NUMBER 13-22-00454-CR

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

MIGUEL ANGEL MORAN, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 221ST DISTRICT COURT 

OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, TEXAS

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Miguel Angel Moran was found guilty by a jury for continuous sexual 

abuse of a young child and assessed a life sentence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02. 

By two issues, Moran argues (1) his due process rights were violated when he was 

provided information from the District Clerk that differed from that provided to the State; 

and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted certain testimony. We affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND1

Moran was indicted for continuous sexual abuse of a young child under the age of 

fourteen for allegedly committing two or more acts of sexual abuse against H.E. and T.E.,

2

during a period that began on November 25, 2016 and ended on March 29, 2021. The 

indictment alleged that the acts of sexual abuse included two incidences of aggravated 

sexual assault of a child against T.E., two incidences of indecency with a child by sexual 

contact against T.E., one incident of aggravated sexual assault of a child against H.E.; 

and one incident of indecency with a child by sexual contact against H.E.

3

Moran’s case proceeded to a jury trial. After presentation of all the evidence and 

testimony by the parties, the trial court read the charge to the jury. After the parties 

presented closing arguments, the jury found Moran guilty of continuous sexual abuse of 

a young child and assessed Moran a life sentence. This appeal followed.

II. DUE PROCESS

In his first issue, Moran argues that “[w]here the District Clerk provides different 

information to the State than it provides to the defense attorney, it is a violation of Due 

Process when the lack of information provided to the defense attorney affects the strategy 

of the case.” Specifically, Moran highlights that he did not have electronic access to the 

1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont pursuant 

to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 

§§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the 

authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for 

the transfer).

2 We refer to the minor victims by initials to protect their identities.

3 Prior to jury selection, the State abandoned the single incident of indecency with a child by sexual 

contact against H.E. as an act of sexual abuse as pleaded in the indictment.
3

State’s outcry notice via the District Clerk’s software and argues that the “difference in 

access to information” resulted in violation of his due process rights and concludes that 

“[e]ither a continuance should have been granted or the outcry witness should not have 

been allowed to testify due to the unfair practice of the District Clerk . . . providing different 

information to the State and the defense attorney of record.” We construe Moran’s issue 

as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of his requests for continuance and objection to 

outcry testimony.

A. Requests for Continuance

1. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

The denial of a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and we review a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of 

discretion. See Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also 

Gutierrez v. State, 446 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. ref’d). “[G]reat 

deference must be shown to trial courts, because of the scheduling problems they face.” 

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 n.31 (1984); see Cates v. State, 72 S.W.3d 

681, 692 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.). An appellant claiming the erroneous denial of 

a motion for continuance must show: (1) the trial court erred by denying the motion for 

continuance; and (2) such denial harmed him in some tangible way. Gonzales v. State, 

304 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072, an outcry witness is the 

first adult to whom a child or disabled individual describes being the victim of certain 

crimes, including many sexual crimes. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072. An 
4

outcry witness may testify, as an exception to the hearsay rule, about the victim’s out-ofcourt description of the offense. See id. § 38.072(2). For an outcry witness to testify under 

this statute, the party intending to offer the outcry statement must, among other 

requirements not at issue here, notify the adverse party “on or before the 14th day before 

the date the proceeding begins.” Id. § 38.072(2)(b)(1)(A). The purpose of requiring notice 

is to prevent the accused from being surprised by the introduction of outcry testimony. 

Bargas v. State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 895 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d.).

2. Discussion

On August 29, 2022, prior to jury selection, Moran’s counsel informed the trial court

that he had not been served with the State’s outcry notice. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 38.072. Moran’s counsel also indicated to the trial court that he did not have

access to the State’s outcry notice via the District Clerk’s software. The State responded

that it had electronically filed and served Moran with its outcry notice on July 8, 2022,

which was more than fourteen days before Moran’s trial. See id. The record demonstrates

that the State’s outcry notice designated Mark Wilson as an outcry witness for H.E. and

Norma Carmona as an outcry witness for T.E. The outcry notice also contained an

“Automated Certificate of eService” indicating that Moran’s counsel was electronically

served with the State’s outcry notice at Moran’s counsel’s email address on “7/8/2022

6:15:40 PM.”

Moran’s counsel orally requested a fourteen-day continuance, and the State 

argued that “without more information—the records of the court indicate that notice was 

provided,” that it had complied with its obligation, and that it wanted to go to trial that day. 
5

As arguments continued, Moran’s counsel admitted to the trial court that the email 

address on the “Automated Certificate of eService” on the State’s outcry notice was his 

own. Moran’s counsel further informed the trial court that he had looked in his email inbox 

and found no such email containing the State’s outcry notice, that no such email was 

found in his email inbox’s “deleted items” or spam folder, and that he had shown this to 

the State. While the trial court expressed concern over Moran’s counsel’s lack of access 

to the State’s outcry notice via the District Clerk’s software, it concluded that the State 

complied with Article 38.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and stated that “we are 

going to start today, pick the jury[,] and recess. And this afternoon I am going to give the 

defense attorney a chance to meet with[ the outcry] witnesses. I want them here.” The 

trial court also required the State to provide its outcry notice to Moran’s counsel, and the 

State indicated it had already provided a “physical paper copy” of the outcry notice that 

morning. Thereafter, jury selection commenced and proceedings recessed after the jury 

was selected.

The next day, on August 30, 2022, Moran filed a written motion for continuance, 

which stated

[Moran] believes that the State intends to call two “outcry witnesses” in Mark 

Wilson and Norma Carm[o]n[a]. The State filed notice of said witnesses 

pursuant to Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure on July 

8, 2022. However, notice was not provided to [Moran] until the day of trial.

The written motion then requested that the trial court enter an order “continuing this cause 

for a minimum of two weeks, or, in the alternative, set[ its] motion for hearing.” On the 

same day, prior to Moran’s arraignment before the jury, the trial court held a hearing on 

Moran’s written motion for continuance outside the presence of the jury. At the hearing, 
6

Moran’s counsel stated that the State filed its outcry notice on July 8, 2022, and he 

confirmed that the outcry notice went to his personal email. However, Moran’s counsel 

reiterated that he did not have access to the State’s outcry notice via the District Clerk’s 

software and that he did not find the email containing the State’s outcry notice in his email 

inbox. The following exchange occurred:

The Court: Okay. Anything the State wants to place on the 

record, other than what you said yesterday?

[The State]: We would just ask the Court to take judicial 

notice of its own file, including the automated 

certificate of service that indicates the document 

was e-filed and e-served at the e-mail address 

we talked about.

The Court: Okay. I will take notice.

[Moran’s counsel]: . . . I need to let the Court know that I concede 

the fact that these witnesses and their 

statements are there and officer’s summary of 

their statements is contained within the State’s 

file. The State has an open file policy. I am 

aware of these witnesses. I know what they 

said.

The problem comes in, as far as trial strategy. 

And of course right now I have to be a little 

vague about that. But when I noticed that there 

—or at least I thought that there was not an 

outcry notice under 38.072, there was a shift in 

trial strategy. And for that reason, my 

continuance is not like, “what, I have never 

heard of these people.”

My motion for continuance is based on I am 

switching horses not in midstream—well, almost 

to the other side of the stream. So it is for those 

reasons that we move for continuance.

The Court: Having taken all of this into consideration, I am 
7

going to deny your continuance. And I will note 

that you need additional time to break prior to 

the witnesses. I will give you that time. That’s 

the reason why we didn’t start today. We haven’t 

arraigned [Moran] in front of the jury yet. And I 

will note that, you know, both sides appear not 

to be at fault, unfortunately.

I feel like when I reached out to the clerk’s office 

and they said that an e-mail was sent and they 

said they had proof that it had been sent to the 

e-mail they had on file for [Moran’s counsel]—

you know, I don’t know where it went. I don’t 

know what happened.

But I just want to make sure that you have 

everything you need discovery[-]wise, there is 

nothing additional that you need, as far as 

discovery or as far as notice, other than—you 

know, you now have the notice. You know what 

is going to be said or what the allegation is. And 

we will have a hearing and you will be able to 

ferret that out and ask questions outside the 

presence of the jury. And I will make my decision 

on whether or not it complies and comports with 

38.072.

Thereafter, Moran was arraigned in the presence of the jury, and his trial commenced.

To the extent that Moran argues that the trial court should have granted his oral

motion for continuance he lodged prior to jury selection on August 29, 2022, it is well 

established that an unsworn, oral motion for continuance preserves nothing for review. 

See Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Ultimately, an 

unsworn oral motion [for a continuance] preserves nothing for appeal.”); Anderson v. 

State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“[I]f a party makes an unsworn oral 

motion for a continuance and the trial judge denies it, the party forfeits the right to 

complain about the judge’s ruling on appeal.”); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 
8

29.03 (“A criminal action may be continued on the written motion of the State or of the 

defendant, upon sufficient cause shown; which cause shall be fully set forth in the 

motion.”), 29.08 (“All motions for continuance must be sworn to by a person having 

personal knowledge of the facts relied on for the continuance.”). The Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals has held that there is no “due process” exception to the preservation 

requirement. See Anderson, 301 S.W.3d at 279–80 (“The court of appeals in this case 

instituted a ‘due process’ exception to a rule of procedural default. The broad and vague 

concept of due process, as invoked by the court of appeals, is amorphous. And no such 

exception exists under our case law.”). Therefore, this sub-issue is not preserved. See 

Blackshear, 385 S.W.3d at 591. 

To the extent that Moran argues that the trial court should have granted his written

motion for continuance, we also conclude that Moran has failed to preserve this subissue. “As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review,” a party must 

have made a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court “with sufficient specificity 

to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent 

from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Preservation of error is a systemic 

requirement on appeal. Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If 

an issue has not been preserved for appeal, the appellate court should not address the 

merits of that issue. Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Further, 

error alleged on appeal must comport with the request, objection, or motion submitted to 

the trial court so as to apprise the trial judge of the precise nature of the error in time to 

do something about it. See Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 463–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 
9

2009); see also Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (legal 

basis of complaint raised on appeal cannot vary from that raised at trial); TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a).

When seeking a continuance, Moran did not allege a due process violation. See 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 29.03 (“A criminal action may be continued on the 

written motion of the State or of the defendant, upon sufficient cause shown; which cause 

shall be fully set forth in the motion.”) (emphasis added).

4 Instead, the basis of Moran’s 

written motion for continuance was that the State’s outcry “notice was not provided to 

[Moran] until the day of trial,” implicating Article 38.072’s requirement that a party 

intending to offer outcry statements notify the adverse party of its intent to do so fourteen 

days before trial. See id. art. 38.072(2)(b)(1)(A). Moran’s written motion for continuance 

does not assert a due process violation relating to his lack of access to the State’s outcry 

notice via the District Clerk’s software. 5 Furthermore, at the hearing, while Moran’s 

4 Moran argues that “[a]lthough [he] did not specifically say the words [‘]due process[’] in his oral 

Motion for Continuance,” he put the court on “notice that the issue would alter the trial strategy,” which is 

sufficient notice that Moran’s right to due process would be violated. However, the record indicates that his 

“trial strategy” argument related to his assertions that the State had not served him its outcry notice in 

compliance with Article 38.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:

I hate to say the quiet part out loud, but when you are the Defense and you realize the 

State hasn’t filed their notice, you don’t tell them. And so, you know, it is either, 1, the intent 

not to use it, which affects the strategy; or No. 2, they can’t use it. And that’s part of your 

trial strategy.

In any event, Moran’s oral motion for continuance preserved nothing for review, and any arguments made 

therefrom cannot be bootstrapped as a legal theory for his written motion for continuance. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 29.03 (“A criminal action may be continued on 

the written motion of the State or of the defendant, upon sufficient cause shown; which cause shall be fully 

set forth in the motion.”) (emphasis added).

5 Moran states in his brief that

This issue has nothing to do with providing documents with sensitive information about 

juvenile sexual assault victims to the public. We are talking about documents that are 
10

counsel mentioned he did not have access to the State’s outcry notice via the District 

Clerk’s software, he did not articulate this as a due process violation. Instead, Moran’s 

counsel stated that “when . . . I thought that there was not an outcry notice under 38.072, 

there was a shift in trial strategy,” affirming that the State’s alleged non-compliance with 

Article 38.072 was the basis for his written motion for continuance. We conclude that 

Moran’s complaint on appeal does not comport with the basis of his written motion for 

continuance. Therefore, Moran has not preserved this sub-issue. See Pena, 285 S.W.3d 

at 463–64; see also Heidelberg, 144 S.W.3d at 537; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

B. Admission of Outcry Witness Testimony

Moran suggests in a single line in his brief that, in connection to his due process 

claim, the trial court alternatively “should have disallowed the testimony of the outcry 

witness.” To the extent that Moran challenges the trial court’s denial of his objections to 

outcry testimony, Moran presents no record references or any pertinent legal authority or 

argument to substantiate this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“[A] brief must contain a 

clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to 

authorities and to the record.”). Therefore, Moran has waived this issue through 

inadequate briefing. See id.; Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 342–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2017) (noting that we have no obligation to make an appellant’s argument for him); Lucio 

supposed to be served upon the defense attorney. Furthermore, this issue has nothing to 

do with whether the document has been served on the defense attorney . . . . 

Moran further argues that “the District Attorney’s office[’s] greater access to [the District Clerk’s] records” 

amounts to a “benefit to the District Attorney . . . that is not being afforded to a defendant.” Moran did not 

present these arguments in his written motion for continuance nor to the trial court at the hearing on his 

written motion for continuance.
11

v. State, 353 S.W.3d 873, 877–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (finding a point of error 

inadequately briefed where the brief contains a single-sentence assertion and is 

unaccompanied by any other argument or authorities). Moran’s first issue is overruled.

III. PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT

In his second issue, Moran argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

permitted J.O.,

6 a friend of T.E.’s, to testify regarding a prior consistent statement T.E. 

made to J.O. over his hearsay objection. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B).

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for a clear abuse of discretion, 

and we will not reverse as long as the judge’s decision lies within the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. McCarty v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. See Klein v. State, 

273 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Under Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(1)(B), statements that are consistent with 

the declarant’s testimony and offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the 

declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive are not hearsay. TEX. R.

EVID. 801(e)(1)(B). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has previously stated that Texas 

Rule of Evidence 801(e)(1)(B) mirrors Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and “thus[,] federal 

decisions provide helpful analysis.” Hammons v. State, 239 S.W.3d 798, 804 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007).

The Supreme Court has explained the four requirements that must be met 

for prior consistent statements to be admissible under Federal Rule 

6 We refer to this witness by initials in furtherance of protecting the identity of the minor victims.
12

801(d)(1)(B):

(1) the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to crossexamination;

(2) there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication 

or improper influence or motive of the declarant’s testimony by 

the opponent;

(3) the proponent must offer a prior statement that is consistent with 

the declarant’s challenged in-court testimony; and,

(4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior to the time 

that the supposed motive to falsify arose.

Id. (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156–58 (1995)).

“The trial court has substantial discretion to admit a prior consistent statement even 

if there has been ‘only a suggestion of conscious alteration or fabrication.’” Fears v. State, 

479 S.W.3d 315, 332 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting 

Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804–05). There is no bright-line rule to distinguish between a 

general challenge to the witness’s memory or credibility and a suggestion of conscious

alteration or fabrication; the trial court should determine if the cross-examiner’s question 

or the tenor of the questioning would “reasonably imply an intent by the witness to 

fabricate.” Id. (quoting Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 805).

B. Discussion

During trial, the State presented T.E., who was eighteen years old at the time of 

her testimony. T.E. testified that, among other things, Moran sexually abused her starting 

in her sixth-grade school year in 2016, and that Moran’s acts of sexual abuse continued 

to occur when she was in eighth or ninth grade. T.E. also testified that she disclosed 

Moran’s acts of sexual abuse to J.O. during her sixth-grade school year and told no one 
13

else. After T.E. completed her testimony, the State presented J.O., who was twenty years 

old at the time of her testimony. The following exchange occurred during J.O.’s testimony:

[The State]: . . . [D]o you recall a time that [T.E.] told you 

about something that had happened to her?

[J.O.]: Yes. 

[The State]: Do you remember what grade you were in?

[J.O.]: I was in eighth grade and she was in seventh.

[The State]: That’s when she told you about something?

[J.O.]: Yes. 

[The State]: Did she specify a range of time?

[J.O.]: Not that I remember.

[The State]: Okay. [J.O.], what did she tell you?

[Moran’s Counsel]: Objection; calls for hearsay.

[The State]: May we approach, Your Honor?

The Court: Yes. 

(Discussion at the Bench)

[The State]: This is a prior consistent statement offered to 

rebut a charge of recent fabrication. [Moran’s 

Counsel] just asked the witness about a time 

when she talked and said she was sexually 

abused and said no, it wasn’t to her mother. Also 

when he cross-examined Detective Kennelly, he 

asked him about allegations of coaching—this is 

I believe a quote—allegations of coaching or 

leading or put an idea in a kid’s head. When he 

talked to Dr. Madera[, Moran’s Counsel] asked 

her about conflicts between parents and kids 

making false allegations.
14

The Court: Okay. I will allow it briefly.

(On the record in presence of jury)

The Court: You may proceed.

[The State]: Thank you, Your Honor.

[The State]: [J.O.], what did [T.E.] tell you?

[J.O.]: She had told me that she was afraid to go home 

because she was being molested by her 

stepfather.

On appeal, Moran argues that the trial court’s ruling permitting J.O. to testify was 

error because he “never allege[d] recent fabrication regarding the allegations” and that 

“[his] questions and statements about fabrication are all about probabilities and 

reasonable doubt.” Moran then concludes that admission of J.O.’s testimony was harmful 

because it “may have had a substantial influence on the verdict.” We conclude that Moran 

failed to preserve his lack of fabrication complaint under Rule 801(e)(1)(B).

To be admissible under Rule 801(e)(1)(B), T.E.’s statement to J.O. had to meet 

the following requirements: (1) T.E. testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination; 

(2) Moran expressly or impliedly accused T.E. of being improperly influenced or motivated 

to provide testimony substantiating the allegation of sexual abuse contained in the State’s 

indictment; (3) T.E.’s statement to J.O. was consistent with her in-court testimony; and 

(4) T.E.’s statement to J.O. was made prior to the time that the supposed improper 

influence or motive to testify arose. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B); see also Hammons, 

239 S.W.3d at 804 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B)).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Klein addressed a statement offered as a 
15

prior consistent statement under Rule 801(e)(1)(B). Klein, 273 S.W.3d at 304. At trial, the 

defendant only contested one element under the Rule. Id. at 312. The court held that the 

defendant could not contest other elements under Rule 801(e)(1)(B) on appeal because 

the defendant did not raise them at trial. Id. The court stated that “it was incumbent upon 

appellant (as the losing party in the trial court) to alert the trial court to any other element[s] 

of rule 801(e)(1)(B) that would require exclusion of the complainant’s out-of-court 

statements.” Id. (citing Bolden v. State, 967 S.W.2d 895, 896–99 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1998, pet. ref’d)).

Moran has not preserved his lack of fabrication complaint under Rule 801(e)(1)(B) 

for appellate review as required by Klein. Klein dealt with the specific hearsay exception 

that is at issue in this case. Id. As the losing party, Moran was required to alert the trial 

court to the elements of Rule 801(e)(1)(B) that required the trial court to exclude T.E.’s 

statement to J.O. Id. As noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals:

[T]he party complaining on appeal (whether it be the State or the defendant) 

about a trial court’s admission, exclusion, or suppression of evidence must, 

at the earliest opportunity, have done everything necessary to bring to the 

judge’s attention the evidence rule or statute in question and its precise and 

proper application to the evidence in question. The issue . . . is 

not . . . whether the trial court’s ruling is legally correct in every sense, but 

whether the complaining party on appeal brought to the trial court’s attention 

the very complaint that party is now making on appeal.

Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (footnote omitted); see Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2018) (quoting Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 177); Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 313 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“[I]n order to preserve a complaint for appeal, the complaining 

party must have done everything necessary to bring the relevant evidentiary rule and its 
16

precise and proper application to the trial court’s attention.”) (citing Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 

176–77). While Moran lodged a general hearsay objection to T.E.’s statement to J.O., he 

failed to preserve his lack of fabrication complaint under Rule 801(e)(1)(B) that he now 

asserts on appeal because he did not bring it to the trial court’s attention after the State 

asserted the hearsay exception under that rule. See Klein, 273 S.W.3d at 312; see also

Gutierrez v. State, 630 S.W.3d 270, 282 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, pet. ref’d) (holding 

that the appellant did not preserve his timing complaint under Rule 801(e)(1)(B) that he 

asserted on appeal because he did not bring it to the trial court’s attention). Accordingly, 

we decline to address the merits of Moran’s issue alleging lack of fabrication. See Ford, 

305 S.W.3d at 532 (holding that if an issue is not preserved, appellate courts should not 

address the merits of that issue). We overrule Moran’s second issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

NORA L. LONGORIA 

 Justice 

 

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the

28th day of March, 2024.