alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-50082

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Devin Edward Hall, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:19-CR-154-1

______________________________

Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Devin Edward Hall pleaded guilty in 2020 to transporting an adult 

across state lines for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2421. His sentence includes 91-months’ imprisonment and fiveyears supervised release. Hall, who has not been released on supervision,

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 27, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-50082 Document: 00516979869 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/27/2023
No. 23-50082

2

challenges a supervised-release special condition requiring him to “take any 

and all medications that are prescribed by the treating physician”.

“This Court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction, on its own 

motion, if necessary.” Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Such sua sponte jurisdictional inquiry includes whether an issue is ripe for 

review. McCall v. Dretke, 390 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 2004). Whether Hall’s 

claim is ripe is reviewed de novo. E.g., United States v. Magana, 837 F.3d 457, 

459 (5th Cir. 2016). 

“[T]he ripeness inquiry focuses on whether an injury that has not yet 

occurred is sufficiently likely to happen to justify judicial intervention.” 

Pearson v. Holder, 624 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted). “A claim is not ripe for review if it rests upon contingent 

future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at 

all.” Magana, 837 F.3d at 459 (citation omitted).

Hall’s challenge to the condition is not ripe for review because it is “a 

matter of conjecture” whether he will ever be subjected to prescribed 

medication. Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Carmichael, 343

F.3d 756, 761–62 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding supervised-release condition 

not ripe because condition was contingent on future events). If he is ever 

required to submit to such medication, Hall may petition the district court 

for a modification of the conditions of his release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)

(permitting modification of supervised-release conditions). 

DISMISSED. 

Case: 23-50082 Document: 00516979869 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/27/2023
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed

August 30 , 2018.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14- 18 -00716- CR

IN RE GERALD J. DURD EN , Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 248th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 905464



### MEMORANDUM OPINION
On August 16, 2018, relator Gerald J. Durden filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in this c ourt. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 ( West Supp. 2017 ); see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this c ourt to compel the District Clerk of Harris County, Texas, Chris Daniel, to present relator’s motion for post

conviction DNA testing to the appropriate trial court

.2

This c ou rt’ s mandamus jurisdiction is governed by section 22.221 of the Texas Government Code. Section 22.221 expressly limits the mandamus jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to: (1) writs against a district court judge or county court judge in the cour t of app eals’ district, (2) writs against a judge of a district court who is acting as a magistrate at a court of inquiry under Chapter 52, Code of Criminal Procedure, in the court of appeals district; (3) writs against an associate judge of a district or county c ourt appointed by a judge under Chapter 201, Family Code, in the court of appeals district for the judge wh o appointed the associate judge; and (4 ) all writs necessary to enforce the court of appeals’ jurisdiction. Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 22.221 ( West Supp. 2017 ). Because the petition for writ of mandamus is directed toward a district clerk and is not necessary to enforce th is court’ s jurisdiction, we have no jurisdiction. See Tex. Gov ’ t Code Ann. § 22.221

. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is o rdered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Busby. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
#### LA HOOD v. HOME INS. CO.

No. 4458.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Sept. *7,*1934.

Hardin & Coleman, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Pegues & Pegues, of Mansfield, for appellee.

DREW, Judge.

This is one of nine suits against nine fire insurance companies on nine different policies. In one of the cases jurisdiction was vested in the Supreme Court, and in the other eight jurisdiction was vested in this court. The suits grew out of damage to a stock of merchandise iby fire.

The lower court rendered judgment for plaintiff in each of the suits and one of the cases was appealed to the Supreme Court. The other eight were appealed to this court, where they were held in abeyance until the *367Supreme Court decided the case before it, due to the fact that all the cases were consolidated for trial; the same law and evidence being applicable to each case. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court in the case in which it has jurisdiction and rejected the demands of plaintiff with costs. See La Hood v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 179 La. 213, 153 So. 695. The reason for the reversal was that plaintiff had failed to keep a set of books clearly showing a complete record of business transactions such as to enable the insurer to ascertain with reasonable certainty the amount of goods on hand at the time of the fire.

Attorneys for both plaintiff and defendants have agreed in writing that this court be guided by the above-cited decision and have submitted the cases on the record as made up and agreed for judgment to be rendered in vacation.

Therefore, for the reasons above given and further elaborated on in the ease cited, supra, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the demands of the plaintiff are rejected, at his costs in both courts.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from
financial  statements for the three month period ended March 31, 1996 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000075053
<NAME>                        D-lanz Development Group, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     $
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 Jan-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   Mar-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   0
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .00
        


</TABLE>
#### BILBRAY v. PELICAN NATURAL GAS CO., Inc.

No. 5033.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Oct. 10, 1935.

Wilkinson, Lewis & Wilkinson, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Olin D. Moore, of Many, for appellee.

MILLS, Judge.

This is a companion suit to that of Felix G. Greer against the same defendant, this *434day decided by us (162 So. 431).- Both are for damages caused by the escape onto plaintiff’s land of salt water and waste oil from the .premises of defendant. , The present action involves 70 acres located immediately below, and traversed by, the same creek of drain that.runs through-the Greer place. The circumstances being the' same, the establishment of defendant’s liability to Greer for actual damage proven, limits the present action to the sole ques-, tion of quantum. It is stated in the-briefs' that the learned trial judge allowed in full the items of $200 for trees killed along the creek, and $200 for depreciation of 'the val-J ue of the land.

Whereas in the Greer Case the amount of timber destroyed was definitely determinable, in the present a startling conflict appears in the testimony to this simple question of fact. Plaintiff and his witnesses testify that at the time of the trial all of the trees bordering the creek were either dead or dying from the effects of this- salt water. Defendant’s witnesses, including several well-qualified experts, say they could find none. As to any definite quantity, the only testimony is that of plaintiff, who says that by actual scaling he found 16,101 feet of merchantable timber of a stumpage value of $6 per thousand, and smaller trees of a sufficient quantity to make up the amount claimed dead or dying. He says that over a strip, bordering on the creek, averaging 100 feet in width, “I see nothing growing. It is as blank as that wall.”

At the conclusion of the taking of testimony on December 13, 1934, counsel for defendant, in view of the irreconcilable conflict as to a fact easily ascertainable by inspection, requested that before rendering a decision, the court view the property, which request was denied and judgment immediately pronounced. In June, 1935, defendant moved that the case be remanded and reopened to receive further testimony as to any existing damage to the timber and vegetation. The motion suggests that its true condition is more apparent in the summer than in the winter, when all vegetation seems dead. The motion is supported by affidavits, and by photographs showing the creek with its banks covered by abundant vegetation and thick timber in full foliage.

Under the circumstances, we think this statement as1 to dying timber being merely an opinion, the motion to remand is rea-r sonable and proper in order that its .correctness may be determined.

It is accordingly .ordered that the .case be remanded and reopened to permit tes-: timony by both sides as to the present condition of the .timber and vegetation along Bilbray creek on the property of plaintiff, and the value of any found destroyed.
EXHIBIT 32.2

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Dennis Bergquist, the Chief Financial Officer of Molecular Diagnostics, Inc.
(the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

      (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the fiscal
quarter ended March 31, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m or 78o(d)); and

      (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: May 17, 2004

                                      /s/ Dennis Bergquist
                                          ---------------
                                          Name: Dennis Bergquist
                                          Title: Chief Financial Officer
DERRICK ANTONIO BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D13-3468

_____________________________/

Opinion filed July 3, 2014.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Adrian G. Soud, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Zachary F. Lawton, Assistant Public 

Defender, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Jay Kubica and Samuel Steinberg, Assistant 

Attorneys General, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROWE, SWANSON, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.
ex102.htm


Exhibit 10.2


 







 


AMENDMENT TO


 


THE SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED 9% SECURED PROMISSORY NOTE


 


DUE DECEMBER 31, 2016, MADE BY POKERTEK, INC.


 


AND HELD BY ARTHUR LOMAX


 







 


This Amendment to the Second Amended and Restated 9% Secured Promissory Note due December 31, 2016, made by the Company and held by Arthur Lomax (the “Note”), is entered into on April 28, 2014.


 


WHEREAS the parties wish to amend the terms of the Note.


 


NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree as follows:


 


Section 4.2 of the Note is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:


 


1.           4.2           Acceleration.  If an Event of Default occurs under Section 4.1(iv) or (v), or the Company enters into a Change in Control Transaction (as defined below), then the outstanding Principal of and accrued and unpaid interest on this Note shall automatically become immediately due and payable, without presentment, demand, protest or notice of any kind, all of which are expressly waived.  If any other Event of Default occurs and is continuing, the Holder, by written notice to the Company, may declare the Principal of and interest on this Note to be due and payable immediately.  Upon any such declaration of acceleration, the Maturity Date shall be deemed to be the date of such acceleration and such Principal and interest shall become immediately due and payable and the Holder shall be entitled to exercise all of its rights and remedies hereunder and under the Purchase Agreement and Security Agreement whether at law or in equity.  The failure of the Holders to declare the Note due and payable shall not be a waiver of their right to do so, and the Holders shall retain the right to declare the Note due and payable unless they shall execute a written waiver.  For the purpose of this Section 4.2, a “Change of Control Transaction” means the occurrence of any of (i) an acquisition after the date hereof by an individual or legal entity or “group” (as described in Rule 13d-5(b)(l) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) of effective control (whether through legal or beneficial ownership of capital stock of the Company, by contract or otherwise) of in excess of 50% of the voting securities of the Company, or (ii) a change in the majority of the Board of Directors of the Company within a 24-month period unless the nomination for election by the Company’s shareholders of each new Director was approved by the vote of two-thirds of the members of the Board (or a committee of the Board, if nominations are approved by a Board committee rather than the Board) then still in office who were in office on the date hereof.


 


2.           All other terms of the Note shall be unchanged.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have executed the Amendment as of the date first above written.


 



	
 


 


 


/s/ Arthur Lomax


Arthur Lomax


 

	  	
POKERTEK, INC.


 


 


By:  /s/ Mark Roberson


Mark Roberson, CEO
<PAGE>



                                                                    Exhibit 99.2


                                WRITTEN STATEMENT

     In  connection  with the Annual Report of Electric  Fuel  Corporation  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-K for the year  ended  December  31,  2002 filed with the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (the  "Report"),  I,  Avihai  Shen,  Vice
President - Finance and Chief Financial  Officer of the Company,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, hereby certify that to my knowledge, the Report fully complies with
the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of
1934,  and the  information  contained  in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

     A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has
been provided to Electric Fuel Corporation and will be retained by Electric Fuel
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.




                                          By: /s/ Avihai Shen
                                              ---------------------------------
                                              Avihai Shen, Vice President -
                                              Finance and CFO
                                              (Chief Financial Officer)

Date: March 31, 2003


<PAGE>
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION* IN THE 

OF MARYLAND 

• COURT OF APPEALS 

Petitioner, 

• OF MARYLAND 

V. 

PHILLIP G. DANTES 

Respondent. 

• Misc. Docket AG 

• No. 45 

• September Term, 2017 

ORDER 

The Court of Appeals of Maryland, having consider the Joint Petition of the Attorney 

Grievance Commission and Respondent, Phillip G. Dantes, to place Respondent 

on Inactive Status by Consent pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-736(c), it is this 6th 

day of December ,2017 

ORDERED, that the Joint Petition be, and it is hereby GRANTED, and the 

Respondent, Phillip G. Dantes, is hereby placed on Inactive Status by consent; and it is 

further, 

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall remove the name of Phillip G. Dantes 

from the register of attorneys in the Court and certify that fact to the Client Protection Fund 

of the Bar of Maryland and all Clerks of all judicial tribunals in this State in accordance with 

Maryland Rule 19-761. 

/s/ Clayton Greenet Jr. 

Senior Judge 

4
DISMISS and Opinion Filed March 4 , 2015 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 14

- 01269

- CV
IN RE HERMES SARGENT BATES, LLP AND COLLE EN MCCOY , Relator
Original Proceeding from the 44th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 12

- 03421


### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Evans By order dated December 30, 2014, the Court abated this mandamus proceeding pursuant to rule 7.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to allow the successor judge to reconsider the ruling of the trial court. Relator has advised the Court that the trial court has granted the relief sought by the petiti on for writ of mandamus

. Relator now moves to dismiss its petition for writ of mandamus. Pursuant to relator’s motion, we dismiss relator’s petition for

writ of mandamus. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1.

141269F.P05 /David Evans/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE
Exhibit 10.1


 


2014 Summary of Executive Cash Compensation


 and Award Targets Under the Annual Incentive Plan







The following table sets forth the current base salaries provided for the Company’s CEO, CFO and three most highly compensated executive officers.  Salary increases are determined annually in March and effective April 1, 2014:







	
Executive Officers

	 	
Current Salary

	 
	
 

	 	


	 
	
Francis Malecha

	 	
$

	
740,000

	 
	
Rodney Underdown

	 	
$

	
416,120

	 
	
Robert Miller

	 	
$

	
300,000

	 
	
Steve Berger

	 	
$

	
367,200

	 
	
David Goadby

	 	
£

	
216,172

	
*





 


* Salary is denominated in pounds, so U.S. dollar equivalent may vary.







Executive officers are also eligible to receive a bonus each year under the Company’s Annual Incentive Plan.  The target percentages (based on percentage of salary) under this plan for the Company’s CEO, CFO and three most highly compensated executive officers are as shown in the following table.







	
Executive Officers

	 	
Target Percentage

	 
	
 

	 	


	 
	
Francis Malecha

	 	 	
100

	
%


	
Rodney Underdown

	 	 	
55

	
%


	
Robert Miller

	 	 	
55

	
%


	
Steve Berger

	 	 	
50

	
%


	
David Goadby

	 	 	
50

	
%
##### 



PHELPS DODGE CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
  COMPUTATION OF TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL CAPITALIZATION
 June 30,
    
    
    December 31,2006
    
    
    2005Short-term debt
    
    $
    61.3
    
    
    
    14.3Current portion of long-term debt
    
    
    62.5
    
    
    
    2.5Long-term debt
    
    
    704.4
    
    
    
    677.7Total debt
    
    
    828.2
    
    
    
    694.5Minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries
    
    
    1,218.5
    
    
    
    915.9Shareholders equity
    
    
    5,586.1
    
    
    
    5,601.6Total capitalization
    
    $
    7,632.8
    
    
    
    7,212.0Ratio of total debt to total capitalization
    
    
    10.9
    %
    
    
    9.6
    %
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

May 11, 2016

No. 04

- 12

- 00108

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.G.N. and A.C.N., Minor Children,

From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2008

- CI

- 17947

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

The panel has considered the appellant’s second motion for rehearing on remand, and the

motion is DENIED.

__ _______________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 11th day of May, 2016

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Frank Paterno, Respondent, v. The City of New York, Appellant. (Action No. 5.)

Judgment of the Municipal Court reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide the event. Opinion by Gaynor, J.* Hirschberg, P. J., Woodward, Jenks and Miller, JJ., concurred.’
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.  20549



FORM 10-Q


Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934


For the Quarter Ended March 31, 1999       Commission File No. 1-5591


                    PENNZENERGY COMPANY
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)


             Delaware                          74-1597290
(State or other jurisdiction of          (I.R.S. Employer
incorporation or organization)           Identification No.)


Pennzoil Place, P.O. Box 4616
Houston, Texas 77210-4616
(Address of principal executive offices)




EXHIBIT


<PAGE>





                        PENNZOIL COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES
                                 INDEX TO EXHIBITS


Exhibit No.
-----------


         12    Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Combined Fixed Charges
               and Preferred Stock Dividends for the three months ended
               March 31, 1999 and 1998.

         27    Financial Data Schedule


<PAGE>