IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SUNDER ENERGY, LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v.

TYLER JACKSON, FREEDOM FOREVER 

LLC, BRETT BOUCHY, CHAD TOWNER, 

FREEDOM SOLAR PROS, LLC, and SOLAR 

PROS LLC,

Defendants. 

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C.A. No. 2023-0988-JTL

OPINION DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Date Submitted: November 17, 2023

Date Decided: November 22, 2023

Raymond J. DiCamillo, Chad M. Shandler, Steven J. Fineman, Kelly E. Farnan, 

Kevin M. Gallagher, Christine D. Haynes, Alexander M. Krischik, Sara M. Metzler, 

RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Joshua Berman, 

Jackson Herndon, Paul C. Gross, Ben Nicholson, Michael H. Rover, PAUL 

HASTINGS LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Plaintiff Sunder Energy, LLC.

Timothy R. Dudderar, Aaron R. Sims, Abraham C. Schneider, POTTER ANDERSON 

& CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Maureen M. Stewart, FOLEY & 

LARDNER LLP, Tampa, Florida; Jordan C. Bledsoe, Tyler Dever, Bryce W. Talbot 

FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, Salt Lake City, Utah; Attorneys for Defendant Tyler 

Jackson.

Paul J. Lockwood, Jenness E. Parker, Jessica R. Kunz, Matthew R. Conrad, Eric M. 

Holleran, Mallory V. Phillips, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, 

Wilmington, Delaware; Karen Hoffman Lent, Evan R. Kreiner, SKADDEN, ARPS, 

SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Defendants 

Freedom Forever LLC, Brett Bouchy, Chad Towner and Freedom Solar Pros, LLC.

LASTER, V.C.
1

Sunder Energy, LLC (“Sunder”) sells residential solar power systems. Sunder 

does not install the systems. Once a Sunder salesperson signs up a deal, the installer 

takes over the process. Until September 2023, Sunder had an exclusive dealer 

agreement with Freedom Forever LLC (“Freedom”), one of the nation’s largest 

installers. 

Tyler Jackson was Sunder’s head of sales. During 2022 and 2023, Sunder’s 

relationship with Freedom deteriorated. In summer 2023, Freedom’s principals 

encouraged Jackson to join Solar Pros LLC, an up-and-coming Freedom dealer. 

Between Monday, September 11, 2023, and Tuesday, September 19, nine of the 

twelve Senior Regional Managers, Regional Managers, and Co-Regional Managers 

who reported to Jackson joined Solar Pros. Over three hundred Sunder sales

personnel followed them. None of the managers or sales personnel have any 

restrictions on their ability to work for a competitor or to solicit Sunder personnel. 

On Friday, September 22, 2023, Jackson signed an independent contractor 

agreement with Solar Pros. Four hours later, he resigned from Sunder. On Monday, 

September 25, Solar Pros announced that Jackson had joined as its new President. 

Sunder maintains that Jackson is bound by restrictive covenants. He received 

Incentive Units in Sunder, and the attorneys who drafted Sunder’s LLC agreement 

embedded in its terms a set of restrictive covenants (the “Covenants”) that bind any 

holder of Incentive Units. The Covenants consist of:

• A restriction prohibiting the holder from engaging in any competitive activity 

(the “Competition Restriction”);
2

• A restriction prohibiting the holder from soliciting Sunder’s employees and 

independent contractors (the “Personnel Restriction”);

• A restriction prohibiting the holder from soliciting, selling to, accepting any 

business from, or engaging in any business relationship with any of Sunder’s 

customers (the “Customer Restriction”); and 

• A restriction prohibiting the holder from inducing, influencing, causing, 

advising, or encouraging any Sunder stakeholder to terminate its relationship 

with Sunder (the “Stakeholder Restriction”). 

The LLC agreement also imposes an expansive restriction on the use of Sunder’s 

confidential information, broadly defined. 

Each Covenant applies not only to the holder of the Incentive Unit but also to 

that person’s “Affiliates,” defined to include the holder’s spouse, parents, siblings, and 

descendants, both natural and adopted. The Covenants thus purport to bind 

Jackson’s wife and children. The Covenants apply during the period when the holder 

owns the Incentive Units and for two years afterward. A holder has no ability to 

transfer the Incentive Units, but Sunder can repurchase them for zero dollars if the 

holder is terminated or leaves other than for good reason. Because Sunder can decide 

not to repurchase the Incentive Units, the Covenants could be perpetual. 

The Incentive Units are a form of incentive compensation. Jurisdictions other 

than Delaware have a significant interest in how businesses compensate employees 

and independent contractors and the extent to which businesses can attach 

restrictive covenants to those arrangements. Sunder has its headquarters in Utah, 

which has an obvious interest in that subject and has passed legislation to regulate 

it. Jackson lives in Texas, which has an interest in the extent to which its citizens 
3

can earn a living. Freedom has its headquarters in California, and Solar Pros has its 

headquarters in Nevada, so those jurisdictions have interests as well. 

But Sunder filed suit here—in Delaware—because Sunder is a Delaware LLC 

and its lawyers deployed the now widespread legal technology of inserting restrictive 

covenants into an internal governance document. Businesses and their lawyers do 

that so they can invoke Delaware’s contractarian regime and argue that it should 

override how other jurisdictions regulate restrictive covenants. 

That legal technology calls on the Delaware courts to adjudicate postemployment disputes for the country and potentially the world. In the past five years 

alone, the Court of Chancery has issued written decisions addressing disputes over 

restrictive covenants for businesses operating in Hong Kong,1 Italy,2 Alabama,3

1 Ainslie v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., 2023 WL 106924 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2023).

2 AlixPartners, LLP v. Mori, 2022 WL 1111404 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2022); AlixPartners, 

LLP v. Mori, 2019 WL 6327325 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2019).

3 HighTower Hldg., LLC v. Gibson, 2023 WL 1856651 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2023); FP UC 

Hldgs., LLC v. Hamilton, 2020 WL 1492783 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2020).
4

Arizona,4 California,5 Colorado,6 Idaho,7 Illinois,8 Louisiana,9 Nebraska,10 New 

Jersey,11 New York,12 Oklahoma,13 and Texas.14 Only two businesses operated in 

Delaware, one of which filed two cases.15 That list excludes transcript rulings. 

For Delaware courts to address these matters is problematic because the 

Delaware franchise depends on other states deferring to Delaware law to govern the 

internal affairs of the entities that Delaware charters. Delaware risks jeopardizing 

4 Dunn v. FastMed Urgent Care, P.C., 2019 WL 4131010 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2019).

5 Gener8, LLC v. Castanon, 2023 WL 6381635 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2023); Sorrento 

Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mack, 2023 WL 5670689 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2023); UBEO Hldgs., LLC v. 

Drakulic, 2021 WL 1716966 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2021); Focus Fin. P’rs, LLC v. Holsopple, 250 

A.3d 939 (Del. Ch. 2020); Focus Fin. P’rs, LLC v. Holsopple, 241 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2020); 

NuVasive, Inc. v. Miles, 2020 WL 5106554 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2020); NuVasive, Inc. v. Miles, 

2019 WL 4010814 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2019); NuVasive, Inc. v. Miles, 2018 WL 4677607 (Del. 

Ch. Sept. 28, 2018).

6 Mountain W. Series of Lockton Cos., LLC v. Alliant Ins. Servs., Inc., 2019 WL 

2536104 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2019).

7 Kodiak Bldg. P’rs, LLC v. Adams, 2022 WL 5240507 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2022).

8 Centurion Serv. Gp., LLC v. Wilensky, 2023 WL 5624156 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2023).

9 AG Res. Hldgs, LLC v. Terral, 2021 WL 486831 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2021).

10 Cabela’s LLC v. Wellman, 2018 WL 5309954 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2018).

11 CelestialRX Invs., LLC v. Krivulka, 2019 WL 1396764 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2019).

12 Intertek Testing Servs. NA, Inc. v. Eastman, 2023 WL 2544236 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 

2023); Badger Hldg. LLC v. Kirsch, 2018 WL 4709563 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018).

13 Parks v. Horizon Hldgs., LLC, 2022 WL 2821337 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2022).

14 U.S. Legal Support, Inc. v. Lucido, 2021 WL 4940823 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2021).

15 Lyons Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wark, 2020 WL 429114 (Del. Ch. Jan. 28, 2020); Lyons 

Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wilson, 2018 WL 4677606 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2018); Physiotherapy Corp. 

v. Moncure, 2018 WL 1256492 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2018).
5

that deference if Delaware accommodates efforts to use the internal governance 

documents of its entities to override the law of other states on issues of great 

importance to them.

16

For Delaware courts to address these matters is unsustainable because the 

Court of Chancery will never have sufficient resources to adjudicate restrictive 

covenant cases for Delaware entities throughout the world. The court’s core role is to 

resolve internal governance disputes for Delaware entities. To Delaware’s good 

fortune, the number of its entities has grown year over year. At the end of 2017, the 

starting point for the five-year lookback that this decision has used, Delaware had 

chartered more than 1.3 million entities.17 At the end of 2022, there were over 1.9 

million, reflecting aggregate growth of 46% and compound annual growth of nearly 

8%. At that rate, the number of Delaware entities should easily crest 2 million in 

2023.18 Because some number of entities have disputes each year, more Delaware 

entities means more disputes. It thus should come as no surprise that the court’s 

expansion from five to seven constitutional judges in 2018 was not a permanent fix. 

It enabled the court to meet 2018 demand, not future demand. 

16 See Diedenhofen-Lennartz v. Diedenhofen, 931 A.2d 439, 451–52 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“If 

we expect that other sovereigns will respect our state’s overriding interest in the 

interpretation and enforcement of our entity laws, we must show reciprocal respect.”).

17 Del. Div. of Corps., 2017 Annual Report, https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/2017-

annual-report/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2023). 

18 Del. Div. of Corps., 2022 Annual Report, https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ (last visited 

Nov. 20, 2023). 
6

For the Court of Chancery to entertain restrictive covenant cases from far and 

wide diverts the court’s attention from its core mission. And it generates considerably 

more work. As this case shows, restrictive covenant cases often start with an 

emergency application for a temporary restraining order, followed by a highly 

expedited motion for a preliminary injunction. Rulings on those preliminary matters 

do not end the case, which can continue to a trial on requests for permanent injunctive 

relief and damages. The factual issues are difficult because they frequently involve 

assertions about surreptitious activity and betrayal, and the discovery disputes 

regularly involve questions about spoliation. The legal questions are equally complex 

because they require determining what law applies, parsing dense contractual 

clauses, and balancing competing interests. 

A solution needs to be found, and the market is unlikely to provide it. This is 

an area where Delaware’s interests and the interests of its bar as a whole conflict 

with the individual interests of clients and their lawyers. For any single business, it 

makes sense for a lawyer to advise the client to embed restrictive covenants in an 

internal governance document. And for any single business faced with a dispute over 

those restrictions, it makes sense for a lawyer to advise the client to file a lawsuit in 

the Court of Chancery. In the aggregate, that is a recipe for a tragedy of the commons. 

A judicial solution is also unlikely, because judges decide specific cases. 

Doubtless there are many combinations of fixes involving choice of law, personal 

jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction that could address this burgeoning 

problem. But a cure requires the involvement of policymakers beyond the courts. 
7

In an ideal world, this case would have been filed in Utah, Nevada, or Texas. 

But the case is here, and it must be decided.

Sunder’s application for a preliminary injunction against Jackson is denied 

because Sunder cannot establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The 

Covenants are part of an agreement that cannot be enforced against Jackson because 

the agreement originates in an egregious breach of fiduciary duty. The Covenants are 

also facially unreasonable in their own right. 

Sunder’s application for a preliminary injunction against the other defendants 

for tortiously interfering with the Covenants is denied for lack of an underlying 

breach of contract. Relief is also denied because Utah law governs that claim, and 

Utah requires conduct that is inherently tortious. The defendants engaged in conduct 

that could support a claim under the multi-factor balancing test that Delaware 

deploys, but not the inherently tortious conduct that Utah requires.

This ruling does not mean that Sunder cannot prove any claims or receive any 

remedy. Sunder might have non-contractual claims that it could prove against 

Jackson for the actions he took before resigning, and Sunder might be able to recover 

damages if it proves those claims. But Sunder cannot obtain the preliminary 

injunction it seeks. 
8

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the record developed in connection with Sunder’s 

application for a preliminary injunction. The parties have submitted numerous 

documentary exhibits and the deposition testimony of eighteen fact witnesses.19

What follows are the facts as they are likely to be found after trial, based on 

the current record. The court must attempt to predict what the factual findings 

eventually will be. The findings of fact after trial may be different.

19 Citations in the form “PX __” are to exhibits that Sunder submitted with its opening 

brief or reply brief. Citations in the form “FX __” are to exhibits that Freedom submitted with 

its answering brief. Citations in the form “JX __” are to exhibits that Jackson submitted with 

his answering brief. Citations in the form “[Name] __” refer to deposition transcripts.

The parties’ choices for producing texts and emails made reviewing the record much 

harder than it needed to be. Sunder generally produced emails and text messages with times 

denoted in Greenwich Mean Time. To determine when events took place, the court had to 

consider what time zone the author would have been in and make an adjustment. Yet for 

email chains, Sunder only used that timing convention for the top email in the chain. Emails 

lower in the chain reflected the local time when they were sent. 

The defendants used a different system. They produced text messages with times 

denoted in Greenwich Mean Time but emails with times denoted in local time, which was 

Pacific time for all of their custodians. Jackson similarly produced text messages with times 

denoted in Greenwich Mean Time and emails with times denoted in local time, which was 

Mountain time for him. Jackson also produced documents from the LGCY action that were 

processed by a different vendor, so no one could say what the timing convention was. 

The use of Greenwich Mean Time and the combination of different timing conventions 

were not helpful. If this had not been an expedited application for a preliminary injunction, 

the court would have ordered the parties to resubmit all of the exhibits in a form that 

identified the local time and time zone for each communication. To avoid having to undertake 

that exercise in the future, parties should agree as part of a discovery plan on a consistent 

form of production that will promote efficiency rather than create confusion. 
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A. Sunder’s Beginnings

Sunder is a solar sales dealer that is organized as a Delaware limited liability 

company and headquartered in Utah. Sunder currently operates in at least fortyseven states.

Sunder’s sole business involves securing agreements with residential 

customers to install solar power systems for their homes. Until September 2023, 

Sunder acted as an exclusive dealer for Freedom, a leading installation firm led by 

Chad Towner and Brett Bouchy. Under Sunder’s business model, teams of Sunder 

sales representatives went door to door, blitzing neighborhoods, to pitch Freedom 

systems to homeowners. When a sales representative inked a deal, the sales 

representative entered it into Freedom’s sales portal. At that point, Freedom took 

over the process, installed the system, collected the payment from the customer, and 

paid a commission to Sunder, split between the sales representative who secured the 

deal and Sunder as an organization. 

Sunder started business in August 2019, when Eric Nielsen, Max Britton, 

Tyler Jackson, Steven Cohen, Michael Gutschmidt, Jed Sewell, and Max Ganley 

(together, the “Co-Founders”) left a different solar sales dealer named LGCY Power, 

LLC. All were in sales. Nielsen had been LGCY’s Chief Revenue Officer—effectively 

its head of sales. Britton had been a Vice President. Jackson, Cohen, Gutschmidt, 

Sewell, and Ganley were Regional Sales Managers.

When they formed Sunder, the Co-Founders agreed on an equity split. Each 

Regional Sales Manager would receive eight percent for a total stake of 40%. Nielsen 
10

and Britton would own the rest of the equity, giving them a 60% majority.20 The CoFounders envisioned that they all would own the same type of equity. There were no 

discussions of separate types of equity or different rights or obligations. Everyone 

expected that Nielsen and Britton would manage Sunder as its majority owners, but 

otherwise everything was expected to be equal.21 The Co-Founders thought of 

themselves as partners, and they called themselves that. 

With that understanding, the Co-Founders formed Sunder as a Delaware LLC 

by filing a certificate of formation with the Delaware Secretary of State on August 16, 

2019. JX 1. At the time, the Co-Founders had not executed a written LLC agreement, 

but that did not mean that Sunder lacked an LLC agreement. It meant that Sunder 

operated under the default provisions of the Delaware Limited Liability Company 

Act (the “LLC Act”), subject to any specific unwritten understandings or agreements 

that the Co-Founders had. 

On August 23, 2019, all of the Co-Founders executed a five-year exclusive 

dealer agreement with Freedom. JX 2 (the “Dealer Agreement”). Each Co-Founder 

20 Cohen 27–28; Sewell 16–17. 

21 Sewell testified that Nielsen and Britton would be the managers of the LLC. Sewell 

27–28. It is not clear whether Sewell meant that Nielsen and Britton would be managing 

members of the LLC such that Sunder would be a manager-managed LLC in the formal sense 

contemplated by the LLC Act, or whether he simply meant that Nielsen and Britton would 

be the managers of the entity in the colloquial sense of its day-to-day managers. The 

consistent testimony from the Co-Founders that they envisioned everyone owning the same 

type of member interest suggests the latter. See Cohen 37–38; Sewell 28, 37–38; Jackson 

323–25. 
11

signed the Dealer Agreement as both a member of Sunder and individually. Nielsen 

also signed as President of Sunder. Id. at ’748.

B. The LGCY Action

On September 23, 2019, LGCY sued the Co-Founders. JX 3. The Co-Founders 

and Sunder engaged Snell & Wilmer to represent them jointly in the LGCY action. 

JX. 4. Snell & Wilmer’s engagement letter limited its engagement to representing the 

Co-Founders in the LGCY action. Id. at ’704. The Co-Founders nevertheless regarded 

Snell & Wilmer as their lawyers more generally. 

LGCY’s claims included the contention that Britton had received grants of 

restricted stock units as part of his compensation, and those restricted stock units 

included restrictive covenants that lasted for two years. When Britton learned about 

the restrictive covenants, he had an understandable reaction:

TWO years is a LONG time not to compete in the very industry I have 

bet my family’s future on. This is what I have been doing for close to a 

decade. This is my career . . . .

This seems very heavy handed. A two year non compete is nuts. 

JX 6 at ’493. A Snell & Wilmer attorney wrote back: “[G]reat initial thoughts. Thanks. 

We agree that this seems extremely heavy handed. We are looking at the reasons 

these agreements might not be enforceable.” Id. at ’492. Britton’s email now drips 

with irony, as Sunder is currently attempting to enforce restrictive covenants against 

Jackson that could last even longer.

22

22 Sunder has tried to argue that Britton was differently situated because he was an 

independent contractor who only received restricted stock units as part of his compensation, 

while Jackson was head of sales and a part owner of Sunder. There is actually very little 
12

Notwithstanding the LGCY action, Sunder’s business took off. By December, 

Sunder had generated hundreds of thousands of dollars in commissions.

C. The 2019 LLC Agreement

In fall 2019, Nielsen and Britton engaged Snell & Wilmer to draft an LLC 

agreement. JX 8 (the “2019 LLC Agreement”). The other Co-Founders were not 

involved in the process.

When the draft was ready, Nielsen and Britton went to Snell & Wilmer’s 

offices, and attorneys from the firm walked them through the agreement. JX 7 at 9. 

The other Co-Founders were not invited to the meeting, and no one explained the 

agreement to them. Cohen 71–73; Sewell 153; Jackson 331–32. Nielsen testified that 

he could not have understood the 2019 LLC Agreement without the attorneys 

explaining it to him, and he invoked privilege in response to questions about the 2019 

LLC Agreement on the grounds that his understanding came entirely from counsel. 

Nielsen 254–57. 

The 2019 LLC Agreement dramatically changed the ownership structure of 

Sunder and radically altered its internal governance. Nielsen and Britton had their 

rights supercharged. The other Co-Founders had their rights emasculated. To call out 

some highlights, the 2019 LLC Agreement:

• Eliminated all fiduciary duties, turning Sunder into a purely contractarian 

entity, JX 8 § 8.1;

difference between them. Jackson was an independent contractor, and both Britton and 

Jackson held Vice President titles. As discussed below, although Nielsen and Britton formed 

Sunder with Jackson and the other Co-Founders, they worked with Snell & Wilmer to convert 

the other Co-Founders’ interests into nothing more than a form of incentive compensation.
13

• Created a manager-managed entity in which Sunder was managed by a Board 

of Managers consisting only of Nielsen and Britton or their appointees, id. §§ 

4.1, 4.3;

• Authorized the Board of Managers to approve compensation agreements with 

selected members “in its sole discretion”, id. § 5.8; 

• Created two classes of member units–Common Units for Nielsen and Britton 

and Incentive Units for the other Co-Founders, id. § 3.4;

• Eliminated voting rights for the Incentive Units, ensuring that Nielsen and 

Britton exercised 100% of the voting power, id. § 3.4(c) (“The Incentive Units 

have no voting rights.”);

• Ensured that the Incentive Units have no consent rights, id. (“For the 

avoidance of doubt, no holder of Incentive Units will have any voting or 

consenting rights with respect to such Incentive Units in regards to any matter 

put or brought before the Members . . . .”);

• Reiterated yet again that the Incentive Units have no voting or consent rights, 

id. § 15.20 (“but in no event shall a Unit Holder be deemed to have any voting 

or consent rights . . . .”);

• Turned each Minority Member’s grant of 8,000 Incentive Units into a 

combination of 1,600 vested units, with another 1,600 units to vest on each 

anniversary after that;23

• Provided for the automatic forfeiture of any unvested Incentive Units if any 

holder left Sunder, JX 8 § 3.5; 

• Gave Sunder a call option on the Incentive Units for zero dollars per unit if any 

holder left Sunder without “Good Reason” or was terminated for cause, id. § 

3.6(b);

• Eliminated informational rights for holders of Incentive Units, id. § 9.1;

• Imposed transfer restrictions on the Incentive Units so that they could not be 

transferred to any third party without Sunder’s consent and any transfer 

would be subject to a right of first refusal in favor of Nielsen and Britton—but 

not any other Co-Founder, id. §§ 11.1–11.3; 

23 See JX 29. The 2019 LLC Agreement refers to unvested units as “restricted units” 

and vested units as “released units.” See id. 
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• Authorized Nielsen and Britton to drag all of the holders of Incentive Units 

into a third-party transaction, id. § 11.4;

• Granted pre-emptive rights to Nielsen and Britton, but not any other CoFounder, id. § 12.1;

• Provided Nielsen and Britton—but not any other Co-Founder—with broad 

indemnification and advancement rights, id. § 8.2 (extending rights to 

“Covered Persons,” defined to exclude holders of Incentive Units) id. § 1.1;

• Recited that all of the signatories made various representations in connection 

with entering into the 2019 LLC Agreement, id. § 15.18; and

• Recited that each party had the opportunity to review the 2019 LLC 

Agreement with independent legal counsel and that Snell & Wilmer only 

represented Sunder in connection with the preparation of the document, id. § 

15.19.

Most significantly for this case, Article XIII of the 2019 LLC Agreement added 

the Covenants. Article XIII also imposed a contractual confidentiality obligation on 

the holders of Incentive Units—and only the holders of Incentive Units. Id. § 13.3. 

Under the 2019 LLC Agreement, the Co-Founders other than Nielsen and 

Britton (the “Minority Members”) went from being co-owners of a single class of 

equity to powerless holders of nothing more than a form of incentive compensation 

that a business might offer to line employees. And the 2019 LLC Agreement turned 

a member-managed LLC structure in which the members owed fiduciary duties to 

each other into a purely contractarian entity where the only limitations on Nielsen 

and Britton were what Snell & Wilmer chose to build into the agreement. 

Nielsen and Britton sprung the 2019 LLC Agreement on the Minority Members 

on New Year’s Eve, when Nielsen sent the Minority Members an email that attached

a .pdf of the 2019 Operating Agreement. JX 10 (the “New Year’s Email”). Addressing 

the Minority Members as “Partners,” he wrote:
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Max [Britton] and I have executed our portion of the Sunder Operating 

Agreement today and a copy for your review is attached. I will be 

sending each of you a couple of documents via docusign momentarily. 

The first one contains your grant of shares and the second one is a 

joinder agreement that will formally add each of you to the Operating 

Agreement. If you are married, your spouse will also be sent a spousal 

consent form. Please let Max or me know if you have any questions.

Lastly, the attorney’s [sic] highly recommend completing these 

documents by the end of tonight, but we don’t expect any of you to sign 

something if you are uncomfortable with it or if you need more 

clarification from the attorney’s [sic] on something. Please let me know 

if you have any questions.

Happy New Year!

Id.

The New Year’s Email did not provide any indication that the 2019 LLC 

Agreement gutted the Minority Members’ rights. Nielsen specifically referenced 

“your grant of shares” without flagging that the Minority Members were only 

receiving Incentive Units, not the Common Units that he and Britton were receiving. 

He did not mention that the two classes of equity had diametrically different rights 

or that the Incentive Units were structured to be nothing more than a form of 

incentive compensation. 

The New Year’s Email did not suggest in any way that the Minority Members 

could not rely on Nielsen and Britton—their “Partners”—as fiduciaries, but rather 

needed to go into adversarial, arms’-length bargaining mode and negotiate vigorously 

for themselves. The email also did not suggest in any way that Snell & Wilmer, the 

firm that was representing all of the Co-Founders in the LGCY Action, was claiming 

only to represent Sunder for purposes of the 2019 LLC Agreement. 
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Instead, the New Year’s Email implied exactly the opposite, namely that 

signing the 2019 LLC Agreement was something that the Minority Members could 

get out of the way quickly before continuing with their celebrations. Nielsen observed 

that he and Britton had already executed the as-circulated copy, and—although it 

might seem like a small thing—he circulated the document as a .pdf as if it were in 

final form. He urged the Minority Members to sign that night and told them that “the 

attorney’s [sic] highly recommend completing these documents by the end of tonight.” 

Note the use of the definite article. He did not say “Sunder’s attorneys,” who were 

really acting as Nielsen and Britton’s attorneys. He said “the attorneys.”

Not only that, but Nielsen circulated the signature pages by DocuSign. That 

meant that the Minority Members did not have to scroll through the 2019 LLC 

Agreement to reach the end and sign it. They only had to look at a one-page joinder 

agreement. JX 11; Cohen 84–86. 

The Minority Members were all high school graduates who had spent all or 

most of their careers in the door-to-door sales industry.24 They were not sophisticated 

in legal matters. They trusted that Nielsen and Britton—their “Partners”—were 

representing their collective interests as fellow fiduciaries.25 Nothing about the email 

put them on notice that their “Partners” were acting self-interestedly and that the 

Minority Members needed to protect themselves. Nor is it reasonable to infer on this 

record that the Minority Members would have understood the traps in the document 

24 See, e.g., Jackson 316–21; Ganley 12–14; Sewell 10–11; Cohen 8. 

25 Jackson 334; Sewell 70–72; Ganley 105, 108; Gutschmidt 150.
17

if they had read it. Nielsen testified that his understanding of the document only 

came from his attorneys and that he had no other understanding of the agreement, 

thereby enabling his counsel to invoke privilege. Even Nielsen could not understand 

the 2019 LLC Agreement without his attorneys’ help. 

Jackson did as he was asked. He signed the 2019 LLC Agreement barely one 

hour after receiving the New Year’s Email. JX 11. 

Nielsen and Britton went even further in 2021, when they amended the LLC 

Agreement (the “2021 LLC Agreement”). This time, they did not even send a copy to 

the Minority Members. They simply circulated an email saying that the 2019 LLC 

Agreement was being amended to add a member and that there were no substantive 

changes.26 That was not true: The 2021 LLC Agreement expanded the geographic 

scope of the Covenants, making them more onerous. See JX 13 § 1.1 (definition of 

“Territory”). But no one had the opportunity to find that out, because Nielsen and 

Britton only circulated a signature page. JX 14. Other Minority Members could not 

recall receiving the amended version. Sewell 73; Ganley 171; Gutschmidt 158–59.

Even after radically altering their relationship with the Minority Members, 

Nielsen and Britton continued to refer to them as “Partners.” Testimony from Jackson 

and other Minority Members in the LGCY action in 2022 shows that they continued 

to believe that they held equity with the same rights as Nielsen and Britton and had 

26See Jackson 421; Glassman 190–91; Sewell 73. 
18

no idea that their rights had been altered.27 Jackson testified to his understanding 

that the LLC Agreement did not contain any restrictions on his ability to compete 

with Sunder or solicit its customers or employees. JX 16 at 110. Snell & Wilmer 

continued to represent the Minority Members, and a Snell & Wilmer attorney 

defended Jackson’s deposition, yet no one from Snell & Wilmer corrected Jackson’s 

misunderstanding. 

D. The Sunder-Freedom Relationship Blossoms.

From 2019 until the start of 2023, Sunder thrived. Sunder grew into one of 

Freedom’s “super-dealers,” generating over 25% of its sales. Freedom supported 

Sunder’s business with administrative services including payroll and commissions 

calculations. Freedom also supported Sunder with marketing. 

Jackson’s responsibilities at Sunder grew with the company. His sales group 

excelled, and he was given direct authority over many of Sunder’s key markets, 

including Texas, Florida, Arkansas, California, and South Carolina. In 2022, Jackson 

received the title of Vice President and had nearly half of Sunder’s sales force 

reporting to him directly or indirectly. He became the highest paid sales leader at 

Sunder, earning a total of $4.8 million in compensation over four years. Over the 

same period, he received a total of $1.2 million in profit distributions from his 

Incentive Units. But Jackson nevertheless remained an independent contractor with 

Sunder. His officer title was just that—a title. 

27 See Sewell 37; JX 15 at 185–86 (Cohen deposition in LGCY action); JX 16 at 109–

10, 217–18 (Jackson deposition in LGCY action).
19

E. Nielsen and Britton Make A Series of Business Decisions With 

Consequences.

In 2021 and 2022, Nielsen and Britton made a series of business decisions that 

caused Sunder to encounter difficulties. Those decisions affected Sunder’s 

relationship with Freedom and with its own sales force.

The first issue put a strain on Sunder’s relationship with Freedom. Sunder had 

become sufficiently important to Freedom that the two organizations operated as 

parts of a single business. Recognizing that reality, Freedom approached Sunder in 

2021 with a proposal for an equity swap that would deepen their ties. Nielsen and 

Britton seemed open to the concept, and Freedom sent Sunder a proposed agreement.

In 2022, however, Nielsen and Britton rejected the equity swap. Instead, they hoped 

to secure a private equity investment. Private equity was pouring billions into the 

renewable technology industry, buoyed by the Inflation Reduction Act and other 

government initiatives. Presumably, they hoped to obtain the usual combination of 

liquidity for themselves and growth capital for the business. 

To make Sunder look more attractive to a private equity investor, Nielsen and 

Britton took steps to increase Sunder’s profit margins. One strategy involved using a 

finance company outside of Freedom’s network, but that strategy would have caused 

Freedom to violate its exclusive agreements with its financing partners, and Freedom 

vetoed it. The fact that Sunder considered seeking financing elsewhere was another 

bump in the road for the Sunder-Freedom relationship. 

Another strategy was more damaging because it broke trust with Sunder’s 

sales force. When a Sunder representative pitched a deal, Freedom supplied Sunder 
20

with a cost for the installation. To increase Sunder’s margins, Nielsen and Britton 

caused Sunder to pad the installation costs, creating a higher, artificial floor for the 

deal. When calculating sales commissions and sales leaders’ overrides, Sunder used 

the higher, artificial floor and pocketed the difference between the artificial floor and 

Freedom’s cost. 

More money for Sunder meant better financials to show a private equity 

investor, but it also meant less money in sales commissions and overrides. As a 

practical matter, the padded installation cost meant that Sunder was taking money 

from its sales force. Sunder sales representatives eventually discovered that Sunder 

had secretly changed its calculations and was taking a portion of their money. Not 

surprisingly, that news went over like a lead balloon and generated feelings of 

betrayal and distrust. 

A final issue was whether Sunder would continue working with Freedom. The 

initial five-year Dealer Agreement would end in 2024, and a new agreement would 

need to be renegotiated before then. Freedom had been critical to Sunder’s success, 

and its sales force knew Freedom’s products and valued Freedom’s industry-leading 

ability to install systems quickly. At the same time, another exclusive, multi-year 

deal with Freedom would limit their options. When asked about Sunder’s future 

direction, Nielsen and Britton said that they prioritized working with Freedom, but 

they would not rule out the possibility that Sunder would go in a different direction. 

F. The Possibility Of Moving To Another Freedom Dealer

By early 2023, the combination of the artificial price floor and the uncertainty 

about whether Sunder would continue with Freedom were topics of discussion and 
21

debate among Sunder’s sales force, and particularly its sales leadership. The sales 

leaders began questioning whether they should stay with Sunder or move to another 

Freedom dealer.28

One attractive option was Solar Pros, a rapidly expanding dealer that was 

majority owned by Bouchy, one of Freedom’s principals. Freedom was also investing 

heavily in Solar Pros to build out its network. 

Joining Solar Pros was attractive for Sunder’s sales professionals because 

Solar Pros did not have an artificial pricing floor and offered significantly better 

commissions. In spring 2023, sixty-three Sunder sales professionals moved to Solar 

Pros. JX. 17. 

Jackson was one of the sales leaders who explored the possibility of moving to 

Solar Pros. In May 2023, Jackson met with Towner and Bouchy at Freedom’s 

headquarters in Las Vegas. Towner and Jackson were best friends; they have known 

each other for twenty years and started their first company together—an alarm sales 

company that eventually expanded into solar sales. Because of the close relationship 

between Sunder and Freedom, Jackson interacted frequently with Towner and 

Bouchy. 

This time, however, the topics of discussion included the possibility of Jackson 

leaving Sunder and working in some fashion for Freedom or one of its dealers. 

Immediately after that meeting, Jackson asked Devon Glassman, Sunder CFO, for 

28 See Towner 93; Armstrong 76–78; Tisdale 61, 137–39; Simmons 51–52; Jackson 374; 

Wilson 57–59, 63–64,
22

copies of all of the agreements he had signed with Sunder, evidencing that he was 

thinking about leaving Sunder. 

After learning that he was bound by the Covenants, Jackson felt that his best 

option was to attempt to preserve the Sunder-Freedom relationship and keep his 

sales force together. He tried to facilitate meetings between Sunder and Freedom. He 

also tried to convince his sales leaders not to leave for Solar Pros. But he kept in touch 

with Towner, communicating with him in late June, early July, and late August. 

By this point, Jackson had seven sales managers reporting to him directly. Two 

of his direct reports—Clayton Granch and Brandon Wilson—were Senior Regional 

Managers who had Regional Managers who reported to them. Another direct report—

Zeke Parker—was a Regional Manager. The four other direct reports were the coregional managers of two regions. Cory Walksler and Chris Minizzi were one set of 

Co-Regional Managers. Jeff Roman and Jed Sewell were the other set of Co-Regional 

Managers. The following chart shows the reporting structure. The individuals 

identified in red left Sunder for Solar Pros between September 11 and 19, 2023.
23

During the same period, Nielsen and Britton were keeping their options open. 

In June and July 2023, they began having meetings with other solar installers. In 

August 2023, they hired counsel to evaluate Sunder’s rights under the Dealer 

Agreement.

Sunder’s sales leaders knew what Nielsen and Britton were doing, and they 

became even more concerned. One sales leader who was particularly frustrated was 

Granch, one of the two Senior Regional Managers who reported directly to Jackson 

and who had two Regional Managers, Jason Tisdale and Josh Simmons, who reported 

to him. Granch was deeply offended by Nielsen and Birtton’s secret implementation 

of the artificial pricing floor, and he no longer trusted Nielsen. Earlier in the year, 

Jackson had connected Granch with Towner so Granch could learn about his options. 

See PX 16 at ’969. 
24

During August 2023, Granch had a blunt yet professional call with Nielsen, 

Britton, and Jackson in which he explained that he did not see how he could ever 

trust Nielsen again. After Nielsen reacted by asking why he should not fire Granch 

on the spot, Jackson succeeded in restoring calm. FX 7.

Nielsen then explained that Sunder’s “main focus is extending with Freedom.” 

Id. He acknowledged, however, that if they could not reach a deal with Freedom, then 

they would have to look to other installers. Nielsen also acknowledged that if that 

happened, then it would have “ramifications” for Sunder in terms of losing sales 

personnel who wanted to continue working with Freedom. Id. Granch then made 

clear to Nielsen, Britton, and Jackson that if Sunder did not stay with Freedom, then 

he would not remain with Sunder. Id. 

At the end of August 2023, Towner and Bouchy spoke with Jackson about 

working for Solar Pros. PX 9 at 12. They began working on a new strategy under 

which in return for a multi-million-dollar payment from Freedom, Sunder would 

release Jackson from the Covenants and facilitate a transition of Jackson’s sales 

organization to Solar Pros. Jackson communicated with Freedom management about 

the strategy, and he sent Freedom’s general counsel a copy of the 2021 Operating 

Agreement so that Freedom could evaluate the Covenants. See JX 20; JX 21; PX 54; 

PX 55; Jackson 154–57.

During early September 2023, Granch had a heartfelt, late-night talk with 

Jackson about his frustrations with Sunder. At one point, Granch asked Jackson 

what he would do if he were in Granch’s position and did not have a do-not-compete 
25

obligation. Jackson responded, “If I didn’t have a [do-not-compete], I’d have made my 

decision months ago.”29 For Granch, Jackson’s statement was “a sign.” PX 17 at ’953. 

He decided he would take his group to Solar Pros. 

G. The Las Vegas Meeting

With Jackson’s support, Freedom requested a meeting between the two senior 

management teams at Freedom’s headquarters in Las Vegas. JX 21. The meeting was 

scheduled for September 14, 2023. On September 11, 2023, three days before the 

meeting, Granch signed an independent contractor agreement with Solar Pros. 

Granch 29. The two regional managers who reported to him—Jason Tisdale and Josh 

Simmons—signed agreements with Solar Pros on September 12. Granch then texted 

Towner to tell him that his group was prepared to resign from Sunder en masse and 

move to Solar Pros. See PX 17. But Towner asked him to wait until after the Las Vega 

meeting, lest the resignations cause Sunder to cancel the meeting. PX 12; PX 19 at 

’038. Anticipating that they would be leaving for Solar Pros, Granch’s group began 

sitting on deals so that they could sign them up through Solar Pros rather than 

through Sunder. See PX 20. Granch told Tisdale that the meeting “would’ve had to go 

perfect to change our direction tomorrow anyway. If sunder sits back and says thanks 

for the info we need to think about it, we’re still gone.” Id. at ’034. 

29 See PX 17 at ’953; (Granch describing conversation to Tisdale); see Granch 161–62 

(describing conversation); Jackson 418–19 (same).
26

The September 14 meeting went forward as scheduled. The attendees were 

Nielsen and Britton from Sunder, and Towner, Bouchy, and Freedom’s general 

counsel from Freedom. Britton took handwritten notes. JX 22. 

During the meeting, Freedom offered to pay $10 million in exchange for 

Sunder’s agreement to release Jackson from the Covenants and to facilitate the 

transfer of “his group” to Solar Pros. Freedom also asked for a global release of all of 

the previous claims that Sunder had made against Freedom, but after Sunder 

objected, Freedom signaled that it was willing to give up on that point. Freedom also 

proposed to pay 25% of the $10 million up front, followed by $1 million per month 

until the amount was fully paid. Sunder countered by asking for one-third at signing, 

one-third in forty-five days, and one-third in ninety days. Id.

The parties did not reach an agreement, but they also did not seem that far 

apart. Britton noted that to proceed with the deal, they needed a “list of Tyler’s people 

– scrub and report back.” Id. That appears to be a reference to generating a list of all 

of the people in Tyler’s group, which everyone would review to determine who would 

transition to Solar Pros. 

During the meeting, Towner gave real time updates to Granch. After hearing 

that Nielsen and Britton seemed receptive to Freedom’s proposal, Granch texted 

Jackson and Towner, telling them to call him “catalyst clay.” PX 18. Granch then 

called and texted his team to tell them that they would not be resigning, because “[i]n 

the next 48 hours [t]here will be a joint public announcement between freedom and 

sunder that they are amicably releasing Tyler Jackson and his entire org to go to 
27

Solar Pros effective immediately.” PX 19 at ’039. He wrote, “WE WERE THE 

CATALYST! We helped sunder and freedom reach this peaceful transition and I 

couldn’t be more proud of us.” Id.

After hearing the news, Jackson circulated a list of Sunder personnel to three 

of his direct reports: Granch, his other Senior Regional Manager Brandon Wilson, 

and a third Regional Manager Zeke Parker. PX 15. The list was an initial effort to 

identify who would join him at Solar Pros. See Granch 96; Jackson 170–73. 

Within days after the Las Vegas meeting, the dominos began to fall. Granch, 

Tisdale, and Simmons had already signed agreements with Solar Pros. They formally 

resigned on September 16, 2022. See JX 23. Parker resigned sometime between 

September 16 and 19. Wilson and his Regional Managers left by September 21.

After the Las Vegas meeting, Jackson had frequent discussions with Towner 

and Bouchy about transitioning to Solar Pros. Jackson and his team also began 

making calls and traveling to meet with leaders of sales teams to find out if they 

wanted to join Solar Pros. See PX 21. In his interrogatory response, Jackson identified 

thirty-seven Sunder representatives that he spoke with about his anticipated role 

with Solar Pros. PX 9. On September 20, Jackson traveled to Tampa, Florida, and 

met with two Sunder sales representatives whom he hoped would join him at Solar 

Pros. Id. On September 21, Jackson sent an audio file to Wilson and the leaders in 

his group, telling them that he had finished about nine hours of meetings with three 

Sunder sales representatives and thought he had “all three of them locked down” to 

join Solar Pros. JX 24. 
28

The defendants claim that Jackson took these steps because coming out of the 

Las Vegas meeting, one of his tasks was to determine who from “his group” would 

join him. Sunder asserts that there was no agreement, and that Jackson was 

soliciting Sunder personnel in violation of the Covenants. 

At this stage of the case, the stronger interpretation of the contemporaneous 

evidence favors Sunder’s position. For example, on September 16, 2023, Britton 

texted Jackson and asked why he was so quiet, noting: “Your division is being ripped 

apart and you didn’t reach out to us at all to help.” JX 26. Jackson replied by asking 

whether there was any chance of undoing Granch’s move to Solar Pros, as if Jackson 

intended to stay. He also spoke of attempting to keep another group at Sunder and 

stressed that he had been trying to prevent departures from happening. Id. That is 

inconsistent with an account in which Jackson was tasked with identifying who 

wanted to leave and planning for a transition. 

It was not until September 18, 2023, that Freedom sent Sunder a draft 

settlement agreement. PX 45. Freedom accepted Sunder’s counterproposal on the 

timing of the payments. PX 46. Sunder has claimed that the agreement contained an 

objectionable release of all claims, but none appears in the draft agreement. Id. 

The next day, Towner sent a spreadsheet labeled “9.14.23 Sunder Region 

Jackson” to Nielsen, Britton, Jackson, and Devon Glassman, Sunder’s Chief 

Financial Officer. The defendants have claimed that the purpose of sending the list 

was to identify the sales representatives who would be covered by the separation offer 

and join Jackson at Solar Pros. JX 7 at 10. Towner generated the list from Freedom’s 
29

own internal information, because Freedom had the necessary information as a result 

of the administrative support that it provided to Sunder.

For the preceding five days, however, Jackson had been working hard to recruit 

his team to join Solar Pros. See PX 23; PX 24. On September 20, 2023, the head of 

Solar Pros, Kiley Powell, wrote: “All of Tyler’s teams were transferred to the Pros 

portal last night and into the morning.” PX 22 at ’483. Powell identified “[t]hose . . . 

that are coming with Tyler” as Clayton Granch, Brandon Wilson, Zeke Partner,and 

Jeff Roman. Id. at ’484. Those were four of Jackson’s seven direct reports. 

H. Jackson Joins Solar Pros.

On September 22, 2023, four hours before he resigned from Sunder, Jackson 

signed an independent consulting agreement with Freedom Solar Pros LLC, an 

affiliate of Freedom and Solar Pros. JX 30. The agreement has a term of two years 

and will automatically renew annually unless terminated. Under the agreement, 

Jackson is entitled to compensation of $120,000 per year. Id. § 3.1. In return, Jackson 

committed to provide Freedom and Solar Pros with services that would compete with 

Sunder’s business, including “[r]eferrals of sales professionals.” Id. at 10. Somewhat 

ironically given the issues in the case, the agreement restricts Jackson from soliciting 

any personnel of the Company during the term of the agreement or for twelve years 

after its termination. Id. § 11. 

In the agreement, Freedom Solar Pros agreed to indemnify Jackson and hold 

him harmless against,

[a]ny claims brought by Consultant’s former company, [Sunder], arising 

out of of Consultant’s engagement with and/or employment for, Freedom 

Forever LLC and/or Company (collectively “Sunder Litigation”), 
30

including but not limited to claims brought under Section 13.1 of [the 

2021 LLC Agreement]. Company shall pay for any settlement entered of 

judgment obtained against Consultant in the Sunder Litigation. 

Id. § 15.2(d) 

On the evening of Friday, September 22, 2023, Jackson submitted his 

resignation. Freedom decided to wait to make a public announcement about Jackson’s 

hiring until Monday, September 25, 2023. PX 25 at ’461. Jackson responded, “Hell 

yes! Super excited and grateful.” Id. at ’462. 

Over the weekend, Jackson “locked down one of Florida[’]s top managers” for 

Solar Pros. PX 27 at ’390. He spoke to a sales representative from Zeke Parker’s 

region about joining Solar Pros. PX 28. He also offered to talk to a group in Los 

Angeles on Freedom’s behalf, saying “I have a really good relationship with those 

guys” and “I can get them if they want to talk.” PX 58. 

On September 25, 2023, Solar Pros posted a picture of Jackson on its 

Instagram page that announced him joining as president. After seeing the post, 

Nielsen emailed Jackson and noted that although Sunder was “in the process of 

negotiating a potential separation agreement that may release you from your 

contractual obligations to Sunder,” no agreement had been reached yet. JX 28. 

Nielsen asked Jackson to immediately publish a retraction, otherwise Sunder “will 

need to take other appropriate action.” Id. Nielsen also noted that “by resigning, you 

have automatically forfeited” his unvested Incentive Units and that Sunder had the 

right to repurchase his vested Incentive Units for $0 per unit. Id. 

Jackson continued recruiting for Solar Pros. On September 26, 2023, he was 

on a plane to Alaska to meet with a sales team, then later in the week he flew to Las 
31

Vegas to help Solar Pros with a sales kickoff. PX 60. He continued to work with other 

Solar Pros representatives on recruiting Sunder personnel. JX 61. 

I. This Litigation

On September 29, 2023, Sunder launched a two-pronged response. First, 

Sunder terminated the Dealer Agreement with Freedom for cause and filed an 

arbitration to enforce its rights. Second, Sunder filed this action against Jackson, 

Freedom, Bouchy, Towner, Freedom Solar Pros, and Solar Pros. Dkt. 1. Sunder filed 

an amended verified complaint on October 3. Dkt. 9. Meanwhile, Jackson continued 

his efforts to recruit Sunder personnel to Solar Pros. See PX 31–33; PX 35. On October 

3, Jackson participated in a call with a Sunder representative and Towner during 

which Towner offered Walksler $200,000 to join Solar Pros. PX 9 at 15. 

On October 4, 2023, Jackson circulated a Google document to multiple Solar 

Pros representatives in a group titled “Gotta catch ‘em all.” The document identified 

Sunder sales professionals to recruit. See PX 36, 37; Jackson 241. Hours later, the 

court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order based on the verified allegations 

of the complaint. The TRO was intended to preserve the status quo pending a hearing 

on whether to renew or lift the order, which would take place on or before October 18. 

Dkt. 10. Ninety minutes later, Jackson sent an audio message to the “Gotta catch ‘em 

all” group in which he told them that he was “going to need to lay low for a bit” and 

that they should request access to the Google document so they could continue his 

work. PX 38. The group participants understood his instructions and began going 

through the list to recruit the people on it. 
32

The parties briefed whether the court should allow the TRO to expire or renew 

it, and the defendants moved to dismiss the case in favor of arbitration under the 

Dealer Agreement. On October 11, 2023, after a hearing held on the preceding day, 

the court renewed the TRO. Dkt. 52.

Over the following month, the parties engaged in expedited discovery in 

preparation for a hearing on Sunder’s motion for a preliminary injunction. That 

hearing took place on November 17, 2023.

II. THE PROCEDURAL STANDARD

Sunder seeks a preliminary injunction enjoining Jackson, and any person or 

entity acting in concert with him, from taking actions in breach of the Covenants. 

When seeking a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate a 

reasonable probability of success on the merits and that some 

irreparable harm will occur in the absence of the injunction. 

Furthermore, in evaluating the need for a preliminary injunction, the 

Court must balance the [moving party’s] need for protection against any 

harm that can reasonably be expected to befall the [non-moving party] 

if the injunction is granted.30

“Delaware cases often describe the issuance of a preliminary injunction as 

‘extraordinary relief,’ but not in the colloquial sense of amazing, astonishing, 

miraculous, or incredible.”31 The remedy is extraordinary in the sense of out of the 

ordinary, because, in the ordinary course of a case, a court does not grant relief until 

after a final adjudication. “A preliminary injunction departs from the ordinary course 

30 Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1278–79 (Del. 1989) (internal 

citation omitted).

31 In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Servs., 285 A.3d 1205, 1227 (Del. Ch. 

2022).
33

of a case because the court grants relief at a preliminary stage, based on a preliminary 

record.” Id. 

Delaware decisions often frame the standard for a preliminary injunction as 

requiring proof of three elements: “(i) a reasonable probability of success on the 

merits; (ii) a threat of irreparable injury if an injunction is not granted; and (iii) that 

the balance of the equities favors the issuance of an injunction.”32 “The party seeking 

a preliminary injunction must demonstrate all three elements to prevail, but once 

proven by the plaintiff the three elements are considered together by the court in 

determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction.”33 The court is not required 

to weigh the elements equally, and a strong showing in one element can compensate 

for a weaker showing on another. Id.

The first element—a reasonable probability of prevailing on its claims—

requires a showing that falls “well short of that which would be required to secure 

final relief following trial.”34 At trial in a civil case, a plaintiff generally must prove 

its claims by a preponderance of the evidence.35 At the injunction phase, a party must 

demonstrate that it has a reasonable probability of meeting that standard. 

32 In re New Maurice J. Moyer Acad., Inc., 108 A.3d 294, 311 (Del. Ch. 2015) (citing 

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.1986)).

33 Abrons v. Maree, 911 A.2d 805, 810 (Del. Ch. 2006).

34 Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, 724 A.2d 571, 579 (Del.Ch.1998).

35 E.g., JER Hudson GP XXI LLC v. DLE Inv’rs, LP, 275 A.3d 755,782 (Del. Ch. 

2022).
34

The second element—immediate, discernible harm for which there is no 

adequate remedy at law—is the “sine qua non of preliminary injunctive relief.”36 The 

threatened harm must occur “between now and trial unless an injunction issues.” Id. 

That timing requirement recognizes that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is 

to preserve the status quo so that the court can hold a trial, make findings of fact, 

render conclusions of law, and issue a remedy. If no irreparable harm will occur before 

a trial, then there is no need for the court to act before the remedial phase.37

Finally, the Court of Chancery “has discretion to grant or deny an application 

for injunctive relief in light of the relative hardships of the parties.”38 Sunder must 

show that “failure to grant the injunction will cause Plaintiff greater harm than 

granting the injunction will cause Defendants.” Id.

Sunder’s application fails on the first element of the injunction standard. 

Because Sunder has not carried its burden, a preliminary injunction will not issue.

That does not mean that Sunder’s application does not have other shortcomings. It 

only means that this decision need not address them. 

36 Kingsbridge Cap. Gp. v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 1989 WL 89449, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 

7, 1989).

37 COVID-Related Restrictions, 285 A.3d at 1228.

38 Bernard Pers. Consultants, Inc. v. Mazarella, 1990 WL 124969 at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 

28, 1990).
35

III. THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST 

JACKSON

Sunder contends that Jackson has breached the Competition Restriction and 

the Personnel Restriction. Sunder asserts that unless the court issues an injunction, 

Jackson will continue to breach the Covenants. Sunder asks for a preliminary 

injunction enforcing the Covenants pending a final determination after trial. 

A. A Reasonable Likelihood Of Success On The Claim For Breach Of The 

Covenants

Sunder’s claim for breach of the Covenants is a claim for breach of contract. 

The elements of a claim for breach of contract are “(i) a contractual obligation, (ii) a 

breach of that obligation by the defendant, and (iii) a causally related injury that 

warrants a remedy, such as damages or in an appropriate case, specific 

performance.”39 Restrictive covenants are enforceable when they are (i) valid under 

general principles of law, (ii) are reasonable in their scope and effect, (iii) bear a 

reasonable relationship to the advancement of legitimate interests, and (iv) survive 

a balancing of the equities.40

Sunder cannot establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits 

because Sunder cannot point to a valid contractual obligation. The Covenants as a 

whole are not enforceable under general principles of law, and two Covenants on 

which Sunder relies—the Competition Restriction and the Personnel Restriction—

39 AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels & Resorts One LLC, 2020 WL 7024929, at *47 

(Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020), aff’d, 268 A.3d 198 (Del. 2021).

40 See TriState Courier & Carriage, Inc. v. Berryman, 2004 WL 835886, at *10 (Del. 

Ch. Apr. 15, 2004).
36

are not reasonable in their scope and effect. Because those issues are dispositive, this 

decision does not consider the other requirements that a restrictive covenant must 

satisfy, nor the other elements of a claim for breach of contract. Sunder’s application 

faces challenges on other elements, but this decision need not reach them.41

1. Choice Of Law For The Covenants

As a threshold matter, the court must determine what law governs the 

Covenants. They appear in the 2021 LLC Agreement, which governs the internal 

affairs of a Delaware LLC. The 2021 LLC Agreement also provides explicitly that 

Delaware law governs its terms. PX 7 § 15.11. Normally, that combination would 

trigger the application of Delaware law, both under the internal affairs doctrine and 

as a matter of contract.

41 Causation is one serious impediment. According to Freedom and Jackson, the 

Sunder representatives left because Nielsen and Britton had committed a series of own goals 

by (i) establishing an artificial cost floor to increase Sunder’s profitability, albeit at the cost 

of the sales professionals losing trust in Sunder’s management team, (ii) taking action that 

put a strain on Sunder’s relationship with Freedom, such as rejecting Freedom’s proposal for 

an equity swap and seeking to use financing sources outside of Freedom’s network, and (iii) 

actively considering using installers other than Freedom, which Nielsen acknowledged would 

have serious repercussions for Sunder’s sales force. During the hearing on the preliminary 

injunction, Freedom offered video testimony from former Sunder sales representatives who 

testified about their decision to leave Sunder and the extent to which Jackson had influenced 

them. To a man, they testified that factors other than Jackson drove their decision. E.g., 

Granch 140, 159–60; Towner 46–47; Tisdale 130–34; Parker 94–95; Armstrong 75; see FX 16.

Each seemed credible, but the court only saw short clips. Not only that, but there is 

contemporaneous evidence in the record indicating that Jackson did influence departure 

decisions. At a minimum, Jackson influenced Granch, who interpreted Jackson’s statement 

that if he were not subject to the Covenants, then he would have made his decision months 

ago, as a sign that he should leave Sunder and join Solar Pros. It is also clear that Jackson 

did engage in extensive solicitation efforts, both before and after leaving Sunder, and that 

Jackson thought in real-time that his involvement had an effect. His senior managers 

thought so too. To parse causation ultimately will require difficult credibility assessments 

and a careful weighing of the evidence. 
37

In this case, however, the drafters of the 2021 LLC Agreement are attempting 

to use Delaware law to govern the relationship between Sunder and one of its 

independent contractors, who also happened to be its head of sales. This is not a case 

in which the drafters of the 2021 LLC Agreement are addressing a quintessentially 

internal dimension of an entity’s affairs. Instead, this is an example of drafters 

attempting to use Delaware law to set the rules for what are effectively employment 

relationships. Other jurisdictions often have a more significant interest in regulating 

those relationships, which affect how their citizens living there can earn a living and 

how a business operating there can compensate its work force. 

Delaware follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, and Delaware 

courts consequently will not enforce choice of law provisions when doing so would 

circumvent the public policy of another state that has a greater interest in the subject 

matter.42 Consequently, when a different state’s law would govern in the absence of 

a choice of law provision, and if that state has established legal rules reflecting a 

different policy toward restrictive covenants than Delaware’s, then this court will 

defer to that state’s law notwithstanding the presence of a Delaware choice of law 

provision.43

42 Cabela’s LLC, 2018 WL 5309954, at *7–10; Ascension Ins. Hldgs., LLC v. 

Underwood, 2015 WL 356002, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2015).

43 HighTower Hldg., LLC v. Gibson, 2023 WL 1856651, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2023); 

FP UC Hldgs., LLC, 2020 WL 1492783, at *8; Cabela’s, 2018 WL 5309954, at *7–10; 

Ascension, 2015 WL 356002, at *2–5.
38

In this case, the law of either Utah or Texas would apply absent the choice of 

law clause. Sunder is headquartered in Utah, and Jackson lives and works in Texas. 

The question then becomes whether Utah or Texas approaches restrictive covenants 

differently than Delaware. Both do, but only to a marginal degree.

Utah’s standard for enforcing a restrictive covenant generally parallels the 

Delaware test. Under Utah law, a covenant not to compete is enforceable if “(1) the 

covenant is supported by consideration; (2) no bad faith is shown in the negotiation 

of the contract; (3) the covenant is necessary to protect the goodwill of the business; 

and (4) it is reasonable in its restrictions as to time and area.”44 By statute, however, 

Utah provides that post-employment restrictive covenants cannot last for a period of 

more than one year from the day on which the employee is no longer employed by the 

employer. Utah Code § 34-51-201(1). A restrictive covenant that violates that 

statutory limit is void. Id. Under Utah law, therefore, all of the Covenants are void, 

because all last more than one year. 

Texas has enacted a statute that governs restrictive covenants.45 Under its 

terms,

a covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an 

otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made to 

the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and 

scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose 

44 Vendr, Inc. v. Tropic Techs., Inc., 2023 WL 3851838, *6 (D. Utah June 6, 2023) 

(citing System Concepts v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425–26 (Utah 1983)).

45 Forum US, Inc. v. Musselwhite, 2020 WL 4331442 (Tex. App. July 28, 2020) (citing 

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 15.50–52).
39

a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other 

business interest of the promisee.

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.50(a). That provision generally parallels Delaware’s test, 

while making explicit the requirement that a restrictive covenant “not impose a 

greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest 

of the promisee.” Unlike Delaware, however, the Texas statute requires bluepenciling. 

[T]he court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to cause 

the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area, 

and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a 

restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or 

other business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as 

reformed.

Id. at § 15.51(c). Under Texas law, therefore, the court would be required to bluepencil the Covenants and enforce them to a reasonable degree. 

Sunder has asked the court to apply Delaware law, not Texas law. Thus, even 

though Sunder would fare better under Texas law, the court will respect its choice. 

Jackson would have a stronger case for invalidity under Utah law, but because the 

Covenants are invalid under Delaware law, the conflict is a false one, and the court 

can apply Delaware law. This decision therefore analyzes the Covenants under 

Delaware law.

2. Lack of Enforceability Under General Principles of Law

Sunder cannot obtain a preliminary injunction because the Covenants are not 

enforceable under general principles of law. The record establishes that Nielsen and 

Britton breached their fiduciary duty of disclosure when seeking member approval 

for the 2019 LLC Agreement and the 2021 LLC Agreement. The terms of the 2019 
40

LLC Agreement and the 2021 LLC Agreement were therefore never validly approved, 

and it would be inequitable to permit Nielsen and Britton to enforce those provisions 

now. Although a claim challenging the 2019 LLC Agreement likely would be 

untimely, timeliness principles apply differently to affirmative defenses.46

a. Lack Of Enforceability Due to Breach of Duty

By default under the LLC Act, a Delaware LLC has a member-managed 

governance structure with strong functional and historical ties to the general 

partnership, albeit with limited liability for members.47 By default, members under 

46 Because this issue is dispositive, the court does not reach Jackson’s other arguments 

against enforceability under general principles of law. Those arguments, however, face 

conceptual difficulties. Jackson contends that the Minority Members did not receive any 

consideration for entering into either the 2019 LLC Agreement and the 2021 LLC Agreement, 

and that is likely true. Both agreements, however, amended Sunder’s then-existing LLC 

agreement. When the appropriate internal entity organs act in compliance with the 

governing law and any applicable duties to amend an entity’s governing document, it is far 

from clear that consideration is required for the amendment. A charter amendment, for 

example, amends the certificate of incorporation—also an internal governance document that 

is interpreted using contractual principles—but our law does not require that stockholders 

receive consideration for the amendment in the traditional contractual sense. See 8 Del. C. § 

242. The same principle should apply to an amendment to an LLC agreement. But see Peco 

Logistics, LLC v. Walnut Inv. P’rs, L.P., 2015 WL 9488249, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2015) 

(holding that an alleged oral amendment to an LLC Agreement could not be effective where 

it lacked consideration). Jackson also contends that the 2019 LLC Agreement was procured 

by fraud, but in a counterfactual world where the parties had no pre-existing entity-based 

relationship and were bargaining at arm’s-length over the terms of an LLC agreement, it 

seems unlikely that anything in the New Year’s Email constituted an affirmatively 

misleading statement or materially misleading omission sufficient to support a claim for 

common law fraud. The viability of Jackson’s defense depends on the duty of disclosure that 

Nielsen and Britton owned as fiduciaries, either in their capacities as members of a flat, 

partnership-like, member-managed LLC, or as the managing members in a managermanaged LLC.

47 See 6 Del. C. § 18–402 (establishing the default rule that management of an LLC is 

“vested in its members in proportion to the then current . . . interest of members in the profits 

of the limited liability company owned by all of the members,” with the decision of members 

owning a majority of such profit interest controlling); Domain Assocs., L.L.C. v. Shah, 2018 

WL 3853531, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2018) (explaining parallels between the default, 
41

a member-managed governance structure are managers, and they therefore owe 

fiduciary duties to the entity and to each other, just like partners in a general 

partnership.48

The fiduciary obligations of managers and managing members include a duty 

of disclosure. That obligation is not a separate duty, but rather a contextual 

manifestation of the duties of care and loyalty.49 Fiduciaries owe a duty of disclosure 

when, for example, fiduciaries ask their beneficiaries to take action: “When 

fiduciaries communicate with their beneficiaries in the context of asking the 

beneficiary to make a discretionary decision—such as whether to consent to a sale of 

substantially all the assets of an LLC—the fiduciary has a duty to disclose all 

material facts bearing on the decision at issue.”50 That duty applies when fiduciaries 

member-managed structure and general partnership); Obeid v. Hogan, 2016 WL 3356851, at 

*6 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016) (same); Kelly v. Blum, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 n.73 (Del. Ch. Feb. 

24, 2010) (identifying parallel between member-managed LLC and partnership). As in a 

general partnership, the LLC Act’s “default framework generally contemplates a unity of 

membership and management control.” Robert L. Symonds, Jr. & Matthew J. O’Toole, 

Delaware Limited Liability Companies § 9.01[A][1], at 9–5 (2d ed. 2019). 

48 6 Del. C. § 18-1104 (“In any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law 

and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties and the law 

merchant, shall govern.”); Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 662 (Del. Ch. 2012) 

(explaining that managing members and managers owe fiduciary duties by default under the 

LLC Act). 

49 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001).

50 Bakerman v. Sidney Frank Imp. Co., 2006 WL 3927242, at *14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 

2006); accord Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, 2009 WL 1124451, 

at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (explaining that the fiduciary duty of disclosure “applies by 

analogy to the fiduciaries of an LLC when they seek members’ consent.”).
42

ask that members approve an amendment to an LLC agreement.51 And a fiduciary 

also cannot make misleading, partial disclosures. A fiduciary that chooses to speak 

must do so candidly and completely.52 The disclosures must cover the subject on 

which the fiduciary chooses to speak “in a manner that is materially complete and 

unbiased by the omission of material facts.”53 Even if the additional information 

independently would fall short under the traditional materiality standard, it must be 

disclosed if necessary to prevent other disclosed information from being misleading.54

Those duties apply to fiduciaries in privately held entities.55 “What changes is 

not the underlying duty but rather the context-dependent analysis of what 

information is material.”56

When Nielsen and Britton solicited the Minority Members’ approval for the 

2019 LLC Agreement, they owed a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all 

material information, as well as a duty not to make misleading partial disclosures. 

51 Cf. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (discussing duty of disclosure in 

connection with charter amendment).

52 Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Del. 1996).

53 In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 448 (Del. Ch. 2002).

54 Johnson v. Shapiro, 2002 WL 31438477, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2002).

55 New Enter. Assocs. 14, L.P. v. Rich, 292 A.3d 112, 147 (Del. Ch. 2023).

56 Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 183 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on 

other grounds sub nom. Crown EMAK P’rs, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del. 2010); see 

Kerbawy v. McDonnell, 2015 WL 4929198, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2015) (acknowledging 

that directors of a privately held company owe a duty of full disclosure when soliciting 

consents); eBay Domestic Hldgs., Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 31 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Fiduciary 

duties apply regardless of whether a corporation is ‘registered and publicly traded, dark and 

delisted, or closely held.’” (quoting Kurz, 989 A.2d at 183)).
43

Nielsen and Britton were not acting as arm’s-length counterparties in a negotiation 

of a contract. The Co-Founders had formed Sunder in August 2019. Under the oral 

operating agreement that existed at formation, they were all members owning a 

single class of member units. Even assuming that the Co-Founders agreed that 

Nielsen and Britton would be managing members rather than simply managers in 

the colloquial sense, Nielsen and Britton still owed fiduciary duties.

As described in the Factual Background, the 2019 LLC Agreement was an 

astoundingly one-sided document, stacked with provisions drafted in Nielsen and 

Britton’s favor. Every one of the eighteen changes highlighted in the Factual 

Background should have been called out for the Minority Members. If Nielsen did not 

feel competent to do that himself in the New Year’s Email, he needed to ask Snell & 

Wilmer to prepare a written summary. Or he could have asked Snell & Wilmer to 

provide the Minority Members with the type of oral presentation that he and Britton 

received.

At the very least, Nielsen and Britton had an obligation to state plainly to the 

Minority Members that it was time to switch out of a mindset of fiduciary reliance 

and into a mindset of arm’s-length bargaining. They were obligated to put the 

Minority Members on notice that this was a really big deal. They needed to say, in

substance, that the 2019 LLC Agreement materially and adversely altered the 

Minority Members’ rights, that Snell & Wilmer represented Sunder and its 

controlling members (viz., Nielsen and Britton) and not the Minority Members, and 
44

that the Minority Members should retain their own counsel and obtain independent 

advice because there were major changes in the draft agreement. 

Instead, the New Year’s Email sought to reassure the Minority Members and 

induce them to sign the 2019 LLC Agreement.

• Nielsen addressed the Minority Members as “Partners.”

• Nielsen sent the document on New Year’s Eve.

• Nielsen noted that he and Britton had already executed the agreement, as if it 

were a done deal.

• Nielsen provided a copy for the Minority Members to review, but sent it as a

.pdf, as if no changes were expected or welcome.

• Nielsen wrote that “the attorney’s [sic] highly recommend completing these 

documents by the end of tonight,” without noting that Snell & Wilmer—the 

attorneys—were not representing the Minority Members in connection with 

the 2019 LLC Agreement. 

Sunder has stressed Nielsen's superficially accommodating coda that “we don’t 

expect any of you to sign something if you are uncomfortable with it or if you need 

more clarification from the attorney’s [sic] on something. Please let me know if you 

have any questions.” That was masterful understatement, and it was hardly 

sufficient to put the Minority Members on notice of the monumental changes that the 

2019 LLC Agreement made to their rights. More importantly, it fell far short of the 

type of warning necessary to inform the Minority Members that their ostensible 

fiduciaries were operating in adversarial, arm’s-length bargaining mode. Scholars 

conducting empirical research have found that statements of this type—and even 

affirmative disclosures of conflicts—often lead the recipient to trust the counterparty 
45

more, reasoning that the statement is evidence of trustworthiness.57 One need not 

delve into that research to perceive that Nielsen’s statement was designed to reassure 

the Minority Members, not put them on their guard. 

Nielsen and Britton also did not make any oral disclosures to the Minority 

Members that might have supplied the information so obviously omitted from the 

New Year’s Email. They said nothing to the Minority Members about the contents of 

the 2019 LLC Agreement, and they could not have reasonably expected the Minority 

Members to read, understand, and evaluate its terms. For starters, providing the 

agreement was not enough to fulfill their fiduciary duty of disclosure. They could not 

simply provide a lengthy, dense document and say, “have at it.” Not only that, but 

Nielsen testified consistently that his understanding of the 2019 LLC Agreement 

came exclusively from his attorneys. In other words, the sender of the New Year’s 

Email could not understand the 2019 LLC Agreement without having Snell & Wilmer 

lawyers explain it to him. He could hardly expect the Minority Members to do what 

he could not. 

As noted in the Factual Background, Nielsen and Britton did not cure the 

situation with the 2021 LLC Agreement. When they asked the Minority Members to

consent to that amendment, they did not even circulate a copy of the agreement. They 

merely told the Minority Members—inaccurately—that the amendment did not make 

57 E.g., Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming 

Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 5–7, 12–14, 17 

(2005); Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Sunlight Fails to 

Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 37 J.

CONSUMER RSRCH. 836, 849–51 (2011). 
46

any material changes. The amendment expanded the scope of the Covenants’ 

geographic coverage. 

The record demonstrates that the Minority Members had no idea what Nielsen 

and Britton had accomplished. When questioned about their rights under the 2021 

LLC Agreement and then confronted with its actual terms, the Minority Members

consistently evidenced shock and surprise about what the agreement said. And that 

testimony came from Minority Members aligned with Nielsen and Britton.58

Even at this preliminary stage, it is clear as a matter of law that Nielsen and 

Britton breached their fiduciary duty of disclosure in connection with the 2019 LLC 

Agreement and 2021 LLC Agreement. Nielsen and Britton therefore cannot enforce 

the terms of the 2021 LLC Agreement against Jackson. 

b. The Untimeliness Argument

With Jackson relying on a breach of duty in December 2019 to defeat a claim 

in September 2023, the obvious response is to challenge the defense as untimely. To 

be timely, a fiduciary challenge ordinarily must be asserted within three years of the 

wrong. Tolling doctrines may extend the timeliness period, but not when a potential 

plaintiff is on inquiry notice.59 The standard for evaluating inquiry notice is more 

lenient than the standard for evaluating compliance with the duty of disclosure, so 

the inadequacies of the New Year’s Email would not be dispositive. Having received 

58 E.g., Gutschmidt 108, 162–63; JX 15 at 185–86 (Cohen LGCY deposition).

59 Ont. Provincial Council of Carpenters’ Pension Tr. Fund v. Walton, 294 A.3d 65, 85, 

96 (Del. Ch. 2023).
47

the 2019 LLC Agreement and the New Year’s Email on December 31, 2019, Jackson 

would have difficulty arguing that he was not on inquiry notice at that point. For 

Jackson to invoke that breach of duty to defeat a lawsuit filed in September 2023 

would seem to come nine months too late.

That reasoning does not apply to this case because Jackson is invoking the 

breach of fiduciary duty as an affirmative defense.60 “The purpose of statutes of 

limitation is to bar actions and not to suppress or deny matters of defense, whether 

legal or equitable; and it is a general rule that such statutes are not applicable to 

defenses, but apply only where affirmative relief is sought.”61 “The policy underlying 

statutes of limitations, that of preventing undue delay and stale claims, is not 

promoted by suppressing a valid defense arising out of the transaction at issue.”62 A 

party therefore can raise conduct as an affirmative defense even when a claim for 

relief based on the same facts would be time-barred.63

60 Jackson has sought leave to file a third party complaint against Britton and Nielsen 

for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Dkt. 178. That motion will be addressed in due course. 

61 Del. Chems., Inc. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 121 A.2d 913, 918 (Del. Ch. 1956) (Seitz, 

C.) (quoting 34 Am. Jur. 2d. Limitation of Actions § 63); accord PNC Bank, Del. v. Turner, 

659 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995). 

62 F.D.I.C. v. Notis, 602 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Me. 1992); see Martin v. Martin, 287 S.W.3d 

260, 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he statute of limitations does not apply to a fraud claim 

pleaded defensively to defeat liability on an obligation induced by fraud.”); King v. Kitchen 

Magic, Inc., 391 A.2d 1184, 1185 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978) (same); see also King Const., Inc. v. 

Plaza Four Realty, LLC, 2012 WL 3518125, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012) (“Ordinarily 

a defendant may amend a pleading to assert an affirmative defense even where the statute 

of limitations or other considerations would bar the assertion of a substantially similar 

counterclaim.”). 

63 See Skye Min. Invs., LLC v. DXS Cap. (U.S.) Ltd., 2021 WL 3184591, at *21 (Del. 

Ch. July 28, 2021) (“Notwithstanding the dismissal of claims, Counterclaim-Plaintiffs may 
48

Sunder has sought equitable relief enforcing the Covenants that it procured 

through a breach of duty. Jackson is entitled to raise the circumstances surrounding 

the procurement of the Covenants as a defense. That is particularly true where 

Nielsen and Britton’s conduct is attributable to Sunder and demonstrates why it 

would be inequitable for the court to grant Sunder the relief that it seeks. 

3. Lack of Enforceability Because The Covenants Are Not 

Reasonable 

Assuming for the sake of argument that the Covenants could be enforced under 

general principles of contract law, they do not pass muster under the additional 

requirements that restrictive covenants must meet. Delaware courts do not 

mechanically enforce restrictive covenants; instead they are “closely scrutinized.”64

Delaware courts “carefully review” restrictive covenants to ensure that they “(1) [are] 

reasonable in geographic scope and temporal duration, (2) advance a legitimate 

economic interest of the party seeking its enforcement, and (3) survive a balancing of 

the equities.”65 When reviewing restrictive covenants, Delaware courts have taken 

present evidence of Counterclaim-Defendants’ alleged misconduct to defend against or set off 

any potential damages arising from the affirmative claims asserted against them.”); 

Winklevoss Cap. Fund, LLC v. Shaw, 2019 WL 994534, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2019) 

(“Defendants have asserted as affirmative defenses fraud, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent 

misrepresentation, and unclean hands, among others, based on the same facts alleged in the 

counterclaims. I can discern no basis to restrict Defendants from presenting evidence of the 

Defendants' failure to honor agreements to promote Treats! as grounds to defend against 

Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants have not delivered all that was promised. Counterclaims 

based on this evidence, however, are time-barred.”).

64 Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 466 (Del. Ch. 1977).

65 FP UC Hldgs., 2020 WL 1492783, at *6 (quoting Lyons Ins. Agency, Inc., 2018 WL 

4677606, at *5).
49

into account the public interest in competition, the need for individuals to be able to 

earn a living, and the imbalances in bargaining power and repeat-player experience 

that exist between businesses and individuals.66

When evaluating the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant, a court 

examines the restriction holistically and in context. That means evaluating all of the 

dimensions of the restrictive covenant and considering how it operates with other 

restrictions in the contract. A court must not tick through individual features of a 

restriction in isolation, because features work together synergistically. For example, 

“a court must consider how the temporal and geographic restrictions operate 

together” because the “two dimensions necessarily interact.”67 A covenant that 

restricts employment in a similar industry for two years might be reasonable if it only 

applies within a single town or county, and vice versa. All else equal, a longer 

restrictive covenant will be more reasonable if geographically tempered, and a 

broader restrictive covenant will be more reasonable if temporally tailored. Id. A 

66 See, e.g., Elite Cleaning Co., Inc. v. Capel, 2006 WL 1565161, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 2, 

2006) (citing Tristate Courier & Carriage, Inc., 2004 WL 835886, at *15); Del. Elevator, Inc. 

v. Williams, 2011 WL 1005181, at *10–11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2011). These considers apply 

with less force to sophisticated, highly compensated executives where, if anything, the 

bargaining power imbalance is on the other foot. Senior executives can retain counsel, 

bargain effectively with employers, and reach bespoke arrangements. They also can bargain 

for sufficient compensation to offset the potential cost of having to sit out due to a competition 

restriction. Sunder has suggested that Jackson was such an executive because he had the 

title of Vice President and received $6 million in commissions and profit distributions over 

the past four years. Both are pertinent considerations, but the dispositive factor here is the 

standardized nature of the Covenants, which were slipped into the 2019 LLC Agreement as 

terms that govern the Incentive Units. Jackson did not have the opportunity to engage in 

bargaining with Sunder, and the Covenants should not be interpreted as if he had that 

chance. 

67 Del. Elevator, 2011 WL 1005181, at *8.
50

court must also consider how one restriction interacts with another. A restriction on 

soliciting employees might be reasonable standing alone, but might become 

unreasonable when combined with other restrictions in the agreement. 

When a restrictive covenant is overbroad, a Delaware court will resist “bluepenciling” the provision to make it reasonable. The differences in bargaining power 

between repeat-player businesses and individuals suggests that “when a restrictive 

covenant is unreasonable, the court should strike the provision in its entirety.” Id. at 

*10. To blue-pencil the provision creates a no-lose situation for employers, because 

the business can draft the covenant as broadly as possible, confident that the scope 

of the restriction will chill some individuals from departing. If someone does challenge 

the provision, then the worst case is that the court will blue-pencil its scope so that it 

is acceptable. It also enables employers to extract benefits at the expense of 

employees by including unenforceable restrictions in their agreements.

68 The logical 

68 That proposition has real-world support. Scholars have documented that ordinary 

people hold naïve beliefs that courts will enforce contracts as written. See generally Tess 

Wilkinson-Ryan, David A. Hoffman & Emily Campbell, Expecting Specific Performance

(forthcoming 2023), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4335951. A study that examined 

employee beliefs about the enforceability of competition restrictions found that employees 

who believed they were bound remained longer with a given employer and were less likely to 

leave that employer for a competitor. Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, & Norman D. Bishara, The 

Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts, 36 J.L. Econ. & Org. 633, 666 (2020). The 

study found that 41.5% of employees who believed they were bound by competition 

restrictions cited the agreement as a reason for declining a competitor’s job offer, and those 

findings remained consistent despite variations in state laws on the provisions’ 

enforceability. Id. at 663, 666. Even in states where the competition restrictions were 

unenforceable, the study found that employees made decisions based on their naïve beliefs 

about enforceability and the likelihood of being sued; the actual law was largely irrelevant. 

Id. at 666. Another study found that 70% of employees with unenforceable competition 

restrictions were misinformed or uninformed about their enforceability and that their beliefs 

about the probability of an employer suing and the court enforcing the provision were not 

positively correlated with what the law provided. J.J. Prescott & Evan Starr, Subjective 
51

result of such a system is sprawling restrictive covenants.69 Accordingly, “[w]hile, in 

some circumstances, a court may use its discretion to blue pencil an overly broad noncompete to make its restrictions more reasonable, this court has also exercised its 

discretion in equity not to allow an employer to back away from an overly broad 

covenant by proposing to enforce it to a lesser extent than written.”70

Beliefs About Contract Enforceability, J. Legal Stud. at 11 (forthcoming 2023), available at 

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3873638 (“[E]mployees bound by noncompetes tend to believe that 

noncompetes are enforceable in their states—even when they are not—and . . . this pattern 

is relatively stable across education levels.”). The studies show that the language of contracts 

affects behavior, independent of laws determining their enforceability. Wilkinson-Ryan, 

Hoffman & Campbell, supra, at 26. “The penchant for overperformance is subject to 

manipulation by knowledgeable parties, who can free-ride on common mistakes.” Id. at 47. 

By including unenforceable restrictive covenants in their contracts, employers gain a windfall 

at the expense of employees, because the employees naively expect that the restrictions will 

be enforced, regardless of the actual law. The findings about longer tenure and decreased 

likelihood to depart for a competitor reflect concrete benefits that employers secure by 

including unenforceable provisions. As noted above the line, the law should not create a “nolose” scenario in which employers receive these benefits and, on those occasions when 

enforceability is challenged, gain the benefit of a lawful restriction through blue-penciling.

69 See Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 

70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1151 (2009) (“[I]t seems likely that many [overbroad non-compete 

agreements], perhaps most, reflect the incentives the law has created for employers: ask for 

as much as possible, with the expectation that you will get at least what you’re entitled to 

should the matter go to court.”); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An 

Argument for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 689–94 (2008) 

(arguing courts’ willingness to modify non-competes creates confusion, encourages employers 

to overreach, and encourages litigation “by building a degree of uncertainty into every 

employment agreement”).

70 FP UC Hldgs., 2020 WL 1492783, at *8 (cleaned up). Section 13.5 of the 2021 LLC 

Agreement purports to waive Jackson’s ability to challenge the reasonableness of the 

Covenants. A provision of that sort is not valid under Delaware law. See Kodiak Bldg. P’rs, 

LLC, 2022 WL 5240507, at *5. The court has an independent obligation to review the 

reasonableness of restrictive covenants that cannot be bargained away. See Lyons Ins. 

Agency, Inc., 2020 WL 429114, at *1 (noting that when enforcement of a contractual provision 

is “inimical to public policy,” then “our courts will decline to enforce contractual obligations, 

no matter how clear or sincerely intended when entered.”).
52

a. The Competition Restriction 

Sunder seeks to enforce the Competition Restriction, but it is not reasonable. 

It reads as follows:

With respect to each Member or Unit Holder (each, a “Restricted 

Person”), for the period during which such Person owns Units and for a 

two (2)-year period thereafter (the “Restricted Period”), such Restricted 

Person shall not, and shall not cause or permit such Restricted Person’s 

Affiliates to, directly or indirectly, engage or invest in, own, manage, 

operate, finance, control or participate in the ownership, management, 

operation, financing, or control of, be employed by, associated with, or in 

any manner connected with, lend any credit to, or render services or 

advice to, any business, firm, corporation, partnership, association, joint 

venture or other entity that engages or conducts any business the same 

as or similar to the Restricted Business, in all cases in the Territory; 

provided, however, that such Restricted Person may own less than five 

percent (5%) of the outstanding shares of any class of securities of any 

enterprise (but without otherwise participating in the activities of such 

enterprise) if such securities are listed on any national or regional 

securities exchange or have been registered under Section 12(g) of the 

Exchange Act.71

To evaluate the Competition Restriction, it is helpful to think in terms of the five 

newspaper reporter’s questions: Whom does the restriction cover? What does it 

restrict? When does it apply? Where does it apply? Why is it justified? For the reasons 

explained previously, those dimensions must be considered individually and 

holistically. 

Each of the Competition Restriction’s dimensions is astonishingly broad. The 

first dimension is what it covers. It prohibits Jackson from being directly or indirectly 

involved or connected with any business that is the same as or similar to the 

71 PX 7 § 13.1(a) (formatting added).
53

Restricted Business. The 2021 LLC Agreement defines the Restricted Business as 

“the Business, and the business of engaging in the marketing and selling of services 

and products, including those related to pest control, alarms, solar, satellite, TV and 

wireless internet, directly to third parties in their homes, and taking other actions 

similar or related thereto.” Id. § 1.1. The 2021 LLC Agreement defines the Business 

as “the sale, marketing and installation of photovoltaic systems and other solar 

services and products and provid[ing] other general services related to such activities 

and [] tak[ing], or caus[ing] to be taken other actions similar or related thereto.” Id.

§ 2.3.

As written, the Competition Restriction prevents Jackson from working in any 

business engaged in “the marketing and selling of services and products . . . directly 

to third parties in their homes.” The restriction specifically encompasses any business 

that markets or sells services or products to consumers in their homes related to “pest 

control, alarms, solar, satellite, TV and wireless internet.” The Competition 

Restriction thus covers the entire door-to-door sales industry, without regard to 

whether Sunder markets or sells similar products.

The next dimension is whom it covers. The Competition Restriction envelopes 

not only Jackson but also his “Affiliates,” defined as “(a) any person directly or 

indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with another Person, 

and (b) with respect to any natural person, the spouse, parents, siblings and 

descendants (natural and adopted) of such natural person.” PX 7 § 1.1. Importantly, 

the Competition Restriction does not use the concept of Affiliates for the limited 
54

purpose of preventing Jackson from violating the Competition Restriction indirectly, 

such as by using a family member as an agent. As written, the Competition 

Restriction requires that Jackson prevent his Affiliates from engaging in any sales of 

products to consumers in their homes. As written, Jackson’s daughter cannot go door 

to door selling Girl Scout cookies. 

The next dimension is where the Competition Restriction applies. It covers the 

Territory, defined as:

California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, Texas, Illinois, Florida, 

Georgia, Wisconsin, New Mexico, South Carolina, North Carolina, 

Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, 

Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire and Rhode Island and such 

other states in which, at any given time, the Company conducts, or 

reasonably anticipates conducting its business (including the Business).

Id. § 1.1. Nielsen testified that Sunder reasonably anticipates doing business in fortysix states. Nielsen 266:10–16, 267:2–7; see also PX 27 at 6. The only states that he 

did not anticipate entering were Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. 

Those are beautiful states, but they hold only 1% of American households.

72 Standing 

alone, those markets hardly represent a fair opportunity for Jackson to pursue his 

livelihood, particularly when his family lives in Texas and cannot easily relocate due 

to his daughter’s medical condition. 

The next dimension is when the Competition Restriction applies. Its term is 

potentially indefinite, because it endures for “the period during which such Person 

72 That rough estimate uses data from the United States Census Bureau. 

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/HSD410221 (last visited Nov. 11, 2023) 

(identifying 124,010,992 households in the United States, 260,561 (0.21%) in Alaska, 436,481 

(0.35%) in Montana, 316,542 (0.25%) in North Dakota, and 345,779 (0.27%) in South Dakota).
55

owns Units and for a two (2)-year period thereafter . . . .” PX 7 § 13.1(a). As discussed 

previously, Incentive Units are either unvested (“restricted”) or vested (“released”). 

Id. § 3.4(c)(v). A holder of Incentive Units forfeits unvested units automatically when 

leaving Sunder. Id. §§ 3.5, 3.6. A holder does not automatically forfeit vested units, 

and although Sunder has the right to repurchase vested units for zero dollars, Sunder 

decides when to exercise that right. The call option gives Nielsen and Britton sole 

discretion over when the two-year clock starts. Because of transfer restrictions in the 

2021 LLC Agreement, a holder of Incentive Units cannot divest himself of the units 

and start the clock. Nielsen and Britton can thus make the Competition Restriction 

last indefinitely. 

Sunder argues that a potentially indefinite time period is fair because a holder 

of Incentive Units would continue to receive profit distributions from Sunder. Jackson 

historically received profit distributions of $400,000 per year. That is a tidy sum 

(about twice what a Delaware judge makes). But there is no reason to think that 

Nielsen and Britton would allow a departed holder of Incentive Units to continue to 

receive distributions. They are profit distributions, and as the individuals who control 

Sunder, Nielsen and Britton have myriad ways to divert consideration to themselves 

and other favored recipients while reducing what the holders of Incentive Units 

receive. Most obviously, they can pay themselves and their non-departing colleagues 

compensation as members, with those amounts coming ahead of and reducing profits. 

Id. § 5.8. They also could issue a preferred class of units with a senior distribution 

right that would have priority over the Incentive Units. Id. § 3.4(d). Or they could 
56

simply amend the 2021 LLC Agreement to eliminate the Incentive Units’ right to 

receive profits, then make up the difference to individuals who remained with Sunder 

through compensation arrangements or a new class of participating units. Id. § 

15.9(a). Any moderately competent lawyer could come up with other ways to bypass 

the distribution right.

As written, the Competition Restriction is overly broad as to whom, what, 

where, and when it applies, but the analysis does not stop there. The Competition 

Restriction is all the more egregious because it interacts with the Customer 

Restriction. That restriction states:

During the applicable Restricted Period, each Restricted Person shall 

not, and shall not cause or permit such Restricted Person’s Affiliates to, 

directly or indirectly, solicit, canvas, transfer, assign, sell to or accept 

any business from, or engage in any business relationship relating to the 

Business with, for such Restricted Person’s or such Restricted Person’s 

Affiliates’ benefit or on behalf of any entity: (i) any existing customer of 

the Company or any Person who was a customer of the Company prior 

to such Restricted Person ceasing to be a Member or Unit Holder; or (ii) 

any prospective customer of the Company for which such Restricted 

Person or such Restricted Person’s Affiliates had responsibilities or 

duties with respect to or was involved in the development of such 

prospective customer, and such Restricted Person shall not, and shall 

not cause or permit such Restricted Person’s Affiliates to, cooperate with 

others in doing or attempting to do so.73

73 There is also the Stakeholder Restriction. It states:

During the applicable Restricted Period, each Restricted Person shall not, and 

shall not cause or permit such Restricted Person’s Affiliates to, directly or 

indirectly, induce, influence, cause, advise or encourage any customer, 

prospect, employee, independent contractor, supplier, vendor, consultant, 

strategic partner, business partner, joint venturer or representative of the 

Company to terminate such Person’s relationship with the Company, and such 

Restricted Person shall not, and shall not cause or permit such Restricted 

Person’s Affiliates to, cooperate with others in doing or attempting to do so, 
57

That is a pile of words. 

As an initial matter, the Customer Restriction suffers from the same problems 

as to whom it covers and when it applies. The Customer Restriction might seem more 

reasonable as to the where, because it does not expressly refer to the Territory. But 

it more than makes up for that omission with the “what,” because a Restricted Person 

cannot “directly or indirectly, solicit, canvas, transfer, assign, sell to or accept any 

business from” any present Sunder customer, past Sunder customer, or prospective 

Sunder customer for which Jackson had responsibilities or duties. Jackson was head 

of Sunder’s nationwide sales. Read literally, the Customer Restriction applies to 

every homeowner in the states where Sunder did business before Jackson’s 

departure. The Customer Restriction is not limited to the “marketing and selling of 

services and products . . . directly to third parties in their homes.” 

As written, the Customer Restriction bars Jackson from participating in any 

business that sells to any homeowner in the states where Sunder did business before 

Jackson’s departure. Take Texas. Jackson could not take a job at a Best Buy in Dallas

without violating the Customer Restriction as soon as he sold a television to a local 

homeowner. He could not take a job at a McDonalds in Houston without violating the 

Customer Restriction as soon as a local homeowner bought a Big Mac. And if he 

and such Restricted Person shall not and shall not cause or permit such 

Related Person’s Affiliates to, interfere with any of the Company’s contracts or 

relationships. 

Id. § 13.1(d). In the interest of brevity, this decision does not analyze the additional 

implications of its presence. 
58

started his own store on Etsy offering NFL jerseys, he would violate the Customer 

Restriction as soon as he shipped one to a homeowner in Austin.74

The final dimension is why the Competition Restriction exists. Sunder asserts 

that the Competition Restriction is necessary to protect its investment in Jackson 

and any sales personnel who have remained at Sunder but could want to follow him 

to a new employer. The latter interest is illegitimate. Other sales personnel are not 

bound by restrictive covenants and can leave freely. The former interest is 

theoretically legitimate. See Kan-Di-Ki, LLC v. Suer, 2015 WL 4503210, at *20 (Del. 

Ch. July 22, 2015). In this case, however, Sunder has not shown that the Competition 

Restriction is appropriately tailored to protect that interest. The Competition 

Restriction instead is overly broad. This Ccurt “will not enforce a covenant that is 

more restrictive than [the company’s] legitimate interests justify or that is 

oppressive.” Norton v. Cameron, 1998 WL 118198, at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 1998). The 

Competition Restriction is both oppressive and far more restrictive than any 

legitimate interest that Sunder could have.

74 There is an argument that the Customer Restriction does not go so far. In its dense 

and poorly drafted text, one finds the qualifying phrase “relating to the Business.” By 

squinting, it is possible to imagine that qualifier applying to the entire Customer Restriction, 

such that it only limits interactions with customers that relate to Sunder’s business. 

Grammatically, that interpretation struggles with the placement of the modifier, which only 

appears to be part of the phrase “engage in any business relationship relating to the 

Business.” If the drafters had wanted the limitation to apply to the Customer Restriction as 

a whole, they could have added a sentence that stated: “The foregoing restrictions only apply 

to the extent the Restricted Person’s actions relate to the Business.” But even if that 

limitation is credited, the 2021 LLC Agreement defines the Business as “the sale, marketing 

and installation of photovoltaic systems and other solar services and products and provid[ing]

other general services related to such activities and [] tak[ing], or caus[ing] to be taken other 

actions similar or related thereto.” Id. § 2.3. That still picks up quite a bit. It would however, 

allow Jackson to work at Best Buy or McDonalds or to start an Etsy business. 
59

The Competition Restriction is unreasonable on its face and is therefore 

unenforceable. 

b. The Personnel Restriction 

Sunder also seeks to enforce the Personnel Restriction, but it is not reasonable

either. It reads as follows:

During the applicable Restricted Period, each Restricted Person shall 

not, and shall not cause or permit such Restricted Person’s Affiliates to, 

directly or indirectly, solicit, recruit, hire, induce or encourage to leave 

the employ of, or cease providing services to, the Company, any Person 

who is at that time an employee or independent contractor of the 

Company, or who has been employed of hired by the Company for any 

period of time, and such Restricted Person shall not, and shall not cause 

or permit such Restricted Person’s Affiliates to, cooperate with others in 

doing or attempting to do so. The terms “solicit, recruit, hire, induce or 

encourage” include, directly or indirectly: (i) initiating communications 

with an employee or independent contractor of the Company relating to 

actual or possible employment or an independent contractor 

relationship for an entity other than the Company; (ii) offering bonuses 

or additional compensation to encourage or cause any employee or 

independent contractor of the Company to terminate employment with 

the Company; or (iii) supplying the names of, or otherwise referring or 

recommending, any employee or independent contractor of the Company 

to personnel recruiters or persons engaged in hiring for an entity other 

than the Company.

PX 7 § 13.1(b).

Like the Competition Restriction, the Personnel Restriction is overly broad as 

to whom it covers (not only Jackson but also his Affiliates) and when it applies (for 

the Restricted Period). Like the Customer Restriction, it is not limited to a particular 

area, but more than makes up for that with what it covers. The Personnel Restriction 

extends to (1) any current Sunder employee or independent contractor or (2) any 

person employed in the past by Sunder for any period of time. Jackson would violate 

the Personnel Restriction if he contacted someone who went door to door for Sunder
60

on one job in August 2019, shortly after Co-Founders started the business. The 

Personnel Restriction also applies regardless of why the employee or independent 

contractor leaves. The person might retire, and yet Jackson would have breached the 

Personnel Restriction if he lacked the foresight to refuse to offer rudimentary 

thoughts about whether the person had saved enough money. Or the person might 

leave the sales industry entirely and join a non-profit, and yet Jackson would have 

breached the Personnel Restriction if he lacked the self-discipline to refuse to discuss 

whether joining a non-profit would be more personally rewarding and aligned with 

that person’s values. 

If the Personnel Restriction was the only restrictive covenant binding Jackson, 

and if it (i) only restricted Jackson, (ii) only lasted for a reasonable time, (iii) only 

applied to current Sunder personnel, and (iv) only restricted recruiting existing 

personnel for another business, then the Personnel Restriction would be reasonable. 

As written, it is overly broad. In conjunction with the other Covenants, it is 

oppressive. The court will not enforce it. 

B. Irreparable Harm And The Balancing Of The Hardships

Having found that Sunder does not have a reasonable probability of success on 

the merits for its claim against Jackson, the court does not need to consider the other 

elements of the preliminary injunction standard. While it seems likely that 
61

irreparable harm likely would exist, the balancing of hardships could well provide an 

independent basis for declining to issue a preliminary injunction.75

IV. THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST 

FREEDOM

Sunder has also sued Freedom, Brett Bouchy, Chad Towner, and Freedom 

Solar Pros (collectively, the “Freedom Defendants”) for tortiously interfering with 

Sunder’s rights under the 2021 LLC Agreement. Sunder contends that the Freedom 

Defendants induced Jackson to breach the Competition Restriction by joining Solar 

Pros, induced him to breach the Personnel Restriction by encouraging his sales 

organization to join Solar Pros, then caused him to continue to breach the Personnel 

Restriction by recruiting other Sunder sales personnel to join Solar Pros. Sunder 

seeks a preliminary injunction that would prevent the Freedom Defendants from 

continuing to tortiously interfere with Sunder’s rights under the Covenants. Sunder’s 

application fails because there is no underlying obligation to enforce and because the 

Freedom Defendants did not engage in tortious interference with contract under Utah 

law.

75 The court must “balance the plaintiff’s need for protection against any harm that 

can reasonably be expected to befall the defendants if the injunction is granted.” Mills Acq’n 

Co., 559 A.2d at 1279. Assuming the Covenants are enforceable, then Sunder will suffer 

irreparable harm if Jackson can freely compete with and solicit sales representatives from 

Sunder. But continuing to enjoin Jackson has a real human cost. Jackson is a high school 

graduate who has spent his entire career in door-to-door sales. Jackson 316–21. The 

Competition Restriction prohibits Jackson (and his spouse or descendants) from engaging in 

that business, effectively rendering Jackson unable to work in the only industry he knows.

Jackson signed a consulting agreement with Solar Pros that pays him $10,000 per month, 

but that amount is insufficient to meet his family's needs due to the medical expenses 

associated with caring for his daughter. See JX 31; Jackson 409–14. Even if the Covenants 

were enforceable, the court would be inclined to deny the preliminary injunction application 

under these circumstances and require Sunder to seek a monetary remedy. 
62

A. Choice of Law For The Tortious Interference Claim

Once again, the analysis starts with choice of law. Sunder contends that 

Delaware law governs Sunder’s tortious interference claim, while Freedom contends 

that Utah law controls. 

The first step in a choice of law analysis is to decide if an actual conflict exists. 

If the competing jurisdictions apply the same principles of law, then there is no need 

to conduct a choice of law analysis. The parties agree that Utah and Delaware use 

different tests to analyze a tortious interference claim, so that requirement is 

satisfied.

To resolve a conflict, Delaware law applies the principles set out in the 

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.76 Under that test, the court applies the law 

of the state with the most significant relationship to the controversy.77 For a claim 

for tortious interference, the court considers:

1) the place where the injury occurred; 2) the place where the conduct 

causing the injury occurred; 3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place 

of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and 4) the place 

where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered

Id. § 145(2). These factors lead to Utah law governing Sunder’s tortious interference 

claim.

The first factor is the place where the injury occurred. When an injury consists 

of the loss of customers or business, “[t]he effect of the loss, which is pecuniary in its 

76 Xcell Energy & Coal Co., LLC v. Energy Inv. Gp., LLC, 2014 WL 2964076, at *5 (Del. 

Ch. June 30, 2014).

77 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (1971).
63

nature, will normally be felt most severely at the plaintiff’s headquarters or principal 

place of business.” Id., cmt. f. Sunder’s headquarters is in Utah and, therefore, 

Sunder’s injury occurred in Utah. The first factor favors the application of Utah law. 

Citing American Bottling Co. v. BA Sports Nutrition, LLC,

78 Sunder argues 

that the place of injury should not receive much weight. In that decision, the Superior 

Court had to determine whether Delaware or Georgia law governed a claim for 

tortious interference. Id. at *16. The Superior Court recognized that “[f]or tortious 

interference cases, the place of injury is the plaintiff’s headquarters.” Id. at *17. But 

the plaintiff’s headquarters was in Texas, not Georgia or Delaware. The Superior 

Court explained that “[t]his contact will not be given much weight since neither party 

has argued that Texas law should apply.” Id. Here, the Freedom Defendants argue 

that Utah law should apply, and this factor favors the application of Utah law.

The second factor is where the conduct causing the injury occurred. The 

Restatement observes that when “the injury occurred in two or more states[,] . . . the 

place where the defendant’s conduct occurred will usually be given particular weight.” 

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. e. The Freedom Defendants’ 

allegedly wrongful actions took place in multiple jurisdictions, but no one contends 

that any of the conduct took place in Utah or Delaware. When choosing between those 

jurisdictions, the second factor is immaterial.

The third factor requires consideration of the domicile, residence, nationality, 

place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties. “[I]f the interest is a 

78 2021 WL 6068705, at *17 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2021).
64

business or financial one, such as in the case of unfair competition, interference with 

contractual relations or trade disparagement . . . the place of business is the more 

important contact.” Id. “Further, where the injury occurs in two or more states, the 

plaintiff’s principal place of business is the single most important contact for 

determining the state of the applicable law as to most issues in situations involving. 

financial injury.” Id. (cleaned up). As noted, Sunder’s principal place of business is in 

Utah. Sunder argues that the court should apply Delaware law when determining 

whether two Delaware LLCs and their executives tortiously interfered with the LLC 

agreement of another Delaware LLC, but the Restatement says otherwise. Because 

Sunder’s principal place of business is in Utah, this factor favors the application of 

Utah law. 

The fourth factor is where the relationship between the parties is centered. 

Neither party contends that their relationship is centered in Delaware. To the extent 

the relationship between Sunder and Jackson is what matters (on the theory that 

that relationship was the subject of the tortious interference), then the relevant 

jurisdictions are Utah and Texas. To the extent the relationship between Sunder and 

Freedom is what matters, the relevant jurisdictions are Utah and California. To the 

extent the relationship between Sunder and Solar Pros is what matters, the relevant 

jurisdictions are Utah and Nevada. As between Utah and Delaware, this factor favors 

Utah. 

Utah has the most significant relationship to Sunder’s tortious interference 

claim. Utah law therefore governs that claim. 
65

B. No Reasonable Likelihood Of Success Under Utah Law

To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with contract under Utah law, 

a plaintiff must prove “(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the 

plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations, (2) by improper means, (3) causing 

injury to the plaintiff.”79 The claim also requires an underlying breach of contract.

80

Given these requirements, Sunder’s claim for tortious interference cannot 

succeed. For the reasons already discussed, Sunder has not shown a reasonable 

likelihood of proving a breach of the 2021 LLC Agreement. That alone is dispositive.

Assuming Sunder had shown a breach, Sunder cannot show that the Freedom 

Defendants interfered with Sunder’s rights by improper means. The Supreme Court 

of Utah has defined “improper means narrowly to include only those actions that are 

contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law 

rules, or actions that violate an established standard of a trade or profession.”81 “[A] 

non-exhaustive list of conduct that would constitute improper means [includes] 

violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, 

unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehoods.” Id. at 394–95 (cleaned 

up). Under that test, the interfering acts must be “independently tortious or 

wrongful.” C.R. England, 437 P.3d at 354.

79 Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553, 556 (Utah 2015).

80 See St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991).

81 Com. Club, 529 P.3d at 394 (quoting C.R. Eng. v. Swift Transp. Co., 437 P.3d 343, 

354 (Utah 2019)).
66

Sunder does not argue that the Freedom Defendants used improper means to 

recruit Jackson. Any claim for tortious interference based on Sunder’s contractual 

relationship with Jackson therefore fails under Utah law. 

Sunder attempts to argue that the Freedom Defendants used improper means 

to interfere with the Covenants by using Jackson “to induce additional Sunder sales 

representatives to leave Sunder” and by telling Sunder’s sales force “that they would 

no longer be paid if they remained with Sunder.” Pl’s Reply Br. at 30–31. Sunder 

contends that the latter conduct involves deceit, misrepresentation, and disparaging 

falsehoods.

In making this argument, Sunder seemingly refers to communications that (i) 

Freedom posted on September 29, 2023, on a portal for sales representatives that 

Freedom operates and (ii) Freedom sent to Sunder sales personnel in emails and text 

messages. Those communications stated that “Sunder Energy has terminated their 

relationship with [Freedom].” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 150, 156, 159. That was not a 

misrepresentation but rather a true statement. The communications also stated that 

“Eric Nielsen, President of Sunder, has requested that [Freedom] immediately 

discontinue paying sales commissions to its sales representatives and leaders,” with 

one communication containing a screenshot of the language from Sunder’s 

termination letter. Id. ¶¶ 150, 156–57, 159. That was also a true statement. 

In addition to these statements, the communications included an offer to join 

another Freedom dealer: “For any sales reps or leaders that transition to another 

Freedom Dealer, Freedom will ensure that you receive the full commissions on your 
67

entire pipeline.” Id. ¶¶ 150, 156, 159. The communications invited sales 

representatives to continue working with Freedom, stating: “If you have the desire to 

continue selling with [Freedom], please submit this webform and we will reach out to 

assist you in making this transition as soon as possible.” Id. ¶ 150, see id. ¶¶ 156, 

159. Neither statement was misleading, deceitful, or disparaging. Sunder has tried 

to suggest that Freedom’s statement implied that sales representatives would not be 

paid if they stayed at Sunder, but the statement instead makes clear that sales 

representatives would not be walking away from their commissions if they joined 

another Freedom dealer. 

Those communications do not constitute an independently tortious act. Sunder 

has failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the Freedom Defendants used 

improper means to interfere with the Covenants. 

V. CONCLUSION

Sunder’s application for a preliminary injunction is denied. That does not mean 

that Sunder is destined to lose at trial. Still, its options are limited. This decision has 

held that Sunder cannot enforce the Covenants as a matter of law, so Sunder cannot 

rely on those provisions to secure a remedy from Jackson. This decision has held that 

Sunder cannot prevail on its claim for tortious interference against the Freedom 

Defendants as a matter of law, so that path is no longer available either. But Sunder 

may have non-contractual theories that could support a recovery from Jackson for 

actions he took before resigning from Sunder. This decision provides no opportunity 

to assess the merits of any possible non-contractual claim that focused Jackson’s predeparture acts.