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2021 IL App (5th) 190440-U 

NO. 5-19-0440 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of 

WILLIAM EDWARD PARKER, ) Monroe County. 

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

and ) No. 10-D-67 

 ) 

SHELLY GAYE REICHERT, ) Honorable 

 ) Thomas B. Cannady, 

 Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Wharton and Vaughan∗ concurred in the judgment. 

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in modifying, rather than 

terminating, petitioner’s maintenance obligation based on petitioner’s early 

retirement at age 62; however, we vacate the amount of maintenance 

awarded and remand for the entry of a new order clarifying the amount of 

imputed income for purposes of calculating maintenance and addressing 

whether it is appropriate to impute income to petitioner past his normal 

retirement age of 65.

¶ 2 Petitioner, William E. Parker (Eddy), filed, in the circuit court of Monroe County, a 

petition to terminate or, alternatively, modify the monthly maintenance that he had been ordered 

to pay respondent, Shelly G. Reichert, pursuant to a previously entered judgment of dissolution. 

∗

Justice Overstreet was originally assigned to participate in this case. Justice Vaughan was 

substituted on the panel after Justice Overstreet ascended to the Illinois Supreme Court and has read the 

briefs and listened to the oral argument recording. 

NOTICE

Decision filed 06/22/21. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Peti ion for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2 

Following a hearing, the court entered an order modifying Eddy’s monthly maintenance 

obligation from $3000 to $1555.75. Eddy filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied.

Eddy appeals, arguing that the court abused its discretion by reducing, rather than terminating, 

his monthly maintenance obligation and, alternatively, in calculating the reduced amount of 

monthly maintenance. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand 

with directions.

¶ 3 I. Background 

¶ 4 In 1981, Eddy, 26, and Shelly, 18, were married. Throughout their marriage, Eddy was 

employed by Ameren as a lineman, and Shelly was a self-employed hair stylist. The marriage 

produced two children: Ashley (born October 18, 1987) and Taylor (born March 27, 1989). In 

2008, after both children had reached the age of 18, Eddy and Shelly separated. 

¶ 5 A. Dissolution Proceedings 

¶ 6 In 2010, Eddy, 55, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and, in 2011, Shelly, 47, 

filed a counterpetition. The case was subsequently assigned to Judge Richard Aguirre for 

disposition. 

¶ 7 In April 2011, following a hearing on temporary issues, Judge Aguirre ordered Eddy to 

pay Shelly temporary maintenance in the amount of $3000 per month. No transcript of the 

hearing was included in the record certified to this court. Prior to the hearing, both parties filed 

financial statements disclosing their monthly incomes, monthly expenses, and assets. Eddy’s 

financial statement listed a net monthly income of $8202 (gross monthly income of $12,140 less 

$3938 in deductions), along with monthly expenses totaling $2925 (Eddy’s monthly expenses of 

$1925 plus the children’s monthly expenses of $1000). Eddy’s financial statement also listed the 

following retirement assets: an Ameren SIP valued at $146,325; a Vanguard 401(k) valued at 
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$61,320; a National Electric Annuity valued at $2400; a union pension valued at $189 per month 

at age 65; and an Ameren pension valued at $2750 per month at age 65. Shelly’s financial 

statement listed a net monthly income of $1418.60 (gross monthly income of $2269.58 less 

$850.98 in deductions), along with monthly expenses totaling $2416.78. Following the hearing, 

Judge Aguirre ordered Eddy to pay Shelly temporary maintenance in the amount of $3000 per 

month. 

¶ 8 In October 2011, Judge Aguirre held a hearing on all remaining issues. No transcript of 

the hearing was included in the record certified to this court. Prior to the hearing, both parties 

filed amended financial and position statements. Eddy’s amended financial statement listed a net 

monthly income of $8266 (gross monthly income of $12,433 less $4167 in deductions) and total 

monthly expenses of $2014 (no children’s expenses). Eddy’s amended financial statement 

revealed no change to the value of his Ameren and union pensions but slight increases to the 

value of the remaining retirement assets. Specifically, the value of the Ameren SIP had increased 

to $176,875.45, the value of the Vanguard 401(k) had increased to $63,523.59, and the value of 

the National Electric Annuity had increased to $2681. Shelly’s amended financial statement 

listed a reduced net monthly income of $420.06 (gross monthly income of $2278.10 less 

$1858.04 in deductions) and total monthly expenses of $4225.64. Shelly’s amended financial 

statement also listed the same retirement assets as Eddy’s amended financial statement, including 

those with projected values at age 65. 

¶ 9 In his position statement, Eddy asserted that Shelly should receive no more than $1000 

per month in maintenance “plus 10% of [Eddy’s] net income of $99,192.00 per year,” which 

represented his average net income over the past few years. According to Eddy, Shelly’s 

amended financial statement, which listed a net income of approximately $1000 less than her 
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prior financial statement, did not include Shelly’s income from her other jobs. In her position 

statement, Shelly requested permanent monthly maintenance in the amount of $4200 based on 

the income and lifestyle of the parties, as well as her contribution to the marriage and failure to 

achieve a viable career. Shelly claimed that Eddy had a nonmarital National Electric Annuity, 

from which he would receive approximately $2681 per month at age 65. Shelly requested her 

marital share of Eddy’s union and Ameren pensions, which would result in Eddy receiving 

approximately $4135.50 per month at age 65. Shelly also noted that Eddy’s Ameren SIP and 

401(k) plan had a cash value of approximately $240,399, and she requested 62% of the cash 

accounts, or approximately $149,000. 

¶ 10 In November 2011, Judge Aguirre entered a judgment of dissolution, dissolving Eddy 

and Shelly’s 30-year marriage and dividing the parties’ marital property. The court awarded each 

party the personal property currently in their possession and, additionally, awarded Eddy the 

draw knife, pipe wrench, climbers (hooks), 20-gallon kettle, and bench vice located in the shed at 

the marital residence. The court awarded 42% of the value of the remaining nonretirement 

marital assets to Eddy, which totaled approximately $170,579 and included the following: (1) a 

Commerce Brokerage account valued at $24,383; (2) a Stifel Nicolaus account valued at $120; 

(3) a Utility Employees Credit Union account valued at $44,022; (4) a Commerce Bank 

certificate of deposit valued at $40,000; (5) First Bank joint savings and checking accounts 

valued at $14,778; (6) a Commerce Bank checking account valued at $32,431; (7) cash in the 

amount of $10,000; and (8) guns valued at $4845. The court awarded 58% of the value of the 

remaining marital assets to Shelly, which totaled $206,953 and included the following: (1) the 

marital residence valued at $181,500; (2) a Hartford mutual fund valued at $16,248; (3) a 

Regions account valued at $7605; and (4) her life insurance valued at $1600. The court also 
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ordered Eddy to pay Shelly a single lump-sum payment in the amount of $12,500. The court 

equally divided the retirement assets with cash value between the parties, awarding each party a 

value of $120,399.52. Shelly was also awarded a pro rata share of Eddy’s Ameren and union 

pension benefits. With regard to nonmarital property, Eddy was awarded his mineral rights lease, 

his National Electrical Annuity Plan, and “his Model 37 Deer slayer Standard Rifle.” 

¶ 11 In addition to dividing the parties’ property, the circuit court ordered Eddy to pay 

Shelly’s attorney fees in the amount of $2000 and to pay Shelly maintenance in the amount of 

$3000 per month. The court provided, however, that the “maintenance award shall be reviewed 

five (5) years or later after the entry of this Judgment, on request by either party.” The court also 

required that Eddy maintain his currently existing life insurance policy with Shelly named as the 

beneficiary but indicated that “[t]his requirement shall be reviewed at the same time as the 

review of the maintenance issue referred to hereinabove.” 

¶ 12 B. Postdissolution Proceedings 

¶ 13 In November 2016, Eddy filed a petition to terminate or, alternatively, modify 

maintenance pursuant to section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act 

(Act) (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2016)), alleging that the circuit court’s previously entered 

judgement of dissolution provided for review of the maintenance award after five years. Eddy 

also alleged that termination, or a reduction, of maintenance was warranted because there had 

been a substantial change in circumstance since the entry of the judgment of dissolution. In 

support, Eddy alleged, inter alia, as follows: his increased age and health problems interfered 

with his ability to continue working for Ameren as a lineman; he would be eligible to collect 

social security benefits when he turned 62 years old on February 12, 2017; he planned to retire 

with full benefits on January 13, 2017; he would receive his final paycheck on March 3, 2017; 
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Shelly’s income had increased since the entry of the judgment of dissolution; and the Act had 

been amended in 2015 to provide a specific formula and guidelines for maintenance in both 

dissolution and postdissolution proceedings. Eddy further asserted that his retirement had been 

“contemplated by the court at the time of the entry of the Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.” 

Eddy noted that each party had been awarded half of the cash retirement accounts and that Shelly 

had also been awarded a portion of his Ameren and Union pensions, which she would begin 

receiving in April 2017. Lastly, Eddy alleged that Shelly had sufficient income and assets to 

support herself without maintenance. 

¶ 14 On January 3, 2017, Shelly filed an answer to Eddy’s petition, along with a petition for 

attorney fees. In her answer to Eddy’s petition, Shelly denied Eddy’s allegations of a substantial 

change in circumstances and his allegation that his retirement had been contemplated by the 

circuit court at the time of the entry of the judgment of dissolution. Shelly also denied that she 

had sufficient income and assets to support herself without maintenance and requested that the 

court deny Eddy’s petition. The case was subsequently assigned to Judge Thomas Cannady. 

¶ 15 On March 1, 2017, following several continuances, Judge Cannady held a hearing where 

both parties appeared with counsel. After hearing argument from counsel, Judge Cannady 

entered a written order directing the parties to submit briefs and setting the matter “for oral 

argument on standard of proof with regard to whether reviewable maintenance per the Judgment 

requires the movant to show a substantial change in circumstances and related procedural issues 

on April 19, 2017.” 

¶ 16 Prior to the scheduled hearing, both parties submitted briefs outlining their respective 

arguments. In Eddy’s brief, he argued that he was not required to show a substantial change in 

circumstances in a review proceeding and that the circuit court should review the issue of 
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maintenance de novo. Eddy further argued that Shelly was required to show a continued need for 

maintenance and to demonstrate her efforts to become self-supporting. In Shelly’s brief, she 

agreed that Eddy was not required to prove a substantial change in circumstances but argued that 

he was required to show “his voluntary retirement and unilateral reduction in income were in 

good faith.” 

¶ 17 On April 19, 2017, Judge Cannady entered a written order, noting that, although the case 

had been “called for oral argument on burden of proof,” both parties had reached the same 

conclusion in their respective briefs. Judge Cannady set the matter for hearing on all remaining 

issues on July 19, 2017. 

¶ 18 On July 19, 2017, Judge Cannady held an evidentiary hearing on Eddy’s petition to 

terminate, or modify, maintenance. At the outset of the hearing, numerous exhibits documenting 

the respective finances of Eddy and Shelly were admitted into evidence by agreement, including 

the parties’ financial affidavits, bank records, and tax returns. 

¶ 19 Eddy then testified to the following details on his own behalf. During the marriage, Eddy 

and Shelly lived with their two children at the marital residence they established in Columbia, 

Illinois. In September 2008, after both children had moved away to attend college, the parties 

separated. Shelly remained at the marital residence, and Eddy moved into a nearby two-bedroom 

apartment. Eddy resided in the same apartment until he retired from Ameren in 2017. At the time 

of the hearing, Eddy lived in a one-bedroom cabin located on 100 acres of wooded land in 

Arkansas, which he had purchased for $165,000. Taylor had since returned to Columbia, Illinois, 

and Ashley had recently moved to Portland, Oregon. 

¶ 20 Eddy testified to the following details regarding his employment at Ameren. In 1979, 

after working as an apprentice in construction for three years, he obtained employment as a 
8 

lineman for Ameren at the age of 24. As a lineman, Eddy worked long hours, including many 

hours of overtime, and he performed physically demanding job duties, including climbing poles 

to “keep the meters turning.” From 2008 to 2017, Eddy worked nearly the same number of 

overtime hours. He explained that there was both voluntary and required overtime at Ameren. 

For instance, when he was classified as an emergency trouble man in 2016, Ameren required 

four daily hours (20 weekly hours) of standby time. According to Eddy, the previously ordered 

maintenance equaled his pay for approximately “a 30-hour week,” so he was getting 10 hours of 

pay and living on the overtime. In addition to his monthly maintenance obligation and living 

expenses, Eddy also voluntarily paid approximately $60,000 in college expenses for Ashley and 

Taylor with no assistance from Shelly. 

¶ 21 Eddy testified to the following details leading to and surrounding his retirement from 

Ameren. Although Ameren allowed for early retirement at age 55, Eddy had always planned to 

retire at age 62. Eddy would have had to take reductions in his pension if he retired at age 55 but 

his pension was fully vested at age 62. Eddy acknowledged that he was not required to retire 

when he turned 62 years old but felt he would have to either retire or “go on workmen’s [sic] 

comp” due to declines in both his physical and mental health. Eddy claimed that he suffered 

from knee, hand, and shoulder issues, all of which interfered with his ability to perform his job 

duties in recent years. Eddy experienced his first knee issue while he was working in 2012. Eddy 

explained that, during his second week of working power outages in New Jersey (caused by 

hurricane Sandy), his “knee went out” while he was walking behind the truck, causing him to fall 

to the ground. Although he recovered after resting for 15 minutes, Eddy experienced a similar 

knee issue, which he described as a “trick knee,” every few weeks following the initial incident. 

His knee would occasionally go out while he was carrying a ladder during a reconnect, and he 
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would “just lay in the yard.” On several occasions, customers offered to call 9-1-1 but he 

refused, advising that he just needed a few minutes. In recent years, Eddy experienced more 

frequent issues with his knee, and he began experiencing issues with his shoulder when he lifted 

objects at work. Eddy did not seek medical treatment because he did not want to have surgery or 

apply for workers’ compensation benefits. Eddy had also developed issues with his hands, 

including a loss of grip strength, and had x-rays taken, which revealed arthritis in his knuckles. 

During his last few years of employment with Ameren, Eddy’s physical conditions deteriorated 

to the point that he was unable to climb poles. He would, instead, “call a crew for a reconnect 

because a reconnect consisted of carrying a ladder to the service and over fences and being 

chased by dogs and whatever.” Ameren made him responsible for the crews because of his 

experience for switching and clearing lines for crews and his knowledge of the circuits and subs. 

¶ 22 Eddy testified that, despite Ameren’s accommodation of his declining physical health, he 

had concerns regarding his ability to continue working as a lineman, which required him to 

maintain a commercial driver’s license (CDL). Specifically, due to his high blood pressure and 

macular degeneration, which he described as retinal damage from repeated exposure to arcing 

electrical wires caused by nighttime storms, he had concerns over passing the physical that 

Ameren required to renew his CDL in 2018. Eddy also claimed that, starting in 2016, long work 

hours over prolonged periods of time caused him to suffer fatigue, which resulted in mental 

mistakes and a decline in his memory. Although no one was injured due to his mental mistakes, 

Eddy became concerned about the crew’s safety. For these reasons, Eddy, 62 years old at the 

time, voluntarily retired in 2017 after 41 years of employment with Ameren. 

¶ 23 Eddy next identified the financial affidavit that he prepared in April 2017. Eddy’s 

affidavit disclosed a total monthly gross income of $4460.74 ($2231.74 from his portion of his 
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Ameren pension, $80 from his portion of his union pension, $2137 in social security retirement 

benefits, and $12 from a premarital mineral rights investment) and a total monthly net income of 

$3479.96 after deductions totaling $980.78 ($700 for federal income tax, $130.78 for state tax, 

and $150 for health insurance). Eddy testified that he was not eligible for Medicare coverage and 

had no dental or vision coverage. According to Eddy’s affidavit, his monthly living expenses 

(household, transportation, and personal) totaled $2168, reducing his available monthly income 

to $1311.96. 

¶ 24 Eddy also testified regarding additional expenses not listed on his financial affidavit. 

Although he did not have a mortgage on the cabin, he anticipated making additions to the cabin 

or building a home on the land. Eddy explained that the cabin was very small, and he would 

“need to add on probably another 25-foot by 15 extension.” Due to the small size of the cabin, he 

had kept some of his belongings, including clothing, in the shed. Eddy’s washer and dryer were 

also in the shed, but he would be unable to do his laundry in the shed during the winter months. 

Eddy anticipated expending $1200 per year to gravel the road leading to his cabin. Eddy also 

planned on making two or three trips per year to visit Ashley in Portland, Oregon, which he 

claimed would cost approximately $2500 each round trip. 

¶ 25 In the affidavit, Eddy also disclosed his assets and the estimated value of each asset. 

Eddy listed a Commerce Bank checking account with a balance of $36,272.85 and a First 

Security checking account with a balance of $30,685.56. Eddy also listed the following 

investment accounts and securities: 600 shares in Clean ENG Foles valued at $1530; 250 shares 

in Facebook valued at $35,512.50; 1000 shares in GE valued at $30,034.11; and 151 shares in 

Valero valued at $10,047.64. Eddy listed an estimated fair market value of $165,000 for his 

cabin and land in Arkansas, along with various motor vehicles valued at $16,000. Eddy also 
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clarified that he owned a GMC Sierra valued at $22,000. Lastly, Eddy listed an Ameren life 

insurance policy valued at $7000 and an Edward Jones IRA valued at $224,581.20. 

¶ 26 Eddy testified that, after he prepared the affidavit in April 2017, he closed the Commerce 

Bank checking account and moved those funds into a First Security savings account in Arkansas. 

Eddy also explained that he had a lower balance in each account because he had spent 

approximately $8000 after he prepared the affidavit. 

¶ 27 Near the end of Eddy’s direct testimony, Eddy’s counsel asked him if there was 

anything that had not been addressed in his testimony that the circuit court should consider 

regarding the petition to terminate. The following question-and-answer exchange occurred: 

 “[Eddy’s Counsel]: Is there anything else that you think the Court should consider 

with regard to your reasons for retirement or your income or expenses that the Court 

should consider in its ruling that we haven’t already addressed? 

A. Can you repeat the question? 

THE COURT: Edd[y], the question—hold on—the question is, is there anything 

else I need to hear concerning your petition? Anything you want to tell me? That’s all 

she’s asking. 

A. Well, I—me and my girls are trying to move on as a family. And we want—

you know, we want to be done, but we try to move on and reestablish, and the way things 

are the last few years with maintenance and everything, so her [name is] always brought 

up about this, that, and the other, but we’re trying to move on as a family. Is that okay?” 

Eddy further responded that he planned on giving Taylor around $4000 to cover expenses of her 

upcoming wedding on March 24, 2018. 

¶ 28 On cross-examination, Eddy was questioned regarding several documents relating to his 

pension benefits that were admitted as exhibits. A document produced by Ameren on January 25, 

2013, titled “Retirement Benefit Statement,” provided a projected calculation of the pension 

benefits Eddy would receive if he retired on March 1, 2017, with 37 years of vesting service. The 

document also provided that Eddy’s “Normal Retirement Date” was March 1, 2020. A document 

from the union also provided a projected calculation of the pension benefits Eddy would receive 
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after 39 years of service. The document specified that Eddy would be eligible for the “Early Age 

62” pension with a monthly payout of $140.44 in March 2017, but he would not be eligible for 

the “Normal” pension with a monthly payout of $189 until March 2020. When questioned 

regarding the union document, Eddy acknowledged that the effective date of his normal pension

was March 2020 and agreed that he had elected to receive the pension classified as “Early Age 

62.” Eddy also confirmed that, throughout his employment with Ameren, he had contributed to a 

401(k) plan and the plan continued to accrue following the parties’ divorce. 

¶ 29 Eddy was also questioned regarding various financial documents, including tax returns 

and earning statements, that were admitted as exhibits. Eddy reviewed the documents and 

confirmed that his total wages were $158,107.86 in 2011 and $177,776.28 in 2015, and his 

“Medicare wages” were $166,484.97 in 2016. Eddy agreed that he was aware of his monthly 

maintenance obligation when he notified Ameren of his retirement in October or November of 

2016. 

¶ 30 The following exchange occurred after Eddy admitted that he knew Shelly’s maintenance 

income would be reduced if he retired: 

“Q. Okay. Did you make provision for you to continue your maintenance payment 

to her after you retired? 

A. The provision was for five years, to be reviewed. 

Q. So in your mind, at the end of five years, you were not going to be required to 

pay her maintenance; is that what your thought process was? 

A. That was my thoughts and the Judge’s ruling. 

Q. Okay. And your income today is reduced to Social Security, your pension from 

Ameren, and a small annuity account; correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Less than $5,000 a month, right? 

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you—did you make any plant [sic]—did you put any money aside to 

continue to pay the maintenance obligation based on that current income? 

A. Us being divorced—supposedly us going and being divorced, no, I didn’t. I 

didn’t—I mean, that’s my definition of divorce. It was—it was for five years to be 

reviewed. I would be under only Social Security and retirement after five years to be 
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reviewed. We’re divorced. She’s—in my mind, she’s no longer my responsibility; just 

like I’m not her responsibility. If I would have fell or got hurt, who would have took [sic] 

care of me? If I would have went out there and got—my dad fell off a pole when he was 

48 and broke his neck and his wrist. Now, if that would have happened to me, she would 

have been scott-free [sic]. Who would have took [sic] care of me?

Q. So there—you’ve made no other—your position is, and I understand it, your 

position is after five years, I’m off the hook? 

A. We’re divorced.” 

Eddy then reiterated that he had expressed “hopes” that he would retire at age 62 during the 

parties’ marriage. Eddy estimated that he made this decision when he was around 50 years old. 

¶ 31 Eddy was then questioned about his real estate in Arkansas. Eddy explained that he had 

decided to purchase the small cabin with 100 acres in lieu of a larger home with less acreage “to 

have a little bit of freedom and live out [his] Autumn years” of his life. He planned to hunt and 

fish on the property but denied plans to farm the land. He used his tractors to mow a couple of 

fields, which were food plots for deer and turkey. Eddy testified that, in anticipation of being 

clear of his maintenance obligation, he planned on saving for a year to add on to his cabin or to 

build a new house on the property. 

¶ 32 Eddy acknowledged that his savings account balance had been reduced by $8000 

approximately three months before the trial. He explained that, even though his regular monthly 

expenses were around $2200, he had spent nearly $6200 in recent months to cover his 

maintenance obligation, attorney fees, and to pay for the two trips to Portland. In addition, after 

moving to Arkansas, he purchased new tools, including two chain saws and an air compressor. 

Eddy admitted that he performed his own yard work, which typically involved mowing with a 

tractor and operating a weed eater and leaf blower. Eddy claimed, however, that he could “go 

usually about two hours a day, and that’s it.” Eddy denied receiving any kind of medical 

disability benefits from Ameren and agreed that Ameren had attempted to accommodate his 

deteriorating physical condition. Eddy also denied seeking medical treatment for his knee, 
14 

shoulder, and memory loss issues. Lastly, Eddy agreed that he earned substantially more income 

than Shelly throughout their marriage. 

¶ 33 Following cross-examination, Judge Cannady stated that he had some follow-up 

questions regarding the Arkansas property that he felt were “significant.” Eddy confirmed that he 

had paid $165,000 in cash for both the cabin and approximately 100 acres of land. Eddy 

estimated that 95% of the acreage was in timber. When asked whether he had checked into the 

value of the timber or selling the timber, Eddy stated that he “had it appraised for tax purposes.” 

Eddy denied making inquiries to companies to clear the timber and denied receiving payments 

from the government for farming or using the timber. 

¶ 34 On redirect examination, Eddy clarified that the monthly payout from his union pension 

had been reduced by approximately $50 due to his retirement at age 62, but he denied that his 

Ameren pension had been reduced because he was “fully vested at 62.” Eddy’s counsel 

concluded redirect by asking Eddy if he had testified regarding his desire to retire at age 62 at the 

2011 trial. Shelly’s counsel objected based on relevance. Eddy’s counsel argued that Eddy’s 

prior testimony regarding retirement was a basis for provision allowing review of maintenance 

after five years. Judge Cannady sustained the objection, stating that he did not think he could 

“get into a previous Judge’s analysis and the facts presented as to the rulings why the previous 

Judge set this for review at five years.” Judge Cannady then expressed a desire to review 

evidence relating to Eddy’s income from 2010. Judge Cannady indicated that he would check the 

court file, which contained the folder with exhibits from the original trial, for Eddy’s 2010 tax 

return. 

¶ 35 Next, Shelly testified to the following details as an adverse witness. Shelly resided in the 

former marital residence, which had three bedrooms and sat on five acres of land, with no 
15 

monthly mortgage payment. Shelly also operated her business, Shear Country Styling Salon, 

from the residence. Shelly produced additional income by working at salons in Bunker Hill, 

Illinois, and St. Louis, Missouri, but she had to pay to rent stations at those salons. In addition, 

Shelly worked for an accreditations company based in Fairfax, Virginia, which required her to 

travel to various cosmetology schools or barber colleges throughout the country for purposes of 

evaluating eligibility for federal funding. 

¶ 36 Shelly was questioned extensively regarding the financial affidavit she prepared on June 

22, 2017, which provided the following details. Shelly’s gross yearly income had increased from 

$29,917 in 2015 to $30,438.74 as of December 18, 2016. Shelly’s gross monthly income totaled 

$3982.31 (employment earnings of $2536.56 plus the payouts from Eddy’s pension in the 

amount of $1445.75), and her net monthly income after deductions totaled $2939.01. Shelly’s 

monthly living expenses totaled $3766.84 ($1892.16 household, $1083.08 transportation, and 

$791.60 personal), which resulted in a monthly deficit of approximately $827.83. Although 

Shelly listed no debts, her affidavit indicated that she owed $34,478.96 for a 2016 Nissan 

Murano. 

¶ 37 Shelly’s affidavit also listed her assets, including two assets with cash value—a Reliance 

Bank checking account with a balance of $135,761.02 and a Regions Bank checking account 

with a balance of $13,343.13. Shelly testified that her Reliance Bank checking account had 

increased by approximately $60,000, from January 9, 2015, to May 31, 2017. Shelly agreed that 

she had been able to save $60,000 in that time. 

¶ 38 The statements produced by Reliance Bank pertaining to Shelly’s checking account 

reveal the following details. Shelly’s checking account had a beginning balance of $76,546.27 in 

January 2015 and an ending balance of $106,374.24 in December 2015. The statements show 
16 

that, from January to December 2015, Shelly deposited over $43,000 into the account and 

debited (checks and other charges) over $15,000 from the account. Shelly’s checking account 

had a beginning balance of $109,146.90 in January 2016 and an ending balance of $133,744.61 

in December 2016. The statements show that, from January to December 2016, Shelly deposited 

over $55,000 into the account and debited over $28,000 from the account. The available records 

from 2017 reveal the following: a January balance of $138,050.89 following $4306.28 in 

deposits; a February balance of $140,810.25 following $3422.36 in deposits and debits totaling 

$663; a March balance of $129,616.07 following $4805.75 in deposits and debits totaling 

$15,999.93; an April balance of $130,959.78 following a $1924.32 deposit, a $108.02 payout 

from Eddy’s union pension, and debits totaling $688.63; and a May balance of $135,761.02 

following a $1698.52 deposit, a $54.01 payout from Eddy’s union pension, a $1304.62 payout 

from Eddy’s Ameren pension, and debits totaling $746.91. 

¶ 39 Shelly testified that the Regions Bank checking account was primarily used for business 

and the income she earned from working at all three salons went into that account. She 

acknowledged that the statements from her Regions checking account reflected payments from a 

credit card company called “Intuit.” Shelly confirmed that the Intuit payments were debited to 

her account when customers paid with credit or debit cards using a scanner that attached to an 

iPad. Shelly’s tax records revealed that she received payments from Intuit, a third-party network, 

in the gross amount of $25,496.30 in 2016 and $25,661.36 in 2015. 

¶ 40 In the financial affidavit, Shelly also disclosed two investment accounts as assets—the 

Hartford Funds and the American Funds—with a total estimated value of $91,319.67. Shelly 

listed the estimated fair market value of the marital residence as $180,000. Shelly also disclosed 

that she had a life insurance policy from Country Companies with a death benefit valued at 
17 

$12,000 and a Franklin Templeton Individual Retirement Account, which came from a 

withdrawal from Eddy’s 401(k) through Ameren, valued at $179,095.89. In addition, she had 

$49,023.17 (as of December 30, 2016) in a Polaris Platinum III life insurance account, which she 

had failed to disclose on her financial affidavit. 

¶ 41 Shelly then testified regarding the income and expenses listed on her tax returns. When 

asked about the Schedule C profit or loss from a business listed on her 2015 tax returns, Shelly 

confirmed that she had listed total gross receipts or sales of $28,557 and claimed the total 

included her income from all three salons and the accreditations firm. The circuit court later 

clarified that the total gross receipts or sales did not include the $1360 Shelly earned from the 

accreditations firm, which had been listed as “Other Income” on her 2015 tax return. She 

acknowledged the tax documents from Intuit indicated that she had received $25,661.36 in credit 

or debit card payments, which included tips, for services she rendered in 2015. Shelly claimed 

that a majority of her clients paid by debit or credit card. Shelly denied accepting checks and 

claimed that she seldom received cash for her services. Shelly charged anywhere from $5 to $22 

for haircuts and $65 to $75 for a color. When asked if she had received only $253 in cash 

payments in 2015, Shelly replied, “Yes, at the most.” Shelly agreed that she had earned a yearly 

average of approximately $27,000 working at the salons in 2015 and 2016. She also agreed that, 

in 2016, she provided free hair services valued at $1377 and her gross income from the national 

accreditation firm had increased to $12,540. In addition, Shelly received $1395.75 per month 

(approximately $16,749 per year) from Eddy’s Ameren pension and approximately $50 per 

month from Eddy’s union pension. 

¶ 42 Regarding expenses listed on her 2015 tax return, Shelly confirmed that she had spent 

approximately $2074 on advertising expenses, including business cards and calendars, and 
18 

approximately $1325 on car expenses in 2015. Shelly also claimed that she had $1301 expenses 

for travel in 2015, which included parking and shuttles when she traveled for the accreditation 

firm. When asked if she had earned a gross total of $1360 from the accreditation firm and spent 

$1301 in travel expense while working for the firm, Shelly indicated that she did not know how 

her accountant “breaks that down.” 

¶ 43 Shelly also testified to the following as a witness on her own behalf. Shelly was 54 years 

old at the time of the hearing. Shelly was 18 years old when she married Eddy in 1981. During 

the marriage, Shelly primarily stayed at home with the children and Eddy was the “bread 

winner.” Throughout the marriage, Eddy worked long hours, including regular overtime, and 

earned a substantially greater income than Shelly. Following the parties’ divorce, Shelly 

attempted to increase her income by exploring additional employment and educational 

opportunities. Shelly began working for the accreditation firm and earned an additional $12,500

in 2016, although she had to take nine weeks off work from the salon and had no control over the 

number of assignments. She also attempted to improve her income by taking a number of 

educational courses, including a financial aid course so that she would qualify for a student 

financial aid advisor for a cosmetology school or barber college. Shelly had been looking for 

jobs in that field, but she was unsure of the yearly salary for such positions. She had looked into 

other jobs because she found it difficult “to stand and cut all day” at her age.

¶ 44 With regard to her income from the salons, Shelly clarified that the number of payment 

transactions listed by Intuit occasionally reflected a single credit card payment for multiple 

services or clients. Shelly also had to pay for necessary supplies out of the gross income she 

earned from her work at the salons. While she had been able to save money since the divorce, 

she did not have a pension plan through her employment. She had been awarded various assets in 
19 

the judgment of dissolution, including interests in Eddy’s annuity account and pensions. Shelly 

agreed that she had been able to pay all of her monthly expenses when she received $3000 in 

monthly maintenance payments. Shelly also agreed that she had been unable to pay her monthly 

expenses when Eddy stopped making the monthly maintenance payments and she received only 

the payouts from Eddy’s pensions, which equated to roughly half of the monthly maintenance. 

Although Shelly had increased her income and taken additional educational courses since the 

divorce, she felt there was nothing more she could do to further increase her income. 

¶ 45 At the close of the evidence, the circuit court directed the attorneys to submit written 

closing arguments by August 18, 2017. As directed, the attorneys timely filed closing arguments 

and, following a status hearing, the court took the case under advisement. 

¶ 46 In his written closing argument, Eddy requested that the circuit court enter an order 

terminating his monthly maintenance obligation to Shelly. In support, Eddy argued that, since the 

entry of the judgment of dissolution in 2011, Shelly’s yearly income had increased from $11,095 

to $51,160.80, while his income decreased from $146,836 to $53,528.88. Specifically, Shelly’s 

most recent financial affidavit listed a total gross monthly income of $3932.31 ($2536.56 from 

her employment and $1395.75 from her previously awarded share of Eddy’s Ameren pension) 

without including the income she received from various investments ($3673 yearly average), 

while Eddy’s most recent financial affidavit listed a total gross monthly income of $4460.74. 

According to Eddy, Shelly’s financial affidavit listed an inflated amount of $3766.84 in monthly 

expenses, given that a number of her listed expenses were “written off” or deducted from her 

gross income as business expenses on her tax returns. Eddy’s financial affidavit listed total 

monthly expenses of $2168, but he expected his monthly expenses to increase when he made 

improvements to his one-room cabin. Eddy maintained that Shelly worked as a hair stylist 
20 

throughout the parties’ marriage and had increased her income since the divorce by taking 

additional classes and obtaining additional employment. Eddy claimed that his income had 

permanently decreased due to his retirement from Ameren, whereas Shelly, who was eight years 

younger than Eddy, could continue to increase her income. Eddy maintained that, after 40-plus 

years of employment, he retired from Ameren at age 62 due to a deterioration in his physical 

condition and the physically demanding job duties. According to Eddy, there was no evidence 

showing that his retirement was in bad faith. Shelly, who was awarded approximately 55% of the 

marital assets in the judgment of dissolution, owned various assets valued at $606,047.54 and 

Eddy owned various assets valued at $562,832. 

¶ 47 In her written closing argument, Shelly requested that the circuit court enter an order 

awarding her $1555.75 “as maintenance on a permanent basis, subject to termination or 

modification as provided in the [Act].” In support, Shelly noted that $1555.75 represented the 

difference between the previous maintenance award ($3000) and the payouts she presently 

received from Eddy’s pensions ($1445.75). Shelly claimed that she had made a good-faith effort 

to become self-supporting by taking additional classes and obtaining additional employment. 

According to Shelly, her employment income increased from $11,095 in 2011 to $20,621 in 

2016, which included $12,540.49 from additional accreditation work. Shelly also noted that the 

parties had a long-term marriage lasting over 30 years, and that she had a limited education 

(beautician’s school and license) because she had married Eddy when she was 18 years old and 

had been primarily responsible for raising the parties’ two daughters. According to Shelly, record 

evidence did not indicate that she could “ever support herself in the lifestyle to which she is 

accustomed without maintenance from [Eddy].” Despite Eddy’s testimony regarding his 

deteriorating physical health, Shelly argued that his early retirement from Ameren at age 62 was 
21 

an attempt to evade his maintenance obligation. In support, Shelly recited Eddy’s testimony on 

cross-examination that he was ready to move on after paying maintenance for five years and that 

he was “tired of hearing discussions about Shelly and what Shelly needs.” 

¶ 48 On April 12, 2019, the circuit court entered a written order modifying maintenance. The 

court listed the nine factors contained in section 510(a-5) of the Act and stressed that factors one 

and seven had been important to its determination. The court also stated that it had considered all 

other factors, including the factors contained in section 504(a) of the Act. 

¶ 49 The circuit court’s written order also included the following factual findings in support of 

its decision. Throughout the 30-year marriage, Eddy, the primary wage earner, worked on a fulltime basis for Ameren. Shelly was primarily responsible for the children’s daily activities and 

care, and she operated a hair salon from her home on a part-time basis. Shelly was 18 years of 

age at the time of the marriage and, other than her beautician school and license, she had no 

education beyond high school. When the parties divorced in 2011, Eddy earned $158,107.86 and 

Shelly earned $11,095. In 2016, Eddy earned $166,487.97 and Shelly earned $20,621. In 

considering Eddy’s retirement, the court found that Eddy’s “normal retirement age” was 65 but 

made no finding regarding Eddy’s yearly retirement income. The court concluded that Eddy 

voluntarily left his employment with Ameren at age 62, and that Eddy had the burden of showing 

that his “early” retirement was in good faith. The court noted that Eddy failed to present any 

medical evidence or testimony showing that he was physically incapable of performing his work 

duties for Ameren. 

¶ 50 Next, the circuit court addressed the requirements for imputing income. Citing In re 

Marriage of Blume, 2016 IL App (3d) 140276, ¶ 30, the court determined that the following 

must be shown to impute income: “(1) The payor has become voluntarily unemployed; (2) The 
22 

payor is attempting to evade a support obligation; or (3) The payor has unreasonably failed to 

take advantage of an employment opportunity.” The court concluded that Eddy’s voluntary 

retirement at the first opportunity, despite his ability to continue working, satisfied the first 

factor. The court, again, noted the absence of medical evidence or testimony showing that Eddy 

was unable to perform the required job duties. Furthermore, the court noted that Eddy had 

recently passed his CDL requirements and had been accommodated by Ameren. Thus, the court 

found it appropriate to impute income to Eddy. 

¶ 51 Lastly, the circuit court made findings regarding Shelly’s attempts at self-sufficiency, 

noting that Shelly had sought other educational and employment opportunities and successfully 

increased her income since the divorce in 2011. Nevertheless, the court found that Shelly would 

“be unable to ever maintain herself in the standard of living provided during the marriage 

without an award of maintenance.” Thus, the court granted Shelly’s request and reduced Eddy’s 

monthly maintenance obligation from $3000 to $1555.75. In doing so, the court indicated that 

the maintenance award was subject to modification or termination as permitted by the Act. 

¶ 52 On May 7, 2019, Eddy filed a motion to reconsider pursuant to section 2-1203 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2018)), requesting that the circuit court 

vacate its April 12, 2019, order and enter a new order terminating his maintenance obligation. 

Eddy alternatively requested that the court either terminate maintenance when Eddy turned 65 or 

set the matter for review in February of 2020. In support, Eddy, once again, argued that the court 

had previously considered Eddy’s eligibility to retire at 62 when it awarded Shelly maintenance 

subject to review in five years in the 2011 judgment of dissolution. Following a hearing, the 

court denied the motion to reconsider. This appeal followed. 
23 

¶ 53 II. Analysis 

¶ 54 Eddy’s main contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred by modifying, rather than 

terminating, maintenance. In support, he argues that the court erred: (1) “in finding that Shelly 

had a continued need for maintenance” and “in failing to apply the guidelines set forth in 750 

ILCS 5/504 and 750 ILCS 5/510” of the Act, (2) in imputing income to him, and (3) in failing to 

terminate maintenance as required under the new statutory guidelines. 

¶ 55 We first address Eddy’s first and third arguments, which we consider together as they are 

closely related. We initially note that Eddy relies on “the new statutory guidelines” in support of 

his first and third arguments. Eddy argues that “[u]nder the new statutory guidelines, enacted in 

2015, Shelly already earns 40% of the parties’ gross income; therefore, maintenance is not 

appropriate.” Eddy asserts that “[a]ny modifications to the maintenance statute[,] effective in 

2015, apply to all cases decided after its’ [sic] effective date.” We disagree. 

¶ 56 We initially note that Eddy has failed to cite legal authority in support of his assertion. 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) provides that the appellant’s brief 

shall include an argument containing the appellant’s contentions, the reasons therefor, citation of 

the authorities, and the pages of the record on which the appellant relies. This court “is not a 

repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), L.L.C. v. Murfin, 2020 IL App (5th) 

160007, ¶ 72. Nevertheless, we conclude that Eddy’s argument regarding “the new statutory 

guidelines” fails on the merits. In our view, section 801(c) of the Act, which makes the 

guidelines applicable to “modification” proceedings, does not extend to the “review” 

proceedings at issue in the present case. 750 ILCS 5/801(c) (West 2016); In re Marriage of 

Brunke, 2019 IL App (2d) 190201, ¶ 53. Here, the parties expressly agreed that Eddy was not 
24 

required to show a change in circumstances because the judgment specifically allowed for 

review. See Brunke, 2019 IL App (2d) 190201, ¶ 51 (unlike a modification proceeding, “[a] 

review proceeding results from a court order that specifically provides for a review of that order” 

and does not require proof of a change in circumstances). Thus, we reject Eddy’s arguments 

pertaining to the recently enacted statutory guidelines. We now turn to Eddy’s remaining 

arguments. 

¶ 57 Section 510 of the Act governs petitions for modification, termination, or review of 

maintenance. 750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2010). Section 510(a-5) requires a circuit court to consider 

the following nine factors in determining whether to modify or terminate maintenance: 

(1) a change in employment status of either party and whether the change was made in 

good faith; (2) any reasonable efforts made by the receiving party to become selfsupporting; (3) any present or future impairment of earning capacity of either party; 

(4) the tax consequences of the maintenance payments; (5) the duration of maintenance 

payments previously, or remaining to be, paid, if any, relative to the length of the parties’ 

marriage; (6) the property, including retirement benefits, awarded to each party under the 

judgment of dissolution of marriage, and the present status of such property; (7) any 

increase or decrease in the income of the parties since the prior judgment; (8) the 

property acquired, and currently owned, by either party after the entry of the judgment of 

dissolution of marriage; and (9) any other factor found by the court to be just and 

equitable. Id. § 510(a-5)(1)-(9). 

¶ 58 In addition, section 510(a-5) of the Act requires a circuit court, in any proceeding seeking 

to modify or terminate maintenance, to consider the factors set forth in subsection (a) of section 

504. Id. § 510(a-5). Section 504(a) sets forth the following 12 factors: 
25 

(1) the respective incomes and property of the parties, including the property awarded or 

assigned to the party seeking maintenance; (2) the parties’ needs; (3) the parties’ present 

and future earning capacity; (4) any impairment of the present and future earning 

capacity resulting from the party seeking maintenance devoting time to domestic duties; 

(5) the time necessary for the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate education 

or training to obtain employment; (6) the parties’ standard of living during the marriage; 

(7) the duration of the parties’ marriage; (8) the parties’ respective ages and physical and 

emotional conditions; (9) any tax consequences of the property division; (10) any 

contributions the party seeking maintenance made to the education or career of the other 

spouse; (11) any valid agreements between the parties; and (12) any other factors found 

by the court to be just and equitable. 750 ILCS 5/504(a)(1)-(12) (West Supp. 2011). 

Although a circuit court must consider the above factors, it is not required to make specific 

findings for each factor if the record establishes the basis for an award of maintenance. Blum v. 

Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 38 (2009). 

¶ 59 Generally, a circuit court’s award of maintenance is presumed to be correct. In re 

Marriage of Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604, ¶ 26. A circuit court’s decision to modify, or 

terminate, maintenance will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Blum, 235 Ill. 2d 

at 36. A circuit court abuses its discretion when its “ ‘ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, 

or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting 

People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000)). 

¶ 60 Here, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion by modifying, rather than 

terminating, maintenance. The court expressly stated that it considered the factors set forth in 

both sections 510(a-5) and 504(a) of the Act. In doing so, the court found the first and seventh 
26 

factors in section 510(a-5)—“(1) any change in the employment status of either party and 

whether the change has been made in good faith” and “(7) the increase or decrease in each 

party’s income since the prior judgment or order from which a review, modification, or 

termination is being sought”—particularly important in its determination. 

¶ 61 The evidence presented at the hearing showed that, throughout the parties’ 30-year 

marriage, Eddy was the primary wage earner while Shelly cared for the parties’ children and 

operated a hair salon from home on a part-time basis. Shelly was 18 years old when the parties 

married and, aside from beautician school, she had no education beyond high school when the 

parties divorced in 2011. Although Shelly had increased her income by pursuing additional 

education and employment opportunities, Eddy’s income continued to greatly exceed Shelly’s 

income in the years following the divorce. Eddy’s income decreased substantially following his 

retirement in 2017, when Eddy began receiving social security benefits and both parties began 

receiving their respective shares of the payouts from Eddy’s pensions. Eddy’s reduced net 

monthly income of $3479.96 continued to exceed Shelly’s increased net monthly income of 

$2939.01, which included a $1444.25 monthly payout from Eddy’s pension. Shelly testified that, 

despite increasing her income and receiving payouts from Eddy’s pensions, she was unable to 

pay all of her monthly expenses without the monthly maintenance payments following Eddy’s 

retirement. Shelly’s most recent financial affidavit listed a monthly deficit of $827.83. In 

contrast, Eddy’s most recent financial affidavit listed his available monthly income, after paying 

all of his monthly expenses, as $1311.96. This evidence supports the circuit court’s decision to 

reduce, not terminate, Eddy’s maintenance monthly maintenance obligation. Thus, we cannot say 

that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. 
27 

¶ 62 We next consider Eddy’s argument that the circuit court erred by imputing income to him 

due to his retirement when calculating the maintenance award. Eddy specifically asserts that the 

court erred by failing to specify the amount of imputed income and by finding that he failed to 

present evidence showing he was unable to perform his job. 

¶ 63 “The ability of the maintenance-paying spouse to contribute to the other spouse’s support 

can be properly determined by considering both a current and future ability to pay ongoing 

maintenance.” In re Marriage of Blume, 2016 IL App (3d) 140276, ¶ 30 (citing In re Marriage 

of Lichtenauer, 408 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1089 (2011)). “Courts should consider the level at which 

the spouse is able to contribute, not merely the level at which he is willing to work.” Id. (citing 

Lichtenauer, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 1088). A circuit court may impute income to a payor spouse if 

the court finds: “(1) the payor has become voluntarily unemployed, (2) the payor is attempting to 

evade a support obligation, or (3) the payor has unreasonably failed to take advantage of an 

employment opportunity.” Id. A reviewing court “will not disturb a trial court’s finding of a 

party’s income for the purpose of setting a support award absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. 

¶ 64 Here, the circuit court imputed income to Eddy due to his early retirement at age 62. In 

doing so, the court found that Eddy’s normal retirement age was 65. Although Eddy testified that 

he could have retired at age 55 with lower benefits and that he had always planned to retire at 

age 62, the court’s finding is supported by Ameren’s “Retirement Benefit Statement,” which lists 

Eddy’s normal retirement date as March 1, 2020. We also note that the court’s finding is 

supported by Eddy’s financial statement from the dissolution proceeding, which lists the values 

of his union and Ameren pensions at age 65. Thus, the court’s finding that the normal retirement 

age for Eddy was 65 is supported by the evidence presented at the hearing and additional 

documents in the record on appeal. 
28 

¶ 65 The circuit court further found that Eddy “voluntarily left his employment at the earliest 

opportunity.” In support, the circuit court found that “[n]o medical testimony was presented to 

the Court nor did Edd[y] offer any testimony indicating to the Court that he was incapable of 

performing his duties for Ameren or that he had any medical reason for his retirement.” The 

court, instead, found the evidence showed that Eddy had “recently passed his CDL licensing 

requirement and was actively accommodated by his employer.” Although Eddy testified 

extensively regarding his physical difficulties in performing his job duties at Ameren shortly 

before his retirement, it appears, although not expressly stated, that the court discounted certain 

aspects of Eddy’s testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding his retirement. Thus, the 

court’s finding that Eddy became voluntarily unemployed is supported by the evidence. 

¶ 66 Nevertheless, we find it necessary to vacate the portion of the circuit court’s order setting 

the amount of maintenance and remand for clarification on the issue of Eddy’s imputed income. 

As Eddy correctly notes, the court failed to specify the amount of imputed income, which 

hinders our ability to determine whether the court abused its discretion in calculating 

maintenance. We note that the court, after imputing an undisclosed amount of income to Eddy, 

actually reduced Eddy’s monthly maintenance obligation from $3000 to $1555.75. Although not 

expressly stated, it appears the court attempted to account for the difference between the 

previous maintenance award and the pension payouts Shelly began receiving after Eddy’s 

retirement. We also note that the court, despite finding Eddy’s normal retirement age was 65, 

neither set the matter for review nor ordered a further reduction of maintenance when Eddy 

turned 65. Thus, we remand the matter back to the court for clarification of these issues. 

¶ 67 On remand, the circuit court should specify the amount of income imputed to Eddy and 

explain the basis for its calculation, including the time period for which it imputed income to 
29 

Eddy. The court should also explain its rationale for imputing income to Eddy while also 

reducing his monthly maintenance obligation from $3000 to $1555.75. 

¶ 68 Based on the foregoing, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by 

reducing, rather than terminating, maintenance. See In re Marriage of Waller, 253 Ill. App. 3d 

360, 362 (1993) (holding that the circuit court properly denied the respondent’s petition to 

terminate maintenance where the respondent had not reached the customary age of retirement 

and his retirement was the result of circumstances within his control). We also hold that the 

court’s finding that Eddy was voluntarily unemployed due to his early retirement at age 62 is 

supported by the evidence. However, we vacate the court’s reduced maintenance award and 

remand for the entry of a new order that clarifies the amount of income imputed to Eddy for 

purposes of calculating maintenance and addresses the issue of imputing income to Eddy past his 

normal retirement age of 65. 

¶ 69 III. Conclusion 

¶ 70 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Monroe County is affirmed, in 

part, and vacated, in part, and this cause remanded for entry of an additional order. 

 

¶ 71 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.