IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2014-KA-00087-SCT
LARRY COLLIER a/k/a LARRY OMAR COLLIER

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/09/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W ILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: A. RANDALL HARRIS DEW EY K. ARTHUR JOEY W . MAYES COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: GRADY MORGAN HOLDER JOHN M. COLETTE ROBERT L. SIRIANNI, JR. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART DISTRICT ATTORNEY: MICHAEL GUEST NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/16/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR AND CHANDLER, JJ. DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In prosecuting Larry Collier f or selling controlled s u b s t a n c e s , t h e State called a seasoned f

elon-turned-conf

i dential-police-inf

orm ant who provided untruthf ul testim ony about previous crim inal convictions, and whom the trial court ref u sed to a llow the def

endant

to f u lly cross-exam ine about those prior crim inal convictions. Although the trial court erredin lim iting the cross-exam ination, we f ind that, in light o f the overwhelm ing evidence of guilt, the error was harm less. W e af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. A Rankin C ounty grand j ury indicted Larry Collier on f our counts of selling cocaine, and a s a s ubsequent drug of f e nder. 1 At trial, Rankin County I nvestigator Barry Vaughn testif i ed that Shirley

Melvin, a conf

idential inf

orm a nt and the State’s star witness, decided

t o g o u n d e r cover f

or the Rankin County Sherif f ’s Departm ent af

ter she was arrested f

o r selling cocaine. Vaughn had agreed to let Melvin “work of f her charges” so she could avoid going b a c k to jail. W hile working of f her charges, Melvin set u p several drug buy s with Collier under Vaughn’s supervision. ¶3. Bef

ore allowing Melvin to buy d rugs f r o m C o l l i e r , Vaughn g ave Melvin m oney , searched her clothing, outf itted her with audio a n d v ideo surveillance equipm ent to record the transactions, and then searched her c ar’s interior. Vaughn conceded on crossexam ination t hat Melvin could h ave h idden cocaine in places on h er b ody or in her car that

were never s earched, a nd that the sherif f ’s of f i ce did not have drug-snif f ing dogs, so Melvin could have hidden drugs in her car that would not have been discovered. ¶4. As soon as Melvin took t he stand, t he State questioned her a bout h er checkered past, including her prior c onvictions. W hen the State a sked her what her prior convictions were, and h ow m a ny prior convictions she had, she replied that she had prior convictions f or “f orgery and sales.” W hen specif ically asked how m any f

o rgery convictions s he had, Melvin

1 C o llier h a d a prior, May 1994, conviction f

or selling cocaine. 2said she had f ive f orgery convictions dating back to 2001, which she characterized as being f or “bad checks.” And when asked if she had another f elony c o nviction, Melvin said she had

a f e lony conviction som etim e around 2 0 0 0 f or selling crack cocaine. Finally , Melvin told the jury t hat she was again a rrested f or selling crack cocaine in 2010—the arrest that inspired her to work as a conf

idential inf

orm ant. ¶5. Melvin then testif

ied t hat she bought drugs f rom Collier on three separate occasions: May 11, July 13, and October 25, 2012. She testif ied that s he would call Collier and ask h im if h e was doing any business. And i f h e w a s , M elvin would then g o t o Collier’s trailer on Shady L ane. Once a d eal was se t u p , Melvin would go to the Rankin County Sherif f ’s Departm ent and m eet w ith Investigator Vaughn. Melvin explained that, bef o re she lef

t f or

a sale, the sherif

f ’s departm e nt of

f icers would search her clothing, w ire her with audio and visual equipm e nt, and search her car. ¶6. According to Melvin, the actual transactions were quick af f a i rs. She would drive to Collier’s trailer in her car, get out, go in, buy crack, give Collier m oney , get back in her car, and then leave. Melvin alw a y s r e t u r ned af ter a buy to the sherif

f ’ s departm ent, where she would give Vaughn the drugs she had just purchased f rom Collier. She r i f

f ’s departm ent of f icers would also search Melvin again f or good m easure. ¶7. During Melvin’s direct testim ony , the State i ntroduced t h e v i d e o r e c o r dings into evidence. The p a r t i e s a g reed to begin p lay ing the v ideo “approxim ately a m i nute bef ore” Melvin arrived at Collier’s trailer and stop the video once she lef t.

3¶8. In the v ideo showing t he May 1 1 m eeting, M elvin arrived at Collier’s trailer and went

inside the f

ront room , where a transaction of som e kind appeared to take place. Collier could be seen holding a s ma l l bag that h e appeared to give Melvin. Melvin then lef t. Likewise, in the video showing the July 13 t ransaction, Melvin arrived at and entered Collier’s trailer where Collier again a

ppeared t o h a n d som ething to M elvin. In the video depicting the October 2 5 transaction, Melvin drove up to C ollier’s trailer but did not go i nside. Collier and Melvin instead m et in the y ard, and Melvin could be seen counting out ten-dollar bills and handing them

to Collier. Collier then handed som e thing to Melvin. ¶9. O n cross-exam i nation, the def ense attem

pted to im

peach Melvin f

o r her f a i l u r e t o disclose three other convictions: a 1975 g rand-larceny conviction and two o ther 1977 f orgery convictions. The State objected, and, outside the hearing of the jury , argued that Rule 609 and this Court’s decision in J o hnson v. State 2 p recluded the def ense f rom im peaching Melvin w i th prior convictions older than ten y ears, and that, i n a n y event, t he def ense was barred f rom im peachi n g w i t h the prior convictions f or f a ilure to p rovide the State with advanced written notice as required by Rule 609. ¶10. Collier argued t hat he wanted to question Melvin about her p r i o r c o nvictions so he could im peach her t estim ony and show she had l ied, and that Melvin h ad “opened the door

to [ im p eachm ent with her prior convictions] by n ot providing the jury with her f ull record.” The d ef ense also wanted to introduce i nto evidence Melvin’s “ guilty p lea petition” f rom her
2000 f o r g e r y c o n v i ction, which, it argued, was relevant because Melvin had disclosed her

2 J o h n so n v. S t

a te , 5 2 9 S o . 2 d 5 7 7 (M iss. 1 9 8 8 ).

41970s-era convictions in the p e t i t ion, and it showed that Melvin’s testim ony that her

f orgeries were f

or nothing m ore than “bad checks” was f a lse. ¶11. Bef

ore m aking his ruling, the judge questioned M elvin about the convictions she had

om itted during h er direct exam ination. M elvin claim ed s he did not rem em ber what she had bee n c o n v i c t e d of during the 1970s or when she was actually convicted, and that she “thought it was i n t he early “ [ ’]80s, but [ t h e d e f e nse attorney said] it was in ’75,” and that she did not rem em

ber. ¶12. T h e trial judge u ltim a tely prohibited Collier f rom as k i n g a b o u t M e l v i n ’ s o t h e r convictions based on Mississippi R ule of Evidence 609(b)’s requirem ent that a party provide

a d v a n c ed written notice if seeking to im peach a witness with a convictions m ore than te n
y ears old. In m a king his ruling, the trial judge analy zed the issue as f

ollows: Now, Mr. Har r i s [ C o llier’s attorney ], y ou want to com e around [ Rule 609’s requirem ents] by arguing that, because [ Melvin] d i d n ’ t answer in a way t hat y ou believe w as truthf

ul, y o u ought to, because o f t hat, now b e able to im peach that answer given during the course o f her testim ony . And that und e r t h a t situation, 609, the tim eline relative to 609(b) is not applicable. I d on’t s e e any authority that provides that. And I d on’t h ave to do a balancing test i f i t were applicable, because it’s a crim e of f alsity

. But I do believe that at som e point, it becom e s cum

ulative in nature in the sense of , y o u know, whether she’s had f ive convictions or seven convictions, I’m not s ure i s t h a t —is t hat probative on the issues bef

ore t he ju r y . S he’s adm i tted that she has f ive f orgery convictions, has she not?

. . . But I guess w hat I’m say i ng is, is that even if y ou m issed giving t he notice, it appears that the rule requires in [ Johnson ] v. State , 529 So. 2d 577, requires that t estim ony , I believe, of two or three m ore convictions now seem s l ike it’s two m ore convictions would be cum ulative, and theref

ore not probative on the issues bef ore the [ c]ourt. S he’s b een im peached with f

i ve or six convictions, and I don’t think o ne or t wo m ore really is going to m a k e m uch dif f erence, so the State’s objection will be sustained.

5H o w ever, the trial j udge did a llow the def ense to “develop the testim ony that [ Melvin ’ s f orgeries] [ we]re not just f alse pretense, bad-check ty pe f orgeries.” ¶13. W h en court resum ed, the def ense h a m m e r e d M e l v i n a

b o u t h e r fo rgery c o nvictions and how the f orgeries involved m ore than just writing b ad checks. The def ense p ointed out that Melvin’s f

orgery c onvictions involved “f orging som eone else’s nam e t o an instrum ent like

a blank check

. . . .” The def ense a lso pointed o ut that M elvin was f acing habitual-of

f ender status when she agreed to work of f her charges. However, t he def ense was not allowed to im p each Melvin about the o ther three 1 970s-era convictions she f a iled to disclose during direct. ¶14. Following Melvin’s testim ony , the S t a t e c a l l e d t w o e x p e r t w i t n esses f rom the Mississippi Crim e Laboratory who both testif ied th a t t h e s u b s t a nce Collier allegedly sold was cocaine. The State t hen rested its case. Af ter m aking an unsuccessf

ul m otion to dism iss, the def ense also rested its case. ¶15. The jury ultim ately f ound Collier g uilty on all c o unts. Collier m oved f or a new trial, which was denied. The trial judge then sentenced him t o f orty y ears on the f

irst two counts and one day on the t hird count, with sentences to run consecutively

. Af ter sentencing, Collier appealed to this Court.
ANALYSIS ¶16. On appeal, Collier raises three issues. T he f irst is that the trial court’s ref u sal to let him cross-exam i n e M e l v in about her other convictions violated h is rights under the Conf r ontation Clause. S econd, h e a r g u e s t h at the trial court e rred in ref u sing to let the

6def

ense introduce Melvin’s “guilty plea petitions” in evidence. And, third, he say s that the jury ’s guilty verdict was against the overwhelm ing w eight of t he eviden ce. Because Collier’s f irst and secon d i s s ues g o to the trial c ourt’s r ulings concerning Melvin’s prior crim inal history , we com

bine them f or analy sis.
I. The trial court’s error in prohibiting Collier from cross-ex am ining Melvin about her undisclosed crim inal convictions w as harm less. ¶17. W e review a trial court’s decision to lim it cross-exam ination f o r abuse of discretion. 3
Under t his standard, “ [ a]n a buse of discretion w i ll be f ound only where t he def

endant shows clear prejudice f

rom undue restraint on the def ense.” 4 ¶18. Collier argues that the t rial court’s ref usal to let him cross-exam ine M elvin about her other t hree c onvictions violated the Conf rontation Clause and c o nstituted reversible error, and t hat the trial court s hould h a ve allowed him to introduce Melvin’s guilty -plea petitions in evidence. T he State counters that Rule 609 excludes f or im p eachm ent purposes the use of convictions that are m ore than ten y ears old, and that, in a ny event, written notice that a party intends to im

peach using a prior conviction m ust be provided bef

ore trial. So the issues

are whether im

peaching a witness who lied about her crim inal history is c o ntrolled by Rule 609, and if not, w hether t he trial judge com m itted reversible error when the judge denied the def ense the opportunity

to im p each the witness’s f

alse testim o ny . A. Rule 609 does not apply w hen a w itness lies about her crim inal record.

3 C a g e v. S ta te , 1 4 9 S o . 3 d 1 0 3 8 , 1 0 4 4 ( M iss. 2 0 1 4 ) (citin g J efferso n v. S ta te , 8 1 8 S o . 2 d 1 0 9 9 , 1 1 0 9 (M iss. 2 0 0 2 )).

4 C a g e , 1 4 9 S o . 3 d a t 1 0 4 4 (citin g D a vis v. S t a te , 6 8 4 S o . 2 d 6 4 3 , 6 5 2 (M iss. 1 9 9 6 )). 7¶19. Rule 60 9 , w h i c h a l l o w s a witness’s character f or truthf ulness t o be attacked with evidence of prior convictions, does not allow a “conviction under this rule” to be used if a period of m ore than ten y ears has elapsed since the date of the convictions or of the release of t he witness f rom t h e c o n f

i n e me nt

. . . unless the court determ ines

. . . the probative value of the conviction supported by the specif ic f acts and circum stances substantially outweighs its prejudicial ef f ect. 5
And even where a trial court f inds the old conviction probative, i t cannot be used “unless the proponent gives to the adverse party suf f icient advance written n otice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a f air opportunity t o c ontest the u se of such evidence.” 6 This Court has held that “[ b]y the e xpress term s of the r ule, a crim i nal def

endant is not exem

pt f rom the requirem ent of appropriate notice.” 7 ¶20. But Rule 60 9

—

b y i t s v e r y t erm s—has no application when a witness lies on the witness stand. Rule 609 allows an attack on a witness’s general character f or truthf ulness, which essentially is an assertion that the witness has the pro p e nsity t o lie. A n attack on a witness’s general character f or truthf u lness is not the sam e as an attack on the truthf ulness

5 M .R .E . 6 0 9 (b ).

6 Id

. 7 J o h n so n , 5 2 9 S o . 2 d at 5 8 7

. S ee a lso W eek s v. S ta te , 8 0 4 S o . 2 d 9 8 0 , 9 9 7 (M iss. 2 0 0 1 ) (“F u rth e rm o re, M .R .E

. 6 0 9 (b ) clear l y s t a t e s t h at in o r d er f o r ev id en ce o f a p rio r co n v ictio n th a t is m o re t h an ten y ears o ld , as calcu l ated i n th e r u le, to b e ad missib le, th e p ro p o n en t

m u st g iv e th e o p p o sin g p arty a d va n c ed w ritten n o tice .”). 8of specif

ic testim o ny . 8 Im

peachm ent of specif

ic testim ony sim

ply is outside the purview of Rule 609, including its advanced-written-notice requirem e nts. ¶21. D u r i n g d i rect e xam ination, the State asked Melvin how m any crim inal conv i c t i o n s s h e h a d , a n d s he said she had only f ive crim inal c onvictions dating b ack to 2001. In reality , Melvin had eight crim inal convictions dating b ack to t he 1970s. Wh i l e , under Rule 609, Melvin’s three other convictions f rom the 1970s would h ave been inadm i ssible to attack her general character f

or truthf ulness, they clearly were adm issible to i m p e a ch Melvin’s inaccurate testim o ny

about her crim inal history

. ¶22. Had t he State asked Melvin to disclose all of her crim inal convictions during the last

ten y ears, this issue would not be bef ore us. But the S tate chose t o ask M elvin about all her convictions, even those barred by Rule 609. This w as a calculated decision by the State to establish Melvin’s credib i l i t y , a nd when Melvin d id not accurately respond to t he State’s questioning, she opened the door to im peachm ent w ith the other c o n v i c t i o ns she f ailed to disclose. And once M elvin opened the door, the j ury ha d a r i g h t t o know that M elvin had
p rovided inaccurate testim ony . W e theref ore f ind that the trial j udge c om m itted e r r o r b y ref using to allow Collier’s counsel to cross-exam ine Melvin on all of her convictions. ¶23. Collier also argues tha t t h e t r i a l c o urt e rred in ref using to allow him t o introduce Melvin’s “guilty plea petition” in evidence. Co l l i e r argued that in M elvin’s guilty plea petition she disclosed her 1 970s-era convictions a nd elaborated on the nature of her 2000s8 S ee 1 M i c h a e l H. Graham , W inning Evidence A r

guments: Advanced Evidence for the Trial Attorney 1 0 01 (2006) (“Use of a prior conviction f or other p u r p o s e s , such as showing bias or interest, f alls outside the scope of

Rule 609.”). 9era f

o rgery conviction. In d eny ing the request, the trial judge s aid the plea was inadm issable because the 1970s-era convictions also were inadm issible. Collier argues that, because these convictions were adm issible as im peachm ent e v idence, th e t rial j udge should have let h im introduce the guilty -plea petition as a prior inconsistent statem ent under Rule 613(b). ¶24. Although we agree that Collier should have been allowed to im peach Melvin with her prior convictions when she did not provide accurate testim ony about h er crim inal history , an advance ruling on the adm issibility of the guilty

- plea petition was prem ature. Rule 613(b) provides that “[ e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statem ent b y a witness is not adm issible unless the witness is af f orded an opportunity t o explain o r d eny t he sam e and the opposite party is af

f orded a n opportunity t o interrogate him thereon, or t he interest of justice otherwise require.” 9 A nd “[ o]ur precedent is clear that, while a prior inconsistent statem ent of a testif y ing witness can be used to im peach the witness’s credibility , it is not adm issible as substantive evidence . . . .” 1 0 ¶25. W h en Collier s ought to introduce Melvin’s guilty -plea petition, Melvin had not been

cross-exam ined about her in c o n sistent crim inal history

. Until Melvin testif ied one way or the other, her g u ilty -plea petition could not be used f or im peachm ent p u r

p o s e s. And even if i t could be used f

or such p u r p o s e s , t h e statem ent c ould not be introduced as s u bstantive evidence. So we agree with the trial judge’s decision t o exclude t he guilty -plea petition, but f or dif f erent reasons.

9 M .R .E . 6 1 3 (b ) (em

p h asis ad d ed ).

10 S m ith v. S ta te , 2 5 S o . 3 d 2 6 4 , 2 7 1 (M iss. 2 0 0 9 ). 1 0¶26. Because w e f ind t hat the trial judge erred in analy zing the issue in this case under Rule
609 and that h e abused h is discretion in sustaining the State’s o bjection, we next consider whether this error constituted reversible error.

B. The trial c o u rt com m itted harm less error w hen it prohibited Collier f

rom c ross-ex am ining Melvin about her other crim inal convictions. ¶27. W e review errors involving the trial court’s adm i ssion or exclusion of evidence under a harm less-error analy sis. 11
Harm less-error analy sis prevents “setting aside convictions f or sm all errors or def ects that have little, if any , likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. W e do not reverse a c onviction f or an erroneous e v identiary ruling unless “the err o r a d versely af f ects a substantial right of a party , ” or i n other words, unless the ruling prejudiced the accused. Thus, w here i t is “clear bey ond a reasonable doubt that t he error d id not contribute t o the verdict,” we need not reverse the conviction. 12 ¶28. I n A n t

h o ny , t his Court f

ound reversible e rror when a trial court r e f u s e d t o l e t a crim inal def

endant cross-exam ine an undercover inf orm an t about a s eventeen-y ear-old crim inal conviction and other charges the inf orm ant was actively “working o f f .” 13 The Court f ound “the f

avorable treatm e nt [ the inf orm ant] received on his prior charges i n exchange f or his testim ony was a m aterial point that af f ected [ the inf

orm a n t’s] credibility as a witness.” 14

11 S m ith v . S ta te , 1 3 6 S o . 3 d 4 2 4 , 4 3 5 (M iss. 2 0 1 4 ) (citin g Y o u n g v. S ta te , 9 9 S o . 3 d 1 5 9 , 1 6 5 (M iss. 2 0 1 2 )).

12 S m ith , 1 3 6 S o . 3 d at 4 3 5 (in tern al citatio n s o m itted ).

13 A n th o n y v. S ta te , 1 0 8 S o . 3 d 3 9 4 , 3 9 8 (M iss. 2 0 1 3 ).

14 Id . 1 1And “[ i]n lim iting [ the def endant’s] cross- e x a mination of [ the inf orm ant], t he trial court denied [ the def

endant] the opportunity

to f ully challenge [ the inf

orm ant’s] credibility .” 15 ¶29. This error was m ade worse because “the S t a t e ’ s c a s e r e l i e d h e a v i l y o n [ t he inf orm a n t’s] testim ony .” 16 Even though the State i ntroduced video evidence, the video evidence d id not clearly show drugs changing hands. 17 So “the reliability of [ the inf orm ant’s] testim o n y was crucial,” and the trial court’s e rror in lim iting the scope of the def endant’s

cross-exam ination constituted reversible error. 18 ¶30. Although there are sim ilarities between this case and A nthony , w e f i nd t hat the trial judge’s error in this c ase w as harm less. Unlike the jury i n Anthony , the j u r y in this case already had learned that Melvin was a seasoned f elon. The trial j udge also allowed Collier

to im peach Melvin’s testim ony about her convictions f or “bad c hecks” a nd point out that this testim o ny was m i sleading. ¶31. Also, the three videos in t his case clearly show that Colli e r e x c h anged packages of

som e substance f

or m oney . Melvin brought t he s u bstances to law-enf

orcem ent of

f icials, and the s ubstances tested p ositive f or control l e d substances. To question Collier’s testim ony , one would have to believe that Collier sold Melvin s om ething ot her than the controlled subst a n c e s , a n d that Melvin then hid or destroy ed what she bought f r om Collier and then

15 Id .
16 Id . 17 Id .
18 Id . 1 2retrieved hidden drugs to p rovide to police

. C ollier produced no evidence to support this

speculation. ¶32. Because Melvin’ s c r e d i b i l i t y a l r e a d y h a d b e e n t arnished, and because of the substantial evidence t hat established the three transactions as d rug sales, a nd in the absence of any evidence to the c ontrary , we f ail to s ee how the disclosure of three m ore convictions would h ave had m ade any dif f erence. T heref

ore, under the f

acts o f t h i s case, w e f

ind that the trial judge’s decision to p revent Collier’s attorney f rom cross-exam ining Melvin on the other three convictions was harm l ess. II. The jury ’s verdict w a s s u p p o r t e d by sufficient e v idence t hat Collier sold cocaine to Melvin. ¶33. F i n ally , Collier argues that the jury ’s verdict was against the o verwhelm ing weig h t of the evidence. The standard f or reversing a jury ’ s verdict as against t h e o v erwhelm ing weight of the evidence is very high. 19 This Court views all the evidence, e v en evidence that does n ot support the State’s c ase, “in the light m ost f avorable to the state .” 20 W e will reverse only when “the f

acts and i nf

erences poin t in f

a v or of the def

endant o n any elem ent of the of f ense w ith suf

f icient f orce that a reasonable jury could not have f o und b ey ond a r easonable doubt that the def

endant was g u ilty .” 21 W h en a reasonable jury c o uld not hav e f o und the def endant guilty bey ond a reasonable doubt, then “the v erdict is ‘ s o c o ntrary to the

19 M o o re v. S ta te , 1 5 1 S o . 3 d 2 0 0 , 2 0 2 (M iss. 2 0 1 4 )

. 20 G riffin v. S

ta te , 6 0 7 S o . 2 d 1 1 9 7 , 1 2 0 1 (M iss. 1 9 9 2 ) (citin g B u r g e v . S ta te , 4 7 2 S o . 2 d 3 9 2 , 3 9 6 (M iss. 1 9 8 5 )) (em p h asis ad d ed ).

21 M o o re , 1 5 1 S o . 3 d at 2 0 2 ( q u o tin g Y o u n g v . S t a te , 1 1 9 S o . 3 d 3 0 9 , 3 1 5 (M iss. 2 0 1 3 )). 1 3overwhelm ing weight o f the evidence t hat allowing i t to stand would s anction an

unconscionable injustice.’” 22 ¶34. Collier argues that t he j ury ’s verdict was based o n speculation and that the evidence

was insuf f icient to prove that Collier sold cocaine t o Melvin. Colli e r n o t e s t h a t Melvin’s testim o ny m ade the State’s case and that the video of the transactions alone was insuf f icient. Collier f urther argues that M e lvin was so d esperate t o stay out of j ail that she f ram ed Collier. ¶35. W h en t he evidence i n this case is viewed i n the light m ost f a vorable to the State, there is enough evidence f

or a reasonable jury to have f ound Collier guilty . Melvin’s testim ony along with the recordings—as unclear as they were— could have been suf f icient f or a reasonable juror to f

ind Collier guilty

of selling cocaine. This issue is without m erit.
CONCLUSION ¶36. To conclude, we af f irm t he jury ’s verdict in this case. Although the trial court erred in r ef using to let Collier cross-exam ine Melvin about the oth e r c r i m inal convictions she f ailed to disclose during her direct exam ination, this error was harm l ess. ¶37. COUNT I I : CONVICTION OF SALE OF COCAINE, AS A SUBSEQUENT DRUG OF F ENDER, AND S E N T E N C E O F F ORTY (40) Y EARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE M I S S I S S I P P I DEP A RTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AF F IRMED. CO U N T I I I : CONVICTION OF SALE OF COCAINE, AS A SUBSEQUENT DRUG OF F ENDER, AND SENTENCE OF F ORTY (40) YEARS I N THE CUSTODY OF THE M ISSISSIP P I DEP ARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AF F IRMED. C OUNT IV: CONVICTION OF SALE OF COCAINE, AS A SUBSEQUENT D R UG OF F ENDER, AND SENTENCE OF F ORTY (40) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF TH E MI S S I SSIP P I DEP ARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AF F IRMED. AS TO COUNT IV, AF TER AP PE LLANT HAS SERVED A TERM OF ONE (1) DAY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIP P I DEP ARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE AP P ELLANT SHALL BE R ELEASED AND SERVE A TERM OF F I V E ( 5 ) Y E A R S O N P OST RELE A S E S U P E R V I S I O N , W I T H C O N D I T I O N S , U N D E R T H E

22 M o o re , 1 5 1 S o . 3 d at 2 0 2 (q u o tin g G ilp a trick v. S ta te , 9 9 1 S o . 2 d 1 3 0 , 1 3 4 (M iss. 2 0 0 8 )). 1 4DIRECT SUP ERVISION OF THE MISSISSIP P I DEP A R TMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

AP P ELLANT SHALL P AY COURT COSTS, F E E S A ND ASSESSMENTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,456.50 WITHIN NINETY (90) D AYS RELEASE F ROM CUSTODY. AP P ELLANT IS IMP OSED A F INE IN THE AMOUNT OF $ 10,000 IN COUNT II; A F INE IN THE AMOUNT OF $10,000 IN COUNT III; A F INE IN THE AMOUNT OF $10,000 IN C O U N T I V , W I T H P A Y M E N T O F S A I D F I N ES SUSP ENDED. THE S E N T E N C E I M P O S E D IN COUNT III SHALL RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE I M PO S E D IN COUNT II. THE SENTENCE IMP OSED IN COUNT IV SHALL RUN CONSECUTIVELY T O T H E S E N T E N C E IMP OSED IN COUNT III. AP P ELLANT SHALL R ECEIVE CRE D I T F OR TIME SERVED IN P RETRIAL DETAINMENT. WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., L AMAR, KI T C HENS, C HANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

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