11-667-cv Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. v. Kumar 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

# SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE N OTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY**  **ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United** 2 **States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on** 3 **the 13 th** **day of March, two thousand twelve.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **BARRINGTON D. PARKER,** 7 **RICHARD C. WESLEY,** 8 Circuit Judges, 9 **SIDNEY H. STEIN,** ***** 10 District Judge. 11

**_____________________________________** 12 13 **Airgas Specialty Gases Inc.,** 14 15 Plaintiff-Appellee **,** 16 17 **v. 11-667-cv** 18 19 **Shivesh Kumar,** 20 21 Defendant-Appellant **.** 22 23

**_____________________________________** 24 25 26 

### FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Lori B. Alexander, Jason R. 27 

### Stanevich, Littler Mendelson, 28 

### P.C., New Haven, Connecticut. 29

*

### Judge Sidney H. Stein, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.1 

### FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Shivesh Kumar, pro se , Cheshire, 2 

### Connecticut. 3 

### Appeal from an order of the United States District 4 

### Court for the District of Connecticut ( Thompson, C.J. ). 5 

### UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 6


### AND DECREEDthat the order of the district court is 7


### AFFIRMED
. 8 

### Appellant Shivesh Kumar, proceeding pro se , appeals the 9 

### district court’s order granting the motion of Appellee 10 

### Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. (“Airgas”) to enforce a 11 

### settlement agreement that the parties entered into in May 12 

### 2010. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 13 

### underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and 14 

### the issues on appeal. 15 

### As an initial matter, although the district court did 16 

### not enter a separate judgment in this case after issuing its 17 

### order granting Airgas’s motion, this Court nonetheless has 18 

### jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 19 

### because the order clearly indicated the district court’s 20 

### intent that the order be the final decision in this case. 21 

### See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis , 435 U.S. 381, 387-99 22 

### (1978). 23 

### In reviewing a district court’s decision whether to 24


### 2

### enforce a settlement agreement, we review its findings of 1 

### fact with respect to the agreement for clear error and its 2 

### legal conclusions de novo
. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, 3


### S.A. , 432 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir. 2005). 4 

### Under Connecticut law, a contract is unambiguous where 5 

### “its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise 6 

### intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 7 

### omitted). If a contract does not define a given term, the 8 

### court should “look to the plain meaning of the language to 9 

### ascertain whether there is ambiguity” and may refer to 10 

### “widespread custom or usage” to define the term. Lee v. BSB 11 

### Greenwich Mortg. Ltd. P’ship , 267 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 12 

### 2001)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 13


### Kumarargues on appeal that the district court erred in 14 

### finding that Airgas had satisfied its obligation under the 15 

### settlement agreement to change Kumar’s record in its Human 16 

### Resource Management System (“HRMS”) to “reflect a voluntary 17 

### quit as opposed to an involuntary termination” because the 18 

### screen shot of Kumar’s record provided by Airgasindicates 19 

### that the reason for Kumar’s termination was “Resignation20 

### Other Position.” Kumar contends that “Resignation-Other 21 

### Position” does not mean the same thing as “voluntary quit.” 22 

### According to Kumar, the notation “Resignation-Other 23



### 3

### Position” falsely indicates that he took another position in 1 

### the same company (Airgas)

. 2 

### Kumar’s argument is without merit. A “voluntary” act 3 

### is one that is “performed, made, or given of one’s free 4 

### will,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary Unabridged 2564 5 

### (3d ed. 1961), and to “quit” means “to give up employment,” 6 

### id. at 1867. Thus, a voluntary quit means to “give up 7 

### employment” “of one’s free will.” “Resignation” is defined 8 

### as “[t]he act . . . of surrendering or relinquishing an 9 

### office,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1336(8th ed. 2004), and 10 

### “quit” is a synonym of the verb “resign,” see Roget’s Int’l 11 

### Thesaurusat entry 448.02 (6th ed. 2001). 12 

### Kumar has provided no support for his contention that 13 

### “Resignation-Other Position” suggests a transfer within the 14 

### same company, and in any event, interpreting the phrase in 15 

### that manner is not inconsistent with a finding that he left 16 

### his original position voluntarily. See Omega Eng’g , 432 17 

### F.3d at 446. Thus, the district court correctly held that 18 

### Airgas had satisfied its obligation to modify Kumar’s HRMS 19 

### record to “reflect a voluntary quit” by changing the reason 20 

### for Kumar’s termination to “Resignation-Other Position.” 21 

### Kumar also argues that the district court erred in 22 

### finding that Airgas had provided Kumar with “proper 23



### 4

### documentation” of its modification of Kumar’s HRMS record 1 

### because the screen shot provided by Airgas was allegedly 2 

### “truncated,”as evidenced by the location of the “scroll 3 

### thumb” on the scroll bar in the screen shot. However, as 4 

### Kumar has conceded, the settlement agreement merely requires 5 

### Airgas to provide Kumarwith “documentation” of the change, 6 

### and does not mandate that the documentation be in a specific 7 

### form. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding 8 

### that Airgas’s screen shot satisfied the terms of the 9 

### settlement agreement. See Lee , 267 F.3d at 178. 10 

### We have considered all of Kumar’s arguments and find 11 

### them to be without merit. Accordingly, we **AFFIRM**the order 12 

### of the district court. 13 14 

### FOR THE COURT: 15 

### Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 16 17 18



### 5