[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10780

Non-Argument Calendar

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WL ALLIANCE LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PRECISION TESTING GROUP INC., 

GLENN STUCKEY, 

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-04459-RV-HTC

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10780

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This case involves a partnership dispute between PlaintiffAppellee WL Alliance and Defendants-Appellants Precision Testing Group, Inc. and Glenn Stuckey (collectively, the defendants). 

After a jury trial on WL Alliance’s claims for wrongful disassociation and breach of partnership agreement, the defendants were

found liable for an aggregate $3.3 million in damages. The defendants appeal, arguing that the damage award included damages for 

lost future profits that were not “reasonably certain,” and that the 

damage awards were not supported by the evidence because there 

was no accounting.

After careful review, we conclude the damage awards were 

in accord with Florida law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

I. 

We assume the parties are familiar with the factual history 

of this case and summarize only the relevant points. WL Alliance 

and the defendants partnered to provide specialized technicians to 

the energy utility company First Energy. Under their business arrangement the defendants formally contracted with First Energy to 

provide the technicians and received payments from First Energy. 

WL Alliance was responsible for actually recruiting the technicians 

and for managing their payroll. The partners intended to split profits fifty-fifty and settled up their accounts on a quarterly basis.

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After a disagreement about the amounts being remitted 

from the defendants to WL Alliance, the partnership was terminated. Stuckey, the owner and principal of Precision Testing, terminated the contract between Precision Testing and First Energy. 

This contract contained an at-will termination clause. Stuckey 

then caused another entity he owned, JJL Consulting, to enter into 

a similar contract with First Energy. The effect was to cut WL Alliance out of the business arrangement with First Energy.

WL Alliance sued, alleging that the defendants and WL Alliance were partners on the First Energy contract, and that Stuckey’s 

actions constituted a wrongful disassociation from the partnership 

(Count 1) and a breach of the partnership agreement (Count 3). 

WL Alliance also requested an equitable accounting of the partnership accounts (Count 2). The defendants did not counterclaim for 

a reciprocal accounting. Pre-trial, the parties stipulated that Count 

2 would be tried to the bench after the jury verdict, “if necessary.” 

At trial the jury heard testimony regarding the course of the 

parties’ business, and the prospect that the business with First Energy would continue for several more years. The jury also heard 

expert testimony from both sides on the valuation of the business. 

WL Alliance’s expert provided a present value calculation of the 

partnership at the time of the disassociation. The defendants’ expert reviewed WL Alliance’s calculation but did not provide his 

own independent valuation.

Pre-verdict, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter 

of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), arguing that 

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there was insufficient evidence to support the future damages. Specifically, they argued that, because the contract with First Energy 

was terminable at-will, damages based on that contract were too 

speculative as a matter of Florida law. The district court denied 

this motion. The jury found that a partnership did exist and 

awarded $1.7 million in past damages, and $1.6 million in future 

damages against the defendants. 

Post-verdict, WL Alliance moved the court to enter judgment on counts 1 and 3 for the money damages, and to moot count 

2’s request for an equitable accounting. WL Alliance noted that it 

had achieved its goals of discovering what it was owed under the 

partnership through the discovery process and no longer needed 

an equitable accounting. The defendants objected, arguing that an 

accounting was required under Florida law and sought to: (1)

amend their answer to add a reciprocal accounting counterclaim to 

conform to the trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(b)(2), and (2) stay entry of judgment pending a bench trial on 

the accounting counts. The district court denied this motion, noting that an accounting was not required under Florida law and 

therefore WL Alliance’s request for an accounting was moot. Further, the court enforced its pre-trial scheduling order and refused 

to allow the late amendment of the defendants’ answer.

Finally, the defendants filed a renewed motion for judgment 

as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), reiterating their arguments that an accounting was required and that 

the future damages were too speculative. The district court denied 

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this motion, holding that the accounting argument was waived because it was not presented in the Rule 50(a) motion and was unsupported by the record. The district court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of future damages.

II. 

We review the denial of motions for judgment as a matter 

of law de novo and apply the same standard as the district court. 

Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1149 (11th Cir. 

2005). Judgment as a matter of law is only warranted where, taking 

all evidence in favor of the non-movant, no reasonable jury could 

have reached a verdict for the non-movant. Id.

This is a diversity action, and both parties agree that Florida 

substantive law governs this appeal. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 

304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

III. 

A.

We begin with the defendants’ argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the award of future damages. We 

have previously held that Florida law requires future damages to 

be proved with “reasonable certainty.” Nebula Glass Int’l, Inc. v. 

Reichold, Inc., 454 F.3d 1203, 1212 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing AutoOwners Ins. Co. v. Tompkins, 651 So.2d 89, 90–91 (Fla. 1995)). 

Florida law distinguishes between proving the causation of damages and proving the amount of damages. The plaintiff must prove 

with reasonable certainty that their lost profits were caused by the 

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defendant’s breach; but, once proven, need only provide a reasonable “yardstick” to judge the amount of damages. Id. at 1213–14, 

1217 (quoting W.W. Gay Mech. Contractor, Inc. v. Wharfside 

Two, Ltd., 545 So.2d 1348, 1350–51 (Fla. 1989)).

Here, Precision Testing argues that the future damages cannot be proved with reasonable certainty because the contract between the defendants and First Energy was terminable at-will and 

“for convenience.” Thus, without an enforceable guarantee that 

the contract would continue, any damages based on its continuation are the result of pure speculation. The defendants rely primarily on our case Brough v. Imperial Sterling Ltd., 297 F.3d 1172 (11th 

Cir. 2002), where we considered a real estate broker’s claim for lost 

future commissions based on the possible sale of certain pieces of 

real estate. There we held that Florida law made those damages 

too speculative because there was no guarantee, contractual or 

otherwise, that those properties would have sold during the real 

estate broker’s contract and thus no reasonable certainty he would 

have received those commissions. Id. at 1177–78.

However, we think that the defendants’ argument that an 

at-will contract cannot support future damages because it is not an 

enforceable guarantee of future business overstates the rule in Florida. For instance, in Nebula Glass, we upheld an award of future 

damages where it was established that recent profits were on an 

upward trajectory and that customers were changing their behavior based on the defendant’s breach. Nebula Glass, 454 F.3d at 

1216. We specifically noted, “[The plaintiff’s] lost profit claim did 

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not depend on any obligation by its customers, but rather on the 

common-sense notion that a large group of sophisticated commercial purchasers would not, without cause, collectively reject a product they had been using.” Id. at 1216 n.1. The rule is thus dependent on the actual facts and circumstances in each case and determined by the evidence presented during the trial.

Here, there was specific evidence from fact witnesses that 

First Energy’s need for the technicians provided by the partnership 

did not change before the disassociation, had not changed since 

then, and was unlikely to change in the future. Stuckey himself 

testified that he believed the business with First Energy would continue into the future, and Stuckey, through his other entity JJL Consulting, had agreed to a three-year extension with First Energy. 

Similar to Nebula Glass, where specific evidence of customers’ patterns of purchasing and evidence of the business’s trajectory was 

sufficient to sustain future damages, here, specific evidence showing the course of the First Energy contract as well as opinions 

showing the longevity of that business are adequate to support future damages. 

This case is different from Brough where there was “absolutely no means by which a jury” could determine whether the real 

estate sales would close in time or not. Brough, 297 F.3d at 1178

(“The jury could only award Brough damages by speculating that 

[the defendant] would leave the properties on the market and accept offers from buyers.”). Here, the jury did not need to speculate, 

but could look at the evidence showing the course of the First 

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Energy business and First Energy’s demonstrated ongoing need for 

the technicians, as well as the renewal of the contract with JJL consulting. Thus, the jury could weigh this evidence and rely on the 

“common sense notion” that a sophisticated business would not 

radically change its business model suddenly and without cause. 

While the defendants point to various pieces of evidence in 

the record to suggest that continuation of the First Energy business 

was less certain, the weight of that evidence was a matter for the 

jury. The jury rejected Precision Testing’s arguments that the business would not continue, and we will not disturb their finding 

merely because we are urged to disagree with it.

B.

We turn now to the defendants’ argument that without an 

equitable accounting all damages are too speculative. This argument was waived because Precision Testing presented it for the 

first time in their post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion. “This Court repeatedly has made clear that any renewal of a motion for judgment 

as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) must be based upon the same 

grounds as the original request for judgment as a matter of 

law . . . .” Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891, 903 (11th 

Cir. 2004). The defendants’ original Rule 50(a) motion raised four 

grounds: (1) that the elements of a partnership were not present; 

(2) that Precision Testing (as opposed to Stuckey) was not liable for 

future damages since it had been removed from the contract; (3) 

that future damages were too speculative due to the nature of the 

business; and (4) that certain past damages were not proved. Of 

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those, the defendants renewed only (3) and abandoned the rest. 

The argument relating to the need for an accounting was not raised 

in the Rule 50(a) motion and accordingly could not be renewed in 

the Rule 50(b) motion.

Further, the argument is unsupported by Florida partnership law. See Larmoyeux v. Montgomery, 963 So.2d 813, 819 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the current version of the partnership statute “eliminat[ed] the requirement that partners first sue 

for an accounting before bringing other claims”); see also Fla. Stat. 

§ 620.8405(2)(a) (“A partner may maintain an action against the 

partnership or another partner for legal or equitable relief, with or 

without an accounting as to partnership business, to: [e]nforce such 

partner's rights under the partnership agreement.”). 

Finally, the defendants’ argument that WL Alliance invited 

this “error” is meritless because WL Alliance does not complain of 

any error in the district court’s decisions. Cf. Pensacola Motor 

Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1231 (11th Cir. 

2012) (“A party that invites an error cannot complain when its invitation is accepted.”).

Accordingly, we affirm the jury’s damages verdicts.

AFFIRMED.

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