J-S31029-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.L. A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.L., BIRTH FATHER

No. 159 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order December 22, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000101-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA and DUBOW, JJ., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 7, 2017

S.L. (“Father”) appeals from the Order involuntarily terminating his 

parental rights to his daughter, L.L. (“Child”) pursuant to the Adoption Act, 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). We affirm.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We summarize the trial court’s factual findings as follows: Father and 

L.G. (“Mother”) are the natural parents of Child, who was born in January 

2012.1 On May 4, 2015, Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth, and 

Families (“the Agency”) obtained an Emergency Custody Authorization 

(“ECA”) after Father presented at a local hospital with Child and claimed 

____________________________________________

1 The court also terminated Mother’s parental rights by the Order at issue. 

She has not filed an appeal.
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they were both victims of a sexual assault from a man that broke into their 

house while they were sleeping. The local hospital transferred Child to a 

children’s hospital where medical staff found no evidence of trauma or 

abuse. While at the hospital, Father also reported that secret agents were 

spying on him with devices and that a constable was stalking him. The 

Agency had concerns about Child’s safety in light of Father’s mental health 

status, and upon obtaining the ECA, the Agency placed Child into foster care. 

On May 12, 2015, the court held a shelter care hearing and ordered 

that Child remain in foster care pending an evaluation of Mother’s home, and 

granted the Agency permission to place Child with Mother prior to the next 

hearing. The court restricted Father to supervised visitation with Child. 

On or about May 15, 2015, the Agency placed Child with Mother and 

provided crisis in-home services. Mother subsequently moved in with Father 

in violation of the court order restricting contact between Child and Father. 

On June 19, 2015, after Mother refused alternative housing, the Agency 

obtained a second ECA and removed Child from Mother’s care.

On June 26, 2015, the court adjudicated Child dependent. At that 

time, the court found that Father “appears to have paranoia and needs to be 

assessed to see if delusional conditions exist. Father’s actions in attempting 

to protect [Child] (constantly moving, calling police, etc[.]) are the result of 

his paranoia and are actually causing [Child] to be without proper parental 

care and control.” Order, 6/26/15, at 1. The court ordered Father to 

participate in a mental health evaluation “to determine if he has a mental 
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illness which causes delusions and whether he needs treatment for a 

delusional disorder beyond (or different) from what he is currently 

receiving.” Id. at 2. 

The Agency created a family service plan (“FSP”) which established the 

following goals for Father: (1) obtain a mental health evaluation; (2) have 

supervised visitation; (3) attend parenting classes; (4) maintain appropriate 

housing; (5) sign releases; (6) continue mental health therapy; and (6) 

obtain a car. The Agency made various referrals to aid Father in achieving 

his FSP goals and arranged for supervised visitation multiple times per week.

On August 5, 2015, Gary Vallano, M.D., a board certified adult 

psychiatrist, examined Father. After the psychiatric examination, Dr. 

Vallano diagnosed Father with Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type, and 

recommended that Father engage in treatment with a therapist specifically 

trained in the treatment of Delusional Disorder and that Father obtain an 

evaluation for anti-psychotic medications. Over a year later, on October 20, 

2016, Dr. Vallano conducted a second psychiatric examination of Father and 

the diagnosis and recommendations remained the same. 

On September 3, 2015, Eric Bernstein, Psy.D., a licensed psychologist, 

conducted an individual psychological evaluation of Father, gave Father a 

provisional diagnosis of Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type, and 

recommended that Father pursue specific therapy. A month later, on 

October 29, 2015, Dr. Bernstein conducted an interactional psychological 

evaluation of Father and Child. During the evaluation, Father reported to Dr. 
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Bernstein that his current therapist did not consider him delusional and was 

not providing treatment for Delusional Disorder. Dr. Bernstein once again 

gave Father a provisional diagnosis of Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type, 

and recommended that Father pursue specific therapy. Additionally, Dr. 

Bernstein expressed concerns regarding Father’s ability to recognize Child’s 

developmental abilities and needs. Dr. Bernstein encouraged parenting 

classes and recommended that the visits should remain supervised.2 

On September 18, 2015, the court held a three-month permanency 

review hearing. The court made a finding that Father made “minimal 

progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the 

original placement. Father continues to deny [that] he is delusional.” 

Order, 9/18/15, at 1. The court ordered the Agency to make a specific 

referral to a program that treats Delusional Disorder and ordered a referral 

for a parenting capacity evaluation. 

____________________________________________

2

In November 2016, Dr. Bernstein attempted to conduct another individual 

psychological evaluation of Father and another interactional psychological 

evaluation of Father and Child. Father did not show up at the scheduled 

time for the evaluation, and Dr. Bernstein found Father one-and-a-half hours 

later sleeping on a couch with the lights off in an annex to the waiting room. 

When Child arrived for the interactional evaluation, Father became 

extremely agitated that Dr. Bernstein diagnosed him with Delusional 

Disorder in previous evaluations and argued with Dr. Bernstein in front of 

Child. Father’s “level of hostility, anger, and behavior prevented the 

interactional from completion.” Agency Exhibit 1, Psychological Evaluation, 

11/15/16, at 7. 
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On December 18, 2015, the court held a six-month permanency 

review hearing. The court made another finding that Father made “minimal 

progress” and “continues to deny that he is delusional.” Order, 12/18/15, at 

2. The court ordered, “Father must enter and participate in treatment if he 

wishes the court to consider return of [Child] to him. It does not appear 

that [Father] will acknowledge his delusions, however, [Father] needs to 

understand the negative impact on [Child] of his actions (moving around, 

calling police) as a result of his belief that he was being followed and is in 

danger.” Id.

On March 29, 2016, the court held a nine-month permanency review 

hearing. The court found Father to be in moderate compliance with his 

permanency plan, noted that he just started parenting classes, and noted 

that Father was not attending visitation regularly. Father did not provide the 

Agency or the court any information regarding his mental health treatment 

status. 

On May 31, 2016, the Agency filed a Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Father’s Parental Rights (“TPR Petition”) pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). 

On July 27, 2016, the court held a twelve-month permanency review 

hearing. The court found Father to be in moderate compliance with his 

permanency plan. The court found that Father was not in mental health 

treatment, that Father needed housing, and that there were “issues” with 

some of the visits. Order, 7/27/16, at 3. 
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On December 2, 2016 and December 21, 2016, the trial court held a 

termination of parental rights hearing. The Agency presented the testimony 

of Dr. Bernstein, psychologist; Melanie Rambish, permanency specialist; 

Marci Bolger, adoption caseworker; and Kelsey McKenna, foster care case 

specialist. By stipulation of all the parties, the Agency entered into evidence 

the August 5, 2015 and October 20, 2016 psychiatric reports authored by 

Dr. Vallano. 

During the hearing, the Agency presented evidence that both Dr. 

Vallano and Dr. Bernstein diagnosed Father with a type of Delusional 

Disorder and that Father was non-compliant with recommended treatment. 

Father has stated to the Agency, Dr. Vallano, and Dr. Bernstein that he does 

not believe that he has a mental health diagnosis. Father discontinued 

mental health treatment in March 2016 when Father’s ongoing therapist 

changed his diagnosis to Delusional Disorder and began specified therapy to 

that effect. 

The Agency presented evidence that Father failed to engage in 

appropriate and consistent visitation. The Agency initially arranged 

supervised visitation in the community three to four times per week. Father 

typically arrived between 15 to 45 minutes late to visits and often called to 

change the visit time and location after the visit began. In March 2016, the 

Agency decreased visitation to twice per week due to Father’s inconsistent 

attendance. After the decrease in visitation, Father attended approximately 

half of the visits. Father spent significant time during the visits speaking to 
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case aides about himself rather than interacting with Child and Father often 

did not respond to attempts to redirect his attention to Child. Father 

discussed inappropriate topics with Child, often giving her false hope of 

returning home to him imminently. Father insisted that Child only eat 

organic food from a specific grocery store, Trader Joe’s, so that Child would 

not get fat. Father also brought inappropriate amounts of food to visits, for 

example, 60 pieces of fruit. Father never progressed to unsupervised 

visitation. 

The trial court heard testimony that Father completed a parenting 

class, but that the Agency continues to have concerns regarding Father’s 

parenting. Specifically, because Father is not engaged in appropriate 

treatment, Father continues to have delusional beliefs about Child’s health 

and safety and continues to schedule an excessive number of medical 

appointments for Child. Father insists on taking Child to the hospital for 

minor bumps and bruises and Father requested that Child receive Invisalign 

braces at the age of four. 

The Agency presented evidence that Father failed to maintain 

consistent housing and employment. Father was homeless or without 

appropriate housing from June 2016 until the date of the termination 

hearing. 

Father testified on his own behalf and presented the testimony of 

Vanessa Shaw, parent mentor. Father admitted that he was not currently 

participating in mental health treatment. Ms. Shaw testified that she 
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observed Father and Child interact in parenting classes in March 2016 to 

May 2016 and that Father was cooperative and progressed appropriately. 

By Order entered on December 22, 2016, the trial court terminated 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). 

Father timely appealed. Father and the trial court and both complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Father raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(2), (5) and (8)?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that [the Agency] met its 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of [Child] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 5. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS

“[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when 

considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for termination of 

parental rights.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). 

This standard of review requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of 

fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by 

the record.” Id. “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 
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review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its 

discretion.” Id. We may reverse a decision based on an abuse of discretion 

“only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. We may not reverse, however, “merely 

because the record would support a different result.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 

251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

We give great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. Moreover, the 

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and 

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in 

the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted). In addition, in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree 

with any one subsection under Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 

A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, we will 

analyze Section 2511(a)(2). 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
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Termination Pursuant to 2511(a)(2)

Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner for involuntary termination 

must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) [that] such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) [that] the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.” In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 479 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). 

Parental incapacity is not limited to affirmative misconduct, but may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In 

re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent has a duty to 

work towards reunification by cooperating with the rehabilitative services 

necessary for him to be able to perform parental duties and responsibilities. 

In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 890 (Pa. 1986). A parent who is 

unable or unwilling to meet the “irreducible minimum requirements” to care 

for a child after given adequate resources “may properly be considered unfit 

and may properly have his or her rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 

1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

This Court has defined “parental duties” in general as the obligation to 

consistently provide safety, security, and stability for the child:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 
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child. Thus, this Court has held that the parental 

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance. This affirmative duty ... requires continuing 

interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child. Because a 

child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires 

that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of 

importance in the child’s life. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations and 

paragraph breaks omitted). “Where the parent does not exercise reasonable 

firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, his parental rights may be 

forfeited.” A.S., 11 A.3d at 481 (citation omitted).

And most importantly, “parental rights are not preserved by waiting 

for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with [] her physical and 

emotional needs.” In re B., N.M., supra at 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citations omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court properly concluded that the Agency 

presented clear and convincing evidence to establish all three elements of 

Section 2511(a)(2). The trial court opined: 

Child has been in care since June 19, 2015. The facts 

unequivocally establish that Father’s inability to meet his 

FSP goals, most importantly his unwillingness to undergo 

mental health treatment, renders him unable to assume a 

role in which he is able to provide essential parental care 

for Child.

* * *

This Court was most swayed by Father’s failure to address 

his mental health goal. Despite his attendance of ABS 

therapy from March of 2014 through March of 2016, [the 
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Agency’s caseworker] testified that Father “does not feel 

he has a mental health diagnosis” and has not participated 

in any type of mental health treatment since March of 

2016. Most notably, [the Agency] had concerns about 

Father’s mental health and that “his delusions would 

incorporate or include [Child].” 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 6, 8 (citations omitted). There is ample 

evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusions. 

Father has failed to demonstrate an ability to remedy the 

circumstances that led to Child’s placement – namely his delusions. Father 

reported to both the Agency and his mental health evaluators that he did not 

believe he had a mental health diagnosis. Although Father engaged in 

therapy through ABS, he discontinued treatment when ABS started specific 

treatment for a Delusional Disorder. 

Father’s refusal to engage in appropriate mental health treatment has 

caused Child to be without essential parental care and subsistence. Father is 

unable to maintain consistent employment or appropriate housing. Father 

has been unable to progress to unsupervised visitation with Child. Father 

only attended half of the scheduled visits with Child and always arrived late. 

Visits were often inappropriate, as Father would focus his attention on 

conversations with the caseworker rather than Child, and he discussed 

inappropriate topics with Child. 

The Agency continues to have concerns about instances where Father’s 

delusions involve Child, including Father’s unreasonable concerns about 

Child’s appearance and health. Father continued to schedule numerous 
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unnecessary medical appointments based on the false belief that Child was 

suffering from abuse and became agitated with the health professionals 

when they found no ailment or injury. Father insisted that Child only eat 

organic food from a specific grocery store, Trader Joe’s, so that she would 

not get fat and Father requested that Child receive Invisalign braces at the 

age of four. 

This evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father’s 

“incapacity” is causing Child to be without essential parental care and 

subsistence and Father is unwilling to remedy the situation with appropriate 

mental health treatment pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). 

Father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental 

rights because, “[g]iven the healthy condition of Child at the time of 

removal, it must be concluded that the sole basis for the trial [court]’s 

conclusion that an incapacity to parent was proven by clear and convincing 

evidence is that he was found to be delusional.” Father’s Brief at 16. Father 

avers that this conclusion is contrary to the testimony of Dr. Bernstein, who 

testified that a delusional disorder does not automatically preclude a parent 

from being a typical parent. Id. at 17 (citation omitted). Father’s argument 

lacks merit.

Contrary to Father’s assertion, Dr. Bernstein testified that an individual 

with a diagnosis of Delusional Disorder could be a “typical parent” as long 

as they accepted the diagnosis and engaged in treatment. On direct 

examination, the Agency questioned Dr. Bernstein:
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Q. But in and of itself, a person with a diagnosis provisional or 

not of a delusional disorder, that in and of itself doesn’t 

indicate whether an individual can safely parent, is that 

correct?

A. As I said, that’s exactly correct. So, the fact that 

somebody is having a delusion which essentially [is] a 

symptom of psychosis but to the level of what would be 

considered schizophrenia, it does not preclude them 

from being a typical parent. Presumably, as long as 

they are aware of their vulnerability, that they are 

seeking help to try and gain improvement and are 

working to make changes as appropriate.

N.T., 12/2/16, at 50-51 (emphasis added). Dr. Bernstein recommended that 

Father participate in therapy, and, if indicated, psychiatric care.

On cross-examination by Father’s counsel, Dr. Bernstein further 

explained the correlation between Father’s mental health diagnosis and his 

ability to parent Child:

Q. So, strictly, that in and of itself, the only impact it would 

have on his parenting would be whether or not it posed an 

imminent risk to [Child], correct?

A. Well, it’s harder to - - now, we’re getting into a little bit of 

theory and conjecture because as much as we are talking 

about diagnoses and constructs, if you will, when it’s 

reduced to a basic level, you really have to look at the 

individual’s behavior. The situation. So, what I mean by 

that is, if we accept for the sake of discussion that [Father] 

had been acting under a state of delusion when he 

believed that he and [Child] had been victim to sexual 

assault, the fact that then therefore [sic] after the 

authorities are involved and that [Child] presumably had 

been subject to physical or some type of an examination, 

not to mention removal from home environment, placed in 

a hospital setting, etc., interactions with authorities, that 

would be an example of [Child] being impacted by, in this 

case, [Father’s] mental health. 
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But in and of itself, the fact that [Father] has this 

diagnosis, doesn’t necessarily mean that [Child] is at any 

increased risk. It’s really how [Father] is going to respond 

and whether or not he is going to seek help that will 

ultimately result in positive change.

N.T., 12/2/16, at 79-80. 

On redirect examination, Dr. Bernstein continued his testimony and 

cautioned that if left untreated, Father’s mental health issues put Child at 

risk:

To the extent the condition remains stable from the time in 

which I evaluated him with that particular provisional diagnosis, 

I believe in 2015, assuming that he remains stable, then, the 

extent to which he perceives the environment as threatening 

and/or that he and/or [Child] is at risk and takes corrective 

action in order to protect him and [Child] that could ultimately 

affect [Child] insofar as the steps that he takes. Whether by 

involving the authorities. Whether it’s from his perception of 

either of them have been victimized and/or are in danger.

So, to the extent that [Father] involves others and/or [Child] 

specifically in the provisional delusion itself is going to impact 

[Child]. Now, if the condition worsens or progresses over time 

and becomes more severe and more consuming, then the 

argument just takes - - it would be even that much more 

relevant.

N.T., 12/21/16, at 6-7. 

Dr. Bernstein’s testimony demonstrates how a diagnosis of Delusional 

Disorder, if left untreated, can affect a Child. The record reveals that Father 

never believed he had a Delusional Disorder, never engaged in specialized 

mental health treatment, and admitted during the hearing that he was not 

currently receiving any mental health treatment. Father’s inconsistent and 

inappropriate visitation, lack of employment, and lack of housing all 
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demonstrate that his untreated mental health diagnosis is affecting his 

ability to provide essential parental care and subsistence to Child. Father’s 

refusal to engage in appropriate treatment renders him unable to remedy 

the situation. In contrast to Father’s assertion, Dr. Bernstein’s testimony 

supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father’s refusal to engage in 

appropriate mental health treatment renders Father unable to provide 

proper parental care and subsistence.

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion regarding 

Father’s progress in meeting his goals. It was for the trial court, as a matter 

of credibility, to determine the weight to give Father’s attempts at seeking 

mental health treatment. In re M.G., supra. Finally, our review of Dr. 

Bernstein’s testimony in its entirety refutes Father’s assertions regarding his 

ability to parent and, in fact, legitimizes the Agency’s ongoing concerns 

regarding Father’s mental health. In sum, the record supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that the Agency has proven by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination of his parental rights to Child is justified pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act.

Given this conclusion, we need not consider Father’s claims regarding 

the trial court’s additional determinations that the Agency met its burden of 

establishing his parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(5) or (a)(8). In re B.L.W., supra.; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(5) and (a)(8). 
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Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(b)

We also agree with the trial court’s determination that the Agency met 

its burden under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), and that terminating Father’s 

parental rights is in the best interest of Child.

With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis shifts focus from 

parental actions in fulfilling parental duties to the effect that terminating the 

parental bond will have on the child. Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether 

termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 

A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court 

found that “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into [the] needs and welfare of the child.” In 

addition, the trial court “must also discern the nature and status of the 

parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing that bond.” Id. The extent of the bond-effect 

analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In 

re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008).

In the instant case, the trial court determined that the evidence 

presented at the TPR hearing established that termination of Father’s 

parental rights was in the best interest of Child. It stated:

Here, this Court judiciously evaluated the bond between 

Father and Child and determined that there was no 
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indication that an emotional bond exists to the extent that 

the termination of parental rights of Father would cause 

Child to suffer extreme emotional consequences. In 

reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon the 

testimony of Eric Bernstein, a licensed psychologist[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 12 (citation omitted). The court then 

discussed at length Dr. Bernstein’s observations of Father and his 

interactions with Child, as well as his testimony concerning how the third 

evaluation was ended early by Dr. Bernstein due to Father’s verbally 

aggressive behavior in front of Child. According to Dr. Bernstein, at this 

third meeting Father ignored Child’s attempts to get his attention and 

instead:

angrily challenged the diagnoses that had been rendered in 

previous evaluations and/or testimony. . . . He proceeded 

to insult the Court and myself and planned to submit 

researching facts that he believes would influence the 

Court and help them understand his position.

I encouraged [Father] to refrain from further complaint, 

but instead to engage [Child] in a supportive and attentive 

manner. And the purposes of the meeting really was to 

give her attention and to spend time with her for my 

observation of his parenting relationship. 

[Child] attempted to communicate with [Father] and he 

ignored her and continued to engage in what I considered 

to be a rant. His hostility increased gradually. And 

eventually then, he appeared unwilling or unable to give 

[Child] the attention that was appropriate and the intensity 

of his complaints increased to a level that I thought was 

inappropriate for her to hear. So, I decided to end the 

appointment.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 14 (citing N.T., 12/2/16, at 72). Finally, we 

note that, when asked about his observations regarding physical interaction 
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with Child, Dr. Bernstein stated that he did not “recall there being any actual 

affection of hugs or anything of that sort.” N.T., 12/2/16, at 86.

The trial court also noted Dr. Bernstein’s testimony regarding his 

evaluation of Child’s interactions with her foster parents. According to Dr. 

Bernstein, the foster parents “eagerly engaged [Child]. Showed interest in 

[Child]’s activity. Encouraged [Child] to be active and playful.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 2/22/17, at 13 (citation omitted). According to Dr. Bernstein, the 

foster parents provided Child with attention and support, and, in return she 

“showed them respect.” Id. at 14. The trial court noted Dr. Bernstein’s 

conclusion that the foster parents “presented as a committed pair of adults 

who recognized the importance of supporting [Child’s] emotional needs and 

physical needs. They offered a balance of attention and structure and 

support.” Id. at 15 (citation omitted).

Given this discussion, the trial court then concluded:

This Court was within its discretion when it determined 

that severing Child’s bond with Father would not cause 

extreme emotional consequences. The evidence 

established that termination will be able to provide Child 

with much needed stability and permanence at her young 

age. This Court concludes that the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of Child would 

be best served by terminating Father’s parental rights.

Id. at 15-16.

Father’s initial claim that the trial court’s consideration of his parental 

bond with Child “was nearly superficial,” is belied by the above discussion by 

the trial court. Father’s Brief at 22. Father then cites his own testimony to 
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assert that he enjoys a strong, loving relationship with Child, and that 

termination of his parental rights “unnecessarily and permanently terminates 

this loving relationship between [them].” Id. Once again, we note that the 

weight and credibility to be assigned the witness’s testimony was exclusively 

in the province of the trial court. In re M.G., supra. 

Finally, we reject Father’s attempt to claim error because the trial 

court did a comparison and concluded that Child “is better off in the 

prospective adoptive home.” See Father’s Brief at 22-23. Our review of the 

record establishes that the trial court properly evaluated Child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs in reaching its conclusion that 

the Agency established the requirements of Section 2511(b).

CONCLUSION

In sum, our review of the record reveals that the Agency provided 

clear and convincing evidence that the trial court should terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2) and 2511(b). 

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2017