NO. 97-021 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

CITY OF HELENA, STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

JAMES C. MEYERS, 

Defendant and Appellant 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, 

The Honorable Thomas C. Honzel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

James C. Meyers, Pro Se, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Robert J. Wood. Helena City Prosecutor, 

Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: July 17, 1997 

Decided: August 18, 1997 

Filed: 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be ctted as precedent and shall be published 

by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company. 

James C. Meyers appealed to the District Court for the First Judicial District in Lewis 

and Clark County from a conviction in the C~ty Court of Helena for driping with a suspended 

license and for failure to have liability insurance. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty 

of both charges and sentenced by the Dtstrtct Court. Meyers appeals. We affirm in part and 

vacate in part the judgment of the Distr~ct Court, and remand for further proceedings. 

There are two issues on appeal: 

1. Did Meyers' conviction result from bias shown by District Judges, the Clerk 

of the Distrtct Court, or the attorney who represented him? 

2. Did the District Court err when tt sentenced the defendant or assessed costs to 

him'? 

FACTUALBACKGROUND 

On September 9, 1995, Officer Mutk Ekola of the Helena Police Department stopped 

Meyers' vehicle for a defective taillight. Meyers could not produce a driver's license or proof 

of insurance. After Ekola learned that Meyers' driver's license had been suspended, Meyers 
was cited for driving while his license was suspended and for failure to have liability 

insurance, in violation of $9 61-5-212, MCA, and 61-6-301, MCA, respectively. 

Meyers was found guilty of both charges by a jury in the City Court of Helena, and 

on December 27, 1995, he filed a notice of appeal to the District Court. After determining 

that Meyers was indigent, the District Court appointed counsel to represent him. Meyers 

filed a number of motions, seeking. among other things, to disqualify the District Court 

Judge for cause, to substitnte counsel. and to remove the matter to Federal District Court. 

On May 1, 1996, District Judge James Purcell conducted a hearing to determine whether 

there was cause to disqualify the District Court Judge. He subsequently denied that motion. 

On October 24, 1996, Meyers withdrew his request for counsel and proceeded pro se. 

Following a jury trial on November 26, 1996, Meyers was found guilty of driving while his 

license was suspended and of failure to have liability insurance. The District Court sentenced 

Meyers to 190 days in jail, with 188 of those days suspended. In addition, it assessed fines 

in the total amount of $600, and court costs, jury costs, and charges in the amount of 

$650.48. 

ISSUE I 

Did Meyers' conviction result from bias shown by District Judges, the Clerk of the 

District Court, or the attorney who represented him? 
Meyers has alleged that due to the bias of both the District Court and Judge Purcell, 

as well as the Clerk of Court and hls own attorney, he was denied effective representation, 

his right to a speedy trial, due process, and his rlght to put forth a proper defense. 

From review of the record, we find no evidence to demonstrate bias against Meyers. 

Meyers' principal claim regarding the District Court (other than claims related to the 

Judges' religion) are that he was denled a speedy trial and that he was precluded from 

offering evidence critical to his defense, However, most delay was attributable to Meyers' 

own motions and no prejudice has been shown from delay. 

Furthermore, the determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is left 

to the sound discretion of the trial judge and wlll not be overturned absent a showing of 

abuse of discretion. State v Gollehon (1993), 262 Mont. 293, 301, 864 P.2d 1257. 1263. 

Here, the District Court's decision that evidence pertaining to Meyers' prior convictions in 

1989 and 1992 was irrelevant to the charges made against him in this proceeding was not an 

abuse of discretion, and therefore, it does not indicate bias against Meyers. For these 

reasons, we conclude that Meyers' conviction was not the result of bias by the District Court, 

Judge Purcell, the Clerk of Court, or Meyers' attorney. 

ISSUE 2 

Did the District Court err when it sentenced the defendant or assessed costs to him? 
"This Court has consistently held that if a sentence is within the limits provided by 

statute, it is not an abuse of discretion." State v. Lemmon (1984), 214 Mont. 121, 129? 692 

P.2d 355,459 (citing State v. Gurrido (1981), 190 Mont. 525,52") 621 P.2d 1105, 1108). 

Section 61-5-212, MCA, provides that a defendant convicted of driving with a 

suspended license "shall be punished by i~nprisonment for not less than 2 days or more than 

6 months and may be fined not more than $500." Here, the District Court sentenced Meyers 

to serve 180 days in jail, but suspended all but the two days required by the statute. In 

addition, the District Court assessed a $250 fine. Each sentence is clearly within the limits 

of the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 

when it imposed Meyers' sentence for driving with a suspended license. 

Section 61-6-304, MCA, states that a second conviction for failure to have liability 

insurance is "punishable by a fine of $350 2r by imprisonment in the county jail for not more 

than 10 days, or both." The District Court fined Meyers $350 and sentenced him to the 

maximum ten days in jail, although the jail sentence was suspended; each sentence is within 

the limits of the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion when it imposed Meyers' sentence for failure to have liability insurance. 

In addition to the sentences imposed, the District Court required that Meyers pay a 

total of $650.48 for costs and surcharges. Section 46-18-201(d), MCA, permits the District 

Court to require payment of costs and jury expenses pursuant to 8 46-18-232, MCA; 

5 46-18-236(l)(a), MCA, requires all courts of original jurisdiction to assess a $15 charge 

5 
for each misdemeanor conviction, and $ 3-1-317(1)(a), MCA, requires imposition of a $5 

user surcharge for each conviction of criminal conduct. Although the District Court did not 

specify these statutes as the basis for its charges, it ordered Meyers to pay $40 as surcharges 

for the convictions in District Court and $40 for court costs and surcharges per violation to 

the City Court. The District Court also ordered that Meyers pay District Court jury costs in 

the amount of $296.48, and City Court jury costs in the amount of $234. 

There is no indication, however, that the District Court applied the other provisions 

of the statutes which provide for an exception where the defendant is unable to pay. Sections 

46-18-236(2) and -232(2), MCA, both provide that if the convicting court determines that 

the defendant is not able to pay the costs or surcharges, those expenses n~ust be waived. 

Section 3-1-317(2), MCA, provides that in the event a defendant is unable to pay, the 

surcharge may be waived. These sections have significance in this case in which the District 

Court found that Meyers was mdigent. Normally imposition of surcharges, costs, and jury 

expenses pursuant to these statutes would be inconsistent with a determination of indigence. 

Therefore, we vacate that part of the District Court's judgment which assessed costs and 

surcharges in the combined amount of $650.48 and remand to the District Court for 

determination of whether Meyers is financially able to pay that amount. 

We affim~ in part and vacate part of the judgment of the District Court, and remand 

for further proceedings consistent wtth this opinion. 
We Concur: 
August 18, 1997 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the 

following named: 

JAMES C. MEYERS 

472 RUSSELL #6 

HELENA MT 59601 

HON. JOSEPH P. MAZUREK, ATTORNEY GENERAL @ 

ELIZABETH GRIFFING, ASSISTANT 

21 5 NORTH SANDERS 

HELENA MT 59620 

ROBERT J. WOOD 

ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY 

BOX 133 

HELENA MT 59624-01 33 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA