alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### ROOD COMPANY, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DADE COUNTY, Florida, a corporation, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division A.

July 31, 1956.

Myers, Heiman & Kaplan, Miami, for appellant.

*22Boardman & Bolles, Miami, for appellee.

DREW, Chief Justice.

The appellee has moved to affirm the judgment in this cause under Rule 38, 31 F.S.A., upon the following grounds:

> “1. That it is manifest that the questions on which the decision of this cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument in the following respects:

> “(a) That this cause is being appealed before this Honorable Court upon the Appellant’s Complaint, Appellee’s Answer thereto, Appellant’s Interrogatories, Ap-pellee’s Answer to Interrogatories, Appel-lee’s Motion for Summary Final Decree and the supporting and opposing affidavits filed in connection therewith by the respective parties of record. Specifically, the Appellant filed its appeal from the order of the Trial Court granting the Appellee’s Motion for Summary Final Decree.

> “(b) There is no genuine issue as to any material fact involved in the controversy.

> “(c) That upon the pleadings herein-above referred to, the Appellee is entitled as a matter of law to have its Motion for Summary Final Decree granted.”

Such motion is wholly insufficient under Rule 38 and under the pronouncement of this Court in Joseph T. Miller Construction Co. v. Borak, Fla., 82 So.2d 147, 149, where we set down at considerable length the procedure to be followed when this rule was to be invoked. We stated there:

> “As will be noted, the appellee is required, when proceeding under Rule 38, to ‘set forth clearly and concisely the matter on which (his motion) is based.’ This provision of the rule is not complied with by merely asserting in the motion ‘that it is manifest that the questions on which the decision of the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument,’ for the duty rests upon the movant to point out ‘clearly and concisely’, with appropriate references to the record-on-appeal, the appellant’s brief, or the appendix, the exact matter on which he bases his conclusion that the questions raised are unsubstantial. Moreover, the burden rests upon the movant to sustain the grounds of his motion by the argument in his brief, and by his oral argument, if oral argument is requested. Rule 39, subd. 3, Supreme Court Rules.”

The motion to affirm is denied.

We reaffirm what we said in the foregoing case and think it timely to point out again the burden placed upon the mov-ant to point out “clearly and concisely” the exact matter on which he bases his conclusion that the questions raised are unsubstantial. Failure to comply with this rule will result in summary disposition of these motions.

THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., and ROWE, Associate Justice, concur.
Exhibit 35
                                  ----------


                      COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP


                             OFFICERS' CERTIFICATE
                    ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE MASTER SERVICER


                                  CWALT, INC.
                        ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OA2
              MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OA2


      The undersigned does hereby certify that the undersigned is an officer
of Countrywide GP, Inc., general partner of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing
LP (the "Master Servicer"), and does hereby further certify pursuant to
Section 3.16 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the above-captioned
Series (the "Agreement") that:

(i)   A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
calendar year and of the performance of the Master Servicer under the
Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

(ii)  To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer
has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material
respects throughout such calendar year.




/s/ Craig Baingo                                      Dated: March 14, 2007
-----------------

Craig Baingo
Executive Vice President, Finance
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 715 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 715

 To amend the Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992 to 
prohibit fishing in the Central Sea of Okhotsk by vessels and nationals 
                         of the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 26, 1995

     Mr. Young of Alaska (for himself, Mr. Saxton, and Mr. Studds) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                               Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992 to 
prohibit fishing in the Central Sea of Okhotsk by vessels and nationals 
                         of the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Sea of Okhotsk Fisheries Enforcement 
Act of 1995''.

SEC. 2. FISHING PROHIBITION.

    The Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992 (16 U.S.C. 
1823 note) is amended--
            (1) in section 302, by inserting ``and the Central Sea of 
        Okhotsk'' after ``Central Bering Sea''; and
            (2) in section 306--
                    (A) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), 
                and (6) in order as paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), and 
                (7); and
                    (B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
            ``(2) Central sea of okhotsk.--The term `Central Sea of 
        Okhotsk' means the central Sea of Okhotsk area which is more 
        than two hundred nautical miles seaward of the baseline from 
        which the breadth of the territorial sea of the Russian 
        Federation is measured.''.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-50377

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN C. MILLIKIN, III,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(SA-96-CR-327-1)

January 7, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

A jury convicted defendant John C. Millikin, III, for being a

f elon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1). Millikin raises a sufficiency of the evidence challenge

to his conviction. He argues that the evidence at trial

demonstrated that his father was in joint occupancy of the house in

which the weapons attributed to Millikin were found. He also

contends that his father wa s the owner and sole possessor of the2

firearms. Accordingly, he asserts that the evidence was

insufficient to prove that he was either in constructive or actual

possession of the firearms.

Normally, the government may establish constructive possession

where the defendant exercises “ownership, dominion, or control over

the contraband itself or dominion or control over the premises in

which the contraband is concealed.” U nited States v. Mergerson

, 4

F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1993). In joint occupancy situations,

however, mere control or dominion over the place in which the

contrab a nd is found is insufficient to establish constructive

possession. S ee id. Rather, in such situations, we require

evide nce “supporting at least a plausible inference that the

defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.”

Id.

As this is a sufficiency of the evidence challenge following

a jury conviction, we review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government. See United States v. Ivy , 973 F.2d

1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, there was ample evidence offered

at trial to indicate that Millikin in fact was the sole occupant of

the res idence in which the guns were found. Sole occupancy and

dominion over the house in which the weapons were found would

support a finding of constructive possession. S ee United States v.

Ybarra

, 70 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995). Alternatively, the

government offered evidence that Millik in had knowledge of the

weapons in his house, and at least one of the f irearms was found3

next to h is bed. The jury could reasonably have concluded that

even if this were a joint occupancy situation, Millikin had

knowledge of and ready access to the contraband. S ee Mergerson

, 4

F.3d at 349. Thus, there was adequate circumstantial indicia of

Millikin’s possession to support his conviction. See id.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

        <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Balance Sheet as of September 30, 1997, and the Consoidated
Statement of Income for the nine months ended September 30, 1997, and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
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<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                               4,400
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<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                  24,700
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<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
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<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               5,397
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  37,735
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        13,867
<NET-INCOME>                                    23,868
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                      1,769
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   22,099
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        16,058
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       12,679
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                          42,872
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.90
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.90
        

        

</TABLE>
#### Katie Dietrich v. Michael Dietrich.

Motion denied, with ten dollars costs. Settle order on notice.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6071 

To prohibit the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency from 

retroactively reducing certain determinations under the Renewable Fuel 

Program, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 23, 2021 

Mrs. HINSON (for herself, Ms. CRAIG, Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. 

KIND, Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota, Mr. SMITH of Nebraska, Mr. 

FORTENBERRY, Mrs. MILLER-MEEKS, Mr. BOST, Mr. FEENSTRA, Mrs. 

AXNE, Mr. BAIRD, Mrs. FISCHBACH, Mr. LATURNER, and Mr. LAHOOD) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency from retroactively reducing certain determinations under the Renewable Fuel Program, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defend the Blend 

5 Act’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6071 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST RETROACTIVE REDUCTIONS 

2 OF DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE RENEW3 ABLE FUEL PROGRAM. 

4 The Administrator of the Environmental Protection 

5 Agency may not reduce any applicable volume determined 

6 under subsection (o)(2) of section 211 of the Clean Air 

7 Act (42 U.S.C. 7545), or any renewable fuel obligation 

8 or applicable percentage determined under subsection 

9 (o)(3) of such section, that has already been finalized for 

10 any calendar year. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
#### Placide COMEAUX v. Leon LANTIER.

No. 2963.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Dec. 30, 1947.

Welton P. Mouton, of Lafayette, for appellant.

Voorhies & Labbe, of Lafayette, for ap-pellee.

OTT, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in the opinion in the consolidated cases of Murphy Trahan v. Leon Lantier and Placide Comeaux v. Leon Lantier, La.App., 33 So.2d 136, this day handed down, the judgment in the above entitled cause is hereby affirmed at the cost of defendant in both courts.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20A0328. DEMETRIS J. WILSON v. THE STATE.

In 2014, Demetris Wilson entered a guilty plea to charges of involuntary

manslaughter and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to a total term of twenty

years with fifteen years in custody. Wilson then filed a motion to set aside his

convictions because the indictment was not returned in open court. The trial court

denied the motion on July 5, 2019, and Wilson filed the instant notice of appeal on

August 16, 2019. We, however, lack jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has made clear that a motion seeking to challenge an

allegedly invalid or void judgment of conviction “is not one of the established

procedures for challenging the validity of a judgment in a criminal case” and that an

appeal from the denial of such a motion is subject to dismissal. Roberts v. State, 286

Ga. 532, 532 (690 SE2d 150) (2010). Thus, Wilson is not authorized to collaterally

attack his conviction in this manner. See id.; Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1)

(686 SE2d 786) (2009); Matherlee v. State, 303 Ga. App. 765, 766 (694 SE2d 665)

(2010).

Based on the foregoing, Wilson’s appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

November 21, 2019

11/21/2019
18613, 18614.

#### Day *v.*Hatton *et al.;*and *vice versa.*

Argued June 16, 1954

Decided July 13, 1954.

*Augustus M. Roan, David H. Ansley,*for plaintiff in error.

*Thomas O. Davis, Owen & Bolton, Davis & Stringer,*contra.

Duckworth, Chief Justice.

1. Where the putative father of an illegitimate child sought and obtained a decree of a Tennessee court declaring him to be the father of such child and creating the relationship of parent and child between the petitioner and the child, the decree showing on its face that it was an ex parte proceeding, it will not be given effect in this State as against the mother, where she was not made'a party in the proceeding, was not served, did not appear and plead, or otherwise waive service or consent to such decree or have notice thereof, as it is violative of the due-process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Code (Ann.) §§ 1-815, 2-103. See also *Towns*v. *Springer,*9 *Ga.*130; *Mobley*v. *Mobley,*9 *Ga.*247; *Milner*v. *Gatlin,*139 *Ga.*109 (76 S. E. 860); *McAlhany*v. *Allen,*195 *Ga.*150 (5) (23 S. E. 2d 676).

2. Where, as here, in a contest between the admitted father of an illegitimate child and third persons, the mother being the only recognized parent (Code § 74-203), and having voluntarily released her parental right of custody and control to the third persons (Code § 74-108(1)), the discretion reposed in the trial court in a habeas corpus hearing under Code § 50-121 is not arbitrary, but should be exercised in favor of the party having the legal right unless the interest and welfare of the child justifies an award to another. *Butts*v. *Griffith,*189 *Ga.*296 (5 S. E. 2d 907); *Fowler*v. *Fowler,*190 *Ga.*453 (9 S. E. 2d 760); *Watkins*v. *Terrell,*196 *Ga.*651 (27 S. E. 2d 329). Therefore, since it is admitted that the defendants are fit and proper persons and they have the legal right to the child by agreement with the mother, the only recognized parent, the court did not err in awarding custody to them as against the father of the illegitimate child. *Eaves*v. *Fears,*131 *Ga.*820 (64 S. E. 269).

*Judgment affirmed on the main bill of exceptions; cross-bill of exceptions dismissed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
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<PAGE>

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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Riverbed Technology, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof, Jerry M. Kennelly, as President, and Chief Executive Officer, and Randy S. Gottfried, as Chief Financial Officer, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The Annual Report on Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Riverbed Technology, Inc.
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |                                                                     
|----------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: February 14, 2008 |  | /S/    JERRY M. KENNELLY                                            
|                        |  |                                                                     
|                        |  | Jerry M. Kennelly                                                   
|                        |  | President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal
Executive Officer) 
|                        | 
|Date: February 14, 2008 |  | /S/    RANDY S. GOTTFRIED                                           
|                        |  |                                                                     
|                        |  | Randy S. Gottfried                                                  
|                        |  | Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and
Accounting Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 has been provided to Riverbed Technology, Inc. and will be retained by Riverbed Technology, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.