* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40453

Summary Calendar

WALTER A MOSLEY JR; MALINDA K MOSLEY; BOBBIE L MOSLEY;

RAMONA J JOHNSTON, also known as Ramona J Mosley

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

BOWIE COUNTY TEXAS; TEXAS YOUTH COMMISSION; ATTORNEY

GENERAL STATE OF TEXAS, Child Support Unit 0508E; BILLY FOX;

STEPHEN F MCKENNA; MARY F IVERSON; TERESA S SEVERNS

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:06-CV-291

Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Walter A. Mosley Jr., Malinda K. Mosley, Bobbie L. Mosley, and Ramona

J. Johnston (collectively, “the Mosleys”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of

their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on

which relief can be granted. The complaint, which was signed only by Walter A.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 22, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-40453

1 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

2 See Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1987).

2

Mosley, Jr., who is not an attorney, alleged several constitutional violations

related to a state court judgment that ordered the payment of child support.

The district court dismissed all of the Mosleys’s claims pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine and the domestic relations exception.2 The district

court also determined that Walter A. Mosley Jr. lacked standing to bring the

lawsuit in his own behalf and on behalf of the other named plaintiffs.

In their pro se appellate brief, which we afford the benefit of liberal

construction, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972),the Mosleys contest

the district court’s determination regarding their lack of standing. To satisfy the

standing requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an injury in fact;

(2) traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct; (3) that is likely to be

redressed by a favorable decision of the district court. Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “At the pleading stage, general factual

allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice.” Id.

Here, the general factual allegations of the complaint were not so insufficient at

this point in the litigation to justify a dismissal based on standing. See id. at

561. We, however, express no opinion regarding an ultimate determination on

standing.

The Mosleys contend that Walter A. Mosley Jr. has been given power of

attorney and that he should be allowed to represent them in this action. Walter

A. Mosley Jr. is not an attorney and thus may not represent another party in

federal court. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020-22 ((5th Cir. 1998).

The Mosleys argue that the district court erred in denying leave to amend

the complaint. Leave to amend was sought for the purpose of adding the

signatures of the other named plaintiffs to the complaint. Rule 15(a) of the
No. 07-40453

3

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that leave to amend “shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” “Rule 15(a) applies where plaintiffs expressly

requested leave to amend even though their request was not contained in a

properly captioned motion paper.” United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana

Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003). The record is

devoid of reasons for the denial of leave to amend the complaint; accordingly,the

denial of such leave constitutes an abuse of discretion. See United States ex rel.

Adrian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 2004).

The Mosleys argue that neither the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nor the

domestic relations exception is applicable because their complaint raises only

“post-judgment” claims. Our reading of the complaint, however, reveals that the

Mosleys pleaded claims that collaterally attack as void the state courtjudgment

ordering the payment of child support as well as claims that assert that the

defendants violated the Mosleys’s constitutional rights in the effort to enforce

the child support order.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that "federal district courts, as

courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or

nullify final orders of state courts.” Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F. 3d 613, 615 (5th

Cir. 2000). The doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 

The Mosleys contend that the state court child support judgment is void

and therefore subject to collateral attack in a federal court. In support of their

argument,the Mosleys assertthatthere is no record of any state courtjudgment

ordering the payment of child support. Under some circumstances, a federal

court may review the state court record to determine ifthe judgment is void. See

United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1994). A Texas judgment
No. 07-40453

4

is only void if “the rendering court (1) lacked jurisdiction over the party or his

property; (2) lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit; (3) lacked

jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment rendered; or (4) lacked the capacity

to act as a court.” Id. at 925 n.5. The Mosleys do not argue that any of the above

deficiencies apply to the state court judgment that is the subject of their claims

and have failed to establish that the void judgment exception applies. See id. at

925. Accordingly, the Mosleys’s claims that collaterally attack as void the state

court judgment ordering the payment of child support are barred under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they “invit[e] district court review and

rejection” of the state child support judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S.

at 284.

We reach a different result as to the Mosleys’s claims that the defendants

violated their constitutional rights in the effortto enforce the state child support

judgment. Because such claims do not ask the district court to “review, modify,

or nullify” a final order of a state court, they are not barred under the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Weekly, 204 F.3d at 615.

Nor are the Mosleys’s claims of constitutional violations in the

enforcement ofthe state child supportjudgment barred by the domestic relations

exception. In deciding whether the domestic relations exception is to be applied,

the crucial factor is the type of determination that the federal court must make

in order to resolve the case, rather than the formal label attached to the claim.

Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir. 1987). “If the federal court must

determine which parent should receive custody, what rights the noncustodial

parent should have, how much child support should be paid and under what

conditions, or whether a previous court’s determination on these matters should

be modified, then the court should dismiss the case” under the domestic relations

exception. Id. Because the Mosleys’s claims of constitutional violations in the

enforcement of the state child support judgment do not involve such

determinations,they are not barred under the domestic relations exception. See
No. 07-40453

5

id.; Franks v. Smith, 717 F.2d 183, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, we

vacate the dismissal of such claims and remand to the district court. In view of

the above determinations, itis unnecessary to consider the remaining arguments

advanced by the Mosleys.

All outstanding motions are denied. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED;

MOTIONS DENIED.