[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 23 (Monday, February 4, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6529-6537]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-1943]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement To Revise Containment Isolation 
Valve Completion Times (TSTF-498, Revision 1) Using the Consolidated 
Line Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) 
relating to the modification of technical specification (TS) 3.6.3, 
Containment Isolation Valves associated with implementation of BAW-
2461-A, ``Risk-Informed Justification for Containment Isolation Valve 
Allowed Outage Time Change.'' The NRC staff has also prepared a model 
license amendment request and a model no significant hazards 
consideration (NSHC) determination relating to this matter. The purpose 
of these models are to permit the NRC to efficiently process amendments 
that propose to modify TS Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times. 
Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply could 
then request amendments, confirming the applicability of the SE and 
NSHC determination to their reactors. The NRC staff is requesting 
comment on the model SE and model NSHC determination prior to 
announcing their availability for referencing in license amendment 
applications.

DATES: The comment period expires March 5, 2008. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail.
    Submit written comments to Chief, Rulemaking, Directives, and 
Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, Mail Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001. Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal 
workdays. Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's 
Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike (Room O-1F21), Rockville, 
Maryland. Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#23606f6a6a73634d51400d444c55"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e2a1aeababb2a28c9081cc858d94">[email protected]</span></a>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Timothy Kobetz, Mail Stop: O-12H2, 
Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection & Regional 
Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-1932.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification 
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The 
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to 
improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes, by processing 
proposed changes to the standard technical specifications (STS) in a 
manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The 
CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed 
changes to the STS after a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and 
finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by 
licensees. This notice solicits comment on a proposed change to the STS 
that modifies TS Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times. The 
CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a 
proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or 
announce the availability of the change for adoption by licensees. 
Licensees opting to apply for this TS change are responsible for 
reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the

[[Page 6530]]

applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-
specific information. Each amendment application made in response to 
the notice of availability will be processed and noticed in accordance 
with applicable rules and NRC procedures.
    This notice involves the modification of TS Containment Isolation 
Valve Completion Times. This change was proposed for incorporation into 
the standard technical specifications by the Owners Groups participants 
in the Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated 
TSTF-498. TSTF-498 can be viewed on the NRC's Web page at: http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs.html.

Applicability

    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the staff requests that each licensee applying for the changes proposed 
in TSTF-498 include TS Bases for the proposed TS consistent with the TS 
Bases proposed in TSTF-498. The staff is requesting that the TS Bases 
be included with the proposed license amendments in this case because 
the changes to the TS and the changes to the associated TS Bases form 
an integral change to a plant's licensing basis. To ensure that the 
overall change, including the TS Bases (which becomes part of the plant 
licensing basis), includes appropriate regulatory controls, the staff 
plans to condition the issuance of each license amendment on the 
licensee's incorporation of the changes into the TS Bases document and 
that the licensee control changes to the TS Bases in accordance with 
the licensee's TS Bases Control Program. The CLIIP does not prevent 
licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the 
changes without the requested TS Bases. However, deviations from the 
approach recommended in this notice may require additional review by 
the NRC staff and may increase the time and resources needed for the 
review. Additionally, the staff is requesting that the methodology for 
assessing large early release frequency (LERF) and incremental 
conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) are to be 
documented in the plant-specific application as a regulatory commitment 
(i.e., included in the licensee's commitment tracking system in 
accordance with NEI 99-04, Revision 0, ``Guidelines for Managing NRC 
Commitment Changes'') (Reference 5) in the licensees' plant-specific 
applications referencing TR BAW-2461-A. The staff is requesting this 
regulatory commitment because a licensee's implementation of Regulatory 
Guide (RG) 1.177 Tier 3 guidelines generally implies the assessment of 
risk with respect to core damage frequency (CDF). However, the proposed 
containment isolation valve (CIV) completion time (CT) impacts 
containment isolation and consequently LERF and ICLERP, as well as CDF. 
Because the extended CIV CTs are also based on the LERF and ICLERP 
metrics, the management of risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 
for these extended CIV CTs must also assess LERF and ICLERP.

Public Notices

    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register. 
After evaluating the comments received as a result of this notice, the 
staff will either reconsider the proposed change or announce the 
availability of the change in a subsequent notice (perhaps with some 
changes to the safety evaluation or the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination as a result of public comments). If the 
staff announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to 
adopt the change must submit an application in accordance with 
applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. For each 
application the staff will publish a notice of consideration of 
issuance of amendment to facility operating licenses, a proposed no 
significant hazards consideration determination, and a notice of 
opportunity for a hearing. The staff will also publish a notice of 
issuance of an amendment to the operating license to announce the 
modification of Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Completion Times for 
each plant that receives the requested change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; Consolidated Line Item Improvement; 
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-498; Modification 
of Technical Specification Containment Isolation Valve; Completion 
Times

1.0 Introduction

    By letter dated December 20, 2006, (Reference 1) the Technical 
Specifications Task Force (TSTF), a joint owners group activity, 
submitted TSTF-498, ``Risk-Informed Containment Isolation Valve 
Completion Times (BAW-2461),'' Revision 0, for NRC review. By letter 
dated October 10, 2007, (Reference 2) the TSTF submitted Revision 1 to 
TSTF-498 based on responses to Requests for Additional Information 
(RAI) that resulted in not adopting certain provisions provided by BAW-
2461-A, ``Risk-Informed Justification for Containment Isolation Valve 
Allowed Outage Time Change,'' (Reference 3). TSTF-498 is proposing to 
change NUREG 1430, ``Standard Technical Specifications Babcock and 
Wilcox Plants,'' (BAW STS) Revision 3.0 (Reference 4), to generically 
implement containment isolation valve completion time (CT) changes 
associated with implementation of BAW-2461-A.
    BAW-2461-A and TSTF-498 support extending CTs for CIVs in a 
penetration flow path with two [or more] containment isolation valves 
from 4 hours to 168 hours. The proposed change revises the TS for B&W 
Plants, NUREG-1430, Revision 3, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), 
Section 3.6.3, ``Containment Isolation Valves,'' Condition A from 4 
hours to 7 days. Additionally, a new Required Action is added (Required 
Action A.1) which requires verification that the Operable containment 
isolation valve in the penetration is not inoperable due to common 
cause failure and also results in Required Actions A.1 and A.2 being 
relabeled as A.2 and A.3. No change is proposed by the Pressurized 
Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG) for Condition B (relabeled Condition 
D)(i.e., a penetration flow path with two inoperable CIVs). A new 
Condition, Condition B, is added which is similar to the existing 
Condition A. It contains a 4 hour Completion Time to isolate the 
affected flow path and is only applicable to the containment isolation 
valves excluded from Condition A (e.g., containment isolation valves in 
the main steam lines or (as described in a Reviewer's Note) those 
identified by plant-specific analysis as having high risk significance 
for interfacing systems loss of coolant accidents (ISLOCAs). A new 
Condition, Condition C, is added which is applicable when two or more 
penetrations have one inoperable containment isolation valve. This 
Condition requires isolating all but one of the affected penetrations 
within 4 hours (the existing Completion Time for Condition A). This 
condition limits the 7 day Completion Time in Condition A to a single 
penetration. The extended Completion Time is not applicable to 
containment isolation valves in the main steam lines or those 
identified by plant-specific analysis as having high risk significance 
for ISLOCAs and the existing 4 hour Completion Time applies. BAW-2461-A 
is only applicable to Davis Besse, Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, 
and 3, and

[[Page 6531]]

Crystal River Unit 3. Other licensees of B&W designed PWRs requesting 
to use the Topical Report (TR) methodology must provide the same level 
of information provided by these demonstration plants to ensure that TR 
BAW-2461-A is applicable to their plant. TSTF-498 will provide 
standardized wording in the B&W STS for plants implementing the changes 
specified in BAW-2461-A related to extending AOTs for applicable 
inoperable CIVs from 4 hours to 168 hours.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    In 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission established its regulatory 
requirements related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS 
are required to include items in the following five specific categories 
related to station operation: (1) Safety limits, limiting safety system 
settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for 
operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design 
features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does 
not specify the particular TSs to be included in a plant's license. 
TSTF-498 is proposing changes to the TSs that involve category 2 above. 
The LCOs are the lowest functional capability, or performance levels, 
of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO 
of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the 
reactor, or follow any remedial actions permitted by the TS until the 
condition can be met.
    Furthermore, the CTs specified in the TSs must be based on 
reasonable protection of the public health and safety. Therefore, the 
NRC staff must be able to conclude that there is reasonable assurance 
that the safety functions affected by the proposed TS CT changes will 
be performed in accordance with the design basis accidents (DBAs) 
identified in Chapter 15 of the licensee's final safety analysis report 
(FSAR). As set forth in 10 CFR 50.36, a licensee's TS must establish 
the LCOs that contain certain information. This requirement includes 
CTs for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are required 
for safe operation of the facility, such as CIVs.
    The Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, ``Requirements for monitoring 
the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants,'' requires 
licensees to monitor the performance, or condition, of SSCs against 
licensee-established goals in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurance that SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. 
The implementation and monitoring program guidance of Regulatory Guide 
(RG) 1.174, section 2.3, and RG 1.177, section 3, states that 
monitoring performed in conformance with the Maintenance Rule can be 
used when such monitoring is sufficient for the SSCs affected by the 
risk-informed application.
    In addition, 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as it relates to the proposed CIV 
CT extension, requires the assessment and management of the increase in 
risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity.
    Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50, GDC-54, ``Piping systems penetrating 
containment,'' requires those piping systems that penetrate primary 
containment be provided with leak detection, isolation, and containment 
capabilities having redundancy, reliability, and performance 
capabilities that reflect the importance to safety of isolating these 
piping systems.
    Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50, GDC-55, ``Reactor coolant pressure 
boundary penetrating containment,'' requires that each line that is 
part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and that penetrates the 
primary containment shall be provided with CIVs.
    Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50, GDC-56, ``Primary containment 
isolation,'' requires that each line that connects directly to the 
containment atmosphere and penetrates the primary reactor containment 
shall be provided with CIVs.
    The CIVs help ensure that adequate primary containment boundaries 
are maintained during and after accidents by minimizing potential 
pathways to the environment and help ensure that the primary 
containment function assumed in the safety analysis is maintained.

2.1 Proposed Change

    TSTF-498 would make the following changes to the B&W STS contained 
in NUREG-1430 associated with TS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves 
(CIVs):
    <bullet> The proposed change adds a Reviewer's Note prior to 
Condition A which states ``The Condition A Note should list the 
specific penetrations (if any) identified by the plant specific risk 
analysis as having high risk significance for an interfacing systems 
loss of coolant accident (ISLOCA).''
    <bullet> The proposed change revises the Condition A NOTE to add 
``except containment isolation valves in the main steam lines and [ 
].''
    <bullet> The proposed change adds the new Required Action A.1, 
``Determine the OPERABLE containment isolation valve in the affected 
penetration is not inoperable due to common cause failure'' with a 
Completion Time of 4 hours. This new Required Action is connected by an 
AND statement to the other applicable Required Actions.
    <bullet> The proposed change revises the previous Required Action 
A.1 to be A.2 with the completion time changed from 4 hours to 7 days.
    <bullet> The proposed change revises the previous Required Action 
A.2 to be A.3.
    <bullet> The proposed change adds a new Condition B for one or more 
penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable 
[for reasons other than purge valve leakage not within limit] with a 
Note stating ``Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or 
more] containment isolation valves in the main steam lines and [ ].'' 
There is also a Reviewers Note similar to Condition A.
    <bullet> The proposed change provides new Required Action B.1 to 
isolate the affected penetration flow path with a completion time of 4 
hours and Required Action B.2 to verify the affected penetration flow 
path is isolated once per 31 days for isolation devices outside 
containment and Prior to entering Mode 4 from Mode 5 if not performed 
within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment. 
Furthermore, new Required Action B.2 has two notes which state: (1) 
Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of 
administrative means and (2) Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, 
or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means.
    <bullet> The proposed change adds a new Condition C for two or more 
penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable 
[for reasons other than Condition[s] [E and F]] with a Note stating 
``Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] 
containment isolation valves.
    <bullet> The proposed change provides new Required Action C.1 to 
isolate all but one of the affected penetration flow paths by use of at 
least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, 
or blind flange with a completion time of 4 hours.
    <bullet> The proposed change revises the previous Condition B and 
Required Action B.1 to be new Condition D and Required Action D.1.
    <bullet> The proposed change revises the previous Condition C and 
Required Action C.1 and C.2 to be new Condition E and Required Action 
E.1 and E.2.
    <bullet> The proposed change revises the previous Condition D and 
Required Action D.1, D.2 and D.3 to be new Condition F and Required 
Action F.1, F.2 and F.3.
    <bullet> The proposed change revises the previous reference to 
Required Action

[[Page 6532]]

D.1 for performance of SR 3.6.3.6 within Required Action D.3 to 
Required Action F.1.
    <bullet> The proposed change revises the previous Condition E and 
Required Action E.1 and E.2 to be new Condition G and Required Action 
G.1 and G.2.
    TSTF-498 includes changes to the B&W STS Bases B 3.6.3 contained in 
NUREG-1430.
    <bullet> Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating this 
Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two 
[or more] containment isolation valves. The Note also states that the 
Condition is not applicable to containment isolation valves in the main 
steam lines and [any specific penetrations identified by the plant-
specific risk analysis as having high risk significance for an ISLOCA. 
The previous discussion about the Note has been deleted. Additionally, 
a new Required Action A.1 has been added to determine that the operable 
containment isolation valve in the affected penetration is not 
inoperable due to a common cause failure with a completion time of 4 
hours. The other Condition A Required Actions have been re-numbered and 
Required Action A.2 Completion Time has been changed from 4 hours to 7 
days.
    <bullet> The bases has been revised to update Required Action A.2 
from 4 hours to 7 days based on an analysis of plant risk and the 
discussion on considering the time required to isolate the penetration 
and the relative importance of supporting containment operability has 
been deleted.
    <bullet> A new Condition B has been added with a Note indicating 
this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with 
two [or more] containment isolation valves that are containment 
isolation valves in the main steam lines or are [any specific 
penetrations identified by the plant-specific risk analysis as having 
high risk significance for an interfacing systems loss of coolant 
accident (ISLOCA)]. Condition B is entered if one containment isolation 
valve in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable, [except for 
purge valve leakage not within limit.] The Bases describes Required 
Actions B.1 and B.2 Completion Times and Notes as specified in the TS 
section.
    <bullet> A new Condition C has been added with a Note indicating 
this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two 
[or more] containment isolation valves. Condition C is entered if two 
or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve 
inoperable [for reasons other than Condition[s] E [and F]]. The Bases 
describes the Required Action C.1 Completion Time to isolate all but 
one of the affected containment isolation valves within 4 hours.
    <bullet> The bases discussion for Required Action D.1 has been 
updated to account for new Conditions B and C and have been added where 
applicable.
    <bullet> Condition B and Required Action B.1 has been re-numbered 
to Condition D and Required Action D.1.
    <bullet> Condition C and Required Action C.1 and C.2 have been re-
numbered to Condition E and Required Action E.1 and E.2.
    <bullet> Reference to BAW-2461-A has been added as Reference 6. 
Previous references 6, 7, and 8 have been re-numbered to references 7, 
8 and 9. Applicable changes have been made throughout the Bases.
    <bullet> Condition D and Required Action D.1, D.2 and D.3 have been 
re-numbered to Condition F and Required Action F.1, F.2 and F.3.
    <bullet> Condition E and Required Action E.1 and E.2 have been re-
numbered to Condition G and Required Action G.1 and G.2.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    As stated previously, BAW-2461-A describes a method to revise the 
Completion Time for specific Conditions per Technical Specification 
3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves. The NRC approved BAW-2461 on 
August 29, 2007, for referencing in license applications to the extent 
specified and under the limitations and conditions stated in the 
topical report and Section 4.1 of the staff's safety evaluation 
(Reference 6). TSTF-498 is proposing changes to the B&W STS, NUREG 
1430, which are in accordance with Topical Report BAW-2461-A and 
subject to the Limitations, Conditions and Regulatory Commitments 
specified in the staff Safety Evaluation. Any differences between TR 
BAW-2461-A Technical Specification examples and TSTF-498 proposed 
Technical Specifications have been evaluated and determined to be 
acceptable. BAW-2461-A, Table 2-1, Condition A note states ``Only 
applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] containment 
isolation valves with the exception of containment isolation valves in 
the main steam lines [and list of specific penetrations (if any) 
identified by the plant-specific risk-informed process to have high 
risk significance for ISLOCA.]'' To be consistent with the ITS format 
and content rules, the Condition A Note was written as ``Only 
applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] containment 
isolation valves except containment isolation valves in the main steam 
lines and [ ].'' The Condition is modified by a Reviewer's Note which 
states, ``The Condition A Note should list the specific penetrations 
(if any) identified by the plant-specific risk analysis as having high 
risk significance for an interfacing systems loss of coolant accident 
(ISLOCA).'' This change is editorial and does not affect the 
application of the TS. The change in wording meets the requirements 
specified in BAW-2461-A and is therefore acceptable.
    The July 5, 2006 Request for Additional Information (RAI) response 
to NRC Question 1 stated that the following action would be added as 
Required Action A.1 with a 4 hour Completion Time, ``Verify that the 
redundant CIV on the same penetration is operable [applicable only if 
the redundant CIV has an operator and/or body type that is not diverse 
from the inoperable CIV depending on which parts are inoperable.]'' In 
TSTF-498, Required Action A.1 has a 4 hour Completion Time and states, 
``Determine the OPERABLE containment isolation valve in the affected 
penetration is not inoperable due to common cause failure.'' The 
wording was chosen to be consistent with LCO 3.8.1, Required Action 
B.3.1, regarding inoperable diesel generators. The discussion of what 
is required to be evaluated, ``applicable only if the redundant CIV has 
an operator and/or body type that is not diverse from the inoperable 
CIV depending on which parts are inoperable,'' is placed in the 
Required Action A.1 Bases. Placing the detailed description of what is 
meant by common cause failure in the Bases is consistent with the ITS 
format and content rules. This change has been evaluated as a Revision 
to BAW-2461-A. TSTF-498 wording is equivalent to the proposed wording 
submitted as RAI response <greek-i>1 and is consistent with NRC's 
Safety Evaluation for BAW-2461-A and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Required Action A.1 and A.2 are being revised to re-number 
these actions to A.2 and A.3. This is necessary to incorporate the new 
Required Action A.1 as described above. Additionally, the completion 
time for the new Required Action A.2 which states ``isolate the 
affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-
activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check 
valve with flow through the valve secured'' is being revised from 4 
hours to 7 days. This change has been evaluated by the staff and is 
consistent with NRC's Safety Evaluation for BAW-2461-A and is therefore 
acceptable.

[[Page 6533]]

    B&W STS is adding a new Condition B for one or more penetration 
flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable [for reasons 
other than purge valve leakage not within limit] with a Note specifying 
``Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] 
containment isolation valves in the main steam lines and [ ]. There is 
also a Reviewer's Note that states ``The condition B Note should list 
the specific penetrations (if any) identified by the plant-specific 
risk analysis as having high risk significance for an interfacing 
systems loss of coolant accident (ISLOCA). This wording is consistent 
with the change made to Condition A and is consistent with the format 
and content rules in ITS. Additionally, the Required Actions and 
associated Completion Times are consistent with Condition A and the 
change evaluated by the staff in the NRC's Safety Evaluation for BAW-
2461-A. This new Condition was required since main steam line isolation 
valves were explicitly excluded from the CT extension as stated in the 
NRC's Safety Evaluation for BAW-2461-A and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Condition B and Required Action B.1 are being revised to be 
Condition D and Required Action D.1. With the addition of new 
Conditions B and C the remaining Conditions and Required Actions need 
to be re-numbered. This change is editorial and results in no technical 
change and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS is adding a new Condition C which is applicable when two or 
more penetrations have one inoperable containment isolation valve. This 
Condition requires isolating all but one of the affected penetrations 
within 4 hours (the existing Completion Time for Condition A). Once 
this Completion Time is satisfied and since Condition A is still 
applicable then this essentially limits the 7 day Completion Time in 
Condition A to a single penetration. This change addresses Condition 
and Limitation 6 in the NRC's Safety Evaluation for BAW-2461-A and is 
therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Condition C and Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are being 
revised to be Condition E and Required Action E.1 and E.2. With the 
addition of new Conditions B and C the remaining Conditions and 
Required Actions need to be re-numbered. This change is editorial and 
results in no technical change and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Condition D and Required Action D.1, D.2 and D.3 are being 
revised to be Condition F and Required Action F.1, F.2 and F.3. With 
the addition of new Conditions B and C the remaining Conditions and 
Required Actions need to be re-numbered. This change is editorial and 
results in no technical change and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Condition E and Required Action E.1 and E.2 are being 
revised to be Condition G and Required Action G.1 and G.2. With the 
addition of new Conditions B and C the remaining Conditions and 
Required Actions need to be re-numbered. This change is editorial and 
results in no technical change and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 Actions A.1, A.2 and A.3 are being 
revised to describe the Note that is being added indicating the 
Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two 
[or more] containment isolation valves and that the isolation valves in 
the main steam line are not applicable along with any specific 
penetrations identified by the plant-specific risk analysis. This is 
necessary to ensure the correct Required Actions are taken based on the 
applicable penetration. This is consistent with all other Bases 
descriptions in the B&W STS and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 Required Action A.2 Completion Time is 
being revised from 4 hours to 7 days and indicates that this is based 
on an analysis of plant risk. The change is revising wording associated 
with the 4 hour completion time to a 7 day completion time. The 7 day 
completion time is now based upon a plant risk evaluation instead of a 
reasonable time to isolate the penetration. This is consistent with 
BAW-2461-A which the staff found acceptable in the Safety Evaluation 
for BAW-2461-A and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 is adding support information for new 
Condition B and Required Actions B.1 and B.2 which is applicable for 
one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve 
inoperable [for reasons other than purge valve leakage not within 
limit]. Condition B is also only applicable to penetration flow paths 
with two [or more] containment isolation valves in the main steam lines 
and [ ]. The associated Required Actions and Completion Times for new 
Condition B are consistent with Actions and Completion Times for 
Condition A which the staff found acceptable in the NRC's Safety 
Evaluation for BAW-2461-A and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 is adding support information for new 
Condition C and Required Action C.1 which is applicable for two or more 
penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable 
[for reasons other than Condition[s] E [and F]]. Condition C is only 
applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more] containment 
isolation valves. The Required Action to isolate all but one of the 
affected penetration flow paths by use of at least one closed and de-
activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange within 
4 hours ensures that simultaneous LCO entry of an inoperable CIV in 
separate penetration flow paths such that the proposed 7 day Completion 
Time in Condition A is limited to no more than one CIV at any given 
time. This change addresses Limitation and Condition 6 as specified in 
the NRC's Safety Evaluation for BAW-2461-A and is therefore acceptable.
    B&W STS Bases for B 3.6.3 are being revised such that each 
Condition and Required Action subsequent to the addition of new 
Conditions B and C need to be re-numbered. Additionally, a new 
reference has been added (Reference 6) which requires subsequent 
references to be re-numbered. These changes are considered editorial 
and do not affect any technical aspect of the Bases and are therefore 
acceptable.

3.1 Summary

    TSTF-498 would provide standardized wording in the B&W STS for 
plants implementing BAW-2461-A, ``Risk-Informed Justification for 
Containment Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time Change.'' The changes 
to NUREG-1430 proposed by TSTF-498 have been reviewed for consistency 
with the current NUREG-1430 and BAW-2461-A. The proposed changes have 
been found to be consistent with NUREG-1430 and BAW-2461-A, therefore 
the proposed changes are acceptable.

4.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the staff].

5.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendments change a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and change surveillance 
requirements. [For licensees adding a TS Bases Control Program: The 
amendment also changes record keeping, reporting, or administrative 
procedures or requirements.] The NRC staff has determined that the 
amendments

[[Page 6534]]

involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant 
change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and 
that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative 
occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a 
proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards 
considerations, and there has been no public comment on the finding 
[FR]. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for 
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and (c)(10)]. 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the 
issuance of the amendments.

6.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, on the basis of the considerations 
discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health 
and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or 
to the health and safety of the public.

7.0 References

1. Letter from the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF), a 
joint owners group activity, re: TSTF-498, Revision 0, ``Risk-
Informed Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (BAW-2461),'' 
dated December 20, 2006. (ADAMS ML063560402)
2. Letter from the TSTF re: Response to NRC Request for Additional 
Information Regarding TSTF-498, Revision 0, ``Risk-Informed 
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (BAW-2461),'' dated 
October 10, 2007. (ADAMS ML072840444)
3. BAW-2461-A, ``Risk-Informed Justification for Containment 
Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time Change,'' Revision 0, dated 
October 2007. (ADAMS ML072980529)
4. NUREG 1430, ``Standard Technical Specifications Babcock and 
Wilcox Plants,'' Revision 3.0. (ADAMS ML041830589 and ML041800598)
5. Nuclear Energy Institute 99-04, Revision 0, ``Guidelines for 
Managing NRC Commitment Changes,'' July 1999.
6. Final Safety Evaluation for Pressurized Water Reactors Owners 
Group, Topical Report, BAW-2461, Revision 0, ``Risk-Informed 
Justification for Containment Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time 
Change (TAC No. MD5722),'' (ADAMS ML072330227)

The Following Example of an Application Was Prepared by the NRC Staff 
to Facilitate Use of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process 
(CLIIP). The Model Provides the Expected Level of Detail and Content 
for An Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Risk-
Informed Justification for Containment Isolation Valve Allowed Outage 
Time Change Using Cliip. Licensees Remain Responsible For Ensuring That 
Their Actual Application Fulfills Their Administrative Requirements As 
Well as Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Nuclear Regular Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 
20555.

Subject:

    Plant Name
    Docket No. 50-
    Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk--
Informed Justification for Containment Isolation Valve Allowed Outage 
Time Change Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

Gentlemen:
    In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90 [LICENSEE] is 
submitting a request for an amendment to the technical specifications 
(TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
    The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements for containment 
isolation valve (CIV) allowed outage time changes with implementation 
of BAW-2461-A, ``Risk-Informed Justification for Containment Isolation 
Valve Allowed Outage Time Change.''
    Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed change, the 
requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific 
verifications. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to 
show the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS 
pages. Attachment 4 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments 
made in this submittal. Attachment 5 provides the proposed TS Bases 
changes.
    [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed License Amendment by 
[DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 
DAYS].
    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with 
attachments, is being provided to the designated [STATE] Official.
    I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 
States of America that I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this 
request and that the foregoing is true and correct. (Note that request 
may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or affirmation statement).
    If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please 
contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER]

Sincerely,

[Name, Title]

Attachments:
    1. Description and Assessment.
    2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes.
    3. Revised Technical Specification Pages.
    4. Regulatory Commitments.
    5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes.

cc: NRC Project Manager
 NRC Regional Office
 NRC Resident Inspector
 State Contact

Attachment 1--Description and Assessment

1.0 Description

    The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements for containment 
isolation valve allowed outage times associated with implementation of 
BAW-2461-A, ``Risk-Informed Justification for Containment Isolation 
Valve Allowed Outage Time Change.''
    The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS change 
TSTF-498, Revision 1. The Federal Register notice published on [DATE] 
announced the availability of this TS improvement through the 
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP).

2.0 Assessment

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part 
of the CLIIP. This review included a review of the NRC staff's 
evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support 
TSTF-498, Revision 1. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the justifications 
presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by 
the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.] and justify this 
amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the [PLANT] TS.

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations

    [LICENSEE] is not proposing any variations or deviations from the 
TS changes described in TSTF-498, Revision 1, and the NRC staff's model 
safety evaluation dated [DATE].

[[Page 6535]]

3.0 Regulatory Analysis

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register 
as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed NSHCD 
presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to [PLANT] and 
has found it acceptable for incorporation into the amendment request 
which satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).

3.2 Verification and Commitments

    As discussed in the notice of availability published in the Federal 
Register on [DATE] for this TS improvement, [LICENSEE] verifies the 
applicability of TSTF-498, Revision 1, to [PLANT], and commits to 
adopting the requirements specified in BAW-2461-A which includes the 
following Limitations and Conditions specified in Section 4.1, Staff 
Findings and Conditions and Limitations, of the NRC's Safety Evaluation 
for BAW-2461 (ML072330227):
    1. Based on TR BAW-2461, the CIV methodology, PRA parameters, 
configurations, and data used to evaluate an extended CIV CT to 168 
hours is limited to the following plants.
<bullet> Davis-Besse
<bullet> Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3
<bullet> Crystal River 3

    Other licensees of B&W designed PWRs requesting to use the TR 
methodology must provide the same level of information provided by 
these demonstration plants to ensure that TR BAW-2461 is applicable to 
their plant.
    2. Because not all penetrations have the same impact on [Delta]CDF, 
[Delta]LERF, ICCDP, or ICLERP, verify the applicability of TR BAW-2461 
to the specific plant, including verification that: (a) the CIV 
configurations for the specific plant match the configurations in TR 
BAW-2461, and (b) the risk-parameter values used in TR BAW-2461, 
including the sensitivity studies contained in the RAIs, are 
representative or bounding for the specific plant. Any additional CIV 
configurations, CT extensions, or non-bounding risk parameter values 
not evaluated by TR BAW-2461 should be addressed in the plant-specific 
analyses. [Note that CIV configurations and extended CTs not 
specifically evaluated by TR BAW-2461, or non-bounding risk parameter 
values outside the scope of the TR, will require NRC staff review and 
licensee development of the specific penetrations and related 
justifications for the proposed CTs].
    3. Each licensee adopting TR BAW-2461 will need to confirm that the 
plant-specific risk assessment including both internal and external 
events is within the assumptions of TR BAW-2461 and the acceptance 
guidelines of RG 1.174 and 1.177. The licensee's application verifies 
that external event risk, including seismic, fires, floods, and high 
winds, either through quantitative or qualitative evaluation, is shown 
to not have an adverse impact on the conclusions of the plant-specific 
analysis for extending the CIV CTs. Specifically: (1) the risk from 
external events cannot make the total baseline risk exceed 1E-4/yr CDF, 
or 1E-5/yr LERF, without justification, (2) the risk from external 
events (i.e., high winds, floods and other) should be specifically 
evaluated with respect to the extended CIV CT, and (3) fire risk should 
be specifically addressed. The evaluation should include fire-induced 
spurious actuation (including containment performance) with respect to 
the proposed 168-hour CIV CT.
    Additionally, each licensee will need to confirm that the seismic 
CDF referenced for TR BAW-2461 is bounding for its plant, or 
incorporate a plant-specific seismic CDF estimate. Furthermore, the 
seismic initiating event frequency will need to be defined and 
justified for each licensee implementing TR BAW-2461. See Section 
3.4.1.4 of the staff's SE.
    4. For licensees adopting TR BAW-2461, confirmation should be 
provided that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 conclusions of the TR are 
applicable to the licensee's plant and that plant-specific Tier 2 
evaluations including CCF and risk-significant configurations including 
interfacing-system LOCA have been evaluated and included under Tier 2 
and Tier 3 including the CRMP as applicable.
    <bullet> The proposed 168-hour CIV CT will not be applied to CIVs 
in penetrations connected to the RCS that have two NC CIVs if there are 
no other valves between the RCS and the environment (i.e., low pressure 
piping, or opening) that may be used for backup isolation and cannot be 
confirmed closed. In that case, the operable CIV will be verified 
closed within the original 4-hour CT, thus satisfying the TS Required 
Action. See Section 3.3.4 of the staff's SE. The specific penetrations 
where this is applicable or where interfacing-system LOCA is shown to 
be risk-significant (as determined by the plant-specific risk-informed 
process including plant-specific LOCA analysis) will be identified on a 
plant-specific basis prior to implementation of the proposed TS change. 
They will be listed explicitly in the proposed TS revision and the 
current CT will be retained.
    <bullet> TR BAW-2461 stated that an interfacing-system LOCA is 
assumed to lead to core damage and large early release, the 
effectiveness of mitigation systems besides containment isolation is 
not considered significant. All failed open penetration flow paths with 
an RCS connection were assumed to have CDF and LERF contributions in TR 
BAW-2461. Licensees incorporating TR BAW-2461 will need to confirm the 
above assumption for their plant specific implementation of BAW-2461.
    <bullet> The specific penetrations with CCF potential will be 
identified by the licensee on a plant-specific basis. Upon entry into 
TS LCO 3.6.3, Condition A, the utility will confirm that the redundant 
similarly-designed CIV has not been affected by the same failure mode 
as the inoperable CIV. This verification will be performed before 
entering into the extended portion of the CT (i.e., within 4 hours). 
The specific penetrations with CCF potential will be identified on a 
plant-specific basis and listed in a plant-specific TS document or 
other administrative source. See Section 3.4.1.2 of the staff's SE.
    <bullet> No action or maintenance activity is performed that will 
remove equipment that is functionally redundant to the inoperable CIV, 
including the redundant CIV(s) on the same penetration and support 
systems for the redundant CIV. See Section 3.3 of TR BAW-2461.
    <bullet> No action or maintenance activity is performed that will 
significantly increase the likelihood of challenge to the CIVs. 
Challenges to the CIVs include DBAs that result in a release of 
radioactive material within containment (LOCA, main steam line break, 
and rod ejection accident). Also included is the removal of equipment 
from service that may cause a significant increase in the likelihood of 
core damage while in the proposed CT, which may increase the large 
early release via the inoperable CIV. See Section 3.4 of TR BAW-2461.
    <bullet> No action or maintenance activity is performed that will 
remove equipment that supports success paths credited in the CT risk 
evaluation. This includes the other series valves, if any, credited in 
the risk assessment for RCS penetrations that otherwise would be risk-
significant (i.e., interfacing-system LOCA). See Section 3.4 of TR BAW-
2461.
    5. TR BAW-2461 was based on generic-plant characteristics. Each 
licensee adopting TR BAW-2461 must confirm plant-specific Tier 3 
information in their individual submittals. The licensee must discuss 
conformance to the requirements of the

[[Page 6536]]

maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), as they relate to the proposed 
CIV CTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93.01, Section 11, as 
endorsed by RG 1.182, including verification that the licensee's 
maintenance rule program, with respect to CIVs, includes a LERF/ICLERP 
assessment (i.e., CRMP). See Section 3.4.3 of the staff's SE.
    6. TS LCO 3.6.3, Note 2, allows separate condition entry for each 
penetration flow path. Therefore, each licensee adopting TR BAW-2461 
will address the simultaneous LCO entry of an inoperable CIV in 
separate penetration flow paths such that the proposed 168-hour CIV CT 
LCO will be limited to no more than one CIV at any given time. In 
addition, the licensee must confirm that its Tier 3 CRMP addresses 
simultaneous inoperable CIV LCOs (i.e., separate condition entry) such 
that the cumulative CIV risk, including LERF, are maintained consistent 
with the assumptions and conclusions of TR BAW-2461. See Section 
3.4.1.2 of the staff's SE.
    7. The licensee shall verify that the plant-specific PRA quality is 
acceptable with respect to its use for Tier 3 for this application in 
accordance with the guidelines given in RG 1.174 and as discussed in 
Section 3.4.1.1 of the staff's SE.
    8. With respect to past plant-specific license amendments or 
additional plant-specific applications for a TS change under NRC review 
that have not been incorporated into the baseline PRA used to evaluate 
the proposed change, the cumulative risk must be evaluated on a plant-
specific basis consistent with the guidance given in RG 1.174, Section 
2.2.6 and 3.3.2, and addressed in a licensee's plant-specific 
application. See Section 3.4.1.5 of the staff's SE.
    9. Closed systems inside and outside containment, which are 
considered to be containment isolation barriers, must meet the 
provisions outlined in NUREG-0800, Section 6.2.4, ``Containment 
Isolation System.'' See Section 2.2 of the staff's SE.
    10. With an extended CIV CT, the possibility exists that the CIV 
unavailability will be impacted. Depending on the penetration risk 
significance and the frequency and length of time of the CIV CT, the 
unavailability of the containment isolation function may also be 
impacted. Therefore, licensee's adopting TR BAW-2461 will need to 
establish an implementation and monitoring program for CIVs, including 
performance criteria, on a plant-specific basis. See Sections 3.4.1.2 
and 3.4.4 of the staff's SE.
    11. The PWROG did not specifically address [Delta]CDF and 
[Delta]LERF in TR BAW-2461 regarding the acceptance guidelines of RG 
1.174. The PWROG stated that it is not expecting that on line CIV 
preventive maintenance will increase with the proposed 168-hour CIV. To 
address this, licensee's adopting TR BAW-2461 will need to assess, on a 
plant-specific basis, the [Delta]CDF and [Delta]LERF acceptance 
guidance of RG 1.174 including the expected frequency of entering the 
proposed CT and the expected mean CT for CIV maintenance. See Section 
3.4.1.2 of the staff's SE.

4.0 Environmental Evaluation

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in 
the model safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part of the CLIIP. 
[LICENSEE] has concluded that the staff's findings presented in that 
evaluation are applicable and acceptable to [PLANT] and the evaluation 
is submitted as an attachment to this application.

Attachment 2--Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)

Attachment 3--Proposed Technical Specification Pages

Attachment 4--List of Regulatory Commitments

    The following table identifies those actions committed to by 
[LICENSEE] in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are 
provided for information purposes and are not considered to be 
regulatory commitments. Please direct questions regarding these 
commitments to [CONTACT NAME].

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Regulatory commitments                   Due date/event
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[LICENSEE] will...................  [Complete, implemented with
                                     amendment OR within X days of
                                     implementation of amendment].
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment 5--Proposed Changes to Technical Specification Bases Pages 
Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: [Plant Name] requests adoption of 
an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS) for 
Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Plants (NUREG-1430) and plant specific 
technical specifications (TS), to allow modification of containment 
isolation valve completion times associated with implementation of BAW-
2461-A, ``Risk-Informed Justification for Containment Isolation Valve 
Allowed Outage Time Change,'' dated October 2007. The changes are 
consistent with NRC approved Industry/Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) STS Traveler, TSTF-498, Revision 1, ``Risk-Informed 
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (BAW-2461).'' The proposed 
change extends the Completion Times for containment penetration flow 
paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable from 4 hours to 7 
days for Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) NSSS plants. This change is applicable 
to containment penetrations with two [or more] containment isolation 
valves in which one containment isolation valve is inoperable [for 
reasons other than purge valve leakage not within limit]. The extended 
Completion Time is not applicable to containment isolation valves in 
the main steam lines or those identified by plant-specific analysis as 
having high risk significance for interfacing systems loss of coolant 
accidents (ISLOCAs) and the existing 4 hour Completion Time applies.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed changes revise the Completion Times for restoring 
an inoperable containment isolation valve (or isolating the affected 
penetration) within the scope of Topical Report BAW-2461-A, ``Risk-
Informed Justification for Containment Isolation Valve Allowed 
Outage Time Change.'' The Completion Times are extended from 4 hours 
to 7 days. Containment isolation valves are not accident initiators 
in any accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the probability 
of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. 
Containment isolation valves control the extent of leakage from the 
containment following an accident. As such, containment isolation 
valves are instrumental in controlling the consequences of an 
accident. However, the consequences of any accident previously 
evaluated are no different during the proposed extended Completion 
Times than during the existing Completion Times. As a result, the

[[Page 6537]]

consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not 
significantly increased. Therefore, the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of 
an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

    The proposed changes revise the Completion Times for restoring 
an inoperable containment isolation valve (or isolating the affected 
penetration) within the scope of Topical Report BAW-2461-A, ``Risk-
Informed Justification for Containment Isolation Valve Allowed 
Outage Time Change.'' The proposed changes do not change the design, 
configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed 
changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or 
different kind of equipment will be installed). Therefore, the 
proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed changes revise the Completion Times for restoring 
an inoperable containment isolation valve (or isolating the affected 
penetration) within the scope of Topical Report BAW-2461-A, ``Risk-
Informed Justification for Containment Isolation Valve Allowed 
Outage Time Change.'' In order to evaluate the proposed Completion 
Time extensions, a probabilistic risk evaluation was performed as 
documented in Topical Report BAW-2461-A. The risk evaluation 
concluded that the proposed increase in the Completion Times does 
not result in an unacceptable incremental conditional core damage 
probability or incremental conditional large early release 
probability according to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.177. 
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous 
discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not 
involve a significant hazards consideration as set forth in 10 CFR 
50.92(c).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of January, 2008.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Gerald Waig,
Acting Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection & 
Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 [FR Doc. E8-1943 Filed 2-1-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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