IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20698

Summary Calendar

JARROD FLAMING,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ALVIN COMMUNITY COLLEGE, being sued in its Individual and Official 

Capacities,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-1074

Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Jarrod Flaming, Texas prisoner 

# 1679601, challenges the district court’s dismissal, pursuant to Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), of his Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA) and Rehabilitation Act claims against Alvin Community College (ACC). 

He alleged ACC failed to accommodate his disabilities (visual and learning 

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 26, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-20698

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impairments) in classes he took while incarcerated and requested declaratory, 

injunctive, and compensatory relief. The court dismissed his declaratory and 

injunctive claims as moot because he had graduated; his compensatory claims, 

as barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by 

a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or 

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical 

injury or the commission of a sexual act . . .”.). 

On appeal, Flaming has expressly abandoned his injunctive claim. 

Whether his remaining claims were properly dismissed is reviewed de novo.

Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Review is limited to the contentions Flaming preserved in district court. See

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 752–53 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 

To preserve a contention, a litigant must have presented it “to such a degree 

that the district court ha[d] an opportunity to rule on it”. Rosedale Missionary 

Baptist Church v. New Orleans, 641 F.3d 86, 89 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). Because the ADA and Rehabilitation Act have parallel remedies, 

“[j]urisprudence interpreting either . . . is applicable to both”. Hainze v. 

Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

The court properly dismissed as moot Flaming’s declaratory claim, which 

sought a declaration ACC had violated his ADA and Rehabilitation Act rights. 

A claim is moot “where the cause of action is no longer live”. Henschen v. City 

of Houston, 959 F.2d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “A claim for 

declaratory judgment seeks to define the legal rights and obligations of the 

parties in anticipation of some future conduct, not to proclaim liability for a 

past act.” Haggard v. Bank of the Ozarks, Inc., 547 F. App’x 616, 620 (5th Cir. 

2013) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Because Flaming was no longer a 

student following his graduation, he no longer had an interest in a court’s 

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declaring any right to accommodations. See, e.g., Moseley v. Bd. of Educ. of 

Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 483 F.3d 689, 692–93 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding 

student’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act declaratory-judgment action moot 

following his graduation because declaration would “have no effect on the 

present or future actions of either party”).

The district court also properly dismissed Flaming’s compensatory claim. 

Although he contended in district court that the ADA is categorically beyond 

§ 1997e(e)’s bar, our court has required “pro[of]” of “physical injury resulting 

from discrimination” to “recover [ADA] compensatory damages”. See Edler v. 

Hockely Cty. Comm’rs Ct., 589 F. App’x 664, 671 & n.8 (5th Cir. 2014) (per 

curiam) (citing Pierce v. Cty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2008);

Cassidy v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 199 F.3d 374, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2000); Robinson 

v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F. App’x 382, 383–84 (6th Cir. 2001)). Flaming’s

complaint does not allege physical injury. 

Along that line, we do not consider Flaming’s contention, raised only on 

appeal, that the damages his complaint sought were not for mental or 

emotional injuries. Similarly waived is his new claim that § 1997e(e) does not 

bar recovery of nominal damages, which, in any event, his complaint does not 

seek.

AFFIRMED.

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