Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 6529 

The reactor will be identified as North 

Anna Unit 3 and located at the North 

Anna Power Station in Louisa County, 

Virginia. A notice of receipt and 

availability of this application was 

previously published in the Federal 

Register (72 FR 70619) on December 12, 

2007. 

The NRC staff has determined that 

Dominion has submitted information in 

accordance with 10 CFR part 2, ‘‘Rules 

of Practice for Domestic Licensing 

Proceedings and Issuance of Orders,’’

and 10 CFR part 52 that is acceptable for 

docketing. The docket number 

established for this COL application is 

52–017. 

The NRC staff will perform a detailed 

technical review of the COL application. 

Docketing of the COL application does 

not preclude the NRC from requesting 

additional information from the 

applicant as the review proceeds, nor 

does it predict whether the Commission 

will grant or deny the application. The 

Commission will conduct a hearing in 

accordance with subpart L, ‘‘Informal 

Hearing Procedures for NRC 

Adjudications,’’ of 10 CFR part 2 and 

will receive a report on the COL 

application from the Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards in 

accordance with 10 CFR 52.87, ‘‘Referral 

to the Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS).’’ If the Commission 

finds that the COL application meets the 

applicable standards of the Atomic 

Energy Act and the Commission’s 

regulations, and that required 

notifications to other agencies and 

bodies have been made, the Commission 

will issue a COL, in the form and 

containing conditions and limitations 

that the Commission finds appropriate 

and necessary. 

In accordance with 10 CFR part 51, 

the Commission will also prepare an 

environmental impact statement for the 

proposed action. Pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.26, and as part of the environmental 

scoping process, the staff intends to 

hold a public scoping meeting. Detailed 

information regarding this meeting will 

be included in a future Federal Register 

notice. 

Finally, the Commission will 

announce in a future Federal Register 

notice the opportunity to petition for 

leave to intervene in the hearing 

required for this application by 10 CFR 

52.85. 

Documents may be examined, and/or 

copied for a fee, at the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR), located at One 

White Flint North, Public File Area O1 

F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 

Rockville, Maryland 20852, and will be 

accessible electronically through the 

Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Public 

Electronic Reading Room link at the 

NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. The 

application is also available at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/ 

col.html. Persons who do not have 

access to ADAMS or who encounter 

problems in accessing documents 

located in ADAMS should contact the 

NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone 

at 1–800–397–4209, or 301–415–4737, 

or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 28th day 

of January 2008. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Thomas A. Kevern, 

Senior Project Manager, ESBWR/ABWR 

Projects Branch 1, Division of New Reactor 

Licensing, Office of New Reactors. 

[FR Doc. E8–1942 Filed 2–1–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Notice of Opportunity To Comment on 

Model Safety Evaluation on Technical 

Specification Improvement To Revise 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (TSTF–498, 

Revision 1) Using the Consolidated 

Line Item Improvement Process 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Request for comment. 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has prepared a 

model safety evaluation (SE) relating to 

the modification of technical 

specification (TS) 3.6.3, Containment 

Isolation Valves associated with 

implementation of BAW–2461–A, 

‘‘Risk-Informed Justification for 

Containment Isolation Valve Allowed 

Outage Time Change.’’ The NRC staff 

has also prepared a model license 

amendment request and a model no 

significant hazards consideration 

(NSHC) determination relating to this 

matter. The purpose of these models are 

to permit the NRC to efficiently process 

amendments that propose to modify TS 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times. Licensees of nuclear 

power reactors to which the models 

apply could then request amendments, 

confirming the applicability of the SE 

and NSHC determination to their 

reactors. The NRC staff is requesting 

comment on the model SE and model 

NSHC determination prior to 

announcing their availability for 

referencing in license amendment 

applications. 

DATES: The comment period expires 

March 5, 2008. Comments received after 

this date will be considered if it is 

practical to do so, but the Commission 

is able to ensure consideration only for 

comments received on or before this 

date. 

ADDRESSES: Comments may be 

submitted either electronically or via 

U.S. mail. 

Submit written comments to Chief, 

Rulemaking, Directives, and Editing 

Branch, Division of Administrative 

Services, Office of Administration, Mail 

Stop: T–6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001. Hand deliver comments to: 11545 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 

between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on 

Federal workdays. Copies of comments 

received may be examined at the NRC’s 

Public Document Room, 11555 

Rockville Pike (Room O–1F21), 

Rockville, Maryland. Comments may be 

submitted by electronic mail to 

CLIIP@nrc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Timothy Kobetz, Mail Stop: O–12H2, 

Technical Specifications Branch, 

Division of Inspection & Regional 

Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, telephone 301–415–1932. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06, 

‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process for Adopting Standard 

Technical Specification Changes for 

Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March 

20, 2000. The consolidated line item 

improvement process (CLIIP) is 

intended to improve the efficiency of 

NRC licensing processes, by processing 

proposed changes to the standard 

technical specifications (STS) in a 

manner that supports subsequent 

license amendment applications. The 

CLIIP includes an opportunity for the 

public to comment on proposed changes 

to the STS after a preliminary 

assessment by the NRC staff and finding 

that the change will likely be offered for 

adoption by licensees. This notice 

solicits comment on a proposed change 

to the STS that modifies TS 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times. The CLIIP directs 

the NRC staff to evaluate any comments 

received for a proposed change to the 

STS and to either reconsider the change 

or announce the availability of the 

change for adoption by licensees. 

Licensees opting to apply for this TS 

change are responsible for reviewing the 

staff’s evaluation, referencing the 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES
6530 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 

applicable technical justifications, and 

providing any necessary plant-specific 

information. Each amendment 

application made in response to the 

notice of availability will be processed 

and noticed in accordance with 

applicable rules and NRC procedures. 

This notice involves the modification 

of TS Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times. This change was 

proposed for incorporation into the 

standard technical specifications by the 

Owners Groups participants in the 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) and is designated TSTF–498. 

TSTF–498 can be viewed on the NRC’s 

Web page at: http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reactors/operating/licensing/ 

techspecs.html. 

Applicability 

To efficiently process the incoming 

license amendment applications, the 

staff requests that each licensee 

applying for the changes proposed in 

TSTF–498 include TS Bases for the 

proposed TS consistent with the TS 

Bases proposed in TSTF–498. The staff 

is requesting that the TS Bases be 

included with the proposed license 

amendments in this case because the 

changes to the TS and the changes to the 

associated TS Bases form an integral 

change to a plant’s licensing basis. To 

ensure that the overall change, 

including the TS Bases (which becomes 

part of the plant licensing basis), 

includes appropriate regulatory 

controls, the staff plans to condition the 

issuance of each license amendment on 

the licensee’s incorporation of the 

changes into the TS Bases document 

and that the licensee control changes to 

the TS Bases in accordance with the 

licensee’s TS Bases Control Program. 

The CLIIP does not prevent licensees 

from requesting an alternative approach 

or proposing the changes without the 

requested TS Bases. However, 

deviations from the approach 

recommended in this notice may require 

additional review by the NRC staff and 

may increase the time and resources 

needed for the review. Additionally, the 

staff is requesting that the methodology 

for assessing large early release 

frequency (LERF) and incremental 

conditional large early release 

probability (ICLERP) are to be 

documented in the plant-specific 

application as a regulatory commitment 

(i.e., included in the licensee’s 

commitment tracking system in 

accordance with NEI 99–04, Revision 0, 

‘‘Guidelines for Managing NRC 

Commitment Changes’’) (Reference 5) in 

the licensees’ plant-specific applications 

referencing TR BAW–2461–A. The staff 

is requesting this regulatory 

commitment because a licensee’s 

implementation of Regulatory Guide 

(RG) 1.177 Tier 3 guidelines generally 

implies the assessment of risk with 

respect to core damage frequency (CDF). 

However, the proposed containment 

isolation valve (CIV) completion time 

(CT) impacts containment isolation and 

consequently LERF and ICLERP, as well 

as CDF. Because the extended CIV CTs 

are also based on the LERF and ICLERP 

metrics, the management of risk in 

accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for 

these extended CIV CTs must also assess 

LERF and ICLERP. 

Public Notices 

This notice requests comments from 

interested members of the public within 

30 days of the date of publication in the 

Federal Register. After evaluating the 

comments received as a result of this 

notice, the staff will either reconsider 

the proposed change or announce the 

availability of the change in a 

subsequent notice (perhaps with some 

changes to the safety evaluation or the 

proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination as a result 

of public comments). If the staff 

announces the availability of the 

change, licensees wishing to adopt the 

change must submit an application in 

accordance with applicable rules and 

other regulatory requirements. For each 

application the staff will publish a 

notice of consideration of issuance of 

amendment to facility operating 

licenses, a proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination, 

and a notice of opportunity for a 

hearing. The staff will also publish a 

notice of issuance of an amendment to 

the operating license to announce the 

modification of Containment Isolation 

Valve (CIV) Completion Times for each 

plant that receives the requested change. 

Proposed Safety Evaluation; U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office 

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement; 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) Change TSTF–498; Modification 

of Technical Specification Containment 

Isolation Valve; Completion Times 

1.0 Introduction 

By letter dated December 20, 2006, 

(Reference 1) the Technical 

Specifications Task Force (TSTF), a 

joint owners group activity, submitted 

TSTF–498, ‘‘Risk-Informed Containment 

Isolation Valve Completion Times 

(BAW–2461),’’ Revision 0, for NRC 

review. By letter dated October 10, 

2007, (Reference 2) the TSTF submitted 

Revision 1 to TSTF–498 based on 

responses to Requests for Additional 

Information (RAI) that resulted in not 

adopting certain provisions provided by 

BAW–2461–A, ‘‘Risk-Informed 

Justification for Containment Isolation 

Valve Allowed Outage Time Change,’’

(Reference 3). TSTF–498 is proposing to 

change NUREG 1430, ‘‘Standard 

Technical Specifications Babcock and 

Wilcox Plants,’’ (BAW STS) Revision 

3.0 (Reference 4), to generically 

implement containment isolation valve 

completion time (CT) changes 

associated with implementation of 

BAW–2461–A. 

BAW–2461–A and TSTF–498 support 

extending CTs for CIVs in a penetration 

flow path with two [or more] 

containment isolation valves from 4 

hours to 168 hours. The proposed 

change revises the TS for B&W Plants, 

NUREG–1430, Revision 3, Limiting 

Condition for Operation (LCO), Section 

3.6.3, ‘‘Containment Isolation Valves,’’

Condition A from 4 hours to 7 days. 

Additionally, a new Required Action is 

added (Required Action A.1) which 

requires verification that the Operable 

containment isolation valve in the 

penetration is not inoperable due to 

common cause failure and also results 

in Required Actions A.1 and A.2 being 

relabeled as A.2 and A.3. No change is 

proposed by the Pressurized Water 

Reactor Owners Group (PWROG) for 

Condition B (relabeled Condition D)(i.e., 

a penetration flow path with two 

inoperable CIVs). A new Condition, 

Condition B, is added which is similar 

to the existing Condition A. It contains 

a 4 hour Completion Time to isolate the 

affected flow path and is only 

applicable to the containment isolation 

valves excluded from Condition A (e.g., 

containment isolation valves in the 

main steam lines or (as described in a 

Reviewer’s Note) those identified by 

plant-specific analysis as having high 

risk significance for interfacing systems 

loss of coolant accidents (ISLOCAs). A 

new Condition, Condition C, is added 

which is applicable when two or more 

penetrations have one inoperable 

containment isolation valve. This 

Condition requires isolating all but one 

of the affected penetrations within 4 

hours (the existing Completion Time for 

Condition A). This condition limits the 

7 day Completion Time in Condition A 

to a single penetration. The extended 

Completion Time is not applicable to 

containment isolation valves in the 

main steam lines or those identified by 

plant-specific analysis as having high 

risk significance for ISLOCAs and the 

existing 4 hour Completion Time 

applies. BAW–2461–A is only 

applicable to Davis Besse, Oconee 

Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, and 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 6531 

Crystal River Unit 3. Other licensees of 

B&W designed PWRs requesting to use 

the Topical Report (TR) methodology 

must provide the same level of 

information provided by these 

demonstration plants to ensure that TR 

BAW–2461–A is applicable to their 

plant. TSTF–498 will provide 

standardized wording in the B&W STS 

for plants implementing the changes 

specified in BAW–2461–A related to 

extending AOTs for applicable 

inoperable CIVs from 4 hours to 168 

hours. 

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation 

In 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission 

established its regulatory requirements 

related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 

10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to 

include items in the following five 

specific categories related to station 

operation: (1) Safety limits, limiting 

safety system settings, and limiting 

control settings; (2) limiting conditions 

for operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance 

requirements (SRs); (4) design features; 

and (5) administrative controls. 

However, the regulation does not 

specify the particular TSs to be included 

in a plant’s license. TSTF–498 is 

proposing changes to the TSs that 

involve category 2 above. The LCOs are 

the lowest functional capability, or 

performance levels, of equipment 

required for safe operation of the 

facility. When an LCO of a nuclear 

reactor is not met, the licensee shall 

shut down the reactor, or follow any 

remedial actions permitted by the TS 

until the condition can be met. 

Furthermore, the CTs specified in the 

TSs must be based on reasonable 

protection of the public health and 

safety. Therefore, the NRC staff must be 

able to conclude that there is reasonable 

assurance that the safety functions 

affected by the proposed TS CT changes 

will be performed in accordance with 

the design basis accidents (DBAs) 

identified in Chapter 15 of the licensee’s 

final safety analysis report (FSAR). As 

set forth in 10 CFR 50.36, a licensee’s 

TS must establish the LCOs that contain 

certain information. This requirement 

includes CTs for structures, systems, 

and components (SSCs) that are 

required for safe operation of the 

facility, such as CIVs. 

The Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, 

‘‘Requirements for monitoring the 

effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear 

power plants,’’ requires licensees to 

monitor the performance, or condition, 

of SSCs against licensee-established 

goals in a manner sufficient to provide 

reasonable assurance that SSCs are 

capable of fulfilling their intended 

functions. The implementation and 

monitoring program guidance of 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, section 

2.3, and RG 1.177, section 3, states that 

monitoring performed in conformance 

with the Maintenance Rule can be used 

when such monitoring is sufficient for 

the SSCs affected by the risk-informed 

application. 

In addition, 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as it 

relates to the proposed CIV CT 

extension, requires the assessment and 

management of the increase in risk that 

may result from the proposed 

maintenance activity. 

Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50, GDC–

54, ‘‘Piping systems penetrating 

containment,’’ requires those piping 

systems that penetrate primary 

containment be provided with leak 

detection, isolation, and containment 

capabilities having redundancy, 

reliability, and performance capabilities 

that reflect the importance to safety of 

isolating these piping systems. 

Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50, GDC–

55, ‘‘Reactor coolant pressure boundary 

penetrating containment,’’ requires that 

each line that is part of the reactor 

coolant pressure boundary and that 

penetrates the primary containment 

shall be provided with CIVs. 

Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50, GDC–

56, ‘‘Primary containment isolation,’’

requires that each line that connects 

directly to the containment atmosphere 

and penetrates the primary reactor 

containment shall be provided with 

CIVs. 

The CIVs help ensure that adequate 

primary containment boundaries are 

maintained during and after accidents 

by minimizing potential pathways to the 

environment and help ensure that the 

primary containment function assumed 

in the safety analysis is maintained. 

2.1 Proposed Change 

TSTF–498 would make the following 

changes to the B&W STS contained in 

NUREG–1430 associated with TS 3.6.3 

Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs): 

• The proposed change adds a 

Reviewer’s Note prior to Condition A 

which states ‘‘The Condition A Note 

should list the specific penetrations (if 

any) identified by the plant specific risk 

analysis as having high risk significance 

for an interfacing systems loss of coolant 

accident (ISLOCA).’’

• The proposed change revises the 

Condition A NOTE to add ‘‘except 

containment isolation valves in the 

main steam lines and [ ].’’

• The proposed change adds the new 

Required Action A.1, ‘‘Determine the 

OPERABLE containment isolation valve 

in the affected penetration is not 

inoperable due to common cause 

failure’’ with a Completion Time of 4 

hours. This new Required Action is 

connected by an AND statement to the 

other applicable Required Actions. 

• The proposed change revises the 

previous Required Action A.1 to be A.2 

with the completion time changed from 

4 hours to 7 days. 

• The proposed change revises the 

previous Required Action A.2 to be A.3. 

• The proposed change adds a new 

Condition B for one or more penetration 

flow paths with one containment 

isolation valve inoperable [for reasons 

other than purge valve leakage not 

within limit] with a Note stating ‘‘Only 

applicable to penetration flow paths 

with two [or more] containment 

isolation valves in the main steam lines 

and [ ].’’ There is also a Reviewers Note 

similar to Condition A. 

• The proposed change provides new 

Required Action B.1 to isolate the 

affected penetration flow path with a 

completion time of 4 hours and 

Required Action B.2 to verify the 

affected penetration flow path is 

isolated once per 31 days for isolation 

devices outside containment and Prior 

to entering Mode 4 from Mode 5 if not 

performed within the previous 92 days 

for isolation devices inside 

containment. Furthermore, new 

Required Action B.2 has two notes 

which state: (1) Isolation devices in high 

radiation areas may be verified by use 

of administrative means and (2) 

Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, 

or otherwise secured may be verified by 

use of administrative means. 

• The proposed change adds a new 

Condition C for two or more penetration 

flow paths with one containment 

isolation valve inoperable [for reasons 

other than Condition[s] [E and F]] with 

a Note stating ‘‘Only applicable to 

penetration flow paths with two [or 

more] containment isolation valves. 

• The proposed change provides new 

Required Action C.1 to isolate all but 

one of the affected penetration flow 

paths by use of at least one closed and 

de-activated automatic valve, closed 

manual valve, or blind flange with a 

completion time of 4 hours. 

• The proposed change revises the 

previous Condition B and Required 

Action B.1 to be new Condition D and 

Required Action D.1. 

• The proposed change revises the 

previous Condition C and Required 

Action C.1 and C.2 to be new Condition 

E and Required Action E.1 and E.2. 

• The proposed change revises the 

previous Condition D and Required 

Action D.1, D.2 and D.3 to be new 

Condition F and Required Action F.1, 

F.2 and F.3. 

• The proposed change revises the 

previous reference to Required Action 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES
6532 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 

D.1 for performance of SR 3.6.3.6 within 

Required Action D.3 to Required Action 

F.1. 

• The proposed change revises the 

previous Condition E and Required 

Action E.1 and E.2 to be new Condition 

G and Required Action G.1 and G.2. 

TSTF–498 includes changes to the 

B&W STS Bases B 3.6.3 contained in 

NUREG–1430. 

• Condition A has been modified by 

a Note indicating this Condition is only 

applicable to those penetration flow 

paths with two [or more] containment 

isolation valves. The Note also states 

that the Condition is not applicable to 

containment isolation valves in the 

main steam lines and [any specific 

penetrations identified by the plantspecific risk analysis as having high risk 

significance for an ISLOCA. The 

previous discussion about the Note has 

been deleted. Additionally, a new 

Required Action A.1 has been added to 

determine that the operable 

containment isolation valve in the 

affected penetration is not inoperable 

due to a common cause failure with a 

completion time of 4 hours. The other 

Condition A Required Actions have 

been re-numbered and Required Action 

A.2 Completion Time has been changed 

from 4 hours to 7 days. 

• The bases has been revised to 

update Required Action A.2 from 4 

hours to 7 days based on an analysis of 

plant risk and the discussion on 

considering the time required to isolate 

the penetration and the relative 

importance of supporting containment 

operability has been deleted. 

• A new Condition B has been added 

with a Note indicating this Condition is 

only applicable to those penetration 

flow paths with two [or more] 

containment isolation valves that are 

containment isolation valves in the 

main steam lines or are [any specific 

penetrations identified by the plantspecific risk analysis as having high risk 

significance for an interfacing systems 

loss of coolant accident (ISLOCA)]. 

Condition B is entered if one 

containment isolation valve in one or 

more penetration flow paths is 

inoperable, [except for purge valve 

leakage not within limit.] The Bases 

describes Required Actions B.1 and B.2 

Completion Times and Notes as 

specified in the TS section. 

• A new Condition C has been added 

with a Note indicating this Condition is 

only applicable to penetration flow 

paths with two [or more] containment 

isolation valves. Condition C is entered 

if two or more penetration flow paths 

with one containment isolation valve 

inoperable [for reasons other than 

Condition[s] E [and F]]. The Bases 

describes the Required Action C.1 

Completion Time to isolate all but one 

of the affected containment isolation 

valves within 4 hours. 

• The bases discussion for Required 

Action D.1 has been updated to account 

for new Conditions B and C and have 

been added where applicable. 

• Condition B and Required Action 

B.1 has been re-numbered to Condition 

D and Required Action D.1. 

• Condition C and Required Action 

C.1 and C.2 have been re-numbered to 

Condition E and Required Action E.1 

and E.2. 

• Reference to BAW–2461–A has 

been added as Reference 6. Previous 

references 6, 7, and 8 have been renumbered to references 7, 8 and 9. 

Applicable changes have been made 

throughout the Bases. 

• Condition D and Required Action 

D.1, D.2 and D.3 have been re-numbered 

to Condition F and Required Action F.1, 

F.2 and F.3. 

• Condition E and Required Action 

E.1 and E.2 have been re-numbered to 

Condition G and Required Action G.1 

and G.2. 

3.0 Technical Evaluation 

As stated previously, BAW–2461–A 

describes a method to revise the 

Completion Time for specific 

Conditions per Technical Specification 

3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves. The 

NRC approved BAW–2461 on August 

29, 2007, for referencing in license 

applications to the extent specified and 

under the limitations and conditions 

stated in the topical report and Section 

4.1 of the staff’s safety evaluation 

(Reference 6). TSTF–498 is proposing 

changes to the B&W STS, NUREG 1430, 

which are in accordance with Topical 

Report BAW–2461–A and subject to the 

Limitations, Conditions and Regulatory 

Commitments specified in the staff 

Safety Evaluation. Any differences 

between TR BAW–2461–A Technical 

Specification examples and TSTF–498 

proposed Technical Specifications have 

been evaluated and determined to be 

acceptable. BAW–2461–A, Table 2–1, 

Condition A note states ‘‘Only 

applicable to penetration flow paths 

with two [or more] containment 

isolation valves with the exception of 

containment isolation valves in the 

main steam lines [and list of specific 

penetrations (if any) identified by the 

plant-specific risk-informed process to 

have high risk significance for 

ISLOCA.]’’ To be consistent with the 

ITS format and content rules, the 

Condition A Note was written as ‘‘Only 

applicable to penetration flow paths 

with two [or more] containment 

isolation valves except containment 

isolation valves in the main steam lines 

and [ ].’’ The Condition is modified by 

a Reviewer’s Note which states, ‘‘The 

Condition A Note should list the 

specific penetrations (if any) identified 

by the plant-specific risk analysis as 

having high risk significance for an 

interfacing systems loss of coolant 

accident (ISLOCA).’’ This change is 

editorial and does not affect the 

application of the TS. The change in 

wording meets the requirements 

specified in BAW–2461–A and is 

therefore acceptable. 

The July 5, 2006 Request for 

Additional Information (RAI) response 

to NRC Question 1 stated that the 

following action would be added as 

Required Action A.1 with a 4 hour 

Completion Time, ‘‘Verify that the 

redundant CIV on the same penetration 

is operable [applicable only if the 

redundant CIV has an operator and/or 

body type that is not diverse from the 

inoperable CIV depending on which 

parts are inoperable.]’’ In TSTF–498, 

Required Action A.1 has a 4 hour 

Completion Time and states, 

‘‘Determine the OPERABLE 

containment isolation valve in the 

affected penetration is not inoperable 

due to common cause failure.’’ The 

wording was chosen to be consistent 

with LCO 3.8.1, Required Action B.3.1, 

regarding inoperable diesel generators. 

The discussion of what is required to be 

evaluated, ‘‘applicable only if the 

redundant CIV has an operator and/or 

body type that is not diverse from the 

inoperable CIV depending on which 

parts are inoperable,’’ is placed in the 

Required Action A.1 Bases. Placing the 

detailed description of what is meant by 

common cause failure in the Bases is 

consistent with the ITS format and 

content rules. This change has been 

evaluated as a Revision to BAW–2461–

A. TSTF–498 wording is equivalent to 

the proposed wording submitted as RAI 

response #1 and is consistent with 

NRC’s Safety Evaluation for BAW–

2461–A and is therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS Required Action A.1 and 

A.2 are being revised to re-number these 

actions to A.2 and A.3. This is necessary 

to incorporate the new Required Action 

A.1 as described above. Additionally, 

the completion time for the new 

Required Action A.2 which states 

‘‘isolate the affected penetration flow 

path by use of at least one closed and 

de-activated automatic valve, closed 

manual valve, blind flange, or check 

valve with flow through the valve 

secured’’ is being revised from 4 hours 

to 7 days. This change has been 

evaluated by the staff and is consistent 

with NRC’s Safety Evaluation for BAW–

2461–A and is therefore acceptable. 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 6533 

B&W STS is adding a new Condition 

B for one or more penetration flow paths 

with one containment isolation valve 

inoperable [for reasons other than purge 

valve leakage not within limit] with a 

Note specifying ‘‘Only applicable to 

penetration flow paths with two [or 

more] containment isolation valves in 

the main steam lines and [ ]. There is 

also a Reviewer’s Note that states ‘‘The 

condition B Note should list the specific 

penetrations (if any) identified by the 

plant-specific risk analysis as having 

high risk significance for an interfacing 

systems loss of coolant accident 

(ISLOCA). This wording is consistent 

with the change made to Condition A 

and is consistent with the format and 

content rules in ITS. Additionally, the 

Required Actions and associated 

Completion Times are consistent with 

Condition A and the change evaluated 

by the staff in the NRC’s Safety 

Evaluation for BAW–2461–A. This new 

Condition was required since main 

steam line isolation valves were 

explicitly excluded from the CT 

extension as stated in the NRC’s Safety 

Evaluation for BAW–2461–A and is 

therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS Condition B and Required 

Action B.1 are being revised to be 

Condition D and Required Action D.1. 

With the addition of new Conditions B 

and C the remaining Conditions and 

Required Actions need to be renumbered. This change is editorial and 

results in no technical change and is 

therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS is adding a new Condition 

C which is applicable when two or more 

penetrations have one inoperable 

containment isolation valve. This 

Condition requires isolating all but one 

of the affected penetrations within 4 

hours (the existing Completion Time for 

Condition A). Once this Completion 

Time is satisfied and since Condition A 

is still applicable then this essentially 

limits the 7 day Completion Time in 

Condition A to a single penetration. 

This change addresses Condition and 

Limitation 6 in the NRC’s Safety 

Evaluation for BAW–2461–A and is 

therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS Condition C and Required 

Actions C.1 and C.2 are being revised to 

be Condition E and Required Action E.1 

and E.2. With the addition of new 

Conditions B and C the remaining 

Conditions and Required Actions need 

to be re-numbered. This change is 

editorial and results in no technical 

change and is therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS Condition D and Required 

Action D.1, D.2 and D.3 are being 

revised to be Condition F and Required 

Action F.1, F.2 and F.3. With the 

addition of new Conditions B and C the 

remaining Conditions and Required 

Actions need to be re-numbered. This 

change is editorial and results in no 

technical change and is therefore 

acceptable. 

B&W STS Condition E and Required 

Action E.1 and E.2 are being revised to 

be Condition G and Required Action G.1 

and G.2. With the addition of new 

Conditions B and C the remaining 

Conditions and Required Actions need 

to be re-numbered. This change is 

editorial and results in no technical 

change and is therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 Actions 

A.1, A.2 and A.3 are being revised to 

describe the Note that is being added 

indicating the Condition is only 

applicable to those penetration flow 

paths with two [or more] containment 

isolation valves and that the isolation 

valves in the main steam line are not 

applicable along with any specific 

penetrations identified by the plantspecific risk analysis. This is necessary 

to ensure the correct Required Actions 

are taken based on the applicable 

penetration. This is consistent with all 

other Bases descriptions in the B&W 

STS and is therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 Required 

Action A.2 Completion Time is being 

revised from 4 hours to 7 days and 

indicates that this is based on an 

analysis of plant risk. The change is 

revising wording associated with the 4 

hour completion time to a 7 day 

completion time. The 7 day completion 

time is now based upon a plant risk 

evaluation instead of a reasonable time 

to isolate the penetration. This is 

consistent with BAW–2461–A which 

the staff found acceptable in the Safety 

Evaluation for BAW–2461–A and is 

therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 is adding 

support information for new Condition 

B and Required Actions B.1 and B.2 

which is applicable for one or more 

penetration flow paths with one 

containment isolation valve inoperable 

[for reasons other than purge valve 

leakage not within limit]. Condition B is 

also only applicable to penetration flow 

paths with two [or more] containment 

isolation valves in the main steam lines 

and [ ]. The associated Required 

Actions and Completion Times for new 

Condition B are consistent with Actions 

and Completion Times for Condition A 

which the staff found acceptable in the 

NRC’s Safety Evaluation for BAW–

2461–A and is therefore acceptable. 

B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 is adding 

support information for new Condition 

C and Required Action C.1 which is 

applicable for two or more penetration 

flow paths with one containment 

isolation valve inoperable [for reasons 

other than Condition[s] E [and F]]. 

Condition C is only applicable to 

penetration flow paths with two [or 

more] containment isolation valves. The 

Required Action to isolate all but one of 

the affected penetration flow paths by 

use of at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed 

manual valve, or blind flange within 4 

hours ensures that simultaneous LCO 

entry of an inoperable CIV in separate 

penetration flow paths such that the 

proposed 7 day Completion Time in 

Condition A is limited to no more than 

one CIV at any given time. This change 

addresses Limitation and Condition 6 as 

specified in the NRC’s Safety Evaluation 

for BAW–2461–A and is therefore 

acceptable. 

B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 are being 

revised such that each Condition and 

Required Action subsequent to the 

addition of new Conditions B and C 

need to be re-numbered. Additionally, a 

new reference has been added 

(Reference 6) which requires subsequent 

references to be re-numbered. These 

changes are considered editorial and do 

not affect any technical aspect of the 

Bases and are therefore acceptable. 

3.1 Summary 

TSTF–498 would provide 

standardized wording in the B&W STS 

for plants implementing BAW–2461–A, 

‘‘Risk-Informed Justification for 

Containment Isolation Valve Allowed 

Outage Time Change.’’ The changes to 

NUREG–1430 proposed by TSTF–498 

have been reviewed for consistency 

with the current NUREG–1430 and 

BAW–2461–A. The proposed changes 

have been found to be consistent with 

NUREG–1430 and BAW–2461–A, 

therefore the proposed changes are 

acceptable. 

4.0 State Consultation 

In accordance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the [ ] State official was 

notified of the proposed issuance of the 

amendment. The State official had [(1) 

no comments or (2) the following 

comments—with subsequent 

disposition by the staff]. 

5.0 Environmental Consideration 

The amendments change a 

requirement with respect to the 

installation or use of a facility 

component located within the restricted 

area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and 

change surveillance requirements. [For 

licensees adding a TS Bases Control 

Program: The amendment also changes 

record keeping, reporting, or 

administrative procedures or 

requirements.] The NRC staff has 

determined that the amendments 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES
6534 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 

involve no significant increase in the 

amounts and no significant change in 

the types of any effluents that may be 

released offsite, and that there is no 

significant increase in individual or 

cumulative occupational radiation 

exposure. The Commission has 

previously issued a proposed finding 

that the amendments involve no 

significant hazards considerations, and 

there has been no public comment on 

the finding [FR]. Accordingly, the 

amendments meet the eligibility criteria 

for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 

CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and (c)(10)]. Pursuant 

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental 

impact statement or environmental 

assessment need be prepared in 

connection with the issuance of the 

amendments. 

6.0 Conclusion 

The Commission has concluded, on 

the basis of the considerations discussed 

above, that (1) there is reasonable 

assurance that the health and safety of 

the public will not be endangered by 

operation in the proposed manner, (2) 

such activities will be conducted in 

compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 

amendments will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security or to the 

health and safety of the public. 

7.0 References 

1. Letter from the Technical Specifications 

Task Force (TSTF), a joint owners group 

activity, re: TSTF–498, Revision 0, ‘‘RiskInformed Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (BAW–2461),’’ dated 

December 20, 2006. (ADAMS 

ML063560402) 

2. Letter from the TSTF re: Response to NRC 

Request for Additional Information 

Regarding TSTF–498, Revision 0, ‘‘RiskInformed Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (BAW–2461),’’ dated 

October 10, 2007. (ADAMS ML072840444) 

3. BAW–2461–A, ‘‘Risk-Informed 

Justification for Containment Isolation 

Valve Allowed Outage Time Change,’’

Revision 0, dated October 2007. (ADAMS 

ML072980529) 

4. NUREG 1430, ‘‘Standard Technical 

Specifications Babcock and Wilcox 

Plants,’’ Revision 3.0. (ADAMS 

ML041830589 and ML041800598) 

5. Nuclear Energy Institute 99–04, Revision 0, 

‘‘Guidelines for Managing NRC 

Commitment Changes,’’ July 1999. 

6. Final Safety Evaluation for Pressurized 

Water Reactors Owners Group, Topical 

Report, BAW–2461, Revision 0, ‘‘RiskInformed Justification for Containment 

Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time 

Change (TAC No. MD5722),’’ (ADAMS 

ML072330227) 

The Following Example of an 

Application Was Prepared by the NRC 

Staff to Facilitate Use of the 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process (CLIIP). The Model Provides the 

Expected Level of Detail and Content for 

An Application to Revise Technical 

Specifications Regarding Risk-Informed 

Justification for Containment Isolation 

Valve Allowed Outage Time Change 

Using Cliip. Licensees Remain 

Responsible For Ensuring That Their 

Actual Application Fulfills Their 

Administrative Requirements As Well 

as Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Regulations. 

lllllllllllllllllll

U.S. Nuclear Regular Commission, 

Document Control Desk, Washington, 

DC 20555. 

Subject: 

Plant Name 

Docket No. 50–

Application for Technical 

Specification Change Regarding 

Risk—Informed Justification for 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Allowed Outage Time Change 

Using the Consolidated Line Item 

Improvement Process 

Gentlemen: 

In accordance with the provisions of 

10 CFR 50.90 [LICENSEE] is submitting 

a request for an amendment to the 

technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT 

NAME, UNIT NOS.]. 

The proposed amendment would 

modify TS requirements for 

containment isolation valve (CIV) 

allowed outage time changes with 

implementation of BAW–2461–A, 

‘‘Risk-Informed Justification for 

Containment Isolation Valve Allowed 

Outage Time Change.’’

Attachment 1 provides a description 

of the proposed change, the requested 

confirmation of applicability, and plantspecific verifications. Attachment 2 

provides the existing TS pages marked 

up to show the proposed change. 

Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) 

TS pages. Attachment 4 provides a 

summary of the regulatory commitments 

made in this submittal. Attachment 5 

provides the proposed TS Bases 

changes. 

[LICENSEE] requests approval of the 

proposed License Amendment by 

[DATE], with the amendment being 

implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 

DAYS]. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a 

copy of this application, with 

attachments, is being provided to the 

designated [STATE] Official. 

I declare under penalty of perjury 

under the laws of the United States of 

America that I am authorized by 

[LICENSEE] to make this request and 

that the foregoing is true and correct. 

(Note that request may be notarized in 

lieu of using this oath or affirmation 

statement). 

If you should have any questions 

regarding this submittal, please contact 

[NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER] 

Sincerely, 

[Name, Title] 

Attachments: 

1. Description and Assessment. 

2. Proposed Technical Specification 

Changes. 

3. Revised Technical Specification 

Pages. 

4. Regulatory Commitments. 

5. Proposed Technical Specification 

Bases Changes. 

cc: NRC Project Manager 

NRC Regional Office 

NRC Resident Inspector 

State Contact 

Attachment 1—Description and 

Assessment 

1.0 Description 

The proposed amendment would 

modify TS requirements for 

containment isolation valve allowed 

outage times associated with 

implementation of BAW–2461–A, 

‘‘Risk-Informed Justification for 

Containment Isolation Valve Allowed 

Outage Time Change.’’

The changes are consistent with 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

approved Industry/Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS 

change TSTF–498, Revision 1. The 

Federal Register notice published on 

[DATE] announced the availability of 

this TS improvement through the 

consolidated line item improvement 

process (CLIIP). 

2.0 Assessment 

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety 

Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety 

evaluation dated [DATE] as part of the 

CLIIP. This review included a review of 

the NRC staff’s evaluation, as well as the 

supporting information provided to 

support TSTF–498, Revision 1. 

[LICENSEE] has concluded that the 

justifications presented in the TSTF 

proposal and the safety evaluation 

prepared by the NRC staff are applicable 

to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.] and justify this 

amendment for the incorporation of the 

changes to the [PLANT] TS. 

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations 

[LICENSEE] is not proposing any 

variations or deviations from the TS 

changes described in TSTF–498, 

Revision 1, and the NRC staff’s model 

safety evaluation dated [DATE]. 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 6535 

3.0 Regulatory Analysis 

3.1 No Significant Hazards 

Consideration Determination 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination (NSHCD) 

published in the Federal Register as 

part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has 

concluded that the proposed NSHCD 

presented in the Federal Register notice 

is applicable to [PLANT] and has found 

it acceptable for incorporation into the 

amendment request which satisfies the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a). 

3.2 Verification and Commitments 

As discussed in the notice of 

availability published in the Federal 

Register on [DATE] for this TS 

improvement, [LICENSEE] verifies the 

applicability of TSTF–498, Revision 1, 

to [PLANT], and commits to adopting 

the requirements specified in BAW–

2461–A which includes the following 

Limitations and Conditions specified in 

Section 4.1, Staff Findings and 

Conditions and Limitations, of the 

NRC’s Safety Evaluation for BAW–2461 

(ML072330227): 

1. Based on TR BAW–2461, the CIV 

methodology, PRA parameters, 

configurations, and data used to 

evaluate an extended CIV CT to 168 

hours is limited to the following plants. 

• Davis-Besse 

• Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 

• Crystal River 3 

Other licensees of B&W designed 

PWRs requesting to use the TR 

methodology must provide the same 

level of information provided by these 

demonstration plants to ensure that TR 

BAW–2461 is applicable to their plant. 

2. Because not all penetrations have 

the same impact on DCDF, DLERF, 

ICCDP, or ICLERP, verify the 

applicability of TR BAW–2461 to the 

specific plant, including verification 

that: (a) the CIV configurations for the 

specific plant match the configurations 

in TR BAW–2461, and (b) the riskparameter values used in TR BAW–

2461, including the sensitivity studies 

contained in the RAIs, are 

representative or bounding for the 

specific plant. Any additional CIV 

configurations, CT extensions, or nonbounding risk parameter values not 

evaluated by TR BAW–2461 should be 

addressed in the plant-specific analyses. 

[Note that CIV configurations and 

extended CTs not specifically evaluated 

by TR BAW–2461, or non-bounding risk 

parameter values outside the scope of 

the TR, will require NRC staff review 

and licensee development of the 

specific penetrations and related 

justifications for the proposed CTs]. 

3. Each licensee adopting TR BAW–

2461 will need to confirm that the plantspecific risk assessment including both 

internal and external events is within 

the assumptions of TR BAW–2461 and 

the acceptance guidelines of RG 1.174 

and 1.177. The licensee’s application 

verifies that external event risk, 

including seismic, fires, floods, and 

high winds, either through quantitative 

or qualitative evaluation, is shown to 

not have an adverse impact on the 

conclusions of the plant-specific 

analysis for extending the CIV CTs. 

Specifically: (1) the risk from external 

events cannot make the total baseline 

risk exceed 1E–4/yr CDF, or 1E–5/yr 

LERF, without justification, (2) the risk 

from external events (i.e., high winds, 

floods and other) should be specifically 

evaluated with respect to the extended 

CIV CT, and (3) fire risk should be 

specifically addressed. The evaluation 

should include fire-induced spurious 

actuation (including containment 

performance) with respect to the 

proposed 168-hour CIV CT. 

Additionally, each licensee will need 

to confirm that the seismic CDF 

referenced for TR BAW–2461 is 

bounding for its plant, or incorporate a 

plant-specific seismic CDF estimate. 

Furthermore, the seismic initiating 

event frequency will need to be defined 

and justified for each licensee 

implementing TR BAW–2461. See 

Section 3.4.1.4 of the staff’s SE. 

4. For licensees adopting TR BAW–

2461, confirmation should be provided 

that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 conclusions 

of the TR are applicable to the licensee’s 

plant and that plant-specific Tier 2 

evaluations including CCF and risksignificant configurations including 

interfacing-system LOCA have been 

evaluated and included under Tier 2 

and Tier 3 including the CRMP as 

applicable. 

• The proposed 168-hour CIV CT will 

not be applied to CIVs in penetrations 

connected to the RCS that have two NC 

CIVs if there are no other valves 

between the RCS and the environment 

(i.e., low pressure piping, or opening) 

that may be used for backup isolation 

and cannot be confirmed closed. In that 

case, the operable CIV will be verified 

closed within the original 4-hour CT, 

thus satisfying the TS Required Action. 

See Section 3.3.4 of the staff’s SE. The 

specific penetrations where this is 

applicable or where interfacing-system 

LOCA is shown to be risk-significant (as 

determined by the plant-specific riskinformed process including plantspecific LOCA analysis) will be 

identified on a plant-specific basis prior 

to implementation of the proposed TS 

change. They will be listed explicitly in 

the proposed TS revision and the 

current CT will be retained. 

• TR BAW–2461 stated that an 

interfacing-system LOCA is assumed to 

lead to core damage and large early 

release, the effectiveness of mitigation 

systems besides containment isolation is 

not considered significant. All failed 

open penetration flow paths with an 

RCS connection were assumed to have 

CDF and LERF contributions in TR 

BAW–2461. Licensees incorporating TR 

BAW–2461 will need to confirm the 

above assumption for their plant 

specific implementation of BAW–2461. 

• The specific penetrations with CCF 

potential will be identified by the 

licensee on a plant-specific basis. Upon 

entry into TS LCO 3.6.3, Condition A, 

the utility will confirm that the 

redundant similarly-designed CIV has 

not been affected by the same failure 

mode as the inoperable CIV. This 

verification will be performed before 

entering into the extended portion of the 

CT (i.e., within 4 hours). The specific 

penetrations with CCF potential will be 

identified on a plant-specific basis and 

listed in a plant-specific TS document 

or other administrative source. See 

Section 3.4.1.2 of the staff’s SE. 

• No action or maintenance activity is 

performed that will remove equipment 

that is functionally redundant to the 

inoperable CIV, including the redundant 

CIV(s) on the same penetration and 

support systems for the redundant CIV. 

See Section 3.3 of TR BAW–2461. 

• No action or maintenance activity is 

performed that will significantly 

increase the likelihood of challenge to 

the CIVs. Challenges to the CIVs include 

DBAs that result in a release of 

radioactive material within containment 

(LOCA, main steam line break, and rod 

ejection accident). Also included is the 

removal of equipment from service that 

may cause a significant increase in the 

likelihood of core damage while in the 

proposed CT, which may increase the 

large early release via the inoperable 

CIV. See Section 3.4 of TR BAW–2461. 

• No action or maintenance activity is 

performed that will remove equipment 

that supports success paths credited in 

the CT risk evaluation. This includes 

the other series valves, if any, credited 

in the risk assessment for RCS 

penetrations that otherwise would be 

risk-significant (i.e., interfacing-system 

LOCA). See Section 3.4 of TR BAW–

2461. 

5. TR BAW–2461 was based on 

generic-plant characteristics. Each 

licensee adopting TR BAW–2461 must 

confirm plant-specific Tier 3 

information in their individual 

submittals. The licensee must discuss 

conformance to the requirements of the 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES
6536 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 

maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), 

as they relate to the proposed CIV CTs 

and the guidance contained in 

NUMARC 93.01, Section 11, as 

endorsed by RG 1.182, including 

verification that the licensee’s 

maintenance rule program, with respect 

to CIVs, includes a LERF/ICLERP 

assessment (i.e., CRMP). See Section 

3.4.3 of the staff’s SE. 

6. TS LCO 3.6.3, Note 2, allows 

separate condition entry for each 

penetration flow path. Therefore, each 

licensee adopting TR BAW–2461 will 

address the simultaneous LCO entry of 

an inoperable CIV in separate 

penetration flow paths such that the 

proposed 168-hour CIV CT LCO will be 

limited to no more than one CIV at any 

given time. In addition, the licensee 

must confirm that its Tier 3 CRMP 

addresses simultaneous inoperable CIV 

LCOs (i.e., separate condition entry) 

such that the cumulative CIV risk, 

including LERF, are maintained 

consistent with the assumptions and 

conclusions of TR BAW–2461. See 

Section 3.4.1.2 of the staff’s SE. 

7. The licensee shall verify that the 

plant-specific PRA quality is acceptable 

with respect to its use for Tier 3 for this 

application in accordance with the 

guidelines given in RG 1.174 and as 

discussed in Section 3.4.1.1 of the staff’s 

SE. 

8. With respect to past plant-specific 

license amendments or additional plantspecific applications for a TS change 

under NRC review that have not been 

incorporated into the baseline PRA used 

to evaluate the proposed change, the 

cumulative risk must be evaluated on a 

plant-specific basis consistent with the 

guidance given in RG 1.174, Section 

2.2.6 and 3.3.2, and addressed in a 

licensee’s plant-specific application. See 

Section 3.4.1.5 of the staff’s SE. 

9. Closed systems inside and outside 

containment, which are considered to 

be containment isolation barriers, must 

meet the provisions outlined in 

NUREG–0800, Section 6.2.4, 

‘‘Containment Isolation System.’’ See 

Section 2.2 of the staff’s SE. 

10. With an extended CIV CT, the 

possibility exists that the CIV 

unavailability will be impacted. 

Depending on the penetration risk 

significance and the frequency and 

length of time of the CIV CT, the 

unavailability of the containment 

isolation function may also be impacted. 

Therefore, licensee’s adopting TR BAW–

2461 will need to establish an 

implementation and monitoring 

program for CIVs, including 

performance criteria, on a plant-specific 

basis. See Sections 3.4.1.2 and 3.4.4 of 

the staff’s SE. 

11. The PWROG did not specifically 

address DCDF and DLERF in TR BAW–

2461 regarding the acceptance 

guidelines of RG 1.174. The PWROG 

stated that it is not expecting that on 

line CIV preventive maintenance will 

increase with the proposed 168-hour 

CIV. To address this, licensee’s adopting 

TR BAW–2461 will need to assess, on 

a plant-specific basis, the DCDF and 

DLERF acceptance guidance of RG 1.174 

including the expected frequency of 

entering the proposed CT and the 

expected mean CT for CIV maintenance. 

See Section 3.4.1.2 of the staff’s SE. 

4.0 Environmental Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

environmental evaluation included in 

the model safety evaluation dated 

[DATE] as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] 

has concluded that the staff’s findings 

presented in that evaluation are 

applicable and acceptable to [PLANT] 

and the evaluation is submitted as an 

attachment to this application. 

Attachment 2—Proposed Technical 

Specification Changes (Mark-Up) 

Attachment 3—Proposed Technical 

Specification Pages 

Attachment 4—List of Regulatory 

Commitments 

The following table identifies those 

actions committed to by [LICENSEE] in 

this document. Any other statements in 

this submittal are provided for 

information purposes and are not 

considered to be regulatory 

commitments. Please direct questions 

regarding these commitments to 

[CONTACT NAME]. 

Regulatory commitments Due date/event 

[LICENSEE] will .............................. [Complete, implemented with amendment OR within X days of implementation of amendment]. 

