NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0850n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 14, 2007 No. 06-4487 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT Terr y Pet re , Husband, F ather , and Executor of the Estates of Wanda Petr e, Chelsey Petre a nd Amber Petre, Pla int if

f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. Norfolk S outhern Co r p. ; F lo r e nc e To wns hi p, Ohio, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A PP E A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT COURT FOR T H E NOR THERN DI STRI CT OF O H IO O P I N I O N

BEFORE: SILE R, G IBBO NS, and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges. McK eague, Circ uit Jud ge. This appea l arises out of a tra g ic automobile-tra in collision t hat claimed the lives of

five individuals. Alleg ing that the collision re sulted from the neg lige nce of the

ra ilr oa d a nd the towns hip wh e re the a c c ide nt o c c ur re d, Pla int if

f f ile d s ui t in Oh io s tate c ourt
. Def endants re moved the ac tion based on diversity of citizenship. The district court g rante d summary judgme nt for De fenda

nts. Pl aintiff timely

appea led. For

the re asons st at ed below, we AF F IRM the well-r easone d decision of the district c ourt. I. BACKG ROUND On J uly 1, 2001, in rural B lakeslee , Ohio, an automobile operat ed by Mrs. Wanda Petre collided with a fr eig ht train owned a nd operated by

Def endant Nor folk Southern Corp. (“ Norfolk” ). The a ccide nt occur

red on County

Road I , which i s located w ithin the boundaries of D efe ndantNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 2 - Flore nce T ownship. Mrs. Petre, a long w ith her two childre n and two of the ir friends, perished in the

a c c ide nt. Mrs. Petre a

nd the children, all residents of I ndiana, we re in the B lakeslee are a for a chur ch pic nic

. At the tim e of the c oll isi on , the y we re tr a ve lin g ba c k to I nd iana on Cou nty Roa d I . Co un ty Road Iis a two-lane rura l road that interse cts with railroa d trac ks owned and operated by Norfolk. As a ru ra l c ro ssi ng , it

is not e qu ipp e d w ithc ro ssb ars , li g hts , o r o the r a c tiv e wa rn ingde vic e s. Howeve r, the c rossing does have two standard refle ctive crossbucks, and ther e is a y ellow ra ilroad crossingwar

ning sig n approximately

800 fee t from the cr ossing. Th e No rf olk tr a in i nv olv e d in

the co ll is io n w a s e qu ipp e d w itha Ra ilV ie w E ve nt D a ta Recorde r (“ RailView”) . The RailView de vice is mounted nea r the e ng ineer ’s window and a long

w i t h p r o v i d i n g a v i d e o r e c o r d i n g , i tr e p o rt s t h e t r a i n ’ s s p e e d , w h i s t l e a c t i v i t y, an d b r a k i n g a c t i v i t y. Ra ilV ie w i nd ic a te s th a t at th e tim e of the c oll isi on , th e tr a in wa s tr a ve lin g 61 m.p .h . w ithits wh ist le sounding. The re is some indication that moments prior to the collision, M rs. Petre notice d t he impending pe ril and unsucc essfully attempted first to spee d up and then to br ake. The e ng ineer of the train stated that he did not rea liz e the c ar w as not g oing to stop at the c rossing until i t was too late. The husband of

Mrs. Petre a

nd fathe r of two of

the dec ease d ch i l dren, Te rry Petre (“Plaintiff” ), filed the instant a ction in Ohio state court. I t was removed to the Unit ed States District Court fo r t he No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Oh io on div e rs ity of c iti zen sh ip g ro un ds , w he re it w a s r e fe rr e d to a mag istrate judg e by consent of the parties. The district c ourt g rante d Norfolk’ s motion for partial summary judgme nt with reg ard t o t he ade quacy of the wa

rning device s installed at the cr ossingNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 3 - beca use the F eder al Railroad Saf ety Act pre empts such a c laim. The district court’ s pree mption de c isi on ha s n ot b e e n a

pp e a le d. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt late r g ra nte d fu ll summa

ry jud g me nt f

or No rf olk and F lorenc e Township. Plaintiff appe aled. II. AN AL YSI S Th is c ourt re vie ws a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo

. Nic ho ls v . M oo re , 477 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2007)

. The mere alleg ation of a f actua l dispute is ins ufficie nt to “defe at an other wise prope rly

supported mot ion for summary judgme nt; the dispute must present a genuine issue of material

fac t.” Hende rson v. W

alled Lake Consol. Sch. , 469 F.3d 479, 487 ( 6th Cir. 2006). A “g enuine” dispute is one that would permit a re asonable jury to return a

verdic t in favo r of the nonmoving pa rt y , and a f act is “material” only

if its resolution could affe ct the outcome of the litigation under

the applica

ble law. Id

. As a matter

over w hich fe dera l jurisdicti o n ex i s t s beca use of diver sity

of citizenship, the applicable substant i v e law is that of the state in which the district cour t sits. Ha y es v . E qu ita ble Energy R es. Co. , 266 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2001)

. Thus, Ohio law g overns the r esolution of the instant case. T o survive a motion for summary judgme nt on a neg lige nce claim under Ohio law, the pla int if f m us t e sta bli sh the e xiste nc e of

a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f a c t “ a s to wh e the r t

he de fe nd ant: (1 ) o we d a

du ty of c are to t he pla int if

f; (2 ) b re a c he d th a t duty ; and (3) the br e a c h o f t

hat duty proxi mately

cause d (4) injury

to the plaintiff.” Nye v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 437 F.3d 556, 563 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Texler v. D.O. Sum mers Cleaners &Shirt L aundry Co. , 69 3 N. E. 2d 27 1, 27 4 (Ohio 19 98 )) . Wh e re the pla int if f f a ils to e sta

bli shthe e xiste nc e of

on e of the se fo ur

e sse nti a l e le me nts ,No. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 4 - summary judgme nt fo r the def

endant is appr opriate. Se e ge ne ra lly Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Th e c ru x of the dis pu te in the ins tant c a se is wh e the r De fe nd ants ’ c on du c t w a s th e pr oximate
cause of the c ollisi on. Although pr ox imate ca use is usuall y a question of fact for the jury , a de fe nd ant is e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt “ if the pla int if f’ s e vid e nc e on the is su e of p ro xima te
cause require s mere spe culation and c onjecture to determine the cause of the eve nt at issue.” Nye , 437 F.3d at 564. A. Discussion of

Norfolk’s Alleged Negligence A thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d and the a pplicabl e ca s e l aw supports the district court’s ho ldi ngthat th e re is n o e vid e nc e fr om whic h a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld f ind that th e c on du c t of

No rf olk pr o xi m a t e l y c a

u s e d t h i s t r a g e dy . A l t h o u g h P l a i n t i f f m a k e s v ar i o u s ar g u m e n t s i n an a tte mptto
e sta bli she rr or

on the pa rt of the dis tr ic t c ourt , a ll o f t

he m la c k me ri t. 1. Vi sua l Obs tr uc ti ons and t he “Lo ok a nd Lis te n” R e quir e m e nt Pla int if f f ir st a rg ue s th a t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in ho ldi ng that N or fo lk w a s n ot t he pr oximate
cau s e o f t h e a cc i d en tb ec au s e M rs . P e t r e f a i l edt o “l o o k

an d l i s t en ” b ef

o re en t er i n g t h e c ro s s i n g. Ac c or din g to P la int if

f, t he di st ric t c ourt

fa ile d to re c og nize the sig nif ic anc e of the Oh io S up re me Court’s decision in Tolli ver v . Consol. Rail Corp. , 463 N.E.2d 389 (Ohio 1984), with reg ard to the application of the “look and listen” r equire ment wher e a motorist’s view is obstruc ted. I n O hio , a mot or ist and ra ilr oa d c omp any ow e e a c h oth e r a re c ipr oc a l duty

of c are to a vo id collisions. W

ooten v. CSX R.R. , 8 42 N. E. 2d 60 3, 61 1 ( Oh io C t. A pp . 2 00 5) . Amot or ist

ha s a common law duty

to “both [] look and [ ] listen for appr oachingtrains, and the lookingand listeningNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

Although the W

ooten court re fer ence d O.R.C. § 2955.36 in thi s portion of its opinion, there 1 is no su c h pr ov isi on in the Oh io Re vis e d Cod e , and it is c le ar f ro m W ooten ’s ea

rlier discussion of O.R.C. § 4955.36 that the court’s re fer ence to § 2955.36 was mere ly a ty pog raphic al er

ror. - 5 - must be at such a time a

nd place and in such a

manner as to be eff

ective f or that purpose .” Zum e nts v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. , 2 71 N. E. 2d 81 3, 81 4 ( Oh io 1 97 1) (p e r c ur iam) . A dd iti on a lly , p ur su ant t o Oh i o R ev i s edC o d e ( “O
. R
. C
. ”) § 4 5 1 1
. 6 2 (A )( 1 ), a motorist “appr o ac h [ i n g] a r ai l ro adgra d e c ro s s i n g, [] shall stop within fifty

fee t, but not less than fifteen feet from the near est rail of the r ailroad if . . . (e) [a] n approa ching train is emitting an a udible signa l or is plainly vi s i b l e and is in haz ardous pr oximi ty to t he c ro ssi ng .” Ho we ve r, the mot or ist ’s fa ilure to “ loo k a nd lis te n” wi ll n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly prec lude re cover

y if the ra ilroad wa s neg lige nt in maintaining the a rea surroundingthe cr ossing. See Cates v. Consol. Rail Cor

p. , 65 3 N. E. 2d

12 29 , 1 23 4- 35 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 19 95 ). As the Oh io S up re me Court expl ained in Tol liv e r, the Zum e nts holding does not prec lude a plaintiff f rom rec overy

if there is “a seve re visual obstruc tion at the crossing site, i.e., heavy veg etation.” Tolli ver , 463 N.E.2d at 3 9 0
. H o w e v e r , s u c h an o b s t r u c t i o n m u s t h a v e b e e n l o c a t e d o nt h e r a i l r o a d

c o mp an y’ s r i g h t
- o f

- w ay. See W ooten , 8 4 2 N
. E
. 2 d a t 6 1 3
. U n d e r O h io la w , a r a il r o a d is r e s p o n s ib le f o r r e mo v in g any “obstructive ve g etation upon its right- of-wa y at ea ch interse ction with a publi c roa d or hig hway , for a distance of s ix h u n dr e d f e e t o r a r e a s o n a

b ly s a f e d is ta n c e f r o m th e r o a dw ay . . . . ” O
. R.C. § 4955.36. Where a ny claimed obstruction is outside of t he railroad’s right-of -wa y , O.R.C. § 4955.36 1 “is not a basis for

liability on the part of [the railroad].” W ooten , 842 N.E.2d at 613. In W ooten , the plaintiff was se vere ly

inju re d in a ca

r-tra in collision at a rura l crossing , and she f iled suit alleg ingNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 6 - that the acc ident was cause d by a corn field that obstructed her view of the trac ks. Id

. at 606. I t was clea r fr om the available evidence that Wooten enter ed the c rossing without first looking and listening, e ven thoug h she could have stopped within the statutory fiftee n fee t from the tra cks and seen the approa ch i n g t rain. Id . at 613. Aff irming summar

y judgme nt for the r ailroad, W ooten reje cted the plaintiff’s arg ument beca use “the corn at issue was located on private pr operty outside of the ra ilroad rig ht-of-w ay .” Id

. I n the instant case , Plaintiff alleg es that his wife’s view of the tra cks wa s impeded by “seve ral momentary

view obstructions alongCounty Road I , the last of which is located a pproxi mately

132 fe e t f ro m th e c ro ssi ng .” Th e se imp e dim e nts inc lud e a fa rmho us e , s e ve ra l outbu ild ing s, and so me tree s. Plainti ff c laims that Norfolk’s fa ilure to re move these visual impediments trig g ers the Tolli ver decision and ne cessitates r ever sal of the district c ourt. We disag ree . As the district court explained, Norfolk had no duty to remove the obstructions of which Plaintiff complains bec ause the y
we re no t on

its ri g ht- of

-w ay . I t is un dis pu te d th a t th e a lle g ed ob st ruct ions a re loc a te d o n p ri vate proper ty some 130 fee t from the cr ossing. The photogr aphs i n t h e record showthat the ar ea immediately

surroundingthe ra ilroad cro s s i n g i n question is open, with the only shrubber y being g round-leve l veg etation that do es not impede a motorist’s view. H ere , as in W ooten , there is no evidenc e that Mrs. Petre ’s view down th e t rac ks would have be en impeded ha d she stopped and listened within the fiftee n fee t require d by O.R.C. § 4511.62. I n a n atte mpt to e sta bli she rr or

on the pa rt of the dis tr ic t court , Plai nti ff argue s th a t th is c a se i s g o v e r n e d b y Tolli ver . As stated above , Tolli ver held t hat a driver’ s failure to look and listen does not warr ant judg ment as a matter of law for the railroad w here there is a “ se v e re visual obstructionNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

The Carpenter

decision that Plaintiff cites is the sec ond opinion from this court arising out 2 of the same fac t pattern. See Carpente r v. Norfolk & W . Ry. Co. , No. 96-3871, 1998 U.S. App. L EXI S 7694, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 1998) (“ Ca r p e n te r #1 ”). In Ca r

p e n te r #1 , the cour

t remande d t h e m at ter to the district cour t for additional discove ry to determine w hether

there was a

g enuine issue of mater ial fac t reg ardingwhether 170 fee t was a suf

ficient distance to r eac t to an appr oaching train. After additional discovery , the di strict court ag ain gra nted s ummary judgme nt for the r ailroad, and in Ca r

p e n te r #2 this court aff

irmed summary

judgme nt over Judge Clay ’s dissent. See Ca r p e n te r #2 , 2000 WL 1785537, at *1-2. - 7 - at the crossing sit e .” Tolli ver , 46 3 N. E. 2d a t 39 0 (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Al tho ug h the Oh io S up re me Court ’s d ec i s ion does not provide a de scription of the obstruc tions in question, t he lower court’s opinion in Tolli ver

state s th a t th e ov e rg ro wth a t the c ro ssi ng“ wa s so se ve re that [mo tor ist s] ha d to ‘cr eep onto the t rac k to see if any thing was coming .’” Tolli ver v. Consol. R. Corp. , No. 26-CA-82, 1982 Ohio A p p . L E X I S 1 3 7 5 2 , a t * 5 ( O h io Ct
. A p p . D e c . 2 9 , 1 9 8 2 )

. B a s e d o nth is d e s c r ip ti o n, Tol liv e r is distinguishable from the i nstant case . First, unlike the c ase sub judice , th e imp e dim e nts in Tolli ver

wer e undoubtedly

on the ra ilroad’s rig ht-of-w ay . Second, a revie w of the photogra phs provided in this c ase illust rate s that there wer e no obstructions pre sent at the County Road Icrossing itself, let alone a

“seve re” obstruction of the ty pe existi ng in Tolli ver . I n addition to his m istaken re liance on Tolli ver , Pl a int if f a rgue s th a t tw o d e c isi on s f ro m th is court re quire re versa l. He points to Carpe n t er v. Norfolk & W . Ry. Co. , 2 3 8 F
. 3 d

4 2 0 , 2 0 0 0 WL 1785537 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table de cision), for the proposition that an obstruction 170 fee t from a r ailroad c rossing is sufficient to survive summ ary judgme nt. Plaintiff misst ates the holding of Carpenter , wher e this court ac tually aff irmed summary

judgme nt for the r ailroad be cause there was “ no longe r a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t as to whether 170 fee t was a suf

ficient distance for a drive r to see a

n approa ching train and stop a sa fe distanc e fr om the trac ks.” Id . at *1. What 2No. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 8 - Pla int if f c ha ra c te ri zes a s Carpenter ’s holding, see Appellant’s Br
. at 16 n.8, is actua lly the position ta k e n b y th e dissent. Se e id . at *3 (Clay , J ., dissenting) (stating “I believe that a g enuine issue of materia l fac t remains . . . as to whe ther the 170 f eet wa s a suffic ient distance f or a dr iver traveling the spee d limit to have sa fely stopped.”). A ccor dingly , Carpenter lends no support to Plainti ff. Plaintiff also argues that our de cision in Stoler v. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. , 583 F.2d 896, 898 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 7 8 ) , b o ls te r s h is p o s it io n . The S t o l er holding is distinguishable beca use it addre ssed whether the cr ossing wa s ext raha zardous under Ohio law such that additional wa rning device s were require d; no such issue is be fore this c ourt beca use of the district court’s pr eemption dec ision. Here, the dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y re lie d on c a se s su c h a s W ooten and Zum ste in in concluding that there wer e no visual obstructions on Norfolk’s r ight- of-wa y that rende red Mr s. Petre unable to e ffe ctively “look and listen” be fore enter ing the crossing

. 2. Tr ain Spe e d I n a d d it io nto h is v is u a l o b s tr u c ti o nar gu me n t, Pl a in ti f f a ll e g e s th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r

red in c on c lud ingthat no re a so na ble jur y c ou ld fi nd that Nor fo lk’ s viol a tio n o f t he 60 m.p .h . s pe e d li mit was the pr ox imate ca

use of the collision. Pursuant to f eder al law, a train trave rsing the cr ossing at County Road Ishall not ex cee d 60 m.p.h. See 49 C.F .R. § 21 3. 9. Ra ilV ie w i nd ic a te s th a t at th e tim e of the c ollisi on, Norfolk’ s locomotive was traveling at 61 m.p.h. The evidence sug g ests that had the train bee n trave ling at 60 m.p.h., inst ead of 61 m.p.h., Mrs. Petre would have had an additional twotenths of a se cond to re act to the trai n . P l aintiff posits that beca use additional time would have exis ted had the tr ain bee n trave lin g t h e s p ee d limit , there is sufficient evide nce f rom which a
rea sonable jury

could conc lude that Norf olk cause d the collision.No. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 9 - We ha ve previously reje cted this same argument in a prior c ase. S e e Ca r p e n te r #1 , 1 99 8 U .S. App. L EXI S 7694, at *10-11. I n Ca r p e n te r #1 , the t rain in question was also traveling at 61 m.p.h. in a 60 m.p.h. zone when it collided with the plaintiff’s ca r. Carpenter #1 , 1 99 8 U .S. Ap p. L EX I S, at *10. L ikewise, the e vidence in Ca r p e n te r #1 indicated that had the tra in been tra veling 60 m.p.h. t h e motorist would have ha d an additional two-te nths of a sec ond to respond. Id

. A f f ir mi ng summary judgme nt for the railroa d, this c ourt explained that “re asonable minds could not conclude that this additional [ time] would have been suff icient time [for the dec ease d] t o shift ge ars, a nd move
awa y from the tra cks.” Id . at *1 1; see also Hotchk iss v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 904 F.2d 36, 1990 U.S. App. L EXI S 8694, at *22-23 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table de cision) (e x plaining that

“ [s]pe e d is no t c a

us a l me re ly

be c a us e the tr a in a

rr ive d at th e c ro ssi ngthe ins tant that it d id, wh ile if it ha d be e n g oin g slo we r, the sn ow plo w mig ht have sa fe ly c ro sse d in fr on t of it.” ). Th is c a se is ind ist inguis ha

ble fr om Ca r

p e n te r #1 , and Plaintiff’s ar g ument that had the tra in been tra veling 60 m.p .h . th e c oll isi on

wo uld no t ha ve oc c ur re d is me re sp e c ulation of the ty pe that is ins uf

fi c ie nt t o survive summary

judgme nt. 3. Act ivation of

the Train’s Whistle Ne xt, Pla int if

f a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de te rm ini ng tha t no re a so na

ble jur y c ou ld
co n clude that Norfolk’s fa ilure to sound th e tr a in ’ s w h is tl e u n ti l a f te r it h a d p a s s e d the are a desig nated by

law wa s a proximate cause of t he accident. Acc ording to O.R.C. § 4955.32(B )(1) , the eng ineer of a tra in “shall sound [t he] whistle at a distance of at least eig hty and not f urther than one hundred r ods from such c rossing and ring[t he] b el l co n t i n uously until the eng ine passes theNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

Eig hty to one hundre d rods is roug hly the equivale nt of 1320 to 1620 fee t. Sh e e ts v . No rfo lk 3 S. Corp. , 671 N.E.2d 1364, 1373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). - 10 - crossing .” I n o rd er t o al er t a train’s c rewof the a ppropriate time to sound the whistle, there a re 3 “whistle posts” installed along side the trac ks. I t is uncontrove rted that in this case the train did not sound its whist le until it had passed the whistle post. W hile a tec hnical violation of O.R.C. § 4955.32(B )(1) may constitute neg lige nce pe r se , summa ry jud g me nt f

or the ra ilr oa d is a

pp ro pr iate wh e re the re is e vide nc e that th e wh ist le did
e ve ntu a lly so un d, and the re is no ev ide nc e that the fa ilure to t ime ly a c tiv a te the wh ist le pr oximate ly
cause d the collision. Henson v. Norfolk S. Corp. , No. 97CAE-05-016, 1997 O hio App. L EXI S 5951, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. De c. 15, 1997). In Henson , th e e vid e nc e ind ic a te d th a t th e e ng ine e r f ir st sounded the whistle whe n the train wa s 1219 fee t from the cr ossing, whic h was a pproxi mately

1000 fee t bey ond the statutory

require ment. Id

. Notwithstanding the statutory violation, Henson aff

irmed summary judgme nt for the r ailroad be cause :
rea sonable minds could not find the appe llees’ ne g lige nce pe r se wa s a pro x imate c a us e of the a c c ide nt. Th e statut e int e nd s to pr ov ide su ff ic ie nt w arn ingto m oto ri sts that a tra i n i s approa ching . The fa cts do not demonstrate de cede nt ever hear d the wh ist le , and we c on c lud e on the se fa c ts ap

pe lla nt ca nn ot sho w th at h ad thewhi stl e sounded sooner, de cede nt would have avoided thecollision

. Id . at *13 (e mphasis added)

. Her e, like in Henson , the alleg ation made by Plaintiff is that Norfolk’ s failure to sound the whistle at t h e whistle post was neg lige nce pe r seand re su lte d in

le ss t ime fo r M rs . Pe tr e to r e a c t. RailView establishes that the e ng ineer in the instant case w as sounding the whis tle leading up to the
mom e nt o f i mpa c t. De sp ite thi s fa c t, M rs . Pe tr e —w ho se wi nd owwa s r oll e d d ow n— pr oc e e de d toNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 11 - enter the cr ossing. Evide nce pr esente d by Plaintiff’s own expert indicates the f allac y of the a rg ument t h at an ex t rat h re e s ec o n d s o f w h i s t l e- b l o wi n g wo u l d h av e p re v en t edt h e a cc i d en tfr o m o cc u rr i n g. Acc ording to Dr. David L ipscomb, an audiolog ist, Mrs. Petre likely would have be en unable to hear the whistle until approxi mately four se conds bef

ore the train re ache d the cr ossing. He f urther opine d that “ the rai l vi ew su g g e ste d th a t sh e wa sn ’t a le rt e d. As fa

r a s I c ou ld d isc e rn , I

watc he d it
re p e a te d ly , th e r e w a s n o h e a d mo v e me n t th a t I c o u ld d is c e r n , w h ic h I th ink if anindividual approa ching a tra ck we re a lerted by a tra in horn they ’d start looking for it.” Joint App’x at 1090. Ba sed on Dr. L ipscomb’s tes ti mony and common sense , a re asonable jury could not conclude that Norfolk’ s delay

in sounding the whistle proxi mately cause d this accide nt. Plainti ff ha s failed to expl ain how Mrs. Petre would have been alerted to the train ha d the whistle started to sound thre e
se c on ds e arl ie r at 13 20 fe e t f ro m th e c ro ssi ng , g ive n th a t it fa ile d to su ff

ic ie ntl y a le rt he r w he n it started to sound at a

pproxi mately

1000 fee t from the crossing

. Thus, we a g ree with the district court that “ it i s il log ic a l to c on c lud e tha t th e 3- se c on d dela y

in s ound ingthe wh ist le ” wa s a pr oximate
cause of the c ollisi on. 4. Tr ain Cr e w’s Dut y t o M ain ta in a P r ope r Loo kout Plaintiff further

argues that summary

jud gm ent was ina

ppropriate ly

g rante d by

the district
c ourt be c a us e the tr a in’ s c re w f

a ile d to ma int a in a pr op e r loo ko ut. Un de r Oh io law, “ [i]t is the du ty of a loc omotive eng ineer

to keep a lookout on the track ah ead of the train.” Nye , 437 F.3d at 567 (q u o t i n g Cates , 653 N.E.2d at 1237). H oweve r, a tra in cre w is not neg lige nt for pres u m ing that motorists approachinga cr ossing will stop short of the tra cks and y ield to a n oncoming train. Cates , 65 3 N.E .2 d at 123 7. Gi ve n th e fa c ts o f t his c a se , w e a g re e wi th t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

that no re a so na

bleNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 12 - jur y c ou ld c on c lud e that th e c oll isi on wa s c a us e d b y the c re w’ s fa ilure to ma int a in a p ro pe r l oo ko ut. Although the conductor

was a ppare ntly rea ding a rule book and did not notice the a pproac hing c ar, the e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t by the tim e the e ng ine e r—

wh o w a s p ayinga tte nti on —r e a liz e d th a t Mr s. P e t r e w a s n o tg o i n g t o s t o p , i tw a s t o o l a t e t o t a k e an y e m e r g e n c y p r e c a u t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y, Plaintiff’s argument fails. B. Discussion of Flore nce Town ship ’s Alleged Ne gligence Plaintiff also argues that F lorenc e Township fa iled to appropriately paint a ra ilroad wa

rning markingon the roa dway

and such a

failure was c ausally connec ted to the collision. County Road I , w hic h is loc a te d w ith in F lor e nc e To wn sh ip, wa s re surf a c e d in 19 92 . Pr ior

to r e surf a c ing , Co un ty Road Ihad painted r oad mar kings s ev eral hundred f

eet be fore the cr ossing. Plaintiff alleg es that Flore nce T ownship’s failure to p ai n t t he mar kings on the resur fac ed roa d was ne g lige nt and contributed to t he collis ion. Flore nce Township responds by arguing that as a polit ical subdivision it is im mu ne fro m suit u

nd e r O .R. C. § 27 44 .0 2( A) (1 ). Ev e n if it i s su bje c t to su it, the towns hip maintains that there is no e vidence that the l ac k o f ro ad marking s was a pr ox imate ca use of the collision. Ra ther t han eng a g e in a de ta ile d a

na ly sis of

Oh io’ s p oli tic a l su

bd ivi sio n im mun ity statute—which would for ce us to determine whe ther the O hio Supreme Court would view the f ailure to p a int the mark ing s o n th e re surf a c e d r oa d a s a nu isa

nc e su c h that O.R. C. § 2744 .0 2 im mun ity is
un a va ila ble —w e c ho os e to a ssume , w ith ou t de c idi ng , th a t F lor e nc e To wn sh ip i s n ot s ub je c t to immunit y and af firm the district cour

t’s decision for

Flore nce T ownship on the merits. Wit h reg ard to the merits, Plaintiff has failed to pr oduce evidenc e from which a rea sonable jury could conc ludeNo. 06-4487

Petre v . Norfolk Southern Corp.

- 13 - that th e a bs e nc e of the ro a d ma

rk ing s in qu e stion was a caus al fac tor in t he c oll isi on . T he re is a y ellow ra ilroad cr ossing wa rning sign 800 fee t pr ior to the crossing , there are ref lective c rossbucks at the cr ossing, a

nd the cr ossing itself is ra ised above the normal roa d level; it is difficult to im ag ine that the exist ence of painted r oad mar kings w arning of t he crossing would have preve nted Mrs. Petre f r o m dr i v i n g i n t o t h e p a t h o f t h e t r a i n w h e n a l l o f t h e o t h e r m e a s u r e s f

a i l e d t o d o s o . A c c o r d i n g l y, the district court c orre ctly g rante d summary

judgme nt in favor of

Flore nce T ownship. Whil e the c ircumstance s of t he present case are trag ic, and we have sy mpathy for Plaintiff’s los s, the re is no e vid e nc e fr om whic h a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld f ind that th e c on du c t of

e ith e r N or fo lk or F lorenc e Township proximately cause d the collision. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the dec ision of the district court.