17-4097(L) 

Carabal-Santos v. Barr 

BIA 

Straus, IJ 

A200 689 439 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 15th 4 day of May, two thousand nineteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

8 REENA RAGGI, 

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 SAMUEL CARABAL-SANTOS, AKA 

14 SAMUEL CARVAGAL, AKA SAMUEL 

15 SANTOS, 

16 Petitioner, 

17 17-4097(L), 

18 v. 18-1358(Con) 

19 NAC 

20 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

21 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

22 Respondent. 

23 _____________________________________ 

24 

25 FOR PETITIONER: Robert C. Ross, West Haven, CT. 

26 

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

28 Attorney General; Carl McIntyre, 

29 Assistant Director; Gregory A. 

30 Pennington, Jr., Trial Attorney, 

31 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

32 United States Department of 

33 Justice, Washington, DC. 

34 
2

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these petitions for review of 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitions for review 

4 are DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Samuel Carabal-Santos, a native and citizen 

6 of Mexico, seeks review of the denials of (1) his application 

7 for relief from removal under the Convention Against Torture 

8 (“CAT”), see In re Samuel Carabal-Santos, No. A200 689 439 

9 (B.I.A. Nov. 27, 2017), aff’g No. A200 689 439 (Immig. Ct. 

10 Hartford June 8, 2017), and (2) his motion to reopen, see In 

11 re Samuel Carabal-Santos, No. A200 689 439 (B.I.A. Apr. 6, 

12 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

13 facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 A. Order of Removal 

15 The only issues before us in this petition are the 

16 agency’s denial of deferral of removal under the CAT and its 

17 denial of a continuance. Under the circumstances of this case, 

18 we have reviewed both the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) and the 

19 BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness,” Wangchuck v. 

20 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006), 

21 examining factual findings for substantial evidence and 
3

1 questions of law de novo, see Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 

2 23, 27 (2d Cir. 2018). 

3 1. Deferral of Removal 

4 An applicant seeking deferral of removal under the CAT 

5 must make a preponderance showing that he would be tortured 

6 upon removal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a). In 

7 deciding whether an applicant has carried this burden, the 

8 agency must consider all relevant evidence, including past 

9 torture, ability to relocate, and human rights violations 

10 within the country of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). 

11 “‘It is the likelihood of all necessary events coming together 

12 that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain 

13 of events cannot be more likely than its least likely link.’” 

14 Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 

15 In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)). 

16 Thus, an alien cannot carry his burden “‘if one link in the 

17 chain cannot be shown to be more likely than not to occur.’” 

18 Id. 

19 The applicant’s testimony may be sufficient to sustain 

20 his burden, even without corroboration, but only if the trier 

21 of fact finds the testimony credible, persuasive, and 
4

1 sufficiently factually specific to demonstrate that the 

2 applicant is a “refugee.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); 

3 see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(C); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 

4 1208.17(a). “[A]n applicant may be generally credible but 

5 his testimony may not be sufficient to carry the burden of 

6 persuading the fact finder of the accuracy of his claim of 

7 crucial facts if he fails to put forth corroboration that 

8 should be readily available.” Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28; see 

9 also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Applying these principles 

10 here, we conclude that the agency did not err in finding that 

11 Carabal-Santos failed to satisfy his burden of proving a 

12 likelihood of torture. 

13 Given that Carabal-Santos asserted that a drug cartel 

14 last harmed or personally threatened him in Mexico sometime 

15 before 2001, he had the burden of demonstrating that the 

16 cartel remained interested in harming him more than 15 years 

17 later. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3); see also Savchuck, 518 

18 F.3d at 123. Carabal-Santos attempted to satisfy that burden 

19 with his testimony that cartel members cut his grandmother’s 

20 face shortly after he left Mexico, killed two of his friends 

21 in 2007 and 2010, kidnapped and tortured his brother-in-law 
5

1 in 2011, and recently threatened him through his sister’s 

2 Facebook account. However, the agency reasonably found that 

3 Carabal-Santos failed to corroborate these crucial facts with 

4 reasonably available evidence. See Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28. 

5 First, although he submitted letters from his grandmother 

6 and brother-in-law, neither of them mentioned being harmed at 

7 all or targeted by anyone as a threat to Carabal-Santos. 

8 Further, although Carabal-Santos testified that cartel 

9 members killed two of his friends who helped him confront 

10 cartel members in 1997, his written statement asserted that 

11 the murder victims were his brother’s friends who were killed 

12 for reasons unrelated to Carabal-Santos. Also, the statement 

13 Carabal-Santos’s sister submitted on his behalf did not 

14 corroborate his testimony that cartel members had threatened 

15 him via her Facebook account. 

16 The agency further reasonably considered and determined 

17 that Carabal-Santos could safely relocate within Mexico. See

18 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Moreover, as the IJ found, 

19 Carabal-Santos did not provide any country conditions 

20 evidence showing that the cartel leader who targeted him 

21 remains active. Indeed, although cartel control is fluid, a 
6

1 Drug Enforcement Agency map of the Mexican drug cartels shows 

2 that the cartel Carabal-Santos fears is not active in many 

3 parts of Mexico. 

4 Accordingly, because Carabal-Santos failed to 

5 corroborate his testimony regarding continued threats from 

6 cartel members, and because evidence demonstrated he could 

7 safely relocate within Mexico, the agency did not err in 

8 finding that he failed to establish a chain of events showing 

9 that he would more likely than not be tortured or killed if 

10 removed to Mexico. See Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28; Savchuck, 

11 518 F.3d at 123. Because that finding was dispositive of 

12 deferral of removal under the CAT, see 8 C.F.R. 

13 §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1), we do not reach the 

14 agency’s alternative basis for denying CAT relief, see INS v. 

15 Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts 

16 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the 

17 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”); 

18 De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2010) 

19 (recognizing that applicant’s failure to establish likelihood 

20 of torture is separate dispositive basis for denying CAT 

21 relief from the requirement of establishing government 
7

1 acquiescence). 

2 2. Continuance 

3 Carabal-Santos faults the IJ for denying him a fourth 

4 continuance before denying him CAT relief. We review such a 

5 denial for abuse of discretion. See Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 

6 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2006). An IJ “may grant a motion for 

7 continuance for good cause shown,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, and 

8 only “abuse[s] his discretion in denying a continuance if (1) 

9 his decision rests on an error of law (such as the application 

10 of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual 

11 finding, or (2) his decision—though not necessarily the 

12 product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual 

13 finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible 

14 decisions,” Morgan, 445 F.3d at 551-52 (quotation marks and 

15 brackets omitted). That is not this case. 

16 The IJ had already granted Carabal-Santos three 

17 continuances, thereby providing him and his family 

18 approximately 16 months to prepare and gather evidence from 

19 Mexico. Carabal-Santos’s attorney requested a fourth 

20 continuance because, although Carabal-Santos’s family had 

21 submitted evidence, their statements could have been 
8

1 “stronger.” Certified Administrative Record at 145. The 

2 denial of a fourth continuance in these circumstances was not 

3 an abuse of discretion. See Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 31 (“[I]t is 

4 reasonable not to require that applicants receive a second 

5 opportunity to present their case after the IJ identified the 

6 specific evidence they need to prevail.”); see also Chuilu 

7 Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he alien 

8 bears the ultimate burden of introducing such evidence 

9 without prompting from the IJ.”). 

10 Because the IJ had already granted numerous continuances, 

11 during which Carabal-Santos managed to obtain evidence from 

12 family and friends, there is no merit to his argument that 

13 his due process rights were violated by the IJ denying him 

14 yet another opportunity to gather evidence. See Burger v. 

15 Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To establish a 

16 violation of due process, an alien must show that she was 

17 denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims or 

18 that [she was] otherwise deprived . . . of fundamental 

19 fairness.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

20 Accordingly, we identify no error in the agency’s 
9

1 decision to deny Carabal-Santos CAT relief from removal. 

2 B. Motion to Reopen 

3 In challenging the agency’s refusal to reopen his removal 

4 proceedings, Carabal-Santos bears a still heavier burden 

5 because the law states that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings 

6 shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that 

7 evidence sought to be offered is material and was not 

8 available and could not have been discovered or presented at 

9 the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Moreover, we 

10 review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 

11 discretion. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-

12 69 (2d Cir. 2008); Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d 

13 Cir. 2006) (“[I]n reviewing the BIA’s determination of 

14 whether previously unavailable evidence supported [a] motion 

15 to reopen, we must inquire whether the evidence could have 

16 been presented at the hearing before the IJ.”). 

17 As the Government argues, Carabal-Santos does not 

18 challenge the BIA’s dispositive finding that the evidence 

19 he submitted in support of his motion to reopen was 

20 previously available. Accordingly, that finding remains a 

21 valid basis for denying reopening, and we deny the petition 
10

1 for review. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 

2 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that petitioner 

3 abandons issues and claims not raised in his brief); see 

4 also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). 

5 In any event, the BIA’s finding was not erroneous since 

6 Carabal-Santos submitted letters that described events 

7 predating his hearing. See Norani, 451 F.3d at 294. 

8 Further, the BIA did not err in its alternative dispositive 

9 determination that the newly submitted letters would not 

10 change the outcome of Carabal-Santos’s proceedings because 

11 they did not undermine the agency’s determination that he 

12 could relocate within Mexico to avoid harm. See INS v. Abudu, 

13 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988) (recognizing failure to establish 

14 prima facie eligibility for relief as a valid basis to deny 

15 motion to reopen).

16 For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are 

17 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

18 that the Court previously granted in these petitions is 

19 VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in these 

20 petitions is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral 

21 argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance with 
11

1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 

2 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 

3 FOR THE COURT: 

4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 

5 Clerk of Court