alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6306 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6306

 To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for a definition of 
   ``disaster-related emergency'' for purposes of the Department of 
   Defense excess personal property program, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 16, 2021

Mr. Jackson (for himself, Mr. Nehls, Mr. Pfluger, Mr. Tony Gonzales of 
 Texas, Mr. Arrington, Mr. Fallon, Mr. Weber of Texas, Mr. Ellzey, Mr. 
  Sessions, and Mr. Taylor) introduced the following bill; which was 
  referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the 
  Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
  of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
                               concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for a definition of 
   ``disaster-related emergency'' for purposes of the Department of 
   Defense excess personal property program, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Providing Our Law Enforcement with 
Adequate Resources for a Response Act'' or the ``POLAR Response Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF DISASTER-RELATED EMERGENCY UNDER DEPARTMENT OF 
              DEFENSE EXCESS PERSONAL PROPERTY PROGRAM.

    (a) Definition of Disaster-Related Emergency.--Subsection (g) of 
section 2576a of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Controlled 
        Property'' and inserting ``Definitions'';
            (2) by striking ``In this section,'' and inserting ``In 
        this section:'';
            (3) by redesignating the text beginning with ``the term'' 
        and ending with ``document.'' as paragraph (1) and adjusting 
        the margins accordingly;
            (4) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking ``the 
        term'' and inserting ``The term''; and
            (5) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(2) The term `disaster-related emergency' means any event 
        with respect to which the President declares an emergency or 
        major disaster pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
        Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et 
        seq.).''.
    (b) Inclusion of Polar Vortex in Definition of Major Disaster.--
Section 102(2) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122(2)) is amended by inserting ``, polar 
vortex'' after ``mudslide''.
                                 <all>
```
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: White Lion Holdings, v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 14

- 00104

- CV

Trial court case number: D

- 1

- GV

- 13

- 001068

Trial court: 98th District Court of Tr avis County

The motion to withdraw filed by Mary W. Koks and the law firm of Munsch, Hardt, Kopf & Harr, P.C. is GRANTED

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 6.5.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature:

___

/s/

_ Harvey Brown X Ac ting individually

Date: December 16, 2016
#### Albert Russell Brandly, Appellant, v. American Butter Company, Respondent.

—Order affirmed, without costs. No opinion.
#### Mohamed SUMARAY, Petitioner, v. John D. ASHCROFT, Respondent.

No. 03-1044.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted July 14, 2003.

Decided Aug. 19, 2003.

Mohamed Sumaray, Petitioner Pro Se. Linda Anna Dominguez, Louis D. Crocetti, Jr., Immigration and Naturalization Service, Baltimore, Maryland; John Ashcroft, Linda Susan Wendtland, Norah Aseoli Schwarz, Gregory Darrell Mack, Cindy S. Ferrier, Blair Timothy O’Connor, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

*265OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Mohamed Sumaray, a native and citizen of Sierra Leone, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”). The order affirmed, without opinion, the immigration judge’s order denying Sumaray’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. For the reasons discussed below, we deny the petition for review.

Sumaray first claims that the Board erred in affirming the decision of the immigration judge without opinion, after review by a single Board member, in accordance with the procedure set out in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7) (2003). We have reviewed Sumaray’s challenges to the Board’s use of this streamlined procedure and find them to be without merit. *See Georgis v. Ashcroft,*328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir.2003); *Mendoza v. United States Attorney Gen.,*327 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (11th Cir.2003); *Soadjede v. Ashcroft,*324 F.3d 830, 832-33 (5th Cir.2003); *Gonzalez-Oropeza v. United States Attorney Gen.,*321 F.3d 1331, 1333-34 (11th Cir.2003); *Albathani v. INS,*318 F.3d 365, 375-79 (1st Cir.2003); *see also Khattak v. Ashcroft,*332 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.2003) (rejecting a challenge to the Board’s summary affirmance procedure on retroactivity grounds and concluding that “allowing summary opinions in clear cases is nothing more than a procedural change that does not affect substantive rights”). We further find that summary affirmance was appropriate in this case under the factors set forth in § 1003.1(a)(7)(ii).

Next, Sumaray challenges the immigration judge’s finding that he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. The decision to grant or deny asylum relief is conclusive “unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2000). We conclude that the record supports the immigration judge’s conclusion that Sumaray failed to establish his eligibility for asylum. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2003); *Gonahasa v. INS,*181 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir.1999). As the decision in this case is not manifestly contrary to law, we cannot grant the relief that Sumaray seeks.

Accordingly, we deny Sumaray’s petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Blanco, Appellant.

[678 NYS2d 514]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), rendered September 4, 1996, convicting him of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by him to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that his written, videotaped, and audiotaped statements to the police and to the District Attorney’s office should have been suppressed. He argues his arrest was not based on probable cause because the People failed to demonstrate that the male witness who provided information to the police was reliable and that this witness had some basis for the knowledge he transmitted. This contention is unpreserved for appellate review since it is raised for the first time on appeal *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Boyd,*244 AD2d 497; *People v Jones,*81 AD2d 22, 29-45; *People v Brown,*232 AD2d 168). In any event, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing established that the witness was reliable and had a basis for the knowledge he transmitted *(see, People v Parris,*83 NY2d 342, 346; *People v Bigelow,*66 NY2d 417, 423; *see also, Aguilar v Texas,*378 US 108; *Spinelli v United States,*393 US 410).

The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that his videotaped and audiotaped statements should have been suppressed because he asserted his right to remain silent during questioning *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Mandrachio,*55 NY2d 906, *cert denied*457 US 1122; *People v Rogers,*245 AD2d 395; *People v Smith,*174 AD2d 701). In any event, there was no unequivocal assertion of his right to remain silent *(see, People v Aguirre,*248 AD2d 717; *People v Goss,*162 AD2d 466, *revd on other grounds*78 NY2d 996; *People v Morton,*231 AD2d 927).

The defendant’s sentence was not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Copertino, J. P., Santucci, Goldstein and Luciano, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 812 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 812

              For the relief of William P. Van Keymeulen.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 2, 1995

 Mrs. Vucanovich introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                     the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
              For the relief of William P. Van Keymeulen.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WAIVER OF CERTAIN NATURALIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR WILLIAM P. 
              VAN KEYMEULEN.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding the inability of William P. Van 
Keymeulen to meet the requirements of section 316 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act that relate to residence and physical presence in 
the United States, he shall be deemed eligible for naturalization upon 
the filing of the appropriate application if otherwise qualified for 
naturalization under such Act.
    (b) Deadline for Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsection (a) 
shall apply only if the application for naturalization is filed with 
appropriate fees within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
CERTIFICATION
 
 Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, I, Weidong Hong, Chief Executive Officer of Yucheng
Technologies Limited (the “Company”), certify, to my knowledge, that the
Company’s annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the
“Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 Date:
June 30, 2010
 
 /s/ Weidong Hong
 Name:
Weidong Hong
 Title:
Chief Executive Officer
   
  The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document.
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2... Because we dismiss this appeal, we deny appellant’s “Motion to

Suspend Filings of Reporter’s Record” as moot.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NOS. 2-09-159-CR

2-09-160-CR

LARRY D. CROWE JR. APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 1 OF DENTON COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

----------

We have considered appellant’s “Motion To Dismiss Appeal.” The motion

complies with rule 42.2(a) of the rules of appellate procedure. Tex. R. App. P.

42.2(a). No decision of this court having been delivered before we received

this motion, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.2 See Tex. R. App. P.

42.2(a), 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and MEIER, J.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: September 17, 2009
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

December 15, 2008

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

520 SOUTH MICHIGAN AVENUE ] Appeal from the United

ASSOCIATES, LTD., doing business ] States District Court for

as THE CONGRESS PLAZA HOTEL & ] the Northern District of

CONVENTION CENTER, ] Illinois, Eastern Division.

 Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 

 ] No. 06 C 4552

No. 07-3377 v. ] 

 ] Joan Humphrey Lefkow,

CATHERINE SHANNON, Director of ] Judge.

the Illinois Department of Labor, ] 

 Defendant-Appellee, ] 

 and, ] 

 ] 

UNITE HERE LOCAL 1, ] 

 Intervenor-Appellee. ] 

 ] 

The opinion issued on December 15, 2008, in the above-entitled case is AMENDED as

to the spelling of the district court judge’s name. The name should be reflected as Joan

Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 14

- 00292

- CV

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF ERMA LYNN

JONES A/K/A LYNNE NE ASE

JONES, AN ALLEGED

INCAPACITATED PERSON

------------

FROM PROBATE COURT N O. 2 OF TARRANT COUN TY

TRIAL COURT NO. 2008

- 03262

- 2

------------



### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 

### AND JUDGMENT

------------

We have considered the parties’ “Agreed Motion to Dismiss.” It is the

court ’ s opinion that the motion should be granted; therefore, we dismiss the

appeal. See Tex . R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f).

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

Costs of the appeal shall be paid by appellant, for which let execution

issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(d).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

BONNIE SUDDERTH

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, J J.

DELIVERED: September 24 , 2015
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**P&F INDUSTRIES, INC.**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Richard A. Horowitz, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that:

 

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Richard A. Horowitz     |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Richard A. Horowitz         |
| Principal Executive Officer |
| May 12, 2006           |

 

----
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 163 (Thursday, August 21, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 49495]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19410]

[[Page 49495]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-63,735]

HTI Hydraulic Technologies, LLC; Galion, OH; Notice of 
Termination of Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on July 24, 2008 in response to a petition 
filed on behalf of workers of HTI Hydraulic Technologies, LLC, Galion, 
Ohio.
    The petitioning group of workers is covered by an active 
certification (TA-W-62,679 as amended) which expires on February 22, 
2010. Consequently, further investigation in this case would serve no 
purpose, and the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 15th day of August 2008.
Linda G. Poole,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E8-19410 Filed 8-20-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
```
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 31, 2011*

Decided August 31, 2011

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

    ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

    DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 11‐1632

NATHAN GILLIS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

RICK RAEMISCH, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 09‐cv‐245‐bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Judge.

O R D E R

Nathan Gillis, a Wisconsin inmate, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

claiming that prison officials punished him in retaliation for reporting guard brutality and

acted with deliberate indifference to unconstitutional prison conditions. Gillis later asked

the court to “arrange” an inspection of the prison so he could document certain conditions

for his deliberate‐indifference claim, and the court denied the request. In subsequent filings,

Gillis complained that prison officials set overly severe restrictions on a visit he proposed

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
No. 11‐1632 Page 2

for an inspector he himself had hired, but a magistrate judge found nothing wrong with the

prison’s handling of the matter. Later, the district court granted summary judgment for the

defendants, and Gillis appeals. We affirm.

Gillis’s brief on appeal rehashes his claims of retaliation and deliberate indifference,

as well as his contention that the district court erroneously “refused” his request for an

inspection. But he barely raises any legal challenge to the court’s decision. See FED. R. APP.

P. 28(a)(9); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). Generously construing his

brief, we discern one issue. He argues that the court improperly discredited his allegations

by determining that he “failed to submit proposed findings of fact sufficient to put critical

issues into dispute.” Gillis, however, misapprehends the court’s statement. The court was

commenting not on Gillis’s credibility, but merely his failure to produce evidence raising a

genuine dispute over whether his rights were violated, as was his burden at summary

judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010).

AFFIRMED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0036

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

JUSTIN LEE LONGTINE,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including August 14, 2020, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 8 2020

07/08/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0036
#### Frederick R. Giebelhausen and Others, Respondents, v. A. Ewing Sumner and Horton Sumner, Appellants, Impleaded with Florence G. Felton and Madeline Mende.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs, and appeal from decision dismissed. No opinion. Ingraham and Houghton, JJ., dissented. .
No. 72-1195.

#### American Pipe & Construction Co. et al. *v.*Utah et al.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.
#### ASCHENBACH v. HERRIN TRANSFER & WAREHOUSE CO. et al.

No. 14625.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

March 12, 1934.

Eraste Vidrine, of New Orleans, for appellants.

Denegre, Leovy & Chaffe and J. H. Morrison, all of New Orleans, for appellee.

JANVIER, Judge.

Plaintiff, as head and master of the community existing between himself and Mrs. Carrie Williams Aschenbach, brings this suit, seeking to recover from defendants remuneration for the damage sustained by the automobile belonging to the said community and also for medical expenses and other losses which resulted to the said community as the result of the automobile accident which we have discussed in an opinion rendered by us to-day in the matter of Mrs. Carrie Williams Aschenbach v. Herrin Transfer & Warehouse Co. et al., 153 So. 313. Since We held that Mrs. Aschenbach, the driver of the car, was in no way at fault and that the accident was attributable solely to the negligence of the driver of the truck of defendant Herrin Transfer & Warehouse Company, the only question now before us in this case is the amount to be awarded to Mr. Aschenbach. In the court below judgment was rendered in his favor for $427.65.

We have carefully studied the evidence and agree with the trial judge on all the items of damage approved by him except in certain minor particulars.

The amount awarded for damage to the automobile was $235, although we cannot find proof in the record of damage in excess of $225.90. We also find awarded below $35 for X-ray bills at Touro Infirmary and hospitalization charge; whereas, so far as we can find, the proof shows only $30. Deducting these items-would leave $413.55 as the total of the items which we find to have been correctly allowed by the district court. But we believe that there should have been an additional allowance of $25 for depredation in the value of the automobile. The evidence plainly shows that, even had the repairs been made in accordance with the estimate furnished, the automobile would not have been worth as much as it was worth before by at least $25. This amount should, therefore, be added, making a total award of $438.55.

Defendant contends that the amount awarded for repairs to the automobile is excessive, and it bases this contention,on the fact that another garage owner estimated the cost of making the repairs at a somewhat smaller figure. We believe, however, that the larger amount was correctly allowed. The larger estimate was made by a reputable. concern after a careful investigation and after the preparation of an itemized list of necessary repairs.

The judgment appealed from is amended by increasing the amount thereof to $438.55, and as thus amended it is affirmed, at the cost of appellant.

Amended and affirmed.