NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0107n.06 No. 09-1250 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DO N PE RK I

NS, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v.
KENNET H T. McKE E, Warden, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : B OG GS, MO OR E a nd SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. Af ter a state cour

t jury convicted D on Perkin s of two counts of first-deg ree murder a

nd imposed a life se ntence , he filed a petition for a wr it of habea s corpus. The district court denie d the petition and g rante d a ce rtificate of a p p ea lability on three issues: (1) whether the trial cour

t impaired his rig ht to present a c omplete def ense; (2) whether

prosec utorial misconduct violated his rig ht to a fair t rial; and (3) whether counsel provide d ineffe ctive assistanc e. We a ff ir m.
I.
L ate in the nig ht spanning October 15 and 16, 2001, Damon Hill , Antonio Hall and Maur ice Odums drove to Ha ll’s gir lfriend’s re s i d en ce at 14181 Spring Gar den Stree t. After pa rking , theyNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 2 - walked to the ba ck of the residenc e whe re thre e men with g uns surprised them. The gunmen pointed the ir ha nd g un s at th e tr io. No on e mov e d f or thi rt y or fo rt y se c on ds . Wh e n O dums h e ard a g un sh ot, he ra n throug h the bac ky ard a

nd down an alley toward an intersec tion, wher e he saw police . He r an to the p o li c e c ar an d to ld th e o f f ic e r s th a t “ s o me g uy s w a s ju s t s h o o ti n g a t me in the back y ard.” R.11-5 at 116. Corey Scales emer g ed from the alley
. The office rs arr ested Scales, afte r w h i ch t hey proce eded dow n the alley

until they discovere d the bodies of Ha ll and Hill at the drivewa y for 14181 Spring G arde n Street. Eac h had suff ere d a sing le g unshot wound to the head. When Serg eant Er ic Dec ker a rrived, he stood near the office rs’ squad c ar, w here Scales wa s detained in the back seat. A whit e C hevrole t Caprice drove by , slowing a s it approac hed the police
car . As the vehic le passed, Sca les pressed his face ag ainst the squad ca r’s ba ckseat window, seeming ly

(ac cordingto Serg eant De cker ) tryi n g to communicate to the c ar’ s occupa nts. Decke r pointed his flashlight at the Caprice and or d er ed t he drive r to stop the car , but the driver ke pt
m o v i n g.
Offic ers in two othe r ca rs pursued the ve hicle. The car eventua lly

slowed down a

nd a pa sse ng e r, An tho ny

Pa tto n, e xite d. Th e dr ive r, Do n Per kin s, sto pp e d, and

the of fi c e rs arr e ste d h im. On Octobe r 16, Maur ice Odums identified D on Perkins in a poli ce lineup as one of the gunmen at 14 18 1 Sp ri ngGa

rd e n Stre e t.No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 3 - A g rand jury

char g ed Perkins with two counts of pre meditated murde r, two counts of f elony murder, one count of a

rmed robbe ry , one count of assault with intent to commit m urder , one count of bein g a f

e lo n in p o s s e s s io n o f a f

ir e ar m, an d o n e c o u n t o f p o s s e s s io n o f a f ir e ar m during the commission of a felony . At trial Perkins denied a ny involvement in the murders. H e testified that he had be en at a wake until approximately 10:40 PM on the night of the mur ders. The only rea son he wa s in the ne ig hb or

ho od , h e sa id, wa s to pic k u p L e na Ni xon, a wo man h e ha d b e e n d a tin g , at a
near by bus stop. A jury

convicted Perkins on all counts and sente nced him to life in prison for the
mur de r c on vic tio ns . The Michig an Court of Appe als aff irmed his conviction, and the Mic higa n Supreme Court denied lea

ve to appe al. The distric t co u rt re j ec ted his habea s petition and g rante d a ce rtificate of
a pp e a la bil it y on th ree iss ue s: ( 1) wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

imp a ir e d h is r ig ht t o p re se nt a c omp le te defe nse; (2) w hether

prosec utorial misconduct violated his rig ht to a fair tri al; and (3) whether counsel provide d ineffe ctive assistanc e.
II.
Perkins filed his ha

beas petition a fter the eff ective date of the Antiterror ism an d E ff ec tive Death Penalty

Act. We there fore may

g rant the w rit with respec t to claim s “a djudicated on the merits in State court proce eding s” only if the state c ourt adjudication “resulted in a de cision that was contra ry to, or inv o l v edan u n re as o n ab l e ap p l i ca t i o no f” cl ea rl y es t ab l i s h edS u

p re m e C o u rt p re ce dent or “r esulted in a de cision based on an unreasonable deter mination of the fa cts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 4 - III
. Pe rk ins fi rs t c la ims that th e state tr ia l c ourt vio la te d his ri g ht to pr e se nt a c omp le te de fe ns e when it re fused to allow him to call the office r who took Maurice Odums’ statement on the nig ht of the mur de rs . A ft e r t

he State re ste d, Pe rk ins c a lle d Ser g e ant Chr ist op he r Qu are llo to t e sti fy a bo ut a state me nt t

hat Ma ur ic e Od ums g a ve t o th e polic e on the nig ht o f t

he mur de rs . In th e state me nt, Odums descr ibed Perkins as a bout 5' 6" tall, e ven though he is a bout six fe et tall. Defe nse counse l thought this testimony

would undermine O dums’ identification.
But a s it turned out, O ffice r Fisher , not Serg eant Qua rello, had taken Odums’ state ment, and Fisher was not on the witness list. When counsel rea liz ed the problem, he tried to ca ll Office r F isher to t he sta nd . T he c ourt

de nie d th e re qu e st b e c a

us e Pe rk ins ha d n ot pu t Of fi c e r F ish e r on the wi tne ss list, it did no t w ant t o d e lay the pr oc e e din g s a

nd F ish e r’ s te sti mony

wo uld have re pe a te d O du ms’
ea rl i er testimony . The Michig an cour t of appe als ag ree d that Perkins’ re quest to produce Offic er Fisher would have “ delay ed the tria l c onsiderably” and that Offic er F isher’s testimony would have touched on matter s that were “alr eady cover ed in detail at trial.” R.11-13 at 3. I t theref ore he ld that the trial cour

t did not abuse its discretion in denying Per kins’ reque st to produce Of fice r F isher.
Th is d e c isi on

did no t un rea so na

bly a pp ly Sup re me Court

pr e c e de nt. Cr imi na l de fe nd a nts
e njo y a Sixth a nd F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt r ig ht t o p re se nt e vid ence, b ut t hat r ig ht “ is s ub

je c t to
re a so nabl e r e s t r i c t i o n s , ” i n c l u d i n g r e a s o n a b l e r e s t r i c t i o n s o nt h e a d m i s s i o no f e v i d e n c e a ta

t r ia l. United States v. Sche

ffer , 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). So long a s judge s rely on evidentiar

y and loca lNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 5 - rules of g ener al applica

