alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
208 La. 310

#### CHALMERS v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT.

No. 37506.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 29, 1945.

*104C. B. Protliro, of Shreveport, for plaintiff and appellant.

J. H. Jackson, J. Edwin Bailey, Jr., Chas. L. Mayer, and Edw. S. Robertson, all of Shreveport, for defendant and ap-pellee.

ROGERS, Justice.

This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the City of Shreveport to grant relator, Robert D. Chalmers, a certificate authorizing him to ■ operate a taxi cab and livery service on furnishing a policy of public liability and property damage insurance in the sum of $5000 on each vehicle operated by him, issued by a surety company authorized to do business in this State. Relator also prays for a judgment declaring to be unconstitutional section 3, subsection d, paragraph 2 of Ordinance No. 30 of 1936 of the City of Shreveport, setting forth the qualifications of an insurance or surety company issuing indemnity bonds required .by the ordinance for conducting or carrying on a public transportation service in the municipality.

The City of Shreveport refused to issue relator a certificate authorizing him to operate a public taxi cab and livery service on the ground that he had not complied with that part of the ordinance which he seeks to have declared unconstitutional.

The case was tried, argued and submitted in the district court on an agreed statement of facts and judgment w.as rendered rejecting relator’s demands and dismissing the suit. This appeal followed.

The City of Shreveport has filed a motion in this Court to remand the case, alleging that since the rendition of the judgment in the district court the relator has filed a petition with the City Council of Shreveport for a certificate authorizing him to operate a taxi cab service, in which petition relator avers that he is able to furnish liability and property damage insurance in a company possessing the qualifications prescribed by that part of the municipal ordinance which relator is attacking in this suit as being unconstitutional; that .the municipal council has accepted the petition and annexed documents as sufficient for a certificate so far as compliance with the insurance coverage required by the ordinance is concerned. Mover further alleges that the matter in controversy has become a moot question as may be readily shown by testimony to be adduced in the district court of the facts alleged in the motion, and that the case should be remanded for that purpose and such proof, if made, to be used in support of an application to dismiss this appeal.

Relator, who, according to the attached certificate, was served with a copy, has not filed any opposition or made any objection to the granting of respondent’s motion.

It is therefore ordered that this case be remanded to the district court for the purpose of allowing mover to adduce proof of the facts set forth in the motion, to be used by mover in support of a motion to dismiss the appeal to be filed later.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

Nos. 17

- 3752, 18

- 1253, 19

- 1129, 19

- 1189

_____________

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY

v.

PRESIDENT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY; SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF L ABOR; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home (Intervenor in D.C.), Appellant in 17

- 3752, 19

- 1129

President United States of America, Secretary United States of Department of Health and Human Services,
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Secretary United States Department of Treasury, United States Department of Treasury, Secretary United States Department of Labor, United States Department of Labor,
A ppellants in 18

- 1253,
19

- 1189 (Except President United States of America)

______________ ________

ORDER AMENDING OPINION

______________ ________

It has come to the attention of the Court that the last name of counsel for Appellee
C ommonwealth of Pennsylvania , Aimee D. Thomson was misspelled. At the direction of the Court, t he opinion filed on July 12, 2019 is amended to reflect the correct spelling of
counsel ’ s name. As this amendment is clerical in nature, it does not alter the filing date of the opinion.For the Court,

s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit
Clerk

Date: July 1 9 , 2019

cc: All Counsel of Record
#### MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford E. McDonald, Jr., Intervenor/Defendant-Appellant, and Michael C. Kelly, Defendant.

No. 02-2062.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 12, 2003.

Decided March 25, 2003.

Irwin E. Weiss, Baltimore, Maryland; Jerome J. Seidenman, Jerome J. Seidenman, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. William C. Parler, Jr., Parler *&*Wobber, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Clifford McDonald appeals the district court’s order entering a declaratory judgment in favor of Mutual Benefit Insurance Co. on its claim that Michael Kelly was a non-permissive user of a vehicle owned by Multi-Complex Contractors that Kelly was driving during a motor vehicle accident on June 24, 2000. McDonald also appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to alter or amend judgment and for a new trial. We affirm.

We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo, and its findings of facts for clear error. *Minyard Enter., Inc. v. Southeastern Chem. & Solvent Co.,*184 F.3d 373, 380 (4th Cir.1999); Fed. R.Civ.P. 52(a). We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the joint appendix, and the supplemental joint appendix and conclude the district court properly entered judgment in favor of Mutual Benefit because Kelly was operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Multi-Complex policy and therefore was a non-permissive user of the vehicle. *See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Bullock,*68 Md.App. 20, 509 A.2d 1217, 1225 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1986). Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. McDonald,*No. CA-01-1129-L (D. Md. July 12, 2002 & Sept. 4, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Raymond H. SMITH, Appellant, v. *Jo Anne BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security *(Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c)).

No. 02-3640.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 6, 2003.

Decided March 21, 2003.

Before ROTH, BARRY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Raymond Smith appeals the District Court’s affirmance of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Our review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. *See Fargnoli v. Massanari,*247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.2001). The factual findings of the Commissioner must be accepted as conclusive so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. *See*42 U.S.C. § 405(g); *Richardson v. Perales,*402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). “Substantial evidence” is “ ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’ ” *Fargnoli,*247 F.3d at 38 (quoting *Plummer v. Apfel,*186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir.1999)).

We have carefully considered Smith’s arguments in this appeal and find that they lack merit. For the reasons substantially stated in the District Court’s well-reasoned and thorough opinion, we find that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s determination that Smith retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work and its decision to deny Smith disability insurance benefits.1 We therefore affirm.

1

. On September 29, 2002, the District Court adopted Magistrate Judge Melinson’s Report and Recommendation, which was filed on September 11, 2002. We therefore consider the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to be the opinion of the District Court.
(No. 23570.

#### The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, *vs.*Frank Nitti, Defendant in Error.

*Opinion filed December 10, 1936.*

Otto Kerner, Attorney General, Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, and A. B. Dennis, ( Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Richard H. Devine, and Melvin S. Rembe, of counsel,) for the People.

Benjamin C. Bachrach, and Morton E. Anderson, (Walter Bachrach, and Arthur Magid, of counsel,) for defendant in error.

Per Curiam :

In 1935, at the November term of the criminal court of Cook county, Frank Nitti was indicted and charged with having burglar’s tools in his possession with, intent to break and enter the shoe store of G. R. Kinney & Co., incorporated, with the intent to commit the crime of larceny on August 25, 1933.' He was permitted to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to file a special plea of former conviction, in which he set forth that he had been indicted by the Cook county grand jury at the September term, 1933, for an attempted burglary of the same store at the same time and place. He alleged that under the earlier indictment he had pleaded guilty to an attempt to commit petty larceny and had been sentenced to the house of correction for a period of six- months. The State’s attorney demurred to the plea of former conviction, and when *21the court overruled his demurrer he sued out this writ of error.

This case is controlled by our decisions in *People*v. *Vitale,*364 Ill. 589, and *People*v. *White,*id. 574. For the reasons stated in the opinions in those cases this court is without jurisdiction, and the writ of error will be dismissed.

*Writ dismissed.*
DISMISS and Opinion Filed July 15, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-24-00636-CV 

ZAVIERN ESTINICHO THOMAS, Appellant 

V. 

ROBERT ELIZONDO, FELLER TOWING & RECOVERY, LLC, RADE 

UTILITY CONSTRUCTION, INC, BRIAN FELLER, AND RADE 

CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellees 

On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-08289 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia 

Opinion by Justice Reichek 

On June 18, 2024, we sent a letter to the parties questioning our jurisdiction 

over this appeal because it appears the complained-of judgment is not final or 

otherwise appealable. We directed appellant to file a letter brief addressing our 

jurisdictional concern no later than June 28, 2024. We expressly cautioned appellant 

that failure to do so might result in the dismissal of the appeal without further notice. 

To date, appellant has not filed a letter brief nor further corresponded with the Court 

regarding the status of this appeal. 
 –2– 

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b), (c). 

240636F.P05 

 

/Amanda L. Reichek/

AMANDA L. REICHEK 

JUSTICE 
 –3– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

ZAVIERN ESTINICHO THOMAS, 

Appellant 

No. 05-24-00636-CV V. 

ROBERT ELIZONDO, FELLER 

TOWING & RECOVERY, LLC, 

RADE UTILITY CONSTRUCTION, 

INC, BRIAN FELLER, AND RADE 

CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellees 

 On Appeal from the 134th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-08289. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Reichek. Justices Goldstein and 

Garcia participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is 

DISMISSED. 

Judgment entered July 15, 2024
Exhibit 10.1


                    FIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


     This  FIRST  AMENDMENT  TO  EMPLOYMENT  AGREEMENT  (this  "Amendment")  is
effective  as  of December 31, 2010, by and between ORBIT INTERNATIONAL CORP., a
Delaware  corporation  (the  "Company")  and  BRUCE  REISSMAN (the "Executive").

                              W I T N E S S E T H:
                              - - - - - - - - - -

     WHEREAS,  the  Company  and  Executive entered into an employment agreement
dated as of December 14, 2007 (the "Employment Agreement") pursuant to which the
Executive  was  employed  by the Company upon the terms and conditions contained
therein;  and
     WHEREAS,  the  parties desire to amend certain provisions of the Employment
Agreement  as  set  forth  below.
     NOW,  THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and other good and
valuable  consideration,  the  receipt  and  sufficiency  of  which  are  hereby
acknowledged,  each  of  the  parties  agree  with  the  others  as  follows:
1.     The  first  sentence of Paragraph 9 of the Employment Agreement is hereby
deleted  in  its entirety, and a new sentence reading in its entirety as follows
is  hereby  inserted  in  its  place:
"The Term and Executive's employment hereunder shall continue from the effective
date  of  this Agreement through February 28, 2011, unless terminated earlier by
the  Company  or  by  Executive  pursuant  to  this  Paragraph  9."

2.     Paragraph  4D  is  hereby  deleted  in  its  entirety.
3.     Except as herein amended, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full
force and effect.
4.     This Amendment may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which
shall be considered an original, and all of which, when taken together, shall be
considered one and the same agreement and shall become effective when such
counterparts have been signed by each of the parties and delivered to the other
parties, it being understood that all parties need not sign the same
counterpart.
                           [Signature page follows.]

IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the  parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be duly
executed  as  of  the  day  and  year  first  above  written.

     ORBIT INTERNATIONAL CORP.


     By:        /s/ Mitchell Binder
                -------------------
     Name:      Mitchell Binder
     Title:     Chief Executive Officer



                              /s/ Bruce Reissman
                              ------------------
                              BRUCE REISSMAN
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended October 2, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael L. Heider, Vice President Finance, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|/S/ MICHAEL L. HEIDER                                        
|-------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                             
|Michael L. Heider                                            
|Vice President Finance, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
|October 20, 2004                                             



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc. and will be retained by OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Rel: April 12, 2024

STATE OF ALABAMA -- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

THE SUPREME COURT

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

SC-2023-0946

Jereme R. Peet v. Jefferson F. Vinson, Sr., and Mathew V. Vinson (Appeal 

from Henry Circuit Court: CV-21-900002).

COOK, Justice.

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.

Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
#### Mary Welch, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Respondent.

Motion for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals denied, with ten dollars costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997             MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                         $36,793                 $11,389
<SECURITIES>                                        $0                      $0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 $930,640                $770,475
<ALLOWANCES>                                        $0                      $0
<INVENTORY>                                 $5,922,794              $6,701,828
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            $7,377,800              $8,056,852
<PP&E>                                     $17,827,847             $17,161,494
<DEPRECIATION>                             $12,312,013             $11,869,232
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             $13,551,137             $13,902,796
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       $3,470,208              $4,031,800
<BONDS>                                     $3,165,802              $3,581,430
<COMMON>                                      $174,926                $174,926
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               $0                      $0
<PREFERRED>                                         $0                      $0
<OTHER-SE>                                  $7,165,321              $6,512,503
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               $13,551,137             $13,902,796
<SALES>                                     $1,403,244              $1,175,051
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            $1,428,088              $1,197,263
<CGS>                                       $1,138,574                $775,519
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               $1,138,574                $775,519
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              $176,775                $175,202
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    $0                      $0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             $79,166                 $83,351
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             ($552,545)              ($409,191)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        $0                      $0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         ($552,545)              ($409,191)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      $0                      $0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     $0                      $0
<CHANGES>                                           $0                      $0
<NET-INCOME>                                ($552,545)              ($409,191)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  ($1.06)                  ($.79)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  ($1.06)                  ($.79)
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, Michael L. Heider, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:

a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)	Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;

c)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

d)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.