In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth __________________________

No. 02-23-00056-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 271st District Court

Wise County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV20-08-579

Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel

WCJ ASSETS, LTD., Appellant

V. 

US TRINITY BRIDGEPORT, LLC, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Appellant WCJ Assets, Ltd. perfected this interlocutory appeal from the trial 

court’s modified temporary-injunction order, which granted the relief requested in a

temporary-injunction application filed by Appellee US Trinity Bridgeport, LLC (UST). 

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (authorizing interlocutory appeal 

from an order granting a temporary injunction). The temporary-injunction order 

restrains WCJ from executing with a third-party lessee a lease that permits mining 

operations on a tract of land that WCJ had conveyed to UST. In the conveyancing

documents, WCJ had reserved the right to mine certain minerals from the conveyed 

property. UST has moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. We grant UST’s motion. 

Our reasons for granting the motion to dismiss are multi-pronged:

• WCJ has now executed an agreement with a different third party to mine 

the property, and that event produced a change in the status of the 

parties that moots the question of whether the restraint in the trial 

court’s temporary-injunction order requires interlocutory review.

• The trial court has rendered an interlocutory summary judgment that 

moots the question of whether UST made a showing of a probable right 

of recovery at the temporary-injunction hearing and makes the legal 
3

question now resolved by summary judgment an issue properly resolved

in an appeal on the merits.

• WCJ predicates its appeal on the questions of whether the trial court 

erred (1) by granting the injunction without a showing that execution of 

the lease it is restrained from executing would irreparably harm UST and 

(2) by failing to properly document that conclusion in its temporaryinjunction order. WCJ’s argument turns primarily on the contention that

no harm would result to UST because the trial court could later 

determine whether the lease at issue was a bona fide exercise of WCJ’s 

rights. Because we conclude that the trial court has now effectively

determined that the proposed lease was not a bona fide exercise of 

WCJ’s rights, the question of whether UST failed to show harm because

the trial court could later determine the validity of the lease is now moot.

• We also reject WCJ’s argument, which was made in a postsubmission 

brief, that the temporary-injunction order dissolved automatically 

because UST nonsuited any “cause of action” that challenged WCJ’s 

ability to execute the lease referenced in that order, but we do agree with 

its present position that appeal of the order is moot.
4 

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The underlying transaction between the parties and the terms of 

an Addendum that is at the center of the controversy

WCJ conveyed an approximately 1,400-acre tract of rural property to UST. 

The underlying controversy involves the construction of a Special Warranty Deed and 

a Special Provisions Addendum (the Addendum) attached to the deed that deals with 

interests reserved by WCJ in the conveyance. 

Initially, the parties executed a Farm and Ranch Contract governing the terms 

of the conveyance. That contract contained the following provision: “Reservations: 

Any reservation for oil, gas, or other minerals, water, timber, or other interests is 

made in accordance with an attached addendum.” Attached to the contract is the 

Addendum that is the epicenter of the dispute. 

The Addendum’s terms carried forward into the conveyance of the property 

when the Addendum was attached and incorporated into the Special Warranty Deed. 

That deed specified that it was “subject to . . . the terms relating to the Aggregate (as 

defined hereafter) that run with the land [as] contained in the Special Provisions 

Addendum to the Farm and Ranch Contract (the ‘Contract’).” Then, the deed’s 

reservations that retained “all of the commercially recoverable sand, gravel, and 

limestone owned by Grantor” referenced the Addendum as the “Contract.” 

The Addendum reserved to WCJ as the seller the “commercially recoverable 

sand, gravel, and limestone[,] which may be located on, in, under[,] or produced from 
5 

the surface of the [p]roperty to a depth of 50 feet below the surface of the [p]roperty 

[that] is owned by [WCJ] (collectively the ‘Aggregate’).” The Addendum contained 

further reservations of 

rights of ingress and egress and of reasonable use of the [p]roperty for 

mining, exploring, testing, operating, developing[,] or removing the 

Aggregate subject to the limitations contained [t]herein provided that, in 

the exercise of such rights of ingress and egress and of reasonable use, 

[WCJ] shall use commercially reasonable efforts in accordance with 

customary industry standards for mining of aggregate materials to 

minimize interference with [UST’s] use of the [p]roperty. 

Also included in the Addendum was a provision entitled “Aggregate 

Contracts.” That provision contained two time limits that have also been the focus of 

the litigation. The first time limit provided that WCJ and UST would have ninety days 

to “attempt to enter into a contract or contracts for the sale of the Aggregate to a

third-party purchaser.” This ninety-day period is defined as the Mining Contract 

Period. The Addendum then went on to define the parties’ duties should the Mining 

Contract Period expire without a contract for the sale of the minerals. Specifically,

this later provision dealt with an Alternative Mining Contract:

In the event that [UST] and [WCJ] do not enter into the Mining 

Contract within the Mining Contract Period, [WCJ] shall have the right 

to enter into a contract or contracts for the mining, removal, 

transportation[,] and sale of the Aggregate with one or more third parties 

on terms and conditions satisfactory to [WCJ] provided such contract 

has a reclamation plan in accordance with industry standards (whether 

one or more the “Alternat[iv]e Mining Contract”), subject to [UST’s] 

Right of First Refusal . . . . 
6

If a Mining Contract, an Alternative Mining Contract, or a contract entered into with 

UST as a result of its exercise of its right of first refusal were not entered into “within 

three (3) years after the expiration of the Mining Contract Period,” another provision 

of the Addendum would be triggered by which WCJ would become obligated to 

“convey it[]s rights, titles[,] and interests in the Aggregate by special warranty deed to 

[UST,] and [WCJ would] no longer have any interest in the Aggregate[,] including 

without limitation executive and/or royalty rights provided that [WCJ would] retain a 

ten percent (10%) royalty interest in the Aggregate.” 

B. A summary of the litigation focusing on whether a crushing-andscreening plant could be placed on the property and the temporary 

injunction at issue in this appeal

The ninety-day Mining Contract Period specified in the Addendum passed

without the creation of a Mining Contract. Eventually, WCJ sued UST. The litigation 

has centered on WCJ’s attempts to exercise its right to enter into an Alternative 

Mining Contract with a third party for the mining of the Aggregate and more 

particularly has centered on whether the rights that WCJ retained pursuant to the

Addendum allowed the placement of a crushing-and-screening plant on the property 

to process the minerals mined from it. Indeed, WCJ’s original petition sought the 

following declaration:

WCJ requests a declaration from the [c]ourt regarding the parties’ rights 

and obligations under the [d]eed and Addendum. Specifically, WCJ 

requests that the [c]ourt grant declaratory judgment that the provisions 

of the [d]eed, Addendum, and Texas law allow WCJ to utilize the 

[p]roperty to develop the aggregate material from the [p]roperty[] and 
7

more specifically the right to operate a crushing[-]and[-]screening plant on the 

[p]roperty. [Emphasis added.]

UST countered with its own declaratory request. Specifically, UST requested

a declaration from the [c]ourt regarding the parties’ rights and 

obligations under the Farm and Ranch Contract and the Special 

Provisions Addendum. Specifically, [UST] request[ed] that the [c]ourt 

grant declaratory judgment that the Farm and Ranch Contract and the

Special Provisions Addendum is valid and enforceable and [sought] a 

declaration of its and WCJ’s obligations, rights[,] and duties under the 

Farm and Ranch Contract and Special Provisions Addendum.[1]

The event that brings the matter under our review is WCJ’s tender of a 

proposed Second Rogers Lease. That tender was intended to trigger UST’s right of 

first refusal as outlined in the provisions of the Addendum. Instead, it triggered 

another in UST’s serial requests for injunctive relief from the trial court predicated on

the claim that WCJ’s attempted exercise of its rights was not bona fide. On this 

occasion, the request was UST’s “Application for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Application for Temporary and Permanent Injunction.”

The Application spans more than twenty pages, but its introduction focuses on 

UST’s objection to the Second Rogers Lease because that lease permits a crushingand-screening plant to be located on the property:

1

Although in its counterclaim UST objected to the operation of a crushing-andscreening plant on the property, it also complained of a laundry list of ways in which it 

contends WCJ’s purported Alternative Mining Contracts exceed the Addendum 

reservation’s scope of WCJ’s rights. In addition, UST complained that by negotiating 

the Second Lease Agreement from Rogers Group, Inc. (Second Rogers Lease), WCJ 

had breached the parties’ contract.
8

[T]his [temporary restraining order] is necessitated by WCJ’s continued 

and persistent attempts to lease rights to third parties that WCJ simply 

does not possess and that go beyond WCJ’s actual rights that the parties 

bargained for and agreed to in the purchase agreement and its 

addendum. WCJ, under the guise of nonexistent rights, seeks to severely disrupt 

and destroy [UST’s] property through the implementation of a destructive 

crushing[-]and[-]screening facility[] and mining and manufacturing operations on the

real property. Despite failing to point to any listed right in any agreement between the 

parties, WCJ has communicated with and engaged several mining companies for the 

construction of the aforementioned operations. [Emphasis added.]

Because the Second Rogers Lease allegedly granted rights that UST argued that WCJ 

did not have the right to grant, UST further argued that the contract was again not a 

bona fide offer that triggered UST’s right-of-first-refusal obligations under the 

Addendum. The reply that UST filed in support of its request for injunctive relief 

highlighted again its contention that the Second Rogers Lease contained rights outside 

the scope of the Addendum, including the right to manufacture aggregate and to 

operate a crushing-and-screening plant on the property.

The trial court conducted a hearing on UST’s temporary-injunction application. 

The lion’s share of the testimony presented at the hearing centered on the issue of 

placing a crushing-and-screening plant on the property. The trial court heard 

evidence on the following topics:

• the parties’ negotiations leading up to the execution of the contract for the 

property’s purchase and the Addendum and whether those negotiations

envisioned an on-site processing facility for the mined material;
9

• expert legal testimony and other expert testimony regarding whether the 

language of the Addendum’s reservations included the right to operate a 

crushing-and-screening plant on the property; 

• the use of water in the processing of the mined material and whether WCJ 

or UST held the water rights on the property;

• the physical characteristics of a crushing-and-screening plant;

• the deleterious effects on the property of a crushing-and-screening plant;

• how long it would take before a crushing-and-screening plant might be 

constructed on the property if the Second Rogers Lease were executed;

• whether the expert witnesses knew of an aggregate operation where there

was not an on-site crushing plant; and 

• the detrimental effects to each party should the trial court permit or not 

permit the execution of the Second Rogers Lease with its corresponding 

trigger of the right of first refusal specified in the Addendum. 

No one challenged that the Second Rogers Lease permitted the placement of a 

crushing-and-screening plant on the property, and the proposed Second Rogers Lease 

introduced into evidence at the injunction hearing contained such a provision.

2

2

Section 1.5(b) of the proposed Second Rogers Lease provides,

Processing Plant. Lessee shall, at such time as Lessee may elect in its sole

discretion, erect or otherwise place on the [p]roperty at least one processing 

plant for the purposes of crushing or otherwise processing Aggregate. The 
10

The parties also clashed on the question of whether the type of irreparable

harm necessary to support the issuance of a temporary injunction would occur if WCJ 

were permitted to execute the Second Rogers Lease. UST argued that execution of 

the Second Rogers Lease would cause immediate harm to the property while WCJ 

argued that the process of permitting a mining operation on the property would delay 

any potential harm for years. 

The parties also had differing views of what the status quo was that the trial

court should protect and whether enjoining execution of the Second Rogers Lease 

was necessary to protect UST or if that restraint would harm WCJ. In essence, UST

argued that if the Second Rogers Lease were executed, it might be forced to respond 

in the ten days that it had to exercise its right of first refusal before there was a legal 

ruling on whether the Second Rogers Lease was a bona fide Alternative Mining

Contract under the terms of the Addendum. UST’s claimed fear was that if it did not 

predict correctly, its rights could be irreparably harmed. 

WCJ countered that because of several factors that had occurred, the three-year 

period for it to enter into an Alternative Mining Contract would expire a few months 

after the injunction hearing was scheduled to be held. To enjoin the execution of the 

Second Rogers Lease and potentially allow the three-year Alternative Mining Contract 

period to lapse would needlessly put WCJ’s rights in peril because the mere execution

configuration, structure, specifications[,] and extent of such processing plant(s) 

shall be at the sole discretion of Lessee. 
11

of the lease would, according to WCJ, cause no harm to UST. As we understand the

argument, WCJ contended that the lease could be executed and that the trial court 

could later make the legal determination regarding whether the executed Second 

Rogers Lease was a bona fide exercise of its rights under the Addendum. If the trial 

court later determined that the Second Rogers Lease was not a bona fide exercise of 

WCJ’s rights, WCJ would lose its rights to argue that the Second Rogers Lease was a 

bona fide Alternative Mining Contract that had triggered UST’s duties. We glean our 

understanding from the following argument made by WCJ’s counsel:

Well, I would argue that we have a right, but we’re not exercising that 

right. There’s no threat to do any injury to their land. And, indeed, I 

want to disagree completely with what counsel just said. They have a 

clear remedy, and the [c]ourt just said it. We’re going to have a trial 

some[]day, and you’re going to argue whether or not this contract has legal 

enforceability. That’s the remedy. And if they win, they win[,] and we can’t go 

forward and mine.

But right now the status quo changes if the [c]ourt takes away 

from my client the right to sign a contract. There is no damage. We said

it again, and I know -- but it makes sense. I could hand the contract to 

[WCJ’s representative] right now, and he could sign it and we’d all sit 

here and look and say where’s the damage. And we could sit here and 

wait and wait and wait and wait, and there is no damage. That’s their 

burden, [Y]our Honor. [Emphasis added.]

Later, WCJ’s counsel again reiterated the argument regarding why enjoining 

execution of the lease injured WCJ but did not injure UST: 

Very simply, [Y]our Honor, [UST] cannot articulate any irreparable 

injury, any damage at all. If we’re -- if they’re right and we’re wrong, 

there’s no harm because they’ve lost nothing. 
12

To the flip side -- and they cannot contradict this -- if this [c]ourt 

enjoins my client from signing this lease, we lose -- and this April

deadline is coming -- we lose this -- it’s a real property right -- this 

reservation of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of rock. We 

literally lose that. So that changes the status quo. 

The only way the status quo changes is if the [c]ourt signs the 

injunction. If the [c]ourt does not sign the injunction, we’re still here. 

And, again, if they’re right, if they win at trial, this is a complete nullity. So there’s

no damage. We can sign 18 contracts to Sunday, and if they have no 

legal effect, there’s no legal damage. [Emphasis added.]

The trial court eventually signed a modified temporary-injunction order stating

that “WCJ is enjoined from executing the Second . . . Rogers Lease.”3 The irreparable 

injury cited in the modified order was the following:

WCJ’s threat to cause direct damage to [UST’s] real property and 

personal property of devaluation and destruction—as the surface estate 

currently houses over 1,000 wild, domestic, and exotic animals on the 

property and serves as a retreat for United States Military veterans. 

Further, [UST] will be irreparably harmed by WCJ’s threat to cause 

direct damages to [UST’s] real[-]property rights, as conveyed and 

maintained in the Farm and Ranch Contract and Special Provisions 

Addendum, dated[] November 12, 2019. [UST] lacks any adequate 

remedy at law due to the threat to [UST’s] real and personal property as 

described herein. If WCJ is not enjoined from executing the second 

proposed mining lease, tendered to [UST] on or about November 18, 

2022, between WCJ and Non-Party Rogers Group Inc., then [UST] will

. . . experience imminent and irreparable harm. 

3

The modified temporary-injunction order differed from the original injunction

order because it did not restrain WCJ “from enforcing the provision entitled, ‘Buyer’s

Right of First Refusal’ in the Special Provisions Addendum of the Farm and Ranch 

Contract executed on or about November 12, 2019.” 
13

C. The summary-judgment orders entered by the trial court that 

appear to resolve the controversy between the parties on whether

the Second Rogers Lease was a bona fide exercise of the 

Alternative Mining Contract provision

After the temporary-injunction hearing, the parties began the process of 

resolving the controversy through summary judgment. WCJ filed an amended 

petition that repeated its declaratory-judgment request asking the trial court to decide 

that the Addendum’s reservation included the right to operate a crushing-andscreening plant on the property. WCJ also filed a motion for partial summary 

judgment seeking relief to avoid the potential adverse consequence that it had told the 

trial court that it might suffer should it be enjoined from executing the Second Rogers 

Lease: WCJ asked the trial court to order that the three-year deadline for an 

agreement to an Alternative Mining Contract be tolled until its appeal of the trial 

court’s injunctive relief was final.

UST filed its own motion for summary judgment on WCJ’s claims. The 

motion—supported by twelve exhibits—raised two grounds, one of which focused on

the much disputed crushing-and-screening plant and WCJ’s declaratory-judgment 

request focusing on the right to operate that type of plant on the property:

WCJ asserts two claims—(1) that it is entitled to a declaration from the

[c]ourt that it can install and operate a massively disruptive limestone 

crushing[-]and[-]screening plant on[-]site at the ranch, and (2) that [UST]

breached the subject contract by purportedly failing and refusing to 

cooperate with WCJ to secure a mining contract within [ninety] days of

closing. Each of these claims is without factual and legal basis. [UST]

therefore respectfully requests that the [c]ourt grant summary judgment 

in favor of [UST] as to both claims. 
14

WCJ’s response—supported by thirteen exhibits—clearly challenged UST’s 

view of what the words in the Addendum mean and whether those words permit the 

processing of mined rock on the property:

What is the meaning of “develop and remove the Aggregate”? Those 

are the operative words of the parties’ contract that UST must prove 

only have one clear meaning as a matter of law that does not include 

processing mined rock into saleable aggregate. UST has not and cannot 

meet that burden. While UST attempts to argue what these words do

not mean, UST wholly fails [to cite] the legal standard to prove what 

they do mean. On the other hand, WCJ’s evidence proves exactly what

these words mean in the context of both the parties’ negotiations and 

the industry custom and norm: to process the mined rock into saleable

aggregates. At best for UST, these words are ambiguous, thus 

necessitating a trial on this issue of fact. At worst for UST, these words 

mean processing the rock on-site, which is frankly the only reasonable 

interpretation within the context of the evidence before the [c]ourt. As 

such, UST’s [m]otion must be denied. 

UST filed a reply to WCJ’s response with an introduction that again crystalized 

the issue on summary judgment as being the right to place a crushing-and-screening

plant on the property:

[T]he [c]ourt should apply the plain, ordinary, and generally accepted 

meanings of “developing” and “removing[,”] which does not include the 

additional language of the right to construct a separate 

crushing[-]and[-]screening facility on the [p]roperty, and disregard the 

improper parol evidence, which was introduced for the purpose of 

creating an ambiguity. Therefore, the [c]ourt should grant [UST’s]

Motion for Summary Judgment as the Contract is clearly unambiguous 

as written. 

The trial court granted UST’s motion with an order that stated the following:

On January 23, 2023[,] the [c]ourt heard oral arguments of [WCJ] and

[UST] regarding the Motion and the relief sought therein[,] and[] having 

considered [UST’s] Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment (the 
15

“Motion”), all responses, replies, and the admissible evidence in the 

summary[-]judgment record, and arguments of counsel, the [c]ourt finds 

that the Motion should be, in all things, GRANTED.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that [UST’s] Traditional Motion 

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

The trial court signed this order three days before it signed the modified temporaryinjunction order that is at issue in this appeal. The trial court later denied WCJ’s 

motion for partial summary judgment.4

4

UST also filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment that challenged a 

fraudulent-inducement claim pleaded by WCJ. The trial court granted this motion. In 

addition, UST filed a “Motion for Determination of Issues of Law” that challenged 

issues raised in WCJ’s fifth amended petition. Specifically, the motion recited the

following:

2. First, [WCJ’s] new causes of action are barred by the Summary[-]

Judgment Order because[] (1) [WCJ] cannot amend its pleadings to 

undermine the Order; (2) the Order bars subsequent claims that are

based on issues already determined by the [c]ourt, and (3) [WCJ] waived 

its new arguments by failing to raise them in its response to [UST’s]

Motion for Summary Judgment.

3. Second, [WCJ] impermissibly seeks a declaratory judgment that 

its ability to secure an Alternative Mining Plan within three (3) years has 

become impracticable due to the [c]ourt’s [t]emporary[-][i]njunction 

[o]rder. This fails for multiple reasons, including that[] (1) declaratory 

relief is not available to resolve disputes already before the [c]ourt, and 

[WCJ’s] impossibility request hinges on the interpretation of rights 

provided in the Contract, an issue the [c]ourt has already resolved at 

summary judgment; (2) an affirmative defense cannot be used to support 

a declaratory[-]judgment action; and (3) impracticability would only apply 

to excuse a party’s non-performance of an obligation when it has been 

sued for not fulfilling that obligation[,] yet [WCJ] only has a right, not an

obligation, to secure a compliant Alternative Mining Plan. The 

declaratory request regarding impracticability should be dismissed.
16

Shortly after the trial court signed its last summary-judgment order, UST filed a 

notice of partial nonsuit:

[UST] hereby dismisses, without prejudice, its breach[-]of[-]contract 

counterclaim. This non[]suit is in accordance with [UST’s] oral 

representations in open court at the March 2, 2023 hearing in this case. 

[UST] does not nonsuit its claim to attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party in

a declaratory[-]judgment action under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 

Code § 37.009. 

The trial court memorialized the nonsuit in an order dismissing UST’s breach-ofcontract claim.

D. The litigation pivots to a new controversy

Shortly after the trial court rendered the summary-judgment order denying 

WCJ’s motion for partial summary judgment, UST filed a new application for 

temporary restraining order and temporary and permanent injunction. This 

application sought to enjoin the execution of some manner of mining agreement 

between WCJ and an entity identified as Brazos Valley Contracting Company

(BVCC); the application described the agreement as the Second BVCC Lease. The 

4. Third, [WCJ’s] mutual and unilateral mistake claims should also 

be dismissed. For there to be a mutual mistake, the parties must share 

the same mistaken belief or assumption, which does not exist here. 

Moreover, the unilateral mistake of a party cannot alone support a claim 

for relief.

5. Thus, [UST] requests that the [c]ourt find [WCJ’s] request for 

declaratory judgment based on an affirmative defense and [WCJ’s] claims 

under mutual and unilateral mistake are unactionable. [Footnotes 

omitted.] 

The trial court granted the Motion for Determination of Issues of Law. 
17

trial court denied UST’s application for injunctive relief to forestall the execution of 

the Second BVCC Lease.

The new controversy embodied in UST’s denied injunction application 

prompted an inquiry from this court. We issued an order asking whether the Second 

Rogers Lease that is the subject of the temporary-injunction order on appeal remained 

viable in light of what is apparently an agreement with another party to conduct 

mining operations on the property, i.e., whether the existence of the Second BVCC 

Lease mooted the question regarding the validity of the trial court’s temporaryinjunction order. 

WCJ filed a response that attached an email from Rogers’s counsel claiming 

that it still wished to execute the Second Rogers Lease and represented that “the 

contractual offer described as the ‘Second . . . Rogers Lease’ in the trial court’s 

Modified Order Granting [UST’s] Application for Temporary and Permanent 

Injunctive Relief (signed January 27, 2023) remain[ed] an outstanding offer from

Rogers to lease the property at issue on the terms set forth in that offer.” 

WCJ, however, did not dispute that it had entered into an agreement with 

BVCC—the entity referenced in UST’s denied injunction application—but instead 

sought to minimize the effect of that agreement:

The Second BVCC Alternative Mining Contract—incorrectly referred to 

by [UST] as a “lease” (the “Second BVCC Lease”)—is not a lease[5] and 

does not conflict with the Second . . . Rogers Lease. The Second BVCC 

5

We will hereinafter refer to this document as the BVCC agreement.
18

Alternative Mining Contract[] . . . is a contract for only the provision of 

mining services and does not convey a property right to BVCC. If the 

modified temporary injunction is vacated, it is WCJ’s intent to execute 

the Second . . . Rogers Lease and then simply not engage BVCC’s 

mining services, as provided in the Second BVCC Alternative Mining 

Contract: “Work shall commence with[in] [sixty] days after WCJ issues

notice to proceed.” [Footnote omitted.] 

Though carefully phrased, WCJ appears to acknowledge that it has now engaged an 

entity to mine the property on its behalf. 

WCJ’s response to our order also argued that the parties have continued to 

litigate and, thus, that there are live controversies between the parties demonstrating 

that our mootness concerns are unfounded:

WCJ argued against mootness in its response to [UST’s] motion to 

dismiss and in its surreply in part because [UST’s] first amended 

counterclaim remained unadjudicated. It was not the subject of [UST’s]

nonsuit, which nonsuited only its breach[-]of[-]contract counterclaim. 

Since then, [UST] filed a second amended counterclaim (attached as 

Exhibit 3 and soon to be included in a supplemental clerk’s record), and 

the underlying case is now much farther from being adjudicated than 

when [UST] filed its motion to dismiss. [Footnote omitted.]

WCJ has now provided us with UST’s latest counterclaim in a supplemental 

clerk’s record. But the counterclaim indicates that the controversy between the 

parties has shifted from the controversy central to the injunction that WCJ appeals. 

In the counterclaim, UST now seeks to litigate the effect of the BVCC agreement that 

was the subject of its denied injunction application:

1. This counterclaim arises from WCJ’s execution of a vague and 

overreaching third-party mining lease with Brazos Valley Contracting 

Company (“BVCC”) (the “Second BVCC Mining Proposal”) on [UST’s]

land. The executed Second BVCC Mining Proposal, WCJ’s fourth 
19

improper lease submitted to [UST], circumvents [UST’s] contracted 

rights and was executed in violation of [UST’s] contractual right of first 

refusal. 

2. The Second BVCC Mining Proposal does not qualify as an 

Alternate Mining Proposal as contemplated by the Contract and 

Addendum. It is a one-page document missing a significant number of 

material terms, making it impossible for [UST] to evaluate for purposes 

of meaningfully exercising its [r]ight of [f]irst [r]efusal. WCJ was 

obligated under the contract to submit to [UST] a bona[ ]fide written

offer that qualifies under the terms of the contract. It has not done so. 

Thus, [UST] brings this counterclaim against WCJ. 

In the most recent counterclaim, UST highlighted the summary-judgment 

ruling that we have detailed above—the one in which the trial court resolved the prior 

central controversy between the parties about whether WCJ had the right to grant the 

ability to construct a crushing-and-screening plant on the property. Its pleading reads 

as follows:

[UST] Wins Summary Judgment on WCJ’s Rights Under the 

Contract.

On January 23, 2023, this [c]ourt [held a hearing] on [UST’s]

Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment on WCJ’s 

declaratory[-]judgment claim. WCJ sought a declaration that it had the 

right to construct an on-site crushing[-]and[-]screening facility and that 

[UST] did not cooperate with WCJ to secure a Mining Contract. [UST], 

on the other hand, presented evidence that[] (1) the Underlying Contract 

unambiguously did not contain the right to construct an on-site

crushing[-]and[-]screening facility (nor the right to convey that right); 

and ([2]) the Underlying Contract unambiguously did not contain the 

rights incidental and necessary to construct an on-site facility. Two days 

later, on January 25, 2023, this [c]ourt granted [UST’s] Traditional 

Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed [WCJ’s]

declaratory[-]judgment claim. [Footnotes omitted.]
20

Also attached to the latest counterclaim is correspondence from WCJ’s counsel

that describes the BVCC agreement as an Alternative Mining Contract. UST 

interpreted the correspondence as signaling that WCJ was going forward with 

implementation of the BVCC agreement and that the agreement is operative as an 

Alternative Mining Contract because UST did not exercise its right of first refusal

after receiving the BVCC agreement as an Alternative Mining Contract. 

III. Analysis

A. We set forth the elements necessary to obtain a temporary

injunction, what is subject to review in the interlocutory appeal of 

a temporary injunction, and when mootness impacts our review. 

The appeal of an order granting a temporary injunction focuses on whether the 

trial court abused its discretion by finding that an applicant has established the 

elements necessary for the court to protect the status quo pending a determination on 

the merits:

[A temporary] injunction functions “to preserve the status quo of the 

litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford

Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002) (op. on reh’g) (citing Walling[ 

v. Metcalfe], 863 S.W.2d [56,] 57[ (Tex. 1993)]). “To obtain a temporary 

injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: 

(1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the 

relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the 

interim.” Id.

Hernandez v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02-20-00225-CV, 2021 WL 520456, at *5

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 11, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
21

The interlocutory appeal of a temporary-injunction order is not a vehicle to 

preview what an appellate court’s ruling will be in an appeal from a judgment on the 

merits. Fuentes v. Union de Pasteurizadores de Juarez Sociedad Anonima de Capital Variable, 

527 S.W.3d 492, 498 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (“[A] party may not use an 

appeal of a temporary[-]injunction ruling to get an advance ruling on the merits.”

(quoting Babu v. Zeeck, 478 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.))). 

Indeed, whatever legal determinations are made to justify the issuance of a temporaryinjunction order do not survive to impact our determination of the merits. Glattly v. 

Air Starter Components, Inc., 332 S.W.3d 620, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2010, pet. denied) (“Furthermore, Texas law is clear that, generally, a trial court’s 

ruling on a temporary injunction (or other interlocutory judgment) does not support 

the defense of res judicata.”). Nor are the consequences before us of a wrongful, but 

now moot, temporary-injunction order. Matott v. Matott, No. 11-22-00362-CV, 2023 

WL 2415279, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 9, 2023, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. 

op.) (holding appeal moot even when “a justiciable controversy still exist[ed] with 

respect to whether the temporary injunction was wrongfully granted and whether 

Appellants were damaged”).

And because a temporary-injunction order is an interlocutory order, events that 

continue to occur in the case as it progresses may make a temporary-injunction order 

moot. The Texas Supreme Court has stated why this court cannot decide moot
22

controversies and how the passage of events may moot the appeal of a temporaryinjunction order:

Appellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies. See

Camarena v. Tex[.] Emp[.] Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988). This 

prohibition is rooted in the separation[-]of[-]powers doctrine in the 

Texas and United States Constitutions that prohibits courts from 

rendering advisory opinions. See Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; see also Tex[.]

Ass’n of Bus. v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993); Firemen’s 

Ins. Co. [of Newark, N.J.] . . . v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968). A 

case becomes moot if at any stage there ceases to be an actual 

controversy between the parties. See Camarena, 754 S.W.2d at 151. 

When a temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in 

status of the parties or the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also 

moot. See Parr v. Stockwell, . . . 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 ([Tex.] 1959); Tex[.]

Educ. Agency v. Dall[.] Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1990, no writ). An appellate[-]court decision about a temporary

injunction’s validity under such circumstances would constitute an 

impermissible advisory opinion. See generally Burch, 442 S.W.2d at 333; 

Tex[.] Educ. Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999); see also Elec. Reliability 

Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 

634–35 (Tex. 2021) (stating that a case becomes moot when (1) a justiciable 

controversy no longer exists between the parties, (2) the parties no longer have a 

legally cognizable interest in the case’s outcome, (3) the court can no longer grant the 

requested relief or otherwise affect the parties’ rights or interests, or (4) any decision 

would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion).

The entry of judgment on the legal issues at play in a temporary-injunction

order may moot the question of the validity of such an injunction. The Beaumont
23

Court of Appeals summarized the authority on the question of whether a subsequent

judgment moots the appeal of a temporary injunction:

When a trial court renders a final judgment while an appeal of an order 

granting or denying a temporary injunction is pending, the 

temporary[-]injunction order becomes moot. See Richards v. Mena, 820 

S.W.2d 372[, 372] (Tex. 1991); Isuani v. Manske–Sheffield Radiology Grp., 

P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) [(order)]. In this case, the 

temporary injunction and the summary judgment (which includes a 

permanent injunction) address the same parties, same issues, and same 

property. Accordingly, because the interlocutory appeal is now moot, 

we dismiss the appeal of the temporary injunction in cause number 09-

16-00393-CV for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., BCH Dev., 

LLC v. Lakeview Heights Addition Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, No. 05-14-00003-

CV, 2015 WL 1756100, [at *1] (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 17, 2015, no 

pet.) (mem. op.); Livingston v. Arrington, No. 03-11-00266-CV, 2012 WL 

1499490, [at *1] (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Ridgepoint Rentals, LLC v. McGrath, Nos. 09-16-00393-CV, 09-17-00006-CV, 2017 WL 

6062290, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 7, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also

Panda Power, 619 S.W.3d at 635 (“For example, a final judgment granting a permanent 

injunction typically moots a pending interlocutory appeal from a prior order granting 

a temporary injunction.”).

B. A change in the status of the parties has mooted this appeal.

The principle that a change in the status of the parties may moot the 

controversy over the validity of a temporary injunction prompted our inquiry to the

parties that we discussed above. We asked whether WCJ’s tender of the BVCC 

agreement mooted the injunction’s restraint on execution of the Second Rogers Lease. 
24

Based primarily on the statements contained in UST’s latest injunction application and 

the fact that the application had been denied, we made the following inquiries:

Specifically, does the existence of the later BVCC [agreement] referenced 

in the application indicate that Rogers is no longer seeking to lease the

property? If Rogers is no longer seeking a lease, does this also moot the 

injunctive relief granted in the injunctive order being appealed? Further, 

if the property that Rogers sought to lease has been leased to BVCC, 

why is the appealed injunctive order not moot?

As noted, WCJ responded that it still wishes to execute the Second Rogers 

Lease and raised the distinction that the BVCC agreement “is not a lease and does not 

conflict with the [Second Rogers Lease].” But in its response, WCJ referenced UST’s 

second amended counterclaim and then provided us a supplemental clerk’s record

containing that pleading. WCJ told us that this pleading demonstrates that “the 

underlying case is now much farther from being adjudicated than when [UST] filed its 

motion to dismiss” for mootness.

But the second amended counterclaim shows two things. First, it shows that a 

controversy still exists between WCJ and UST but that the focus of the controversy

has shifted to whether the BVCC agreement qualifies “as an Alternate Mining 

Proposal as contemplated by the Contract and Addendum.” Second, and critically, an

email attached to the counterclaim written by WCJ’s counsel to UST’s counsel 

indicates that WCJ has taken the position that the BVCC agreement is the exercise of 

its rights under the Addendum: 

Since UST did not exercise its right of first refusal per the below

correspondence sent on March 3, 2023, WCJ has proceeded in executing 
25

the attached Alternative Mining Contract with Brazos Valley Contracting 

Co. (“BVCC”). We will let you know when BVCC will begin mining. In 

the interim, we assume UST will want a double gate installed for access 

off Highway 380. Please let us know if UST wants to install it[] or 

prefers that WCJ does that.

Also attached is an email from WCJ’s counsel to UST’s counsel stating, “Please see 

the attached correspondence from [WCJ’s counsel] and proposed contract” that 

includes the BVCC agreement with hand-written notations showing its acceptance by 

the parties. 

Thus, the controversy in this case has now shifted because WCJ has taken the 

position that the Alternative Mining Contract executed within the three-year period 

that would allow it to avoid conveying the Aggregate to UST, which it claims it is 

entitled to execute pursuant to the Addendum, is no longer the Second Rogers Lease 

but is now the BVCC agreement and that WCJ is going forward with implementation

of that agreement. We have no doubt that WCJ will argue on appeal of an eventual 

final judgment that the Second Rogers Lease was a valid Alternative Mining 

Contract—no matter its provision permitting the placement of a crushing-andscreening plant on the property. But for now, WCJ has self-altered the status quo that

it argued existed at the time of the temporary-injunction hearing by taking the 

position that the BVCC agreement, and not the Second Rogers Lease, is now the 

Alternative Mining Contract that exercised its rights under the Addendum and 

triggered UST’s obligation of first refusal. As noted, “[w]hen a temporary injunction 

becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties[,] . . . the issue of its 
26

validity is also moot.” Jones, 1 S.W.3d at 86. WCJ wants to hedge—and admittedly 

our questions may have prompted the hedge—that the BVCC agreement is somehow

a contingency, but the words of WCJ’s counsel do not support this conclusion; those 

words state that the BVCC agreement is now the Alternative Mining Contract

executed within the three-year period required to avoid the sale-to-UST provision.

WCJ has changed horses; that change in status does not mean that we might

not have to address eventually whether the Second Rogers Lease was a bona fide 

Alternative Mining Contract, but it does impact when that review should occur. For 

the time being at least, WCJ has positioned itself to rely on the BVCC agreement as an 

exercise of its rights under the Addendum and rendered a dead letter the question of 

whether it should be able to execute the Second Rogers Lease as an exercise of that 

right.

C. Because of the trial court’s rulings on the merits of the parties’

claims, the appeal of the temporary-injunction order is moot.

We also conclude that WCJ’s appeal is mooted for an additional reason. Why

WCJ pivoted away from the Second Rogers Lease is apparent and provides our 

second rationale for determining that the controversy over the trial court’s temporaryinjunction order is moot. We have detailed the parties’ arguments at the temporaryinjunction hearing and those involved in UST’s motion for summary judgment. Both 

revolve around the question regarding whether the rights reserved to WCJ in the 

Addendum included the right to build a crushing-and-screening plant on the property. 
27

Because of the obvious effect on the question of mootness of a judgment that 

resolves UST’s right to relief on the merits from WCJ’s claim, the parties argue 

strenuously on both sides of the question regarding whether the trial court’s summary 

judgment may be decoupled from the issues at play in the injunction. WCJ argues

that the issues are not coupled, while UST argues that they are. We conclude that the 

issues cannot be decoupled and that the trial court’s summary-judgment ruling 

resolves the legal question at issue in the injunction; renders our review of that 

question in the appeal of the temporary injunction moot; and instead, postures the 

question for review as an appeal from an eventual final judgment.

Several issues are beyond dispute: (1) the Second Rogers Lease allows Rogers 

to construct a crushing-and-screening plant on the property; (2) the focus of UST’s 

claimed right to relief at the temporary-injunction hearing was whether WCJ retained

the right to build such a plant on the property and thus had the right to grant the 

ability to build such a plant to its lessee; and (3) UST’s summary judgment sought a 

resolution of WCJ’s declaratory-judgment claim that a crushing-and-screening plant

could be constructed on the property—a claim that we view the trial court as having 

effectively resolved adversely to WCJ’s position. As we will explain below, we cannot 

construe the trial court’s summary-judgment order as anything other than a rejection

of WCJ’s contention that it has the right to build or can grant the right to build a 

crushing-and-screening plant on the property. Thus, we conclude that the trial court 

has resolved—on the merits—the legal issue that formed the basis of its conclusions
28

that UST had shown a probable right to recover on its legal claim that the Second 

Rogers Lease granted a right that WCJ did not have the right to grant. To address the 

merits in this appeal would put us in the position of offering an advisory opinion on a

question that should be addressed on the merits of an appeal from a final judgment.

We acknowledge that the trial court has not entered a final judgment and that

the basis for the rule that a final judgment moots an interlocutory temporary

injunction is the fact that the interlocutory order is merged into the final judgment. 

See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co. v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex.

2020) (“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court’s interlocutory orders 

merge into the judgment and may be challenged by appealing that judgment.”). That

merger has not occurred in this case, nor do the parties argue otherwise. But in the 

form of its interlocutory order granting UST’s summary judgment, the trial court has 

made a ruling on the merits that directly impacts the validity of the Second Rogers

Lease. We have no jurisdiction to review an interlocutory summary-judgment order,

and as noted, the appeal of a temporary injunction is not a vehicle to obtain a preview 

ruling on the merits. See Equip. Performance Mgmt., Inc. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., No. 14-15-

01000-CV, 2017 WL 1540805, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 27, 2017, 

no pet.) (mem. op.) (“No statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal in this case, so this 

court has jurisdiction over this appeal only if the trial court’s summary-judgment order 

is final.”); see also Fuentes, 527 S.W.3d at 498 (holding that appeal of a temporary

injunction is not a vehicle to obtain an advance ruling on the merits).
29

To try reviewing the present status of this matter in an interlocutory appeal 

from a temporary injunction would put us in a position in which every corner we 

turned, we would meet ourselves coming the other direction with questions that are 

poised for a review on the merits. If a question integral to the temporary-injunction

order is whether the Second Rogers Lease is a valid Alternative Mining Contract, how 

can we ignore and not address the question resolved by the trial court’s summaryjudgment ruling that answers that question? And as discussed below, WCJ’s argument 

to invalidate the temporary injunction is that there can be no irreparable harm from 

executing a lease that can later be invalidated by a ruling on the merits. Again, as we

discuss below, how does that question survive when we have concluded that the trial 

court has rendered a ruling on the merits that invalidates the lease?

WCJ disagrees with our view of mootness because the trial court has not 

entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the execution of the Second Rogers Lease 

and disputes that the summary-judgment ruling does not explicitly invalidate the 

Second Rogers Lease. True enough, but again as we discuss below, that argument

turns a blind eye to the fact that the interlocutory summary-judgment order can be 

construed as resolving the only issue that was the focus of the temporary-injunction

hearing: whether WCJ could grant a right that it purportedly did not retain, i.e., the 

right to place a crushing-and-screening plant on the property.

WCJ specifically argues why we should ignore this state of affairs and go 

forward with interlocutory review:
30

The temporary injunction is in place and prevents WCJ from signing the 

Second . . . Rogers Lease, to WCJ’s detriment. The temporary injunction

is therefore literally not moot, and this [c]ourt can affect WCJ’s rights by 

finding the modified temporary injunction to be void and by vacating it.

Upon the [c]ourt’s vacating the temporary injunction, WCJ can sign the 

lease,[6] and then the parties can address the partial summary[-]judgment 

order in a regular appeal once a final judgment is rendered. [Footnotes

and record reference omitted.]

WCJ then fleshes out this argument in an accompanying footnote:

UST is correct that vacating the temporary injunction “will not have any 

effect” on the yet-to-be-appealed partial summary[-]judgment order, and 

that is part of WCJ’s point that the partial summary[-]judgment order 

also has no effect on the temporary injunction, as explained in WCJ’s 

response. But UST is incorrect that, as “part of obtaining injunctive 

relief, [UST] proved that there was no right to a

crushing[-]and[-]screening plant.” All UST ostensibly demonstrated was

a likelihood of success. [Reply references omitted.] 

Again, we disagree with the premise that the question of the validity of the Second

Rogers Lease remains only a likelihood in view of what has transpired in the trial 

court. We disagree that the very basis of WCJ’s interlocutory appeal remains—that it 

should be able to preserve its rights by executing the Second Rogers Lease7

—when it 

is no longer an unresolved question in the trial court that the lease contains a 

6

As explained in more detail below, any attempt by WCJ to proceed with

signing the Second Rogers Lease, which permits the construction of a crushing-andscreening plant, would be contrary to the trial court’s summary-judgment ruling, 

which indicates that WCJ does not have the right to construct a crushing-andscreening plant on the property.

7

The three-year post-mining contract period has passed without the Second 

Rogers Lease’s being signed, and thus it can no longer serve the purpose of an 

Alternative Mining Contract to prevent the sale-to-UST provision from becoming

operative.
31

provision showing that it is not a bona fide Alternative Mining Contract. And again, 

WCJ has moved the controversy beyond the issues at play in the temporary-injunction

hearing by now taking the position that the BVCC agreement is an exercise of its right 

to enter into an Alternative Mining Contract. Events have moved too far beyond the 

controversies at play in the temporary injunction, making the temporary-injunction 

issues moot.

D. The trial court’s rulings on the merits moot WCJ’s arguments

regarding why the restraint of the temporary-injunction order 

harms it.

WCJ also argues that its temporary-injunction appeal is not moot because even 

if the trial court has resolved the question of UST’s probable right to recovery, the 

question remains outstanding regarding whether there is irreparable harm to support 

the issuance of the injunction. This argument is encapsulated in a footnote in WCJ’s 

response to UST’s motion to dismiss: “At best, UST can only establish that the 

partial summary[-]judgment ruling8 would prove its probable right to relief sought on 

its counterclaims, but that does not moot the third injunctive-relief element of 

‘probable[,] imminent, and irreparable injury’ to warrant a finding of mootness of this

appeal.” We disagree with the premise that if the question of UST’s probable right to 

recovery is mooted, the question of whether harm exists to support the injunction

survives for our interlocutory review.

8

Although WCJ refers to this as a partial summary-judgment ruling, the trial 

court’s various orders have resolved all of WCJ’s claims.
32

Not only did the trial court’s summary judgment appear to moot this 

controversy because the Second Rogers Lease allows the placement of a crushingand-screening plant on the property despite the trial court’s declining to rule that such 

a right was not reserved to WCJ in the contract, but that judgment also renders moot 

the underlying basis of WCJ’s primary argument regarding why the injunction is 

invalid. The premise of WCJ’s argument at the temporary-injunction hearing and on 

appeal is that the trial court erred by restraining WCJ from executing the Second 

Rogers Lease because UST would suffer no harm from that act. WCJ’s brief 

challenges the argument that UST made at the temporary-injunction hearing that

execution of the lease would irreparably harm its right to validly exercise its right of 

first refusal.

9 And as we noted above, WCJ’s counsel argued at the hearing that mere

9

The core of this argument in WCJ’s brief follows:

Moreover, UST has claimed that this issue has been legally and factually 

determined in the trial court’s partial summary[-]judgment ruling on 

WCJ’s claim for declaratory relief. WCJ disputes the breadth of the

partial summary[-]judgment ruling, but by taking this position, UST has

confirmed that it is no longer facing a dilemma—and therefore no 

longer facing harm—on whether to exercise its right of first refusal. For 

UST explained as follows in its response to WCJ’s motion for

reconsideration of the temporary injunction:

Here, WCJ is attempting to change the status of the

[p]roperty by entering into a [l]easehold with Rogers.

Executing that lease with Rogers then triggers [UST’s] right 

of first refusal, putting [UST] to an election of whether to 

exercise the right of first refusal or to gamble that it will prevail 

at trial. If [UST] exercises the right of first refusal, it will do 

so at an inflated price beyond market for what [UST]
33

execution of the Second Rogers Lease, in and of itself, would do UST no harm 

because the trial court could later determine whether that lease was a valid Alternative 

Mining Contract, and no immediate physical harm to the property would occur

because operations would not occur until the permitting process was complete. In

essence, WCJ argues that UST would suffer no harm because if the trial court allowed

execution of the Second Rogers Lease, that court could later determine whether that

lease triggered UST’s obligation to exercise its right of first refusal and could make 

believes WCJ actually owns and has the legal ability to 

convey. But if [UST] waits for trial and loses, it will have 

forever lost its valuable right of first refusal. That election 

and the timing of it that WCJ has repeatedly and continually 

attempted to force onto the [c]ourt and [UST] is the 

irreparable, imminent harm that must be enjoined. . . . [T]he 

imminent, irreparable harm . . . relates to the right of first 

refusal and the impossible choice to which WCJ is 

attempting to force on [UST]. [Emphases added.]

This is a tacit admission by UST that, because it prevailed on the

merits in the partial summary[-]judgment ruling, it is no longer facing

harm. Based on the above evidence and UST’s admission that it no

longer faces “imminent, irreparable harm . . . relat[ing] to the right of

first refusal,” there is no evidence of injury to UST’s right of first refusal

from WCJ’s signing the Second Rogers Lease.

Nevertheless, the question of why UST sought to enjoin signing

the lease cries out because the obvious and proper course of action

would have been to seek to enjoin any mining preparation and mining

activity on the property after the lease was signed. [Footnote and record 

reference omitted.]
34

that determination before the only possible basis that UST has to claim harm—

physical damage to the property—occurs.10

Assuming the validity of this argument, how does it present a live controversy

that still exists when the trial court (in the later summary judgment on the merits

outside the temporary-injunction context) declined WCJ’s invitation to make a 

declaration that a central feature of the Second Rogers Lease—the right to place a 

crushing-and-screening plant on the property—was permitted? Irreparable harm 

became irrelevant because the trial court was not relying on harm to leave the status

quo in place until it had time to make its final decision. Instead, it made the decision

that, as a matter of law, WCJ is not entitled to a declaration that the act of placing a 

crushing-and-screening plant on the property is permitted. The need for the trial 

court to give itself the breathing room to make that decision by concluding that 

irreparable harm could occur in the period to make that decision is now a past 

concern.

10With the question of harm moot, the question of whether the modified 

temporary-injunction order adequately documented a finding of irreparable harm as 

required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 also appears moot. See Clark v. Hastings 

Equity Partners, 651 S.W.3d 359, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.).

(“To comply with Rule 683, a trial court must set out in the temporary[-]injunction 

order the reasons the court finds it proper to issue the injunction, including the 

reasons the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction does not issue. 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 683.”).
35

E. We conclude that the trial court’s summary judgment order 

invalidated WCJ’s claim that a crushing-and-screening plant could 

be placed on the property as envisioned by the Second Rogers

Lease.

To wrap up, we address WCJ’s argument that we cannot glean a ruling on the 

merits from the trial court’s grant of UST’s summary-judgment motion because of its

form:

The partial summary[-]judgment order on WCJ’s claim for declaratory 

relief does not declare anything or make any rulings other than a generic 

grant of UST’s motion for partial summary judgment. Contrary to 

UST’s assertions, it does not state that “there is no right to have a 

crushing[-]and[-]screening plant on the property.” The partial 

summary[-]judgment order also does not state that “WCJ did not have 

the right to build or the right to convey the right to build a

crushing[-]and[-]screening plant.” And the partial summary[-]judgment 

order does not state that “there are no rights in the conveyance

documents to a crushing[-]and[-]screening plant.” 

As we understand the argument, it is that no conclusion as to what declaration the 

trial court was making can be drawn from the summary-judgment order because it

does not explicitly state a declaration of the parties’ rights. We disagree.

WCJ’s premise—that we can glean nothing from the trial court’s order because

it merely grants UST’s summary-judgment motion—is not supported by case law.

For example, a prior case from this court dealt with a take-nothing judgment in a suit 

in which a party sought declaratory relief. See Downe v. Askey, 529 S.W.2d 121, 124 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1975, no writ). We concluded that we could glean the 

nature of the declaration by pursuing the following inquiry:
36

The law appears to be that since no technical form is prescribed for the 

declaration of rights in a declaratory[-]judgment action, the form of a 

judgment rendered in such an action is sufficient if the rights of the 

parties that are sought in the suit to be ascertained can be ascertained

from the judgment rendered when considered in view of the controversy 

involved along with the findings of fact and conclusions of law filed in

the case by the trial court.

Id. Later cases have cited our opinion for the proposition that the nature of a 

declaration may be gleaned by examining what was in controversy:

Moreover, under the liberal construction [that] must be given the 

[D]eclaratory [J]udgment[s] [A]ct, Hext v. Price, 847 S.W.2d 408, 416 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ), no particular form is necessary for 

the declaration of rights in a declaratory[-]judgment action if, when 

construed together with the pleadings and any findings, the rights of the 

parties can be determined from the face of the judgment. Travis Heights 

Imp[rovement] Ass’n v. Small, 662 S.W.2d [406,] 412–13[ (Tex. App.—

Austin 1983, no writ)]; Downe . . . , 529 S.W.2d [at] 124 . . . .

46933, Inc. v. Z & B Enters., Inc., 899 S.W.2d 800, 808 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, 

writ denied); see also In re An Unborn Child, 153 S.W.3d 559, 561 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

2004, pet. denied) (stating that “[e]ven though the order does not make a declaration, 

determination of law, or expressly grant any relief, because no particular form is 

prescribed for a declaration of rights in a declaratory[-]judgment action[] and [because]

matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court,” the court would

“construe the word ‘finds’ to constitute a declaration based upon facts found from the 

evidence” (citations omitted)).
37

More recent cases are less supportive of the proposition that the trial court can 

forgo stating its declaration in a judgment but still leave the burden on the appellate

court to define the parameters of the declaration:

As drafted, the trial court’s judgment does not set forth a declaration of 

the interest and rights conveyed by the assignments. From the four 

corners of the judgment, we are left to speculate as to exactly what the 

trial court determined the rights of the parties under the assignments to 

be. A properly drafted declaratory judgment should terminate the 

uncertainty or controversy giving rise to suit by declaring the rights of 

the parties as to those matters upon which the parties joined issue. 

Calvert v. [Emps.] Ret. Sys. of Tex., 648 S.W.2d 418, 419–20 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). See generally Robert W. Calvert, 

Declaratory Judgments in Texas—Mandatory or Discretionary?, 14 St.

Mary’s L.J. 1 (1982). Notwithstanding the fact that the parties may have 

drafted the judgment and submitted it to the trial court “approved as to 

form,” the failure of the judgment to specifically declare those rights was 

error.

In a situation where all parties have moved for summary judgment 

and one motion is granted and the others are denied, the appellate court 

should review all parties[’] summary[-]judgment evidence and determine 

all questions presented. See Bradley v. State ex rel. White, 990 S.W.2d 245, 

247 (Tex. 1999)[; s]ee also Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(c). The reviewing court 

should then render the judgment that the trial court should have 

rendered. Bradley, 990 S.W.2d at 247. The questions presented in this 

case are, what interest is conveyed by the assignments, and what are the 

rights of the parties? Therefore, this [c]ourt will construe the 

assignments in question and declare the interests conveyed and [the] 

rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the parties have 

joined issue.

Petro Pro, Ltd. v. Upland Res., Inc., 279 S.W.3d 743, 747–48 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007,

pets. denied) (footnote omitted). Though Petro Pro dealt with cross-motions for 

summary judgment, we read it as indicating an appellate court can glean the nature of
38

the declaration rendered by the trial court from the issues in controversy in the 

summary-judgment proceeding. 

Again, we express no opinion on any question resolved in the trial court’s 

summary-judgment order; that task awaits an appeal on the merits. The matter-of-law 

ruling—that WCJ does not get an affirmative declaration—effectively operates as a 

legal ruling that the Addendum’s reservations do not encompass the right to operate a 

crushing-and-screening plant, even if there is not currently an actual declaration in 

place that expressly says that. Almost the entirety of the controversy involved in 

UST’s motion for summary judgment was an attack on WCJ’s claim that the

reservations in the Addendum and Special Warranty Deed permitted the construction 

of a crushing-and-screening plant on the property. We can efficiently glean what the

trial court intended to not declare in its interlocutory order granting UST’s motion for 

summary judgment.

F. After submission of this matter, WCJ filed a supplemental brief 

arguing this appeal is indeed moot.

Three weeks after this matter was submitted on the briefs, WCJ filed a 

supplemental brief that again shifts its position and raises an argument not made in

the voluminous prior briefing in this case—indeed, WCJ now argues that this appeal

is moot. See generally Tex. R. App. P. 39.8 (providing for notice to parties of 

submission of case). The last two paragraphs of the supplemental brief capture WCJ’s 

new argument asserting that UST has nonsuited the “cause of action” attacking the 
39

Second Rogers Lease underlying its request for injunctive relief and that this act 

“dissolved” the injunction:

During this appeal, [UST] nonsuited its first amended counterclaim for 

breach of contract, leaving only its first amended counterclaim for 

declaratory judgment pending. When [UST] then filed its second 

amended counterclaim during this appeal, it omitted its causes of action 

pertaining to the Second Rogers Lease, and it does not seek any 

injunctive relief. The causes of action in the first amended counterclaim 

pertaining to the Second Rogers Lease have therefore been nonsuited. 

The causes of action in the second amended counterclaim pertain only 

to the BVCC lease; they do not make any allegations pertaining to the 

Second Rogers Lease and therefore cannot support the temporary 

injunction. 

Because [UST’s] causes of action pertaining to the Second Rogers 

Lease have been nonsuited, the temporary injunction is not supported by 

a cause of action and must be vacated. Alternatively, because of the 

actual and deemed nonsuits of the causes of action in the first amended 

counterclaim pertaining to the Second Rogers Lease, the temporary 

injunction dissolved automatically, and this appeal should be dismissed 

as moot. If the [c]ourt dismisses this appeal as moot because the 

temporary injunction dissolved automatically, the [c]ourt should 

affirmatively hold that the temporary injunction dissolved automatically 

so that the parties and the trial court know the status of the temporary 

injunction. [Record references omitted.] 

UST filed its own supplemental brief in response to WCJ’s latest argument. 

UST argues that WCJ misses the point that UST has never abandoned the 

declaratory-judgment claim that is the foundation of its suit. In UST’s view, its 

second amended counterclaim alleges verbatim the declaratory-judgment claim made

in its first amended counterclaim but then pleads additional facts addressing the everevolving landscape created by WCJ’s execution of the BVCC agreement. Specifically, 

UST argues that WCJ’s characterization of its pleadings is myopic by failing to 
40

recognize that UST is seeking a broad declaration about what characteristics an 

Alternative Mining Contract may possess. To quote UST’s response,

To get around [UST’s] actual pleadings, WCJ mischaracterizes [UST’s]

claims as “causes of action pertaining to the Second Rogers Lease[.]” This is 

result-oriented wordsmithing. [UST’s] declaratory[-]judgment 

action is not and has never been lease-specific. WCJ’s 

declaratory[-]judgment action language requests a general declaration of 

the parties[’] rights under the Farm and Ranch Contract. Specifically, 

[UST] and WCJ have argued over whether WCJ had the right to build a 

crushing[-]and[-]screening plant. The trial court ruled via temporary 

injunction and summary judgment that WCJ did not. This construction 

of the Farm and Ranch Contract applies to all leases. It would be absurd 

to relitigate the Farm and Ranch Contract interpretation for each new 

WCJ lease, yet that’s what WCJ attempts to impose through its 

argument. [UST’s] Second Amended Counterclaim still contains the 

same declaratory[-]judgment action that has underlied [sic] this entire 

litigation, with the identical pleading allegation, and WCJ is not relieved 

of its injunctive obligations just because [UST] amended its claims to add 

additional factual allegations and claims relating to WCJ’s new and 

unadjudicated conduct. WCJ’s latest attack on the injunction order is 

without merit. [Record references and references to the supplemental 

brief omitted.] 

Though it approaches the argument with more certainty than is reflected in the 

record, UST anticipates our holding above: that the trial court’s summary-judgment 

order addressing WCJ’s declaratory-judgment claim “effectively operates as a legal 

ruling that the Addendum’s reservations do not encompass the right to operate a 

crushing-and-screening plant”; that this ruling undermines WCJ’s ability to enter into 

the Second Rogers Lease; and that review of that ruling should be from an appeal on 

the merits:

Moreover, as explained in prior briefing, even if the injunction were 

lifted, WCJ still cannot legally enter into the Second Rogers Lease that 
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contains provisions relating to a crushing[-]and[-]screening plant because 

the trial court has also decided, independent of the injunction order, that 

WCJ did not have the right to operate a crushing[-]and[-]screening plant 

or to convey to Rogers any such right—meaning WCJ must await a final 

judgment and then successfully appeal the trial court’s January 24, 2023 

summary-judgment order to conceivably gain any relief in relation to the 

Second Rogers Lease. An order reversing or dissolving the temporary[-]

injunction order will not change the summary-judgment order, and the 

Second Rogers Lease will remain illegal and inoperative. [Record 

reference omitted.] 

We conclude that WCJ’s latest premise—that UST’s pleadings abandoned a 

legal basis for a claim that challenges WCJ’s claimed right to execute the Second 

Rogers Lease—is not supported by the record. Nor does the argument alter our view 

that the trial court has effectively made a merit-based ruling that we interpret 

invalidates the Second Rogers Lease and that review of that ruling should await an 

appeal on the merits. This opinion reflects (1) the struggle that we have faced in 

reconciling the ever-evolving state of the trial-court record as the parties continue to 

maneuver; (2) the summary-judgment orders rendered that leave it to us to interpret 

the scope of the rulings being made and to determine when such rulings should be 

reviewed; and (3) how the arguments on appeal have continually shifted even after the 

case was submitted. Though we do not accept the premise of WCJ’s latest argument, 

we do note that the relief sought by its new argument now parallels our holding that 

this appeal of the trial court’s temporary-injunction order is moot. 
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IV. Conclusion 

Having determined that the issues at play in the trial court’s modified

temporary-injunction order are now moot, we set aside the January 27, 2023

“Modified Order Granting [UST’s] Application for Temporary . . . Injunctive Relief,”

and we dismiss WCJ’s interlocutory appeal.

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel

Justice

Delivered: June 22, 2023