NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BMICHELLE BUSH,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5104

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00446-JFM, Senior Judge James F. 

Merow.

______________________ 

Decided: January 8, 2016

______________________ 

BMICHELLE BUSH, Washington, DC, pro se.

WILLIAM PORTER RAYEL, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., DONALD E. KINNER. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
2 BUSH v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Ms. Bush appeals from an order of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) dismissing her complaint 

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the CFC

properly dismissed Ms. Bush’s claims, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Ms. Bush filed a complaint seeking to invoke the 

CFC’s Tucker Act jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491. 

The complaint identified as parties the Social Security 

Administration, U.S. Department of Education, U.S. FMS 

Treasury, U.S. HHS, U.S. CMS, U.S. Contractors, Bank of 

America, and W.C. Smith & Co. Ms. Bush sought relief 

for purported false imprisonment, a Social Security benefit dispute, civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 

Privacy Act violations under 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g), and 

federal conspiracy criminal conduct under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371. The CFC dismissed Ms. Bush’s complaint sua 

sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ms. Bush 

subsequently submitted a letter to the CFC’s clerk’s office 

that the CFC construed as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal 

Claims. Her motion attempted to establish jurisdiction 

through a purported violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and the Fourteenth Amendment for 

failure to appoint her counsel. The motion further indicated that Ms. Bush did not seek disability benefits, but 

rather compensation for nineteen months of “unjust 

imprisonment.” A. 19. 

The CFC denied Ms. Bush’s motion and she appealed 

to us. Reiterating some of the jurisdictional bases from 

her complaint and Rule 60(b) motion, Ms. Bush’s appeal 

also cites, without elaboration, “False Profile Identity 

Records,” “‘to sublease’ under the Fair Housing Act,” and 

“the Federal Consumer Leasing Act.” Appellant Br. 1. 

We have jurisdiction to review under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).
BUSH v. US 3

DISCUSSION

We review the CFC’s dismissal for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction de novo. See Kam-Almaz v. United 

States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Because Ms. 

Bush filed her documents pro se, we hold her filings to 

“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.” See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 

(1972). However, even a pro se litigant “bears the burden 

of proving that the Court of Federal Claims possessed 

jurisdiction over [her] complaint.” Sanders v. United 

States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

The CFC is a court of limited jurisdiction, largely established by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. United 

States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1976). The Tucker 

Act “is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it does not 

create any substantive right enforceable against the 

United States for money damages.” In re United States, 

463 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Testan, 

424 U.S. at 398). Rather, a “substantive right must be 

found in some other source of law, such as ‘the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an 

executive department.’” United States v. Mitchell, 

463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491). 

The CFC does not have Tucker Act jurisdiction over 

any of the purported causes of action brought by 

Ms. Bush. We have held that the CFC does not have 

jurisdiction to hear claims for: Social Security benefits, 

Marcus v. United States, 909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 

1990); civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Gant 

v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 311, 316 (2004), aff’d, 417 

F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Fourteenth Amendment 

violations, LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 

(Fed. Cir. 1995); or infractions of the federal criminal 

code, Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 

1994), which includes conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. 

Likewise, we agree with the CFC’s prior holdings that it 
4 BUSH v. US

does not have jurisdiction over claims for Privacy Act 

violations under 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g), Treece v. United States,

96 Fed. Cl. 226, 232 (2010), or Fair Housing Act violations, 

Fennie v. United States, No. 12-272C, 2013 WL 151685, 

at *1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 4, 2013). 

There is no jurisdiction for Ms. Bush’s Federal Consumer Leasing Act claim because that Act provides the 

federal district courts, not the CFC, with jurisdiction. 

15 U.S.C. § 1667d(c); see United States v. Bormes, 133 

S. Ct. 12, 18 (2012) (“The Tucker Act is displaced . . . 

when a law assertedly imposing monetary liability on the 

United States contains its own judicial remedies.”). 

Ms. Bush’s false imprisonment claim also does not establish jurisdiction, as recovery in the CFC for false imprisonment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 requires a 

conviction and subsequent reversal or pardon. Here, Ms. 

Bush only presented evidence that a criminal indictment 

against her was dismissed. And because Ms. Bush provided no explanation, we presume her reference to “False 

Profile Identity Records” relates to her false imprisonment claim and, thus, this alleged ground also does not 

provide jurisdiction.

Finally, Ms. Bush has not shown that her case is one 

of the “exceedingly restricted circumstances” in which 

there is a constitutional right to civil counsel. Lariscey v. 

United States, 861 F.2d 1267, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 

Ms. Bush’s invocation of the Rehabilitation Act in connection with this claim does nothing to alter the result, as the 

Rehabilitation Act only pertains to programs of the executive, not judicial, branch. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). A court’s 

refusal to appoint civil counsel is an act of the judicial—

not executive—branch and, thus, the Rehabilitation Act 

does not apply here.

Thus, Ms. Bush has not presented any claims for 

which the CFC has jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the 

CFC’s dismissal of her complaint.
BUSH v. US 5

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.