bility that are not “arb i t ra ry

or disproportionate to the pur poses they

are desig ned to se rve,” the judge s may enfor ce these rules. Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). Trial judge s also have “wide discretion” to r efuse to a dmit testimony that would be “me rely cumulative in nature.” United States v. Soc ony-Vac uum Oil Co. , 310 U.S. 150, 230 (1940).
Under Michig an law, c riminal defe ndants must disclose to t h e prosec utor the name s and addr e s s e s o f a ll w it

n e s s e s th e y p la

n to c a ll a t tr ia l. M ic h
. Ct
. R. 6
. 2 0 1 ( A ) ( 1 ) ; M ic h . Comp. L aws § 767.94a(1) (a)
. Def

endants may add other witnesse s during trial only with the court’s pe rmission. M.C.R. 6.201(F), (I ); M.C.L . § 767.94a(2) –(3). Perkins wisely

does not cha lleng e the Michig an rule itself, which is neither ar bitrary nor disproportionate to its purposes because , without it, no lawy er c ould prepa re f or trial. Cf. Taylor v. Il lin ois , 484 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1988). Perkins instead c halleng es the trial c ourt’s application of the
ru l e. He notes that, bec ause the prosec uting attorney remove d Fisher

from the witness list, “any bla me fo r t he de lay sh ou ld” lie wi th the State
. Pe rk ins B r. a t 11, 12. B ut n oth ingin t he re c or d te lls us who remove d the Fishe r fr om the witness list. The prosecutor acknow ledg ed that Offic er F isher

“ wa s r e mov e d f

ro m th e wi tne ss lis t,” R.1 1- 8 a t 8, bu t did no t sa y wh o to ok him of f t he lis t. N or

did any one else . Nor for

that matter is it clear

that, even if the prosec utor had initially place d Fisher

on its wi tne ss lis t, thi s wo uld a lle viate de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s ob lig a tio n to pr e pa re his ow n a c c ur a te wi tne ss list. On thi s rec ord, we cannot sa y t h at t h e s t at e trial c ourt unrea sonably found that Perkins wa s responsible for

Fisher ’s abse nce f

rom the list.No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 6 - Ev e n s o, Pe rk ins a dd s, F ish e r’s tes tim on y “ we nt t o th e ve ry

he art of thi s c a se ” and

wo uld have “ cre ate[d] a reasona ble doubt that otherwise would not e x ist,” and thus a ny witness-list error s should have be en excused. Perkins B r. at 12, 13. Ye t the state c ourts held that this testimony was cumulative, and r easona

bly so. At this point in the trial, th e j ury had alr eady

hear d from Maur ice Odums about his w itness statements to police and a bout any inconsistencies be tween that testimony
and his te sti mony in an oth e r tr ia l. T he pr os e c uto r a nd Od ums e ng a g e d in

a lon g c oll oq

uy a bo ut h is descr ipti on of Perkins to offic ers, includinghis estimate that Perkins was “ may be six fee t tall.” R.11-5 at 119. Def

ense c ounsel then attempted to unde rmine Odums’ identification testimony . He
a sk e d a bo ut O dums’ pr ior

te sti mony in C or e y

Sc a le s’ tr ia l, i nc lud inga

state me nt i n w hic h O du ms de sc ri be d Pe rk ins a s “ [t]he sma ll guy ,” R.1 1- 6 at 40 , a ll a s pa rt of a se ri e s o f q

ue sti on s d e sig ne d to sh owinc on sis te nc ie s b e tw e e n O dums’ te sti mony a t Pe rk ins ’ t

ri a l and his te sti mony in Cor e y Sc a le s’ trial. Althoug h Odums never specific ally

said Perkins wa s 5 '6 " t al l, as opposed to say ing he was “[t] he small g uy ,” the state court’s c onclusion t h at an y inconsistencies in Odums’ testimony had “alr eady been br oug ht out” was a

rea sonable one . R.11-8 at 10.

I V.
Perkins next claims t hat the st ate courts violated hi s constitutional rig hts, primarily it appear s his ri g hts un de r t

he Com pu lso ry Pr oc e ss C la

us e , w ithre sp e c t to ho w the y tr e a te d his e ff or ts t o c a ll L ena N ix on as a w itness. Here , too, he is mistaken.No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 7 - Perkins identified Nixon as an alibi witness and s oug ht to produce he r at trial, but she
mana g e d to a vo id s e rv ic e of a wi tne ss s ub po e na . In r e sp on se , P erki ns a sk e d to c a ll the pr oc e ss
serve r, the individual who tried to ser ve the subpoe na, as a

witness. The trial c ourt reje cted the reque st beca

use t he process server c ould not say any thing a bout Nix on’s testimony , only what the ind ivi du a l ha d d on e to tr

y to se rv e he r. Th a t w a s a re a so na ble de c isi on . T he Com

pu lso ry Pr oc e ss C l ause doe s not require courts to admit irrele vant evidenc e. Crane v. Kentuck y , 4 7 6 U.S. 683, 689–90 (1986). Be cause the proce ss se rver could not ha ve testified about what Nixon would have
s a i d , b u to n l y h o w h e h a d

t r i e d t o s e r v e h e r , t h e t r i a l c o u rt h a d n o o b l i g a t i o nt o p e r m i tt h e t e s t i m o n y.
To the extent Perkins means to ar g ue that the tria l court re fused to subpoena Nix on, that does not he lp h im
. Pe r

k in s o f f e r s n o e v id e n c e th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt r e f u s e d to is s u e th e s u

b p o ena, a nd nothing in the r ecor d supports the idea. To the contra ry : Perkins’ eff

orts to c all the proc ess serve r
as a w itness sugg est that the cour t indeed issued a subpoe na but that Nixon could not be found. To the extent Perkins means to argu e t h at t h e t rial cour t should have off

ere d additional assistance in locating and produc ing N ix on, that contention g oes nowher e. The Michig an cour t of appea ls held that, as a matter of Michig an evidence law, P erkins did not seek a dditional assistance until i t wa s t o o l ate. See M.C.L . § 767.40a(5) . A state c ourt’s application of its own evidentiary rules, unless fund am en t all y unfair, doe s not violate the U.S. Consti tution. W ynne v . Renico , 606 F.3d 867, 871 ( 6th Cir. 2010). That was not the c ase he re.No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 8 - V.
Pe rk ins c omp la ins tha

t hi s c ouns e l pro vid e d ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e by fa ili ng(1 ) t o o bje c t to “the many instances of prosec utorial misconduct,” (2) to move to suppr ess the line u p i n which Od ums ide nti fi e d Pe rk ins a nd (3 ) t o p re se nt “ an e xpe rt wi tne ss o n th e in herent pr ob le ms w ith ey ewitness testimony .” Perkins B r. at 24–25. C o n s t i t utionally ineffe ctive assistanc e exists when “counse l’s perf

ormanc e wa s deficie nt” and the “ defic ient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the de fense .” Strickland v. W

ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 68 7 (1 98 4)
. An a tto rn e y ’s pe rf or manc e is c on sti tut ion a lly defic ient when it fa lls “below an obje ctive standa rd of r easona

bleness.” Id
. a t 68 8. Our ana ly sis is “hig hly defe rential” and we “indulg e a strong presumption that counsel’s c onduct [fell] within the wide ra ng e of r easona

ble profe ssional assistance.” Id
. at 689. Def icient per formanc e pre

judices the defe nse whe n “ther e is a reasona ble probabilit y ” that “the result of t he procee ding would have be en differ ent.” Id. at 69 4
. Be cause the Michig an cour t of appe als revie wed Per kins’ ineffe ctiveassistance claim on t h e mer its, we g ive the state c ourt’s adjudication AEDPA defe renc e. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) . The Supreme Court rec ently emphasized the double dose of defe renc e that fe dera l
co u rt s m u s tgi v e s t at e c o u rt s i nre v i ew i n g Strickland claims under A EDPA: As a c on dit ion fo r o bta ini ng ha

be a s cor pu s fr om a fe de ra l cou

rt , a state pr iso ne r m

us t show that the state court’s ruling on the claim beingprese nted in fede ral c ourt was so lacking in justi fication that ther e was an err or we ll understood and compr ehende d in exi sting law b ey o n d any possibili ty

for f airminded disag ree ment. . . . An ineffe ctive-a ssistance c laim can f unction as a w ay

to esca pe r u l es of wa iver a

nd forf eiture a nd raise issues not pre sented at trial, and so the Strickland sta nd ard mus t be applied w ith scrupulous car e, lest “intrusive post-tria l i n q uiry ” thre aten the int e g rity of th e ve ry

a dv e rs ary

pr oc e ss t

he ri g ht t o c ouns e l is me ant t o s e r v e . . . . F e d e r a l h a

b e a s c o u rts mu s t g u ar d a g a in s t th e d an g e r of e quating unrea sonablene ss under S tr ic kland wi th unrea sonablene ss under § 2254(d) . WhenNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 9 - § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were r easona ble. The que stion is whether there is any rea sonable a

rg ument that counsel satis fi ed Strickland ’s def

ere ntial standard. Harrington v. Richter , __ U.S. __, 131 S. C t. 770, 786–88 (2011).
A.
Di sp arag ing

c om me nts . P e r

k i n s ’ m a i n ar g u m e n t g o e s t o h i s c o u n s e l ’ s f a i l u r e t o o b

j e c t to disparag ing c omments by the prosec utor. Two inquiries g uide whethe r a prosec utor’s misconduct
war rants a new trial and whether, for prese nt purposes, a r easona ble attorne y

would have obje cted to the con d u ct
. On e, we ask whe ther “ the prosec utor’s conduc t and re marks we re imprope r.” Macias v. M

akowski , 291 F.3d 447, 452 ( 6th Cir. 2002). Two, i f t he comments were imprope r, we ask “( 1) whe ther the c onduct and r emar ks of the prose cutor tende d to misl ead the jury or pre judice the def endant; (2) whether

the conduc t or re m ar k s wer e isolated or e x tensive; (3) w hether the
rema rks wer e deliber ately

or acc identally made; and ( 4) whe ther the e vidence ag ainst the defe ndant was strong .” Id. (c i t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . Ca rro ll , 2 6 F .3 d 1 38 0, 13 85 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) ); see D arden v. W ainwright , 4 77 U. S. 1 68 (1 98 6) ; Uni t ed S t ates v. Y oung , 4 70 U. S. 1 (1 98 5) . A t is su e the n is whether the prosec utor’s conduc t rose to this level, whether as a re sult P erkins’ c ounsel should have ob je c te d a nd wh e the r a

ny fa ilure to o bje c t pr e

jud ic e d Pe rk ins
. 1.
Pr os e c uto ria l m isc on du c t—op ening s tat e me nt. Fi rst , the prosec utor noted in his opening statement that C o re y S ca les’ “c ase ha s alrea dy been disposed of

,” R.11-5 at 70, a

ref ere nce thatNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 10 - beca me unfa ir, Perkins say s, whe n th e p r o s ecutor

elicited testimony

from Odums that he ha d testified
a t Sc a les’ tr ial. Th e “ c le ar i mpl ic a tio n” fr om t his pa rt of the op e nin g state me nt a nd Od ums ’ testimony , as Perkins see s it, is t hat Odums must be a cr edible witness bec ause he testified at the tria l of a de fenda

nt whose ca se had “ alre ady been disposed of

.” Perkins B r. at 16. But this argument piles one unwa rra nted assumption on another
. Assumption one: when the pr os e c uto r s a id that Sc a le s’ c a se ha d be e n dis po se d of , he imp lie d Sc a le s ha d be e n c on vic te d at hi s trial. Assumption two: because Maurice Odums had testi fied for the S tate in a trial where the jury
c on vic te d th e de fe nd ant, Od ums mus t be a re lia

ble wi tne ss. As su mpt ion thr e e : th a t a

jur y wo uld
connec t the two infere nces, e ven thoug h they do not specifica lly

ref ere nce one other or for that
ma tte r s a y w h a t P e r

k i n s s u g g e s t s t h e y s ay . E a c h a s s u mp t i o n i s u n n e c e s s ar y , an d t h e r i s k t ha t a ll three would be made by the jury is an attenuated one. A c ou rt can “dispose of” a cr iminal defe ndant’s ca se with a c o n v i ction, an ac quittal or in some circumstanc es a mistrial. The pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nt i n h is o pe nin g state me nt e le va te s n on e of

tho se me anin g s o ve r t

he oth e rs . Odums’ statement that he testified at Scale s’ trial thus tells the jury littl e. And the r eality

that the prosec utor made the two statements at diffe rent times, roug hly an hour or two apar

t, weake ns further the ri sk that any su c h in fe re nc e s w ou ld b e dr awn . T he Mic hig an c ourt of a pp e a ls r e a so na

bly de te rm ine d th a t Pe rk ins wa s n ot p re jud ic e d b y

his c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to o bje c t.
Second , th e pr os e c uto r s a id in his op e nin g state me nt that Ma ur ic e Od ums “ pa sse d th e g old standard te st, goingto a line-up a nd choosing the rig ht man, that is Don Perkins.” R.11-5 at 81–82. The d i s t ri ct cour

t acknowle dg ed that “[t]hi s remar k would have be en better suited to closingNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 11 - arguments,” but t h at u l t imately it “could not have pr ejudiced Petitioner, g iven the streng th of evidenc e ag ainst him and the trial court’s instruction that the attorney s’ opening statements wer e not
e vid e nc e .” R.1 1- 13 a t 10
. We a g re e . Th e re mark wa s fl e e tin g , re la tiv e ly mil d and ind eed co uld have be en made in the same trial, a lbeit during closing argument. At a m inimum, and as the Mic hig an c ourt

of a pp e a ls c on c lud e d, de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s f a ilure to o bje c t to it w a s n ot p re jud ic ia l. See B yrd v. Collins , 209 F.3d 486, 537–38 ( 6th Cir. 2000).
2.
Cross-examination. Perkins argues th at hi s counsel should have objected w hen the pr os e c u t o r a s k e d P e r

k i n s w h e t h e r h e c o u l d “ t h i n k o f an y r e a s o n ” t h a t S e r g e an t D e c k e r w o u l d li e when he said he had order ed P erkins to stop his car on the night of the cr ime. R.11-9 at 124. Under Mic hig an la

w, “ it [is ] imp ro pe r f

or a wi tne ss t o c omm e nt or pr ov ide an o pin ion on the c re dib ili ty of another wit ness s ince matter s of cr edibility are to be deter

mined by the trier of

fac t.” People v

. Buck ey , 378 N.W.2d 432, 439–40 (Mich. 1985). But the risk of pre judice her e is slender . Whether De cker asked Per

kins to stop was a periphe ral point, and the f act that the defendant was g iven an op po rt un ity to c omm e nt o n D e c ke r’ s c re dib ili ty ho lds lit tle ri sk

of pr e jud ic e to P e rk ins
. 3.
Di sp arag ing

de fe ns e c ou ns e l. Fi rst , Perkins say s that his counsel should have objec ted when the prosec utor noted in his opening statement t hat “may be [ defe nse counsel] is not thankful for” the jurors’ service, but that “we know t hat y ou made a sacr ifice to be here .” R.11-5 at 62. This kind ofNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 12 - shameless e ffor

t to ingratiate onese lf to a jury may be in bad taste and may g ive l awy ers a bad name
. But ther e ar e tac tical re asons for de clining to object (re maining above the fra y ) and a re medy

to boot (disproving the sug g estion by thanking the jurors in his opening statement, which de fense counsel did). “[T]rial counsel’s tactica l decisions are particula rly difficult to attack,” O’Hara v. W igginton , 24 F .3 d 8 23 , 8 28 (6 th C ir . 1 99 4) , a nd c ho os ingwh e the r a

nd wh e n to ob

je c t to su c h p os tur ingis classica lly

one that should not be upset by a fe dera l court on collate ral re view.
Second , Perkins say s that the prosec utor “implied that [defense] counsel wa s either a liar or incompetent by saying in f ront of the jury

that he showe d him an exhibi t during lunch hour, knowing that he did not.” Perkins Br
. at 17. On the third day of trial, the pr osecutor r epre sented that he had shown an exhibi t to defe nse counsel during the lunch hour. D efe nse counse l responded that he “wa s down on the third floor dur ing lunch hour,” sug g esting he had not se en the exhibi t. R.11-9 at 182. At that po int , th e pr os e c uto r s ho we d co un se l the e xhibi t and e xpla ine d th a t he ha d s ha re d it wi th h im as the jury

left for lunch. The r ecor d supports the prosec utor’s statements. Just befor e the c ourt
a djo ur ne d at mi d- da

y , th e pr os e c uto r t old

the c ourt , w ithde fe ns e c ouns e l th e re , a bo ut t he e xhibi t. Th e pr os e c uto r at any

rate did no t say that de fe ns e c ouns e l wa s “ a lia r o r i nc omp e te nt” bu t me re ly said (ac curately

) what had happe ned.
Thi rd , Perkins complains about di spara g ing comments the prosecutor m ade in his rebuttal argument, namely

that defe nse counse l “knows how to cast an aspersion on somebody ,” that he wa s
a “ wo lf in s he e p’ s c lot

hin g ,” that he wa s “ a

g uy wh o r e pr e se nts a

c ri min a l,” that hi s “ c ha

ra c te r i s known” a nd that he wa s paid t o re p re s en t Perkins. R.11-11 at 67–70, 72, 74. The tit-for- tatNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 13 - g amesmanship exemplified by these c omments and by the rema rks of def ense c ounsel that prec eded the m br ing s n o c re dit

to t he ba r and g ive s tr ia l ju dg e s g ra y ha ir . B ut t

he Mic hig an c ourt

of a pp e a ls
ne ve rt he le ss r e a so na

bly c on c lud e d th a t de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s fa ilure to obj e c t did not vio la te the Sixth Am e ndme nt.
Th e ke y pr ob le m w ithPe rk ins ’ c la im i s th a t th e pr os e c uto r’ s r e bu tta l r e mark s d id n ot a ri se in a va c uum. B e fore th e pr os e c uto r g a ve his re bu tta l argume nt, Pe rk ins ’ c ouns e l e ng a g e d in bord e r li n e c o n d

u c t o f h is o w nd

u r in g h is c lo s in g ar g u me n t. D e f e n s e c o u n s e l w a s a

f o r mer profe ssional football play er, a nd in his arg ument he re counted “ the two per cent” of football play ers who would play

“the illeg al g ame,” “[h] it y ou out of bounds” and othe rwise play dirty
. R.11-10 at 57. J ust a s the football are na reve als char acte r, trying a case “demonstrates y our char acte r. Be lieve me,” he said, “if you want to see somebody ’s cha rac ter, just come to cour

t.” R.11-10 at 57.
All of this was prelude to defe nse counsel’s direc t and im plied attacks on the charac ter of the prosec utor and the State’ s witnesses. He twic e re fer red to the “ two perc ent” in de scribing the State’s
case , its lawy er a

nd its witnesses. R.11-11 at 63. He dire ctly acc used one police o fficer who ha d testified for the prosecution of being “a sacrificial liar” and of t estifying “ untruthfully .” R.11-10 at 57. And he c alled another S tate’s witness “an ang el” who “ never tells a lie,” mockingthe idea that h e wa s t elling the truth: “Think about those little costumes they have at Christm as time, they put wing s on them, and they put that littl e halo thing that g o around the m, the white halo. That’s what we need to put on Sgt. W ilson. He never tells a li e. I ’ve got some other ini tials I ’d put for him, but Iwon’t say

that.” R.11-11 at 62.No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 14 - Contex t matters. The prosecution’s rebuttal followed on the heels of the de fense closing , and
n o ts u rp ri s i n gl y

i ts o u gh tt o re b u tt h e c h ar ges . T h e pr o s ec u t o r no t ed t h at P er k i n s ’ co u n s el , “t h ro u gh his entire comments to” the jury , “[wa]s essentially scanda liz ing pr etty

much eve ry

body in the case ,”

“ c a st[in g ] as pe rs ion s” and “ a tta c k[in g ] e sse nti a lly e ve ry bo dy in the c a se .” R.1 1- 11 a t 67 –6 8. On ly then did the prosec utor ca ll Perkins’ counsel “the wolf in sheep’ s clothing” based appar ently on the soft-spoken wa

y in which counse l delivere d his criticisms of the State’s witnesses. R.11-11 at 67. On ly the n d id h e say

that def e ns e c ouns e l’ s “ c ha

ra c te r i s k no wn .” R.1 1- 11 a t 68 . A nd on ly the n d id he re pe a te dly

me nti on that de fe ns e c ouns e l w a s p a id t o r e pr e se nt P e rk ins . Wh e n “ ob je c tiona ble content wa s invited by

or wa s responsive to the opening summation of t he defense,” that may “not . . . excuse improper c omments,” but it does help “to deter mine their eff

ect on the trial as a

whole.” Darden , 4 77 U. S. at 18 2. Un lik e un pr ov ok e d c omm e nts , th e se ba c k- and -f or th r e mar ks aro se in
v e r b a l s u r r o u n d i n g s t h a tl e s s e n e d

t h e r i s k o f p r e j u d i c e t o e i t h e r

p art y.
Ho w i n th is s e tti ng , mo re ov e r, wo uld a tr ia l c ourt have re sp on de d to an o bje c tio n b y de fe ns e counsel? The two most likely possibili ties are these. One is an outright overr uling on the g round that what is sauce for the g oose is sauce for the g ander , with the trial court telling de fense counsel in open cour

t that he ca

nnot expect to launch an a g g ressive attack on the c hara cter of the State’s wi tne sse s and

the pr os e c uto r w ith ou t in c ur ri nginc omi ngfi re on

re bu tta l. T he other po ssibi lity is an admonition to the prosec u t i o n to tone it down while ag ain re minding def ense c ounsel that he eng ag ed in t he same kind of conduct and the prosec ution is allowed to respond in kind. The risk ofNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 15 - prejudice in these scenar ios runs i n the di rec tion of P erkins if his counsel objected and awa y from Pe rk ins if he do e s n ot. The prose cutor’s r emark s al s o wer e isolated. Se e Car ro ll , 26 F.3d at 1385. He made one po te nti a lly

imp ro pe r co mme nt d

ur inghis op e nin g state me nt— the re mark

that Ma ur ic e Od ums “passe d the g old standard test” when he identified Don P erkins in a line- up, R.11-5 at 81–82—and made a fewborder l i n e co m m en t s during his rebuttal ar g ument, all in response to c omments by defe nse counsel. Even when the prosec utor made these comments, context shows that they wer e not par t of a lar g er, de liberative strateg y to discredit def

ense c ounsel. Se e Car

ro ll , 26 F.3d at 1385. They wer e “of f-ha nd rema rk[s] in a heated trial,” trig g ere d by defe nse counsel’s char g es ag ainst the pr os e c uto r a

nd the State ’s wi tne sse s, a s o pp os e d to pr e vio us ly “ se le c t[e d] in a

pp ro pr ia te argume nts . . . use[d] . . . repe atedly

during summation.” Ba te s v . B e ll , 402 F.3d 635, 648 ( 6th Cir. 2005).
Th e pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nts a lso did no t be ar o n th e ke y

iss ue s in t he case and

ha d li ttl e possibili ty of affec ting a jury verdic t that rested on a mple evidenc e. Se e Car

ro ll , 26 F.3d at 1385. Ma ur ic e Od ums ide nti fi e d Pe rk ins a s o ne of the a ssa ila nts in a lin e -u

p wi thi n 24 ho ur s o f t

he c ri me
and did the same a t tr ia l. Pol ic e fo un d Pe rk ins ne ar t he sc e ne of

the c ri me so on

a ft e r t he sh oo tin g s. And when a police serg eant order ed him to stop his car , Perkins sped aw ay and continued to dr ive
a ft e r tw o oth e r po lic e c ars g a ve c ha se . At tr ia l, Pe rk ins a dmi tte d to be ing ne ar the sc e ne of the c ri me and that he did not stop his car despite the office rs’ pursuit. T he key piece of evide nce w as Maur ice Od ums ’ i de nti fi c a tio n tes tim on y . Ye t the pr os e c uto r’ s a lle g e d mi sc on du c t ha d n oth ingto d o w ith Odums. The prose cutor’s c omments did not i mproperly inflate Odums’ testimony , and they did notNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 16 - imp ro pe rl y

dim ini shc omp e tin g te sti mony . T he y we re di rect ed at d e fe ns e c ouns e l, w ho ha d ju st
acc used seve ral state w itnesses of lying and attacked the c hara cter of the prose cutor. The Michig an
c ourt of a pp e a ls r e a so na

bly he ld t hat fa ilure to o bje c t in

thi s se tti ngdo e s n ot e sta

bli sha c og niza ble ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e c la im.
4. Unsworn Testimony. Pe rkin s arg ue s th a t th e pr os e c uto r g a ve un sw or n te sti mony

in h is clo s in g ar g u me n t. “ I t is im p r o p e r f o r a p r o s e c u to r , d

u r in g c lo s in g ar g u me n ts , to b r in g to the attention of the jury any purported fac ts that are not in evidenc e and are prejudicia l
. . . . Howeve r, prosec utors must be given leeway to argue re asonable infere nces f rom the evide nce.” By rd , 209 F.3d at 535.
Fi rst , the prosec utor made two comments sug g esting that Anthony Patton could have be en the third g unman: (1) When re fer ring to th e m en who ambushed Hall, Hill and Odums in the backyard of

14181 Spring G arde n St re et , t he prose cutor said that “ a third per son who’s neve r identified” “ might be Anthony Patton,” R.11-10 at 15; and (2) When ref err ing to the same me n, he
sa id, “ Th a t’ s th re e g uy s; C or e y Sc a le s, Do n Pe rk ins , th e un kn ow n p ers on , e ve ntu a lly , s up po se dly is Mr. Patton.” R.11-10 at 35. This was a rea sonable inferenc e to draw from the e vidence . Patton’s tes timony corr oborate d Perkins’ testimony . And when the prosec ution fairly challeng ed the truthfulness of Perkins’ te stimony , the nec essar y implication was that Patton had li ed as well. Nor, it bears a dding, did the pr osecutor a ffirmatively decla re that Patton had be en the third gunman. HeNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 17 - used qualify ing la

nguag e—“mig ht be” a

nd “supposedly ”—to dra w a f air infe renc e that the man ri din g a lon g wi th P e rk ins a ft e r t he sh oo tin g s mig ht be the thi rd tr ig g e rm an. I t is un c le ar at a ll e ve nts how these r emar

ks prejudice d Perkins, as he of fer s no theory

of pre judice on this score
. Second , the prosec utor said that the bac ky ard at 14181 Spring Garden Street was “ lit up . . . by a fl o o d l ight,” R.11-10 at 15–16, which a lleg edly was c ontrary

to the evidenc e. Ye t severa l witnesses testified a

bout the light in the bac ky ard. R.11-5 at 108–09 (Odums); R
. 1 1-6 at 19–20 (O d u m s ); R
. 1 1 -6 at 8 2

– 8 3 (O ff i ce r W i l l i am Ni arh o s ); R
. 1 1 -6 at 8 7 (O ff i ce r N i arh o s , d es cr i b i n g a “floodlig ht”); R.11-6 at 103–04 (T iffany Hopkins). No doubt there was some testimony to t he
c on tr ary , b ut t

he pr os e c uto r (l ike de fe ns e c ouns e l) may us e the e vid e nc e fa vo ri ngit d ur ingargume nt.
Thi rd , th e pr os e c uto r sa id that, wh e n Pe rk ins dr ov e by the sq ua d c ar c on ta ini ngCor e y

Sc a le s, it was a “ classic” instance of a def endant “ returningto the scene of the crime,” a statement Perkins decr ies bec ause the re w as no foundation that those who commit crimes r eturn shortly to the scene of the c rime. R.11-10 at 19. But this wa s a per missibl e infe renc e to dra

w from the e vidence , g iving
c ouns e l a re a so na ble ba sis fo r n ot o bje c tin g to i t.
Fo ur th , Perkins say s that the prosec utor unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof when he noted that L ena N ix on had not testified and ha d not corrobor ated his alibi defe nse. B ut while a prosec utor may

not comment o n a d ef

endant’s silence, “ a prose cutor is entitled to comment on a defe ndant’s fa ilure to ca ll witnesses to c ontradict the g overnme nt’s case ” so long a s the prosec utor does not sug g est that the def endant bear s the burden of proof. Un ite d S tat es v . Cl ar k , 982 F.2d 965,No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 18 - 968–69 (6th Cir. 1993). The pr osecutor did not say or sug g est that Perkins bear s the burde n of proof
. He star ted his remar

ks by saying that, fac ed with the State’s e vidence , “if y ou’re sitti ng with Mr. Perkins” y o u may

want to “pr oduce some witnesses that ar e g oing to put y ou somewher e else .” R.11-10 at 28. To do that, y ou put on “ alibi witnesses.” R.11-10 at 29. But Ms. “Nixon wasn’t one of those witnesses, a

nd that’s the first thing that Ithink y ou beg in y our ana ly sis on.” R.11-10 at 29. He thu s did not say that Per kin s bor e the burd e n of pr ov ing his inn oc e nc e ; he sa id that the fa ilure to pr od uc e L e na Ni xon und e rm ine d h is a lib i.
B. Police Lineup. Perkins say s that defe nse counse l provided ineff ective a ssistance whe n he failed to c halleng e the lineup in which O dums identified Perkins. Only if an “ identif

i ca t i on proce dure w as so impermissibly sug g estive as t o g ive rise to a ve ry substantial likelihood of irrepa rable misidentification” is there a cog nizable challeng e to a lineup. Simmons v. United States , 39 0 U. S
. 3 7 7 , 384 (1968). Per kins’ problem is that he off ers no r eason w hy

his counsel underpe rfor

med in ref

using to objec t to the lineup. He off ers no e vidence that the identifica tion proce dure w as impermissibly sug g estive. An d t h e risk of misidentification was small in view of Od u m s ’ t e s t i m o n y t h a t h e i d e n t i f i e d P e r k i n s i n t h e l i n e u

p b e c a u s e “ [h ]e w a s f

a m i l i ar ” w ith him
. R.11-6 at 54–55.No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 19 - C. Eye witness T

estimony. Also unavailing is Perkins’ claim that his attorney should have c alled an expert witness to testify about the “inhe rent proble ms with e y ewitness testimony .” Perkins Br
. at 25. The Constitution does not require de fense counsel to pursue ever y trial strateg y

imag inable, wh e the r l ike ly

to b e ar f ru it o r n ot. See E

ngle v. I saac , 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1 9 8 2 ). No precede nt
e sta bli sh e s that de fe ns e c ouns e l mus t c a ll an e xpe rt wi tne ss a bo ut the pr ob le ms wit h ey e wi tne ss te sti mo ny in i de nti fi c a tio n c a se s o r r isk fa lli ngbe low

the min imum r e qu ir e me nts of the Sixth Amendment. And the re i s n o t hing a bout this case sug g esting that such a w itness was imperative here
. V I.
F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

Pe rk ins ra ise d a

se pa rate pr os e c uto ri al- mi sc on du c t c la im b ut a dmi ts that th e c la im i s 1 proce durally

defa ulted beca

use couns el d i d n ot object to the prosec utor’s comments at tria l. He argues that his claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel for failure to obje ct constitutes cause and prejudice to overc ome the proc edura l defa ult. See, e .g. , Girts v. Y

anai , 501 F .3 d 743 , 7 57 –5 8 ( 6th Cir. 2007), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct. 92 ( 20 08 ); W ashington v. Hofbauer , 228 F.3d 689, 708 ( 6th Cir. 2000). There is no question that the prosecutor ’s statements a t t acking de fense counsel we re

2 improper. Perkins , 2 00 4 WL 25 35 107, a t *5 (“ We c on c lud e that th e se c omm e nts imp ro pe rl y attacke d the cre dibilit y of defe nse counsel and implied that defe nse counsel did not believe his own client, and wa s only

making his arg uments beca use def endant pa id him.”). - 20 - KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge, dissenting. Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt a nd wo uld g rant the petition f

or a writ of habea s corpus with respec t to Perkins’s claim that defe nse counse l was ine ff e c tiv e fo r fa ili ngto o bje c t to the pr os e c uto r’ s r e pe a te d r e fe re nc e s to Pe rk ins ’s “ pa id” de fe ns e
c ouns e l du

ri ngre bu tta l c los ingargume nts
. 1
The state c ourt addre ssed Per kins’s ineffe ctive-a ssistance-of -counse l claim. Michigan v. Perkins , N o. 25 01 59 , 2 00 4 WL 25 35 10 7, a t *7 –8 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. No v. 9, 20 04 ). Thus , “ be c a us e the AEDPA a

pplies to [ Perkins’s] pe t i t i on, we c an only consider [his] challeng e within the more limit ed asse ssment of whethe r the state c ourt’s application of Strickland to the fac ts of this case was objectively

unre as o n able.” W

ashington v. Hofbauer , 228 F.3d 689, 702 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (citing W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 408–09 (2000))
. Wit h respe ct to Perkins’s claim that his counsel
wa s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto ob

jec t to t he pr os e c uto r’ s im

pr op e r c omm e nts de nig ra tin g de fe ns e counsel, the state c ourt relied on its conclusion reg ardingthe under ly ing pr osecutoria l-misconduct

2

c la im— that Pe rk ins “ wa s n ot s o p re jud ic e d b y

the se c omm e nts that he w a s d e nie d a fa ir tr ia l” —toNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 21 - conclude that “def

ense counsel’s failure to object to t hese c omments did not amount t o ineffe ctive assistance of counse l.” Perkins , 2004 WL 2535107, at *7.
Iconclude , howeve r, that the state c o u rt ’s an aly sis of prejudice resulting from the prosec utor’s m isconduct i s an unreasonable application of c lear ly established Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Specifically , it was unrea sonable for the state c ourt to conclude that Perkins
wa s n ot prej ud ic e d b y

the pr os e c uto r’ s im

pr op e r c omm e nts be c a

us e the c omm e nts dir e c tly imp lic a te d Pe rk ins ’s Sixth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c ouns e l. The prose c uto r ’ s a

r g u me nts amounted to repe ated a ccusations that defense counsel wa s ly ing simply beca use he w as paid to re prese nt Perkins. The prose cutor said:

. . . . T h i s i s a

g u y w h o r e p r e s e n t s a

c r i m i n a l , o k ay.

. . . . But whe n y ou talk about, y ou know, when is Mr. Mann eve r g oing to g et up and say , “Well, you know what? They g ot my g uy ? ” You know. T hat’s his lawy er. H i s o b l i g a t i o nf

l o w s t o o n e p e r s o n , D o nP e r k i n s . O k ay.

. . . . . . . . Now, what Bo b M an n d o es i s, he’s a paid lawy er to c ome in for Don Pe rk ins . A nd

he ’s up he re vo uc hin g fo r h im.
R.11 (Tria l T r . , V o l. I V , a t 6 8

– 6 9 )
. T h e p r o s e c u to r r e f e r r e d to th e f a c t t h a t M an nw a s Pe r

k ins’ s “paid” attorney

five ad d i t i o n al t imes in his rebuttal, id. a t 69 –7 4, and re pe a te dly

ma de state me nts ty ing the defe nse’s a

rg uments to defense counsel Mann. See, e .g. , id. a t 73 (“ [W]he n y ou lis te n to his c omm e nts on be ha lf of his c lie nt
. . . .” ); id. at 75 (“It’s offe red to y ou by Mr. Perkins’ law y er.” ).No. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 22 - Much of the pr osecutor’ s rebuttal, in fa ct, was dire cted towa rds d ef en se counse l personally
. See, e.g. , id. a t 75–7 6 (“ No w, if the y ha d gun s, Mr . M ann , w he re are the g un s?”) ; id. at 77–78 (“I f that’s the ca se, Mr. Mann, you know, why isn’t he [tol d to identify ] Anthony Patton? ”).
I n its review of

habea s claims for pr osecutoria l misconduct, the Supreme Court has distin gu i s h ed misconduct that implicates a c onstitut ional rig ht. Darden v . W ainwright , 4 77 U. S. 168, 181–82 (1986) (“The prosecutor s’ arg ument did not
. . . implicate other spe cific r ights of the
acc used su c h as the rig

ht to c ou ns e l or the ri g ht to re ma in sil e nt. ” (e mph a sis a dd e d) ); Donnelly v

. DeChr istofo ro , 4 1 6 U
. S. 6 3 7 , 6 4 3 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ( “ T h is is n o t a c a s e in w h ic h th e St a te h a s d e n ie d a de fe nd ant t

he ben efi t of

a sp e c if ic pr ov isi on

of the B ill of

Rig hts , s uc h a s th e ri g ht t o c ouns e l, Ar ge rsi ng e r v . H

am lin , 407 U.S. 25 (1972), or in whic h the prosec utor’s rem ar ks so prejudice d a specific rig ht, such as the pr ivilege ag ainst compulsory self-inc rimination, a s to a mount to a denia l of that rig ht. Gr iff

in v . Ca lif or nia , 3 80 U. S. 6 09 (1 96 5) .” ). “ Whe n s pe c if ic g ua ra nte e s o f t he B ill of Rights a

re involved, [ t h e Supreme Court] has taken spec ial car e to assure that prosec utorial conduct in no wa

y impermissibly

infring es them.” Do nn e lly , 416 U.S. at 643. “[T] he rig ht to be repr esente d by counsel is amongthe most fundamental of rig hts.” Penson

v . O hio , 488 U. S. 7 5, 84 (1 98 8) ; se e als o U nit e d S tat es v . M c Do na ld , 620 F.2d 559, 564 ( 5th Cir. 1980) (“ The rig ht to counsel is so basic to all other rig h t s t h at i t m ust be ac corde d very car eful treatment. Obvious and insidious attacks on the ex erc ise of t his constitutional rig ht are antithetical to the conce pt of a fa ir trial . . . .”). Acc ording ly , “[n] o prosec utor may employ lang uag e which de nig rate s th e ri g ht o f a

c ri min a l de fe nd ant t o r e ta in t he c ouns e l of his c ho ic e , or oth e rw ise lim itsNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 23 - the fundamental due pr ocess r ight of an ac cused to pre sent a vig orous d efe nse.” Sizemore v

. Fletche r , 921 F.2d 667, 671 ( 6th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit, in g ranting a wr it of h a b e a s c o r p u s u n d e r p re- AEDPA standar ds, discussed the pr e jud ic e that r e su lts fr om a

pr os e c uto r’ s atta c ks on a de fe nd ant’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o c ouns e l: At the outset, we f

eel it incumbent on u s t o note that in no situation in a c ri min a l tr ia l su c h a s th is o ne do we fe e l th e me re a c t of hir ingan atto rn e y

is p r o b a ti v e in th e le a s t o f th e g u il t o r inn o c e n c e o f d e f e n d an ts
. L aw y e r s in criminal c a se s are ne c e ssi tie s not luxur ie s, and e ve n the mos t inno c e nt i nd ivi du a ls d o w e ll t o re ta in c ouns e l. Ne ith e r is it a c c ur a te to state that def e ns e c ouns e l, in g e ne ra l, a c t in underha nded and une thical way s, and a b s en t s p ecif ic evidenc e in the re cord, no p arti c u la r d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c anb e ma li g n e d
. E v e nth o u g h s u c h p r o s e c u torial expressions of belief a

re only intended ultimately

to impute guilt to the acc used, not o n l y ar e they

invalid for that purpose , they also sever ely

damag e an a ccuse d’s opportunity

to pr esent his c ase befor e the jury
. I t the ref ore is a n impermissible strike at the very fundame ntal due proce ss pr otections that the F ourtee nth Amendment has made a pplicable to ensur e an inhere nt fairne ss in our adver sarial sy stem of cr iminal justice. Fur

thermore , such tac tics unquestionably tarni sh the badg e of evenha ndedn es s and fa irness that normally marks our sy stem of justice and w e rea dil y presume be cause the principle is so fundamental that all attorne y s are c og niza nt o f i t. A ny

a br idg me nt of its sanc tity the re fo re se e ms p art ic ula rl y unacc eptable.
Bruno v. Rushen , 72 1 F.2d 1193, 1194–95 ( 9th Cir. 1983) (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. de nied , 469 U.S. 920 (1984).
Th e pr os e c uto r a lso e ff

e c tiv e ly “ c on ve y e d to the jur

y a fu nd a me nt a l m i s c o n c e p t i o n

o f t h e ro le of def ense c ounsel.” United States v. Friedm an , 909 F.2d 705, 708–09 (2d Cir. 1990) (r ev er s ing conviction on direc t a

ppeal beca

use of prosec utor’s improper state ments—including, int e r a lia , thatNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 24 - defe nse counse l “try

to ge t [ defe ndants] off, perha ps even f or hi gh fe es ” and that def ense c ounsel “will make a

ny argument he ca

n to ge t that guy

off” ). I n stating that defense counsel’s “ obligation flows to one per son, Don Perkins,” R.11 (Tr ial Tr., Vol. I V, at 68), the prose cutor misled the jury
re g ard ingthe ba sic pr inc ipl e of pr of e ssi on a l r e sp on sib ili ty

that an atto rn e y

ha s an o bli g a tio n n ot o nly to his client but also to the court. See M O D EL R U LES O F P R OF ’ L C O N D U CT 3.3 (Candor Towar d the Tribunal).
Th e pr os e c uto r e xac e rb a te d th e pr e jud ic e of his mis c on du c t by

ind ic a tin g t hat he ha s a pe rs on a l hi sto ry

wi th d e fe ns e c ouns e l: “ An d ma ke no mis take a

bo ut it, Mr
. Ma

nn ’s be e n do ingthi s
a lon g tim e .” R.1 1 (T ri a l Tr ., Vo l. I V a t 67 ); “ We’ s [si c ] tr ie d c a se s b e fo re . T his isn ’t the fi rs t ti me
our paths have c rossed.” Id. at 68. “[I ]m proper sug g estions, insinuations, and, especia lly , asser tions of pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e are a pt t o c arr y muc h w e ig ht ag a ins t the a c c us e d whe n the y sh ou ld p ro pe rl y
car ry none.” Berger v . United States , 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Fur ther, in r ep ea t ed l y

ad dressing defe nse counse l personal l y t h ro u ghout rebuttal, the prose cutor “ encour ag e[d] the jury to focus on the conduct and role of [ defe nse counsel] rathe r than on the e vidence of [the defe ndant’s] guilt.” See United States v. Holme

s , 413 F.3d 770, 775 ( 8th Cir. 2005). The majority

points out that the prosec utor’s comments wer e not r elated to the ke y evidenc e of Odums’s identification of Perkins and we re limited to t h e rebuttal portion of the prosec ution’s
c los ingargume nt. B ut i mpr op e r c omm e nts str iki nga t a de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht t o c ouns e l neces sari ly strikes at the he art of the case and per meates the entire tria l. I t is throug h his attorney that PerkinsNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 25 - te sts the g ov e rnme nt’ s e vid e nc e a t tr ia l, w hic h is on e re a so n w hy the ri g ht t o c ouns e l is so f u n d a me n ta l in o u r a d v e r s ar ia l s y s te m o f ju stice. S ee P en son , 488 U.S. at 84. The prose cutor’s repe ated r efe renc es to “pa id” def ense c ounsel—made dur ing t h e l ast argument hear d by the jury b e f o r e d e l i b e r a t i o n s
—

p r e j u d i c e d P e r k i n s b y i mp a i r i n g h i s a

b i l i t y t o p r e s e n ta

d e f e n s e t o t h e j u r

y. See B runo , 721 F.2d at 1195.
To be sure , defe nse counsel delivere d his ow n attacks on the prosec ution and their witnesses during his closing a

rg ument, which is rele vant “to dete rmine the[] eff ect [of the prose cutor’s improper c omments] on the trial as a whole.” Darden , 4 7 7 U. S
. at 1 8 2 (c i t i n g United States v. Y oung , 470 U.S. 1 (1985))
. Acc ording ly , this court has distinguished between pe rsonal attac ks on defe nse counse l and s t at em ents about counse l based on “ a re asonable infere nce to be draw n from defe nse counsel’s prese ntation of evidenc e and a

rg ument.” Byrd v. Collins , 209 F .3 d 486 , 536 (6 th Cir. 2000), cert. de nied , 531 U.S. 1 0 8 2 (2001). “ ‘Where the re is conf licting testimony , it may

be
rea sonable to infer a

nd acc ording ly

to argue, that one of

the two sides is ly ing.’ ” Id. at 536 (quoting United States v. Collins , 78 F.3d 1021, 1040 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 5 19 U. S. 8 72 (1 99 6) ). Thus , comme nta

r y o n d e f e n s e c o u n s el’s cr edibility

based on de fense counsel’s pr esentation of the evidenc e
or ar g ument was wa

rra nted; commentar

y on defe nse counsel’s cre dibilit y based simpl y on the fa ct that Perkins paid counse l to repre sent him, however , was c onstitut ionally impermissible.
B e c a us e the pr os e c uto r’ s r e pe a te d r e fe re nc e s to Pe rki ns ’s pa id d e fe ns e c ouns e l di re c tly imp lic a te d Pe rk ins ’s Sixth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c ouns e l, i t w a s unr e a so na ble fo r the state c ourt

toNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 26 - conclude that counsel wa s not ineffe ctive for failing to object. Even if defe nse counsel did not want to risk rec eiving rebuke in front of the jury for his own c onduct in cl o s i n g, “[ a]t the very least,”
c ouns e l sh ou ld a sk

fo r a be nc h c on fe re nc e ou t o f th e hearin g of the jur y to r e qu e st a

n a pp ro pr ia te instruction. Y

oung , 470 U.S. at 13. I f defense counsel had a sked for an appr opriate instruc tion, “the jury would have he ard f

rom the judg e th at t h e prose cutor’s c omments called for an improper

and impermissible neg ative inferenc e for [P erkins’s] exercise of his [Six th] Amendment rig hts.” Gi rts v. Y anai , 5 0 1 F
. 3 d

7 4 3 , 7 5 7 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 007), ce r t
. denied , 129 S. Ct . 92 (2008). F urthermor e, allowing the prosec utor to attack his client’ s exercis e o f t h e S ix th Amendment rig ht to counsel “ca nnot be cha

rac terized as litigation strateg y .” Id. ; accord H odge v. H urley , 4 26 F .3 d 368 , 386 (6 th Cir. 2005). Ther efor e, it was un re asonable for the state court to conc lude that def ense c ounsel’s fail u r e to o b

je c t— h is f a il u r e to d o an y

th in g to a tt e mp t t o c u r e th e p r e ju d ic e o f th e repe ated
c omm e nts —d id n ot a

mou nt t o in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Finally , this is not a ca se in which it is reasona ble to conclude that the fa ilure to cure such prejudicia l comments im

p li c a ti n g Pe r k ins’s fundamenta l Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel does not “under mine confide nce in the outcome” of the trial. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The evidenc e ag ainst Perkins was not “ove rwhe lming,” Darden , 477 U.S. at 182; rather , the
case hinge d on one witness’s identific ation of Perkins. P erha ps nothing be tter demonstrates the “re asonable probability

that, but f

or counsel’s [i neff

ectivene ss] , the result of the [trial] would have been dif fer ent,” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, than t he fact t hat P erkins’s first trial resulted in a hungNo. 09-1250

Perkins v . McKee

- 27 - jur y . R. 11 -2 (S ta te Court

Do c ke t a t 6) ; c

f. S izemore , 921 F.2d at 671 (noting that the defe ndant’s first trial re sulted in a hung jury as evide nce that the proof of g uilt was not overwhe lming).
Ac c or din g ly , I

wo uld re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt and g ra nt t he pe tit ion

fo r a wr it of habe as cor

pus on Perkins’s clai m t h at hi s counsel wa s ineffe ctive for failing to object to the pr os e c uto r’ s re pe a te d de nig ratio n of de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s c re dib ili ty on the ba sis that he wa s “ pa id” to
re pr e se nt P e rk ins . I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.