UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

COOK, GALLAGHER, and HAIGHT 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E2 MATHEW J. WILLIAMSON 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20100828 

Headquarters, Fort Bliss 

Michael J. Hargis, Military Judge (arraignment) 

David H. Robertson, Military Judge (trial) 

Colonel Michael J. Benjamin, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Patricia A. Ham, JA; Major Jacob D. Bashore, JA; Captain 

Stephen J. Rueter, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Major Amber J. Roach, JA; Major Ellen S. Jennings, JA; Captain 

Edward J. Whitford, JA (on brief). 

1 October 2012 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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COOK, Senior Judge: 

A panel composed of officer and enlisted members sitting as a general courtmartial convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of false official statement and rape 

in violation of Articles 107 and 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 

907, 920 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The panel sentenced appellant to a 

dishonorable discharge, confinement for two years, total forfeiture of all pay and 

allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority approved 

the adjudged sentence and credited appellant with five days of confinement credit. 

This case is before this court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

has raised the following assignment of error: 

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED TO THE 

SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF PRIVATE 

WILLIAMSON BY ADMITTING OVER DEFENSE 
WILLIAMSON—ARMY 20100828 

2

OBJECTION INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF 

THE ALLEGED VICTIM, JR, UNDER MIL. R. EVID. 

803(4). 

 LAW AND DISCUSSION 

The rape victim in this case, JR, sought assistance at Sierra, a civilian medical 

facility located in El Paso, Texas, a few hours after she was sexually assaulted. 

Later that same morning, special agents from the Army’s Criminal Investigation 

Command transported JR to William Beaumont Army Medical Facility [hereinafter 

Beaumont] at Fort Bliss, Texas. While at Beaumont, Ms. JH, a registered nurse, 

conducted a sexual assault forensic exam on JR. As part of this exam, JR provided a 

statement that Ms. JH transcribed. This statement was included in the Forensic 

Medical Report [hereinafter Report] Ms. JH created as a result of the exam. This 

statement included events that transpired before, during, and after the assault. 

At trial, the prosecution called Ms. JH as a witness and offered the Report 

into evidence. Appellant’s defense counsel objected to the introduction of this 

Report for multiple reasons, the relevant one being that JR’s statement was 

inadmissible hearsay. The military judge overruled the objection, citing the hearsay 

exception found at Military Rules of Evidence [hereinafter Mil. R. Evid.] 804(3) as 

his basis and admitted the Report over additional objections. 

A military judge’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Hollis, 57 M.J. 74, 79 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation 

omitted). A military judge’s factfinding is reviewed under the clearly erroneous 

standard of review, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. 

Because the military judge admitted the statement pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 

804(3), we review the military judge’s application of the relevant two-part test. Id. 

The first part of the test for admitting a statement under Mil. R. Evid. 804(3) 

requires the proponent of the offered evidence to establish that the statement was 

made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Id. Second, the proponent 

must establish the declarant made the statement “with some expectation of receiving 

medical benefit for the medical diagnosis or treatment that is being sought.” Id. 

(quoting United States v. Edens, 31 M.J. 267, 269 (C.M.A. 1990)). 

In overruling appellant’s objection and allowing the prosecution to enter the 

statement, the military judge found that “it comes in under the medical treatment 

exception because [JR] was told by Ms. [JH] that part of the reason for the 

examination was treatment of any injuries she may have sustained.” Although “[t]he 

key factor in deciding if the second prong is met is ‘the state of mind or motive of 

the patient giving the information’” Id. (quoting United States v. Kelley, 45 M.J. 

275, 279 (C.A.A.F. 1996), the military judge failed to make a finding of whether JR 
WILLIAMSON—ARMY 20100828 

3

provided the statement to Ms. JH with the expectation of receiving a medical 

benefit. In addition, and as conceded by government appellate counsel, the record 

does not support a finding that the government, as the proponent, established that JR 

made the statement to Ms. JH with the expectation of receiving a medical benefit.1

 

Therefore, because the proponent of the statement did not establish that JR made the 

statement to Ms. JH with some expectation of receiving a medical benefit, it was 

error for the military judge to admit it under Mil. R. Evid. 804(3). 

