PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ STEPHEN MARESCA; HEATHER MARTIN-MARESCA; M.M.; C.M.; ANTHONY MARESCA, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. BERNALILLO COUNTY; BERNALILLO COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICERS, DEPUTY, J. FUENTES; DEPUTY, G. GRUNDHOFFER; DEPUTY, L. TONNA; DEPUTY, E. LUCERO; DEPUTY, L. SWINT; DEPUTY, S. QUINTANA, Defendants - Appellees. No. 14-2163

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00733-PJK-KBM)

________________ _________________ Joseph P. Kennedy; (Michael L. Timm, Jr., with him on the briefs), Kennedy Kennedy & Ives, Albuquerque, New Mexico for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Deborah D. Wells, Kennedy, Moulton & Wells, P.C., Alb uquerque, New Mexico, for Defendants-Appellees.

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ EBEL , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 22, 2015 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Plaintiffs-Appellants Stephen Maresca, Heather Martin-Maresca, and their three children were driving back from a fam ily hike when they were arrested in a “felony stop” carried out by Bernalillo Count y Sheriff’s Deputies J. Fuentes, G. Grundhoffer, and fo ur other officers. 1 Deputy Fuentes initiated the stop because she mistakenly believed that the Marescas were driving a stol en vehicle. The Marescas sued, alleging that the office rs violated the Marescas’ Fourth Amendment rights both by unlawfully arresting them and by using excessive force in doi ng so. On crossmotions for summary judgment, the district c ourt held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had not violated clearly established Fourth Amendment standards. We have jurisd iction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291 and we AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART AND REMAND, holding the following: (1) the Marescas are entitled to summary judgment against Deputy Fuentes on their unlawful arrest claim beca use they were arrested without probable cause as the result of Deputy Fuen tes’s unreasonable conduct; (2) Deputy Grundhoffer is entitled to qualified imm unity on the unlawful ar rest claim against him because he was entitled to rely on in formation conveyed to him by his fellow officer (Deputy Fuentes) that the Marescas were in a stolen vehicle; and (3) disputed issues of material fact—prima rily whether any of the depu ties pointed firearms at the Marescas after they had been detained—p reclude summary judgment for Fuentes,

1 The four other officers, Deputies L. Tonna, E. Lucero, L. Swint, and S. Quintana, were also defendants and a ppellees in this case. Th e Marescas have voluntarily dismissed them from this appeal.3 Grundhoffer, or the Mares cas on the excessive force cl aim and accordingly on that claim we reverse the distri ct court’s grant of summar y judgment for Fuentes and Grundhoffer and we affirm th e district court’s denial of summary judgment for the Marescas and remand. I. FACTS Unless noted otherwise, the parties do not dispute the following facts: The Maresca family—Stephen Mare sca, Heather Martin-Mares ca, their three children (seventeen-year-old Anthony Maresca, fourteen-year-old C.M., and nine year-old M.M.), and their dog (Maya)—were returni ng from a family hiking trip on March 14, 2013, when Fuentes saw them driving by in their red 2004 Ford F-150 pickup truck. The Marescas had violated no traffic laws and there was nothing about their truck that caught Fuentes’s attent ion. Mr. Maresca—a former police officer—waved at Deputies Fuentes and Grundhoffe r as the Marescas drove by. Fuentes, who had completed training as a new officer approximately two months earlier, was on routine traffic pa trol and decided randomly to follow the Marescas. While doing so, Fuentes used th e on-board computer in her vehicle to enter the Marescas’ license plate number into the Nationa l Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database. Her entry, however, was off by one digit: the Marescas’ plate was 526-PLF, but Fuente s entered 525-PLF. As a result of this typing error, Fuente s’s NCIC screen retu rned an entry for a maroon (or red) 2009 four-door Chevrolet sedan with expired plates, which was4 listed as stolen. 2 Fuentes failed to notice the c onsiderable mismatch between the description of the stolen car in the NCIC report (a maro on 2009 Chevrolet sedan with expired plates) and the Marescas’ truck (a red 2004 Ford pickup truck with current plates). These differences are not minor; they are materi al and obvious. The car in the NCIC report did not match the Marescas’ tr uck in (1) color, (2) type of vehicle, (3) make, (4) model, (5) y ear, (6) license plate numbe r, or (7) license plate registration status. The NCIC screen al so stated: “Warning—the follo wing stolen vehicle record contains expired license plat e data. Use caution, contact entering agency to confirm status.” Aplt. App. at 239. Bernalillo C ounty officers are, in a ny event, trained to double-check stolen vehicle re ports and are told it is a go od practice to have dispatch verify the information in those reports before approaching a potentially stolen vehicle. Notwithstanding the NCIC warning and the officers’ training, Fuentes and Grundhoffer (who was patrolling with Fuente s and traveling behind her in a separate car) did not take any steps to confirm that the Marescas’ vehicle was in fact stolen before stopping the Marescas. This is so even though nothing in the record suggests that there were exigent circumstances that necess itated Fuentes stopping the Marescas immediately, before taking time to verify that the vehicle they were in was stolen.

2 The NCIC return screen, in different places, identified th e stolen vehicle as red and as maroon.5 At 5:06 p.m., Fuentes pulled the Mare scas over with her overhead lights flashing. As she did so, Fuentes called th e Marescas’ actual plat e number, 526-PLF, into dispatch, stating that the vehicle was stolen. With out waiting for dispatch to verify the information, Fuen tes stated over the radio that she was going to conduct a “felony stop.” This announcement caused othe r deputies to respond to assist Fuentes with the stop. Before the other deputies arrived, Fuente s, aided initially only by Grundhoffer, implemented “f elony stop” procedures. The two deputies parked their vehicles behind the Marescas ’ stopped truck, stood behi nd the open doors of their vehicles, drew their weapons , and aimed them at the Ma rescas’ vehicle. Fuentes began shouting commands to the Maresca fami ly: she first ordered all of them to put their hands up in the air where she could se e them. Then she ordered Mr. Maresca to turn off his truck, throw hi s keys out the window, and exit the truck with his hands in the air. Next, Fuentes ordered Mr. Mares ca to lift his shirt by the collar and turn around so she could check his waistband for weapons. She then ordered him to walk backwards toward the officer s and get on his knees, then lie on the highway on his stomach with his arms out a nd his legs up in the air. Fuentes then repeated this procedure with Mrs. Mares ca. The Marescas complied with every command. As they were lying prone on the ground, Mr. and Mrs. Maresca told Fuentes and Grundhoffer that there were children and a dog in the truck. Mr. Maresca further told the officers that there had to be a mistake, and im plored them to check his license and check “everything” because his family was in the tr uck. Id. at 154. Mrs. Maresca likewise asked the de puties to check the truck’s license and registration.6 The officers ignored the Marescas and did not ask whether they owned the vehicle. In his deposition, Grundhoffer, who was aiding Fuentes, ad mitted that he thought the situation was “a little weird.” Id. at 131. Fuentes continued to aim her handgun at the Marescas’ truck even after Mr. and Mrs. Maresca were on the ground and after they told th e deputies that there were children in the truck. The deputies orde red the two boys, C.M. and Anthony, one by one from the truck using the same “felony stop” procedure—keeping their hands in the air, lifting their shirts to expose their waistlines, wa lking backwards toward the officers, and lying prone on th e ground. As the officers ordered the children out one by one, Mr. Maresca told th e deputies that “[t]his does not warrant a felony stop.” Id. at 324. Finally, Grundhoffe r ordered nine-year-old M.M. to exit the truck and lift her shirt. The evidence is di sputed as to whether the de puties ordered M.M. to lie on the ground with her hands behind her back or, instead, let her stand to the side, telling her “stern[ly]” not to move, id. After all of the Marescas were out of the truck, Maya (the dog) became upset, jumped out of the truck, and ran into the highway. Mrs. Maresca feared that Maya would be run over. Mr. Maresca called Ma ya to him and the deputies permitted Mr. Maresca to hold onto the dog. While Fuentes and Grundhoffer were gett ing the Marescas out of their truck and onto the ground, additional deputies— Defendants Tonna and Lucero—arrived. Because the “felony stop” was blocking mu ch of the two-lane highway where it7 occurred, Lucero began trying to direct traffic around th e scene. The officers eventually had to stop highway tr affic in both directions. After all of the Marescas were out of the truck and lying on the highway (except perhaps M.M.), Defendants Deputy Swint and Deputy Quintana arrived. Although disputed, the Maresc as presented evidence that Swint stood directly over fourteen-year-old C.M., as he was lying pr one on the ground as ordered, and pointed a gun at C.M., leading C.M. to cry and “freak[] out” for fear of being shot, saying “Mom, they’re going to shoot us, they’re going to shoot me,” id. at 323. There was also evidence, which Defenda nts disputed, that Quintana stood over Mrs. Maresca, as she was lying on the highwa y, and pointed his gun at her head with his finger on the trigger in what Mr. Mare sca characterized as a “gangster thing where he turns [the gun] on the side.” Id. at 327. Mrs. Maresca, fearing that she would be inadvertently shot, began to “panic ,” screaming and crying. Id. As the stop continued, the children were crying and Mrs. Maresca tried to talk with them to calm them down. Eventually, deputies handcu ffed each member of the Maresca family (except M.M.) and locked them in separate squad cars (ex cept that M.M. was locked in a car with her mother). Fuentes and Grundhoffer then checked th e Marescas’ vehicle to insure that there was no one still in the truck. In doing so, the depu ties approached the Marescas’ truck from opposite sides, with their guns drawn, warning each other to “[w]atch out for cross-fi re.” Id. at 324.8 Finally, between seven and fifteen minutes into the stop, Fu entes returned to her car and re-ran the Marescas ’ license plate. She then realized that the Marescas’ truck did not match the stolen vehicle info rmation on her computer screen. Fuentes asked Tonna whether she was going to get in trouble, and he told her to get the family out of the patrol cars, uncuff them, and call a sergeant. Sergeant John Bartholf was called to the scene. He expl ained to Mr. and Mrs. Maresca that Fuentes was a new officer. The parties dispute whet her Bartholf, or any other officer on the scene, apologized to the Marescas. Mrs. Maresca asked Quintana , in front of Sgt. Bartholf: “Why did you think it was necess ary to point your gun at me when I’m already laying on the ground?” Id. at 327. A ccording to Mrs. Mare sca, Quintana just smiled and walked away. After the incident, the Maresc as filed complaints with the sheriff’s department. Fuentes was “counseled” that she needed to make sure that she “checks, doublechecks and sometimes triple-che cks the information that’s in front of her,” id. at 189; that it is a good practice to have dispatch verify the vehi cle as stolen “especially if she is busy doing something else that may di minish her attention- to-detail,” id. at 380; and that it is important to double ch eck information on vehicle queries and to match indicators such as vehicle descriptions while doing so. The Marescas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New Mexico state court, alleging that Deputies Fuente s, Grundhoffer, Tonna, Lucer o, Swint, and Quintana had violated the Marescas’ Fourth Amendmen t rights to be free from unlawful arrest9 and excessive force. 3 The Marescas also asserted state-law claims against the officers for assault, false imprisonment , battery, and negligence, and against Bernalillo County fo r negligent training. Defendants removed th e case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The Marescas filed a motion for summary judgment on their federal law cl aims, and the deputies filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The distri ct court denied the Marescas’ motion for summary judgment, granted summary judgme nt to Defendants as to all federal claims, and dismissed the Marescas ’ state claims without prejudice. 4
II. ANALYSIS We consider the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment separately, see Constitution Party v. Kobach, 695 F.3d 11 40, 1144 (10th Cir. 2012), reviewing the district court’s orders granti ng and denying summary judgment de novo , see Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228 , 1237 (10th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to a ny material fact and the movant is entitled to

3 The Marescas’ complaint act ually frames their Fourth Amendment allegations as four claims, alleging that the officers viol ated the Marescas’ Fo urth Amendment right to be free from (1) unreasonable seizure, (2 ) excessive force, (3 ) unlawful detention, and (4) unlawful arrest. We discern only tw o separate Fourth Amendment claims in their arguments, however: (1) a rrest without probable cause (or, in the alternative, detention without reasonable suspic ion) and (2) excessive force.

4 The Marescas do not challenge on appeal the dismissal of their state-law claims and, having voluntarily dismissed Deputies Tonna, Lucero, Swint, and Quintana, the Marescas no longer challenge summary judgment entered in favor of those deputies. The only claims that remain for our consider ation, then, are the Ma rescas’ claims that Deputies Fuentes and Grundhoffer violated the Marescas’ Fourth Amendment rights by 1) unlawfully arresting them and 2) using excessive forc e in doing so.10 judgment as a matter of law. In maki ng that determination, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct . 1861, 1866 (2014) (citations a nd internal quotation marks omitted). In defending against § 1983 claims like th e ones at issue here, an official may plead an affirmative defense of qualified im munity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). This defense is based on the presumption that officials know and respect “basic, unquestioned co nstitutional rights” as meas ured by clearly established law. Id. (internal quotation marks omitte d). Qualified immunity is unavailable “if an official knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks a nd alteration omitted). Therefore, “[i]n resolv ing questions of qualifie d immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.” Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865. “The first asks whether the facts, taken in the light most favorab le to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer’s conduc t violated a federal right. . . . The second . . . asks whether the ri ght in question was ‘clearly es tablished’ at the time of the violation.” Id. at 1865–66 (citations, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). A right is clearly establishe d if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation. ” Cortez v. McCa uley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Ordinari ly, this means that “there must be a11 Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Id. at 1114–15. However, “o fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in no vel factual circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff . . . need not cite a factua lly identical case to demonstrate the law was clearly established.



### . . . A plaintiff may therefore carry the burden of demonstrating a right is clearly established by citing cases that have a sufficient degree of factual correspondence to enable a reasonable officer to know that the o fficer’s acts violat ed the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights. Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252 , 1257 n.9 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). In this case, the Marescas argue that Deputies Fuentes and Grundhoffer violated the Marescas’ Fourth Amendmen t rights by (1) arresting them without probable cause and (2) using excessive for ce in the course of that arrest. [I]n cases involving clai ms of both unlawful arre st and excessive force arising from a single encounter, it is necessary to consider both the justification the officers had for the arrest and the degr ee of force they used to effect it. If the plaintiff can prove th at the officers lacked probable cause, he is entitled to da mages for the unlawful arrest, which includes damages resulting from a ny force reasonably employed in effecting the arrest. If the plainti ff can prove that the officers used greater force than would have been reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest, he is entitled to da mages resulting fro m that excessive force. These two inquiries are se parate and indepe ndent, though the evidence may overlap. The plainti ff might succeed in proving the unlawful arrest claim, the excessive force claim, both, or neither. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1127 (footnote omitted).12 A. The Marescas’ unlawful arrest claim The Marescas first contend that Deputies Fuentes and Grundhoffer violated the Fourth Amendment by arresting the Ma rescas without probable cause. 1. The stop was an arrest The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures . The parties do not dispute that the deputie s seized the Marescas. Se e United States v. GamaBastidas, 142 F.3d 1233, 1239 (10th Cir. 1998) (“It is undi sputed that ‘stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants cons titutes a “seizure” w ithin the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting Delawa re v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (alterations omitted)). But the parties di sagree as to whether that seizure was an arrest or an investigative dete ntion (also known as a Terry stop 5 ). An arrest must be based on “probable cau se to believe that a person committed a crime,” and “is distinguished” from an i nvestigative detention “by the involuntary, highly intrusive nature of the encounter .” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The use of firearms, handc uffs, and other forceful techniques” generally suggests an arrest. Id. at 1115-16; see also Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012). An inve stigative detention, on the other hand, permits an officer to “stop and briefly detain a person fo r investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articul able facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115 (internal quotation marks omitted). In vestigative detentions are characterized

5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).13 by their “limited intrusion on the personal secu rity of the suspect.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Th ere is no bright line or litm us test distinguishing these two types of seizures. See id. at 506; see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). Here, because of the actions the deputies took to effect the stop—ordering the Marescas out of their truck at gunpoint , forcing them to lie face-down on the highway, handcuffing four of them and lo cking them in separate patrol cars—we conclude the deputies arrested the Marescas . See United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1050, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding “felony stop,” during which officers directed occupants of vehicle to exit one at a time, handcuffed and frisked them, and then placed the suspect in separate patrol cars, was an arrest). This stop took between seven and fifteen minutes—a duration which, although not dispositive, suggests that this was more than a “limited intrusion” lasting “no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of th e stop,” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. Moreover, in considering the totality of the circ umstances, see Melend ez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1051, we also consider th e intrusion on the Marescas’ dignity when they were required to lift their clothes and assume prone positions on the ground in view of other motorists and the officers themse lves. See Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating, in addressing injuries necessary to support excessive force claim, that “the interests pr otected by the Fourth Amendment are not confined to the right to be secure against physical harm; they14 include liberty, property and privacy intere sts—a person’s ‘sense of security’ and individual dignity.”). The deputies accurately point out “tha t the use of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques does not necessar ily transform a Terry detention into a full custodial arrest,” Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1052 (emphasis added). But that is so “when the circumstances reasona bly warrant such measures” in order for the officers to conduct an investigative de tention safely. Id.; see, e. g. United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1495-99, 1506 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding display of firearms, removing occupants from thr ee stopped vehicles and frisk ing and handcuffing them did not transform Terry stop occurring late at night into an arre st because officers “reasonably suspected [one of the motorist s] of being armed a nd dangerous”); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1458-59, 1462- 63 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding fact that two officers removed two occupants from ve hicle at gunpoint a nd made them lie on the ground did not transform Terry stop occurri ng in remote area in to an arrest where officers reasonably believed oc cupants were “armed and dangerous”). Here, on the other hand, the deputies had no objectively reasonable basis to believe that such forceful measures were nece ssary for them to conduct an investigative detention. The deputies stopped the Marescas on a hi ghway in broad daylight and had no indication that the Marescas were “arm ed and dangerous.” Furthermore, the Marescas fully cooperated by pulling over a nd complying with every directive the officers gave. Under these circumstances, the deputies, by ordering the Marescas out of the car one-by-one at gunp oint, making them lie on th e ground, handcuffing four15 of them and placing them in separate patrol cars, effected an arrest. See MelendezGarcia, 28 F.3d at 1050, 1053 (holding that felony stop—during which officers removed occupants, whom they suspected of drug trafficking, from vehicles at gunpoint, frisked, handcuffed and placed them in separate patrol cars—was an arrest, where, among other factors, the stop occu rred “on an open highway during the day, [officers] had no tips or observations that th e suspects were armed or violent, and [the suspects] had pulled their cars to a stop off the road and stepped out of their cars in full compliance with police orders”). 2. Because the Marescas were arrest ed without probable cause, based on only Fuentes’s unreasonable mi stake, they are entitled to summary judgment against Fuentes on their unlawful arrest claim. We next consider whether Deputy Fuente s had probable cause to arrest the Marescas. This “is a lega l issue that we review de novo.” United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896 ( 10th Cir. 2004). Probable ca use exists only if, in the totality of the circumstances, the “facts available to the o fficers at the moment of the arrest would warrant a [person] of reasonabl e caution in the belief that an offense has been committed.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the qualified immunity c ontext, we ask “whether an objectively reasonable officer could conclu de that the historical fact s at the time of the arrest amount to probable cause.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1116. The arrests at issue here were not supported by probable cause because Fuentes lacked an ob jectively reasonable basis to be lieve that the Marescas’ truck16 was stolen. An unreasonable mistake of fact cannot furnish probable cause. United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2006). [W]hat is generally demanded of th e many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government—whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the po lice officer executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a sear ch or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requireme nt—is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990). Moreover, in determining whether there is probable cause, of ficers are charged with knowledge of any “readily availa ble exculpatory ev idence” that they unreasonably fail to ascertain. Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1259 (quoting Clipper v. Takoma Park, 876 F.2d 17, 19-20 (4th Cir. 1989)). “[T]he probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment requires officers to reasonably interview witnesses readily available at the scene, inves tigate basic evidence, or othe rwise inquire if a crime has been committed at all before invoking the power of warran tless arrest and detention.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1117 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). In this case, such readily available exculpatory ev idence included the stolenvehicle description already on Fuentes’s com puter screen before the arrest, which did not match the Marescas’ truc k in style, make, model, year, color, license plate number, or registration status; and the corrective information that dispatch presumably would have provi ded had Fuentes waited for verification, in accordance with her training. These steps were not taken. See Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1257 (“A police officer may not close her or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the17 circumstances of an arrest.”) (quoting BeVi er v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Phelan v. Village of L yons, 531 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2008). Even after stopping the Marescas, Fuentes c ould have gleaned readily available exculpatory evidence by interviewing the Marescas, considering the Marescas’ specific, repeated requests to recheck their license plate and the fact that all of the Marescas were fully compliant and showed no indicia of any risk to officer safety, and recognizing the commonsense implications of the fact that the truck’s passengers were a family of five (plus the family dog) on a state highway du ring the daytime. The sole basis for arresting the Ma rescas was Fuentes’s mistaken and unreasonable belief that their truck was stol en. That belief ar ose because Fuentes mistyped the Marescas’ license plate numbe r into her computer, thereby triggering the stolen vehicle report. We do not hold that a mere typing e rror in entering a license plate number would make it unreasonabl e for the officer to rely on the result of the database inquiry. In the often unpr edictable and fast-paced context of traffic stops, we cannot require perf ection—only reasonable behavi or. Our conclusion that it was unreasonable for Fuentes to arrest the Marescas is based upon all the circumstances of the case and, in particular , Fuentes’s failure to use readily available information—already on the computer sc reen in front of her and from the dispatcher—to verify that the Marescas’ ve hicle was reported stol en before arresting them. According to Fuentes’s supervis or, Sergeant Bartholf, “[Deputies are] supposed to verify the inform ation on the screen , the year of the car, the color, the make, the model and whether or not what’s on their screen is the same car that’s in18 front of them,” Aplt. App. at 319, and it is a good practice for officers to confirm with dispatch that the stolen vehicle report was accurate and up-to-date. Yet Fuentes did neither. See, e.g., Weig el v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1155 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he reasonableness of an officer’s actions must be assessed in light of the officer’s training.”). 6 Every application of the Fourth Amendm ent’s reasonableness standard is factdependent, and the myriad circumstances offi cers confront do not lend themselves to bright-line rules. Thus, we do not suggest that an officer must always double-check a database hit or await confirmation from dispat ch that the hit is accurate. There are undoubtedly circumstances that would just ify a reasonably prudent officer’s decision to bypass such steps. Howeve r, in the circumstances of this case, which did not suggest any likely threat to the arresting officers or a ny need for immediate action preventing verification, a reasonable offi cer would be expected to confirm the accuracy of her information in light of th e disparity between the vehicle described on the stolen vehicle report and that driven by the Marescas. In fact , Fuentes could have detected her error by merely reading (or rer eading) the computer screen right in front of her that reported the database result. Fuentes, then, is charged with knowledge of the read ily available exculpatory information on her screen. That inform ation did not provide an objectively

6 In light of these particular facts presen ted in this case, Unite d States v. Hines, 564 F.2d 925, 927-28 (10th Cir. 1977), which indicates as a ge neral rule that an NCIC stolen vehicle report is sufficient to establish probable cause, is inapposite.19 reasonable basis for seizing the Marescas at all—much less give Fuentes probable cause to arrest them in a fe lony stop. Therefore, the undi sputed facts establish that Fuentes violated the Fourth Amendment wh en she arrested th e Marescas without probable cause. And it was clea rly established, at the time of this arrest, that an officer must have probable cause to arre st an individual, and the officer must reasonably investigate readily available exculpatory evidence “before invoking the power of warrantless arrest and deten tion.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore conclude that Fu entes is not entitled to qualified immunity on the Marescas’ unlawful a rrest claim, and, to the contrary, the Marescas are entitled to summary judgment against Deput y Fuentes on that claim. 3. Grundhoffer is entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably relied on Fuentes’s report that the Ma rescas’ vehicle was stolen In assisting Fuentes in arresting th e Marescas, Deputy Gr undhoffer relied on Fuentes’s statement that the Marescas’ truck was stolen. “A police officer who acts in reliance on what proves to be the flaw ed conclusions of a fellow police officer may nonetheless be entitled to qualified imm unity as long as th e officer’s reliance was objectively reasonable.” Felders ex re l. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 882 (10th Cir. 2014) (interna l quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 975 (2015); accord, e.g., Baptiste , 147 F.3d at 1260 (“Police wo rk often requires officers to rely on the observations, statements, and conclusions of their fellow officers. An officer who is called to the s cene to conduct a search incide nt to arrest is not required to reevaluate the arresting officer’s probabl e cause determination in order to protect20 herself from personal liability.”). This ru le makes sense, becau se “[e]ffective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless po lice officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to anot her and . . . officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross- examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitte d information.” Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Un ited States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985)). “Accordingly, the ‘good faith’ defense shields objectively reasonable good faith reliance on the statements of a fellow o fficer, but does not protect deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligen t reliance on the flawed conclu sions of a fellow officer.” Felders, 755 F.3d at 882. Here, there is no evidence that Grundhoffer’s relianc e on Fuentes’s statement was in bad faith or unreasonable under the circumstances. Grundhoffer was traveling in a separate car immediatel y behind Fuentes when Fuentes stated over the radio that the Marescas were driving a stolen vehicl e. Unlike Fuentes, he did not have a computer screen in front of him describing the stolen ve hicle and could not see the Marescas’ plate at the time Fu entes first made the stop. Grundhoffer testified that the officers followed the Marescas for only about a quarter of a mile between Fuentes’s statement and her pulling th e Marescas over, so Gr undhoffer had no reasonable opportunity to investigate on his own and double-check the accuracy of Fuentes’s conclusion before initiati ng the arrest. Under these undisputed circumstances, Grundhoffer reasonably and in good faith believed that probable cause to arrest existed at the moment of th e stop. He is therefore en titled to qualified immunity on21 the unlawful arrest claim; a ccordingly we affirm the gr ant of summary judgment for Grundhoffer on the unlawful arrest claim. B. The Marescas’ excess ive force claim presen ts a jury question. In addition to alleging they were unlawfu lly arrested, the Ma rescas also claim that Fuentes and Grundhoffer violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force when they arrested the Marescas. Be cause we treat claims for unlawful arrest and excessive force as separa te causes of action, see Co rtez, 478 F.3d at 1126-27, the Marescas’ success on their unlaw ful arrest claim against Fuentes does not carry over to their excessive for ce claim against her; the same is true for Grundhoffer’s qualified immunity defense. In considering the Mare scas’ excessive force claim, we consider whether the force the deputie s used to arrest the Mare scas exceeded “the force reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest or detenti on under the circumstances of the case.” Id. at 1126 (emphasis added). Fo r purposes of this section, we assume, for sake of argument, that Fuentes reasonably be lieved that the truck was stolen and thus had probable cause to a rrest the Marescas. A police officer violates an arrest ee’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessi ve force during an arrest if the officer’s arresting actions were not ob jectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronti ng him. This court assesses the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, acknow ledging that the officer may be forced to make split-second ju dgments in certain difficult circumstances. This reasonablenes s standard—which is “clearly established” for the pu rposes of § 1983 actions —implores the court to consider factors including the alle ged crime’s severity, the degree of potential threat that the suspect poses to an officer’s safety and to others’ safety, and the suspect’s effort s to resist or ev ade arrest. Because the reasonableness inquiry overl aps with the qualified immunity22 analysis, a qualified immunity defense is of less value when raised in defense of an exces sive force claim. Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304 , 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations, internal quotation marks, alterations omitted ); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). We have held that the seizure of the Marescas was an arre st, but we note that even in an investigative detention, “o fficers are required to articulate specific justifications for uses of force . . . such as locking a person in a police car .” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1131 (emphasis added) . In considering the reas onableness of a particular use of force, “personal secur ity and individual dignity inte rests, particularly of nonsuspects, should also be cons idered.” Id. These interest s are particularly vulnerable when the officers’ use of force is directed at children, such as the three Maresca children arrested in this case. 1. Factual disputes preclude summary judgment for party The Marescas presented evid ence that the officers point ed loaded guns directly at them—including their children—despite th eir full compliance with the officers’ orders. Specifically, there is evidence that deputies poi nted a gun at C.M., held a weapon close to M.M., pointed a firearm at Mrs. Maresca’s he ad, and aimed their weapons directly at Mr. Maresca. There is also evidence that the deputies continued to aim their weapons at the Marescas’ ve hicle after Mr. and Mrs. Maresca were removed from the vehicle and after the offi cers had been informed by the Marescas23 that their children were sti ll in the truck. The deputie s deny these facts. These factual disputes preclude summ ary judgment for any party. “The display of weapons, and the pointi ng of firearms directly at persons inescapably involves the immediate threat of deadly force. Su ch a show of force should be predicated on at least a perceived risk of inju ry or danger to the officers or others, based upon what the of ficers know at that time.” Holland, 268 F.3d at 1192. In Holland, we denied qualified immunity wh ere, acting pursuant to lawful warrants, the officers “held each of the plaintiffs-a ppellees at gunp oint, initially forcing several of them to lie down on the ground for ten to fifteen minutes . . . .” Id.; see id. at 1196–97. Like the Marescas , the Holland plaintiffs fully complied with the officers’ orders. Id. at 1197 (“The young people en countered by the SWAT deputies as they entered the Heflin property offered no resistan ce. They did as they were told. The SWAT deputies’ initial show of force gain ed immediate and unquestioned control of the situation outside the residence. Therea fter, the justification for continuing to hold the young people directly at gunpoi nt simply evaporated.”). Where a person has submitted to the officers’ show of force without resistance, and where an officer has no reasonable cause to believe that person poses a danger to the officer or to others, it may be excessive and unreasonable to continue to aim a loaded firearm directly at that person, in contrast to simply holding th e weapon in a fashion ready for immediate use. Id. at 1193. Additionally, as here, the offi cers in Holland allegedly pointed loaded guns at children who posed no risk to officer safety. “Poi nting a firearm directly at a child calls for even greater sensitivity to what may be justified or what may be24 excessive under all the circumstances.” Id. The officers attempt to distinguish Holland on the grounds that in that case, the officers continued to hold minors at gunpoint after they had been subdued—but the Marescas submitte d evidence that this is exactly what happened here. Defendants presented evidence to the contrary, denying that any officer ever pointed a weapon directly at any member of the Maresca family, thus creating a genui ne dispute of material fact. Moreover, while the Mares cas’ evidence indicates it was primarily Deputies Swint and Quintana who pointed their weap ons directly at memb ers of the Maresca family, a jury could find that Fuentes a nd/or Grundhoffer was liable for not taking steps to stop the other deputies from using excessive force; it is clearly established “that a law enforcement official who fails to intervene to prevent another law enforcement official’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983,” Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10t h Cir. 1996); accord Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1441-42 (11t h Cir. 1985) (“It is not necessary that a police officer actually participate in the use of excessive force in order to be held liable under section 1983. Rather, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to prot ect the victim of another offi cer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable fo r his nonfeasance.”). Finally, a jury could also find that Fu entes and/or Grundho ffer used excessive force against M.M., depending on how the jury resolved the disputed facts as to the manner in which the deputies tr eated the nine-year-old and, in particular, whether the deputies made M.M. lie on the highway w ith her hands behind her back after the25 deputies had removed all of th e other Marescas from their vehicle and discovered that none of the older family members were armed or uncooperativ e. See Holland, 268 F.3d at 1192-93, 1196-97. 2. The Marescas have presen ted evidence of more than de minimis injuries Finally, we reject the o fficers’ argument that the Marescas’ excessive force claim fails as a matter of law because any injuries th e Marescas suffered were “ de minimis .” As an initial matter , it is not clear that a § 1983 excessive force claim raising excessive force issues beyond mere handcuff use would fail at the summary judgment stage if the plaintiff a lleged and submitted evidence of only de minimis injury. Although Cortez stat ed that “[i]n order to re cover on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the officers us ed greater force than would have been reasonably necessary to effect a lawful seizure, and (2) some ac tual injury caused by the unreasonable seizure that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional,” 478 F.3d at 1129 n.25, Cortez wa s specifically addr essing an excessive force claim premised on allegations that o fficers handcuffed the plaintiff too tightly and refused to adjust the ha ndcuffs, see id. at 1128-29. Ge nerally, since Cortez, the Tenth Circuit has required a showing of more than de minimis injury only in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases based on handc uffing. See, e.g., Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2011); Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 897–99 (1 0th Cir. 2009). But see Aldaba v. Pickens, 777 F.3d 1148, 1153, 1161 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015) (sugges ting, in dicta, that in a Taser case proof of actual, rather than de minimis , injury might have to be a ddressed on remand), petition for26 cert. docketed, (U.S. June 19, 2015) (No. 14-1492); but see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34 (2010) (per curiam) (holding, in an Eighth Amendment context, that an inmate did not need to prove actual inju ry in an excessive force claim against a prison guard; stating that c ourts should “decide excessiv e force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the in jury”) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992)). Here, however, we need not decide whet her the Marescas need to show more than de minimis injury because the Marescas pres ented evidence that each of them suffered psychological and emotional in jury that significan tly exceeded any de minimis requirement. 7

7 The Marescas alleged in th eir complaint that after the incident, nine-year-old M.M. began writing at school about being shot in the head and was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder th at was the result of this incident. At the summaryjudgment stage, the Marescas claimed that each member of the family suffered emotional injury and they presented evidence that Deput y Swint pointed a gun at fourteen-year-old C.M. as he was lying on the highway , causing C.M. to cry and “freak[] out,” stating “Mom, they are going to shoot us, they’re going to shoot me” (Aplt. App. at 323); Deputy Quintana point ed a gun at Mrs. Maresca’s head as she was lying prone on the highway, causing Mrs. Maresca to scream and cry for fear that she would be shot inadvertently; An thony suffered nightmares for several weeks after the incident; th e children (at least th e nine- and fourteen-year-old) were crying during the felony stop; and after the inci dent, M.M. developed a fear of police officers, had “night terrors,” and continually locked th e doors to the family’s home (id. at 328). Because emotiona l injury is suffici ent to meet Cortez’s requirement of actual injury, see Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1125 n. 25, this evidence is sufficient to create at least a triable question as to whether e ach of the Marescas suffered more than de minimis injury. See also Holland, 268 F.3d at 1192-93, 1195.27 4. Conclusion: Factual disputes precl ude summary judgment for any party on the excessive force claim Under Cortez, we must cons ider whether the Marescas have an excessive force claim that is separate from and in addition to their unl awful arrest claim. The reasonableness of the force used during an a rrest ordinarily involve s questions of fact for the jury. See Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 12 69, 1288 (10th Cir. 2008). That is the case here. Because there are genuine di sputes of facts that are material to the question of whether the deputies used excessive for ce to arrest the Marescas— including whether the deputies pointed thei r weapons at members of the Maresca family and whether the deputies made nine -year-old M.M. lie on the highway with her hands behind her back—su mmary judgment is not appr opriate on this claim for any party. III. CONCLUSION Pursuant to the Marescas’ request, De fendants Tonna, Swint, Quintana, and Lucero are DISMISSED from this appeal. As to the remaining Defendants, Deputies J. Fuentes and G. Grundho ffer, we hold as follows: A. Fuentes: i. Unlawful arrest claim : We REVERSE summary judgment for Fuentes on the unlawful arrest claim and hold that she is not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. We also REVERSE the denial of summary judgment for the Marescas on their unlawful arrest clai m as to Fuentes and REMAND for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Ma rescas against Fuen tes on the issue of28 liability for the unlawful arrest. We REMAND that claim for further proceedings on the Marescas’ da mages for the unlawful arrest. ii. Excessive force claim: We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the Marescas’ motion for summ ary judgment on their se parate excessive force claim. We REVERSE the grant of summary judgment for Fuentes on that claim. We REMAND that claim for further proceedin gs consistent with our opinion. B. Grundhoffer: i. Unlawful arrest claim : We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Grundhoffer on the unlaw ful arrest claim and hold that Grundhoffer is entitled to qualified imm unity on that claim. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the Marescas’ motion for summary judgment on their unlawful arrest claim as to Grundhoffer. ii. Excessive force claim : We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the Marescas’ motion for summ ary judgment on their se parate excessive force claim. We REVERSE the grant of su mmary judgment for Grundhoffer on that claim. We REMAND that claim for further proceedin gs consistent with our opinion. We therefore AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND for further proceedings consiste nt with this opinion.