alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Mose Hardy, Appellant.

Gen. No. 66-30.

Third District.

September 21, 1966.

Morton S. Goldfine, of Peoria, for appellant; George R. Kennedy, State’s Attorney, of Peoria, for appellee.

Opinion by

PRESIDING JUSTICE CORYN.

Not to be published in full.
1 The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-3727

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Anthony Drake Barber, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 7, 1999 Filed: April 13, 1999

___________ Before FAGG, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. While Anthony Drake Barber was serving a period of supervised release, he violated his release conditions and the district court 1 revoked supervised release and sentenced him to serve 14 months in prison. On appeal, Mr. Barber argues that the districtcourt erred by failing to consider the 5-to-11-month revocation imprisonment range suggested under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (1998). We affirm.-2-

After a thorough review of the record--which includes the probation officer’s letternotifying the district court of the revocation range recommended in Chapter 7-- we reject Mr. Barber’s argument and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him. See United States v. Grimes , 54 F.3d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Carr , 66 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EX-10.68





 EXHIBIT 10.68 

Domino’s Pizza, Inc. 

Independent Director Compensation Schedule 

The following table sets forth the current compensation received by independent directors of Domino’s Pizza, Inc. for service on the Board of Directors,
Audit Committee, Compensation Committee and Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee: 
  

					
	 Director Compensation Summary
	 
	 Annual Retainer
	  	Amount	 
	 Board of Directors
	  	$	80,000	 
		
	 Audit Committee
	  			
	 Chairperson
	  	$	30,000	 
	 Member
	  	$	15,000	 
		
	 Compensation Committee
	  			
	 Chairperson
	  	$	20,000	 
	 Member
	  	$	10,000	 
		
	 Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee
	  			
	 Chairperson
	  	$	15,000	 
	 Member
	  	$	10,000	 
		
	 Annual Equity Award
	  	Value	 
	 Target grant date fair value
	  	$	160,000
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 27, 2016

No. 04-16-00194-CV

Jose PEREZ, Jr.,

Appellant

v.

Salud CAZARES,

Appellee

From the 83rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas

Trial Court No. 3287CCL

Robert Cadena, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

A filing fee of $205.00 was due when this appeal was filed but it was not paid. See

TEXAS SUPREME COURT ORDER REGARDING FEES CHARGED IN THE SUPREME COURT, IN CIVIL 

CASES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS, AND BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 

LITIGATION (Misc. Docket No. 14-9158, Aug. 28, 2015). The clerk of the court notified 

appellant of this deficiency in a letter dated April 5, 2016. The fee remains unpaid. Rule 5 of 

the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

A party who is not excused by statute or these rules from paying costs must pay –

at the time an item is presented for filing – whatever fees are required by statute 

or Supreme Court order. The appellate court may enforce this rule by any order 

that is just.

TEX. R. APP. P. 5. 

We therefore order appellant, not later than May 9, 2016 to either (1) pay the 

applicable filing fee, or (2) provide written proof to this court that he is indigent or otherwise 

excused by statute or the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure from paying the fee. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 20.1 (providing that indigent party who complies with provisions of that rule may 

proceed without advance payment of costs). If appellant fails to respond satisfactorily within the 

time ordered, this appeal will be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3.
_________________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 27th day of April, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### PICOU v. ROUSSEAU (PICOU, Intervener).

No. 1221.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Oct. 5, 1933.

Mat J. Allen, of Amite, for appellant.

Rownd & Warner, of Hammond, for appel-lee.

MOUTON, Judge.

■ Plaintiff, in October, 1932, obtained the seizure of an auto, then in the possession of defendant, Rousseau.

Eugene Picou filed an intervention claiming the ownership of the auto, which was based on an alleged sale of the auto to him by defendant.

The court below held that the alleged sale was a simulation, dismissed the intervention, and maintained the seizure.

Intervener appeals.

A bill of sale purporting to transfer the ownership of the auto by Rojisseau to inter-vener for $325 was passed before L. W. Ernest, justice .of the peace, on July 9, 1932.

When questioned as to the reality of the transaction, Eugene Picou, intervener, said he had paid $325 in cash for the auto. This sum was made up, according to his testimony, from $250 he had in his possession, $50 he ■borrowed from a bank, and $25 loaned him by his brother, Aristide-or Alcide.

Mr. Rousseau, defendant, father-in-law of the intervener who was living with him, being asked if intervener had paid $325 for the auto, said in answer thereto: “He did not pay me just then. He paid me the last $25.00 when the bill of sale was passed.” This was a clear contradiction of the testimony of his son-in-law, intervener, who testified that this sum had been paid in cash when the sale was passed.

The justice, L. W. Ernest, who had written the deed, was not questioned by intervener upon whom rested the burden of establishing his title to the auto, as to whether or not this sum of $325 had been paid in cash when the sale was executed.

In connection with the foregoing, it is proper to state that it is shown that the inter-vener could not pay interest on property he had bought at that time and, notwithstanding that fact, claims to have invested $325 in the' auto in question, and a; secondhand machine.

*68It is also sliown that Rousseau, defendant, was actually in possession of the auto when it was seized and which had been almost invariably in his possession after the pretended sale, on July 9, 1932; intervener having been seen driving the auto only on two or three instances. This was shown by the neighbors of intervener and defendant, by two ferry men where defendant and intervener had occasion to cross some creek or stream, and by merchants where defendant bought oil and gas to run the auto. The fact is that the gas and oil purchased for the car was paid for by defendant and when not paid for was charged to his account, even when bought by Eugene Picou, intervener.

With evidence of that character, we think, the court correctly held that the pretended sale was a simulation, and properly dismissed the intervention.

Judgment affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 20, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 49232]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19107]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration


Notice Before Waiver With Respect to Land at Baltimore-Washington 
International Airport, Baltimore, MD

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of intent of waiver with respect to land.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is publishing notice of proposed release of 0.239 
acres of land (a portion of parcel 165 as identified on the Exhibit 
``A'' Property Map) at the Baltimore-Washington International Airport, 
Baltimore, Maryland, to the Maryland State Highway Administration 
(MSHA) for the improvement of Corporate Center Drive. There are no 
impacts to the Airport and the land is not needed for airport 
development as shown on the Airport Layout Plan. The parcel was 
acquired with local funding only based on the Noise Compatibility Plan 
(NCP) developed under the PART 150 Update.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 19, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this application may be mailed or delivered in 
triplicate to the FAA at the following address: Terry J. Page, Manager, 
FAA Washington Airports District Office, 23723 Air Freight Lane, Suite 
210, Dulles, Virginia 20166.
    In addition, one copy of any comments submitted to the FAA must be 
mailed or delivered to Ellen Sample, at the following address: Ellen 
Sample, Manager, Division of Noise and Land Use Compatibility, Maryland 
Aviation Administration, P.O. Box 8766, BWI Airport, Maryland 21240-
0766.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Terry Page, Manager, Washington 
Airports District Office, 23723 Air Freight Lane, Suite 210, Dulles, 
Virginia 20166; telephone (703) 661-1354, fax (703) 661-1370, e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#dc88b9aeaea5f28cbdbbb99cbabdbdf2bbb3aa"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a0f4c5d2d2d98ef0c1c7c5e0c6c1c18ec7cfd6">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April 5, 2000, new authorizing 
legislation became effective. That bill, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Public Law 10-181 (Apr. 
5, 2000; 114 Stat. 61) (AIR 21) requires that a 30-day public notice 
must be provided before the Secretary may waive any condition imposed 
on an interest in surplus property.

    Issued in Chantilly, Virginia, on August 6, 2008.
Terry J. Page,
Manager, Washington Airports District Office, Eastern Region.
[FR Doc. E8-19107 Filed 8-19-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M


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</html>
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ 

Case No. 5D23-0617

LT Case No.2017-CF-000430

_____________________________ 

JOHN BRENNAN BALL, 

Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

_____________________________ 

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County. 

Lisa D. Herndon, Judge. 

Lori Wurtzel, of Wurtzel Law, PLLC, Winter Park, for 

Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. 

Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellee. 

March 22, 2024

PER CURIAM.

John Brennan Ball (“Appellant”) appeals the trial court’s 

order finding him to be retroactively competent following a nunc 

pro tunc competency hearing. This Court previously determined 

that the trial court erred when it relied solely on counsel’s 

stipulation in finding Appellant competent and failed to 
2 

independently evaluate the expert’s written report and make an 

independent determination of competency as to three of his counts. 

Ball v. State, 319 So. 3d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). We remanded for 

the trial court to “conduct a nunc pro tunc competency evaluation, 

if it can, to determine whether Appellant was competent to proceed 

at the time of his trial and to enter an appropriate order regarding 

his competence.” Id. 

On remand, the trial court held a nunc pro tunc competency 

hearing, following which it found Appellant to be retroactively 

competent. Both before and during the hearing, Appellant 

repeatedly requested to be appointed counsel to represent him at 

the hearing. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for counsel. 

Appellant contends that the court erred when it declined his 

request for appointed counsel. The State concedes error in that a 

nunc pro tunc competency hearing is a crucial stage of the 

proceedings at which Appellant was entitled to be represented by 

counsel. We agree. See generally Dickerson v. State, 228 So. 3d 658, 

659–60 (Fla. 5th 2017) (noting that defendants are entitled to 

counsel at each crucial stage of the proceedings, and defining 

“crucial stage” as any stage that may significantly affect the 

outcome of the proceedings); see also United States v. Ross, 703 

F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor the

Sixth Circuit have considered whether a competency hearing is a

‘critical stage.’ ‘However, every federal court of appeals to take up

the question has answered it affirmatively.’” (internal citations

omitted)).

We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct 

a nunc pro tunc competency hearing at which Appellant is 

represented by counsel. We do not address the other issues raised 

on appeal. 

REVERSE and REMANDED with instructions. 

JAY, EISNAUGLE, and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur. 
3

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
#### Celia Reilly, as Administratrix, etc., of David Reilly, Deceased, Appellant, v. Troy Brick Company, Respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Chester, J., not voting.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**P & FINDUSTRIES, INC.**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Qof P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ending June 30,2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), the undersigned, Joseph A. Molino, Jr., PrincipalFinancial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350that:

(1)   The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.
| /s/ Joseph  A. Molino, Jr. |   |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| Joseph A. Molino, Jr.      |
| *Principal Financial Officer*   |
| August 16, 2004            |

 

1

----
#### JACOBS et al. v. SWIFT & CO.

4 Div. 797.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 9, 1935.

*233Chas. O. Stokes, of Ozark, for appellants.

Sollie & Sollie, of Ozark, for appellee.

BROWN, Justice.

This is a bill by a contract creditor, whose debt is secured by a chattel mortgage, for discovery and relief. The relief sought is the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, and to avoid a voluntary conveyance of the real estate described in the bill, made by the debtor to his son and codefendant. The discovery sought is in respect to the location and identity of the property covered by the chattel mortgage.

The bill is single in its purpose — to subject the property of the debtor to the satisfaction of his debt due the complainant.

The demurrers to the bill were not well taken and were properly overruled. Code 1923, §§ 6526, 7342; Rice et al. v. Eiseman Bros. & Co. et al., 122 Ala. 343, 25 So. 214; Douglass Cotton Oil Co. et al. v. Alabama Machinery & Supply Co. et al., 205 Ala. 51, 87 So. -342; Comer v. Lehman, Durr & Co., 87 Ala. 362, 6 So. 264; J. E. Butler & Co. et al. v. A. G. Henry & Co., 202 Ala. 155, 79 So. 630; Hanson v. Luther, 229 Ala. 256, 156 So. 771.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, C. J., and THOMAS and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
13.1





CERTIFICATION




Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, I, Weidong Hong, Chief Executive Officer of Yucheng
Technologies Limited (the “Company”), certify, to my knowledge, that the
Company’s annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2008 (the
“Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:
      June 29, 2009/s/ Weidong HongName:
      Weidong HongTitle:
      Chief Executive Officer


_______________________________________________________________________





The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document.


Exhibit 13.1, page1
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

LR/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROSA MARIA ARGUMEDO

RODRIGUEZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-73539

Agency No. A097-586-947

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 15, 2009** 

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

Rosa Maria Argumedo Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from 

an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for cancellation of 

FILED

JAN 08 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
LR/Research 2 07-73539

removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for 

substantial evidence the agency’s continuous physical presence determination,

Lopez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 847, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2004), and we deny the 

petition for review.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Argumedo Rodriguez met 

her burden to establish continuous physical presence from 1993 to 2003. See 

Singh-Kaur v.INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (a contrary result is not 

compelled where there is “[t]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions 

from the evidence”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In light of our

disposition, we need not address Argumedo Rodriguez’s contentions regarding 

the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.

We need not consider Argumedo Rodriguez’s contention regarding 

good moral character, because her failure to establish continuous physical presence

is dispositive. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
Exhibit 4.68


 


Buyer: CSUN Eurasia Energy System


 


Address :İstanbul Endüstri ve Ticaret Serbest
Bölgesi Akif Kopuz Caddesi T-10 parsel, B Blok, 1. Kat, Aydınlı-Tuzla 34957 İSTANBUL Turkey


 





 


Purchase Order


 


	PO No.:	Date:


 


Supplier :


CEEG(SHANGHAI) SOLARSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY CO, LTD


Address: NO.5999 GUANGFULIN ROAD, SONGJIANG, SHANGHAI, CHINA


Tel: 86 21 60259200


Fax: 86 21 60291900


Contact Person : hong.yu@chinasunergy.com


 


Attention:


 


We are pleased to submit the Purchase Order
for the attached Materials on the terms and conditions set forth below.


 


1 Specifications:


 


	Material Name	 	Material No.	 	Specification	 	Quantity	 	Unit	 	 	Total amount	 
	semi-finished solar module	 	550017	 	245-60P	 	3000	 	 	103.2	 	 	€	309,600.00	 
	semi-finished solar module	 	550019	 	250-60P	 	9000	 	 	105.35	 	 	€	948,150.00	 
	semi-finished solar module	 	550021	 	250-60p	 	11000	 	 	107.5	 	 	€	1,182,500.00	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Total amount:	 	 	 	 	 	€	2,440,250.00	 



 


	2 Delivery date:	3/30/2013
	 	 
	3 Terms of Payment:	T/T 30 days after received goods.


 




    	 



    	 



    

 


	4 Shipment Term:	CIF Turkey, BY SEA
	 	 
	5 Specifications:	Csun's specifications as previous.
	 	 
	6 Broken Rate and Shortage:	Except forwarder problem, broken rate should be less than 0.3%, if over, supplier should be replaced them within 30 days. Supplier should replenish the shortage within 30 days after receiving the notice from buyer.
	 	 
	7 remarks:	This PO is made out in two originals, one original to be held by each party in witness thereof. Fax for this PO is same valid as original.


 


	For and on behalf of	 	For and on behalf of
	 	 	 
	CSUN Eurasia Energy Systems	 	CEEG(SHANGHAI)SOLAR SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD
	 	 	 
	/s/ CSUN Eurasia Energy Systems Industry and Trade Inc.	 	/s/ CEEG(SHANGHAI)SOLAR SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD
	 	 	 
	Date:	 	Date:
Denied and Opinion Filed July 26, 2017 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-00603-CV No. 05-17-00604-CV No. 05-17-00605-CV No. 05-17-00606-CV IN RE TERRY C. SHELTON, Relator Original Proceeding from the 291st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F09-20518, F09-73040, F10-21198, and F10-55874 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Franci s, Brown, and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Whitehill Before the Court is relator’s June 6, 2017 pe tition for writ of mandamus in which relator complains of the trial court’s order withdrawing funds from his inmate trust account and failure to rule on his motion seeking return of the funds. To establish a right to mandamus relief in a cr iminal case, the relator must show that the trial court violated a ministerial duty a nd there is no adequate remedy at law. In re State ex rel. Weeks , 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). The relator has not met these requirements because the proper method fo r seeking appellate revi ew of an order of withdrawal of funds from an in mate trust account is by direct appeal of the order, not by mandamus. See In re Jones , No. 05-16-00001-CV, 2016 WL 279432, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 22, 2016, orig. proceeding) (citing Harrell v. State , 286 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. 2009)–2– (“[A]ppellate review should be by appeal, as in analogous civil post–judgment enforcement actions.”)). Relator, therefore, has an adequate appellate remedy. As fo r relator’s request for a writ directing the trial c ourt to rule on his moti on for return of the withdrawn funds, the trial court denied the motion on July 13, 2017, so that request is now moot. Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.

170603F.P05 /Bill Whitehill/ BILL WHITEHILL JUSTICE
<PAGE>



                                                                    Exhibit 99.1


                                WRITTEN STATEMENT

     In  connection  with the Annual Report of Electric  Fuel  Corporation  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-K for the year  ended  December  31,  2002 filed with the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (the  "Report"),  I,  Robert S.  Ehrlich,
Chairman,  President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, hereby certify that to my knowledge, the Report fully complies with
the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of
1934,  and the  information  contained  in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

     A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has
been provided to Electric Fuel Corporation and will be retained by Electric Fuel
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.




                                   By: /s/ Robert S. Ehrlich
                                       ----------------------------------------
                                       Robert S. Ehrlich, Chairman,
                                       President and CEO
                                       (Chief Executive Officer)

Date: March 31, 2003

<PAGE>
#### Gertrude E. Childs, by Arthur S. Westfall, Her Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Irving W. Childs, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Ho opinion. Woodward, Jenks, Hooker, Gaynor and Miller, JJ., concurred.