J-A30001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MICA WILSON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

JOYCE BRODY

Appellee No. 731 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 16, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): December Term 2011 No. 01251

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., JENKINS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 04, 2015

Appellant, Mica Wilson, appeals from the June 16, 2014 judgment 

entered in her favor and against Appellee, Joyce Brody, in the amount of 

$500.00. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant background of this case as 

follows.

The relevant facts in this motor vehicle 

accident are not in dispute. This case involves a 

rear-end accident resulting in injury to [A]ppellant 

for which she received medical treatment.

...

On December 7, 2011, Appellant ... 

commenced this action for damages resulting from a 

motor vehicle accident against [A]ppellee .... The 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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matter proceeded to trial before the Honorable Gary 

F. DiVito. At trial, [A]ppellee conceded liability. 

Appellant offered testimony regarding the nature and 

extent of her injuries. Both parties offered expert 

medical testimony. The only issue left for the jury’s 

determination was the extent of pain and suffering 

[A]ppellant sustained.

On September 12, 2013, after a period of 

deliberation, the jury initially returned a verdict for 

no damages. Appellant’s counsel motioned for a 

mistrial; the motion was denied. Judge DiVito 

directed the jury to award some compensation.

Upon further review, the jury returned a 

verdict in favor of [A]ppellant and assessed damages 

in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00). 

Post[-]trial motions for a new trial, additur and delay 

damages were timely filed. Oral arguments were 

heard on January 15, 2014. On January 31, 2014, 

Judge DiVito denied said motions.

On February 24, 2014, Appellant filed this 

[timely notice of] appeal. A [c]oncise [s]tatement of 

[matters complained] of on [a]ppeal [was] requested 

on March 14, 2014 and timely provided.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/15, at 2.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following three issues for our review.

I. Whether [t]he [t]rial [c]ourt [e]rred, [a]bused 

[i]ts [d]iscretion, and [c]ommitted [r]eversible 

[e]rror, by not granting a new trial in light of a 

jury verdict that is based on partiality and bias 

and was opposite of the [trial] court’s 

instruction that the verdict must fairly and 

adequately compensate Appellant for her 

losses[,] especially when with the [trial] courts 

[sic] instruction the jury returned an award of 

$0[?]

II. Whether [t]he [t]rial [c]ourt [e]rred, [a]bused 

[i]ts [d]iscretion, and [c]ommitted [r]eversible 
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[e]rror, in not applying additur, in light of the 

jury’s award of $500, which award bore no 

reasonable relationship to ... Appellant’s loss[?]

III. Whether [t]he [t]rial [c]ourt [e]rred, [a]bused 

[i]ts [d]iscretion, and [c]ommitted [r]eversible 

[e]rror in failing to award ... Appellant delay 

damages for relief of bodily injury, which 

beg[an] from the date one year after the date 

original process was first served in the action 

up to the date of the award, verdict, or 

decision[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

We elect to address Appellant’s first two issues together. Appellant 

argues the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial on damages 

or in the alternative her motion for additur on the same basis. Appellant’s 

Brief at 13, 16-17. We begin by noting our standards of review.

Our review of the trial court’s denial of a new 

trial is limited to determining whether the trial court 

acted capriciously, abused its discretion, or 

committed an error of law that controlled the 

outcome of the case. In making this determination, 

we must consider whether, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, a new 

trial would produce a different verdict. 

Consequently, if there is any support in the record 

for the trial court’s decision to deny a new trial, that 

decision must be affirmed.

Grossi v. Travelers Pers. Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 103 (Pa. 2014). In addition, 

“[w]here an appellant’s claim arises from a challenge to the jury’s 

determination of damages, our review is highly circumspect.” Helpin v. 
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Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 969 A.2d 601, 616 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(citation omitted), affirmed, 10 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2010).

The duty of assessing damages is within the province 

of the fact-finder and should not be interfered with 

unless it clearly appears that the amount awarded 

resulted from partiality, caprice, prejudice, 

corruption or some other improper influence. 

Generally, a verdict will not be disturbed merely on 

account of the smallness of the damages awarded or 

because the reviewing court would have awarded 

more. To support the granting of a new trial for 

inadequacy, the injustice of the verdict should stand 

forth like a beacon. So long as the verdict bears a 

reasonable resemblance to the damages proved, it is 

not the function of the court to substitute its 

judgment for that of the jury.

Epstein v. Saul Ewing, LLP, 7 A.3d 303, 314 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1212 (Pa. 2011). 

Instantly, Appellant avers that the jury’s award of $500.00 “bears no 

reasonable relationship to the evidence offered at trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 

13. Appellee counters that the jury was free to disbelieve Appellant’s 

evidence and award the amount that it deemed appropriate. Appellee’s Brief 

at 9.

Our Supreme Court has held the following relevant to Appellant’s 

claims.

[A] jury’s award of medical expenses without 

compensation for pain and suffering should not be 

disturbed where the trial court had a reasonable 

basis to believe that: (1) the jury did not believe the 

plaintiff suffered any pain and suffering, or (2) that a 
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preexisting condition or injury was the sole cause of 

the alleged pain and suffering. 

Davis v. Mullen, 773 A.2d 764, 767 (Pa. 2001). Furthermore, this Court 

has explained that “a jury is not required to award a plaintiff any amount of 

damages if it believes that any injury plaintiff suffered was insignificant.” 

