alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
188 La. 410

#### STATE of Louisiana v. L. L. LAWRENCE.

No. 34549.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 2, 1937.

John R. Hunter, of Alexandria, for appellant.

Gaston L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., James O’Connor, Asst. Atty. Gen., and A. V. Hundley, Dist. Atty., and Ben. F. Thompson, Jr., both of Alexandria, for the State.

ROGERS, Justice.

The defendant, L. L. Lawrence, was convicted and sentenced for violating an ordinance of the Police Jury of Rapides Parish, dated January 15, 1935. Defendant appealed, relying on bills of exception which he reserved to the overruling by the trial judge of his motions to quash, for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment; each of the motions setting up the unconstitutionality and illegality of the ordinance.

The issues in the case are identical with the issues in the case of State v. Roy Reed (La.Sup.) 177 So. 252, this day decided.

For the reasons assigned in the case of State v. Reed, the conviction and sentence herein appealed from are anulled, the motion to quash is sustained, and defendant is ordered discharged.

HIGGINS, J., takes no part.
#### William J. Kelly, Respondent, v. Theodore E. Webb, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concurred.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated financial statements and notes included in this Form 10-Q and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           1,885
<SECURITIES>                                    32,500
<RECEIVABLES>                                   38,715
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     14,741
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                90,776
<PP&E>                                         253,047
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               181,169
<CGS>                                          142,871
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,560
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<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.14
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</TABLE>
NO. 07-06-0092-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

JULY 6, 2006

______________________________

THE SCHOOL OF THE OZARKS, INC.,

D/B/A COLLEGE OF THE OZARKS, APPELLANT

V.

WILL W. SNEAD AND RAY A. SNEAD, APPELLEES

_________________________________

FROM THE 69TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARTLEY COUNTY;

NO. 4289H; HONORABLE RON ENNS, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The School of the Ozarks, Inc., d/b/a College of the Ozarks perfected this

accelerated appeal from the trial court’s order denying its special appearance. Pending

before this Court is an unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. Attached to the

motion as exhibits are a joint motion and an order signed by the trial court to vacate the
2

appealed order and dismiss with prejudice the claims of appellees Will W. Snead and Ray

A. Snead. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal as moot. See Tex. R. App. P. 1

42.1(a). Having dismissed the appeal at the request of all parties, no motion for rehearing

will be entertained and our mandate will issue forthwith.

Don H. Reavis

 Justice
#### UNITED STATES of america, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adrian SERNA-ZERMENO, also known as Adrian Zerna-Zermeno, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-50061.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 20, 2003.

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Adrian Serna-Zermeno appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Serna-Zermeno complains that his sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) based on a prior conviction. He argues that the sentencing provision is unconstitutional. Serna-Zermeno thus contends that his sentence should not exceed the maximum terms of imprisonment prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

In *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. *Id.*at 239-47, 118 S.Ct. 1219. Serna-Zermeno acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres,*but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review.

*Apprendi*did not overrule *Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,*530 U.S. at 489-90, 120 S.Ct. 2348; *United States v. Dabeit,*231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir.2000). This court must follow *Almendarez-Torres*“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” *Dabeit,*231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appel*428lee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
SEC form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                              12
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      607
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        489
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,401
<PP&E>                                           3,456
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,774
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   4,959
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,075
<BONDS>                                          1,887
<COMMON>                                           652
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              194
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                        (961)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     4,959
<SALES>                                          3,130
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,130
<CGS>                                            2,383
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,383
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    14
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  78
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    199
<INCOME-TAX>                                        48
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                164
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       164
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     3.11<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.92<F2>
<FN>
<F1> Represents basic earnings per share as defined in FASB Statement 128.
<F2> Represents diluted earnings per share as defined in FASB Statement 128.
</FN>

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Antonio MCCALLISTER, Appellant.

No. 01-3149.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Nov. 8, 2002.

Before EDWARDS, SENTELLE, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s judgment filed January 7, 2002, be affirmed. Appellant did not raise the issue whether his plea agreement barred him from seeking a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part K for playing a minor role within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). Therefore, the court reviews the district court’s decision under a “plain error” standard. *See United States v. Ginyard,*215 F.3d 83, 86-87 (D.C.Cir.2000). It was not plain error for the district court to determine that the plea agreement barred appellant from seeking the downward departure. The term “base offense level” may be interpreted to have the meaning assigned to it by the district court. Furthermore, appellant may not challenge an alleged dis*3trict court error that he invited. *See id.,*at 88.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition -will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 20, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 49161]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19147]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE


Notice of Performance Review Board Members

AGENCY: Economics and Statistics Administration.

ACTION: Performance Review Board Membership.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Below is a listing of individuals who are eligible to serve on 
the Performance Review Board in accordance with the Economics and 
Statistics Administration's Senior Executive Service and Senior 
Professional Performance Management Systems:

Thomas L. Mesenbourg
Shirin Ahmed
Mark Wallace
William G. Bostic, Jr.
Daniel Weinberg
Nancy M. Gordon
Arnold A. Jackson
Theodore A. Johnson
Ruth Ann Killion
Andrew Moxam
Michael J. Longini
Francis Grailand Hall
Brian Monaghan
C. Harvey Monk
Daniel Weinberg
Tommy Wright
William Bell
Michael Palensky
James Tyler, Jr.
Douglas Clift
Marilia Matos
David Hackbarth
Jeffrey Mayer
Enrique Lamas
Thomas Zabeisky
David Whitford
Frank Vitrano
Susan Schechter Bortner
Howard Hogan
David Johnson
Cheryl Landman
David F. Findley
Paul Friday
J. Steven Landefeld
Rosemary D. Marcuss
Dennis J. Fixler
Brent R. Moulton
Joel Platt
James K. White
Dr. Jennifer Madans


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Crystal Roy, 301-763-3727.

    Dated: August 6, 2008.
James K. White,
Associate Under Secretary for Management Chair, Performance Review 
Board.
[FR Doc. E8-19147 Filed 8-19-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-BS-M
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of LifeCare Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), I, Phillip B. Douglas, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial position and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 30, 2011

/s/ Phillip B. DouglasPhillip B. DouglasChief Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Jose Armando ESTRADA, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-10450. D.C. No. CR-96-20128-RMW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 28, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Jose Armando Estrada appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of his post-conviction motion for a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines based on rehabilitation and alien status. Estrada pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and was sentenced in 1997 to a 120-month term. We agree with the district court that it had no jurisdiction over Estrada’s motion for a downward departure.

AFFIRMED.1

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. We reject the government's contention that Estrada's notice of appeal was untimely, because as a pro se prisoner, Estrada's notice of appeal is deemed filed when it was delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. Fed. R.App. P.4(c)(1); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 270, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).
#### William C. Haight, Respondent, v. Rufus E. Leavitt and P. Geddes Grant, Copartners, Doing Business under the Firm Name of Leavitt & Grant, Appellants.

—Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-50140

Summary Calendar

 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KORNELIA CHRISTINA LOCKWOOD, 

also known as Kornelia Christina Haffner,

also known as Kornelia Christina Stacer, 

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-00-CR-1161-ALL-H 

________________________________________

October 31, 2001

Before POLITZ, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kornelia Christina Lockwood appeals the 41-month term of imprisonment

imposed following her conviction of being found in the United States following

removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. She contends that the district court erred

by increasing her offense level 16 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)
1243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 262 F.3d 479 (5th

Cir. 2001).

2523 U.S. 224 (1998).

2

based on her prior felony conviction of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”). She

notes that under this court’s decision in United States v. Chapa-Garza1 that a Texas

felony DWI conviction is not a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)

and thus is not an aggravated felony for the purpose of a 16-level adjustment under

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The Government has filed an unopposed motion to

remand for resentencing acknowledging that the district court, which did not have

the benefit of Chapa-Garza when it sentenced Lockwood, erred in applying the 16-

level adjustment. The motion is GRANTED.

Lockwood also contends that the district court erred by enhancing her

sentence based on her prior aggravated felony conviction because the fact of that

conviction was not alleged in her indictment. Lockwood’s contention is foreclosed

by Almendarez-Torres v. United States2 and is moot in light of the resolution of her

previous argument.

The Government’s motion is GRANTED, the sentence is VACATED, and

this case is REMANDED for resentencing in light of Chapa-Garza.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marie Josee ASMATH, a/k/a Maria Joseph, a/k/a Marie J. Pierre, a/k/a Marie Pierre, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-4130.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 6, 2003.

Decided Aug. 20, 2003.

David P. McCann, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., United States Attorney, Robert H. Bickerton, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, WILKINSON, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Marie Josee Asmath appeals the sentence imposed after she pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2000). The district court concluded that Asmath had previously been convicted of two crimes of violence, and therefore qualified for an enhanced sentence as a Career Offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. *See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*(“USSG”) § 4B1.1 (2001). On appeal, As-math contends that the evidence at sentencing was insufficient to establish that she was in fact the person who was convicted of the predicate crimes.

We review a district court’s resolution of factual questions at sentencing under the clearly erroneous standard. *United States v. Daughtrey,*874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989). A defendant is a career offender if she was at least eighteen years old when the instant offense was committed, the instant offense is a felony and is either a crime of violence or a drug offense, and she has at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or drug of*985fenses. *See*USSG § 4B1.1. Asmath does not dispute the first two requirements, nor does she contest that the convictions in question were felony convictions for crimes of violence. She argues that her identity as the person who was convicted of those crimes was not sufficiently established to qualify her for an enhanced sentence. Our review of the record convinces us that the district court did not err in concluding that Asmath’s identity was adequately established and that she was a career offender.

Accordingly, we affirm Asmath’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
EXHIBIT
32.1





P&F
INDUSTRIES, INC.


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&F Industries, Inc.
(the “Company”) for the period ended September 30, 2010, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the
undersigned, Richard A. Horowitz, Principal Executive Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





/s/
      RICHARD A. HOROWITZRichard
      A. HorowitzDate
      November 12, 2010
            Principal
      Executive Officer
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 161 (Tuesday, August 19, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 48380]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19120]



[[Page 48380]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket Nos. PR08-19-000; PR08-19-001]


Northwest Natural Gas Company; Notice of Offer of Settlement

August 12, 2008.
    Take notice that on August 5, 2008, Northwest Natural Gas Company 
(NW Natural) filed an Offer of Settlement in the above-docketed 
proceeding. Included in its filing was a request to shorten the period 
for filing initial and reply comments, in response to the Offer of 
Settlement. NW Natural requested the initial comments to be due on 
August 15, 2008 and reply comments to be due on August 19, 2008.
    The request is approved. The initial comments are due on August 15, 
2008 and reply comments are due on August 19, 2008.

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E8-19120 Filed 8-18-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. Sebastian BELTRAN-BUENO, Appellant.

No. 02-2271.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 12, 2002.

Decided Nov. 18, 2002.

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

[UNPUBLISHED]

PER CURIAM.

Sebastian Beltran-Bueno pleaded guilty to illegal reentry following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2), and the district court1 sentenced him to 41 *804months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has moved to withdraw under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and has filed a brief arguing that the district court should have granted Beltran-Bueno’s motion for a downward departure because he agreed to be voluntarily deported.

The district court’s comments at sentencing indicate that its decision not to depart was purely discretionary, and therefore the decision is unreviewable on appeal. *See United States v. Field,*110 F.3d 587, 591-92 (8th Cir.1997).

Moreover, following our independent review, *see Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. We also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

A true copy.

1

. The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.