NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROSA MELIDA PINEDA-MONROY, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 15-73527 

Agency No. A206-783-615 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 12, 2022**

Before: SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Rosa Melida Pineda-Monroy, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions 

pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing 

her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 19 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-73527 

(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial 

evidence the agency’s factual findings, including determinations regarding social 

distinction. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We 

review de novo questions of law, including whether a particular social group is 

cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation 

of the governing statutes and regulations. Id. We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that PinedaMonroy failed to establish her proposed social group is socially distinct. See id. at 

1243 (petitioner’s proposed social group was not cognizable because of the 

absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction). Thus, the BIA did not 

err in concluding that Pineda-Monroy did not establish membership in a cognizable 

particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant 

must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common 

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct 

within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 

237 (BIA 2014))). 

The BIA did not err in declining to consider Pineda-Monroy’s arguments 

regarding imputed political opinion and the proposed particular social groups of 

“former business owners” and “witness against gang members who robbed and 
3 15-73527 

beat her” that were raised for the first time to the BIA. See Honcharov v. Barr, 

924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019) (BIA did not err in declining to consider 

argument raised for the first time on appeal). We do not consider these claims

because the BIA did not decide the issues. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 

F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (review limited to the grounds relied on by the BIA).

Thus, Pineda-Monroy’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because 

Pineda-Monroy failed to show it is more likely than not she would be tortured by 

or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. 

See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033-35 (9th Cir. 2014) (petitioner 

did not establish the necessary “state action” for CAT relief).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the 

mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.