Affirmed as Reformed and Opinion Filed June 1, 2015 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-01243-CR JONATHAN LYNN BOUGHTON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Crimin al District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1215740-H 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Myers Opinion by Justice Bridges Jonathan Lynn Boughton appeals his aggravat ed sexual assault conviction. A jury convicted appellant, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-fiv e years’ confinement. In a single issue, appellant argues th e evidence is insufficient to s upport his conviction. In a crosspoint, the State argues the judgment should be reformed to correctly show that appellant was convicted under section 22.021 of th e penal code. As reformed, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Appellant was charged by indictment with th e offense of sexual as sault of his niece, V.M., who was fourteen at the time of trial. V.M. testified appellant came to stay with her family for the summer when she was six years ol d. Appellant babysat V.M. and her brother. Appellant and V.M. were sitting on a bed when appellant asked if she wanted to play “the–2– nervous game.” V.M. testified the nervous ga me involved appellant t ouching V.M. on the leg and moving his hand up her thigh “to see if [she] would get nervous.” Appellant moved his hand “all the way up” and touched V.M.’s “privates.” V. M. testified her “privates” were the vagina. After that first time, “it was more and more each day,” with appellant eventually touching both “the inside and outside” of her vagina and “showing his parts,” wh ich V.M. said was his penis. Appellant also put his penis in V.M.’s vagina “almost every day.” As a result, V.M.’s “body would hurt,” and her back “was really in pain.” V.M. remembered “one time bleeding,” and that made her “scared.” V.M.’s mother had a boyfriend who had se veral children, one of which was a daughter named Ashley. Ashley was “16, 17” when she lived with V.M. and her mother. Until she was eleven years old, V.M. had not told anyone a bout the abuse because she “thought [she] was going to be the one to get in trouble or no one wa s going to believe [her].” V.M.’s parents were “going through a really hard time dealing with their divorce,” and V.M. thought “bringing this up” would make things worse. V.M. testifie d she was scared her father was going to hurt appellant. One night, V.M. was with some frie nds and Ashley and Ashley’s boyfriend when one of V.M.’s friends asked for a cigarette. Ashl ey’s boyfriend was “getting onto us” about how “we shouldn’t be smoking.” V.M. took Ashley aside a nd told her about the abuse to explain V.M. “wasn’t this big troublemaker out of nowhere.” Even though Ashley said she would not tell anyone, V.M. “knew in the back of [her] head she was going to tell someone because that’s something that you should do.” One night thereaf ter, V.M.’s stepmother and father came into her room, woke her up, and “were freaking out.” Th ey asked V.M. if appellant had touched her, and V.M. denied “everything” because she was s cared her father was going to “freak out” and she was “scared of what he was going to do.” The next morning, V.M. went to her father and–3– told him, “yes, it’s true, that [appellant] did touch [V.M.] for a long time.” V.M. “didn’t really give them too much details,” but he r parents took her to the police. Appellant testified V.M. is five years younge r than him. Appellant testified he never touched V.M.’s “genitalia, her private parts.” Appellant te stified he never played a “nervousness” game with anybody. Nevertheless, th e jury convicted appe llant of aggravated sexual assault, and th is appeal followed. In a single issue, Appellant argues the eviden ce is insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, appellant argues V.M.’s “chaotic fam ily,” the fact that V.M. “lived in numerous cities and houses,” V.M.’s “drug use and addictio n,” the fact V.M. got “i n trouble at school,” and the “details of the outcry,” when coupled with the defensive evidence in this case, render the evidence insufficient to support the verdict. When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determ ine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of th e offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Temple v. State , 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) . Although we consider ever ything presented at trial, we do not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. See Williams v. State , 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because the jury is the sole judge of the credibil ity of witnesses and of the weight given to their testimony, any conflicts or inconsiste ncies in the evidence are resolv ed in favor of the verdict. See Wesbrook v. State , 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Our review includes both properly and improperly admitted evidence. See Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We also consid er both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id.–4– To satisfy the elements of aggravated sexual as sault of a child as alleged in count one of the indictment, the State was re quired to prove that appella nt intentionally or knowingly penetrated the sexual organ of the victim, a ch ild under fourteen at th e time, with his sexual
organ. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2014). Here, V.M. testified appellant sexually assaulted her on many occasions over several years. The jury was free to believe V.M.’s te stimony and disbelieve appe llant. Further, this testimony alone was sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt. See T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN
. art. 38.07. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s a ggravated assau lt conviction. See Temple , 390 S.W.3d at 360; Wesbrook , 29 S.W.3d at 111. In its cross-point, the State points out the judgment in this case states the “Statute for Offense” is “22.021 Property Code.” The State as ks us to reform the judgment to reflect appellant was convicted under “22.021 Penal Code.” We note the judgme nt also incorrectly states that the punishment was assessed by the jur y. An appellate court has the power to correct and reform a trial court judgment to make the r ecord speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so, or make any appr opriate order as the law and nature of the case may require. Nolan v. State , 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2001, no pet.), quoting Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). We sustain the State’s cross-point. We order the trial cour t’s judgment be reformed to show appellant was convicted under “22.021 Penal C ode” and the punishment was assessed by the trial court.–5– In all other respects, we affi rm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b) 131243F.U05 /David L. Bridges/ DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE–6– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JONATHAN LYNN BOUGHTON, Appellant
No. 05-13-01243-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1215740-H. Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. Justices Lang-Miers and Myers participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: under the heading "Statute for Offense," th e word "Property" is deleted and the word "Penal" is substituted. Under th e heading “Punishment Assessed by:,” the word “JURY” is deleted and the word “COURT” is substituted. As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered June 1, 2015.