Majczyk v. Oesch, 789 A.2d 717, 724 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (citation 

omitted). “[T]he determination of what is a compensable injury is uniquely 

within the purview of the jury.” Id. at 726. “[A] jury is always free to 

believe all, part, some, or none of the evidence presented.” Id. at 725-726 

(citation omitted). 

In this case, Appellant presented the expert testimony of Dr. Mark 

Allen who testified that approximately one month after the accident 

Appellant suffered from “[c]ervical spine, sprain and strain with right cervical 

radiculopathy, rule out herniated disk.” N.T., 7/25/13, at 26.1 Dr. Allen 

further testified that two years after the motor vehicle accident, Appellant 

suffered from “[c]hronic posttraumatic sprain cervical spine. Cervical disk 

bulges C 2-3, C 3-4, C 4-5 and C 5-6. Status post cervical spine epidural 

injection. Cervical radiculopathy and chronic posttraumatic right shoulder 

strain.” Id. at 44. Appellant also received more than one set of facet 

____________________________________________

1 Dr. Allen gave a videotaped deposition at which he testified to the above. 

Dr. Allen’s deposition was admitted into evidence at trial and played for the 

jury. N.T., 9/10/13, at 85. 
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injections, including a set from Dr. Mansfield at Massachusetts General 

Hospital in Boston.2 N.T., 9/11/13, at 53. Appellant testified that she 

continues to suffer occasional pain three to four times a week as of the time 

of trial. Id. at 64.

On cross-examination, Appellant testified that at the time of the 

accident she had no injuries. Id. at 78-79. Appellant testified that she was 

able to get out of her car after the accident, as well as lift up the back gate 

of the Mercedes SUV she had been operating, all without incident. Id. at 79, 

81. Appellant told the police who arrived on the scene that she did not 

require an ambulance. Id. at 81. Appellant also testified that she was able 

to continue to work for her mother after the accident until she left to attend 

graduate school at Harvard. Id. at 102. Dr. Allen also testified that after 

receiving five physical therapy sessions, she was discharged with an 

“excellent prognosis.” N.T., 7/25/13, at 63. Dr. Allen agreed that this was a 

“good sign” for Appellant. Id.

In addition, Appellee presented the expert testimony of Dr. Ira Sachs, 

a doctor of orthopedic medicine, in the form of a videotaped deposition. 

N.T., 9/11/13, at 127. Dr. Sachs testified that he examined Appellant on 

September 12, 2012, in addition to reviewing her medical records. N.T., 

1/30/13, at 19. Dr. Sachs testified that Appellant had no residuals from the 

____________________________________________

2 At the time, Appellant was in the process of obtaining her master’s degree 

from Harvard University. N.T., 9/11/13, at 44, 48.
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motor vehicle accident at the time he examined her. Id. Importantly, Dr. 

Sachs reviewed the same records as Dr. Allen, and noted that Appellant had 

continued unresolved issues pertaining to pain flowing from her cervical 

spine that predated the instant motor vehicle accident. Id. at 33-34. 

After careful review of the certified record, we conclude that Appellant 

is not entitled to relief. The jury, as fact-finder, heard all of the above 

evidence and weighed it accordingly. See generally Oesch, supra. The 

jury was free to disregard Appellant’s medical testimony and find it 

incredible. The jury was also free to conclude, as a matter of fact, that 

Appellant did have an excellent prognosis after only five physical therapy 

sessions and therefore the motor vehicle accident only resulted in $500.00 

of damages for pain and suffering. The jury was also free to weigh Dr. 

Sachs’ testimony and conclude none of Appellant’s complaints stemmed 

from the motor vehicle accident itself, but from prior injuries. Regardless of 

the method the jury utilized to weigh the evidence, it remains that it was 

within the sole province of the jury. See id. The jury was free to “not 

believe [Appellant] suffered any pain and suffering[.]” Davis, supra. As an 

appellate court, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See 

id. Based on these considerations, we conclude Appellant’s first two issues 

on appeal do not warrant relief.

In her third issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred in denying 

her motion for delay damages. However, before we may review the merits 
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of Appellant’s claim, we must first ascertain whether Appellant has waived 

this issue.

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119 states that an 

appellant’s “argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are 

questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part--in 

distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the particular point treated 

therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are 

deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

The argument portion of an appellate brief 

must include a pertinent discussion of the particular 

point raised along with discussion and citation of 

pertinent authorities. This Court will not consider 

the merits of an argument which fails to cite relevant 

case or statutory authority. Failure to cite relevant 

legal authority constitutes waiver of the claim on 

appeal.

In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 603 (Pa. 

2013).

In this case, Appellant’s brief consists of her argument heading, 

followed by one block quotation to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238, 

pertaining to delay damages. Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant then 

concludes her argument by stating that she sought delay damages, was 

denied delay damages without explanation, and that such denial was an 

abuse of discretion. Id. Appellant’s brief is devoid of any discussion of how 
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Rule 238 applies in this case, nor does she provide any developed argument 

as to why she is entitled on this record to delay damages, such that the trial 

court erred in denying the same. It is axiomatic that “[t]his Court will not 

act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2011).3 As a result, we deem 

Appellant’s third issue waived for want of development.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that all of Appellant’s issues on 

appeal are either waived or devoid of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s 

June 16, 2014 judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/4/2015

____________________________________________

3 We note “[s]ince the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to criminal and 

civil cases alike, the principles enunciated in criminal cases construing those 

rules are equally applicable in civil cases.” Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 

141, 148 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2006), citing Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 

400 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005).