### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Fe brua ry 7, 200 6 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RO BER T A . WILE Y, AK A JA BO

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for McN airy County No. 1740 WeberMcC raw, Jud ge

No. W2005-01662-C A-R3- CD - F iled May 19, 2006

Th e De fe nd a nt, Rob e rt

A. W il ey , aka

Jabo , w a s c on vic te d b y

a Mc Nairy Cou nty jury of ide nti ty the ft , v iol a tion of a

Mo tor Ve hic le Ha

bitua l O ff e nd e r ( MV HO ) o rd e r, a nddrivi ng wh ile lic e ns e
canc elled, suspended, or revoked. For these c onvictions, the Defe ndant re ceive d an ef fec tive three

y e ar s e nte nc e a s a

Ra ng e I , s ta nd ardof

fe nd e r. I n th is app e a l a s o f rig ht, the De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t: (1 ) t he tr i a l c o u r t m a d e s e v e r a l e rr o r s i n i n s tru c t i n g t h e j u r y , ( 2 ) t h e e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e nt t o support his conviction for identity theft, and (3) the trial court committed sentencing err ors. Finding plain err or, double jeopa

rdy principles require us to va cate the Def endant’ s conviction for driving while license canc elled, suspende d, or re voked. The rema ining judg ments of the trial court are

a ff ir me d ina ll r e sp e c ts.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t; Reve rsed in Par t

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

W ayn e T

. D e w e e s , B o l i v ar , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , R o b e r tA

. W i l e y.

Paul G . Su mme rs , Attorne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Da vid H. F ind le y , As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Elizabeth Rice, District Attorne y Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On June 14 , 2 00 2, a

Mc Nair yCou nty

g randjury

ind ic te d th e De fe nd a nt f or ide nti ty the ft , violation of a MVHO order , and driving whil e li cense canc elled, suspended, or revoked. A jury trial was he ld on November

2, 2004.-2-

Th e State ’s fi rs t w itn e ss w a s O ff icer B y ro n M a xed on of

the Se lme r P oli c e De pa rt me nt. Offic er Ma x edon testified that, “ midday ” June 10, 2003, he wa s patrolling the “north a rea ” of the City of Selmer, when he encounte red the Def endant. Ac cording to Office r Maxedon, he passe d the Def endant, w h o was driving a Mer cede s-B enz, and re cog nized the Defe ndant “throug h the front windshield of the vehic le.” He also rec og nized the vehicle a s belong ing to the D efe ndant. Off icer Maxedon testified that he knew the Defenda nt’s driver’ s license was revoked. Additionally , Offic er Maxedon observed that the side windows of the D efen d an t ’s vehicle wer e hea vily tinted, and he believed “ that [t he De fendant’s] window ti nt was in violation under the Te n n es s ee Wi ndow Tint Cod e .” B a se d upo n Of

fi c e r Ma xed on ’s kn ow le dg e of the status of the De fe nd a nt’ s d ri ve r’ s li c e ns e and the window tint violation, he stopped the ve hicle.

Offic er Ma x edon informe d the Def endant of the window tint violation and asked him if he had a driver’s license. The Def endant pr oduced a

license that was issued on Nove mber 27, 2002, which stated the Def

endant’ s name a s “ROB ERT A RR O NWI L E YJR. ” H o w ever , Offic er Ma x edon kn e w the De fe nd a nt a s “ Rob e rt Al le n Wil e y .” Th e inf

orma tio n o n th e lic e ns e wa s o the rw ise

acc urate . He then a sked t he Defendant to exit the vehicle and advised him of his Miranda rig hts.

Offic er Ma x edon aske d the Def endant to state his socia l security number, and the Def endant “spit out the social sec urity number of 255 - - I

can’ t r emember the whole number without looking at it, but I reme mber the f

irst part was 255.” Of

fice r Maxedon then aske d the Def endant whe re he was born, to whic h the Def endant r eplied that he wa s born in Tenne ssee. Of fice r Maxedon inquired

o f t h e D e f e n d a n t , “ I f

y o u w e r e b o r n i n T e n n e s s e e , h o w d i d y o u o b t a i n a 2 5 5 s o c i a l s e c u r i t y n u m b e r ?” The De fendant had no re sponse.

I n o rd e r t o e sta

bli sh that th e De fe nd a nt’ s lic e ns e wa s re vo ke d at the tim e of the sto p, the Sta te introduced into evide nce a certified copy

of the De fendant’s Depa rtment of Safe ty

Driving Certification and a ce rtified copy of the orde r declaring the Defenda nt an habitual offende r under the MVHO Ac t. The S t at e then c alled Circuit Court Clerk Ronnie Br ooks, who testified that, af ter a
sear ch of his re cords, he found no petition by the Def endant to re store his driving privileg es.

Robert Arr on Wil ey , J r., testified that he was an eng ineer and lived in the State of Ge org ia. Mr. Wiley

was shown a

Depa rtment of Safe ty

Document, whic h contained the Def endant’ s picture and identification information. Mr. Wil ey testified that the socia l security number on the doc ument belong ed to him. The license the Def endant prese nted to Offic er Ma x edon wa s then passed to Mr. Wil ey

. Mr. W iley stated t hat it was his name on the lice nse but that none of the other identification inf orma tio n w a s h is. Ac c or din g to Mr . Wile y , he ha d a Te nn e sse e drive r’ s li c e ns e fo r a pp ro xima te ly ten months in 1988. Mr. Wiley stated that he was in the Army National Gua

rd for about one y ear and wa s discharg ed in 1989. Mr. Wiley testified, “When my separ ation time came up, I went to the of fi c e , s ig ne d th e pa

pe rs a nd a s eve rythi ng wa s pro c e sse d, the y we re jus t mail e d to me. ” On c ro ssexamination, Mr. W iley

said that he ha d never met the Defenda nt, who was black, and that he wa s white. Additionally , he did not know whether a copy of his discharg e had e ver be en mailed to the Def endant.-3-

Th e De fe nd a nt p re se nt ed B ri a n D ic ke y , M c Nairy Cou nty Re g ist e r o f D e e ds , a s a

wi tne ss. Mr . Dic ke y

te sti fi e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt r e c or de d a n A rm y dis c ha rg e do c ume nt w ith his of fi c e in 2001. On cr oss-examination, Mr. Dickey acknow ledg ed that he could not “vouc h[] for the authenticity ” of the document.

The D e f e n d a n t th e n te s ti f

ie d o n h is o w n b e h a lf

. H e s tate d th a t h e w a s b o r n inMcNa iry County , had a 9th g rade education, and served in the Army National Guard for six teen y ear s and wa s discharg ed in 1989. Acc ording to the Defenda nt, he “went t o Adamsville to see what [he] had to do to g e t [hi s ] lic e ns e re ins ta te d. ” He a sk e d a n e mpl oy e e of the lic e ns e of fi c e wh a t he wo uldne e d to obtain a license and, as a result of that conver sation, he filled out an applicat i o n fo r a l i cense. Ac c or din g to the De fe nd a nt, he pu t th e na me “R ob ert A. Wile y ” on the app lic a tio n. He a lso prese nted a birth c ertificate, which state d his middl e name as “A llen,” a t ax rec eipt as proof of

re sid e nc e , a nda

Natio na l G ua

rddis c ha rg e . B a se d u po n th is i nf

orma tio n, he wa s is su e d th e lic e ns e he prese nted to O ffice r Maxedon. Additionally , the Def endant testified that he had never rec eived notice fr om the State of Tenne ssee that his license was re voked.

Th e De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t, o n tw o p ri or oc c a sio ns , h e ha d b e e n s top pe d b y oth e r o ff ic e rs , who looked at the lice nse and le t him go. Ac cording to the Def endant, h e re ce i v ed h i s National Guar d discharg e pape r in the mail in 1989 but did not ex amine it closely . He testified that he “put it up” until he rec orded it in 2001.

On cr oss-examination, the Defe ndant ac knowledg ed that his middle name wa s “Allen” not

“ Ar ro n. ” He tes ti fi ed that

he ha d tw o o r thr e e dif

fe re nt n a me s a ndtw o d if fe re nt s oc ia l se c urity numbers. Ac cording to the Def endant, these multipl e name s and social se curity numbers re sulted fr om the Natio na l G ua

rddis c ha rg e pa pe r i ssu e d to him . H e e xpla ine d tha t he ha d tw o s oc ia l se c urity numbers bec ause: “E v er s i n ce I was born I had one and then when I come [sic] out of the . . . National Gua

rd, I was issued a nother one .” Ac cording to the Def endant, the social secur

ity number issued to him at birth beg an with “ 411.” The State then introduced into e vidence a “mug shot” of the Def endant, whic h contained the “411” soc ial security number.

The De fendant admitte d t h at h e was a tank operator and not a “ basic e lectric ity and elec tronics avionics re pairman” as stated on the disc harg e pape r. The Def endant explained that he did not reg ister the discha rg e pape r until 2001 because: “I just didn’t know I had to reg ister it and I just re g istered it, I mean, y ou know.” The Def endant testified that he had not used the “255” soc ial

s ec u ri t y n u m b er fo r an y o t h er p u rp o s e. He s t at ed t h at h e c o p i ed t h e i n fo rm at i o n fr o mt h e d i s ch ar ge paper in filling out his driver’ s license a pplication.

Ad dit ion a lly , th e De fe nd a nt a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he ha d sig ne d the 19 99 or de r d e c lari ng him an habitual of

fende r. Reg arding any court appea ranc e relating to the order , the Def endant state d, “I

came down her e and ta lked t o a lady conce rning that and that was all that was [ sic] to i t.” Moreove r, he admitte d th a t h e h a d n o t p e ti ti o n e d th e c o u r t t o h a v e h is li c e n s e r e in s tate d

. O n r e

- d ir e ct examination, he stated t h at, at his court a ppear ance , he wa s informed he was a n habitual offe nderW e no te tha t t h e trial c o u rt d id no t sp e c ify w h e the r t h e D e fen d a n t’s se n te n c e s w e re to b e se rv e d c o n c u rr e n tly 1

or c on s ecu t i vel y

. T her efore, by operat i on of l aw, t he D ef

endan t ’ s s ent enc es ar e c oncur r ent

. U nder T enn es s ee procedur e,
c o n c u rr e n t se n te n c ing is th e b a se line o r p re su m p tive a rr a n g e m e n t o f m u lti p le s e n te n c e s: “ S e n te n c e s sh a ll b e o rd e re d to

ru n c o n c u rr e n tly, if the c rite ria n o te d in [se c tio n 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 5 ]( b ) ar e n o t m e t, u n le ss c o n se c u tive se n te n c e s a re sp e c ifi c a lly req uired b y stat ute o r the T en ne ssee R ules o f C rimina l P ro ce d ure .” T en n. C o d e A nn . § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 5 (d ) (2 0 0 3 ); see also T en n

. R. Cr i m. P. 32( c) ( 1) ( “ U n l es s i t i s ma de t o a f f i r mat i v el y a ppea r t h at t h e s en t en ce s a r e con s ec u t i v e, t h ey s h al l be dee med t o be c on cu r r en t

. ”)

. M or eov er , t h e man n er of s er v i ce i n di ca t es t h at t h e t r i al c ou r t i n t en ded t h e s en t en ce s t o be

c o n c u rr e n t.

T h e re c o rd is un c le a r w h e the r th e se n te n c e r e c e ive d w a s p ro b a tio n , t o b e su p e rv ise d in the c o m m u n ity 2

c o rr e c tio n s p ro g ra m , o r a co m m u n ity c o rr e c tio n s se n te n c e

. C o m m u n ity c o rr e c tio n s a n d p ro b a tio n a r e n o t fu n g ib le met h ods of

s er v i n g a n a l t er n at i v e s en t en ce

. St at e v

. K at h y r n W h i t e B y r d, N o. E2002- 00417- CC A- R3- CD , 2003 W L 2 1 2 7 6 4 9 9 , at * 5 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. , K no xvi l l e, M ay 2 9 , 2 0 0 3 ) (ci t i ng Stat e v. P et t us, 98 6 S.W

. 2 d 54 0 , 54 4 (T enn. 1 9 9 9 )) (“ A revi ew o f

t he l anguage o f

t he rel evant s t at ut es r eveals a cl ear dis tinc tio n b e tw e en co m m uni t y co rr ect i o ns and pr ob a t i on

. ” )

. How e v e r , a s a c on di t i on of pr ob a t i on , a de fe n da n t c a n be pl a c e d i n t o a c om mu n i t y c or r e c t i on s pr og r a m. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 6 -1 0 6 (f).

O n the ju d g m e n t f

o rm s, the b o x e s m a rk e d “T D O C ,” “P ro b a tio n ,” a n d “C o m m u n ity B a se d A lter n a tive ” a re a ll

c h e c k e d . B e c a u se a lter n a tive se n te n c e s a n d se n te n c e s to the D e p a rtm e n t o f C o rr e c tio n a re d istinc t se n te n c e s w ith d iff e re n t p ro g ra m re q u ir e m e n ts, d iff e re n t co n d iti o n s, a n d d istinc tly d iff e re n t co n se q u e n c e s fo llo w ing re v o c a tio n , i t i s i m p o rt ant t hat t he co rr ect s ent ence b e no t ed on t he judgm ent fo rm. A ny co nd i t i o ns, s uch as a peri o d of i ncarcerat i o n,
s h ou l d be n ot ed i n t h e “ s pec i al con di t i on s ” s ec t i on of t h e j u dg men t for m. St at e v

. W i l l i am G eor g e Sol l er , N o. E2003- 02970- CC A- R3- CD , 2004 W L 2346024, at * 1 n

. 1 ( T en n

. Cr i m. App. , K n ox v i l l e, O ct

. 19, 2004) , af f ’ d, 181 S. W

. 3d 645 (T enn. 20 0 5 ). O ur conclus i o n i s t hat t hi s i s a case of pro b at i o n.
-4- and just signe d the pape r. I n re- cross, he testified that he did not talk wit h a judg e and only spoke with a “lady .”

F oll ow ing the pr e se ntatio n o f e vid e nc e , th e jury fo un d th e De fe nd a nt g uil ty of a ll c ha rg e s. There afte r, a se ntencing hearing w as held on Nove mber 10, 2004. The trial co u rt s entenced the De fe nd a nt a s a

Ra ng e I , s ta nd ardof

fe nd e r t o c on c ur

re nt se nte nc e s of thr e e y e ars fo r i de nti ty the ft , 1

o n e ye ar a n d s i x m o n t h s f

o r v i o l a t i o n o f

t h e M V H O o r d e r , a n d e l e v e n m o n t h s a n d t w e n t y- n i n e d a ys for driving while license canc elled, suspended, or revoked. As to m anner of ser vice, the trial court imposed “CMC a fter 120 day s in ja il 1 y ear CMC then supervised probation.” Aft er h earing 2 testimonyabout the De fendant’s financ ial situation, the trial court re duced the fines imposed by the jury to “ $5 0. 00 pe r c ou nt. ” Th e De fe nd a nt f ile d a mot ionfo r n e w t

ri a l, w hi ch was de nie d. Th is appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S I. Jur y I nst r uc ti ons Th e D e f e n d a n tar g u e s t h a tt h e tr i a l c o u r te rr e d i n i t s j u r y i n s tru c t i o n s i n s e v e r a l r e s p e c ts. First, the De fendant submit s that the trial court err ed b y n o t i n structing the jury as to anylesserincluded off

enses f or the c rime of identity theft. Second, the De fendant contends that the trial c ourt faile d to g iv e a

li mi ti n g in s tr

u c ti o n th a t a

p r io r c o n v ic ti o n c o u ldo n ly

b e u s e d to imp e a c h the Def endant and not a s proof that he committed the crime in que stion. Third, the Defe ndant contends that the trial court erre d by not char g ing his de fense s.-5-

A. Lesser -Included O ff enses The De fendant’s arg ument in this respect is not clea r. The D efe n d an t , i n his brief, twice states the issue as , “T h e Court fa iled to instruct the jury as to any lesser inc luded offe nses to the

c ha rg e of c ri min a l impe rs on a tio n. ” Ho we ve r, in c on c lud ing the arg ume nt s e c tio n o f h is b ri e f on thi s issue, the issue is phrase d as, “The trial court e rre d in neg lecting to instruct the jury as t o the lesser included off

ense of criminal neg lige nce w here the [D] efe ndant, a pe rson with very littl e formal education or rea ding skills fa iled to pe rce ive the risk cre ated by the conduct.” The De fendant was char g ed with and c onvicted of ide ntitytheft, not criminal impersonation. M o re over, c riminal neg lige nce is a

culpable me ntal state, not a lesse r-include d offe nse. Ac cording ly , we c onfine our analy sis to whether c riminal impersonation is a lesser -included of fense of identity

theft.

De f e n d a n t d idn o t r a is e th e tria l c o u r t’ s f a il u r e to in s tr

u c t th e ju r y

o n a n y le s ser- included of fe ns e s in his mot ionfo r n e w t ri a l. Ge ne ra lly , a def

e nd a nt wa ive s an i ssu e if

he fails to i nc lud e it in h is m oti on fo r n e w tri a l. Te nn . R. App . P. 3( e ), 36 (a ). Ad dit ion a lly , the De fe nd a nt h a s f a ile d to include a tr anscript of the motion for ne w trial hea ring in the rec ord. It is the dutyof the a ppealing pa rty to p re pa re a n a de qu a te re c or d f

or app e llate re vie w. Ten n. R. Ap p. P. 2 4( b) . “ Whe n a pa rt y
se e ks app e llate re vie w the re is a du ty to pr e pa re a re c or d wh ic h c on ve y s a fair , a c c ur a te a ndc omp le te account of what transpired w ith respec t to the issues forming the basis of the a ppeal.” State v. Ba llard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993).

Furthermore , the Def

endant made no written or or al request to the trial court f or anylesserincluded inst ru ct i o n s

. I n fac t, “no spec ial reque sts” wer e made by the Def endant. Relying on Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 40 -1 8- 11 0, the State su bmi ts that the De fe nd a nt ha s w a ive d th is issue for f

ailure to re quest the instruction in writing at trial.

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 18 -1 10 , inpe rt ine nt p art , p ro vid e s:
(b) In the absence of a written reque st from a pa rty specific ally

identify ing the pa rt ic ula r l e sse r i nc lud e d off

e ns e or of fe ns e s on whi c h a jury

ins truc tio n is so ug ht, the trial judg e may

char g e the jury on any lesser included offe nse or of fense s, but no party shall be entitled to any

such cha rg e.
(c) Notwithstanding any

other pr o v i s i on of law to the c ontrary , when the defe ndant fa ils to re quest the instruction of a lesser included offe nse as re quired by this section, such instruction is waived. Absent a written request, the fa ilure of a trial jud g e to i n s tru c t t h e j u r y o n a n y l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e m a y n o t b e p r e s e n t e d a s a g ro un d f or re lie f e ith e r i n a

mot ionfo r a

ne w t ri a l or on app e a l.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 18-110(b) , (c) . Our supre me court has rec ently conclude d that “Te nnessee Cod e An no ta te d se c tio n 40 -1 8- 11 0( c ) do e s no t vio la te the c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o tria l by jury .” State v. Robert Pag e, -- S.W .3d --, No. W2003-01342-SC-R11-CD, at *5 (T enn., Na shville, Feb. 8, 2006)

. There fore , we a g ree with the State that this iss ue is waive d.In t he argume nt s ect i o n of t he D efend ant ’ s b ri ef o n t he i ss ue, he st at es t hat “i t was hi ghl y p rejudi ci al fo r t he 3 j u r y t o v i e w a n y p r i o r b o o k i n g p i c t u r e s [

. ] ” Th i s i s s u e h a s n o t b e e n b r i e fe d a s r e q u i r e d b y o u r r u l e s

. Te n n

. R. A p p

. P. 2 7 (a )( 7 ); T e n n . C t. C rim . A p p

. R

. 1 0 (b ); se e a lso H a rv e y v. S ta te , 7 4 9 S .W .2 d 4 7 8 , 4 7 9 (T e n n . C rim . A p p .1 9 8 7 ). T h is i s s u e appe ar s t o be a n a f t er t h ou g h t , a n d w e wi l l t r ea t i t a s w ai v ed.

-6- Moreove r, a panel of this court has held that criminal impersonation is not a lesser -included

o f f e n s e o f id e n ti ty th e f

t. Se e St a te v

. Ro n a ldB o w man , N o

. W2 0 0 3

- 0 2 3 8 9

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 5 WL 94365, at *6 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ackson, Jan. 13, 2005) (Wade, P.J., di ssenting) (conc luding that fraudulent use of a

driver’ s license is lesser -included of fense o f i d en t ity

theft), pe rm. to appea l de nie d, (T e nn . M a y 23 , 20 05 ). F ina lly , the De fe nd a nt h a s f a ile d to sh ow that he didno t w a ive thi s iss ue fo r t a c tic a l r e a so ns

. Pa g e , 200 5 WL 94 36 5, a t *6. De fe nd a nt is n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.

B. Pr ior Conviction Ag ain, the De fendant’s arg ument is u n cl ea r. T he De fendant relies on Te nnessee Rule of Evidence 609 and pre sents the issue as the t rial court committed reve rsible er ror by failing to provide the jury a limiti n g instruction addre ssing the MV HO orde r that conta ined eig ht prior driving

c on vic tio ns . H ow e ve r, it a lso a pp e ars that he is a

rg uin g that th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr on e ou sly

a dmi tte d th is unduly prejudicia l char acte r evide nce w ithout enga g ing in the requisite analy sis. Thus, his ar g ument can be st be interpre ted as the trial court e rre d in admitting the orde r and, a lternatively , if the orde r is dee me d a d mi s s ib le , th e tria l c o u r t w a s r e q u ir e d to g iv e a li mi ti n g in s tr u c ti o n c o n c e r n in g u se of prior c on vic tio ns

. 3
Additionally , the Def

endant’ s relianc e on Rule 609 is misplaced because Rule 609 pertains to attacking the cr edibilityof a w itness with a prior c onviction. I n the pre sent ca se, the State soug ht to intro du c e the MV HO or de r as su bs ta nti ve e vid e nc e of the De fe nd a nt’ s g uil t. T hu s, the app lic able rule in this situation i s Tennesse e Rule of Evide nce 404.

Mo re ov e r, it ap pe ars fr om the re c or d tha t the De fe nd a nt r a ise d th is i ssu e fo r the fi rs t ti me in his moti on for ne w trial. The Defendant has failed to include the transcript of the motion for new trial hea ring in the rec ord bef

ore this court. I t is the dutyof the a ppealing party

t o p re pare an adequate re cord f

or appe llate re view. Te nn. R. App. P. 24(b). “When a party seeks a ppellate r eview there is a duty t o p re p ar e a rec ord which c onvey s a fa ir, ac cura te and c omplete ac count of what transpire d with respec t to the issues forming the basis of the appea l.” B allard, 855 S.W.2d at 560. No tw ith stand ing , w e e le c t to a dd re ss the De fe nd a nt’ s c la im.

Re c e n tl y , inSt a te v

. Ch ar le s E

. Ro b in s o n , N o

. M 2 0 0 4

- 0 1 1 6 3

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 5 WL 2008186 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville , De c. 2 7 , 2005), this Court addresse d a similar situation, wher ein the defenda nt was convicted of possession of a handg un by a convicted felon. Robins on, 20 05 WL 20 08 18 6, a t *2 (c iti ng Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 17 -1 30 7( b) (1) (B)) (de fi nin g su c h o ff e ns e as posses s io n o f a h a n d g u n b y a n in d iv id u a l c o n v ic te d o f a f e lo n y d ru g o f

f e n s e )

. T h u s , the defe ndant’s st at u s as a convic ted fe lon was an e ssential element of his offense . I d. at *3. The defe ndant ar g ued that the tria l cour t er red by admitting evide nce that he had se vera l felony drug-7-

con v ic ti o n s

. I d

. a t * 2

. T h e Co u r t c o n c lu d e d th a t th e p r o b a ti v e v a lu e o f th e e v id e n c e of the d e f e n d a n t ’ s p r i o r

f e l o n y d ru g c o n v i c t i o n s o u t w e i g h e d a n y p o t e n t i a l p r e

j u d i c i a l e f

f e c t

. Id

. a t* 3

. In doing so, the Court rea soned:

I n St a te v

. Wi n g ar d , 8 9 1 S. W. 2 d 6 2 8 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 9 4 ) , this Court h el d t h at i n the “unique situation” w here a “prior conviction [i] s an ele ment of the of fe ns e [ch arg e d], .

. . the pr ob a tiv e va lue of a n e sse nti a l elem ent of th e of fe ns e would almost alway s outweig h any potential prejudice under Rule 404(b), [and the re fo re the ] sp e c if

ic natur e of

the of fe ns e w[o uldbe ] ad mis sib le .” I d. a t 63 4. Th is ho ldi ng wa s late r l imi te d to situatio ns in w hic h the defend a nt d id n ot o ff e r t o stipulate to his or he r status a s a convicted f elon. See State v. James, 81 S.W .3d 751, 763 n. 7 (T en n. 2002) (“ We note that in Wi ng ard, the re is no evide nce that the defe ndant offe red to stipulate to his prior convic tions. Ac cording ly , we f ind that the decision in Wingar d rema ins good la w i n those situations where the defe ndant does not offer to stipul ate to his or her

prior off enses.” ).

I d. at *2.

In t h e i n s t an tca s e, T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed § 5 5 -1 0 -6 1 6 p ro v i d es , i n p er t i n en tp ar t , “It is unlawful for any

person to oper ate a ny

motor vehicle in this state while the judg ment or orde r of the court prohibiting the operation rema ins in eff ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-616(a ). Violation of a MVH O orde r is a material element of the i ndicted offense. Furthermore , there is no evidence in the rec ord, nor does the Def endant a ssert, that he of

fer ed to stipulate to his status as an habitual offe nder. A ccor dingly , we c onclude that the probative value of the order decla ring the Def

endant

a n h abitua l of

fe nd e r o utw e ig hs a ny po te nti a l pre jud ic ia l ef

fe c t. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

pr op e rl y a dmi tte d th is evidenc e.
Thus, we must consider the Def endant’ s alternative arg ument that the trial court should have provided the jury

with a li miting i nstruction reg arding the orde r and the prior convic tions described there in. I n Robinson, “the trial court instructe d the jurors that they could not consider those prior convictions as evide nce of the def endant’ s propensit y t o co m mit the crime of possession of a handg un by

a convicted felon.” Robinson, 2005 WL 2008186, at *3. No such instruction was g iven in the prese nt case

.
I n addre ssing whe ther a

limit ing instruc tion should have bee n gi v en , t he Winga rd court stated:

When the defe nse aske d for jury instructions ex plaining that proof of the prior felony was a dmissibl e to establish the ele ments of the off ense only and for no other purpose, the trial court de nied the reque st. I n our view, the evidenc e of a first deg ree murder c onviction prejudice d the def endant- -eve n if that prejudice was outwe ighe d by the probative value. Under such circumstance s, the t rial courts should take pains to pla ce the value of the evidenc e in pr oper context. Rule 105 of the Te nnessee-8-

Rul e s o f E vid e nc e pr ov ide s, in p art , a s f oll ow s: “ Whe n e vid e nc e wh ic h is a dmi ssi ble

. . . for one purpose but not admissible . . . for anothe r purpose is admitted, the court upon reque st shall restrict t h e evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury

a c c o r d in g ly

. ” Se e , e

. g

. , St at e v

. H o w e ll , 8 6 8 S. W. 2 d [2 3 8 , ] 2 5 5 [( T e n n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ]; L aird v. State, 565 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tenn. C ri m

. App. 1978); L ace y v. State, 506 S.W .2d 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974) ; see a lso 1 C. Torcia, W h ar t o n’s Criminal Evidence , § 264 (14th ed. 1985). I n our view, the jury should have be en instructed that th e prior c on vic tio n or c on vic tio ns ha d be e n a dmi tte d int o e vid e nc e fo r the so le purp o s e o f

e s ta b li s h in g th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t h a d b e e n c o n v ic te d o f a f e lo n y

- -an essential ele ment of the off ense- -and f

or no other p u rpose. It would have be en pref era ble for the jurors to have kn own that no infer ence s of g uilt could have bee n dr a wn by the natur e or

g ra vity of the prior of fe ns e s.

I d.

I n this ca s e , th e D e f e n d a n t d id n o t r e q u e s t a li mi ti n g in s tr u c ti o n a d v is in g th e ju r y th a t the

re fe re nc e s to the prior

c on vic tio ns we re no t to be c on sid e re d a s a ny e vid e nc e of the De fe nd a nt’ s g uil t of the char g es for whic h he wa s on trial. The issue wa s not raised during trial, but rather , was raised fo r the fi rs t tim e in the mot ion fo r ne w t ri a l. “ [C]oun se l mu st r a ise a c on te mpo rane ou s o bje c tio n to an incomplete jury

char g e[.] ” State v. Eldridg e, 951 S.W. 2 d 7 7 5 , 7 7 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (citing State v. Haynes, 720 S.W. 2d 76 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986)); see also Rhoden v. State, 816 S.W . 2d 56, 62-63 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1991) (“If a trial judge does not g ive a c urative instruc tion sua sponte, the party

who objects to the testimonymust request such a n instruction.”). The Def endant

a lso faile d to re qu e st that the jud g me nt be re da c te d to e xclu de a ny re fe re nc e s to the prior

c on vic tio ns

.
“ Ob je c tio ns mus t be tim e ly

a ndsp e c if

ic .” Te nn . R. Ev id. 10 3, Ad vis ory Com mis sio n Co mme nts

. There fore , to the extent that the Defe ndant ar g ues on appe al that t he jury should not have bee n exposed to the refe renc es of the prior convictions, the i ssue i s waived. Relief is not available to a party who is responsible for , or fa ils to t ake a ction to preve nt, an er ror. Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a).

C. Defenses The De fendant arg ues that the trial court “ failed to instruct the jury as to [his ] defenses.” The De fe nd a nt d oe s n ot s pe c if y wh ic h d e fe ns e s ar e app lic able to his c a se . In h is m oti on fo r n e w t ri a l, the De fe nd a nt l ist e d th e fo llo wi ng de fe ns e s:

a. T hat he c omplied with the directions of the D epartment [ sic] of Tennessee , Depa rtment of Safe ty

when a pply ing f or his driver’ s license.

b. Th a t th e [sic ] ap pe are d at th e Driv e r’ s Lic e ns e of fi c e a ndsu bmi tte d a ll do c ume ntatio n th a t w a s r e qu e ste d o f h im.

c. That State of Tenne ssee, De partment of Saf ety , issued a valid drive r’s lice nse.

d. Th a t he ha d [si c ] dul y

iss ue d a ndva liddrive r’ s li c e ns e a t th e tim e of his arr e st.-9-

e . T hat th e re we re no re stric tio ns or su sp e ns ion s to the drive r’ s lic e ns e he ha d in his po sse ssi on a t th e tim e of

his arr e st.

f. Th a t a po lic e of fi c e r i s n ot a j ud ici al ent ity a nddo e s n ot h a vethe a uth ority to suspend or re voke a va lid driver’s lice nse.

g . That said duly

issued driver’ s license issued by the State of Te nnessee was ne ver void, held for naug ht or suspended/c ance lled/revoke d by the State of Te nnessee

.
I t appea rs from the r ecor d that the Def endant r aised this issue for the f irst time in his motion for ne w t rial. We ag ain note that the De fendant has failed to include the transc ript of the motion for new tria l hearing in the r ecor d befor e this court. It is the duty of t he appealing party to prepa re a n adequate re cord f

or appe llate re view. Te nn. R. A pp. P. 24( b). “When a party seeks a ppellate r eview there is a duty

to prepa re a rec ord which c onvey s a fa ir, ac curate and c om p l et e ac co unt of what transpire d with respec t to the issues forming the basis of the a ppeal.” Ba llard, 855 S.W.2d at 560. Moreove r, this issue has not been briefe d as re quired by Rule 27(a) (7) of

the Tenne ssee Rules of Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re , w hic h p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art , th a t:

The brie f of the a

ppellant shall contain . . . [a] n arg ument, which may be pre cede d by a summary of ar g ument, setting f orth the conte ntions of the appellant with re spect to the issues prese nted, and the r ea s o ns theref or, including the re asons why the

c on te nti on s r e qu ir e app e llate re lie f, wi th c itatio ns to the a uth oriti e s a ndapp ro pria te ref ere nces to the r ecor d (which ma y be quoted ve rbatim) re lied on[.]
Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a) (7); see also Harvey v. State, 749 S.W .2d 478, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App.1987)

. “I ssues which a

re not supported by arg ument, citation to a uthorities, or appropriate re fer ence s to the

rec ord will be treated as wa ived in this court.” Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b).

I n th e p r e s e n t c a s e , th e D e f e n d a n t is c o rr e c t in h is a s s e r ti o n th a t d e f e n s e s “ f a irly r aised by the p r o o f ” s h o u ld b e s u b mi tt e d to th e ju r y

. Se e T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 2 0 3. Howeve r, the De fe nd a nt d o e s n o tp r o v i d e t h i s C o u r tw i t h a n y a u t h o r i t y

t h a th i s l i s tc o n s t i t u t e s “ d e f e n s e s”

c ha rg e able to a jury

. We a g re e wi th the State that the De fe nd a nt’ s lis t “ app e ars a t mo st t o c on sti tut e infere nces a

rg uable f rom the proof

at t rial.” See gene rally Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-501 to -621; 7 Tenne ssee Pra ctice, T ennesse e Pattern Jury I nstructions--CRI MI NAL §§ 40.01-.18 (Comm. of the Tenn. Judicial Conferenc e 9th e d. 2005). I n sum, the Appellant has f ailed to comply

with Rule 27 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re . We a lso no te that th e De fe nd a nt m a de no re qu e sts fo r a dd iti on a l ju ry

ins truc tio ns . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence Th e De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th ee v ide nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his c on vic tio n f

or ide nti ty theft. Specific ally , he ar g ues, “[T]he rec ord is devoid of e vidence that the def endant a ctions [s ic]-10-

pr e c e din g his arr e st f

or [ide nti ty the ft ] wa s in a ny

ma nn e r u nr e a so na

ble or reckle ss muc h le ss criminal.”

Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Procedure 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]indings of g uilt in criminal actions whether bythe trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evide nce is insuffic ient to support the finding s by

the trier of

fac t of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” A convicted criminal defenda nt who cha lleng es the suff

iciency of t he evidence on appea l bear s the burden of demonstrating why

the evidenc e is insufficie n t to support the verdic t, because a ve rdict of g uilt destroy s the presumption of innoce nce and imposes a pre s u m p t i o n o f guilt. St ate v. Evans, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

. T h i s C ourt must rejec t a convicte d criminal def endant’ s challeng e to the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence if, afte r considering the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, we determine that any rational trier of fact could have f ound the essential e lements of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 44 3 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) ; State v. Ha ll, 8 S.W .3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999)

.
On app e a l, the State is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f th e evide nc e a nda ll

rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces w hich may be dra wn there from. Carr uthers, 35 S.W .3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 5 9 9

. A gu i l t y verdic t by

the trier of

fac t acc redits the testimony of the State’s witnesses and r esolves all conf licts in the evidenc e in fa vor of the pr osecution’s theory . State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Questions about the cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht and value of the e vidence , as we ll as all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e are resolved by the trier of fa ct, and this Court will not re-we igh or re- evaluate the evide nce. E vans, 108 S.W.3d at 236; Bla nd, 9 58 S.W .2d at 659. Nor w ill thi s Court substi tute its own infere nces dr awn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those d ra wn b y t h e trier of fa ct. Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.

I dentity theft is define d as knowing ly transfe rring or using , without lawful authority , a mea ns of identification of another pe rson with the intent to commit a ny unlawful a ctivity . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-150( a) ( 2 0 0 3 ). T h e Defendant admits that he relied upon the disc harg e pape r of Robert Ar ro n W i l ey , J r. , i n get t i n g a d ri v e r ’ s l i c e n s e , b u th e a rgu es t h at h e b el i ev ed i twa s h i s d i s ch ar ge paper , he wa s unawa

re that a MVHO or der ha d been enter ed ag ainst him, and he lac ked suff icient education or knowledg e to unde rstand the conditions of reinstateme nt. I n essenc e, he submits t hat the re c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in a ny pr oo f that he int e nd e d to c omm it a ny un la wf ul a c tiv ity . T he State arg ues that the jury

could infer

from the e vidence that the Def endant intended to e vade the MVHO order . There was proof

at trial that, in order

t o ci rc u m v en t t he MVHO order , the Def endant use d Robert Arr on W i l ey , J r. ’s name a nd social sec urity number to obtain a driver’s lice nse. The jury
c ho se no t to a c c re dit

the De fe nd a nt’ s te sti mon y , a s w a s th e ir pr e ro g a tiv e

. Vi e we d in the lig ht m os t fa vo ra ble to the Sta te , w e c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e su pp orts the D e fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n f or ide nti ty theft. See B owman, 2005 WL 94365, at *2.In t he co ncl usi o n sect i o n o f the D efend ant ’ s b ri ef , he st at es t hat he “ was denied hi s co nst i t ut i o nal ri ght pursuant 4

t o his 4 t h and 6th am end m ent ri ght s t o f ace hi s accuser, t o be s afe f rom unreas o nab l e searches and s ei zures[

. ]” T hi s i ss ue h as n ot be en bri ef

ed. T en n

. R

. A pp. P

. 27(a ) ( 7) ; T en n

. C t

. C r i m. A pp. R

. 10(b) ; s ee al s o H ar v ey , 749 S. W

. 2d a t 479. Aga i n , t h i s i s s u e appe ar s t o be a n a f t er t h ou g h t , a n d w e wi l l t r ea t i t a s w ai v ed.

W e not e t hat t he l egi s l at ur e has rece nt l y am ended s eve r al provi s i ons of t he C r i mi nal Sent enc i ng Ref orm Act 5

o f 1 9 8 9 , sa id c h a n g e s b e c o m ing e ff e c tive J u n e 7 , 2 0 0 5 . H o w e v e r, the D e fe n d a n t’ s c rim e s in th is c a se , as w e ll a s h is

sen t en cing , p red ate the e f fec t i ve d ate o f

t he se a m en d m en t s. T he refo re, t his ca se i s no t aff ec t ed b y t he 2 0 0 5 am en d m en t s,
an d t h e s t at u t es c i t ed i n t h i s opi n i on a r e t h os e t h at w er e i n e f fec t a t t h e t i me t h e i n s t an t c r i mes w er e commi t t ed.

T h e D e fen d a n t’s cr im ina l histo ry in c lud e s n u m e ro u s d riv ing c o n v ic tio n s i n a d d iti o n to tho se ne c e ssa ry to 6

e sta b lish h is sta tus a s a n ha b itua l o ff e n d e r.
-11- III . Se nt e nc ing Finally , the Def

endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt committed sentencing err ors. First, he titles 4 the issue as “[t] he C ourt err ed in submitti ng the pre sentenc e re port and e nhance ment fac tors, which

wer e not a dmitted into evidenc e at tria l in violation of the Blake ly I ssue.” How ever , the ar g ument section on this issue does not addre ss Blake ly v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2 004); instead, he

c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt faile d to app ly

or pr op e rl y we ig h mi tig a tin g fa c tor s. 5

The B lakely Court held t hat any fac t that increa ses a se ntence bey ond the “r eleva nt statutory maxi mum,” define d as the maximum sentenc e that a judg e m ay impose without making a ny additional finding s of fac t, must be submitt ed and proved to the jury bey ond a r ea s o n ab l e doubt unless admitted by

the def endant. B lakely , 542 U.S. at 301-02. Thus, adhe renc e to B lakely require s that any enhanc ement fa ctors, other than prior c riminal history , can be applied only if found by

a jury or admitted by

the def endant. I d.

F i r s t , t h e D e f

e n d a n t ’ s s e n t e n c e w a s p r o p e r l y e n h a n c e d s o l e l y o n h i s p r i o r c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2) (2003). Sentencing enhanc ement base d upon prior criminal 6 his tory is n ot i mpl ic a te d u nd e r B lake ly . Se c on d, th e Ten ne sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s ju st r e c e ntl y considere d the impact of the Blakely ruling on Tenne ssee’ s sentencing scheme and has c oncluded that the Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989, under w hich the De fendant was sentenc ed, does not violate a defe ndant’s Six th A mendment rig hts. See State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 661 (Tenn. 20 05 ). Ac c or din g ly , th e De fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nt o n th is b a sis ha s n o me ri t.

Re g ard ing mit ig a tin g fa c tor s, the De fe nd a nt c on te nd s:
[T] hat substantial g rounds e x i s t tending to excuse or justify the def endants [sic]

cr i m i n al co n d u ct , t h o u gh fa i l i n g t o es t ab l i s h a de fe n s e; t h at t h e d ef en d an t , al t h o u gh g uil ty of the c ri me , c omm itt e d the of fe ns e un de r s uc h u nu su a l c ir c ums ta nc e s th a t it is u nli ke ly

that a sust ain ed inte nt t o v iol a te to l a w m oti vate d th e c ri min a l c on du c t.-12-

See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113( 3), (11). Ag ain, we note that this issue has not be en brie fed a s requ i red by

Rule 27(a) (7) of

the Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure . See also Ha rvey , 749 S.W. 2d a t 47 9. “ I ssu e s wh ic h are no t su pp orte d by arg ume nt, c itatio n to a uth oriti e s, or app ro pria te ref ere nces to the r ecor d will be treated as waived in this court.” Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b).

Mo re ov e r, the mit ig a tin g fa c tor s e sp ou se d b y the De fe nd a nt w e re app lic able on ly if hi s te s ti mo n y w a s a c c e p te d

. St a te v

. Jo h n C. Wa lk e r , I I I , N o

. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 1 4 3 2

- CC A

- RM

- CD , 2 0 0 5 WL 17 98 75 8, a t *1 4 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , Na sh vil le , July 28 , 2 00 5) . T he jury , b y its ve rd ic t, i mpl ic itl y reje cted the D efe ndant’s testimony . I d. The trial c ourt found:
The [D]efendant kne w he shouldn’t have been driving

. He was driving in violation of a n H abitua l Mo tor

Ve hic le Of

fe nd e r o rd e r. Th e Cou rt do e s re c a ll un de r the fa c ts, though, t h at he had a

license issued to him. The jury believed that to be by subterfuge or fr aud. The other mitigating f actor s are that he lac ked suff icient

e du c a tio n o r kno wl e dg e to und e rs ta nd the c on dit ion s of re ins ta te me nt. Th e Cou rt , a g a in, ha s r e a lly

he ardno pr oo f o n th a t othe r than the p ro of pr e se nte d at th e tr ia l, which the jury

disreg arde d.

We c on c lud e the tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

by re je c tin g the pr op os e d mi tig a tin g fa c tor s.

IV. P lain E rror The De fendant has not arg ued that his dua l convictions for driving while license canc elled,

su sp e nd e d, or re vo ke d a nd the ha bitua l mot or of

fe nd e r of fe ns e vio la te do ub le je op ard y princ ipl e s. Ty pically under the se circ umstances, our analy sis of an issue is waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b). Neve rtheless, re view of this issue is permitted if plain er ror e x ists.

Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure pr ovides that “[a]n error w hich has

a ff e c te d th e su bs ta nti a l r ig hts of a n a c c us e d may

be no tic e d at an y tim e , e ve n th ou g h n ot r a ise d in the motion for a ne w trial or a ssigne d as er ror on a ppeal, in the d i s cr et i o n o f t he appe llate court wh e re ne c e ssa

ry to d o s ub sta nti a l ju sti c e .” I n or de r to f indplain e rr or , w e mus t c on sid e r f ive fa c tor s:
(a) the rec ord must c lear ly establish what occur red in the tria l court; (b) a clea r and unequivoca l rule of law must have bee n b rea ched; ( c) a substantial rig ht of the

acc used must have been adver sely aff ecte d; ( d) the acc used [m ust not have w aived] the i ssue for tactica l rea sons; and (e) consideration of the err or [must be] nece ssary to do substantial just ice.
State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 641-42 (Te n n. Crim. App. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted). Taking t h es e fa ct o rs in sequenc e, the r ecor d clea rly establishes that the De fendant was convicted of both driving while license canc elled, suspended, or re voked and violation of MVH O order . See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 55-50- 504, 55-10-616. Sec ond, multipl e convic tions breac h a cle ar
a ndun e qu ivo c a l rule of

la w. Th ir d, a

fu nd a me nta l c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht o f the D efe nd a nt, his F if th-13-

Amendment rig ht to be fre e from double jeopar dy , is a ffe cted. Fourth, the rec ord is devoid of any evidenc e that the De fendant waived the issue for ta ctical r easons. F ifth, we c onsider violation of the De fe nd a nt’ s p ro te c tio n a g a ins t do ub le je op ard y to be su ff ic ie ntl y se ri ou s a s to re qu ir e ou r r e vie w i n
or de r t o d o su bs ta nti a l jus tic e

. Ac c or din g ly , we wi ll re vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s e rr or in thi s re g ardin spite of the De fendant’s failure to raise it as a n issue.
This Court has previously conclude d that convi ct i o n s for driving while lice nse cancelled,

su sp e nd e d, or

re vo ke d a nda ha

bitua l mo tor

of fe nd e r o ff

e ns e are the “ sa me ” un de r the do ub le jeopar dy principles if the evidence relied upon by the S tate to establish both crimes was the same. See State v. Gr een, 947 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 997) (c iting Duc hac v. State, 505 S.W .2d 237, 239) (Te nn. 1973)); State v. M o rga n L . Ray , No. M2002-02910-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22888923, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec . 8, 2003). The De fendant’s convictions for driving while license canc elled, suspende d, or re voked and the habitual motor offe nder of fense wer e based upon the same evidenc e. They both c ame about as a result of the even t s o n J u n e 1 0 , 2 003. Be cause of double jeopa

rdy prohibitions, plain error require s us to va cate the judg ment of convic tion for driving while lice nse suspende d, canc elled, or r evoked

. We note the Def endant’ s eff

ective sentenc e re mains unchang ed. CO NC LU SION Ba sed upon t he for eg oing r easons a nd the re cord be fore this Court, we vacate the judg ment of convic tion for driving wh i le license canc elled, suspende d, or re voked. The Def endant’ s convictions and sente nces f or identity

theft and violation of a

MVHO orde r ar e af

firmed.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE