This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO , 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 30,893 4 WARREN SCHUESSLER, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Kenneth H. Martinez, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General 10 Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General 11 Santa Fe, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender 14 Will O’Connell, Assistan t Appellate Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellant 172 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 2 {1} Convicted of two counts of criminal se xual penetration of a minor (CSPM) and 3 two counts of criminal sexual contact with a minor (CSCM), Warren Schuessler 4 (Defendant) appeals. Defendant alleges that the district court erred in admitting 5 improper character evidence, that there was insufficient evidence of criminal sexual 6 contact, and that the jury convicted him of multiple indistinguishable counts. We 7 affirm. 8 BACKGROUND 9 {2} Defendant was indicted on eleven counts of molesting his niece (Child) and her 10 older sister. Defendant is seven years older than Child. Child also has a younger 11 sister. Prior to trial, the counts involving Ch ild and her sister weresevered. Thus, the 12 charges relevant to the present case are only those in which Defendant is accused of 13 sexual contact with Child when Child was between the ages of eleven and twelve. As 14 part of the order severing the counts involving Child’s sister, the district court ordered 15 exclusion of all evidence related to those charges. Additional facts are provided as 16 necessary to our discussion of Defendant’s arguments on appeal. 173 DISCUSSION 1 {3} Defendant makes six arguments. In his first point Defendant argues that, even 2 though evidence pertaining to the counts relate d to Child’s sister was supposed to be 3 excluded, “the State introduced evid ence throughout the trial suggesting that 4 [Defendant] molested [Child’s] sisters . . . as well.” Defendant c oncedes that evidence 5 that he groomed Child for a sexual relati onship with him by giving her alcohol and 6 drugs was permissible. But, he submits, evidence that he similarly groomed Child’s 7 sisters was inadmissible because it was tant amount to evidence that he had molested 8 the sisters. He asserts that evidence of grooming the sisters was “other bad acts 9 evidence” that should have been exclude d under New Mexico’s rules of evidence. 10 Rule 11-404(B) NMRA. 11 {4} The State argues in response that the older sister’s testimony merely 12 corroborated Child’s testimony and therefore was not evidence of other “bad acts.” 13 It maintains that “[h]aving conceded that [use of the evidence of grooming of Child 14 was permissible], Defendant should not be permitted to turn around and deny that the 15 corroborating testimony of an eyewitness to the exact same events was reversible 16 error.” 17 {5} We review the district court’s rulings as to admission of testimony for abuse of 18 discretion. State v. Armendariz , 2006-NMSC-036, ¶ 6, 140 N.M. 182, 141 P.3d 526, 194 overruled on other grounds by State v. Swick , 2012-NMSC-018, 279 P.3d 747. “An 1 abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the 2 facts and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion 3 by its ruling unless we can characterize it as clearly untenable or not justified by 4 reason.” State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 41, 126 N.M . 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal 5 quotation marks and citations omitted). 6 {6} Rule 11-404(B)(1) prohibits admission of “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or 7 other act . . . to prove a person’s characterin order to show that on a particular 8 occasion the person acted in accordance withthe character.” Such evidence is not 9 always prohibited, however. “[E]vidence of prior acts with the complaining witness 10 can directly bolster the complaining witness’s testimony by providing significant 11 corroboration. When used for such a purpose, this evidence is admissible and not 12 considered propensity evidence.” State v. Dietrich , 2009-NMCA-031, ¶ 42, 145 N.M. 13 733, 204 P.3d 748 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, even 14 if not admissible for showing propensity to act in a certain way, “evidence [of other 15 acts] may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 16 intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, ab sence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 17 Rule 11-404(B)(2). 185 {7} Here, Child testified that Defendant gave her alcohol “[a]ll the time. As many 1 times as he had it[,]” and that he would give alcohol to both her and her older sister. 2 She also testified that Defendant gave her and her older si ster marijuana. The older 3 sister testified that Defendant gave her and Child alcohol and marijuana. Child’s 4 younger sister testified that Defendant drank with “[her] and [her] sisters,” that she 5 had observed Child and her older sister smoking marijuana with Defendant, and that 6 she had smoked marijuana with Defendant. The sisters’ testimony thus addressed 7 both that Defendant gave alc ohol and marijuana to Child and that Defendant also gave 8 them to the sisters. Assuming without deciding that admission of this testimony was 9 contrary to Rule 11-404(B) , we conclude that its admission was harmless. See State 10 v. Gallegos , 2005-NMCA-142, ¶ 32, 138 N.M. 673, 125 P.3d 652, aff’d in part, rev’d 11 in part on other grounds, 2007-NMSC-007, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 (stating that 12 we apply a harmless error analysis to improperly admitted evidence). 13 {8} “Improperly admitted evidence is not grounds for a new trial unless the error 14 is determined to be harmful.” State v. Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 25, 275 P.3d 110. 15 Here, Defendant alleges a violation of th e rules of evidence; the error alleged is 16 therefore non-constitutional, see State v. Barr , 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 53, 146 N.M. 301, 17 210 P.3d 198, overruled on other grounds by Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 35, which 186 we review to determine whether “there [is] a reasonable probability that [the evidence] 1 contributed to the [defendant’s] conviction.” 2 To judge the “probable” effectof an evidentiary error, 3 courts must evaluate all circumstances surrounding the 4 error. We examine the erro r itself, including the source of 5 the error and the emphasis placedon the error at trial. To 6 put the error in context, we often look at the other, non7 objectionable evidence of guilt, not for a sufficiency-of-the8 evidence analysis, but to evaluate what role the error played 9 at trial. [In addition,] . . . courts may, depending upon the 10 circumstances of the cases before them, examine the 11 importance of the erroneously admitted evidence in the 12 prosecution’s case, as well as whether the error was 13 cumulative or instead introduced new facts. This is a case14 by-case examination. 15 State v. Leyba , 2012-NMSC-037, ¶ 24, 289 P.3d 1215 (internal quotation marks and 16 citation omitted). 17 {9} Under this standard of re view, we conclude that the admission of this testimony 18 was harmless. In the context of this twelve-day jury trial, we cannot say that there is 19 a reasonable probability that the sisters’ so mewhat oblique references to provision of 20 alcohol and marijuana to them by De fendant “contributed to [D]efendant’s 21 conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and c itation omitted). The testimony did 22 not play a major role in the prosecution’s case. First, the testimony complained of 23 constituted only a few minutes out of the entire trial and the State did not highlight the 24 sisters’ testimony that Defendant had give n them alcohol and marijuana in opening 257 or closing arguments. Cf. id. ¶¶ 27-29 (holding that improperly admitted evidence 1 was harmful because “[ t]actically, the [s]tate used th e diary as a centerpiece of its 2 case[,]” including addressing the evidence in direct and cross-examination as well as 3 opening and closing arguments.). 4 {10} In addition, we note that the jury receive d instruction that there were no charges 5 against Defendant for conduct with the younger sister. After defense counsel objected 6 to a question of the younger sister, the districtcourt instructed the jury that there had 7 been no allegations by the younger sister against Defendant of improper sexual 8 conduct. Even though the district court gave this instruction in the context of 9 testimony about the younger sister’s safe house interview, the instruction limits, if not 10 eliminates, the probability that the verdic t would have been different without the 11 younger sister’s testimony that Defe ndant offered her marijuana. 12 {11} Further, the impact of the sisters’ te stimony is minimal in light of the other 13 evidence adduced at trial. See id. ¶ 24 (“To put the error incontext, we often look at 14 the other, non-objectionable evidence of gu ilt, not for a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 15 analysis, but to evaluate what role the error played at trial.”). Here, Child testified at 16 length about Defendant’s c onduct and about her living arrangements before, during, 17 and after the charging period, including her mother’s debilitating alcohol use, the lack 18 of supervision by the mother, and Defendant’s visits to Child’s home and Child’s 198 visits to Defendant’s home. Other witn esses testified as to the same topics. 1 Defendant testified, denying th at he sexually abused Child. Two experts testified, one 2 for the State and one for the defense, aboutthe physical evidence of sexual abuse and 3 the significance of the lack of evidence of injury in Child ’s examination. Under the 4 circumstances of this case, we conclude th at there is no reasonabl e probability that the 5 testimony at issue contributed to Defendant ’s convictions and that its admission was, 6 therefore, harmless. 7 {12} Defendant’s second argument is that th e district court erred in denying his 8 motion for a new trial after a detective tes tified that, after receiving a referral from the 9 Children, Youth and Familie s Department, she began i nvestigating by “contact[ing] 10 the persons that were involved, the female s that were involved, or their parents.” 11 Defendant characterizes this testimony as “unmistakable that the [d]etective was 12 referring to multiple female victims of sexual abuse” and that this testimony, in 13 combination with that of the sisters, “would have improperly induced the jury to 14 convict [him and therefore] the [district] c ourt abused its discretion in failing to grant 15 a mistrial.” The State argues that (1) the statement was unobjectionable because 16 “[s]tating that more than one female was involved in the inves tigation is simply not 17 the same as saying that more than one fe male made allegations against Defendant[;]” 18 (2) the district court’s finding that the st atement was not intentionally elicited by the 199 prosecution obviates the need for any anal ysis of whether the improperly admitted 1 evidence “could have induced the jury’s verdict[;]” and (3) the possible prejudicial 2 effect of the testimony was cured when the district court offered to give a curative 3 instruction. 4 {13} We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. 5 Gallegos v. State Bd. of Educ. , 1997-NMCA-040, ¶ 30, 123 N.M. 362, 940 P.2d 468. 6 If evidence of prior bad acts is improperly admitted inadvertently, “the prompt 7 sustaining of an objection and an admonition to disregard the witness’s answer cures 8 any prejudicial effect of the inadmissible testimony.” State v. Ruiz , 2003-NMCA-069, 9 ¶ 6, 133 N.M. 717, 68 P.3d 957. Even when the defendant refuses a curative 10 instruction, the district court’s offer of an instruction “is sufficient to cure any 11 prejudicial effect.” State v. Fry , 2006-NMSC-001, ¶ 53, 138 N.M. 700, 126 P.3d 516. 12 If the State intentionally sought the prohibited testimony, however, “we must 13 determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the improperly admitted 14 evidence could have induced the jury’s verdict.” Ruiz , 2003-NMCA-069, ¶ 6

. 15 {14} Here, the district court determined thatthe statement was inadvertently elicited. 16 Similarly, we discern nothing in the State’ s questioning of the detective that indicates 17 an intent to elicit referen ce to allegations against Defe ndant by people other than Child 18 and Defendant does not argue to the contrary. Cf. id. ¶¶ 8-9 (determining that the 1910 prosecutor intentionally elicited prohibite d testimony where it was clear “that the 1 witness was trying to avoid im proper reference to the pen itentiary” and “[r]ather than 2 accept[ing] that testimony,” the prosecuto r pushed the witness to refer to the 3 penitentiary.). The district court offered a curative instruction, which was refused by 4 Defendant. We conclude that the district court’s offer, even if refused by Defendant, 5 was sufficient to address the possible prejudicial effect of the testimony. See Fry , 6 2006-NMSC-001, ¶ 53. 7 {15} Defendant’s remaining four arguments pertain to whether there was sufficient 8 evidence of distinct acts of CSCM or C SPM and whether his ri ght to be free from 9 double jeopardy was violated. Before addre ssing these arguments, we make several 10 observations about the charges and the testimony. The indictment alleges four counts 11 of CSPM and two counts of CSCM that occurred between October 7, 2001 and July 12 17, 2003. These dates correspond to Defe ndant’s eighteenth birthday and the day 13 before Child’s thirteenth birthday, respectiv ely. Thus, the State sought to specify a 14 charging period in which the alleged conduc t would constitute CSPM in the fourth 15 degree and in which Defe ndant could be sentenced as an adult. See NMSA 1978, § 16 30-9-11(D)(1) (2009); NMSA 1978, §§ 31-18-15.1(G) (2009), -15.2 (1996). Two 17 counts alleged digital penetr ation of Child (CSPM) and two counts alleged sexual 18 intercourse with Child (CSPM ). Two counts alleged that Defendant caused Child to 1911 touch his penis (CSCM). The jury instruc tions for each two-count set of charges were 1 identical. The jury instructions for CSPMbased on digital penetration permitted the 2 jury to convict for the step-down offense of CSCM. During trial, the State argued that 3 each type of contact occurred at least on ce when Child was eleven years old and at 4 least once when Child was twelve years old. The jury instructions did not, however, 5 require jurors to differentiate between acts occurring whenChild was eleven and acts 6 occurring when Child was twelve, since the charging period in all of the instructions 7 were the same. Child testif ied that Defendant first be gan touching her sexually when 8 she was seven years old and that he con tinued to have sex w ith her until she was 9 thirteen years old. 10 {16} With this context in mind, we turnto Defendant’s specific arguments. 11 Defendant’s third argument is that “[t] here was no testimony of distinct acts of 12 CSC[M] that occurred within the time charged. Accordingly, [Defendant’s] 13 convictions for CSCM must be vacated.” To determine whether the evidence was 14 sufficient to support the CSCM convictions, we first view the evidence in the light 15 most favorable to the verdict. State v. Apodaca , 118 N.M. 762, 766, 887 P.2d 756, 16 760 (1994). Then, we assess “whether the evidence viewed in this manner could 17 justify a finding by any rational trier of fact that each element of the crime charged has 18 been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 1912 citation omitted). “[A] reviewing court will not second-guess the jury’s decision 1 concerning the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its 2 judgment for that of the jury.” State v. Lucero , 118 N.M. 696, 699, 884 P.2d 1175, 3 1178 (Ct. App. 1994). 4 {17} In essence, Defendant’s argument is that Child did not testify to acts of sexual 5 contact separate from that i nherent in acts of sexual pene tration that occurred during 6 the charging period. The State argues thatChild’s specific testimony that Defendant 7 touched her vagina with his hand and then had sex with her and that Defendant had 8 sex with her multiple times when she was eleven and twelve years old supports the 9 CSCM convictions. We agree with the State that this ev idence is sufficient to permit 10 the jury’s verdict as to the CSCM counts b ecause this Court has previously held that 11 CSC and CSP convictions arising fro m unitary conduct are appropriate. See State v. 12 Pisio , 119 N.M. 252, 261, 889 P.2d 860, 869 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that convictions 13 for CSP and CSC were “proper units of prosecution” even when they arose from 14 unitary conduct). 15 {18} In his fourth argument, Defendant maintains that the “[m]ultiple 16 undifferentiated sexual abuse charges that are factually indistinguishable violate[d] 17 [his] due process rights and protecti ons against double jeopardy.” Citing State v. 18 Tafoya , 2010-NMCA-010, 147 N.M . 602, 227 P.3d 92 and State v. Dominguez , 2008- 1913 NMCA-029, 143 N.M. 549, 178 P. 3d 834, Defendant argues that “[b]ecause the State 1 was unable to offer evidence that distinguish ed the generic, identical counts described 2 in the [identical] jury instructions, th e resulting duplicative convictions must be 3 reduced to a single count [of each type].” He requests that we vacate one conviction 4 for CSCM and one conviction for CSPM. 5 {19} The right to due process of law stems from the Fourteenth Amendment to the 6 United States Constitution and “requires the State to provide reasonable notice of 7 charges against a person and a fair opportunity to defend.” Dominguez , 2008-NMCA8 029, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see U.S. Const. amend XIV. 9 The right to due process also “requires that criminal charges provide criminal 10 defendants with the ability to protectthemselves from double jeopardy.” Dominguez , 11 2008-NMCA-029, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Following 12 these principles, “[an] indictment [is] defective [when] it provide[s] the defendant with 13 little ability to defend himself [because] the counts [are] not anchored to particular 14 offenses.” Tafoya , 2010-NMCA-010, ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation 15 omitted). An insufficiently particular indictment offends the prohibition against 16 double jeopardy in two ways: first, it does not 17 permit the defendant to plead a conviction or an acquittal as a bar to 18 future prosecutions, and second, . . . “undifferentiated counts introduce[] 19 the very real possibility that [the defendant] would be subject to double 2014 jeopardy in his initial trial by being punished multiple times for what 1 may have been the same offense.” 2 Dominguez , 2008-NMCA-029, ¶ 9 (second alteration in original) (quoting Valentine 3 v. Konteh , 395 F.3d 626, 634-635 (6th Cir. 2005)). Whether a defendant is at risk of 4 being convicted multiple times for the same conduct depends on whether the evidence 5 at trial supports multiple distinguishable counts. Tafoya , 2010-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 24, 25 6 (“[I]t is the evidence admitted at trial that must be reevaluated by the district court to 7 determine whether a criminal charge is sufficient to satisfy the due process 8 requirements under Dominguez. ”). 9 {20} Child testified that Defendant had sex with her when she was eleven years old 10 and when she was twelve years old. A lthough at one point she stated she could not 11 remember a specific instance ineach of those years, at another point in her testimony 12 she testified about a specific instance of sexual abuse after her grandmother died, 13 including the location of the incident, details about which family members were in the 14 house at the time, what she and Defendant were drinking at the time, and what they 15 were doing before the sexual ac tivity began. She also tes tified that Defendant had sex 16 with her “more than once” wh en she was eleven and “more than one time” when she 17 was twelve. In addition, sh e testified that Defendant be gan having sex with her when 18 she was seven years old and c ontinued until she was thirteen years old. Child also 19 stated that the sexual abuse occurred in different locations, designated at trial as “the 2015 two-story house” (where Defe ndant lived) and “the blue house” (where Child lived). 1 A number of witnesses testifie d about the dates that Child lived in the blue house and 2 visited the two-story house, as well as the dates that Defendant lived in the two-story 3 house. Although there are some conflicts in the testimony, it appears that at least a 4 portion of the charging period overlaps withthese periods, which themselves overlap 5 with Child’s eleventh and twelfth years. See State v. Sena , 2008-NMSC-053, ¶ 11, 6 144 N.M. 821, 192 P.3d 1198 (stating that appellate courts must assume the trier of 7 fact resolved conflicts in the testim ony in favor of the prevailing party). 8 {21} This testimony is sufficient to satisfy due process. Child’s testimony about a 9 specific incident of sexual penetration s upports a single CSPM count. Her testimony 10 about a pattern of conduct in addition to that incident supports another CSPM count. 11 The State also distinguished between the two CSPM counts through Child’s testimony 12 that Defendant had sex with her multiple times in each of her eleventh and twelfth 13 years, which indicates a pattern of conduct in each year. Thus, the evidence at trial 14 sufficiently distinguished between the two CSPM counts on either of these bases. See 15 State v. Altgilbers , 109 N.M. 453, 466, 786 P.2d 680, 693 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that 16 the State is not required to choose “between either one count in toto or one count for 17 each act” and that “[t]he charging pattern that best reconc iles the community’s interest 18 in proper enforcement of the laws and the interest . . . in fairness to the defendant may 1916 well be a charging pattern fitting between th e two extremes.”). Similarly, the two 1 CSCM counts are distinguished by Child’s testimony about a specific instance of 2 touching preceding sexual interc ourse and that “[i]t [(sexual intercourse)] pretty much 3 happened the same way every time. He’d start with touching me, and then, that’s 4 when it progressed.” Like the CSPM counts, this testimony supports one count for 5 a specific instance and one count for a pattern of conduct. The identical CSCM and 6 CSPM counts did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. 7 {22} Defendant’s fifth argument is that the juryinstructions “allowed the jury to use 8 the same acts to support four convictions ” such that “[Defendant] may have been 9 punished multiple times for . . . the same offense.” Defendant relies on Griffin v. 10 United States , 502 U.S. 46 (1991) and State v. Olguin , 118 N.M. 91, 98, 879 P.2d 92, 11 99 (Ct. App. 1994), aff’d in part, set aside in part by State v. Olguin , 120 N.M. 740, 12 741, 906 P.2d 731, 732 (1995) to argue that “this Court [must] vacate all but one 13 count of CSP[M].” 14 {23} When a jury instruction allows convic tion on alternate theories, one of which 15 would violate double jeopardy, the protections against double jeopardy are violated 16 unless it is clear from the record that th e jury convicted only on the adequate ground. 17 State v. Montoya , 2011-NMCA-074, ¶ 39, 150 N.M . 415, 259 P.3d 820. In Olguin , 18 this Court relied on Griffinto explain the differences between a verdict in which one 1917 of the alternate bases isfactuallyinadequate and a verdict inwhich one of the alternate 1 bases is legallyinadequate. Olguin , 118 N.M. at 97-98, 879 P. 2d at 98-99. Reversal 2 is not required in th e former case when at least one of the bases for conviction was 3 supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 98, 879 P.2d at 99. In contrast, reversal is 4 required when one of the bases is contrary to law, such as when “the action in question 5 is protected by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to come within the statutory 6 definition of the crime.” Id. (quoting Griffin , 502 U.S. at 59). 7 {24} As discussed, the instructions for c ounts one and two are identical and the 8 instructions for counts three and four are id entical. Although the State’s theory at trial 9 was that one count of digital penetration and one count of sexual intercourse occurred 10 when Child was eleven and one count of each type occurred whenChild was twelve, 11 the jury instructions all include the same twenty-one month charging period which 12 overlaps with but does not align precisely withChild’s eleventh and twelfth years. In 13 addition, the jurors asked several questions during deliberations. Specifically, in a 14 note to the district court, they stated, “Our issue regards the separation of [c]ounts 15 [one and two] from [c]ounts [three and four]. ” They then asked, “Regarding [c]ounts 16 [three and four], does sexual intercourse inherently include applying a force or 17 touching the vagina of [Child]?” and “Reg arding [c]ounts [one and two], is sexual 18 contact limited to touching or applying a force by hand?” The district court refused 1918 defense counsel’s request to instruct the jury that counts one and two required them 1 to find that Defendant had touched Child by hand and instead told the jury to rely on 2 the instructions already given. 3 {25} Defendant argues that these questions i ndicate that the jury “was considering 4 convicting [Defendant] for CS C[M] based on something ot her than a manual touching, 5 which under the testimony provided them would be the touching inherent in the sexual 6 intercourse for which they separately convicted him in [c]ounts [three] and [four].” 7 He maintains there is no contrary evidence from which to “dismiss the . . . possibility” 8 that the jury convicted Defendant “four times for the sameconduct.” Defendant 9 overstates the situation. At most, the juro rs’ questions might be read to indicate that 10 they questioned whether Defendant could beconvicted twice for CSCM for touching 11 inherent in the two sexual in tercourse counts. These que stions would imply at most 12 two possible duplicate convictions, not three, as Defendant argues. In any case, we 13 do not agree that any of the convictions require reversal. Even if we accept 14 Defendant’s argument that the jury c onvicted him of CSCM based on touching 15 associated with sexual intercourse, we havedetermined that such a verdict does not 16 violate double jeopardy and is, theref ore, not legally inadequate. See Pisio , 119 N.M. 17 at 261, 889 P.2d at 869. 1819 {26} In his final argument, Defendant conte nds that, should this Court decline to 1 vacate both CSCM convictions and one C SPM conviction on the grounds discussed 2 above, we should at least vacate the CSCM convictions because the jury’s questions 3 indicated “an intolerable quantum of confusion” in the deliberations. See State v. 4 DeSantos , 89 N.M. 458, 462-63, 553 P.2d 1265, 1269-70 (1976). To the extent 5 Defendant’s argument is that the jury was confused as to whether they could convict 6 Defendant for CSCM based on touching inherent insexual intercourse, we have 7 concluded that the verdict was not inappr opriate because it was not error to do so. 8 Defendant does not elaborate on other rami fications of the alleged confusion nor 9 direct us to alternate authority. “We decline to review such an undeveloped 10 argument.” Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 11 110 P.3d 1076. 12 {27} Finally, we note the extraneous comment ary in the State’s answer brief and 13 caution advocates to avoid language that is overly dramatic, snide, and/or belittling 14 of opposing counsel’s arguments because it is both unnecessary and unhelpful. See 15 Hagen v. Faherty , 2003-NMCA-060, ¶ 21, 133 N.M. 605, 66 P.3d 974 (“We think the 16 parties’ arguments in this case could have been made more effectively if they were 17 less strident and more tailored as a logical refutation of the other side’s arguments.”). 18 CONCLUSION 1920 {28} Having found no reversible error in the di strict court, we affirm Defendant’s 1 convictions. 2 {29} IT IS SO ORDERED. 3

4 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 5 WE CONCUR: 6

_________________________________ 7 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 8

_________________________________ 9 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 10