J-A22032-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MEECO, INC.

v.

CLEAN GROWTH FUND III, LP, 

CLEAN GROWTH FUND IV, LP AND 

NORTH SKY CLEANTECH VENTURES, 

LP 

Appellants

v.

JERRY RIDDLE AND LISA BERGSON

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 438 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered December 31, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 

2018-03133-0040

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., STRASSBURGER, J.*, and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2019

Clean Growth Fund III, LP, Clean Growth Fund IV, LP, and North Sky 

Cleantech Ventures, LP (collectively, North Sky) appeal from the order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) granting MEECO, Inc.’s 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(MEECO) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the Declaratory Judgment

count of its complaint. After careful review, we affirm.

I.

A.

We take the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the 

trial court’s March 6, 2019 opinion and our independent review of the certified 

record. MEECO is a Pennsylvania corporation. North Sky is a limited 

partnership organized under Minnesota law, with its principal places of 

business there. Tiger Optics, LLC (Tiger) is a Pennsylvania Limited Liability 

Company organized into three classes of ownership units under an Amended 

and Restated Operating Agreement (Operating Agreement). The organizing 

structure consisted of Series A Preferred units (Series A), Common units 

primarily owned by MEECO, Jerry Riddle (Riddle) and Lisa Bergson (Bergson),1

and Series B Preferred units (Series B), which were mostly owned by North 

Sky.

Under this structure, MEECO, Riddle and Bergson held an equity stake 

of 61% prior to sale. North Sky, Riddle and Bergson held all of the seats on 

Tiger’s Governing Board (the Board). North Sky obtained its Series B stake 

through investments, the last of which was in late 2016. Under the Operating 

____________________________________________

1 Riddle and Bergson are officers of MEECO and they served as officers of 

Tiger. (See MEECO, Riddle and Bergson’s Brief, at 12).
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Agreement, holders of Series B units obtain the liquidation preference and the

conversion preference, which are triggered by certain events. Under the 

liquidation preference, the preference at issue here, Series B holders were to 

receive 150 percent of the Initial Series B Preferred Value plus any declared 

but unpaid dividends.2

Prior to making the final investment, North Sky alleged that it sought 

confirmation of the pattern of distributions between the classes of owner that 

would occur in the event of Tiger’s sale. Riddle purportedly provided express 

assurances to North Sky that Section 10.2 of the Operating Agreement would 

be triggered in the event of Tiger’s sale in spite of his belief that Section 10.2 

would only be applicable if the sale was structured as an asset sale. In reliance 

on Riddle’s representations, North Sky purportedly made the two million dollar 

investment.

In 2017, the Board solicited buyers for the Membership units of Tiger. 

It sought ownership interest buyers instead of asset purchasers because Tiger 

had been operating as a C Corporation since 2008 for tax purposes. The Board 

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2 Under the conversion preference, Series B holders had the right to convert 

their Series B units into Common units at any point in time but would not be 

entitled to the liquidation preference. (See Operating Agreement, at § 9.3).

The conversion formula in Section 9.3 of the Operating Agreement contained 

terms that would enable the holders of the Series B units to increase their 

proportional equity interests from 35 percent to approximately 48 percent of 

the equity interests in Tiger Optics.
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believed that an asset sale would present major tax consequences. It reached 

a sales agreement with an external buyer, Cosa Xentaur Corporation (Cosa).

Before closing, the Board sought to determine the distribution of the 

proceeds of the sale to satisfy creditors and equity holders. The Board 

members disagreed about whether the Series B units were entitled to a 

preferential share of the distribution of the proceeds based on Sections 9.2 

and 10.2 of the Operating Agreement. The disputed distribution amount is 

$1,138,745.00. The Board initially deadlocked, jeopardizing the sale, but 

eventually it agreed to complete the pending sale and place the disputed 

amount in escrow pending the outcome of this case.

B.

On June 6, 2018, MEECO filed a complaint against North Sky consisting 

of: (1) a claim for a declaratory judgment that Article 10 of the Operating 

Agreement does not apply to the transaction with Cosa and that, upon 

completion of closing, any funds held in escrow should be distributed to the 

sellers of the Membership units without any preference under Section 10.2; 

(2) an alternative claim for breach of contract; and (3) aiding and abetting 

Riddle and Bergson’s breach of fiduciary duty. (See Complaint, at 9-14).

North Sky filed an answer and a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment

seeking a declaration that, as a Series B unitholder, it was entitled to the sale 

preference payment described in Sections 9.2 and 10.2 of the Operating 

Agreement. (See Answer, New Matter and Counterclaim, at 20). It filed a 
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joinder complaint against Riddle and Bergson on July 30, 2018, for fraud 

(against Riddle) and breach of fiduciary duty (against Riddle and Bergson). 

