alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Washington Fidelity National Ins. Co. *v.*Herbert.

(No. 23510

Decided December 7, 1932.)

*593
      *Messrs. Hightower & O’Brien,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Nicholas Klein,*for defendant in error.

Matthias, J.

The charge requested in writing to .be given before argument is conceded to be a correct statement of the law, pertinent to an issue in the case and the facts embodied therein supported by competent evidence.

The provisions of the statute, Section 11447, General Code, that a requested instruction meeting the above requirements shall be given to the jury prior to argument, are mandatory. This principle has been announced in numerous cases, in which it has been further declared that the error of refusing to give such requested charge before argument is not cured by giving the same instruction in substance, or in terms, in the general charge. The statute confers upon parties in civil actions the absolute right to have instructions, presented in writing, given to the jury before argument, if so requested, provided the same be a correct statement of the law, pertinent to one or more issues, and applicable to evidence adduced in the case. A failure to comply with such mandatory provisions, and thus deny the right clearly and expressly granted, is reversible error. *Village of Monroeville*v. *Root,*54 Ohio St., 523, 44 N. E., 237; *Cleveland & Elyria Elec. Rd. Co.*v. *Hawkins,*64 Ohio St., 391, 60 N. E., 558; *Chesrown*v. *Bevier,*101 Ohio St., 282, 128 N. E., 94; *594
      *Cincinnati Traction Co.*v. *Kroger,*114 Ohio St., 303, 151 N. E., 127; *Lima Used Car Exchange Co.*v. *Hemperly, 120*Ohio St., 400, 166 N. E., 364; *Bartson*v. *Craig,*121 Ohio St., 371, 169 N. E., 291.

This statutory provision has long been in force and has been consistently held to be of a mandatory character. If the procedure thereby required is to be changed, it must come through a modification of the terms of the statute by the legislative branch of the government.

The Court of Common Pleas committed error in refusing to give the requested instruction, and the Court of Appeals committed like error in its failure to reverse the judgment on the ground stated.

There was evidence upon the question of the violation of speed regulations by the decedent, warranting the submission of that issue to the jury. Hence the motion for final judgment for the defendant was properly denied.

*Judgment reversed.*

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Day, Allen, Kinkade and .Stephenson, JJ., concur.
O rder issued April 30 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 15
- 00163
- CV

——————————— XIA N GXIAN G TANG , Appellant

V. KLAUS WIEGAND , Appellee

On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 13
- DCV
- 211293

MEMORANDUM O RDER Appellant , Yvonne Tran, representing that she no longer desires to pursue this appeal, has filed a “Withdrawal of Notice of Appeal” that we construe as a motion to dismiss her appeal

. A lthough Tran failed to include a certificate of2

conference in her motion, more than ten days have passed and no party has responded. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 10.1(a)(5), 10.3(a). Further, n o opinion has issued

. S ee T EX
. R. A PP
. P

. 42.1( c ). Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss Yvonne Tran’s appeal. See
T EX
. R. A PP . P. 42.1(a)(1). Xiang X ian g Tang’s appeal remains pending

.

PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Lloyd.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SECTION OF THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
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<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                    1,052,272
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<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            27,805
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<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                       130,000
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       22,027
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                          94,242
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   45,929
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   45,929
        

</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIRATH SINGH,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-73448

Agency No. A095-399-044

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 19, 2010** 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TALLMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges. 

Tirath Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board

of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 

FILED

OCT 26 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-73448

Reviewing for abuse of discretion, Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.

2003), we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion because it

was filed more than seven months after the BIA’s November 2, 2007, order

dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to

demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see

Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is

prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner

acts with due diligence”); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th

Cir. 2007). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### Rafael Oswaldo JIMENEZ, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. D. ALFARO, Officer; Rodriguez, Officer; Gonzales; McCoy; B D. Cake; S.G. Vasquez, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 02-16521.

D.C. No. CV-97-05049-OWW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 18, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Rafael Oswaldo Jimenez, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district *228court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging Eighth Amendment violations, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Barnett v. Centoni*31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the action without prejudice because Jimenez’s proffered reasons for failing to pursue his grievances through the final level of review did not excuse his noncompliance with the exhaustion requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). *See Booth v. Churner,*532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (noting that the Court “will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion”); *Wyatt v. Terhune,*315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.2003).

To the extent Jimenez contends that the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Booth*should not be applied retroactively to his case, the argument lacks merit. *See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation,*509 U.S. 86, 96, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (stating “a rule of federal law, once announced and applied to the parties to the controversy, must be given full retroactive effect by all courts adjudicating federal law”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.61


January 13, 2016


FIRST Amendment to OPTION Agreement
 
This First Amendment (“Amendment”) to the Intelsat S. A. Nonqualified Option Award Agreement (“Option Agreement”) between DAVID PAUL MCGLADE (the “Participant”) and Intelsat S.A. (the “Company”), dated as of May 1, 2013, is entered into by the Company and made as of December 15, 2015.
 
WHEREAS, pursuant to its authority under the Intelsat S.A. 2013 Equity Incentive Plan and the Option Agreement, the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of the Company has approved this amendment to the Option Agreement to reflect an Exercise Price (as defined in the Option Agreement) equal to the closing price of a common share of the Company on December 15, 2015, as reported on the New York Stock Exchange composite transactions reporting system.
 
It is hereby agreed as follows:
 
1.                 The last sentence of Section 1(a) of the Option Agreement is amended to read as follows:  
“The Exercise Price shall be $3.77 per Option Share.” 
2.                 In accordance with Section 14(b) of the Intelsat S.A. 2013 Equity Incentive Plan, the effectiveness of this Amendment is subject to the approval of the Company’s shareholders at the Company’s 2016 annual general meeting of shareholders. For the avoidance of doubt, if shareholder approval is not obtained, then this Amendment shall be void ab initio and of no force and effect.
3.                 As amended and modified by this Amendment, the Option Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
4.                 If there is any conflict between the terms of the Option Agreement and this Amendment, the terms of this Amendment shall prevail.
                         
        IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has executed this Amendment as of December 15, 2015.




INTELSAT S.A. 


By: /s/ Michelle V. Bryan 
Name: Michelle V. Bryan
Title: Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Chief Administrative Officer 






Accepted on January 13, 2016
 DAVID PAUL MCGLADE                                                                    




Accepted on January 13, 2016
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

PD

-___________________

REGINALD TURON HILL §

Appellant § On Petition for Review of

v. § No. 14 -14- 00 376- CR

§ Court of Appeals

§ Fourteenth District of Texas

THE STATE OF TEXAS §

Appellee

PETITIONER/APPELLANT ’S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME

TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

Petitioner/Appellant Reginald Turon Hill, moves for an extension of time to file

his petition for discretionary review, under T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 10.5(b).

I. LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS

Judgment in this case was entered on May 8, 2014

. The court of appeals affirmed

on August 25, 2015

. No motion for rehearing was filed.

II. PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT

Mr. Hill ’s petition is due on September 24, 2015. No previous extensions have

been requested.

III. REASONS FOR REQUEST

Since the court of appeals handed down its judgment, counsel has been working

to complete briefs in Margaret Mayer v. State , Cause No. 14- 14 -01011-CR, which is

subject to abatement; Herman Whitfield v. State , Cause No. 01- 15 -00274-CR; Eric Samuel PD-1260-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 9/24/2015 12:40:48 PM

Accepted 9/24/2015 4:36:49 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK2

Tucker v. State , Cause No. 01

- 15

- 00274

- CR; and Bo Daniel Shafer v. State , Cause No. 14

-

15

- 00372

- CR; as well as applications for writs of habeas corpus arising from juvenile

certification issues brought to li ght by the Moon / Guerrero / Yado line of cases.

I V . FILING OF MOTION

In the exercise of due diligence, counsel could not complete Mr. Hill’ s p etition

by the deadline. Th i s motion is not filed for purposes of delay, but so justice may be

done.

PRAYER

Mr. Hill respectfully requests that this motion be granted and that the Court

permit an extension of time until October 24 , 2015

, to fil e his petition for discretionary

review

.

Respectfully submitted,

ALEXANDER BUNIN

Chief Public Defender

Harris County Texas

/s/ Cheri Duncan

___________________

___________ CHERI DUNCAN

Assistant Public Defender

Harris County Texas

S tate Bar No. 06210500

1201 Franklin, 13 th Floor

Houston Texas 77002

(713) 368

- 0016

(713) 368

- 9278 (Fax)

cheri.duncan@pdo.hctx.net3 Attorney for Petitioner/ Appellant,

REGINAL TURON HILL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of Appellant’s Motion to Extend Time to File Petition was

served on the State of Texas by electronic delivery to the A ppellate Division of the

H arris County District Attorney’s Office and the State Prosecuting Attorney

,

September 2 4 , 2015

.

/s/ Cheri Duncan

_________________________ CHERI DUNCAN
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     <ARTICLE>                5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE SEC FORM OF WHICH
THIS EXHIBIT IS A PART AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000


<S>                                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                             497
<SECURITIES>                                       525
<RECEIVABLES>                                      519
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        549
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,552
<PP&E>                                           3,572
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,933
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   6,997
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<BONDS>                                          2,698
<COMMON>                                           701
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              195
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (626)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (254)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (372)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (377)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (6.90)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (6.90)


</TABLE>
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 98-41217

Summary Calendar

_______________________

TRANSPORTES DE NUEVO LAREDO S.A. DE C.V.;

EDUARDO JAVIER HINOJOSA-SANCHEZ; CARLOS

LUIS HINOJOSA-SANCHEZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

ROADWAY EXPRESS INC; ROADWAY SERVICES INC;

TNL-ROADWAY S.A. DE C.V.; BRIAN HICKERT;

TRANSCONTINENTAL LEASE S.A. DE C.V.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(L-96-CV-90)

_________________________________________________________________

August 16, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The court has carefully considered this appeal in light

of the briefs and pertinent portions of the record. Having done

so, we find no reversible error of fact or law, and in particular,

no error in holding that Mexican law is applicable or that 
2

defendant Brian Hickert was fraudulently joined to defeat

diversity, and no abuse of discretion in the court’s ultimate

dismissal based on forum non conveniens.

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>   1
                               [WCRA LETTERHEAD]

                                      2001
                           CERTIFICATE OF REINSURANCE

================================================================================

                                    for the
                            AGREEMENT OF REINSURANCE
                                  between the
                 WORKERS' COMPENSATION REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION
                                      and


                    AMERICAN COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY







JANUARY 1, 2001 - DECEMBER 31, 2001                    RETENTION LIMIT: $330,000


This certifies that the entity named above is a Member of the Workers'
Compensation Reinsurance Association (WCRA) as of the date indicated below, and
that the WCRA reinsures the Member's liability for benefits pursuant to Minn.
Stat. Ch. 176 in excess of the Member's retention limit for the period indicated
above. This certificate shall not be valid for any portion of the indicated
period during which the entity is not a Member of the WCRA.

                                        Workers' Compensation
                                        Reinsurance Association

                                        /s/ JAY BENANAV
                                        -------------------------------------
                                        Jay Benanav
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer

                                        Dated: January 1, 2001

================================================================================
#### William W. R. King, by Mary L. Bucklin, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. William Muldoon, Appellant.

Judgment and order affirmed by default, with costs. Hirschberg, P. J., Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor and Miller, JJ., concurred.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Randall Lee GAMBLE, Appellant.

No. 00-3285.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 6, 2002.

Decided Nov. 12, 2002.

Before MCMILLIAN, FAGG, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

[UNPUBLISHED]

PER CURIAM.

Randall Lee Gamble challenges his conviction and sentence for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, conspiring to launder drug proceeds, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Gamble argues his guilty plea was not voluntary because the indictment was defective and because the district court * did not conduct the plea hearing in conformity with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11; he did not receive notice his sentence could be statutorily enhanced; the district court used a stale conviction as a basis for applying the career-offender Guideline; and the Attorney General had improperly changed the designation of methamphetamine from a Schedule III to a Schedule II controlled substance. We reject these arguments.

First, although a specific drug quantity was not charged in the indictment, Gamble’s 290-month sentence is less than the 360-month maximum allowable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), based on an earlier felony drug conviction and without reference to drug quantity, and thus does not violate *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), *see United States v. Aguayo-Delgado,*220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied,*531 U.S. 1026, 121 S.Ct. 600, 148 L.Ed.2d 513 (2000); and the money-laundering count set forth all the elements of the charging statutes as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1). Second, the record shows the district court conducted the plea hearing under Rule 11: it specifically reviewed the indictment with Gamble, he affirmed he understood what he was charged with, and he described and affirmed his involvement in the charged conduct. *See*Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c), (f). Third, as noted in the plea agreement Gamble signed, the government filed a 21 U.S.C. § 851 information giving notice of an increased penalty based on Gamble’s past felony drug conviction. Fourth, the conduct underlying the charged offenses began within fifteen years of Gamble’s release from prison on an earlier conviction, and thus the conviction could be counted for purposes of calculating Gamble’s criminal history. *See*U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, comment. (n.l). Finally, Congress has given the Attorney General authority to transfer drugs from one schedule to another regardless of the drug’s initial placement. *See 21*U.S.C. §§ 811(a)(1), 812(c).

We thus affirm Gamble’s convictions and sentences.

*

 The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.