Opinion issued June 18, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00614-CR

———————————

JASON B. JACKSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1365892

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State charged appellant Jason Jackson with sexual assault. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a) (West 2011). Jackson waived his right to a jury 

trial, and, after a trial to the bench, the trial court found him guilty. Jackson pled 
2

true to an enhancement paragraph, and the court assessed his punishment at 17 

years’ confinement. On appeal, Jackson contends that the evidence is legally 

insufficient to support his conviction because the complainant’s testimony was not 

credible. We affirm.

Background

One night in June 2012, the complainant went with a friend to a bar in 

Houston. They arrived at approximately 11:00 p.m., and the complainant drank 

three margaritas. The complainant testified that about an hour after he arrived at 

the bar, Jackson approached him. The complainant and Jackson talked for about 

fifteen minutes. Then, Jackson invited him to his house to continue drinking, and 

he agreed to go. They left the bar and went to a gas station. Jackson gave the 

complainant an orange soda in an open container, and the complainant drank it. 

Jackson then drove him to his house. The complainant felt dizzy during the drive. 

When they arrived at Jackson’s house, the lights were off. Jackson 

explained that he had not paid his electricity bill. Jackson took the complainant by 

the hand and led him to a bedroom. Jackson began to take off the complainant’s 

clothes, and the complainant resisted and told him to stop. The complainant 

testified that Jackson took off his own clothes, put the complainant on the bed, and 

inserted his penis into the complainant’s anus. The complainant told Jackson to 

stop again, and Jackson held down the complainant and hit him twice in the face. 
3

Jackson took $60 from the complainant’s wallet, and the complainant pushed him, 

which knocked over a soda. As Jackson began to clean up the drink, the 

complainant ran away down the street. He approached a woman, who was sitting 

outside a nearby house, and asked her to call 911 because he had been raped. The 

woman spoke to an emergency operator and waited outside until the police arrived. 

That night, a sexual assault nurse examined the complainant and wrote a 

report. She testified at trial. On the night of the incident, the complainant told her

that Jackson “may have put something in my drink.” A lab test did not detect 

Rohypnol in the complainant’s system, but the lab did not test for GHB, another 

date-rape drug. 

The complainant identified Jackson from a photo lineup prepared by the 

Houston Police Department. The State also presented evidence that DNA secured 

from the sexual assault examination done on the night of the incident matched 

Jackson’s DNA sample. 

While investigating the crime, a Houston Police Department officer 

interviewed Jackson. Jackson told the officer that he had not engaged in sexual 

activity with men. 

During the trial, the complainant testified that he feared that Jackson might 

kill him during the encounter, that he struggled, and that he was crying and told 

Jackson that he wanted to leave. The complainant acknowledged that he had 
4

applied for a resident visa based on his status as a victim of a violent crime after 

the assault occurred. He also testified that he had been granted political asylum, 

which he had applied for when he first entered the United States. 

Discussion

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Under the standard of review for legal sufficiency challenges, evidence is 

insufficient to support a conviction if, considering all the record evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict, no rational factfinder could have found that 

each essential element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); In re 

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970); Laster v. State, 275 

S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s evaluation of the credibility 

and weight of the evidence and its resolution of conflicting testimony. Williams, 

235 S.W.3d at 750. We consider the combined force of the evidence and 

determine whether any necessary inferences have a reasonable basis. Clayton v. 

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the 

factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to 

that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d 

at 778. 
5

A person is guilty of sexual assault if the person “intentionally or knowingly

. . . causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another person by any 

means, without that person’s consent.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(1)(A). 

A sexual assault under section 22.011(a)(1) is without the consent of the other 

person if “the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by the use of 

physical force or violence.” Id. § 22.011(b)(1). 

A conviction under section 22.011 of the Texas Penal Code “is supportable 

on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the victim 

informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense within one 

year after the date on which the offense is alleged to have occurred.” TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (West 2011).

Analysis

Jackson contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that 

Jackson forced the complainant to participate by physical force of violence because 

the complainant’s testimony was not credible. Specifically, Jackson argues that the 

complainant’s testimony that he did not consent to the sexual activity was not 

believable, given that the complainant conceded that he had agreed to accompany 

Jackson to his house and had agreed to walk hand-in-hand with him to his 

bedroom. He further argues that the complainant’s motivation for claiming that he 

was assaulted was that he would qualify for resident status by cooperating as a 
6

victim of a violent crime. Finally, Jackson argues that the complainant’s testimony 

at trial conflicted with his statements to the nurse examiner on the night of the 

incident regarding Jackson’s potential administration of a date-rape drug. 

None of these arguments warrant reversal. In both his statement to the nurse 

and at trial, the complainant stated that Jackson may have drugged his soda. 

Although the complainant testified that he went to Jackson’s house willingly, the 

State adduced evidence that the complainant did not consent to sexual relations and 

struggled during the encounter in the bedroom. In addition, the complainant 

testified that Jackson physically restrained him and slapped his face, that the 

complainant resisted the assault, that he feared for his life, and that he was crying 

and telling Jackson to let him go. We defer to the factfinder’s determination of

witness credibility. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. Similarly, the trial court

could have credited the complainant’s testimony that he did not consent to the 

sexual activity and struggled with Jackson during the encounter, despite a potential 

motive to obtain a U-Visa. We defer to the factfinder’s resolution of conflicting 

inferences if supported by a reasonable basis. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 

S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

 Because the trial court could have credited the complainant’s testimony

that he was sexually assaulted and did not engage in a consensual sexual 
7

encounter, we hold that legally sufficient evidence supports the conviction. See 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. 

Conclusion 

We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Jackson’s 

conviction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jane Bland

Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Brown.

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).