alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Thomas Newlan, Plaintiff in Error, *v.*The President and Trustees of Aurora, Defendants in Error.

ERROR TO ICAHE.

A party will not he liable to the penalty, inflicted by an ordinance of an incorporated town for selling liquor, unless it clearly appears from the evidence, that the ordinance took effect before the act complained of was committed.

This was an action of debt, brought by the defendants in error, against the plaintiff in error for a violation of one of the ordinances of the town of Aurora, before a justice of the peace of Kane county, and taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of *365Kane county, Wilson, Judge, when at the May term, 1852, the cause was tried before a jury, and judgment rendered against the defendant below. The defendant below prosecuted his writ of error. The only question of importance involved in the case appears in the opinion of the court.

T. S. Dicicey and O. D. Day, for plaintiff in error.

Glover and Cook, for defendants in error.

Treat, C. J.

It is provided by the statute, under which the town of Aurora was incorporated, that *“*the proceedings of said board shall always be public; and all their ordinances, before taking effect, shall be published at least ten days, in a newspaper of such town, or by setting up copies of the same, in three of the most public places in such town.” It was proved by the clerk of the corporation, that he posted copies of the ordinance in question in three of the most public places in the town; “ and that they had been up for more than ten days before the bringing of this suit.” It was proved by another witness, that Newlan sold the liquor “ about one week prior to the commencement of this suit.” This was the only testimony in the case as to the publication of the ordinance, or the doing of any act in violation of its provisions. It did not authorize the jury to find a verdict of guilty. It did not show that the ordinance took effect before the act complained of was committed. On the contrary, the inference clearly was that the liquor was sold before the ordinance went into operation. The court should have granted a new trial.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

*Judgment reversed.*
#### Thomas Bell *et al.,*Pltffs in Error *v.*Henry Sheldon *et al.,*Defts in Error.

ERROR TO McHENRY.

It is erroneous to enter final Judgment against a defendant, when the issue presented by a plea has not been tried.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the defendants in error in the McHenry Circuit Court. Several pleas in addition to the general issue, were filed by the defendants; to the special pleas, demurrers were filed, which were sustained by the court, and the defendants standing by their pleas, judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs for the sum of $530 *42,*without any notice of the issue joined upon the plea of non-assumpsit.

The cause was heard before Henderson, Judge, at April term, 1851.

C.. McClure, for Pltffs in Error.

J. Loop, for Hefts in Error.

Treat, C. J.

This judgment must be reversed. After sustaining a demurrer to several special pleas, the Court proceeded to render a final judgment against the defendants, without noticing a plea of non-assumpsit.

The issue presented by that plea had to be tried and found against the defendants, before the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

*Judgment reversed.*
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39703

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRIAN KEITH BLACK,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 304

Filed: January 3, 2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period 

of confinement of four years, for burglary, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before LANSING, Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Brian Keith Black pled guilty to burglary. I.C. §§ 18-1401, 18-1403. The district court 

sentenced Black to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of four 

years. Black appeals.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
2

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Black’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
7th
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-20021

 Summary Calendar 

 

RICHARD E. CHANEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BROWN & ROOT ENERGY SERVICES, INC.,

BROWN & ROOT INTERNAT’L, INC., 

BROWN & ROOT FAR EAST ENG’RS PTE 

LTD. (REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE), BROWN & ROOT, INC., 

BROWN & ROOT HOLDINGS, INC., BROWN & ROOT 

TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., BROWN & ROOT FAR EAST, 

BROWN & ROOT SERV. CORP., BROWN & ROOT FAR EAST

ENG’RS PTE LTD., AND HALLIBURTON CO.,

Defendant-Appellees.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-97-CV-3540)

 

August 4, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Richard Chaney appeals the district court’s grant of Brown &

Root Far East’s motion to dismiss and the other defendants’ motions

for summary judgment. Chaney did not file responses to these

motions, but instead filed a delayed Rule 56(f) motion for a

continuance, which the district court denied.
2

This court reviews the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for abuse

of discretion. See Stearns Airport Equip. Co., Inc. v. FMC Corp.,

170 F.3d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1999). On review of the record, we

find that the district court’s rulings were not an abuse of

discretion. The district court appropriately enforced its rules

and correctly concluded that Chaney’s Rule 56(f) motion lacked the

requisite specificity. See Washington v. Allstate Insurance Co.,

901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the movant must

be able to demonstrate how postponement and additional discovery

will allow him to defeat summary judgment). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350

I, Michael P. Scarpelli, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of
Data Domain, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2007, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Data Domain, Inc.



|                      |  |  |  |     |  |                          |  |                        
|--------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ------------------------ |  | -----------------------
|Date: August 13, 2007 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ MICHAEL P. SCARPELLI
|                      |  |  |  |     |  |                          |  | Michael P. Scarpelli   
|                      |  |  |  |     |  |                          |  | Chief Financial Officer
210 La. 1021

#### WILSON v. MOSER.

No. 38128.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 13, 1946.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 31, *1946.*

Julius C. Pearlstine, of New Orleans, for plaintiff and appellant.