Attachment 5—Proposed Changes to 

Technical Specification Bases Pages 

Proposed No Significant Hazards 

Consideration Determination 

Description of Amendment Request: 

[Plant Name] requests adoption of an 

approved change to the standard 

technical specifications (STS) for 

Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Plants 

(NUREG–1430) and plant specific 

technical specifications (TS), to allow 

modification of containment isolation 

valve completion times associated with 

implementation of BAW–2461–A, 

‘‘Risk-Informed Justification for 

Containment Isolation Valve Allowed 

Outage Time Change,’’ dated October 

2007. The changes are consistent with 

NRC approved Industry/Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS 

Traveler, TSTF–498, Revision 1, ‘‘RiskInformed Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (BAW–2461).’’ The 

proposed change extends the 

Completion Times for containment 

penetration flow paths with one 

containment isolation valve inoperable 

from 4 hours to 7 days for Babcock & 

Wilcox (B&W) NSSS plants. This change 

is applicable to containment 

penetrations with two [or more] 

containment isolation valves in which 

one containment isolation valve is 

inoperable [for reasons other than purge 

valve leakage not within limit]. The 

extended Completion Time is not 

applicable to containment isolation 

valves in the main steam lines or those 

identified by plant-specific analysis as 

having high risk significance for 

interfacing systems loss of coolant 

accidents (ISLOCAs) and the existing 4 

hour Completion Time applies. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an 

analysis of the issue of no significant 

hazards consideration is presented 

below: 

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Increase in the 

Probability or Consequences of an Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed changes revise the 

Completion Times for restoring an inoperable 

containment isolation valve (or isolating the 

affected penetration) within the scope of 

Topical Report BAW–2461–A, ‘‘RiskInformed Justification for Containment 

Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time 

Change.’’ The Completion Times are 

extended from 4 hours to 7 days. 

Containment isolation valves are not accident 

initiators in any accident previously 

evaluated. Consequently, the probability of 

an accident previously evaluated is not 

significantly increased. Containment 

isolation valves control the extent of leakage 

from the containment following an accident. 

As such, containment isolation valves are 

instrumental in controlling the consequences 

of an accident. However, the consequences of 

any accident previously evaluated are no 

different during the proposed extended 

Completion Times than during the existing 

Completion Times. As a result, the 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 23 / Monday, February 4, 2008 / Notices 6537 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(iii). 

4 17 CFR 240.19b–4(f)(3). 

5Specifically, FINRA is updating its Internet 

address and the title of the Tracking Form generated 

by the System. 

consequences of any accident previously 

evaluated are not significantly increased. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Create the Possibility of a New or Different 

Kind of Accident From Any Previously 

Evaluated 

The proposed changes revise the 

Completion Times for restoring an inoperable 

containment isolation valve (or isolating the 

affected penetration) within the scope of 

Topical Report BAW–2461–A, ‘‘RiskInformed Justification for Containment 

Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time 

Change.’’ The proposed changes do not 

change the design, configuration, or method 

of operation of the plant. The proposed 

changes do not involve a physical alteration 

of the plant (no new or different kind of 

equipment will be installed). Therefore, the 

proposed changes do not create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated. 

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin 

of Safety 

The proposed changes revise the 

Completion Times for restoring an inoperable 

containment isolation valve (or isolating the 

affected penetration) within the scope of 

Topical Report BAW–2461–A, ‘‘RiskInformed Justification for Containment 

Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time 

Change.’’ In order to evaluate the proposed 

Completion Time extensions, a probabilistic 

risk evaluation was performed as 

documented in Topical Report BAW–2461–

A. The risk evaluation concluded that the 

proposed increase in the Completion Times 

does not result in an unacceptable 

incremental conditional core damage 

probability or incremental conditional large 

early release probability according to the 

guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.177. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

Based upon the reasoning presented 

above and the previous discussion of 

the amendment request, the requested 

change does not involve a significant 

hazards consideration as set forth in 10 

CFR 50.92(c). 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day 

of January, 2008. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Gerald Waig, 

Acting Chief, Technical Specifications 

Branch, Division of Inspection & Regional 

Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. E8–1943 Filed 2–1–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–57225; File No. SR–FINRA–

2007–042] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; 

Financial Industry Regulatory 

Authority, Inc.; Notice of Filing and 

Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed 

Rule Change Relating to Amendments 

to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure 

To Remove the Page Limit on 

Statements of Claim Filed Through the 

Online Arbitration Claim Filing System 

January 29, 2008. 

Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2

notice is hereby given that on December 

27, 2007, Financial Industry Regulatory 

Authority, Inc. (‘‘FINRA’’) (f/k/a 

National Association of Securities 

Dealers, Inc. (‘‘NASD’’)) filed with the 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule 

change as described in Items I, II, and 

III below, which Items have been 

substantially prepared by FINRA. 

FINRA has designated the proposed rule 

change as concerned solely with the 

administration of the self-regulatory 

organization under section 

19(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act 3 and Rule 

19b–4(f)(3) thereunder,4 which renders 

the proposal effective upon receipt of 

this filing by the Commission. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 

solicit comments on the proposed rule 

change from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

FINRA is proposing to amend Rule 

12302 of the Code of Arbitration 

Procedure for Customer Disputes 

(‘‘Customer Code’’) and Rule 13302 of 

the Code of Arbitration Procedure for 

Industry Disputes (‘‘Industry Code’’) to 

remove the 50-page limit on Statements 

of Claim filed through the Online 

Arbitration Claim Filing System (‘‘the 

System’’), to allow parties to submit 

exhibits to Statements of Claim through 

the System, and to reflect the new 

FINRA name.5 Below is the text of the 

proposed rule change. Proposed new 

language is in italics; proposed 

deletions are in brackets. 

* * * * * 

12302. Filing an Initial Statement of 

Claim 

(a) Filing Claim with the Director 

(1) To initiate an arbitration, a 

claimant must file the following with 

the Director: 

• Signed and dated Uniform 

Submission Agreement; and 

• A statement of claim specifying the 

relevant facts and remedies requested. 

The claimant may include any 

additional documents supporting the 

statement of claim. 

(2) A claimant may use the online 

claim notification and filing procedure 

to complete part of the arbitration claim 

filing process through the Internet. To 

commence this process, a claimant may 

complete a Claim Information Form that 

can be accessed through [http:// 

www.nasd.com] http://www.finra.org. In 

completing the Claim Information Form, 

the claimant may attach an electronic 

version of the statement of claim, and 

any additional documents supporting 

the statement of claim, to the form[, 

provided it does not exceed 50 pages]. 

Once this online form has been 

completed, [an NASD] a FINRA Dispute 

Resolution Tracking Form will be 

generated and displayed for the 

claimant to reproduce as necessary. The 

claimant shall then file with the 

Director the rest of the materials 

required in subparagraph (1) of the rule, 

along with a hard copy of the [NASD] 

FINRA Dispute Resolution Tracking 

Form. 

(b)–(d) No change. 

13302. Filing an Initial Statement of 

Claim 

(a) Filing Claim with the Director 

(1) To initiate an arbitration, a 

claimant must file the following with 

the Director: 

• Signed and dated Uniform 

Submission Agreement; and 

• A statement of claim specifying the 

relevant facts and remedies requested. 

The claimant may include any 

additional documents supporting the 

statement of claim. 

(2) A claimant may use the online 

claim notification and filing procedure 

to complete part of the arbitration claim 

filing process through the Internet. To 

commence this process, a claimant may 

complete a Claim Information Form that 

can be accessed through [http:// 

www.nasd.com] http://www.finra.org. In 

completing the Claim Information Form, 

the claimant may attach an electronic 

version of the statement of claim, and 

any additional documents supporting 

the statement of claim, to the form[, 

provided it does not exceed 50 pages]. 

Once this online form has been 


ebenthall on PRODPC61 with NOTICES