alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Timothy CLARKE, Plaintiff— Appellant, v. Virginia HAWORTH, sued in her individual and official capacities, Defendant — Appellee.

No. 01-56031.

D.C. No. CV-97-00574-MRP/AJW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 9, 2002.

Decided Nov. 7, 2002.

Before BALDOCK,* KLEINFELD and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM**

The district court properly granted Appellee Virginia Haworth’s (“Haworth”) motion for summary judgment. Appellant Timothy Clarke (“Clarke”) admitted that Haworth’s alleged comment that Clarke was an informant was not the actual cause of the assaults against him. Since Clarke failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Haworth’s alleged deliberate indifference was the actual and proximate cause of his injuries, summary judgment was appropriate. *See Leer v. Murphy,*844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.1988).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The record indicates an issue of material fact regarding causation. There was evidence that both assailants mentioned the alleged “snitch” rumor, that Clarke had never been assaulted before the rumor and was assaulted twice subsequent to it, and that the ostensible causes of the fights were pretexts for inmates who did not want to share a cell with a “snitch.” At least as to the second assault, the injuries were more serious than *de minimis.*I would reverse.
#### William Tabachnick, Appellant, v. Leopold Brand, Respondent.

Second Department,

December 30, 1908.

Court — stare decisis — Municipal Court of New York— costs.

Where the evidence on a new trial is substantially the same as on the former trial, the Appellate Division will adhere to its prior decision.

By virtue of section 333 of the Municipal Court Act, a defendant who has not filed a verified pleading or a wn-itten notice of appearance is not entitled to tax costs on the dismissal of the complaint.

Appeal by the plaintiff, William Tabaohnick, from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Brooklyn, in favor of the defendant, rendered on the 1st day of April, 1908, dismissing the complaint upon the merits; also from an order opening a default which the plaintiff had taken against the defendant, and also from an order denying the plaintiff’s motion for a retaxation of costs.

*Walter S. MacGregor,*for the appellant.

*Reich*& *Brand,*for the respondent.

Rich, J.:

The evidence was substantially the same as that given upon the former trial of the action, and we must adhere to our decision (123 App. Div. 667) as to the interpretation of the written agreement. The discretion of the justice was properly exercised in opening the default, but a mistake was made in denying the motion for a retaxation of costs. There is no authority in the taxing officer to allow costs to the defendant, except where the party has appeared by an attorney at law, who filed a verified pleading or a -written notice of appearance (Mun. Ct. Act [Laws of 1902, chap. 580], § 332), and as the defendant did not file a verified pleading and neglected to file a written notice of appearance, it follows that the costs were improperly taxed and plaintiff’s motion should have been granted.

The judgment of the Municipal Court and order opening the default are affirmed, without costs. The order denying plaintiff’s *621motion for a retaxation is reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion granted, with ten dollars costs.

Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor and Miller, JJ., concurred.

Judgment of the Municipal Court and order opening default affirmed, without costs. Order denying plaintiff’s motion for retaxation reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted, with ten dollars costs.
Exhibit 31.2
 CERTIFICATION
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Annual Report on Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of
Buckeye GP Holdings L.P.; and2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report.
 MAINLINE MANAGEMENT LLC, as general partner of the registrantDate:  August 26, 2010
    /s/  KEITH E. ST.CLAIRKeith E. St.ClairChief Financial Officer
Exhibit 4.65


 


Buyer: CSUN Eurasia Energy Systems Industry and Trade
Inc.


 


Address :Istanbul Industrial & Free Trade Zone Akif
Kopuz St. No: T-10, B Block, 1st floor, Aydinli-Tuzla 34957 ISTANBUL


 





 





Purchase Order


 


	PO No.:	Date:


 


Supplier :


CEEG(NANJING)RENEWABLE ENERGY CO,LTD


NO.6,SHUIGEROAD,


JIANG NING DISTRICT,


NANJING,CHINA


 


Address: NO.6,Shuige Road,Jiangning, Nanjing,211100, China


Tel: 8625-52766666


Fax: 8625-52766882


Contact Person : hong.yu@chinasunergy.com


 


Attention:


 


We are pleased to submit the Purchase Order
for the attached Materials on the terms and conditions set forth below.


 


1 Specifications:


 


	Material Name	 	Material No.	 	Specification	 	Quantity	 	Unit	 	 	Total amount	 
	semi-finished solar module	 	550019	 	245-60P	 	4160	 	 	100.45	 	 	€	417,872.00	 
	semi-finished solar module	 	550021	 	250-60P	 	24960	 	 	102.5	 	 	€	2,558,400.00	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Total amount:	 	 	 	 	 	€	2,976,272.00	 



 


	2 Delivery date:	8/15/2013
	 	 
	3 Terms of Payment:	T/T 30days after received goods.


 




    	 



    	 



    

 


	4 Shipment Term:	 	CIF Turkey, BY SEA
	 	 	 
	5 Specifications:	 	Csun's specifications as previous.
	 	 	 
	6 Broken Rate and Shortage:	 	Except forwarder problem, broken rate should be less than 0.3%, if over, supplier should be replaced them within 30 days. Supplier should replenish the shortage within 30 days after receiving the notice from buyer.
	 	 	 
