SUMMARY

October 6, 2022

2022COA117

No. 21CA0552, MLS Properties, Inc. v. Weld Cnty. Bd. of 

Equalization — Real Property; Taxation — Property Tax —

Valuation for Assessment — Level of Value — Unusual 

Conditions 

In Colorado, real property value for property tax assessment is 

calculated every two years. The county assessor determines the 

level of value of a property, which takes effect on January 1 of 

odd-numbered years. The property’s level of value is generally

carried over to the even-numbered year and can only be modified 

under three circumstances, including to adjust for certain 

statutorily described unusual conditions affecting the property. 

The plaintiff property owners claimed that two unusual 

conditions under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2021, required 

the assessor to revalue their properties for the 2020 tax year, 

claiming (1) the COVID-19 pandemic was a detrimental act of 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
nature and (2) the various governmental orders issued in response 

to the pandemic were new regulations restricting the use of their 

land. 

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss 

the action under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), holding that, as a matter of law,

the pandemic and resulting orders occurred too late to be 

considered for 2020 property valuations. 

A division of the court of appeals concludes, in a matter of first 

impression, that section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) requires the assessor to 

consider unusual conditions that occur at any point during the 

even-numbered calendar year of the reassessment cycle, not just 

those that are present before January 1 of the even year. The 

division also concludes that the complaint was specific enough to 

survive a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. Finally, the division 

concludes that the record is insufficient to conclude as a matter of 

law whether the pandemic or the governmental orders were

unusual conditions requiring revaluation of the taxpayers’ 

properties.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA117

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0552

Weld County District Court No. 20CV30593

Honorable Todd Taylor, Judge

MLS Properties LLC, 736 Baseline LLC, 2528 W. 16th Street LLC, 3200 Village 

Vista Drive LLC, Adams Bank Trust, Ashton Greeley Property LLC, Scott T. 

Banzhaf, BFI Medical Waste Inc., Boulder Marine Inc., Boulder Scientific 

Company, Brown Business Properties LLC, C & K Investment Properties LLC, 

Capitol 3109 LLC, Carbon Element SPE LLC, Code 3 Associates, Inc., Crestone 

Peak Resource Holdings LLC, Diesel Service Property LLC, Early Education 

Enterprises LLC, EJ Holdings Inc., Exit LTP Investments LLC, FEI Energy Fund 

LLC, Ferrous Development LLC, First National Bank of Johnstown, Garretson 

Family Partnership LLLP, GEP Investments Inc., Gtuida LLC, Highway 119 

LLC, Jagadar LLC, Kersey Hotel LLC, Liberty Aviation LLC, Marsid Land LLC, 

MJ 3106 LLC, Mountain States Rosen LLC, MP 4665 LLC, Nan Madeira Stuart 

Trust, Norlarco Credit Union, NVW LLC, PAR 4 Properties LLC, PHI Enterprises 

LLC, Raw Property LLC, RC 4689 LLC, Riggs & Dicken Properties LLC, Ritchie 

Bros. Properties Inc., Rolinda Colorado Co LTD, Silver Coin Investments, Texas 

Roadhouse Holdings LLC, Union Colony Bank, Ana Uyemjura, Weaver 880 

LLC, Westlake Village II LLC, Westlake Village LLC, White Peaks Property II 

LLC, Wide Open Real Estate LLC, Willco IV Development LLLP, Willco VIII 

Development LLLP,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Weld County Board of Equalization and Brenda Dones, Weld County Assessor,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE KUHN

Navarro and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

Announced October 6, 2022
Hutchinson Black and Cook, Glen F. Gordon, Boulder, Colorado; Law Offices of 

James P. Bick, Jr. PC, James P. Bick, Jr., Chesterfield, Missouri, for PlaintiffsAppellants

Bruce Barker, County Attorney, Karin McDougal, Assistant County Attorney, 

Greeley, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

Nancy Rodgers, City and County Attorney, Patricia W. Gilbert, Deputy City and 

County Attorney, Broomfield, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae City and County of 

Broomfield Assessor and Board of Equalization

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Benjamin P. Swartzendruber, Assistant County 

Attorney, Littleton, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Arapahoe County Assessor and 

Board of Equalization

Ben Pearlman, County Attorney, Michael A. Koertje, Assistant County Attorney, 

Boulder, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Boulder County Assessor and Board of 

Equalization

Heidi M. Miller, County Attorney, Meredith P. Van Horn, Assistant County 

Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Adams County Assessor and 

Board of Equalization

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Rebecca Klymkowsky, Assistant Deputy 

County Attorney, Rachel Bender, Parker Smith, Jason Soronson, Assistant 

County Attorneys, Golden, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Jefferson County 

Assessor and Board of Equalization

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Steven Klaffky, Senior Assistant County 

Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae El Paso County 

Assessor and Board of Equalization

Amy T. Markwell, County Attorney, Telluride, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae San 

Miguel County Assessor and Board of Equalization

Lance J. Ingalls, County Attorney, Dawn L. Johnson, Senior Assistant County 

Attorney, Megan L. Taggart, Assistant County Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, 

for Amicus Curiae Douglas County Assessor and Board of Equalization

Erick Knaus, County Attorney, Lynaia M. South, Senior Assistant County 

Attorney, Steamboat Springs, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Routt County 

Assessor and Board of Equalization

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Robert H. Dodd, First Assistant Attorney 

General, John H. Ridge, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, 
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae The Colorado 

Property Tax Administrator

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Andrea Nina Atencio, Chief Deputy County 

Attorney, John R. Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney II, Grand Junction, 

Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Mesa County Assessor and Board of Equalization

Kathryn L. Schroeder, Pueblo West, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado 

Assessors’ Association

Kristin Bronson, City Attorney, Charles T. Solomon, Assistant City Attorney, 

Paige A. Arrants, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae 

City and County of Denver Assessor and Board of Equalization

William G. Ressue, County Attorney, David P. Ayraud, Deputy County 

Attorney, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Larimer County Assessor
1

¶ 1 In Colorado, real property value for property tax assessment is 

calculated every two years. The county assessor determines the 

“level of value” of a property, which takes effect on January 1 of 

odd-numbered years. § 39-1-104(10.2)(d), C.R.S. 2021. Typically, 

the property’s level of value is carried over to the even-numbered 

year and can only be modified under three circumstances: (1) to 

correct a clerical error or omission; (2) to correct an incorrect value; 

or (3) to adjust for an unusual condition affecting the property. 

Thibodeau v. Denver Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2018 COA 124, ¶ 12; 24, 

Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 800 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Colo. App. 1990). 

¶ 2 The plaintiffs — fifty-five Weld County commercial property 

owners and taxpayers (the taxpayers) — filed this action in district 

court after exhausting their administrative remedies for protesting 

their 2020 property valuations. In both the administrative and 

district court proceedings, the taxpayers alleged that two unusual 

conditions had occurred under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) (the 

unusual conditions statute), requiring the assessor to revalue their 

properties for the 2020 tax year: (1) the COVID-19 pandemic was a 

“detrimental act[] of nature,” and (2) the various governmental 
2

orders issued in response to the pandemic were “new regulations 

restricting . . . the use of their land.” 

¶ 3 The defendants — the Weld County Board of Equalization 

(BOE) and Weld County Assessor Brenda Dones (collectively, Weld 

County) — moved to dismiss the action under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). 

The district court granted the motion on the grounds that the 

taxpayers’ claims were nonspecific and conclusory, and that, as a 

matter of law, the pandemic and resulting orders occurred too late 

to be considered for 2020 property valuations. 

¶ 4 We reverse for two reasons. First, as a matter of first 

impression, we conclude that, under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), the 

assessor is required to consider unusual conditions that occur at 

any point during the even-numbered calendar year1 of the 

reassessment cycle, not just those that exist before January 1 of the 

even year. Second, we conclude that the complaint was specific 

enough to survive a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.

1 Weld County refers to the even year of the reassessment cycle as 

the intervening year.
3

I. Additional Background and Procedural History

¶ 5 In May 2020, after receiving their 2020 property valuations, 

the taxpayers sent a letter to Weld County’s assessor requesting 

revaluation of their properties under the unusual conditions statute 

because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting governmental 

orders. 

¶ 6 The assessor denied the taxpayers’ request and, in a letter to 

the taxpayers’ counsel, said that the pandemic and resulting orders 

were not relevant to the 2020 property valuations because they 

occurred after January 1, 2020 — the assessment date for the 2020 

tax year. The assessor wrote that “any documented impact of the 

COVID-19 pandemic on property values will be taken into 

consideration for purposes of the 2021 biennial reappraisal.”

¶ 7 The taxpayers then filed formal protests of the assessor’s 

initial valuations. The protest letter said that the taxpayers were 

protest[ing] and object[ing] to the failure of the 

assessor to decrease the value of the [their] 

propert[ies] for tax year 2020 due to [the] 

decrease in value as a result of the detrimental 

act of nature of the COVID-19 pandemic which 

has resulted in, among other detriments to the 

property, [c]ounty, [s]tate and federal 

regulations and [governmental] orders issued 

which severely limit taxpayers’ and others’ 
4

access and use of the property, which 

revaluation of the property the assessor is 

required to perform in accordance with . . . 

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). 

¶ 8 The assessor denied the protests on the grounds that the 

pandemic and orders occurred too late to be considered for 2020 

tax purposes. The taxpayers timely appealed the assessor’s denials 

to the BOE. After a hearing, the BOE denied the taxpayers’ 

appeals.

¶ 9 Then the taxpayers filed suit in Weld County District Court. 

Weld County filed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). The 

district court, after finding that the “allegations in the complaint 

[were] purely conclusory,” dismissed the taxpayers’ claims without 

prejudice.

¶ 10 The taxpayers filed an amended complaint that, unlike the 

original complaint, identified the fifty-five taxpayers by name and 

their properties by legal address, parcel ID number, and county tax 

account number. It also set forth each property’s 2020 assessed 

value. Attached to the complaint was a list of the pandemic-related 

governmental orders that the taxpayers alleged had devalued their 

properties. 
5

¶ 11 In the amended complaint, the taxpayers sought three types of 

relief: (1) a writ of mandamus under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2); (2) de novo 

review of the denials of their property assessment appeals under 

section 39-8-108(1), C.R.S. 2021; and (3) a declaratory judgment 

that the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting governmental orders

were unusual conditions under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) that 

required the assessor to revalue the subject properties for the 2020 

tax year. 

¶ 12 Weld County again filed a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. It 

argued that the amended complaint lacked specificity and was 

conclusory, and that the taxpayers’ claims failed as a matter of law 

because even if the pandemic and resulting governmental orders 

were unusual conditions, they could not be considered for the 2020 

tax year because they occurred after January 1, 2020. 

¶ 13 The district court granted Weld County’s motion and 

dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. It did not 

address whether the pandemic itself was an unusual condition and 

concluded that the governmental orders were the only possibly 

relevant unusual condition. It noted that the “[taxpayers] have not 

referred to any regulation that restricts (or increases) the use of 
6

land, nor have they explained how any of the [governmental] orders, 

declarations, or guidance to which they make only a cursory 

reference to in the amended complaint has prevented them from 

using their land.” So the court found that the amended complaint 

“still fail[ed] to state valid claims for relief because it [made] only 

bald assertions and relie[d] on conclusory allegations that [were] not 

supported by specific facts that would put the defendants on notice 

as to what ‘regulation’ affected each [taxpayer’s] property and how.” 

The court stated it was dismissing the amended complaint with 

prejudice “for these reasons, and for all the reasons raised in the 

defendants’ motion.”

II. Analysis

¶ 14 This case is one of eleven nearly identical suits filed by 

commercial property owners in eleven counties.2 In each case, the 

property owners — who are all represented by the same attorneys 

2 The eleven district court cases include the following, by county 

and case number: Adams County (20CV31565), Arapahoe County 

(20CV31729), Boulder County (20CV30996), City and County of 

Broomfield (20CV30366), City and County of Denver (20CV32946), 

Douglas County (20CV30909), Eagle County (20CV30186), El Paso 

County (20CV31533), Jefferson County (20CV31506), Larimer 

County (20CV30613), and this case, Weld County (20CV30593).
7

— seek to compel their respective county assessors to revalue their 

properties for the 2020 tax year. As of the date of this opinion, 

rulings from six of the eleven district court cases have been 

appealed and are pending in this court.3 This case is the first one 

decided by a division of this court. 

¶ 15 On appeal, the taxpayers contend the district court erred by

ruling that (1) events that occurred after January 1, 2020, cannot 

be considered as unusual conditions for the 2020 tax year; (2) the 

complaint did not contain sufficient facts to support a plausible 

claim for relief; and (3) COVID-19 is not, as a matter of law, an 

unusual condition.

¶ 16 We start by stating the applicable standards of review and 

providing an overview of the property tax assessment statutory 

framework. Then we address the taxpayers’ contentions in turn. 

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶ 17 Applying the same standards as the district court, we review 

the court’s ruling on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss de novo. 

3 Besides this case, the following cases are pending in our court, by 

county and case number: Broomfield County (22CA0695), Douglas 

County (21CA1253), Eagle County (21CA0985), Jefferson County 

(21CA1731), and Larimer County (21CA1191).
8

Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. 

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under C.R.C.P. 

12(b)(5), a complaint must plead sufficient facts that suggest 

plausible grounds to support a claim for relief. Warne v. Hall, 2016 

CO 50, ¶ 24; Froid v. Zacheis, 2021 COA 74, ¶ 29.

¶ 18 On review, we must accept as true all factual allegations 

asserted in a complaint. Norton, ¶ 7. However, we are not required 

to accept as true bare legal conclusions. Id. 

¶ 19 Motions to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) are viewed with 

disfavor. Begley v. Ireson, 2017 COA 3, ¶ 7. Therefore, “[w]e will 

uphold the grant of a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion only when the 

plaintiff’s factual allegations do not, as a matter of law, support the 

claim for relief.” Norton, ¶ 7. “When considering a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, we may consider the facts 

alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or 

incorporated by reference, and matters proper for judicial notice.” 

Id. 

¶ 20 The interpretation of the property tax assessment statutes is a 

question of law that we also review de novo. See Yen, LLC v. 

Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2021 COA 107, ¶ 10. In 
9

interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate 

the legislature’s intent. Lewis v. Taylor, 2016 CO 48, ¶ 20. We 

start with the plain language of the statute. People v. Johnson, 

2021 CO 79, ¶ 9. “Applying the plain meaning of the language 

requires us to ‘give consistent effect to all parts of a statute, and 

construe each provision in harmony with the overall statutory 

design.’” Lannie v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2020 COA 77, ¶ 8 (quoting 

Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 CO 38, ¶ 12). “If the statutory 

language is unambiguous, we effectuate its plain and ordinary 

meaning and look no further.” Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18.

¶ 21 The Colorado Constitution sets forth “[t]he basic framework for 

fair and uniform ad valorem taxation of real and personal property” 

in this state. Gilpin Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Russell, 941 P.2d 

257, 260 (Colo. 1997). The constitution mandates that

[t]he actual value of all real and personal 

property not exempt from taxation under this 

article shall be determined under general laws, 

which shall prescribe such methods and 

regulations as shall secure just and equalized 

valuations for assessments of all real and 

personal property not exempt from taxation 

under this article.

Colo. Const. art. X, § 3(1)(a).
10

¶ 22 To effectuate this mandate, the legislature has enacted a 

comprehensive statutory framework. Yen, ¶ 15. Under this 

framework, county assessors are tasked with determining the 

actual value of real property in their counties and making the initial 

appraisal. Russell, 941 P.2d at 261; see Colo. Const. art. X, 

§ 3(1)(a); §§ 39-1-103(5)(a), 39-5-104, C.R.S. 2021. 

¶ 23 By statute, real and personal property must be assessed and 

valued biennially, or every two years. Bachelor Gulch Operating Co. 

v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2013 COA 46, ¶ 19; §§ 39-1-103(5)(a), 

39-1-104(10.2)(a). On January 1 of odd-numbered years, the 

assessor assigns the level of value for each property. In reaching 

this determination, the assessor must consider, as appropriate, 

three different approaches to property appraisal: cost, market, and 

income.4 Bachelor Gulch, ¶ 19; §§ 39-1-103(5)(a), 39-1-104(10.2)(a). 

4 “The cost approach values property by estimating the cost of 

replacing improvements to a property; the market approach values 

property by considering sales of comparable properties in the 

market; and the income approach considers the income stream a 

property is capable of generating, capitalized to value at a rate 

typical within the relevant market.” Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. 

Montezuma Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2017 CO 72, ¶ 6 n.2.
11

¶ 24 A property’s level of value is the actual value of the property 

“for the one-and-one-half-year period immediately prior to July 1 

immediately preceding the assessment date.” § 39-1-104(10.2)(d). 

Thus, for the 2019 assessment, the data-gathering period for 

determining the actual value of the taxpayers’ properties was 

January 1, 2017, to June 30, 2018.

¶ 25 Under the statutory framework, the assessor “need not 

revaluate each property every year even though particular 

properties may have increased or decreased in value during a 

particular year.” LaDuke v. CF & I Steel Corp., 785 P.2d 605, 608 

(Colo. 1990). Although their properties may have increased or 

decreased in value, taxpayers pay taxes on the basis of their 

properties’ values at the end of the data-gathering period preceding 

the odd-numbered year in the reassessment cycle and not on the 

properties’ current actual value. Id. When property values are 

rising during an economic upturn, this method benefits taxpayers. 

Id. When property values are falling, this method disadvantages 

taxpayers. Id.

¶ 26 Generally, this level of value is carried over to the 

even-numbered year. Bachelor Gulch, ¶ 19. However, there are 
12

exceptions to this general framework. An assessor may decrease or 

increase a property’s actual value “for the years which intervene 

between changes in the level of value” if certain “unusual 

conditions” exist. § 39-1-104(11)(b)(I); Bachelor Gulch, ¶ 20. 

