OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 

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1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice 

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 City of Middleburg Heights, Appellee, v. Ohio Board of 

Building Standards, Appellant. 

 [Cite as Middleburg Hts. v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Standards 

(1992), Ohio St.3d .] 

Building standards -- Municipal building department certified 

 by Ohio Board of Building Standards may adopt additional 

 regulations not in conflict with state law. 

A municipality whose building department has been certified by 

 the Ohio Board of Building Standards pursuant to R.C. 

 3781.10(E) to enforce state and local building codes 

 within its territorial jurisdiction may adopt additional 

 regulations not in conflict with state law. (Springdale v. 

 Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Standards [1991], 59 Ohio St.3d 56, 570 

 N.E.2d 268, construed and followed.) 

 (No. 91-1985 -- Submitted October 21, 1992 -- Decided 

December 16, 1992.) 

 Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 

90AP-1289. 

 Appellee, the Ohio Board of Building Standards ("board"), 

was created by R.C. Chapter 3781. The board is charged with 

duties including the adoption of rules governing the erection, 

construction, repair, alteration, and maintenance of all 

buildings (with certain exceptions) in Ohio. R.C. 3781.10(A). 

Pursuant to this rulemaking authority, the board adopted the 

Ohio Basic Building Code ("OBBC"). (See Ohio Adm.Code 

4101:2-1-03.) 

 The board is also authorized to certify municipal, 

township and county building departments to enforce the OBBC at 

the local level. R.C. 3781.10(E). The board certified the 

building department of the city of Middleburg Heights ("city") 

for such purpose. 

 In 1989, the board issued an order revoking the city's 

certification. The board determined that certain provisions of 

Chapter 1351 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of 

Middleburg Heights ("city code") were in conflict with the 

OBBC. Specifically, the city code established structural and 

fire safety construction standards exceeding the standards 

adopted by OBBC. 
 Upon appeal, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

affirmed the order of the board revoking the city's 

certification. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, 

holding that the revocation of the city's certification was 

improper because there is no conflict between the city code and 

the OBBC. 

 This cause is now before the court pursuant to the 

allowance of a motion to certify the record. 

 

 Calfee, Halter & Griswold, John E. Gotherman, John J. 

Eklund and Mark S. Yacano; and Peter H. Hull, Law Director, for 

appellee. 

 Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, Raul Rosado, Jr. and 

Kathleen M. O'Malley, Assistant Attorneys General, for 

appellant. 

 Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., Craig D. 

Leister and Richard W. Ross, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 

Architects Society of Ohio. 

 Keith McNamara, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 

Associated General Contractors of Ohio. 

 Diane G. Porter, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 

Midwest Industrialized Unit Manufacturers Association. 

 Thompson, Hine & Flory, Jeffrey A. Appelbaum and Donald P. 

Screen, urging reversal for amici curiae, Flair Corporation and 

Ohio Consultative Council of the National Institute of Building 

Sciences. 

 Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, N. Victor Goodman 

and Mark D. Tucker, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio 

State Building and Construction Trades Council. 

 Edward G. Kramer, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio 

Housing Coalition. 

 Spieth, Bell, McCurdy & Newell Co., L.P.A., and Timothy J. 

Grendell, urging reversal for amici curiae, Ohio Home Builders 

Association and Building Industry Association of Cleveland and 

Suburban Counties. 

 Barry M. Byron, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio 

Municipal League. 

 Ward & Associates, Alan E. Johnson and Leo R. Ward, urging 

affirmance for amici curiae, North Eastern Ohio Fire Prevention 

Association and Northeastern Ohio Fire Chiefs' Association. 

 Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy 

and Marc J. Jaffy, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio 

Association of Professional Fire Fighters. 

 

 Moyer, C.J. The city of Middleburg Heights has 

challenged the Ohio Board of Building Standards' revocation of 

its building department's certification. A finding that the 

board had just cause for the revocation hinges on one issue: 

whether provisions of the city's building ordinance relating to 

fire protection requirements conflict with the Ohio Basic 

Building Code. No question is raised in this appeal concerning 

the city's constitutionally conferred home-rule authority. See 

Springdale v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Standards (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 

56, 570 N.E.2d 268. 

 The standard for determining whether a municipal ordinance 

conflicts with a general law of the state was first announced 

in Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, 
and remains unchanged: "In determining whether an ordinance is 

in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether the 

ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids or 

prohibits, and vice versa." Id. at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. See, also, Fondessy Enterprises, Inc. v. Oregon 

(1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 213, 23 OBR 372, 492 N.E.2d 797; Lorain 

v. Tomasic (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 1, 13 O.O.3d 1, 391 N.E.2d 726. 

 Applied to the present dispute, the question is whether 

the OBBC permits or licenses any construction in the state 

meeting its standards, or whether the OBBC provides minimum 

requirements, only forbidding or prohibiting construction not 

complying with its standards. For the following reasons, we 

hold that absent any specific statutes limiting local 

regulation, the OBBC provides only minimum building 

requirements within Ohio. Accordingly, a municipality whose 

building department has been certified by the Ohio Board of 

Building Standards pursuant to R.C. 3781.10(E) to enforce state 

and local building codes within its territorial jurisdiction 

may adopt additional regulations not in conflict with state law. 

 Pursuant to R.C. 3781.10, the board may adopt rules 

governing construction in Ohio. An examination of additional 

language in the chapter demonstrates that such rules 

promulgated by the board are simply minimum requirements. 

 R.C. 3781.10(A) states: "* * * The rules shall be the 

lawful minimum requirements specified for such buildings ***." 

R.C. 3781.11(A)(1) states the rules shall "[p]rovide uniform 

minimum standards and requirements for construction and 

construction materials * * *." 

 The chapter also states that local authorities may adopt 

their own standards that do not conflict with the state rules: 

"Chapters 3781. and 3791. of the Revised Code do not prevent 

the legislative authority of a municipal corporation from 

making further and additional regulations, not in conflict with 

such chapters or with the rules and regulations of the board of 

building standards. * * *" R.C. 3781.01. 

 Appellant argues that the inclusion of the word "uniform" 

in various sections of the chapter prior to the term "minimum 

standards" prevents a locality from adopting any ordinance 

pertaining to the same subject matter as the state rules. 

There is no dispute that a locality may not adopt enforceable 

standards less stringent than the OBBC regulations. But 

appellant also urges that stricter standards may not be adopted 

by a local government because uniformity would be lost. 

 This interpretation would make the state rules not only 

minimum standards, but also maximum standards, because no local 

requirements that are more stringent than the state standards 

would be enforceable. The term "minimum" would therefore be 

rendered meaningless. 

 Appellant asserts that to give effect to the word 

"uniform," municipal building ordinances may only "address 

their specific or local concerns in areas where the OBBC is 

silent." Contrary to this argument, giving effect to the word 

"uniform" does not require that all local regulations 

pertaining to the same subject matter as the Ohio Basic 

Building Code be found unenforceable. As written, the statute 

requires no more than the minimum standards to be applied 

uniformly throughout the state. To accept appellant's 
interpretation, this court must read into the statute language 

that does not exist, granting to the board exclusive regulatory 

authority over construction in this state. 

 Appellant also relies on two decisions from this court to 

support its view that a conflict between the city's ordinance 

and the OBBC exists: Springdale, supra, and Eastlake v. Bd. of 

Bldg. Stds. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 363, 20 O.O.3d 327, 422 

N.E.2d 598. 

 In Springdale, the local building code authorized the 

city's building official to require the submission of a 

certificate from a registered architect or professional 

engineer upon application for a building permit. We held that 

decertification of Springdale's building department was 

justified because the local ordinance conflicted with R.C. 

3791.042, which provides: 

 "If a building department certified under division (E) of 

section 3781.10 of the Revised Code does not have personnel in 

its full-time employ as described in division (E)(1)(a) of 

section 3781.10 of the Revised Code who are certified by the 

board of building standards to do plan and specification 

review, plans and specifications submitted to the building 

department shall be examined by the approved building official 

and shall be approved by him if the plans and specifications 

are determined to conform with the Ohio building code and 

Chapters 3781. and 3791. of the Revised Code, and if the plans 

and specifications satisfy both of the following requirements: 

 "(A) The plans and specifications were prepared by an 

architect who is certificated and registered pursuant to 

Chapter 4703. of the Revised Code, or by a professional 

engineer who is registered pursuant to Chapter 4733. of the 

Revised Code. 

 "(B) The plans and specifications contain a written 

certification by an architect or professional engineer, as 

described in division (A) of this section, that indicates that 

the plans and specifications conform to the requirements of the 

Ohio building code and Chapters 3781. and 3791. of the Revised 

Code." 

 The statute sets out two avenues for approval of building 

plans and specifications. The proper method of approval, as 

specified by the statute, must be followed, and depends upon 

the personnel employed by a local building department. Because 

the Springdale building department had full-time personnel 

qualified to approve plans and specifications, the city's 

requirement that there be additional certification conflicted 

with the statute. 

 A similar conflict between state and local regulation was 

presented in Eastlake, supra. Eastlake's building ordinance 

prohibited construction using industrialized building units 

unless the units were manufactured with a specified type of 

wiring. The Ohio Board of Building Standards allowed 

construction with industrialized units containing wiring 

prohibited by Eastlake. The General Assembly expressly 

provided that approval of industrialized units by the board 

constituted "approval for their use anywhere in Ohio." R.C. 

3781.12. Uniform standards for industrialized units are 

necessary because the units are manufactured prior to shipment 

to the local construction site. Accordingly, as this court 
stated in Eastlake: 

 "* * * Standardization of industrialized units, as 

described in R.C. Chapter 3781, necessarily precludes 

imposition of local requirements which conflict with the 

practices approved for statewide use. This is not the case 

with public buildings not using factory produced modules as the 

basic unit of construction. In those cases, the statutes do 

provide minimum standards only, and local authorities may 

impose higher standards consistent with local ordinances." 

Eastlake at 367-368, 20 O.O.3d at 330, 422 N.E.2d at 601. 

 In both Springdale and Eastlake we held that the local 

ordinances conflicted with state law. The Springdale ordinance 

attempted to forbid approval of building plans that were 

submitted without certification when R.C. 3791.042 specified 

that no such certification be submitted with building plans for 

approval. Similarly, in Eastlake, the local ordinance required 

industrialized units to adhere to a stricter standard of 

manufacture, in conflict with a statutory scheme that 

guaranteed approval of the units for construction anywhere in 

the state. 

 Local standards conflict with the state rules only when 

the standards prohibit that which the state allows, as in 

Eastlake, or require that which the state prohibits, as in 

Springdale. 

 The state rules at issue provide minimum requirements for 

fire safety. It is necessary for a builder to meet these 

requirements in order to obtain a building permit, but nowhere 

is there a statute or state rule providing that compliance with 

the board's rules is sufficient to obtain a permit. Therefore, 

Middleburg Heights' code does not conflict with the OBBC by 

prohibiting that which the state allows. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of 

appeals is affirmed. 

 Judgment affirmed. 

 

 Holmes, Wright and H. Brown, JJ., concur. 

 Sweeney, Douglas and Resnick, JJ., dissent.