IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

April 28, 2015 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DAVID HUGH CRUMLEY

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Claiborne County

No. 2012-CR-1216 E. Shayne Sexton, Judge

No. E2013-02373-CCA-R3-CD – Filed July 20, 2015

The Defendant, David Hugh Crumley, pled nolo contendere to two counts of vehicular 

homicide and received an effective eight-year sentence under the terms of the agreement. 

Thereafter, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing based upon the nature 

and circumstances of the offenses combined with the Defendant‟s lack of remorse and his 

past criminal history involving alcohol and drugs. The Defendant appeals, arguing that

he is a suitable candidate for alternative sentencing pursuant to the statutory 

considerations outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). 

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court‟s alternative 

sentencing decision. Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Michael G. Hatmaker, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, David Hugh Crumley.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ahmed A. Safeeullah, Assistant 

Attorney General; Lori Phillips-Jones, District Attorney General; and Jared R. Effler, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Following a November 5, 2011 automobile wreck, the Defendant was charged 

with two counts of vehicular homicide as the proximate result of his intoxication, a Class 

B felony, and one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-213, 55-10-401. He entered a nolo contendere plea of 
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guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide on June 17, 2013, and the DUI charge was 

dismissed.1 Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, he received concurrent terms of eight 

years as a Range I, standard offender for both counts of vehicular homicide. Only the 

manner of service was left for the trial court‟s determination. 

A sentencing hearing was held on September 23, 2013. The presentence report 

was entered as an exhibit and provided details surrounding the events. The information 

in the report about the crash was taken verbatim from a Tennessee Highway Patrol 

Critical Incident Response Team Reconstructionist‟s Report completed by Trooper James 

Fillers. After Trooper Fillers examined “all known physical evidence” and reviewed the 

witnesses‟ accounts of the automobile collision, he made the following conclusions. 

On Saturday, November 5, 2011, at approximately 7:39 p.m., the Defendant was 

operating a 2010 Chevrolet Malibu heading south on State Route 63 in Claiborne County

at a rate of sixty-eight miles per hour. The posted speed limit was fifty-five miles per 

hour. Ronald P. McNew was traveling in the opposite direction, north of State Route 63, 

in his 2011 Toyota Highlander, at a rate of 49 miles per hour, and was accompanied by 

his wife Wilma McNew, who was in the passenger seat. Ashley N. Fultz was driving 

behind the McNews in her 2008 Ford Escape. All individuals were wearing their 

seatbelts according to Trooper Fillers‟s report.

The report further stated,

The Chevrolet crossed the center line and collided with the Toyota 

head-on in the northbound lane. The Chevrolet and Toyota entered a 

clockwise rotation. The Ford collided with the right rear of the Toyota and 

then collided with the left rear of the Chevrolet. The Chevrolet entered a 

counter clockwise rotation and came to an uncontrolled final rest in the 

center of the roadway facing north. The Toyota came to an uncontrolled 

final rest in the center of the roadway facing north. The Ford came to a 

controlled final rest on the shoulder of the northbound lane. 

 

1 At the outset, we note that there appears to have been much confusion regarding the Defendant‟s 

indigency status and preparation of the transcripts once the Defendant‟s notice of appeal was filed in 

October 2013. On March 27, 2014, the trial court found the Defendant indigent for purposes of appeal 

and ordered preparation of the sentencing hearing proceedings. This court later returned the appellate 

record to the trial court clerk for correction of defects therein. Upon motion of the trial court clerk, the 

late-filed record was finally accepted by this court on October 28, 2014. Although a transcript of the 

guilty plea submission hearing is absent, we believe that the record is sufficient to conduct a meaningful 

review of the trial court‟s sentencing decision. See State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012).
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Mr. McNew died on the scene, and Mrs. McNew was transferred to Claiborne County 

Hospital, where she died from her injuries sustained in the crash. The Defendant was 

transported to University of Tennessee Medical Center, where he received treatment. 

The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation conducted blood alcohol tests and drug 

screens on the Defendant and the other two drivers. No alcohol was detected in the 

Defendant‟s blood, but the “toxicology results were positive for Etomidate, Doxylamine 

less than .05 ug/ml, Oxycodone .14 ug/ml, Midazolam 39.2 mg/ml, and Alprazolam 77.8 

ng/ml.” All results were negative for both Mr. McNew and Ms. Fultz. Based on this 

information, Trooper Fillers determined, “It is my opinion that failure to keep in the 

proper lane of travel, speeding and impaired driving, on behalf of [the Defendant], are the 

primary contributing factor[s] to the cause of this crash.”

Angela Brooks and Karen Bullins both testified about the impact of the loss of 

their mother and father on themselves and their entire family. They described their 

parents as loving, faithful, loyal, hard-working, wonderful, generous, and dedicated to 

their family. Their mother was a breast cancer survivor, and their father was a Vietnam 

combat veteran, who had received a purple heart. Over 1,500 people attended their 

parents‟ funeral on a cold and rainy day, according to the two women. They requested 

the maximum punishment for the Defendant. 

The Defendant‟s father, Jeffrey Crumley, testified that he and his family were 

extremely sympathetic towards the McNews‟s family and “wished [they] could bring 

them back.” He confirmed that the Defendant had insurance coverage when the collision 

occurred and that the insurance company paid $200,000.00 under the policy. 

The Defendant suffered extensive injuries during the crash, according to Mr. 

Crumley, and due to these injuries, the Defendant now lived with his parents. Mr. 

Crumley testified that these injuries included: “mild short term memory” impairment; 

“bad” headaches; depression; vision trouble; and head trauma. The Defendant, Mr. 

Crumley said, still required ongoing treatment for some of his injuries and was unable to 

work, but he could drive a vehicle. Mr. Crumley added that the Defendant‟s “mind [was] 

not good” and that he behaved “like a child” when he was in public. 

Mr. Crumley acknowledged that the Defendant had been in legal trouble for 

alcohol-related offenses and that the Defendant had admitted to previously using 

marijuana. However, Mr. Crumley clarified, “That was back when he was younger 

before he straightened his life up, made the nurse.” According to Mr. Crumley, the 

Defendant loved his job as a nurse, enjoying “talking to the patients and stuff[.]” 
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Jacqueline Robinson, a lifelong friend of the Defendant‟s, testified that she was an 

elementary school teacher and that the Defendant sometimes substituted for her in her 

classroom. She conveyed stories of the many personal things that the Defendant had 

done for her, like checking in on her, taking care of her cat, and buying her child 

necessities. The Defendant, according to Ms. Robinson, had expressed remorse, even 

coming to her house the week before the hearing and crying in front of her and her 

husband, saying “how sorry he felt for what he had done to the family and how sorry he 

felt that he couldn‟t bring these people back.” That day he also had “actually experienced 

empathy” by trying to put himself in the victims‟ family‟s shoes and feeling devastated 

by the thought of that loss.

The Defendant was a twenty-eight-year-old, single male at the time of the 

sentencing hearing. He could not recall any details about the November 5, 2011 

collision. Due to his many injuries from the wreck, he was hospitalized for almost three 

months, and then upon his release, he continued with outpatient therapy for two more 

months. He reported multiple bone fractures and “a brain injury to the front and back” 

and stated that he still suffered from short term memory loss and poor vision, tired easily, 

and had problems sleeping. He still saw doctors at Patricia Neal Rehabilitation Center 

approximately once every six weeks, a psychiatrist once a week, and an eye doctor as 

needed. Regarding any medications, the Defendant stated that he took Depakote for his 

seizures and Prozac for depression. He described changes in his personality since the 

wreck, saying that he was a “loner” now, even at home, and that he did not “really go out 

anymore like [he] used to.”

When asked if he had consumed alcohol since the crash, the Defendant said that 

he had “drank like once at the lake . . . when [he] was with [his] parents[,]” drinking only 

maybe a beer or two. He testified that, since November 2011, he had taken no drugs 

other than his prescribed medications. When asked if he had anything to say to the 

victims‟ family, he replied, 

I really wish that I could go back and change November 5th, 2011, and I 

wish there was something I could do for the family so they didn‟t have to 

deal with this loss, and I‟m truly sorry. I can‟t even begin to imagine what 

any of you all feel because I‟ve tried to step out of my shoes and put myself 

in your all‟s shoes and tried to see what you all are feeling, and I can‟t even 

begin to imagine, and I‟m truly very sorry, and I just hope I never have to 

experience what you all are going through. I know that‟s bad to say, but I 

can‟t imagine how painful it is for you all and how much you have to miss 

the two loved ones that you all lost. And I‟m once again very sorry. 

 
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Regarding the Defendant‟s prior criminal history, he had two speeding tickets—

one in Bell County, Kentucky, in 2004; and the other in Lee County, Virginia, in July 

2009, for driving at a rate of fifty-one miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone. 

On August 26, 2005, also in Lee County, Virginia, the Defendant was charged with 

driving while impaired and was later convicted of the amended charge of reckless 

driving. The Defendant admitted that he was under the age of twenty-one when he was 

found as a passenger in a parked car with the keys in the ignition on this occassion. He 

was also convicted of possession and distribution of intoxicating liquors by persons under 

the age of twenty-one for this August 26, 2005 event. In Hancock County, Tennessee, 

the Defendant was convicted of public intoxication on May 13, 2009, although originally 

charged with DUI by consent. The Defendant admitted that both he and the driver were 

drunk. He stated that the driver “was a lot less under the influence than what [he] was” 

but agreed that this did not “somehow make that situation safe[.]” 

Regarding his educational and employment history, the Defendant graduated from 

Thomas Walker High School in Virginia in 2003. According to the presentence report, 

the Defendant worked as a sales associate at Belk Department Store in 2004 and at 

Greenfield Assisted Living of Oak Ridge in 2011 as a nurse. Between 2004 and 2011, 

the Defendant went to school and received his Licensed Practical Nursing Degree, 

initially going to school in Tennessee but later returning to Virginia, where he lived with 

his parents. According to the Defendant, he also worked at Farmers and Miners Bank in 

Pennington Gap, Virginia, and at Claiborne County Hospital during these years; however, 

he could not explain why these additional jobs were not listed in the presentence report. 

The Defendant was asked about the toxicology report in this case. He admitted 

that he took Oxycodone that day, but he could not recall if he obtained it “from someone 

that had a prescription” or “from an old prescription” of his. He explained that his 

prescription for Oxycodone “was just out of date[,]” although he acknowledged that he 

did not have a valid prescription at the time of the car crash. He also admitted that he had 

obtained Oxycodone from “someone else other than [his] prescription” in the past, even 

with the knowledge that it was illegal to do so. The Defendant agreed that he “had a 

problem of using Oxycodone in the past[.]” According to the Defendant, his last use of 

marijuana occurred at the age of twenty-five. 

The Defendant was asked if he had frequented any bars after the automobile

wreck. He admitted going to a bar and grill with his parents called “Bubba Bruce,” also 

to a bar in Gatlinburg called “Puckers” with several of his friends, and to a bar in

Cumberland Gap then known as “The Tavern.” He stated, 

Just because you go to a place that serves alcohol doesn‟t mean you 

are drinking alcohol or that you are even driving. And I‟m of age, I‟m 28 
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years old. If I want to consume an alcoholic beverage, that‟s not against the 

law. It is if I want to go out and drive, yes, but I don‟t drive under the 

influence. Those bars that I‟ve been to, my car has been sitting in my 

driveway at home. It‟s when I‟ve been picked up by somebody and ridden 

with somebody, so I didn‟t feel that there was a problem with if I wanted to 

go out into a public place and me being of age to have a drink if I wanted 

one and then go get in the passenger seat of a car and go home. 

He agreed that this behavior probably was not “an appropriate display of remorse” for 

someone awaiting sentencing after entering nolo contendere pleas to killing two people 

while driving under the influence. He then clarified, “I also know that unfortunately, 

there is nothing that I can do to bring them back. There is nothing I can do to change 

what happened. And I mean, I don‟t—am I supposed to just stop my life and just not do 

anything for the rest of my life?” 

The trial court then heard arguments from counsel and rendered its decision. At 

the outset of its ruling, the trial court noted that the Defendant was convicted of Class B 

felonies and, therefore, was not considered a favorable candidate for alternative 

sentencing. The trial court then denied any form alternative sentencing, reasoning as 

follows:

I understand the purpose of entering a nolo contendere plea based on the 

testimony here today and also what led up before. That, in and of itself, is a 

legal maneuver that really has no bearing on the [D]efendant‟s suitability 

for alternative sentencing. However, the other statements that were made 

before this [c]ourt are somewhat appalling. 

Remorse can come in a lot of different forms. The [D]efendant 

clearly stated his thoughts to the family, and he did it in a somewhat 

compelling way. That‟s not nearly as troubling to the [c]ourt as the 

[D]efendant‟s statement that his life should just go on, he can‟t do anything 

about what he has done. That directly goes to the point of his suitability for 

alternative sentencing. If wrecking while under the influence of narcotics 

and the taking of two lives cannot steer someone away from a particular 

act, I don‟t know what can. This . . . set of facts is troubling on any scale, 

but to have the [D]efendant testify that, well, you know, life goes on. 

Sometimes it doesn‟t. Sometimes it doesn‟t. Some acts are so egregious 

and the taking of innocent lives—by all the presentence investigation, the 

McNews, every—there was no fault, there was no culpability on their side, 

there was no medication, there was nothing that pointed in their direction as 

to . . . their being part of a problem here. Everything pointed directly at the 

[D]efendant. Couple that with the situations in the past dealing with 
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smoking [m]arijuana, the charges in other jurisdictions that led to 

reduced—I don‟t know what happened and I‟m not gonna second guess 

that, but I see some failure in the legal system there. I don‟t know if it 

could have prevented this, but it might have taught the [D]efendant, 

possibly led him away from this particular conduct.

However, based on the previous behaviors of the [D]efendant, the 

acts that occurred here that led to the death of these two individuals and the 

statements made here in [c]ourt, I find that he is a very poor candidate for 

alternative sentencing . . . . 

This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant takes exception to the trial court‟s complete denial of 

any alternative sentence. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the statutory criteria of 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103 are not met because “his [criminal] history 

is of misdemeanors, long in his past”; because “[t]he crime itself—involving death—

cannot be depreciated” and, therefore, “confinement does not provide an „effective 

deterrence‟”; and because “measures less restrictive than confinement” have never been 

applied to the Defendant, much less “unsuccessfully” or “recently.” He concludes that 

the trial court should have granted him “probation, or, at worst, split confinement.” The 

State responds that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it ordered the 

Defendant to serve his eight-year sentence in confinement. 

Before a trial court imposes a sentence upon a convicted criminal defendant, it 

must consider: (a) the evidence adduced at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the 

presentence report; (c) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing 

alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) 

evidence and information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating 

factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; (f) any 

statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to 

Tennessee sentencing practices for similar offenses; and (g) any statement the defendant 

wishes to make in the defendant‟s own behalf about sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-210(b). When an accused challenges the length and manner of service of a sentence, 

this court reviews the trial court‟s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion 

standard accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 

682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). This standard of review also applies to “the questions related to 

probation or any other alternative sentence.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 

(Tenn. 2012).
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This court will uphold the trial court‟s sentencing decision “so long as it is within 

the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in 

compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-

10. Moreover, under such circumstances, appellate courts may not disturb the sentence 

even if we had preferred a different result. See State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 346 

(Tenn. 2008). The burden of showing that a sentence is improper is upon the appealing 

party. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm‟n Cmts.; see also State v. 

Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001).

A defendant who is an especially mitigated or standard offender convicted of a 

Class C, D, or E felony should be considered a favorable candidate for alternative 

sentencing absent evidence to the contrary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(A). 

However, no longer is any defendant entitled to a presumption that he or she is a 

favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347. Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 40-35-102(6) is now only advisory. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-102(6)(D). 

Regardless, an offender is eligible for probation if he or she is sentenced to ten 

years or less and has not been convicted of certain specified offenses. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-303(a). While the trial court was required to automatically consider 

probation as a sentencing option, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(b), 

no criminal defendant is automatically entitled to probation as a matter of law, see State 

v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1997). It is the defendant‟s burden to establish his 

or her suitability for full probation. See Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-303(b)). The defendant must demonstrate that probation will “subserve the 

ends of justice and the best interests of both the public and the defendant.” Hooper v. 

State, 297 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tenn. 1956), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hooper, 29 

S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000). Among the factors applicable to probation consideration 

are the circumstances of the offense; the defendant‟s criminal record, social history, and 

present condition; the deterrent effect upon the defendant; and the best interests of the 

defendant and the public. State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978).

A trial court should consider the following when determining any defendant‟s 

suitability for alternative sentencing: 

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a 

defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness 

of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective 

deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or
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(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or 

recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1). A trial court should also consider a defendant‟s 

potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation when determining if an alternative 

sentence would be appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5); State v. Boston, 938 

S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Ultimately, in sentencing a defendant, a trial 

court should impose a sentence that is “no greater than that deserved for the offense 

committed” and is “the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which 

the sentence is imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2), (4).

Again, the consideration of favorable candidacy for alternative sentencing extends 

to a defendant “who is an especially mitigated or standard offender convicted of a Class 

C, D, or E felony[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(A). When a defendant is to be 

considered a favorable candidate, the State can overcome such consideration with 

“evidence to the contrary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(A). Because the Defendant 

was convicted of two Class B felonies, he is not to be considered a favorable candidate 

for alternative sentencing. Moreover, as noted above, no longer is any defendant entitled 

to a presumption that he or she is a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing, and it 

is a defendant‟s burden to establish his or her suitability for full probation. See Carter, 

254 S.W.3d at 347 (citation omitted). Importantly, we observe that the State had no 

burden to justify confinement in this case.

Here, the trial court based its denial of any alternative sentence upon the following 

grounds: the nature and circumstances of the offenses, the Defendant‟s lack of remorse, 

and the Defendant‟s past criminal behavior. This court has previously stated that the 

nature and circumstances underlying the criminal conduct may alone give rise to the 

denial of probation or another alternative sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

210(b)(4); State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). When 

imposing confinement based solely upon the seriousness of the offenses, the trial court 

must first determine if “„the circumstances of the offense[s] as committed [are] especially 

violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or 

exaggerated degree.‟” State v. Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) 

(quoting State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled on 

other grounds, Hooper, 29 S.W.3d at 9-10)). This principle has been codified in section 

40-35-103(1)(B), which considers confinement to avoid depreciating the seriousness of 

the offense. State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); see also

Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d at 787. Sentencing decisions should not, however, turn on a 

generalization of the crime committed, such as the fact that a death occurred. See

Bingham, 910 S.W.2d at 454-55. In this case, the trial court made the following 

descriptive statements about the nature and circumstances of these events: “wrecking 
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while under the influence of narcotics and the taking of two lives”; “this set of facts is 

troubling on any scale”; and “[s]ome acts are so egregious and the taking of innocent 

lives . . . .” The trial court further noted that the McNews were not found to be at fault in 

the car crash in any way and that “[e]verything pointed directly at the [D]efendant.” 

However, the trial court did not exclusively rely on the seriousness of the offenses 

in its decision to impose confinement. The trial court further found that the nature and 

circumstances underlying the offenses, coupled with the Defendant‟s “somewhat

appalling” statements at the sentencing hearing, were indicative of a lack of remorse and 

bore directly on his suitability for an alternative sentence. One such statement was,

“[H]is life should just go on, he can‟t do anything about what he has done.” The trial 

court also observed that if this automobile collision could not “steer [the Defendant] 

away from a particular act,” then it was unsure what punishment could, apparently 

referring to the Defendant‟s behavior of frequenting bars while awaiting sentencing in 

this matter. Lack of remorse is sufficient evidence by which a trial court may deny an 

alternative sentence. State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). 

Finally, the trial court discussed the previous criminal behavior of the Defendant

in addition to the above two considerations. The trial court noted that the Defendant had 

a “past dealing with smoking [m]arijuana” and several alcohol-related convictions in 

other jurisdictions. The Defendant submits that because of the old age of this behavior

and the misdemeanor classifications of his convictions, the trial court should not have 

considered this behavior. However, the Defendant was still young at time of the 

sentencing hearing, being only twenty-eight years old, and these convictions were

extremely relevant due to their similarity to the crimes at issue—speeding, intoxication, 

and reckless driving. Moreover, the Defendant admitted last smoking marijuana as 

recently as twenty-five years of age. The trial court also noted that, despite these 

previous run-ins with the law, the Defendant continued to drive while under the 

influence, which resulted in this crash that took two “innocent lives.” Based upon these 

observations, the trial court concluded that the Defendant was “a very poor candidate for 

alternative sentencing[.]” The Defendant‟s history of criminal convictions and criminal 

behavior lends support to the denial of an alternative sentence.

The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, properly weighing the 

factors and principles in denying alternative sentencing, and placing its reasoning for 

denying an alternative sentence on the record. Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to 

establish an abuse of discretion or otherwise overcome the presumption of reasonableness 

afforded to the trial court‟s denial of alternative sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Dennis 

Neil Bizzoco, 2011 WL 743404, at *4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2011) (affirming the 

denial of an alternative sentence for a defendant who pled guilty to vehicular homicide by 

intoxication, reckless homicide, and vehicular assault, and received an effective sentence 
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of eight years pursuant to the agreement); State v. Keaton M. Guy, No. E2007-01827-

CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 5130729, at *12-13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2008) (affirming 

the denial of full probation for a defendant who entered an open plea to reckless vehicular 

homicide and aggravated assault and received an effective four-year sentence following a 

sentencing hearing).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

 

_________________________________ 

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE