I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6114 

To promote United States trade leadership in the Indo-Pacific region and 

to require a report on the long-term economic and trade relationship 

between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 1, 2021 

Mrs. MILLER of West Virginia (for herself and Mr. LAHOOD) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To promote United States trade leadership in the IndoPacific region and to require a report on the long-term 

economic and trade relationship between the United 

States and the People’s Republic of China. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘U.S. Trade Leadership 

5 in the Indo-Pacific and China Act’’. 


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1 TITLE I—UNITED STATES TRADE 

2 LEADERSHIP IN THE INDO3 PACIFIC REGION 

4 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

5 Congress makes the following findings: 

6 (1) Rising authoritarian powers that adhere to 

7 non-market principles for managing their economies 

8 are challenging the United States strategic influence 

9 in the Indo-Pacific region. These mercantilist poli10 cies, which include predatory industrial planning to 

11 subsidize exports and support national champions at 

12 the expense of foreign competitors, conditioning 

13 market access on both forced and voluntary tech14 nology transfers, and intellectual property theft, 

15 among other unfair policies, are contrary to the in16 terests and values of the United States and its Indo17 Pacific allies and directly challenge the United 

18 States economic and trade interests in the region. 

19 (2) The United States was a leader during ne20 gotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership Agree21 ment (TPP) and joined eleven other nations in the 

22 Asia-Pacific in signing the agreement on February 

23 4, 2016. 

24 (3) In January 2017, the United States notified 

25 the other 11 signatories to the TPP that it did not 


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1 intend to become a party to the Agreement. The no2 tification letter to the 11 other TPP signatories af3 firmed that ‘‘[t]he United States remains committed 

4 to taking measures designed to promote more effi5 cient markets and higher levels of economic growth, 

6 both in our country and around the world.’’. 

7 (4) Following the United States formal with8 drawal from the TPP, the 11 remaining signatories 

9 (Australia; Brunei; Canada; Chile; Japan; Malaysia; 

10 Mexico; New Zealand; Peru; Singapore; and Viet11 nam) renegotiated and signed a new Comprehensive 

12 and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Part13 nership (CPTPP) on March 8, 2018. Like the TPP, 

14 the CPTPP includes high-standard provisions to 

15 eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers in key sectors 

16 such as agriculture, autos, currency, e-commerce/ 

17 digital trade, government procurement, goods tariffs, 

18 intellectual property rights (IPR), investment, work19 er rights, environment, rules of origin (ROO), serv20 ices, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, 

21 the CPTPP suspended certain high-standard provi22 sions which the United States had proposed or sup23 ported. United States engagement in TPP negotia24 tions helped shape many of the provisions of the ex25 isting CPTPP. Similar, and updated versions of 


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1 many of these provisions are included in the United 

2 States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), includ3 ing in the chapter on technical barriers to trade 

4 (TBT). 

5 (5) United States withdrawal from the TPP has 

6 undermined its ability to promote United States-led 

7 rules, norms, and standards, and has paved the way 

8 for increased non-democratic state-driven economic 

9 and political presence in the Indo-Pacific region. 

10 SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 

12 States, in pursuing trade leadership in the Indo-Pacific 

13 region, to proactively promote and defend fair and open 

14 trade practices and to counter the use of mercantilist, dis15 torting, and coercive trade measures by actors in the re16 gion, including by pursuing objectives described in sub17 section (b). 

18 (b) OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED.—The objectives de19 scribed in this subsection are the following: 

20 (1) The United States will play a sustained and 

21 long-term leadership role in establishing and ensur22 ing an open, rules-based trading system in the Indo23 Pacific region, including through the following: 

24 (A) The United States should urgently 

25 consider the merits of negotiating entry into the 


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1 CPTPP with improved standards or a similar 

2 plurilateral trade agreement. 

3 (B) The United States should urgently 

4 consider the merits of negotiating new, high5 standard bilateral trade agreements in the re6 gion. 

7 (C) The United States should urgently 

8 consider modernizing and updating existing 

9 trade agreements in the region. 

10 (2) The United States and its allies should uti11 lize new or updated, high-standard trade agreements 

12 to maintain rules-based and market-based policies in 

13 the Indo-Pacific region to ensure, among other 

14 areas— 

15 (A) free flow of commerce; 

16 (B) enhanced market access; 

17 (C) elimination of tariff and non-tariff bar18 riers on goods, services, agriculture, and energy; 

19 (D) high-standard provisions to protect in20 tellectual property, investment, worker rights, 

21 the environment, e-commerce and digital trade, 

22 and autos; and 

23 (E) transparency on rules of origin, state24 owned enterprises, and government procure25 ment. 


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1 (3) The United States membership and leader2 ship in negotiating new or updated, high-standard 

3 trade agreements will ensure its economic, techno4 logical, scientific, and regulatory leadership in the 

5 Indo-Pacific region and ensure a comprehensive, 

6 rules-based platform throughout the region well into 

7 the 21st century. 

8 (4) The United States membership and leader9 ship in new or updated, high-standard trade agree10 ments will foster free and reciprocal trade and open 

11 and integrated markets in the Indo-Pacific region, 

12 including— 

13 (A) strengthening, protecting, and diversi14 fying critical supply chains for batteries, critical 

15 minerals, medicines, next-generation semi16 conductors, telecommunications, artificial intel17 ligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology 

18 and medical supplies; and 

19 (B) supporting the development and main20 tenance of advanced manufacturing capacity 

21 among key regional allies to maximize trade ef22 ficiency and supply chain security. 

23 (5) The United States leadership in new or up24 dated, high-standard trade agreements will inspire 

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1 ing and high-growth Indo-Pacific countries that may 

2 not be members of the CPTPP. 

3 SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that the implementation 

5 of the policy described in section 102 requires the fol6 lowing actions: 

7 (1) Long-term competition and strategic en8 gagement in the Indo-Pacific region will require the 

9 United States to deeply engage with allies and part10 ners on trade policy in the region, including the con11 sideration of joining new or updated, high-standard 

12 trade agreements, to establish trade and economic 

13 stability in the most vibrant economic region in the 

14 world. A sense of urgency by the Administration, bi15 partisanship in Congress, and whole-of-government 

16 approach will be required to achieve this significant 

17 pivot in United States trade policy. Immediate, in18 tensive bipartisan engagement between the Adminis19 tration and Congress to develop and swiftly reau20 thorize and update the Bipartisan Congressional 

21 Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 is 

22 a critical step to provide the Administration with 

23 tools to negotiate ambitious new trade agreements. 

24 (2) The United States, through the leadership 

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1 tive, must urgently coordinate closely with like-mind2 ed countries throughout the Indo-Pacific region to 

3 express immediate interest in new or updated, high4 standard trade agreements, including by hosting a 

5 series of summits held throughout the region to dis6 cuss outlaying issues that are reflective of a post7 pandemic global economy. 

8 (3) The President must lead and direct the en9 tire executive branch, specifically the Office of the 

10 United States Trade Representative, to make mem11 bership and leadership in new or updated, high12 standard trade agreements a priority and assure the 

13 allocation of appropriate resources adequate to ad14 dress market-access barriers and trade distortions in 

15 the Indo-Pacific region. 

16 (4) The United States must ensure that key 

17 Federal agencies, led by the Office of the United 

18 States Trade Representative, advance accelerated, 

19 bipartisan, frequent, sustained, and meaningful col20 laboration and consultation with Congress regarding 

21 a robust United States trade strategy in the Indo22 Pacific region. 

23 (5) The United States must ensure that key 

24 Federal agencies, led by the Office of the United 

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1 celerated Indo-Pacific trade strategy consultations 

2 with Congress, the private sector, civil society, uni3 versities, and academic institutions, and other rel4 evant stakeholders. 

5 (6) The President should direct the Office of 

6 the United States Trade Representative, the White 

7 House National Security Council, and all relevant 

8 Federal agencies to meet upon request with any 

9 Member of Congress regarding the components of its 

10 Indo-Pacific trade strategy, including the President’s 

11 intention to begin negotiations to implement that 

12 strategy, the objectives for such negotiations, and 

13 any changes in the laws of the United States or the 

14 administration of those laws that may be rec15 ommended to Congress to implement that strategy. 

16 The President should also direct the Office of the 

17 United States Trade Representative, the White 

18 House National Security Council, and all relevant 

19 Federal agencies to provide access to pertinent docu20 ments relating to any such negotiation, including 

21 classified materials. 


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1 TITLE II—REPORT ON THE 

2 LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND 

3 TRADE RELATIONSHIP BE4 TWEEN THE UNITED STATES 

5 AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUB6 LIC OF CHINA 

7 SEC. 201. FINDINGS. 

8 Congress makes the following findings: 

9 (1) On January 15, 2020, the United States 

10 and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a 

11 historic and enforceable agreement, the Economic 

12 and Trade Agreement Between the United States of 

13 America and the People’s Republic of China, or the 

14 ‘‘Phase One’’ trade agreement. The Phase One trade 

15 agreement went into effect on February 14, 2020, 

16 and requires the PRC to undertake a wide range of 

17 reforms to facilitate a more transparent and equal 

18 bilateral trading relationship in areas such intellec19 tual property, technology transfer, agriculture, fi20 nancial services, and currency and foreign exchange. 

21 (2) The Phase One trade agreement includes a 

22 chapter on ‘‘Expanding Trade’’, in which the PRC 

23 made specific commitments to import a wide range 

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1 ergy products, and services in a total amount that 

2 exceeds the PRC’s annual level of imports for those 

3 goods and services in 2017 by no less than $200 bil4 lion for a two-year period from January 1, 2020, 

5 through December 31, 2021. The United States and 

6 the PRC also stated a shared expectation that ‘‘the 

7 trajectory of increases’’ in China’s purchases of 

8 United States goods in each of these categories 

9 would continue in calendar years 2022 through 

10 2025. 

11 (3) Publicly available trade data show that the 

12 PRC has made significant progress in purchasing 

13 United States products within the agriculture sector, 

14 but is far behind its agreed upon year-end pur15 chasing targets in energy, manufacturing, and serv16 ices. 

17 (4) The Phase One trade agreement features a 

18 chapter on ‘‘Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Reso19 lution’’ that establishes a process to resolve disputes 

20 in a fair and prompt manner and creates an avenue 

21 to conduct regular bilateral meetings at the principal 

22 and working levels. 

23 (5) The Phase One trade agreement represents 

24 an important and concrete step toward a more bal25 anced economic relationship between the United 


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1 States and the PRC but substantially more is need2 ed to address systemic problems in our bilateral 

3 trading relationship. Important remaining issues in4 clude the PRC’s persistent theft of United States in5 tellectual property rights, its market access policies 

6 that depend on forced technology transfers and dis7 criminatory licensing practices, and its support for 

8 state-owned enterprises with market-distorting and 

9 World Trade Organization (WTO)-inconsistent sub10 sidies. 

11 SEC. 202. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

12 It is the sense of Congress that— 

13 (1) the United States should successfully and 

14 fully implement the Phase One trade agreement, en15 suring that the PRC fully complies with its stated 

16 commitments both to make legal and regulatory 

17 changes in various sectors and to purchase addi18 tional United States goods and services; 

19 (2) the Office of the United States Trade Rep20 resentative should take expedited and concrete steps 

21 toward thorough consultation and coordination with 

22 Congress and key United States private sector 

23 stakeholders wholly consistent with the spirit and 

24 letter of the law as prescribed under the Bipartisan 

25 Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 


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1 Act of 2015 regarding implementation of the Phase 

2 One trade agreement and any further trade negotia3 tions with China; 

4 (3) the United States Government should ana5 lyze all positive and negative effects on the United 

6 States economy of the current tariffs in place 

7 against the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act 

8 of 1974, including the effects on United States 

9 workers, businesses, and consumers and an analysis 

10 of the benefits of such tariffs providing sufficient 

11 trade leverage on the PRC, in comparison to these 

12 tariffs’ harm to the United States economy; 

13 (4) consistent with such analysis, the United 

14 States Government should immediately modify such 

15 tariffs to ensure that they meet the intent of the 

16 statute and provide leverage on China without harm17 ing the United States economy; 

18 (5) the Office of the United States Trade Rep19 resentative should articulate a long-term trade and 

20 economic plan with the PRC, which may include pro21 posed new enforcement tools to address the PRC’s 

22 ongoing economic and structural challenges, includ23 ing the PRC’s use of massive industrial subsidies 

24 that are inconsistent with WTO norms and rules 

25 and create global price distortions in critical supply 


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1 chains, bilateral engagement with the PRC to obtain 

2 changes to the PRC’s policies, and working with al3 lies to pressure the PRC on these same issues; 

4 (6) the Office of the United States Trade Rep5 resentative should take expedited and concrete steps 

6 toward better consultation and coordination with 

7 Congress and key United States private sector ac8 tors regarding the drafting of its comprehensive re9 port on the long-term economic and trade relation10 ship between the United States and the PRC; and 

11 (7) efforts to enforce the Phase One trade 

12 agreement should not delay initiatives to address 

13 other issues in the trade relationship, especially 

14 longstanding, systemic issues that disadvantage 

15 United States companies or injure United States in16 terests, that have been identified for negotiation by 

17 previous administrations, but that were not ad18 dressed in the Phase One trade agreement. 

19 SEC. 203. REPORT. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 

22 the United States Trade Representative, in coordination 

23 with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall 

24 submit to Congress a report that— 


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1 (1) describes progress toward addressing the 

2 issues identified in Trade Representative’s report ti3 tled, ‘‘Findings of the Investigations into China’s 

4 Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology 

5 Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation 

6 under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974’’, dated 

7 March 22, 2018; 

8 (2) comprehensively reviews current tariffs in 

9 place against the PRC under section 301 of the 

10 Trade Act of 1974— 

11 (A) to assess whether such tariffs continue 

12 to meet the requirements of such section and 

13 provide leverage to encourage the PRC to 

14 change its unfair practices without undue harm 

15 to the United States economy; and 

16 (B) to recommend removal of such tariffs 

17 that harm United States industry competitive18 ness in which data does not clearly demonstrate 

19 that the tariffs have substantially and directly 

20 alleviated discriminatory, restrictive, or burden21 some PRC trade practices, or where any bene22 fits that can be clearly linked to the tariffs are 

23 less substantial than the costs the tariffs have 

24 imposed on United States entities; 


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1 (3) evaluates the PRC’s compliance with its 

2 Phase One trade agreement commitments and iden3 tifies those provisions in the agreement that have yet 

4 to be implemented; 

5 (4) lists and explains proposed new enforcement 

6 tools that will address and compel the PRC to com7 plete structural reforms to its economic and trade 

8 regimes; 

9 (5) articulates new market access objectives 

10 with respect to the PRC; 

11 (6) identifies key United States goods and serv12 ices that have the ability to provide long-term bene13 fits to the PRC’s economic growth, including energy, 

14 carbon capture, agricultural goods and services 

15 among other sectors, without impeding United 

16 States national security interests; and 

17 (7) identifies key PRC goods and services that 

18 have the ability to provide long-term benefits to the 

19 United States economic growth, including tourism 

20 and education goods and services among other sec21 tors. 

22 (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 

23 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include 

24 a classified annex. 

Æ 


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