alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Douglas W. Hyde, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this third quarter SEC Form 10-Q of OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

d)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 22

- 50248 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,** Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus **Cruz Aguirre Cruz,** Defendant

— Appellant **,**

**consolidated with**

**_____________** No. 22

- 50264

**_____________ United States of America,**  Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus
**Cruz Aguirre**

**- Cruz,**  Defendant

— Appellant

**.** United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 6, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 22-50248 Document: 00516499944 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/06/2022No. 22

- 50248 c/w No. 22

- 50264

2 Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 4:21

- CR

- 1001

- 1 USDC No. 4:18

- CR

- 596

- 2

Before **Stewart, Duncan,** and **Wilson,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** * Cruz Aguirre Cruz appeals his guilty plea conviction and sentence for illegal re entry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). He also appeals the district court’s order revoking the term of supervised release he was serving at the time of the offense. Becau se his appellate brief does not address the revocation or the revocation sentence, he abandons any challenge to that order

. See Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224

- 25 (5th Cir. 1993). On appeal, Aguirre Cruz argues that the recidivism enhancement in § 13 26(b) is unconstitutional because it permits a sentence above the otherwise

- applicable statutory maximum established by § 1326(a), based on facts that are neither alleged in the indictment nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. While Aguirre Cruz acknowledges this argument is foreclosed by Almendarez

- Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), he nevertheless seeks to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. Accordingly, he has filed an unopposed motion for summary disposition.
We have h eld that subsequent Supreme Court decisions such as Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), did not overrule Almendarez

- Torres

. See United States v. Pervis , 937 F.3d 546, 553

- 54 (5th Cir. 2019). Thus , Aguirre Cruz is correct that his argument is foreclosed. Because his position “is clearly right as a

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. Case: 22-50248 Document: 00516499944 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/06/2022No. 22

- 50248 c/w No. 22

- 50264

3 matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,” summary affirmance is proper
. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis , 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Accordingly, Aguirre Cruz’s motion for summary disposition is **GRANTED** , and the judgment s of the district court are **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 22-50248 Document: 00516499944 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/06/2022
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.



## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2009-7102

KEITH D. SNYDER,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

Respondent-Appellee.

Kenneth M. Carpenter , Carpenter, Chartered, of Topeka, Kansas, argued for

claimant-appellant.

Daniel Rabinowitz , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,

United States Department of Ju stice, of Washingt on, DC, argued for re spondent-appellee.

On the brief were Tony West , Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director,

and Kirk T. Manhardt , Assistant Director, and Jeffrey A. Regner , Trial Attorney. Of counsel

on the brief were Michael J. Timinski , Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and Michael G.

Daugherty , Attorney, Office of the General Counsel , United States Department of Veterans

Affairs, of Washington, DC.

Appealed from: United States Cour t of Appeals for Veterans Claims

Judge Robert N. DavisNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.



## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2009-7102

KEITH D. SNYDER,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

Respondent-Appellee.



## Judgment

ON APPEAL from the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

in CASE NO(S). 04-0381

This CAUSE having been hear d and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

Per Curiam (LOURIE, GAJARSA, and MOORE, Circuit Judges ).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

DATED February 5, 2010 /s/ Jan Horbaly

Jan Horbaly, Clerk
#### The Cleveland Ry. Co. *v.*Karbole.

(No. 23451

Decided June 15, 1932.)

*469*Messrs. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey*and *Mr. B. G-Green,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Booker & Schwarts,*for defendant in error.

Stephenson, J.

The case of *Reining, Admx.,*v. *Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co.,*107 Ohio St., 528, 140 N. E., 84, disposes of this case. The specific allegations of negligence set out in plaintiff’s petition against the street railway company do not constitute a cause of action against the company. It has been specifically held that when a passenger has alighted iu safety from a street car, the relation of carrier and passenger ceases *eo instanti.*

There is no testimony in this case tending to show that the street railway company had anything whatever to do with barricading the east side of Fifty-fifth street; nor did it in any wise contribute to such barricade. It produced no condition of danger.

The trial court should have granted the motion of the street railway company to direct a verdict, and in failing to do so erred; and the Court of Appeals, by affirming the judgment of the court of common pleas, likewise committed error.

This court, coming now to render the judgment that *470should have been rendered in the trial court, reverses the Court of Appeals and the court of common pleas, and judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff in error, the Cleveland Railway Company, with costs.

*Judgments reversed and judgment for plaintiff in error.*

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Day and Kinkade, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99.1





CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER OR


PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In connection with the
accompanying Form 10-Q of PG&E Gas Transmission, Northwest Corporation for the quarter ended June 30, 2002, I, Thomas B. King, President and Chief Operating Officer of PG&E Gas Transmission, Northwest Corporation, hereby certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:





(1)  such Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2002, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  the information contained in such Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2002, fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of PG&E Gas Transmission, Northwest Corporation.





By:

/s/    THOMAS B.
KINGThomas B. King President and
Chief Operating Officer





Date:   August 2, 2002
221 So.2d 921

#### Curtis FRANKLIN v. STATE.

4 Div. 354.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 27, 1969.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1969.

Jas. M. Prestwcod, Andalusia, for petitioner.

MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., opposed.

Certiorari to Court, of Appeals.

HARWOOD, Justice.

Petition of Curtis Franklin for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision in Franklin v. State, 45 Ala.App. 27, 221 So.2d 919.

Writ denied.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and MERRILL, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 15.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We have issued our reports dated May 5, 2015 with respect to the consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting includedin the Annual Report of WNS (Holdings) Limited on Form 20-F for the year ended March 31, 2015. 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference ofsaid reports in the Registration Statements of WNS (Holdings) Limited on Form S-8 (File No. 333-136168, File No. 333-157356, File No. 333-176849 and File No. 333-191416). 

/s/ GRANT THORNTON INDIA LLP

Mumbai, India 

May 5, 2015
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, *v.*Rochester Railway and Light Company, Respondent.

Fourth Department,

January 13, 1909.

Crime—manslaughter, second degree—corporation cannot be indicted,

An indictment does not lie against a corporation for manslaughter in the second degree for causing the death of a human being by culpable negligence.

The word "person” as used in section 193 of the Penal Code defining manslaughter, second degree, refers only to a human being, not to a corporation.

Appeal by the plaintiff, The People of the State of Hew York, from a judgment of the County Court of Monroe county in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 17th day of June, 1908, sustaining a demurrer to an indictment against the defendant for the crime of manslaughter, second degree.

*Howard H. Widener*and *Charles B. Bechtold,*for the appellant.

Harris, *Havens, Beach & Harris,*for the respondent.

Williams, J.:

The judgment should be affirmed.

An indictment will not lie against a defendant corporation for manslaughter, second degree, for the causing of the death of a human being by culpable negligence under section 193 of the Penal Code. By section 179 homicide is defined as the killing of one *844human being by the act, procurement or omission of another, and then by section 193 it is provided that such homicide is manslaughter in the second degree when committed (Subd. 3) by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of any person, which does not constitute the crime of murder nor manslaughter in' the first degree. "We think the word *person*in the latter section should not be construed as including a corporation, because a homicide can only be committed by a human being. We are asked to construe the definition of *homicide*as meaning the killing of one human being by another person, and thus as including a corporation. We do not so construe it, but rather that the killing must be by another human being.

Without discussing this question at length, or considering the decisions of this or other States or countries, we merely call attention to the fact that there has never yet been a conviction had against a corporation in this State for a criminal homicide, and if such an indictment and conviction is now to be sustained, under any construction of the provisions of the Penal Code, it had better be done by the Court of Appeals and not by any of the lower courts.

All concurred, except Reuse, J., not sitting.

Judgment affirmed.
#### Nicholas Ramos HERRERA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dr. George J. BETO, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 72-1477.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 24, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1973.

Philip Friday, Austin, Tex. (Court-appointed), for petitioner-appellant.

Crawford Martin, Atty. Gen., Roland Daniel Green, Sarah E. Phillips, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Before DYER, SIMPSON and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Herrera was convicted in a Texas state court of unlawfully possessing a narcotic drug. On this habeas appeal petitioner contends that the prosecution knowingly acquiesced in the use of false testimony and that the trial -court erroneously refused to allow defense counsel to impeach the main prosecution witness. On oral argument before this court, Herrera’s case was consolidated with four other cases involving similar factual situations. It was undisputed that our disposition of the above two issues in any one case would of necessity control the same issues in the other cases. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Corpus v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1972, 469 F.2d 953, the denial of the writ of habeas corpus by the district court is hereby

Affirmed.
**Exhibit 10.6.17.2**

February 11, 2008 

Chuck Clark 

717 Texas Ave 

Houston, TX 77002 

DearMr. Clark: 

As you are aware, on May 15, 2006, Calpine Corporation (“Calpine”) and its debtor affiliates (collectively,the “Debtors”) received Bankruptcy Court approval of the Emergence Incentive Plan (the “EIP”), which provides variable cash awards to approximately select senior employees. Pursuant to the terms of the EIP, an incentive pool willbe created according to certain metrics related to the valuation of Calpine both under the Debtors’ plan of reorganization and based on market value during a certain period after the effective date of the plan (the “EIP Pool”), which,once created will be distributed to eligible employees solely at my discretion as chief executive of Calpine. 

As communicated to youearlier, you have been chosen to be a participant in the EIP. This letter confirms my final intentions regarding distribution under the EIP. Accordingly, as of the date hereof, you are eligible to receive 5.00% of the EIP Pool once the EIP Pool isfunded. 

This proposed distribution percentage is a final and binding decision and cannot be altered except in the event that you areterminated by Calpine for “Cause” or you voluntarily terminate without “Good Reason”, in which case you will forfeit any right to any distribution from the EIP Pool. You will remain eligible to receive the proposed distributionset forth herein if you resign for “Good Cause” or are terminated without “Cause”. The distribution out of the EIP Pool is expected to be made around May 9, 2008. 

I believe the Emergence Incentive plan recognizes and rewards our efforts toward a successful exit from bankruptcy. Fortunately for all of us, ourcombined efforts created a higher than expected adjusted enterprise value which will result in payments from the EIP that are more than competitive. 

I look forward to our continued shared success. Should you have any questions regarding the foregoing, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ Robert P. May 

Robert P. May 

Chief Executive Officer
#### The Trustees of Schools for Township six, in South range six West, Appellants, *v.*Charles N. Starbird, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM RANDOLPH.

Where a party by himself or his agent undertakes to appeal from the decision of a justice of the peace, and executes a bond which is accepted, the appeal shall be sustained, if he will supply any defect in the bond, when objection is made thereto.

This action was commenced by Starbird before a justice of the peace in Randolph county, upon which he recovered a judgment against the Trustees of Schools. One of the trustees took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Randolph county. A motion was made in the Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal for want of a sufficient -bond, and also a motion to amend the appeal bond. The Circuit Court sustained the motion to dismiss, and entered judgment accordingly. From this judgment of the Circuit Court, the trustees took an appeal to this court.

The judgment of the Circuit Court was pronounced by Underwood, Judge, at September Term, 1850, of the Randolph Circuit Court.

G. Koerner, for appellants.

S. Breese, for appellee.

Treat, C. J.

Starbird recovered a judgment, before a justice of the peace, against the trustees of schools, of a township-in Randolph county. An appeal bond was entered into by one of the trustees, and approved by the clerk of the Circuit Court.. The court overruled an application by the trustees to amend the bond, and sustained a motion of the plaintiff to dismiss the-appeal.

This case is not distinguishable from those of Bragg v. Fessenden, 11 Ill. 544, and Boosman *v.*Freeman, 12 Ill. 165. The principle is settled in those cases, that where a party, by himself or his agent, undertakes to appeal from the decision of a justice of the peace, and makes such an attempt at the execution of an appeal bond, that the proper officer accepts it, he *50shall not be prejudiced by reason of any deficiency in the obligation, if he will, when objection is made, supply the defect. Here the bond was defective, because not executed by the corporation against which the judgment was rendered. It was, however, binding on the obligors personally, and the appellee was, consequently, not without a remedy. The trustee intended to take an appeal that would enable the corporation to have the case re-heard, and, for that purpose, executed a bond which was approved and accepted by the clerk. The court should have permitted the trustees to perfect this appeal, by the execution of a bond obligatory on the corporation.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

*Judgment reversed.*
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-14-00062-CR

IN RE: JEFFREY MCGILL

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jeffrey McGill has filed a petition for writ of mandamus in which he asks this Court to 

order William H. McCoy, who he identifies as his counsel of record in the underlying case, to 

turn over to him all documents and exhibits related to his conviction in the Fifth Judicial District 

Court of Cass County, Texas. McGill indicates that he desires to pursue a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus and seeks the documents so that he may do so effectively.

This Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against “a judge of a district or 

county court in the court of appeals district.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(b) (West 2004). 

McCoy does not fall within those categories, and the request does not impact an appeal to this 

Court. We therefore have no jurisdiction to issue the writ.

We deny the petition.

Bailey C. Moseley

Justice

Date Submitted: April 8, 2014

Date Decided: April 9, 2014

Do Not Publish
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID LINDON HARPINE,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

IGNACIO DE LAS HERAS, in his

individual capacity as Clinical Director

and JASPAL DHALIWAL, in his own

individual capacity as Medical Director at

the Federal Correctional Institution at

Sheridan, Oregon,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-35910

D.C. No. 6:07-cv-01882-TC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ann Aiken, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2010 ** 

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

FILED

DEC 22 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-35910

David Lindon Harpine, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) alleging deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review summary judgment de novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,

926 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harpine’s claims

against defendant De Las Heras because Harpine failed to present evidence

creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether De Las Heras purposefully

ignored or failed to respond to Harpine’s medical condition. See McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harpine’s claims

against defendant Dhaliwal because Harpine failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact as to Dhaliwal’s alleged deliberate indifference. Dhaliwal prescribed

various pain killers and behavior change to treat the condition and referred Harpine

to specialists to evaluate his condition and opine as to the need for further

treatment. That this was not the treatment Harpine desired does not render it “so

outrageous as to amount to no treatment at all.” Shields v. Kunkel, 442 F.3d 409,
3 09-35910

409 (9th Cir. 1971); see also Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A

difference of opinion does not amount to a deliberate indifference to . . . serious

medical needs.”).

Harpine’s motion for reconsideration is denied. His motion for judicial

notice is granted but his motion for an order is denied as unnecessary. 

Harpine’s remaining contentions are not persuasive.

AFFIRMED.
#### Charles O. Cavitt and Charles Cavitt, a Minor, by His Next Friend, Charles O. Cavitt, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Terrence F. Faulkner, Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 65-151. (Abstract of Decision.)

Second District.

August 22, 1966.

Reese & Schuster, of Rockford, for appellants; Thomas and Kostantacos, of Rockford, for appellee.

Opinion by JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON. Not to be published in full.