SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2462-15T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ADAM J. PETRUZZIELLO,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

Submitted March 7, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Espinosa and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal 

Appeal No. 15-035.

Levow DWI Law, P.C., attorneys for appellant 

(Evan M. Levow, of counsel and on the brief).

Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor,

attorney for respondent (Erin Smith Wisloff, 

Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Adam J. Petruzziello (defendant) appeals a December 21, 2015 

order, which denied his request to dismiss a driving while 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 27, 2017
2 A-2462-15T1

intoxicated conviction on speedy trial grounds. We reverse the 

conviction. 

In September 2013, defendant sustained significant injuries 

when the motorcycle he was operating struck a parked truck. He 

was charged with driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; 

reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; careless driving, N.J.S.A.

39:4-97; failure to maintain a lane, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88; and 

speeding, N.J.S.A. 39:4-98. 

The case was transferred to the Morris County Prosecutor's 

Office (the prosecutor's office) in early October 2013, within 

weeks of the accident, for investigation and possible presentment 

to the Grand Jury. The record provides no information about the 

course of that investigation, but no additional charges were 

brought against defendant. 

In September 2014, a Superior Court judge remanded 

jurisdiction of the case to the Rockaway Township Municipal Court. 

It is unexplained why the remand was not recorded until November 

2014. Defendant's first appearance on the September 2013 charges 

was in January 2015, when he pled not guilty. The parties were 

in court on discovery issues in April and June. Defendant did not 

raise the speedy trial violation claim until June 4, 2015. The

motion was denied on July 22, 2015, and defendant pled guilty to 
3 A-2462-15T1

driving while under the influence, conditioned on the outcome of 

the appeal. The other charges were dismissed. 

Defendant appealed this conviction, which was heard de novo 

in the trial court. On December 21, 2015, the trial court rejected 

defendant's claimed speedy trial violation, and sentenced him to 

a ninety-day suspension of his driver's license, fines, court 

costs, penalties and a surcharge, which was the same sentence 

imposed by the municipal court judge.1

The Superior Court found defendant's injuries did not cause 

delay in the case. The twenty-two month delay was attributable 

"at least in the first instance to a review by the Morris County 

Prosecutor's Office," for investigation. The trial court did not 

know whether the "delay [was] caused simply by the bureaucratic 

miasma in the prosecutor's office or some further detailed 

investigation." Nevertheless, the trial court found there was "no 

indication" the delay was due to inattention by the prosecutor. 

Further, there was "no evidence of a deliberate attempt by the 

State to gain an advantage over the defendant by reason of the 

delay." The trial court stated the State was prejudiced by delay 

because it had to prove its case through "observation" and not 

through blood alcohol results. 

 

1 We understand defendant has served the suspension. The record 

does not provide whether the monetary amounts were paid.
4 A-2462-15T1

The trial court found defendant did not assert his right to 

a speedy trial until June 4, 2015, which was "a significant factor 

in weighing the delay in this case, and its impact on the 

defendant." It also found defendant "may have suffered some 

anxiety" while the charges were pending, but there was no evidence 

of "employment interruptions," "public ridicule or scorn or 

negative status" because of these charges, nor "indication of 

actual prejudice." The trial court did not find the delay 

oppressive or that defendant's "speedy trial rights under the 

Sixth Amendment were significantly impacted." 

Defendant's appeal raises these issues:

POINT I: SINCE APPELLANT WAS THE ONLY ONE 

INJURED IN THE ACCIDENT, AND NO 

CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE FILED, THERE 

WAS NO VALID REASON TO HAVE 

TRANSFERRED THIS CASE TO THE COUNTY 

PROSECUTOR, OR FOR IT TO HAVE 

LANGUISHED THERE FOR ALMOST A YEAR, 

BEFORE BEING SENT BACK TO THE 

MUNICIPAL COURT AND RESOLVED 677 

DAYS AFTER APPELLANT'S ARREST, THIS 

CASE MUST BE DISMISSED. 

POINT II: THE LAW DIVISION'S RELIANCE ON STATE 

V. ALEXANDER,

2 WHICH INVOLVES PREARREST AND PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY, IS 

MISPLACED: STATE V. CAHILL3 IS 

CONTROLLING AND REQUIRES DISMISSAL 

OF THIS MATTER.

 

2 Reference is to State v. Alexander, 310 N.J. Super. 348 (App. 

Div. 1998).

3 Reference is to State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013).
5 A-2462-15T1

Defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. 

Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. That right applies 

"to quasi-criminal matters pending in the municipal courts," such 

as driving while intoxicated cases. State v. Cahill, supra, 213 

N.J. at 267. When evaluating whether defendant's constitutional 

right to a speedy trial has been violated, four factors must be 

reviewed and balanced, including: (1) length of delay, (2) reasons 

for delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of a speedy trial claim, 

and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.

514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117 (1972). The 

Court adopted these factors in Cahill, supra, 213 N.J. at 266. 

The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is different from

the timeframe under the Due Process Clause for "initiating a 

criminal prosecution after discovering an offense has been 

committed." State v. Aguirre, 287 N.J. Super. 128, 131-32 (App. 

Div.) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S. 

Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, 758 (1977)) (other citation 

omitted), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 585 (1996). "[P]re-indictment

or pre-arrest delay [is] measured by a far more rigorous standard." 

Id. at 132. "In order to prevail, a defendant must demonstrate 

'both that (1) there was no legitimate reason for the delay and 

(2) [defendant] was prejudiced thereby.'" Ibid. (alteration in 

original) (citations omitted). 
6 A-2462-15T1

The distinction arises from the different interests which are 

protected. Id. at 133. With respect to speedy trial claims,

arrest or indictment is a public act that may 

severely interfere with the defendant's 

liberty, whether or not he is free on bail, 

and that may disrupt his employment, drain his 

financial resources, curtail his 

associations, create anxiety and subject him 

to public obloquy. In contrast, the Due 

Process Clause in the context of preindictment or pre-arrest delay is confined to 

protecting the ability of the defendant to 

mount a defense against the prosecution's 

charges.

[Ibid. (citation omitted).] 

The trial court erroneously conflated the speedy trial and 

due process analyses. In analyzing Barker factor two, the "reason 

for delay," the trial court focused on whether the State had 

attempted to gain an advantage over the defendant by its delay, a 

concern expressed under the due process line of cases. In 

analyzing Barker factor four, whether defendant was prejudiced, 

the court concluded defendant had not demonstrated any "actual"

prejudice, which is part of the due process analysis.

Under Barker, there is no "bright-line rule" to determine 

whether the delay in a case is excessive. Cahill, supra, 213 N.J.

at 258, 277. A delay exceeding one year prompts our review of the 

other Barker factors. Id. at 266.
7 A-2462-15T1

The delay here was twenty-two months measured from the date 

of the charges (September 2013) to the date of the guilty plea 

(July 2015). Id. at 272 (calculating "length of the delay" from 

the filing of charges "to the notice of trial in the municipal 

court of the remanded charge[s]"). Fourteen months of the delay

occurred when the case was at the prosecutor's office for 

investigation and before it was recorded by the municipal court 

in November 2014. The court found, without support in the record, 

there was no evidence of inattention by the prosecutor's office. 

In fact, there was no evidence of attention or inattention. 

Defendant acknowledged the remaining six-month delay, from January 

to June 2015, was attributable to defense initiated discovery 

issues. Defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial

until June 4, 2015. Then, although the trial court found prejudice 

to defendant based on anxiety suffered waiting for the case to be 

heard while the charges were pending, it then asserted defendant 

had not shown "actual" prejudice. 

 We are constrained to reverse because the trial court raised 

the bar too high for defendant. Because defendant had not shown 

actual prejudice beyond anxiety, or proof that the State was trying 

to gain advantage over him by delaying the case, which are factors 

under the Due Process Clause, it discounted the excessive twentytwo month delay and the prejudice to defendant by the length of 
8 A-2462-15T1

the delay. In Cahill, the court found a sixteen-month delay too 

long when the case was not complicated, there was no justification 

for the delay, and defendant's only proof of prejudice was anxiety. 

Id. at 273-75. Under these facts where the record bespeaks of no 

complexity, the case is similar to Cahill, requiring dismissal of 

the charges. 

Reversed.