2021 IL App (1st) 201306-U 

Order filed: June 11, 2021

FIRST DISTRICT

FIFTH DIVISION

No. 1-20-1306 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Hoffman and Cunningham concurred in the judgment.

 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Summary judgment in favor of plaintiff is affirmed, where plaintiff was a resident 

of his parents’ household and was therefore entitled to underinsured motorist 

coverage. 

¶ 2 Plaintiff-appellee, Luis Montano, filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that he 

was entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under an insurance policy issued to his father and 

stepmother by defendant-appellant, Erie Insurance Exchange. The parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment, and the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 Plaintiff filed his complaint for declaratory judgment against Erie on February 27, 2020. 

Therein, he alleged that he was injured when a vehicle in which he was a passenger was involved 

LUIS MONTANO,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

No. 20 MR 2487

Honorable 

Pamela M. Meyerson, 

Judge, presiding.

)

) 

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No. 1-20-1306 

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in a collision on April 15, 2015. Another insurer provided coverage for the collision in a total 

amount of $100,000 per occurrence, and plaintiff ultimately recovered $41,000 under that policy

for his injuries. In addition, Erie had issued an insurance policy to plaintiff’s parents, Angel and 

Elana Montano, that was effective at the time of the collision. That policy provided up to $250,000 

per person in underinsured motorist coverage to plaintiff’s parents and their “relatives.” Under the 

policy relatives were defined as “residents” of the Montano’s household related to them by—inter 

alia—"blood, marriage [or] adoption.” Finally, the policy defined residents as follows:

 “a person who physically lives with “you” in “your” household on a regular basis. “Your” 

unmarried, unemancipated children attending school full time, living away from home, will 

 be considered “residents” of “your” household.” 

¶ 4 After alleging that he was the son of the Montanos and a resident of their household, 

plaintiff asserted that Erie had improperly denied him underinsured motorist coverage on the basis 

that he was not a relative of the Montanos, as defined by the policy. He therefore asked the circuit 

court to enter a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to such coverage as a relative of the 

Montanos. 

¶ 5 Erie filed an answer and affirmative defense to plaintiff’s complaint, in which it denied 

plaintiff’s material allegations and asserted that plaintiff was not entitled to coverage under the 

policy it issued to the Montanos because—at the time of the collision—plaintiff was neither 

physically living with the Montanos on a regular basis or living elsewhere while attending school 

full-time. Specifically, the affirmative defense asserted that while plaintiff had previously attended 

college full-time at the University of Wisconsin-Parkside, he received an academic suspension 

following the spring semester of 2014. Thereafter, plaintiff worked for the university providing 

janitorial services until December 2014, when he started working full-time as a factory worker in 
No. 1-20-1306 

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Kenosha, Wisconsin. Plaintiff worked at that factory until the collision in April 2015. He had also 

lived alone in an apartment in Kenosha from November 2014 until the time of the collision. His 

parents did not co-sign the lease for that apartment, and plaintiff never returned to school as a fulltime student. 

¶ 6 Plaintiff filed an answer to the affirmative defense in which he admitted Erie’s factual 

allegations but denied its legal conclusions. Erie then filed a motion for summary judgment. 

Attached to the motion was a transcript of an examination under oath plaintiff sat for on December 

7, 2017. Therein, plaintiff generally confirmed the factual allegations contained in Erie’s 

affirmative defense. 

¶ 7 In addition, however, plaintiff stated during his examination under oath that he lived with 

his father in Wisconsin when he graduated high school in 2012. He then attended college in 

Wisconsin for two years, living on campus except for his return to his father’s home for the summer 

break following his first year, until he received an academic suspension following the spring 

semester of 2014. After the collision and a more than two-month stay in the hospital, plaintiff 

returned to live with his father. By that time, plaintiff’s father had moved to Naperville, Illinois. 

¶ 8 Plaintiff responded by filing a response and cross-motion for summary judgment, attaching 

an affidavit completed by plaintiff. Therein, he averred that prior to college and during the summer 

after his first year, he lived in Wisconsin with his father and stepmother. He only found 

“temporary” employment and rented a “temporary” apartment in Wisconsin until he would be able 

to apply to re-enroll in college following his academic suspension in the fall of 2015. Plaintiff 

believed that obtaining a job would improve his prospects to be readmitted to college. After 

completing his education, he intended to return to live with his parents. Plaintiff continued to 
No. 1-20-1306 

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“spend a considerable amount of time with [his] family when they lived in Wisconsin, and in 

Naperville” and always had a key to the family home in each state.

¶ 9 As to the family’s move to Illinois, plaintiff averred that he moved to Naperville in 

November 2014 with his father, stepmother, and siblings, after his father started working in Oak 

Brook, Illinois. The family first lived in a rental home while their permanent home was under 

construction. Plaintiff had his own bedroom in each house, and the newly constructed home had a 

fifth bedroom with a private bathroom that was intended for plaintiff’s use and which he still

occupied. Plaintiff washed his laundry in Naperville, most of his possessions were kept in his 

family home in Naperville, and he “lived with [his] family there on many weekends.” Plaintiff also 

“spent the Christmas/New Year’s holidays in 2014 in [the] family home in Naperville.” Finally, 

plaintiff explained that he was financially dependent upon his father, he received his mail at his 

family’s home, and used the address of his family home as his permanent address for his driver’s 

license, voter registration, bank accounts, tax returns, college correspondence and employment. 

¶ 10 The parties completed briefing on the cross-motions and following a hearing held on 

November 4, 2020, the circuit court entered an order finding that plaintiff was entitled to 

underinsured motorist coverage under the Erie policy and granted summary judgment in plaintiff’s 

favor. Erie timely appealed, contending that the circuit court improperly denied its motion for 

summary judgment.

¶ 11 In construing an insurance policy, a court determines the intent of the parties to the contract 

by construing the policy as a whole, with due regard to the risk undertaken, the subject matter that 

is insured and the purposes of the contract. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 

Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108 (1992). Where the words in the policy are clear and unambiguous, “a court 

must afford them their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. 
No. 1-20-1306 

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However, any ambiguities in the language of an insurance policy will be interpreted in favor of 

the insured. Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc., 223 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2006).

“The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations 

thereunder are questions of law.” Konami (America), Inc. v. Hartford Insurance Co. of Illinois, 

326 Ill. App. 3d 874, 877 (2002). We review such an issue de novo. Central Illinois Light Co. v. 

Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 153 (2004).

¶ 12 As “[t]he construction of an insurance policy” and the determination of the rights and 

obligations thereunder are questions of law for the court, the issues are appropriately addressed by 

way of summary judgment. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 

2d 384, 391 (1993). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 

5/2–1005(c) (West 2020). Since the parties here filed cross-motions for summary judgment, they 

conceded that no material question of fact exists and that there is only a question of law which the 

court may decide on the basis of the record. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. We review a 

court's decision as to cross-motions for summary judgment de novo. Home Insurance Co. v. 

Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307, 315 (2004).

¶ 13 On appeal, the parties vigorously debate issues such as plaintiff’s intent with respect to his 

permanent residence and returning to school, whether he can have more than one legal residence, 

whether he was still a full-time student despite his academic suspension, the exact time at which 

plaintiff had to be a resident of the Montanos’ household to be entitled to coverage, and more. We 

need not address all these issues. Rather, we note the uncontested fact that plaintiff—the son of

Angel and stepson of Elana—was related to the Montanos by "blood, marriage [or] adoption.” As 
No. 1-20-1306 

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such, we may resolve the question of plaintiff’s entitlement to coverage under Erie’s policy by 

answering the simple question of whether—at the time of the collision—plaintiff was a resident of 

the Montanos’ household because he physically lived with them on a regular basis. 

¶ 14 In answering this question, we first reject Erie’s factual contention that plaintiff “never 

returned to his parents’ home after moving into his apartment and before the accident.” This 

contention misreads plaintiff’s testimony during his examination under oath, in which plaintiff 

merely acknowledged that he “stay[ed]” at his apartment until the collision, never returning

thereafter but rather returning to his parents’ home after being released from the hospital. It also 

ignores plaintiff’s affidavit, in which he specifically discusses the various times he stayed at the 

family home in Naperville prior to the collision.

¶ 15 We also find several cases cited by the parties to be irrelevant. Erie cites to cases that have 

found no coverage was available under certain circumstances, pursuant to policy language that 

was found to unambiguously restrict insurance coverage to those related to the insured that “live[] 

with” the insured (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Taussig, 227 Ill. App. 3d 913, 

915 (1992)) or to relatives that were a “resident of [the insured’s] household” (Farmers Automobile 

Insurance Ass'n v. Gitelson, 344 Ill. App. 3d 888, 890 (2003)). Plaintiff cites to cases finding 

coverage was available under certain circumstances, pursuant to policy language—often found to 

be ambiguous—that restricted insurance coverage to those related to the insured that “live[] with” 

the insured (Casolari v. Pipkins, 253 Ill. App. 3d 265, 268 (1993); Murphy v. State Farm 

Automobile Insurance Co., 234 Ill. App. 3d 222, 226 (1992); State Farm Automobile Insurance 

Co. v. Reinhardt, 253 Ill. App. 3d 823, 826 (1994)), or to a “resident of the same household” as 

the insured (Coriasco v. Hutchcraft, 245 Ill. App. 3d 969, 970-71 (1993). However, none of these 

cases presented the exact circumstances presented here, nor did they address the specific policy 
No. 1-20-1306 

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language contained in the Erie policy requiring plaintiff to “physically live[]” in the Montanos’ 

household on a “regular” basis.

¶ 16 Our primary function is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties, as 

expressed in the policy language. Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz, 237 Ill. 2d 424, 433 (2010). 

The word “regular” is not further defined in Erie’s policy. “Where a term in an insurance policy is 

not defined, we afford that term its plain, ordinary and popular meaning, i.e., we look to its 

dictionary definition.” Id. at 436. “If a term has multiple reasonable definitions or is subject to 

more than one reasonable interpretation within the context in which it appears *** the term is 

ambiguous,” and such ambiguous terms “will be strictly construed against the insurer who drafted 

the policies.” West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2021 IL 125978, 

¶ 43. 

¶ 17 The word “regular” can be defined strictly as an event or action that occurs in a fixed 

pattern, with even or similar amounts of time between one and the next. Collins Dictionary, 

www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/regular (last visited June 4, 2021) (“Regular 

events have equal amounts of time between them, so that they happen, for example, at the same 

time each day or each week.”); Cambridge Dictionary, www.dictionary.cambridge.org/us/ 

dictionary/english/regular (last visited June 4, 2021) (defining regular as “existing or happening 

repeatedly in a fixed pattern, with equal or similar amounts of space or time between one and the 

next; even.”). However, “regular” can also be defined more broadly to simply mean “often.” 

Collins Dictionary, www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/ english/regular (last visited June 4, 

2021) (“Regular events happen often.”); Cambridge Dictionary, www.dictionary.cambridge.org/ 

us/ dictionary/english/regular (last visited June 4, 2021) (defining regular as “happening or doing 

something often.”). Considering these multiple, reasonable definitions, the word “regular” as used 
No. 1-20-1306 

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in the Erie policy is ambiguous and must be strictly construed against Erie.

¶ 18 Here, it is uncontested that plaintiff did not physically live in the Montanos’ household 

full-time at the time of the collision. However, it is also uncontested that plaintiff always had a key 

to the family home in Naperville, had his own room in that home with an attached bathroom, kept 

most of his possessions there, and washed his laundry there. In addition, while plaintiff had his 

own apartment in Wisconsin at the time of the collision, he also spent a “considerable amount of 

time with [his] family” in Naperville, “lived with [his] family there on many weekends,” and spent 

the Christmas/New Year’s holidays in 2014 in [the] family home in Naperville.” While these facts 

might not be sufficient to satisfy the narrowest definition of the word “regular,” they clearly

establish that plaintiff physically lived in the Montanos’ household “often” at the time of the 

collision. Because we must strictly construe the ambiguous language in the policy against Erie, we 

conclude that the circuit court properly concluded that plaintiff was entitled to underinsured 

motorist coverage and properly granted summary judgment in his favor.

¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 20 Affirmed.