UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. 109 DERR AVENUE, LARAMIE COUNTY, CHEYENNE, WYOMING; 508 WEST 9TH STREET, LARAMIE COUNTY, CHEYENNE, WYOMING; 1000 WEST LEISHER ROAD, LARAMIE COUNTY, CHEYENNE, WYOMING; 717 SOUTH 4TH STREET, ADAMS COUNTY, BRIGHTON, COLORADO, Defendants.

------------------------------ DARREN MICHAEL GONZALES, Movant - Appellant. No. 18-8025 (D.C. No. 2:17-CV-00019-ABJ) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , MURPHY , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument w ouldn’t materially assist in th e determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is th erefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgmen t isn’t binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 19, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Proceeding pro se, Darren Gonzal es appeals the district court’s order denying his postjudgment motion to stay a civil forfeiture judgment. 1 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. Background This appeal arises from the gove rnment’s decision to seek an or der “forfeiting to the United States all right, t itle, and interest in and to” several pieces of real property belonging to Gonzales. E.g. , R. vol. 1, 9. According to the government, the property at issue was subject t o forfeiture because it was (1) involved in moneylaundering transactions and (2) tr aceable to unlawful sales of controlled substances.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a); 18 U.S. C. § 981(a)(1)(A), (C). After the government filed its c omplaint in th e underlying civi l forfeiture proceedings, Gonzales pleaded gu ilty in a related criminal case to various federal offenses, including unlawfully d istributing a controlled substa nce and money laundering. 2 As part of Gonzales’s plea agr eement in the related criminal c ase, Gonzales (1) admitted that the r eal property at issue in this a ppeal was subject to forfeiture; (2) relinquished any interest in or title to that p roperty; and (3) waived his right to notice of any subsequent forfeit ure proceedings. After Gonzales entered his plea in the related criminal case, t he government moved for judgment in the unde rlying civil forfeiture proceedin gs. The district court

1 We liberally construe pro se pl eadings. But we won’t act as Go nzales’s advocate. See James v. Wadas , 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). 2 Gonzales’s direct appeal in the related criminal case is curre ntly pending before this court.3 granted the government’s motion and, on December 7, 2017, enter ed judgment of forfeiture ordering that the rea l property at issue be “condemn ed, forfeited[,] and vested in the United States o f America.” R. vol. 1, 44. More than three months later, in March 2018, Gonzales filed a m otion to stay the district court’s civil fo rfeiture judgment pending resoluti on of his direct appeal in the related criminal case. 3 On March 26, 2018, the distric t court denied Gonzales’s motion to stay the civil forfeitu re judgment, concluding that G onzales failed to present any “explanation or aut hority” that might justify such a stay. Id. at 67. Eight days later, on April 3, 2018, G onzales filed a notice of appeal designating the district court’s March 26, 2018 order. Analysis I. The Scope of Our Review Before turning to the merits of G onzales’s arguments on appeal, we must assure ourselves that we have jurisdiction to consider those ar guments. See KCOM,

3 On the same date, G onzales also filed a request for bill of pa rticulars and a motion to release transcripts i n the civil forfeiture proceedin gs. Although the district court indeed denied similar moti ons that Gonzales filed in the related criminal case, Gonzales’s opening brief fails to provide a citation to the rec ord demonstrating the district court ruled on the moti ons he filed in the civil forfe iture proceedings that are the subject of this appeal. And we see no indication that it di d. Accordingly, to the extent we could construe Gonzal es’s brief as challenging the di strict court’s purported rulings on these moti ons, we decline to address his a rguments. See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2) (“For each iss ue raised on appeal, all brief s must cite the precise reference in the record where t he issue was raised and ruled on .”); Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It i s the general rule, of course, t hat a federal appellate court does not consider an issu e not passed upon below.”).4 Inc. v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. , 829 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10t h Cir. 2016) (noting our “obligation to examine our own subject matter jurisdiction”). “This court has jurisdiction onl y to review district court judg ments from which a timely notice of appeal has been filed.” Lebahn v. Owens , 813 F.3d 1300, 1304 (10th Cir. 2016). In most civil cases, the appealing party must file a notice of appeal “within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed f rom.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). But when the United St ates is a party to the action , the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is 60 days instead. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Further, Rule 4(a)(4) provides that certain t imely filed postjudgment motions will toll that 60-day period. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (stating that if party timely files one of several enumerated motions, “the time to file an appeal runs for all pa rties from the entry of the order disposing of the l ast such remaining motion”). Here, the district court entered its civil forfeiture judgment on December 7, 2017. Gonzales didn’t appeal tha t order. Instead, more than thr ee months later, Gonzales filed his March 2018 mo tion to stay. The district cour t appropriately construed that motion as arising under Rule 60 of the Federal R ules of Civil Procedure. See United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre , 414 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n attack on the suffi ciency of [a] pr ior forfeiture complaint[] and judgment[] . . . must be brought i n a Rule 60(b) motion.”). And a Rule 60 motion will toll the time for filing an app eal—but only if that motion “is filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is enter ed.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) (vi).5 Because Gonzales filed his March 2018 moti on more than 28 days after the district court entered its Dece mber 7, 2017 civil forfeiture ju dgment, the former came too late to toll the time f or appealing the latter. 4 See Fed. R. App. P. 4 (a)(4)(A)(vi);
Lebahn , 813 F.3d at 1304. And that mean s Gonzales’s April 3, 2018 not ice of appeal is timely only as to the distric t court’s March 26, 2018 order denying his motion to stay; that notice of appeal isn’t timely as to the district cou rt’s December 7, 2017 civil forfeiture judgment. 5 Thus, to the extent that Gon zales’s opening brief attempts to challenge the district court’ s December 7, 2017 civil forfei ture judgment, we lack jurisdiction to consider his ar guments. Instead, our review is limited to the district court’s March 26, 2018 order de nying Gonzales’s motion to stay. See Lebahn , 813 F.3d at 1304–05. We turn next to that order. II. The District Court’s March 26, 2018 Order We review the district court’s order denying Gonzales’s Rule 60 (b) motion for abuse of discretion, “keeping in mind that Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and may

4 Because Gonzales doesn’t suggest that his request for a bill o f particulars or his motion to release transcript s tolled the time for filing hi s notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(4)(A), we decline to address that possibility. See supra note 3; Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co. , 642 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir . 2011) (“It is the appellant’s burden, not ours, to conjure up possible theories to invoke our legal authority to hear her appeal.”).

5 In his reply brief, Gonzales s uggests that we should equitably toll the 60-day deadline because—accord ing to Gonzales—he didn’t receive timely notice of the district court’s December 7, 201 7 civil forfeiture judgment. Bu t “the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil ca se is a jurisdictional requirem ent.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Becaus e we have “no authority to crea te equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requi rements,” we must reject this argument. Id.6 only be granted in excep tional circumstances.” Id. at 1306 (quoting ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers , 643 F.3d 735, 754 (10th Cir. 2011)). For instance, a court may grant a Rule 60(b) motion (1 ) in light of “mistake, inadver tence, surprise, or excusable neglect”; (2) based on “newly discovered evidence tha t, with reasonable diligence, could not have been dis covered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)”; or (3) on the basis of “fraud . . . , misrepresentation , or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P . 60(b)(1)–(3) . Notably, because a Rule 60(b) motion isn’t “a substitute for an appeal ,” our review of an order deny ing such a motion “is meaningfully narrower than review of the mer its of a direct app eal.” Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc. , 426 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2005) (first quoting Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 365 F.3d 944, 955 (10th Ci r. 2004); then quoting Amoco Oil Co.
v. EPA , 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2000)). Here, Gonzales argued below that the district court should stay the forfeiture order because (1) Gonzales didn’ t have an attorney and lacked n otice of the civil forfeiture proceedings; (2) the re lated criminal case “did not address” the property at issue in the civil forfeiture p roceedings; (3) he received inef fective assistance of counsel in the related criminal case; and (4) the government fa iled to prove the property at issue in the civil forfeiture proceed ings was “trac eable to the criminal behavior” that gave rise to the related criminal case. R. vol. 1, 45. But as the district court pointed out in denying Gonzales’s mot ion to stay, Gonzales “admitted as part of hi s plea agreement” in the relate d criminal case that the property at issue in the civil forfeiture proceedings was “invo lved in money7 laundering.” Id. at 67. Further, the record dem onstrates that Gonzales was represented by counsel when he ent ered his plea in the related criminal case. And Gonzales had no constitutional ri ght to counsel in the underlyi ng civil forfeiture action. See Johnson v. Johnson , 466 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10t h Cir. 2006). Moreover, even assuming that Gonzales receive d ineffective assistance of counsel in the related
criminal case, he failed to direct the d istrict court’s attention to an y “authority” that might “support[]” granting a stay on this basis in the civil forfeiture proceedings. R. vol. 1, 67. Notably, Gonzales likew ise fails to identify any su ch authority on appeal. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Fin ally, to the extent that Gonzal es argues he received inadequate notice of t he government’s December 5, 2017 motion for judgment and the district court’ s December 7, 2017 civil forfei ture judgment, he overlooks the fact that he waive d his right to such notice as p art of his plea agreement in the relat ed criminal case. Under these circumstances, we c onclude the distr ict court didn’ t abuse its discretion in denying Gon zales’s motion to stay. See Lebahn , 813 F.3d at 1306 (explaining that district court a buses its discretion only if i ts decision is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or mani festly unreasonable” (quoting Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc. , 214 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2000))).
Conclusion Because Gonzales’s untimely pos tjudgment motion to stay didn’t toll the deadline for appealing the dist rict court’s judgment of forfeit ure, we lack jurisdiction to entertain Gonzales’s challenge s to that judgment. Moreover, the district court8 didn’t abuse its discretion in d enying Gonzales’s postjudgment motion to stay the civil forfeiture proceedings, whi ch the court properly construe d as a Rule 60(b) motion. Accordingly, we affirm t he district court’s order denyi ng that motion.

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge