alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pedro SANDOVAL-LANDEROS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-41041.

Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 20, 2003.

Mitchel Neurock, Laredo, TX, James Lee Turner, Assistant US Attorney, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Roland E. Dahlin, II, Federal Public Defender, H. Michael Sokolow, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Pedro Sandoval-Landeros appeals his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for being found in the United States, without permission, following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). Sandoval-Landeros acknowledges that his arguments, which are raised for the first time on appeal, are foreclosed. He raises the issues to preserve them for further review.

Sandoval-Landeros’s argument that his conviction and sentence are void because *438his plea allocution was delegated to a non-Article III magistrate judge is without merit. That task may be constitutionally delegated to a magistrate judge. *See United States v. Dees,*125 F.3d 261, 264-69 (5th Cir.1997).

Sandoval-Landeros waived his argument that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to conduct his plea allocution because the task had not been properly delegated to her by the district court judge. Sandoval-Landeros failed to challenge the magistrate judge’s handling of his plea allocution in district court. *See United States v. Bolivar-Munoz,*313 F.3d 253, 256-57 (5th Cir.2002), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1642, 155 L.Ed.2d 499 (2003).

Sandoval-Landeros’s argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in his case because it treats a prior conviction for a felony or aggravated felony as a sentencing factor and not as an element of the offense is also without merit. In *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. *Id.*at 239-47, 118 S.Ct. 1219. *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 489-90, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), did not overrule that decision. *See United States v. Dabeit,*231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir.2000).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Christine C. Aussicker, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[677 NYS2d 814]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed December 23, 1997, which ruled, *inter alia,*that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

Claimant resigned from her position as an office assistant for a medical office in order to attend school. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that claimant left her employment under disqualifying circumstances and disapproved her application for training benefits pursuant to Labor Law § 599. Inasmuch as voluntarily leaving one’s employment to attend school has been held not to constitute good cause under the Labor Law *(see, Matter of Rulka [Commissioner of Labor],*249 AD2d 876; *Matter of Talyansky [Sweeney],*234 AD2d 880, *lv denied*90 NY2d 802), we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision.

Mikoll, J. P., White, Yesawich Jr., Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6563

LUTHER CARTER SPAIN, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA BEACH CIRCUIT COURT; ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS, Commonwealth

Attorney Virginia Beach, Virginia,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (CA-99-276-AM)

Submitted: August 19, 1999 Decided: August 25, 1999

Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Luther Carter Spain, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court’s final order is dated stamped

March 8, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on March 9, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58

and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date

that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the

effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v.

Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

Luther Carter Spain, Jr., appeals the district courts orders

denying relief on his petition construed as filed under 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) and his motion to reconsider the

judgment. We have reviewed the record and the district court's

opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning

of the district court. See Spain v. Virginia, No. CA-99-276-AM

(E.D. Va. Mar. 9 & Mar. 29, 1999).* We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6288 

To establish certain protections for members of the Armed Forces who refuse 

to receive vaccinations against COVID–19. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 14, 2021 

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To establish certain protections for members of the Armed 

Forces who refuse to receive vaccinations against 

COVID–19. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that no member of the 

5 Armed Forces should be required to receive a vaccination 

6 against COVID-19. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6288 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROTECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 

2 FORCES WHO REFUSE TO RECEIVE VACCINA3 TIONS AGAINST COVID-19. 

4 (a) CHARACTERIZATION OF DISCHARGE OR DIS5 MISSAL.— 

6 (1) PROHIBITION OF DISHONORABLE CHARAC7 TERIZATION.—The characterization of the discharge 

8 or dismissal of a covered individual shall be honor9 able. 

10 (2) UPGRADE.—In the case of a covered indi11 vidual discharged or dismissed from the Armed 

12 Forces before the date of the enactment of this Act, 

13 the Secretary concerned shall upgrade the character14 ization of such discharge or dismissal to honorable. 

15 (b) PROHIBITION OF DENIAL OF RETIRED PAY AND

16 BENEFITS.—No covered individual may be denied, solely 

17 on the basis that such individual is a covered individual, 

18 any— 

19 (1) retired or retainer pay; or 

20 (2) benefit under a law administered by the 

21 Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Veterans 

22 Affairs (including post-9/11 educational assistance 

23 under chapter 33 of title 38, United States Code). 

24 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

25 (1) The term ‘‘covered individual’’ means an in26 dividual involuntarily separated from the Armed 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6288 IH

1 Forces solely on the basis of the refusal of such indi2 vidual to receive a vaccination against COVID-19. 

3 (2) The term ‘‘Secretary concerned’’ has the 

4 meaning given that term in section 101 of title 10, 

5 United States Code. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
##### 



Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to 18 United States Code § 1350 The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2004 of Phelps Dodge
Corporation (the Company) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ J. Steven WhislerName:
    
    J. Steven WhislerTitle:
    
    Chairman andChief Executive OfficerDate:
    
    July 27, 2004
 The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2004 of Phelps Dodge
Corporation (the Company) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ Ramiro G. PeruName:
    
    Ramiro G. PeruTitle:
    
    Senior Vice President andChief Financial OfficerDate:
    
    July 27, 2004
#### MEDIA SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff — Appellant, v. Peter MEHAS, Superintendent of Fresno County Schools, Defendant — Appellee.

No. 01-16876.

D.C. No. CV-01-05608-AWI.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.*

Decided Nov. 12, 2002.

Before HAWKINS, GRABER, and RICHARD C. TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not detail them.

Even assuming that Appellant is correct and Cal. Gov’t Code § 53051 requires the listing in the Roster of Public Agencies of *any*clerk or secretary, as opposed to a formal clerk or secretary, Appellee substantially conformed to the requirements of section 53051.

The Roster of Public Agencies filing does give the name and address where claimants can deliver or mail their claims. Furthermore, the alleged error here is insubstantial considering that the policies behind section 53051 could still be served without the listing of a clerical secretary or clerk. *See Wilson v. San Francisco Redevelopment Agency,*19 Cal.3d 555, 138 Cal. Rptr. 720, 724, 564 P.2d 872 (Cal.1977). We therefore hold that under these circumstances the failure to list a secretary or clerk is not “so inaccurate or incomplete that it does not substantially conform to the requirements of Section 53051.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 946.4(a)(2). It is undisputed that Appellant never filed a claim since it offered no proof of an actual claim document having been delivered before the action was filed. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Costs are awarded to the Appellee.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 863 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 863

 To amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 
 to authorize the transfer to States of surplus personal property for 
donation to nonprofit providers of necessaries to impoverished families 
                            and individuals.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 8, 1995

 Mr. Hamilton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 
 to authorize the transfer to States of surplus personal property for 
donation to nonprofit providers of necessaries to impoverished families 
                            and individuals.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TRANSFER OF SURPLUS PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR DONATION TO 
              PROVIDERS OF NECESSARIES TO IMPOVERISHED FAMILIES AND 
              INDIVIDUALS.

    Section 203(j)(3)(B) of the Federal Property and Administrative 
Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 484(j)(3)(B)) is amended by inserting 
after ``homeless individuals'' the following: ``, providers of 
assistance to families or individuals whose annual incomes are below 
the poverty line (as that term is defined in section 673 of the 
Community Services Block Grant Act),''.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6220 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6220

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 100 3rd Avenue Northwest in Perham, Minnesota, as the ``Charles P. 
                          Nord Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CHARLES P. NORD POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 100 3rd Avenue Northwest in Perham, Minnesota, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Charles P. Nord Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Charles P. 
Nord Post Office''.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 14, 2022.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
117th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 6220

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 100 3rd Avenue Northwest in Perham, Minnesota, as the ``Charles P. 
                          Nord Post Office''.
```
**
**Exhibit 32.4**

**American Campus Communities Operating Partnership LP – Certification of Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

I, Daniel B. Perry, Chief Financial Officer of American Campus Communities, Inc., the sole member of American Campus Communities Holdings LLC, the generalpartner of American Campus Communities Operating Partnership LP (the “Operating Partnership”), certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that: 

 
(i)
The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Operating Partnership for theannual period ended December 31, 2018 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and 

 
(ii)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Operating Partnership. 

 
Dated: April 23, 2019  By:   /s/ Daniel B. Perry   Daniel B. Perry   Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary
This certification is being furnished and not filed, and shall not be incorporated into any document for any purpose, underthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Securities Act of 1933. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Operating Partnership and will be retained by the Operating Partnership andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 
**
Cite as 2014 Ark. 382



## SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-14-534

SERGIO ANDRADE-MARTINEZ APPELLANT
V. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE Opinion Delivered September 18, 2014 PRO SE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF [WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. 72CR-12-677] HONORABLE WILLIAM A. STOREY, JUDGE
APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION MOOT.

PER CURIAM
In 2012, judgment was entered reflecting that appellant Sergio Andrade-Martinez had been found guilty by a jury of multiple felony offenses for which he was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 1788 months’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Andrade-Martinez v. State , 2013 Ark. App. 604. The mandate on affirmance of the judgment was issued on November 13, 2013. On January 14, 2014, sixty-two days after the mandate had been issued, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se request for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2012), challenging the judgment. The trial court denied and dismissed the petition on the ground that it was untimely. Appellant lodged an appeal from the order in this court, and now before us is appellant’s motion for extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. We need not consider the merits of the motion for extension of time because it is clear from the record that appellant could not prevail if an appeal were permitted to go forward. AnCite as 2014 Ark. 382

appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief will not be allowed to proceed where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Laswell v. State , 2013 Ark. 407 (per curiam); Bates v. State , 2012 Ark. 394 (per curiam); Martin v. State , 2012 Ark. 312 (per curiam). In this case, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider appellant’s Rule 37.1 petition because the petition was not timely filed. Pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(c), when there was an appeal from a judgment of conviction, a petition for relief must be filed in the trial court within sixty days of the date that the mandate was issued by the appellate court. The time limitations imposed in Rule 37.2(c) are jurisdictional in nature, and, if the petition is not filed within that period, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant postconviction relief. Laswell , 2013 Ark. 407; Holliday v. State , 2013 Ark. 47 (per curiam); Bates , 2012 Ark. 394; Talley v. State , 2012 Ark. 314 (per curiam). The petition before the trial court was not timely filed, and, thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. When the trial court lacks jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks jurisdiction. Laswell

, 2013 Ark. 407; Holliday , 2013 Ark. 47; Winnett v. State , 2012 Ark. 404 (per curiam); Martin , 2012 Ark. 312. Appeal dismissed; motion moot. Sergio Andrade-Martinez

, pro se appellant. No response.

2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6944

DWAYNE WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SAMUEL B. GLOVER; ROBERT M. STEWARD; BARBARA A. SCOTT; JON 

E. OZMINT; JOHN DOE; JANE DOE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(6:10-cv-01591-TLW)

Submitted: December 12, 2011 Decided: January 9, 2012

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dwayne Williams, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Dwayne Williams appeals the district court’s order 

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

dismissing Williams’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006). We have reviewed the record 

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the 

reasons stated by the district court. Williams v. Glover, No. 

6:10-cv-01591-TLW (D.S.C. July 11, 2011). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Donald FONVILLE, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Sharon BOLTON, Superintendent, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 02-35762. D.C. No. CV-01-01499-JCC.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided Aug. 14, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Donald Fonville appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. Fonville argues that his convictions are unlawful because the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify by referring to his discussions with counsel.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We affirm because, “under our precedent, prosecutorial comments on failure to testify only require reversal where such comment is extensive, where an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to the jury as a basis for conviction, and where there is evidence that could have supported acquittal.” *Beardslee v. Woodford,*327 F.3d 799, 825 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted). Here, the prosecutor made a single comment regarding Fonville’s discussions with counsel in the courtroom during trial in an attempt to identify him as the person speaking on several video tapes. This isolated comment, while referring to facts not in evidence, did not imply guilt from silence. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury “not to consider under any circumstances any conversations during the course of th[e] trial between counsel and client.” In these circumstances, the district court correctly determined that Fonville’s petition should be denied. *United States v. Smith,*282 F.3d 758, 769-70 (9th Cir.2002) (“We will not reverse when a prosecutorial comment is a single, isolated incident, does not stress an inference of guilt from silence as the basis for conviction, and is followed by a curative instruction.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6075

KANE EDWARD WILSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

ROBERT SMITH, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District

Judge. (CA-97-407-5-H(2))

Submitted: July 22, 1998 Decided: August 5, 1998

Before ERVIN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kane Edward Wilson, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Stephen Hicks, NORTH

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Kane Edward Wilson seeks to appeal the district court's order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate

judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of

the district court. Wilson v. Smith, No. CA-97-407-5-H(2) (E.D.N.C.

Jan. 7, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED