[Cite as Cleveland v. Clifford, 2020-Ohio-3803.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

CITY OF CLEVELAND, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 108822 

 v. : 

 

JASON T. CLIFFORD, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 23, 2020 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court 

Case No. 2019 CRB 003322 

 

Appearances: 

Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, 

Karrie D. Howard, Chief Prosecutor, and Joan Bascone, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Mark Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 

Cullen Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.: 

 Defendant-appellant Jason T. Clifford (“Clifford”) appeals from his 

conviction for aggravated trespass following a plea agreement. Because we find the 

trial court complied with its obligations under Crim.R. 11, we affirm the conviction. 
We remand the matter to the trial court, however, with instructions to enter a nunc 

pro tunc journal entry reflecting that the domestic violence charge was dismissed. 

I. Procedural History and Substantive Facts 

On March 7, 2019, Clifford was charged in Cleveland Municipal Court 

with two misdemeanors of the first degree — domestic violence and aggravated 

trespass — and one misdemeanor of the third degree — unlawful restraint, arising 

from an incident that purportedly involved a family or household member. 

On April 15, 2019, Clifford withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded 

guilty to one count of aggravated trespass with a notation that the victim is a family 

or household member. The state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges as part of 

the agreement, and the court in fact nolled the charges. 

At the plea hearing, the trial court engaged Clifford in the following 

plea colloquy: 

Court: Sir, is it your desire to plead guilty to one count of aggravated 

trespass? 

Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 

Court: You understand that by changing your plea, you’re giving up 

the right to go to trial; do you understand that? 

Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 

Court: You’re giving up your right to confront witness and have 

witnesses come in and testify [o]n your behalf; do you understand 

that? 

Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 

Court: You’re giving up the right to have the prosecutor prove your 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 

Court: And, you’re giving up your right to remain silent for the limited 

purpose of pleading guilty; do you understand that? 

Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 
Court: You also understand that by pleading guilty I could make a 

finding of guilt, and I could sentence you to a fine of up to $1,000 and 

up to 180 days in jail; do you understand that, sir? 

Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 

Court: You also understand that the journal entry and the record will 

reflect that the victim in this case is a family or household member, 

which means if in fact you’re arrested for an offense of violence against 

a family or household member in the future, you could be charged 

with a felony; do you understand that? 

Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 

Thereafter, Clifford entered his guilty plea, the court accepted the plea 

and found Clifford guilty of aggravated trespass, and the court dismissed the 

remaining charges. The court then scheduled the matter for sentencing. 

At sentencing, the court heard from defense counsel and the 

prosecutor. After some discussion regarding Clifford’s GPS monitor, defense 

counsel reported that this case is Clifford’s first “truly criminal involvement,” where 

his previous offenses pertained to driving citations. Counsel explained that Clifford 

has been cooperative and took responsibility for his actions in pleading. The court 

then sentenced Clifford to 180 days’ incarceration, $1,000 fine, court costs, and two 

years’ active probation. The court waived the fine and suspended 149 days of 

incarceration and credited Clifford with 31 days served. 

Clifford now appeals his conviction, assigning three errors for our 

review: (1) appellant’s guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 

entered when the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11’s requirement of 

explaining the effect of [the appellant’s] plea; (2) appellant’s guilty plea was not 

knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered when the trial court failed to properly 
advise [the appellant] of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading 

guilty; (3) the trial court’s docket incorrectly states that [the appellant] was found 

guilty of domestic violence when in fact the charge was dismissed. We will address 

the first two assignments of error together. 

II. Guilty Plea 

 In his first two assignments of error, Clifford contends that his guilty 

plea must be vacated because the trial court failed to advise him of the effect of his 

guilty plea and of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. 

 Crim.R. 11 delineates the constitutional and procedural requirements 

with which a trial court must comply prior to accepting a guilty or no contest plea in 

order to ensure that a defendant enters a plea knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). And a 

trial court’s obligations in accepting a plea depend upon the level of offense to which 

the defendant is pleading. State v. Watkins, 99 Ohio St.3d 12, 2003-Ohio-2419, 788 

N.E.2d 635; Cleveland v. Jaber, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103194 and 103195, 

2016-Ohio-1542, ¶ 22; Parma v. Buckwald, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 92354 and 

92356, 2009-Ohio-4032. 

The charge in this case is aggravated trespass, which is a first-degree 

misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum sentence of six months. 

R.C. 2929.24(A)(1). Because the maximum confinement is six months, aggravated 

trespass is a petty offense. See Solon v. Bollin-Booth, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97099, 

2012-Ohio-815, ¶ 14, citing Crim.R. 2(C) and 2(D) (defining a petty offense). 
Crim.R. 11(E) governs pleas entered in petty offense cases. “In 

misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses[,] the court may refuse to accept a plea 

of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such pleas without first informing the 

defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty.” 

Crim.R. 11(E). Thus, a trial court must “advise the defendant, either orally or in 

writing, of the effect of the specific plea being entered.” Cleveland v. Tittl, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 105193, 2017-Ohio-9156, ¶ 7, citing State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 

2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, paragraph one of the syllabus and ¶ 23. Under 

Crim.R. 11(B)(1), the effect of a guilty plea is that “the plea of guilty is a complete 

admission of the defendant’s guilt.” 

The Ohio Supreme Court explained the different types of offenses and 

the corresponding procedural requirements: 

For a petty offense, defined in Crim.R. 2(D) as “a misdemeanor other 

than [a] serious offense,” the court is instructed that it “may refuse to 

accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such pleas 

without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, 

no contest, and not guilty.” Crim.R. 11(E). If the misdemeanor charge 

is a serious offense, meaning that the prescribed penalty includes 

confinement for more than six months, Crim.R. 2(C), the court shall 

not accept a guilty or no contest plea “without first addressing the 

defendant personally and informing the defendant of the effect of the 

pleas of guilty, no contest, and not guilty and determining that the 

defendant is making the plea voluntarily.” Crim.R. 11(D). 

The procedure set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2) for felony cases is more 

elaborate than that for misdemeanors. Before accepting a guilty plea 

in a felony case, a “trial court must inform the defendant that he is 

waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right 

to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of 

compulsory process of witnesses.” State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 

473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus. In addition 
to these constitutional rights, the trial court is required to determine 

that the defendant understands the nature of the charge, the 

maximum penalty involved, and the effect of the plea. 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). 

Jones at ¶ 11-12; State v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103364, 2016-Ohio-4956, 

¶ 6. 

Therefore, for Clifford’s guilty plea to the petty offense charge of 

aggravated trespass, the trial court’s obligation under Crim.R. 11 was only to inform 

Clifford of the “effect” of his plea. Jaber at ¶ 24, citing Jones at paragraph one of 

the syllabus; Strongsville v. Petronzio, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102345, 

2016-Ohio-101, ¶ 10, citing State v. Watkins, 99 Ohio St.3d 12, 2003-Ohio-2419, 788 

N.E.2d 635, ¶ 28 (“where a defendant charged with a petty misdemeanor * * * pleads 

guilty or no contest, the trial court complies with [Crim.R. 11(E)] by informing the 

defendant” of the effect of his plea); Mitchell at ¶ 8. 

 The right to be informed that a guilty plea is a complete admission of 

guilt is nonconstitutional and therefore subject to review for substantial compliance. 

State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12. 

Consequently, the failure to comply with a nonconstitutional right, such as the 

information contained in Crim.R. 11(B)(1), will not invalidate a plea unless the 

defendant suffered prejudice. Jones at ¶ 52, citing Griggs at ¶ 12. The test for 

prejudice is “whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” State v. Nero, 56 

Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). 
Under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the totality of 

circumstances surrounding the defendant’s plea to determine whether he 

subjectively understood that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt. Id. “‘[A] 

slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible,’ provided that, ‘under the 

totality of the circumstances,’ ‘the defendant subjectively understands the 

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.’” State v. Musleh, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 105305, 2017-Ohio-8166, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Clark 119 Ohio St.3d 

239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31. And where a defendant has entered a 

guilty plea without asserting actual innocence, he is presumed to understand that he 

has completely admitted his guilt and the trial court’s failure to inform the defendant 

of the effect of his guilty plea as required by Crim.R. 11 is presumed not to be 

prejudicial. Griggs at ¶ 19.

Where there is a complete failure to comply with the relevant 

mandates of Crim.R. 11, however, a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice. 

Cleveland v. Bowman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103287, 2016-Ohio-1545, ¶ 6, citing 

Clark at ¶ 31 (applying the Ohio Supreme Court’s admonition in Clark that a 

complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11 in a felony case does not implicate a 

prejudice analysis to a petty misdemeanor offense); Buckwald, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

Nos. 92354 and 92356, 2009-Ohio-4032, ¶ 46 (finding a prejudice analysis not 

necessary where the trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(B)(2) 

regarding the effect of the defendant’s no contest plea concerning a petty 

misdemeanor offense). 
Here, we find that the trial court at least partially complied with its 

obligations under Crim.R. 11. Although the trial court did not recite the exact 

language of Crim.R. 11(B)(1) — that his guilty plea “is a complete admission” of guilt, 

it informed Clifford of the nature of the charge, the rights he was giving up by 

pleading guilty, including “the right to go to trial,” the “right to confront witness[es] 

and have witnesses come in and testify in your behalf,” the “right to have the 

prosecutor prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “your right to remain 

silent for the limited purpose of pleading guilty.” 

Additionally, the court informed Clifford that “by pleading guilty I 

could make a finding of guilt.” And after each advisement, Clifford indicated that he 

understood, and the record reflects that he asked no questions nor demonstrated 

any confusion. Although the trial court arguably conflated a guilty plea with a no 

contest plea, which requires the trial court inform the defendant that the plea of no 

contest is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of 

the facts alleged in the indictment, the totality of the record indicates that Clifford 

understood that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt. More importantly, 

Clifford never asserted actual innocence at the plea hearing, and therefore, the law 

presumes he understands that he has completely admitted his guilt. 

Finally, Clifford has failed to demonstrate prejudice. As previously 

stated, he did not assert actual innocence anytime during the plea or the sentencing. 

On the contrary, at sentencing, defense counsel informed the court that Clifford took 

responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty. He is therefore presumed to 
understand that he has completely admitted his guilt, and a trial court’s failure to 

inform him of the effect of his guilty plea as required by Crim.R. 11 is presumed not 

to be prejudicial. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, at 

¶ 19. Additionally, during the sentencing, Clifford corrected the court by reporting 

that the victim of his crime was not the mother of his child. 

 In light of the foregoing, Clifford has failed to show that had he been 

explicitly advised that his guilty plea constituted “a complete admission” of his guilt, 

he would not have pled guilty. 

 Clifford’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

III. The Journal Entry 

 In his third assignment of error, Clifford contends that the trial court’s 

journal entry incorrectly states that he was found guilty of domestic violence. The 

state concedes the error. 

 The trial court’s docket entry dated April 29, 2019, includes the 

following two entries: 

Having been found guilty, the defendant is sentenced to 180 days of 

incarceration at the Cleveland House of Corrections. 149 days of 

incarceration are hereby suspended. Charge #1: Domestic Violence. 

Having been found guilty, is hereby sentenced to pay a fine in the 

amount of $1,000 and all court costs associated with this case. $1,000 

of the fine is hereby suspended. Charge #2: Aggravated Trespass. 

 The record shows, however, that in exchange for Clifford’s guilty plea 

to aggravated trespass in Count 2, the state agreed to request dismissal of the 

remaining charges that included domestic violence (Count 1) and unlawful restraint 
(Count 3). And on April 15, 2019, during the plea hearing, the court in fact dismissed 

the two charges: 

Court: Understanding all of your rights, how do you plead to the 

aggravated trespass charge? 

Clifford: Guilty. 

Court: Court will accept the guilty plea, make a finding of guilt, will 

dismiss Counts 1 and 3, will pass this for sentencing until April 29th 

at 10:00. 

 And then on April 29, 2019, the trial court sentenced Clifford on the 

aggravated trespass charge to 180 days’ incarceration, $1,000 fine, court costs, and 

two years’ active probation. The court waived the fine and suspended 149 days of 

incarceration and credited Clifford with 31 days served. 

 Courts possess the authority to correct errors in judgment entries so 

that the record speaks the truth. State v. Trone, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108952 

and 108966, 2020-Ohio-384, ¶ 23, citing State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 

158, 163-164, 656 N.E.2d 1288 (1995); Crim.R. 36. Errors that may be corrected by 

the court include clerical errors, mistakes, or omissions that are mechanical in 

nature and apparent on the record and do not involve legal decisions or judgment. 

State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, 940 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 15; 

Crim.R. 36. Nunc pro tunc entries are used to make the record reflect what the court 

actually decided and not what the court might or should have decided or what the 

court intended to decide. Miller at ¶ 15; Fogle at 164. 

 Here, the journal entry that indicates Clifford was convicted of and 

sentenced on the domestic violence charge was clearly a clerical error that does not 
accurately reflect what the court decided in open court. Therefore, the trial court 

shall issue a nunc pro tunc judgment entry reflecting that the domestic violence 

charge was dismissed. 

 Clifford’s third assignment of error is sustained. 

 Judgment affirmed; case remanded for proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_____________________________ 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR