[Cite as Cleveland v. Paramount Land Holdings, L.L.C., 2011-Ohio-3383.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95448 

CITY OF CLEVELAND

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

PARAMOUNT LAND HOLDINGS, LLC

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cleveland Municipal Court 

Case Nos. 08-CRB-37072, 08-CRB-41885, 

09-CRB-03590, 09-CRB-04261, 

09-CRB-27014, 09-CRB-30186, 

09-CRB-35426, and 09-CRB-44396

BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Boyle, P.J., and Cooney, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 7, 2011

 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
2

Richard G. Lillie 

Gretchen A. Holderman 

Lillie & Holderman 

75 Public Square 

Suite 1313 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2001 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Robert J. Triozzi 

Director of Law 

Karyn J. Lynn 

Assistant Director of Law 

City of Cleveland 

601 Lakeside Avenue, Room 106 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶ 1} Paramount Land Holdings, LLC (hereinafter referred to as 

“Paramount”), appeals from the decision of the Cleveland Municipal Court, 

Housing Division. Paramount argues the trial court failed to comply with 

Crim.R. 11, imposed excessive and unrelated fines, and that it was precluded 

from imposing multiple sentences on Paramount’s convictions. Finding 

merit to the appeal, we reverse and remand. 

{¶ 2} Throughout 2008 and 2009, the city of Cleveland filed the 

following cases against Paramount: 08-CRB-37072, 08-CRB-41885, 
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09-CRB-03590, 09-CRB-04261, 09-CRB-27014, 09-CRB-30186, 

09-CRB-35426, and 09-CRB-44396. Case Nos. 08-CRB-37072 and 

09-CRB-03590 were multiple count complaints for failure to correct building 

code violations while the remaining six cases involved minor misdemeanor 

health code violations. After several attempts to secure Paramount’s 

presence, the defendant finally appeared through its attorney on November 

16, 2009. At that time, Paramount pleaded not guilty on all cases and the 

court scheduled a supervised pretrial between the court’s magistrate, 

Paramount’s attorney, and the city prosecutor. 

{¶ 3} During the pretrial, the city made recommendations that 

Paramount pay $500 for each of the six minor misdemeanor cases for a total 

of $3,000 and $10,000 for Case No. 08-CRB-37072. The city prosecutor 

requested that Case No. 09-CRB-03590 be dismissed as it related to the 

same property as Case No. 08-CRB-37072. Additionally, as the city had 

already demolished the structure on this property, it also recommended that 

the fine of $10,000 be suspended by 90 percent if and when Paramount 

reimbursed the city for the costs of demolition. 

{¶ 4} On March 18, 2010, Paramount’s manager, George Kastanes, 

appeared in court via telephone for a change of plea hearing. Paramount 

provided the court with a corporate resolution indicating its authorization for 
4

attorney Edward Hayman to enter a plea of no contest on the company’s 

behalf. During the hearing, the court addressed the issue of Paramount’s 

expected no-contest plea on two occasions, then heard the city’s 

recommendations for each case. Without any further action or colloquy with 

the defendant, the court concluded the hearing and entered a no-contest plea 

in its journal entry. 

{¶ 5} In a June 18, 2010 journal entry, the trial court found 

Paramount guilty of all charges. The trial court also issued its decision on 

sentencing in written format that same day. At that time, the court 

sentenced Paramount to a $1,000 fine on each of the six minor misdemeanor 

cases, a $400,000 fine for the charges contained in Case No. 08-CRB-37072, 

and a $653,000 fine for the charges contained in Case No. 09-CRB-03590. 

{¶ 6} Paramount appeals, raising the six assignments of error 

attached in the appendix to this opinion. 

{¶ 7} In its first, second, and third assignments of error, Paramount 

attacks the validity of the court’s March 18, 2010 plea hearing. Specifically, 

Paramount alleges the trial court failed to actually take the no-contest plea, 

failed to inform Paramount of the effect of the no-contest plea, and failed to 

make a finding of guilt based on an explanation of circumstances. Because 

these assignments of error are interrelated and involve the same standard of 
5

review, they will be addressed together. 

{¶ 8} A review of the March 18, 2010 transcript reveals that the trial 

court failed, in many respects, to comply with Crim.R. 11 during this 

change of plea hearing. A trial court’s obligations in accepting a plea 

depend upon the level of offense to which the defendant is pleading. State v. 

Watkins, 99 Ohio St.3d 12, 2003-Ohio-2419, 788 N.E.2d 635; Parma v. 

Buckwald, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 92354 and 92356, 2009-Ohio-4032. For a 

petty offense, defined in Crim.R. 2(D), the court is instructed that it “may 

refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such pleas 

without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no 

contest, and not guilty.” Crim.R. 11(E); Buckwald. If the misdemeanor 

charge is a serious offense, defined in Crim.R. 2(C), the court shall not accept 

a guilty or no-contest plea “without first addressing the defendant personally 

and informing the defendant of the effect of the pleas of guilty, no contest, 

and not guilty and determining that the defendant is making the plea 

voluntarily.” Crim.R. 11(D); Buckwald. 

{¶ 9} The procedure set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2) for felony cases is 

more elaborate than that for misdemeanors. Buckwald. Before accepting a 

guilty plea in a felony case, a “trial court must inform the defendant that he 

is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to 
6

jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory 

process of witnesses.” State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 

N.E.2d 115, paragraph one of the syllabus. In addition to these 

constitutional rights, the trial court is required to determine that the 

defendant understands the nature of the charge, the maximum penalty 

involved, and the effect of the plea. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b); Buckwald. 

{¶ 10} It is clear that in all cases, i.e., petty misdemeanor offenses, 

serious misdemeanor offenses, and felonies, the judge must inform the 

defendant of the effect of his or her plea. Watkins; Buckwald. Both 

Paramount and the city of Cleveland agree that all charges against 

Paramount were petty misdemeanor offenses. 

{¶ 11} Primarily, we note that the transcript lacks any indication that 

the trial court ever took a no contest plea from Paramount. During the 

hearing, the court addressed the issue of a no contest plea on two occasions, 

but only in the context of what the court expected Paramount to do — not 

with respect to what it actually did. Neither Paramount nor its attorney 

ever entered a plea of no contest. 

“Court: We have a case here in Cleveland and the authorization is 

fine, but if there is a change from not guilty to no contest, we have to 

do what we call ‘Wanzo’ because it’s named after Mary [sic] Wanzo, 

the defendant. * * * [B]ut the only thing missing is that you 
7

understand that the corporation, not you personally, but the 

corporation in the criminal cases that are before us would be entering 

a plea of no contest, which is not an admission of guilt, but an 

admission that the violations did exist; and the corporation would be 

giving up its right to a jury trial; right against self-incrimination; right 

for compulsory process and right to have the City prove their case 

beyond a reasonable doubt; and that Mr. Hayman then will work on 

the case as outlined in your authorization. * * * So I just need to — 

that the corporation, both corporations Paramount Land Holdings and 

Interstate know their rights and knowingly and willingly give them up, 

and have authorized Mr. Hayman to act in their behalf today? 

“Mr. Kastanes: That would be correct.” Tr. 2-3. 

“Court: And he has authorized you to enter a no contest plea in the 

cases that are before us. Now, I understand that there are duplicate 

cases, and do you have the spreadsheet based upon the no contest plea 

by Paramount and Interstate? Does the City move to dismiss the 

duplicate cases?” Tr. 4. 

{¶ 12} These excerpts are the only references to Paramount’s alleged 

plea of no contest. Immediately after the above, the court allowed the city to 

present its recommendations as to fines for each offense. The court, without 

taking any further action, entered a plea of no contest. While Mr. Kastanes, 

on behalf of Paramount, did execute a corporate resolution authorizing 

attorney Hayman to change its plea from not guilty to no contest, the trial 

court never actually asked Mr. Hayman or Mr. Kastanes whether they 

wanted to change the plea from not guilty to no contest. Accordingly, the 

court was without any authority to enter the plea of no contest. 

{¶ 13} At its most basic level, the court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11 
8

because it failed to even take the plea of no contest from Paramount or its 

representative. See Cleveland v. McCoy, Cuyahoga App. No. 90763, 

2009-Ohio-2247. 

{¶ 14} Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court failed to inform 

Paramount of the effect of its no contest plea as required by Crim.R. 11(E), 

the language of which is set forth in Crim.R. 11(B)(2).1 Crim.R. 11(B) sets 

forth the “effect of guilty or no contest pleas.” This provision provides: 

“The plea of no contest is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is 

an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, 

information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall not be used 

against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.” 

Crim.R. 11(B)(2). 

{¶ 15} In Watkins, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that all that 

is required of a trial judge before accepting a plea to a petty misdemeanor 

offense under Traf.R. 10(D) and Crim.R. 11(E) is that the judge must inform 

the defendant of the information contained in Traf.R. 10(B) and Crim.R. 

11(B)(2) — both of which set forth the effect of the no contest plea. 

Buckwald. 

{¶ 16} In State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 

N.E.2d 677, the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the “effect 

 1

Although Paramount’s second assignment of error focuses on the court’s 

failure to inform Paramount of the maximum penalty for its crimes, we interpret 

this argument to include the failure to inform Paramount of the effect of its plea of 

no contest. 
9

of the plea.” It specifically addressed the question, “[w]hether a trial court 

complies with Crim.R. 11(E) by simply notifying a defendant of the effect of 

his/her plea as set out in Crim.R. 11(B) or whether the trial court complies 

with Crim.R. 11(E) by notifying a defendant of the maximum penalties that 

could result from a plea and that the defendant waives his/her right to jury 

trial by entering a plea, but does not notify a defendant of the effect of 

his/her plea.” Jones; Buckwald. 

{¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court stated that its prior cases “suggest” 

that Crim.R. 11(B), captioned “‘[e]ffect of guilty or no contest pleas,’ actually 

defines the effect of the plea.” Jones. Thus, “for a no contest plea, a 

defendant must be informed that the plea of no contest is not an admission of 

guilt but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, 

and that the plea or admission shall not be used against the defendant in 

any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.” Id., citing Traf.R. 10(B)(2) and 

Crim.R. 11(B)(2). The Ohio Supreme Court held that “to satisfy the 

requirement of informing a defendant of the effect of a plea, a trial court 

must inform the defendant of the appropriate language under Crim.R. 

11(B).” Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 18} A review of the record quoted above reveals that while the trial 

court did state “the corporation in the criminal cases that are before us 
10

would be entering a plea of no contest, which is not an admission of guilt, but 

an admission that the violations did exist,” the court failed to further explain 

that the plea or admission shall not be used against the defendant in any 

subsequent civil or criminal proceeding. Crim.R. 11(B)(2). Accordingly, the 

trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(E). 

{¶ 19} Notwithstanding the court’s failure to take a plea of no contest 

and its failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(E), the court purported to find 

Paramount guilty without any explanation of circumstances, as required by 

R.C. 2937.07, which provides: 

“A plea to a misdemeanor offense of ‘no contest’ or words of similar 

import shall constitute an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in 

the complaint and that the judge or magistrate may make a finding of 

guilty or not guilty from the explanation of the circumstances of the 

offense. If the offense to which the accused is entering a plea of ‘no 

contest’ is a minor misdemeanor, the judge or magistrate is not 

required to call for an explanation of the circumstances of the offense, 

and the judge or magistrate may base a finding on the facts alleged in 

the complaint.” 

{¶ 20} Although all cases but Case Nos. 2008CRB37072 and 

2009CRB03590 involved minor misdemeanors and, therefore, required no 

explanation of circumstances, the two cases cited involved multiple 

violations, including first degree misdemeanors, fourth degree 

misdemeanors, unclassified misdemeanors, and minor misdemeanors. 

Accordingly, Paramount alleges the court was required to base its finding of 
11

guilt on an explanation of circumstances. 

{¶ 21} “Section 2937.07 confers a substantive right on the accused to be 

discharged by a finding of not guilty where the ‘explanation of circumstances’ 

that the statute requires fails to establish all of the elements of the offense,” 

or where no explanation of circumstances is made at all. State v. Keplinger 

(Nov. 13, 1998), Greene App. No. 98-CA-24; State v. Osterfeld, Montgomery 

App. No. 20677, 2005-Ohio-3180. The state bears the burden to ensure that 

an explanation of circumstances appears on the record before a conviction is 

entered. Osterfeld. Although R.C. 2937.07 does not define the phrase 

“explanation of circumstances,” it requires evidence sufficient to demonstrate 

the accused’s criminal liability for the offense charged. Id. 

{¶ 22} In the present case, the record is devoid of any explanation of 

circumstances before the trial court found Paramount guilty. In opposition 

to this conclusion, the city suggests that the complaints and the tickets filed 

provide sufficient information to support a finding of guilt by the trial court. 

We disagree with the city’s argument. 

{¶ 23} The “explanation of circumstances” that R.C. 2937.07 requires is 

not satisfied by a presumption that the court was aware of facts that may be 

gleaned from a review of “the available documentation.” Cuyahoga Falls v. 

Bowers (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 148, 459 N.E.2d 532. “Rather, an ‘explanation 
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of circumstances’ necessarily, involves, at a minimum, some positive 

recitation of facts which, if the court finds them to be true, would permit the 

court to enter a guilty verdict and a judgment of conviction on the charge to 

which the accused has offered a plea of no contest.” Keplinger; Bowers. 

Lacking that, the defendant must be found not guilty. Id. 

{¶ 24} A review of the record of the plea proceeding reveals that no 

explanation of circumstances of any kind concerning the charges facing 

Paramount was made before the court erroneously entered the no contest 

plea and found Paramount guilty. 

{¶ 25} All in all, there was a complete failure on the part of the trial 

court to comply with Crim.R. 11. Not only did the trial court fail to take a 

plea of no contest, the court also failed to inform Paramount of the effect of 

the plea as required by Crim.R. 11(E) and it failed to elicit an explanation of 

circumstances before it found Paramount guilty as required by R.C. 2937.07. 

 As such, Paramount’s plea and sentence must be vacated. State v. Clark, 

119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462; Buckwald. 

{¶ 26} Paramount’s first, second, and third assignments of error are 

sustained. Our analysis of these assignments of error renders Paramount’s 

remaining assignments of error moot. 

{¶ 27} The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is 
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remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the lower court to 

carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR 

 

APPENDIX 

Assignments of Error: 

“I. The trial court committed reversible error in failing to have the 

defendant-appellant enter a valid plea, in violation of the United 

States and Ohio Constitutions and Ohio Crim.R. 11.” 
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“II. Defendant-appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive its 

constitutional rights with full knowledge of the maximum penalty 

included as required by Ohio Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).” 

“III. The trial court failed to make a finding of guilt based on an 

explanation of the circumstances of the offense in violation of Ohio 

R.C. 2937.07.” 

“IV. The trial court failed to advise the defendant-appellant that it 

had a right to confront witnesses against it.” 

“V. The total fine of $1,059,000.00 is excessive, unrelated, and grossly 

disproportionate to the offense to which defendant-appellant pled no 

contest, and constitutes an excessive fine in violation of the 

defendant-appellant’s rights as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and Section 9, Article I of the Ohio 

Constitution.” 

“VI. The defendant-appellant’s numerous/multiple convictions for 

building and housing code violations involved allied offenses of similar 

import, thus precluding the trial court’s imposition of multiple 

sentences.”