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Filed 12/28/22 Marriage of Kamalnathan CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not 

been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re the marriage of LINDA 

and RAJAGANESH 

KAMALNATHAN 

LINDA KAMALNATHAN,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

RAJAGANESH 

KAMALNATHAN,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 A162464

 (Alameda County

Super. Ct. No. 

HF15792825)

In this dissolution appeal, petitioner Linda Kamalnathan 

argues that the trial court erred in rejecting her claim that 

certain properties in India constitute community property 

because they were acquired by respondent Rajaganesh 

Kamalnathan during their marriage. Finding no reversible error, 

we affirm the judgment.
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BACKGROUND1

Petitioner and respondent married in October 1998, and 

petitioner filed for dissolution in 2015. After years of litigation, 

the court set a July 2019 trial date, and it ultimately held trial in 

July 2020. 

Prior to the original trial date, petitioner appears to have 

requested that the court hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

authentication of deeds for multiple Indian properties that she 

claimed were community properties (the disputed properties). 

The record does not include petitioner’s briefing in support of her 

request, but respondent argued in his briefing that the foreign 

deeds should be excluded as hearsay and for lack of 

authentication. With respect to authentication, respondent 

argued that the foreign deeds could not be presumed authentic as 

acknowledged documents under Evidence Code section 1451 and 

Civil Code section 1183, subdivision (e)2 because the words 

1 We recite only the background facts relevant to the 

contentions raised in this appeal.

2 An acknowledged document may be offered into evidence 

without further proof of its execution. (Evid. Code, § 1451 

[certificate of acknowledgment “is prima facie evidence of the 

facts recited in the certificate and the genuineness of the 

signature of each person by whom the writing purports to have 

been signed if the certificate meets the requirements of [Civ. 

Code, § 1180 et seq.]”]; Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil 

Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 8:361, Ch. 8C–B.) 

An acknowledgment is the act of a person who has executed an 

instrument declaring before a competent court or officer that the 

execution is their act or deed. (De Wolfskill v. Smith (1907) 

5 Cal.App. 175, 184.) An acknowledgment may be made outside 

of the United States in front of a notary, but, in such cases, the 

notary’s signature must be “proved or acknowledged (1) before a 
3

“authentic” and “authenticity” were crossed out in the apostilles 

on the deeds petitioner submitted. 

Judge Nixon presided over the hearing and ordered as 

follows: “After review of each parties’ points and authorities as 

well as all other documents filed by each party concerning the 

deeds at issue, the court denies petitioner’s request to admit all 

18 apostilles ‘sale deeds’. The court finds that the modified 

notary stamps specifically crossing out the words ‘authenticated’, 

‘authentic’ and ‘authenticity’ and renouncing any liability for the 

accuracy of the content of each document nullifies the very 

purpose of the Apostilles. [¶] The court reserves for trial the use 

of said deeds, their relevancy, or other evidentiary methods of 

admission proven at trial.”

Shortly thereafter, on his own motion, Judge Nixon 

reconsidered his order. He ruled, “The court finds that the 

Apostilles are not defective because the word ‘authenticated’ is 

crossed out. The Apostilles were not meant to authenticate the 

deeds, only to certify the authenticity of the signature, seal or 

position of the official (in this case the notary) who executed, 

issued or certified a copy of a public document (the deeds). An 

apostille of an authentication does not relate to the content of the 

underlying document. [¶] The deeds may be introduced into 

judge of a court of record of the country where the proof or 

acknowledgment is made, or (2) by any American diplomatic 

officer, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent, or 

(3) by an apostille (certification) affixed to the instrument 

pursuant to the terms of The Hague Convention Abolishing the 

Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents.” 

(Civ. Code, § 1183, subd. (e).) 
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evidence provided they have a notary stamp certified with an 

apostille. Neither the notary stamp nor the apostille are evidence 

of the validity of the information contained in said deeds.”3 

At trial, the parties did not contest that six of twenty 

Indian properties were community properties, but they disputed 

the characterization of the additional fourteen properties. 

