J-S01015-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WAYNE EUGENE BROOKS

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 973 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 20, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0000087-1971

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 27, 2017

Appellant, Wayne Eugene Brooks, appeals pro se from the order 

entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his 

pro se serial petition for collateral relief (labeled a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus), per the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Following trial, on June 25, 1971, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree 

murder arising from his involvement in a shooting death, and the court 

sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Our 

Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on October 3, 1973. See 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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Commonwealth v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d 732 (1973). Appellant 

sought no further direct appeal. 

Appellant then began a long and unsuccessful journey for postconviction relief. On October 28, 2015, Appellant filed his most recent 

application as a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which Appellant 

argued the statute under which he was sentenced to life imprisonment was 

invalid. The PCRA court treated Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition and 

issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on May 2, 2016. Appellant filed a response 

on May 12, 2016, and the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on May 

20, 2016. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on June 8, 2016. 

On June 21, 2016, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); 

Appellant timely complied on July 8, 2016. 

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

DID THE [PCRA] COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR AND 

ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY CHANGING APPELLANT’S 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, VIOLATION OF 

EIGHTH AMENDMENT, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 

UNLAWFUL CONFINEMENT AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 

PUNISHMENT, INTO A PCRA [PETITION]?

(Appellant’s Brief at 2). 

Appellant argues our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 

449 Pa. 19, 295 A.2d 842 (1972), declared unconstitutional the statute 

under which he was convicted and sentenced, i.e., 18 P.S. § 4701 

(repealed). Appellant insists he is entitled to resentencing. Appellant avers 
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the PCRA does not govern his present claim, and the PCRA court erred when 

it denied his petition as an untimely PCRA petition. We disagree. 

Preliminarily, the PCRA is “the sole means of obtaining collateral relief 

and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same 

purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas 

corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. “Under the plain words of 

the statute, if the underlying substantive claim is one that could potentially 

be remedied under the PCRA, that claim is exclusive to the PCRA. It is only 

where the PCRA does not encompass a claim that other collateral procedures 

are available.” Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). See Commonwealth v. 

Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 557-58, 722 A.2d 638, 642-43 (1998) (stating PCRA 

time limits do not unreasonably or unconstitutionally limit constitutional right 

of habeas corpus relief). Further, a petitioner may not avoid the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA by labeling a filing as a petition for “writ of habeas 

corpus.” Commonwealth v. Mercado, 826 A.2d 897, 899 (Pa.Super. 

2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 765, 832 A.2d 436 (2003) (stating petition for 

habeas corpus relief must first satisfy jurisdictional PCRA timeliness 

requirements). Here, Appellant’s substantive claim challenges his sentence, 

which is a claim cognizable under the well-established rubric of the PCRA. 

As an additional prefatory matter, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is 

a jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 
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(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA 

petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment 

becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at 

the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking 

review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The three statutory exceptions to the 

timeliness provisions in the PCRA allow for very limited circumstances under 

which the late filing of a petition will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

A petitioner asserting a timeliness exception must file a petition within 60 

days of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(2). The PCRA time limits apply to claims raising the legality of a 

sentence. Commonwealth v. Voss, 838 A.2d 795 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

The statute under which Appellant was sentenced provided, in 

pertinent part, as follows:

Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the first 

degree is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to suffer 

death..., or to undergo imprisonment for life at the 

discretion of the jury trying the case, which shall...fix the 

penalty....

18 P.S. § 4701 (repealed). In Bradley, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

declared unconstitutional the Section 4701 death penalty. See Bradley, 

supra (vacating Bradley’s Section 4701 death sentence and sentencing him 

directly to life imprisonment) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 

S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), which addressed continued viability of 

death penalty statutes and whether death penalty violated constitutional 
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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). Following Bradley, the 

legislature repealed and replaced Section 4701 with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102 in 

tandem with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711.2 Commonwealth v. Yount, 615 A.2d 

1316, 1318 (Pa.Super. 1992), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 634, 631 A.2d 1007 

(1993). With respect to challenges to life sentences as unconstitutional 

under the repealed Section 4701, our Supreme Court also stated:

If a defendant receives a death sentence and successfully 

challenges the validity of the statute under which it is 

imposed, the proper relief is to modify the sentence, as 

was done in cases where previous death penalty laws were

invalidated. [Bradley, supra.] The convictions 

themselves were not struck down.... The question of the 

validity of a death penalty statute is moot when no 

death penalty is imposed. 

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 493 Pa. 281, 288, 426 A.2d 550, 553 (1981) 

(some internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Instantly, Appellant received a life sentence which became final on 

January 2, 1974, upon expiration of the time to file a petition for writ of 

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 22 

(effective in 1974) (allowing 90 days to file petition for certiorari with United 

States Supreme Court). On October 28, 2015, Appellant filed the current 

post-conviction petition, which is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1); Voss, supra. Additionally, Appellant failed to plead and prove 

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2 The new statutes still allow for imposition of the death penalty in 

Pennsylvania under certain circumstances, with additional safeguards and 

restrictions. 
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any exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements. Therefore, his claim 

remains time-barred. 

Moreover, Appellant was not sentenced to death; he was sentenced to 

life imprisonment under Section 4701. Thus, Appellant’s challenge to 

Section 4701 is moot. See Edwards, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/27/2017