United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-2423

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Anthony Sean Acton

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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 Submitted: April 14, 2020

Filed: July 20, 2020

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.
Anthony Acton pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court1

sentenced Acton to 96 months imprisonment to be followed by three years of

supervised release. No fine was imposed. Acton appeals, arguing that the sentence

is substantively unreasonable. Having jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, we

affirm.

In August 2017, a Missouri state trooper stopped the vehicle driven by Acton

in Columbia, Missouri after the officer noted that the vehicle’s license plate number

matched the number of the getaway vehicle involved in a home invasion which had

occurred shortly before the stop. During the home invasion, the masked perpetrators

threatened to shoot the home’s resident with 9-millimeter handguns and took

thousands of dollars in cash. A search of Acton’s vehicle revealed over $7,000 in

cash and a handgun matching the description of the weapon used during the home

invasion. In the district court, Acton admitted that he was a convicted felon and knew

he could not legally possess firearms.

The district court calculated Acton’s United States Sentencing Guidelines

range to be 51-63 months. The United States recommended a sentence at the high

end of the range and Acton sought a sentence at the low end. The district court varied

upward and imposed a sentence of 96 months imprisonment. 

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Smith, 795 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 

 “A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court fails to consider a

relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight

to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but

1The Honorable Roseann Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

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commits a clear error of judgment weighing those factors.” United States v. Lozoya,

623 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In conducting

this review, we are to ‘take into account the totality of the circumstances, including

the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Feemster,

572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 51 (2007)). However, it is “the unusual case when we reverse a district court

sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as

substantively unreasonable.” Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d

1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).

Acton asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

district court gave too much weight to his criminal history and did not give enough

weight to his “history of poor family support, introduction to drugs at an early age by

his father, lack of education, and history of mental illness.” We reject this contention

because “[w]here [as here] the district court in imposing a sentence makes ‘an

individualized assessment based on the facts presented,’ addressing the defendant’s

proffered information in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, such sentence is

not unreasonable.” United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). The district court has “wide latitude” in assigning

greater weight to some § 3553(a) factors than others. United States v. Wisecarver,

911 F.3d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 2018). The district court does not abuse its discretion

simply because it weighs the relevant § 3553(a) factors differently than the defendant

thinks appropriate. See United States v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2011).

While the district court did discuss at some length Acton’s criminal history,

noting that Acton, who was 27 years old at sentencing, has a history of two burglary

convictions, a revocation of probation, a pending robbery charge arising from the

home invasion, as well as five other cases where robbery or burglary charges were

either declined or dismissed, the court specifically noted that the upward variance was

also based on the “characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence to reflect

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the seriousness of the offense, the need to promote respect for the law, the need to

provide just punishment, [and] the need to somehow deter Mr. Acton from continuing

criminal conduct.” The district court also heard Acton and his counsel describe

Acton’s “history of poor family support, introduction to drugs at an early age by his

father, lack of education, and history of mental illness,” and the court alluded to

Acton’s history of drug use and his family circumstances. See United States v.

Wilcox, 666 F.3d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting that, where the defendant

presented arguments about his mitigating factors at sentencing, the circuit court may

presume that the district court considered those factors).

On appeal, Acton “must show more than the fact that the district court

disagreed with his view of what weight ought to be accorded certain sentencing

factors.” United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 

Because he has failed to do so, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in varying above the Guidelines range and imposing the sentence in this

case.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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