alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov’t Code

Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003). 

NO. 07-03-0244-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

JULY 25, 2003

______________________________

STEPHANIE MARIE PIERCE,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

_________________________________

FROM THE 222ND DISTRICT COURT OF DEAF SMITH COUNTY;

NO. CR-02B-018; HON. H. BRYAN POFF, JR., PRESIDING

_______________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., QUINN, J., and BOYD, S.J.1

Appellant Stephanie Marie Pierce, by and through her attorney, has filed a motion

to dismiss this appeal because she no longer desires to prosecute it. Without passing on

the merits of the case, we grant the motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 42.1(a)(2) and dismiss the appeal. Having dismissed the appeal at appellant’s

request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

Brian Quinn

 Justice

Do not publish.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-1788

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DENISE D. CANTY,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

TERESA SAUNDERS-WIGGINS; INGRID SAUNDERS;

GEORGE H. SAUNDERS, JR.; ARETHA BENJAMIN, as

Mother and Next Friend of Quentin B. Saunders,

a Minor; BEVERLY POWELL SISK, Guardian ad

litem for Quentin B. Saunders, minor,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (CA-96-19-3)

Submitted: May 29, 1998 Decided: July 21, 1998

Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.
2

Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Denise D. Canty, Appellant Pro Se. Alvin Pasternak, Sherry Susan

Laird, METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, New York, New York, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court’s order dismissing

her claim as a beneficiary to life insurance proceeds. We have

reviewed the record and the district court’s order and affirm as

modified.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) brought this

interpleader action in district court against the five children of

George Saunders, a deceased federal employee. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1951 (FEGLIA), the

decedent was covered under a group policy issued by MetLife to the

Office of Personnel Management (OPM). See 5 U.S.C. § 8701-16

(1994). The Appellant was a named beneficiary in two forms; however, as the district court correctly concluded, both forms were

invalid. See 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a); see also Ward v. Stratton, 988

F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1993). We therefore affirm the district

court’s order but modify it to reflect the denial of the Appellant’s motion for summary judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
#### Mancil Welch v. State.

No. 25265.

April 4, 1951.

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of the local option liquor law and assessed a fine of $1,000.00 and he appeals.

The testimony shows a sale of liquor to one, Winlow Magness, who was in company with a representative of the Texas Liquor Control Board. The information herein charges two former convictions of a like character. The testimony seems to be sufficient to show a sale to Magness by the appellant.

There are two bills of exception in the record, the first relating to the insufficiency of the evidence, as well as certain purported objections to portions of the evidence. The trial court did not sign such bill, but did certify that no such objections were made. In addition to the attempted bill being multifarious, under the record presented, the same seems not to have happened. The bill will therefore be overruled.

*592The second bill of exception is in the same condition as the one above discussed. It seems that appellant was endeavoring to complain of a violation of the rule under which the witness had been placed. In his original testimony a witness had underestimated the distance of a turn in the road from an adjacent cemetery. The witness was permitted to take the stand and correct his estimate of this distance. An attempted qualification of this bill contained the statement that no objection was made to the witness thus making this correction. Appellant, however, in an exception to such qualification, asserts that such objection was made and gives his reason therefor. This exception is not certified to over the signature of the judge. The matter itself seems to be of but little moment, and the distance of such turn in the road from the cemetery seems to be of small importance in this trial. The bill is not certified to by the trial judge and is overruled.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.
Document Headings

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###### Federal Maritime Commission

                    The Commission hereby gives notice of the filing of the following agreement under the Shipping Act of 1984. Interested parties may submit comments on agreements to the Secretary, Federal Maritime Commission, Washington, DC 20573, within ten days of the date this notice appears in the                     **Federal Register**                    . Copies of agreements are available through the Commission's Web site (                    *http://www.fmc.gov*) or contacting the Office of Agreements (202) 523-5793 or                     *tradeanalysis@fmc.gov*.                 

*Agreement No.:*                     201146-001.                 

*Title:*                     Agreement for the Termination of the Restated Lease and Operating Agreement between Broward County, Universal Maritime Service Corp., and Maersk, Inc.                 

*Parties:*                     Broward County (Florida); Maersk, Inc.; and Universal Maritime Service Corp.                 

*Filing Party:*                     Candace J. Running; Office of the County Attorney; Broward County; 1850 Eller Drive, Suite 502; Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316.                 

*Synopsis:*                     The agreement provides for the terms and conditions for terminating the parties' underlying lease.                 

By order of the Federal Maritime Commission. 

Dated: August 15, 2008. 

Karen V. Gregory,

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E8-19333 Filed 8-19-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6730-01-P
#### Harrison Smith v. State.

No. 24865.

October 18, 1950.

*191
      *James G. Denton,*Lubbock, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of an assault with intent to murder without malice upon one Charles B. Sims and by the jury assessed a penalty of one year in the penitentiary.

It is claimed herein that the trial court committed fundamental error in its charge in paragraph 13 thereof, which reads as follows:

> “But if from the evidence you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Harrison Smith, on or about the 11th day of December, 1949, in the county of Lubbock and state of Texas, with a deadly weapon, to wit, a rifle, and without malice, as that term has been hereinbefore defined to you, and not in his own proper self-defense, did assault Charles B. Sims, you will find the defendant guilty of assault with intent to murder without malice and so say by your verdict and assess his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of years not less than one nor more than three, as you may determine and state in your verdict.”

It is evident therefrom that the trial court omitted to require the jury to find that appellant “did assault Charles B. Sims” with intent to kill said Sims.

“A charge is fundamentally erroneous if it authorizes a conviction for an assault with intent to murder without requiring the jury to find an intent to kill.” Branch’s Ann. Tex. P.C., p. 956, Sec. 1670, and many authorities there cited.

A further matter that gives us some concern is found in a bill filed as No. 1 in which it is shown, that after the testimony herein was heard and the jury charged, that they retired to consider of their verdict in the afternoon of the day of *192trial; that after they had deliberated about four hours, they returned into court and notified the judge that they were unable to agree upon a verdict, evidently desiring to be discharged. Thereupon the trial judge made the following remarks to the jury:

> “I am not ready to discharge you at this time. The facts are too clear in this case for there to be any hung jury in this case. It costs too much to try these cases over.”

Whereupon the jury again retired and on the following morning returned with their verdict of one year.

The bill of exceptions signed by the judge shows that no exception was taken to these remarks at the time they were made, but that they were called to the court’s attention in the motion for a new trial; and the court signed, approved and ordered filed the bill to that effect containing such remarks.

We think such a statement by the trial court violates the statute, Art. 707, C.C.P., and conveyed to the jury the court’s opinion of the case. See Kelly v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 31, 24 S.W. 295, which case was reversed because the trial court told the jury:

> “ ‘It seems strange you would fail to agree, when there is so little conflict in the evidence. If it was a long, complicated case, with conflicting testimony, the court could readily see a cause for failure to agree,’ etc.”

For the errors complained of, this judgment is reversed and remanded.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6224 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6224

  To prohibit payment of administrative funding to States with a high 
  backlog of unprocessed unemployment claims, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 9, 2021

   Mr. Harder of California introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To prohibit payment of administrative funding to States with a high 
  backlog of unprocessed unemployment claims, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fix the Unemployment Backlogs Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON PAYMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNDING TO STATES WITH 
              HIGH BACKLOG OF UNPROCESSED UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS.

