alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00607-CR

Jason Brian Burress

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From County Criminal Court No. 4

of Denton County (CA-2012-00002-

CCA)

January 31, 2013

Per Curiam

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

the appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for 

want of jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
2

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00607-CR

JASON BRIAN BURRESS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 4 OF DENTON COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Jason Brian Burress attempts to appeal his conviction for

speeding. Appellant appealed his conviction from the municipal court to the 

county criminal court, which signed its order on October 23, 2012. No motion for 

new trial was filed. Under our rules, Appellant’s notice of appeal was due on 

November 26, 2012. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). Appellant did not file his 

notice of appeal, however, until December 3, 2012.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
3

An appellate court may extend the time to file the notice of appeal if, within 

fifteen days after the deadline for filing the notice of appeal, the party (a) files in 

the trial court the notice of appeal and (b) files in the appellate court a motion 

complying with rule 10.5(b). Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. In this case, a motion to 

extend time to file the notice of appeal was due on December 11, 2012. See id. 

Appellant filed a response to our jurisdiction letter, which we broadly construe as 

a motion to extend time to file his notice of appeal, on December 27, 2012. It is, 

therefore, untimely.

A notice of appeal that complies with the requirements of rule 26 is 

essential to vest this court with jurisdiction. Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The court of criminal appeals has held that, without a 

timely filed notice of appeal or motion for extension of time, we cannot exercise 

jurisdiction over an appeal. See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996); see also Slaton, 981 S.W.2d at 210.

Because Appellant’s notice of appeal and motion to extend time to file 

notice of appeal were untimely, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal. 

Accordingly, we deny the motion to extend time to file notice of appeal and 

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3, 42.3(a), 

43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
4

DELIVERED: January 31, 2013
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Alfred Lee Rice, * From the 142nd District Court

of Midland County,

Trial Court No. CR41089.

Vs. No. 11-13-00302-CR * October 30, 2015

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Willson, J.

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there 

is no error in the judgments below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, the judgments of the trial court are in all things affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                       MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                  49,100
<SECURITIES>                                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                          186,300
<ALLOWANCES>                             7,000
<INVENTORY>                            193,800
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                       462,900
<PP&E>                                 210,200
<DEPRECIATION>                          11,200
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       1,152,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                  504,600
<BONDS>                                 92,900
<COMMON>                                   200
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0
<OTHER-SE>                             256,900
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         1,152,200
<SALES>                                264,300
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                       264,300
<CGS>                                  204,200
<TOTAL-COSTS>                          204,200
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        55,700
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       6,700
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         (2,300)
<INCOME-TAX>                             1,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     (3,300)
<DISCONTINUED>                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0
<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                            (3,300)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                            (0.16)
<EPS-DILUTED>                            (0.16)
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 23.1

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the  incorporation by reference in Post Effective  Amendment No. 1
to Registration  Statement No. 33-94914 on Form S-8,  Registration No. 333-30237
on Form S-8 and Registration  No. 333-22535 on Form S-3 of Hirsch  International
Corp. and  Subsidiaries  of our report dated March 31, 2006,  except for Note 16
which is April 26, 2006,  appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Hirsch
International Corp. and Subsidiaries for the year ended January 28, 2006.


---------------------------------
BDO Seidman, LLP
Melville, New York
April 27, 2006
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-20-00488-CV

SHENANDOAH CHURCH OF CHRIST,

Appellant

v.

Gabriel RODRIGUEZ,

Appellee

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020-CI-10952

Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 25, 2020

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION 

When appellant filed this appeal, it was required to pay a filing fee of $205.00. See TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.207(b)(1), 51.941(a); see also id. §§ 51.208, 51.0051; TEXAS SUPREME 

COURT ORDER REGARDING FEES CHARGED IN THE SUPREME COURT, IN CIVIL CASES IN THE 

COURTS OF APPEALS, AND BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (Misc. 

Docket No. 14-9158, Aug. 28, 2015). Appellant did not pay the required filing fee when it filed 

the notice of appeal. The clerk of the court notified appellant of this deficiency in a letter dated 

October 1, 2020 and advised appellant that the filing fee was due by October 12, 2020. On October 
04-20-00488-CV

- 2 -

22, 2020, when the fee remained unpaid, we ordered appellant to show cause in writing that either 

(1) the filing fee had been paid, or (2) it was entitled to appeal without paying the filing fee by 

November 2, 2020. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1 (providing that indigent party who complies with 

provisions of that rule may proceed without advance payment of costs). We further advised 

appellant that if it failed to respond satisfactorily within the time ordered, the appeal would be 

dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee. See id. R. 5, 42.3(c). 

When the fee was not paid by November 2, 2020, this court contacted appellant about the 

late filing fee by telephone, but the filing fee remains unpaid. We therefore order this appeal 

dismissed for want of prosecution. See id. R. 42.3(c). We further order that appellee recover his 

costs of this appeal, if any, from appellant. 

PER CURIAM
J-S28028-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RYAN JAMES ALLIS 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 37 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 17, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-08-CR-0000510-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2019

Ryan James Allis appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on 

December 17, 2018, following his guilty plea to Accidents Involving Death or 

Personal Injury, Driving While Operating Privilege Suspended or Revoked, and 

Recklessly Endangering Another Person (“REAP”).

1 Allis’s counsel has filed an 

Anders2 brief and a petition to withdraw as counsel. We deny counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and remand with instructions.

We do not reach the merits of the appeal at this time because counsel 

has not met the requirements to withdraw pursuant to Anders. Among other 

things, an Anders brief must: (1) “provide a summary of the procedural 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3742(a) and 1543(a), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, respectively.

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
J-S28028-19

- 2 -

history and facts, with citations to the record” and (2) “refer to anything in 

the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

Counsel maintains that “after a conscientious examination of the entire

record,” he believes the appeal is frivolous. Anders Br. at 13 (emphasis 

added). Our review reveals that the notes of testimony from the guilty plea 

hearing are not part of the certified record. Further, it appears that counsel 

did not request the transcript and that the hearing was never transcribed. 

Without this testimony, “[c]ounsel could not have fulfilled his duty to review 

the entire record for any non-frivolous issues.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 

113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa.Super. 2015) (denying petition to withdraw as 

counsel and remanding case where counsel failed to include notes of testimony 

from guilty plea hearing in certified record). 

Accordingly, we deny counsel’s petition to withdraw and remand for 

counsel to obtain the missing notes of testimony and to file a new Anders 

brief and petition to withdraw or an advocate’s brief, within 60 days from the 

date of this order.

Petition denied. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction retained.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 

Pursuant to Public Law 92-463, notice is hereby given that the Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS) National Advisory Council will meet on August 25, 2008 from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. via teleconference. 

The meeting will include the review, discussion and evaluation of grant applications. Therefore the meeting will be closed to the public as determined by the Administrator, SAMHSA, in accordance with Title 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6) and 5 U.S.C. App. 2. § 10(d). 

                    Substantive program information, a summary of the meetings and a roster of Council members may be obtained as soon as possible after each meeting, either by accessing the SAMHSA Committee Web site at                     *http://www.nac.samhsa.gov,*                     or by contacting CMHS National Advisory Council's Designated Federal Official, Ms. Dianne McSwain (see contact information below).                 

*Committee Name:*                         SAMHSA Center for Mental Health Services National Advisory Council.                     

*Date/Time/Type:*                         August 25, 2008, from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m.: Closed.                     

*Place(s):*                         SAMHSA Building, 1 Choke Cherry Road, Conference Room 6-1060, Rockville, Maryland 20857.                     

*Contact:*                         Dianne McSwain, M.S.W., Designated Federal Official, 1 Choke Cherry, Rm. 6-1063, Rockville, Maryland 20857, Telephone: (240) 276-1828, Fax: (240) 276-1850, e-mail:                         *Dianne.McSwain@samhsa.hhs.gov.*

This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and funding cycle.

Toian Vaughn, 

Committee Management Officer, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.

[FR Doc. E8-19360 Filed 8-20-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4162-20-P
#### Priscilla M. POPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-5106.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 6, 2001.

Before NEWMAN, GAJARSA, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Priscilla M. Pope appeals the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims1 dismissing her takings claim as beyond the court’s jurisdiction and as barred by the doctrine of *res judicata.*We *affirm.*

Ms. Pope seeks to overturn the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, which she argues acted illegally, and that the bankruptcy court’s illegal action constitutes a taking for which she is due compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The Court of Federal Claims observed that a taking can occur only when the government acts legally, and actions that are alleged to be illegal are not takings. The court noted that the decision of the bankruptcy court is now final and can not be re-litigated.

Decisions of a bankruptcy court must be appealed to the district court for the district in which the bankruptcy court sits, and from there to the court of appeals for the regional circuit. This is the only path of appeal from a bankruptcy court. *See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,*514 U.S. 300, 313, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (“If dissatisfied with the Bankruptcy Court’s ultimate decision, respondents can appeal ‘to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving,’ *see*28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and then to the Court of Appeals for the [regional] Circuit, *see*§ 158(d)”). Collateral attack on the decision of a bankruptcy court is not available. *Id.*

The Court of Federal Claims correctly dismissed Ms. Pope’s complaint.

1

. *Pope v. United States,*No. 99-957C (Fed. Cl. June 12, 2000)
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 621

To amend the Act of January 26, 1915, establishing Rocky Mountain National Park, to provide for the protection of certain lands in Rocky

Mountain National Park and along North St. Vrain Creek and for

other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 20, 1995

Mr. SKAGGS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Resources

A BILL

To amend the Act of January 26, 1915, establishing Rocky

Mountain National Park, to provide for the protection

of certain lands in Rocky Mountain National Park and

along North St. Vrain Creek and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. NORTH ST. VRAIN CREEK AND ADJACENT

4 LANDS.

5 The Act of January 26, 1915, establishing Rocky

6 Mountain National Park (38 Stat. 798; 16 U.S.C. 191

7 and following), is amended by adding the following new

8 section at the end thereof:
2

•HR 621 IH

1 ‘‘SEC. 5. NORTH ST. VRAIN CREEK AND ADJACENT LANDS.

2 ‘‘Neither the Secretary of the Interior nor any other

3 Federal agency or officer may approve or issue any permit

4 for, or provide any assistance for, the construction of any

5 new dam, reservoir, or impoundment on any segment of

6 North St. Vrain Creek or its tributaries within the bound7 aries of Rocky Mountain National Park or on the main

8 stem of North St. Vrain Creek downstream to the point

9 at which the creek crosses the elevation 6,550 feet above

10 mean sea level. Nothing in this subsection shall be con11 strued to prevent the issuance of any permit for the con12 struction of a new water gaging station on North St. Vrain

13 Creek at the point of its confluence with Coulson Gulch.’’.

14 SEC. 2. ENCOURAGEMENT OF EXCHANGES.

15 (a) LANDS INSIDE ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL

16 PARK.—Promptly following enactment of this Act, the

17 Secretary of the Interior shall seek to acquire by donation

18 or exchange those lands within the boundaries of Rocky

19 Mountain National Park owned by the city of Longmont,

20 Colorado, that are referred to in section 111(d) of the Act

21 commonly referred to as the ‘‘Colorado Wilderness Act of

22 1980’’ (Public Law 96–560; 94 Stat. 3272; 16 U.S.C.

23 192b–9(d)).

24 (b) OTHER LANDS.—The Secretary of Agriculture

25 shall immediately and actively pursue negotiations with

26 the city of Longmont, Colorado, concerning the city’s pro-
3

•HR 621 IH

1 posed exchange of lands owned by the city and located

2 in and near Coulson Gulch for other lands owned by the

3 United States. The Secretary shall report to Congress 2

4 calendar years after the date of enactment of this Act,

5 and every 2 years thereafter on the progress of such nego6 tiations until negotiations are complete.

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 715 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 715

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend the Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992 to 
prohibit fishing in the Central Sea of Okhotsk by vessels and nationals 
                         of the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Sea of Okhotsk Fisheries Enforcement 
Act of 1995''.

SEC. 2. FISHING PROHIBITION.

    The Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992 (16 U.S.C. 
1823 note) is amended--
            (1) in section 302, by inserting ``and the Central Sea of 
        Okhotsk'' after ``Central Bering Sea''; and
            (2) in section 306--
                    (A) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), 
                and (6) in order as paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), and 
                (7); and
                    (B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
            ``(2) Central sea of okhotsk.--The term `Central Sea of 
        Okhotsk' means the central Sea of Okhotsk area which is more 
        than two hundred nautical miles seaward of the baseline from 
        which the breadth of the territorial sea of the Russian 
        Federation is measured.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives March 14, 1995.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
                                     

104th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 715

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To amend the Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992 to 
prohibit fishing in the Central Sea of Okhotsk by vessels and nationals 
                         of the United States.
```
Exhibit 32.2

                       CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                         PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                         AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                         OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David Matzele, principal accounting officer of Nugget Resources Inc.,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of
Nugget Resources Inc., for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2006 fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Annual Report
on Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition
and results of operations of Nugget Resources Inc.


/s/ David Matzele
------------------------------------
David Matzele
Principal Accounting Officer
January 3, 2007
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 96-30218 Conference Calendar

__________________ DANIEL C. SULLIVAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus ORLEANS INDIGENT DEFENDERS PROGRAM; HANS SINHA; MARK D. NASACKA, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 95-CV-4045-T

- - - - - - - - - - June 26, 1996 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Daniel C. Sullivan, #672555, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his civil rights complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Sullivan argues that his court-appointed attorneys provided ineffective representation during his criminal proceedings. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. The court-appointed attorneys were not acting underNo. 96-30218 -2- color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). This appeal is without merit and is thus frivolous. It is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. We caution Sullivan that any additional frivolous appeals filed by him will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Sullivan is further cautioned to review all pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are frivolous because they have been previously decided by this court. APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.