In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-4113

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHNNIE BOND,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 99 CR 73--Charles N. Clevert, Judge.

Argued September 14, 2000--Decided November 3, 2000

 Before ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit

Judges.

 EVANS, Circuit Judge. Before he was nabbed,

Johnnie Bond made $4 million out of shady real

estate deals in the inner city of Milwaukee,

Wisconsin. Having been caught, and now convicted

on two substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. sec.

2314 and one count of conspiracy to violate that

provision, Bond appeals, contending that the

evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions.

 Bond’s appeal is from the denial of his motion

for a judgment of acquittal. To prevail, he must

establish that, judging the evidence in the light

most favorable to the United States, no rational

trier of fact could find the essential elements

of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Hill, 187 F.3d 698 (7th Cir.

1999). This is a rigid standard, and we reverse

"only when the record is devoid of any evidence,

regardless of how it is weighed, from which a

jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."

United States v. Thompson, 106 F.3d 794, 798-99

(7th Cir. 1997). We recite the facts with that

standard in mind.

 Bond operated at least six companies in

Milwaukee which were involved in residential real

estate transactions. Between June of 1997 and

March of 1999 he falsified documentation on more
than 150 real estate transactions and in the

process skimmed more than $4 million in loan

proceeds. With federal agents closing in on him,

in April 1999 Bond appeared in the office of the

United States Attorney and gave a statement

admitting his fraud. Apparently thinking better

of his conversations with the prosecutor’s

office, Bond denied on the stand at his jury

trial that he was guilty or that he had admitted

fraud to the U.S. Attorney. He said he went to

the U.S. Attorney’s office to explain his

conduct, not to confess guilt.

 In any case, what the government determined

upon investigation of Bond’s conduct was that he

induced owners of residential property in

Milwaukee’s inner city to sell properties to him

by saying he would improve and then resell them

to inner-city residents. Bond made sure he was

not the purchaser of record. He recruited

"investors" who allowed their names and credit to

be used for mortgage loans to finance the

purchases. The investors were not required to put

any money down, and the profits from the resale,

which in fact never occurred, were to be split

between them and Bond. Bond promised each

investor that he would receive about $6,000 when

the deal closed.

 Bond’s companies were the ones who solicited

the real estate mortgage loans to fund the

purchases. The documentation which the companies

forwarded to the lenders in support of the loans,

not surprisingly, did not reflect the actual

deal. For one thing, the purchase prices listed

were vastly inflated. For example, Bond agreed to

buy a property at 2229-31 North 47th Street for

$35,000, but the lending company and the investor

were told that the purchase price was $70,000.

The lending company was also told that the

investor was making a down payment of $15,677.37,

which was supposedly on deposit in an account at

Tri City National Bank in Milwaukee. Bond said he

would bring the money to the closing in the form

of a cashier’s check. The lender, in this case an

Illinois company, sent $56,000 to fund the deal.

Bond took control of the proceeds in excess of

the amounts due the seller by representing to the

closing agent that the funds were for "rehab"

work that one of his companies had performed. But

of course the work was not performed.

 Amazingly, the scheme was repeated 150 times.

Bond skimmed money using construction invoices,

invoices from other real estate businesses, and

businesses such as True Management Group for

which he obtained "management" fees. The

mortgages exceeded $8 million; the amount of

fraudulent down payments was more than $2

million.
 Tri City’s cashier’s checks and account

verifications were used for each transaction. The

cashier’s checks were brought to the closing as

down payments. The verifications were used to

show that the buyer had used an account balance

to fund the cashier’s check. In reality, the

cashier’s checks were issued without funds to

back them up. Bond managed this sleight of hand

because he was paying bribes to a bank employee.

That employee and a vice-president of the bank

were aware of the fraud.

 Bond’s fraud left lenders holding mortgages that

far exceeded the value of the properties.

Predictably, the mortgage notes went into

default. And because the scheme left no money to

cover repairs, the properties failed to meet

Milwaukee code requirements.

 After he was convicted and sentenced to 97

months in prison and ordered to make restitution

in the amount of $1.9 million, Bond filed this

appeal. He points out that the indictment alleges

a scheme to defraud mortgage lenders, investors,

and the City of Milwaukee and that the jury

instructions contain similar language. His

contention seems to be that because the victims

are set out in the conjunctive, the scheme as

alleged must necessarily include fraud on the

City. But, he contends, there is insufficient

evidence to support a finding that the City of

Milwaukee was a victim of the fraud and therefore

his conviction must be overturned. For several

reasons (almost any one of which could stand

alone), we find the argument unconvincing.

 Bond was accused of violating the first

paragraph of sec. 2314, which provides that

[w]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers in

interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares,

merchandise, securities or money, of the value of

$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been

stolen, converted or taken by fraud;

. . . . 

Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or

imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

He was not charged under paragraph two, which

applies, in part, to those "having devised or

intending to devise any scheme or artifice to

defraud . . . [.]"

 The elements of a paragraph one offense are

that the defendant caused money to be transported

in interstate commerce; that the money exceeded

$5,000; that the money was taken by fraud; and
that the defendant knew the funds had been

obtained by fraud. United States v. Gooch, 120

F.3d 78 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Jaderany, 221 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2000). There is

no requirement for a scheme to defraud, though we

have to admit that it is a mind-bending task to

imagine a fraud without a scheme to defraud.

What, after all, is a scheme to defraud? It is a

plan for how to effectuate the fraud. Because

"fraud" is not something that happens by

accident, we can agree with the government when

it argues that "fraud" and "scheme to defraud"

pretty much mean the same thing in the statute.

 We encountered a cousin of Bond’s argument in

United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469 (7th

Cir. 1993), where, as here, the government set

out a charge under paragraph one as involving a

"scheme to defraud." Quintanilla claimed that he

predicated his defense on refuting that there was

a "scheme to defraud." Then some counts of his

indictment were dismissed and the indictment was

redacted. In the process of redaction, reference

to a "scheme to defraud" was eliminated. We

rejected Quintanilla’s claim that the alteration

of the indictment deprived him of his right to

notice of the charges against him. We stated that

participation in a "scheme" to defraud is not an

essential element of a paragraph one offense and,

quoting United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130,

136 (1985), we said that a part of the indictment

which is unnecessary to the allegations of the

offense "may normally be treated as a ’useless

averment’ that ’may be ignored.’" So long as a

fraud was proved, the reference to a scheme was

a useless averment. Similarly, in Gooch, 120 F.3d

at 80, we said that a reference to a "scheme to

defraud" in a paragraph one charge "is mere

surplusage and will therefore be disregarded."

There is no requirement in paragraph one of sec.

2314 that there be a "scheme" or that victims of

the scheme be identified.

 Bond’s precise argument on this point is hard

to pin down, but he seems to be saying that the

government said he was involved in a scheme to

defraud three victims and now it is stuck with

that claim. A related argument was made in United

States v. Mastrandrea, 942 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir.

1991), a case we relied on in Quintanilla. The

Mastrandrea court said that a scheme to defraud

is not an element of a paragraph one offense, and

including the phrase in the indictment does not

make it an element.

 Furthermore, even if proof of the identity of

victims of the scheme was an essential element of

the crime, the general rule is that "when a jury

returns a guilty verdict on an indictment

charging several acts in the conjunctive . . .
the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient

with respect to any one of the acts charged."

Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420

(1970). In Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46

(1991), the Court considered a challenge to a

conviction based on an indictment which stated

that the objectives of a conspiracy were to

impede the Internal Revenue Service in computing

taxes and to impede the Drug Enforcement

Administration in obtaining forfeitable assets.

The objects of the conspiracy were set out in the

conjunctive in both the indictment and the jury

instructions. The defendant contended that the

evidence was not sufficient to connect her to the

object of the conspiracy involving the DEA. She

proposed instructions to the effect that she

could be convicted only if the jury found she was

aware of the object of the conspiracy involving

the IRS. She requested special interrogatories

asking the jury to identify which of the objects

of the conspiracy she was found to have had

knowledge. Her requests were denied. The Supreme

Court upheld the conviction based on a general

verdict. It distinguished cases which set aside

general verdicts because one of the alternate

bases of conviction was unconstitutional

[Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)] or

illegal [Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298

(1957)]. In Griffin, as here, the argument was

merely that one of the bases of conviction was

not supported by sufficient evidence. Relying on

the language from Turner, which we just quoted,

the Court found no merit to the contention that

the conviction was invalid. We see no reason to

decide otherwise in Bond’s case. There was far

more than sufficient evidence that investors and

lenders were victims of Bond’s fraud.

 Concluding as we do, that the scheme and the

parties defrauded are not elements of the

offense, and that even if they were, the

conviction would stand because there is more than

sufficient proof of investors and lenders being

victims, we will nevertheless proceed to other,

much simpler, reasons why Bond’s argument fails.

 First, having concluded that it is unnecessary,

we note that there is, in fact, evidence that at

least in some instances the City was victimized.

As we have said, we will reverse a conviction

based on a claim that the evidence is

insufficient only when the record is devoid of

any evidence on which a conviction could be

based. Gooch. Here, Bond finds comfort in the

fact that the district judge called the evidence

that the City suffered "scant." And Bond thinks

scant means nonexistent. We think, rather, that

the evidence was scant only in comparison to the

evidence of fraud of lenders and investors. But

that does not mean that the record was devoid of
evidence. The government is not required to prove

that all victims were equally harmed or that the

City was hurt as much as the lenders or

investors. Several of the investors--Gregory

Powell, Phil Holidy, Lela Manning, Regina

Cleveland, and Beverly Montgomery--testified

about the run-down condition of the property they

now own. Holidy testified that Bond falsely

represented that he would handle City of

Milwaukee code compliance requirements, but at

the time of trial Holidy held properties with

several code violations. Holidy also testified to

the gap between the appraisals cited in the loan

documents and the city assessments. He testified

that he was informed by the City that the

assessment on one of his properties had, in fact,

dropped. Powell testified to code compliance

citations from the City, which persons at Bond’s

companies said they would take care of but which

they did not correct. So, unnecessary though it

was, there was evidence of the victimization of

the City.

 Turning to another reason we reject Bond’s

argument, we look specifically at count one. It

alleges a conspiracy to cause in excess of $5,000

to be transmitted in interstate commerce knowing

the funds had been obtained through a scheme to

defraud. As with any conspiracy allegation, the

government need not prove a completed underlying

crime. United States v. Seawood, 172 F.3d 986

(7th Cir. 1999). The government need only prove

the existence of an unlawful agreement. Here,

there was evidence of an agreement. Antoinette

Higgins, a former employee of Bond’s companies,

testified that Bond asked her to make up numbers

for an account verification. Annette Reynolds, a

vice-president at Tri City, testified that, under

an arrangement with Bond, she and another bank

employee allowed unfunded cashier’s checks to be

issued. The checks were used as part of the loan

scheme. There is sufficient evidence to support

the conspiracy count.

 The same is true of the substantive offenses

set out in counts two and three. These counts

charge that Bond knowingly caused $68,800 and

$56,000, respectively, to be transmitted in

interstate commerce knowing the funds had been

obtained through the scheme to defraud. As we

have said, Bond contends that because the "scheme

to defraud" set out in the indictment lists as

victims investors, lenders, and the City, the

government must prove, as to each count, that all

three were defrauded. That contention could not

be sustained even if the scheme to defraud the

victims were an essential element of the offense.

Counts two and three are specific substantive

violations arising out of the fraud. A specific

offense could very well involve a scheme to
defraud in which the victim was an investor only,

or a lender only, or for that matter the City

only. That would not detract from the possibility

that a scheme to defraud all three existed. A

specific offense can be a subset of the scheme.

 For all of these reasons, the conviction of

Johnnie Bond is

AFFIRMED.