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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 21-CV-0217

ADMAS HAILEMARIAM, APPELLANT,

V.

TINSAYE KAH ZEWDIE, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(2021-CA-000037-H)

(Hon. Kelly Higashi, Trial Judge)

(Submitted February 15, 2022 Decided March 23, 2023) 

Jonathan H. Levy and Megan Moffett* were on the brief for appellant.

Workneh Churnet was on the brief for appellee.

Before MCLEESE, Associate Judge, and GLICKMAN and THOMPSON, Senior 

Judges.

†

 * Practicing law in the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C. Court of Appeals 

Rule 49(c)(9)(C) under the supervision of Legal Aid attorneys admitted to the D.C. 

Bar and in good standing.

† Judges Glickman and Thompson were Associate Judges of the court at the 

time this appeal was submitted.
2

GLICKMAN, Senior Judge: This appeal is from the dismissal of a complaint 

that appellant Hailemariam filed against her landlord, appellee Zewdie, on the 

Superior Court’s Housing Conditions Civil Calendar. We affirm.

Appellant’s complaint sought remediation of numerous alleged Housing Code 

violations. At the initial hearing, the parties apprised the trial judge that the matters 

in dispute included threshold issues regarding the scope of the tenancy, what part of 

the house had been rented to appellant, and whether the lease obligated the landlord

to provide and repair a bathroom on the first floor of the dwelling. The judge stated 

that she “need[ed] to consult with the Civil Division management to see if this case 

would need to be transferred to a Civil II calendar because the Housing [Conditions 

Civil] calendar is not set up to handle contested motions like these.” At the next 

status hearing, the judge referenced that consultation and informed the parties, 

“[a]ccording to the case management plan for the housing conditions civil calendar, 

when there are issues, such as these, that require more extensive litigation they need 

to be addressed on a regular Civil II calendar. . . . And because of that, I am going 

to dismiss this case without prejudice so that plaintiff may, if she chooses, file a 

complaint alleging her [landlord’s] breach of contract and outlining her basis for her 

claim that her lease agreement with the landlord covers the bathroom downstairs.” 
3

Appellant requested the judge to “retain jurisdiction at least over those 

violations” that were unrelated to the first-floor bathroom. The judge noted, 

however, that “most of the violations” did relate to that bathroom, and appellant’s

counsel agreed that was so. After further colloquy, the judge ruled that she could 

not “retain jurisdiction over part of this case. All of the issues can be addressed 

through a Civil II case.” 

Following the dismissal of her complaint without prejudice, appellant filed a 

new complaint for damages and injunctive relief in the Civil Division of Superior 

Court. This complaint, No. 2021 CA 003168B, is still pending on the Superior 

Court’s docket.

Appellant apprehends that the court dismissed her case for want of subject 

matter jurisdiction on the Housing Conditions Civil Calendar, and she argues that 

“[a] case over which the Superior Court has jurisdiction is not subject to 

dismissal . . . merely because it is assigned to a unit of the court in which it does not 

belong.”1

 That is a correct statement of law. However, appellant’s premise is 

mistaken, and the principle she invokes does not apply here. The dismissal was not 

 1 Robinson v. United States, 769 A.2d 747, 751 (D.C. 2001).
4

for want of jurisdiction, but rather to effectuate a discretionary transfer of the case 

to a more appropriate civil calendar. Because the dismissal was, under the 

circumstances, functionally equivalent to a certification of the case directly to that 

calendar without a formal dismissal, we conclude that appellant was not prejudiced 

and reversal is not warranted. 

The Case Management Plan for the Housing Conditions Civil Calendar 

expressly authorized the procedure that the court followed. In relevant part, the 

Management Plan states:

The Housing Conditions Civil Calendar is a problemsolving court. Its goal is to efficiently and quickly achieve 

compliance with the District of Columbia Housing Code 

Regulations . . . and Property Maintenance Code . . . .

The Housing Conditions Civil Calendar is governed by the 

terms of these practices and procedures and the Superior 

Court Rules of Civil Procedure. . . .

Although the Court has the same jurisdiction over cases on 

the Housing Conditions Calendar as over cases on other 

calendars in the Civil Actions Branch, the Court imposes 

several limits on cases on the Housing Conditions Civil 

Calendar in order to keep the Calendar within manageable 

limits consistent with resource constraints. In addition, the 

judge presiding over the Calendar has discretion to 

manage the Calendar consistent with its purpose 

efficiently and quickly to secure compliance with housing 

code regulations. . . .
5

If issues arise that cannot be addressed on the Housing 

Conditions Civil Calendar without adversely affecting the 

Court’s ability to provide efficient and expedited 

enforcement of housing code regulations, the Court may 

certify the case to a randomly assigned Civil 2 Calendar or 

dismiss it without prejudice so that the plaintiff can file the 

case on a Civil 2 Calendar.[2]

Thus, under the terms of the Case Management Plan, the judge was vested 

with broad discretion to manage the Housing Conditions Civil Calendar by

certifying this case to the Civil 2 Calendar or dismissing the case without prejudice 

so that appellant could refile it on the Civil 2 Calendar herself. Generally speaking, 

a judge in this position should certify the case rather than dismiss it, because a 

dismissal of the complaint — even one without prejudice — could have adverse 

consequences for the plaintiff. In such a case, the dismissal would be error or an 

abuse of the court’s discretion. Fortunately, however, the two options were 

functionally equivalent in this case; appellant has not shown that the choice of 

dismissal rather than certification prejudiced her, and we do not perceive that it did.3

 2 Case Management Plan for the Housing Conditions Civil Calendar, District 

of Columbia Courts, https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/HousingConditions-Case-Management-Plan.pdf; https://perma.cc/R69V-UJTB (last visited 

March 2, 2023). 

3 This was not a situation where, for example, the choice of dismissal triggered 

the running of a statute of limitations that operated to preclude any of appellant’s 

claims. Nor is it a case in which the transferred claims could not be litigated on the 

destination calendar. And the dismissal and refiling did not burden appellant with
6

We likewise do not perceive that the judge abused her discretion in deciding 

it would be appropriate for the case to be transferred to the Civil 2 Calendar. 

Appellant asserts that the articulated need for “more extensive litigation” of a 

“threshold” issue was not a valid reason to dismiss her complaint. It would not have 

been a valid reason to dismiss appellant’s complaint with prejudice for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, but under the Case Management Plan it was a valid 

reason to transfer the case to the Civil 2 Calendar.

Appellant also argues that the issues concerning the scope of her lease were 

not “particularly complex” and were not the ultimate questions presented to the 

court, and thus did not necessitate a transfer from the Housing Conditions Civil 

Calendar. Perhaps so, but this was a judgment call for the judge to make in managing 

her docket. We cannot say the judge abused her discretion in concluding, after 

hearing from both sides, that having to take the time to deal with the issues raised in 

appellant’s case would adversely affect the court’s ability to provide efficient and 

expedited enforcement of Housing Code violations in its caseload — a high priority 

of the Superior Court.

 

an additional filing fee; the Superior Court granted her leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, both when she filed her original complaint on the Housing Conditions 

Calendar and when she filed her new complaint on the Civil 2 Calendar.
7

Finally, appellant asserts that the court could have retained “most” of her 

Housing Code violation claims on its Housing Conditions calendar because they 

were not related to the issues concerning her right to use the first-floor bathroom.

This assertion appears to contradict appellant’s agreement in the trial court that most 

of the alleged violations did relate to that bathroom. In any event, accepting 

appellant’s proposal would have meant splitting the lawsuit between appellant and 

her landlord into two separate but closely related actions that would be maintained 

simultaneously in two different branches of the Civil Division. This would have had

the potential for duplication of effort, added expense and other burdens of litigation, 

and conflicting findings and rulings by different judges or triers of fact. The judge’s 

rejection of that proposal was not unreasonable.

We appreciate that transfer of appellant’s lawsuit from the Housing 

Conditions Civil Calendar to the Civil 2 Calendar deprived her of the advantages of 

an accelerated determination of her claims of Housing Code violations.4

 

Nonetheless, transfer was within the court’s discretion, and appellant has not shown 

error in the court’s decision to accomplish that transfer by dismissing her complaint 

 4 On the other hand, the transfer allowed appellant to amend and enlarge her 

complaint to seek damages and other relief that she could not seek in a case on the 

Housing Conditions Calendar.
8

without prejudice rather than certifying her case directly to the Civil 2 Calendar. The 

result was the same either way, and the former approach had the advantage of giving 

appellant more flexibility and the opportunity to expand her lawsuit.

We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.