UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4629

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEON ERIQUE SHERROD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10-

cr-00140-RWT-1)

Submitted: January 26, 2012 Decided: February 14, 2012

Before MOTZ and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Sapna Mirchandani, Staff 

Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Adam K. Ake, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Deon Erique Sherrod pled 

guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). The district court 

sentenced Sherrod to seventy-seven months’ imprisonment, the 

bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. Sherrod timely 

appealed.

The district court calculated Sherrod’s base offense 

level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(2) 

(2010). This provision establishes a base offense level of 

twenty-four if the defendant committed his instant firearm 

offense after being convicted of at least two felony crimes of 

violence or controlled substance offenses. The district court 

found that Sherrod had two prior Maryland convictions that 

qualified as crimes of violence under § 2K2.1(a)(2): a 2000 

robbery conviction and a 2008 second degree assault conviction. 

Sherrod does not challenge the district court’s finding that his 

robbery conviction qualified as a crime of violence. However, 

he disputes the court’s finding that his Maryland second degree 

assault conviction was a crime of violence.

Sherrod first argues that the district court 

erroneously employed the modified categorical approach in 

determining that his Maryland second degree assault conviction 

qualified as a crime of violence. His argument is foreclosed by 
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this Court’s recent decisions in United States v. Donnell, 661 

F.3d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 2011), and United States v. Taylor, 659 

F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2011).

Next, Sherrod argues that, even if the court properly 

applied the modified categorical approach to determine that his 

Maryland second degree assault conviction qualified as a crime 

of violence, under our decision in United States v. Alston, 611 

F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2010), the district court improperly 

relied on the guilty plea colloquy in the state proceeding to 

conclude that his assault conviction was a crime of violence. 

Unlike the defendant in Alston, however, Sherrod did not enter 

an Alford∗ plea in the state proceeding. Moreover, in this case, 

the transcript of the state court guilty plea shows that the 

judge directly addressed Sherrod as to the factual basis for his 

plea, and Sherrod orally confirmed the factual basis, i.e., the 

expected witness testimony had the case gone to trial, for his 

plea. Therefore, we conclude that Sherrod’s argument is 

unavailing.

Accordingly, we affirm Sherrod’s sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

 ∗ North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED