In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-4035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JIMMIE ROSS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 98 CR 20039--Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.

Argued NOVEMBER 1, 2000--Decided March 14,

2001

 Before CUDAHY, COFFEY, and EASTERBROOK,

Circuit Judges.

 COFFEY, Circuit Judge. On June 3, 1998,

a federal grand jury sitting in the

Central District of Illinois returned a

one-count indictment charging Jimmie

Ross, Jr., with being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of

18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1)./1 After the

district judge denied his motion to

dismiss the indictment due to alleged

violations of the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers (IAD),/2 Ross entered into a

written plea agreement in which he

retained the right to challenge the

denial of his motion to dismiss. On

November 22, 1999, the district court

sentenced Ross to 63 months’

imprisonment, three years’ supervised

release, and a special assessment of

$100. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND/3

 Prior to being the subject of this

federal indictment, Ross was charged in

Illinois state court with unlawful

possession of a controlled substance. On
June 8, 1998, Ross entered a plea of

guilty to the state charge of possession

of a controlled substance and was

sentenced to a term of three years’

imprisonment. On June 11, 1998, a federal

detainer/4 was lodged against Ross with

the Sheriff of Champaign County,

Illinois, in conformance with the IAD. On

August 10, 1998, Ross delivered to Paul

Barnett, the warden of the Danville

Correctional Facility, a written demand

for a final disposition of the federal

charges then pending in conformance with

Article III(a) of the IAD. The demand for

final disposition Ross delivered to the

warden was accompanied with a pre-printed

cover memorandum citing the relevant

portions of the IAD. It said, in

pertinent part:

(b) The written notice and request for

final disposition . . . shall be given or

sent by the prisoner to the warden . . .

or other official having custody of him,

who shall promptly forward it together

with the certificate to the appropriate

prosecuting official and court by

registered or certified mail, return

receipt requested.

(c) The warden . . . or other official

having custody of the prisoner shall

promptly inform him of the source and

contents of any detainer lodged against

him and shall also inform him of his

right to make a request for final

disposition of the indictment,

information or complaint on which the

detainer is based.

(d) . . . The warden . . . or other

official having custody of the prisoner

shall forthwith notify all appropriate

prosecuting officers and courts in the

several jurisdictions within the state to

which the prisoner’s request for final

disposition is being sent of the

proceeding being initiated by the

prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant

to this paragraph shall be accompanied by

copies of the prisoner’s written notice,

request, and the certificate. If trial is

not had on any indictment, information or

complaint contemplated hereby prior to

the return of the prisoner to the

original place of imprisonment, such

indictment, information or complaint

shall not be of any further force or

effect, and the court shall enter an

order dismissing the same with prejudice.
18 U.S.C. App.2 sec. 2; see also 730 ILCS

5/3-8-9. Despite the requirement in the

IAD that the warden should "promptly

forward" the prisoner’s request for final

disposition to the appropriate federal

prosecutor, the Danville warden merely

drafted a certificate of confinement and

returned the demand for final disposition

and certificate of confinement to Ross.

After 180 days had passed since Ross had

sent his demand for final disposition to

the warden (which was returned to him),

Ross inquired about the status of his

detainer and learned that no action had

been taken to forward either his demand

for final disposition or certificate of

confinement. Taking the matter into his

own hands, Ross filed his demand for

final disposition with the Clerk for the

U.S. District Court for the Central

District of Illinois on March 29, 1999.

The court forwarded a copy of the demand

for final disposition to Assistant United

States Attorney Richard N. Cox, and, as a

result, Ross was arraigned shortly

thereafter in federal district court on

April 22, 1999.

 Prior to entering a guilty plea on July

23, 1999, Ross attended his arraignment

and five additional pre-trial hearings in

federal court on June 7, June 10, June

14, July 15, and July 16, 1999. He

appeared at each of these proceedings

pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad

prosequendum. Each writ contained the

following directive:

We command you, the Warden of the

Illinois Department of Corrections,

Danville Correctional Center, and the

United States Marshal for the Central

District of Illinois, to transport the

said Jimmie Ross, Jr., . . . in the

United States District Court . . . [on a

certain date] . . . and then and there to

appear in connection with this cause and

then and there to present the defendant

before the court and from day to day

thereafter as may be necessary, and after

the said Jimmie Ross, Jr. has so then and

there appeared, that you return the said

Jimmie Ross, Jr. to the Illinois

Department of Corrections, Danville

Correctional Center . . . .

At each of the hearings, the judge

ordered Ross to be transferred back to

state custody at Danville. However, it is
undisputed that Ross was never removed

from the Danville facility for more than

a portion of a single day for the purpose

of attending any of the six hearings

stemming from the federal charge pending

against him.

 On July 12, 1999, Ross filed a motion to

dismiss and a motion to hold an

evidentiary hearing in which he alleged

the following two violations of the IAD:

(1) that he was not brought to trial

within 180 days of the date he formally

requested a final disposition of the

federal case by giving a written notice

to the warden at the Danville

Correctional Center; and (2) that the six

separate writs of habeas corpus ad

prosequendum that the federal court had

used to remove him from Danville for

hearings in federal court violated the

"anti-shuttling" provision (Article

IV(e)) of the IAD.

 In this motion, Ross acknowledged that

his first argument had been considered

and rejected by the United States Supreme

Court in Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43

(1993). Similarly, Ross conceded that

this court had previously considered and

rejected the merits of his second

argument in United States v. Roy, 830

F.2d 628, 635-37 (7th Cir. 1987). Ross

asserted that he had filed the motion in

order to preserve both issues for

appellate review.

 Given Ross’s admissions as to the

controlling nature of Fex and Roy, the

district court denied the motion to

dismiss without holding an evidentiary

hearing. In ruling against the motions,

the trial judge stated:

I do believe that no further argument is

necessary. The, the [sic] attorneys have,

have [sic] both briefed and cited the

issues for the Court, and I certainly can

understand the defendant’s belief that

the warden of the Illinois Department of

Corrections facility should have

forwarded this. But at this point, the

Court sees no case law that requires the

warden to do things for the defendant. In

effect, the case law is clear that it’s

the defendant’s responsibility and

obligation to be filing matters with the

clerk of the Court of the United States.

And, of course, by raising this issue,

while it may have previously been
litigated before the Seventh Circuit, I

certainly don’t want to deprive the

defendant of the opportunity to revisit

and reconsider its holdings in the case

of United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628,

and certainly allow the defendant to have

the opportunity to have Fex v. Michigan,

which is a United States Supreme Court

case [at] 507 U.S. 43, a 1993 Supreme

Court case, reviewed.

However, this Court believes that it, as

a trial court, has no authority to

reverse the Seventh Circuit or the United

States Supreme Court in any way. So, I

will allow those decisions to stand.

 On appeal, Ross once again raises the

same two arguments.

II. DISCUSSION

A. "Speedy Trial" Argument

 With regard to Ross’s argument that the

180-day time limit begins to run on the

day that the warden or prison staff is in

receipt of a demand for final decision

rather than on the date when the demand

for final decision is filed with the

appropriate federal court and prosecutor,

the Supreme Court has previously ruled on

this issue. And, as Ross admits, the

United States Supreme Court has rejected

this argument in Fex v. Michigan, 507

U.S. 43 (1993). In Fex, the Supreme Court

interpreted the statutory language of the

IAD and held that:

[T]he 180-day time period in Article

III(a) of the IAD does not commence until

the prisoner’s request for final

disposition of the charges against him

has actually been delivered to the court

and prosecuting officer of the

jurisdiction that lodged the detainer

against him.

Id. at 52. It is a basic principle of law

that courts of appeal do not have the

authority to overrule a Supreme Court

decision, Garcia v. San Antonio

Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.

528, 542 (1985), and, therefore, we deny

Ross’s appeal on the speedy trial

issue./5

B. "Anti-shuttling" Argument

 Ross next claims that his indictment
should have been dismissed because of a

violation of the "anti-shuttling"

provision contained in Article IV of the

IAD. Ross specifically claims that

Article IV(e) of the IAD is violated

whenever a prisoner is removed from one

jurisdiction (in this case, the State of

Illinois) to face charges in another jur

isdiction (in this case, the federal

government), and the charges in the

receiving jurisdiction (the federal

government) are not disposed of prior to

the prisoner being returned to the

original jurisdiction (Illinois). Ross’s

argument is based on the following

language in Article IV(e) of the IAD,

commonly referred to as the "antishuttling" provision. This provision

states that:

If trial is not had on any indictment,

information, or complaint contemplated

hereby prior to the prisoner’s being

returned to the original place of

imprisonment pursuant to article V(e)

hereof, such indictment information, or

complaint shall not be of any further

force or effect, and the court shall

enter an order dismissing the same with

prejudice.

18 U.S.C. App.2 sec. 2. Ross argues that

his brief periods of confinement in

federal custody on six separate

accessions required trial of the pending

federal charge against him prior to his

return to state custody in Illinois. In

so arguing, Ross is specifically

requesting that we overrule our decision

in United State v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628 (7th

Cir. 1987).

 In Roy, a state prisoner claimed that an

overnight stay in federal custody for the

purposes of attending a hearing on

federal charges lodged against him

"necessitated trial of all federal

charges pending against him prior to his

return to state custody." Id. at 635. We

rejected this argument and held that

there was no real interruption of Mr.

Roy’s state imprisonment resulting from

his overnight stay in Bridgeport, we find

that there was no violation of the antishuttling provisions of article IV of the

IAD.

Id. at 637. The holding in Roy was based

upon our determination that the brief
overnight transfer did not threaten the

prisoner’s rehabilitation efforts. Id. at

636. "The IAD was meant to protect the

prisoner against endless interruption of

the rehabilitation programs because of

criminal proceedings in other

jurisdictions." Id.

 In the present case, Ross complains of

six transfers in which he was returned to

state custody on the same day that he was

removed from the Danville prison. Ross

does not allege, and the record does not

support, that these trips interfered with

his rehabilitation. We hold that the

handful of day trips Ross experienced

does not constitute the "endless

interruption" of rehabilitation that the

IAD was designed to guard against and

reaffirm our holding in Roy. Finally, we

note that our decision is consistent with

a majority of other circuits that have

held that brief interruptions in state

prison confinement for the purpose of

attending proceedings in federal court do

not violate the IAD, particularly where

the prisoner is returned to state custody

on the same or following day. United

States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d 25, 27 (1st

Cir. 1993); United States v. Roy, 771

F.2d 54, 60 (2nd Cir. 1985); Sassoon v.

Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371, 374-75 (5th

Cir. 1981); United States v. Taylor, 173

F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,

120 S. Ct. 448 (1999); Baxter v. United

States, 966 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir.

1992); and United States v. Johnson, 953

F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1992).

 The decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

/1 At the time of the indictment, Ross was in the

custody of Illinois state prison officials on a

pending state charge of possession of a controlled substance.

/2 The IAD is a compact entered into by 48 states,

the United States, and the District of Columbia

to coordinate the disposition of outstanding

criminal charges brought against prisoners incarcerated in other jurisdictions. There are two

relevant provisions of the IAD to this case,

Article III(a) and Article IV(e). Article III(a)

provides that a prisoner may formally demand that

criminal charges pending in another jurisdiction

be brought to trial within 180 days. Article

IV(e) states that:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to

the prisoner’s being returned to the original

place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e)

hereof, such indictment information, or complaint

shall not be of any further force or effect, and

the court shall enter an order dismissing the

same with prejudice.

/3 The facts underlying Ross’s crime are not relevant to his appeal. In entering into a plea

agreement, Ross attested that the following facts

were true:

Prior to April 24, 1998, the defendant was convicted of a crime punishable by more than one

year of imprisonment. Also before that day, a

warrant had been issued for the defendant’s

arrest in connection with another matter. During

the afternoon of April 24th, officers from the

Champaign Police Department observed defendant

driving a vehicle and attempted to apprehend him

on that warrant. A short chase ensued in which

the defendant’s automobile crashed into several

other automobiles. The defendant then fled on

foot and was later apprehended by officers.

Following his arrest, officers found a magazine

containing seven rounds of .380 caliber ammunition in one of his pants pockets. Officers also

found a Lorcin .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol, bearing serial number 358661, under one of

the cars that the defendant had crashed into.

Defendant was later interviewed and admitted

earlier possessing the recovered firearm. This

firearm had previously traveled in interstate

commerce.

/4 A detainer is "a request filed by a criminal

justice agency with the institution in which a

prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be

advised when the prisoner’s release is imminent."

Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44 (1993).

/5 In fact, Ross’s appellate brief specifically

states:

For Mr. Ross to get any relief under Article III

of the IAD, the Supreme Court would have to

overturn Fex. Mr. Ross is therefore raising this

issue to preserve it for a writ of certiorari

should this Court deny Mr. Ross the relief he

seeks on his other issue.