During her testimony, petitioner sought to introduce a purported 

foreign deed for one disputed property, and respondent objected 

that the deed was hearsay and it did not conform with Judge 

Nixon’s order because it lacked a notary stamp. After reviewing 

the record, the trial judge ruled that the court was going to 

enforce Judge Nixon’s order. The court stated the deeds could be 

admitted with a notary stamp and apostille, and it observed that 

petitioner had submitted an example deed to Judge Nixon that 

contained both. Petitioner thereafter did not seek to move the 

foreign deeds into evidence. She testified about how she obtained 

the deeds; however, her counsel expressly disclaimed that her 

testimony was being offered to prove that respondent owned any 

of the properties.

3 Because the record does not include petitioner’s briefing 

in support of her request for the evidentiary hearing or the 

reporter’s transcript for the hearing, we are left to speculate to 

some extent about what exactly petitioner requested with respect 

to the foreign deeds. From the record provided, it appears the 

issue was authenticity, the court rejected respondent’s argument 

that the apostilles were defective because certain words therein 

were crossed out, and the court ruled that deeds with both a 

notary stamp and an apostille were properly authenticated.
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In its final statement of decision, the court rejected 

petitioner’s contention that the disputed properties were 

community properties. The court ruled as follows: “Petitioner 

claims that Respondent purchased numerous other properties in 

India during the marriage that she contends are community 

assets and seeks her share of those properties. Respondent 

denies that those properties are community assets. He denies 

purchasing those disputed properties or directing any community 

assets towards their purchase. Despite much discussion during 

trial about the issue, Petitioner did not introduce into evidence 

any purported deeds regarding these disputed properties. 

Petitioner did not prove that any community assets were used to 

purchase these disputed properties, despite the extensive work 

done by [an appointed expert under section 730]. Petitioner did 

not prove that Respondent purchased any of these properties 

during the marriage. Petitioner did not identify any transfers 

from any community account that went towards the purchase of 

any of the disputed properties. Petitioner’s own knowledge of 

these disputed properties was very limited and speculative. 

Respondent testified that his mother and sister purchased 

certain properties in India and placed certain ones in his name. 

That testimony was not contradicted by any credible evidence. 

The Court finds that Petitioner did not prove that any of the 

disputed India properties is a community asset to be divided. 

Petitioner’s claim for a share of the value of the disputed India 

properties is DENIED.” 
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DISCUSSION

On appeal from a judgment based upon a statement of 

decision, we review questions of law de novo and findings of fact 

for substantial evidence. (Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 

194 Cal.App.4th 757, 765.) Under substantial evidence review, 

findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment 

and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of 

the findings. (Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 

218 Cal.App.4th 602, 613.) We review the trial court’s 

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (See People v. 

Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196–197.) 

Petitioner contends the trial court erred by refusing to 

admit deeds for the disputed properties into evidence; by failing 

to require respondent to rebut the presumption under Family 

Code4 section 760 that the disputed properties were community 

properties; and by failing to continue the trial to allow her more 

time to obtain deeds compliant with Judge Nixon’s order. As set 

forth below, each of petitioner’s contentions lacks merit.

I. Admissibility of the Foreign Deeds

Petitioner argues that the court erred in ruling that foreign 

deeds with notary stamps and apostilles could be admitted, but 

she does not establish the court abused its discretion in so ruling. 

The court’s ruling addressed authentication, yet petitioner 

notably fails to cite any authority governing the authentication of 

4 All further statutory references are to the Family Code 

unless otherwise specified.
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writings. Petitioner instead cites Evidence Code sections 452, 

subdivision (f), 1202, and 1523, subdivision (b), but these statutes 

do not assist her. Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (f), 

allowing a court to take judicial notice of “[t]he law of an 

organization of nations and of foreign nations and public entities 

in foreign nations,” and Evidence Code section 1202, addressing 

impeachment of hearsay statements by a declarant who does not 

testify at trial, are inapposite, and in any event, petitioner fails to 

show she sought relief under those statutes below. The same is 

true for Evidence Code section 1523, subdivision (b), which 

addresses the admissibility of oral testimony to prove the content 

of a writing, not the authenticity of writings that a party seeks to 

admit.5 

The Section 760 Presumption 

Before addressing petitioner’s claim that the court 

misallocated the burden of proof and failed to require respondent 

to rebut the section 760 presumption, it is helpful to review the 

two statutes relevant to her claim. Section 760 sets forth the 

5 Under Evidence Code section 1523, subdivision (b), oral 

testimony of the content of a writing is admissible when the 

proponent does not have possession or control of a copy of the 

writing and the original is lost or has been destroyed without 

fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent. Even if this 

statutory provision were somehow implicated, petitioner concedes 

its inapplicability by admitting that she had copies of the 

writings at issue. In her brief, petitioner also cites “Code of Civil 

Procedure [s]ection 1281(8)[,]” which does not exist. To the 

extent she meant to cite Code of Civil Procedure section 128, 

subdivision (a)(8), which grants the court the power to amend 

and control its process and orders, that statute too is inapposite.
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presumption that, except as otherwise provided by statute, all 

property acquired during marriage is community property. On 

the other hand, section 770, subdivision (a)(2) provides, “(a) 

Separate property of a married person includes all of the 

following: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) All property acquired by the person after 

marriage by gift, bequest, devise or descent.” Section 760 

provides a rebuttable presumption, and, once the presumption is 

activated, the opposing party has the burden of establishing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the property at issue is not 

community property. (Evid. Code, § 606; In re Marriage of 

Ettefagh (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1585, 1591.) Any credible 

evidence may be used to overcome the section 760 presumption, 

including evidence the item was acquired as a gift to one spouse. 

(In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 91.) 

Here, petitioner does not demonstrate error in the trial 

court’s finding that she failed to show that the disputed 

properties were acquired during marriage, and that the section 

760 presumption was therefore not triggered. (Cf. Simons, 

Cal. Evid. Manual (2022) § 10:4 [effect of a rebuttable 

presumption as to proof is that once the preliminary fact is 

proved, a finding of the conclusionary fact is required if no 

contradictory evidence is presented or when contradictory 

evidence leaves trier of fact in equilibrium].) With one exception, 

the evidence petitioner points us to in her briefing does not 

establish the specific date of any property acquisition. And the 

trial court did not err in the characterization of the single 

exception—a property called “Thirunendarvur,” the deed to which 
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respondent admitted signing in 2007—because the court found 

Thirunendarvur was community property. 

In any event, the judgment is not reversible even assuming 

that respondent acquired the disputed properties during 

marriage and the court erred by failing to apply the section 760 

presumption because petitioner does not address prejudice, and 

we perceive none given the court’s findings. (See Navigators 

Specialty Ins. Co. v. Moorefield Construction, Inc. (2016) 

6 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1288 [misallocation of burden of proof in 

bench trial must be prejudicial].) The court acknowledged that 

respondent disputed that he purchased the properties at issue 

and disputed that they were community property. The court then 

credited respondent’s testimony that his mother and sister 

purchased the disputed properties, and the court found there was 

no credible evidence to the contrary. Thus, if there were 

acquisitions by respondent of the disputed properties during 

marriage, the court found that the only credible evidence showed 

that such acquisitions were made with the money of respondent’s 

mother and sister. (See § 770, subd. (a)(2) [property acquired by 

gift is separate property].) On this record, petitioner cannot show 

that it is reasonably probable that she would have obtained a 

more favorable result in the absence of any alleged error.6

6 Petitioner mentions undue influence within the section of 

her brief discussing the section 760 presumption. To the extent 

she seeks to raise this as an issue, she forfeited any such 

contention. (See Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 

179 [failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may 

be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a 

heading]; Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 
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II. Trial Continuance

Petitioner’s final contention—that the trial court should 

have continued the trial to allow her time to obtain foreign 

deeds—merits little discussion. Petitioner mentions authority 

allowing the trial court to set aside a judgment in certain 

instances (§ 2122, Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b)), but she does 

not seek reversal based on these authorities. Instead, she 

contends that the trial court should have continued the trial in 

the interests of justice. But petitioner knew of the need to obtain 

deeds that complied with Judge Nixon’s order for nearly a year 

before trial, and she never asked for a continuance. (In re A.B., 

supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1366 [“Because [the appellant’s] 

counsel never requested a continuance . . . , we consider the 

argument forfeited”].) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

POLLAK, P. J.

GOLDMAN, J.

In re Marriage of Kamalnathan (A162246)

270, 277 [to show error, appellant must supply some cogent 

argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record].) 

Petitioner also fails to show that she raised undue influence 

below. (See In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1366 

[appellant is generally precluded from urging on appeal any point 

not raised below].)