alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 96-20980

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PAUL ARTHUR BEDFORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-96-CR-85-1)

__________________________________________

June 10, 1997

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Court appointed counsel for Paul Arthur Bedford, has moved to

withdraw and has filed an accompanying brief as required by Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Bedford did not respond to

this motion. Our independent review discloses no nonfrivolous

issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel is excused from further

responsibilities herein, and Bedford’s appeal is dismissed. See

5th Cir. R. 42.2.
 DISMISSED
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUlTlN 

Sfowrmblo 0. E. 8lm@tor 

oowty Attoraoy 

martla oouaty 

Stanton, Ton8 

voforo trtal it ir 600ia04 to romblm 

the owe. and try both detasdurta tcqrther 

rhioh lr ooaourre4 ia by muare ior ao?os4- 

ant and a am oomplaintl~ l aoutod lnol1141~ 
Eonanblo 0. Il. sloughto?; h&e E 

both ~oioadazito, rEargod with tha umo of- 

?$ LBB~~8 ;O l haraod oa tho orlgl~l oom- It l ppanatlq kina the latoatloa et 

thi WllO. to uao on. or the orlglaal nUbor 

so rppearlag oa hlo dookot, oaf tb mambo? 

&lroa to A*o oaoo, lnoludo thio oa tho sow OOPplaint tlloa to lno ludl o aoh 4etoabaat and not 

l rrlgn a new nuabw aad a now oaw, or l lro tha 

mttor wa6 onrlookod aa4 aa l atirol;I now oaoo 

WI oto&lookod and not dookatoe. At w rat0 

the uoo we o~l1.d en4 triad, Mood on tho OOPpiht that in0hd0b both e0r0dhd0 l n4 00 

error ma aLoovaro4 00. tho ame. 

vha l aoo was trlod b*r0&0 I jury end l 

vo&tllot o? lullty wao returned @ g a lnol aah t daiondant to r h io h the dotoatlaato l x oop toan4 Q 

gave notloo or appeal to the oouat~ oolwt. 

“What mambo? oboold tho juuont and t&wrorlpt oar&r rroa tJm Juotloo*o dookot? The 

number origla8119 8oolgno4 to *A* oaoo es originally tllod, or should both number8 that we&o 

@torn to ldratiir tho two ro9arato oa800 OII the 

dookot bo lnoludod la trJri4 tb UIO ap to tho 

aouaty oourt rhoro it will bo glvoa 8 now numkr, dookotob oa tho oouat~ oourt a00k0t ana 

trio& 40 noto and doobtloor both dotoadaato 

trio& to 

the just r 

thor l o in tho tuotioo’o ooort? woul& 

00 h wo l logal & l& t to oO?&a0t his 

dookot raaoo l uoh l l&oautaaooo to oornot aa 

error ati h&w th8 4ookot oonSora to tba naw 

oosplalat filed to l110lu60 both 4oion4oatrt 

9. .: .* 

tlade? tha irots 80 rot ?o&th in your lotto&, tho 

joint oosplalat l xaoutod aad ?lloU &gainrt both of tho dofo r & h a lo ts, a l o p a r a an6 to (Uotinot oamplalnt ?rc#a tho 

two oomplalato ?llod qalaot tho dofondants oeparatel9. 

Such bolag tho ~ABO, tho now Cmm@alnt should bo l ro~nod 

8 a&v rllo amber, 8ab l hould bo bookotob a8 a now oom9lalat. 
. . 

Hohonblo 0. Lt. dlrryhtoti, mgo 8 

a 8 r ~iip n) to l 0rlgr r.rli0 aprb0& t0 thb m 

ooaplalat was aa ororol~t 00 the part 0s th0 suet100 0s 

tho Naoo, or s ma&o olrrloal or&o?, and one wh lo h l an bo 

00rr0ot0d rith0ut 0~ inJ8r~ to tb ria;ht0 0s th0 aah 

ants. 

Too a&o thoroioro rorpaottully 8Qvloo4 that It 

ia the opinion or this Doputmat that the fuotioe 0s tb 

POOO, ho the right to oorroot hi. doakot, by ontarIng 

thorola tha tile numbor of tho joint oomplalat yalmt 

both of the dofoaUaat8, an8 thnt this IUW ?I10 numbor 

l houl& bo oa&&lod oa tho judgment and tranoorlpt on l p - 

~1 to the oouutr oourt. 

Twting t&at this bOti8r00t0rii~ di0p0000 0s 

you? laqulry, w rewln 

You&r wry truly 

ATTORBBY9~ OFTEXAS 

DBDrau
EXHIBIT 32.2
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of ONLINE  ORIGINALS,  INC. (the "Company")
on Form  10-KSB  for the  period  ended  November  30,  2007,  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gregory
Adams,  Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: March 13, 2008


By:      /s/ Gregory Adams
         --------------------------------
         Gregory Adams
         Chief Financial Officer, principal financial officer and principal
         accounting officer
#### William Lee RICHARDSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rosemarie L. RICHARDSON; Maryland District Court of Frederick County, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-1021.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 30, 2002.

Decided Nov. 18, 2002.

William Lee Richardson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges,

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

William Lee Richardson seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in for-ma pauperis, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Richardson v. Richardson,*No. CA-01-616-2 (S.D.W.Va. Dec. 21, 2001).

We have further reviewed Richardson’s response to our order to show cause as to why he should not be sanctioned for filing frivolous appeals and enjoined from filing further actions in this court until the sanctions are paid and a district court judge finds the action is not frivolous. We find his response legally and factually baseless. Therefore, having filed numerous frivolous appeals in this court from district court orders dismissing his civil complaints as frivolous, for failure to state a claim, and as non-justiciable, Richardson is sanctioned $500 for filing frivolous appeals and enjoined from filing further actions in this court until the sanctions are paid and a district court judge finds that the action is not frivolous.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before *179the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Exhibit 23.1













CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
 
 
 
 We
consent to the incorporation by reference in this Registration Statement (No.
333-156744) on Form  S-8 of Energy Services of America Corporation and
subsidiaries of our report dated December 23, 2009, on our audits of the
consolidated financial statements of Energy Services of America Corporation
appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Energy Services of America
Corporation for the year ended September 30, 2009.
 
 ARNETT
      & FOSTER, P.L.L.C.GRAPHIC







Charleston,
West Virginia


December
23, 2009
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Innovation
With Results
 
 AF Center
Ÿ 101 Washington
Street, East Ÿ P.O.
Box 2629 Ÿ
Charleston, West Virginia 25329
 304/346-0441
Ÿ
800/642-3601
 www.afnetwork.com
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 164 (Friday, August 22, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 49652]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19496]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary


Closed Meeting of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee will meet in 
closed session on September 25, 2008 from 0800 until 1830 and September 
26, 2008 from 0800 until 1200 at the Pentagon.
    The purpose of the meeting is to provide the Secretary of Defense, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
with independent, informed advice on major matters of defense policy. 
The Board will hold classified discussions on national security 
matters.
    In accordance with Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act, Public Law No. 92-463, as amended [5 U.S.C. App II (1982)], it has 
been determined that this meeting concerns matters listed in 5 U.S.C. 
552B (c)(1)(1982), and that accordingly this meeting will be closed to 
the public.

    Dated: August 15, 2008.
Patricia L. Toppings,
OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
 [FR Doc. E8-19496 Filed 8-21-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
#### Samuel Anthony MILES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-7322.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 15, 2002.

Samuel Anthony Miles, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Andrew Witmer, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Samuel Anthony Miles appeals a district court’s order accepting a magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition as untimely. An appeal may not be taken to this court from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state court unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2254 petition solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(l)’that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’ ” *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)).

We have reviewed the record and conclude for the reasons stated by the district court that Miles has not made the requisite showing. *See Miles v. Angelone,*No. CA-01-814-2 (E.D.Va. Aug. 26, 2002). *166Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS
OF INCOME, CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS, AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH
FLOWS, AND QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      1405028
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                      16301
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                          447673
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                         21613
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                   34082
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1924697
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<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                            0
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<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                  738411
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<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                            527004
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                 731
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<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                           28062
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.01
        

</TABLE>
#### MANY IRON WORKS v. KAY.

No. 1261.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Dec. 4, 1933.

S. I. Poster, of Leesville, for appellant.

Eraser & Carroll, of Many, for appellee.

MOUTON, Judge.

In this case, citation was properly served on defendant and so was notice of provisional seizure, after the sheriff had seized the property.

A preliminary default was entered April 17, 1933, and confirmed April 20, 1933. The confirmation was in time. Code Prac. art. 312; Taney v. Meilleur, 35 La. Ann. 117. The proceedings were therefore legal and regular..

There is no evidence in the record, but the presumption is that the judgment was rendered on sufficient evidence and that it is correct. Burbank v. Succession of Barton, 117 La. 262, 41 So. 567; Wilson v. Ivy Lodge, 116 La. 537, 40 So. 864; Pepper v. Smith, 4 La. App. 370.

Judgment affirmed.
-26-

                          SIGNATURES


Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Company has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.


                           OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION
                                             Registrant



Date   November 14, 1995          By  /s/David W. Devonshire
       -----------------              -------------------------------
                                      David W. Devonshire
                                      Senior Vice President and Chief
                                      Financial Officer
                                  

Date   November 14, 1995          By  /s/Domenico Cecere
       -----------------              ------------------------------- 
                                      Domenico Cecere
                                      Vice President and Controller
Exhibit 32(b)





PEOPLES ENERGY CORPORATION AND CONSOLIDATED AFFILIATES



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the combined Quarterly Report of Peoples Energy Corporation (the "Company"), The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company ("Peoples Gas") and North Shore Gas Company ("North Shore Gas") on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas A. Nardi, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company, Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas.



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | February 9, 2004
|------------------- |  |  | ----------------
|                    |  |  | Date            

Thomas A. Nardi
Senior Vice President, 
and Chief Financial Officer of
Peoples Energy Corporation



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | February 9, 2004
|------------------- |  |  | ----------------
|                    |  |  | Date            

Thomas A. Nardi
Senior Vice President, 
and Chief Financial Officer of
The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company



|/s/ THOMAS A. NARDI |  |  | February 9, 2004
|------------------- |  |  | ----------------
|                    |  |  | Date            

Thomas A. Nardi
Senior Vice President, 
and Chief Financial Officer of
North Shore Gas Company
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 2021

_____________________________
T RAMAIN S MITH , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Wa lton County

. Kelvin C. Wells , Judge

. November 28, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
B.L. T HOMAS , C.J., and R OBERTS and O STERHAUS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Tramain Smith, pro se
, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
#### ARNOLD et ux. v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

No. 2928.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Dec. 30, 1947.

For former opinion, see 33 So.2d 76.

Lemle, Moreno & Lemle, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Plauche & Plauche, of Lake Charles, and Homer Stephenson, of Orange, Tex., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Applications for a rehearing were filed by the defendant railroad company and by both plaintiffs.

In the application of the defendant railroad company it is urged that our holding with reference to the duty of a railroad to provide a flagman at a much traveled crossing where visibility is poor on account of a heavy fog will place an undue burden on the railroads of the State. We are not *99unmindful of the importance of the question involved, however, a careful study of the facts and circumstances in this case and a comparison of these facts and circumstances with those in the case of Squyres v. Baldwin, 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14, made it impossible for us to differentiate the two cases on this point. We therefore felt hound to follow the principle kid down in the Squyres case.

A further study of the question of the contributory negligence of plaintiff, Mrs. Mildred Arnold, does not convince us that she was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar her recovery.

The majority of the court feel that there was no error in holding plaintiff, Hugh Arnold, guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar his recovery.

For these reasons, both applications for a rehearing are refused.

DORE, J., dissents from the refusal to grant a rehearing to Hugh Arnold.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-50227

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MANUEL ANTONIO GALDAMEZ-ESCOBAR,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:12-CR-931-1

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Manuel Antonio Galdamez-Escobar appeals his 41-month sentence, 

imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being found unlawfully present 

in the United States following deportation. He contends the sentence was 

unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to meet the sentencing 

goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 8, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-50227 Document: 00512492853 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/08/2014
No. 13-50227

Although post-Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, and 

a properly preserved objection to an ultimate sentence is reviewed for 

reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the district court must 

still properly calculate the Guideline-sentencing range for use in deciding on 

the sentence to impose. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In that 

respect, for issues preserved in district court, its application of the Guidelines 

is reviewed de novo; its factual findings, only for clear error. E.g., United States 

v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. 

Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005). Galdamez does not claim 

procedural error. Instead, he maintains only that the challenged sentence was 

substantively unreasonable.

“A discretionary sentence imposed within a properly calculated 

guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. CamposMaldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). Galdamez contends, however,

the presumption of reasonableness does not apply to his within-Guideline

sentence because the illegal reentry Guideline, § 2L1.2, is not supported by 

empirical data. Galdamez concedes this argument is foreclosed by United 

States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2009). He raises the issue only 

to preserve it for possible further review.

Asserting his sentence is greater than necessary to meet the sentencing 

goals outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Galdamez contends the district court 

failed to consider that the applicable Guideline does not take into account his 

benign motive for returning to the United States and the overstatement of his 

criminal history. Galdamez’ contentions are insufficient to rebut the 

presumption of reasonableness. E.g., United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 

F.3d 554, 565-66 (5th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 13-50227 Document: 00512492853 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/08/2014
226 La. 730

#### Roy G. MENDES v. Markham D. KOSTMAYER.

No. 39949.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 13, 1954.

Russell J. Schonekas, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

Bernhardt C. Heebe, New Orleans, for appellee.

HAMITER, Justice.

The presumption is that this appeal has been abandoned, the appellant (Roy G. Mendes), when the case was called for argument, having failed to appear personally or through counsel and having omitted to favor us with a brief in support of his demands. Therefore, it must and will be dismissed. See Core Brothers v. F. J. J. Sloat Dredging Company, 220 La. 169, 55 So.2d 904, Peace v. Love, 223 La. 772, 66 So.2d 803, and the numerous cases therein cited.

The appeal is dismissed.