alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 642 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 642

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the unified 
   credit against estate and gift taxes to an amount equivalent to a 
                         $1,000,000 exclusion.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 23, 1995

  Mr. Stump introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the unified 
   credit against estate and gift taxes to an amount equivalent to a 
                         $1,000,000 exclusion.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASE IN UNIFIED ESTATE AND GIFT TAX CREDIT.

    (a) Estate Tax Credit.--
            (1) Subsection (a) of section 2010 of the Internal Revenue 
        Code of 1986 (relating to unified credit against estate tax) is 
        amended by striking ``$192,800'' and inserting ``$345,800''.
            (2) Paragraph (2) of section 2001(c) of such Code is 
        amended by striking ``$21,040,000'' and inserting ``the amount 
        at which the effective tax rate under this section is 55 
        percent''.
            (3) Subparagraph (A) of section 2102(c)(3) of such Code is 
        amended by striking ``$192,800'' and inserting ``$345,800''.
            (4) Paragraph (1) of section 6018(a) of such Code is 
        amended by striking ``$600,000'' and inserting ``$1,000,000''.
    (b) Unified Gift Tax Credit.--Paragraph (1) of section 2505(a) of 
such Code is amended by striking ``$192,800'' and inserting 
``$345,800''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to the estates of decedents dying, and gifts made, after December 
31, 1995.
                                 <all>
```
#### Eddie Everett v. State.

No. 24671.

February *15,*1950.

*Gordon R. Wellborn,*Henderson, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is a conviction for unlawfully carrying a pistol; the punishment, a fine of $200 and confinement in jail for a term of one year.

Art. 483, P. C. fixes the punishment for unlawfully carrying a pistol at a “fine of not less than $100.00 nor more than $500.0.0 or by confinement in jail for not less than one month nor more than one year.”

It is insisted that the two methods of punishment are separate and distinct and that both a fine and confinement in jail may not be inflicted.

*263The case of Irwin v. State, 25 Tex. App. 588, 8 S. W. 681, appears to be in point, and sustains appellant’s contention. There, under the misdemeanor theft statute, Art. 1422, P. C., as it existed prior to the amendment of 1927, the punishment affixed was a fine and confinement in jail, or confinement in jail without a fine.

Under that statute, we held that the accused is entitled to have each of the alternative punishments submitted to the jury— that is, the jury may assess a punishment of a fine and term in jail, or a term in jail without a fine.

By analogy, the holding in the Irwin case finds support in the cases of Thomas v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 246, 211 S. W. 453, and Busey v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 23, 218 S. W. 1048.

The conclusion is here reached that the punishment affixed by statute to the offense of unlawfully carrying a pistol is either a fine, or a term in jail — not both. The two methods of punishment are stated in the alternative and not the conjunctive ; there is not an express provision authorizing both.

It appearing that the punishment assessed against appellant was not authorized by statute, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Opinion approved by the court.
#### Osterman, Appellant, *v.*Patterson.

*Equity*— Finding *of fact*— Evidence—Deed—Undue *influence.*

A finding of fact by the court below in an equity case that a deed was not procured by coercion or undue influence will not be reversed by the Supreme Court where there is sufficient evidence to sustain the finding, and the record discloses no manifest error.

Argued Oct. 17, 1907.

Appeal, No. 110, Oct. T., 1907, by plaintiffs, from decree of C. P. Armstrong Co., June T., 1905, No. 80, dismissing bill in equity in case of Sarah Osterman, by her Guardian, *W.*A. McAdoo, v. Lucy R. Patterson et al.

Before Mitchell, C. J., Fell, Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin and Stewart, JJ.

Affirmed.

Bill in equity to set aside a deed made by Mrs. Sarah Osterman to the defendants, her three daughters, on October 5, 1904.

The complainant alleged that the deed was procured by coercion and undue influence.

The court in an opinion by Patton, P. J., found as a fact that there was no coercion or undue influence, and dismissed the bill.

*Error assigned*was decree dismissing the bill.

*J. W. King*and *H. L. Golden*and *W. A.*McAdoo, for appellant.

*Geo. M.*Hill, *W. J. Christy*and *R. A.*McCullough, for appellees, were not heard.

November 4, 1907:

Per Curiam,

The learned judge below after a careful review and summary of the evidence concludes “ In our opinion the deed in dispute was voluntarily made, without coercion or undue influence, by a person fully conscious of what she was doing.” In this we concur.

Decree affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 22-0731

TCF ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a 

MALMQUIST CONTRUCTION

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

RAMES, INC. formerly d/b/a CENTRAL 

INSURANCE AGENCY,

 Defendant and Appellant,

ORDER OF MEDIATOR APPOINTMENT

This appeal being subject to M.R.App.P. 7, and the parties having failed to jointly 

and timely select a mediator under M.R.App.P., 7(4),(c),

IT IS ORDERED THAT Leslie Budewitz, whose name appears next on the list of 

attorneys desiring appointment as mediators for Money Judgments appeals which is 

maintained pursuant to M.R.App.P., 7(4)(e), is hereby appointed to conduct the 

mediation process required by M.R.App.P., 7(5), and 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the time periods set forth in M.R.App.P., 

7(5)(d) shall run from the date of this order of appointment.

A true copy of this order is being mailed to counsel of record for the parties, or to 

the parties individually if not represented by counsel, on the date hereof.

DATED this 10 Feb 2023.

Bowen Greenwood, Clerk of the Supreme Court

c: Marcel A. Quinn, Todd A. Hammer, Jesse Beaudette

02/10/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0731
Exhibit 99.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                     SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


        In  connection  with  the  Quarterly   Report  on  Form  10-Q  of  nStor
Technologies,  Inc. (the "Company") for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed
with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the "Form
10-Q"),  I, H. Irwin Levy,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the  Company,  certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        (1) The Form 10-Q fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2) The information  contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.




/s/ H. Irwin Levy
-----------------------
H. Irwin Levy
Chief Executive Officer
May 13, 2003

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.  This statement is
not deemed to be "filed" with the Securities and Exchange  Commission as part of
the report on Form 10-Q.
Exhibit 10.2

nStor Technologies, Inc.100 Century BoulevardWest Palm Beach, Florida 33417

April 30, 2004

Cenvill Recreation, Inc.100 Century BlvdWest Palm Beach, FL 33417Attn: Mark F. Levy

Dear Mr. Levy:

We have agreed to the following amendments to that certain Promissory Note, dated December 31, 2003, in the amount of $2,194,124 (the “Note”), payable by nStor Technologies, Inc. to Cenvill Recreation, Inc., copies of which are attached hereto.

1)         The maturity date of the Note is hereby extended from April 30, 2004 to July 31, 2004 (“Maturity”).

2)         Accrued and unpaid interest on the Note through April 30, 2004 in the amount of $58,030 is hereby added to the $2,194,124 principal amount of the Note so that as of the date hereof, the principal amount of theNote has been increased to $2,252,154 (the “New Principal Amount”).  Interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum will accrue on the unpaid New Principal Amount and be payable at Maturity.

Except as set forth in this letter, the Note remains unmodified and in full force and effect.

Please indicate your concurrence with the foregoing.

Sincerely,

                                                                                               Cenvill Recreation, Inc.

                                                                                               Agreed:/s/ JackJaiven                                                                         By:  /s/ Mark F. LevyJackJaiven                                                                                          Mark F. LevyVice President andTreasurer                                                               President
224 So.2d 924

#### Betty Lou JONES v. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM.

6 Div. 719

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 26, 1969.

J. Louis Wilkinson, Birmingham, for petitioner.

William C. Walker, Birmingham, opposed.

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

MERRILL, Justice.

Petition of Betty Lou Jones for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision in Jones v. City of Birmingham, 45 Ala.App. 86, 224 So.2d 922.

Writ denied.

' LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1011 

CA 15-00400 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.

 

IN THE MATTER OF ARBITRATION BETWEEN 

MONROE COUNTY AND MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

OFFICE, PETITIONERS-RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS, 

 

AND MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MONROE COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION, 

RESPONDENT-PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

HARRIS BEACH, PLLC, PITTSFORD (EDWARD TREVVETT OF COUNSEL), FOR

PETITIONERS-RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS. 

BLITMAN & KING LLP, ROCHESTER (BRIAN J. LACLAIR OF COUNSEL), FOR

RESPONDENT-PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (W.

Patrick Falvey, A.J.), dated March 31, 2014. The order, among other

things, denied the petition to stay arbitration and granted the cross

petition to compel arbitration. 

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed 

without costs (see Smith v Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens,

155 AD2d 435; see also CPLR 5501 [a] [1]). 

Entered: October 9, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

September 21, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

133575 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

CHRISTOPHER DAWAYNE LAMAR, Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices 

v SC: 133575 

 COA: 272966 

Oakland CC: 2005-066668-NO 

RAMADA FRANCHISE SYSTEMS, INC., SAM 

SALMAN YONO, GANDHI DAVID YONO, 

SAYO, INC., d/b/a RAMADA INN SOUTHFIELD, 

d/b/a YESTERDAYS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 22, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in 

lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

we REINSTATE the order of the Oakland Circuit Court granting summary disposition to 

the defendants. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that any questions about when 

a fight started and how long it had been going on before the defendants’ employees 

contacted the police created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants 

took reasonable measures to respond to that fight. MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 

322, 336 (2001). 

KELLY, J., would deny leave to appeal. 

l0914 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 21, 2007 

Clerk
#### In the Matter of Minnie H. Vogel.

Motion denied on terms stated in order.
Exhibit 32.2

Statement of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of Pacific Enterprises (the "Company") certifies that:

the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended June 30, 2006 (the "Quarterly Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

August 3, 2006

/S/  Steven D. Davis
Steven D. Davis
Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.4



Statement of Chief Financial Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (the "Company") certifies that:



(i)

the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended March 31, 2009 (the "Quarterly Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii)

the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







May 5, 2009



/S/  Robert SchlaxRobert SchlaxChief Financial Officer
213 La. 503

#### NEWTON B. STOER v. SHREVEPORT PROPERTIES, Inc., et al.

No. 38245.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 22, 1948.

Foster, Hall & Smith, of Shreveport, and Phelps, Dunbar, Marks & Claverie, of New Orleans, for plaintiff and appellant.

Milling, Godchaux, Saal & Milling, and Sidney G. Roos, all of New Orleans, for defendants and appellees.

HAMITER, Justice.

For the reasons assigned in cause No. 38,244 on the docket of this court, entitled Johnson v. Shreveport Properties, Inc., et al., 35 So.2d 25, this day decided, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside insofar as it dismisses plaintiff’s suit against the defendant 1 corporation, and there is now judgment in favor of plaintiff, Newton B. Stoer, and against Shreveport Properties, Inc., in the full sum of $3625, together with five per cent per annum interest thereon from May. 19, 1943, and for all costs of this suit in both courts. In all other respects the judg-' ment is affirmed.
Exhibit (32)

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Owens Corning (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2006 (the Report), I, David T. Brown, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ David T. Brown     
|Chief Executive Officer

October 25, 2006
#### Armando CRAMER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert L. AYERS, Warden; Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 02-55953. D.C. No. CV-00-09201-CBM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 24, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

California state prisoner Armando Cramer appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition, which challenges his conviction and 34-years-to-life sentence for attempted murder and burglary. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Reviewing de novo, *Alvarado v. Hill,*252 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.2001), we affirm.

Cramer contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because coun*648sel pursued a defense of voluntary intoxication, but did not investigate and call witnesses or otherwise put on evidence in support of that defense. However, Cram-er has not submitted evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel was acting within the bounds of reasonable professional conduct. *See Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255*F.Sd 926, 939 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the defendant “bears the heavy burden of proving that counsel’s assistance was neither reasonable nor the result of sound trial strategy”). Further, the statements of the witnesses identified by Cramer would not have been sufficient to convince a rational jury that Cramer lacked the ability form the requisite intent. *See California v. Horton,*11 Cal.4th 1068, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478, 510 (1996) (explaining that a voluntary intoxication instruction is not warranted when the evidence does not indicate that the defendant’s intoxication affected his or her ability to form the necessary intent). Therefore, Cramer has not shown that he was prejudiced by any error on counsel’s part. *See Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (holding that prejudice “is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Thus, the district court properly denied Cramer’s petition.1

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. We deny appellant’s motions for appointment of counsel.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6044 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6044

 To amend the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 to 
extend the authorization of the Emergency Management Performance Grants 
                         Program through 2026.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 18, 2021

   Ms. Meng (for herself, Ms. Malliotakis, Ms. Jackson Lee, and Mrs. 
 Carolyn B. Maloney of New York) introduced the following bill; which 
   was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 to 
extend the authorization of the Emergency Management Performance Grants 
                         Program through 2026.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``FEMA Emergency Management 
Performance Grants Program Reauthorization Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS.

    Section 662(f) of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 762(f)) is amended by striking ``2018 through 2022'' 
and inserting ``2022 through 2026''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.56


January 22, 2016


Second Amendment to OPTION Agreement
(ANTI-DILUTION OPTION)
 
This Second Amendment (“Amendment”) to the Intelsat S. A. Option Agreement between David McGlade (the “Participant”) and Intelsat S.A. (the “Company”), dated as of April 18, 2013, and subsequently amended by that certain Amendment to Option Agreement Anti-Dilution Option) effective as of October 24, 2014 (collectively, the “Option Agreement”), is entered into by the undersigned parties and is effective as of January 2, 2016 (the “Amendment Effective Date”).
 
WHEREAS, the undersigned parties wish to further amend the Option Agreement so that a portion of the common shares of the Company subject thereto will have an Exercise Price (as defined in the Option Agreement) equal to the closing price of a common share of the Company, as reported on the New York Stock Exchange composite transactions reporting system as of the Amendment Effective Date.
 
It is hereby agreed as follows:
 
1.                 Section 2(b) of the Option Agreement is amended to read as follows:  
Exercise Price. The purchase price of 700,000 Shares covered by the Option shall be US$4.16 per Share, and the purchase price of the remaining 909,990 Shares covered by the Option shall be US$18.00 per Share (in each case, without commission or other charge).  Such purchase price, as applicable, is referred to herein as the “Exercise Price.” 
2.                 As amended and modified by this Amendment, the Option Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
3.                 If there is any conflict between the terms of the Option Agreement and this Amendment, the terms of this Amendment shall prevail.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of January 2, 2016.


 
INTELSAT S.A.




By: /s/ Michelle V. Bryan
     Name:  Michelle V. Bryan
     Title:  Executive Vice President, General Counsel
and Chief Administrative Officer






THE EXECUTIVE 




/s/ David P. McGlade
 David P. McGlade
#### Hans Becker, Appellant, v. Luke A. Burke and Others, Respondents.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Mo opinion.
Exhibit 32.4



Statement of Chief Financial Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of Southern California Gas Company (the "Company") certifies that:



(i)

the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 (the "Quarterly Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii)

the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







August 7, 2008



/S/  Dennis V. ArriolaDennis V. ArriolaChief Financial Officer