alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6259 

To revise the authority provided to the President to impose export licensing 

requirements or other restrictions on the export of crude oil from the 

United States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 14, 2021 

Mr. ARRINGTON (for himself, Mr. NEWHOUSE, Ms. VAN DUYNE, Mr. JACKSON, Ms. GRANGER, Mr. WILLIAMS of Texas, Mr. CAWTHORN, Mrs. MILLER of West Virginia, Mr. PFLUGER, Mr. TONY GONZALES of Texas, Mr. 

BUDD, Mr. BALDERSON, Mr. ROY, Mr. FALLON, Mr. BABIN, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. GOODEN of Texas, Mr. DUNCAN, Mrs. BICE of Oklahoma, Mr. 

CLOUD, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. CRENSHAW, and Mr. MCCAUL) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To revise the authority provided to the President to impose 

export licensing requirements or other restrictions on 

the export of crude oil from the United States, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Continuing Robust and 

5 Uninhibited Drilling and Exporting Act’’ or the ‘‘CRUDE 

6 Act’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6259 IH

1 SEC. 2. CRUDE OIL EXPORT LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 

2 AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS. 

3 Section 101(d)(1) of division O of the Consolidated 

4 Appropriations Act, 2016 (42 U.S.C. 6212a(d)(1)) is 

5 amended— 

6 (1) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as 

7 follows: 

8 ‘‘(A)(i) the Secretary of Defense, the Sec9 retary of Energy, and the Secretary of Com10 merce jointly find and report to the President 

11 and to the Congress that— 

12 ‘‘(I) the export of crude oil pursuant 

13 to this Act has caused sustained material 

14 oil supply shortages or sustained oil prices 

15 significantly above world market levels that 

16 are directly attributable to the export of 

17 crude oil produced in the United States; 

18 and 

19 ‘‘(II) those supply shortages or price 

20 increases have caused or are likely to cause 

21 sustained material adverse employment ef22 fects in the United States; and 

23 ‘‘(ii) the President declares a national 

24 emergency based on the findings of a report 

25 under clause (i) and formally notices the decVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:00 Dec 20, 2021 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6259.IH H6259

pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6259 IH

1 laration of a national emergency in the Federal 

2 Register; or’’; 

3 (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and 

4 inserting a period; and 

5 (3) by striking subparagraph (C). 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
Dismiss and Opinion Filed July 15, 2013.

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 13

- 00654

- CV

INWENCO USA, INC. , Appellant

V. WENZHOLD L.P. , Appellee

On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 11

- 15624

- H

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Bridges, and Lang

- Miers

Opinion by Justice Moseley Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss its appeal. In the mot ion, appellant states the

parties have settled their dispute and appellant no longer wishes to appeal the trial court’s

judgment. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42. 1 ( a ) (1)

.

130654F.P05 /Jim Moseley/ JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE– 2

– 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

INWENCO USA, INC., Appellant

No. 05

- 13

- 00654

- CV V.

WENZHOLD L.P., Appellee On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 11

- 15624

- H. Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, Justices Bridges and Lang

- Miers participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal. We ORDER that each party bear its own costs of the appeal.

Judgment entered this 15th day of July, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/ JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE
#### In re RUSTON CREAMERY, Inc. Opposition of T. L. JAMES & CO. et al.

No. 5475.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

April 30, 1937.

T. L. Scarborough and Lenora Fuller, both of Ruston, for appellant.

Dhu Thompson, of Monroe, Elder & Elder, of Ruston, and Barksdale, Bullock, Warren, Clark & Van Hook, of Shreveport, for appellees.

HAMITER, Judge.

Counsel for all parties litigant in this receivership proceeding have joined in a written motion for the transferring of the appeal to the Supreme Court. Therein the averment is made that the amount of the fund to be distributed by the receivers in the cause exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this court.

The appeal is one for the consideration of the highest court in this state, as counsel suggest, and the motion will be granted. Succession of Wengert, 178 La. 1027, 152 So. 747; Snyder Wagon Company v. Campbell Ice Cream Company, 173 La. 467, 137 So. 855; General Motors Truck Company et al. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Company, Inc., et al. (La.App.) 172 So. 178.

Accordingly, and pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 19 of 1912, it is ordered that the appeal in this case be transferred to the Louisiana Supreme Court; that a period of 60 days is granted for the perfecting of the transfer, dating from the finality of this decree; and that on failure to make the transfer within that period, the appeal shall stand dismissed.

Appellant shall pay the cost of this appeal, and all other costs shall abide the final disposition of the case.
### NUMBER 13

- 10

- 00436

- CV



## COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

PATRICIA GOMEZ MONROY, Appellant,

v.

MARIA DE LOS ANGELES DOMIT, ET AL., Appellees.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 370th District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



## O R D E R

Before Justice s Garza, Benavides, and Perkes

Order Per Curiam

This appeal was abated by this Court on December 21, 2011 , due to the

bankruptcy of one of the parties to this appeal. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; see generally T EX

.

R. A PP

. P . 8. On March 21, 2013, this Court issued an order requesting the status of the

appeal. In response, the parties requested the appeal remain abated. Since that time

,

there has been no activity in this appeal.2

The Court hereby orders the parties to file, within fourteen days of the date of this

order, an advisory regarding the status of the appeal and, if applicable, a motion to

reinstate the appeal or a motion to dismiss the appeal.

Failure to respond to this order will result in reinstatement and dismissal of the

appeal for want of prosecution. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.3(b),(c).

It is so ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

D elivered and filed the

8th day of May, 20 1 4

.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASON MARR, Petitioner - Appellant,
v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent - Appellee. No. 13-35189 D.C. Nos. 1:12-cv-00185-BLW 1:10-cr-00182-BLW-5
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 9, 2014 ** Seattle, Washington Before: PAEZ, BYBEE, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. Appellant Jason Marr appeals the distri ct court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Marr contends that law enforcement 

# FILED
OCT 15 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).withheld impeachment eviden ce from him in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
. We review de novo a district c ourt’s denial of defendant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and we review for clear error its factual findings. United States v. Guess , 203 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm. To determine whether a Brady violation has occurred, the court considers whether the evidence was: (1) “favorableto the accused,” (2) “suppressed by the government,” and (3) “material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” United States v. Jernigan , 492 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Evidence is material if its admission would have created a “reasonable probability” of a different result. Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). In this case, the Government concedes that la w enforcement suppressed evidence and that this evidence was favorable to Marr. Thus , the only issue in dispute is whether the evidence was material. The Government had substantial evid ence showing Marr’s participation in the distribution conspiracy. First, su rveillance officers witnessed Marr conduct drug transactions with two methamphe tamine distributors on nine separate occasions during a 19-day period. Officers monitoring the distributors’ cell phones also identified multiple phone calls betw een Marr and the distributors. Second, these two distributors confessed to, and were willing to testify about, their 2agreement to supply Marr with four ounces of methamphetamine per week. And finally, Marr twice confessed to pur chasing methamphetamine from these distributors and then reselling it at a profit. All of this evidence would have been admissible through witnesses other than the persons about whom law enforcement withheld impeachment evidence. Given the strength of the evidence against Marr and the admissibility of the evidence through other witnesses, the district court did not err in concluding that the withheld impeachment evidence was not material to Marr’s decision to plead guilty. AFFIRMED.

3
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rudolph Ali CHAMBLEE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-7111.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 14, 2002.

Rudolph Ali Chamblee, Appellant Pro Se. Laura Marie Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAM D. WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Rudolph Ali Chamblee seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). An appeal may not be taken to this court from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2255 petition solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of *630the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’ ” *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)). We have reviewed the record and conclude for the reasons stated by the district court that Chamblee has not made a requisite showing. *See United States v. Chamblee,*No. CR-06-140 (E.D. Va. filed May 17, 2002 & entered May 20, 2002). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Applied Biosystems Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, Dennis L. Winger, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  | 
|----------------------- |  | 
|                        |  | 
|                        | 
|/s/ Dennis L. Winger    |  | 
|Chief Financial Officer |  | 

Date: November 6, 2008
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM SEC FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                              99
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      584
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        532
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,532
<PP&E>                                           3,642
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,962
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   5,050
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,021
<BONDS>                                          1,994
<COMMON>                                           698
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              195
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                      (1,627)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     5,050
<SALES>                                          3,773
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,773
<CGS>                                            2,844
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,844
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    (2)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 112
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    336
<INCOME-TAX>                                       118
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                218
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       209
<EPS-BASIC>                                       3.87<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     3.62<F2>
<FN>
<F1>REPRESENTS BASIC EARNINGS PER SHARE AS DEFINED IN FASB
STATEMENT NO. 128.
<F2>REPRESENTS DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE AS DEFINED IN FASB
STATEMENT NO. 128.
</FN>
#### McDONALD et ux. v. SOUTHWESTERN GAS & ELECTRIC CO. et al.

No. 4074.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

March 6, 1933.

For former opinion, see 136 So. 169.

Thomas W. Robertson, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Wilkinson, Lewis & Wilkinson, of Shreveport, for appellee.

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

The pleadings and facts of this case are fully set forth in our original opinion reported in 136 So. 169. A rehearing was granted by us to the defendant, Southwestern Gas & Electric Company, but denied to its codefend-ant, Shreveport Railways Company. This defendant applied to the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari or review of our decree affirming the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the lower court, holding it liable in damages for the death of the minor son of plaintiffs. The Supreme Court granted the application for the writ and ordered the ease up for its review.

That court reversed the judgment of this court and absolved the Shreveport Railways Company from any liability to plaintiffs. While the court only had before it primarily the case of the Shreveport Railways Company, yet, in passing on the involved questions presented by its defense, it necessarily, impliedly at’ least, passed on the question of the Southwestern Gas *&*Electric Company’s responsibility. It was held by the court (174 La. 1023, 142 So. 252) that the tower with attachments for distribution of electricity, erected and operated by defendants on land of the railway company, inclosed by seven-foot fence, was not an attractive nuisance. The case turned on this point.

Under the facts of the case, if the railways company cannot be held liable, of course it is obvious the electric company cannot be held.

For the reasons herein assigned, and assigned by the Supreme Court in its opinion on application of Shreveport Railways Company for writ of review, reported in 174 La. 1023, 142 So. 252, our former judgment against the Southwestern Gas & Electric Company is annulled and set aside, and the judgment of the lower court in its favor is affirmed.

MILLS, J., recused.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 167 (Wednesday, August 27, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 50645-50646]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19797]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION


Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission to OMB for 
Reinstatement; Comment Request

AGENCY: National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).

ACTION: Request for comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The NCUA is submitting the following information collection to 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and clearance 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-13, 44 U.S.C. 
Chapter 35). This information collection is published to obtain 
comments from the public.

DATES: Comments will be accepted until September 26, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties are invited to submit written comments to 
the NCUA Clearance Officer listed below:
    Clearance Officer: Mr. Jeryl Fish, National Credit Union 
Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314-3428, Fax No. 
703-837-2861, E-mail: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d699959f999bb7bfba96b8b5a3b7f8b1b9a0"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="440b070d0b09252d28042a2731256a232b32">[email protected]</span></a>.

[[Page 50646]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional information or 
a copy of the information collection request should be directed to 
Tracy Sumpter at the National Credit Union Administration, 1775 Duke 
Street, Alexandria, VA 22314-3428, or at (703) 518-6444.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Proposal for the following collection of 
information:
    Title: Central Liquidity Facility Regular Member Membership 
Application.
    OMB Number: 3133-0063.
    Form Number: CLF--8702.
    Type of Review: Reinstatement of a previously approved collection.
    Description: This is a one-time form used to request membership in 
the CLF.
    Respondents: Credit unions seeking membership in the CLF.
    Estimated No. of Respondents/Record keepers: 25.
    Estimated Burden Hours Per Response: .5 hour.
    Frequency of Response: Other. As credit unions request membership 
in the CLF.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 12.5 hours.
    Estimated Total Annual Cost: 0.

    By the National Credit Union Administration Board on August 20, 
2008.
Mary Rupp,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. E8-19797 Filed 8-26-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7535-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 6814** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. MONTE MOORE , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Newport News . Arenda L. Wright Allen , District Judge. ( 4:12

- cr - 00104

- AWA

- LRL

- 1 ; 4:15

- cv - 00062

- AWA )

Submitted : October 18, 2016 Decided: October 21, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
.

Monte Moore , Appellant Pro Se. Eric Matthew Hurt, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Monte Moore seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ( 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealabil ity will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists wou ld find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutio nal right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that
Moore has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument beca use the facts and legal3 c ontentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**P&F INDUSTRIES, INC.**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Richard A. Horowitz, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

| /s/ RICHARD  A. HOROWITZ    |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Richard A. Horowitz         |   |
| Principal Executive Officer |   |
| November 10, 2006           |   |

 

----