J-A32025-14

*Retired Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SHAWN COAXUM,

Appellant No. 602 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of August 29, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013596-2007

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2015

Appellant, Shawn Coaxum, appeals from her judgment of sentence 

entered on August 29, 2013, following resentencing on her jury trial 

convictions for aggravated assault and conspiracy. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:

[T]he victim’s drink accidentally spilled on [Appellant]. 

[Appellant] went to her house to get her nephew, 

codefendant Tyree Coaxum [(“Tyree”)], who came out of 

the house and asked the victim why he hit [Appellant]. 

While [Appellant], Tyree [] and the victim were arguing, 

codefendant Ahmad Williams [(“Williams”)] exited a house, 

went to the trunk of a car, took out a black revolver, and 

shot the victim in the foot from a distance of about five feet 

away or closer, before saying “What’s up now, old head?” 

As the victim was slowly walking away (due to his injury) 

and looking behind him, Tyree [] grabbed the gun and 

[Appellant] instructed codefendant to “Shoot that M.F.er” or 

“Kill that M.F.er.” Tyree then shot the victim in the head.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/2009, at 3 (record citations).
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On October 21, 2008, a jury convicted Appellant of aggravated 

assault, conspiracy, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a 

firearm in the streets of Philadelphia.1 Appellant filed a timely appeal to this 

Court. On May 27, 2011, in an unpublished memorandum, we vacated 

Appellant’s firearm convictions and affirmed her aggravated assault and 

conspiracy convictions. See Commonwealth v. Coaxum, 30 A.3d 550 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum). Accordingly, we remanded the 

case for resentencing.

Thereafter, the trial court

resentenced [Appellant] on August 28, 2013 as follows: 85 

to 204 months [of imprisonment] for [a]ggravated [a]ssualt 

followed by 57 to 197 months [of imprisonment] for 

[c]onspiracy to [c]ommit [a]ggravated [a]ssault. [On 

September 3, 2013, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion 

asking for reconsideration of her sentence. The trial court 

denied Appellant’s request on September 20, 2013. No 

appeal was taken.]

On November 22, 2013, [Appellant] filed a [petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9541-9546]. On February 18, 2014, [the trial court 

reinstated Appellant’s] appellate rights []. On February 20, 

2014, [Appellant] filed a [n]otice of [a]ppeal. On February 

28, 2014, [Appellant] filed a [s]tatement of [e]rrors 

[c]omplained of on [a]ppeal [pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)], listing four appellate issues. [The trial court 

issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on May 5, 

2014.]

Trial Court Opinion, 5/5/2014, at 2. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 903, 6106, and 6108, respectively. 
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On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue2for our review:

Is [A]ppellant entitled to [a] new sentenc[ing] hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

Appellant argues that “[t]he sentence imposed by the trial court was 

unjust, improper, manifestly unreasonable, irrational, and an abuse of 

discretion because the court imposed [a] sentence of 11 years [and] 10 

months to 33 years in prison, on a 44 year old individual, which was above 

the average range of the sentencing guidelines and outside the guidelines, 

when [Appellant’s] prior record score was two, and [Appellant] had no 

history of violent criminal behavior.” Id. at 7. Further, she avers that “the 

fact that she was on probation at the time of the alleged offenses is not a 

reason to impose such a harsh sentence[.]” Id. Appellant also challenges 

the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences. Id. at 8. Finally, 

Appellant claims the trial court “did not consider any of the factors required 

by 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 9721(b) that is the protection of the public, the gravity 

of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant].” Id. 

____________________________________________

2

 We note that Appellant set forth four individual sentencing challenges in 

her Rule 1925(b) statement. While Appellant did not follow Pa.R.A.P. 2116, 

the sole issue presented on appeal fairly encompasses all four original 

claims. 
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Appellant challenges the trial court’s discretionary authority to impose 

a sentence. 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must 

invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, 

see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue 

was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion 

to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are 

generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing 

hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)(citations 

and brackets omitted).

Appellant has complied with the first requirement above, by timely 

filing a notice of appeal. Next, we observe that Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion preserved the issue presented. Appellant has also complied with the 

third requirement of the above-mentioned four-part test, by including a 

statement in her brief in conformity with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Finally, 

Appellant presents two substantial questions for our review. 

Commonwealth v. Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en 

banc) (substantial question is raised where appellant alleges sentencing 
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court imposed sentence in aggravated range without adequately 

considering mitigating circumstances). Likewise, Appellant’s argument that 

the sentencing court failed to consider the factors proffered in 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721 presents a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). 

However, “the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences 

lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and a challenge to 

the imposition of consecutive sentences simply does not raise a substantial 

question.” Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 878 A.2d 867, 873 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(citation omitted). Hence, we will examine whether the trial court 

considered Appellant’s individual circumstances, as well as, “the protection 

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life 

of the victim and on the community, and [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs” 

in fashioning Appellant’s sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). However, we 

will not examine the consecutive nature of Appellant’s sentences.

Our standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion 

of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. 

In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely 

by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must 

establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing 

court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment 

for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived 

at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
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Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253-1254 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted).

Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is 

confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9781(c). Subsection 

9781(c) provides:

The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand 

the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence 

within the sentencing guidelines but applied 

the guidelines erroneously;

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the 

sentencing guidelines but the case involves 

circumstances where the application of the 

guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the 

sentencing guidelines and the sentence is 

unreasonable.

In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the 

sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c).

In reviewing the record, we consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense 

and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to 

observe the defendant, including any 

presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was 

based.
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(4) The guidelines promulgated by the 

commission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).

Moreover, “the court shall follow the general principle that the 

sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs 

of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

Here, the trial court determined:

[Appellant’s] criminal history, [the trial court’s] duty to 

protect the public, and the scant rehabilitative potential of 

[Appellant] called for the sentences imposed. [Appellant] 

committed the crimes of aggravated assault and conspiracy 

to commit aggravated assault while on probation. 

[Appellant] was offered rehabilitative options [and] she 

refused to continue treatment. [Appellant] showed no 

remorse about her crimes, nor did she ever admit 

responsibility.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/5/2014, at 4-5.

Further, the trial court noted:

In addition, [Appellant’s] work history was reviewed and it 

was noted that [Appellant] was also illegally collecting 

welfare. Though having two sources of income, [Appellant] 

only paid back $70[.00] of the $38,000[.00] stolen. 

[Appellant] was offered [but,] refused[,] treatment. 

[Appellant] [expressed] no remorse for the crimes 

committed and merely stated that she was sorry for being 

found guilty and being charged, not for the actual 

commission of the acts. 

Id. at 5.
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Upon review of the record, we agree. Initially, the trial court 

recognized its duty to “balance the protection of the public[,] against 

[Appellant’s] possibility of being rehabilitated, as well as the gravity of the 

offenses that were committed back on July 13, 2007.” N.T., 8/29/2013, at 

22. The trial judge also stated:

My duty is not just to take the time that I imposed on 

November 25, 2008, and just robot-like add it to the 

sentences where I was not reversed. And, by the same 

token, I’m not a robot-like machine[...] that should just let it 

go and not do the same evaluation that was done back in 

November of 2008.

Id. at 23. 

The trial court looked at the facts of the case and recalled that 

“Appellant was on house arrest with electronic monitoring supervision when 

she asked people to shoot [the victim].” Id. at 16. Appellant’s age was 

discussed at length and Appellant argued that consecutive, aggravated 

range sentences had the effect of placing Appellant “under supervision either 

in prison or on parole [until] she’s 75 years old.” Id. at 15-16. Both parties 

presented argument and the trial court gave Appellant the right of 

allocution, which she declined. Id. at 27. The trial court ultimately imposed 

the following sentences, accompanied with the following rationale:

I’m going to not disturb the 57- to 192-month 

sentence on the conspiracy; on the aggravated assault 

sentence I am imposing a sentence of 85 to 204 months. 

That is an above guideline sentence, and that is amply 

justified by the [following] factors. [...] [Appellant’s 

expression of remorse was hollow, [Appellant] took no 

sincere responsibility for her crime, she committed these 
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crimes while on probation, her rehabilitation potential was 

shown to be almost nonexistent, and her propensity to 

provoke violence for a minor slight represents a danger to 

society. 

The individuals who shot [the victim] did this at 

[Appellant’s] urging. She was the instigator. She was the 

ring leader, all because she grabbed at someone’s glass of 

vodka and some of the vodka spilled on her.

Id. at 28. 

Based upon our standard of review and a review of the certified 

record, we discern no abuse of discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentences. 

The trial court was aware of the sentencing guidelines and clearly weighed 

the statutory factors in fashioning Appellant’s sentence. As the result of an 

otherwise minor altercation, Appellant engaged in a conspiratorial 

relationship that resulted in two gunshot wounds to the victim. These were 

grave offenses. Because Appellant engaged in those crimes while on house 

arrest, the trial court could reasonably conclude that her potential for 

rehabilitation was slim. Accordingly, the trial court acted within the scope of 

its discretion when it imposed aggravated sentences to protect the public. 

Moreover, the trial court adequately took into consideration Appellant’s 

proffered mitigating circumstances, including her age, when imposing her 

sentences. We discern no abuse of discretion and Appellant’s appellate 

claims fail.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/6/2015