1

07-4895 -cr U nit e d S ta te s v . B e ng is 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E 

### S ECOND 

### C IRCU IT

_____________________ Aug ust Term, 2008 (Argued: Dec ember

10, 2008 Dec ided: J anuar y 4, 2011) Docke t No. 07-4895-c r

_____________________ U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , Plaintif f-Appellant ,

— V .— A R NOL D M AURI CE B E N G IS , J EF F R EY N O LL , and D AVI D B E N G IS Defendants-A

ppellees

.

_____________________ B e fore : F EI N BERG , C ABRANES , and H A LL , Circuit Judges

.

_____________________ The United States of

Americ a appe als from two order s o f the United States District Court for the Souther

n District of Ne w York ( Kaplan, J .) deny ing its applications for a re stitut ion awar d in favor of

the Republic of South Afric a, pursua nt to, first, the Mandatory Victims Restit ution Act of 1996 (“ MVRA”), 18 U .S.C. § 3663A, and se cond, the Vic tim and Wi tness Protection Act of 19822

(“V WP A”) , 18 U.S.C. § 3663. W e hold that South Africa : (1) has a proper ty interest in rock lobsters unlawfully

harve sted from its water s, and (2) is a victim, as define d by th e MVRA and V WP A, elig ible to rec eive r estitution. According ly , restitution is owed to Sout h Afric a.

V AC ATED AND R EMA NDED .

_____________________ M A RC U S A. A S NER , A s s i s t an tU n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r

n e y , ( C e l e s t e L. Koeleve ld, Assistant United St ates Attorne y , of counsel) , f o r M i c h a e l J. Gar cia, United States A ttorney for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, New Y ork, Ne w York, for Plain tif f- Ap pe lla nt. B AR R Y A. B OHRER , Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, I ason, Ane llo & Bohr er, P.C., New Y ork, Ne w York ( Ba rbar a L . Trenc her, on the brief , J ames Da rrow, of counsel), for Defendants-Appe llees

.

_____________________ H A LL , Circuit Judge : The United States of

Americ a appe als from two order s o f the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York ( Kaplan, J .) deny ing its applications for a restituti on awa rd in favor of

the Republic of South Af rica pursuant to, f

irst, the Mandatory

Victims Restit ution Act of 1996 (“ MVRA”), 18 U .S.C. § 3663A, and second, the V ictim and Wit ness Protection Act of 1982 (“V WP A”) , 18 U.S.C. § 3663. I n its fir s t o rd er, the district court denied the g overnme nt’s application for

a re s t i t u t i on awa

rd under the MVRA, adopting the mag istrate judg e’s r eport a nd

rec ommendation, and holding that South Africa ha d no proper ty interest in either the lobsters that the def endants took fr om South African wa ters or in a

ny tax or other form of r evenue as a result of the def endants’ br eac h of South Africa ’s conse rvation re g ulatory laws. In i t s s econd order, the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d th e g ov e rnme nt’ s a pp lic a tio n f

or a re sti tut ion

awa rd un de r t he VW P A, ag a in3

adopting the mag istrate judg e’s r eport a nd rec ommendation. The district court held that in addition to its failure to prove that th e i l l ega lly harve sted lobsters wer e the pr operty of South Africa , the g overnme nt failed to demonstrate that South Afric a was a “victim,” i.e., how it suffe red a ny direc t or proximate harm as a result of t he defenda nts’ conduct. The dist rict court further held that, eve n if restitution was per

missibl e as a matter

of law, “ the complication and pr olongingof the sente ncing p ro ce s s re s u l t i n g fr o m t h e f as h i o n i n g o f t h e o rd er

o f r es t i tu t i o nu n d er t h i s s ec t i o nwo u l d o u t we i gh the ne e d to pr ov ide re sti tut ion to the Re pu

bli c of Sou th Af

ri c a .” F or the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e ho ld that So uth

Af ri c a : ( 1) ha s a

pr op e rt y int e re st i n r oc k lo bs te rs un lawf ull y ha rv e ste d f ro m it s w a te rs , (2) is a vic tim for restitution pur poses, as define d by

the MVRA and VWPA, and (3) whateve r the complexit y

in f ashioning a restitution or der in this case , it is insufficie nt to preclude entry of such an orde r under

the MVRA. Acc ording ly , the judgme nts of the district c ourt are VACATED a nd the

case is REMANDED to the district court f or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion. I. Bac kgr ound Fr om 1987 to 2001, Arnold Be ng is, Jeffr ey Noll and David B eng is (jointly , “def endants” )

e ng a g e d in

an e la bo rate sc he me to ille g a lly ha rv e st larg e qu anti tie s o f S ou th C oa st a nd Wes t Co a st

ro c k lo bs te rs in S ou th A fr ic an w a ters for ex po rt to t he Un ite d St a te s in

vio la tio n o f b oth

Sou th Afric an and U .S. law. Arnold B eng is was the Mana g ing D irec tor and Chairma n of Hout Bay

Fishing I ndustries, L td. (“Hout B ay ”), a fishing a nd fish-proc essing operatio n in Capetown, South Africa , throug h w h ic h d e f

e n d an ts p r in c ip a ll y

o r g an iz e d

th e ir c o n s p ir a c y

to c a p tu r e , p r o c e s s an d

e xport lobster to the United States. J eff rey Noll and David B eng is were presidents of two U .S. corporations that imported, proce ssed, pac ked, and distributed the f ish within t he United St ates on behalf of Hout B ay . A t a ll r e le va

nt t ime s, the ha

rv e sti ng , p ro c e ssi ngand

e xpor tin g of Sou th Coa st a

nd Wes t Co a st4

rock lobster s from South Af rica was g overne d under South Afr ican law principally

by the Marine L iving Resour ces A ct 18 of 1998 (“ML RA”), the r eg ulations promulgated under the ML RA, and the Convention on the Conservation of Mar i n e L i v i n g Resource s. The South Africa n Depa rtment of Marine a nd Coastal Manag ement re g ulated the ha rvesting , proce ssing a

nd exporting of f

ish from South Afric a’s waters by , int e r a lia , establishing f ishing sea son quotas and issuing ha rvesting and exporting per

mits. Defenda

nts caused H out Ba y

to harve st Sout h Coast and West Coast rock lob ste rs in a

mou nts e xce e din g a

uth or ize d q

uo ta s a nd to e xpor t tho se lob ste rs to t

he Un ite d St a te s. I n M ay 20 01 , So uth

Af ri c an a uth or iti e s se ize d a

nd op e ne d a

c on ta ine r o f u

nla wfu lly harve sted fish and a lerted U .S. authorities that another c ontainer w as sche duled t o arrive in the United States soon there afte r. Following the May 2001 seizure, the def

endants c ontinued to attempt to avoid detec tion and to perpe tuate their sc heme. Although South Af

rica n authorities obtained a

rre st warr ants for de fenda

nts, after concluding that defe ndants’ fina

ncial re source s and pre sence outside of South Af rica rende red the m “beyond the

rea ch of South Afr ican a

uthorities,” Mo rri

so n D e c l. , App. 324, South Af rica declined to charg e,

muc h le ss pr os e c ute , the m. I ns te a d, Sou th Af ri c a fo c us e d its pr os e c uti on on th e “S ou th Af ri c an- ba se d e nti tie s in vo lve d in the sc he me ,” inc lud ing Ho ut B ay , its ope ratio na l ma na g e r, Col lin van Schalkwy

k, sever al West Coast lobst er f isherman with whom Hout B ay had contr acte d, and fourtee n fisherie s inspectors who had take n bribes duringthe cour se of the sc heme. Id. a t3 2 5

. In April 2002, Arnold B eng is returne d to South Africa to ente r a ple a of guilty on behalf of Hout B ay for, int e r a lia , over- fishing of South and West C oast rock lobster in viola t i o n o f the ML RA. Acc ording to its pl ea a g ree ment with the South African g overnmen t , Ho u t Ba y paid a f ine of 12 milli on Rand (appr ox imately $1.2 milli on in April 2002) and f orfe ited two fi s h i n g boats and theTh e L a c e y Ac t pr ov ide s in

pe rt ine nt p art : “ I t is un lawf ul f or any pe rs on . . . ( 2) to 1 import, ex port, transport, se ll, rece ive, ac quire, or pur chase in interstate or f oreig n commerc e– (A) a ny fish or wildlife take n, possessed, tra nsported, or sold in violation of any law or r eg ulation of any State or in violation of any fore ign la

w.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (2)( A). The term “f ish or wildlife” is def

ined to include cr

ustace ans, such a s lobsters. 16 U.S.C. § 3371(a). OL RAC Method Ialso included a n additional cost measur e, “ove rhar vesting costs,” 2 which mea sured the c osts incurred by Hout Ba y ’s competitors as a

result of Hout B ay ’s ov e rh arv e sti ng . T he g ov e rnme nt e le c te d n ot t o s e e k th e a mou nt o f “ ov e rh arv e sti ngc os ts” in i ts application for

restitution because those costs wer e not borne direc tly by South Africa, but r ather by Ho ut B ay ’s c omp e tit or s. 5 contents of the c ontainer se ized by the g overnme nt. The South Africa n g overnme nt also cooper ated with the United S tates i n its investigation and prosecution of t he B eng ises and Noll for the ir violation of U.S. law. Following their indictments in the United States, Arnold B eng is and J eff rey Noll pleaded g uil ty to: (i ) c on sp ir a c y

to v iol a te the L a c e y

Ac t and to c omm it smu g g lin g in vio la tio n of 18 U. S.C. § 3 71 ; and

(i i) vio la tio ns of

the L a c e y Ac t, 1 6 U. S.C. § 33 72 (a )( 2) (A ). Da vid B e ng is p le a de d g uil ty 1 to the consp i ra cy charg e only . I n 2004, the def endants we re se ntence d to various terms of im p ri sonment and super

vised rele ase a

nd toge ther for feited a

total of $13,300,000 to the United States. Although the defe ndants’ plea ag ree ments acknow ledg ed that re stitut ion might be or dere d, with the parties’ consent, the district c ourt defe rre d the re stitut ion hear ing to a later date. Following the co u rt ’s decision to hol d a re stitut ion hear ing, the United States submitted a repor t prepa red by the Oce an and L and Resource Assessment Consultants (“ OL RAC”), a g roup of experts commissioned by

the South Africa

n Depa rtment of Mar ine and Coastal Ma nag ement , setting out two differ ent methods for c alculatingrestitution. OL RAC Method Ifocuse d on the co s t of

re me diatio n, i. e., wha t it w ou ld c os t So uth Af ri c a to r e sto re the ro c k lo bs te r f ish e ry to t he le ve l it would have been had the defe ndants not e ng ag ed in ove rhar vesting (the “catch forf

eit” a m o u n t). 26

OL RAC estimated restitution using the catch forf eit amount to be $46,775,150. OL RAC Method I Ifocuse d on the marke t val u e of the overha rvested f ish and was c alculate d by multipl y ing the quantity of over harve sted fish by

the pre vailing market price. OL RAC estimated re stitut ion using OL RAC Method I Ito be $61,932,630. The g overnme nt rec ommended that the district cour t adopt OL RAC Method Irestituti on amount—the lower

of the two c alculations—which totale d $39,700,000 afte r deduc ting t h e value of the fine and vesse ls previously forf eited by Hout ’s Ba y

to South Africa. Alter

natively , the g overnme nt rec ommended adoptingthe OL RAC Method I I calc ulation totaling $54,900,000 after those same de du ct i o n s. The district cour t held its decision on a re stitut ion awar d in abey ance pending the out come of settlement discussions, which ended uns ucce ssfully

. Consequently , on J une 2, 2006, the district court ref er red the restitution iss ues to a mag istrate judg e for a re port and

re c omm e nd a tio ns . II. The Decisions Below I n s e pa rate or de rs , th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e g ov e rnme nt’ s re qu e st fo r r e sti tut ion fo r S ou th Afric a under

the MVRA, Un ite d Stat es v. B e ng is , 03 Crim. 308, 2007 W L24170, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. J an. 29, 2007 ), an d t h e VW PA, Un ite d S tat es v . B e ng is , 03 Crim. 308, 2007 W L2669315, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2007). I n eac h order , the district c ourt adopted by ref ere nce the rea soning in the repor t and re commendation (“ R&R”) of the mag istrate judg e.7

A. Th e MV RA Wit h respe ct to the MVRA, the R& R concluded that pursuant to the limi t ed ca teg ories of

c ri me s f or wh ic h r e sti tut ion

is m and a tor

y , So uth Af

ri c a is e nti tle d to re sti tut ion

in t his c a se on ly

if the c on du c t to wh ic h d e fe nd ants ple a d guil ty c on sti tut e s “ an o ff

e ns e a g a ins t pr op e rt

y ” un de r T itl e 18 of th e Un ited States Code, 8 U.S.C. § 3663(A)(c )(1) (A)( ii). Un ite d S tat es v . B e ng is , 0 3 Cr im. 308, 2006 WL 3735654, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2006). Under our pre cede nts, the R&R continued, the def inition of “proper

ty ” is limit ed to “tang ible proper ty ,” see United States v. Cummings , 1 89 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), and not “ purely regulatory ” intere sts in which “the natur e of [the] proper ty cannot not be e conomic,” Cleveland v . United States , 531 U.S. 12, 13 (2000). Id. at *3. Her e, the mag istrate judg e conc luded, South Africa confr onts two obstacles. F irst, under South African la

w, the state doe s not “ own” the fish in its territoria l water s. Id. a t *6 . “ De fe nd a nts ’ acts of taking f

ish from South Africa

n water s that the South Africa n g overnme n t d i d n ot own,” the re fo re “ d o e s n o tp r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r an y o f f e n s e s a g a i n s tS o u t h A f

r i c anp r o p e rt y

t h a tw o u ld trig g er r estitution under the MVRA.” Id. at * 7 . Moreove r, bec ause “ the South Africa n laws that provide the ba sis for def

endants’ unde rlying violations here involve no ty pe of ta x es or sig nificant

reve nue for

South Af rica ,” the g overnme nt cannot cla im a proper ty interest in a “ tax or other form of re venue” connec ted to de fenda nt’s activity

. Id. at 8 (d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Pasquantino v. United States , 54 4 U .S. 34 9, 35 5- 57 (2 00 5) , w hic h c on c lud e d th a t th e Cana dia n g ov e rnme nt h old s a

pr op e rt y int e re st i n th e su

bs tanti a l li qu or

ta x re ve nu e that de fend ant s avo ide d p ay inga s a re su lt o f t

he ir smugg ling sc heme)

. F ina lly , the dis tr ic t court re je c te d the arg

ume nt that def

e nd ant’ s v iol a tio n o f t

he L a c e y Ac t, itself, constituted an off

ense a g ainst proper

ty pursuant to Title 18. Id. at *8. L ike the ML RA, the8

L ace y Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (2)( A) (c riminaliz ing trade in “ any fish or wildlife take n, possessed, transporte d, or sold . . . in violation of any fore ign la

w.”), wa s en ac t ed for

regulatory , and not economic, pur

poses, as a

result of whic h a viol ation there of i s not an offense ag ainst proper ty
. Id. at *9. B

. Th e VWPA Havingdeni ed mandatory restitution under the MVRA, the district c ourt consider ed and reje cted discr etionary

restitution under the VWPA, adopting the mag istrate judg e’s c onclusion that South Africa w as not a “victim” of def endants’ c rime. Un ite d S

tat es v . B e ng is , 03 Crim. 308, 2007 WL26 69 31 5, a t *1

. I n or de r to be a vic tim fo r the purp os e s of the VWPA , th e los s su sta ine d mu st be “‘ cause d by t h e o ffense of c onviction.’” Un ite d S tat es v . B e ng is , 0 3 Cr im

. 3 0 8 , 2 0 0 7 WL 1 4 5 0 3 8 1 , at * 3 (S

. D. N. Y. M ay 1 7 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Silkowski , 32 F.3d 682, 689 ( 2d Cir. 1994)). The underlying violation of the L ace y Act—the c rime to which de fenda nts pleaded g uilty —related t o the trade in i lle g a lly ob ta ine d lo bs te rs and

no t th e ov e rf

ish ingof lob ste r i n So uth Af ri c an w a te rs . T hat is , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d, “ [i]t was no t ne c e ssa ry fo r t he g ov e rnme nt t o have pr oved that the de fenda nts . . were the ones who took the f ish in viol ation of South Africa n law.” Un ite d Sta te

s v . B e ng is , 03 Crim. 308, 2007 W L2669315, at *1. B eca use the g overnme nt’s los s th e or ie s w e re pr e dic a te d o n th e inj ur y a sso c ia te d w iththe c on seque nc e s o f d e fe nd a nts ’ overf ishing—a s opposed to its trading —and the overf

ishing of lobster is not directly related to any of the re quired c riminal conduct unde r the statutes to w hich defe ndants plead g uilty , the district court conclude d that South Africa is not a vic tim under the VWPA. Un ite d S tat es v . B e ng is , 03 Crim. 308, 2007 WL 1450381, at *7.9

Finally , th e d is tric t court obser ved that, if discr etionary

restitution were available , calc ulating South Africa’ s injury

would involve “complex issues of fore ign la w as we ll a s i n tricate questions of fa ct,” a s a re sult of which “e x tensive fur ther proc eeding s would be re quired.” Un i t ed S tates v. Be ng is , 03 Crim. 308, 2007 WL 2669315, at *2. Acc ording ly , the district court held that, e ven if a restitution order pur suant to the VWPA were pe rmissible, “the complication and prolong ation of the

se nte nc ingpr oc e ss r e su lti ngfr om t he fa sh ion ingof

an o rd e r o f r e sti tut ion

un de r t his se c tio n w ou ld outweig h the nee d to provide re stitut ion” in this case. Id. III. Discussion On appe al, the g overnme nt c halleng es the district c ourt’s conclusions that South Africa ha d no proper ty interest in the overharve sted lobsters and that it was not di rec tly harme d as a r esult of the def endants’ illeg al sche me. We reviewa district cour t’s decision to de ny an order of restitution f or abuse of discre tion. Nordwi nd v. Rowland , 584 F.3d 420, 429 (2d C ir. 2009). “To identify such abuse , we must conc lude that a c ha lle ng e d r

uli ngre sts on

an e rr or of law, a c le arl y e rro ne ou s f

ind ingof fa c t, o r o the rw ise cannot be located w ithin the rang e of perm i s s i b l e decisions.” United States v. Pe arson , 570 F.3d 480, 486 (2d Cir. 2009) (pe r cur iam) (inter nal quotation marks re moved).10

A. South Africa’ s proper ty interest in the illeg ally

harve sted rock lobster s The MVRA provides for mandatory restitution in all sente ncing proce eding s for c onvictions of any offe nse that is, int e r a lia , “an of fense ag ainst proper

ty under [Title 18] .

. . in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffe red a . . . pecunia

ry loss.” 18 U.S.C. § 366 3A (c )( 1) (A )( ii) -( c )( 1) (B ). Ac c or din g ly , the thr e sh old qu e sti on is w he the r S ou th A fr ic a

ha s a pr op e rt y int e re st i n th e ill e g a lly

ha rv e ste d r oc k lo bs te rs . We c on c lud e that S ou th Africa ha s a pr op e rt y ri g ht i n il le g a lly

ha rv e ste d r oc k lo bs te rs . Under South African la

w the rock lobsters may

be har vested law fully

pursuant to a r eg ulatory scheme administered by the Depa rtment of Mar ine and Coastal Ma nag ement. F urthermor e, under Sou th A fr ic an la

w, lob ste rs c a

ug ht i lle g a lly

are no t th e pr op e rt

y of tho se wh o c a

ug ht the m, M L RA § 4 4( 2) , a nd the Sou th A fr ic an g ov e rnme nt i s a uth or ize d to se ize ill e g a lly ha rv e ste d lo bs ters, se ll them, and re tain the proce eds, §§ 51(3)( c)( iii), 63(1)(b) , 68(1). Put differ ently , lobsters possessed in violation of the regulatory scheme do n o t b ec o m e p ro perty of the possessors, r ather they are

su bje c t to se izur e and

sa le by the g ov ernm ent of South Af ri c a . U nd e r t

his log ic , th e mom e nt a fi sh e rm an p ull s an ille g a lly ha rv e ste d lobs te r out of the se a , a pr op e rt y ri g ht t o s e ize that lo bs te r i s vested in the g overnme nt of South Af rica

. Evading seizure of overha rvested lobsters thus deprives South Africa of

an opportunity

to sell those illega lly

captur ed lobsters at marke t price and re tain the proce eds, repr esenting an economic loss to South Af rica eac h time a

n illega lly harve sted lobster g oes unseized. South Africa’ s interest in those illeg ally harve sted lobsters, there fore , g oes bey ond a mer e

re g ulator y int e re st i n a dmi nis te ri ngthe fi sh inga c tiv iti e s in its wate rs . Con tr ary to t he Di str ic t Co ur

t’ s c on c lus ion , th e Sup re me Court ’s ho ldi ngin Pasquantino —a

nd no t Cleveland

— p r o v id e s th e c lo s e s t an a lo g y to So u th A f r ic a ’ s in te r e s t in the11

lobsters seized by

the def endants a nd g uides our ana ly sis here. In Cleveland , the Supreme Court conclude d that, beca

use its interest was “ purel y re gu l atory ,” the State of L ouisiana did not have a “prope rty ” rig ht in a

n unissued license to a

video poker

operator, despite the pr e-issuanc e proc essing fee s collecte d by

the s tate. 531 U.S. at 20-21. As J ustice Ginsburg e x plained, “T he State re ceive s the lion’s share of its expected re venue not w hile the license s remain in its own hands, but only afte r they h av e b ee n i s s ued to license es. L icense s pre- issuance do not g ener ate a n ong oing stre am of

reve nue.” Id. I mportantly , the Supreme Court note d that “as to the c hara cter of L ouisiana’s stake in its v i d eo p o k er licenses,” the licensee in Cleveland did no t “ de fr a

ud the state of

any mon e y to which the State wa s entitled by law.” Id. at 22. By contra st, in Pasquantino , t h e S u p r e m e C o u rth e l d

t h a t C an a d a d i d p o s s e s s a “ p r o p e rt y” rig h t to u n c o ll e c te d e xc is e taxe s o n li qu o r th a t w a s il le g a ll y im p o rte d in to th e c ountry . The

un c oll e c te d tax, Justi c e Th oma s r e a so ne d, wa s a ri g ht t o “ c oll e c t mo ne y ” wh ic h is a “ va lua ble entitlement” conside red to be “‘pr operty ’ as that term ordinarily is employ ed.” Pasquantino , 544 U.S. at 355-56 ( citing B l a c k ’ s L aw D i c t i o n a r y 1 3 8 2 ( 4 t h e d

. 1 9 5 1 ) ( d e f i n i n g d e f i n i n g “ p r o p e rt y”

a s “ e xt e n d [i n g ] t o e v e r

y s p e c i e s o f

v a l u a b l e r i g h tan d

i n t e r e s t ” ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m m i t t e d ) ; se e als o Pasquantino , 544 U.S. at 356 (“The rig ht to be paid money has long been thoug ht to be a spec ies of proper ty .”) ( citing 3 W. B lackstone, Commentaries on the L aws of E ng land 153-155 (1768) ). The Court had no d o u

b t th a t th e r ig h t to c o ll e c t th a t r e v e n u e w a s “ ‘ s o me th in g o f v a lu e ’ to the Gover nment of Canada .” Id. at 3 5 5 (q u o t i n g McNally v. U nited States , 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)). As a re sult, the Pasquantino Court clear ly distinguished its ear lier holding in Cleveland

. In Cleveland , the “St ate’ s interest in an unis sued vi deo poker license w as not ‘prope rty ,’ bec ause the interest in choosing particula r license es wa s ‘pure ly regulatory ’ and ‘[could not] be ec onomic,’” id.We also rejec t the R&R’s re liance on the district court ca ses sug g esting that “off enses 3 ag ainst proper

ty ” ar e limited to offense s ag ainst “tang ible proper ty ,” including money . Our prec edents dictate that the def inition of property

is broader

than those ca ses sug g est. See U nited Sta te s v . M ils te in , 481 F.3d 132, 137 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (re cog nizi ng intang ible proper ty). 12 at 3 5 7 (q u o t i n g Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 22-23). Indeed, “ the Gover nment nowher e alleg e[d] that [t he defe ndant] defra

uded the State of

any money t o wh i ch t h e S tate wa s entitled by law.” Id. In Pasquantino , on the other ha nd, “Cana da’s e ntitlement to tax reve nue is a str ai ghtforwa rd ‘ec onomic’ intere st . . . the Governme nt alleg ed an d p ro v ed that petitioners’ sche me aimed at depriving Canada

of money

to which it was entitled by law.” Id. L ike the def

enda n ts in Pasquantino , A rn old B e ng is, Jef

fr e y No ll, and

Da vid B e ng is’ conspirac y

to conce al t heir il leg al t rade in lobster deprive d South Africa of money it was due. Ha d the d ef en d ants not undertake n eff orts to conce al their ove rhar vesting , including of

f-loading overha rvested lobster s at nig ht and under -re port i ng the amounts of their c atch to South Africa n authorities, those lobsters ca ug ht in ex cess of

the leg al limits would have be en seized and sold by the g overnme nt. As a conseque nce, the defe ndants’ conduc t deprived South Afr ica of proce eds fr om the sale of

the illeg ally

harve sted lobsters, i.e., “money to which it was e ntitled by law.” Id. J ust as in Pasquantino , “ ha d [de fe nd ants ] co mpl ie d w ith[the ir ] le g a l ob lig a tio n, the y wo uld hav e pa id

mo n e y t o [S o u t h A f

r i c a ]. ” L i k e C an a d a ’ s e n t i t l e m e n t t o i t s u n c o l l e c t e d e xc i s e t a x r e ve nu e in Pasquantino , So uth

Af ri c a ’s e nti tle me nt t o th e re ve nu e fr om the lob ste rs that w e re take n il le g a lly do e s c on sti tut e “ pr op e rt

y .” Th e de fe nd ants ’ co nd uc t in de pr ivi ng Sou th Af ri c a of that r e ve nu e is, t h e r e f o r e , ano f f e n s e a g a i n s tp r o p e rt y. 3 B . So uth Af ri c a a s a “ vic tim ” un de r t

he MV RA and

VWPA13

Both the MVRA a

nd VWPA contemplate that a court must or m ay order the defendant to pay

re sti tut ion

to a “ vic tim .” 18 U. S.C. § 3 66 3A (a )( 1) ; § 3 66 3( a )( 1) (A ). B oth statut e s d e fi ne a

“ vic tim ”

a s: a per son directly and proximately

harme d as a result of the commission of an o ff e ns e fo r w hic h r e sti tut ion may be or de re d inc lud ing , in t he c a se of an of fense that involves as an e lement a sc heme, c onspiracy , or patter n of cr imin al ac tivity , any person dire ctly

harme d by

the def endant’ s criminal conduc t in the course of the sche me, conspira cy , or patter n. Id. § 3 6 6 3 A ( a ) ( 2 ) ; § 3 6 6 3 ( a ) ( 2 )

. I n it s s e c o n d o r d e r a d o p ti n g th e ma g is tr ate ju d g e ’ s r e p o rt, the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d r e sti tut ion

un de r t he VWPAon

the g ro un d th a t So uth

Af ri c a wa s n ot a “ vic tim ” entitled to restitution beca use it had fa iled to show that it had suffer ed any losses directly

cause d by the def endants’ illeg al sche me. We disag ree . Rely ing on the m agistrate judg e’s r eport a nd district court’s orde r, the de fenda nts contend that, even if

South Africa ha d a prope rty rig ht in th e l o bsters, it is not a victim of the conspirac y beca use t he conspiracy to which the defe ndants pleade d g uilty did not involve the illega l harve sting of the lobsters, only their i mportation to the Unit ed S tates wit h the knowledg e that the lobsters ha d been obta ined in violation of South African la w. We are not persuade d. The de fenda nts need not have pe rsonally

harve sted the lobsters in order to have de prived the South Afr ican g overnme nt of its property

rig ht in the lobster s. By smugg ling the lobsters out of South Af rica knowing that they ha d b e e n h arv e ste d unla

wf ull y , d e fe nd ants de pr ive d th e Sou th A fr ic an g ov e rnme nt o f it s ri g ht t o seize and sell the poac hed lobsters. The defe ndants’ conduc t fac ilitated the illega l harve sting of the lobsters by

providing acc ess to the United States marke t and ena bled the poac hing to g o undetec ted by the Sou th A fr ic an g ov e rnme nt b y , f or e xamp le , o ff

-l oa din g the ov erha rvest e d lo bs te r at ni g ht,

un de r- re po rt ingc a tc h amou nts to S ou th A fr ic an a

uth or iti e s, br ibi ngof

fi c ia ls, and

su bmi tti ngfa lse14

e xpor t d oc ume nts . In d oin g so , th e de fe nd ants ’ c ri min a l c on du c t “ dir e c tly ha rm e d” the Sou th Afric an g overnme nt, which in turn makes South Af rica elig ible for restitution under the VWPA and MVRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)( 2); § 3663(a) (2). B e c a us e Sou th A fr ic a

ha d a pr op e rt y int e re st i n the ill e g a lly ha

rv e ste d lob ste rs and

is a vic tim for pur poses of re stitut ion, we hold that the MVRA g overns the r estitution award at issue here

. C. Calculating a Restitution Award We further

conclude that the fa cts on the rec ord do not suppor t the district court’s findingthat the complexity

of fa shioning a

n awa rd of r estitution would furth er co m p l i cate and prolongthe

se nte nc e so that the burd e n on the se nte nc ing pr oc e ss ou tw e ig hs any ne e d to pr ov ide re sti tut ion to which South Africa

is entitled. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)( 3). Given our analy sis of the nature of Sou th A fr ic a ’s pr op e rt

y int e re st a

nd our r e vie w o f t

he re c or d, OL RAC Me tho d I Ise e ms t o u s a sufficie nt loss calculation methodolog y under the circ umstances pr esente d by this case. Th is me thod most directly

trac es the nature of the loss inflicted on South Afric a because , had the poaching been de te c te d, Sou th Af

ri c a wo uld have be e n en tit le d to sei ze the ill e g a lly ha rv e ste d lobs te rs a t th a t ti me and sell them at mar

ket price for its own bene fit

. R es t i t u t ion would thus be calc ulated by multipl y ing the number of poa ched lobster s by the cor respondingm ar ket price (base d on the preva iling mar

ket rates at t h e t i me the lobsters we re poa ched) . Every overha rvested lobster

that South Africa did not seize and se ll repre sents a loss that has not bee n rec overe d. We note, further

more, that ther e is no problem in imposing both a r estitution award a nd a forf eiture a war d in t h i s case . Se e Un ite d S tat es v . Ka lis h , 626 F.3d 165, 169- 70 (2d Cir. 2010) ( n o t i n g t h a t“ s i m u l t an e o u s i mp o s i t i o n ” o f b o t ha f o r f e i tu r e r e m e dy an d

a r e s t i tu t i o nr e m e dy, authorized by

separ ate statutes, “ offe nds no constitutional provision”). We l ea v e to t he district15

court’s de termination in the first instance all rele vant issues relatin g t o t h e amount of re stitut ion,

w h e th e r an y o f

f

- s e t s h o u ld a

p p ly , an d if s o , w h e th e r

th e r e s h o u ld

b e o n e b a s e d

o nth e f o r f e it u r e . We note in passing , howeve r, that to the ex tent that a restituti on awa rd for South Afric a that is derive d from the m ar k et v al ue of the illega lly harve sted lobsters might be duplicative of the sums that defe ndants have alre ady forf eited to the United States, the g overnme nt may exercise its discre tion to transfe r the for feited f

unds to Sout h Afric a, in orde r to r educe the restitution awar d by the amount defe ndants have alre ady

forf eited. See Gov’ t Br

. 5 6 n.* (“U nder the Depa rtment of Just ice’ s Restoration Policy , once the District Court orders r estitution, t h e Government would have the dis c re tio n to fo rw ard

tho se mon ie s to Sou th A fr ic a in p art ia l satis fa c tio n o f t he d e fe nd a nts ’ restitution obligations.”). We e x press no viewas to how such issues should be r esolved. IV. Conclusion F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e jud g me nts of the dis tr ic t court are VA CA TE D, and the c a se is REMANDED to the district c ourt with instructions to calculate r estitution and enter a n order of restitution in favor of the Republic of South Africa

.