    (a) In General.--In the case of any State in which the Secretary of 
Labor determines, as of the date of enactment of this Act, that the 
number of unprocessed unemployment claims in the State is in excess of 
45,000, the Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for payment 
of amounts for unemployment compensation administration under section 
302 of the Social Security Act to such State at any time following the 
date that is 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act unless 
the Secretary determines at such time that the number of unprocessed 
unemployment claims in the State has been reduced to zero.
    (b) Definition of Unprocessed Unemployment Claim.--For purposes of 
subsection (a), the term ``unprocessed unemployment claim'' means, with 
respect to a State, a claim for unemployment compensation filed in the 
State for which a determination of initial eligibility has not been 
made within 21 days of the date of filing.
                                 <all>
```
#### Rudolph Klein, Respondent, v. Aurelia E. Runk, as Administratrix, etc., of Charles E. Runk, Deceased, Appellant.

Judgement affirmed, with costs. No opinion.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ORIOLE CORP. HOMES FOR THE NINE MONTH PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.<F1>
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       9,180,991
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  265,475
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 94,817,883
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      25,988,647
<DEPRECIATION>                              10,636,580
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             132,741,061
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                     67,999,433
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       462,553
<OTHER-SE>                                  45,581,103
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               132,741,061
<SALES>                                     53,423,398
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            59,866,563
<CGS>                                       45,994,447
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               48,399,642
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            11,256,876
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,063,364
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (853,319)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (853,319)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (853,319)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.18)
<FN>
<F1>COMPANY REPORTS ON A NON-CLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Moore Medical Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 29, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Linda M. Autore, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company and member of the Board of Directors, certify, pursuant to Section 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                     
|-----------------------------------------------------
|/s/    LINDA M. AUTORE                               
|Linda M. Autore President and Chief Executive Officer



May 12, 2003
183 La. 1037

#### REED v. SUCCESSION OF GIBSON. In re LEWIS.

No. 33719.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 6, 1936.

Pierre Morere, of New Orleans, for applicant in writ Robert Lewis.

Legier, McEnerny & Waguespack, of New Orleans, for respondent Mrs. Martha M. Reed.

Frank W. Plart, of New Orleans, for respondent civil sheriff.

HIGGINS, Justice.

Relator made application to this court for writ of mandamus to compel the district judge to issue a writ of injunction, restraining the defendant from further proceeding with the foreclosure of a mortgage against certain real estate, alleging that the note under which the executory proceedings were instituted had prescribed, and that the trial judge, without hearing the rule nisi for the issuance of the injunction, recalled the rule and refused to issue a preliminary injunction. * It was further alleged that, if the injunction was not granted, the property seized would be sold, resulting in irreparable injury to relator, and that she had no other adequate remedy.

We made the writs returnable to this court on December 2, 1935, when the defendant and the respondent judge filed returns in which they both stated that, due to the fact that the rule for the injunction was fixed on the same day that a number of other rules had been assigned to be heard, and for the further reason that it would otherwise interfere with the jury term of his court, the trial judge, in effect, postponed the hearing of this rule, requesting counsel *193for relator to have the matter set for hearing during December.

The returns show that the relator’s property has not been advertised for sale and that there was adequate time within which to hear the rule before a sale of the property could be effected.

It is further stated that the trial judge did not refuse to hear the rule or deny the injunction, but merely directed counsel for relator to have the rule set for hearing on a later date.

Since the trial judge did not pass upon the application of the relator for a preliminary writ of injunction and did not refuse to hear the rule nisi, but merely postponed the hearing until a later date, when the rights of relator could be determined without causing any prejudice or irreparable injury to her, there is no reason why this court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. The action of the relator is clearly premature.

For the reasons assigned, the writs are recalled and set aside, at relator’s costs.
EXHIBIT 31.1
                       CERTIFICATION

I, Stephen L. Baum, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Pacific
Enterprises;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this Quarterly Report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this Quarterly Report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial
information included in this Quarterly Report fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this Quarterly Report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and we have:

a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information relating
to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this Quarterly Report is being
prepared;

b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this Quarterly Report
our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this Quarterly Report, based on such evaluation; and

c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting;

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing
the equivalent function):

a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal controls over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and

b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.


August 5, 2004

/S/ STEPHEN L. BAUM
Stephen L. Baum
Chief Executive Officer
218 La. 293

#### FLEURY v. RAMOS.

No. 39580.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 6, 1950.

*18J. Y. Gilmore, Morgan 'City, Rene H. Himel, Franklin, for plaintiff and appellant.

Bauer & Bauer, Franklin, for defendant and appellee.

FRUGE, Justice ad hoc.

This is an action to recover commissions claimed to be due under an alleged verbal contract whereby plaintiff was to receive compensation of $5 per day per boat for negotiating the rental of boats belonging to defendant; the amount claimed ($11,-375.00) represents the commissions on the rental of 5 boats for a period of 455 days. The defendant denied the existence of any such agreement.

The suit was tried on its merits and the district judge rendered judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing the plaintiff’s demands, at his costs. The plaintiff has appealed.

This suit being on an alleged verbal contract for the payment of money exceeding $500, the burden of proving such contract by at least one credible witness and corroborative circumstances rests upon the plaintiff. Article 2277, R.C.C.

The trial judge found that the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged agreement and stated. that *“** * * There is no proof of 'it in the record, except plaintiff’s own statement, which is not entirely clear as to where and when the contract was made, nor what its terms were, and that statement is specifically denied by an equally credible witness. * * * ”

We have studied the record and reviewed all of the testimony herein, and we are convinced that the trial judge’s factual findings are correct. The findings of the trial judge on a question of fact are to be given great weight on appeal and will not be reversed unless manifestly erroneous.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellant’s costs.