[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 99-1874

VELIA CICCARIELLO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Selya, Circuit Judge,

Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Michael James Kelley on brief for appellant.

Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Rayford A.

Farquhar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.

May 4, 2000
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Per Curiam. Claimant Velia Ciccariello appeals a

district court order that upheld the denial of her claim for

Social Security disability benefits. Although claimant had

moved the district court to remand her case to the

Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence six, the

district court ruled that the claimant had failed to adduce

"new" and "material" evidence and denied her motion to

remand while holding that the Commissioner's decision was

supported by substantial evidence. Claimant now maintains

that both the district court and the Appeals Council erred

by declining to remand her case to the ALJ. She further

argues that the ALJ's decision is not supported by

substantial evidence. Having thoroughly reviewed the record

and the parties' briefs on appeal, we are disposed to affirm

for the following reasons.

First, we conclude that the district court did not

err by denying claimant's motion to remand. Even if the

evidence that claimant submitted to the Appeals Council was

new and material (a matter we need not decide in light of

our disposition), it is clear that the claimant failed to

establish the "good cause" required to justify a remand
1In relevant part, the sixth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

provides that:

The court may ... at any time order

additional evidence to be taken before the

Commissioner ... but only upon a showing

that there is new evidence which is material

and that there is good cause for the failure

to incorporate such evidence into the record

in a prior proceeding....

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under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence six.1 "Congress plainly

intended that remands for good cause should be few and far

between...." Evangelista v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 826 F.2d 136, 141 (1st Cir. 1987). Virtually all

of the medical records that claimant submitted to the

Appeals Council were in existence long before the date of

her administrative hearing. Yet both below and on appeal,

claimant's counsel has offered only personal unsworn

assertions that these late-submitted medical records were

previously unavailable because of the poor record-keeping of

claimant's medical providers. It is well established in

this circuit that this is not enough. See, e.g., Gooley v.

Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1988); cf.

Blackburn v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 908, 914 (D.C. Ill.

1985)(finding "good cause" where counsel submitted affidavit

to support allegations of unavailable medical records).

Since claimant failed to submit any proof to support her
2We do not suggest that the allegations about the poor

record-keeping of claimant's medical providers are false. We

simply emphasize that unsworn allegations do not constitute the

proof required by the good cause standard.

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"good cause" claim, there was no error in the denial of her

motion to remand.2

Claimant has waived her contention that the ALJ's

decision is not supported by substantial evidence by failing

to raise this argument below. See Evangelista, 826 F.2d at

143. Her arguments that the Appeals Council erred by

failing to state the basis of its decision denying

claimant's request for review and by failing even to review

her late-submitted evidence similarly have been waived. We

note, however, that the record clearly establishes that the

Appeals Council reviewed claimant's additional evidence and

that the Appeals Council was not required to explain the

basis of its decision denying review. See Perkins v.

Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1293-94 (7th Cir. 1997); Damato v.

Sullivan, 945 F.2d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 1992).

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the

district court is affirmed. See Local Rule 27(c).