*U.S. Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 21, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

_________________________________

No. 01-51108

_________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

VERSUS

JEFFERY A. JACKSON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

____________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

____________________________________________________

Before: DAVIS, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL*, and EMILIO M. GARZA,

Circuit Judges.

CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit Judge:

Jeffery A. Jackson appeals his convictions for aiding and

abetting the interstate transportation of stolen jewelry, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2314, and for conspiracy to

transport stolen jewelry in interstate commerce, in violation of
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18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314. On appeal, Jackson contends that the

district court erred by admitting evidence of a prior state

conviction for theft of watches and by admitting evidence of his

state parole status. 

The district court had jurisdiction over Jackson’s

prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court abused its

discretion by admitting both pieces of evidence and these errors

were not harmless, we REVERSE.

FACTS

At approximately 5:30 a.m., on June 15, 1999, a Bailey,

Banks and Biddle jewelry store in San Antonio, Texas, was

burglarized. The burglars smashed through a sliding glass door

and took several valuable watches and other jewelry worth almost

$700,000. The burglary, which only lasted a few minutes, was

caught on a security camera. The video showed four masked

individuals. No identifiable fingerprints were found in the

store.

Throughout the months surrounding this burglary, a number of
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Bailey, Banks and Biddle stores were burglarized in similar

“smash and grab jobs” throughout California and Nevada. The

burglaries were believed to be the work of the infamous “threeminute gang” which may have been responsible for stealing up to

$80 million of jewelry in twelve states over a five-year-period. 

The “three-minute gang,” referred to as such because of their

apparent ability to get in and out of a jewelry store in less

than three minutes, was based in California. See generally Scott

Marshall, ‘Three Minute Gang’ Suspects Arrested in Las Vegas,

Contra Costa Times, November 2, 1999. 

Appellant, Jackson, a resident of San Antonio, was not a

member of the gang. According to the prosecutor, Jackson was

“local talent” used only in the burglary at issue. The core of

the gang consisted of Jackson’s co-defendant, Clinton Randolph,

Clinton’s brother Clayton and Jabby Lawson, the government’s

principal witness at trial. The three all resided in the Los

Angeles area. Other members of the gang who allegedly

participated in a number of robberies included Anthony Bilberry

and Tony Whitaker, both of whom were also from California. 
1 According to the Government’s main witness, Jabby Lawson,

Jackson was sitting in this seat. From the photograph of Jackson

in the record, he does not appear to meet this description. 

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On the morning of June 15, 1999, several hours after the

burglary, an African-American male walked into a Mailboxes, Etc.

store in San Antonio and mailed two boxes to California. Chandra

Young, the clerk who handled the mailing of the packages,

positively identified the man as Clinton Randolph, Jackson’s codefendant. Young claims that Randolph pulled up to the store in

a dark-colored sports utility vehicle and parked close to the

store entrance. She saw, sitting in the front seat, one other

person whom she described as a “Hispanic male” or “light-skinned

black male.”1 Randolph filled out an air bill using his Los

Angeles address as a return address. He sent the packages

“express priority overnight” to the Los Angeles area home of a

long-time friend. He picked up the package several days later. 

Shortly after Randolph left, Young saw something shining

close to the store entrance. She went outside to see what it was

and found four expensive watches. Later, Young stopped at two

pawn shops and sold one watch at each shop. When Young learned
2 On May 22, 1999, just a few weeks before the burglary that

is the subject of this appeal, Bilberry was pulled over in Texas. 

He stated that he was on his way to San Antonio. With him were

Clinton Randolph and 51 pieces of expensive jewelry in the

original manufacturer’s packaging. Jackson’s lawyers implied

that Bilberry, not Jackson, was the fourth burglar involved in

the San Antonio burglary.

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about the jewelry store break-in, she promptly notified the

police and the jewelry store about the watches. 

At around 9:00 p.m. on June 15, 1999, almost sixteen hours

after the burglary, Jackson was pulled over for speeding in

Reeves County, Texas, about 400 miles from San Antonio. He was

driving on Interstate 10 westbound in a dark sports utility

vehicle with California license plates. Jabby Lawson later

testified that he and Clinton Randolph were in the car with

Jackson when he was pulled over.

In October 1999, Clinton Randolph was arrested in Las Vegas,

along with Jabby Lawson and Anthony Bilberry, another member of

the gang.2 Shortly after the arrest, Detective Eddie Gonzales

interviewed Jabby Lawson in Las Vegas. In this interview, Lawson

claimed that Jackson was involved in the San Antonio burglary. 

The Trial
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Jackson and his co-defendant Clinton Randolph were not

indicted for burglarizing the jewelry store. Rather, they were

indicted for the federal offenses of transporting stolen goods in

interstate commerce and for conspiring to commit such

transporting. At trial, the prosecution connected Jackson to the

burglary mainly through the testimony of Jabby Lawson. Lawson

admitted that he was involved in the San Antonio burglary and

claimed that the other burglars were Clinton Randolph, Clayton

Randolph and Jackson. Lawson testified that after the burglary,

the four burglars went to a rented room at the Hampton Inn. 

There, they placed the stolen jewelry in plastic sandwich bags

and packed them in boxes. Then Clinton Randolph, Jackson and

Lawson went to Mailboxes, Etc. Lawson claims that the three of

them left San Antonio in a black Dodge sports utility vehicle

later that morning. Lawson also admitted to a long history of

drug use and said that during the time of the burglary, he had a

five hundred dollar-a-week cocaine habit. He claimed to have

received about $7,000 for his participation in the San Antonio

burglary which yielded about $700,000 in stolen merchandise. 
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Detective Gonzales, however, testified that Lawson told him he

only received $4,000 for his participation. 

Lawson testified that he had been involved in eight other

burglaries. Detective Gonzales, however, testified that Lawson

had told him that he had been involved in twelve other

burglaries. Clinton Randolph and Clayton Randolph had

participated in all of these burglaries. Other members of the

gang, all of whom were from the Los Angeles area, had also

participated. Lawson testified that Jackson was involved only in

the San Antonio burglary. Lawson said that he had met Jackson

only one time before the San Antonio burglary. 

FBI agent Kenneth Smith testified regarding an interview he

conducted with Lawson in December 1999, two months after

Detective Gonzales’s first interview in Las Vegas. In this

interview, Lawson acknowledged that he knew Jackson but did not

implicate him in any burglary. Lawson admitted to being in Texas

around June 1999 and admitted to being involved in one burglary. 

Yet Lawson claimed that he could not clearly remember where in

Texas he had been and where he had committed the burglary. He
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told Smith that he had been partying in Texas with the Randolph

brothers and because he had consumed lots of drugs and alcohol,

his memory regarding this time was hazy. Lawson did claim to

remember, however, that he was not in San Antonio on June 15,

1999, the day of the burglary, just the contrary of Lawson’s

testimony in the courtroom. 

In order to further implicate Jackson, the prosecution

introduced into evidence records of a large number of telephone

calls between Clinton Randolph’s Los Angeles home and Jackson’s

San Antonio home during the weeks surrounding the burglary. 

Also, there was evidence of telephone calls being made from

Randolph’s Los Angeles home to Jackson’s San Antonio home and to

Jackson’s girlfriend’s San Antonio home while Jackson was in

California. The prosecution also placed Jackson at several

parties with Clinton Randolph in California after the burglary. 

Finally, the prosecution pointed out that Jackson had been pulled

over on his way to California in a black sports utility vehicle

with Lawson and Clinton Randolph, sixteen hours after the

burglary. 
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Jackson’s ex-wife testified that she had introduced Jackson

to Clinton Randolph several years before the burglary and that

Randolph had been a “family friend” of the Jacksons for a long

time. Jackson’s ex-wife also testified that Jackson was living

with her in San Antonio during the months surrounding the

burglary and at least one of the calls from Clinton Randolph’s

Los Angeles home to her home may have been for her.

Jackson’s defense was simple and clearly laid out in his

opening statement—Jackson had nothing to do with the burglary. 

He was not one of the men on the videotape. He similarly claimed

he had nothing to do with the shipping of the bounty of the

burglary to Los Angeles. Jackson claims that Jabby Lawson

accused Jackson of being the fourth burglar to protect another

member of Lawson’s gang.

At trial, the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence of

Jackson’s 1994 Texas felony conviction for theft of watches. The

prosecutor claimed that he offered the evidence “to demonstrate

the defendant’s intent to commit this offense.” Jackson’s

attorney responded:
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Mr. Jackson’s state of mind isn’t – we haven’t contested

anything about state of mind. . . . The issue here is

whether or not he was there. You know, if he was there in

that burglary, no question what his state of mind is. He’s

– you saw the video what those guys are doing. There’s no

question what the people who are in that burglary are doing,

they are stealing.

To this the prosecution responded, “they enter a not guilty plea,

Your Honor, and all issues – everything is in issue, everything

in the indictment. . . . Intent is always an issue.” The

district court permitted the evidence to be introduced. 

Jackson’s attorney then stated, “Your Honor, before – I also urge

under Rule 403 that the prejudicial value – outweighs the

relevance. And I request the Court to make a finding[.]” The

district court never responded to this request except by saying,

“you’re on the record.”

Later, the prosecution called as a witness Janita Lee, an

officer of the Texas Department of Justice, Parole Division. The

prosecutor’s purported reason for calling Janita Lee was to

introduce evidence of Jackson’s parole status in order to prove
3 As noted above, Jackson’s address was relevant because of

telephone calls made to Jackson’s home originating from Clinton

Randolph’s home in Los Angeles in the period surrounding the

burglary. 

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Jackson’s address in San Antonio.3 The defense objected stating: 

Your Honor, his ex-wife has already put him there. This is

doing it just to get parole records in. If the Court

doesn’t just exclude this testimony, then I would move that

under Rule 403 you order them to redact any reference to the

agency she was working for or the fact that he was on parole

. . . And she just testifies that in her business records

this is Jackson’s address on these dates. 

The prosecutor responded, as follows:

She’s going to have to say who she works for, Judge. Now I

don’t even care about putting the record in. All I [want]

her to do is to say that she does – she is employed by the

parole division. Obviously, she says we made a home visit

in July 16th of ‘99, she’s going to have to say why that

[sic] made a home visit, but she’s going to have to say we

had him as a listed address on that date, and we made a home

visit, according to our records. I don’t even want to put

the record in, for that matter. I just want her to testify

from, just because it is a business record.

The judge overruled Jackson’s objection. Lee was called as a

witness and identified herself as a parole officer. Despite the

prosecutor’s statements that he didn’t “even want to put the

record in,” he immediately introduced Jackson’s parole record

into evidence. Jackson again objected and the objection was
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overruled. The records contained the following notation:

OFFENSE OF RECORD: LARCENY–THEFT, OF CREDIT CA

Lee testified to Jackson’s address and stated that a home visit

was made on July 16, 1999.

 Jackson was convicted of both offenses. This appeal

followed. 

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s admission of extrinsic

offense evidence over a 404(b) objection under a “heightened”

abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Wisenbaker, 14

F.3d 1022, 1028 (5th Cir. 1993). “[E]vidence in criminal trials

must be ‘strictly relevant to the particular offense charged.’”

United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1083, 93

L. Ed. 1337 (1949)). If the district court abused its

discretion, we do not reverse if the error was harmless. United

States v. Torres, 114 F.3d 520, 526 (5th Cir. 1997).

DISCUSSION

In United States v. Beechum, this court, sitting en banc,
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laid out the two conditions that must be met before extrinsic

evidence of prior offenses, or other misconduct, can be

introduced. 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc). 

“First, it must be determined that the extrinsic offense evidence

is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character. 

Second, the evidence must possess probative value that is not

substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and must meet the

other requirements of rule 403.” Id. Jackson argues that

neither the evidence of his prior conviction nor the evidence of

his parole status and accompanying parole record meets the two

requirements of the Beechum test. 

The Prior Conviction

At trial, the prosecutor stated that he was introducing

evidence regarding Jackson’s prior theft conviction to show

Jackson’s “intent and motive in connection with this offense.” 

Jackson was charged with two offenses. The prosecutor, when he

introduced the conviction did not make clear to which of the two

offenses he was referring. In closing argument, the prosecutor

told the jury that the prior conviction could be considered “in
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determining whether . . . [Jackson] act[ed] in the conspiracy

knowingly and intentionally.” In the government’s brief in this

court, it also focuses on the relevance of Jackson’s prior

conviction to the issue of intent in the conspiracy charge. We

therefore address whether the prior conviction was relevant to

prove intent on the conspiracy charge. 

“Once it is determined that the extrinsic offense requires

the same intent as the charged offense,” the admission of the

extrinsic offense “satisfies the first step” of Beechum. Id. at

913. “The similarity in intent required between the extrinsic

and charged offenses only means that the defendant ‘indulge

himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of both . .

. offenses.’” United States v. McMahon, 592 F.2d 871, 873 (5th

Cir. 1979)(quoting Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911). In McMahon, we

found that the extrinsic offense of aiding and abetting an alien

to elude examination “required the defendant to possess the same

‘state of mind’ as agreeing with others” to transport aliens. 

Id. Here, the extrinsic offense admitted into evidence,

Jackson’s conviction under Texas Penal Code section 31.03,
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required that Jackson intend “to deprive the owner of property.” 

The conspiracy charge required that Jackson intend to agree to

transport property deprived from its owner. The two offenses

require Jackson to “indulge himself in the same state of mind”

and therefore require the “same” intent under Beechum and

McMahon. 

At trial, Jackson never made any arguments based on intent. 

His defense was clearly laid out to the jury in his opening

statement. His defense was simply that the government had the

wrong man. He was not involved in the burglary and the

subsequent shipping of the stolen jewelry in interstate commerce. 

Jackson argues that if the jury believed Lawson’s testimony that

Jackson was the fourth burglar on the videotape and that he

participated in the packing and shipping of the stolen jewelry

then the jury would inevitably believe that he intended to join a

plan to do so. 

Jackson’s argument overlooks the unique nature of the intent

element in conspiracy. In order to be found guilty of

conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
-16-

that the defendant knowingly joined a plan to further an unlawful

objective—here the mailing of stolen property. See United States

v. Suarez, 608 F.2d 584, 586 (5th Cir. 1979). In United States

v. Roberts, this court expressly considered the question of

whether a prior conviction is relevant to prove intent in a

conspiracy case when the defendant has not raised the issue. 619

F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980). The defendant, Roberts, was convicted

of conspiracy to operate an illegal gambling business. Id. at

380. At trial, the government sought admission of a prior

gambling offense. Roberts’ counsel argued that the conviction

was not relevant unless the issue of intent were first

affirmatively raised by the defense. The district court rejected

that argument and we affirmed. We focused on the special nature

of the element of intent in conspiracy cases:

Charges of conspiracy involve considerations not present in

other criminal prosecutions. The offense of conspiracy

requires an element of intent or knowledge which is often

difficult to prove. Because the prosecution must prove that

the defendant knowingly joined a plan to commit a crime,

evidence that establishes a defendant's participation in a

criminal act, United States v. Suarez, 608 F.2d 584 (5th

Cir. 1979), or evidence establishing his association with

co-conspirators, Panci v. United States, 256 F.2d 308 (5th
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Cir. 1958), may be insufficient to support the inference

that the defendant voluntarily joined a conspiracy to commit

a crime. Intent is particularly difficult to prove when a

defendant is a passive or minor actor in a criminal drama. .

. . Unequivocal evidence that a defendant committed a

substantive offense may justify the inference that he

intended to do so, but it does not plainly support the

conclusion that he agreed and planned with others to commit

the crime.

Id. at 383. The court therefore upheld the admission of the

prior conviction notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had

not previously made intent an issue.

The same considerations are present here. While, it is

difficult to imagine that a jury would credit Jabby Lawson’s

testimony and nevertheless conclude that Jackson had not

knowingly joined a plan to ship stolen goods, it is theoretically

possible. Based on Roberts, we conclude that evidence of the

prior offense was relevant to an issue other than

character—specifically, Jackson’s intent to join an agreement to

ship stolen goods in interstate commerce. The extrinsic offense

evidence therefore meets the first part of the Beechum test.

 Under Beechum, however, extrinsic offense evidence that is

relevant to a non-character purpose must still possess probative
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value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue

prejudice. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 898. “[W]hat counts as the Rule

403 ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence, as distinct from

its Rule 401 ‘relevance,’ may be calculated by comparing

evidentiary alternatives.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S.

172, 184 (1997). “Probity in this context is not an absolute; its

value must be determined with regard to the extent to which the

defendant's unlawful intent is established by other evidence,

stipulation, or inference. . . . Thus, if the Government has a

strong case on the intent issue, the extrinsic offense may add

little and consequently will be excluded more readily.” Beechum,

582 F.2d at 914. In Roberts, the court took two considerations

into account when determining the probative value of the prior

offense. First, the court noted that “[t]here was little other

independent evidence of intent.” Roberts, 619 F.2d at 383. 

Second, the court observed that evidence of Roberts’ prior

gambling conviction was necessary to counter his claim that he

was merely an ignorant participant in the operation and never

knowingly agreed to participate in a gambling business. Id.
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Neither consideration is present in the instant case. 

First, unlike Roberts, there was other substantial evidence

going to the issue of intent to enter into an unlawful agreement. 

Jabby Lawson testified that Jackson participated in the burglary

to acquire the stolen property, went to a hotel room to help

three other people package the stolen property and then drove

with two others to Mailboxes Etc. to mail the stolen property in

interstate commerce. If Jabby Lawson’s testimony were credited,

a jury would be hard-pressed to conclude that Jackson did not

intend to enter into an agreement to ship stolen property. The

prior conviction could not have added much to a jury’s analysis

of the issue except to make the jury more likely to credit

Lawson’s assertion that Jackson was the fourth burglar because of

Jackson’s prior criminal conduct. This is exactly what Rule 404

forbids. 

Second, unlike the defendant in Roberts, Jackson never made

a claim that he was just an ignorant participant in the burglary

and shipping of the jewelry. Rather, he claimed that he was not

involved at all. The nature of Jackson’s defense further lessens
4 The prosecutor, when he referred to Jackson as “local

talent” in his opening statement, was explaining why an

experienced gang of Los Angeles jewelry thieves would work with

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the probative value of the prior conviction. See United States

v. Hernandez-Guevera, 162 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 1998)

(probative value of prior convictions for smuggling aliens was

“relatively great” when defendant “based his defense on a claim

that he was merely in the wrong place at the wrong time”).

The prior conviction in this case had very little probative

value when considering the other evidence going to intent and the

nature of Jackson’s defense but the potential to cause unfair

prejudice was substantial. "'Unfair prejudice' within its

context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an

improper basis[.]" Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid.

403. Here, where the threshold issue was one of identity, there

was great danger that the jury would decide that Jackson was

involved in the conspiracy because of his prior criminal conduct. 

This is precisely the inference Rule 404 forbids. The

prosecutor, moreover, invited the jury to think about Jackson’s

character when he referred to Jackson as “local talent.”4 The
Jackson, a resident of San Antonio who had never stolen with them

before. The inference the prosecutor invited the jury to draw

was clearly that because Jackson was an experienced thief he was

more likely to be involved in this criminal activity. Such an

inference is prohibited by Rule 404. 

5 We have noted that evidence of a “conviction for a similar

crime is more probative than prejudicial and that any prejudicial

effect may be minimized by a proper jury instruction.” United

States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2000);

but see Hernandez-Guevera, 162 F.3d at 872 (“[A] close

resemblance between the extrinsic offense and the charged offense

also increases the unfair prejudice to the defendant.”). As we

noted in Roberts, and reiterate today, the inchoate crime of

conspiracy involves unique elements not present in other crimes. 

Here, Jackson was accused of conspiring with three expert jewelry

thieves first to obtain almost a million dollars in stolen

jewelry in Texas and then to ship the jewelry across the country

to California. The extrinsic offense was for a simple theft of

around ten watches worth about seven hundred dollars. We do not

find the crimes similar enough to compel a finding that the prior

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prior conviction’s probative value was substantially outweighed

by its undue prejudice. See United States v. Kirk, 528 F.2d

1057, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1976) (When intent is not being

contested, “evidence of the defendant's commission of a crime not

charged in the indictment goes more to the inadmissible purpose

of proving that the defendant is a bad man than to the admissible

purpose of proving intent.”). Its admission therefore fails the

second part of the Beechum test. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911.5
conviction was more probative than prejudicial. 

-22-

Our review of whether a district court abused its discretion

is “heightened” in criminal cases. Wisenbaker, 14 F.3d at 1028. 

We recognize that a district court has wide discretion in

criminal evidentiary matters. Review for abuse of discretion is

not, however, “tantamount to no review at all.” Wilton v. Seven

Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995) (internal quotation and

citation omitted). We find that, under the facts and

circumstances of this case, the admission of Jackson’s prior

conviction was an abuse of discretion and therefore error. 

The Parole Record

We also conclude that the district court abused its

discretion by allowing a witness to testify regarding Jackson’s

parole status and by admitting Jackson’s un-redacted parole

record into evidence. The government claims to have introduced

those records to prove Jackson’s address from April 16, 1999

until July 16, 1999. The government also claims that the record

was relevant to show that Jackson was present at his residence on

July 16, 1999. Evidence that Jackson resided at this address was
-23-

relevant because there were a large number of telephone calls

between Clinton Randolph’s Los Angeles home telephone number and

the telephone number corresponding to this address. The

government, however, does not explain why it was relevant that

Jackson was at his residence on July 16, 1999. No relevant

telephone call was placed on this date. Except for one call

placed on July 17, every relevant telephone call was placed

before July 16, 1999. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the

relevant telephone calls occurred in June during the weeks

surrounding the burglary. 

This case cannot be materially distinguished from United

States v. Palmer, 37 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 1994). In Palmer, we

found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting

a parole certificate for the purpose of showing that the

defendant fled from the police because he knew he could not

legally own a firearm due to his parole status. Id. at 1085. 

The government had already offered evidence showing this. The

court held that since the parole certificate referred to a prior

conviction—not otherwise admissible into evidence—the district
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court abused its discretion by admitting the parole certificate. 

Id.

Here, like Palmer, there was already evidence that Jackson

resided at his ex-wife’s residence during the relevant time

period. The prosecution called Jackson’s ex-wife to testify to

this fact. Furthermore, during cross-examination of Jackson’s

ex-wife, Jackson’s counsel never questioned this fact. At no

point in the trial did Jackson ever claim that he did not live at

this address. 

Also like Palmer, the parole record appeared to refer to a

prior conviction not otherwise admissible into evidence,

specifically, a conviction for credit card theft. The parole

record contained the following notation:

OFFENSE OF RECORD: LARCENY–THEFT, OF CREDIT CA

The government has since explained that this notation had nothing

to do with a theft of a credit card but had to do with some

credit Jackson received for time served. The government asks us

to look at the Pre-Sentencing Report which shows that Jackson had

never been convicted for credit card theft. But the Pre-
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Sentencing Report did not exist at the time of trial. We

therefore cannot consider it when considering how a jury

interpreted the parole record notation. A plain reading of that

notation implies that Jackson had been convicted of theft of a

credit card and nothing to the contrary was ever explained to the

jury. 

Moreover, the government offers no plausible justification

for not redacting the document and for not requiring the parole

officer to identify herself as just an officer of the State of

Texas. At oral argument, the government claimed that because the

state is required to keep track of its parolees’ addresses, the

document and the parole officer’s testimony were more credible

regarding Jackson’s address. At trial, however, the government

never tried to establish that the document and testimony were

more credible for this reason and, as previously noted, Jackson

did not challenge the fact that he resided at his ex-wife’s

address. The only case the government cites as authority for its

position that the unredacted parole record was admissible is one

where the parole certificate was redacted to exclude reference to
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the prior conviction. United States v. DeLeon, 170 F.3d 494, 497

(5th Cir. 1999) (redacted parole certificate without any

reference to nature of crime admissible where it was necessary to

prove defendant was a felon).

The minuscule probative value of the parole officer’s

testimony and the parole record were clearly outweighed by their

potential to cause undue prejudice. The district court therefore

abused its discretion by allowing the unredacted parole record to

be admitted and by allowing a witness to testify regarding

Jackson’s parole status. See Palmer, 37 F.3d at 1085. 

Harmless Error

Given the evidence against Jackson, we cannot say that the

evidentiary errors here were harmless. The evidence against

Jackson, while certainly enough to go forward with a prosecution,

was not overwhelming. This was a close case. The government’s

case depended heavily on the testimony of Jabby Lawson. Lawson

had a five-hundred dollar-a-week cocaine habit at the time of the

burglary at issue and told one FBI agent that he was using such

large quantities of drugs and alcohol, at the time he was in
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Texas, that he could not remember where in the state he was. He

told inconsistent stories about who was involved in the San

Antonio burglary, whether he himself was involved in the burglary

at all, the amount of money he received for participating in the

burglaries, and the total number of burglaries in which he was

involved. Although there was some evidence linking Jackson to

Clinton Randolph, such evidence could not have sustained a

conviction without the testimony of Lawson. The erroneously

admitted evidence regarding Jackson’s prior conviction and parole

status could have been what convinced the jury to believe Jabby

Lawson’s claim that Jackson was involved in the shipping of

stolen jewelry. We therefore cannot say that the errors were

harmless. 

CONCLUSION

Jeffery A. Jackson’s convictions, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371

and 2314, are REVERSED. The sentences imposed pursuant to those

convictions are VACATED. We REMAND for retrial, or other

proceedings, consistent with this opinion.