alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NEY GENERAL 

EXAS: 

PRICE DANIEL 

ATTORNEY CE.NEHAL 

February 2, 1949 

Han. J. G. Knight 

County Attorney 

Bee County 

Beeville, Texas 

Dear Sir: 

Opinion No. V-765 

Re: The legality of errployment 

by a county commissioner of 

a son of his stepmother by 

another marriage, under the 

Nepotism Statute. 

You request an opinion upon the above subject 

matter as follows: 

LW. Gilbert Rarris, Commissioner of Precinct No. 1, in Bee County, Texas, is desirous 

of employing 3s an employee of his Precinct a 

, son of his stepmother by another marriage, and 

he has requested that I obtain s ruling from 

your office as to whether such employment is 

prohibited or not." 

The Nepotism Statute (P. C. Art. 432) forbids 

the Commissioner to employ one who is related to him by 

consanguinity or blood within the third degree, or by 

affinity within the second degree, 

Under your statement the Comg;i.s;ioyr is not 

related by blood to his stepbrother. t under the 

statement made by you we have no means of de&mining 

whether he has any affinitive kinship whatsoever. 

By the rule of affinity relations, the Commissioner, if he is a married man, is related to his wife's 

blood relatives within the second. dbgree. Specifically, 

in such case he would be related to his stepbrother, the 

proposed appointee, by affinity only in the event his 

wife is related by blood within the second degree to his 

stepbrother; that is to say, where she is the sister, 

first cousin, niece, or aunt of his stepbrother. 

If the Commissioner is not a married man he of 

course has no kin by affinity, and nothing in the Nepotism Statute forbids the appointment of his stepbrother. 
Hon. J. G. Knight - Page 2 (V-765) 

SUMMARY 

A county commissioner is not related by 

consanguinity to the son of his stepmother by a 

former marriage, nor can he be related by affinity if he is unmarried. (P. '2. Art. 432). 

Yours very truly, 

A'M'ORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

0S:wb By o&& Assistant 

APPROVED:
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6435 

To provide for the application of certain provisions of the Secure Rural 

Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 for fiscal year 2021. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 20, 2022 

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington (for herself and Mr. NEGUSE) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture, and 

in addition to the Committee on Natural Resources, for a period to be 

subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 

of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To provide for the application of certain provisions of the 

Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination 

Act of 2000 for fiscal year 2021. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. COUNTY ELECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 

4 UNDER THE SECURE RURAL SCHOOLS AND 

5 COMMUNITY SELF-DETERMINATION ACT OF 

6 2000. 

7 Sections 102(b)(1)(D), 102(d)(1)(F), and 

8 102(d)(3)(D) of the Secure Rural Schools and Community 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6435 IH

1 Self-Determination Act of 2000 (16 U.S.C. 

2 7112(b)(1)(D), 7112(d)(1)(F), 7112(d)(3)(D)) shall be 

3 applied for fiscal year 2021. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 7813

JACK ZIMMERMAN , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. JUSTIN ANDREWS; TERRY KILPATRICK; DR. PATRICK CRAFT; UNITED STATES , Defendants

- Appellees

.

No. 19
- 7814

JACK ZIMMERMAN , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. JUSTIN ANDREWS; TERRY KILPATRICK; DR. PATRICK CRAFT; UNITED STATES , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. James C. Dever III , District Judge. ( 5:18

- ct

- 03167

- D )

Submitted : July 20, 2020 Decided: August 13, 20202 Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by un published per curiam opinion

.
Jack Zimmerman, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:
Jack Zimmerman se eks to appeal the district court’s order s accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge , d ismissing Zimmerman’s claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 2671

- 80 (2018) , dismissing in part his
claims filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed

. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) , denying his motions challenging the disposition of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis , and denying reconsideration

. This Court may exercise jurisdiction only over f inal orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2018); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 545

- 47 (1949). An order denying “a motion to proceed in forma paupe ris is an appealable [interlocutory]
order.” Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Court , 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950) (per curiam). On appeal, Zimmerman challenges only the court’s denial of his c laims related to the disposition of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Upon review, we affirm in part for the reasons stated by the district court. Zimmerman v. Andrews , No. 5:18

- ct

- 03167

- D (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2019; Nov. 22, 2019). The remaining portions of the orders appealed

are ne ither final order s nor appealable interlocutory or collateral order s
. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction.4 We deny Zimmerman’s motion to appoint counsel and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequate ly presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART , DISMISSED IN PART
198 La. 893

#### CITY OF SHREVEPORT v. AALDRUP.

No. 36270.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 3, 1941.

J. Bennett Johnston, of Shreveport, for appellant.

John Webb, of Shreveport, for appellee.

PONDER, Justice.

Jack Aaldrup was prosecuted by the City of Shreveport under an affidavit charging him with violating a city ordinance prohibiting the driving of a motor vehicle within the city limits while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. The charge was brought and the prosecution conducted in the name of the City of Shreveport. The defendant moved to quash the affidavit on the grounds that the prosecution is not carried on in the name and by the authority of the State of Louisiana and does not conclude with the words, “against the peace and dignity of the same.” The motion was overruled and a bill of exception reserved. Upon trial the defendant was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and serve thirty days in the city jail. The defendant has appealed.

The City of Shreveport has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Under the provisions of Article 7 of Section 10 of the Constitution of 1921 we cannot entertain an appeal where the fine imposed is less than $300 or the imprisonment is less than six months unless the legality or constitutionality of the fine, forfeiture or penalty imposed by the city ordinance is contested.

The defendant contends that the appeal is properly lodged for the reason that the legality of the fine or penalty is questioned. This contention is based on the grounds that the affidavit under which the prosecution is conducted is subject to the same rules of pleading as required in informations filed by the district attorney or indictments returned by the grand jury in that the style of the process shall be in the name of the State of Louisiana and shall conclude, “against the peace and dignity of the same.” In support of this contention the defendant cites Article 7, Section 10, of the Constitution of 1921 and Articles 7 and 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The constitutionality or legality of the city ordinance imposing the penalty is not contested. In cases where the appellate jurisdiction is founded only upon the fact that the constitutionality or legality of a fine or other penalty imposed by a parish or municipality is in contest, the only question that can be considered is the question of constitutionality or legality of the ordinance imposing the penalty. State v. Zurich, 49 La.Ann. 447, 21 So. 977; State v. Hohn, 50 La.Ann. 432, 23 So. 966; State v. Faber, 50 La.Ann. 952, 24 So. 662; Ruston v. Fountain, 118 La. 53, 42 So. 644; City of Shreveport v. Mackie, 140 La. 724, 73 So. 842; Downs, Tax Collector, v. Dunn, 162 La. 747, 111 So. 82; Town of Waterproof v. Towles, 180 La. 168, 156 So. 211; City of Shreveport v. Gregory, 186 La. 407, 172 So. 435 and State v. Bonner, 193 La. 402, 190 So. 626.

Motion sustained. Appeal dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6338 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6338

  To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to permit supplemental 
nutrition assistance program benefits to be used to purchase additional 
                          types of food items.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 20, 2021

 Mr. Rush (for himself, Ms. Meng, and Mr. Fitzpatrick) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to permit supplemental 
nutrition assistance program benefits to be used to purchase additional 
                          types of food items.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``SNAP Provisions to Lower Undue 
Struggle Act of 2021'' or the ``SNAP PLUS Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS.

    Section 3 of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2014) is 
amended--
            (1) in subsection (k)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1) by striking ``hot foods or hot 
                food products ready for immediate consumption other 
                than those authorized pursuant to clauses (3), (4), 
                (5), (7), (8), and (9) of this subsection,'',
                    (B) by striking ``and (9)'' the last place it 
                appears and inserting ``(9)'', and
                    (C) by inserting before the period at the end the 
                following:
``, and (10) prepared foods fit for immediate consumption and hot 
foods'',
            (2) in subsection (o)(1)(A)--
                    (A) by inserting ``(i)'' after ``(A)'',
                    (B) by striking ``; or'' at the end and inserting 
                ``; and'', and
                    (C) by adding at end the following:
                    ``(ii) does not have more than 50 percent of its 
                total gross sales from prepared foods fit for immediate 
                consumption and hot foods; or'', and
            (3) in subsection (q)(2)--
                    (A) by striking ``include accessory'' and inserting 
                the following:
        ``include--
                    ``(A) accessory'',
                    (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting 
                ``; and'', and
                    (C) by adding at end the following:
                    ``(B) prepared foods fit for immediate consumption 
                and hot foods.''.
                                 <all>
```
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-16-00867-CV

In re Natural Soda, LLC

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

M E M O R AN D U M O P I N I O N

Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

__________________________________________

Jeff Rose, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Field and Bourland

Filed: January 5, 2017
#### Calvin O’Neil ALLEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David MITCHELL, Superintendent, Mountain View Correctional Institution; Roy Cooper, Attorney General for the State of North Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 03-6712.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 6, 2003.

Decided Aug. 25, 2003.

Calvin O’Neil Allen, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, Office of the Attorney General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

*1000PER CURIAM.

Calvin O’Neil Allen seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. Allen cannot appeal this order unless a circuit judge or justice issues a certificate of appealability, and a certificate of appealability will not issue absent a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A habeas appellant meets this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,*534 U.S. 941, 122 S.Ct. 318, 151 L.Ed.2d 237 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude Allen has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
EXHIBIT
23.2





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
PETROLEUM ENGINEERS AND GEOLOGISTS





As
independent petroleum engineers, Netherland, Sewell & Associates, Inc.
hereby consents to the inclusion or incorporation by reference in the
registration statement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-149190), the registration
statement (No. 333-159888) on Form S-3, the registration statement (No.
333-153579) on Form S-3/A, the 2009 Annual Report on Form 10-K and the 2009
Annual Report on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 of BreitBurn Energy Partners L.P.
of information from our firm’s reserve report dated January 28, 2010, entitled
Estimates of Reserves and
Future Revenue to the BreitBurn Operating L.P. Interest in Certain Oil and Gas
Properties located in California, Florida and Wyoming as of December 31,
2009 and all references to our firm included in or made part of the
BreitBurn Energy Partners L.P. 2009 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A Amendment No.
1.





NETHERLAND,
      SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC./s/ J. Carter Henson,
Jr.J.
      Carter Henson, Jr., P.E.Senior
      Vice PresidentHouston,
      TexasOctober
      21, 2010
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 29 , 2019

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14- 19 -00020- CR NO. 14- 19 -00021- CR NO. 14- 19 -00022- CR NO. 14- 19 -00023- CR

KENNETH WAYNE PHILLI PS , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 923443 , 923444 , 924337, and 924338

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant, Kenneth Wayne Phillips, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of four offenses on February 18, 2003: possession of a firearm (trial number 923443, appeal number 14- 19 -00020-CR); theft of a firearm (trial number 923444, appeal
number 14- 19 -00021- CR ); aggravated assault (trial number 924337, appeal number
14

- 19 -00022-CR); and aggravated robbery (trial number 924338, appeal number 14-
19 -00023-CR). Pursuant to the terms of a plea-bargain agreement between appellant2

and the State, the trial court sentenced appellant to 35 years’ imprisonment for each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from each judgment of conviction on December 26, 2018

. We lack jurisdiction over these appeals for two reasons: the notic es of appeal were not filed timely, and these are plea bargain cases with no appealable matters and appellant has not been granted permission to appeal.
First, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after sentence is imposed when the defendant has not filed a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). A notice of appeal that complies with the requirements
of Rule 26 .2 is essential to vest the court of appeals with jurisdiction. Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If an appeal is not timely perfected, a court of appeals does not obtain jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal. Under those circumstances it can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal. Id. Appellant’s notices of appeal were filed nearly sixteen years after the sentences were imposed. Therefore, the appeals were not timely perfected.
Second, in a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant may appeal only matters raised by a written , pretrial motion or with the trial court’s permission. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Appel lant’s punishments do not exceed the agreed lengths of confinement. The record s do not contain any appealable pretrial rulings , and the trial court did not grant appellant permission to appeal.
Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal s

. PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Hassan, and Poissant

. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Exhibit 18.0

     Payless Cashways, Inc.
     Lee's Summit, Missouri

     Ladies and Gentlemen:

     We have been furnished with a copy of the quarterly  report on Form 10-Q of
     Payless  Cashways,  Inc. (the Company) for the three months ended  February
     24, 2001, and have read the Company's statements contained in Note 2 to the
     condensed  financial  statements included therein. As stated in Note 2, the
     Company  changed  its  method  of  accounting  for  the  costs  of  certain
     inventories  from the  last-in  first-out  (LIFO)  method  to the  first-in
     first-out  (FIFO)  method,  and states  that the newly  adopted  accounting
     principle is  preferable  in the  circumstances  because the FIFO method of
     valuing  inventory  more  closely  matches  current  costs and  revenues in
     periods of declining  prices.  In  accordance  with your  request,  we have
     reviewed  and  discussed  with  Company  officials  the  circumstances  and
     business  judgment and planning upon which the decision to make this change
     in the method of accounting was based.

     We have not audited any financial  statements of Payless Cashways,  Inc. as
     of any date or for any period  subsequent to November 25, 2000, nor have we
     audited  the  information  set  forth in the  aforementioned  Note 2 to the
     condensed financial statements;  accordingly,  we do not express an opinion
     concerning the factual information contained therein.

     With regard to the aforementioned accounting change, authoritative criteria
     have  not  been  established  for  evaluating  the   preferability  of  one
     acceptable method of accounting over another  acceptable  method.  However,
     for  purposes of the  Company's  compliance  with the  requirements  of the
     Securities and Exchange Commission, we are furnishing this letter.

     Based on our review and discussion,  with reliance on management's business
     judgment  and  planning,  we  concur  that  the  newly  adopted  method  of
     accounting is preferable in the Company's circumstances.

                                /S/   KPMG LLP

     Kansas City, Missouri
     March 12, 2001
#### Vescelius v. Martin.

Evidence that defendant placed her husband in apparent charge and control of her retail grocery business does not show authority in the husband to employ another to sell out the entire business in one transaction.

*392
      *Appeal from Arapahoe County Court.*

The appellant was carrying on a retail grocery business' at Denver, and her husband, W. S. Vescelius, had apparent charge and control of the same for her. The evidence tends to show that the appellee made a contract with the husband, as agent for appellant, whereby he, the appellee, was to make a sale of the entire stock of goods and fixtures for .appellant, and that she was to pay him a commission of $200 for effecting such sale;, that in pursuance of such contract the appellee found a purchaser for the stock of goods and fixtures^ introduced such purchaser to W. B. Vescelius, the husband, and that thereupon an agreement for the sale of said goods and fixtures was entered into between said purchaser and the said W.- S. Vescelius, as such agent, at a price satisfactory to the parties. Ko sale, however, was completed. The goods were not delivered, and no part of the purchase price was paid. The evidence tends to show that the alleged purchaser tendered a performance of the agreement on his part, and that the appellant, through her husband, as agent, refused to accept the tender, or to comply with the agreement on her part. The appellee, claiming, upon this state of facts, that he was entitled to his commission, brought this action against appellant, before a justice of the peace, to recover the same. An appeal was taken from there to the county court, where a trial was had, without a jury, and a judgment rendered in favor of the appellee, and against the appellant, for the sum of $200 and costs of suit; from which judgment an appeal has been taken to this court.

Messrs. Tilford, Gilmore and Rhodes, for appellant.

Mr. M. B. Carpenter, for appellee.

De France, C.

The evidence in this case fails to disclose that W. S. Vescelius was possessed of authority *393from his wife, the defendant, to make the contract sued upon. Without such proof the action must fail. The most that can be claimed for the evidence in this respect is that the husband was agent for the wife in conducting a retail grocery business. Granting the fact that his agency was a general one for this purpose, it does not follow that he had authority to sell out the entire business, stock and fixtures in one transaction. This authority is not to be implied from such an agency. But, if it were, the further authority in such agent to employ some one else to do so at the cost of his principal cannot be implied therefrom. It is not necessary to notice the other questions discussed by counsel. The evidence being insufficient to support the same, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.

Bising and Stallcup, 00., concur.

Per Curiam.

For the reasons assigned in the foregoing opinion the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

*Reversed.*
Exhibit 13.1


CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(B) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934





In connection with the Annual Report of Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the year ended June 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Changli Wang, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of June 30, 2011 and results of operations of the Company for the year ended June 30, 2011.





/S/ Changli WangName:
Changli WangTitle:
Chief Executive OfficerDate:
September 20, 2011





The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of this Annual Report or as a separate disclosure document.