alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  1.
    
    The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2007 (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Robert L. Parker Jr.Robert L. Parker Jr.Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 35.1

                                                          [LOGO] IndymacBank(SM)


                       REG AB 1123 Statement of Compliance

I am an authorized officer for IndyMac Bank, F.S.B, the servicer for the
transaction listed below and I certify:

a)    A review of IndyMac Bank's activities during the reporting period and of
      its performance under the applicable servicing agreement has been made
      under my supervision.

b)    To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, except as set forth
      below IndyMac Bank has fulfilled all of its obligations under the
      agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period.

c)    None


                                By: /s/ Robert M. Abramian
                                    ----------------------
                                    Robert M. Abramian
                                    First Vice President
                                    Home Loan Servicing
                                    Investor Reporting
                                    Indymac Bank


                                By: /s/ Barbara Perez
                                    ----------------------
                                    Barbara Perez
                                    Senior Vice President
                                    Indymac Bank



Prepared for:   Deutsche Bank

Date:           February 28, 2007

Ref:            673 - INDX 2006 AR11 (BS)



                                                             www.indymacbank.com


             460 Sierra Madre Villa Ave., Pasadena, CA 91107   Tel: 626.535.5555
#### WEITKAM et ux. v. JOHNSTON.

No. 17606.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Feb. 16, 1942.

For prior opinion, see 5.So.2d 582.

Solomon S. Goldman, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., of New Orleans, for appellees. 0

PER CURIAM.

In an application for rehearing filed in this matter counsel for defendant, Johnston, seeks a modification of our decree with respect to the assessment of costs.

Our decree affirmed the judgment of the lower court insofar as it ran in favor of Mrs. Weitkam at defendant’s cost and reversed the judgment in favor of Mr. Weit-kam at his cost.

Counsel points out in his application that the suit filed below was a joint action on the part of plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Weit-kam, and that the amount of costs incurred by plaintiffs in that court would have been the same had the suit been filed by Mr. Weitkam alone. As a consequence, he contends that in a sense no costs were actually incurred by Mrs. Weitkam in the lower court, therefore, defendant should not be cast for any costs other than those incurred by Mrs. Weitkam, if any, in connection with this appeal.

Counsel also contends that, as defendant was successful in having reversed the judgment obtained against him by Weitkam, he should have judgment against Weitkam for the costs incurred by him in both courts.

We do not believe it would be equitable to grant the relief which counsel requests. Approaching the situation from the viewpoint of Mr. Weitkam, we observe that the same costs incurred in this suit would have been expended if the action had been filed by Mrs. Weitkam alone. Bearing this in mind, Weitkam might also, with equal force, contend that since Mrs. Weit-kam was successful in her demand against defendant, the latter should pay all costs.

Should we grant the relief requested by counsel, the effect would be to relieve defendant of all liability for costs even though he was unsuccessful in defense of the action brought by Mrs. Weitkam.

However, we have concluded to modify our decree on the question of costs because of the peculiar situation obtaining/ and to order the plaintiff Weitkam and the defendant Johnston to share equally the costs in both courts and our former decree is accordingly amended so as to so provide.

The rehearing applied for is refused.

Decree amended.

Rehearing refused.
EXHIBIT 11

                      SPARTECH CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
                 STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                      (In thousands, except per share data)


                                                    QUARTER ENDED
                                                February 3, January 29,
                                                    2001        2000
NET EARNINGS
  Basic net earnings                               $ 8,555    $ 11,167
  Add:  Distributions on Preferred Securities,
        net of tax                                     502         488

  Diluted net earnings                               9,057      11,655

WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING
  Basic weighted average common shares
       outstanding                                  26,673      27,299
  Add:  Shares issuable from assumed conversion
        of Preferred Stock                           1,637       1,637
  Add: Shares issuable from assumed exercise
       of options                                      328       1,098

  Diluted weighted average shares                   28,638      30,034
       outstanding


NET EARNINGS PER SHARE:

  Basic                                            $   .32     $   .41

  Diluted                                          $   .32     $   .39
#### Isaac O. Schiff and Joseph Schiff, Appellants, v. Charles Miller, Respondent.

—Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion.
220 So.2d 895

#### Leburn BURLESON v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN TUSCUMBIA, Alabama.

8 Div. 329.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 13, 1969.

*709Walter Joe James, Jr., Haleyville, for appellant.

Jas. E. Smith, III, Tuscumbia, for appellee.

LAWSON, Justice.

Submission was on Motion and Merits.

Motion

Appellee has moved that the appeal be dismissed on the ground that the transcript of the record was not timely filed in this court.

The appeal was taken on September 25, 1968, from a judgment rendered on June 10, 1968.

The appeal is on the record proper, there being no transcript of the evidence in the record. In Calvert v. Calvert, 265 Ala. 529, 92 So.2d 891, following Duke v. State, 264 Ala. 624, 89 So.2d 102, we said that where an appeal is on the record proper without a transcript of the evidence, Supreme Court Rule 37, Revised Rules effective June 1, 1955, as amended on February 17, 1956 (263 Ala. XXI), requires that the transcript of the record be filed in this court within sixty days after the taking of the appeal where there has been no request for an extension of time. See Lovelady v. Thomas, 273 Ala. 246, 139 So.2d 335; Keene v. State, 272 Ala. 596, 133 So.2d 246; Nettles v. Nettles, 283 Ala. 457, 218 So.2d 269.

The transcript of the record was not filed in this court within sixty days after the taking of the appeal and we find nothing in this record to indicate that any request was made for extension of time for filing the transcript of the record.

Consequently we have no alternative but to grant the motion to dismiss the appeal

Appeal dismissed.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
#### Eugene C. SMALLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gordon R. ENGLAND, Secretary of the Navy; et al., Defendants— Appellees.

No. 01-15827.

D.C. No. CV-98-00908-SPK Hawaii.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Nov. 7, 2002.

Before BROWNING, KOZINSKI and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The unpublished memorandum disposition filed on July 29, 2002 is withdrawn.

Because we are unable to determine the basis on which the district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction, we remand to the district court for the limited purpose of clarifying whether it exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, or under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), or under both.

The appeal is held in abeyance. Appellant shall notify this court within 7 days of the district court’s clarification order.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc is denied as moot.
## S IXTH 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________ Case No. 6D 2024

- 0332 Lower Tribunal No. 2023

- CC

- 001012

- 0001

- XX

_____________________________ C LARK P EAR ,

Appellant,

v.
898 F IFTH A VENUE S OUTH H OLDINGS , LLC and NECO 898 5 TH A VE S, LLC , Appellee s

.

_____________________________ Appeal from the C ounty Court for Collier County

. Janeice T. Martin , Judge.
July 12, 2024

PER CURIAM.

A FFIRMED. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a)

. STARGEL, WHITE, and MIZE , JJ., concur

.

Clark Pear, Naples, pro se.
Todd M. Rich, of Holmes Fraser, P.A., Naples, for Appellees.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
#### HERRING v. BREEDLOVE.

No. 7009.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Feb. 17, 1947.

Watson & Williams, of Natchitoches, for appellant.

Gahagan & Pierson, of Natchitoches, for appellee.

HARDY, Judge.

This is a suit for damages alleged by plaintiff to have resulted from the breach of an oral agreement of lease of a filling station. Exceptions of no cause and no right of action filed on behalf of defendant were sustained by the district court, and plaintiff’s suit dismissed at his cost, from which judgment plaintiff has brought this appeal.

Reference to plaintiff’s petition discloses an itemization of damages as follows:

> “For loss of his job in Texas and loss of his wife’s employment in Texas and loss of anticipated profits from the operation of this filling station during the next two years — $10,000.00; expenses of moving to Louisiana — $125.00; for loss in value of the filling station equipment— $451.07.”

The prayer of the petition, in line with the allegation noted, seeks judgment in the principal sum of $10,576.07.

 It is obvious that plaintiff’s claims and prayer for relief, as above outlined, aggregate an amount far in excess of the constitutionally established jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. Although no motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction of this Court has been filed, this is a matter of which the Court must take notice ex proprio motu.

Accordingly, it is ordered that this appeal be transferred to the Honorable the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Plaintiff-appellant is hereby granted a period of sixty days from and after the date upon which this decree becomes final within which to effect the transfer and to perfect his appeal in said Court, failing which action within the time fixed, this appeal is to stand dismissed.

Costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiff-appellant. All other costs are to await final determination hereof.
Exhibit 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, James Whang, certify that:

      1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
      required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on
      Form 10-K of STRATS(SM) Trust For Allstate Corporation Securities, Series
      2006-3 (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

      2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
      whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
      state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
      the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
      with respect to the period covered by this report;

      3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
      information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered
      by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

      4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in
      this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in
      the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its
      obligations under the servicing agreement; and

      5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
      for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
      assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
      securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item
      1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been
      included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in
      this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such
      reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: The Bank of New York, as
Trustee.

Dated: March 28, 2008           By:  /s/ James Whang
                                     --------------------------------------
                                     James Whang
                                     Director
                                     (senior officer of depositor in charge of
                                     securitization)
#### CALI v. CLOVERLAND DAIRY PRODUCTS CO., Inc., et al.

No. 2703.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

March 5, 1945.

See, also, 21 So.2d 171.

Reid & Reid, of Hammond, for appellants.

Ponder & Ponder, of Amite, for appel-lee.

OTT, Judge.

Plaintiff was injured in the accident in which the wagon of Vito Cali was run into by the milk truck driven by Jimmie Newman, and she sued for personal injuries in the sum of $15,000, medical expenses and clothes damaged in the sum of $125. As we disposed of the question of liability of the defendants in the suit of Vito Cali, it only remains for us to fix the quantum of damages in this case as to the defendant, Newman.

Frances Cali received some cuts and scratches on her face, arms and hands which were rather superficial. She did not receive medical attention, but saw a doctor about five days after the accident who put some dressing on her left ear. Plaintiff claims that her ear has given her trouble since the accident; that it has a ringing in it and feels like it is stopped up. The doctor testified that the blow or rupture to the ear drum should heal up in two or three months. There are some small scars remaining on the young lady’s face, hands and arms, but these are so small and dim that the doctor had to get close to her to see them. Her clothes and shoes were damaged for which she claims $25, which amount she has proved. The trial judge gave her $1,000 for personal injuries, pain and suffering and disfigurement. We think this item should be reduced to $500. She has not proved any medical expenses.

For the reasons above assigned, and for the reasons assigned in the case of Cali v. Cloverland Dairy Products Company, Inc., et al., La.App., 21 So.2d 166, it is ordered that as to the defendants, Clover-land Dairy Products Company, Inc., and the New Amsterdam Casualty Company, the judgment herein appealed from is avoided and set aside, and it is now ordered that this case be remanded to the district court to be proceeded with according to law and the views expressed in the case of Vito Cali; that as to the other defendant, Jimmie Newman, the judgment is amended by reducing the amount awarded plaintiff herein from the sum of $1,025 to the sum of $525, and as thus amended, the judgment is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                       DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                  59,900
<SECURITIES>                                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                          152,900
<ALLOWANCES>                            11,700
<INVENTORY>                            175,100
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                       416,900
<PP&E>                                 561,200
<DEPRECIATION>                         346,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         816,600
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                  211,200
<BONDS>                                177,500
<COMMON>                                 3,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0
<OTHER-SE>                             219,500
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>           816,600
<SALES>                                197,100
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                       197,100
<CGS>                                  174,400
<TOTAL-COSTS>                          174,400
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        31,800
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       4,400
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        (13,500)
<INCOME-TAX>                               800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    (14,300)
<DISCONTINUED>                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0
<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                           (14,300)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                            (0.71)
<EPS-DILUTED>                            (0.71)
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee, v. Edward HANSERD, Petitioner-Appellant.

No. 01-1582.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Nov. 18, 2002.

Before SILER and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges, and ALDRICH,* District Judge.

*

The Hon. Ann Aldrich, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Edward Hanserd, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his “supplemental motion for modification of sentence,” which was intended to supplement Hanserd’s motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, then pending in the district court. The district judge determined that the motion was the funetional equivalent of a successive petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), § 2255, ¶ 8. Because Hanserd had failed to obtain the requisite authorization from this court to file a successive petition, the district judge dismissed the “supplemental motion.” We conclude that the district court reached the right result, and we therefore affirm the judgment, although on different reasoning.

The sole issue raised in Hanserd’s supplemental motion is the validity of his sentence under *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). However, we have recently held that *Apprendi*does not apply retroactively, even to initial § 2255 motions. *See Goode v. United States,*305 F.3d 378 (6th Cir.2002). Hence, even if we were to hold that the “supplemental motion” filed by Hanserd in this case was not successive to the § 2255 motion then pending in the district court and, further, even if we were to view the pending § 2255 motion, as supplemented, as an initial petition following Hanserd’s 1998 re-sentencing, *Goode*would prevent us from reviewing the *Apprendi*claim.

Because review of the only issue raised on this appeal is foreclosed, we AFFIRM the order of the district court dismissing the petitioner’s “supplemental motion for modification of sentence.”
#### Charlie Bumguardner v. State.

No. 25048.

December 20, 1950.

Motion for Rehearing Granted March 14,1951.

*Aubrey Davee,*Brady, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of the liquor laws in McCullough County, and under an allegation of a prior conviction of like character, he was given a penalty of $500.00.

We find only one bill of exception in the record, which relates to the overruling of a motion to quash the indictment on the general ground that same does not charge an offense under the law. To this we do not agree.

We do find a statement of facts herein, and the facts support a judgment, as well as a former conviction of like character.

The judgment will therefore be affirmed.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.

GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

On the original submission of this cause no brief was filed. *492It appears from the transcript that in the court below the motion for a new trial was overruled on May 22, 1948, but that this case was not filed in this court until September 11, 1950, and no reason is given for this late transmission to this court.

There is one bill of exception in the record which is so vague and indefinite that it is not clear therein what objection, if any, was leveled at the information herein.

On this motion for a rehearing, our attention is called for the first time to the fact that both the information and the complaint were filed on the same day that the alleged offense was committed. It is further shown that the information neither alleges nor shows that such offense was committed anterior to the filing thereof as required by Art. 414, Sec. 6, Vernon’s Ann. Tex. C.C.P. See Martini v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. Rep. 215, 205 S.W. (2d) 988.

This defect in the information renders the same void and cannot be supplied by reference to the complaint. See Hoot v. State, 149 Tex. Cr. R. 316, 194 S. W. (2d) 97; Kennedy v. State, 22 Tex. App. 693, 3 S.W. 480, and cases there cited.

The motion for a rehearing is granted, the judgment heretofore entered is set aside, and this cause is now reversed and remanded.