[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-14238

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cr-00366-JSM-TBM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROGER LEE SHOSS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(July 24, 2013)

Before MARCUS, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM: 

Roger Shoss appeals his conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud

under 18 U.S.C. § 371 arguing (1) that venue was improper in the Middle District 

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 1 of 9 
2

of Florida, where the trial was held, and (2) that the indictment failed to charge an 

offense constituting a crime. 

I. Background

Shoss was charged and convicted of conspiring with co-defendant Nicolette 

Loisel and others to steal and misappropriate the identities, histories and 

shareholder bases of publicly traded, dormant companies so that shares of stock in 

companies with no underlying business and mere puppet presidents could be sold. 

The conspirators used online applications, faxes, wires and e-mail to carry out their 

scheme. 

Typically, the scheme started by identifying a company that was no longer in 

good standing in its state of incorporation, say Delaware, often for failing to pay 

taxes, but that still had an active Committee on the Uniform Securities 

Identification Procedure (CUSIP) number and ticker symbol on the NASDAQ 

stock exchange. Then, one of the conspirators would request to incorporate a new 

company with the same name in the same state. The new company would then

change its name. The conspirators would then apply online for a new CUSIP 

number and to suspend the old CUSIP number based on the name change, 

explaining that the company had been publicly traded on the NASDAQ exchange 

under the old name. Armed with the new CUSIP number, documentation that 

showed amendments to the articles of incorporation authorizing a new stock split, 

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 2 of 9 
3

and other fraudulent verification documentation,1 the conspirators would approach 

the NASDAQ requesting to change the company’s ticker symbol. After obtaining 

a new ticker symbol, the conspirators would print stock certificates using the new 

CUSIP number but also information about the old company. Finally, through 

others, shares in these shell companies would be sold to unknowing British 

investors, with the sale proceeds being deposited in an escrow account in Pinellas 

County, Florida. Money from that escrow account in Florida would then be wired 

back to Shoss in Texas. 

II. Venue

On appeal, Shoss argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss the indictment for improper venue in the Middle District of Florida and, in 

the alternative, to transfer the proceeding to the Southern District of Texas. He 

contends that the conspiracy for which he was charged involved twenty overt acts, 

none of which occurred in the Middle District of Florida, and that the conspiracy 

had terminated prior to the acts taking place in Florida. Shoss also argues that the 

Southern District of Texas was an appropriate forum because all of the overt acts 

involved wires to or from Houston, where Shoss resided and could obtain optimal 

medical care for what he characterizes as a neurological condition. 

 1 In some cases, Shoss would sign all of the incorporation documents, but at least with respect to 

one of the shell companies, the conspirators enlisted Preston Valentine in Florida to serve as the 

nominal president and sign an array of verification documents. 

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 3 of 9 
4

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an 

indictment for improper venue. United States v. Muench, 153 F.3d 1298, 1300 

(11th Cir. 1998). 

“[V]enue is an essential element of the government’s proof at trial.” United 

States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 865 (11th Cir. 2010). The Sixth Amendment 

requires that criminal trials be held before “an impartial jury of the State and 

district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 

The locality of the crime is “determined from the nature of the crime alleged and 

the location of the act or acts constituting it.” United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 

1, 6–7, 118 S. Ct. 1772, 1776 (1998) (quotation marks omitted). “In a conspiracy 

case, venue is proper in any district where an overt act was committed in 

furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th 

Cir. 1990). “[The] overt act may be committed by any conspirator, anyone who 

aids or abets a conspirator, or anyone a conspirator causes to act.” United States v. 

Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1255 n.87 (11th Cir. 2011). In order to sufficiently prove 

venue, the government need only show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

an overt act was committed in the district of prosecution. United States v. Barnes, 

681 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1982). “In determining whether the prosecution met 

this burden, the evidence and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom must be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. Finally, the overt act in 

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 4 of 9 
5

the location of the venue need not be alleged in the indictment, so long as evidence 

of the act is presented at trial and the defendant is given constitutionally sufficient 

notice of the charges against him. United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 975 n.10 

(11th Cir. 1997). 

Venue was proper in the Middle District of Florida because co-conspirators 

Loisel and Shoss committed and/or caused others to commit overt acts in the 

Middle District of Florida in furtherance of their conspiracy. See Smith, 918 F.2d 

at 1557. Specifically, by e-mail Loisel directed Valentine, who was working in the 

Middle District of Florida, to take various actions as “president” of one of the 

empty-shell companies to create the façade crucial to the conspiracy. See id.; see 

also United States v. Strickland, 493 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that 

venue was proper both in the district in which a phone call, the overt act, originated 

and the district where it was received).

2

 Further, Shoss caused money-wire 

transfers to be made from the escrow account in Pinellas County, Florida to 

Shoss’s Texas account. See Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1255 n.87. These overt acts, 

outlined in the indictment as having occurred “in the Middle District of Florida and 

elsewhere” and presented at trial, were more than sufficient to establish venue in 

the Middle District of Florida. See Smith, 918 F.2d at 1557. Thus, there was no 

 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth 

Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 5 of 9 
6

error in failing to dismiss the case for improper venue. See Schlei, 122 F.3d at 975 

n.10; Barnes, 681 F.2d at 722.

We review a district court’s decision regarding change of venue for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. 

denied, Langford v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1121 (2012). Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b) permits a district court to transfer venue to any 

appropriate jurisdiction “for the convenience of the parties, any victim, and the 

witnesses, and in the interests of justice.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b). “A criminal 

defendant does not have a constitutional right to be tried in the district 

encompassing his residence.” United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1322 (11th 

Cir. 1982). “A transfer of venue is completely within the discretion of the trial 

court . . . .” Smith, 918 F.2d at 1556. 

Shoss’s motion for change of venue does not justify transfer, as his concern 

about the cost of his “daily subsistence” while being tried in a district other than 

his own was of little relevance to the choice of venue. See Kopituk, 690 F.2d at

1322–23. Shoss’s explanation of his neurological condition was short and vague,

without an affidavit from a doctor giving a specific diagnosis. In any event, other 

factors weighed in favor of the Florida location, such as witnesses living in the 

Middle District of Florida. Indeed, no potential witnesses, other than Shoss and 

Loisel, resided in the Southern District of Texas. 

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 6 of 9 
7

We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Shoss’s motion to dismiss 

for improper venue, and, in the alternative, for a transfer of venue.

III. Failure to State an Offense

Shoss also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss the indictment because it did not state an offense. Shoss argues that the 

ticker symbols and CUSIP numbers Shoss fraudulently acquired were comparable 

to licenses and, thus, did not qualify as money or property under United States v. 

Cleveland, 531 U.S. 12, 121 S. Ct. 365 (2000). Based on this, Shoss argues that he 

did not commit the crime for which he was indicted. 

We review de novo the sufficiency of an indictment. United States v. Bobo, 

344 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2003). We have explained that 

[a]n indictment is sufficient if it: (1) presents the essential elements of 

the charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to be 

defended against, and (3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment 

under the indictment as a bar against double jeopardy for any 

subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 

United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks

omitted).

To prove conspiracy to commit fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the 

government must demonstrate: “(1) agreement between two or more persons to 

achieve and unlawful objective; (2) knowing and voluntary participation in that 

agreement by the defendant; and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” 

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 7 of 9 
8

United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d 1260, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012). Proof of wire 

fraud, in violation of § 1343, requires evidence that a person “(1) intentionally 

participat[ed] in a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property, and 

(2) use[d] or caus[ed] the use of . . . wires for the purpose of executing the scheme 

or artifice.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1238 (quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has held that the wire fraud statutes protect only 

property rights. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358–59, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 

2880–81 (1987), superseded by 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).

3

 Cleveland, upon which 

Shoss relies, held that municipal-granted licenses do not qualify as property rights 

because, when fraudulently obtained, the licenses are property-like in the 

recipient’s hands only, not in the victim’s. 531 U.S. at 15, 121 S. Ct. at 368. 

Because a state’s core concern in issuing licenses is regulatory, the licensing 

scheme constitutes an exercise of the state’s police powers, rather than a 

conveyance of property. Id. at 20–21, 121 S. Ct. at 371–72. 

On the record before us, we conclude that Shoss’s indictment alleging 

conspiracy to commit wire fraud sufficiently presented the essential elements of a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Steele, 147 F.3d at 1320. The CUSIP numbers 

and ticker symbols constituted valuable intangible property under 18 U.S.C. 

 3 The Supreme Court later held that Congress’s enactment of § 1346 allowed a more expansive 

interpretation of the rights protected by including the intangible right to honest services. Skilling 

v. United States, 561 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927 (2010). 

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 8 of 9 
9

§ 1343. These corporate identities had discernible monetary value because they 

simulated companies that were publicly-traded, a status valued for generating 

investor confidence, and which must usually be obtained through a cumbersome 

and expensive process. Beyond that, the monetary value of the corporate identities 

was demonstrated both by Shoss’s insistence that the new corporations appear to 

be publicly-traded and the market demand for shares in the companies that 

appeared to be traded on NASDAQ. Thus, the unique, identifying information was 

not like a government-issued license, but, instead, had value in the hands of both 

the recipient (Shoss) and the victim companies. See Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 15, 

121 S. Ct. at 368. Because the identifying information constituted property, the 

indictment was sufficient to state an offense under § 371. See Bobo, 344 F.3d at 

1083; Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1238; Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1277. 

Upon consideration of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 12-14238 Date Filed: 07/24/2013 Page: 9 of 9