	7 remarks:	 	This PO is made out in two originals, one original to be held by each party in witness thereof. Fax for this PO is same valid as original.


 


	For and on behalf of	 	For and on behalf of
	 	 	 
	CSUN Eurasia Energy 

Systems Industry and 	 	CEEG(NANJING)RENEWABLE 

ENERGY CO., LTD
	Trade Inc.	 	 
	 	 	 
	/s/ CSUN Eurasia Energy	 	/s/ CEEG(NANJING)RENEWABLE
	Systems Industry and	 	ENERGY CO., LTD
	Trade Inc.	 	 
	 	 	 
	Date:	 	Date:
#### In re Benjamin R. MEYERS, Debtor, Benjamin R. Meyers, Appellant, v. Empire Wholesale Lumber Co., an Ohio Corporation; Eric R.T. Roost, U.S. Bankruptcy Trustee of the Estate of Benjamin R. Meyers, Appellees.

No. 01-35012.

D.C. No. OR-00-01046-KMaB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 8, 2002.*

Decided Nov. 19, 2002.

Before REAVLEY,** KOZINSKI, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Benjamin R. Meyers appeals the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel *893(BAP). Meyers contends, among other things, that the bankruptcy court erred by entering a judgment against him because Empire Wholesale Lumber Co.’s motion for summary judgment was denied before trial commenced. Meyers’s contention reflects a misunderstanding of the effect of a denial of a motion for summary judgment, and we affirm.

Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact to be tried. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. A denial of summary judgment is not a decision on the merits; it is simply a decision that a material issue of fact exists which requires trial. 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2712 (1998 *&*Supp.2002).

The district court partially denied Empire’s motion for summary judgment because it concluded that the question of Meyers’s personal liability for the judgment against his corporation involved unresolved issues of material fact. The district court did not reach the merits of Empire’s claim; it simply decided trial would be necessary to determine whether Meyers was personally liable for conversion by his corporation and whether a judgment against Meyers would be dis-chargeable in bankruptcy. After trial, the bankruptcy court determined that Meyers was personally liable and that the judgment was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The district court’s denial of summary judgment and the bankruptcy court’s judgment on the merits do not conflict.

None of Meyers’s other assignments of error have any merit, and all were addressed by the BAP. We affirm for the reasons stated in the BAP’s opinion.

Empire has requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. Although circumstances suggest that Meyers’s appeal is frivolous, we decline to award fees and double costs at this time.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir R. 36-3.
EXHIBIT 32.1

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Tapslide, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Aaron Lamkin, President and
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)    
          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)    
          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  May 13, 2009

| | /s/ Aaron Lamkin
Aaron Lamkin, Chief Executive Officer
| | ------------------------------------------------------

---
Page 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

Supreme Court Cause No. DA 23-0126

WAYNE W. FIBKE, SPIRITS FLORIDA, INC., JIM EDWARDS, and J.E. REAL 

ESTATE HOLDING, INC.

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

vs.

KIP K HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a PRECIOUS VODKA, a/k/a 

PRECIOUS VODKA SPIRITS, a Montana limited liability company; CLIFFORD 

“KIP” KIMERLY, and JOHN DOES I-V,

Defendants/Appellees.

On Appeal from the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court

Missoula County, Cause No. DV-2017-951

Before Hon. Leslie Halligan

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLEES’ 

ANSWER BRIEF

Upon the Unopposed Motion of Defendants/Appellees Kip K Holding Company, 

LLC, d/b/a Precious Vodka, a/k/a Precious Vodka Spirits, and Clifford “Kip” Kimerly, for 

an extension to file Appellees’ Answer Brief, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendants/Appellees Kip K Holding Company, LLC, 

d/b/a Precious Vodka, a/k/a Precious Vodka Spirits, and Clifford “Kip” Kimerly shall have 

until August 16, 2023 to file their Answer Brief.

DATED AND ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED BELOW.

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

July 12 2023

07/12/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0126
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Small Business Administration [Disaster Declaration #11394]
 AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.
 ACTION: Notice.
 SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Vermont (FEMA-1784-DR), dated 08/15/2008. *Incident:*
                         Severe storms, a tornado, and flooding. *Incident Period:*
                         07/18/2008. *Effective Date:*
                         08/15/2008. *Physical Loan Application Deadline Date:*
                         10/14/2008. *Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date:*
                         05/15/2009.
 ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.
 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of the President's major disaster declaration on 08/15/2008, private non-profit organizations that provide essential services of governmental nature may file disaster loan applications at the address listed above or other locally announced locations. The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster: *Primary Counties:* Caledonia, Grand Isle, Lamoille. *Contiguous Counties (Economic Injury Loans Only):* Vermont: Chittenden, Essex, Franklin, Orange, Orleans, Washington. New Hampshire: Grafton. New York: Clinton. The Interest Rates are: PercentOther (Including Non-Profit Organizations) With Credit Available Elsewhere:
5.250Businesses and Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit Available Elsewhere:
4.000
 The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage and for economic injury is 11394. (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59002 and 59008) Herbert L. Mitchell, Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.


[FR Doc. E8-19889 Filed 8-26-08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
---

Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL

OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT

TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I,Matthew Markin, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  that:



(1)

The Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K ofNugget Resources Inc. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2008 (the Report ) fully complies with the requirements of § 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 ; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report.



Date:    March 11, 2009





/s/ Matthew Markin

Matthew Markin,

Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)

and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer)



---
**Exhibit 23.1**      Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration    Statements    (Form S-8    Nos.    333-135405    and    333-141352)    of Omniture, Inc. pertaining to the 1999 Equity Incentive Plan,    the 2006 Equity Incentive Plan, the 2006 Employee Stock Purchase    Plan, The Touch Clarity Limited Enterprise Management    Incentives, Share Option Plan 2002, and Touch Clarity Limited    2006 U.S. Stock Plan of our report dated March 19, 2007,    with respect to the consolidated financial statements of    Omniture, Inc. included in its Annual Report    (Form 10-K)    for the year ended December 31, 2006.     Salt Lake City, Utah    March 19, 2007
Exhibit 32.1



DSP GROUP, INC.



CERTIFICATION



In connection with the annual report of DSP Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Eliyahu Ayalon, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of
my knowledge:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
indicated.
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



A signed original of this written statement required
by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



This Certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.



Date: March 15, 2004



/s/ Eliyahu AyalonEliyahu AyalonChief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-02-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-02-1998
<CASH>                                       1,290,835
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,455,931
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,453,764
<INVENTORY>                                  7,879,871
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            23,170,201
<PP&E>                                     122,941,170
<DEPRECIATION>                              69,793,681
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             136,375,146
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       51,682,077
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     1,589,576
<OTHER-SE>                                  41,994,670
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               136,375,146
<SALES>                                     99,630,230
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            99,630,230
<CGS>                                       79,640,706
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               79,640,706
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,364,347
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (1,747,706)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (563,461)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (1,184,245)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (1,184,245)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.15)
        

</TABLE>
#### August Interrante, Doing Business under the Firm Name of M. Interrante *&*Son, Respondent, v. Louis Levinson, Appellant.

Second Department,

December 30, 1908.

Contract — Statute of Frauds — parol modification of contract under seal.

Where a written building contract under seal provides for specific payments at specified stages of the work, a subsequent parol agreement changing the meth'od of payment is void and may be repudiated so far as the contract remains executory.

Appeal by the defendant, Louis Levinson, from a judgment of the ¡Municipal Court of the city of ¡¡New York, borough of Brooklyn, in favor of the plaintiff, rendered on the 17tli day of April, 1908, after a trial without a jury.

*Henry Pearlman,*for the appellant.

*John J.*Curtin, for the respondent.

Jenks, J.:

This appeal by the defendant is from a judgment of the Municipal Court in favor of the plaintiff who had a contract with the defendant to do building work for him and who sues for a breach of that contract. The contract was written and under seal. It provided for certain payments on account at specified stages of the work. The plaintiff’s case is that he was discharged by the defendant before the work was done and during the time prescribed for the doing of the work. The discharge followed a dispute over a payment on account which the plaintiff insisted that the defendant had promised he would make and which was not made as promised.

As I read the evidence it does not appear that this payment-was due under the terms of the original contract, but the plaintiff insists that subsequent to the execution of that contract, the parties agreed to a variance in method of payments and acted accordingly, so that they were made weekly, and that such a payment was past due at the time the plaintiff quit his work or was discharged. But as the alleged modification of the written contract under seal as to the payments was by parol, so far as such agreement remained unexe*496cuted it was void *(McKenzie*v. *Harrison,*120 N. Y. 260, and authorities cited), and the defendant could repudiate such agreement and stand upon the original contract. The attitude of the defendant as shown by his evidence was that any payments made in variation of the terms of the original contract were of favor to the plaintiff, and that on several occasions and upon the occasion of the dispute which led to the ending of the work the defendant said to the plaintiff that he invoked the original contract.

The judgment is reversed and a new trial is ordered, costs to abide the event.

Woodward, Hooker, Rich and Miller, JJ., concurred.

Judgment of the Municipal Court reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.
EXHIBIT 32





CERTIFICATION PURUANT TO SECTION 302 OF


THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with this report on Form 10-Q for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.





Steven J. Johnston, the chief executive officer, and Michael J. Sewell, the chief financial officer, of Cincinnati Financial Corporation each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:





|   |                                                                                                   
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|1. | the report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and

|   |                                                                                                                                                                          
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|2. | the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Cincinnati Financial Corporation.




Date: October 24, 2013





/S/ Steven J. JohnstonSteven J. Johnston, FCAS, MAAA, CFA, CERAPresident and Chief Executive Officer/S/ Michael J. SewellMichael J. Sewell, CPAChief Financial Officer, Senior Vice President and Treasurer