17-4097(L) Carabal-Santos v. Barr BIA Straus, IJ A200 689 439 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT** = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall** 2 **United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 15 th**  **day of May, two thousand nineteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,** 7 **REENA RAGGI,** 8 **RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **SAMUEL CARABAL-SANTOS, AKA** 13 **SAMUEL CARVAGAL, AKA SAMUEL** 14 **SANTOS,** 15 Petitioner **,** 16 **17-4097(L),** 17 **v. 18-1358(Con)** 18 **NAC** 19 **WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES** 20 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 21 Respondent **.** 22

**_____________________________________** 23 24 **FOR PETITIONER:** Robert C. Ross, West Haven, CT. 25 26 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; Carl McIntyre, 28 Assistant Director; Gregory A. 29 Pennington, Jr., Trial Attorney, 30 Office of Immigration Litigation, 31 United States Department of 32 Justice, Washington, DC. 33 342 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these petitions for review of 1 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, it is hereby 2 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitions for review 3

are DENIED. 4 Petitioner Samuel Carabal-Santos, a native and citizen 5 of Mexico, seeks review of the denials of (1) his application 6 for relief from removal under the Convention Against Torture 7 (“CAT”), see In re Samuel Carabal-Santos, No. A200 689 439 8 (B.I.A. Nov. 27, 2017), aff’g No. A200 689 439 (Immig. Ct. 9 Hartford June 8, 2017), and (2) his motion to reopen, see In 10 re Samuel Carabal-Santos , No. A200 689 439 (B.I.A. Apr. 6, 11 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 12 facts and procedural history in this case. 13

**A. Order of Removal**  14 The only issues before us in this petition are the 15 agency’s denial of deferral of removal under the CAT and its 16 denial of a continuance. Under the circumstances of this case, 17 we have reviewed both the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) and the 18 BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness,” Wangchuck v. 19 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006), 20 examining factual findings for substantial evidence and 213 questions of law de novo, see Wei Sun v. Sessions , 883 F.3d 1 23, 27 (2d Cir. 2018). 2 1. Deferral of Removal 3 An applicant seeking deferral of removal under the CAT 4 must make a preponderance showing that he would be tortured 5 upon removal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a). In 6 deciding whether an applicant has carried this burden, the 7 agency must consider all relevant evidence, including past 8 torture, ability to relocate, and human rights violations 9 within the country of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). 10 “‘It is the likelihood of all necessary events coming together 11 that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain 12 of events cannot be more likely than its least likely link.’” 13 Savchuck v. Mukasey , 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 14

In re J-F-F- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)). 15 Thus, an alien cannot carry his burden “‘if one link in the 16 chain cannot be shown to be more likely than not to occur.’” 17 Id. 18 The applicant’s testimony may be sufficient to sustain 19 his burden, even without corroboration, but only if the trier 20 of fact finds the testimony credible, persuasive, and 214 sufficiently factually specific to demonstrate that the 1 applicant is a “refugee.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); 2 see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(C); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 3 1208.17(a). “[A]n applicant may be generally credible but 4 his testimony may not be sufficient to carry the burden of 5 persuading the fact finder of the accuracy of his claim of 6 crucial facts if he fails to put forth corroboration that 7 should be readily available.” Wei Sun , 883 F.3d at 28; see 8 also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Applying these principles 9 here, we conclude that the agency did not err in finding that 10 Carabal-Santos failed to satisfy his burden of proving a 11 likelihood of torture. 12 Given that Carabal-Santos asserted that a drug cartel 13 last harmed or personally threatened him in Mexico sometime 14 before 2001, he had the burden of demonstrating that the 15 cartel remained interested in harming him more than 15 years 16 later. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3); see also Savchuck , 518 17 F.3d at 123. Carabal-Santos attempted to satisfy that burden 18 with his testimony that cartel members cut his grandmother’s 19 face shortly after he left Mexico, killed two of his friends 20 in 2007 and 2010, kidnapped and tortured his brother-in-law 215 in 2011, and recently threatened him through his sister’s 1 Facebook account. However, the agency reasonably found that 2 Carabal-Santos failed to corroborate these crucial facts with 3 reasonably available evidence. See Wei Sun , 883 F.3d at 28. 4 First, although he submitted letters from his grandmother 5 and brother-in-law, neither of them mentioned being harmed at 6 all or targeted by anyone as a threat to Carabal-Santos. 7 Further, although Carabal-Santos testified that cartel 8 members killed two of his friends who helped him confront 9 cartel members in 1997, his written statement asserted that 10 the murder victims were his b rother’s friends who were killed 11 for reasons unrelated to Carabal-Santos. Also, the statement 12 Carabal-Santos’s sister submitted on his behalf did not 13 corroborate his testimony that cartel members had threatened 14 him via her Facebook account. 15 The agency further reasonably considered and determined 16 that Carabal-Santos could safely relocate within Mexico. See 17 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Moreover, as the IJ found, 18 Carabal-Santos did not provide any country conditions 19 evidence showing that the cartel leader who targeted him 20 remains active. Indeed, although cartel control is fluid, a 216 Drug Enforcement Agency map of the Mexican drug cartels shows 1 that the cartel Carabal-Santos fears is not active in many 2 parts of Mexico. 3 Accordingly, because Carabal-Santos failed to 4 corroborate his testimony regarding continued threats from 5 cartel members, and because evidence demonstrated he could 6 safely relocate within Mexico, the agency did not err in 7 finding that he failed to establish a chain of events showing 8 that he would more likely than not be tortured or killed if 9 removed to Mexico. See Wei Sun , 883 F.3d at 28; Savchuck , 10 518 F.3d at 123. Because that finding was dispositive of 11 deferral of removal under the CAT, see 8 C.F.R. 12 §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1), we do not reach the 13 agency’s alternative basis for denying CAT relief, see INS v. 14 Bagamasbad , 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts 15 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the 16 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”); 17 De La Rosa v. Holder , 598 F.3d 103, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2010) 18 (recognizing that applicant’s failure to establish likelihood 19 of torture is separate dispositive basis for denying CAT 20 relief from the requirement of establishing government 217 acquiescence). 1 2. Continuance 2 Carabal-Santos faults the IJ for denying him a fourth 3 continuance before denying him CAT relief. We review such a 4 denial for abuse of discretion. See Morgan v. Gonzales , 445 5 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2006). An IJ “may grant a motion for 6 continuance for good cause shown,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, and 7 only “abuse[s] his discretion in deny ing a continuance if (1) 8 his decision rests on an error of law (such as the application 9 of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual 10 finding, or (2) his decision—though not necessarily the 11 product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual 12 finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible 13 decisions,” Morgan , 445 F.3d at 551-52 (quotation marks and 14 brackets omitted). That is not this case. 15 The IJ had already grant ed Carabal-Santos three 16 continuances, thereby providing him and his family 17 approximately 16 months to prepare and gather evidence from 18 Mexico. Carabal-Santos’s attorney requested a fourth 19 continuance because, although Carabal-Santos’s family had 20 submitted evidence, their statements could have been 218 “stronger.” Certified Administrative Record at 145. The 1 denial of a fourth continuance in these circumstances was not 2 an abuse of discretion. See Wei Sun , 883 F.3d at 31 (“[I]t is 3 reasonable not to require that applicants receive a second 4 opportunity to present their case after the IJ identified the 5 specific evidence they need to prevail.”); see also Chuilu 6 Liu v. Holder , 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he alien 7 bears the ultimate burden of introducing such evidence 8 without prompting from the IJ.”). 9 Because the IJ had already granted numerous continuances, 10 during which Carabal-Santos managed to obtain evidence from 11 family and friends, there is no merit to his argument that 12 his due process rights were violated by the IJ denying him 13 yet another opportunity to gather evidence. See Burger v. 14 Gonzales , 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To establish a 15 violation of due process, an alien must show that she was 16 denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims or 17 that [she was] otherwise deprived . . . of fundamental 18 fairness.” (quotation marks omitted)). 19 Accordingly, we identify no err or in the agency’s 209 decision to deny Carabal-Santos CAT relief from removal. 1

**B. Motion to Reopen**  2 In challenging the agency’s refusal to reopen his removal 3 proceedings, Carabal-Santos bears a still heavier burden 4 because the law states that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings 5 shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that 6 evidence sought to be offered is material and was not 7 available and could not have been discovered or presented at 8 the former hearing.” 8 C.F. R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Moreover, we 9 review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 10 discretion. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey , 546 F.3d 138, 168- 11 69 (2d Cir. 2008); Norani v. Gonzales , 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d 12 Cir. 2006) (“[I]n reviewing the BIA’s determination of 13 whether previously unavailable evidence supported [a] motion 14 to reopen, we must inquire whether the evidence could have 15 been presented at the hearing before the IJ.”). 16 As the Government argues, Carabal-Santos does not 17 challenge the BIA’s dispositive finding that the evidence 18 he submitted in support of his motion to reopen was 19 previously available. Accordingly, that finding remains a 20 valid basis for denying reopening, and we deny the petition 2110 for review. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales , 426 F.3d 540, 1 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that petitioner 2 abandons issues and claims not raised in his brief); see 3 also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). 4 In any event, the BIA’s find ing was not erroneous since 5 Carabal-Santos submitted letters that described events 6 predating his hearing. See Norani , 451 F.3d at 294. 7 Further, the BIA did not err in its alternative dispositive 8 determination that the newly submitted letters would not 9 change the outcome of Carabal-Santos’s proceedings because 10 they did not undermine the agency’s determination that he 11 could relocate within Mexico to avoid harm. See INS v. Abudu , 12 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988) (recognizing failure to establish 13 prima facie eligibility for relief as a valid basis to deny 14 motion to reopen). 15 For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are 16 DENIED. As we have completed our rev iew, any stay of removal 17 that the Court previously granted in these petitions is 18 VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in these 19 petitions is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral 20 argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance with 2111 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 1 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 2
FOR THE COURT: 3 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 4 Clerk of Court 5