No. 02-540 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2003 MT 18N 

CALVIN SKELTON, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF MONTANA 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, Cause No. ADC 98-457

The Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Calvin Skelton, Deer Lodge, Montana (Pro Se) 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Ilka Becker, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: January 9, 2003 

 Decided: February 11, 2003 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk
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Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1996 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent but shall be filed as a public document with the 

Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title, 

Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter 

Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of 

noncitable cases issued by this Court. 

¶2 Calvin Skelton (Skelton) appeals from the order entered by the 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denying his 

petition for postconviction relief. We affirm. 

¶3 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in 

denying Skelton’s petition. 

 BACKGROUND 

¶4 In October of 1998, the State of Montana (State) charged 

Skelton by information with felony riot, felony criminal mischief 

by accountability, felony arson by accountability and misdemeanor 

assault. During the course of the proceedings, Skelton moved to 

dismiss the case based on lack of a speedy trial; the District 

Court denied the motion. Skelton subsequently pleaded guilty to 

the felony riot charge pursuant to a plea agreement in which the 

State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The plea agreement 

also expressly provided that Skelton reserved his right to appeal 

the denial of his motion to dismiss. The District Court sentenced 

Skelton to 5 years at the Montana State Prison and entered judgment 
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on the conviction and sentence. Skelton then appealed the denial 

of his motion to dismiss and we affirmed the District Court in a 

nonpublished opinion. See State v. Skelton, 2001 MT 18N. 

¶5 In February of 2002, Skelton petitioned the District Court for 

postconviction relief, arguing that he was denied his 

constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and a 

speedy trial. The State responded that Skelton’s claims both 

lacked merit and were procedurally barred. The District Court 

denied the petition and Skelton appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶6 We review a district court’s denial of a petition for 

postconviction relief to determine whether the court’s findings of 

fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law correct. 

State v. Wright, 2001 MT 282, ¶ 9, 307 Mont. 349, ¶ 9, 42 P.3d 753, 

¶ 9. 

 DISCUSSION 

¶7 Did the District Court err in denying Skelton’s petition for 

postconviction relief? 

¶8 Skelton first argues that the District Court erred in denying 

his petition because he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

during the underlying proceedings. In analyzing ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims in postconviction proceedings, we 

apply the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington 

(1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Wright, ¶ 

11. The Strickland test requires that a defendant establish that 

his counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficient 
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performance prejudiced the defense. Wright, ¶ 11. A defendant 

must satisfy both prongs of the test; if an insufficient showing is 

made regarding one prong, there is no need to address the other. 

Dawson v. State, 2000 MT 219, ¶ 21, 301 Mont. 135, ¶ 21, 10 P.3d 

49, ¶ 21. Furthermore, where a defendant entered a guilty plea, 

“prejudice is established if the [defendant] demonstrates that, but 

for his counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have pled 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Wright, ¶ 11. 

Finally, a petition for postconviction relief must identify facts 

supporting the alleged grounds for relief and be accompanied by 

affidavits, records or other evidence establishing those facts. 

Section 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA. 

¶9 Skelton contends that his trial counsel was ineffective 

because he only spoke with her twice over the telephone, did not 

meet her in person until the eve of trial, was not informed that 

different counsel would be representing him at his sentencing and 

failed to make arrangements for witnesses to testify in his behalf. 

 However, Skelton does not allege how any of these perceived 

deficiencies of his counsel prejudiced him or that he would not 

have pleaded guilty to the riot offense had they not occurred. Nor 

does he provide any factual basis, via affidavits or other 

evidence, as required by § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA, which would 

support an allegation of prejudice had he made one. We conclude, 

therefore, that Skelton has failed to establish the prejudice prong 

of the Strickland test and his ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument fails. 
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¶10 Skelton also argues that the District Court erred in denying 

his postconviction relief petition because he was denied his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, as the State 

points out, Skelton raised--and we resolved--this issue in his 

direct appeal. Claims which were, or reasonably could have been, 

raised on direct appeal may not be raised or decided in a 

postconviction relief proceeding. Section 46-21-105(2), MCA. 

Moreover, under the doctrine of res judicata, claims which were 

raised on direct appeal cannot be raised again in a postconviction 

relief proceeding. Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8, ¶ 13, 293 Mont. 60, 

¶ 13, 973 P.2d 233, ¶ 13. We conclude, therefore, that Skelton is 

barred from raising his speedy trial argument here. 

¶11 Finally, Skelton argues that his rights guaranteed by Article 

II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution were violated in that he 

was denied the opportunity to have his witnesses testify 

(one way or the other) on his behalf, and a speedy public 

trial by an impartial jury of the County or District in 

which the offense is alleged to have been committed as 

guaranteed by the Montana Constitution. 

Skelton provides no further analysis or citation to legal 

authority, however, in support of this conclusory contention. Rule 

23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., requires that an appellant’s arguments be 

supported with citation to legal authority and we will decline to 

address arguments that are not so supported. State v. Anderson, 

1999 MT 60, ¶ 21, 293 Mont. 490, ¶ 21, 977 P.2d 983, ¶ 21. 

Consequently, we decline to address Skelton’s argument here. 

¶12 We hold that the District Court did not err in denying 

Skelton’s petition for postconviction relief. 
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¶13 Affirmed. 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

We concur: 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER