alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 20, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49161-49162]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19321]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Order No. 1569]


Grant of Authority for Subzone Status

In Mocean Group, LLC

(Swimwear/Beach Accessories Distribution)

North Brunswick, New Jersey

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 
June 18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u), the Foreign-Trade 
Zones Board (the Board) adopts the following Order:
    WHEREAS, the Foreign-Trade Zones Act provides for ``. . . the 
establishment . . . of foreign-trade zones in ports of entry of the 
United States, to expedite and encourage foreign commerce, and for 
other purposes,'' and authorizes the Foreign-Trade Zones Board to grant 
to qualified corporations the privilege of establishing foreign-trade 
zones in or adjacent to U.S. Customs and Border Protection ports of 
entry;
    WHEREAS, the Board's regulations (15 CFR Part 400) provide for the 
establishment of special-purpose subzones when existing zone facilities 
cannot serve the specific use involved, and when the activity results 
in a significant public benefit and is in the public interest;
    WHEREAS, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, grantee of 
Foreign-Trade Zone 49, has made application for authority to establish 
special-purpose subzone status at the swimwear and beach accessories 
distribution facility of In Mocean Group, LLC, in North Brunswick, New 
Jersey (Docket 45-2007, filed 8/31/2007);
    WHEREAS, notice inviting public comment was given in the Federal 
Register (72 FR 51780, 9/11/2007); and,
    WHEREAS, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiner's report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and 
Board's regulations would be satisfied, and that approval of the 
application would be in the public interest if approval were subject to 
a restriction;
    NOW, THEREFORE, the Board hereby grants authority for subzone 
status for activity related to swimwear and beach accessories 
distribution at the In Mocean Group, LLC, facility located in North 
Brunswick, New Jersey (Subzone 49K), as described in the application 
and Federal Register notice, subject to the FTZ Act and the Board's 
regulations, including Section 400.28, and further subject to a 
restriction that all foreign-origin textile and apparel products that 
are subject to U.S. import quotas will be admitted to the proposed 
subzone under privileged foreign status (19 CFR Sec. 146.41) or 
domestic (duty-paid) status (19 CFR Sec. 146.43).

[[Page 49162]]

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 5 \th\ day of August 2008.

David M. Spooner,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration.
Alternate Chairman.
Foreign-Trade Zones Board.
    ATTEST:
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-19321 Filed 8-19-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-S
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</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**P&F INDUSTRIES, INC.**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO SECTION 906**

**OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&FIndustries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2009,as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),the undersigned, Richard A. Horowitz, Principal Executive Officer of theCompany, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that:

 

(1)                                  The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|                    | /s/  RICHARD A. HOROWITZ      |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                    | Richard  A. Horowitz          |
| Date  May 12, 2009 | *Principal Executive Officer* |

 

----
# .-

# \~ Q; -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

# FILED SEP - 22009

ChristopherBullard, Plaintiff,
v. The United States et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

### Clerk, U.S. District

### and Bankruptcy Courts

Civil Action No. 

# 09 1670

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on its initial review ofplaintiffs pro se complaint, which is accompanied by an application to proceed informapauperis. The Court will grant the application and will dismiss the case for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction, as required byRule 12(h)(3) ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure. Plaintiff, a prisoner in North Carolina, alleges that on May 12,2009,he filed two nonprovisional patent applications with the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), but the PTO returned them on June 1,2009, as incomplete in part because they were submitted without the $165 filing fee. See CompI. Attachments. "Anapplicant for a patent, any ofwhose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision ofthe primary examinerto the Board ofPatent Appeals and Interferences, having once paid the fee for such appeal." 35 U.S.C. 

### § 134(a). And "[a]n applicant dissatisfied with the decision ofthe Board ofPatent Appeals and Interferences
... may, unless appeal has been taken to the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, have remedy by civil action against the Director in the United States District Court for the District ofColumbia[.]" 35 U.S.C. § 145.The exhaustion ofadministrative remedies is ajurisdictional prerequisite to filing a civil lawsuit arising from the denial ofa patent. Leighton v. Cae, 130 F.2d 841, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
see Fieldv. Manbeck 1990 WL 116818, 

## *3 (D.D.C., Aug. 2, 1990) ("The plaintiffhas not received a decision from the Board ofPatent Appeals and thus this Court does not have jurisdiction over this action in the absence ofafinal agency decision, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145 and 5 U.S.C. 

### §704."). To the extent that plaintiffis seeking a writ ofmandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 to compel the PTO Directorto waive the patent filing fee, see Form CompI. at 5 (reliefsought), he has not cited authority showing that he has a "'clearand indisputable' right to [such] relief,"In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and "[i]t is well-settled that a writ ofmandamus is not available to compel discretionary acts," Cox v. Sec'y a/Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases). The complaint therefore is dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.**~** Date: August

# 2..JL, 2009 United States

-2- t: a'6;
EXHIBIT 31.2



P&F INDUSTRIES, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



I, Joseph A. Molino, Jr., certify that:



1.       I have reviewed
this quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of P&F Industries, Inc.; and



2.       Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to
the period covered by this report.







|                   | /s/ Joseph A. Molino, Jr.  
|------------------ | ---------------------------
|                   | Joseph A. Molino, Jr.      
|Date: June 2, 2020 | Principal Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 31.1
                       CERTIFICATION

I, Stephen L. Baum, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Pacific
Enterprises;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this Quarterly Report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this Quarterly Report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial
information included in this Quarterly Report fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this Quarterly Report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and we have:

a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information relating
to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this Quarterly Report is being
prepared;

b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this Quarterly Report
our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this Quarterly Report, based on such evaluation; and

c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting;

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing
the equivalent function):

a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal controls over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and

b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.


November 4, 2004

/S/ STEPHEN L. BAUM
Stephen L. Baum
Chief Executive Officer
| **$50,000.00** | **November 29, 2004** |
|----------------|-----------------------|

----

----

|   | (a)    | (a) waive demand, presentment, protest, notice      of protest, notice of dishonor, diligence in collection, notice of nonpayment      and all notices of a like nature; and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|   | (b)    | (b) to (i) the release, surrender, exchange      or substitution of all or any part of the security for the indebtedness      evidenced by this Note, or the taking of any additional security, (ii) the      release of any or all other persons from liability, whether primary or contingent,      for the indebtedness evidenced by this Note or for any related obligations,      and (iii) the granting of any other indulgences to any such person. |

----

----

----

----

|   | DIAYSYS CORPORATION                                                |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                               |
|   |                                                               |
|   | By: S/ JEFFREY B. AARONSON                                    |
|   |       Jeffrey B. Aaronson,      President |
|   |                                                               |
#### Thomas Wynne v. Continental Asphalt Paving Company. Strasburger v. Goldenberg. Kaplan v. Potter. Grant v. Leopold. Heller v. Montrose. McCann v. Blue Ribbon Garage Company. Kent v. Ward. Benson v. Hobbs. Wohlrab v. New York Horse Insurance Company. Fischer v. Motor Boat Club.

— Applications for leave to appeal to Appellate Division denied, with ten dollars costs in each case. Orders signed.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, in his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of FGX International Holdings Limited (the "Company"), hereby certifies
that the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ended January 3, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

March 12, 2009

/s/ ALEC TAYLOR Alec Taylor Chief Executive Officer


---



QuickLinks
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SERGIO OCTAVIO PENA,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

JAMES E. TILTON, in his capacity as

Head of the California Department of

Corrections,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 11-15003

D.C. No. 4:07-cv-02119-PJH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 10, 2014** 

San Francisco, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Sergio Octavio Pena appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for

habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

FILED

JUN 12 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Pena first argues that the state court’s determination that the admission of

gang-related evidence did not violate his federal due process rights was contrary to

clearly established federal law. But the Supreme Court has never issued a “clear

ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough,

568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Dawson v. Delaware held that the admission

of sanitized gang evidence during sentencing violated the First Amendment. 503

U.S. 159, 168 (1992). So there was no clearly established federal law for the state

court’s determination to contravene.

Pena next contends that the state trial court’s failure to provide certain jury

instructions violated his rights to a jury trial and to due process. He does not

dispute, however, that he procedurally defaulted this claim.

To excuse his procedural default, Pena maintains that his appellate counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. There

is, at least, a reasonable argument that appellate counsel’s decision—to omit a

weak issue that would have undermined Pena’s primary argument on appeal—was

not constitutionally unreasonable. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th

Cir. 1989). Given the “doubly” deferential standard of review, Harrington v.

2
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011), we cannot say that the state court

unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Because Pena cannot demonstrate cause to excuse his procedural default, we

will not review the jury instruction issue. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729–30 (1991).1

AFFIRMED.

1We decline to address Pena’s uncertified cumulative error argument. See

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 1999).

3
##### 



Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Kevin G. Moug, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Otter Tail
Corporation; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report; 4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and have: (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to
the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during
the period in which this report is being prepared; (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; and (c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrants internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions): (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting. Date: May 7, 2004 /s/ Kevin G. Moug
Kevin G. Moug
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 1178** 
JOHN B. LASCHKEWITSCH, as Administrator for the Estate of Ben La s chkewitsch , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. LINCOLN LIFE AND ANNUITY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., d/b/a Lincoln Financial Group , Defendant

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:13

- cv - 00315

- BO )

Submitted : September 17, 2015 Decided: September 23, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and KING , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. John B. Laschkewitsch, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Nis Leerberg, SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina; Robert R. Marcus, SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: John B. Laschkewitsch seeks to appeal the district court’s order grantin g summary judgment in Defendant’s favor . We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). If a party files in the district court any of the motions listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A), the 30

- day appeal period runs from the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bow l e s v. Russell , 551 U.S. 2 0 5, 2 1 4 ( 2007 ). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on September 16, 2014
. Laschkewitsch timely filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend the judgment, which the district court denied on January 15, 2015. The notice of appeal was filed thirty

- fiv e days later, on February 19, 2015 . Because Laschkewitsch failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We deny as moot the parties’ pending3 motions. We dispense with oral ar gument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. DISMISSED