[Cite as State ex rel. Dodson v. Held Phipps, 2023-Ohio-3639.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Ricardo Dodson, :

Relator, :

v. : No. 22AP-304

Karen Held Phipps, Judge et al. : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Respondents. :

 

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on October 5, 2023

On brief: Ricardo Dodson, pro se.

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Brandon Coy Hendrix, for respondents Judge Karen Held 

Phipps and Magistrate Bosques Milliken.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John H. Bates, 

for respondent Ohio Adult Parole Authority.

IN MANDAMUS AND PROCEDENDO ON OBJECTIONS TO 

MAGISTRATE’S DECISION 

BEATTY BLUNT, P.J.

{¶ 1} On May 24, 2022, relator, Ricardo Dodson, filed this original action 

requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus and procedendo to the Honorable 

Judge Karen Held Phipps, the Honorable Magistrate Bosques Milliken, and the Ohio Adult 

Parole Authority (“OAPA”). Dodson’s complaint requested this court to compel Judge Held 

Phipps to issue a ruling on his delayed motion for leave to file a motion for new trial from 
No. 22AP-304 2

his criminal convictions in Franklin C.P. No. 90CR-5725, to compel Magistrate Bosques 

Milliken to rule upon his motion to amend a judgment related to the paternity/child 

support case Franklin C.P. No. 92DP-11576, and to compel the Ohio Department of 

Rehabilitation and Correction to correct his parole records and grant him a new parole 

hearing at which he would be given meaningful consideration for release.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, 

this matter was referred to a magistrate. On June 13, 2022, Judge Held Phipps and 

Magistrate Bosques Milliken filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, observing that Judge 

Held Phipps had denied Dodson’s motion for leave to file a motion for new trial on June 9, 

2022, and that Magistrate Bosques Milliken had denied Dodson’s motion to amend the 

judgment on June 5, 2022. On June 22, 2022, Dodson filed a motion for leave to amend 

his complaint to add two new claims as to the OAPA only. On August 11, 2022, the OAPA 

filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that 

Dodson’s claims against it had already been finally litigated in cases Dodson had previously 

pursued.

{¶ 3} On November 30, 2022, the magistrate issued a decision recommending that 

this court grant the motion to dismiss filed by Judge Held Phipps and Magistrate Bosques 

Milliken and granted the OAPA’s motion to dismiss in part, but denied the motion insofar 

as it related to the two new claims Dodson set forth in his June 22 motion. (See Nov. 22, 

2022 Mag.’s Decision at 15, attached hereto as Appendix A.) Dodson filed objections to this 

decision on December 20, 2022, and the OAPA filed a motion for summary judgment on 

the remaining claims on January 19, 2023. The magistrate stayed further proceedings until 

the summary judgment motion was decided, and on April 19, 2023, the magistrate issued 

a decision recommending that this court grant the OAPA’s motion for summary judgment, 

thereby dismissing the remaining portions of the case. (See Apr. 19, 2023 Mag.’s Decision

at 13, attached hereto as Appendix B.) Dodson filed objections to this decision on May 18, 

2023, and both those objections and his December 20, 2022 objections are now before this 

court for decision.

{¶ 4} In order for the court to issue a writ of mandamus, a relator must show a clear 

legal right to the relief sought, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide 

such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. See generally 
No. 22AP-304 3

State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A writ of mandamus will 

issue only to compel the performance of a clear legal duty or where a clear legal right to the 

remedy has been shown, and it will not lie to control the discretion confided in an officer, 

commission, or inferior tribunal, unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been 

abused. State ex rel. Breno v. Indus. Comm., 34 Ohio St.2d 227, 230 (1973).

{¶ 5} In order to be entitled to a writ of procedendo, a relator must establish a clear 

legal right to require that court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the court to 

proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. 

Miley v. Parrott, 77 Ohio St.3d 64, 65 (1996). A writ of procedendo is appropriate when a 

court has either refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to 

judgment. Id. An “ ‘inferior court’s refusal or failure to timely dispose of a pending action 

is the ill a writ of procedendo is designed to remedy.’ ” State ex rel. Dehler v. Sutula, 74 

Ohio St.3d 33, 35 (1995), quoting State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake, 70 Ohio St.3d 104, 

110 (1994). But under Ohio law, procedendo will not lie to compel an act that has already 

been performed. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lester v. Pepple, 130 Ohio St.3d 353, 2011-Ohio5756, ¶ 1.

{¶ 6} A motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) tests the sufficiency of the 

complaint. “In order for a court to dismiss a case pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6)‘it must appear 

beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him 

to recovery.’ ” T & M Machines, LLC v. Yost, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-124, 2020-Ohio-551, ¶ 10,

quoting O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975). The

court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all 

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin, 114 Ohio 

St.3d 323, 2007-Ohio-3608, ¶ 14. The court may take judicial notice of the pleadings and 

orders in related cases when these are not subject to reasonable dispute, at least insofar as 

they affect the present original action. State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 10th Dist. 

No. 19AP-199, 2020-Ohio-2690, ¶ 33, citing Evid.R. 201(B); State ex rel. Ohio Republican 

Party v. Fitzgerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, ¶ 18, and State ex rel. Womack v. 

Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8.

{¶ 7} Pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such 

time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A court 
No. 22AP-304 4

considering a motion under Civ.R. 12(C) must construe the material allegations in the 

complaint and all reasonable inferences to be drawn by the same in favor of the nonmoving 

party as true. Ohio Mfrs.’ Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act, 147 Ohio St.3d 42, 

2016-Ohio-3038, ¶ 10.

{¶ 8} Additionally, summary judgment procedure applies to an action in 

mandamus. State ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 173 Ohio St. 203 (1962), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. Under Civ.R. 56(B), a defending party may move with or without supporting 

affidavits for summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part of the claim, and 

summary judgment is appropriate when the movant demonstrates that, when the evidence 

is viewed most strongly in his favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of 

material fact, that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that

reasonable minds can only come to a conclusion adverse to the nonmoving party. State ex 

rel. Nelson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-940, 2010-Ohio-4994, ¶ 21.

And in a mandamus action against the OAPA, summary judgment in favor of the OAPA is 

proper where the undisputed evidence, viewed strongly in the relator’s favor, fails to meet 

the standard for mandamus as a matter of law. State ex rel. Foster v. Ohio State Adult 

Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 91AP-1109, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4065 (Aug. 6, 1992).

{¶ 9} Dodson’s specific objections are numerous and often difficult to parse, but in 

general, as to Judge Held Phipps, he asserts that she had a duty to rule upon—and to grant—

his motion for leave for new trial and verdict to “amend” his judgment entry of conviction 

for the offense of kidnapping and to “journalize” the jury’s alleged finding that the victim of 

the crime had been released unharmed. As to the OAPA, Dodson asserts that he has been 

repeatedly denied meaningful consideration for release on parole, specifically by the 

OAPA’s actions in considering “sentencing parity” under S.B. 2 in determining the 

appropriate length of a term of an incarceration, and in using the Ohio Risk Assessment 

System (“ORAS”) to evaluate his suitability for release on parole. Dodson has not 

specifically objected to the magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss his complaint as to 

Magistrate Bosques Milliken.

{¶ 10} As to Magistrate Bosques Milliken and Judge Held Phipps, we agree with the 

conclusions set forth in the November 22, 2022 magistrate’s decision. Judge Held Phipps 

has already ruled upon and denied Dodson’s motion for leave to for new trial, and Dodson 
No. 22AP-304 5

has in fact already appealed that decision to this court. See State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. No. 

22AP-388, 2023-Ohio-701. As noted above, procedendo cannot lie to compel an act that 

has already been performed, and Dodson has not shown either that he has a clear legal right 

to any other relief he demands or that Judge Held Phipps has a clear legal duty to grant any 

such relief. Similarly, Dodson has not specifically alleged error by this court’s magistrate in 

dismissing his petition as to Magistrate Bosques Milliken and indeed cannot demonstrate 

any error, as she has already performed the act his petition demanded.

{¶ 11} We also agree with the conclusions set forth in the April 19, 2023 magistrate’s 

decision. Despite Dodson’s contentions, the undisputed evidence before the magistrate 

conclusively demonstrates that the OAPA acted within its discretion in denying him parole, 

and does not suggest that he was denied meaningful consideration for parole in any way. 

Compare, e.g., State ex rel. Semenchuk v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 19AP361, 2019-Ohio-4641, ¶ 14-21 (holding that R.C. 2967.03 vests discretion in the parole 

board whether to grant parole when statutorily authorized and that the parole board “must 

consider available ORAS information in its evaluation of whether to parole an inmate”) and 

State v. Caslin, 10th Dist. No. 98AP-463, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4689, *5 (Sept. 29, 1998) 

(holding that S.B. 2 does not unconstitutionally affect parole hearings, as “there is no 

constitutional, statutory, or inherent right to parole,” and “[t]here is no change to 

appellant’s imposed sentence * * * merely [a] change in APA consideration of appellant’s 

parole eligibility”).

{¶ 12} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Dodson’s objections to the 

magistrate’s decisions in this case and adopt those decisions as our own, including the 

findings of fact and the conclusions of law set forth in each decision. Dodson has failed to 

demonstrate that he is entitled to extraordinary relief, and in accordance with the 

magistrate’s decisions, the motion to dismiss of Judge Held Phipps and Magistrate Milliken 

are granted, the motion for summary judgment of OAPA is granted, and the requested writs

are denied.

Objections overruled;

Writ of mandamus and 

procedendo denied.

DORRIAN and JAMISON, JJ., concur.
No. 22AP-304 6
No. 22AP-304 7

APPENDIX A

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Ricardo Dodson, : 

Relator, :

v. : No. 22AP-304

Karen Held Phipps, Judge et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

 

Respondents. :

M A G I S T R A T E ' S D E C I S I O N

Rendered on November 30, 2022

Ricardo Dodson, pro se. 

G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brandon Coy 

Hendrix, for respondents Judge Karen Held Phipps and 

Bosques Milliken. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John H. Bates, for 

respondent Ohio Adult Parole Authority.

IN MANDAMUS/PROCEDENDO 

ON MOTIONS

{¶ 13} Relator, Ricardo Dodson, has filed this original action seeking a writ of 

mandamus/procedendo, naming the Honorable Judge Karen Held Phipps ("Judge Held 

Phipps") The Honorable Magistrate Bosques Milliken ("Magistrate Milliken"), and the 

Ohio Adult Parole Authority ("OAPA") as respondents. Relator seeks an order from this 

court ordering Judge Held Phipps: (1) to render a judgment and/or make a ruling on 
No. 22AP-304 8

relator's September 1, 2021, motion for leave to file delayed motion for new trial that was 

filed in State v. Dodson, Franklin C.P. No. 90CR-5725 ("Dodson I"); (2) to record and 

journalize the jury verdict, pursuant to R.C. 2945.78, rendered in Dodson I and State v. 

Dodson, Franklin C.P. No. 90CR-5678B ("Dodson II"), that found relator not guilty of the 

greater first-degree kidnapping offense based on the jury finding relator did release the 

victim in a safe place unharmed, but guilty on the lesser second-degree kidnapping offense; 

(3) to comply with the notice/service requirement contained in Civ.R. 58(B), with regard to 

the decisions rendered on all pending motions related to relator's September 1, 2021, 

motion for leave to file delayed motion for new trial; and (4) to pay the filing fees and other 

additional costs associated with the filing of these pleadings. 

{¶ 14} Relator seeks an order from this court ordering Magistrate Milliken: (1) to 

render a judgment and/or make a ruling on relator's pending August 27, 2021, motion to 

amend the December 18, 1992, judgment-order, filed in Mills v. Stuckey, Franklin C.P. No. 

92DP-12-11576 ("Mills"); and (2) to compel Magistrate Milliken to comply with the notice 

requirement contained in Civ.R. 58(B), with regard to the decisions rendered on all pending 

motions relating to the August 27, 2021, motion to amend the December 18, 1992, 

judgment-order, filed in Mills. 

{¶ 15} Relator seeks an order from this court ordering OAPA to provide a 

meaningful parole hearing by: (1) correcting and removing inaccurate information in his 

parole records that was considered when determining his eligibility for parole and used to 

deny parole; (2) excluding the inaccurate information in a new parole hearing; and (3) an 

order compelling OAPA to pay the costs in this action. In an amended complaint, relator 

added the following additional claims against the OAPA: (1) the OAPA denied relator 

meaningful consideration for parole when it improperly utilized and applied the Ohio Risk 

Assessment System instrument in determining suitability for parole; and (2) the OAPA 

denied relator a fair and meaningful consideration for parole during the May 17, 2021, 

hearing, when it considered Senate Bill No. 2 ("S.B. 2") consecutive sentencing parity 

pursuant to R.C. 2971.01 and retroactively applied the equivalent sentence range under S.B. 

2's R.C. 2971.03 in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution 

and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 16} Respondents have filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
No. 22AP-304 9

{¶ 17} Relator has also filed several other motions, described below, that this 

decision disposes of. 

Findings of Fact:

{¶ 18} 1. Relator is a prisoner who was incarcerated at Southeastern Correctional 

Institution in Lancaster, Ohio, at the time he filed this mandamus/procedendo action. 

{¶ 19} 2. Judge Held Phipps is a public official serving as a judge in the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, Ohio, and presides over Dodson I and II.

{¶ 20} 3. Magistrate Milliken is a public official serving as a magistrate in the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Ohio, and presides over Mills.

{¶ 21} 4. OAPA is a governmental agency responsible for, among other things, the 

release of criminal offenders from prison.

{¶ 22} 5. As noted in the conclusions of law below, the magistrate may take judicial 

notice of the pleadings and orders in related cases when these are not subject to reasonable 

dispute, at least insofar as they affect the present original action. The present case involves 

a multitude of court cases involving relator encompassing over 30 years of litigation, 

including an extraordinary number of post-conviction motions, trial court decisions, and 

appellate decisions, both state and federal. Unless otherwise noted as being sourced from 

relator's current complaint for writ of mandamus/procedendo, the following relevant facts 

are culled from the various pleadings, orders, and decisions filed in all the related trial court 

and appellate cases over the past 30 years, all readily available via internet sources. 

{¶ 23} 6. In his complaint, relator alleges the following. In Dodson I, he was indicted 

on one count of first-degree rape, and one count of first-degree kidnapping. A jury returned 

a not-guilty verdict on the greater first-degree kidnapping count but guilty of the lesser 

second-degree kidnapping offense, where the jury found he released the victim in a safe 

place unharmed. The jury found him guilty of one count of rape. The trial court issued a 

sentencing entry on September 9, 1991, but the entry did not mention the not-guilty verdict 

on the first-degree kidnapping count and did not provide the fact regarding the seconddegree kidnapping conviction for which he was not indicted. After sentencing, relator 

appealed, and this court affirmed the conviction and sentencing in State v. Dodson, 10th 

Dist. No. 91AP-498 (Oct. 31, 1991). 
No. 22AP-304 10

{¶ 24} 7. In his complaint, relator alleges the following. In Dodson II, on September 

7, 1990, a Franklin County grand jury indicted relator on three first-degree counts of rape, 

one count of second-degree rape, and one count of first-degree kidnapping. On March 18, 

1991, a jury returned a not-guilty verdict on the greater first-degree kidnapping count where 

the jury found he did release the victim in a safe place unharmed. However, the jury did 

find him guilty of second-degree kidnapping and guilty on all remaining counts. The trial 

court issued a sentencing entry on September 9, 1991, in which the court failed to mention 

the not-guilty verdict rendered on the first-degree kidnapping conviction for which he was 

not indicted. 

{¶ 25} 8. In his complaint, relator alleges he has appeared before the Ohio Parole 

Board eight times and was denied parole on each occasion. 

{¶ 26} 9. In Mills, relator filed an August 27, 2021, motion to amend a December 18, 

1992, judgment-order. However, at the time of relator's filing of this mandamus action, 

Magistrate Milliken had not ruled on the motion.

{¶ 27} 10. In Dodson I, on September 1, 2021, relator filed a motion for leave to file 

a delayed new trial motion based on newly discover evidence. However, at the time of 

relator's filing of this mandamus action, Judge Held Phipps had not ruled on the motion.

{¶ 28} 11. In his complaint, relator seeks an order from this court compelling the 

OAPA to provide a meaningful parole hearing by: (1) correcting and removing inaccurate 

information in his parole records that were considered when determining his eligibility for 

parole and used to deny parole pursuant to State ex rel. Keith v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 

141 Ohio St.3d 375, 2014-Ohio-4270 (including the parole board information and decision 

sheet; the decision and minutes sheet, which inaccurately indicates that the victim was not 

released in a safe place unharmed and that she escaped with injuries where the jury verdict 

found that relator did release the victim in a safe place unharmed; and the decision and 

minutes sheet during the parole hearings that inaccurately fail to note that relator had 

engaged in risk relevant programming); and (2) excluding the inaccurate information in a 

new parole hearing. Relator also requests that OAPA pay the costs associated with this 

action. 

{¶ 29} 12. In his complaint, relator alleges the following. In Mills, after a hearing 

before Magistrate Milliken on relator's August 27, 2021, motion to amend the December 18, 
No. 22AP-304 11

1992, judgment-order, the magistrate stated several rulings on the record but never 

journalized the rulings. 

{¶ 30} 13. On April 12, 2022, relator filed motions in both Dodson I and II

requesting, pursuant to R.C. 2945.78, that the court record and journalize the kidnapping 

jury verdicts that found him not guilty of first-degree kidnapping counts based on a jury 

finding that he released the victim in a safe place unharmed.

{¶ 31} 14. On April 19, 2022, the trial court denied relator's April 12, 2022, motions 

in both cases. Relator filed two notices of appeal in this court, and we consolidated the 

appeals.

{¶ 32} 15. On May 26, 2022, in State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-297, and 

State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-299, this court dismissed relator's April 19, 2022, 

appeals as being untimely filed. Relator filed applications for reconsideration, which this 

court denied.

{¶ 33} 16. On May 24, 2022, relator filed the current complaint in 

mandamus/procedendo with this court.

{¶ 34} 17. On June 5, 2022, Magistrate Milliken denied relator's motion to amend 

the judgment order in Mills. 

{¶ 35} 18. On June 9, 2022, Judge Held Phipps denied relator's motion for leave to 

file a delayed motion for new trial in Dodson I.

{¶ 36} 19. On June 13, 2022, Judge Held Phipps and Magistrate Milliken filed a 

motion to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), based on the following grounds: (1) relator 

is seeking to compel Judge Held Phipps to rule on relator's leave to file a delayed motion 

for new trial in Dodson I; however, Judge Held Phipps denied relator's motion on June 9, 

2022; and (2) relator is seeking to compel Magistrate Milliken to rule on his motion to 

amend the judgment order in Mills; however, Magistrate Milliken denied relator's motion 

on June 5, 2022. 

{¶ 37} 20. On June 22, 2022, relator filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint 

to include the following two new claims solely against the OAPA: (1) the OAPA denied 

relator meaningful consideration for parole when it improperly utilized and applied the 

Ohio Risk Assessment System instrument in determining suitability for parole; and (2) the 

OAPA denied relator fair and meaningful consideration for parole during the May 17, 2021, 
No. 22AP-304 12

hearing, when it considered S.B. 2 consecutive sentencing parity pursuant to R.C. 2971.01 

and retroactively applied the equivalent sentence range under S.B. 2's R.C. 2971.03 in 

violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and the Retroactivity 

Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 38} 21. On July 14, 2022, relator filed a motion for emergency order directing 

Judge Held Phipps to refrain from directing the office of the clerk to refuse to file relator's 

legal documents properly delivered to the clerk's office via registered certified mail. 

{¶ 39} 22. On July 29, 2022, relator filed a motion for default judgment against 

Judge Held Phipps for failure to timely plead, answer, or otherwise defend the claim raised 

in the complaint requesting that the jury verdict that found he did release the victim in a 

safe place unharmed be recorded and journalized or, in the alternative, motion to strike 

Judge Held Phipps's motion to dismiss because she failed to plead, answer, or otherwise 

defend the claim requesting to compel Judge Held Phipps to record and journalize the jury 

verdict. 

{¶ 40} 23. On August 9, 2022, relator filed a motion to strike the OAPA's affirmative 

defenses and motion to strike several answers to the complaint. 

{¶ 41} 24. Also on August 9, 2022, relator filed a motion for sanctions and objections 

against the OAPA. 

{¶ 42} 25. On August 11, 2022, the OAPA filed a motion to dismiss or, in the 

alternative, judgment on the pleadings. The OAPA argued that relator's complaint should 

be dismissed because relator is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from raising 

the issue of meaningful consideration in his 2018 and 2021 parole hearings because this 

issue has already been litigated and decided in State ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. 

& Corr., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-448, 2022-Ohio-2552; and Dodson v. Mohr, S.D.Ohio No. 

2:18-cv-908 (July 26, 2021), affirmed in Ricardo Dodson v. Gary Mohr, Case No. 21-3778 

(6th Cir.2022) ("Mohr"). 

{¶ 43} 26. On October 31, 2022, the magistrate issued an order indicating that 

relator's June 22, 2022, motion for leave to amend his complaint to include two additional 

claims against the OAPA was unnecessary based upon Civ.R. 15(A); thus, the complaint was 

deemed amended to include these two claims.
No. 22AP-304 13

{¶ 44} 27. On November 1, 2022, the OAPA filed a motion for leave to file an answer 

to relator's amended complaint, which was granted the same day.

{¶ 45} 28. On November 1, 2022, the OAPA filed a motion to dismiss relator's 

amended complaint or, in the alternative, judgment on the pleadings. The OAPA asserted 

the same grounds for dismissal as it did in its August 11, 2022, motion to dismiss. 

Conclusions of Law:

{¶ 46} For the reasons that follow, it is the magistrate's decision that this court grant 

Judge Held Phipps's June 13, 2022, motion to dismiss relator's complaint for a writ of 

mandamus/procedendo; grant Magistrate Milliken's June 13, 2022, motion to dismiss the 

claims raised in relator's complaint for a writ of mandamus/procedendo; grant OAPA's 

August 11, 2022, motion to dismiss the claims raised in relator's original complaint for writ 

of mandamus/procedendo, except as to the request for costs; deny OAPA's November 1, 

2022, motion to dismiss the claims raised by relator in his amended complaint specifically 

against the OAPA; deny relator's July 14, 2022, motion for emergency order directing Judge

Held Phipps to refrain from directing the office of the clerk to refuse to file relator's legal 

documents properly delivered to the clerk's office via registered certified mail; deny 

relator's July 29, 2022, motion for default judgment against Judge Held Phipps for failure 

to timely plead, answer, or otherwise defend the claim raised in the complaint; deny 

relator's August 9, 2022, motion to strike the OAPA's affirmative defenses; and deny 

relator's August 9, 2022, motion for sanctions and objections against the OAPA .

{¶ 47} In order to be entitled to a writ of procedendo, a relator must establish a clear 

legal right to require the court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the court to 

proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. 

Miley v. Parrott, 77 Ohio St.3d 64, 65 (1996). A writ of procedendo is appropriate when a 

court has either refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to 

judgment. Id. An " 'inferior court's refusal or failure to timely dispose of a pending action is 

the ill a writ of procedendo is designed to remedy.' " State ex rel. Dehler v. Sutula, 74 Ohio 

St.3d 33, 35 (1995), quoting State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake, 70 Ohio St.3d 104, 110 

(1994).
No. 22AP-304 14

{¶ 48} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus, a relator must ordinarily 

show a clear legal right to the relief sought, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent 

to provide such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 

State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967).

{¶ 49} "[N]either procedendo nor mandamus will compel the performance of a duty 

that has already been performed." State ex rel. Kreps v. Christiansen, 88 Ohio St.3d 313, 

318 (2000), citing State ex rel. Grove v. Nadel, 84 Ohio St.3d 252, 253 (1998).

{¶ 50} A motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) tests the sufficiency of the 

complaint. "In order for a court to dismiss a case pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 'it must appear 

beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him 

to recovery.' " T & M Machines, LLC v. Yost, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-124, 2020-Ohio-551, ¶ 10, 

quoting O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), 

syllabus. In construing a complaint upon a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, a court must presume 

that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in 

the plaintiff's favor. LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007-Ohio3608, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 51} The doctrine of res judicata states that "[a] valid, final judgment rendered 

upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the 

transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action." Grava v. 

Parkman, 73 Ohio St.3d 379 (1995), syllabus. "The doctrine of res judicata encompasses 

the two related concepts of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata or estoppel by 

judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel." O'Nesti v. DeBartolo 

Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, ¶ 6, citing Grava at 381. Claim preclusion 

prevents a subsequent action, "by the same parties or their privies, based upon any claim 

arising out of a transaction that was the subject matter of a previous action." Id. at ¶ 6. 

Issue preclusion prevents "relitigation of any fact or point that was determined by a court 

of competent jurisdiction in a previous action between the same parties or their privies." 

Id. at ¶ 7. In order to establish issue or claim preclusion, a party must show: (1) a prior

final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action 

involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims or 

issues that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action 
No. 22AP-304 15

arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous 

action. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, ¶ 84, 

quoting Hapgood v. Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir.1997).

{¶ 52} "While the merger and bar aspects of the res judicata have the effect of 

precluding the relitigation of the same cause of action, the collateral estoppel aspect 

precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that has been actually and

necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action that was based on a different cause of 

action. * * * 'In short, under the rule of collateral estoppel, even where the cause of action 

is different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior suit may nevertheless affect the 

outcome of the second suit.' " Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations 

Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395 (1998), quoting Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 

112 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Grava, at syllabus. "If the same evidence would 

sustain both issues, then the two issues are the same for purposes of applying collateral 

estoppel." Fort Frye at 396, citing Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299 (1943), 

paragraph four of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds, Grava, at syllabus.

{¶ 53} Res judicata is usually not a proper basis for dismissal under Civ.R. 12.

However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that it may address a res judicata 

argument under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if the defense does not depend on documents outside the 

pleadings. See Jones v. Wainwright, 162 Ohio St.3d 491, 2020-Ohio-4870, ¶ 5. See also

State ex rel. Parker v. Black, 5th Dist. No. 2021 CA 0038, 2021-Ohio-2739, ¶ 5 (citing 

Jones). 

{¶ 54} However, a court may take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in 

related cases when these are not subject to reasonable dispute, at least insofar as they affect 

the present original action. State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-199, 

2020-Ohio-2690, ¶ 33, citing Evid.R. 201(B); State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. 

Fitzgerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, ¶ 18; and State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 

128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8. Furthermore, a court may take judicial notice of 

pleadings that are readily accessible on the internet. See Draughon v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. No. 

16CA3528, 2016-Ohio-5364, ¶ 26, citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 

195, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8, 10 (a court may take judicial notice of appropriate matters, 

including judicial opinions and public records accessible from the internet, in determining 
No. 22AP-304 16

a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion); and Giannelli, 1 Baldwin's Ohio Practice Evidence, Section 201.6 

(3d Ed.2015) (noting the rule generally precluding a court from taking judicial notice of 

other cases has been relaxed if the record is accessible on the internet). Courts may take 

judicial notice of appropriate matters, such as pleadings filed in other related matters, in 

considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim without converting it to a motion 

for summary judgment. State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan, 75 Ohio St.3d 12 (1996).

{¶ 55} In the present case, relator seeks an order directing Judge Held Phipps (1) to 

render a judgment and/or make a ruling on relator's September 1, 2021, motion for leave 

to file delayed motion for new trial that was filed in Dodson I; (2) to record and journalize 

the jury verdict, pursuant to R.C. 2945.78, rendered in Dodson I and Dodson II that found 

relator not guilty of the greater first-degree kidnapping offense based on the jury finding 

that relator did release the victim in a safe place unharmed, but guilty on the lesser seconddegree kidnapping offense; (3) to comply with the notice/service requirement contained in 

Civ.R. 58(B), with regard to the decisions rendered on all pending motions related to 

relator's September 1, 2021, motion for leave to file delayed motion for new trial; and (4) to 

pay the filing fees and other additional costs associated with the filing of these pleadings. 

{¶ 56} With regard to his first claim in relator's complaint, Judge Held Phipps 

denied relator's September 1, 2021, motion for leave to file delayed motion for new trial in 

Dodson I on June 9, 2022. Because neither procedendo nor mandamus will compel the 

performance of a duty that has already been performed, Judge Held Phipps is entitled to 

dismissal of this claim. 

{¶ 57} With regard to the second claim in relator's complaint, relator filed April 12, 

2022, motions in both Dodson I and II requesting the exact same relief as raised in his 

second claim herein. The trial court denied the motions, and this court dismissed relator's 

subsequent appeals from the trial court's denials as untimely in Case Nos. 22AP-297 and 

22AP-299 on May 26, 2022. This court then subsequently denied relator's applications to 

reconsider our dismissals. Mandamus will not lie where there is an adequate remedy in the 

ordinary course of the law. Here, not only was there an adequate remedy at law, but relator 

fully pursued those remedies, although he was ultimately unsuccessful. Therefore, Judge 

Held Phipps is entitled to dismissal of this claim.
No. 22AP-304 17

{¶ 58} With regard to the third claim in relator's complaint, relator seeks an order 

from this court directing Judge Held Phipps to include Civ.R. 58(B) language in a decision

rendered on all pending motions related to relator's September 1, 2021, motion for leave to 

file delayed motion for new trial. However, relator's writ of mandamus seeks to compel 

compliance with Civ.R. 58(B) by Judge Held Phipps in the future. A writ of mandamus will 

not issue to compel the general observance of laws in the future. State ex rel. Am. Civ. 

Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-

Ohio-625, ¶ 39, quoting State ex rel. Kirk v. Burcham, 82 Ohio St.3d 407, 409 (1998).

Although Judge Held Phipps has now filed a decision on relator's September 1, 2021, 

motion subsequent to relator's filing of his mandamus action, mandamus would still not 

issue on this claim because: (1) insofar as relator may be seeking a writ in mandamus 

ordering Judge Held Phipps to serve the parties pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B), that rule imposes 

the duty of serving the parties upon the clerk of courts, see, e.g., State ex rel. Thomas v. 

Nestor, 164 Ohio St.3d 144, 2021-Ohio-672, ¶ 5-6; and (2) insofar as relator may be seeking 

a writ in mandamus compelling Judge Held Phipps to direct the clerk of courts to serve the 

judgment entry, as Civ.R. 58(B) requires, any lack of service by the clerk under Civ.R. 58(B) 

is of no benefit to relator at this point, and the court need not grant extraordinary relief in 

mandamus when relator would receive no benefit from such an order. Id. at ¶ 6-9. The trial 

court indicated in its June 9, 2022, entry that a copy of the decision was mailed to relator, 

and relator has already filed an appeal of that entry in State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. No. 22AP388, which remains pending. Therefore, Judge Held Phipps is entitled to dismissal of this 

claim.

{¶ 59} With regard to relator's fourth claim, relator's claims against Judge Held 

Phipps have been dismissed, and relator fails to explain why he is entitled to the filing fees 

and other additional costs associated with the filing of his pleadings. Therefore, Judge Held 

Phipps is entitled to dismissal of this claim. 

{¶ 60} In his complaint, relator also seeks an order from this court ordering 

Magistrate Milliken to: (1) render a judgment and/or make a ruling on relator's pending 

August 27, 2021, motion to amend the December 18, 1992, judgment-order, filed in Mills; 

and (2) comply with the notice requirement contained in Civ.R. 58(B), with regard to the 
No. 22AP-304 18

decisions rendered on all pending motions relating to the August 27, 2021, motion to 

amend the December 18, 1992, judgment-order, filed in Mills.

{¶ 61} With regard to relator's first claim, Magistrate Milliken denied relator's 

August 27, 2021, motion to amend on June 5, 2022. Because neither procedendo nor 

mandamus will compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed, 

Magistrate Milliken is entitled to dismissal of this claim. 

{¶ 62} With regard to relator's second claim, relator seeks an order from this court 

directing Magistrate Milliken to include Civ.R. 58(B) language in the decisions rendered on 

all pending motions relating to the August 27, 2021, motion to amend the December 18, 

1992, judgment-order, filed in Mills. However, relator's writ of mandamus seeks to compel 

compliance with Civ.R. 58(B) by Magistrate Milliken in the future. A writ of mandamus will 

not issue to compel the general observance of laws in the future. Am. Civ. Liberties Union 

of Ohio, Inc. at ¶ 39, quoting Kirk at 409. Although Magistrate Milliken has filed a decision 

on relator's August 7, 2021, motion subsequent to relator's filing of his mandamus action, 

mandamus would still not issue on this claim because Magistrate Milliken's June 5, 2022, 

magistrate's decision was adopted by the trial court the same day, and the trial court's 

judgment entry, to which was appended to the magistrate's decision, included Civ.R. 58(B) 

language instructing the clerk to serve all parties. The record in Mills also establishes that 

the clerk of courts served relator with the judgment entry and magistrate's decision on June 

8, 2022. No appeal from that judgment has been filed. Therefore, Magistrate Milliken is 

entitled to dismissal of this claim.

{¶ 63} In his complaint, relator also seeks in mandamus an order from this court 

ordering OAPA to provide a meaningful parole hearing by: (1) correcting and removing 

inaccurate information in his parole records that was considered when determining his 

eligibility for parole and used to deny parole pursuant to Keith, 2014-Ohio-4270 (including 

the parole board information and decision sheet; the decision and minutes sheet, which 

inaccurately indicates the victim was not released in a safe place unharmed and that she 

escaped with injuries where the jury verdict found that relator did release the victim in a 

safe place unharmed; and the decision and minutes sheet during the parole hearings that 

inaccurately fail to note that relator had engaged in risk relevant programming); and 
No. 22AP-304 19

(2) excluding the inaccurate information in a new parole hearing. Relator also seeks an 

order compelling OAPA to pay the costs in this action.

{¶ 64} In the two amendments to his complaint, relator seeks to include the 

following two new claims against the OAPA: (1) the OAPA denied relator meaningful 

consideration for parole when it improperly utilized and applied the Ohio Risk Assessment 

System instrument in determining suitability for parole; and (2) the OAPA denied relator 

fair and meaningful consideration for parole during the May 17, 2021, hearing, when it 

considered S.B. 2 consecutive sentencing parity pursuant to R.C. 2971.01 and retroactively 

applied the equivalent sentence range under S.B. 2's R.C. 2971.03 in violation of Ex Post 

Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio 

Constitution. 

{¶ 65} As for the issues raised in relator's original complaint, the magistrate finds 

they are barred in this action by the doctrine of res judicata. In Mohr, relator brought an

action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a number of defendants associated with the Ohio 

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC") and OAPA. The case concerned the 

same two underlying criminal cases that are the subject of the current mandamus action 

and his action centered on his parole proceedings, including whether he had a fair and 

meaningful parole hearing, whether he was denied due process in his parole hearing, and 

the denial of parole. In affirming the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge's 

granting summary judgment to the defendants, the Sixth Circuit court found on appeal, as 

pertinent to the present matter: (1) the defendants were fully candid with relator as to the 

grounds for their denial of parole in the minutes sheet; (2) the minutes sheet fully discussed 

the grounds for denial of parole, including relator's elevated risk for reoffending due to the 

aggravating case-specific factors of violence, brutality, multiple occurrences, multiple 

victims, and extensive victimization, while acknowledging that relator has completed some 

relevant programs to address his risk factors for re-offending; (3) relator was informed of 

the basis upon which he was denied parole, in satisfaction of his due process rights; (4) the 

OAPA board's determination complied with Keith, in that relator had not made credible 

allegations, supported by evidence, that any information in his parole record was 

inaccurate, or that defendants knew or should have known that any such information was 

inaccurate, including information related to the victim's intellectual disability; the paternity 
No. 22AP-304 20

of the victim's child; the victim's statements; relator's purported domestic-violence 

conviction; the factors of violence, brutality, and extensive victimization of the crimes he 

committed; his past convictions; and his termination from the comprehensive sex-offender 

program; (5) the OAPA need not conduct an extensive investigation into the information it 

reviews for every prisoner to ensure accuracy, or credit every unsupported allegation by a 

prisoner that the information is correct; (6) relator failed to put forth credible allegations, 

supported by evidence, of inaccuracies in his parole record; (7) the OAPA has a duty to 

exclude known inaccuracies from consideration; and (8) relator's thickheaded soliloquy 

demonstrating a failure to acknowledge that his crimes were indeed violent and brutal is 

jarring and unpersuasive, insofar as relator failed to acknowledge that his talk of killing the 

victim was not violent or brutal, failed to acknowledge that his attempt to throw the victim 

out of a window was not brutal, failed to acknowledge that his forced vaginal intercourse

was not violent or brutal, and he rationalized that he did not beat the victim, cause any 

physical harm, or cause a hospital stay, but, instead, only forced intercourse on the victim.

{¶ 66} The issues raised by relator in the present case are the same as the issues 

raised and addressed in the findings made in Mohr. The court in Mohr addressed relator's 

claims relating to the information contained in his parole records and parole board decision 

sheet, the application of Keith, relator's participation in relevant programs to address his 

risk factors for re-offending, and the injuries and harm caused to the victim. The court in 

Mohr ruled that the defendants, including the OAPA, fully discussed the grounds for denial 

of parole, informed relator of the basis upon which he was denied parole, complied with 

Keith, did not know that any information in the records was inaccurate, need not conduct 

an extensive investigation on the information, and had a duty to exclude known 

inaccuracies from consideration. Therefore, because the contentions raised by relator in his 

original mandamus complaint were already analyzed and determined by the court in Mohr, 

res judicata precludes relator from raising them again in this mandamus action. 

{¶ 67} As for the two additional claims raised in relator's amended mandamus 

complaint specifically against the OAPA, the OAPA's motion to dismiss filed in response to 

these additional claims is the same motion to dismiss filed in response to the claims in the 

original complaint. Although the arguments contained in these motions to dismiss apply to 

the claims in the original complaint, as addressed above, they do not appear to apply to the 
No. 22AP-304 21

two additional amended claims, which relate to the improper utilization of the Ohio Risk 

Assessment System instrument in unspecified parole hearings, and the improper 

application of Senate Bill 2 to his May 17, 2021, parole hearing. Because the OAPA's second 

motion to dismiss fails to specifically address the two additional claims, the OAPA's motion 

to dismiss the two additional claims is denied. 

{¶ 68} With regard to relator's claim in his original mandamus complaint seeking to 

compel OAPA to pay the costs of this action, the magistrate will not address that claim at 

this juncture, given relator's action remains pending with regard to the two additional 

claims raised in his amendment to the complaint. 

{¶ 69} Finally, the magistrate denies the following motions filed by relator: (1) the 

July 14, 2022, motion for emergency order directing Judge Held Phipps to refrain from 

directing the office of the clerk to refuse to file relator's legal documents properly delivered 

to the clerk's office via registered certified mail; (2) the July 29, 2022, motion for default 

judgment against Judge Held Phipps for failure to timely plead, answer, or otherwise 

defend the claim raised in the complaint; (3) the August 9, 2022, motion to strike the 

OAPA's affirmative defenses; and (4) the August 9, 2022, motion for sanctions and 

objections against the OAPA.

{¶ 70} Accordingly, the magistrate recommends that this court grant Judge Held 

Phipps's June 13, 2022, motion to dismiss relator's complaint for a writ of 

mandamus/procedendo; grant Magistrate Milliken's June 13, 2022, motion to dismiss the 

claims raised in relator's complaint for a writ of mandamus/procedendo; grant OAPA's 

August 11, 2022, motion to dismiss the claims raised in relator's original complaint for writ 

of mandamus/procedendo, except as to the request for costs; deny OAPA's November 1, 

2022, motion to dismiss the claims raised by relator in his amended mandamus complaint 

specifically against the OAPA; deny relator's July 14, 2022, motion for emergency order 

directing Judge Held Phipps to refrain from directing the office of the clerk to refuse to file 

relator's legal documents properly delivered to the clerk's office via registered certified mail; 

deny relator's July 29, 2022, motion for default judgment against Judge Held Phipps for 

failure to timely plead, answer, or otherwise defend the claim raised in the complaint; deny 

relator's August 9, 2022, motion to strike the OAPA's affirmative defenses; and deny 

relator's August 9, 2022, motion for sanctions and objections against the OAPA.
No. 22AP-304 22

/S/ MAGISTRATE

THOMAS W. SCHOLL III

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as 

error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or 

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a 

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), 

unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual 

finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
No. 22AP-304 23

APPENDIX B

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Ricardo Dodson, : 

Relator, :

v. : No. 22AP-304

Karen Held Phipps, Judge et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

 

Respondents. :

M A G I S T R A T E ' S D E C I S I O N

Rendered on April 19, 2023

Ricardo Dodson, pro se. 

G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brandon Coy 

Hendrix, for respondents Judge Karen Held Phipps and 

Bosques Milliken. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John H. Bates, for 

respondent Ohio Adult Parole Authority.

IN MANDAMUS/PROCEDENDO 

ON RESPONDENT OAPA’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

{¶ 71} Relator, Ricardo Dodson, has filed this original action seeking a writ of 

mandamus/procedendo, naming the Honorable Judge Karen Held Phipps (“Judge Held 

Phipps”) The Honorable Magistrate Bosques Milliken (“Magistrate Milliken”), and the 

Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“OAPA”) as respondents. 
No. 22AP-304 24

{¶ 72} In a June 22, 2022, amended complaint, relator added the following 

additional claims against the OAPA: (1) the OAPA denied relator meaningful consideration 

for parole when it improperly utilized and applied the Ohio Risk Assessment System 

(“ORAS”) instrument in determining suitability for parole because (a) ORAS is not 

applicable to sex offenders, and (b) ORAS is inapplicable to inmates who have already been 

incarcerated for long terms; and (2) the OAPA denied relator a fair and meaningful 

consideration for parole during the May 17, 2021, hearing, when it considered Senate Bill 

No. 2 (“S.B. 2”) consecutive-sentencing parity pursuant to R.C. 2971.01 and retroactively 

applied the equivalent sentence range under S.B. 2’s R.C. 2971.03 in violation of the Ex Post 

Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio 

Constitution.

{¶ 73} This court previously granted respondents’ motions to dismiss pursuant to 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on all of the claims raised against respondents in the original complaint but 

denied OAPA’s motion to dismiss with regard to the additional claims relator raised in his 

amended complaint. 

{¶ 74} OAPA has now filed a January 19, 2023, motion for summary judgment on 

the two additional claims raised in relator’s amended complaint.

Findings of Fact:

{¶ 75} 1. Relator is a prisoner who was incarcerated at Southeastern Correctional 

Institution in Lancaster, Ohio, at the time he filed this mandamus/procedendo action. 

{¶ 76} 2. Judge Held Phipps is a public official serving as a judge in the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, Ohio.

{¶ 77} 3. Magistrate Milliken is a public official serving as a magistrate in the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Ohio.

{¶ 78} 4. OAPA is a governmental agency responsible for, among other things, the 

release of criminal offenders from prison.

{¶ 79} 5. As noted in the conclusions of law below, the magistrate may take judicial 

notice of the pleadings and orders in related cases when these are not subject to reasonable 

dispute, at least insofar as they affect the present original action. The present case involves 

a multitude of court cases involving relator encompassing over 30 years of litigation, 
No. 22AP-304 25

including an extraordinary number of post-conviction motions, trial court decisions, and 

appellate decisions, both state and federal. Unless otherwise noted as being sourced from 

relator’s current complaint for writ of mandamus/procedendo, the following relevant facts 

are culled from the various pleadings, orders, and decisions filed in all the related trial court 

and appellate cases over the past 30 years, all readily available via internet sources. 

{¶ 80} 6. In his complaint, relator alleges the following. In State v. Dodson, Franklin 

C.P. No. 90CR-5725, he was indicted on one count of first-degree rape, and one count of 

first-degree kidnapping. A jury returned a not-guilty verdict on the greater first-degree 

kidnapping count but guilty of the lesser second-degree kidnapping offense, where the jury 

found he released the victim in a safe place unharmed. The jury found him guilty of one 

count of rape. The trial court issued a sentencing entry on September 9, 1991, but the entry 

did not mention the not-guilty verdict on the first-degree kidnapping count and did not 

provide the fact regarding the second-degree kidnapping conviction for which he was not 

indicted. After sentencing, relator appealed, and this court affirmed the conviction and 

sentencing in State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. No. 91AP-498 (Oct. 31, 1991). 

{¶ 81} 7. In his complaint, relator alleges the following. In State v. Dodson, Franklin 

C.P. No. 90CR-5678B, on September 7, 1990, a Franklin County grand jury indicted relator 

on three first-degree counts of rape, one count of second-degree rape, and one count of 

first-degree kidnapping. On March 18, 1991, a jury returned a not-guilty verdict on the 

greater first-degree kidnapping count where the jury found he did release the victim in a 

safe place unharmed. However, the jury did find him guilty of second-degree kidnapping 

and guilty on all remaining counts. The trial court issued a sentencing entry on September 

9, 1991, in which the court failed to mention the not-guilty verdict rendered on the firstdegree kidnapping conviction for which he was not indicted. 

{¶ 82} 8. In his complaint, relator alleges he has appeared before the Ohio Parole 

Board eight times and was denied parole on each occasion. 

{¶ 83} 9. On May 24, 2022, relator filed the current complaint in 

mandamus/procedendo with this court.

{¶ 84} 10. On June 22, 2022, relator filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint 

to include the following two new claims solely against the OAPA: (1) the OAPA denied 

relator meaningful consideration for parole when it improperly utilized and applied the 
No. 22AP-304 26

ORAS instrument in determining suitability for parole because (a) ORAS is not applicable 

to sex offenders, and (b) ORAS is inapplicable to inmates who have already been 

incarcerated for long terms; and (2) the OAPA denied relator a fair and meaningful 

consideration for parole during the May 17, 2021, hearing, when it considered S.B. 2 

consecutive-sentencing parity pursuant to R.C. 2971.01 and retroactively applied the 

equivalent sentence range under S.B. 2’s R.C. 2971.03 in violation of the Ex Post Facto 

Clause of the United States Constitution and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio 

Constitution.

{¶ 85} 11. In State ex rel. Ricardo Dodson v. Karen Held Phipps, Judge et al., 1oth 

Dist. No. 22AP-304 (Nov.22, 2022) (magistrate’s decision), this court dismissed all claims 

raised by relator against all parties in his original complaint. However, we denied OAPA’s 

motion to dismiss as to the additional claims raised by relator in his amended complaint.

{¶ 86} 12. On January 19, 2023, OAPA filed a motion for summary judgment with 

regard to the two additional claims raised by relator in his amended complaint.

Conclusions of Law:

{¶ 87} For the reasons that follow, it is the magistrate’s decision that this court grant

OAPA’s motion for summary judgment. 

{¶ 88} In order to be entitled to a writ of procedendo, a relator must establish a clear 

legal right to require the court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the court to 

proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. 

Miley v. Parrott, 77 Ohio St.3d 64, 65 (1996). A writ of procedendo is appropriate when a 

court has either refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to 

judgment. Id. An “ ‘inferior court’s refusal or failure to timely dispose of a pending action is 

the ill a writ of procedendo is designed to remedy.’ ” State ex rel. Dehler v. Sutula, 74 Ohio 

St.3d 33, 35 (1995), quoting State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake, 70 Ohio St.3d 104, 110 

(1994).

{¶ 89} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus, a relator must ordinarily 

show a clear legal right to the relief sought, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent 

to provide such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 

State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967).
No. 22AP-304 27

{¶ 90} A court may take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in related cases 

when these are not subject to reasonable dispute, at least insofar as they affect the present 

original action. State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-199, 2020-

Ohio-2690, ¶ 33, citing Evid.R. 201(B); State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. Fitzgerald, 

145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, ¶ 18; and State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio 

St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8. Furthermore, a court may take judicial notice of pleadings 

that are readily accessible on the internet. See Draughon v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. No. 

16CA3528, 2016-Ohio-5364, ¶ 26, citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 

195, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8, 10 (a court may take judicial notice of appropriate matters, 

including judicial opinions and public records accessible from the internet, in determining 

a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion); and Giannelli, 1 Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Evidence, Section 201.6 

(3d Ed.2015) (noting the rule generally precluding a court from taking judicial notice of 

other cases has been relaxed if the record is accessible on the internet). 

{¶ 91} Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party 

demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion 

and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment 

is made. Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 

183 (1997). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all doubts 

and construe the evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Premiere Radio 

Networks, Inc. v. Sandblast, L.P., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-736, 2019-Ohio-4015, ¶ 6, citing Pilz 

v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-240, 2004-Ohio-4040, ¶ 8.

{¶ 92} In 2001, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 5120.114(A), which, in pertinent 

part, provides: “The department of rehabilitation and correction shall select a single 

validated risk assessment tool for adult offenders.” The assessment tool must be used by, 

in addition to others, state and local correctional institutions, private correctional facilities, 

community-based correctional facilities, the adult parole authority, and the parole board. 

Id. ODRC selected the ORAS. Ohio Adm.Code 5120-13-01(B). ORAS was created by the 

University of Cincinnati’s Center for Criminal Justice Research as the single validated risk 

assessment tool to be used to assess an adult offender’s risk of reoffending and to assess the 

offender’s rehabilitative needs. Ohio Adm.Code 5120-13-01(A) and (B). 
No. 22AP-304 28

{¶ 93} S.B. 2 established truth-in-sentencing laws to ensure that sentences 

imposed by trial judges were the sentences served, unless altered by the judge. 

State v. Shelor, 6th Dist. No. F-21-011, 2022-Ohio-2613, ¶ 28. This was primarily 

accomplished by eliminating indefinite sentences and eliminating parole. Id. Before S.B. 2, 

offenders rarely served the time to which they were actually sentenced because 

(1) indefinite sentences were prescribed for most serious felonies; (2) upon entering a 

correctional institution, an offender’s sentence was automatically reduced by 30 percent for 

good behavior; and (3) the parole board reviewed all prison sentences for disparity among 

offenders and attempted to abate inequities. Id., citing Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 

508 (2000). Under S.B. 2, offenders were sentenced to definite sentences, good time was 

significantly reduced and had to be earned, and the parole board no longer had authority 

to determine how long an offender stayed in prison. Id. Instead of parole, S.B. 2 introduced 

“post-release control,” which is similar to parole. Id. at ¶ 29. Under the parole system, a 

sentencing court imposed an indefinite sentence with the possibility of parole. Id. at ¶ 32. 

It could control the maximum length of the prison sentence, but had no power over 

when parole might be granted or what conditions of parole would be imposed. Id.

Similarly, under post-release control, the sentencing court imposes a sentence from the 

options available under the sentencing scheme, informs the offender that he or she may be 

subject to a period of post-release control, and advises him or her of the consequences of a 

violation of the conditions of post-release control. Id.

{¶ 94} Under the Ex Post Facto Clause found in Section 10, Article I of the United 

States Constitution, “ ‘[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts greater 

punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed’ ” is barred. 

State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344, 2012-Ohio-2583, ¶ 50, quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 

386, 390 (1798). The Ex Post Facto Clause does not forbid every “legislative change that

has any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner’s punishment.” California Dept. of Corr. v.

Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 508 (1995); Greene v. OhioAdult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 08AP555, 2008-Ohio-5972, ¶ 14. “Instead, to determine whether a law is prohibited, we ask

whether the change ‘produce[d] a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment

attached to the covered crimes.’ ” Greene at ¶ 14, quoting Morales at 509. Retroactive
No. 22AP-304 29

changes to parole regulations may, in some cases, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Garner

v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).

{¶ 95} In the present case, in the two amendments to his complaint, relator seeks to 

include the following two new claims against the OAPA: (1) the OAPA denied relator 

meaningful consideration for parole when it improperly utilized and applied the ORAS 

instrument in determining suitability for parole because (a) ORAS is not applicable to sex 

offenders, and (b) ORAS is inapplicable to inmates who have already been incarcerated for 

long terms; and (2) the OAPA denied relator a fair and meaningful consideration for parole 

during the May 17, 2021, hearing, when it considered S.B. 2 consecutive-sentencing parity 

pursuant to R.C. 2971.01 and retroactively applied the equivalent sentence range under S.B. 

2’s R.C. 2971.03 in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution 

and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 96} In its motion for summary judgment, OAPA asserts it is entitled to summary 

judgment on the two claims in relator’s amended complaint because: (1) relator had an 

adequate remedy at law by way of a request for reconsideration of any of the OAPA’s parole 

determinations pursuant to ODRC Policy No. 105-PBD-04; (2) ORAS applies to all 

incarcerated inmates, including sex offenders, and it was properly utilized and applied 

pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-07(B)(1); and (3) relator’s claim regarding S.B. 2, 

consecutive-sentencing parity, and retroactivity is nonsensical and confusing, because the 

board does not recalculate an inmate’s sentence or increase the sentence; it is the trial court 

that sentences a criminal defendant.

{¶ 97} As for OAPA’s first argument, the magistrate finds that relator did not have 

an adequate remedy at law by way of a request for reconsideration of the OAPA’s parole 

determinations pursuant to ODRC Policy No. 105-PBD-04, which provides for requests for 

reconsideration to parole board actions. It is true that the failure to pursue an adequate 

administrative remedy bars mandamus. See State ex rel. Kevin O’Brien & Assocs. Co., 

L.P.A. v. Tyack, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1099, 2014-Ohio-3048, ¶ 25, citing State ex rel. Reeves 

v. Indus. Comm., 53 Ohio St.3d 212 (1990). However, a mere policy or resolution 

permitting reconsideration of an administrative decision is not an adequate remedy at law. 

See State ex rel. Novak v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 92AP-1326 (Nov. 12, 1993) 

(rejecting respondent’s argument that relator has failed to exhaust the remedy of rehearing 
No. 22AP-304 30

contained in the Industrial Commission of Ohio’s resolution R92-1-3 Section (D)(1)(b)). 

The provision for rehearing or reconsideration by the administrative agency must be made 

by statute or regulatory rule promulgated by R.C. 119. Id. A resolution that is not 

promulgated pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119 does not have the same stature as a legally 

binding statute or administrative rule. Id. See also State ex rel. Dillon v. Indus. Comm., 

10th Dist. No. 20AP-600, 2022-Ohio-4773, ¶ 12 (there is no legal authority to support the 

contention that, in order to exhaust all administrative remedies, a party must file a request 

for reconsideration with the commission before filing a mandamus action, citing Novak); 

State ex rel. Lapp Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-950, 

2007-Ohio-933, ¶ 10-11 (there is no legal authority to support the contention that a party 

to a workers’ compensation claim must file a request for reconsideration pursuant to an 

Industrial Commission of Ohio’s resolution before filing a mandamus action, citing Novak). 

In the present case, OAPA points to no statute or rule permitting reconsideration of an 

OAPA parole determination and only presents an ORDC policy that permits 

reconsideration. Therefore, the magistrate concludes that ODRC Policy No. 105-PBD-04 

did not provide relator an adequate remedy at law.

{¶ 98} OAPA next argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is 

no question of law that ORAS applies to all incarcerated inmates, including sex offenders, 

and it was properly utilized and applied pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-07(B)(1). 

Relator claims that OAPA is not permitted to consider ORAS in determining parole 

suitability because none of the seven categories contained therein pertain to sex offenses, 

relying upon State v. Snider, 4th Dist. No. 20CA5, 2021-Ohio-348, citing State v. Saylor, 

2d Dist. No. 2018-CA-14, 2019-Ohio-1025. In Snider, the Fourth District Court of Appeals 

rejected the argument that the trial court improperly discounted an appellant’s ORAS score, 

which predicted that the appellant’s possibility of recidivism was low. The court found that, 

“none of the seven categories that ORAS assesses pertain to sex offenses,” citing Saylor and 

noting the seven ORAS categories are criminal history, education, employment and 

financial situation, family and social support, neighborhood problems, substance use, peer 

associations, and criminal attitudes and behavioral patterns. Id. at ¶ 24. The trial court in 

Snider “acknowledged Appellant’s ORAS score, but found that ‘it was not set up for sex 

offenders,’ and found it ‘not to be accurate.’ The trial court went on to find that Appellant’s 

risk of reoffending is actually very high.’ ” Id. at ¶ 26. The court in Snider further found that:
No. 22AP-304 31

Because courts, including this one, have recognized ORAS is 

not a litmus test for sentencing, let alone specifically intended 

to assess sexual offenders, and Appellant was involved in a 

course of conduct in sexually abusing minor victims, we find 

that the trial court’s decision to not consider Appellant’s 

ORAS score as a factor in Appellant’s sentencing was not 

unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, we hold 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in discounting 

Appellant's ORAS score.

Id. at ¶ 27.

{¶ 99} Initially, the magistrate notes the findings and conclusions in Snider by the 

Fourth District Court of Appeals are not binding on this court. Nevertheless, the court in 

Snider did not conclude that the OAPA denies an offender meaningful consideration for 

parole when it uses the offender’s ORAS score to assess the offender’s risk of reoffending 

when making the parole determination, which is relator’s argument here. Furthermore, the 

opinion of the trial and appellate courts in Snider was that ORAS was not accurate for sex 

offenders because it understated a sex offender’s risk of reoffending, which is a different 

argument than relator presents in the present case. In addition, as OAPA points out, ORAS 

applies to all incarcerated inmates, including sex offenders, pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 

5120:1-1-07. See State ex rel. Semenchuk v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 19AP361, 2019-Ohio-4641, ¶ 21 (the parole board must consider available ORAS information in 

its evaluation of whether to parole an inmate). Although some courts, such as the court in 

Snider, have questioned the applicability of ORAS to sex offenders, see also State v. Garcia, 

11th Dist. No. 2020-A-0034, 2021-Ohio-4480, ¶ 52, citing Snider (a defendant’s ORAS 

score is only a factor, one of limited applicability to sexual offenders, for the court to 

consider in fashioning a sentence), relator can point to no authority that OAPA had a clear 

legal duty not to apply ORAS to him in making a parole determination or that to apply 

ORAS to a sex offender in a parole determination denies the offender of meaningful parole 

consideration. Also, as the court in Snider and Garcia acknowledged, ORAS is merely one 

factor in assessing an offender’s risk. Here, the OAPA also found in his 2021 parole hearing 

that relator lacked a risk-management plan specific to his sexual reoffending and he had an 

escalating history of violence specific to women. In his 2018 parole hearing, the OAPA 

found that his elevated risk of reoffending was aggravated by case-specific factors, such as 
No. 22AP-304 32

violence, brutality, multiple occurrences, multiple victims, and extensive victimization. For 

these reasons, OAPA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. 

{¶ 100} In his amended complaint, relator also asserts that OAPA denied him 

meaningful parole consideration when it improperly utilized and applied ORAS because 

ORAS is inapplicable to inmates who have already been incarcerated for long terms.

However, in neither relator’s amended complaint nor relator’s reply brief in opposition to 

summary judgment does relator present any argument or authority for this ground for 

relief. A non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its 

pleadings. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). Here, the magistrate finds no 

legal authority to support relator’s contention that the OAPA has a clear legal duty not to 

apply ORAS in making a parole determination when the offender has already been 

incarcerated for a long term. OAPA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

{¶ 101} OAPA next argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on relator’s claim 

that it denied relator meaningful parole consideration when it considered S.B. 2 

consecutive-sentencing parity, pursuant to R.C. 2971.01, which provides for sentencing of 

sexually violent predators, and retroactively applied the equivalent sentencing range under 

S.B. 2’s R.C. 2971.03 in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 

Constitution and Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution. OAPA asserts that this 

claim is nonsensical and confusing. OAPA contends that the parole board does consider 

sentencing parity in its review of parole-release hearings pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 

5120:1-1-07(16), but the parole board does not recalculate an inmate’s sentence or increase 

the sentence. OAPA claims that the parole board cannot violate the Ex Post Facto Clause 

because it is the trial court that sentences a criminal defendant and not OAPA. OAPA points 

out that relator is still serving an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to 130 years, with his 

maximum expiration of sentence being October 9, 2120, and the OAPA’s parole 

determinations have no effect on the original sentence. 

{¶ 102} On this claim, relator argues the following: (1) he is entitled to a writ of 

mandamus based on State v. Rush, 83 Ohio St.3d 53 (1998), in which the Supreme Court 

of Ohio held that the amended sentencing provisions of S.B. 2 apply only to crimes 

committed on or after July 1, 1996; (2) OAPA has acknowledged in other cases that the 

parole board does not consider S.B. 2 sentencing parity pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-
No. 22AP-304 33

1-7 when the S.B. 2 equivalent sentence would be longer than the original sentence 

imposed; yet, in this case, OAPA now admits that the OAPA does consider S.B. 2 sentencing 

parity in its review of parole-release hearings and did, in fact, indicate in denying parole at 

his May 2021 hearing that it considered S.B. 2 parity and the fact that relator was given 

consecutive sentences by the court; (3) pursuant to pre-S.B. 2 R.C. 2967.13, he was 

statutorily eligible for parole after serving ten years; yet, OAPA considered S.B. 2 

consecutive-sentencing parity and applied the equivalent consecutive-sentencing range 

under S.B. 2, while ignoring the statutory sentences enacted by the legislature pre-S.B. 2; 

(4) under S.B. 2 consecutive-sentencing range, he would not be statutorily eligible for 

parole until after serving approximately 56 years; (5) OAPA’s actions imposed an additional 

punishment that what was prescribed at the time of the offense, thereby constituting an ex 

post facto violation; and (6) OAPA has effectively extended the length of time he must serve 

before becoming statutorily eligible for parole when it applied S.B. 2 consecutivesentencing statutes and applied the equivalent sentencing range under S.B. 2 consecutivesentencing statutes, contrary to Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000).

{¶ 103} After a review of relator’s amended complaint and his arguments, the 

magistrate finds relator has failed to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to the relief 

requested. Despite citations to authority for some general propositions, he does not present 

any controlling legal authority for his main contention that OAPA is prohibited from 

considering S.B. 2 consecutive-sentencing parity pursuant to R.C. 2971.01 or applying the 

equivalent sentence range under S.B. 2’s R.C. 2971.03 for an offender whose crimes were 

committed before July 1, 1996. In State v. Caslin, 10th Dist. No. 98AP-463 (Sept. 29, 1998), 

the defendant argued that S.B. 2 unconstitutionally affected his parole hearings. This court 

found there is no constitutional, statutory, or inherent right to parole, citing State ex rel. 

Hattie v. Goldhardt, 69 Ohio St.3d 123, 125 (1994), and State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 

69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490 (1994). We also found that application of S.B. 2 to parole does not 

make the defendant’s punishment more burdensome for the crime of which he was 

convicted, and it does not deprive him of any defense available according to the law in effect 

at the time that he committed the crime. We explained that there is no change to the 

defendant’s imposed sentence under the prospectively applied parole guidelines but merely 

a change in OAPA’s consideration of parole eligibility. See also Harris v. Wilkinson, 10th 

Dist. No. 01AP-598 (Nov. 27, 2001), quoting Akbar-El v. Wilkinson, S.D.Ohio No. C2-95-
No. 22AP-304 34

472 (Apr. 28, 1998), aff’d 181 F.3d 99 (6th Cir.1999) (finding that parole is a discretionary 

decision, and a state may constitutionally add or delete factors that guide the parole board’s 

exercise of its discretion without running afoul of the Constitution). In the present case, 

OAPA did not change or increase relator’s original sentence imposed by the trial court. 

Relator’s sentence remained the same, and he has no right to parole before the expiration 

of that term. 

{¶ 104} Furthermore, with regard to relator’s reliance upon Rush, the court in that 

case held that legislation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it makes a previously innocent 

act criminal, increases the punishment for a crime after its commission, or deprives the 

accused of a defense available at the time the crime was committed. However, relator’s ex 

post facto challenge here does not assert that any law, legislation, or rule adopted in 

accordance with statutory procedure increased his punishment. Relator complains only of 

OAPA’s discretionary decision-making pursuant to its own policy in determining his 

parole. Because relator raises no legislative enactment, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not 

apply here. See Muhammad v. Kinkela, 10th Dist. No. 00AP-525 (Dec. 21, 2000) (parole 

guidelines are not legislative enactments, nor adopted in accordance with statutory 

procedure for adopting rules; therefore, the ex post facto clause does not apply to them). 

{¶ 105} In addition, relator does cite to any existing parole statute that OAPA 

violated in making its parole determination. Although the parole board indicated that it 

considered, among other things, sentencing parity and the fact that the trial court ordered 

consecutive sentences in determining parole, it did not indicate that he was not statutorily 

eligible for parole in any way that conflicted with a statutory parole legislation. See 

Muhammad (although the parole board is granted discretion in granting parole, it does not 

grant discretion to the parole board to set an inmate’s parole eligibility outside the statutory 

limit set forth in R.C. 2967.13(G); the intent of the legislature was to require the parole 

authority to consider a prisoner at the time he statutorily becomes eligible for parole).

{¶ 106} Therefore, even taking relator’s factual assertions in his amended 

complaint as true, OAPA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Relator presents no 

legal authority to support his allegation that the OAPA denied him fair and meaningful 

consideration for parole during the May 17, 2021, hearing, in its application of S.B. 2 to his 

parole proceedings. 
No. 22AP-304 35

{¶ 107} Accordingly, the magistrate recommends that this court grant the motion 

for summary judgment as to the two additional claims raised by relator in his amended 

mandamus complaint specifically against the OAPA. Given this disposition of OAPA’s 

motion for summary judgment, all other pending motions are denied as moot.

/S/ MAGISTRATE

THOMAS W. SCHOLL III

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as 

error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or 

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a 

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects 

to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(b). A party may file written objections to the 

magistrate's decision within fourteen days of the filing of the 

decision.