J-A21029-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

BRADLEY E. GOODRICH, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF 

THE ESTATE OF LISA A. GOODRICH, 

DECEASED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

DEBRA M. ROSA, M.D. AND VALLEY 

FORGE SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, LTD. 

AND SHARON FLEISCHER, M.D. AND 

POTTSTOWN MEDICAL SPECIALISTS, 

INC.

Appellees No. 391 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 30, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Civil Division at No(s): 11-06505

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2014

Bradley E. Goodrich (“Goodrich”), individually and in his capacity as 

Executor of the Estate of Lisa A. Goodrich, Deceased, appeals from the 

judgment entered January 30, 2014,1in favor of the defendants, Debra M. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note Goodrich filed his notice of appeal from the January 22, 2014, 

order of the trial court denying his post-trial motions. It is well-settled, 

however, that “[a]n appeal to this Court can only lie from judgments entered 

subsequent to the trial court’s disposition of post-verdict motions, not from 

the order denying post-trial motions.” Stahl Oil Co. v. Helsel, 860 A.2d 

508, 511 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quotation omitted), appeal denied, 885 A.2d 43 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Rosa, M.D. (“Dr. Rosa”), Valley Forge Surgical Associates, Ltd. (“VFSA”), 

Sharon Fleischer, M.D. (“Dr. Fleischer”), and Pottstown Medical Specialists, 

Inc. (“PMS”), in this medical malpractice action.2 On September 30, 2013, a 

jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, specifically finding Dr. 

Rosa and Dr. Fleischer were not negligent. Following the denial of post-trial 

motions, Goodrich filed this appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his 

pretrial motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence of the decedent’s prior 

prescription drug abuse. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

The facts underlying this medical malpractice case are as follows. In 

2010, Lisa Goodrich (“the decedent”) was a 44-year-old woman with chronic 

health issues, including hypertension and obesity, and a family history of 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(Pa. 2005). Here, judgment was subsequently entered “in favor of 

defendants and against the plaintiff” on January 30, 2014. Praecipe for 

Entry of Judgment, 1/30/2014. See also Amended Notice of Entry of 

Judgment, Order or Decree, 2/20/2014. Therefore, we will treat Goodrich’s 

appeal as if it was filed after the entry of judgment. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a) 

(providing that “[a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 

determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as 

filed after such entry and on the day thereof”). See also McEwing v. Lititz 

Mut. Ins. Co., 77 A.3d 639, 645 (Pa. Super. 2013). Accordingly, we have 

directed the Superior Court Prothonotary to correct the appeal paragraph.

2 As Goodrich notes in his brief, it does not appear from the docket entries 

that judgment was ever formally entered in favor of the medical practices, 

PMS and VFSA. See Goodrich’s Brief at 1-3. However, because their 

liability was only derivative of any liability on the part of the doctordefendants, we agree the judgment on appeal is final and appealable. 

Nevertheless, we direct the Chester County Prothonotary to formally enter 

judgment in favor of PMS and VFSA and against Goodrich.
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heart disease. She was a family care patient of Dr. Fleischer at PMS. On 

January 7, 2010, she saw another doctor in the PMS practice when she 

experienced an elevated blood pressure reading at home. The doctor 

adjusted her medication and scheduled a follow-up appointment with Dr. 

Fleischer for the following week.

During that follow-up appointment, on January 12, 2010, the decedent 

described to Dr. Fleischer severe pain she had experienced the night before. 

Dr. Fleischer recounted the decedent’s symptoms as follows: 

She told me that at 10:00 the night before she developed an Ace 

bandage feeling around her chest; she said it was hard for her to 

take a deep breath; some GERD means reflux symptoms for a 

few days; it hurt to breathe in deeply; she was slightly short of 

breath; a little off balance; she denied having any nausea or 

vomiting.

N.T., 9/27/2013, at 19. Although the pain had subsided by 5:00 a.m., at 

the time of her appointment, Dr. Fleischer testified the decedent still “felt a 

little dizzy, had a dull ache in the left side of her neck, down her arm and 

her chest; and something was not right.” Id. at 20. Dr. Fleischer 

suspected the decedent was suffering from either coronary artery disease or 

gallbladder disease. N.T., 9/25/2013, at 21-22. The doctor performed an 

electrocardiogram (“EKG”) in her office, the results of which were “fully 

normal.” N.T., 9/27/2013, at 33. Dr. Fleischer then referred the decedent 

to the emergency room at Pottstown Hospital for evaluation. Id. at 34. Dr. 

Fleischer received a call, later that afternoon, from the emergency room 

doctor, who told her he “didn’t find anything to suspect cardiac ... 
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dysfunction.” Id. at 40. Nevertheless, Dr. Fleischer ordered an ultrasound 

of the decedent’s abdomen. Id. at 41. After the ultrasound was completed, 

the decedent was sent home. Later that day, the hospital electronically 

forwarded a copy of the ultrasound report to Dr. Fleischer. The report 

indicated the decedent had “multiple gallstones ... and a thickened 

gallbladder wall.” Id. at 42. The emergency room doctor diagnosed the 

decedent with “atypical chest pain of gallbladder disease with normal cardiac 

enzymes, as well as normal EKG[.]” Id. at 43. 

The decedent next saw Dr. Fleischer on February 22, 2010. She 

reported no return of “chest tightness.” Id. at 45. Dr. Fleischer discussed 

with the decedent the ultrasound report, and, ultimately, referred her to Dr. 

Rosa at VFSA for a surgical consultation. Id. at 56-57. Dr. Fleischer had no 

further contact with the decedent or Dr. Rosa. 

The decedent first saw Dr. Rosa on March 2, 2010. The decedent 

reported “no history of chest pains, no history of palpitations, no history of 

irregular heartbeat, [and] no history of dizziness.” N.T., 9/26/2013, at 28. 

Dr. Rosa obtained a copy of the decedent’s ultrasound results for verification 

of the gallstones and discussed surgical intervention. Id. at 32-33. The 

decedent opted to have her gallbladder removed laparoscopically, and 

surgery was scheduled for March 12, 2010. Id. at 34. Although Dr. Rosa 

ordered pre-operative lab work, she did not request a cardiac clearance. Dr. 

Rosa explained that the decedent had no reported history of chest pains or 

palpitations, and had a prior normal EKG. Id. at 41. Further, her family 
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history of cardiac disease did not include her immediate family, but rather 

was remote, i.e., an uncle and a cousin had heart disease. Id. Neither Dr. 

Fleischer nor the decedent told Dr. Rosa about the cardiac symptoms the 

decedent experienced in February. 

On March 12, 2010, Dr. Rosa performed a laparoscopic 

cholecystectomy on the decedent. Due to post-operative discomfort, the 

decedent remained in the hospital overnight. She was discharged to her 

husband, Goodrich, in the early afternoon the next day. N.T., 9/25/2013 

(Testimony of Goodrich), at 22. Goodrich took the decedent home and put 

her to bed in a second floor bedroom. He then went to the pharmacy to fill 

her prescription for Dilaudid, a pain medication, and gave her two pills, as 

prescribed, when he returned home.3 Id. at 23, 25-26. Goodrich then 

helped the decedent to a chair, and went downstairs to cook dinner for their 

daughter. After dinner, he returned upstairs, and checked on the decedent. 

He testified that it looked as though she was sleeping because “[h]er head 

was back in the chair, and she was making a snorting type noise.” Id. at 

30. However, when the noise continued a short time later, Goodrich 

____________________________________________

3 Goodrich could not recall whether he had given the decedent any Klonopin, 

a medication she was prescribed for anxiety. See N.T., 9/25/2013 

(Testimony of Goodrich) at 26-27. See also N.T., 9/24/2013 (Excerpted 

Testimony of Jonathan Arden, M.D.) at 61-62 (testifying that the decedent’s 

medical records indicated she had an “ongoing prescription” for Klonopin to 

combat anxiety, and “had been given Dilaudid as post-operative pain 

medication.”).
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returned to the bedroom to try to wake her. When he received no response, 

he called 911, and attempted to perform CPR. Id. at 31. 

The decedent was taken to the hospital, but died the next day. 

According to a urinalysis performed after her death, the decedent had both 

Benzodiazepine and opiates in her system, although a blood level analysis 

was never performed. N.T., 9/24/2013, at 47-48. An autopsy was 

performed on March 16, 2010, which revealed the decedent died from 

“cardiac arrest.” Id. at 60.

Goodrich filed this medical malpractice action in June of 2011. In his 

first Amended Complaint, filed on April 20, 2012, Goodrich alleged 

negligence claims against Dr. Fleischer and Dr. Rosa, vicarious liability 

claims against their respective medical practices, PMA and VSFA, and 

wrongful death and survival claims against all of the defendants.4 On 

September 4, 2013, Goodrich filed several motions in limine seeking to 

preclude certain defense evidence. Relevant to this appeal, he sought to 

preclude any reference at trial to the decedent’s alleged prescription 

medication abuse or prior suicide attempts.5

____________________________________________

4 Specifically, Goodrich claimed the defendants were negligent for failing to 

order a cardiac workup prior to the decedent’s surgery.

5 Goodrich also filed motions to preclude references to the decedent’s mental 

health, to Goodrich’s alleged infidelity, and to the decedent’s contraction of a 

sexually transmitted disease as a result of Goodrich’s infidelity.
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The case proceeded to a jury trial on September 23, 2013. The court 

bifurcated the trial into two phases, liability and damages. With respect to 

the liability phase, the trial court granted all of Goodrich’s motions, except 

the motion in limine to preclude reference to the decedent’s prior 

prescription drug abuse. Specifically, the court ruled:

During [the liability] phase of the trial I am not going to preclude 

evidence or cross-examination on the issue of drug ingestion by 

the decedent on prior occasions and even that it was not 

inadvertent or accidental, but I am precluding reference to those 

prior occasions as attempts at suicide.

N.T., 9/24/2013, at 6. 

On September 30, 2013, the jury returned a verdict for the defense, 

specifically finding no negligence on the part of either Dr. Fleischer or Dr. 

Rosa. Goodrich filed timely post-trial motions, which were denied by the 

trial court on January 22, 2014. This appeal followed.6

Goodrich raises one issue on appeal: Whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in failing to preclude evidence of the decedent’s prior overdoses 

on prescription medications. He argues this evidence was irrelevant to the 

issues at trial. Further, he contends that even if we determine the evidence 

____________________________________________

6 On February 14, 2014, the trial court ordered Goodrich to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Goodrich complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement 

on March 5, 2014.
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was relevant, its prejudicial impact outweighed any potential probative 

value. 

Where, as here, a request for a new trial is based on an alleged 

erroneous evidentiary ruling:

[W]e must acknowledge that decisions on admissibility [of 

evidence] are within the sound discretion of the trial court 

and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or 

misapplication of law. In addition, for a ruling on 

evidence to constitute reversible error, it must have 

been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.

Stumpf v. Nye, 950 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Pa. Super. 2008). A 

party suffers prejudice when the trial court’s error could have 

affected the verdict. Trombetta v. Raymond James Financial 

Services, Inc., 907 A.2d 550, 561 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 7 A.3d 830, 839 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis 

supplied), aff'd, 55 A.3d 1088 (Pa. 2012).7

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 402 provides that “[a]ll relevant 

evidence is admissible” and that “[e]vidence that is not relevant is not 

admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. 

____________________________________________

7

It is well-established that:

An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an 

appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but 

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be 

clearly erroneous. 

Catlin v. Hamburg, 56 A.3d 914, 920 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 74 

A.3d 124 (Pa. 2013).
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Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable. 

Even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative 

value is outweighed by, inter alia, the danger of unfair prejudice 

arising from its presentation to the fact-finder. Unfair prejudice 

supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to 

suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury’s 

attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence 

impartially. The function of the trial court is to balance the 

alleged prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative 

value and it is not for an appellate court to usurp that function.

Lykes v. Yates, 77 A.3d 27, 33 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal punctuation and 

citations omitted), appeal denied, 92 A.3d 812 (Pa. 2014). 

Before trial, Goodrich sought to preclude all references to “the 

decedent’s alleged past misuse of prescription medication,” as well as her 

“supposed suicide attempts.”8 After the parties agreed to bifurcate the trial, 

and resolve the issue of liability, i.e., negligence and causation, before the 

issue of damages, the trial court ruled that reference to the decedent’s prior 

“drug ingestion,” whether accidental or purposeful, would be permitted 

during the liability phase of the trial. N.T., 9/24/2013, at 6. However, the 

court specifically prohibited any “reference to those prior occasions as 

attempts at suicide.” Id. Throughout the trial, the defendant doctors 

abided by the trial court’s ruling, and did not refer to the decedent’s prior 

drug overdoses as suicide attempts.

____________________________________________

8

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Decedent’s 

Alleged Prescription Medication Abuse or Alcohol Abuse, 9/4/2013, at ¶ 2; 

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference at Trial to Decedent’s 

Mental Health, 9/4/2013, at ¶ 4.
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Goodrich argues that, nevertheless, “it is clear that this evidence [of 

the decedent’s prior misuse of prescription medications] was presented to 

infer to the jury that [the decedent] had [suicidal] tendencies.” Goodrich’s 

Brief at 18. However, he asserts “[t]hose overdoses, and the inference of 

suicidal tendencies linked to them, are simply irrelevant to this case.” Id. at 

19. Relying on Valentine v. Acme Market, 687 A.2d 1157 (Pa. Super. 

1997), he contends that “it cannot be proven that a person committed an 

act by showing that the person committed a similar act in the past” unless 

there is some correlation between the prior and present acts. Id. at 1160.

In Valentine, the plaintiff was injured when he fell in defendant’s 

store, after hitting his leg on a pull-out shelf at the end of a counter. Over 

plaintiff’s objection, the defendant was permitted to present evidence that 

plaintiff had experienced two prior, unexplained falls. After the jury returned 

a defense verdict, finding the counter was not defective, the plaintiff filed an 

appeal.

On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded that the trial court abused 

its discretion in admitting evidence of the plaintiff’s prior falls. Specifically, 

the Court found there was no evidence his prior falls were related to a 

medical condition, which may have also caused his fall in the defendant’s 

store. Id. at 1160. Further, the Valentine Court also found there was no 

evidence the plaintiff suffered injuries in his prior falls that were similar to 

those he suffered in the fall at issue. Id. The Court concluded:
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The only purpose of this evidence, therefore, was to allow the 

jury to infer that because [the plaintiff] had fallen for no specific 

reason in the past, he probably just fell on his own this time too. 

This conclusion, however, is impermissible. Therefore, we find 

that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of 

[the plaintiff’s] two prior falls.

Id.9 

In the present case, however, there was a correlation between the 

decedent’s prior overdoses and her sudden death in March of 2010. 

Specifically, a urine screen revealed the presence of opiates (Dilaudid) and 

Benzodiazepine (Klonopin). However, no blood screen was performed to 

determine the amount of medication in the decedent’s system. N.T., 

9/24/2013, at 47-48. 

It was undisputed that the decedent had been prescribed Klonopin for 

anxiety and Dilaudid for pain,10 and that she had taken her prescribed 

dosage of Dilaudid a few hours after she was discharged from the hospital. 

N.T., 9/25/2013 (Testimony of Goodrich), at 26-28. Moreover, Goodrich 

testified that he may have given her a dosage of Klonopin when she 

____________________________________________

9 Nevertheless, the Valentine Court ultimately concluded the trial court’s 

error in admitting the evidence was harmless. The Court found the evidence 

of the plaintiff’s prior falls “permitted the jury to infer that because [the 

plaintiff] had fallen on prior occasions, he fell in the instant case due to his 

own negligence.” Valentine, supra, 687 A.2d at 1161. Therefore, it was 

relevant to the issue of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. However, the 

jury never reached that issue because it determined that the counter was 

not defective. Accordingly, the Court reasoned, “[w]ithout an initial breach 

of duty by [the defendant, the plaintiff] cannot recover.” Id. 

10 N.T., 9/24/2013 (Excerpted testimony of Jonathan Arden, M.D.), at 61-62.
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returned home, but that he could not recall for certain.11 Furthermore, it 

was also undisputed that the decedent was hospitalized on three prior 

occasions – once in January of 2008, and twice in December of 2009 - for 

taking more than her prescribed dosage of Klonopin. Id. at 37-38. The last 

hospitalization was only three months prior to her death.

Although the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy opined 

the decedent died of “heart disease, ... hypertensive atherosclerotic 

cardiovascular disease,”12 she also acknowledged that she was unable to 

determine, pathologically, “whether or not the patient suffered a respiratory 

arrest which then led to the cardiac arrest as opposed to a cardiac arrest 

that led to a respiratory arrest[.]” Id. at 47. Moreover, she agreed that the 

reported “gasping breaths” the decedent experienced shortly before her 

death could have been a sign of the decedent’s respiratory arrest. Id. at 

60-61. 

In fact, one of the defense experts, Dr. Elliot Gerber, opined that the 

decedent’s death was precipitated by a respiratory arrest prior to her cardiac 

arrest, and that the respiratory arrest could have resulted from an overdose 

____________________________________________

11 Goodrich claimed that he controlled the decedent’s medications, that he 

kept the Dilaudid in his pocket, and that the Klonopin was in a cabinet in the 

kitchen. N.T., 9/25/2013 (Testimony of Goodrich), at 28. He also testified 

that the decedent did not return downstairs after he put her to bed. Id.

12 N.T., 9/24/2013, at 57. Specifically, the pathologist testified that the 

decedent’s “proximal left anterior descending coronary artery” was “99 

percent blocked.” Id. at 41. 
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of Klonopin and Dilaudid. N.T., 9/26/2013 (Excerpted Testimony of Defense 

Experts), at 18. He explained:

The combination of Klonopin and Dilauded [sic] are both 

respiratory suppressants, and when used together, especially if 

used in doses in excess of what was prescribed, will dramatically 

suppress your respirations and also dramatically suppress your 

gag reflex[.] ... If that reflex is suppressed by the combination of 

Dilauded [sic] and Klonopin, you can accidentally, if you vomit, 

accidentally inhale that into your lungs, which is what aspiration 

is.

There were findings at autopsy that showed that this 

patient did, in fact, have a pneumonia in her lungs, consistent 

with aspiration, and it was seen on a chest X ray, as well as CAT 

scan, and the finding of the fact that she had acidic fluid in her 

mouth at the time that she had her arrest, all of that is 

consistent with aspiration being the cause of death.

Id. at 18-19. Therefore, in light of the above testimony, we agree with the 

trial court’s conclusion that the fact that, on three prior occasions, the 

decedent had, either purposefully or inadvertently, taken more than the 

recommended dosage of her prescribed anxiety medication, Klonopin, each 

time necessitating her hospitalization, was relevant to the issue of causation. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 3/15/2014, at 1. 

Goodrich argues, however, that “there is absolutely no evidence 

whatsoever that [the decedent] died from an overdose and, hence, no 

connection was established between these prior overdoses and her death.” 

Goodrich’s Brief at 22. The flaw in Goodrich’s argument is the fact that, 

absent an affirmative defense or counterclaim, a defendant in a medical 

malpractice action has no burden of proof. Neal by Neal v. Lu, 530 A.2d 

103, 109 (Pa. Super. 1987). Indeed, 
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the defendant’s case is usually nothing more than an attempt to 

rebut or discredit the plaintiff's case. Evidence that rebuts or 

discredits is not necessarily proof. It simply vitiates the effect of 

opposing evidence. 

Id., at 109-110. Therefore, the defendant doctors had no obligation to 

prove the decedent died of an overdose. Rather, they simply put forth 

evidence in an attempt to discredit Goodrich’s explanation for the decedent’s 

cause of death. As Dr. Rosa explained in her brief, “[t]he evidence 

regarding prior misuse of medication was relevant as a basis to challenge 

[the] central principle of [Goodrich’s] case, that is, that the decedent died 

from a cardiac event” which could have been prevented had the defendant 

doctor obtained a cardiac clearance prior to the gallbladder surgery. Dr. 

Rosa’s Brief at 7. Because we agree that the evidence concerning the 

decedent’s prior misuse of her prescription medication, and in particular, 

Klonopin, was relevant to the issue of her cause of death, we find no abuse 

of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Goodrich’s motion in 

limine.

However, Goodrich also argues that even relevant evidence may be 

inadmissible if it is “unfairly prejudicial” to the objecting party. Goodrich’s 

Brief at 22. See Pa.R.E. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if 

its probative value is outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice”). He 

contends the evidence regarding the decedent’s “overdoses, with the 

concomitant inference of suicide, was so inflammatory that a new trial is 

warranted even though the jury found no negligence on the part of the 

Doctors.” Goodrich’s Brief at 25. He relies on this Court’s decision in Seals, 
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Inc. v. Tioga County Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 519 A.2d 951 (Pa. Super. 

1986), for support. 

In Seals, a fire destroyed a hardware store in a building owned by the 

insured. George Plank was the insured’s President and sole shareholder. 

When the insured sought to recover benefits under its fire insurance policy, 

the insurer denied coverage because it believed “the fire was arson and 

George Plank was the arsonist.” Id. at 954. Ten days after the fire, Plank 

purportedly shot and killed his girlfriend, and, later that same day, killed 

himself. 

The insured instituted an action to recover the fire insurance proceeds. 

During the ensuing trial, the insurer was permitted to introduce evidence of 

Plank’s murder-suicide to support its theory that Plank killed his girlfriend 

because she would not support his alibi for the night of the fire, and then 

killed himself because he feared prosecution for the arson. Id. at 954-955. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the insurer.

On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, 

concluding that the highly prejudicial character of the murder-suicide 

evidence outweighed its low probative value. Id. at 953. In particular, the 

Court noted that “[t]he evidence of Plank’s suicide is only relevant to the 

arson defense if in fact Plank killed himself because he had set the fire.” Id. 

at 955. However, there was no evidence that this was so, or even “that 

[Plank] had any inkling that he was under suspicion for arson.” Id. at 956. 

Accordingly, the Court found the trial court abused its discretion in allowing 
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the jury to speculate that Plank set the fire, merely because he committed 

suicide a week later. Id. at 955.

Furthermore, the Court explained that the evidence of Plank’s suicide 

was highly prejudicial to the insured’s case: 

To commit suicide is in the minds of many a reprehensible, even 

immoral and sinful act. At minimum, it is the violent act of a 

severely troubled person. To this jury, evidence of such violence 

and mental instability, or even immorality, might have been 

enough to support in the jurors’ minds an inference of arson. 

Since they may have decided on this clearly improper basis, a 

new trial without the suicide evidence is required.

Id. at 956.

We find the facts in Seals distinguishable from the case sub judice. 

First, in the present case, there was no mention of suicide, or even 

attempted suicide. Second, the testimony regarding the decedent’s prior 

overdoses was relevant to the issue of the decedent’s cause of death. See 

supra at 11-13. Conversely, in Seals, the evidence of Plank’s suicide was 

not relevant to any issue in the case, and, in fact, permitted the jury to 

engage in “pure ‘speculation’” that Plank must have set the fire because he 

committed suicide a week later. Seals, supra, 519 A.2d at 955. Third, as 

the trial court noted in its opinion, “the challenged evidence in this case was 

not introduced with respect to any issue that was actually reached by [the] 

jury.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/15/2014, at 3 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, 

because the jury concluded that neither Dr. Fleischer nor Dr. Rosa were 

negligent, it never reached the issue of causation. Therefore, we detect no 

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in concluding “the evidence 
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objected to had no likelihood of causing the jury to decide this case on an 

improper basis.” Id.

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2014