alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. L. Ry. Co. et al. v. John A. Hamilton.

1. *Practice—Objection to Evidence Does Not Relate to Errors in Settling*Pleadings.—Where no error is assigned touching any action of the trial court in settling the pleadings, the sufficiency of the pleas can not be considered on an objection to evidence.

Trespass on the Case.-^Damages by fire. Appeal from the Circuit. Court of Champaign County; the Hon. Francis M. Wright, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1902.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed November 1, 1902.

*76Gere & Philbrick, attorneys for appellants.

Ray & Dobbins and Walter B. Riley, attorneys for appellee.

Mr. Justice Marker

delivered the opinion of .the court.

At the September term, 1901, of the Champaign County Circuit Court, appellee recovered a judgment against the appellant railroad company for $70 and costs. The railroad company took an appeal to the Supreme Court and in compliance with the order entered executed an appeal bond for $150, with appellant Glover as surety. The appeal was dismissed in the Supreme Court and at the March term, 3902, of the Circuit Court, this suit was commenced on the appeal bond, resulting in a judgment in favor of appellee for $150 debt and $71.46 damages.

This appeal is prosecuted to reverse the last named judgment on account of alleged errors of the trial court in .sustaining a demurrer to a certain special plea, on account of improper evidence admitted and because of erroneous instructions. Eo' error is assigned touching any action of the Circuit Court in settling the pleadings and for that reason the sufficiency of pleas is not considered by us. The objection to evidence relates to the judgment recovered in the Circuit Court and appealed from. Under the pleadings it was not necessary to introduce that judgment. It was recited in the appeal bond sued upon and appellants were estopped from questioning it. We see .nothing wrong with the instructions.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Presiding Justice Wright took no part.
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-60341

Summary Calendar

SALVADOR CABALLERO-HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A094-953-167

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Salvador Cabellero-Hernandez petitions this court for review of the Board

of Immigration Appeals’ decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s

(“IJ”) order denying his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Petitioner contests the merits of the IJ’s determination

that he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 3, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

Case: 09-60341 Document: 00511019853 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/03/2010
No. 09-60341

2

demonstrate the requisite hardship. Further, Petitioner challenges the

constitutional basis of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b) and 1252(a)(2)(B). 

“This court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ’s [discretionary] hardship

determination” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Rueda v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 831,

831 (2004). Petitioner’s remaining constitutional claims are meritless.

Petitioner raises a due process challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) on behalf of

his American children, but “[l]egal orders of deportation to their parents do not

violate any constitutional right of citizen children . . . .” Gonzalez-Cuevas v. INS,

515 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1975). Petitioner next claims that

§ 1252(a)(2)(B) violates the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), but “the APA

does not apply to deportation hearings under [the Immigration and Nationality

Act].” Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 967 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992). 

For these reasons, petition for review is DENIED. 

Case: 09-60341 Document: 00511019853 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/03/2010
18584.

#### King *v.*Balkcom, Warden.

Argued May 10, 1954

Decided May 31, 1954.

*A. T. Walden, E. S. D’Antignac,*for plaintiff in error.

*J. T. Grice, Deputy Assistant Attorney-General, John J. Flynt, Jr., Solicitor-General,*contra.

Wyatt, Presiding Justice.

The instant case is identical on its facts and is controlled by *Jones*v. *Balkcom,*ante.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6873

JIMMY G. GILCHRIST, SR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GEORGE T. HAGAN, Warden of Allendale

Correctional Institution; HENRY D. MCMASTER,

Attorney General of South Carolina,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. Margaret B. Seymour, District

Judge. (6:06-cv-01236-MBS)

Submitted: September 28, 2007 Decided: October 11, 2007

Before MICHAEL, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jimmy G. Gilchrist, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka,

William Edgar Salter, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH

CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Jimmy G. Gilchrist, Sr. seeks to appeal the district

court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge

and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Gilchrist has

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate

of appealability, as well as Gilchrist’s motion to expand the

certificate, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Luis BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-50229.

D.C. No. CR-01-00353-SVW-1.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 19, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN and T. G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Luis Beltran appeals his 37-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction to two counts of distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U. S.C. § 841(a)(1). Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Beltran’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no arguable issues for review, and a motion to *933withdraw as counsel of record. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our examination of the briefs and independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. *75,*83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no issues warranting review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRTANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 6035** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. CHRISTOPHER TIMBERS, a/k/a Alibi , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. Henry E. Hudson , District Judge. ( 3:10

- cr - 00170

- HEH

- 21; 3:13

- cv - 00271

- HEH )

Submitted : May 18, 2015 Decided: June 3, 2015

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Christopher Timbers, Appellant Pro Se. Peter Sinclair Duffey, Gurney Wingate Grant, II, Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Theryn G. Gibbons, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia; Dennis Michael Fitzpatrick, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Christopher Timbers seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U .S.C. § 2255 ( 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutio nal claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive pr ocedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Timbers has not made the requisite showing. Accor dingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### A. W. BATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WINN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD et al., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 5907.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

May 29, 1939.

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1939.

Joel L. Fletcher, of Colfax, for appellant.

Harry Fuller, of Winnfield, and Vinson M. Mouser, of Columbia, for appellee.

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

This suit is companion to No. 5908, styled Ab Dean v. Winn Parish School Board et al., 193 So. 245, on the docket of this court,decided today. The two cases propound the same questions of law. The facts and issues thereof are practically identical. Plaintiff herein appealed from a judgment sustaining the same sort of exceptions as were tendered and sustained in the other case. The cases below and the appeals here were consolidated for trial.

For. the reasons assigned in our opinion in case No. 5908, this appeal is dismissed at appellant’s cost.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 7
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
unaudited consolidated financial statements included in the Form 10-Q and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                           242,668
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                                0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                                  0
<EQUITIES>                                      83,989
<MORTGAGE>                                      11,330
<REAL-ESTATE>                                    3,345
<TOTAL-INVEST>                                 427,203
<CASH>                                           9,244
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                              29,707
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                          31,530
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,077,371
<POLICY-LOSSES>                                500,902
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                            143,874
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                                0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                 69,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         6,098
<OTHER-SE>                                     193,771
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,077,371
<PREMIUMS>                                     265,774
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                             19,580
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                               3,575
<OTHER-INCOME>                                   1,005
<BENEFITS>                                     174,985
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                    (6,945)
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                            79,190
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 36,382
<INCOME-TAX>                                    11,561
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             24,821
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    24,821
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.64
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.61
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                       0<F1>
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                  0<F1>
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0<F1>
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                   0<F1>
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                     0<F1>
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                      0<F1>
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>This amount is presented on an annual basis.  See 12/31/95 Form 10-K for the
most recent reported amounts.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Rosina Bareis Hooghkerk, Respondent, v. John F. W. Bareis and Others, Impleaded with Charles E. Rockenstyre, as Executor, etc., of Fred Bareis, Deceased, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Smith, P. J., and Sewell, J., dissenting.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEAN C. RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

SHELLY MATIS; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 17

- 15779

D.C. No. 2:14

- cv

- 01049

- MCE

- KJN

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 1 7 , 2019 **

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Dean C. Rodriguez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims related to his

imprisonment at High Desert State Prison. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo whether the magistrate judge had jurisdiction. Allen

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Rodriguez’s requests for oral

argument, set forth in his briefs, is denied. 

# FILED

APR 22 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 17

- 15779

v. Meyer , 755 F.3d 866, 867

- 68 (9th Cir. 2014). We vacate and remand.

Rodriguez consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). The magistrate judge then d ismissed certain claims before the named

defendants had been served. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Because all parties,

including unserved defendants, must consent to proceed before the magistrate

judge for jurisdiction to vest, see Williams v. King

, 875 F.3d 5 00 , 503

- 04 (9th Cir.

2017), we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

In light of our disposition, we do not consider Rodriguez’s remaining

contentions.

All pending motions and requests are denied.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.
| (1)    | the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Freshwater Technologies, Inc. for the period ended June 30, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| (2)    | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Freshwater Technologies, Inc.                                                                       |

|   | /s/Max Weissengruber                            |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
|   | Max Weissengruber                               |
|   | President, Chief Executive Officer and Director |
|   | (Principal Executive Officer)                   |
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 683

To provide a minimum for payments with respect to counties in the State

of Texas from receipts from national forests.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 25, 1995

Mr. WILSON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Agriculture

A BILL

To provide a minimum for payments with respect to counties

in the State of Texas from receipts from national forests.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Texas County Mini5 mum Payment Act of 1995’’.

6 SEC. 2. PAYMENT TO COUNTIES IN TEXAS FROM FOREST

7 RECEIPTS.

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—In any fiscal year, the monetary

9 amount of the distributive share to each county in the
2

•HR 683 IH

1 State of Texas from the payment made to the State under

2 the Forest Receipts Act shall be the greater of—

3 (1) the amount provided under the Act for such

4 distributive share to such county for the fiscal year;

5 and

6 (2) 85 percent of the amount of such distribu7 tive share to such county in fiscal year 1993.

8 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF PAYMENT TO TEXAS TO EN9 SURE PAYMENTS TO COUNTIES.—In any fiscal year, the

10 payment to the State of Texas, with respect to each county

11 in the State, under the Forest Receipts Act from receipts

12 from national forests shall be not less than 85 percent of

13 the amount of the distributive share to such county of

14 such payment in fiscal year 1993.

15 (c) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the

16 term ‘‘Forest Receipts Act’’ means the last undesignated

17 paragraph under the heading ‘‘GENERAL EXPENSES,

18 FOREST SERVICE’’ under the heading ‘‘FOREST SERV19 ICE’’ of the Act of May 23, 1908 (16 U.S.C. 500).

20 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

21 This Act shall take effect on the first day of the first

22 fiscal year beginning after the date of the enactment of

23 this Act.

Æ
#### Mrs. Cecelia REUGGER, Wife of William Gautreaux, Jr., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. *

No. 14369.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

April 10, 1933.

Lemle, Moreno & Lemle, of New Orleans, R. V. Eleteher, of Chicago, Ill., and Charles N. Burch, H. D. Minor, and Clinton H. McKay, all of Memphis, Tenn., for appellant.

James G. Schillin, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee.

*

Rehearing den ad May 22, 1933.

JANVIER, Judge.

Mrs. Cecelia Reugger Gautreaux, Jr., was a guest passenger in an automobile truck which ran into the center pier of an overhead trestle of the defendant company near Harahan, La.

In other cases involving this accident, to wit, Prank J. Becker v. Illinois Central Railroad Company (La. App.) 147 So. 378, and Frank J. Abadie v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company (La. App.) 147 So. 384, decided this day, we held that defendant railroad was not responsible for the accident and that there could be no recovery.

There is nothing to distinguish this case from the case of Abadie v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company except that, in this case, there appears the contention made by plaintiff that defendant has not properly pleaded that it is not the owner of the overhead crossover and that it was erected by public authorities and has been permitted to remain by such authorities.

In the principal cases to which we have referred and in which this defense was actually presented by the pleadings, we found it unnecessary to consider it, because we held that there was no actionable negligence in ■any event in defendant. There is therefore nothing to distinguish this case from the others.

In the district court Mrs. Gautreaux was awarded judgment in the sum of $3,000.

Por the reasons given in the cases to which we have referred, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be, and it is, annulled, avoided, and reversed, and that there now be judgment dismissing plaintiff’s suit, at her cost.

Reversed.

Por written reasons stated in Frank J. Becker v. Illinois Central R. R. Co. (La. App.) 147 So. 378, decided this day:

WESTERPIELD, J., dissents.

HIGGINS, J., concurs.
Exhibit 32.2

Statement of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of
Pacific Enterprises (the "Company") certifies that:

(i)	the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2005 (the "Quarterly Report") fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended; and

(ii)	the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.



May 4, 2005
                                               /S/ NEAL E. SCHMALE
                                              ______________________
                                               Neal E. Schmale
                                               Chief Financial Officer