The Attorney General of Texas 

May 28, 1980 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

Honorable Patrick J. Ridley 

Bell County Attorney 

P. 0. Box 474 

Belton, Texas 76513 

Opinion No. MW-185 

Re: Constitutionality and interpretation of article 6701d, section 

143A, V.T.C.S., regarding dismissal 

of charges on completion of a 

defensive driving course. 

Dear Mr. Ridley: 

You ask whether section 143A(a)(2) of ‘article 6701d, V.T.C.S., is 

constitutionaL This provision reads as follows: 

Sec. 143A. (a) When a person is charged with a 

misdemeanor offense under this Act, other than a 

violation of Section 50 or 51, committed while 

operating a motor vehicle, the court: 

(1) in its discretion may defer proceedings and allow 

the person 90 days to present evidence that, subsequent to the alleged act, the person has successfully completed a defensive driver’s course approved 

by the Texas Department of Public Safety or other 

driving safety course approved by the court; or 

(2) shall defer proceedings and allow the person 90 

days to present written evidence that, subsequent to 

the alleged act, the person has successfully 

completed a driving safety course approved by the 

court, it: 

(A) the person presents to the court an oral request 

or written motion to take a course; 

(B) the nerson has a valid Texas Driver’s license or 

permit; and 

(C) the person’s driving record as maintained by the 

Texas Department of Public Safety &es not indicate 

successful completion of a driving safety course 

under this subdivision within the two years immediately proceding the date of the alleged offense. 

(b) When the person complies with the provisions of 

Subsection (a) of this section and the evidence 

presented is accepted by the court, the court shall 

dismiss the charge. 

p. 591 
Honorable Patrick J. Ridley - Page Two (NW-195) 

You suggest that this provision is unconstitutional because it requires the judge to dismiss 

charges if the three stated conditions are met, allowing him no discretion. You suggest 

that it violates article II, section 1 of the Constitution which provides for the separation of 

powers, and article V, section 1 of the Constitution which vests judicial power in justices 

of the peace. 

However, it is well established that the legislature may give judges responsibilities 

which do not require the exercise of judicial discretion. See Jarnagin v. Garrett, 69 

S.W.2d 5ll (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934, writ ref’d); K-a 157 S.W.2d 377 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1941). A judge may be assigned ministerial duties, which ere duties 

prescribed and &fined with such precision as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion 

or judgment. Jarnagin v. Garrett w. Once the defendant complies with the three 

conditions under sectton 143A(a)(2 , we believe the court has a ministerial duty to dismiss 

the charge. 

You next ask for an interpretation of the following language of section 143A(b): “and 

the evidence presented is accepted by the court.” You suggest that this provision refers 

to common law n&a of evidence and means that the judge must admit the evidence 

presented by a defendant unless there is an objection to it. However, section 143A(b) uses 

the term “accepted” rather than “admitted .” Moreover, since section 143A(a)(2) spells out 

the kind of evidence which defendant must present, the judge need not rule on relevancy. 

He need only determine whether the evidence conforms~ to the requirements of section 

143A(aX2). We believe the language you inquire about contemplates that the judge will 

evaluate the evidence presented by the defendant that he has successfully completed an 

approved defensive driving course and accept it if in fact it complies with the statutory 

requirements. 

SUMMARY 

Section 143A(a)(2) of article 67Old, V.T&.S., &es not unconstitw 

tionally deprive a justice of the peace of judicial discretion. The 

section requires hi to evaluate evidence presented by the 

defendant that he hss successfully completed a defensive driving 

course. 

/gGijiij 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

TED L. HARTLEY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

p. 592 
Honorable Patridc J. Ridley - Page Three (m-185) 

Prepared by Susan Garrison 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPlNION COMMlTTEE 

C. Robert Heath, Chairman 

Jon Bible 

Susan Garrison 

Rick Gilpin 

Bill Willis 

Bruce Youngblood 

p. 593