* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, we have determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-50778

Summary Calendar

_________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOEL HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(SA-97-CR-360-ALL)

March 18, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

We must decide whether the district court judge properly afford ed t he appellant, Joel

Herna ndez, an opportunity to allocute before imposing sentence, as required by Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(C). The district court’s compliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(C) is a question

of law subject to de novo review. See United States v. Meyers

, 150 F.3d 459, 465 (5 th Cir. 1998).

Failure to comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(C) requires a remand for resentencing. Id.

In 1996, Hernandez pled guilty to posse ssio n wit h intent to distribute marijuana and was

sentenced to twenty-one months in pr iso n, fo llowed by three years of supervised release. Shortly1 The district court judge and Hernandez had the following exchange:

THE COURT: Mr. Hernandez, do you have anything you want to say to the Court?

THE DEFENDANT: Not at this time, your Honor.

THE COURT: I can’t hear you.

THE DEFENDANT: Not at this time, your Honor.

-2- after Hernandez began his supervised release term, the government filed a motion to revoke the

supervised release, alleging that Hernandez had committed several violations of his release conditions.

At a hearing on the motion, Hernandez admitted that the government’s allegations were true. The

district court revoked Hernandez’s release and sentenced him to twenty-one months imprisonment.

On a ppeal, Hernandez argues that he was not afforded an opportunity to allocute at the

hearing. According to Hernandez, the district court judge did not address him after revocation and

immediately before sentencing. Although the judge asked Hernandez if he had anything to say to the

court, 1 Hernandez ma int ains that the judge’s comments did not inform him of his right to speak

specifically about the mitigation of his sentence.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(C) provides: “Before imposing sentence, the

court must

. . . address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes to make

a statement and to present any information in mitigation of sentence.” F E D R. C RIM

. P. 32(c)(3)(C).

To satisfy R ule 32(c)(3)(C) “the court, the prosecutor, and the defendant must at the very least

interact in a manner that shows clearly and convincingly that the defendant knew he had a right to

speak on any subject of his choosing prior to the imposition of sentence.” M eyers

, 150 F.3d at 462.

A district court judge’s failure to renew a previous offer of allocu t ion does not violate Rule

32(c)(3)(C). See United States v. Washington , 44 F.3d 1271, 1277 (5 th Cir. 1995).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court judge addressed Hernandez

personally and gave him an opportuni ty to “s peak o n any subject of his choosing prior to the

imposition of sentence.” Meyers

, 150 F.3d at 462. We note that Hernandez admitted that he had

violated the terms of his supervised release. The only issue in dispute at the hearing was the issue of

sentencing. The district court judge asked Hernandez whether he had anything he wanted to say to

the court, and then, after hearing from Hernandez’s attorney

, imposed sentence. On these facts, the-3-

district court judge satisfied the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(5). Accordingly, we AFFIRM.