alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-50377

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN C. MILLIKIN, III,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(SA-96-CR-327-1)

 

January 7, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

A jury convicted defendant John C. Millikin, III, for being a

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1). Millikin raises a sufficiency of the evidence challenge

to his conviction. He argues that the evidence at trial

demonstrated that his father was in joint occupancy of the house in

which the weapons attributed to Millikin were found. He also

contends that his father was the owner and sole possessor of the
2

firearms. Accordingly, he asserts that the evidence was

insufficient to prove that he was either in constructive or actual

possession of the firearms.

Normally, the government may establish constructive possession

where the defendant exercises “ownership, dominion, or control over

the contraband itself or dominion or control over the premises in

which the contraband is concealed.” United States v. Mergerson, 4

F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1993). In joint occupancy situations,

however, mere control or dominion over the place in which the

contraband is found is insufficient to establish constructive

possession. See id. Rather, in such situations, we require

evidence “supporting at least a plausible inference that the

defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.”

Id.

As this is a sufficiency of the evidence challenge following

a jury conviction, we review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government. See United States v. Ivy, 973 F.2d

1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, there was ample evidence offered

at trial to indicate that Millikin in fact was the sole occupant of

the residence in which the guns were found. Sole occupancy and

dominion over the house in which the weapons were found would

support a finding of constructive possession. See United States v.

Ybarra, 70 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995). Alternatively, the

government offered evidence that Millikin had knowledge of the

weapons in his house, and at least one of the firearms was found
3

next to his bed. The jury could reasonably have concluded that

even if this were a joint occupancy situation, Millikin had

knowledge of and ready access to the contraband. See Mergerson, 4

F.3d at 349. Thus, there was adequate circumstantial indicia of

Millikin’s possession to support his conviction. See id.

AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 697 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 697

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore, for taxable 
 years beginning in 1994, the deduction for the health insurance costs 
                     of self-employed individuals.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 26, 1995

Mr. Thomas (for himself, Mr. Archer, Mr. Crane, Mr. Shaw, Mrs. Johnson 
of Connecticut, Mr. Bunning of Kentucky, Mr. Houghton, Mr. Herger, Mr. 
 McCrery, Mr. Hancock, Mr. Camp, Mr. Ramstad, Mr. Zimmer, Mr. Nussle, 
   Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Ms. Dunn of Washington, Mr. Collins of 
Georgia, Mr. Portman, Mr. English of Pennsylvania, Mr. Ensign, and Mr. 
 Christensen) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore, for taxable 
 years beginning in 1994, the deduction for the health insurance costs 
                     of self-employed individuals.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RESTORATION OF DEDUCTION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS OF SELF-
              EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING IN 1994.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (6) of section 162(l) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to special rules for health insurance 
costs of self-employed individuals) is amended by striking ``December 
31, 1993'' and inserting ``December 31, 1994''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1993.
                                 <all>
```
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2... See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21(a)(1), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2008).

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-093-CR

KEVIN WINN TITUS A/K/A APPELLANT

KEVIN TITUS

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

In February 2006, Appellant Kevin Winn Titus pled guilty pursuant to a

plea bargain to forgery by possession of a check with intent to pass, a state jail

felony,2 and the trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community

supervision for two years. In April 2007, the State filed a petition to proceed
3... 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

2

to adjudication, alleging that Appellant had violated the terms of his community

supervision by failing to report, leaving Tarrant County without authorization,

failing to notify the community supervision officer within five days of his

address change, and failing to serve thirty days in jail as a condition of his

community supervision. Appellant pled true to leaving Tarrant County without

authorization and to failing to serve the required thirty days in jail. After a

hearing, the trial court found all four allegations true, adjudicated Appellant’s

guilt, and sentenced him to one year’s confinement in the State Jail Division of

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant timely appealed.

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel

avers that, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief

and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California3 by presenting a

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds for relief. We gave Appellant the opportunity to file a pro se response,

but he has not filed one. The State also has not filed a brief.

After an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw

on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of
4... See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);

Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no

pet.).

5... See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351

(1988).

6... See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

3

Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the

record.4 Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

5

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree

with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find

nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.6 Accordingly, we

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and LIVINGSTON, J.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: May 21, 2009
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Coy Ray PHELPS, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-10044.

D.C. No. CR-85-00899-MHP.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 13, 2003.*

Decided March 17, 2003.

Before GOODWIN, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

ORDER **

This appeal is ordered dismissed as moot in light of *United States v. Phelps,*283 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.2002).

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### The McCaskey Register Company, Appellant, v. Mary Green, as Executrix, etc., of John Green, Deceased, Respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Cochrane, J., dissenting.
Exhibit 10.42 [Protection One
Letterhead]  March 19, 2003  Martin J. Bregman
Executive Director, Legal
Westar Energy
818 S. Kansas Avenue, 10th Floor
Topeka, KS  66612 Dear Marty: Protection One, Inc. is writing this letter in
response to the requirements set forth by the Kansas Corporation Commission
(Commission) in its Order No. 65 in the captioned docket, whereby the
Commission conditionally approved the Partial Stipulation and Agreement filed
on February 25, 3003 (Partial Stipulation). (a)Pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Order
No. 65, the reimbursement set forth in Paragraph 19 of the Partial
Stipulation extinguishes all current balances outstanding regarding services
provided pursuant to the Protection One Data Services agreement with Westar
Energy. (b)Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Order
No. 65, the payment specified in Paragraph 20 of the Partial Stipulation,
as updated by Westar Energys filing required by Order No. 65,
extinguishes all current balances outstanding regarding services provided
pursuant to the aviation services agreement with Westar Energy. (c)Pursuant to Paragraph 16 of Order
No. 65, Protection One releases any and all claims for amounts due under
the Management Services Agreement with Westar Energy. Sincerely, /s/ J. Eric Griffin J. Eric Griffin
Vice President and General Counsel
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

WILLIAM VAUGHN
, Appellant,

v.

MEGHAN VAUGHN
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 17

- 2895

[July 25, 2018 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County ; Michael J. McNicholas , Judge; L.T. Case No. 16

- 649 DR

.

Michael Rebuck of Michael Todd Rebuck, P.A., Palm City, for appellant.

Karen O ’ Brien Steger and Lori I. Steger of Steger Law, Stuart, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

The f ormer h usband appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage and equitable dissolution of marital assets. Because the trial court failed to make statutorily required factual findings in support of its distribution scheme, it erred as a matter of law. 1 See Callwood v. Callwood , 221 So.

3d 1198, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)

. Therefore, we reverse.

Section 61 .075(3)

, Florida Statutes (2017) , which governs the instant dispute, requires that “any distribution of marital liabilities . . . be supported by factual findings in the judgment or order based on competent

substantial evidence with reference to the factors enumerated in subsection (1).” That section also requires specific written findings with regard to “any other findings necessary to advise the parties or the reviewing court of the trial court’s rationale” for its distribution. § 61.075(3)(d), Fla. Stat.

Here, the trial court faile d to make the requisite section 61.075(3)(d)

1 Further, the trial court failed to make these findings even though the former husband generally requested such findings in his motion for rehearing.2 findings and did not refer to the section 61.075(1) factors in its final judgment as required by the statute. Instead, its final judgment included only a general conclusory statement that certain items were det ermined to

be marital and others non

- marital. Most of the contested assets were not specifically discussed, nor was the evidence supporting distribution identified so as to “advise the parties or the reviewing court” of the basis

for the distribution. Se e § 61.075(3)(d), Fla. Stat.

Reversible error occurs where “the equitable distribution in the final judgment is not supported by factual findings with reference to the factors listed in section 61.075(1), as required by section 61.075(3) when ‘ a stipulat ion and agreement has not been entered and filed

. ’ ” Richardson v. Knight , 197 So. 3d 143, 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting § 61.075(3), Fla.

Stat

. )

. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to incorporate the requisite factual findings into its final judgment.

Reversed and remanded with instructions

.

D AMOORGIAN

, L EVINE and K UNTZ

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
svlt_ex101.htm


EXHIBIT 10.1


 





 




  





1











  






 





 




  





2











  






 





 




  





3











  






 






 




  





4











  






 





 




  





5











  






 





 




  





6











  








 






 




  





7











  






 





 




  





8











  






 





 


 


9
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Balance Sheet as of September 30, 1996, and the Consolidated
Statement of Income for the nine months ended September 30, 1996, and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      449,718
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                    110,945
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                          79,334
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        11,428
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 651,425
<COMMON>                                        55,901
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                       30,335
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                            103,363
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 189,599
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           18,000
<PREFERRED>                                     20,831
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           187,391
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                   18,532
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                 217,072
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                  651,425
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      270,844
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            11,303
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     227,447
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     238,750
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         32,094
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               2,108
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  34,202
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        11,983
<NET-INCOME>                                    22,219
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                      1,769
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   20,450
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        15,093
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       11,751
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                          49,034
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.83
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.83
        

</TABLE>
NOTE : This order is nonprecedential. 

# United States Court of Appeals
**for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

WRINKL, INC.,
Appellant

v.

META PLATFORMS, INC.,
Appellee

______________________

2023

- 1369 , 2023

- 1370

______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2021

- 00882, IPR2021

- 00883

.

______________________

O R D E R

The parties having so agreed, it is ordered that:

(1) The proceeding s are D ISMISSED under Fed. R. App. P. 42 (b). Case: 23-1369 Document: 15 Page: 1 Filed: 04/19/2023W RINKL

, I NC

. V

. M ETA P LATFORMS

, I NC

. 2

(2) Each side shall bear their own costs.

FOR THE COURT

April 19, 2023

Date /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner

Clerk of Court

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: April 19, 2023 Case: 23-1369 Document: 15 Page: 2 Filed: 04/19/2023
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1


                          JOHN Q. HAMMONS HOTELS, L.P
                 HISTORICAL RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                                (000's omitted)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                          1993     1994     1995     1996     1997
                                         -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
<S>                                      <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>
HISTORICAL EARNINGS:

Net income before extraordinary
item...................................  $15,390  $15,386  $18,729  $18,524  $ 8,791
 
Add:
Interest, amortization or deferred
 financing fees and other fixed
 charges (excluding interest
 capitalized)..........................   27,839   33,308   28,904   36,337   45,086
                                         -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
   Historical earnings.................  $43,229  $48,694  $47,633  $54,861  $53,877
                                         =======  =======  =======  =======  =======
 
FIXED CHARGES:
Interest expense and
 amortization of deferred
 financing fees........................  $27,412  $32,932  $28,447  $35,620  $44,325
Interest capitalized...................       --      957    5,270    7,162   10,259
Interest element of rentals............      427      376      457      717      761
                                         -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
   Fixed charges.......................  $27,839  $34,265  $34,174  $43,499  $55,345
                                         -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
RATIO OF EARNINGS TO
 FIXED CHARGES
 (A)...................................     1.55     1.42     1.39     1.26     0.97
                                         =======  =======  =======  =======  =======
</TABLE>

(A)  In computing the ratio of earnings to fixed charges, earnings have been
     based on income from operations before income taxes and fixed charges
     (exclusive of interest capitalized) and fixed charges consist of interest
     and amortization of deferred financing fees (including amounts capitalized)
     and the estimated interest portion of rents (deemed to be one-third of
     rental expense).
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of First Priority Financial Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2013, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Mark J. Myers, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |  |  |                        
|------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Dated: May 20, 2013 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Mark J. Myers      
|                    |  |  |  |  |  | Mark J. Myers          
|                    |  |  |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 3.1.3


                                STATE OF DELAWARE


                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                                     OF THE

                              AMENDED AND RESTATED

                          CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

                                       OF

                            ELECTRIC FUEL CORPORATION



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Adopted in accordance with the provisions of
                   Section 242 of the General Corporation Law
                            of the State of Delaware
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


The undersigned,  being respectively the Chairman and Secretary of Electric Fuel
Corporation, a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Delaware (the
"Corporation"), hereby certify as follows:

         FIRST:  The  certificate  of  incorporation  of  the  Corporation,   as
heretofore amended and restated (the "Certificate of Incorporation"),  is hereby
amended as follows:

                  By   striking   out  Article   ONE  of  the   Certificate   of
Incorporation  as it now exists and inserting in lieu and instead  thereof a new
Article ONE, reading in its entirety as follows:

                  ONE: The name of this corporation is Arotech Corporation.

         SECOND:  This amendment has been duly adopted at a meeting of the Board
of  Directors of the  Corporation  and at a meeting of the  stockholders  of the
Corporation duly called and held,  pursuant to notice in accordance with Section
222 of the General  Corporation Law, by the vote of the holders of a majority of
the outstanding stock of the Corporation  entitled to vote thereon in accordance
with the provisions of Section 242 of the General Corporation Law.

<PAGE>

         THIRD: The capital of the Corporation  shall not be reduced under or by
reason of this amendment.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Certificate this
16th day of September, 2003.



                                           -----------------------------------
                                           Robert S. Ehrlich, Chairman and CEO



ATTEST:



------------------------------
  Yaakov Har-Oz, Secretary




                                       2
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

September 10, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00240

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF R.L.L. III, ET AL., CHILDREN,

From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016PA02373

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellee’s brief was due September 4, 2018. On that day, appellee filed a motion

requesting a fourteen (14) day extension of time to file his brief. After consideration, we

GRANT appellee’s request for an extension of time and ORDER the brief due on or before

September 18, 2018.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 10th day of September, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court