alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
.-

\~ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

FILED 

SEP - 2 2009 

Christopher Bullard, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

The United States et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Clerk, U.S. District and 

Bankruptcy Courts 

Civil Action No. 09 1670 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiffs pro se complaint, which 

is accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will grant the 

application and will dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as required by Rule 

12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Plaintiff, a prisoner in North Carolina, alleges that on May 12,2009, he filed two nonprovisional patent applications with the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), but the PTO 

returned them on June 1,2009, as incomplete in part because they were submitted without the 

$165 filing fee. See CompI. Attachments. "An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has 

been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Board of Patent 

Appeals and Interferences, having once paid the fee for such appeal." 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). And 

"[ a]n applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ... 

may, unless appeal has been taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 

have remedy by civil action against the Director in the United States District Court for the 

District ofColumbia[.]" 35 U.S.C. § 145. 
The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a civil 

lawsuit arising from the denial of a patent. Leighton v. Cae, 130 F.2d 841, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1942); 

see Field v. Manbeck 1990 WL 116818, * 3 (D.D.C., Aug. 2, 1990) ("The plaintiff has not 

received a decision from the Board of Patent Appeals and thus this Court does not have 

jurisdiction over this action in the absence ofa final agency decision, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145 

and 5 U.S.C. § 704."). To the extent that plaintiff is seeking a writ of mandamus under 28 

U.S.C. § 1651 to compel the PTO Director to waive the patent filing fee, see Form CompI. at 5 

(relief sought), he has not cited authority showing that he has a "'clear and indisputable' right to 

[such] relief," In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and "[i]t is well-settled that a 

writ of mandamus is not available to compel discretionary acts," Cox v. Sec'y a/Labor, 739 F. 

Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases). The complaint therefore is dismissed. A separate 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

~ 

Date: August 2..JL, 2009 

United States 

-2-

;
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6106 

To amend title III of the Public Health Service Act to terminate the effective 

time period for immunity for manufacturers of COVID–19 vaccines, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 1, 2021 

Mr. GOODEN of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend title III of the Public Health Service Act to 

terminate the effective time period for immunity for 

manufacturers of COVID–19 vaccines, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIABILITY OF COVID–19 VACCINE MANUFAC4 TURERS. 

5 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in apply6 ing section XII of the ‘‘Declaration Under the Public 

7 Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical 

8 Countermeasures Against COVID–19’’ issued pursuant to 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6106 IH

1 section 319F–3(b)(2)(B) of the Public Health Service Act 

2 (42 U.S.C. 247d–6d(b)(2)(B)), with respect to manufac3 turers of COVID–19 vaccines, the reference to October 1, 

4 2024, shall be deemed a reference to December 1, 2021. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6238 

To amend the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 to increase 

Tribal access to water conservation and efficiency grants, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 9, 2021 

Ms. STANSBURY (for herself, Ms. LEGER FERNANDEZ, Mr. HORSFORD, Mr. 

GALLEGO, Mr. COLE, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Mr. NEGUSE, 

and Mr. COSTA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 

2009 to increase Tribal access to water conservation 

and efficiency grants, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘WaterSMART Access 

5 for Tribes Act’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6238 IH

1 SEC. 2. WATER MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT. 

2 Section 9504(a)(3)(E)(i) of the Omnibus Public 

3 Land Management Act of 2009 (42 U.S.C. 

4 10364(a)(3)(E)(i)) is amended— 

5 (1) in subclause (I), by striking ‘‘subclause 

6 (II)’’ and inserting ‘‘subclauses (II) and (III)’’; and 

7 (2) after subclause (II), by inserting the fol8 lowing: 

9 ‘‘(III) WAIVER; REDUCTION.— 

10 With respect to a grant or other 

11 agreement entered into under para12 graph (1) between the Secretary and 

13 an Indian tribe, the Secretary may re14 duce or waive the non-Federal share 

15 (and increase the Federal share ac16 cordingly) of the cost of any infra17 structure improvement or activity that 

18 is the subject of that grant or other 

19 agreement if the Secretary determines 

20 that the Indian tribe does not have 

21 sufficient funds to pay such cost 

22 share.’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
#### Ex Parte J. B. Chadwick.

No. 25141.

January 31, 1951.

*Waldo E. Ximenes,*Houston, for relator.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

*411BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

This case is property before the court as an original filing by which the relator seeks his discharge from the penitentiary.

According to his petition and certified copies of judgment and other proceedings, he was convicted in the 54th Judicial District Court of McLennan County, on November 23rd, 1942, and sentenced by jury verdict to nine years in the penitentiary. Proper judgment was duly entered and relator is confined in the penitentiary by virtue thereof. In his petition relator sets out the history showing that he was later paroled by the Governor of Texas and, while under parole, was arrested by officers in the city of Waco for driving while intoxicated. The Federal authorities seemed to have some information and asked the local parole officer not to recommend revocation of his parole until they could investigate his criminal record. The result of their investigation led to his conviction and service of some years in the Federal penitentiary. It is further alleged that if he is given credit for the time served in the penitentiary and earned good time that his nine years in the state penitentiary should be fulfilled and he should be discharged from further service thereunder.

This contention is made by virtue of the holding of this court in Ex Parte Pete Baird, 154 Texas Crim. Rep. 109, 225 S. W. 2d 845. The holding in that case is discussed by the opinion of this date in Ex Parte Spears, No. 25,075, 154 Texas Cr. Rep. 112 and is specifically overruled. The contention in the instant case will not be sustained and relator is remanded to the custody of the penitentiary authorities who will hold him until he has served the sentence imposed upon him in the state court, without giving credit for any time served in the Federal penitentiary.
227 So.2d 440

#### James Lee PHARR v. STATE.

1 Div. 601.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 2, 1969.

John Coleman, Mobile, for petitioner.

MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and Herbert H. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., opposed.

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

MERRILL, Justice.

Petition of James Lee Pharr for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision in Pharr v. State, 45 Ala.App. 152, 227 So.2d 439, (1 Div. 241). [transferred to Court of Criminal Appeals (1 Div. 1)].

Writ denied.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.4



Statement of Chief Financial Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of Southern California Gas Company (the "Company") certifies that:



(i)

the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended September 30, 2006 (the "Quarterly Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii)

the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







November 2, 2006



/S/  Dennis V. ArriolaDennis V. ArriolaChief Financial Officer
#### William E. Mowbray v. Harriet De Forest.

Motion granted unless appellant have appeal ready for April term.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2003
  By:
    /S/ Joshua G. JamesDate: February 28, 2008
    Name:
    Joshua G. JamesTitle:
    President and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer) CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2003
  By:
    /S/ Michael S. HerringDate: February 28, 2008
    Name:
    Michael S. HerringTitle:
    Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) A signed original of each of the written statements above required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to Omniture, Inc. and will be retained by Omniture,
Inc. and furnished to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
 The forgoing certifications are being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an
exhibit to the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007, and they shall not
be considered filed as part of such report
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER TIMBERS, a/k/a Alibi,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:10-cr-00170-HEH-21; 3:13-cv-00271-HEH)

Submitted: May 18, 2015 Decided: June 3, 2015

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher Timbers, Appellant Pro Se. Peter Sinclair Duffey, 

Gurney Wingate Grant, II, Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Theryn G. Gibbons, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia; Dennis Michael Fitzpatrick, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Timbers seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Timbers has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### ARCENEAUX et al. v. PRATHER et al.

No. 1841.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

June 14, 1938.

Dubuisson & Dubuisson, of Opelousas, for appellants.

J. Y. Fontenot, of Opelousas, for appel-lees.

DORE, Judge.

This is a companion suit to that of Preston Stelly against the same defendants, 182 So. 171, this day decided. The suit is by' the father of Joseph Arceneaux, the boy who was riding the bicycle along the west curb of Main Street, and was struck by the truck driven by Prather just after its collision with the Stelly car. The same charges of negligence were made against Prather as were made in the other suit, and the answer of the defendants is the same, except that there is no effort made to charge or hold the Arceneaux boy guilty of any contributory negligence.

The reasons given in the Stelly Case for holding the defendants liable for damages resulting from the collision apply with equal or greater force in this case. Consequently, the only thing to do in this case is to pass on the amount of damages.

The father of the boy asks for damages in his individual capacity in the sum of $4150, and in behalf of his minor son in the sum of $1596. The nature of the damage sustained by the father was not alleged or proved, and his claim was not allowed. No complaint is made on the appeal by the father on account of the disallowance of his claim. Judgment was rendered in favor of the boy in the sum of $896, and defendants have appealed.

The medical testimony shows that this eighteen year old colored boy received a laceration of the scalp, brush burns and abrasions of the body, face, arms and legs, and a severe contusion of the left hip. The boy was in bed and was seen by the doctor daily for some five days. During that time he suffered considerable pain and had a slight hemorrhage from the nose and chest, and was given sedatives to relieve the pain. The boy received treatment at the hospital after he got up and was disabled from work for 12 weeks. He was a delivery boy and received $5.50 per week. The lower court properly allowed him $60 for loss of time. The boy’s bicycle was demolished and he was allowed $36 for that item which does "not seem to be questioned.

The boy’s injuries are entirely healed, and an award of $500 is sufficient for the personal injuries received. The judgment will have to be amended accordingly.

For these reasons, it is ordered that the judgment appealed from is amended by reducing the amount from $896 to $596 and as thus amended the judgment is affirmed. The plaintiff to pay the cost of this appeal, defendant to pay all other costs.
**Exhibit 15.5**

** **

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLICACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the RegistrationStatement (Form S-8 No. 333-170811) pertaining to the 2006 Stock Plan of Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd. of our reportsdated September 27, 2013, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd., andthe effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd., included in this AnnualReport (Form 20-F) for the year ended June 30, 2013.

 

/s/ Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP

 

Beijing, the People’s Republic of China

 

September 27, 2013
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6275 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6275

 To prohibit the use of Federal funds to administer a COVID-19 vaccine 
 to officers and employees of the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, or certain Department of the Interior officers 
and employees or require that such officers and employees receive such 
                a vaccine as a condition of employment.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 14, 2021

   Ms. Mace introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
 Committee on Homeland Security, and in addition to the Committees on 
 Natural Resources, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit the use of Federal funds to administer a COVID-19 vaccine 
 to officers and employees of the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, or certain Department of the Interior officers 
and employees or require that such officers and employees receive such 
                a vaccine as a condition of employment.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NO VACCINE MANDATE FOR U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
              AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, OR CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF THE 
              INTERIOR OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

    No Federal funds may be used to--
            (1) administer a COVID-19 vaccine to--
                    (A) any officer or employee of the U.S. Border 
                Patrol or the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 
                or
                    (B) any officer or employee of the Department of 
                the Interior or the Drug Enforcement Agency who is 
                engaged in activities respecting the construction or 
                maintenance of a border barrier along the souther 
                border of the United States; or
            (2) require any such officer or employee to receive such a 
        vaccine as a condition of employment.
                                 <all>
```
March 15, 1977 

The Honorable Selden N. Snedeker Opinion No. H-95.6 

Criminal District Attorney 

Cameron County Re: Fingerprinting of 

Brownsville, Texas 78520 juveniles. 

Dear Mr. Sn~edeker: 

You have, requested ou,r opinion regarding whether a 

law enforcement agency may fingerprint a child for identification purposes. Section 51.15~of the Family,Code~ provides, 

in pertinent part: 

(a) No child may be fingerprinted 

without the consent of the juvenile court 

except as provided in Subsection (f) of 

this section. However, if a child 15 

years of age or older is referred to the 

juvenile court for a felony, his fingerprints may be taken and filed by a lawenforcement officer investigating the.case. 

Subsection (f) permits a law enforcement officer to take a 

child's fingerprints "[i]f latent fingerprints are found during 

the inves.tigation of an offense, and a law-enforcement 

officer has reasonable cause to.believe that they~ are those 

of a particular child. . . '." 

Prior to its 1975 amendment, subsection (a) provided: 

No child may be fingerprinted in the -- 

investigation of a crime except.as provided -- 

in Subsection (f) of this section . . . . 

(Emphasis added). 

In our opinion, the deletion of the phrase "in the investigation 

of a crime" from the 1975 amendment to section 51.15(a) 

conclusively indicates that a law enforcement agency may 

fingerprint a child only. in the specified circumstanc,es. 

P. 3990 
The Honorable Selden N. Snedeker - page 2 (H-956) 

A child may be fingerprinted in only three instances: 

~if the juvenile court grants its approval: if. subsection (f) 

is applicable; or if the child is "15 years of age or older 

[and] is referred to the juvenile court for a felony." 

Thus, it is our opinion that, unless one of the statutory 

exceptions is applicable, section 51.15 of the Family Code 

prohibits a law enforcement agency from fingerprinting's 

child. 

SUMMARY 

Unless one of the stated exceptions is 

applicable, section 51.15 of the Family 

Code prohibi~ts a law enforcement agency 

from fingerprinting a child., 

Very truly yours, 

Attorney General of Texas 

APPROVED: 

KENDALL, First Assistant 

C. ROBERT HEATH, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

jwb 

P. 3991
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of VelaTel Global Communications, Inc. ("Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (this Report"), I, George Alvarez, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §. 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(i) this Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(ii) the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Date: May 17, 2013
By:
/s/ George AlvarezGeorge Alvarez, Chief Executive Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7573

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARIO ALBERTO GARCIA HOLGUIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Glen E. Conrad, Chief 

District Judge. (5:04-cr-00025-GEC-4)

Submitted: February 23, 2012 Decided: February 28, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mario Alberto Garcia Holguin, Appellant Pro Se. Ronald Mitchell 

Huber, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Mario Alberto Garcia Holguin appeals the district 

court’s order granting his motion to reduce his sentence under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). We have reviewed the record and 

find no error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by 

the district court. United States v. Holguin, No. 5:04-cr00025-GEC (W.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2011). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
#### Ronald M. SINGLETON, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Respondent.

No. 02-3287.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Oct. 15, 2002.

ORDER

Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis having been granted, and the required Statement Concerning Discrimination having been filed, it is

ORDERED that the order of dismissal and the mandate be, and the same hereby are, VACATED and RECALLED, and the petition for review is REINSTATED.

Petitioner should compute the due date for filing his brief from the date of filing of this order.