PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 15-2264

__________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LOUIS MILTON WILLIS,

 Appellant

__________

On Appeal from the District Court

of the Virgin Islands

(D.C. Crim. No. 3:14-cr-00028-001)

District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gómez

__________

Argued: May 19, 2016

BEFORE: FUENTES, VANASKIE, and RESTREPO, 

Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: December 13, 2016)

 

 Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed Senior Status on July 

18, 2016.
2

__________

Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III

Jeffrey J. Molinaro (Argued)

Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph

1001 Brickell Bay Drive

Suite 3112

Miami, FL 33131

Counsel for Appellant

Ronald Sharpe

Office of United States Attorney

5500 Veterans Building, Suite 260

United States Courthouse

St. Thomas, VI 00802

Justin D. Weitz (Argued)

United States Department of Justice

Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section

1400 New York Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

Counsel for Appellee

__________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________
3

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:

Louis Milton Willis, the former Executive Director of 

the Legislature of the U.S. Virgin Islands, appeals his 

conviction on two counts of federal programs bribery and two 

counts of federal extortion. From about 2009 to 2011, the 

Legislature’s main building on the island of St. Thomas 

underwent major renovations, which required the Legislature 

to seek out contractors. The United States claims that, during 

this period, Willis engaged in a pattern of corrupt conduct 

involving several contractors working on the renovations. 

Specifically, the United States claims that Willis solicited and 

received a $3,000 cash bribe from one contractor, a $10,000 

“loan” and a new air conditioner for his home from a second, 

and a $5,000 kickback from a third. According to the United 

States, these payments and kickbacks were all made to Willis 

to ensure that the contractors would continue to be awarded 

work on the renovations. Willis was tried and convicted by a 

jury for charges related to the bribes solicited and was 

sentenced to a five-year prison term followed by a term of 

supervised release. 

Willis argues that the District Court erred by (i) 

denying his pretrial motion to dismiss two counts of the

indictment, (ii) denying his renewed motion for judgment of 

acquittal, and (iii) improperly admitting evidence of his prior 

acceptance of bribes.

1

 Because we find all of Willis’s 

arguments unavailing, we will affirm his conviction.2 

 

1

(Willis Br. 13.)

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3241. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

I. BACKGROUND

Government officials are vested with a duty to uphold 

the law and serve the best interests of the public. This case 

involves a government employee who betrayed the trust of

this country’s taxpaying citizens by abusing his power for his 

own benefit.

From 2009 to 2012, the United States Government 

appropriated $150 million in federal funds each fiscal year to 

the Government of the Virgin Islands. During that period, 

Louis Milton “Lolo” Willis served as Executive Director of 

the Legislature for the Virgin Islands. In that position, 

Willis’s main role was to direct and advise division heads and 

to oversee administrative matters under the supervision of the 

President of the Legislature. He was also delegated the power 

from the President of the Legislature to administer contracts 

on behalf of the Legislature. 

During Willis’s tenure as Executive Director, the 

Legislature’s main building underwent major renovations, 

and Willis was substantially involved in securing contractors 

to perform those renovations. Three of those contractors –

Wilson John Marie, Frank James, and Alwin Williams, Sr. –

later testified at Willis’s trial. Marie, James, and Williams 

stated that they all gave cash or other items of value to Willis 

to secure more government work or to ensure payment of 

their invoices for completed work.

Sometime in 2010, the U.S. Department of the Interior

audited the Legislature’s administrative section while the 

renovations were taking place. The Department then released 

a report that highlighted a number of flaws in the 

administrative section’s fiscal controls. In the report, the 
5

Department concluded that the Legislature had mismanaged 

public funds and that management of the Legislature lacked

adequate financial safeguards. According to the report, some

contractors worked on the renovation without any written 

agreements, and others obtained “sole-source” contracts,

which Willis alone negotiated and issued without going 

through the normal process of soliciting bids from multiple 

vendors. 

After a federal investigation, an indictment eventually

issued for Willis’s prosecution on extortion charges under 18 

U.S.C. § 1951(a), which prohibits robbery or extortion 

affecting interstate commerce, and bribery charges under 18 

U.S.C. § 666(a)(1), which outlaws theft and bribery in entities 

receiving more than $10,000 in federal funds. Before trial, 

Willis moved to dismiss the indictment. The District Court 

denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

During the trial, the United States presented substantial 

evidence in support of its case. The three contractors testified 

on behalf of the United States, claiming to have been 

involved in the bribery and extortion. Each of the contractors 

testified that they had given Willis things of value and had

received some form of guaranteed work on the renovations in 

return.

Wilson Jean Marie was the first contractor to testify 

about his interactions with Willis. What he described, in 

short, was a basic kickback scheme. He stated that he was a 

carpenter in the U.S. Virgin Islands and claimed to have done 

renovation work on the Legislature’s main building from 

2010 to 2011. He further stated that Willis drafted a contract 

for his work on the renovations. Marie claimed that only 

Willis would review the hours that he submitted for work. 
6

Willis would then apparently sign the invoice, and the 

Legislature’s Business Office would in turn pay Marie. 

Marie stated that he would then give some of the money he 

had been paid by the Legislature to Willis. 

Marie explained that the payments to Willis were “[t]o 

keep the job going, keep [Marie] going for the job,”

3

suggesting that he paid Willis to secure more renovation 

work. Marie also stated that he had given Willis “about 

$5,000,” divided up among three payments.4 Marie also 

described a 25% overhead fee that Willis paid him for his 

work, which apparently had no clear underlying purpose.

The second contractor to testify was Frank James. 

James said that he worked on the Legislature’s main building 

during the renovation at a rate of about $2,100 per month

under a contract arranged by Willis. He also testified that, at 

various points, Willis asked him for $1,000, which he said 

that he needed to pay back certain debts, but James refused. 

On another occasion, Willis asked James for $10,000, but, 

again, James refused. Nevertheless, James said that he went 

to Willis’s home, inspected Willis’s home air conditioning 

units, and replaced one of the units without charging him for 

the value of the unit or for his services. James estimated that 

the air conditioner had a value of about $1,100. Finally, 

James claimed that he wrote a company check for $10,000 to 

a paving company in order to assist Willis with paving his 

driveway. He described the money as a loan to Willis, but he

said he was never repaid.

 

3

(J.A. 390.) 

4

(Id.)
7

Alwin Williams Sr. was the last contractor to testify 

against Willis. Williams, the owner of a company that did 

excavation and demolition work, entered into a contract to

excavate certain tree roots near the Legislature building. He 

claimed that while he was working on the renovations, Willis 

told him that he was having money issues and needed help. 

Shortly after, Williams gave Willis $3,000 in cash, a payment 

which he claimed was made to ensure that Willis would “look 

out for [Williams] down the road,” presumably to ensure

future awards for renovation work on the Legislature.5 

Williams also testified that, prior to serving as Executive 

Director of the Legislature, Willis had accepted certain bribes 

from Williams when Willis was working for the Virgin 

Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue. Williams claimed to 

have paid the bribes to Willis for the purpose of having a 

Bureau of Internal Revenue tax levy lifted from his bank 

accounts.

The testimony of these three witnesses was bolstered 

by another witness for the United States, Clifford 

Charleswell, who explained that Willis told him that he had 

received money from the contractors during the renovation 

project. All told, James, Williams, and Marie testified to 

giving Willis roughly $19,000 in kickbacks and other graft in 

exchange for over $300,000 in contract work on the 

renovations. 

Michael Benjamin, the acting business director for the 

Legislature, also testified on behalf of the United States. He 

stated that Willis was in charge of managing the contracts for 

the renovation work and that Willis answered solely to the 

 

5

(J.A. 621.)
8

President of the Legislature. He also testified that Willis had 

the power to seek bids, find the best price, and select 

contractors. He further claimed that funds used for the 

payment of contractors came from the Government of the 

Virgin Islands’ treasury.

6

 As to the procurement of 

contractors, Benjamin stated that sometimes the contracts 

would go through legal counsel to the Legislature for review, 

but sometimes they did not. Once approved, the contracts 

would be signed and finalized by Willis or by the President of 

the Legislature. Finally, Benjamin stated that Willis had the 

power to bind the Legislature to payment, including during 

the time that the renovations took place.

