In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 7, 2023

S22A0885. WILSON v. THE STATE.

 PINSON, Justice.

Antonio Wilson was convicted of felony murder in connection 

with the shooting death of Tre Griffin.1 On appeal, he contends that 

 1 The crimes occurred on November 19, 2017. On April 24, 2018, a 

DeKalb County grand jury returned an indictment against Wilson and two codefendants, Adonis Lewis and Braindon Cayo; a superseding indictment was 

issued on February 5, 2019. The superseding indictment charged the 

defendants with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on armed 

robbery (Count 2), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 3), 

felony murder predicated on conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled 

Substances Act (Count 4), armed robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault 

(Count 6), conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act (Count 

7), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 8). Codefendant Lewis pleaded guilty to all charges. Co-defendant Cayo pleaded 

guilty to Counts 7 and 8 and pleaded guilty to the reduced charges of voluntary 

manslaughter and robbery as to Counts 4 and 5, with his remaining charges 

nolle prossed. Wilson pleaded not guilty and was tried by a jury from July 15 

to 19, 2019. The jury found him guilty of Counts 4 and 7 and not guilty of the 

remaining charges. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 

of parole for Count 4, with Count 7 merging into Count 4 for sentencing 

purposes. Wilson, through new counsel, filed a timely motion for new trial, 

which the trial court denied after a hearing. Wilson filed a timely notice of 

appeal. The case was docketed to the August 2022 term of this Court and 

submitted for a decision on the briefs. 
2

(1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for

conspiracy to purchase marijuana; (2) his indictment did not 

adequately describe that drug-conspiracy charge, which was the

predicate felony for his felony-murder charge; (3) the State failed to 

prove that the predicate felony proximately caused the victim’s

death; (4) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury that a 

felony-murder conviction must be based on proof that the predicate 

felony proximately caused the death; (5) the trial court did not

properly instruct the jury on conspiracy to possess marijuana as a 

lesser included offense of conspiracy to purchase marijuana; (6) the 

trial court improperly instructed the jury about proof of 

participation in a conspiracy; (7) the trial court improperly admitted 

irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, including a homemade rap video 

and Instagram messages from Wilson to a co-defendant; and (8) the 

trial court improperly imposed a sentence of life without parole. 

Each of these claims fails. The evidence was sufficient to 

support Wilson’s drug-conspiracy conviction. The indictment 

satisfied due process because the predicate felony for the felony 
3

murder charge was fully described in a separate count. The State 

established that the predicate felony—conspiracy to purchase 

marijuana—proximately caused Griffin’s death, because it was 

reasonably foreseeable that violence could ensue during the planned 

transaction in illegal drugs, which our decisions have consistently 

recognized are inherently dangerous. The trial court was not 

required to give Wilson’s requested jury instructions: the court’s 

instructions on proximate cause and proof of participation in a 

conspiracy included all the points of law that Wilson’s requested 

instructions contained, and no evidence could support a theory that 

Wilson was guilty only of conspiracy to possess marijuana but not 

conspiracy to purchase because, on the facts here, any conspiracy to 

possess the marijuana necessarily included the step of purchasing it 

from Griffin. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

the homemade rap video and the Instagram messages, which were 

probative because they connected the defendants to the murder 

weapon and showed them in close association, and did not give rise 

to a substantial danger of unfair prejudice. Finally, the trial court 
4

could sentence Wilson to life without parole without any finding of 

aggravating factors, and the record does not show that the court 

relied on improper factors in doing so. So we affirm Wilson’s 

convictions and sentence.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the 

evidence at trial showed the following. 

(a) On the morning of the shooting, Wilson was at Braindon 

Cayo’s house smoking marijuana with Cayo, Adonis Lewis, Cayo’s 

girlfriend, Britney Coleman, and Wilson’s girlfriend, Auviance West. 

At around 2:00 p.m. they were joined by Jalene Wright. 

The group discussed going to buy more marijuana from Lewis’s 

regular dealer, Griffin. Wilson was involved in the planning: West 

testified that she gave Wilson money because “[h]e said he was going 

to go buy weed,” and Wright testified that Cayo asked her, on behalf 

of himself, Wilson, and Lewis, if they could borrow her car to go 

make the purchase.

Wilson, Cayo, Lewis, Coleman, and Wright left in Wright’s car 

to drive to Griffin’s house; West stayed behind. According to 
5

Coleman, Cayo drove while Lewis talked to Griffin on the phone. 

Wright testified that “[t]he boys” were talking about not paying for 

the marijuana that they had ordered. Among other things, Cayo and 

Lewis knew that Griffin would use a scale to weigh the marijuana, 

and they were planning to have him place the scale on the ground 

“[s]o he wouldn’t be looking around.”

The group arrived at Griffin’s house. Lewis got out of the car 

and stood by the driver’s side door. Griffin came down the driveway 

carrying a bookbag and wearing a gun on his hip. Lewis and Griffin 

greeted each other, and Lewis got out the money while Griffin pulled 

marijuana and a scale from his bookbag. Griffin put the scale on the 

ground by the driver’s side door to weigh the marijuana. Lewis stood 

nearby.

Wilson got out of the passenger side of the car and walked 

around to the driver’s side where Griffin was. A few seconds later, 

Griffin was shot. No one admitted to seeing the actual shooting. But 

Coleman, Wright, Cayo, and Lewis all testified that they saw Wilson 

holding a gun afterwards, either just after the shooting or in the car 
6

on the way back to Cayo’s house. 

Lewis picked up Griffin’s bookbag and got back in the car. On 

the way back to Cayo’s house, Wilson took the SIM card from 

Griffin’s phone and Cayo threw the phone out the window. When 

they arrived at Cayo’s house, Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis divided up 

the marijuana from the bookbag. Then they burned the bookbag and 

talked about selling the murder weapon. Wilson reported to West,

“we robbed him.”

(b) Right after Griffin was shot, his mother called 911. 

Investigators at the scene got Griffin’s phone number from his 

family and obtained a description of the car that was seen driving 

away from the shooting. In the following weeks, police got a tip that 

led them to Wright. They then found Wright on social media and 

were able to connect her to the car. When Wright was interviewed 

by police, she told them that on the day of the shooting she went to 

Cayo’s house and that “all three of the guys at the house”—Cayo, 

Lewis, and Wilson—went to buy marijuana. She admitted later that 

she and Coleman went with them. 
7

Police also obtained significant information from cell-phone 

data. Griffin’s phone records showed that five minutes before his 

mother called 911, he received a call from a phone that was later 

connected to Lewis’s mother. Police obtained the records and data 

from Lewis’s mother’s phone and found that the phone call to Griffin 

pinged a cell tower that was a half mile from Griffin’s house. Lewis’s 

mother’s phone also contained photos of Cayo and Lewis holding a 

handgun. A firearms expert from the Georgia Bureau of 

Investigation testified that the handgun in the photos appeared to 

be a Smith & Wesson SD9, and that the bullet recovered from 

Griffin’s body could have been fired from that type of gun. And 

Lewis’s mother’s phone also contained a text message conversation 

that included a YouTube link to a rap video entitled “Dope,” in which 

Cayo, Lewis, and Wilson appeared and Cayo and Lewis “flashed 

around” a handgun. Cayo and West testified that the gun in the 

“Dope” video was the one used to kill Griffin.

2. Wilson first contends that the evidence was not sufficient as 

a matter of constitutional due process to support his conviction for 
8

conspiracy to purchase marijuana. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LEd2d 560) (1979). We evaluate a dueprocess challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by viewing the 

evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the 

verdicts, and asking whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes 

of which he was convicted. Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 714 (2) (b) 

(878 SE2d 247) (2022). “We leave to the jury the resolution of 

conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, 

and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts.” Perkins v. 

State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 185) (2022) (citation and 

punctuation omitted).

A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime “when he 

together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime 

and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the 

object of the conspiracy.” OCGA § 16-4-8. A conspiracy requires an 

agreement between two or more people, but that agreement “need 

not be express, nor does it require a meeting of the minds to the 
9

same degree necessary to form a contract.” Griffin v. State, 294 Ga. 

325, 327 (751 SE2d 773) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

Instead, “all that is required is a tacit mutual understanding 

between persons to pursue a common criminal objective.” Id. The 

mutual understanding may be established either by direct proof or 

by inference from acts and conduct which “disclose[] a common 

design...to act together for the accomplishment of the unlawful 

purpose.” Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 699 (2) (715 SE2d 110) 

(2011) (citation omitted).

The evidence here was sufficient to support Wilson’s conviction

for conspiracy to purchase marijuana. First, there was testimony

that Wilson was an active participant in the plan to buy marijuana 

from Griffin: Wright testified that when Cayo asked to borrow her 

car to go make the purchase, he was asking on behalf of Wilson and 

Lewis as well as himself. West testified that she gave Wilson money 

because “[h]e said he was going to go buy weed.” And multiple 

witnesses testified that Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis divided the 

marijuana among them after they had obtained it. See McLeod v. 
10

State, 297 Ga. 99, 103 (2) (772 SE2d 641) (2015) (“appellant’s shared 

criminal intent with her co-conspirators may be inferred by her 

conduct before, during, and after the crimes”). That was enough to 

show a mutual understanding among Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis to 

purchase marijuana. Also, the evidence showed that all three did 

overt acts in furtherance of their plan: among other things, Wilson 

collected money from West, Lewis contacted Griffin to arrange the 

purchase, and Cayo obtained Wright’s car. This evidence of those 

overt acts, together with that of the participants’ mutual 

understanding, was sufficient to support Wilson’s conviction for 

conspiracy to purchase marijuana.

3. Wilson contends the trial court erred by denying his special 

demurrer to quash Count 4 of the indictment. Count 4 charged 

Wilson (along with Cayo and Lewis) with felony murder for causing 

Griffin’s death “while in the commission of the offense of Conspiracy 

to Violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, a felony.” Wilson 

argued in the special demurrer, as he does on appeal, that the count

was not sufficient as a matter of due process because it did not 
11

adequately describe the predicate felony. “We review a ruling on a 

special demurrer de novo to determine the legal sufficiency of the 

allegations in the indictment.” Sanders v. State, 313 Ga. 191, 195 (3) 

(869 SE2d 411) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

As described in footnote 1, Wilson was convicted of Counts 4 

and 7 of the indictment. Count 4 charged Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis 

with felony murder predicated on conspiracy to violate the Georgia 

Controlled Substances Act. Count 7, in turn, charged that all three

“unlawfully conspired with each other to commit the offense of 

Purchase of Marijuana, in violation of code section 16-13-30 of the 

Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and in furtherance of said 

conspiracy, did do the following overt acts to effect the object of the 

conspiracy: contacted Tre Griffin to arrange the purchase of 

marijuana, secured a method of transportation to the residence of 

Tre Griffin, traveled to the residence of Tre Griffin, and met in 

person with Tre Griffin.” No other count charged any defendant with 

any violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act.

The purpose of an indictment “is to allow the defendant to 
12

prepare his defense intelligently and to protect him from double 

jeopardy.” Jones v. State, 289 Ga. 111, 116 (2) (c) (709 SE2d 773) 

(2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). To satisfy due process, 

the indictment must “contain all the essential elements of the crime” 

and must “notify the accused of what factual allegations he must 

defend in court.” Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 139, 140 (1) (800 

SE2d 356) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). The test for 

determining the constitutional sufficiency of an indictment is not, 

therefore, whether it could be made more certain and definite, but 

whether it puts the defendant on notice of the crimes with which he 

is charged and sufficiently apprises him of what he must be prepared 

to meet. See Sanders, 313 Ga. at 195 (3). When applying this test, 

“the indictment is read as a whole.” Id. at 196 (3) (a) (ii) (punctuation 

and citation omitted). 

Wilson’s indictment was constitutionally sufficient. Count 4 

charged him with felony murder for causing Griffin’s death while 

committing conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances 

Act; Count 7, in turn, charged him with conspiracy to purchase 
13

marijuana in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, 

and laid out specific factual allegations supporting that charge. 

Read as a whole, see Sanders, 313 Ga. at 196 (3) (a) (ii), the 

indictment put Wilson on notice of the crimes charged and the 

factual allegations he had to defend against. And contrary to 

Wilson’s contention, the details of the predicate felony did not have

to be specified in the felony murder count. It was enough that they 

were specified in the count charging the predicate felony. See id. at 

197-198 (3) (a) (iii) (indictment was constitutionally sufficient when 

Count 1 charged defendant with felony murder for causing victim’s 

death while committing conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, 

and Count 3 charged him with conspiracy to commit aggravated 

assault and laid out the factual allegations supporting that charge). 

The indictment satisfied the requirements of due process and so the 

trial court did not err in denying Wilson’s special demurrer.

4. Wilson next contends the State did not prove that the 

conspiracy to purchase marijuana proximately caused Griffin’s 

death. He argues that a conspiracy to purchase marijuana is not 
14

inherently dangerous, and that he could not have foreseen that his 

involvement in that crime alone—with no anticipation of an armed 

robbery or aggravated assault, neither of which he was convicted

of—would lead to Griffin’s murder.

A person commits felony murder when, “in the commission of 

a felony, he or she causes the death of another human being 

irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). The causation element 

requires proof of proximate cause. Campbell-Williams v. State, 309 

Ga. 585, 587 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 583) (2020). Under the proximatecause standard, the defendant is liable “for the reasonably 

foreseeable results of criminal conduct if there is no sufficient, 

independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.” Menzies v. State, 

304 Ga. 156, 161 (II) (816 SE2d 638) (2018) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). Any felony can be a predicate for felony 

murder so long as it is “inherently dangerous to human life,” 

meaning that it is “dangerous per se” or “by its circumstances 

create[d] a foreseeable risk of death.” Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 

760 (4) (725 SE2d 280) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted).
15

Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the 

conspiracy to purchase marijuana proximately caused Griffin’s 

death. We have recognized time and again that transactions in 

illegal drugs are inherently dangerous. See State v. Spratlin, 305 

Ga. 585, 595-596 (2) (b) (826 SE2d 36) (2019) (“this Court and others 

have recognized that violence is inherent in the business of dealing 

illegal drugs”) (punctuation omitted); Davis, 290 Ga. at 760-761 (4) 

(explaining that it is “not unusual” for parties to an illegal drug 

transaction to be armed, and citing cases noting that it was not 

unreasonable to expect firearms to be present at a drug transaction 

or to believe that one’s safety was in danger when going to a known 

drug area). This is because it is among the “incidental, probable 

consequences” of an illegal drug transaction that something may go 

wrong and someone may be killed. See Davis, 290 Ga. at 760 (4) 

(defendant proximately caused victim’s death when he arranged to 

purchase marijuana from the victim, “something went wrong,” and 

the defendant’s brother shot the victim). Indeed, at Wilson’s trial, a 

homicide detective testified that “at least 75 to 80 percent” of his 
16

homicides involved drug transactions. 

Wilson urges that it was not the conspiracy to purchase 

marijuana but the later plan to rob Griffin—of which he was 

acquitted—that foreseeably caused Griffin’s death. But “[r]egardless 

of whether an [armed] robbery took place, the [parties] met for a 

drug transaction and something went wrong”—which was 

reasonably foreseeable. Davis, 290 Ga. at 760 (4). The proximatecause requirement is satisfied here, so this claim of error fails.

5. Wilson contends that the trial court erred by failing to give 

his requested jury instruction on proximate cause. We review de 

novo a properly preserved claim that a trial court erred in refusing 

to instruct the jury on an applicable principle of law. See Reese v. 

State, 314 Ga. 871, 879-880 (2) (880 SE2d 117) (2022).

Wilson asked for an instruction to the effect that the jury could 

not convict him of felony murder unless it found beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he committed a felony that both proximately caused the 

victim’s death and was dangerous enough that it created a 

foreseeable risk that it would result in the victim’s death. The trial 
17

court declined to give that instruction. Instead, the trial court gave 

the following instruction on causation for felony murder: 

A person commits armed robbery, aggravated assault, 

and conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled 

Substance Act as previously defined. In order for homicide 

to have been done in the commission of these particular 

felonies, there must be some connection between the 

felony and the homicide. The homicide must have been 

done in carrying out the unlawful act and not collateral to 

it. It is not enough that the homicide occurred soon or 

presently after the felony was attempted or committed. 

There must be a legal relationship between the homicide 

and the felony so as to cause you to find that the homicide 

occurred before the felony was at an end, or before any 

attempt to avoid conviction or arrest for the felony. The 

felony must have a legal relationship to the homicide, be 

at least concurrent with it in part, and be part of it in the 

actual and material sense. A homicide is committed in the 

carrying out of a felony when it is committed by the 

accused when engaged in the performance of any act 

required for the full execution of a felony.2

The trial court also properly defined felony murder for the jury, 

explaining that “[a] person commits the crime of murder, when in 

commission of a felony, that person causes the death of another 

 2 This was the pattern jury instruction at the time. See Ware v. State, 

305 Ga. 457, 459 (2) (826 SE2d 56) (2019) (citing Georgia Suggested Pattern 

Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed. 2007, updated Jan. 2017), 

§ 2.10.30).
18

human being with or without malice.” And the trial court instructed 

the jury on the various predicate offenses Wilson had been charged

with.

Those instructions, taken together, adequately informed the 

jury about the principles of proximate cause that applied to this 

case. See Ware v. State, 305 Ga. 457, 459-460 (2) (826 SE2d 56) 

(2019) (concluding that the same set of instructions fully informed 

the jury that it could not convict the defendant of felony murder 

unless it found that he committed a predicate felony that 

proximately caused the victim’s death). See also Campbell-Williams, 

309 Ga. at 588 (2) (a) (jury instructions are “read and considered as 

a whole in determining whether there is error”) (citation omitted).

The jury was instructed that it could not convict Wilson of felony 

murder unless it found that he was guilty of one of the charged 

predicate felonies; that the murder was “done in the commission of,” 

and “at least concurrent with” and “not collateral to,” the predicate 

felony; and that the predicate felony was related to the murder “in 

an actual and material sense.” Following those instructions—as 
19

jurors are presumed to do, see Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 190 (6) (850 

SE2d 110) (2020)—the jury could not have found Wilson guilty of 

felony murder unless it found he committed one of the predicate 

felonies and that that felony proximately caused Griffin’s death.

Wilson’s requested instruction also would have told the jury 

that a predicate felony for a felony murder must itself be inherently 

dangerous. But our “clear precedent” is that such an instruction is 

not required, even when requested. Davis, 290 Ga. at 762 (5) (b). See 

also State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 34 (2) (b) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) ( “our 

case law runs contrary to” the notion that a trial court must “instruct 

the jury explicitly that it must find as an element of the felony 

murder that the underlying felony...was committed in a manner 

that created a foreseeable risk of death”). So the trial court’s failure 

to give that part of the instruction was not error.

Because the trial court fully and correctly instructed the jury 

on the relevant points of law, it was not error to fail to give the

additional explanatory instruction that Wilson requested. See, e.g.,

Stafford v. State, 312 Ga. 811, 821 (4) (865 SE2d 116) (2021) (where 
20

trial court gave updated version of pattern jury instruction on 

causation in felony murder, no additional instruction on unforeseen 

or intervening cause was needed because, “considered as a whole, 

the charge given by the trial court was a correct statement of the 

law with regard to proximate cause in a felony murder case”);

Whiting v. State, 296 Ga. 429, 431 (2) (768 SE2d 448) (2015) (trial 

court not required to give separate charge on proximate cause when 

court’s instructions “adequately informed the jury that Whiting 

could only be found guilty of felony murder if the conspiracy to 

conduct the marijuana transaction was the proximate cause of [the 

victim’s] death”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

6. Wilson asked for a jury instruction on conspiracy to possess 

marijuana as a lesser included felony or misdemeanor offense of 

conspiracy to purchase marijuana. The trial court declined to give 

that instruction, and Wilson contends this was error.

A written request to charge a lesser included offense “must 

always be given if there is any evidence that the defendant is guilty 

of the lesser included offense.” Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517, 520 (2) 
21

(813 SE2d 343) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). The 

evidence “does not need to be persuasive, but it must exist.” Id. 

(citation and punctuation omitted). If there is no evidence that the 

defendant committed the lesser offense, then the trial court is 

justified in refusing to charge on it. Id. And when the evidence shows 

that the defendant could have committed only the greater offense as 

charged or no crime at all, an instruction on a lesser included offense 

is not required. See Walker v. State, 311 Ga. 719, 722 (2) (859 SE2d 

25) (2021). Whether the evidence warranted the requested 

instruction is a legal question that we review de novo. See id.

Here, even assuming that conspiracy to possess is a lesser 

included offense of conspiracy to purchase,3 the evidence could not 

support a finding that Wilson was guilty only of conspiracy to 

possess marijuana and not conspiracy to purchase. It is undisputed 

that Wilson at least knew about the plan to buy more marijuana 

 3 The State argues that no instruction on conspiracy to possess was 

necessary because actual possession is not a lesser included offense of 

conspiracy to purchase. We do not reach that question, but we assume without 

deciding that conspiracy to possess is a lesser included offense of conspiracy to 

purchase.
22

from Griffin. If he conspired with Cayo and Lewis to possess that

marijuana, it could only have been through that purchase. In other 

words, the two possible conspiracies were the same: the plan to 

possess the marijuana necessarily included the step of purchasing it 

from Griffin. And Wilson could be guilty of that conspiracy even if, 

as he argues, he did not actively participate in planning the 

transaction. See OCGA § 16-4-8 (“A person commits the offense of 

conspiracy to commit a crime when he together with one or more 

persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such 

persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy.”) 

(emphasis added); Martin v. State, 310 Ga. 658, 661 (1) (852 SE2d 

834) (2020) (“all of the participants in a conspiracy are criminally 

responsible for the acts of each, committed in the execution of the 

conspiracy, and which may be said to be a probable consequence of 

the conspiracy, even though the particular act may not actually have 

been part of the plan”) (citation and punctuation omitted). In short, 

Wilson either was part of the conspiracy to purchase, or he was not 

involved at all, but he could not have been guilty only of conspiracy 
23

to possess. See Walker, 311 Ga. at 722-723 (2). So the trial court was 

not required to give an instruction on that offense as a lesser 

included offense of conspiracy to purchase. See id.

7. Wilson contends that the trial court erred by declining to 

give his requested instruction on the proof needed to show his 

participation in the conspiracy. The requested instruction would 

have told the jury that Wilson could not be guilty of conspiracy 

unless the State proved “that a conspiracy existed, that the 

defendant knew the essential objectives of that conspiracy, and that 

armed with that knowledge he participated” in the conspiracy. 

We see no error because the points of law in Wilson’s requested 

instruction were covered in the court’s other instructions. The trial 

court gave jury instructions that track the current pattern 

instructions on the defendant’s criminal intent, mere presence, and 

mere association. See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, 

Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed. 2007, updated Aug. 2022), §§ 1.43.10, 

1.43.30, 1.43.31. Those instructions informed the jury that the State 

had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson “knowingly and 
24

intentionally participated in or helped in the commission of” the 

conspiracy, and that Wilson must be acquitted if the jury found that 

he did not knowingly or intentionally participate in the conspiracy,

that he was merely present at the scene, or that he was merely 

associated with other guilty parties. See id. §§ 1.43.10, 1.43.30, 

1.43.31. We see no meaningful difference between proof that Wilson 

“knowingly and intentionally” participated in the conspiracy and 

proof that he “knew the essential objectives of” the conspiracy and 

“armed with that knowledge...participated” in it. Wilson’s requested 

jury instruction added no essential point of law to the existing 

instructions, so it was not error for the trial court to decline to give 

it. See Francis v. State, 296 Ga. 190, 194 (2) (766 SE2d 52) (2014) 

(“[a] trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a jury 

charge in the exact language requested when the charge given 

substantially covers the correct principles of law”) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). See also, e.g., Stafford, 312 Ga. at 821 (4) (no 

additional jury instruction necessary when instructions given 

adequately covered applicable legal principles).
25

8. Wilson contends that the trial court erred by admitting

evidence that, in Wilson’s view, was irrelevant and prejudicial. He 

challenges two pieces of evidence: the “Dope” rap video and a series 

of Instagram messages from Wilson to Cayo. We review a trial 

court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Jones v. State, 

305 Ga. 653, 655 (2) (827 SE2d 254) (2019).

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 

the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. Generally, relevant evidence is 

admissible. See OCGA § 24-4-402. The standard for relevance is “a 

liberal one,” and relevant evidence is admissible “even if it has only 

slight probative value.” Jordan v. State, 313 Ga. 841, 844 (2) (874 

SE2d 67) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

Relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded “if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice.” OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). But the exclusion of 

evidence under Rule 403 is an “extraordinary remedy” that should 
26

be used “only sparingly.” Jordan, 313 Ga. at 844 (2) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). This is because “the major function of Rule 

403 is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, 

dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” Hood v. 

State, 299 Ga. 95, 103 (4) (786 SE2d 648) (2016) (cleaned up). And 

“[p]rejudice is not ‘unfair’ simply because it tends to inculpate the 

defendant in an awful crime.” Morgan v. State, 307 Ga. 889, 897 (3) 

(c) (838 SE2d 878) (2020). “[I]nculpatory evidence is inherently 

prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 

probative value that Rule 403 permits exclusion.” Id. (citation and 

punctuation omitted). The prejudicial effect of evidence is “unfair” if 

the evidence has “the capacity...to lure the factfinder into declaring 

guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense 

charged,” or an “undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper 

basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Old 

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (117 SCt 644, 136 LE2d 

574) (1997) (citation and punctuation omitted).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the two pieces of 
27

evidence that Wilson challenges. 

(a) Rap Video

As described above, Cayo, Lewis, and Wilson appeared in a 

homemade rap video entitled “Dope.” In the video, Cayo and Lewis 

“flashed” a handgun and identified it as a Smith & Wesson SD-9, 

which was capable of having fired the bullet recovered from Griffin’s 

body, and which Cayo and West testified was the murder weapon. 

Also in the video, Cayo said that he “hit [his] first lick,” and in Cayo’s 

proffer (a transcript of which was introduced at trial) he explained 

how “hitting a lick” is slang for committing a robbery. The video was 

shot on November 30, 2017—eleven days after the murder—and 

uploaded to YouTube a few weeks later. In the period between the 

murder and the shooting of the video, Cayo exchanged messages on 

Instagram with another person about wanting to sell the gun, but 

wanting to wait until after he had used it in a video.

The “Dope” video was certainly relevant. Most importantly, it 

connected the defendants to the murder weapon, and it also 

implicated Cayo in a robbery, very close in time to the crimes here, 
28

thus making it more likely that it was the defendants who possessed 

the murder weapon and used it to kill Griffin. And although the 

State also introduced still photos of Cayo and Lewis holding the gun, 

the video was not merely cumulative: among other things, it added 

an incriminating context to Cayo’s Instagram messages, sent in the 

days after the crime, about wanting to sell a gun but wanting to use 

it in a rap video first. The video also furnished further evidence of a 

conspiracy by showing Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis together in the days 

after the shooting, brandishing a gun of the same model as the 

murder weapon and boasting of having committed a robbery. See 

McLeod, 297 Ga. at 103 (2) (criminal intent to participate in 

conspiracy can be shown by actions after the criminal act).

The video’s probative value was not substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice. A defendant’s appearance in a rap 

video—even one like this one replete with obscenities and racial 

slurs—is not per se prejudicial. And Wilson does not endeavor to 

explain what specifically about this video might cause unfair 

prejudice. The video shows the defendants boasting about making 
29

money in a violent drug trade, but they were charged with robbing 

a drug dealer shortly before the video was made. This is not a 

question of evidence that could inflame the passion of the jury for a 

reason that is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 

Compare Morgan, 307 Ga. at 897 (3) (c) (unfair prejudice from video 

of police officer performing CPR on a baby who had been murdered, 

when video gave no indication of the identity of the perpetrator), 

with Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 394-395 (1) (d) (807 SE2d 425) 

(2017) (no unfair prejudice from video of sexual assault victim 

sobbing as he described sexual encounter with defendant, because 

video was “relevant as evidence of the crimes charged”). In short, 

although the video may have cast Wilson in an unflattering light, it 

did not do so unfairly. So the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by admitting the video under Rule 403.4

 4 Wilson also argues that the rap video was inadmissible as “other act” 

evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”). The trial court did not 

specify on what basis it was admitting the evidence, but it is apparent that the 

evidence was admitted as intrinsic, not under Rule 404 (b). The State offered 

the video primarily as relevant evidence under OCGA §§ 24-4-401 and 24-4-

402—suggesting Rule 404 (b) only as an alternative basis for admissibility—
30

(b) Instagram Messages

Nine months after the murder, after both Wilson and Cayo had 

been charged, Wilson sent a series of messages to Cayo on 

Instagram. Wilson wrote, “Congrats,” then “Keep grinding,” 

followed by “I miss you too no cap bruh it’s jus my lawyer Nd 12 

watchin my page,” and finally, “It’s a lot, but ima chop it up witchu.” 

Those messages were also relevant. They showed that Wilson 

and Cayo were still on good terms while they were both being 

prosecuted for the murder, which tended to make it less likely that

Wilson was an unwitting bystander to a murder carried out solely 

by Cayo or Lewis. The probative value may have been slight, but 

that is enough to satisfy the relevance standard. See Jordan, 313 

Ga. at 844 (2). And we see no danger of unfair prejudice from the 

 

and argues only relevance on appeal. The State did not give notice of intent to 

introduce Rule 404 (b) evidence, see OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (requiring State to 

give “reasonable pretrial notice” of its intent to offer such evidence), and no 

limiting instruction was given as to how the jury could consider the video. 

Moreover, as discussed above, the video is evidence of the defendants’ guilt in 

this crime. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (b) (880 SE2d 501) (2022) 

(concluding that evidence placing the murder weapon in the defendant’s hands 

days before the murder was intrinsic to the charged crime and had substantial 

probative value). We therefore do not address whether it was admissible in the 

alternative under Rule 404 (b).
31

messages. Wilson’s friendliness with Cayo was a relevant fact, and 

nothing in the content of the messages hints at an “undue tendency 

to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 

180. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. 

9. Finally, Wilson contends that the trial court improperly 

sentenced him to life without parole. He argues that the sentence is 

unlawful because the jury did not find any aggravating factors in 

the crime and because the trial court relied on improper 

considerations. As to the second point, Wilson points to the trial 

court’s remarks, in an order denying his motion to reduce his

sentence, that “the evidence points to Wilson being the actual 

shooter” and that Wilson “fail[ed] to accept and recognize his 

responsibility.”

Neither contention has merit. A defendant convicted of murder 

is eligible for a sentence of life without parole, regardless of whether 

any aggravating factors are found. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (e) (1) (“A 

person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death, 

by imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for 
32

life.”); Parks v. State, 305 Ga. 712, 714 (2) (827 SE2d 669) (2019) 

(noting that the 2009 revisions to the sentencing statute “remov[ed] 

requirements that a jury find an aggravating circumstance before 

imposing the sentence of life without parole”) (citation omitted); 

Lewis v. State, 301 Ga. 759, 767 (4) (804 SE2d 82) (2017) (“no 

additional facts are required to be found by the jury for the 

imposition of life without parole”). And a trial court, in imposing a 

sentence, “may consider any evidence that was properly admitted 

during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial,” as well as “the conduct 

and attitude of the defendant during trial.” Blake v. State, 273 Ga. 

447, 450 (4) (542 SE2d 492) (2001). The trial court is not, in other 

words, limited to considering only those facts that the jury finds are 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It was within the trial court’s 

discretion to sentence Wilson to life without parole, and the record 

does not show that the court relied on improper considerations in 

doing so.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.