When a military judge abuses his discretion in admitting evidence, this court 

must determine whether this error resulted in prejudice to appellant. To evaluate 

prejudice, we use a four part test in weighing (1) the strength of the government’s 

case; (2) the strength of the defense case; (3) the materiality of the evidence in 

question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question. United States v. Kerr, 51 

M.J. 401, 405 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (citation omitted). 

 

In regards to the first part of this test, the government’s case was strong. JR 

and SS, JR’s friend who was present during the rape, offered consistent testimony 

that Specialist (SPC) Archambeau raped JR and that appellant’s actions of 

repeatedly grabbing JR’s friend, SS, aided and abetted SPC Archambeau’s rape of 

JR. Appellant’s second statement to law enforcement personnel contained 

incriminating statements and was entered as evidence against him at trial. In this 

statement, appellant admitted to seeing JR struggling underneath SPC Archambeau, 

that he heard JR tell SPC Archambeau to stop, that he heard JR call for help, and 

that even though he concluded that JR was being sexually assaulted by SPC 

Archambeau, he chose to grab SS, who was attempting to stop the rape. In addition, 

 

1

 Although no one asked JR any specific questions concerning her motive in 

providing the statement to Ms. JH, during her testimony, the trial counsel questioned 

JR about what happened at Beaumont: 

TC: And what occurred while you were at Beaumont? 

JR: My rape kit, my questioning, another interview about 

everything that happened. 

TC: . . . What is a rape kit? 

JR: . . . that’s what they told me is just to show—find any 

DNA, any scarring that would have happened, I actually 

have to give a statement that goes into it, and I believe 

that was it that actually went into the box. 
WILLIAMSON—ARMY 20100828 

4

DNA evidence supported finding that SPC Archambeau had sexual intercourse with 

JR. 

In contrast, when reviewing the second part of the test for prejudice, 

appellant’s case was weak. One defense theory pursued at trial was that JR engaged 

in consensual sex with SPC Archambeau based on JR’s flirtatious behavior on the 

night of the assault. Another defense theory espoused was that appellant was 

confused by JR, SS, and SPC Archambeau yelling at the same time and did not 

realize that SPC Archambeau was raping JR when he pulled SS off of SPC 

Archambeau. The defense attempted to support these theories through crossexamination and two defense witnesses. The first witness called by defense, PFC 

RV, occupied a room near appellant’s room on the night in question. Although he 

did not hear anything during the time of the assault, PFC RV conceded that we was 

listening to music, talking to his fiancé, and may have been sleeping during the 

assault. The other witness called by the defense was SPC JB, who was offered to 

impeach JR’s testimony concerning the first place JR met appellant. Defense also 

introduced the videotape of appellant’s first statement to law enforcement. 

Although appellant denied that PFC Archambeau raped JR and that JR ever said “no” 

or “stop” in this statement, appellant’s second statement, as highlighted above, 

contradicts this statement. 

Finally, in regards to the materiality and quality of the evidence, JR’s 

statement in the Report was clearly material but cumulative with JR’s trial 

testimony. JR’s extensive testimony at trial included the matters found in the 

statement and appellant was given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine JR 

at trial concerning both her trial testimony and the statement contained in the 

Report. In addition to being cumulative, this statement (pages nine through twelve 

of a thirteen page exhibit which was only referenced with any specificity by defense 

counsel), appears of little persuasive value when compared to JR’s trial testimony. 

We therefore conclude that the erroneous admission of JR’s statement to Ms. JH was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the entire record2

 and the assigned error, we find 

appellant’s arguments to be without merit. We have also considered the matters 

 

2

 The military judge erred in applying an instruction that was inconsistent with 

Article 120, UCMJ, with regard to the Specification of Charge II. However, under 

the facts of this case, we are satisfied that this error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The military judge clearly instructed the members the burden 

rested solely on the government with regard to the defense of consent and any 

 (continued . . .) 
WILLIAMSON—ARMY 20100828 

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personally raised by appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 

(C.M.A. 1982), and find them to be without merit. We hold the findings of guilty 

and the sentence as approved by the convening authority correct in law and fact. 

Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED. 

Judge GALLAGHER and Judge HAIGHT concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

 

(. . . continued) 

mistake of fact as to consent. United States v. Medina, 69 M.J. 462, 465 (C.A.A.F. 

2011) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 234 (1987)).

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: