alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

TROY HAMILTON SCOTT,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-3682

[November 20, 2019]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Okeechobee County; Michael C. Heisey, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 471985CF000256A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Matthew Steven 

Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Troy Scott appeals an order denying his motion to vacate 

sentence based on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 

L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 

176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). We reverse and remand upon accepting the 

State’s concession that the issue is controlled by our decision in Jones v. 

State, 279 So.3d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).

In Jones, the defendant moved for resentencing based on Miller and 

Graham. Jones, 279 So. 3d at 173. The trial court granted the motion 

and ordered resentencing. Significantly, the State did not seek rehearing 

or appeal. Before resentencing occurred, and after a change in the law, 

the State changed its position and objected to Jones’s resentencing. See 

Franklin v. State, 258 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 2018); State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 

3 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1401, 203 L. Ed.2d 

630 (2019). The circuit court agreed with the State and vacated the order 

granting resentencing. Jones, 279 So. 3d at 173.
2

We reversed that order in Jones because the circuit court lacked 

jurisdiction to reconsider the earlier order granting resentencing. Id. at

174 (citing Simmons v. State, 274 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (holding 

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rescind an order granting 

resentencing once it became a final, appealable order, and neither party 

timely moved for rehearing of the order under Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.800(b)(1)(B)).

As in Jones, we reverse the order on appeal and remand with directions 

that the trial court reinstate the order granting appellant’s rule 3.800(a) 

motion. The trial court should then resentence appellant to a lawful 

sentence. As in Jones, we decline to address the substantive challenges 

appellant raises as to the current sentencing law.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

WARNER, TAYLOR and GERBER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Exhibit 13.1
 Certification of Chief Executive Officer
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  (i)
    
    the accompanying annual report on Form 20-F of the Company for the year ended
March 31, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(ii)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Neeraj BhargavaName:
    Neeraj BhargavaTitle:
    Group Chief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 7
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
unaudited consolidated financial statements included in the Form 10-Q and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                           329,459
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                                0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                                  0
<EQUITIES>                                      88,511
<MORTGAGE>                                      10,513
<REAL-ESTATE>                                    3,332
<TOTAL-INVEST>                                 506,118
<CASH>                                           3,171
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                              43,698
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                          29,302
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,131,359
<POLICY-LOSSES>                                452,694
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                            152,799
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                                0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                 94,875
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         6,137
<OTHER-SE>                                     238,216
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,131,359
<PREMIUMS>                                     256,748
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                             20,619
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                               5,373
<OTHER-INCOME>                                       0
<BENEFITS>                                     161,369
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                        135
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                            75,827
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 39,325
<INCOME-TAX>                                    12,361
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             26,964
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    26,964
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.77
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.74
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                       0<F1>
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                  0<F1>
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0<F1>
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                   0<F1>
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                     0<F1>
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                      0<F1>
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>This amount is presented on an annual basis.  See 12/31/96 Form 10-K for the
most recent reported amounts.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANA SYRIA, individually and on behalf

of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

ALLIANCEONE RECEIVABLES

MANAGEMENT, INC.; TRANSWORLD

SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-35678

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01139-TSZ

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 14, 2019

Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, W. FLETCHER, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Dana Syria (“Syria”) appeals the denial of her motion to remand and the

adverse grant of summary judgment on her Washington Consumer Protection Act

(“CPA”), Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86 et seq., claims. We have jurisdiction under 28

FILED

MAY 24 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except

as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1453(c). We review de novo, Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical

Center, L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013); Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575

F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009), and affirm.

1. There was no error in denying Syria’s motion to remand. The court did not

abuse its discretion by striking documents that Syria failed to rely upon in her motion. 

See Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.4 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“A district court’s grant of a motion to strike is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion.”). Syria did not bring to the court’s attention any other documents that

triggered 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)’s removal clock.

2. There was no error in granting AllianceOneReceivables Management, Inc.’s

(“ARMI”) motion for summary judgment. With regard to Syria’s per se CPA claim,

even assuming her legal financial obligation constitutes a “claim” under the

Washington Collection Agencies Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 19.16.100 et seq., the

challenged transaction fee is expressly authorized by Wash. Rev. Code § 3.02.045(1). 

With regard to Syria’s stand-alone CPA claim, it was not unfair or deceptive for

ARMI to charge the transaction fee where it informed Syria of the fee and offered her

reasonable alternative payment options free of charge. See Merriman v. Am.

Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 396 P.3d 351, 368 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (an act or

practice is not unfair under the CPA if the consumer can avoid the injury).

2
3. Syria’s motion to certify questions to the Washington Supreme Court is

denied.

AFFIRMED.

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-05-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-04-1998
<CASH>                                             438
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,369
<ALLOWANCES>                                       344
<INVENTORY>                                     15,188
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                32,593
<PP&E>                                          14,646
<DEPRECIATION>                                (10,209)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  37,504
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,481
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            33
<OTHER-SE>                                      23,776
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    37,504
<SALES>                                         30,042
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                30,042
<CGS>                                           20,685
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   20,685
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 8,250
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (18)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,125
<INCOME-TAX>                                       416
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                709
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       709
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.24
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.24
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.2****CERTIFICATION**I, Robert F. McCullough, Jr. certify that:(1) I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of CytoCore, Inc.;(2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;(3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;(4) The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b. evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc. disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter(the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer’sinternal control over financial reporting; and(5) The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small businessissuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting.                           /s/ Robert F. McCullough, Jr.   Robert F. McCullough, Jr.   Chief Financial Officer  Dated:  May 14, 2007
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6658 RICHARD T. THARPE, a/k/a Richard Terry Tharp, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus NORFOLK COMMUNITY HOSPITAL; MRS. WATSON, Supervisor; DENTAL DEPARTMENT, Norfolk City Jail; SHERIFF, Norfolk City Jail, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CA-96-133) Submitted: September 5, 1996 Decided: September 17, 1996 Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard T. Tharpe, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. Appellant's case was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1988). Themagistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Appellant that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Appellant failed to object to the magistrate judge's recommendation. The timely filing of objections to a magistrate judge's recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned that failure to object will waive appellate r eview. Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985). See generally Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Appellant has waived appellate review by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Order entered October 10, 2018

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 18
- 00518
- CR AGEAK M CHOL, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 283rd Jud icial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F16
- 30952
- T



### O RDER
T he clerk’s record reflects appellant is indigent and requested the reporter’s record on May 9, 2018. The reporter’s record was due August 24, 2018. When it was not filed , we notified court reporter Trashuna Salaam by postcard dated August 28, 2018 that it was overdue and directed her to file (1) the reporter’s record, (2) written verification that no hearing were recorded, or (3) written verification that appellant had no t requested the reporter’s record by September 27, 2018. To date, the reporter’s record has not been filed and we have had no
communication from Ms. Salaam.
We ORDER Trashuna Salaam to file the complete reporter’s record by October 24 , 2018 . Should Ms. S alaam fail to file the reporter’s record by that date, the Court will takewhatever remedies it has available to ensure this appeal proceeds in a timely fashion, including

ordering Ms. Salaam not sit until the complete reporter’s record is filed.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to the Honorable Livia Liu Francis , Presiding Judge, 283rd Judicial District Court; Trashuna Salaam , official court reporter, 283rd Judicial District Court; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
Exhibit 31.1


SOX 302 CERTIFICATION

I, Tommy Harris, Senior Vice President of CitiMortgage, Inc., certify that:

1. I have reviewed the reports on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form
10-K of Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., Series 2006-AR2 (the "Exchange Act
periodic reports");

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole,
do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by
the report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the master
servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in
preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under
Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic
reports, the master servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing
agreement, in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
asset backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of
compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be
included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of
noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on
Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Washington
Mutual Bank, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.



March 30, 2007

By: /s/ Tommy Harris
Name:  Tommy Harris
Title: Senior Vice President of CitiMortgage Inc.
#### Alvin Logan v. State.

No. 24589.

January 18, 1950.

*Garland Casebier,*Fort Stockton, for appellant.

*J. W. Swarts,*County Attorney, Van Horn, and *George P.*Blackburn, State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for aggravated assault, with a fine of $25.00.

The sole question necessary to be discussed in this case is whether or not appellant’s motion to quash the jury panel in the *165county court should have been sustained. The '.judge of the County Court of Culberson County' for the preceding eighteen years did not feel it necessary to appoint a jury commission as provided by Article 2109, R. C. S. When the present county judge came into office, in January, 1949, no jury had been drawn for the six months term of court to follow. On the 16th day of June this case was called for trial and the motion filed to quash the jury panel. This is denominated a second motion to quash. The grounds therefor set out that the jury commission drawing the jury before them was not appointed according to law.

It appears that about the latter part of January a jury commission was appointed who selected 20 men for service and that they appeared in court, in response to the summons, on the 13th day of April following. Over the objections of defendant’s counsel, the county judge at that time orally dismissed all of the jury panel except three, whom he swore in as jury commissioners. Following the court’s instruction, they selected the jury panel from which the jury was selected in the instant case. It is set out and shown by the record, without dispute, that the failure to have a jury commission appointed in accordance with the statute, and the selection of a jury panel by them, was not unintentional but was the willful act and judgment of the county judge. The second motion to quash the panel was overruled and defendant was forced to select a jury from such panel.

It will not be necessary to give an extended discussion of the question thus presented in the case now before us. The identical question was fully discussed in Clark v. State, 138 Tex. Cr. R. 107, 134 S. W. 2d, page 676, and re-affirmed in Newberry v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. R. 186, 143 S. W. 2d 962 and Fann v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. R. 142, 143 S. W. 2d 963. The opinions of this court on the subject are consistent. Neither the county judge nor this court has the power to change statutory law.

For the reasons stated in the foregoing cases, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remandede.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6085 

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide that sex includes 

sexual orientation and gender identity, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 30, 2021 

Mr. BROWN of Maryland (for himself, Mr. HIGGINS of New York, Mr. KILDEE, Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York, Mr. MOULTON, Ms. 

ROYBAL-ALLARD, and Mr. TONKO) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide 

that sex includes sexual orientation and gender identity, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fair Pay for All Act 

5 of 2021’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6085 IH

1 SEC. 2. SEX TO INCLUDE SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GEN2 DER IDENTITY. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3 of the Fair Labor 

4 Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203) is amended by 

5 adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(t)(1) ‘Sex’ includes— 

7 ‘‘(A) a sex stereotype; 

8 ‘‘(B) pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical 

9 condition; 

10 ‘‘(C) sexual orientation or gender identity; and 

11 ‘‘(D) sex characteristics, including intersex 

12 traits. 

13 ‘‘(2) ‘Sexual orientation’ includes homosexuality, het14 erosexuality, and bisexuality. 

15 ‘‘(3) ‘Gender identity’ means the gender-related iden16 tity, appearance, mannerisms, or other gender-related 

17 characteristics of an individual, regardless of the individ18 ual’s designated sex at birth.’’. 

19 (b) SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION.—Section 6(d)(1) 

20 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 

21 206(d)(1)) is amended by striking ‘‘opposite’’ and insert22 ing ‘‘another’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS