alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 23 - 0563

_________________ JORY RUSSELL STRIZICH,

Petitioner and Appellant, v . STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellee. O R D E R

_________________ Pursuant to Appellant’s motion for extension to time to file the opening brief and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is given an extension of time to and including February 12, 2024, to file the opening brief.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 9 2024

01/09/2024
Case Number: DA 23-0563
Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The
Board of Directors
FGX International Holdings Limited:

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-148083), on Form S-3
(post-effective amendment) (No. 333-151896) and Form S-3 (No. 333-157184) of FGX International Holdings Limited of our reports
dated March 11, 2009, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of FGX International Holdings Limited as of January 3, 2009 and December 29, 2007, and the related
consolidated statements of operations, shareholders' equity (deficit) and comprehensive income (loss), and cash flows for the fiscal years ended January 3, 2009, December 29, 2007 and
December 30, 2006, and the related financial statement schedule, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of January 3, 2009, which reports appear in the
January 3, 2009 annual report on Form 10-K of FGX International Holdings Limited. Our report refers to a change in the accounting for uncertain tax positions in 2007.

Our
report dated March 11, 2009, on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting contains an explanatory paragraph that states that management excluded from its
assessment of the effectiveness of the Company's internal control over financial reporting as of January 3, 2009, the internal control over financial reporting of Dioptics Medical
Products, Inc. ("DMP"), which was
acquired on November 26, 2008. Due to the short time between the acquisition and the end of the fiscal year, it was not possible for management to conduct an assessment of DMP's internal
controls. At year-end, the DMP subsidiary had assets of $68.2 million (of which $50.6 million represents goodwill and intangible assets included within the scope of the
assessment), constituting 25% of the Company's total assets. DMP generated total revenue of $2.1 million (or less than 1% of the Company's total 2008 revenue) that was included in the Company's
consolidated financial statements as of and for the year ended January 3, 2009. Our audit of internal control over financial reporting of the Company also excluded an evaluation of the internal
control over financial reporting of DMP.

Providence, Rhode Island
March 11, 2009

/s/ KPMG LLP


---



QuickLinks
#### In re Question Propounded by the Governor.

Governor — Power op Appointment.— The governor may appoint a state board of pharmacy under the act of 1887, page S35, section 9, and a state hydraulic engineer under General Statutes of 1883, section 1807, by his own act, and without the advice and consent of the senate, the power to appoint being expressly conferred and such advice and consent not being required.

*400The question is as follows: “Whether, in view of article 4, section 6, of the state constitution, the governor may appoint a state board of pharmacy under the act of 1887, page 355, section 9, and a state hydraulic engineer under General Statutes, section 1807, by his own act, and. without the advice and consent of the senate.”

Article 4, section 6, of the constitution, so far as material, provides: “The governor shall nominate, and, by and with the consent of the senate, appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution or which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for, and may remove any such officer for incompetency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”

Per Curiam.

As by the acts referred to the authority to appoint certain state officers is expressly conferred upon the executive without requiring such appointments to be made by or with the consent of the senate, we answer the question propounded in the affirmative.
#### Kenneth Michael PLYMALE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Shannon MARKLE, Warden, Central Regional Jail, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-7352.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.

Decided Nov. 15, 2002.

Kenneth Michael Plymale, Appellant Pro Se. Heather Dawn Foster, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth Michael Plymale seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). We have reviewed the record and conclude based on the reasons stated by the district court and the magistrate judge that Ply-male has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. *See Plymale v. Markle,*No. CA-02-2-CVB (N.D.W.Va. Aug. 20, 2002). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
EXHIBIT 35.4

                        Servicer Compliance Statement for
                     GMAC Mortgage Corporation, as Servicer



                    SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (Item 1123)

                               GMAC Mortgage, LLC

                                   GSR 2006-4F

The undersigned,  a duly authorized  officer of GMAC Mortgage,  LLC, as servicer
(the "Servicer")  pursuant to the applicable  servicing  agreement,  does hereby
certify that:

    1.    A review of the Servicer's activities during the period covered by the
          Issuing Entity's report on Form 10-K and of the Servicer's performance
          under  the  applicable  servicing  agreement  has been  made  under my
          supervision.

    2.    To the best of my  knowledge,  based on such review,  the Servicer has
          fulfilled  all of  its  obligations  under  the  applicable  servicing
          agreement in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,  the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 6th
day of March 2007.


     By: /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
         --------------------
         Name: Anthony N. Renzi
        Title: Executive Vice President
Exhibit 99(a)



PEOPLES ENERGY CORPORATION AND CONSOLIDATED AFFILIATES

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the combined Quarterly Report of Peoples Energy Corporation (the "Company"), The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company ("Peoples Gas") and North Shore Gas Company ("North Shore Gas") on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas M. Patrick, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company and Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company, Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas.



|/s/ THOMAS M. PATRICK |  |  | February 11, 2003
|--------------------- |  |  | -----------------
|                      |  |  | Date             

Thomas M. Patrick
Chairman of the Board, 
President and Chief Executive Officer of
Peoples Energy Corporation



|/s/ THOMAS M. PATRICK |  |  | February 11, 2003
|--------------------- |  |  | -----------------
|                      |  |  | Date             

Thomas M. Patrick
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company



|/s/ THOMAS M. PATRICK |  |  | February 11, 2003
|--------------------- |  |  | -----------------
|                      |  |  | Date             

Thomas M. Patrick
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
North Shore Gas Company
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000075448
<NAME> NSTOR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           1,113<F1>
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,749
<ALLOWANCES>                                       291
<INVENTORY>                                      3,166
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 8,003
<PP&E>                                           9,192<F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,208<F3>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  15,987
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,927
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           934
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,563
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    15,987
<SALES>                                          3,606
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,622
<CGS>                                            2,958
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,042
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 162
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,540)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,540)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,540)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.14)
<FN>
<F1>Cash balance includes $1,031 of restricted cash (see note 3 to consolidated
financial statements).
<F2>PP&E balance includes $6,406 of intangible assets.
<F3>Accumulated depreciation balance includes $576 of accumulated amortization.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### NALL MOTORS et al., Appellants, v. IOWA CITY, IOWA, et al., Appellees.

No. 75-1618.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 9, 1976.

Decided April 1, 1976.

William L. Meardon, Meardon, Sueppel, Downer & Hayes, William Y. Phelan, Shulman, Phelan, Tucker, Boyle & Mullen, Iowa City, Iowa, for appellants.

John W. Hayek, Hayek, Hayek & Hayek, Iowa City, Iowa, for appellees.

Before LAY, ROSS and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this case Nall Motors, an auto distributor in Iowa City, Iowa, and Russell F. Mann, also of Iowa City, claim that the land acquisition policies of that city in its urban renewal development, violate the provisions of Public Law 91-646 (42 U.S.C. § 4601*et seq.).*The trial court1 disagreed with their contentions and entered judgment against the plaintiffs. We affirm.

The plaintiffs, on this appeal, make the following arguments:

> 1. 42 U.S.C. § 4602 does not preclude judicial review of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 4651 nor obviate the necessity of compliance therewith by the defendants.

> 2. The trial court erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 4602 or under a theory that plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries of an agreement between the City and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

> 3. The City could not require the acceptance of an offer to purchase by both landlord and tenant as a condition to a purchase from either of them.

> 4. The City failed to reimburse Nall Motors for an “uneconomic remnant” under 42 U.S.C. § 4651(9).

> 5. The district court erred in holding that the City did not violate Mann’s civil rights in respect to the appraisal and negotiation for his property.

We have carefully considered the record and the oral and written arguments of the parties. We believe that Judge Stuart has correctly determined each of the contested factual and legal issues and we affirm on the basis of the memorandum opinion of the district court. *Nall Motors et al. v. City of Iowa City, Iowa, et al.,*410 F.Supp. 111 (S.D.Iowa 1975).

1

. The Honorable William C. Stuart, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
**EXHIBIT32.2**

 

**P&F INDUSTRIES, INC.**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Joseph A. Molino, Jr., Principal Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that:

 

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/  Joseph A. Molino, Jr.  |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Joseph A. Molino, Jr.       |
| Principal Financial Officer |
| August 12, 2005             |

 

1

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 20-0183

FILED

STATE OF MONTANA, MAY 1 5 2020

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

LESLIE PAUL JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of Supreme Court

State nf IVInntana

ORDER

Counsel for Appellant Leslie Paul Jones moves this Court to withdraw because the

scope of representation that had been agreed upon earlier did not include an appeal.

Counsel points out that Jones has been incarcerated since his January 15, 2020 sentencing,

and is thus without resources and indigent. Jones requests appointment of counsel from

the Appellate Defender Division. Upon review of the motion and good cause, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED, and that appointment

of appellate counsel is GRANTED. The Appellate Defender Division shall have thirty

days from the date of this Order within which to file either a Notice of Appearance or a

Motion to Rescind this Order appointing counsel. In the event the Appellant qualifies for

appointed counsel, the Appellate Defender Division shall immediately order transcripts.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court is directed to provide a copy of this Order to the

Appellate Defender Divi%Ito counsel of record, and to Leslie Paul Jones personally.

DATED this 5 day of May, 2020.

For the Court,

By

Chief Justice

05/15/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0183
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
Note:  This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1997 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001029388
<NAME> FM SERVICES CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          35,110
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   22,028
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,186
<INVENTORY>                                     68,658
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               106,105
<PP&E>                                          87,561
<DEPRECIATION>                                  52,448
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 351,654
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           68,519
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     11,249
<COMMON>                                            53
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   351,654
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                63,842
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   68,596
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,523
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,277)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,496)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (7,781)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (7,781)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        
<PAGE>

</TABLE>
#### Tieshaun SIMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Andre Abney, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Constantinee Jackson, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Jason Delisser, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The State of NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 02-5100, 02-5101, 02-5102, 02-5103.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Nov. 1, 2002.

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, GAJARSA and DYK, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

*ORDER*

The United States moves to summarily affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ judgment dismissing the complaint filed by Tieshaun Simmons et al. (Simmons). Simmons has not responded.

Simmons filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims against the State of *989New York, seeking damages based on the conduct of a prison nurse in a New York penitentiary. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the complaint “failed to make any allegations against the United States whatsoever.” Each of the plaintiffs appealed.

The United States argues that the Court of Federal Claims’ judgment should be summarily affirmed. Simmons has not responded to the motion. The Court of Federal Claims correctly held that it lacks jurisdiction over claims against a state. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Summary disposition of a case “is appropriate, *inter alia,*when the position of one party is so clearly correct as a matter of law that no substantial question regarding the outcome of the appeal exists.” *Joshua v. United States,*17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed.Cir. 1994). In the present cases, it is clear that summary disposition is warranted. The complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims'.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The United States’ motion for summary affirmance is granted.

(2) All sides shall bear their own costs.

(3) The revised official caption is reflected above.
OFFICE.OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 
Caai8alana. pure 8ulmg.)1,200.00 

Uhlei bollrr lnaputor . .63,000.00 

f3uretrrpflla awtodlan . 1.725.00 

Auditor, prt uluy . . .~ 945.00 

staa~@act . . . . . . . 1;553.00 

pmp*ctox . . . . . . . 2.700.00 

lfl8pactor . . . . . . ..2JoO.OC 

XnsprotoT . . . . . . ..2.7oo.fJO 

Inmj-ec tar . . . . . . . l 

To tnl .& 1 *r ia s fH& 3%% 

~8la ta neno t ma 4 a 5eellulsa lr 

Tr8vrl 3X9uam . . . . . .f6,6%aa 

watr@, 8t*Ua~y, t&J- 

‘&mph, tc1e@x!e, bfmea rar 

3Aemctors 8tl4 ooatinrtrrnt 

a+MU . . . . . . . . . s .s00.00 

Total RI:nteallncs WA4 

~lSO*l&llCoW. . . l @2.3.25.00 

C6,62~.00 

_. 

s.soo.oo 

%2.125.W 

31p3.w 
. 

.__
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 20

- 00488

- CV
SHENANDOAH CHURCH OF CHRIST , Appellant

v. Gabriel RODRIGUEZ , Appellee From the 225th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020

- CI

- 10952 Honorable Angelica Jimenez , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Beth Watkins , Justice Liza A. Rodriguez , Justice Delivered and Filed: November 25, 2020
DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION When appellant filed this appeal, it was required to pay a filing fee of $205.00. See T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. §§ 51.207(b)(1), 51.941(a); see also id. §§ 51.208, 51.0051; T EXAS S UPREME C OURT O RDER R EGARDING F EES C HARGED I N THE S UPREME C OURT , I N C IVIL C ASES I N THE C OURTS OF A PPEALS , AND B EFORE THE J UDICIAL P ANEL ON M ULTIDISTRICT L ITIGATION (Misc. Docket No. 14

- 9158, A ug. 28, 2015). Appellant did not pay the required filing fee when it filed the notice of appeal. The clerk of the court notified appellant of this deficiency in a letter dated October 1, 2020 and advised appellant that the filing fee was due by October 1 2, 2020. On October04

- 20

- 00488

- CV

- 2

- 22, 2020, when the fee remained unpaid, we ordered appellant to show cause in writing that either (1) the filing fee had been paid, or (2) it was entitled to appeal without paying the filing fee by November 2, 2020. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P

. 20.1 (providing that indigent party who complies with provisions of that rule may proceed without advance payment of costs). We further advised appellant that if it failed to respond satisfactorily within the time ordered, the appeal would be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee. See id. R. 5, 42.3(c). When the fee was not paid by November 2, 2020, this court contacted appellant about the late filing fee by telephone, but t he filing fee remains un paid. We therefore order this appeal dismissed for want of prosecution. See id. R. 42.3(c). We further order that appellee recover his costs of this appeal, if any, from appellant.
PER CURIAM