Andrew H. Thalheim, of Gretna, for defendant and appellee.

ICENNON, Justice.

Plaintiff, on August 18, 1943, filed suit against her husband, seeking a separation from bed and board on the grounds of cruelty and habitual drunkenness. From a judgment rejecting her demands and dismissing the suit, she prosecutes this appeal.

The plaintiff relied upon her own testimony and offered no witness other than her six year old daughter, whose testimony was excluded by the court. The defendant introduced the testimony of several neighbors and close friends. The district court found that plaintiff's charges were not proven. Our examination of the record leads us to the same conclusion.

 Appellant complains here that the district court erred in refusing to hear the testimony of the six year old child. The district judge, in sustaining the objection to the child’s competency as a witness, said that he could not “bring himself to placing that child in the position of making a choice between father and mother * * Had the exclusion of the testimony been based entirely upon that ground, the judge’s ruling would have been erroneous under the authority of Chavigny v. Hava, 125 La. 710, 51 So. 696. Plowever, the record shows that the district court also added “ * * * I don’t believe that the child would be a competent witness * * * »

Act 157 of 1916, Section 1, provides:

> “ * * * That the competent witness in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court, or before a person having authority to receive evidence, shall be a person of proper understanding * *

The court permitted counsel to question the little girl with a view of qualifying her as “ * * * a person of proper un*50derstanding * * under the Louisiana statute. An examination of the questions and answers does not indicate any abuse of discretion by the district judge in ruling the child incompetent as a witness. The admission of the testimony of a child of tender years is a matter which addresses itself to the discretion of the trial court. 28 R.C.L., par. 48, pg. 461; Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, 4th Ed., par. 720.

Judgment affirmed with costs.
EXHIBIT 32.2


CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
    Quarterly Report of Applera Corporation (the Company) on Form
    10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities
    and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Dennis
    L. Winger, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
    U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
    Act of 2002, that:


(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements
      of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report
        fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
        results of operations of the Company.




/s/ Dennis L. Winger
Chief Financial Officer

Date: November 9, 2004

---
Exhibit 32.1
                                                                    ------------

                      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Levcor International,
Inc. (the "Company") for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert A. Levinson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


Dated:   May 13, 2005
         ------------

By: /s/ ROBERT A. LEVINSON
    ------------------------------
    Robert A. Levinson
    Chief Executive Officer


                                    Page 38
EX10.1 - FRB Loan Renewal 2014






EXHIBIT 10.1

























BORROWER:                                LENDER:


Greenhill & Co., Inc.                            First Republic Bank
a Delaware corporation




By:    /s/ HAROLD J. RODRIGUEZ, JR.                By:     /s/ KANAKO S. YUJUICO
Name: Harold J. Rodriguez, Jr.                     Name:    Kanako S. Yujuico      
Title:    Treasurer                             Title:    Director
#### Norman L. MOSS, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent.

No. 03-3212.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

July 29, 2003.

ORDER

Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis having been granted, *842and the required Statement Concerning Discrimination having been filed, it is

ORDERED that the order of dismissal and the mandate be, and the same hereby are, VACATED and RECALLED, and the petition for review is REINSTATED.

Respondent should compute the due date for filing its brief from the date of filing of this order.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6315 

To improve the Safe Routes to School Program, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 16, 2021 

Mr. NEGUSE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To improve the Safe Routes to School Program, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Safe Routes to All 

5 Schools Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. SAFE ROUTES TO SCHOOL PROGRAM. 

7 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con8 gress that— 

9 (1) the safe routes to school program under sec10 tion 1404 of SAFETEA–LU (23 U.S.C. 402 note; 

11 Public Law 109–59) (referred to in this subsection 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6315 IH

1 as the ‘‘program’’) should be expanded to include 

2 high school students as well as primary and middle 

3 school students; 

4 (2) the program helps ensure the safety of chil5 dren; and 

6 (3) Congress should continue to provide funding 

7 for this important program. 

8 (b) SAFE ROUTES TO SCHOOL.—Section 1404 of 

9 SAFETEA–LU (23 U.S.C. 402 note; Public Law 109– 

10 59) is amended— 

11 (1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘primary and 

12 middle’’ and inserting ‘‘primary, middle, and high’’; 

13 and 

14 (2) in subsection (k)(2)— 

15 (A) in the heading, by striking ‘‘PRIMARY

16 AND MIDDLE’’ and inserting ‘‘PRIMARY, MID17 DLE, AND HIGH’’; 

18 (B) by striking ‘‘primary and middle’’ and 

19 inserting ‘‘primary, middle, and high’’; and 

20 (C) by striking ‘‘eighth grade’’ and insert21 ing ‘‘12th grade’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
#### Deborah FAYSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KALEIDA HEALTH, INC., David Croston, Director of Clinical Engineering of Kaleida Health, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-9202.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

July 2, 2003.

*876Deborah Fayson, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se.

Robert C. Weissflach, Jaeckle, Fleischmann & Mugel, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT: STRAUB, POOLER, Circuit Judges, and HURD, District Judge.*

The Honorable David N. Hurd, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Deborah Fayson, *pro se,*appeals from the September 21, 2002, judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (John T. Elfvin, Judge) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Kaleida Health, Inc., and David Croston. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court.

At bottom, the defendants were able to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the wage disparity and lack of promotion that formed the basis of the bulk of Fayson’s employment discrimination claims. The defendants established that the white employees who received higher salaries than Fayson received such salaries because they had held higher previous positions and an employee’s pay was scaled relative to prior positions held. The defendants also established that the white male who received a promotion instead of Fayson possessed greater experience. Because Fayson failed to set forth any evidence to show that these non-diseriminatory reasons were pretextual, summary judgment was appropriate as to the Title VII claim, *see St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,*509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), and the claim under the New York State Human Rights Law, *see Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc.,*259 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.2001). Furthermore, because the pay differential was based on circumstances statutorily permitted, summary judgment was appropriate as to the Equal Pay Act claim, *see*29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); *Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist.,*963 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir.1992), and the claim under New York State Labor Law § 194.

Fayson’s remaining claims fail because she has not shown: as to retaliation, that she suffered an adverse employment action followed her filing of the EEOC charge, *see Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp.,*157 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir.1998); and as to hostile work environment, that the conditions of her workplace were “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter” her employment, *Meri*
      *877
      *tor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,*477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2899, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986).

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
#### WALKER v. MILLS ENGINEERING CONST. CO. et al.

No. 1265.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

March 6, 1934.

For original opinion, see 152 So. 83.

Pujo, Bell & Hardin, of Lake Charles, for appellants.

Hawkins & Pickrel, of Lake Charles, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this case a pro forma application for rehearing was timely filed with the clerk of the district court of Beauregard parish in which the ease originated, but was not filed within the" required number of days with the clerk of this court. Counsel for plaintiff, appellee, have filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that it was filed too late.

The question involved is whether an application for rehearing can be filed with the clerk of the district court and have the same effect as though filed with the clerk of this court. We are of the opinion that it has not.

The Constitution of 1921, art. 7, § 28, which provides for the Courts of Appeal in the state, directs the said courts to appoint a clerk of their own; then using the alternative “or,” the section also provides that the said courts “may use the clerks, or any deputy clerk of the District Courts as such deputies, who shall serve during the pleasure of the court.” This court complied with the provision of the Constitution by appointing1 its own clerk, who has been acting as such since his appointment, and it has never since-made use of the alternative authority granted thereunder. It follows therefore that the clerk appointed by this court is the only clerk authorized to file any motions or pleadings before it, including applications for rehearings such as we are here concerned with.

If it be urged that the application was properly filed by the local clerk of the district court under the provisions of Act No.. S9 of 1914, our answer would be that that act of the Legislature has been necessarily and by implication repealed by the article of the Constitution herein cited, and is therefore no-longer in effect.

For these reasons, first, the motion to-dismiss the application for rehearing is sustained, and the application will not be enter-*345(rained. A second reason for refusing to consider the application lies in tlie fact that it is purely formal and does not point out specifically any error in the opinion and judgment handed down herein.
Exhibit 23.1


Consent of Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm





Sonic
Solutions


Novato,
California





We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No.
333-127627) of Sonic Solutions of our reports dated May 29, 2009 relating to the
consolidated financial statements and schedule, and the effectiveness of Sonic
Solutions’ internal control over financial reporting, which appear in the Annual
Report to Shareholders, which is incorporated by reference in this Annual Report
on Form 10K.





BDO
Seidman, LLP


San
Francisco, California


May 29,
2009
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6269 

To require a report on cooperation between China and the United Arab 

Emirates regarding defense, security, technology, and other strategically 

sensitive matters that implicate the national security interests of the 

United States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 14, 2021 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI (for himself and Mr. STEWART) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

A BILL 

To require a report on cooperation between China and the 

United Arab Emirates regarding defense, security, technology, and other strategically sensitive matters that implicate the national security interests of the United 

States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Monitoring China5 UAE Cooperation Act’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6269 IH

1 SEC. 2. REPORT ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND 

2 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. 

3 (a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 60 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 

5 Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of 

6 the intelligence community that the Director determines 

7 appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 

8 committees a report containing the following: 

9 (1) Details on the cooperation between China 

10 and the United Arab Emirates regarding defense, 

11 security, technology, and other strategically sensitive 

12 matters that implicate the national security interests 

13 of the United States. 

14 (2) The most recent, as of the date of the re15 port, quarterly assessment by the intelligence com16 munity of measures that the United Arab Emirates 

17 has implemented to safeguard technology of the 

18 United States and the reliability of any assurances 

19 by the United Arab Emirates (with respect to both 

20 current assurances and assurances being considered 

21 as of the date of the report). 

22 (3) A certification by the Director regarding 

23 whether such assurances described in paragraph (2) 

24 are viable and sufficient to protect technology of the 

25 United States from being transferred to China or 

26 other third parties. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6269 IH

1 (b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be 

2 submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall in3 clude an unclassified executive summary. 

4 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms ‘‘intel5 ligence community’’ and ‘‘congressional intelligence com6 mittees’’ have the meanings given such terms in section 

7 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS