NUMBER 13-17-00681-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

EDWARD BERLANGA SALGADO, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 138th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Hinojosa

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, appellant Edward Berlanga 

Salgado pled guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI), third offense or more, a third-degree 

felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). 

By one issue, Salgado argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
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because the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Salgado for backing

his vehicle unsafely. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.415 (West, Westlaw through 

2017 1st C.S.). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 15, 2016, Salgado backed his vehicle out of a private driveway onto 

Boca Chica Boulevard in Brownsville, Texas. Salgado backing out onto the street forced 

Officer Jose Huerta to come to a complete stop. Officer Huerta conducted a traffic stop, 

claiming that Salgado had backed his vehicle unsafely in violation of Texas Transportation 

Code section 545.415. See id. Based on Officer Huerta’s observations during the traffic 

stop, Salgado was found guilty of DWI, third offense or more. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 

§ 49.09(b).

Salgado filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the way he backed up was not 

per se unsafe. More specifically, Salgado did not have “any problem backing out of his 

vehicle from the driveway,” he did not back out “faster than necessary,” and he did not 

“hit the curb.” Thus, according to Salgado, Officer Huerta failed to articulate facts to 

establish that Salgado unsafely backed up his vehicle in violation of the traffic laws. At 

the suppression hearing, the trial court admitted dashcam footage showing Officer Huerta 

pulling to a stop to avoid crashing into Salgado, who was backing from a private driveway 

onto the street. Officer Huerta testified, “[a]s you can see in the video, he backed into 

traffic, which I consider my unit traffic, as well, making me have to stop to prevent from 

hitting his vehicle.” The trial court denied Salgado’s motion to suppress, ruling that “[i]f 

the patrol unit had to put on the brakes and slow down, then it was at a time that it was 

unsafe.” Subsequently, Salgado pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six years’ 
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imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division. This 

appeal followed.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his sole issue, Salgado argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress because there was legally insufficient evidence to show that he was lawfully 

stopped.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we employ a bifurcated 

standard, giving almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historic facts and 

mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness, but applying a 

de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not 

depend on credibility determinations. See State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013); Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The 

trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight to be given their testimony. See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007). The record is reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

determination, and the judgment will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or 

“outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” State v. Dixon, 206 S.W. 3d 587, 590 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

A police officer may temporarily detain an individual when the officer has 

reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual “actually is, has been, or soon will be 

engaged in criminal activity.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

Reasonable suspicion exists when the officer has specific and articulable facts that, when 
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combined with the inferences from those facts, lead the officer to reasonably believe that 

the individual is or will soon be engaged in crime. See id.; See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety 

v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (“The State is not 

required to show a traffic offense was actually committed, but only that the officer 

reasonably believed a violation was in progress.”).

Under the Transportation Code, “[a]n operator may not back the vehicle unless the 

movement can be made safely and without interference with other traffic.” See TEX.

TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.415.

B. Analysis

Salgado argues that Officer Huerta did not articulate facts establishing that 

Salgado backed up his vehicle unsafely. According to Salgado, there was nothing 

“ostensibly unsafe” about the way he backed up; for example, he did not hit the curb and 

he did not go faster than necessary to back up. Salgado acknowledges that Officer 

Huerta had to stop his vehicle to avoid colliding with Salgado but he asserts that driving 

“inherently involves the inconvenience of every driver having to stop his vehicle at some 

point in order to avoid the tragic consequence of causing a collision.” But Salgado ignores 

the plain text of the traffic violation for which he was pulled over: “[a]n operator may not 

back the vehicle unless the movement can be made safely and without interference with 

other traffic.” See id. § 545.415 (emphasis added). By his own admissions and by the 

undisputed evidence in the record, Salgado interfered with other traffic—Officer Huerta—

as he backed his vehicle onto the street. See id. Therefore, we conclude that Officer 

Huerta had reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation was occurring or recently 

occurred. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
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denying Salgado’s motion to suppress. See Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273. We overrule 

Salgado’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

 NORA L. LONGORIA

 Justice 

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

14th day of March, 2019.