Debra Gottlieb, the Budget Director for the 

Government of the Virgin Islands Office of Management and 

Budget, also testified. She stated that, as a matter of 

government accounting, federal funds were segregated from 

the Virgin Islands’ general funds in the Treasury. She also 

testified that the Legislature only received money out of the 

general fund, which did not include federal funds. She 

claimed that the federal funds were kept in a separate treasury 

fund.

At the conclusion of the testimony on behalf of the 

United States, Willis moved for a judgment of acquittal. The 

court denied the motion. After the close of all of the 

 

6 Benjamin’s testimony was ambiguous and conflicting as to 

whether or not those funds included only local funds or both 

local and federal funds. (J.A. 464-65) (stating that annual 

budget for the Legislature consisted of “local funds,” but then 

claiming that the money was “appropriated” from “federal 

funds”).
9

evidence, Willis then renewed his motion for judgment of 

acquittal, which the court again denied. Thereafter, the jury 

returned a verdict finding Willis guilty of federal programs 

bribery (Counts One and Three) and federal extortion (Counts 

Two and Four). However, he was acquitted as to Counts Five 

and Six, charges stemming from the alleged bribes involving 

Marie. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss the 

Indictment

Willis asserts several challenges to his conviction on 

appeal.

7

 First, he argues that the District Court erred by 

denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, 

claiming that the indictment failed to adequately set forth the 

elements of federal programs bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 

666(a)(1)(B). In particular, he claims that Counts One and 

Three, the federal programs bribery charges, should have 

been dismissed for failure to allege a quid pro quo, that is, “a

specific intent to give or receive something of value in 

exchange for an official act.”8 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) requires an 

indictment to “be a plain, concise, and definite written 

statement of the essential facts charged.” In United States v. 

 

7 We exercise plenary review over a challenge to the 

sufficiency of an indictment. United States v. Bansal, 663 

F.3d 634, 656 (3d Cir. 2011).

8 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 

398, 404-05 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
10

Rankin, we explained that an indictment is deemed sufficient 

so long as it “(1) contains the elements of the offense 

intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant 

of what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the 

defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he may plead 

a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent 

prosecution.”9 We have also said that “no greater specificity 

than the statutory language is required so long as there is

sufficient factual orientation to permit the defendant to 

prepare his defense.”10 We should uphold the indictment 

“unless it is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable 

construction, charge an offense.”11

Given the language of the statute, the essential 

elements that the United States must prove to establish a 

violation of § 666 here are that, at the time of the offense: (1) 

Willis was an agent of a state government or agency; (2) he

corruptly solicited, demanded, or accepted something of value 

with the intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection 

with any business of the state government or agency; (3) he

accepted something of value in connection with the business 

or transactions of the state government or agency, where the 

transactions involved anything of value of $5,000 or more; 

(4) the state received in excess of $10,000 in federal funds in 

 

9 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks, 

alterations, and citation omitted).

10 Rankin, 870 F.2d at 112.

11 United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
11

any single year; and (5) he acted willfully and knowingly.12

The statutory definitions under § 666(d)(4) further provide 

that the term “State” includes “a State of the United States, 

the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or 

possession of the United States.” 

Willis contends that the indictment is insufficient as to 

the federal programs bribery charges because it fails to charge 

an essential element of the offense: a quid pro quo. Willis 

concedes that this Circuit has yet to decide whether § 666 

requires charging and proof of a quid pro quo to sustain a 

conviction13 and urges us to adopt such a requirement. To 

that end, Willis argues that the indictment must set forth facts 

supporting an allegation of “specific intent to give or receive 

something of value in exchange for an official act.”14 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v)

authorizes a defendant to lodge a pretrial challenge to the 

sufficiency of an indictment for “failure to state an offense.” 

There are two primary ways in which a defendant can 

proceed with such a challenge. First, a defendant may 

contend that, under the first Rankin element, “an indictment is 

insufficient on the basis that it does not satisfy the first 

requirement in that it fails to charge an essential element of 

 

12 See 18 U.S.C. § 666; United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441, 

444 (3d Cir. 1991); cf. United States v. Foley, 851 F. Supp. 

507, 509 n.1 (D. Conn. 1994). 

13 See United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 

2012) (“We have never decided whether § 666(a)(2) requires 

proof of a quid pro quo . . . .”).

14 Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404-05.
12

the crime.”

15 Second, “because an indictment that merely 

‘recites in general terms the essential elements of the offense’ 

does not satisfy the second and third requirements, a 

defendant may also claim that an indictment fails to state an 

offense on the basis that ‘the specific facts alleged . . . fall 

beyond the scope of the relevant criminal statute, as a matter 

of statutory interpretation.’”

16 It appears that Willis asserts

the first type of challenge, claiming that a quid pro quo

should be an element of a § 666 offense and that the United 

States failed to include it in the indictment. 

In response, the United States argues that § 666 does 

not include a quid pro quo requirement and that we should 

follow those Circuits that have declined to read such a 

requirement into the statute.

17

 The United States further 

 

15 United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

16 Id. (quoting United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 685 

(3d Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in 

United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 567 (3d Cir. 2012)).

17 We note that many of our sister circuits are split over this 

question. Compare United States v. Redzic, 627 F.3d 683, 

692 (8th Cir. 2010) (requiring a quid pro quo), United States 

v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 148-50 (2d Cir. 2007) (same, on 

plain-error review), and United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 

1006, 1020-22 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding plain error but 

affirming the conviction where the jury instruction omitted a 

quid pro quo element), with United States v. McNair, 605 

F.3d 1152, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 2010) (no quid pro quo

required), United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 520-21 (6th 

Cir. 2009) (same), and United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 

714-15 (7th Cir. 2005) (same). “And to some extent, 
13

contends that, even if we were to incorporate such a 

requirement into § 666, the indictment adequately alleged a

quid pro quo as to all counts. 

The bribery proscriptions are covered in subsections 

(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) of § 666. Subsection (a)(1)(B), which 

covers one who requests a bribe, provides: 

Whoever . . . being an agency of an organization, 

or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, 

or any agency thereof . . . corruptly solicits or 

demands . . . anything of value from any person, 

intending to be influenced or rewarded in 

connection with any business, transaction, or 

series of transactions of such organization, 

government, or agency involving anything of 

value of $5,000 or more . . . shall be fined under 

this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 

both.18

Put another way, § 666 criminalizes the acceptance of 

a bribe of $5,000 or more by a government agent of a local 

government that receives more than $10,000 a year in federal 

funds if the agent intends to be influenced by the bribe when 

making a decision to enter into business on behalf of the 

government. 

 

confusion reigns in this area because courts often use the term 

quid pro quo to describe an exchange other than a particular 

item of value for a particular action.” McNair, 605 F.3d at 

1190.

18 18 U.S.C. § 666(a).
14

Contrary to Willis’s contention, each § 666 Count that 

he challenges clearly alleged a quid pro quo. For instance, 

Count One of the indictment alleged:

In or about 2009 to 2010, at St. Thomas, in the 

District of the Virgin Islands, the defendant, 

LOUIS MILTON “LOLO” WILLIS while an 

agent of the Government of the Virgin Islands, 

did corruptly solicit, demand, accept, and agree 

to accept anything of value from any person 

with the intent to be influenced and rewarded in 

connection with any business, transaction, and 

series of transactions of such government, 

involving anything of value of $5,000 or more, 

in that WILLIS accepted cash payments 

from Contractor A in exchange for 

WILLIS’s use of his official position to 

provide favorable treatment for Contractor 

A in the award of contracting work at the 

Legislature of the Virgin Islands and to 

ensure payment to Contractor A for such 

work.19

Similarly, Count Three of the indictment specifically 

alleged:

In or about 2009 to 2011, at St. Thomas, in the 

District of the Virgin Islands, the defendant, 

LOUIS MILTON “LOLO” WILLIS while an 

agent of the Government of the Virgin Islands, 

 

19 (J.A. 76.) (emphasis added).
15

did corruptly solicit, demand, accept, and agree 

to accept anything of value from any person 

with the intent to be influenced and rewarded in 

connection with any business, transaction, and 

series of transactions of such government, 

involving anything of value of $5,000 or more, 

in that WILLIS accepted $10,000, an air 

conditioning unit, and free labor associated 

with the installation of the air conditioning 

unit from Contractor B in exchange for 

WILLIS’s use of his official position to 

provide favorable treatment for Contractor 

B in the award of contracting work at the 

Legislature of the Virgin Islands and to 

ensure payment to Contractor B for such 

work.20

Thus, even if we were to require the United States to

allege and prove a quid pro quo to establish a § 666 bribery

offense – which we decline to do here – we conclude that it 

was adequately alleged in the indictment. Put simply, the 

indictment stated that Willis accepted cash payments from the 

various contractors in exchange for the use of his official 

position to provide favorable treatment for each contractor in 

the award of more contracting work at the Legislature. 

Moreover, we conclude that the indictment adequately 

alleged all other required elements of the offense: the parties, 

the relevant amounts of money exchanged, where the illegal 

 

20 (J.A. 78.) (emphasis added).
16

transactions allegedly occurred, that Willis used his public 

position unlawfully, the specific details of each transaction,

and the improper purposes alleged under the relevant federal 

statutes. The District Court therefore properly refused to 

dismiss the federal programs bribery charges under Counts 

One and Three.

B. The District Court 

properly denied Willis’s

renewed motion for 

judgment of acquittal.

Next, Willis argues that the District Court erred in 

denying his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal as to 

the federal programs bribery charges. He contends that the

United States failed to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites

to those charges because it failed to prove a sufficient nexus

between Willis’s alleged conduct or his status as Executive 

Director and any corresponding effect on federal funds. In 

particular, he asserts that: (1) the Legislature of the Virgin 

Islands is distinct from the Government of the Virgin Islands 

and received no federal funds; (2) he served as an agent of the 

Legislature, and not of the Government of the Virgin Islands, 

thus lacking sufficient connection to federal funds; and (3) the 

Government failed to adduce evidence sufficient to show that 

the Legislature received a federal “benefit” within the 

meaning of § 666. In short, all of his challenges hinge on his 

ability to separate himself from the federal funds, something 

we conclude that he cannot do.

21

 

 

21 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant or 

denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the 

sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 
17

i. The Legislature of the 

Virgin Islands is a covered 

entity under § 666.

We first address Willis’s contention that he is entitled 

to judgment of acquittal on the federal programs bribery 

charges because the Virgin Islands Legislature is separate and 

distinct from the Government of the Virgin Islands and 

therefore does not receive federal funds. Section 666

establishes federal jurisdiction over bribery and fraud 

committed by agents of covered entities, including a state or 

territorial “government, or any agency thereof,” that receives 

in excess of $10,000 in federal funds in a twelve-month 

period.22 The statute defines “government agency” as “a 

subdivision of the executive, legislative, judicial, or other 

branch of government, including a department, independent 

establishment, commission, administration, authority, board, 

 

123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005). A judgment of acquittal is 

appropriate under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 if, 

after reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, we determine that no rational jury could have 

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United 

States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 

United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(stating that, in addressing a Rule 29 motion, a district court 

must “‘review the record in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact

could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

based on the available evidence’” (quoting United States v. 

Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2001)).

22 18 U.S.C. § 666.
18

and bureau, and a corporation or other legal entity 

established, and subject to control, by a government or 

governments for the execution of a governmental or 

intergovernmental program.”23

The purpose of this statute is to enhance the ability of 

the United States to “vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, 

and bribery involving federal monies” and “to protect the 

integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through 

Federal programs.”24 The history of § 666 reveals Congress’s

intent to root out public corruption. In enacting § 666 as part 

of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress 

expressly intended “to augment the ability of the United 

States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery 

involving Federal monies that are disbursed to private 

organizations or State and local governments pursuant to a 

federal program.”25 

Moreover, courts have specifically recognized that

§ 666 is broad in scope.

26

 As the Sixth Circuit noted in 

United States v. Valentine, “it is apparent that Congress 

intended to expand the federal government’s prosecutorial 

 

23 Id.

24 S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 369-70 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510.

25 Id. at 369.

26 See Vitillo, 490 F.3d at 321 (stating that § 666 is “broad in 

scope, as that statute seeks to ensure the integrity of vast 

quantities of federal funds” (citation and internal quotation

omitted)).
19

power to encompass significant misapplication of federal 

funds at a local level.”

27

 

In addressing Willis’s first argument that the 

Legislature falls outside the scope of § 666, it is first 

important to keep in mind the structure of the Government of 

the Virgin Islands, which was created under the “Revised 

Organic Act,” 48 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq. That statute vests the 

power of the Government of the Virgin Islands in three 

coequal branches: the legislative, the executive, and the 

judicial. These three branches constitute one territorial entity, 

which is substantially funded by the federal government. 

Indeed, it is undisputed that the Government of the Virgin 

Islands received $150 million dollars in federal funds per year 

from 2009 to 2012 and that the renovations took place during 

this time. Thus, contrary to Willis’s assertion, we conclude

the Legislature is part and parcel of the Government of the 

Virgin Islands, and it received federal funds. 

Willis nonetheless relies on Debra Gottlieb’s 

testimony wherein she claimed that the Legislature never 

received federal funds, as it was funded by a segregated, 

general fund consisting of local funds derived from territorial 

sources. Based on this testimony, Willis claims that the 

Legislature (1) lacks direct control over the disbursement of 

federal funds, and (2) did not receive any federal funds. 

We begin by noting that courts have been wary of 

interpreting § 666 too narrowly. Indeed, the Supreme Court 

has repeatedly avoided constructions of § 666 that would 

impose limits beyond those set out in the plain meaning of the 

 

27 63 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 1995).
20

statute. In Salinas v. United States,

28 for example, the Court 

rejected a defendant’s attempt to read into the statute an 

extra-textual requirement of proof that “the bribe in some way 

affected federal funds, for instance by diverting or 

misappropriating them, before the bribe violates 

§ 666(a)(1)(B).”

29 In reaching its conclusion, this Court 

pointed to the “enactment’s expansive, unqualified language, 

both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered.”30

The Supreme Court has also rejected an argument that 

§ 666 is unconstitutional because it does not require a nexus 

between the bribe and some federal monies or program. In 

Sabri v. United States,

31 the Court noted that the enactment of 

§ 666 was “an instance of necessary and proper legislation” to 

execute Congress’s spending power, especially in light of the 

fact that “other legislation had failed to protect federal 

interests.”32 The Court stated that while “not every bribe or 

kickback offered or paid to agents of governments covered by 

§ 666(b) will be traceably skimmed from specific federal 

payments, or show up in the guise of a quid pro quo for some 

dereliction in spending a federal grant,” the absence of such 

links does not “portend[ ] . . . enforcement beyond the scope 

of federal interest, for the reason that corruption does not 

have to be that limited to affect the federal interest.”

33 And, 

 

28 522 U.S. 52 (1997).

29 Id. at 55-56.

30 Id. at 56.

31 541 U.S. 600 (2004).

32 Id. at 607.

33 Id. at 600-01.
21

perhaps most relevant to the present case, the Court said that 

“Congress was within its prerogative to ensure that the 

objects of spending are not menaced by local administrators 

on the take.”34

Willis’s related argument that the Legislature of the 

Virgin Islands never “received” federal funds is also

undermined by the First Circuit’s 2013 decision in United 

States v. Fernandez,

35 relied upon by the District Court in its 

opinion. In Fernandez, the court found that the territorial 

Legislature of Puerto Rico was part and parcel of the 

government of the territory, and that the principles of 

separation of powers did not exempt an agent of the 

Legislature of Puerto Rico, a Senator, from § 666’s 

coverage.36 The First Circuit’s holding also supports our 

conclusion that the Legislature was part and parcel of the 

Government of the Virgin Islands, a federally funded entity.

Therefore, we conclude that Willis’s narrow reading of 

§ 666’s scope is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the 

statute and the broad interpretations of that law advanced by 

the Supreme Court. Thus, we further conclude that the 

Legislature, as a coequal branch of the Government of the 

Virgin Islands – itself a territorial “government” that receives 

in excess of $10,000 in federal funds in a twelve-month 

period – fell within the scope of § 666 by receiving federal 

funds.37 We therefore reject Willis’s argument that he cannot 

 

34 Id. at 601.

35 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013).

36 Id. at 10-12.

37 18 U.S.C. § 666.
22

face criminal liability under § 666 because the Legislature

received funds only from territorial sources. 

ii. Willis was an “agent” 

within the meaning of 

§ 666.

In attempting to further sever his connection from the 

federal funds at issue, Willis also argues that he was not “a 

person authorized to act on behalf of . . . a government” as a 

“servant or employee, . . . director, officer, manager, and 

representative.”

38

 We find this argument equally

unpersuasive. The plain language of the statute merely 

requires that the individual be “authorized to act on behalf of 

another person or government.”39 Testimony at trial 

established that Willis, as Executive Director of the 

Legislature, had the authority to “go out and seek offers for a 

particular project . . . [w]hatever project [was] deemed 

necessary”; that he could determine whether or not it “was the 

best price”; and that he or the President of the Legislature 

could unilaterally enter into a contract for whatever price that 

person wanted.40 Thus, Willis’s claim that he was not an 

agent of the government is without merit.

In Fernandez, the First Circuit rejected a similar 

argument, concluding that two senators were agents of the 

government because they were a part of the limited category 

of government officials who represent the “State” as a 

 

38 18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(1). 

39 Id.

40 (J.A. 470.)
23

whole.41 As the United States correctly notes here, 

Fernandez supports the conclusion that a territorial legislature 

is part and parcel of the government of the territory, and that 

the principles of separation of powers do not excuse an agent 

of the Legislature from § 666’s coverage. Willis simply 

cannot escape the conclusion that he was an agent of the 

Virgin Islands’ Government, given his substantial power to 

enter into contracts on behalf of the Legislature.

iii. The Legislature received 

a “benefit” within the 

meaning of § 666.

Willis next argues that the United States failed to 

present evidence of the “structure, operation, and purpose” of 

the federal funds sufficient to show that the Virgin Islands 

Legislature received a federal “benefit” within the meaning of 

§ 666.42 Section 666, by its plain terms, limits its application 

to qualifying entities that receive “benefits in excess of 

$10,000 . . . under a Federal Program.”

43 Although the term 

“benefit” is not defined in the statute, Willis nonetheless 

argues that the United States failed to meet its burden of 

demonstrating that the Government of the Virgin Islands 

received some type of specific beneficial interest from the

federal funds to satisfy § 666’s jurisdictional requirements. 

We find this argument to be without merit. 

 

41 722 F.3d at 9.

42 (Willis Br. 29.)

43 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).
24

In Fischer v. United States,

44 the Supreme Court found 

§ 666 to be constitutional as applied where the identified 

benefit was far more attenuated than the one involved here.45 

There, the federal funds received by healthcare providers 

were Medicaid reimbursement payments made by the federal 

government to the providers in exchange for services 

rendered to Medicaid and Medicare recipients.

46 Rejecting 

the notion that the patients – as opposed to the service 

providers – received the only “benefit” under the program,

the Court stated that the service providers “derive significant 

advantage by satisfying the participation standards imposed 

by the Government. These advantages constitute benefits 

within the meaning of the federal bribery statute.”47 The

Fischer Court also emphasized that § 666 is “expansive . . . 

both as to the [conduct] forbidden and the entities covered.”48 

Thus, the Fischer Court read the statute to reveal Congress’s 

“expansive, unambiguous intent to ensure the integrity of 

organizations participating in federal assistance programs.”49

Here, as the District Court noted, the link to a benefit

is fairly direct. The Government of the Virgin Islands 

received $150 million per year during the time that Willis was 

Executive Director. Those funds, paid directly by the federal 

government, significantly supported the Government of the 

 

44 529 U.S. 667 (2000).

45 Id. at 680.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 Id. (citing Salinas 522 U.S. at 56).

49 Id.
25

Virgin Islands during that period. In consequence, we find 

Willis’s argument that the Virgin Islands did not receive a 

“benefit” within the meaning of § 666 completely unavailing. 

Because we conclude that all of Willis’s challenges to 

the applicability of § 666 lack merit, we will therefore affirm 

the District Court’s denial of Willis’s judgment of acquittal as 

to Counts One and Three.

C. Section 666 does not 

violate the Tenth 

Amendment or the 

Spending Clause.

Willis also challenges his conviction under § 666 on 

Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause grounds. Willis 

claims that, to permit the application of § 666 as to his 

conduct in these circumstances would “transform § 666 into a 

general police power,” in violation of the Tenth 

Amendment.50 He further claims that the application of § 666 

to his conduct would exceed Congress’s power under the 

Spending Clause.51 He is wrong.

First, the Tenth Amendment reserves certain powers to 

“the States,” but it has never been extended to the Virgin 

Islands. In fact, as the United States again correctly points 

out, the Revised Organic Act of 1954, which dictates the 

limits of constitutional protection afforded to the territory, 

incorporates only the first nine amendments and not the Tenth 

 

50 (Willis Br. 16.)

51 (Id.)
26

Amendment.

52

 At least one other court has also explicitly 

stated that “[t]he limits of the Tenth Amendment do not apply 

to” a constitutional territory because the territory’s “powers 

are not ‘[those] reserved to the States’ but those specifically 

granted to it by Congress under its constitution.”53 We agree 

that the Tenth Amendment does not apply here and therefore 

reject Willis’s argument.

Willis also claims that to apply § 666 to his conduct 

would “exceed the proper bounds of Congress under the 

spending clause.”54 Under the Spending Clause, Congress 

has the power to “appropriate federal moneys to promote the 

general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and it has corresponding 

authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, 

cl. 18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that 

power are in fact spent for the general welfare.”55 With 

respect to those powers, in Sabri v. United States, the

Supreme Court noted that the enactment of § 666 was “an 

instance of necessary and proper legislation” to execute 

Congress’s spending power, especially in light of the fact that 

“other legislation had failed to protect federal interests.”56

Willis’s Spending Clause argument is thus foreclosed by 

Supreme Court precedent. 

 

52 48 U.S.C. § 1561.

53 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 

344 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; 

amend. X), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).

54 (Willis Br. 32.)

55 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004). 

56 Id. at 607.
27

D. The District Court 

properly admitted 

evidence of Willis’s 

prior acceptance of 

bribes.

Finally, Willis contends that the District Court erred in 

denying his motion to exclude certain prior-act evidence 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

57

 Rule 404(b) 

provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove character or demonstrate action in 

conformity with those acts.58 Prior-act evidence, though, may 

be admitted “for another purpose, such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”59 To be admissible, 

prior-act evidence must satisfy the test set forth in Huddleston 

v. United States.

60 As the Supreme Court stated there, the 

proffered evidence must be: (1) offered for a proper purpose 

under Rule 404(b)(2); (2) relevant to that purpose; (3) 

sufficiently probative under the Rule 403 balancing 

requirement; and (4) accompanied by a limiting instruction, if 

 

57 We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings 

principally for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kolodesh, 

787 F.3d 224, 234 n.12 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 

Ct. 281 (2016). To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, Willis

must show the district court’s action was “arbitrary, fanciful 

or clearly unreasonable.” United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 

196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009).

58 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).

59 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

60 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
28

requested.61 We have also emphasized that the proffered 

evidence must fit “into a chain of logical inferences, no link 

of which may be the inference that the defendant has the 

propensity to commit the crime charged.”62

Willis’s defense at trial was that he did not know that 

the money he solicited and received from contractors 

constituted bribes and instead understood them to be loans. 

The United States offered evidence that Willis had accepted a 

kickback bribe from Williams when Willis was the Director 

of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue, in exchange 

for lifting a lien on Williams’s bank account. The United 

States offered this evidence to demonstrate that Willis was 

not mistaken about the nature of the transactions involved in 

the Legislature’s renovation and fully intended to accept 

bribes and commit extortion. The prior-acts were also offered 

as evidence of motive and knowledge.

Contrary to Willis’s assertion, there was a strong nexus 

between this evidence and his state of mind, his intent, his 

knowledge, and the absence of any mistake about the 

transactions. This evidence showed that he knew that these 

payments were not loans, that they were not gifts, and that he 

intended to accept cash in exchange for handing out more 

government contract work. Moreover, the record reveals that 

the District Court discussed the issues substantially with the 

 

61 Id. at 691-92.

62 United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 250 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(citing United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d 

Cir. 1994)).
29

parties, accepted submissions from them, and further engaged 

with them at a pretrial omnibus hearing before ruling on the 

admission of the evidence. Before admitting the evidence, 

the court also provided a specific limiting instruction to the 

jury as a prophylactic measure against any tendency by the 

jury to consider the evidence for improper purposes.

Consequently, we conclude that the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Willis’s prior 

conduct.

63

 

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, and those set forth in the District 

Court’s thorough and persuasive opinion, we will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court.

 

63 We have thoroughly reviewed all of Willis’s remaining 

arguments, including his Commerce Clause challenge to his 

conviction of Hobbs Act extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), 

and find them to be without merit.