COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker and Willis 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

DEMETRIUS LAMONE LARRY 

v. Record No. 2530-93-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JUNE 6, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Morris B. Gutterman, Judge Designate 

 Bruce C. Sams (Sams & Hawkins, P.C., on brief), 

 for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), 

 for appellee. 

 Demetrius Lamone Larry (appellant) appeals from his bench 

trial conviction by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk 

(trial court) for possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously 

refused to suppress cocaine found in appellant's motel room 

during a warrantless search and that the evidence was 

insufficient to establish an intent to distribute. 

 SUPPRESSION 

 Absent exigent circumstances, the threshold of one's home, 

whether temporary or permanent, may not be crossed without a 

warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1990). 

Whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to exclude 

____________________ 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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evidence discovered as a result of a warrantless crossing must be 

determined from an examination of the facts leading to the entry. 

 In making that determination at the trial level, the 

Commonwealth has a heavy burden to justify the warrantless entry, 

as all such entries are presumed to be unreasonable. Verez v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752-53 (1985), 

cert. denied, 497 U.S. 813 (1986). However, upon appeal from a 

trial court's denial of a motion to suppress the discovered 

evidence, the burden is upon the appellant to show that the 

denial, when the evidence is considered in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, constituted reversible error. 

Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). 

 A warrantless search and seizure is not unlawful unless it 

is unreasonable, Chevrolet Truck v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 506, 

508, 158 S.E.2d 755, 758 (1968), because the Fourth Amendment 

does not forbid all searches and seizures, only those that are 

unreasonable. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); 

Verez, 230 Va. at 410, 337 S.E.2d at 752. In the matter before 

this Court, the trial court rejected the testimony of appellant 

and, obviously, believed the evidence of the officers. The 

record discloses that in response to information received by a 

tip, at approximately 5:00 a.m. on June 21, 1993, Officers 

Sergeant and Maston of the Norfolk Police Department went to a 

motel where appellant occupied a room. The officers had been 
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given the room number and told that drugs were being sold from 

that room. 

 Upon arrival at the room, appellant responded to the 

officers' knock on the door. The officers informed appellant of 

the purpose of their visit and asked appellant if they could 

enter the premises. The officers testified at the suppression 

hearing that appellant had given them permission to search the 

room. 

 Once inside the room, one officer found a 9 millimeter 

handgun in a nightstand. The other officer, seeing a pair of 

pants and a shirt, asked appellant whether they belonged to him 

to which appellant responded in the affirmative. Inside the 

pants, the officer recovered a billfold belonging to appellant 

and twenty-eight individual ziplock baggies containing cocaine. 

 The voluntariness of a consent to a search is a question of 

fact to be determined by the trial court and will not be reversed 

on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. On the evidence 

contained in this record, we cannot say that the trial court's 

denial of appellant's motion to suppress was plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. See McFadden v. Commonwealth, 

225 Va. 103, 108, 300 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1983). 

 SUFFICIENCY 

 On appeal, when the sufficiency of the evidence is 

challenged, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 
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deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 

352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). Viewed in that light, the 

record discloses that twenty-eight individual ziplock baggies 

containing cocaine, packaged as if for distribution, were found 

inside clothes belonging to appellant. In addition, a gun was 

found in a nightstand in the motel room. 

When the proof of intent to distribute 

narcotics rests upon circumstantial evidence, 

the quantity which the defendant possesses is 

a circumstance to be considered. Indeed, 

quantity, alone, may be sufficient to 

establish such intent if it is greater than 

the supply ordinarily possessed for one's 

personal use. 

Dukes v Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 122, 313 S.E.2d 382, 383 

(1976). Moreover, the courts have long recognized that a gun is 

an object associated with persons dealing narcotics. 

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.