IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-00694-COA C ONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2015-CT-01903-COA CHARLES H. GRINER JR. APPELLANT

v. MELANIE GRINER APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHNNY LEE W ILLIAMS COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MARION COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: S. CHRISTOPHER FARRIS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: RICHARD ANTHONY FILCE ERIK M. LOW R EY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 10/08/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ. McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT: FACTS ¶1. Melanie and Charles “ C h i p ” G r i n er Jr. w ere granted an irreconcilable-dif f erences divorce in Marion County

. During their m a rriage t he couple had one d aughter and one son. There was a m

utual decision by Melanie and Chip t hat Melanie would stay hom e and devote her f ull tim e and e nergy

to taking care of

the children while Chip would work and provide f or the f am ily f inancially

.¶2. During the divorce proceedings the couple provided written consent to the chancery

court to decide alim ony , equitable distribution o f the m arital estate, a n d e quitable division of the parties’ debts. ¶3. In light of Chip’s s u b s t a n t i a l s e p a r a t e e s t a t e —valued at o ver $7,000,000—the chancery court awarded Melanie $3,000 a m onth in periodic alim ony , $ 480,000 i n lum p-sum alim ony with t he option t o pay in m onthly installm ents o f $4,800 over ten y ears, and seventy percent of the m arital estate. Chip was assigned one-hundred percent of the m arital debts and ordered to m aintain health insurance f or Melanie. ¶4. Upon Melanie’s and Chip’s separate m o tions, the chancery court am e n ded i t s p r ior order to detail the m arital estate as including: (1) The m arital hom e and its surrounding land valued at $762,500; (2) Chip’s twenty -f

ive percent interest in the Florida condom i nium valued at $231,250; (3) the AG Edw a r d s I RA, Griner D rilling Services 401(k), AG Edwards Investm ent account; (4) f o rty -f o ur shares of

the Citizens Bank Corporation valued at $2,860; and (5) 6,505 shares of

the First Federal Bank Corporation valued at $227,675. ¶5. Chip subsequently f iled a notice of appeal. On appeal t his Court f ound a calculation error by the chancery court in its valuation of the real property

. 1 Griner v. Griner , 235 So.

1 T h e ch an cery co u rt in co rp o rated th e g ro ss, n o t n et, v alu e o f t h e real p r o p erty in its calcu l atio n s. T h e ch a n cery co u rt calcu lated th e v a lu e o f th e m arital h o m e an d f i f teen acres, p lu s t h e tw en ty

- f

i v e acres at $ 7 6 2 ,5 0 0

. H o w ev er, th e ch an cery c o u rt f ailed to tak e in to acco u n t th e $ 3 2 8 ,8 0 0 m o r tg ag e en cu m

b erin g th e h o m e, leav in g o n ly $ 3 7 2 ,0 0 0 i n eq u ity

. “T h i s f i g u re, co m

b i n ed w ith th e $ 6 2 ,5 0 0 v alu e o f th e ad j acen t tw en ty

- f

iv e acres, resu lts in a f ig u re o f $ 4 3 4 ,5 0 0 f

o r p u rp o s es o f

m a rital d iv isio n .” G rin er , 2 3 5 S o . 3 d at 1 8 6 (¶1 5 ). 23d 177, 186 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2017). Additionally , we h eld that while the chancery court

was w ithin i ts authority to order C hip to m aintain a l if e-insurance policy with Melanie as the benef iciary , we f

ound the am ount—$1,000,000—to be unreasonable and excessive. Id

. at 188 (¶29). W e also f

oun d t h a t the f

inal judgm ent contained a scrivener’s error m aking it unclear a s to how l ong C hip was to m aintain Melanie’s health insurance. Id

. at (¶27). In one part of the order Chip w as to m aintain the insurance f or eighteen y e ars, and another part of the order required Chip to m aintain the insurance f or eighteen m onths, so we rem anded f or clarif i cation. Id

. ¶6. W h en we rem anded this case b ack to t he chancery court we assessed all costs of the appeal to Melanie. Chip f iled a m o tion f

or recovery of t he appellate costs, which was denied by the chancery court. ¶7. On rem and, the chancery court revised t h e e q uitable d ivision and awarded Melanie seventy percent of t he corrected value of the m arital estate. T o com p ensate f or the decrease in the equitable division award, the chancery court increased M elanie’s lum p-sum alim ony award t o $700,000. T he court also clarif i ed that Chip w a s to provide h e a l t h

- insurance coverage f

or Melanie until she reaches sixty -f ive y ears of age. The chancery court f urther ordered Chip to m aintain a lif e-insurance policy in the am ount of $ 700,000, nam ing Melanie as the benef

iciary

. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8. Gre a t d e f

e r e n c e i s g i v e n t o a chancery court’s d ecree of divorce. Ferguson v. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d 921, 930 (Miss. 1994). This Court w ill not r everse s uch a decree

3unless it is m anif estly wrong as to law or f

act. Id

. DISCUSSION I. Appellate costs m u st be paid from the first appeal. ¶9. For h is f

irst ass i g n me n t o f e r ror, Chip argues that t he chancery court s hould have executed this Court’s m andate assessing all appellate costs to Melanie. As a m atter of law this is correct. ¶10. In our 2017 opinion we orde r e d M e l a n i e t o p a y a l l c o s t s o f the appeal, and the

m andate echoed this language. Griner , 235 So. 3d at 190 (¶35) (“All costs of t his appeal are assessed to the appellee.”). A party who disagrees with a n assessm e nt of costs issued in an opinion m ay seek relief through a m otion f or rehearing under Mississippi Rule of A ppellate Procedure 40. See M.R.A.P. 36(d) (“a party seeking relief

m ay f ile a m otion f

or rehearing under Rule 40”). If t he m andate issues with a r equirem e nt t o p ay costs, our r ules likewise allow a m otion to r etax costs, w hich m ust be f iled within f

ourteen day s of the issuance of the

m andate. Id

. ¶11. W h ile Chip f

iled a m otion f

or rehearing, Melanie did not. Af ter the Suprem e Court denied a request f

or c ertiorari review, the m andate was i ssued. Melanie did not ask f or the costs to be retaxed. ¶12. The m andate i s an order of this Court whic h mu s t b e f o l l o w e d w ithout deviation. Rely ing upon a basic def

inition o f the w ord, the S uprem e Court has held it is “[ a ] com m and, order, or direction” which, once given, a “person is bound to o bey .” D enton v. Maples , 394 So. 2d 895, 897 (Miss. 1981). This “judicial com m and” directs a lower court “to enf orce a

4judgm ent, sentence, or decre e . ” Id

. Coupled with the opinion, the m andate is how we

com m unicate with trial courts. “ It is inherently necessary that this Court have som e m ethod of advising the lower court of the action t aken h ere; under our practice the m ethod us ed is the m andate.” Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Pub. Co. , 221 M iss. 785, 787-88, 75 So. 2d 73, 74 (1954). Because it is to be f ollowed without deviation, “ [ t ]he t rial court m a y not receive
any other intelligence of the action of this Court.” I

d

. ¶13. The procedure f

o l lowing the m a ndate m

ust be f ollowed strictly

. “Upon issuance of

our m andate, the trial court sim ply proceeds to enf

orce t he f inal judgm e nt.” Collins v. Acree , 6 1 4 S o . 2 d 391, 392 (Miss. 1993). T here i s no discretion whether to f ollow a m anda t e , because “[ t]he execution of t he m andate of this C ourt is purely m i nisterial.” I d

. Indeed, the Suprem e C ourt has ruled that any order which is contrary to the m andate is actually outside the jurisdiction o f a trial court, and will b e held “a n ullity and void ab initio.” D enton , 394 So. 2d at 897. 2 ¶14. Af ter rem and, Chip f

iled a m otion f

or recovery of appeal costs. O ur rules explicitly allow recovery of “[ c]osts incurred in the preparation and transm ission of the record, the
costs of the r eporter’s transcript, if necessary f or the determ ination of the appeal, the
prem ium s paid f

or cost of supersedeas bonds o r o t h e r bonds to preserve r ights pending appeal, and the f

ee f or f iling the appeal

. . . .” M.R.A.P. 36(c). Because the original appeal included a m oney judgm ent, there was a supersedeas bond, and the trial court required it to

2 N o t e th a t w h ile th e m an d a te m u st b e strictly f

o llo w ed , th ere rem ain s th e o p p o rtu n ity to later d iv e in to w h at co s t s w ere actu ally in cu rred o r sh o u ld b e p aid p er t h e m a n d ate, sin ce a p arty “ w h o seek s relief

as to an y o th er m atter in v o lv in g co sts sh all seek relief i n th e trial co u rt.” M .R .A .P

. 3 6 ( d ). 5be one m i llion dollars. The bond carried a $20,000 prem ium

. On rem a nd, Chip requested

these prem ium costs, the docket f ee of $ 200, a n d a p r e pay

m ent f o r record preparation, f

or

a t otal of $41,200. The request did not seem to be f ully f o rm ed, as Chip alleged som e f urther bond prem ium m ight need to be paid pro rata, an d t h e f i n a l r ecord c ost was not included. Nonetheless, the m otion included exhibits ref lecting the two bond prem ium s. ¶15. Melanie did not respond to the m otion at all. The trial court did not m a k e a lengthy ruling on the issue. Instead, i ts Findings of Fact and C onclusions of Law Following Rem and noted in its last line that “All other requests f o r relief not granted are denied.” ¶16. The chancery c ourt d i d n ot have discretion to ignore t he m andate. T he m andate issued

o n F e b r u a r y 15, 2018, and has to this point n ot been f ollowed. In accord with ou r longstanding precedent, we reverse and rem and f or im m ediate com

pliance with the original

m andate. Per t he m andate f or the original appeal, and in accord with t he procedures set out in Rule 36, Chip is entitled to all costs f or the original appeal.
II. T h e c h ancery court did not err in its valuation and equita b l e division of the m arital estate

. ¶17. Chip goes o n to raise a num ber of issues concerning the equitable distribution of the

m arital estate. First, Chip asserts that the chancery court again m iscalculated t he v alue of the

m arital p roperty

. Second, Chip argues that Mel anie’s receipt o f seventy percent of the

m arital estate was im

proper d ue to the assignm ent of the m arital debts. Finally , Chip alleges that the loans f

r o m Griner Drilling were personal in nature and not related to his business. A. The chancery court proper l y c a lculated the value of the m arital estate on rem and.

6¶18. Chip argues that the chancery c ourt erred in its f indings of f

act due to a “discrepancy ” in the values listed f

or the m arital estate. The c hancery court’s order provided a val ue of $812,584 and later another value of $ 304,150. The $304,150 v alue clearly r ef ers to the seventy percent of the m artial hom e as this Court previously concluded. Chip’s a rgum ent is based o n a m iscalculation. In his brief , Chip lists the m arital hom e and connected f if teen

acres as having a v alue of $700,000, with a $328,000 loan. This m a th led him to conclude that the hom e e quity was $ 260,400. However, $328,000 subtracted f rom $700,000 is $372,000. This a m o u n t c o m bined with the value of the adjoining twenty -f ive acres ($62,500) totals to $434,500. Seventy percent of $434,500 is $304,150. This is the am ount the chancery

court f actored into its calculation, and is correct. ¶19. The second am ount, $812,584, is Melanie’s s e v e n t y - p e r c e n t s h a r e o f the m arital
estate. The total value of the m arital estate is $1,160,848.96. 3 At m ost we are a ble to f ind a $10 discrepancy

between the chancery

court’s calculation and our own. 4

3 We arriv ed at o u r to tal u sin g th e f o llo w in g v alu es: M arital h o m e an d su rro u n d in g lan d : $ 3 7 2 ,0 0 0 T w e n ty -f iv e acres: $ 6 2 ,5 0 0 F lo r id a C o n d o m in iu m : $ 2 3 1 ,2 5 0 A G E d w ard s IR A : $ 4 8 ,5 1 7 .9 6 4 0 1 ( k ) G rin e r D rillin g : $ 2 1 5 ,0 6 8 A G E d w ard s In v estm e n t: $ 9 7 8 C itizen s B an k sto ck : $ 2 ,8 6 0 F irst F ed e ral B a n k sto ck : $ 2 2 7 ,6 7 5 T o tal $ 1 ,1 6 0 , 8 4 8 .9 6

4 S ev en ty p ercen t o f th e to tal m arital estate i s $ 8 1 2 , 5 9 4 .2 7

. T h e ch an cery co u rt’s calcu l atio n cam e to $ 8 1 2 , 5 8 4

. 7¶20. W e reversed the chancery court to f ix the calculation errors regarding the value of the real p roperty

. W ith this error corrected we af f irm the chancery court’s division of the assets. B. The distributio n of t he m arital estate has previously been decided. ¶21. Chip goes on to a ssert that awarding Melanie seventy p ercent of the m a r ital estate was im p roper due to the assignm ent of the m arital debts. He argues that Melanie was awarded twice the am ount of the m arital estate w i t h n o n e o f the debts. “An equitable d ivision of property does not necessarily m ean an equal division of p roperty .” Lowrey v. L owrey , 25 So. 3d 274, 2 85 (¶26) (Miss. 2009). Rather, t he division m ust b e e quitable c o nsidering all of the Ferguson f

actors. Ferguson v. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). ¶22. In G riner , 235 So. 3d a t 187 (¶24), we “f ound no issue w ith the chancellor awarding Melanie seventy percent of th e m a r t i a l estate b ased on an erroneous, but higher, valuation f igure f or the m arital estate.” W e decline to reconsider this issue as it has previously been approved. The chancery court’s award of seventy pe r c e n t o f t h e m arital estate to Melanie is af f irm ed. C. The nature of the loans f rom Griner Drilling has previously been decided. ¶23. In h is f

i rst appeal Chip argued that the loans f rom G riner Drilling were personal, not business. This m atter was af f irm ed in the f

irst appeal and has becom e t he l aw of the case. Griner , 235 So. 3d at 185 n.8. ¶24. “W hatever is once established as the controlling legal rule of decision, b etween the

sam e parties in the sam e case, continues to be t he law of the case, so long a s there is a

8sim ilarity of f acts.” Lewis v. Pagel , 172 So. 3d 162, 1 74 (¶23) (Miss. 2015). Theref ore, once an issue has becom e the law of the case, we will not revisit it. ¶25. Because the classif ication o f the loan f

rom G riner Drilling had becom e the l aw of the case, this argum ent is procedurally barred, and also without m erit.
III. The chancery court’s alim ony and support aw ards w ere proper. ¶26. Chip argues that the chancery court abused its discretion b y awarding lum p-sum and periodic a lim ony to Melanie because she did not suf f er a def icit a f t er the equitable distribution of

the m arital estate. ¶27. Mississippi p recedent establishes that alim ony awards are “a m atter prim arily within the discretion of the chancery court because o f its peculiar opportunity to sense the equities of t he situation bef

o re it.” Flechas v
. F

l e c h as , 724 So. 2d 948, 953 (¶14) ( Miss. Ct. App. 1998). “As a result, the chancellor is given wide latitude in determ ining a n alim o ny award.” Gutierrez v. Gutierrez , 233 So. 3d 797, 811 (¶33) (Miss. 2017). Further,
Lum p -sum a lim ony can serve two distinct p urposes. The f irst purpose is to aid the chancellor in equitably dividing the m a r ital estate under the Ferguson f actors. T he second purpose is to aid t he chancellor in correcting a n equitable def icit, resulting f

rom the equitable distribution of the m a rital estate under the Armstrong

f a ctors. Davenport v. Davenport , 156 So. 3 d 231, 240 (¶30) (Miss. 2014) (internal citations om itted).
It has also been used to provide an equitable award to a spouse who m ade s u bstantial contributions to the m arriage, but whose contributions cannot be awarded through property division. See Davis v. Davis , 832 So. 2d 492, 499-502 (¶¶23-29) (Miss. 2002). ¶28. This Court previously f ound no error in the chancery court’s detailed Armstrong and

9Ferguson analy s es. Griner , 235 So. 3d at 185 (¶14), 187 ( ¶24). W e f ind Chip’s argum ents unpersuasive based on the chancery court’s conclusion that M elanie exhibited a greater need and there was a great disparity between the two estates. ¶29. There is a disparity between the two estates in this ca s e . T h e chancery court f ound

a “great f i nancial need and security ” on the part of Melanie and a “f inancial ability ” on the part of C hip. The chancery court’s $700,000 lum p-sum award did not disturb Chip’s separate estate of over $7,000,000. ¶30. For these r easons, we f ind that the chancery c o urt did not ab u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n on

rem and in ordering Chip to pay $3,000 per m onth in periodic alim o ny a nd $700,000 in lumpsum alim ony , or $5,833.33 a m o nth f or ten y ears. IV. T h e allegation that Chip’s e x penses ex ceed his incom e is unsupported. ¶31. C h i p a

r g u es that the court-ordered alim o ny and support pay m ents result in his m o n t

h l y expenses e xceeding his incom e. However, Chip dedicates less than a single paragraph to this claim i n the f

acts section of h is brief

. Not only does he f

ail to continue this argum ent in the

rem ainder of his brief

, but he also neglects t o provide any l eg a l a u t h ority to s u pport his contention. Failure to support allegations of er r o r w i t h a rgum e nt or authority results in waiver. L ambert v. State , 518 So. 2d 621, 625 (Miss. 1 987); see also , S tubbs v. Stubbs , No. 2017-CA-01734-COA, 2019 W L 350309, a t *2 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2019) (holding that “[ i ]f an appellant f

ails to s upport h is allegation of error with argum e nt or authority , this Court need not consider the issue”). ¶32. E v e n s o , C h ip’s argum ent still f alls f l at. In M osley v. Mosley , 784 So. 2d 901, 9 0 9

1 0(¶38) (Miss. 2001), a f orm er husband claim e d t hat the chancery court’s alim ony award was excessive and lef

t h im unable to live a “decent lif e.” In that case we af

f i rm ed the chancery court’s proper Armstrong analy s is which f ound a substantial f

inancial need o n the part of the ex-wif e w hile the ex-husband was stable in his em p loy m e nt and in a f

ar b e t t e r f

inancial position. Id . at 910 (¶40). ¶33. As in Mosley , the c hancery court here properly considered the A r m s t r o n g fa c t o r s when it awarded alim ony and s upport. A dditionally , a t t he tim e of t he original order Chip was to
pay $ 1,500 a m onth in child support. Because he no l onger h as to pay child support as both children are now em ancipated, t here is no reason why the increase in lum p-sum alim ony (an

am ount $466.67 less than his child-support pay m ent) should render Chip unable to m ake his

m onthly pay m ents. ¶34. C h ip’s assertion that the chancery court’s order requires him to m ake p a y me n t s i n

excess of his m onthly incom e is sim ply not supported by t he record. Theref ore, this issue is without m erit.
V. The assignm ent of the m arital debts ha s p r e v iously been decided and becom e the law of the case. ¶35. Chip again argues that the c hancery court f a iled to equitably divide the m arital debts. However, this issue has previously been decided by this C ourt and has becom e t he law of the

case. Griner , 235 So. 3d at 186-87 (¶20). ¶36. In Griner I we reviewed the equ i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d f ound “ n o error in the chancellor’s assigning responsibility f or pay m ent of the d ebts t o C h i p i n light of Chip’s substantial separate incom e and earni n g p o t e n tial.” Id. at 1 87 (¶20). W e rem a n ded with

1 1specif

ic instructions to reconsider the division of the m arital estate b ased on a proper valuation of the real property

. On rem and, the chancery court re-evaluated the m arital estate b a s e d on the real property ’s net value and adjusted the equitable distribution accordi n g l y . The chancery court prope r l y d i d n o t re-evaluate allocation o f the m arital debts. This is because the chancery court’s previous holding that Chip was responsible f o r all of the m arital debts was af

f irm ed by this Court and had becom e the law of the case. ¶37. Because the assignm ent o f ma r i t a l d e b t s h a d b e c o me the law of the case, this
argum ent is procedurally

barred, and also without m erit.
VI. The chancery court acted w ithin its authority w hen it included health-insurance coverage in the alim o ny aw ard. ¶38. As in the previous appeal, Chip continues t o challenge the chancery court’s authority
to order that he m aintain health-insurance coverage f or Melanie. He argue s t h a t health insurance was not an issue the couple consented t o having the c hancery court decide. On appeal, this Court held that t he chancery court did n ot exceed its authority when it awarded Melanie health insurance. ¶39. Health insu

r a n c e fa l l s u n d e r the category o f alim ony and support—which Melanie and Chip authorized the chancery court to determ ine. See Voda v. Voda , 731 So. 2d 1152, 1157 (¶27) ( Miss. 1999) (holding that alim ony is d e t e rm ined “based on the substance, not the label”). W e r eversed and r em anded purely f o r clarif ication as to how l ong Chip has to

m aintain health insurance f or Melanie—an i ssue not raised on appeal. The chancery court clarif i ed that Chip w as to m aintain health insurance f or Melanie until she reaches sixty -f ive
y ears of age.

1 2¶40. On appeal, Chip m e rely repeats his a ttack on the general g r a n t o f h e a lth insurance.

He d oes not attack the duration. As discussed above, this issue has been previously decided and becom e the law of the case. ¶41. W e af

f irm in part and reverse and rem a nd in pa r t

. We r e v e r s e and rem and to f ully

com ply with t he 2017 m andate and the procedures outlined in Rule 36(d). All other issues are af f irm ed. ¶42. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. BARNES, C.J., J. W I L SON, P.J., GREENLEE, W E S T B R O O K S , M c D O N ALD, LAWRENCE A ND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J., AND TINDELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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