SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4432-16T4

IN THE MATTER OF 

RUDDY CASTILLO,

UNION CITY.

_______________________

Submitted September 9, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Rothstadt and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service 

Commission, Docket No. 2016-2387.

Ruddy Castillo, appellant pro se.

O'Toole Scrivo Fernandez Weiner Van Lieu, LLC, 

attorneys for respondent Union City (Kenneth B. 

Goodman, of counsel and on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission 

(Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, 

of counsel; Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Ruddy Castillo appeals the Civil Service Commission's 

(Commission) final agency decision denying his application to reopen his 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 17, 2019
2

A-4432-16T4

administrative appeal of the termination of his employment by the City of Union 

City (the City). Petitioner also appeals the Commission's final agency decision 

denying his motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

Prior to his termination, petitioner held the position of "Laborer 1" with 

the Union City Department of Parks and Recreation. On or about December 8, 

2011, the City sent petitioner a preliminary notice of disciplinary action (PNDA) 

via certified mail, charging petitioner with excessive absenteeism, 

insubordination, failure to perform duties, and other infractions. Specifically, 

the PNDA stated that petitioner "ha[d] been absent from work, without 

permission and [sic] and/or without giving the requisite notice, since September 

26, 2011" and, prior to September 26, "was insubordinate in that he refused to 

perform those tasks required of him."

A departmental disciplinary hearing was held on February 16, 2012, but 

petitioner did not appear at the hearing. The hearing officer recommended 

termination. The City concurred with the hearing officer's recommendation and 

sent petitioner a final notice of disciplinary action (FNDA) via certified mail on 

May 14, 2012. The FNDA terminated petitioner's employment effective 

December 12, 2011, and advised him of his right to appeal within twenty days 

of receipt of the FNDA.
3

A-4432-16T4

Petitioner, however, asserted that he did not receive notice of the 

departmental hearing because the disciplinary notices had been sent to an

incorrect address. By letter dated June 18, 2012, the City agreed to hold a 

rehearing as to the disciplinary charges.

Before a departmental rehearing was held,

1 petitioner appealed his 

termination to the Commission. On June 22, 2012, the matter was transferred 

to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for hearing as a contested case. 

After adjournments, the hearing was scheduled for February 22, 2013. By letter 

dated February 22, 2013, however, petitioner voluntarily withdrew his appeal 

based on the City's agreement to rehear the matter at the departmental level. The 

letter provided that if petitioner was unsatisfied with the outcome, he could 

appeal to the Commission "within the requisite time period." 

It appears that the parties unsuccessfully pursued a settlement after the 

voluntary dismissal of petitioner's appeal. By letter dated December 13, 2013, 

the City confirmed to petitioner that he was terminated from employment on 

December 12, 2011. 

 

1

 The departmental rehearing was scheduled for July 12, 2012 but was held in 

abeyance to explore the possible resolution of the matter by petitioner retiring 

on ordinary disability.
4

A-4432-16T4

Over two years after the withdrawal of his appeal, on May 22, 2015, 

petitioner requested that the Commission reinstate his appeal. In a written 

decision issued November 9, 2015, the Commission found that petitioner did not 

present a sufficient basis or good cause to reopen his appeal. The Commission 

noted that "[a]lthough the settlement discussions may have come to an impasse 

in July 2013, there was no doubt that in December 2013, the appointing authority 

considered the petitioner removed from employment." The Commission further 

reasoned that although N.J.A.C. 1:1-19.2 did not specify a time limit for filing 

a motion to reopen an appeal, "the petitioner's request was filed almost a year 

and one-half after he received definite notice in December 2013 that he no longer 

would be reinstated to his Laborer 1 position" and that "petitioner has not 

provided any explanation regarding this delay." The Commission concluded 

that "[u]nder these circumstances, it is prejudicial to the appointing authority to 

permit the petitioner now to reopen his administrative appeal, almost four years 

after the disciplinary action in question and over two years after he withdrew his 

appeal."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the denial of his application to 

reinstate his appeal. By decision issued May 8, 2017, the Commission denied 

petitioner's application, finding that there was no showing of a clear material 
5

A-4432-16T4

error or any evidence or additional information that would change the outcome 

of the case. See N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.6(b). The Commission found that petitioner's 

stated explanation for the delay in seeking to reinstate the appeal, i.e., that he 

had been unable to pay for expenses of litigating the claim earlier, was without 

merit because he could have appeared pro se before the OAL. In addition, the 

Commission found that petitioner inappropriately raised substantive arguments 

against his termination, including that he was harassed and was being retaliated 

against, which were not relevant to the application for reconsideration because 

the Commission had not previously addressed the reasons for petitioner's

termination.

On appeal, petitioner urges us to reverse the Commission's decisions. 

Having reviewed the record in light of the applicable legal principles, we 

conclude that the Commission's decisions are supported by sufficient credible 

evidence in the record. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Accordingly, the Commission's 

determinations were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and there is no 

reason to disturb them. See In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007). 

To the extent we have not addressed any of petitioner's remaining 

arguments on appeal, we find they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in 

a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 
6

A-4432-16T4

Affirmed.