alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Robert Eddins v. State.

No. 24794.

May 31, 1950.

Motion for Rehearing Denied (Without Written opinion; October 4, 1950. Leave to File Second Motion for a Rehearing Denied October 25, 1950.

*Benson, Anderson & Howard,*and *Hugh Anderson,*Lubbock, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway while intoxicated and by the jury fined the sum of $400.00.

The facts show that a certain peace officer observed appellant’s erratic driving on a public street in Lubbock, and testified that he saw him swing his car against another automobile; that he ran through a red light and drove on the wrong side of the street, and that he, the officer, drove up to appellant and stopped him. His tongue was thick; his eyes were bloodshot; *203he had the odor of whisky on his breath; he mumbled when talked to and could not walk without assistance. When the officers requested to see the appellant’s driver’s license, he produced a courtesy card, but did not talk to them. They testified that they smelled liquor on his breath and that he was intoxicated. They took him into custody and to the city hall, where he was observed by others, who testified as above outlined.

It is contended that the arrest of appellant was illegal, and that under Art. 727a, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P., such testimony was inadmissible. Appellant denied his drunkenness and admitted that he had only taken a small drink of whisky. He did not remember running the red light and knew nothing about a car collision, and claimed that he was sober. The jury decided this contention adversely to appellant, and we think such decision was justified by the facts.

We think that under the testimony herein the officers had a right to arrest appellant without a warrant. See Art. 803, Vernon’s Ann. P.C. If they had the right to arrest, then they had a right to describe his condition. Such testimony is the basis of many objections to the officers being allowed to describe appellant’s condition at the time of the arrest. The arrest being legal, they had the right to 'delineate what they then found even though it was some short time after the arrest. See King v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. R. 496, 113 S.W. (2d) 181.

Bill No. 2 complains of the trial court’s charge relative to intoxication. It was not necessary that such term be defined in the charge, same not being a technical term needing a definition, but had a commonly understood meaning. See Randolph v. State, 145 Tex. Cr. R. 526, 169 S.W. (2d) 178; Davis v. State, 142 Tex. Cr. R. 602, 115 S.W. (2d) 801; Zachery v. State, 142 Tex. Cr. R. 464, 154 S.W. (2d) 489; Moynahan v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. R. 540, 146 S.W. (2d) 376.

Bill No. 8 is multifarious in that it complains of the testimony of three separate witnesses. Again, we think the testimony was admissible because it referred to appellant’s actions, and demeanor at the time of and soon after his legal arrest.

Bill No. 13 relative to the remarks of the county attorney is without merit.

*204All bills not written upon have been considered and are without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.
March 15, 1977

The Honorable Selden N. Snedeker Opinion No. H-95.6 Criminal District Attorney Cameron County Re: Fingerprinting of Brownsville, Texas 78520 juveniles. Dear Mr. Sn~edeker: You have,requested ou,ropinion regarding whether a law enforcement agency may fingerprint a child for identification purposes. Section 51.15~of theFamily,Code~provides, inpertinent part:

(a) No child may be fingerprinted without the consent of the juvenile court except asprovided in Subsection (f)of this section. However, if a child 15 years of age or older isreferred to the juvenile court for a felony, his fingerprints may be taken and filed by a lawenforcement officer investigating the.case. Subsection (f)permits a law enforcement officer to take a child's fingerprints "[i]f latent fingerprints are found during the inves.tigationof an offense, and a law-enforcement officer has reasonable cause to.believe that they~are those of aparticular child. . .'." Prior to its 1975 amendment, subsection (a)provided: No child may be fingerprinted in the -- investigation of a crime except.as provided

-- in Subsection (f)of this section . . . . (Emphasis added). Inour opinion, thedeletion of the phrase "in the investigation of a crime" fromthe 1975 amendment to section 51.15(a) conclusively indicates that a law enforcement agency may fingerprint a child only.in the specified circumstanc,es.

P. 3990The Honorable Selden N. Snedeker -page 2 (H-956)

A child may be fingerprinted 

### inonly three instances: ~ifthe juvenile court grants its approval: if.subsection (f) is applicable; or if the child is "15years of age or older [and] isreferred to the juvenile court for a felony." Thus, it isour opinion that, unless one of the statutory exceptions is applicable, section 51.15 of the Family Code prohibits a law enforcement agency from fingerprinting's child. SUMMARY

Unless one of the stated exceptions is applicable, section 51.15 of theFamily Code prohibi~tsa law enforcement agency from fingerprinting a child.,

Very truly yours,

Attorney General of Texas APPROVED:

KENDALL, First Assistant

C. ROBERT HEATH, Chairman Opinion Committee jwb

P. 3991
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6108

RAYMOND TATE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; J. C. STREEVAL, Warden,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at 

Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Senior District Judge. (7:20-cv-00245-GEC-PMS)

Submitted: May 25, 2021 Decided: May 28, 2021

Before DIAZ and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Raymond Tate, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Raymond Tate, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his 

28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition and denying reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and 

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. 

Tate v. United States, No. 7:20-cv-00245-GEC-PMS (W.D. Va. Nov. 4, 2020 & Jan. 29, 

2021). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6215

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL WALLACE RICE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:05-cr-00011-REP-2)

Submitted: June 24, 2021 Decided: June 29, 2021

Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Wallace Rice, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Calvin Moore, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Michael Wallace Rice appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release based on the COVID-19 

pandemic. We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021). 

Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s alternative 

determination that the circumstances in this case, evaluated in light of the pertinent 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, did not warrant the grant of compassionate release. 

See United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 187 (4th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s order. See United States v. Rice, No. 3:05-cr-00011-REP-2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 

27, 2021). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit
10.40


 





 


February
18, 2020


 


Dr.
William V. Williams


CEO


BriaCell
Therapeutics Corporation


Suite300


Bellevue
Centre, 235 –15th Street


West
Vancouver, BC V7T2X1


 


RE:
Extension of Loan Agreement Maturity Date


 


Dear
Dr. Williams,


 


Regarding
the Loan Agreements between Clearit LLC and BriaCell Therapeutics Corporation dated December 3, 2019 and January 27, 2020, Clearit
LLC, without penalty, hereby extends the maturity dates of each Loan Agreement from March 2, 2020 to March 20, 2020.


 


Sincerely,


 





 





Martin
E. Schmieg


Chief
Executive Officer







 


1l
Togan Way, Marblehead, MA 01945 * Tel. 1 (215) 300-9400* Email: clearittattoo@gmail.com
'. '• 

STATE OF TEXAS 

vs. 

BARRY LYNN MCCURTAIN 

199-82933-2014 

§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

§ 

§ 199th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

§ 

§ COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS 

NOTICE OF APPEAL 

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 

Now comes BARRY LYNN MCCURTAIN, Defendant in the above styled and numbered 

cause, and gives this written notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State of Texas from the 

judgment of conviction and sentence herein rendered against BARRY LYNN MCCURTAIN. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Law Offices of Biederman & Burleson PLLC 

2591 Dallas Parkway, #207 

Frisco, TX 75034 

(469) 252-4018- Tel 

(800) 933-0891 -Fax 

By:~£-· -

Daniel Moran 

State Bar No. 24075738 

Attorney for Defendant 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

This is to certify that on July 23, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

document was served on the Collin County District Attorney's Office via hand delivery. 

~Md£ 

15 JUL 23 AN 8: 45 

ANDREA STROI·i THOMPSON 

DISTRICT CLERK CO~TY. TEXAS 

BY . DEPUTY 

 FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS 8/10/2015 2:38:44 PM LISA MATZ Clerk
IIB 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6267 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2022 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 15 Chestnut Street in Suffern, New York, 

as the ‘‘Sergeant Gerald T. ‘Jerry’ Donnellan Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

HR 6267 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SERGEANT GERALD T. ‘‘JERRY’’ DONNELLAN 

2 POST OFFICE. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 15 Chestnut Street in Suffern, 

5 New York, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Ser6 geant Gerald T. ‘Jerry’ Donnellan Post Office’’. 

7 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg8 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

9 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

10 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Sergeant Gerald T. 

11 ‘Jerry’ Donnellan Post Office’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 28, 

2022. 

Attest: CHERYL L. JOHNSON, 

Clerk. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
Exhibit 32.1  Certification of the President Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  In connection with the quarterly report of China RuiTai International Holdings Co. Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Dian Min Ma, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  /s/ Dian Min MaChief Executive Officer Date: August 14, 2008
#### John C. BOYLE, Appellant, v. BARCLAYS GLOBAL INVESTORS, N.A., Appellee.

No. 02-1357.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Nov. 1, 2002.

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, GAJARSA, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

*987DYK, Circuit Judge.

*ORDER*

Barclays Global Investors, N.A. moves to waive the requirements of Fed. Cir. R. 27(f) and to dismiss John C. Boyle’s appeal. Boyle submits a document entitled “date of filing” that we treat as an opposition to Barclays’ motion to dismiss.

Barclays argues that Boyle’s appeal was not timely filed. Barclay states that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board issued its decision on November 1, 2001, and that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) did not receive Boyle’s notice of appeal until January 7, 2002. Boyle responds that he mailed a notice of appeal to the court on November 30, 2001 and again on January 3, 2002.*

An appeal from a decision of the Board must be filed with the PTO within two months of the date of the Board’s decision. In this case, the notice of appeal was due by January 2, 2002. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 2.145(b)(1) (“When an appeal is taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the appellant shall give notice thereof in writing to the Commissioner, which notice shall be filed in the Patent and Trademark Office, within the time specified in paragraph (d) of this section.”). Paragraph (d) provides that the time for appeal is “[t]wo months from the date of the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.” In this case, the PTO received Boyle’s notice of appeal on January 7, 2002, over two months after the date of the Board decision. Thus, Boyle’s appeal is untimely and must be dismissed.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) Barclays’ motion to dismiss is granted.

(2) All pending motions are moot.

(3) Each side shall bear its own costs.

*

 The court has no record of receiving a notice of appeal dated November 30, 2001. The court received the January 3, 2002 notice of appeal on January 4, 2002.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 20, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 49230]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19294]



[[Page 49230]]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Delegation of Authority No. 315]


Delegation by the Deputy Secretary of State to the Under 
Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs To Convene an 
Interagency Committee on Climate Change

    By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 1 of the State 
Department Basic Authorities Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2651a), I 
hereby delegate to the Under Secretary of State for Democracy and 
Global Affairs, to the extent authorized by law, the authority to 
convene an interagency meeting on climate change consistent with 
Section 684(b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY 2008 (Pub. L. 
110-161).
    Any act, executive order, regulation or procedure subject to, or 
affected by, this delegation shall be deemed to be such act, executive 
order, regulation or procedure as amended from time to time.
    Notwithstanding this delegation of authority, the Secretary or the 
Deputy Secretary may at any time exercise any authority or function 
delegated by this delegation of authority.
    This delegation of authority shall be published in the Federal 
Register.

    Dated: August 7, 2008.
John Negroponte,
Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State.
[FR Doc. E8-19294 Filed 8-19-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-10-P
Exhibit 32.2

Statement of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of
Pacific Enterprises (the "Company") certifies that:

(i)	the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2005 (the "Quarterly Report")
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii)	the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.



November 2, 2005
                                               /S/ NEAL E. SCHMALE
                                              ______________________
                                               Neal E. Schmale
                                               Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 23.1



                       Consent of Independent Accountants


We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  registration
statements  of Equity Inns,  Inc. on Form S-3 (Files Nos.  333-26559,  33-99480,
33-90364,  333-48169,  333-47761 and  333-63253) of our report dated January 22,
2001, except as to Note 11, for which the date is January 25, 2001,  relating to
the financial  statements and financial  statement  schedules,  which appears in
this Form 10-K.



PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP





Memphis, Tennessee
March 22, 2001
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6278 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6278

  To amend the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act to make a violation of 
   such Act, relating to the enforcement of a storage lien, a felony.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 14, 2021

  Mr. Moulton (for himself and Mrs. Trahan) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and in 
 addition to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for a 
 period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act to make a violation of 
   such Act, relating to the enforcement of a storage lien, a felony.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF A STORAGE LIEN IN 
              VIOLATION OF THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT.

    Section 307(c) of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. 
3958(c)) is amended--
            (1) in the heading, by striking ``Misdemeanor'' and 
        inserting ``Criminal Penalties'';
            (2) by striking all that follows ``so'' and inserting an em 
        dash; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
            ``(1) shall be fined as provided in title 18, or imprisoned 
        for not more than one year, or both; or
            ``(2) after a prior conviction under this section has 
        become final, shall be fined as provided in title 18, or 
        imprisoned for not more than three years, or both.''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 10.4

nStor Technologies, Inc.100 Century BoulevardWest Palm Beach, Florida 33417

April 30, 2004

Cenvill Recreation, Inc.100 Century BlvdWest Palm Beach, FL 33417Attn: Mark F. Levy

Dear Mr. Levy:

We have agreed to the following amendments to that certain Promissory Note, dated March 2, 2004, in the amount of $750,000 (the “Note”), payable by nStor Technologies, Inc. to Cenvill Recreation, Inc., copies of which are attached hereto.

1)         The maturity date of the Note is hereby extended from April 30, 2004 to July 31, 2004 (“Maturity”).

2)         Accrued and unpaid interest on the Note through April 30, 2004 in the amount of $6,870 is hereby added to the $750,000 principal amount of the Note so that as of the date hereof, the principal amount of the Notehas been increased to $756,870 (the “New Principal Amount”).  Interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum will accrue on the unpaid New Principal Amount and be payable at Maturity.

Except as set forth in this letter, the Note remains unmodified and in full force and effect.

Please indicate your concurrence with the foregoing.

Sincerely,

                                                                                               Cenvill Recreation, Inc.

                                                                                               Agreed:/s/ JackJaiven                                                                         By:  /s/ Mark F. LevyJackJaiven                                                                                          Mark F. LevyVice President andTreasurer                                                               President
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

May 25, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00120

- CR

Jace Vincent MEAGHER

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 224th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021CR9095

Honorable Stephanie R. Boyd , Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s memorandum opinion of this date, appellant’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED.

It is so ORDERED on May 25, 2022

.

_____________________________ Irene Rios , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 25th da y of May, 2022

.

_____________________________ Michael A. Cruz , Clerk of Court
Exhibit 32.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                                (18 U.S.C. 1350)


     In  connection  with  Amendment  2 to the Annual Report of Leo Motors, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008, as filed with
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert  Kang, Chief Executive Officer and Interim Chief Financial Officer of the
Company,  certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18
U.S.C.  1350),  that  to  my  knowledge:


     1.   the Report  fully  complies  with  the  requirements  of Section 13(a)
          or  15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     2.   the information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material  respects,  the financial condition and results of operations
          of  the  Company.


                                        /s/ Robert Kang
                                        ---------------
                                        Robert Kang
                                        Chief Executive Officer, President
                                        and Interim Chief Financial Officer

                                        July 23, 2009