In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-10-00077-CV

______________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF S.P., J.P., AND A.P., CHILDREN

 

On Appeal from the 145th Judicial District Court

Nacogdoches County, Texas

Trial Court No. C20,871-2004

 

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Chanda Pipes has filed an appeal from the denial of her bill of review.1The underlying 

case involves the termination of her parental rights to three children, by order of March 10, 2006. 

She states that her husband, Jimmy Pipes, is now incarcerated and had informed her that he had 

discovered, while in the legal library at the prison, that she could have appealed from the order of 

termination. She maintains an unawareness that she could do so before, stating that her former 

attorney had abandoned her by not seeking to file a notice of appeal, and that she was wrongfully 

advised she could not appeal the order of termination.2 

A bill of review is an equitable proceeding to set aside a final judgment that is no longer 

appealable or subject to a motion for new trial or appeal. Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe, 

722 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1987). To be entitled to relief, a plaintiff in a bill of review action is 

ordinarily required to prove three elements: (1) a meritorious claim or defense; (2) which he was 

prevented from asserting by the fraud, accident, or mistake of the opposite party or a mistake by 

court personnel in the execution of official duties; (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of his 

 

1Originally appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme 

Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005). We are 

unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Twelfth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant 

issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2We note that the record includes a copy of an opinion on her appeal from the termination that was issued on 

September 6, 2006. An appeal was thus brought, but the nonindigent Pipes did not pay the fee for filing the appeal 

with the Tyler Court of Appeals despite multiple warnings and opportunities to do so, and the Tyler court ultimately 

dismissed her appeal. Thus, her claim is without validity on its face.
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own. Id. at 408; W. Columbia Nat’l Bank v. Griffith, 902 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 1995, writ denied).

Under the general statute, as applied by the trial court, a petition for bill of review must be 

filed within four years of the date of the disputed judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 2008); TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f); Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 538 

(Tex. 1998); Layton v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp., 141 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi 2004, no pet.).

The Texas Family Code also has its own separate restriction on the time in which a party 

may bring either a direct or a collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights. Section 

161.211 of the Texas Family Code provides that ―the validity of an order terminating parental 

rights of a person who has been personally served . . . is not subject to collateral or direct attack 

after the sixth month after the date the order was signed.‖ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.211 

(Vernon 2008). This section has been treated as shortening the time in which a bill of review 

could be brought to a maximum of six months. See In re L.N.M., 182 S.W.3d 470, 473–74 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).

By her own pleadings (and under both the four-year and the six-month time period), the

time for filing a bill of review has expired and the relief is no longer available. Thus, the trial 

court did not err by denying the bill. Further, allegations of fraud or negligence on the part of a 

party’s attorney are insufficient to support a bill of review. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d at 408; Gracey v. 
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West, 422 S.W.2d 913, 918–19 (Tex. 1968). Thus, a bill of review petitioner who alleges that the 

wrongful act of his attorney caused an adverse judgment is not excused from the necessity of 

pleading and proving his opponent’s extrinsic fraud. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 

742 (Tex. 2003); Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d at 408. No such fraud is pled.

We affirm the judgment.

Bailey C. Moseley

Justice

Date Submitted: December 3, 2010

Date Decided: December 7, 2010