alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
214 So.2d 299

#### Joseph Eugene STEHL v. STATE of Alabama.

8 Div. 273.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 19, 1968.

*23L. Bruce Abies, Huntsville, for appellant.

MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and Marlin Mooneyham, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, an indigent, represented in the trial court, and here, conscientiously and diligently, by appointed counsel, was indicted by the grand jury of Madison County and there convicted in the circuit court of burglary in the first degree. The conviction was for burglary in the nighttime of an occupied dwelling house.

The indictment is deficient, in that it fails to allege the name of the owner or the person in possession of the alleged burglarized property, or to negate the ownership and possession of defendant. Wilson v. State, 32 Ala.App. 127, 22 So.2d 600, cert. den. 247 Ala. 84, 22 So.2d 601. But the deficiency was not challenged by demurrer or questioned by appropriate pleading. Under such circumstances we will not review the indictment. Such challenge will be available to defendant on reversal and remand of this cause.

The occupant of the dwelling, alleged to have been burglarized, testified that so far as she knew all of the windows and doors were closed and locked. A police officer, called to the scene at the time of the alleged burglary along with other police officers, testified that when he arrived he went to a side door that was open, and went in through the open door. The officers testified that they found the defendant under a bed in one of the rooms of *24the house. There was no evidence that any of the doors or windows were broken open, and no evidence of any keys or burglary tools found on the defendant.

Requested written charge No. 8 for the defendant was refused, and was not covered by the oral charge of the trial court, nor by given charges for the defendant. The charge reads as follows:

> “The Court charges the Jury that Defendant would not be guilty, even though he were in the house, if he entered through an open door or window without further opening such door or window.”

The indictment charges that the defendant “did, in the nighttime, * * * break into and enter an inhabited dwelling, to-wit: * * * against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.”

In Scott v. State, 22 Ala.App. 380, 115 So. 853(7), the identical charge (as No. 8, supra) was refused in a burglary charge, as here. The refusal was held error to reverse and remand.

Entering a house through an open door or window is not burglary. Pines v. State, 50 Ala. 153; Green v. State, 68 Ala. 539; Scott v. State, supra.

We will not consider other rulings of the trial court which appellant contends were in error. The same rulings may not be invoked or made at the next trial.

The judgment of the trial court, for error in refusing defendant’s written charge No. 8, is reversed and the cause remanded.

The foregoing opinion was prepared by B. W. Simmons, Supernumerary Circuit Judge, and was adopted by the court as its opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, COLEMAN and KOHN, JJ., concur.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6253 

To amend the District of Columbia Home Rule Act to permit the Council 

of the District of Columbia to enact laws with respect to the organization 

and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 13, 2021 

Ms. NORTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Reform 

A BILL 

To amend the District of Columbia Home Rule Act to permit 

the Council of the District of Columbia to enact laws 

with respect to the organization and jurisdiction of the 

District of Columbia courts. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘District of Columbia 

5 Courts Home Rule Act’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6253 IH

1 SEC. 2. AUTHORITY OF COUNCIL OF DISTRICT OF COLUM2 BIA TO ENACT LAWS WITH RESPECT TO DIS3 TRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS. 

4 Section 602(a) of the District of Columbia Home 

5 Rule Act (sec. 1–206.02(a), D.C. Official Code) is amend6 ed by striking paragraph (4). 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
#### Edward Exnoal Johnson, Jr., v. State.

No. 24846.

October 4, 1950.

No attorney of record on appeal for appellant.

*A. C. Winborn,*Criminal District Attorney, and *E. T. Branch,*Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Houston, and *George P. Blackburn, State’s Attorney,*Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Rape is the offense; the punishment, death.

Only one question is presented for review, which is as follows:

Appellant was indicted under the name of George H. Young. Upon arraignment, he suggested that his true name was Edward Exnoal Johnson, Jr. Whereupon, the trial court had the same *128noted upon the minutes of the court, and the indictment was corrected to so read — that is, a line was drawn through the name of George H. Young wherever it appeared in the indictment and the name of Edward Exnoal Johnson, Jr., was written into the indictment in place thereof.

In making this change, the allegation of the indictment that the prosecutrix then and there “not being the wife of the said George H. Young” was changed to read “not being the wife of the said Edward Exnoal Johnson, Jr.”

Appellant insists that such change amended the indictment as to a matter of substance, which is unauthorized. Branch’s P. C., Sec. 511.

A similar contention was held untenable in Colter v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 78, 51 S. W. 945.

It would be a strange doctrine, indeed, that would authorize an accused, by suggesting his correct name, to vitiate the indictment against him. The statute (Art. 496, C. C. P.) authorizing the accused to suggest that his true name be inserted in an indictment was intended to have no such construction.

No reversible error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
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<CGS>                                       42,719,942
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               42,719,942
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,482,814
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               108,113
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,309
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,630,763
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,406,786
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<NET-INCOME>                                 2,223,977
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .14
        

</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4090

___________

Eric Randall Nance, *

*

Petitioner/Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas

Larry Norris, Director, *

Arkansas Department of * [PUBLISHED]

Correction, *

*

Respondent/Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 22, 2005

Filed: November 22, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, BEAM, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Before the court is respondent's motion to vacate a stay of execution entered by

the district court. We grant the motion and vacate the stay.

On November 14, 2005, petitioner filed a pleading captioned "Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus" accompanied by a motion for stay of execution. The district court
1

On January 23, 2003, the district court denied habeas relief and dismissed CV00339. We affirmed this action on December 10, 2004. Our mandate issued on

October 12, 2005. The case is closed.

-2-

construed the petition as a requested amendment to the previously filed1

 petition in

district court, case number: 5:00-CV-00339 ("CV-00339"). The district court, after

making findings of fact and conclusions of law, granted a motion to amend the habeas

corpus petition, and granted the stay of execution.

On January 24, 2005, petitioner filed a petition to remand in CV:00339 seeking

the same relief sought in the present filings. Construing the motion to remand as a

motion to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2244 habeas petition, we denied the motion.

We view the present filings as yet another attempt to avoid the requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

Accordingly, we deny a motion for interlocutory appeal, vacate the district

court's stay of execution and dismiss the petition for habeas corpus.

______________________________
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-13-00845-CV

J. C. C., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 

NO. D-1-FM-12-000387, THE HONORABLE SCOTT H. JENKINS, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

The reporter’s record in this appeal was originally due to be filed on January 2, 2013. 

By request to this Court dated January 6, 2014, Chavela V. Crain requested an extension of 10 days.

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure prohibit this Court from granting extensions 

of over 10 days for the filing of reporters’ records in accelerated appeals, including those from suits 

for termination of parental rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 35.3(c). Further, any extensions of time 

granted for the filing of the reporters’ records may not exceed 30 days cumulatively. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 28.4(b)(2). Accordingly, Chavela V. Crain is hereby ordered to file the reporter’s record in 

this case on or before January 17, 2014. If the record is not filed by that date, Crain may be 

required to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court.

It is ordered on January 7, 2014.

Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin and Field
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 520 Introduced in House (IH)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 520

   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to double the maximum 
benefit under the special estate tax valuation rules for certain farm, 
                          etc., real property.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 13, 1995

  Mr. Thomas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to double the maximum 
benefit under the special estate tax valuation rules for certain farm, 
                          etc., real property.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DOUBLING OF MAXIMUM BENEFIT UNDER SPECIAL ESTATE TAX 
              VALUATION RULES FOR CERTAIN FARM, ETC., REAL PROPERTY.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (2) of section 2032A(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to limitation on aggregate reduction in 
fair market value) is amended by striking ``$750,000'' and inserting 
``$1,500,000''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to decedents dying after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Israel Kaufman, Respondent, v. Julius Smith and Hyman Director, Appellants.

Judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor and Miller, JJ., concurred; Hirschberg, P. J., taking no part.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 669 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 669

      To repeal the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 25, 1995

 Mr. Boehner introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                        Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To repeal the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Perishable 
Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, is repealed.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6219 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6219

  To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to modify the definition of 
                 franchise fee, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 9, 2021

Ms. Eshoo (for herself, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Costa, Mr. Welch, Ms. Pingree, 
 Ms. Meng, Mr. Raskin, Ms. Norton, Mr. Case, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Pappas, 
 Ms. McCollum, Mr. Blumenauer, and Mr. Payne) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to modify the definition of 
                 franchise fee, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Community Television 
Act''.

SEC. 2. MODIFYING THE DEFINITION OF FRANCHISE FEE.

    Section 622(g)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
542(g)(1)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``includes'' and inserting ``means''; and
            (2) by inserting ``other monetary'' before ``assessment''.
                                 <all>
```
198 La. 896

#### MOUNT OLIVE BAPTIST CHURCH v. NEW ZION BAPTIST CHURCH.

No. 35881.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 3, 1941.

Bentley G. Byrnes, of New Orleans, for appellant.

L. R. Hoover, of New Orleans, for appel-lee.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

The appellee has moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the appeal bond was not filed within the year after the judgment was signed. The appeal was asked for and granted before the year had expired, but the bond which was required by the order granting the appeal was not filed until several days after the year had expired. We are obliged therefore to dismiss the appeal. The time limit of one year, allowed by article 593 of the Code of Practice, for the taking of a devolutive appeal, is the limit of time in which the taking of the appeal must be completed by the filing of the appeal bond, in cases where a bond is required by law and by the order granting the appeal, as in this case. Marigny v. Stanley, 2 La. 322; Sibley v. Roman Catholic Church Congregation, 3 Rob. 77; City Bank v. Kent, *7*Rob. 60; Mayer v. Prudhomme, 1 La.Ann. 230; Brickell v. Conner, 10 La.Ann. 235; Hall v. Beggs, 17 La.Ann. 238; Wood v. Calloway, 21 La. Ann. 481; Higgins v. Haley, 28 La.Ann. 216, 217; Untereiner v. Miller, 29 La.Ann. 435; Ulman & Co. v. Briggs, Payne & Co., 32 La.Ann. 655; Reed v. His Creditors, 37 La.Ann. 907; People’s Bank of Elton v. Arceneaux, 134 La. 292, 64 So. 116; Hyman v. Veith, 142 La. 933, 77 So. 854; Lafayette v. Farr, 162 La. 385, 110 So. 624; Succession of Dahm, 166 La. 774, 117 So. 826.

It was decided in Untereiner v. Miller, 29 La.Ann. 435, and affirmed in Lafayette v. Farr, 162 La. 385, 110 So. 624, that the declaration in article 593 of the Code of Practice, that “no appeal will lie * * * after a year has expired”, is so imperative that the appellate court has not jurisdiction over a case where the appeal bond was not filed within the year after the judgment was signed, and that the court therefore must dismiss the appeal on its own motion, in such a case, even though the parties to the suit have given their consent to the appellate court’s deciding the case on its merits. A similar ruling was made in Higgins v. Haley, 28 La.Ann. 216. In the light of these decisions it is a matter of no importance that the attorney representing the appellee in the present case gave his consent in writing to an extension of the time allowed in the order of appeal for the appellant to file the record or transcript in this court.

, The appeal is dismissed at appellant’s cost.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**P & F INDUSTRIES, INC.**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ending September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Richard A. Horowitz, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 that:

 

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/ Richard A. Horowitz     |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Richard A. Horowitz         |
| Principal Executive Officer |
| November 12, 2003      |

 

----
Exhibit 9.3


           SECOND AMENDMENT TO VOTING TRUST AGREEMENT

           THIS  AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 5th  day  of
September,  1996, by and between Richard F. Schaden  and  Richard  E.
Schaden ("Shareholders"), as shareholders of The Quizno's Corporation
(the  "Corporation"), and as joint Trustees under  the  Voting  Trust
Agreement (the "Trustees").

                      W I T N E S S E T H:

          WHEREAS, the Shareholders and the Trustees are parties to a
Voting Trust Agreement dated July 14, 1994 (the "Voting Trust"); and

           WHEREAS,  pursuant to the terms of the Voting  Trust,  the
Shareholders deposited, with the Trustees, an aggregate of  1,552,800
shares of the Corporation's Common Stock; and

           WHEREAS,  pursuant to the terms of the Voting  Trust,  the
Shareholders   deposited   an  additional   9,200   shares   of   the
Corporation's  Common Stock and 146,000 shares of  the  Corporation's
Class  A Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock with the Trustees  on
November 4, 1994; and

           WHEREAS, the Shareholders desire to withdraw 8,666  shares
of  the  Corporation's Common Stock from the Voting Trust to  make  a
gift of such shares; and

          WHEREAS, the Trustees have consented to such withdrawal.

          NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and
covenants herein contained, the parties hereto agree as follows:

           1.   The  number of shares of stock subject to the  Voting
Trust listed adjacent to the signatures of the Shareholders on page 5
of  the  Voting Trust is hereby deleted and the following substituted
therefore:

SHAREHOLDERS:              NUMBER OF SHARES OF CORPORATION
                           SUBJECT TO VOTING TRUST AGREEMENT
                           COMMON STOCK       CLASS A STOCK
Richard F. Schaden            776,667            73,000
Richard E. Schaden            776,667            73,000

            IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the  parties  have  executed  this
Agreement on the day and year first above written.


                                   /s/ Richard F. Schaden
                                   RICHARD F. SCHADEN,
                                   SHAREHOLDER AND TRUSTEE


                                   /s/ Richard E. Schaden
                                   RICHARD E. SCHADEN,
                                   SHAREHOLDER AND TRUSTEE
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
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<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                    127,704
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                          52,724
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        69,111
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,298,067
<COMMON>                                        85,474
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                      242,000
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                            130,882
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 458,356
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           557,642
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                  81,715
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                        0
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                     16,564
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                   401
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                 183,389
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                1,298,067
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      118,530
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            13,552
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                      56,318
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                      69,870
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         48,660
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                             (11,682)
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  36,978
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        24,079
<NET-INCOME>                                    12,899
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          0
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   12,899
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        59,275
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                            0
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                          59,693
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   12,899
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   12,899
        

</TABLE>