alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6042 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 213 William Hilton Parkway in Hilton Head 

Island, South Carolina, as the ‘‘Caesar H. Wright Jr. 

Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 6042 EH

1 SECTION 1. CAESAR H. WRIGHT JR. POST OFFICE BUILD2 ING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 213 William Hilton Parkway in 

5 Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, shall be known and 

6 designated as the ‘‘Caesar H. Wright Jr. Post Office 

7 Building’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

10 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

11 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Caesar H. Wright 

12 Jr. Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 12, 

2022. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6042 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Post-

‘‘Caesar H. Wright Jr. Post Office Building’’. in Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, as the al Service located at 213 William Hilton Parkway
#### Joe Morrison v. State.

No. 24791.

May 31, 1950.

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1950.

*107
      *Alvin R. Allison*and *Earl R. Allison,*Levelland, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Unlawful possession of whisky for the purpose of sale in a dry area is the offense; the punishment, a fine of $600.

For the purpose of making a search of the station for intoxicating liquor, peace officers, armed with a search warrant, went to the filling station operated by appellant. Upon approaching the station they saw appellant come out of a building near the station with four pints of whisky in his hands. Appellant was placed under arrest, and the four pints of whisky were seized.

The record suggests that the officers thereafter searched the filling station and found some whisky, but we are unable to ascertain from the facts the amount so found.

In any event, appellant, testifying in his own behalf, admitted the possession of all the whisky involved, which the state appears to have introduced in evidence. He insists, however, that he possessed it for his own personal use and not for the purpose of sale.

This defensive theory was pertinently submitted by the trial court in his charge to the jury.

The aforesaid admission of appellant rendered untenable his objection to the search of his premises and the result of that search.

*108The information followed established precedents and was not subject to any valid objection.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant complains in his motion because the state was permitted to ask appellant while on the witness stand as to whether he had ever sold any whisky out at his station. This question was objected to by appellant’s attorney that such had not been plead, was immaterial and violated the principle of self-incrimination. Such objection was overruled by the court. It is not shown in said bill whether any answer was ever made to such question. The statement of facts does show that appellant denied ever making such sales, and the matter went no further.

Appellant was charged with the possession of whisky for the purpose of sale, and we think that “in a prosecution for the possession of intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, proof of sales made by the accused at a time not too remote is admissible as throwing light upon the purpose for which the liquor was possessed.” Hood v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. R. 95, 10 S.W. (2d) 94; Overly v. State, 104 Tex. Cr. R. 386, 283 S.W. 796; Johnson v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 417, 266 S.W. 155.

The motion will therefore be overruled.
### IN THE UNI TED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCUIT

No. 11-50264 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. JORGE JAQUEZ PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:10-CR-2720-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Jorge Jaquez Perez (Jaquez) appeals from the 46-month sentence imposed by the district court following his conviction for illegal reentry. He argues only that this sentence, which falls at the bottom of the applicable guidelines range, is substantively unreasonable. In Gall v . United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), the Supreme Court established a bifurcated process for reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence. United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez , 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). This U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Decem ber 1 4, 2 011 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court hasd ete rm inedthat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-50264 Document: 00511695465 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/14/2011No. 11-50264

court mus t d etermine whether the district court committed any procedural

errors. Gall , 552 U.S. at 51. If the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, this court will “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. Jaquez concedes, however, that he failed to object to the sentence following it s i m position such that plain error review is appropriate. See United States v. Peltier , 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007). We have rejected Jaquez’s argument that the use of a conviction both for determining a defe n d a nt’s offense level as well as his criminal history score renders a sentence u nr e a s o n ab le. See United States v. Duarte , 569 F.3d 528, 529-31 (5th Cir. 2009). We likewise have rejected Jaquez’s contention that a guidelines sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1

. 2 i s unreasonable because illegal reentry is a mere trespass offense. See United States v. Aguirre-Villa , 460 F.3d 681, 683 ( 5 th C ir. 2006). Finally, we are unpersuaded by Jaquez’s argument that the sentence imposed i s u n reasonable because it fails to give sufficient weight to the facts that he was culturally assimilated in the United States and that he returned to the U nited States to visit his family. See United States v. Gomez-Herrera , 523 F.3d 554, 565-66 (5th Cir. 2008). He fails to show plain

error. See Peltier , 505 F.3d at 391-92. AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 11-50264 Document: 00511695465 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/14/2011
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. John A. HALL, Appellant.

Nos. WD 50734, WD 52284.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Feb. 18, 1997.

Emmett D. Queener, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Becky Owenson Kilpatrick, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.

Before LOWENSTEIN, P.J., and BERREY and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Mr. Hall appeals his conviction of one count of the class D felony of sexual abuse in the first degree, for which he was charged as a prior offender and sentenced to five years imprisonment. This appeal is consolidated *657pursuant to the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion. Judgment affirmed. Rule 30.25(b).
#### Gilbert *v.*Rorick et al.

(No. 23239

Decided May 25, 1932.)

*Messrs. Eirhbride, Boesel, Brease & Cole,*for plaintiff: in error.

*Messrs. Fraser, Hiett, Wall S Effler,*for defendants in error.

It is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said Court of Appeals be, and the same is hereby, affirmed by virtue of Buie XIX of this Court, the Court finding that the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversing that of the common pleas, was based, at least partly, on the ground that the judgment was not sustained by sufficient evidence.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen, Kinkade and Stephenson, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-7249

JOSEPH R. HEDDINGER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

SEWALL SMITH, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson E. Legg, District Judge. (CA-98-

1079-L)

Submitted: December 15, 1998 Decided: December 29, 1998

Before WIDENER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph R. Heddinger, Appellant Pro Se. Regina Hollins Lewis, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Joseph R. Heddinger seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal for the reason that Heddinger received constitutionally effective assistance

of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-23-00401-CV

___________________________

Original Proceeding

431st District Court of Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. 22-5037-431

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

IN RE PATRICIA HARVEY AND KENNETH B. CHAIKEN, Relators
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The court has considered relators’ “Motion to Dismiss.” We grant the motion 

and dismiss relators’ supplemental petition for writ of mandamus, and we lift our 

January 9, 2024 stay.

Per Curiam

Delivered: March 7, 2024
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-03-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-03-1999
<CASH>                                             530
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,083
<ALLOWANCES>                                       403
<INVENTORY>                                     15,645
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                32,094
<PP&E>                                          19,419
<DEPRECIATION>                                (11,184)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  40,825
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           14,410
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            33
<OTHER-SE>                                      26,014
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    40,825
<SALES>                                         29,055
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                29,055
<CGS>                                           19,546
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   19,546
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 8,803
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (45)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    751
<INCOME-TAX>                                       274
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                477
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       477
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.16
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.16
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 33.1.3.1

[Letterhead of REGULUS]


Report on Assessment of Compliance with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria

1.      Pursuant to Subpart 229.1100 Assest Backed Securities, 17 C.F.R.
229.1100-229.1123 ("Regulation AB"), Regulus Group LLC, for itself and its
wholly-owned subsidiaries (individually and collectively "Regulus"), is
responsible for assessing its compliance with the servicing criteria applicable
to the remittance processing services it provides to customers who are issuers
or servicers of asset backed securities transactions and who have requested
confirmation of Regulus' compliance in connection with loan and/or
receivables portfolios that include pool assets for asset backed securities
transactions (the "Platform"). Remittance processing is a service whereby check
payments that are remitted by mail to a post office box are collected,
processed through a highly automated data capture system, and prepared for
deposit to a bank account held by the beneficiary of the payment.

2.      The servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB were
used in Regulus' assessment of compliance. Regulus has concluded that the
servicing criteria set forth Items 1122(d)(2)(i) and 1122(d)(4)(iv) of
Regulation AB are applicable to the servicing activities it performs with
respect to the Platform (such criteria the "Applicable Servicing
Criteria"). Regulus has concluded that the remainder of the servicing criteria
set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB are inapplicable to the activities
it performs with respect to the Platform because Regulus does not participate
in the servicing activities referenced by such servicing criteria.

3.      As of and for the year ending December 31, 2006, Regulus has complied
in all material respects with the Applicable Servicing Criteria set forth in
Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB.

4.      KPMG LLP, a registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation
report on Regulus' assessment of compliance with the Applicable Servicing
Criteria as of and for the year ending December 31, 2006. A copy of that
attestation report is attached hereto as Exhibit A.


/s/ Kimberlee Clark
Kimberlee Clark
Chief Financial Officer

February 22, 2007
expd-ex41_1166.htm



Exhibit 4.1

DESCRIPTION OF EXPEDITORS’ COMMON STOCK

The common stock of Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. is its only class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”).  

The following description of our Common Stock is a summary and does not purport to be complete. It is subject to and qualified in its entirety by reference to our Restated Articles of Incorporation, as amended (the “Articles”) and our Amended and Restated Bylaws (the “Bylaws”), each of which attached as exhibit to the Annual Report on Form 10-K.  We are incorporated in the State of Washington and are subject to the Washington Business Corporation Act, Title 23B of the Revised Code of Washington. 

Authorized Capital Shares 

Our authorized capital shares are six hundred forty-two million (642,000,000), consisting of six hundred forty million (640,000,000) shares of Common Stock, having a par value of $0.01 (“Common Stock”), and two million (2,000,000) shares of Preferred Stock, having a par value of $0.01. The outstanding shares of our Common Stock are fully paid and nonassessable.  There are no shares of Preferred Stock outstanding.  

Voting Rights

Holders of Common Stock are entitled to one vote per share on all matters voted on by the shareholders, including the election of directors. Our Common Stock does not have cumulative voting rights.

Dividend Rights

The holders of Common Stock are entitled to receive dividends, if any, as may be declared from time to time by the Board of Directors in its discretion out of funds legally available for the payment of dividends.

Liquidation Rights

Holders of Common Stock will share ratably in all assets legally available for distribution to our shareholders in the event of dissolution.

Other Rights and Preferences

Our Common Stock has no sinking fund or redemption provisions or preemptive, conversion or exchange rights. Holders of Common Stock may act by unanimous written consent. 

Potential Limitations on Rights of Holders of Common Stock

Our Articles authorize our board of directors to issue up to 2,000,000 shares of Preferred Stock and to determine the price, rights, preferences, privileges and restrictions, including voting rights, of those shares without any further vote or action by the shareholders. The rights of the holders of Common Stock may be subject to, and may be adversely affected by, the rights of the holders of any Preferred Stock that may be issued in the future.

Listing

The Common Stock is traded on The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC under the trading symbol “EXPD.”
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-6101

GEORGE JENKINS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN ROBERT STEVENSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Beaufort. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(9:09-cv-00057-RBH)

Submitted: April 22, 2010 Decided: April 28, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George Jenkins, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Samuel Creighton Waters, Assistant 

Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

George Jenkins seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this 

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find 

that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district 

court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural 

ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th 

Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and 

conclude that Jenkins has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny Jenkins’s motion to appoint counsel, deny a 

certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The Central Union Trust Co. of Wheeling, West Virginia, *v.*The Union Savings Bank *&*Trust Co. of Steubenville, Ohio, et al.

(No. 23395

Decided June 1, 1932.)

*Mr. J. G. Heinlein, Mr. Charles J. Lynch, Mr. David H. James*and *Messrs. Riley & Riley,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Lewis, Smith & Francis, Mr. Ralph B. Cohen, Mr. David M. Spriggs, Messrs. Huston & Hooper, Mr. Gilbert Bettman,*attorney general, *Mr. Roy N. Merryman, Mr. C. L. Hawthorne*and *Mr. L. M. Sedgwick,*for defendants in error.

By the Court

(Kinkade, J.).

This action, in the trial court, presented a contest with respect to the proper disbursement of the sum of $7,000, in round figures, which sum was in the registry of the trial court, and which the court had ordered to be taxed as a part of the costs and disbursed to certain attorneys in payment for valuable services rendered in connection with the settlement of an insolvent estate. The *446Court of Appeals affirmed the finding and judgment of the trial court.

The $7,000 came into the registry of the court as a balance of net rentals collected by agents duly appointed by the court, pending a mortgage foreclosure and sale of mortgaged property. •

The mortgagee claimed, at the time disbursement of the $7,000 was ordered, that the mortgage covered rentals as well as property, and that the rentals in the registry of the court should be ordered applied on the deficiency judgment if the property did not sell for a sum sufficient to pay the balance due on the mortgage debt. The property brought only about fifty per cent, of the mortgage debt.

Had these rents been applied on a deficiency judgment, there would have been no fund left from which compensation could have been paid to the attorneys for valuable services rendered in securing the setting aside of fraudulent conveyances of property which rightfully belonged to the creditors of the insolvent estate mentioned.

The judgment entered by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals accomplished substantial justice between all parties to the action.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen and Stephenson, JJ., concur.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2133

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Adan Zarate-Cobain

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln

____________

 Submitted: October 22, 2014

Filed: October 23, 2014

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Adan Zarate-Cobain directly appeals the below-Guidelines-range sentence the

district court imposed after he pled guilty to a drug charge. His counsel has filed a

1

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District 1

of Nebraska.
brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the substantive

reasonableness of Zarate-Cobain’s sentence. In addition, counsel seeks leave to

withdraw.

Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not impose an

unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.

2009) (en banc) (describing appellate review of sentencing decisions); United States

v. Lazarski, 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2009) (where district court varied downward

from Guidelines range, it was “nearly inconceivable” that court abused its discretion

in not varying downward further). Finally, having independently reviewed the record

pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. 

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment. 

______________________________

-2-
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### March 24, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 134802 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 134802 COA: 277704 Wayne CC: 95-011960-FY JERRY ALLEN METCALF, JR., Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 13, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, a nd it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

p0317 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 24, 2008

Clerk