Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Doe v. Carlson, 2017 IL App (1st) 160536

Appellate Court 

Caption

JANE DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHERIE CARLSON, DefendantAppellee.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-16-0536

Filed February 7, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 13-L-13466; the 

Hon. John P. Callahan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Heath & Heath, P.C., of Naperville (Sharon L. Heath and Timothy W. 

Heath, of counsel), for appellant.

Law Offices of Michael P. Schmiege, of Hinsdale (Michael P. 

Schmiege, of counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Hyman and Justice Neville concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
- 2 - 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff Jane Doe appeals an order dismissing her November 2013 complaint alleging 

negligence, civil battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendant, 

Cherie Carlson, on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 This case arises from Cherie Carlson’s alleged sexual abuse of Jane Doe, beginning when 

Doe was 16 years old. In her deposition, Doe, who was born in September 1979, testified that 

she belonged to the North Side Gospel Church and, through the church, became a member of 

the Approved Workmen Are Not Ashamed (AWANA) club at the age of five. Beginning at the 

age of 11 or 12, Doe attended the AWANA overnight camps in Wisconsin for approximately 

two weeks every summer. 

¶ 4 Carlson was a leader at the church in charge of the high school AWANA youth group. Doe 

met Carlson when Doe was 12 or 13, but the two did not have regular contact until Doe joined 

the high school youth group when she was 14 years old. At that time, Doe saw Carlson at youth 

group meetings once a week, at church on Sundays, and for sporadic extracurricular activities. 

¶ 5 In the summer of 1996, when Doe was 16, she attended the AWANA overnight camp, 

where she was one of several youth group leaders for the younger members, and Carlson was 

in charge of the leaders. Carlson told Doe during a series of conversations that she was 

interested in pursuing a “discipleship” or mentor-mentee relationship with Doe. Doe 

understood this to mean that Carlson wanted to read the Bible together and act as her teacher 

and spiritual advisor. Doe was aware that Carlson previously had a mentor-mentee relationship 

with another youth group leader. Doe had seen the other leader in bed with Carlson at camp in 

the summer of 1993 or 1994, when Doe was 12 or 13. After Doe agreed to the discipleship, 

Carlson began lying in bed with Doe, cuddling her, and giving her back rubs. 

¶ 6 When Doe returned from camp in August 1996, Carlson invited her to Carlson’s parent’s 

house to watch a movie, at which time Carlson fondled her. Doe cried and pulled away, and 

Carlson, also crying, apologized. Doe testified that she felt ashamed, surprised, and scared 

because she knew the touching was wrong. Although Carlson assured Doe it would not happen 

again, approximately one month later, in Carlson’s car, Carlson moved her hand up Doe’s leg 

and kissed Doe. Again, Doe cried and Carlson apologized. From September to December 

1996, the abuse occurred on at least 10 occasions. In early 1997, Doe testified that Carlson 

sexually penetrated her in Carlson’s parent’s house, which Doe knew was “inappropriate.” 

Over the next several years, Carlson continued to abuse Doe, often taking her to hotels when 

Carlson’s parents were home. 

¶ 7 Doe testified that the sexual abuse became less frequent when she began college and 

stopped altogether in 1999 when Doe was 20, because Doe “couldn’t take it anymore” and felt 

Carlson was no longer interested in being her spiritual advisor, but was using her for sex. At no 

point did Doe feel that her relationship with Carlson was consensual. 

¶ 8 Doe did not report Carlson’s behavior while it was occurring because she was aware that 

when the other youth group leader made allegations against Carlson, the leader and her family 
- 3 - 

left the church, while Carlson remained. In addition, Carlson threatened to kill herself if Doe 

told anyone about the abuse. 

¶ 9 In 1999, after the abuse had stopped, Doe received a phone call from a woman named 

Dianna, who asked Doe if Carlson ever tried to touch her. Doe did not answer the question 

directly, but later called Dianna’s cousin, Claire, and told her about Carlson’s abuse toward her 

because she was concerned about Dianna. Specifically, Doe told Claire that Carlson was 

“sexually inappropriate” with her in the hopes that Claire would “warn” her cousin. At around 

this same time, Doe began experiencing chronic anxiety, sadness, and nightmares. However, 

Doe testified that she did not connect these feelings to Carlson’s abuse until more than a 

decade later, when in 2012 she told her husband what she had suffered and began therapy. Her 

therapist diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder arising out of the abuse. 

¶ 10 Doe filed suit against Carlson, among others, on November 15, 2013. Carlson moved to 

dismiss the suit on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired in 2001, two years 

after Doe knew or should have known both that the abuse occurred and that her injury was 

caused by the abuse. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1996). The trial court agreed and 

granted Carlson’s motion.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS 

¶ 12 The sole issue on appeal is the timeliness of Doe’s suit against Carlson. The relevant statute 

of limitations provides that “An action for damages for personal injury based on childhood 

sexual abuse must be commenced within 2 years of the day the person abused discovers or 

through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse 

occurred and that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse.” 735 ILCS 

5/13-202.2(b) (West 1996). The statute further provides that the limitations period under 

subsection (b) does not begin to run until the victim of the abuse is 18 years old. 735 ILCS 

5/13-202.2(d) (West 1996). 

¶ 13 The trial court granted Carlson’s motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely pursuant to 

section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 

2012)), and our review of that dismissal order is de novo (Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty 

Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 579 (2006)). Ordinarily, the issue of when the statute of 

limitations begins to run under the discovery rule is one of fact, but when the answer is clear 

from the pleadings, we may decide this issue as a matter of law. Softcheck v. Imesch, 367 Ill. 

App. 3d 148, 156 (2006). Significantly, we accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the 

plaintiff’s complaint and draw reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff 

as the non-moving party. Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Teachers’ Retirement System, 2014 

IL App (1st) 131452, ¶ 13. 

¶ 14 Carlson argues that Doe knew of the abuse and knew or should have known that her injury 

was caused by the abuse no later than 1999, shortly after she ended her relationship with 

Carlson. Therefore, the limitations period expired two years later in 2001, according to 

Carlson. In support, Carlson cites Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603 (2000), and Parks v. Kownacki, 

193 Ill. 2d 164 (2000). Significantly, both cases address sexual abuse that occurred prior to the 

time the legislature enacted a separate statute of limitations for actions involving childhood 

sexual abuse. Before 1991, the applicable statute of limitations for abuse cases was two years, 

the same as for all cases involving personal injury. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, ¶ 13-202. 

A separate section of the pre-1991 Code provides that the two-year period for bringing a cause 
- 4 - 

of action for personal injury does not begin to run until the plaintiff reaches the age of 18. Ill. 

Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, ¶ 13-211. In both Clay and Parks, the plaintiffs waited well over two 

years past the time of the abuse to file their complaints, but both plaintiffs claimed the benefit 

of the discovery rule. Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 607-08; Parks, 193 Ill. 2d at 173-74. Pursuant to the 

discovery rule, “a party’s cause of action accrues when the party knows or reasonably should 

know of an injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused.” Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 608 (citing 

Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415 (1981)). 

¶ 15 In Clay, the plaintiff, who filed suit in 1996, admitted that she knew of the abuse at the time 

it occurred in the 1970s, but she did not realize her “ ‘sexual encounters’ ” with the defendant 

had caused her later psychological injuries until June 1994. Id. at 605, 609. But the supreme 

court held that application of the discovery rule did not save the plaintiff’s complaint, which 

was otherwise untimely. Id. at 610. The court’s decision rested on the fact plaintiff “[did] not 

argue that she repressed her memories of the abuse” and that she “was aware of the abuse at the 

time it occurred.” Id. The court went on to hold that “Illinois law presumes an intent to harm 

and a resulting injury” from the “misconduct” committed by the defendant. Id. at 611; see also 

Softcheck, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 156 (“As a matter of law, adults are charged with the knowledge 

that sexual contact between 9- to 14-year-old boys and an adult is not only harmful and wrong 

but also that it results in injury.”). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint was untimely, since 

she knew of the abuse (which was tantamount to knowing she was injured) and that her injury 

was wrongfully caused by the time she turned 18 in 1983, but did not file suit until 14 years 

later. Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 610-12. 

¶ 16 The supreme court reached the same conclusion in Parks. There, the plaintiff likewise 

alleged that, while she had not repressed memories of the abuse by her priest, she did not 

connect her post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis with that abuse until over 20 years after 

the abuse ended. Parks, 193 Ill. 2d at 177. Moreover, she alleged that at the time the abuse was 

occurring, she did not know that the sexual relationship between her and her priest was wrong. 

Id. The supreme court, citing Clay, held that the discovery rule did not save the plaintiff’s 

claims. Id. at 177-78. The court pointed out that, despite the plaintiff’s allegations, her actions 

of reporting the abuse to her parents and a church leader demonstrated that she knew the 

defendant had wronged her. Id. at 177. Further, the plaintiff reasonably should have known 

that a portion of her injury—namely, the abortion the defendant forced her to obtain—was 

caused by the abuse. Id. at 177-78. The court concluded that the facts regarding plaintiff’s 

knowledge were stronger than those in Clay and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s 

complaint as time-barred. Id. at 178.

¶ 17 Doe disputes the applicability of Clay and Parks, pointing out that they do not interpret 

section 13-202.2 of the Code but instead apply the common law discovery rule. But Doe 

overlooks the supreme court’s express finding in Clay that section 13-202.2 of the Code 

“codif[ied] the common law discovery rule for actions involving childhood sexual abuse.” 

Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 609. As such, we are hard-pressed to find inapposite cases applying that 

rule. 

¶ 18 Significantly, Doe’s allegations bear striking similarities to those made by the Clay and 

Park plaintiffs. First, Doe does not allege her memories of the abuse were repressed. Further, 

while she, too, denied awareness of the fact that the contact between her and Carlson was 

criminal, she admitted that she knew the contact was “wrong” and “inappropriate” at the time it 

was occurring. Doe elaborated that she did not believe her encounters with Carlson amounted 
- 5 - 

to a consensual dating or sexual relationship. It is well-settled that under the discovery rule a 

plaintiff need not appreciate the criminality of the conduct at issue to be charged with 

knowledge that her injury was wrongfully caused. See Mitsias v. I-Flow Corp., 2011 IL App 

(1st) 101126, ¶ 24 (citing Knox, 88 Ill. 2d at 415-16). Finally, just as the plaintiff in Parks, 

Doe, at the age of 20, informed a third party that Carlson had been “sexually inappropriate” 

with her. Indeed, Doe had considered reporting Carlson’s conduct earlier, but decided against 

it after remembering that another girl whom Carlson mentored made similar allegations that 

Carlson “inappropriately touch[ed]” her, only to end up leaving the church with her family. 

Doe also recalled that her youth group leader at the time ordered the members not to discuss 

those allegations. Taken together, and contrary to her argument on appeal, Doe’s testimony 

establishes that she knew of Carlson’s abuse at the time it occurred.

¶ 19 Turning then to the issue of when Doe knew that her injuries were caused by the sexual 

abuse (the second prong of section 13-202.2(b)), pursuant to Clay, knowledge of injury is 

presumed where the victim was aware of the sexual abuse as it was occurring (Clay, 189 Ill. 2d 

at 611-12). And even assuming arguendo that this presumption of knowledge of injury is 

inapplicable, Doe’s testimony nevertheless reveals that she had actual knowledge of the cause 

of at least a portion of her injuries when they occurred. 

¶ 20 In Doe’s complaint, she states a claim for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress against Carlson, alleging that “as a direct result of [Carlson’s] conduct” she “suffered 

and will continue to suffer *** severe and permanent emotional distress, physical 

manifestations of emotional distress, embarrassment, and loss of self-esteem, humiliation and 

psychological injuries.” All these are injuries Doe testified she suffered immediately following 

the abuse. For example, Doe testified that after Carlson fondled her, Doe began crying and felt 

shame, fear, and embarrassment. These same reactions and feelings occurred whenever 

Carlson abused her. To be sure, Doe may not have realized that the persistent nightmares and 

ongoing emotional problems she experienced in her 20s were likewise attributable to the 

abuse, but it is not necessary that a plaintiff recognize the full extent of his or her injuries 

before bringing suit. See, e.g., Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 367 (1995). 

Thus, regardless of the applicability of the Clay presumption, the evidence reveals that Doe 

actually knew that a portion of her injury was caused by the abuse at the age of 16. And 

pursuant to section 13-202.2(d), when Doe reached the age of 18, the statute of limitations 

began to run. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(d) (West 1996). The statute expired two years later, in 

1999, well before Doe filed her complaint against Carlson in 2013. The circuit court’s order 

dismissing Doe’s complaint as time-barred is therefore affirmed.

¶ 21 Affirmed.