[Cite as State v. Guiser, 2019-Ohio-5421.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

KRISTIE M. GUISER 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 29456 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR-2014-07-2178(B) 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: December 31, 2019 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} Kristie Guiser appeals a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas 

that denied her motion for jail-time credit. For the following reasons, this Court reverses. 

I. 

{¶2} In 2014, Ms. Guiser pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated possession of 

drugs. The trial court found her guilty of the offense and sentenced her to 30 months of 

community control, advising her that, if she violated the conditions of her community control, it 

would sentence her to one year in prison and order it to run consecutive to a sentence she had 

received in a different case. 

{¶3} Three weeks after sentencing, Ms. Guiser violated the conditions of her 

community control. The trial court found her guilty of the violation and ordered her to serve one 

year in prison consecutive to the two-year sentence she had received in a different case. The 
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court credited her 145 days for time she had already served in jail and a community-based 

correctional facility (CBCF). 

{¶4} After Ms. Guiser served more than 500 days in prison, the trial court granted her 

judicial release and placed her on two years of community control. Ms. Guiser violated the 

conditions of her community control three times. The first two times, the court continued her on 

community control. The third time the trial court sentenced her to one year in prison to be 

served consecutively to a two-year sentence it had imposed for her community control violation 

in a different case, for a total of three years imprisonment. It credited her “an aggregate total of 

67 days of jail credit * * * since the time she was released from prison on judicial release.” The 

court also wrote in its entry that “Defendant’s previously calculated jail time credit prior to the 

original imposition of sentence, along with the time served in the Ohio State Reformatory for 

Women, is not included in this calculation.” 

{¶5} Ms. Guiser did not appeal her sentence. Instead, she filed a motion for jail-time 

credit, arguing that she had only received 67 days of credit and that the trial court should have 

included the time she spent in jail and a CBCF before her first prison stay. The trial court denied 

her motion. Ms. Guiser subsequently filed a request for a nunc pro tunc entry and a motion to 

calculate and amend her jail time and prison credit, arguing that the court’s jail time credit 

should have included all of the time she spent in jail, a CBCF, or prison before her judicial 

release. The trial court denied her motion. Ms. Guiser has appealed, assigning as error that the 

trial court failed to properly calculate and credit her prior jail and prison time. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DUE 

PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW WHERE IT 
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FAILED TO CALCULATE AND CREDIT THE DEFENDANT’S 

CONFINEMENT (JAIL-TIME) CREDIT AND PRIOR INCARCERATION IN 

ITS SENTENCING ENTRY. 

{¶6} Ms. Guiser argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that she was not 

entitled to any additional jail-time credit. Revised Code Section 2929.19(B)(2)(g)1 provides that, 

at sentencing, if a court determines that a prison term is necessary or required, it shall 

include in the sentencing entry the total number of days, including the sentencing 

date but excluding conveyance time, that the offender has been confined for any 

reason arising out of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by 

which the department of rehabilitation and correction must reduce the definite 

prison term imposed on the offender as the offender’s stated prison term * * *. 

The court’s calculation shall not include the number of days, if any, that the 

offender served in the custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction 

arising out of any prior offense for which the prisoner was convicted and 

sentenced. 

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i). The statute also provides that a sentencing court retains jurisdiction 

“to correct any error [in the calculation] not previously raised at sentencing[.]” R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii). “[An] offender may, at any time after sentencing, file a motion in the 

sentencing court to correct any error made in making a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) 

of this section, and the court may in its discretion grant or deny that motion.” Id. We review the 

denial of a motion to correct jail-time credit for an abuse of discretion. State v. George, 9th Dist. 

Medina No. 19CA0037-M, 2019-Ohio-3823, ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion occurs when the 

court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio 

St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶7} Ms. Guiser argues that the trial court’s sentencing entry did not award her all of 

the jail-time credit to which she was entitled. She contends that, in contrast to the 67 days that 

 1

 Since their enactment in 2012, the location of these jail-time credit provisions has 

fluctuated between R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f), 2929.19(B)(2)(g), and 2929.19(B)(2)(h). 
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the court credited her, she has actually been in a jail or a CBCF for a total of 243 days. She also 

contends that she has been incarcerated in prison a total of 504 days, bringing her aggregate time 

served to 747 days. 

{¶8} The State notes that the trial court was not responsible for crediting Ms. Guiser’s 

prison time. Section 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) specifically provides that “[t]he court’s [jail-time 

credit] calculation shall not include the number of days, if any, that the offender served in the 

custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction * * *.” Prior prison time is credited to 

a defendant by the department of rehabilitation and correction itself under Section 2967.191(A), 

which provides that the department “shall reduce the stated prison term * * * by the total number 

of days, if any, that the prisoner previously served in the custody of the department * * * arising 

out of the offense for which the prisoner was * * * sentenced.” See State v. Fisher, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 16AP-402, 2016-Ohio-8501, ¶ 16 (explaining that the department of rehabilitation 

and corrections’ “obligation to reduce a stated prison term by the number of days an inmate 

previously served in [its] custody is independent of the sentencing court’s duty to determine jailtime credit.”). 

{¶9} Although the trial court was not required to include Ms. Guiser’s prior prison time 

in its calculation, it was required to determine “the total number of days” that Ms. Guiser has 

been confined “for any reason arising out of the offense” for which she was being sentenced. 

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i). When the trial court sentenced Ms. Guiser after her first community 

control violation, it determined that she had served 145 days in jail or a CBCF. According to 

Ms. Guiser, she spent another 15 days in jail after sentencing until she was actually transported 

to prison. Under Section 2967.191(A), Ms. Guiser is entitled to credit for the number of days 

that she spent in “confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where [she] is to serve 
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[her] prison term.” Because a sentencing court does not know how many days that is going to be 

at the time of sentencing, Ohio Administrative Code 5120-2-04(C) provides that, when a sheriff 

delivers an offender to the department of rehabilitation and corrections’ reception center, the 

sheriff must present “a record of the days [the offender] was confined for the offense between the 

date of sentencing and the date committed to the reception center.” See State v. Davis, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 27495, 2018-Ohio-4137, ¶ 10-14. 

{¶10} When the trial court sentenced Ms. Guiser for violating the conditions of her 

community control after her judicial release, it did not include the 145 days it originally credited 

her or the time that she spent awaiting transportation to prison following her first violation in its 

jail-time credit. Instead, it only credited her the 67 days she had spent in custody “since the time 

she was released from prison on judicial release.” It explicitly indicated that “Defendant’s 

previously calculated jail time credit * * * is not included in this calculation.” 

{¶11} The plain language of Section 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) directs a sentencing court to 

include in its sentencing “the total number of days” that an offender has been confined “for any 

reason” arising out of the offense for which she is being sentenced. We note that, although the 

court sentenced Ms. Guiser after she committed a community control violation, the sentence it 

imposed was actually for her original conviction of aggravated possession of drugs, just as the 

sentence it imposed following her first community control violation. Upon review of the record, 

we conclude that the trial court’s jail-time credit should have included all of the time that she 

was confined in jail or a CBCF before and immediately after sentencing on her first community 

control violation as well as the time that she has spent in jail or a CBCF related to that offense 

following her judicial release. 
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{¶12} Upon review of the trial court’s sentencing entry, it appears that the court believed 

it did not have to include the jail-time credit it previously determined, but could simply tack on 

the additional time that Ms. Guiser was entitled because of her confinement on the latest 

community control violation. Although that makes some practical sense, Section 

2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) requires a court to calculate “the total number of days” that an offender was 

confined related to the underlying offense. It is also important for a court’s latest sentencing 

entry to include all of the prior time because the department of rehabilitations and correction may 

only credit jail time that has been “determined by the sentencing court under [R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i).” R.C. 2967.191(A). Furthermore, in assessing what time has been 

“determined by the sentencing court[,]” Section 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(v) provides that “[t]he 

department of rehabilitation and correction shall rely upon the latest journal entry of the court in 

determining the total days of local confinement for purposes of division (B)(2)(g)(i) to (iii) of 

this section and section 2967.191 of the Revised Code.” The department, therefore, could not 

look back to the time the trial court credited in its prior sentencing entry, but was only authorized 

to award Ms. Guiser 67 days of jail time credit. 

{¶13} Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court should have granted 

Ms. Guiser’s motion and awarded her the additional jail-time credit to which she is entitled. 

Without a correction of the amount of jail-time credit, Ms. Guiser will be required to serve time 

that she has already served, which is both unreasonable and unconscionable. We, therefore, 

conclude that the trial court exercised improper discretion when it denied Ms. Guiser’s motion 

under Section 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii). The trial court is instructed to enter a new sentencing order 

that credits Ms. Guiser for all of the time she has spent in confinement in jail or a CBCF related 

to her aggravated-possession-of-drugs offense. If the trial court concludes on remand that the 
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correct jail-time credit can be determined from the record, it may correct the error by issuing a 

corrected sentencing entry nunc pro tunc. Davis, 2018-Ohio-4137, ¶ 17. Ms. Guiser’s 

assignment of error is sustained. 

III. 

{¶14} Ms. Guiser’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded for proceedings 

consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed, 

and cause remanded. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellee. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 
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CARR, P. J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

KRISTIE M. GUISER, pro se, Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.