Section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) defines an “unusual condition” as 

the installation of an on-site improvement, the 

ending of the economic life of an improvement 

with only salvage value remaining, the addition 

to or remodeling of a structure, a change of 

use of the land, the creation of a condominium 

ownership of real property as recognized in the 

“Condominium Ownership Act”, article 33 of 

title 38, C.R.S., any new regulations restricting 

or increasing the use of the land, or a 

combination thereof, the installation and 

operation of surface equipment relating to oil 

and gas wells on agricultural land, any 

detrimental acts of nature, and any damage 

due to accident, vandalism, fire, or explosion.

¶ 27 The circumstances that qualify as “unusual conditions” are 

restricted to those enumerated in the statute. LaDuke, 785 P.2d at 

609. If an “unusual condition” exists, the assessor is required to 

revalue the property for the intervening tax year. Bachelor Gulch, 

¶ 20; § 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).
13

¶ 28 The statutory framework provides a process for taxpayers to 

appeal the assessor’s initial valuation.5 Under section 

39-5-121(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2021, no later than May 1 each year, the 

assessor must mail a notice to every property owner setting forth 

the value of the property. Yen, ¶ 15. Before June 1, the property 

owner may submit a protest to the assessor’s valuation. Bd. of 

Assessment Appeals v. Sampson, 105 P.3d 198, 202 (Colo. 2005); 

§ 39-5-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021. If the assessor denies the protest, 

the property owner may petition the county board of equalization, 

which holds a hearing on the petition. Sampson, 105 P.3d at 202; 

§§ 39-8-106, 39-8-107(1), C.R.S. 2021. If the board denies the 

petition, the property owner may appeal the board’s decision to the 

district court for a de novo trial. Sampson, 105 P.3d at 202; 

§ 39-8-108(1). 

5 A taxpayer may also contest a property valuation under the 

abatement statute. § 39-10-114, C.R.S. 2021; Yen, LLC v. Jefferson 

Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2021 COA 107, ¶ 16. That provision is not at 

issue here. 
14

B. Unusual Conditions That Arose After January 1, 2020, 

are Relevant for the 2020 Tax Year 

¶ 29 The taxpayers contend the court erred by adopting Weld 

County’s position that the pandemic and orders were not relevant 

for the 2020 tax year because they occurred after January 1, 2020 

— the assessment date for that tax year. We agree.

¶ 30 The unusual conditions statute states as follows:

The provisions of subsection (10.2) of this 

section are not intended to prevent the 

assessor from taking into account, in 

determining actual value for the years which 

intervene between changes in the level of 

value, any unusual conditions in or related to 

any real property which would result in an 

increase or decrease in actual value. If any 

real property has not been assessed at its 

correct level of value, the assessor shall 

revalue such property for the intervening year 

so that the actual value of such property will 

be its correct level of value; however, the 

assessor shall not revalue such property above 

or below its correct level of value except as 

necessary to reflect the increase or decrease in 

actual value attributable to an unusual 

condition . . . . When taking into account such 

unusual conditions which would increase or 

decrease the actual value of a property, the 

assessor must relate such changes to the level 

of value as if the conditions had existed at that 

time.

§ 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).
15

¶ 31 The key interpretation question in this case involves the 

meaning of the phrase “years which intervene between changes in 

the level of value.” The taxpayers contend that the assessor may 

revalue their properties for the 2020 tax assessment based on 

unusual conditions that occurred after the conclusion of the base 

period — June 30, 2018 — and at any point during the 2020 

calendar year. Weld County contends that, because January 1, 

2020, is the assessment date for the 2020 tax year, the assessor 

may only consider unusual conditions that occurred prior to that 

date. In support of their reasoning, Weld County and the amici 

curiae point to other provisions of the statutory scheme and the 

Assessors’ Reference Library (ARL),6 and advance various policy 

arguments about how their interpretation of the statute promotes 

stability and certainty in the valuation and taxation process. 

However, their interpretation has a fatal flaw: it isn’t supported by 

the plain language of the statute. 

6 Under section 39-2-109(1)(e), C.R.S. 2021, the Property Tax 

Administrator prepares and publishes a land valuation manual, the 

Assessors’ Reference Library (ARL), which assists county assessors 

in valuing land. Jet Black, LLC v. Routt Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 

165 P.3d 744, 748-49 (Colo. App. 2006). The ARL’s interpretation 

of a statute is binding on county assessors. Id. at 749. 
16

¶ 32 The statutory framework expressly defines “level of value.” 

“[L]evel of value” means the actual value of taxable real property as 

calculated during the one-and-a-half year period immediately prior 

to July 1 immediately preceding the odd-year assessment date. 

§ 39-1-104(10.2)(d). Absent any exceptions, that level of value is 

meant to be used for both years of the biennial assessment cycle. 

§ 39-1-104(10.2)(a). At the end of the biennial cycle, a new level of 

value is calculated and assessed on January 1 of the odd year. For 

the time period in question here, the “level of value” was assessed 

on January 1, 2019, and was meant to carry over for the 2020 tax 

year. Then, a new level of value was assessed on January 1, 2021. 

¶ 33 The unusual conditions statute does not, however, expressly 

define the terms “years which intervene” or “intervening year.” Nor 

do other provisions within the statutory framework, the ARL, or the 

relevant case law define these terms. Therefore, we look to their

ordinary and usual meaning. See Roup v. Com. Rsch., LLC, 2015 

CO 38, ¶ 8 (“When a statute does not define a term, we assume that 

the General Assembly intended to give the term its usual and 

ordinary meaning.”).
17

¶ 34 Applying the plain and ordinary meaning, we deduce that the 

phrase “years which intervene between changes in the level of 

value” means the time period between the dates when a new level of 

value for the biennial cycle was assessed for the taxpayers’ 

properties: from January 1, 2019, to January 1, 2021. Put another 

way, the “years which intervene” were the entire 2019 and 2020 

calendar years.7

¶ 35 Importantly, the unusual conditions statute contains no 

language that imposes a cutoff date of January 1 of the even year or 

otherwise suggests that an “intervening year” does not span the 

entire calendar year. If the legislature had intended to set a cutoff 

date, it could have done so. See Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 

656 (Colo. 2005) (“Just as important as what the statute says is 

what the statute does not say.”). Because it didn’t, we won’t — as 

Weld County’s interpretation would require us to do — read 

language into the statute that isn’t there. See Oakwood Holdings, 

7 Weld County asserts that there is an “intervening year” and a 

“reassessment year.” However, the General Assembly did away with 

that distinction when it inserted “years which intervene between 

changes in the level of value” into the statute. See Ch. 267, sec. 4, 

§ 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 1272. 
18

LLC v. Mortg. Invs. Enters. LLC, 2018 CO 12, ¶ 12 (“[W]e must 

respect the legislature’s choice of language, and we do not add 

words to the statute or subtract words from it.”). 

¶ 36 Weld County contends that section 39-1-105, C.R.S. 2021, 

which provides that the yearly assessment date is January 1, 

supports its interpretation and, along with the amici, argues that 

the January 1 cutoff date is necessary to conform to the general 

procedure for protesting valuations. See Sampson, 105 P.3d at 202 

(describing valuation protest process); §§ 39-5-122, 39-8-106, 

39-8-108. However, by definition, the unusual conditions statute is 

an exception to the general framework. It requires the assessor to 

revalue property in an intervening year if, due to an unusual 

condition, the predetermined level of value does not reflect the 

actual value of the property. Therefore, the unusual conditions 

statute is not governed by the assessment date set forth in section 

39-1-105.8

8 This structure reinforces our interpretation of the unusual 

conditions statute as an exception to the normal assessment cycle. 

If the unusual conditions statute were governed by the assessment 

date, it would merely be restating the protest statute, which would 

render the unusual conditions statute superfluous. See Kinder 
19

¶ 37 Weld County and the amici also highlight provisions in the 

ARL that support their interpretations of the statute. Although we 

defer to the ARL when the statute at issue is subject to different 

reasonable interpretations, we are not bound by it. Bachelor Gulch, 

¶ 31. And we will not follow the interpretation if it is not supported 

by the language of the statute. Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. 

Montezuma Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2015 COA 72, ¶ 15, aff’d, 2017 

CO 72. 

¶ 38 In sum, because the phrase “years which intervene between 

changes in the level of value” includes the entire even-numbered

calendar year between reassessment cycles, the taxpayers were not 

precluded by law from invoking the unusual circumstances statute 

in their protest of valuation based on events that arose during the 

spring of 2020. To the extent the court concluded otherwise by 

adopting the reasoning in Weld County’s motion to dismiss, it erred.

Morgan CO2, ¶ 24 (“We strive to avoid statutory interpretations that 

render certain words or provisions superfluous or ineffective.”). 
20

C. The Amended Complaint Alleged Plausible Claims for Relief

¶ 39 The taxpayers next contend that the court erred by concluding

they did not plead sufficient facts to suggest a plausible claim for 

relief. We agree. 

1. Burden of Pleading and Proof

¶ 40 As a threshold matter, we address the taxpayers’ burden of 

pleading, and eventual proof at trial, in the district court. We 

address this issue because, although not dispositive, it will arise on 

remand. See People v. Stewart, 2017 COA 99, ¶ 64 (J. Jones, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[O]ur common practice 

is to address contentions that pertain to issues likely to arise on 

remand.”).

¶ 41 The taxpayers’ second claim for relief sought de novo review of 

their property valuations. § 39-8-108(1) (“If the county board of 

equalization . . . [denies a] petition[,] . . . the petitioner may appeal 

the valuation set by the assessor . . . to the district court of the 

county wherein the petitioner’s property is located for a trial de 

novo . . . .”). The taxpayers contend that the court erred by

implicitly finding that they needed to demonstrate a diminution in 

property value at the pleading stage and assert that they are not 
21

required to allege how the pandemic or orders specifically affected 

the value of their individual properties. They contend that, to 

warrant revaluation of their properties by the assessor, they simply 

need to allege, and then prove, the existence of an unusual 

condition. We disagree.

¶ 42 An assessor’s property valuation for taxation is presumed to 

be correct. Lodge Props., Inc. v. Eagle Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 

2022 CO 9, ¶ 25. To rebut that presumption in a trial de novo

under section 38-8-108(1), taxpayers who challenge a property 

assessment bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the valuation is incorrect. Id.; see A.B. Hirschfeld 

Press, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 806 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo. 1991) 

(stating that “[a] party challenging a tax assessment assumes the 

burden of establishing the invalidity of the assessment” in a case 

involving judicial review of a hearing officer’s decision under 

C.R.C.P. 106(4)(a)).

¶ 43 The taxpayers’ theory in this case is that Weld County’s 

valuations were incorrect because the assessor failed to consider 

the unusual conditions caused by the pandemic and orders. The 

assessor is required to revalue a property when “any unusual 
22

conditions in or related to any real property which would result in 

an increase or decrease in actual value” occurs. 

§ 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Thus, to establish the assessments were 

incorrect, the taxpayers must plead, and later prove, (1) the 

pandemic or orders constituted an unusual condition, and (2) the 

unusual condition would affect the value of their properties. This 

expressly requires the taxpayers to show how the unusual 

conditions affected the value of their specific properties. The 

taxpayers are not, however, required to plead or prove an 

alternative valuation. Sampson, 105 P.3d at 202.

2. Claim for Relief for Diminution of Value

¶ 44 The taxpayers next contend that the court misapplied the 

Warne pleading standard. We agree. Accepting the taxpayers’ 

factual allegations as true, the amended complaint contains 

sufficient facts and is specific enough to support a plausible claim 

for relief. See Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 23. Therefore, 

the court erred by granting Weld County’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion. 

¶ 45 We agree with the district court that the taxpayers’ amended 

complaint contains many bald assertions and conclusory 

allegations that are not supported by specific facts. It is not a 
23

paragon of clarity. However, we conclude that the amended 

complaint alleges sufficient facts to put Weld County on notice of 

the claims against it. 

¶ 46 The amended complaint identifies the individual taxpayers and 

their properties. For each property, the amended complaint 

identifies the actual value that the BOE assigned for the 2020 tax 

year. The attachments to the amended complaint also identify the 

reduced values that the taxpayers claim were the correct values for 

their properties.

¶ 47 The amended complaint then describes what the taxpayers 

asserted was the source of the unusual conditions: the pandemic 

and orders that affected the use of and access to the taxpayers’ 

commercial properties and land. One of the exhibits to the 

amended complaint describes terms contained in one set of the 

challenged orders that could impact commercial properties. The 

other two exhibits summarizing the governmental orders do not.

¶ 48 The amended complaint groups the taxpayers into categories 

based on type of business. For example, Kersey Hotel LLC, Willco 

IV Development LLLP, and Willco VIII Development LLLP are 

identified as “hotel motel.” It also identifies how the groups of 
24

taxpayers allege the unusual conditions affected them. For hotels 

and motels, the amended complaint alleges that

[a]s a result of the existence of the COVID-19 

virus, including its infectiousness and overall 

threat to health and safety and the various 

stay-at-home orders, reduced occupancy 

orders, and travel restrictions, 

occupancy/rental rates at the hotel and motel 

Petitioners dropped substantially since March 

2020 to date. Occupancy rates bear direct 

correlation to operating income of hotels and 

motels which bears a direct relationship to ad 

valorem valuation for such properties. Such

reduced occupancy rates have caused a 

diminution in the value of such Petitioners’

properties the exact amount of which would be 

determined by the Assessor’s revaluation or by 

the trier of fact.

¶ 49 We cannot say this does not state a plausible claim for relief. 

The taxpayers’ overall theory is that they were entitled to 

revaluation of their properties for the 2020 tax year because the 

pandemic and related orders constituted unusual conditions that 

affected the value of their properties. The amended complaint and 

attachments identify the taxpayers in groups and describe, for each 

group, how the virus and the orders resulted in lower income, 

affecting one of the approaches to valuation, and suppressed sales, 

affecting another. It’s true that the amended complaint did not 
25

describe how the individual properties were affected by specific 

orders, which the taxpayers will need to do to prevail in the district 

court. However, the amended complaint is sufficient to survive the 

significantly lower standard that applies to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) 

motions.

3. Claim for Relief for Improper Application of 

Unusual Circumstances Statute

¶ 50 As the taxpayers note, the primary basis for their claim is not 

the diminution of value described above — that was their 

alternative ground. The primary claim in the amended complaint is

that Weld County did not comply with the unusual conditions 

statute. After describing the course of their administrative appeals, 

the taxpayers pleaded that Weld County “denied all of [their] 

appeals, solely on the basis that unusual conditions occurring after 

January 1, 2020[,] cannot be taken into account and therefore 

[Weld County] has no duty to revalue [their] properties.”

¶ 51 In support, the taxpayers attach their appeal letter and the 

response from Weld County. The response indicates that Weld 

County denied the bulk of the appeals with the following identified 

reason:
26

CV19 - The COVID-19 pandemic occurred after 

the appraisal date of June 30, 2018, and after 

the assessment date of January 1, 2020. 

Therefore, it cannot be considered for the 2020 

property valuation.

¶ 52 The taxpayers then frame the dispute in their amended 

complaint as follows:

A dispute exists between all [plaintiffs] and 

respondent [Weld County] in that

a) the respondent Assessor refuses to revalue 

[taxpayers’] properties taking into account the 

unusual conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic 

and the governmental orders and regulations 

resulting therefrom as a result of the 

pandemic. Respondent Assessor erroneously 

concludes that the unusual condition statute 

cannot be triggered or be operative for the 

2020 tax year for any unusual condition 

unless any such enumerated conditions 

existed on or before the January 1, 2020 

assessment date . . . .

¶ 53 The taxpayers clarify that they are not “seek[ing] to establish 

or for the Court to find a particular valuation for their properties.” 

Instead, they are asking the court to compel Weld County to apply 

the unusual conditions statute.

¶ 54 In our view, these factual allegations also state a plausible 

claim for relief. The taxpayers allege that Weld County improperly 

denied their requests for revaluation under the unusual conditions 
27

statute based on the unusual conditions themselves falling after the 

assessment date for the year. They ask the court to resolve that 

legal question and to compel Weld County to apply the statute 

despite the dates. 

¶ 55 As we note above, the unusual conditions statute is not 

restricted to events occurring before the assessment date. We 

therefore conclude that the taxpayers stated a plausible claim for 

relief based on Weld County denying their protests on that ground. 

¶ 56 We also note that we express no opinion on the factual 

viability of these claims. Determining whether the pandemic was a 

detrimental act of nature and the orders were regulations restricting 

the use of land within the meaning of the unusual conditions 

statute requires further proceedings. However, we conclude that 

the amended complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to 

plead a plausible claim for relief.

D. Whether COVID-19 is an Unusual Condition

¶ 57 The taxpayers contend that the district court erroneously 

ruled that COVID-19 was not a detrimental act of nature when it 

stated, “Section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) provides an exclusive list of 

conditions that qualify as ‘unusual conditions . . . .’ The only 
28

unusual condition listed in the statute that has relevance here is 

‘any new regulation[] restricting or increasing the use of the land.’”

¶ 58 We’re not persuaded that such statement constitutes a ruling 

or legal conclusion. Instead, when viewed in context, it merely 

introduces the next sentence, which addresses the specificity of the 

complaint. And it would have been improper for the court to reach 

such a conclusion because Weld County did not argue in its motion 

to dismiss that COVID-19 was not, as a matter of law, a detrimental 

act of nature.

¶ 59 On the record before us, we cannot say, as a matter of law,

whether the pandemic is an unusual condition requiring 

revaluation of the taxpayers’ properties. That question is best 

answered after further proceedings to develop the record. 

¶ 60 Nor can we say, on this record, whether the orders were, as a 

matter of law, “new regulations restricting or increasing the use of 

the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). That question also 

requires additional factual development beyond what is alleged in 

the complaint.
29

III. Conclusion

¶ 61 We reverse the judgment and remand for the district court to 

reinstate the amended complaint and to conduct further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.