(See Joinder Complaint, at 8-11). Riddle and Bergson filed preliminary 

objections in the nature of demurrer.

On September 7, 2018, MEECO filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings as to the competing declaratory judgment claims. It argued that 

the sale of the Membership units was not a sale of Tiger’s assets, which MEECO 

maintained was required under the Operating Agreement for the Series B Sale 

Preference to be paid. (MEECO’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Judgment 

on the Pleadings, at 15-32). North Sky countered that (1) Sections 9.2 and 

10.2 of the Operating Agreement require the sale preference to be paid in 

connection with any “Transfer” or disposition of assets, and the sale of Tiger 

necessarily “Transferred” all the assets to new ownership, and (2) even if 

MEECO were correct in its interpretation of the Operating Agreement, the most 

this would mean is that it is silent on how proceeds of the sale are to be 

distributed, thus making it ambiguous and rendering judgment on the 

pleadings inappropriate. (See North Star’s Answer to Motion for Judgment on 

the Pleadings, at 12-17).

On December 31, 2018, the trial court granted judgment on the 

pleadings on the declaratory judgment count in favor of MEECO because “[t]he 

unambiguous language of the Operating Agreement does not provide for any 

liquidation preference for Series B Preferred Units in the event of a sale of the 
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Membership Units.” (Order, 12/31/18). It sustained Riddle and Bergson’s 

preliminary objection to the breach of fiduciary duty claim and dismissed that 

count of the Joinder Complaint. (See id.). It overruled the preliminary 

objection to the fraud claim. North Sky timely appealed the dismissal of the 

declaratory judgment count of its action.

3

II.

On April 10, 2019, MEECO, Riddle and Bergson filed an application to 

quash this appeal as interlocutory that was denied per curiam. Because the 

per curiam order did not explain this Court’s reasoning for denying the motion 

to quash, we will briefly do so now.

It is well-settled that our court’s appellate jurisdiction is largely limited 

to appeals from final orders of courts of common pleas.4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

742. “A final order is generally one which terminates the litigation, disposes 

of the entire case, or effectively puts the litigant out of court.” Joseph F. 

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3 “Our standard of review of the grant of a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings is limited. A motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted 

where, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is 

possible.” Metcalf v. Pesock, 885 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations 

and quotation mark omitted). “Because contract interpretation is a question 

of law,” our standard of review is de novo. Gillard v. Martin, 13 A.3d 482, 

487 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

4 “Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal presents a 

threshold issue. Such an issue raises a question of law; accordingly, our 

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Pa. 

Manufacturers’ Assoc. Ins. Co. v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 188 A.3d 396, 

398 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).
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Cappelli & Sons, Inc. v. Keystone Custom Homes, Inc., 815 A.2d 643, 

648 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted); see Pa.R.A.P. 341(b).

However, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 provides, in 

pertinent part, that “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right . . . from . . . [a]n 

order that is made final or appealable by statute or general rule, even though 

the order does not dispose of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 

311(a)(8). Pursuant to Section 7532 of The Pennsylvania Declaratory 

Judgments Act:

Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have 

power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether 

or not further relief is or could be claimed. . . . The declaration 

may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such 

declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or 

decree.

42 Pa.C.S. § 7532; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wickett, 763 

A.2d 813, 817 (2000) (“[A]ny order in a declaratory judgment action that 

either affirmatively or negatively declares the rights and duties of the parties 

constitutes a final order.”). The Pa. Manufacturers’ Court observed that this 

general rule has been refined and, “[i]f the order in question merely narrows 

the scope of the litigation and does not resolve the entirety of the parties’

eligibility for declaratory relief, then the order is interlocutory and not 

immediately appealable.” Pa. Manufacturers, supra at 400 (citation 

omitted) (emphasis added).

MEECO, Riddle and Bergson argue that the court’s order narrowed but 

did not completely resolve the fundamental issue in this case. (See MEECO, 
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Riddle and Bergson’s Brief, at 5). North Sky maintains that this is an 

interlocutory appeal taken as of right pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 311(a)(8) and Section 7532 of The Declaratory 

Judgments Act. (See North Sky’s Brief, at 1-2). We agree with North Sky 

that the trial court’s order is immediately appealable.

The order granted MEECO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to 

the declaratory judgment count of its complaint and expressly held that “[t]he 

unambiguous language of the Operating Agreement does not provide for any 

liquidation preference for Series B Preferred Units in the event of a sale of the 

Membership Units.” (Order, 12/31/18). This did not merely narrow the 

declaratory judgment issue but resolved “the entirety of the parties’ eligibility 

for declaratory relief[.]” Pa. Manufacturers, supra at 399. Because the 

order is appealable, we will now consider the merits of North Sky’s appeal.

III.

North Sky contends that the trial court erred in finding that Sections 9.2 

and 10.2 of the Operating Agreement do not require that the liquidation 

preference be paid because the sale to COSA was a transfer within the 

meaning of those provisions triggering the preference. Section 9.2 of the 

Agreement provides:

9.2 Mergers and Consolidations. In the event of a 

Capital Transaction any consideration provided to the Members in 

connection with such Capital Transaction shall be allocated or 

distributed, as appropriate, in accordance with Section 10.2.
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(Operating Agreement, at 43 § 9.2).5 “Capital Transaction” is defined as “any 

Transfer of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company and its 

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5 Section 10.2 of the Operating Agreement provides for the order of priority 

for the distribution of assets upon the Liquidation and Termination of Tiger. It 

provides, in pertinent part:

10.2 Liquidation and Termination. On dissolution of the 

Company, . . . [t]he liquidator shall proceed diligently to wind up 

the affairs of the Company and make final distributions as 

provided herein and in the Law. . . . The steps to be accomplished 

by the liquidator are as follows:

(a) as promptly as possible after dissolution and again after 

final liquidation, the liquidator shall cause a proper accounting to 

be made . . . ;

(b) the liquidator shall apply the assets of the Company 

remaining after payment of the costs and expenses of winding up 

in the in the following priority:

(i) First, to the creditors of the Company . . . in the order 

of priority established by law;

(ii) Second, to the Members holding Series B Preferred 

Units, an amount equal to 150 percent of the Initial Series 

B Preferred Value plus any declared, but unpaid, Series B 

Preferential Distributions;

(iii) Third, to the Members holding Series A Preferred 

Units, an amount equal to the Initial Series A Preferred 

Value; plus any declared, but unpaid Series A Preferential 

Distributions; and

(iv) Fourth, to Members holding Series B Preferred Units 

and Common Units pro rata in accordance with their 

Sharing Percentages.

(Operating Agreement, at 59-60, § 10.2) (emphasis in original).
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subsidiaries[.]” North Sky argues that the COSA sale was a Capital 

Transaction, defined as “any transaction referenced in 2.3(b)(ii)(F),” which 

refers to “any Transfer of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company 

or its subsidiaries.” (Id. at 6 § 2.3(b)(ii)(F), 67 § 12.1). It observes that the 

Operating Agreement defines “Transfer” as “the assignment, transfer, license 

pledge, mortgage, grant of security interest in, encumbrance, exchange or gift 

or other disposition.” (Id. at 73 § 12.1) (emphasis added). Because the 

definition of Capital Transaction includes the term “transfer,” it contends that 

means the COSA sale is the “transfer” or “other disposition” of the assets of 

the Company.

However, what that argument ignores is that the definitions of “Capital 

Transaction” specifically involves a transfer of the “assets” of the Company, 

which is not even specifically mentioned in the definition of “Transfer.” The 

question here is whether the sale of the membership interests in the Company 

was the sale of an “asset.”

We have held that a “membership interest is an ownership interest in a 

limited liability company and is akin to an interest in stock of a corporation.” 

Missett v. Hub Intern. Pa., LLC, 6 A.3d 530, 537 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The sale of stock is not a sale of a corporation’s 

assets because “a corporation is an entity irrespective of . . . the persons who 

own its stock.” Id. (citation omitted). Similarly then, the sale of membership 

interests in a limited liability company, like the sale of stock, is not the sale of 
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assets. See id.; see also 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 8852(a)(2) (“[A] transfer, in whole 

or in part, of a transferable interest [in a limited liability company] . . . does 

not by itself cause . . . a dissolution . . . of the limited liability company’s 

activities and affairs[.]”).6 Therefore, the trial court properly found that the 

sale of the Membership units was not a “Capital Transaction” within the 

meaning of Section 9.2 of the Operating Agreement based on its unambiguous 

language.

North Sky next argues that even if the trial court properly declared that 

it was not entitled to Series B preference payments, the Operating Agreement 

still is ambiguous because it does not state how to distribute the proceeds of 

the Cosa transaction. (See North Sky’s Brief, at 32-37).

First, we observe that this issue is outside the scope of the limited issue 

that both MEECO and North Sky asked the trial court to decide whether: North 

Sky was entitled to preferential treatment under Sections 9.2 and 10.2 of the 

Operating Agreement for the proceeds of the Cosa transaction. This is the 

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6 Similarly, North Sky’s reliance on Section 4.1 of the Operating Agreement, 

for the method of distributing Available Cash, is likewise unavailing because 

the sale of the Membership units did not result in Available Cash. (See North 

Sky’s Brief, at 34-35); (see also Operating Agreement, at 24-25 § 4.1). 

“Available Cash” is defined as “cash funds from Operations on hand or on 

deposit . . . as the Board . . . shall deem available for distribution [or] proceeds 

received after the payment of all expenses incurred in connection with a 

Capital Transaction.” (Operating Agreement, at 66 § 12.1). The transaction 

with Cosa did not involve a Capital Transaction and the proceeds of the sale 

of the Membership units were not “cash funds” owned by Tiger.
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question the trial court answered and from which North Sky appealed. 

Whether the Operating Agreement is silent as to how to distribute the 

proceeds since North Sky is not entitled to preferential treatment does not 

affect whether the trial court properly answered the question about the 

applicability of Sections 9.2 and 10.2.

In any event, Section 9.3 of the Operating Agreement enabled North 

Sky and any other holders of Series B units to convert their Series B units into 

Common units, which would increase their proportional equity interests from 

thirty-five percent to approximately forty-eight percent. (See Operating 

Agreement, at 43-51 § 9.3); (see also MEECO, Riddle and Bergson’s Brief, at 

22). North Sky did not exercise its conversion preference before the Cosa 

transaction. However, despite this, MEECO admitted in its Complaint that 

North Sky is entitled to it for purposes of the distribution of the proceeds from 

the Cosa transaction. (See Complaint, at 5 ¶ 26, 7 ¶ 28). Therefore, based 

on the language of Section 9.3 and MEECO’s admission that North Star is 

entitled to the conversion preference contained therein for the distribution of 

the Cosa transaction proceeds, North Star’s claim that the Operating 

Agreement fails to identify how proceeds are to be distributed should they not 

be entitled to a preference pursuant to Section 10.2 is disingenuous.

Finally, the cases on which North Sky relies in support of its argument 

that the trial court was precluded from granting judgment on the pleadings in 

MEECO’s favor on its declaratory judgment claim because extrinsic evidence 
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would show that the pertinent provisions of the Operating Agreement are 

ambiguous and distinguishable. For instance, North Sky relies on Rourke v. 

Pa. Nat’l. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 116 A.3d 87 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 

128 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2015), and claims that this Court reversed a grant of 

judgment on the pleadings because the relevant insurance policy was 

ambiguous. (See North Sky’s Brief, at 36-37). However, in Rourke, we 

reversed the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings, not because the 

subject policy’s language was ambiguous, but because the trial court’s 

interpretation of its meaning was erroneous.7 See Rourke, supra at 95-96.8

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7 The policy defined “covered family member” as “a person related to you by 

blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes 

a ward or foster child.” The policy did not define “ward.” Rourke, supra at 

91 (record citation omitted). We concluded that the trial court’s interpretation 

that a “ward” had to be a minor to be a “covered family member” was 

erroneous. See id. at 95-96.

8 The remainder of the cases on which North Sky relies for this argument are 

similarly distinguishable and are not legally persuasive in this matter. See

Insurance Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 462, 

469-70 (Pa. 2006) (holding that trial court’s grant of preliminary objections in 

the form of demurrer was error when subject insurance contract provision 

underlying cause of action was capable of two reasonable interpretations and,

thus, was ambiguous); Nederostek v. Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co., 202 

A.2d 72, 73 (Pa. 1964) (reversing grant of motion for judgment on the 

pleadings where trial court indicated that complaint’s “basic allegation was 

susceptible of many interpretations.”); In re Estate of Plasterer, 198 A.2d 

525, 527 (Pa. 1964) (reversing grant of preliminary objections where parties’ 

intent was unclear because pertinent document contained “numerous 

misspellings, incomplete sentences, lack of punctuation, and generally 

horrendous grammar.”); Mowry v. McWherter, 100 A.2d 51, 54 (Pa. 1953) 

(noting that it had previously reversed court’s grant of preliminary objections 

where relevant language of agreement was ambiguous); Bogojavlensky v. 
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Here, the trial court properly decided the only issue before it and 

properly declared that the unambiguous language of the Operating Agreement 

made North Sky ineligible for preferred status in the distribution of the 

proceeds of the sale of the Membership units. Even if the Operating 

Agreement were silent as to how the Cosa proceeds are to be distributed, it

does not render judgment on the pleadings as to the discrete issue before the 

trial court improper.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/3/19

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Logan, 124 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa. Super. 1956) (reversing order granting 

judgment on the pleadings where breach of contract action alleged 

defendant’s failure to pay, but answer raised factual issues and it was unclear 

whether time was of the essence in land sale and construction contract, thus 

going to central issue of complaint).