of unfair prejudice is minimized by the ‘already-grap hic nature of the case,’” Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (quoting United States v. Wolford , 386 F. Appx. 479, 484 (5th Cir. 2010)), the30 Court cannot fully and properly w eigh the probative, prejudicia l, and redundancy value of the images without first having revie wed precisely what it is that the Government intends to introduce at trial, see United States v. Curtin , 489 F.3d 935, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The inflammatory nature and reprehe nsible nature of these abhorrent [,] [prurient] stories, although generally relevant, is such that a district court making a Rule 403 decision must know precisely what is in the stories in ord er for its weighing discretion to be properly exercise d and entitled to deference on appeal.”). Accord ingly, the Court finds that, as a general matter, the images and videos of child pornography found at Mr. Lieu’s home are admiss ible under Rule 404(b), but this admissibility is subject to this Court’s review of the evidence so that it may determine the number of images that might be admitted and how they may be pre sented. b. Prior Abuse of Mr. Lieu’s Step Daughter Like the evidence of Mr. Lie u’s possession of child pornography , Mr. Lieu’s alleged abuse of his stepdaughter is probative of issues of knowledge, intent, motive, and absence of mistake with respect to the ch arged crimes. Indeed, like posse ssion of child pornography, a prior act of molestation demonstrates a p rurient intere st in children , and courts have frequently admitted evidence of such acts under Rule 404(b) in cases invol ving charges of child pornography and crimes involving travel for purposes of engagin g in illicit sexual misconduct. See e.g., United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence under Rule 404(b)” because “the government had to prove intent to travel interstat e to sexually abuse the minor relative and the ste pdaughters’ testimony suggests a similar pa ttern of sexual abuse of female minor relatives made possible by exploitation of familial autho rity.”); United States v. Dhingra , 371 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[t] estimony regarding sexua l contact with a minor is31 particularly relevant in the context of a prosecution under § 2 422(b) because intent is a key element of a crime” and “[w]hat could be more probative of illi cit purpose than carrying through with the sex act itself?”); United States v. Russell , 662 F.3d 831, 846–47 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that evidence of prior molesta tion was allowed under Rule 404(b ) to show defendant’s motive in taking obscene photographs of children). Under the circumstances presente d here, the Court concludes tha t the probative value of the evidence is not substan tially outweighed by undue prejudice . First, the Court is convinced that evidence of Mr. Lieu’s al leged assault on h is stepdaughter is particularly s alient on the issue of Mr. Lieu’s intent and knowle dge. To start, this alleged con duct occurred within approximately four years of the a lleged crimes at issue, which is not so remote in time as to have lost all relevance to the crimes at issue. See e.g., United States v. Knope , 655 F.3d 647, 657 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The other acts occurred within the past three years, s ufficiently close in time to his arrest to be relevantto the offense.”). Its relevance is further confirmed, however, by the fact that Mr. Lieu expressly raised th is alleged abuse in his commun ications with Detective Palchak and, later, with John Doe. Because Mr. Lieu himself raised thi s conduct in his communications, the truth and veracity of his a ssertions on that topic are high ly informative of hi s state of mind. Indeed, by corroborating these interactions, it casts doubt on the notion that his communications with the detective were merely amanifestation of harmless sexu al fantasy or some other morbid curiosity and were, in fact, a r eflection of his actual intent and desires. In addition, evidence that Mr. Lieu abused his stepdaughter b etween the ages of seven and ten demonstrates, not just a sexual interest in c hildren, but an actual and specific sexual interest in female children of approximately that age. This is relevant because it is consist ent with the crimes with which he is charged. Indeed, the images thathe sent to Detective Palchak depicted girls between the ages of32 six and twelve years old and he i s accused of traveling into th e District to have sex with a nineyear-old girl. Thus, it paints apicture that Mr. Lieu sent im ages of child pornography knowingly and that he traveled to the dist rict with an actual and serious purpose to abuse a female child of that age. Weighing against this rather si gnificant and probative evidence is minimal prejudice. While the alleged abuse would certainly seem abhorrent, based o n the representations made to the Court, it does not appear tha t the evidence will be especia lly graphic in the context of the crimes with which Mr. Lieu has been charged. Likewise, the Court has no reason to believe that the testimony on the topic will be especially voluminous or oth erwise dominate the trial. Accordingly, the Court finds tha t evidence of Mr. Lieu’s allege d abuse of his stepdaughter is admissible under Rules 404(b) and 403. c. Mr. Lieu’s Communications with John Doe Finally, the Court finds that ev idence that Mr. Lieu engaged in explicit discussions with John Doe is properly admissibl e under Rules 404(b) and 403 and is relevant to the issues of knowledge, intent, motive, and abs ence of mistake. Mr. Lieu in itially made contact with John Doe through the Craigslist webs ite and the two then enthusiasti cally discussed their mutually shared sexual interest in children. Thus, at a minimum, these communications demonstrate Mr. Lieu’s sexual interest in child ren, and are therefore relevant to Mr. Lieu’s knowledge at the time he sent the images of child pornography to Detective Palchak. Moreover, in light of the fact that Mr. Lieu is charged with using the Craigslist website to arrang e a meeting with a supposed father of a young girl for the purpose of s exually abusing a child, Mr . Lieu’s communica tions with John Doe are sufficiently similar t o the charged conduct to permit a reasonable jury to d raw from it an inference that Mr. Lieu was mo tivated by a sexual intent when h e traveled into the District of33 Columbia to meet Detective Palc hak and his fictitious daughter. See e.g., Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (“[E]vidence the Defendant engaged in explicit discussio ns of sexual contact with minors, regardless of whether or not he f ollowed through with plans to meet in person, is probative of his intent to entice or coerce the minors to engage in illicit sexu al activity.”); United States v. McDarrah , 351 F. App’x. 558, 561, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that tria l court properly admitted four emails that defendant sent to “erotic services ad vertisements on Craigslist” under Rule 404(b) because they were “relevant to his knowledge and in tent, because he wrote those emails to girls he knew could be minors . . . and his emails sh owed his interest i n actual sexual conduct”); Knope , 655 F.3d at 657 (holding that chats showing that defendant “h ad expressed interest in having sex with mi nors in the past, that he had att empted to meet with at least one minor [] for this purpose, and tha t he attempted to distinguishbetween actual minors and other who might pose as minors on the i nternet . . . was relevant to establishing [defendant]’s knowledge, intent, and lac k of mistake”) (citing Sebolt , 460 F.3d at 917). And, just as he admitted to Detective Palchak, Mr. Lieu admits in this conversa tion with John Doe that he had sexual contact with his stepdaughter, further adding to its pro bative value on the issue of intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake. See Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d at 122–23 (defendant’s “repeated admission” in an electronic chat transcript that “in the past h e had sexual contac t with an eleven year-old boy” was “highly relevan t to the Defendant’s intent to actually coerce or entice the minors at issue in this case.”). But perhaps the most probative as pect of this correspondence is the fact that it occurred contem poraneously with Mr. Lieu’s con versation with the undercover agent and Mr. Lieu expressly ref erenced his upcoming meeting wi th the undercover agent. In fact, Mr. Lieu expressed great e nthusiasm for his upcoming meet ing with the agent and his fictitious daughter and gave no i ndication that his desire to m eet them involved fantasy rather34 than actual intent. Thus, for these reasons, the conversation is highly probative of Mr. Lieu’s state of mind around the time of his alleged offenses. After closely reviewing the tran script of Mr. Lieu’s conversati on with John Doe, the Court finds that the risk of unf air prejudice does not substant ially outweigh its probative value. As noted above, the transcript of Mr. Lieu’s communications with John Doe is highly probative of Mr. Lieu’s state of mind—an i ssue that is likely to be of cr itical importance in this case. Although the graphic nature of the conversation may be prejudic ial in some sense, the conversation is relatively brie f and, given that the subject ma tter of this case is centered on sexual exploitation of minors, a ny prejudice to Mr. Lieu cannot be said to be wholly “unfair.” See id. at 123 (“The subject matter of the Defendant’s conversations w ith Aussie creates some risk of prejudice,” but “in a case that by definition concerns sexual activity with minors, the discussions with Aussie are not unduly prejudicial.” (emphasis in or iginal)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Lieu’s conve rsation with John Doe is admis sible under Rule 404(b) and 403. 2. Rule 414 In addition to Rule 404(b), the Gove rnment argues that evidence of Mr. Lieu’s collection of child pornography and his abuse of his stepdaughter are inde pendently admissible under Rule 414. As discussed above, the admi ssibility of a defendant’s pr ior acts is ordinarily governed by Rule 404, which prohibits using evi dence to show that the defen dant has a propensity to act in a certain manner and that the de fendant, in fact, acted in accord ance with that propensity in a given instance. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1 ),(2). But, cases involving “ child molestation” are different. Rule 414(a) provides that “[i]n acriminal case in which a defe ndant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant co mmitted any other child molestation” and emphasizes that “[t]he evidence may be conside red on any matter to which it is35 relevant.” Fed. R. Evid. 414(a). Thus, Rule 414 “create[s] an exception to the general ban on propensity evidence contained in Rule 404(b).” United States v. Seymour , 468 F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Jones , 748 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Rule 414 removes Rule 404(b)’s blanket ba n on propensity inferences in c hild-molestation cases.”). In fact, Rule 414 embodies a “strong legislative judgment that evi dence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible.” United States v. LeCompte , 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997). The Rule’s historical notes sugge st that “[t]o implement the le gislative intent, the courts must liberally construe these rules to provide the basis for a fullyinformed decision of sexual assault and child molestation cases, inc luding assessment of the defend ant’s propensities and questions of probability in light of the de fendant’s past conduct.” Fed. R. Evid. 413 Historical Notes. Nevertheless, “Rule 414 evidence remains subject to Rule 403’s balancing between probative value and unfair prejudice.” United States v. Joubert , 778 F.3d 247, 254 (1st Cir. 2015). To determine the applicabilit y of Rule 414, the Court must firs t consider the threshold issue of whether this is a cri minal case in which Mr. Lieu has been “accused of child molestation,” as the Rule defi nes that term. Under Rule 414, “ child molestation” is defined to include, among other things, crime s under federal law involving “any conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. chapter 109A and committed with a child,” “any conduct p rohibited by 18 U.S.C. chapter 110,” as well as certain other cri mes of a sexual nature commit ted with children 6 or attempts or conspiracies to enga ge in such conduct. See Fed. R. Evid. 414(d)(2). In this case, only one of the two c harges against Mr. Lieu come s within Rule 414’s definition of “child molestation.” Count One of the supersedin g indictment, which concerns Mr. Lieu’s alleged distribution of c hild pornography, is a crime un der 18 U.S.C. chapter 110 and

6 The term “child” is further de fined as “a person below the age of 14.”36 therefore constitutes “child molestation” under Rule 414. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). On the other hand, Count Two, which invol ves travel with intent to eng age in illicit sexual conduct, is found in chapter 117 of Title 18. Thus, it does not fall withi n Rule 414’s inclusion for crimes found in chapters 109A or 110. 7 Moreover, the acts allege d for purposes of Count Two do not fall within the other acts enum erated in Rule 414, which genera lly involve sexual contact with persons under the age of 14. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). The Government makes no argument for why Rule 414 evidence should be c onsidered for purposes of Coun t Two. Thus, to the extent that Rule 414 applies, it applie s only to evidence used for pur poses of Count One. The next step then is to assess wh ether the evidence that the G overnment seeks to admit is “evidence that the defendant committed [another] child moles tation” and whether it is relevant to the current charge. See Fed. R. Evid. 414(a). The Government seeks to admit the evid ence of Mr. Lieu’s collection of child po rnography and evidence that Mr . Lieu sexually abused his stepdaughter when she was seven-years-old. See Gov’t Mot. at 8–10. The Court has no trouble finding that such matters constitu te “child molestations” for p urposes of the Rule and that they are relevant to Count One. First, the images and videos of child pornography discovered at Mr. Lieu’s home clearly constitute “child molestation” under the Rule because, like Count One, knowing possession of child pornography is conduct pr ohibited by 18 U.S.C. chapter 11 0. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Moreover, as di scussed in greater detail above , his possession of this material is certainly relevant to the di stribution charge for it is help ful in proving intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident. See Brown , 862 F.2d at 1038 (finding “no difficulty with the

7 Although the Government initially c laimed in its motion that t he Count Two was a crime under chapter 110, it notif ied the Court at oral argument that this claim was in error.37 admission into evidence of the child pornography found . . . in[defendant]’s home” in case involving charge of knowing rece ipt of child pornography becaus e it was relevant to show “proof of . . . intent, . . . knowledge, . . . or absence of mistake o r accident.” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (alterations in original)); Long , 328 F.3d at 663 (“It hardly can be denied that ‘in cases where a defendant is charged w ith unlawful possession of someth ing, evidence that he possessed the same or similar things at other times is often quite releva nt to his knowledge and intent with regard to the crime charged.’” (quoting United States v. King , 254 F.3d 1098, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). Likewise, evidence that Mr. Lie u sexually abused his seven-year -old stepdaughter is also properly admissible under Rule 414 for purposes of Count One. According to the Government, Mr. Lieu’s stepdaughter, in her discussions with police, indica ted that Mr. Lieu had “engaged in sexual acts with her, beginning fro m when she was seven years o ld until she was ten years old.” Gov’t Mot. at 9. Specifically, she claimed that Mr. Lieu would “‘tuck her in’ at night and have her touch his unclothed penis be fore bed.” Gov’t Mot. at 9. S uch conduct constitutes “child molestation” as it is a “crim e under federal law” involving “co ntact between the defendant’s genitals . . . and [a] part of a child’s body.” Fed. R. Evid. 414(d)(2)(D); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c) (aggravated sexual abuse with children), 2244(5) (abusi ve sexual contact). It is also conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 109A that was committed with a child under the age of 14. Fed. R. Evid. 414(d)(2)(A). And, as discussed above, Mr. Lieu’ s alleged abuse of his daughter is relevant to the charged offenses because, like the evidence of child pornography found in his home, if true, it demonstrates M r. Lieu’s sexual interest in ch ildren and is admissible to prove his propensity to possess and distribute prurient materials involvi ng children. See United States v. Foley , 740 F.3d 1079, 1087–88 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Under Rule 414, Mino r Male B’s testimony38 about his past molestation was adm issible to prove [defendant]’ s propensity to produce and possess child pornography unde r federal law.”); United States v. Moore , 425 F. App’x. 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that, in case where defendant was char ged with receiving and possessing child pornography, trial court di d not abuse disc retion in admi tting “the testimony and diary excerpts of his stepdaughter, w ho alleged that [defendant] had molested her when she was twelve,” to prove that defendant had a “sexual interest in chil dren” under Rule 414); United States v. Bentley , 475 F. Supp. 2d 852, 858 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (admitting Rule 414 evidence because “[i]f the jury finds tha t Defendant sexually molested [ victims], there would be evidence that Defendant has a sexual int erest in children and thus has apropensity to commit the crimes alleged in the Second Superseding Indictment,” which are produc tion, possession and transportation of child pornography.) Consequently, the Court finds tha t evidence of Mr. Lieu’s colle ction of child pornography and his alleged abuse of his stepdaughter may be pr operly admitted under Rule 414 and may be used to demonstrate pr opensity with respect to Count One, 8 but only so long as the

8 There is conflicting authority on the issue of how evidence of “child molestation” may be used in cases in which some , but not all, of the charges aga inst a criminal defendant amount to “child molestation.” Some courts have held that the evidence m ay only be considered in relation to the crimes that fall wi thin Rule 414’s definition. See United States v. Schuttpelz , No. 07- 20410, 2010 WL 363319, at *1 (E.D. M ich. Jan. 22, 2010) (“Insof ar as Congress, in FRE 414, requires admission at trial of evi dence of a prior child molest ation offense[], the Court finds admissible Defendant’s prior c onviction, noted by the Governmen t-but only as to the Counts that come under 414”). Other courts, ho wever, have emphasized the s weeping language that Congress employed in the rules spe cific to sexual assaults and child molestations and the legislative intent to interpret those rules broadly. Indeed, they point out that Rules 413 and 414 permit evidence of certain prior acts to be admitted in any “ case in which a defendant is accused of” certain sex crimes and broa dly permits the evidence to be “ considered on any matter to which it is relevant.” See United States v. Boyajian , No. 09-933, 2012 WL 4094977, at *10 n.8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (“[a]lthough defendant contends that Count One does not charge defendant with an act of sexual as sault and therefore the Rule 413 evidence is inadmissible as to that offense, Rule 413 does not di fferentiate between or among counts in an indictment,” rather “the plain language of the statute is that prior acts are admis sible in any ‘case’ in which a39 probative value of this eviden ce is not substantially outweighe d by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, an issue di scussed in greater detail supra . 3. Jury Instruction Finally, the Court finds that itis appropriate in this case to issue a limiting jury instruction concerning the evidence of Mr. Lieu’s prior acts. In cases such as this, courts often issue these types of instructi ons as a means of diminishing the danger of unfair prejudice to defendants. See e.g., United States v. Cooke , 675 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Also, the district court gave a limiting ins truction that diminished the danger of prejudice.” (citing United States v. Strong , 415 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 2005))); Hite , 916 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (“the Court shall instruct the jury as to the limited purposes for which th e evidence is admitted, at the time of admission and in the final instruc tions, which substantially li mits any risk of unfair prejudice.” (citing Long , 328 F.3d at 662)). Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has noted that t hese types of limiting instructions “ordinarily suffi ce to protect the defendant’s int erests.” Long , 328 F.3d at 662. Therefore, the Court will instr uct the jury, both at the time that the prior acts evidence is admitted and in the final instr uctions, as to the limited purpo ses for which the evidence may be considered. The parties are en couraged to provide the Court wi th proposed instructions for this
purpose.

defendant is so accused.”). Nevertheless, this Court sees no n eed to resolve this split of authority here because, even though the tra vel offense does not independe ntly come within Rule 414’s definition of “child molestation,” as discussed above, a jury m ay properly consider evidence of Mr. Lieu’s collection of pornogra phy and his alleged sexual abu se of his stepdaughter as to that charge under Rule 404(b).40 IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Mr. Lieu’s motion to suppress and GRANTS the Government’s motion to admit. An order consistent with th is Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: February 8, 2018 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge