J-S47029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES BRYANT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1320 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 5, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0013822-2011

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 4, 2024

James Bryant appeals pro se from the order denying his untimely-filed 

petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court treated this as a serial 

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In 2012, the 

trial court convicted Bryant at a bench trial of third-degree murder and related 

charges. On October 12, 2012, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate 

term of 191⁄2 to 41 years in prison. Following the denial of post-sentence 

motions, Bryant filed a timely appeal to this Court. On May 8, 2014, we 

affirmed Bryant’s judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 104 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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A.3d 41 (Pa. Super. 2014) (non-precedential decision). Bryant did not seek 

further review.

On September 11, 2014, Bryant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and, 

on October 4, 2016, a supplemental petition. The PCRA court appointed 

counsel. On January 12, 2017, PCRA counsel filed a “no-merit” letter and a 

motion to withdraw, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 

(Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) 

(en banc), based upon his conclusion that Bryant’s petition was without merit. 

On April 3, 2017, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent 

to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Bryant filed a pro se response. By 

order entered May 19, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed Bryant’s petition and 

granted PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

Bryant appealed. On October 26, 2018, this Court affirmed the PCRA 

court’s order denying Bryant post-conviction relief. Commonwealth v. 

Bryant, 200 A.3d 605 (Pa. Super. 2018) (non-precedential decision). In 

2019, Bryant filed another pro se petition, which the PCRA court dismissed as 

untimely. Bryant did not appeal.

On June 22, 2021, Bryant filed the pro se “Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc 

Reinstatement of PCRA Petition Filed 9-11-14” at issue here. The PCRA court 

treated Bryant’s 2021 motion as a subsequent PCRA petition. On March 17, 

2023, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the 

petition without a hearing because it was untimely-filed, and Bryant failed to 

establish an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Bryant filed a pro se response. 
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By order entered May 5, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed Bryant’s petition. 

This appeal followed. The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925 

compliance.

Bryant raises the following issue on appeal: “Whether a Court may 

Reconsider a final order when the prior order has been procured by fraud?” 

Bryant’s Brief at 3.

Before addressing this issue, however, we must address whether the 

PCRA court properly considered Bryant’s latest filing for post-conviction relief 

as a serial PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA 

“shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all 

other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including 

habeas corpus”); Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 

2016) (explaining that “claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be 

brought under that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the . . . 

conviction resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)”).

In seeking reversal of the court’s May 5th order denying relief, Bryant 

essentially claims that PCRA counsel committed a fraud upon the court by 

misrepresenting Bryant’s claims and by filing a Turner/Finley “no-merit” 

letter.1 We deem this to be a cognizable claim under the PCRA of counsel’s 

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1 Although Bryant does not cite Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 

(Pa. 2021), its holding is inapplicable to Bryant’s untimely second petition. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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ineffectiveness. See Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Thus, the PCRA court 

properly considered Bryant’s motion at issue here as a serial PCRA petition. 

Treating Bryant’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we next determine 

whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely filed, and 

that Bryant failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness of a postconviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 

649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, 

including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner 

proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as 

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the 

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional 

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s 

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time 

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See Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(clarifying that “our Supreme Court in Bradley unambiguously rejected the 

filing of a successive untimely PCRA petition as a permissible method of 

vindicating the right to effective representation by PCRA counsel.” Id. 

(additional emphasis added).

In addition, we note that, in affirming the order denying Bryant’s first 

PCRA petition this Court found no merit to Bryant’s claim that PCRA counsel 

was ineffective for filing a Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter rather than an 

amended petition. See Bryant, 104 A.3d 41 (Pa. Super. 2014) (nonprecedential decision).
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on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date 

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and 

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction 

over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal 

authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. 

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

Here, Bryant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 9, 2014, 

thirty days after he failed to file a petition for allowance of appeal with our 

Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).2 Therefore, Bryant had until 

June 9, 2015, to file a timely PCRA petition. As Bryant filed the petition at 

issue in 2021, it is patently untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of 

pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See

Hernandez, supra.

Bryant has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time 

bar. Indeed, in both his motion and brief, he fails to acknowledge the 

statutory time restrictions and proceeds to argue his substantive issue. 

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2 Because the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, Bryant had until the following 

Monday to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal. See generally, 1 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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In sum, Bryant’s motion is cognizable under the PCRA, but it is untimely, 

and he has failed to establish a time-bar exception. As such, both the PCRA 

court and this Court lack jurisdiction to consider his substantive claim. 

Derrickson, supra. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying him 

post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.

Date: 3/4/2024