alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nha KIEM (David) Tran, also known as David Tran, also known as David, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-20108.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 19, 2003.

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Nha Kiem Tran, a/k/a David Tran, federal prisoner # 48793-079, is appealing the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence based on amendment 640 to the sentencing guidelines.

Amendment 640 to U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(a)(3) is not listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). Therefore, this amendment may not be applied retroactively to reduce Tran’s sentence. *See United States v. Drath,*89 F.3d 216, 217-18 (5th Cir.1996). Tran has not shown that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a modification of sentence. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 5, 2014

d0825

Order 

Clerk

September 5, 2014

148199(25)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 148199

COA: 317386

Macomb CC: 2006-003114-FH

JOHN DAVID NIEMIEC, 2006-003117-FC

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s April 28, 

2014 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
#### STIRLING v. INDUSTRIAL LUMBER CO., Inc.

No. 1271.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Jan. 22, 1934.

Julius T. Long, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Thornton, Gist & Richey, of Alexandria, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, Judge.

Leonard Stirling, alleging injury in its service, claims of Industrial Lumber Company, Inc., compensation at the rate of $20 per week for a period of 400 weeks. He alleges that he received injury in defendant’s service on or about July 18, 1931. Defendant appeared in the lower court and urged as exceptions to plaintiff’s petition that it disclosed no right or cause of action. That his action, if any he had, was barred by the prescription of one year under - Act No. 20 of 1914, § 31 (amended by Act No. 85 of 1926).

The exception of prescription was sustained in the lower court on the face of the papers and the suit dismissed. Plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff has not filed any brief in support of his action against the prescriptive bar urged against it. "Defendant contends in its brief that the action is barred by the prescription pleaded against it.

The present suit was filed on October 29, 1932, more than fourteen months after the time alleged in the petition. The petition does not allege that the psrties agreed on the payment within the time mentioned. The case Carroll v. International Paper Co., 175 La. 315, 143 So. 275, supports the position taken by defendant on the Question of prescription. The ruling of the lower court is, no doubt, based on the case mentioned. The judgment appealed from is in our opinion correct. Judgment affirmed. Plaintiff, appellant, to pay the cost in both courts.
#### The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Junior Lee Blanchett, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 10,569.

Fourth District.

July 7, 1966.

Russell R. *92Goehl, Public Defender, of Quincy, for appellant; Donald G. Adams, State’s Attorney of Adams County, of Quincy (William A. Brown, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion by

JUSTICE CRAVEN.

Not to be published in full.
ACE ROBERT PATTERSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-3372

_____________________________/

Opinion filed December 19, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Madison County.

Andrew J. Decker, III, Judge.

Ace Robert Patterson, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

OSTERHAUS, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 0 3

- 00 331

- CR

John Thomas Shewmaker , Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

NO. 03

- 0178

- 1 , HONORABLE SUZANNE BROOKS , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

After his notice of appeal was received by this Court, the trial court granted John Thomas

Shewmaker

=

s motion for new trial and dismissed the prosecution. The appeal is dismissed as moot.

Bea Ann Smith, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices B. A. Smith and Puryear

Dismissed

Filed: June 26, 2003

Do Not Publish
227 So.2d 435

#### Jerome GORE v. STATE.

6 Div. 746.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 2, 1969.

Fred Blanton, Birmingham, for petitioner.

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

*730MacDonald Gallion', Atty. Gen., and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty Gen., opposed.

LAWSON, Justice.

Petition of Jerome Gore for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision in Gore v. State, 45 Ala.App. 146, 227 So.2d 432, (6 Div. 348); ’ [transferred to Court of Criminal Appeals (6 Div. 2)].

Writ .denied.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
#### Nicklose *v.*The State of Ohio.

(No. 23480

Decided May 25, 1932.)

*Mr. Frank Wiedemann*and *Mr. Theodore Ochs,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. John Wiedemann*and *Mr. Bussell M. Wilhelm,*for defendant in error.

*636It is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said Court of Appeals be, and the same is hereby, affirmed for the reason that the record presents ample evidence that trafficking in intoxicating liquors was being carried on in the house in question on or about the date charged in the indictment, and that hence such house did not constitute a *bona fide*private residence.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen, Kinkxde and Stephenson, JJ., concur.
#### Ex Parte P. F. Wilbur.

No. 24900.

May 31, 1950.

*22
      *Goodenow & Gregg,*by *George I. Goodenow,*Texas City, for relator.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Relator was tried and convicted in the corporation court of the City of Galveston and fined $1.00 and costs, on a complaint charging him with “Violating Grain Ordinance.” He appealed to the county court where he was again tried, found guilty and assessed a fine of $25.00. He then filed his application for writ of habeas corpus before the district judge who, after hearing, re fused to order his release. This is an appeal from that order.

It is alleged that the relator was illegally restrained of his liberty by F. L. Biaggne, Sheriff of Galveston County.

According to the application, supported by the evidence in the case, the “Grain Ordinance” referred to in the complaint reads as follows:

> “It shall be unlawful for any person to take, receive or carry away any com, grain, produce or other commodity from any grain car or other car loaded or unloaded, standing upon any waterfront property and it shall be unlawful for any person to buy, receive or handle any such com, grain, produce or other commodity in any quantities, so taken or received from such cars. But nothing in this section shall be construed as applying to employees upon waterfront properties who are lawfully engaged in "the duties of their employment. (Code 1917, art 141.)”

The petition attacks the validity of said ordinance on a number of grounds. The state was represented by the Assistant County Attorneys Jean Hosey and Hugh Gibson, Jr., who contested the application and cross-examined appellant’s witnesses. The ordinance was introduced in evidence, in accordance with the language above quoted, and if there is any penalty affixed for the violation denounced it does not appear in this record. *23Consequently, no authority is shown for the assessing of the fine imposed by the jury.

It requires no analysis of the ordinance quoted to discover that it is vague, indefinite, uncertain and probably subject to other exceptions. There is no limitation, description or other identifying words to fix the area in which one is forbidden to take grain or other produce from a grain car or other car. If given effect, one owning property and living on a waterfront, according to the ordinary acceptation of that term, could not haul grain to his own bin and unload it therein for his own use, regardless of how or where he acquired it. The only exception to the article would be “employees upon waterfront properties who are lawfully engaged in the duties of their employment.” Owners of waterfront property, as well as strangers to it, would be forbidden to unload any corn, grain, produce or other commodity for any purpose, under any condition, within the area for which the ordinance was intended to apply.

Without discussing the other objections raised to the ordinance, we think it is void for uncertainty. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the relator is ordered discharged from the custody of the respondent.
#### Elie MEAUX and Alma Meaux, His Wife, v. GULF INSURANCE CO. et al.*

No. 1852.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

June 14, 1938.

Lewis & Lewis, of Opelousas, for appellants.

James Domengeaux and Welton P. Mou*ton, both*of Lafayette, for appellees.

*

Rehearing denied July 27, 1938.

LE BLANC, Judge.

This is one of the three consolidated *suits*referred to in the opinion in the suit of Elie Meaux versus this same defendant, La.App., *182 So.*158, this day handed down by the court, and which opinion was made to serve in all three cases. The facts relating to liability *and to*damages claimed in this suit are therein fully discussed.

For the reasons therein stated, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment appealed from in this case be and the same is hereby amended by reducing the amount of the award made in favor of Mrs. Alma Meaux from the sum ^f $4500.00 to the sum of $1200.00, and the amount of the award in favor of her husband Elie Meaux from the sum of $371.00 to the sum of $150.-00, and that as thus amended the judgment be affirmed.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 13, 2020

No. 04

- 20

- 00025

- CV

Diana Martinez MCGLOWN,

Appellant

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A.,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CV05083

Honorable Meli ssa Vara, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The trial court signed a final judgment on December 6, 2019. Therefore, the notice of appeal was due to be filed on January 6, 2020. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 4.1(a), 26.1. A motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due on January 20, 2020. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P.

26.3

. Although appellant filed a notice of appeal within the fifteen

- day grace period allowed by Rule 26.3, s he did not file a motion for extension of time.

A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by Rule 26.1 but within the fifteen

- day grace period provided by Rule 26.3 for filing a mot ion for extension of time. See Verburgt v.

Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (construing the predecessor to Rule 26). However, the appellant must offer a reasonable explanation for failing to file the notice of appeal in a timely manner. See id. ; T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.3, 10.5(b)(1)(C).

It is therefore ORDERED that appellant file, within fifteen days from the date of this order, a response presenting a reasonable explanation for failing to file a notice of appeal in a timely manner. If appellant fai ls to respond within the time provided, the appeal will be

dismissed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3(c). All other appellate deadlines are suspended until further

order of this court.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 13th day of February, 2020

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
QIAN IDRAHIM ZHAO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

Civil Action No. 09-1986 

UNKNOWN CIA AGENT, et aI., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

FILED 

NOV 1 6 2009 

NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON. CLERK 

U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff s application to proceed in forma pauperis and 

pro se complaint. The application will be granted and the complaint will be dismissed. 

Plaintiff alleges that, in 2004 in the District of Columbia, an unidentified agent of the 

Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") arrested him, searched his person and property, falsely 

imprisoned him, and seized his passport, among other property. Further, plaintiff alleges that his 

passport now is in the possession of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), and that the 

agency has refused to return it. According to plaintiff, both the unidentified CIA agent and the 

DHS have violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, and he demands compensation for the loss of his property and lost income, and for 

emotion al distress. 

It appears that plaintiffs sole means of recovery comes under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act ("FCTA"), see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA provides that the "United States shall be 

liable [for tort claims] in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 

like circumstances." 28 U.S.c. § 2674(a). It requires that a claimant present his claim to the 

appropriate federal agency prior to filing a civil action in a federal district court. McNeil v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (requiring claimant to present 
claim "for money damages for injury or loss of property ... caused by the negligent or wrongful 

act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 

employment ... to the appropriate Federal agency" from which written notice of the denial of the 

claim has been forwarded to the claimant before a suit may be filed). It does not appear that 

plaintiff has exhausted of his administrative remedies by having presented his claim first to the 

appropriate agency and, absent exhaustion, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See 

McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). 

Even if plaintiff had exhausted his available administrative remedies, plaintiff cannot 

prevail because "the United States simply has not rendered itself1iable under [the FTCA] for 

constitutional tort claims." Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478; see Zakiya v. 

United States, 267 F. Supp. 2d 47,56 (D.D.C. 2003. Further, the FTCA expressly excludes relief 

for a claim of false imprisonment. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 

The Court will dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An Order 

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately on this same date. 

DATE: (\ I (O{O't un~i!~U~
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

IN THE MATTER

OF J.J.S.,

A CHILD §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 16

- 00261

- CV

Appeal from the

22nd District Court

of Hays County, Texas

(TC# 10

- 2304 )

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes that the appeal should

be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, in accordance with the opinion of this Court. We therefore

dismiss the appeal. This decision shall be certified below for observ ance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 27TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2017.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1





Certifications of CEO and CFO Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Houston Wire & Cable Company (the “Corporation”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Charles A. Sorrentino, as Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, and Nicol G. Graham, as Chief Financial Officer of the Corporation, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of their knowledge, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.





Date:
March 15, 2011
/s/ Charles A. SorrentinoCharles A. SorrentinoChief Executive Officer





Date:
March 15, 2011
/s/ Nicol G. GrahamNicol G. GrahamChief Financial Officer





This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by Houston Wire & Cable Company for purposes of section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
ACE ROBERT PATTERSON

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 3372

_____________________________/

Opinion filed December 19, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Madison County

. Andrew J. Decker, III , Judge

.

Ace Robert Patterson, pro se

, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

OSTERHAUS, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.
EXHIBIT 99.2

    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Park Premier  Mining  Company (the
"Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the period  ending  September  30, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Robert W. Dunlap,  Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ ROBERT W. DUNLAP
-------------------------------------
Robert W. Dunlap, President
(Principal Executive and Financial Officer)
**Exhibit 21.1**

**List of Subsidiaries**

 

| **Subsidiaries**             | **State of Incorporation** |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| CPG International I Inc      | Delaware                   |
| AZEK Buildings Products Inc. | Delaware                   |
| Scranton Products Inc.       | Delaware                   |
| Santana Products Inc.        | Delaware                   |
| CPG Sub I Corporation        | Delaware                   |
| Vycom Corp.                  | Delaware                   |
| Sanatec Sub I Corporation    | Delaware                   |
| Procell Decking, Inc.        | Delaware                   |
|                         |                       |
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          39,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  142,700
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    194,400
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               396,200
<PP&E>                                         194,200
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 901,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          371,000
<BONDS>                                        236,400
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     30,900
<COMMON>                                           200
<OTHER-SE>                                      83,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   901,200
<SALES>                                        269,100
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               269,100
<CGS>                                          225,700
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  225,700
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                63,700
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,306
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (28,600)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (29,700)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (31,500)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.54)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.54)


</TABLE>
Exhibit
32




CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Mondo Acquisition I, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jeffrey
J. Fessler, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
1350 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)The Report fully complies
with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and





(2)The information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.


Dated:  August
      12, 2008
              
              
              
              By:
              
              /s/
      Jeffrey J. FesslerJeffrey
      J. Fessler
                Principal
      Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer
#### THORNTON v. HAYNESVILLE LUMBER CO., Inc.

No. 4866.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Nov. 2, 1934.

For former opinion, see 155 So. 584.

Julius T. Long, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Wilkinson, Lewis & Wilkinson and Edward S. Klein, all of Shreveport, for appellee.

DREW, Judge.

This case is before us on rehearing, which was granted in order that we might correctly reform a decree of this court. In our original opinion we amended the judgment of the lower court and rewrote the judgment. In doing so, we inadvertently failed to fix the attorney’s fee of plaintiff and to fix the fees of the expert witnesses, both of which had been done by the court below.

We therefore now amend our original opinion and decree herein by fixing the fee of the *280attorney for plaintiff at 20 per cent, of tlie amount awarded, to plaintiff, and fixing tlie fees of the expert witnesses used in the trial below at $15 for each witness, and taxing the expert witness fees as costs. In all other respects the original opinion of this court is reinstated and made the judgment of the court.