alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6181 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6181

To reaffirm that certain land has been taken into trust for the benefit 
          of the Samish Indian Nation, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 8, 2021

Mr. Gallego (for himself, Mr. Aguilar, Mr. Sablan, Mr. Gomez, Mr. Soto, 
 Mr. Cole, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, Mr. Ruiz, Ms. McCollum, Mrs. Torres 
of California, Mr. LaMalfa, and Mr. Cardenas) introduced the following 
     bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To reaffirm that certain land has been taken into trust for the benefit 
          of the Samish Indian Nation, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Samish Indian Nation Land 
Reaffirmation Act''.

SEC. 2. REAFFIRMATION OF TRUST LAND STATUS AND ACTIONS.

    (a) In General.--The decision dated November 9, 2018, and the 
actions taken by the Bureau of Indian Affairs Northwest Regional 
Director to approve the application of the Samish Indian Nation to take 
approximately 6.70 acres of land into trust as described in the 
decision for the benefit of the Samish Indian Nation are ratified and 
confirmed.
    (b) Application.--This Act shall apply to all claims (including 
claims challenging the validity of title or the effectiveness of any 
action of the Secretary acquiring and taking land into trust) pending 
on the date of the enactment of this Act or filed on or after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Retention of Future Rights.--Nothing in this Act alters or 
diminishes the right of the Samish Indian Nation from seeking to have 
any additional land taken into trust by the United States for the 
benefit of the Samish Indian Nation.
                                 <all>
```
#### Ex Parte Lenece Maynor

No. 25676.

January 9, 1952.

Hon. Dean Gauldin, Judge Presiding.

*Duke & Melton,*by *W. J. Duke,*Dallas, for relator.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

Relator was charged with misdemeanor theft in three separate complaints. The charge in the first cause was for the theft of perfume of the value of $17.50. The second complaint charged the theft of two ladies’ belts of the value of $7.96; and the third ^complaint charged the theft of a child’s coat and cap of the value of $24.98.

*575Bond in each of the cases was set at one time in the sum of $5,000.00. Upon the hearing of this writ of habeas corpus, which involves all three of these complaints, bond was reduced to the sum of $2,500.00 in each case.

This is but a misdemeanor theft, although it seems that the relator has possibly been in the habit of shoplifting. Therefore, we think that the bond in such amount for misdemeanor theft is excessive and that same should be reduced to $300.00 in each case.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the relator granted bail in the sum of $300.00 in each of the three cases in question.
#### HEYMANN v. LAZARUS.

No. 15083.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

June 24, 1935.

Harold J. Moore, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Jos.-A. Casey, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee.

JANVIER, Judge.

This is a suit on a promissory note.

Petitioner, the holder of the note, alleges that he is licensed and authorized, under Act No. 7 of the Extra Session of 1928, to engage in the business of making loans in accordance with the provisions of that statute, which is commonly referred to as the “small loan law,” and that he acquired the note sued on from the original owner. The balance claimed to be due on the note is $134.68, with interest at 31⁄2 per cent, per month from August 15, 1933, and with attorney’s fees at 15 per cent, on the total amount due, all in accordance with the said note, which is alleged to be attached to the petition. Petitioner also prays for recognition of the chattel mortgage and lien and privilege alleged -to have been granted to secure payment .of the said note.

Defendant raises many technical objections, some by exception and some by answer. By exception he contends that the petition is vague and indefinite and that plaintiff should be required to state on what day he acquired the note and whether the note is governed by the terms of the statute to which we have referred. He further contends, by exception, that the petition does not disclose a cause of action for the ■ reason that notes issued in accordance with the provisions of the said act, só exceptor contends, are not negotiable and cannot be transferred. In his answer defendant alleges that petitioner has no interest in the said note, that when the said note was issued there was another note in existence which was never delivered to defendant, and he further charges that plaintiff has no right to claim to be the owner of the note unless he shall first show that he has paid the license required by the small loan law both in his individual name and in the name in which he does business, to wit, the “Home Finance Service.”

In the court, a qua, there was judgment as prayed for, and defendant has appealed.

*231• The record shows that petitioner has secured license to -do business in accordance with the requirements of the statute, that he acquired the note for value, and that there remains unpaid on the principal a balance of $134.68. We think, therefore, that plaintiff was entitled to the judgment rendered in his favor, unless defendant, by affirpiative proof, could have established any of the defenses raised in his answer. He has offered no evidence of any kind.

We have given to the various contentions such investigation as we feel is deserved in view of the fact that no evidence was produced, no oral argument made, and no brief filed. We conclude that there was no error in the judgment rendered below. Consequently,

It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be, and it is; affirmed, at the cost of appellant.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1


                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In  connection  with the  Annual  Report of  Arotech  Corporation  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-K for the year  ended  December  31,  2004 filed with the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (the  "Report"),  I,  Robert S.  Ehrlich,
Chairman,  President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, hereby certify that the Report fully complies with the requirements
of  Section  13(a) or  15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934,  and the
information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



                         By:  /s/ Robert S. Ehrlich
                              -------------------------------------------------
                              Robert S. Ehrlich, Chairman, President and CEO
                              Chief Executive Officer)

Date:  March 31, 2005
#### CHENEY et al. v. HALEY et al.†

No. 4223.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Dec. 9, 1931.

M. C. Redmond, of Monroe, for appellant.

Munholland & Munholland, of Monroe, for appellee.

†

 Rehearing granted February 16, 1932.

STEPHENS, J.

The plaintiff seeks in this suit to have the defendants ejected from the leased premises for failure to pay rent. The plaintiff proceeded by notice and rule as provided by Act No. 55 of 1926 of the statutes of the state of Louisiana, amending the Revised Statutes, § 2155.

The defendants excepted to the summary procedure, and answered admitting they were in possession of the pi’operty from which they were sought to be ejected, but denied that they were tenants of plaintiff, or that they owed plaintiff rent.

A trial of the rule resulted in a judgment rejecting plaintiff’s demands, and from that judgment she has appealed.

The evidence discloses that the plaintiff leased the premises through her agent to one A. R. Haley during the fall of 1926 for the consideration of $100 per year; that the said A. R. Haley died in April 1930; that the defendant Mrs. A. R. Haley, the surviving spouse of A. R. Haley, and the defendants A. J. Haley, A. M. Haley, and Joe Haley, the sons of A. R. Haley, continued to occupy the premises leased by A. R. Haley, after his death, and were in possession of same, as admitted, at the time of the institution of this suit.

The sole question that it is necessary to determine is whether the plaintiff was within her legal rights in resorting to the summary process provided by the act above referred to. We are 'of the opinion that she was not, as the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist between her and the defendants. The act is clear and specific in its provisions that this rigorous, extraordinary, and summary remedy may be exercised only against the tenant. Certainly the scope of its severe provisions may not be extended by implication to include persons other than tenants. The plaintiff must pursue the ordinary remedies provided by law to test the question of her right to possession of the property under the circumstances here presented.

The judgment of the district court, we think, is correct, and it is affirmed.
Exhibit








EXECUTION VERSION
1


SECOND AMENDMENT
TO THE
AON SUPPLEMENTAL SAVINGS PLAN
This Second Amendment (the “Amendment”) to the Aon Supplemental Savings Plan, as amended and restated as of January 1, 2017 (the “Plan”), is adopted by Aon Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”) and wholly owned subsidiary of Aon plc (“Aon”), to be effective as set forth below.


WHEREAS, pursuant to resolutions of the Committee dated September 20, 2018, the Committee has delegated to Company management authority to amend the Plan in the manner set forth below.
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to such delegation of authority by the Committee, the Plan is hereby amended, effective as of the date hereof, by adding the following as a new Supplement B to the Plan:


SUPPLEMENT B
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
AND PARTIAL PLAN TERMINATIONS


		
	1.
	National Flood Services. The Plan shall be terminated and liquidated, effective August 4, 2018, with respect to all Participants who experienced a “change in control event” (within the meaning of Code Section 409A) in connection with the sale of National Flood Services.  In accordance with the requirements of Code Section 409A, the entire vested balance of each such Participant’s account, determined as of February 15, 2019, shall be distributed no later than March 15, 2019.  







































































IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed on its behalf by its duly authorized officers, this 31 day of December 2018.


AON CORPORATION                    


By:                            


_______________________________            
Siobhan Ciffelli
Chief Human Resources Officer (Interim)
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 613 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the limitation on 

the deduction for certain taxes, including State and local property and 

income taxes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 28, 2021 

Mr. SUOZZI (for himself, Mr. SCHNEIDER, Mr. GARBARINO, Mr. 

GOTTHEIMER, Mr. JONES, Mrs. KIM of California, and Mr. SMITH of 

New Jersey) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal 

the limitation on the deduction for certain taxes, including State and local property and income taxes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing Access to 

5 Lower Taxes by ensuring Deductibility Act’’ or the 

6 ‘‘SALT Deductibility Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 613 IH

1 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON DEDUCTION FOR STATE 

2 AND LOCAL, ETC. TAXES. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 164(b) of the Internal 

4 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking paragraph 

5 (6). 

6 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

7 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

8 December 31, 2020. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, A. Clay Leighton, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Sonic Solutions; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in this annual report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer andI have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses inthe design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls and control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: June 14, 2004
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 95-5851 MIKEL ENNIS, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Alexander Harvey II, Senior District Judge. (CR-95-192) Submitted: September 24, 1996 Decided: November 20, 1996 Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL James K. Bredar, Federal Public Defender, Beth M. Farber, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. LynneA. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Katharine J. Armentrout, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION PER CURIAM: Mikel Ennis seeks to appeal the 90-month sentence he received after he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West Supp. 1996). He contends that the district court plainly erred in awarding him two criminal history pointsunder USSG § 4A1.1(b)* for a prior sentence of 60 days home detention with electronic monitoring followed by a term of probation. The government argues that Ennis validly waived his appeal rights. We agree and dismiss the appeal. Ennis' plea agreement contained a provision waiving his right to appeal a sentence within the guideline range, "including any issues that relate to the establishment of the guideline range." A defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal his sentence if the waiver is knowing and voluntary. A valid waiver bars an appeal based on improper application of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Marin , 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). A waiver is not knowing and voluntary if the district court fails to question the defendant about it during the Rule 11 colloquy unless the record otherwise discloses that he was aware of its full significance. Id. Whether a defendant effectively waived his right to appeal is a matter of law that this court reviews de novo. Id. Here, while the district court did not question Ennis about the waiver during the Rule 11 hearing, Ennis acknowledged that he had reviewed the entire agreement with his lawyer and that certain matters were left open for determination by the district court. In addition, Ennis had prior convictions both in state court and federal court.Therefore, we find that the circumstances surrounding the waiver disclose that Ennis fully appreciated its significance. We find the waiver effective and dismiss the appeal.

_________________________________________________________________ *United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1994).
2We deny Ennis' request for oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED 3
Exhibit
13.1





CERTIFICATION







Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, I, Weidong Hong, Chief Executive Officer of Yucheng
Technologies Limited (the “Company”), certify, to my knowledge, that the
Company’s annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2007 (the
“Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: May
5, 2008




/s/
      Weidong HongName:
      Weidong HongTitle:
      Chief Executive Officer





The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document.
#### Paul Christopher HAMILTON, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Sergeant D. JACKSON; K. Wood, Correctional Officers, Defendants—Appellants.

No. 02-56024.

D.C. No. CV-97-08979-WMB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 7, 2003.*

Decided March 18, 2003.

Before PREGERSON and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and OBERDORFER, District Judge.**

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

California prison officials, Correctional Sergeant D. Jackson (“Jackson”) and Correctional Officer K. Woods (“Woods”), appeal the district court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment based on their belief that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Inmate Paul Christopher Hamilton (“Hamilton”) in pro se brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jackson and Woods, alleging that Jackson and Woods were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. *See Jeffers v. Gomez,*267 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (“Although the denial of summary judgment is not ordinarily an appealable order, we have jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal when, as here, the ground for the motion is qualified immunity.”). We remand.

The district court, relying on *Hamilton v. Endell,*981 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir.1992), held that because there was a genuine issue of fact as to deliberate indifference, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. But *Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer,*301 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir.2002), decided after the district court’s ruling in this case, held that after *Saucier v. Katz,*533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), qualified immunity cannot be denied in an Eighth Amendment case solely because there is a triable issue of fact as to whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s safety. *Estate of Ford,*301 F.3d at 1045. Instead, courts must apply *Saucier’s*two-step qualified immunity inquiry to Eighth Amendment cases. *Id.*In light of our recent decision in *Estate of Ford,*we remand to the district court to conduct a *Saucier*analysis.

REMANDED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT
23.3





CONSENT OF SCHLUMBERGER
TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION





As
independent petroleum engineers, Data & Consulting Services Division of
Schlumberger Technology Corporation hereby consents to the inclusion or
incorporation by reference in the registration statement on Form S-8 (File No.
333-149190), the registration statement (No. 333¬159888) on Form S-3, the
registration statement (No. 333-153579) on Form S-3/A, the Annual Report on Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2009, and the Annual Report on Form
10-K/A Amendment No. 1 for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2009 of BreitBurn
Energy Partners L.P. of information from our firm’s reserve report dated 11
February 2010, entitled “Reserve and Economic Evaluation Of Proved Reserves Of
Certain BreitBurn Management Company, LLC Illinois and Michigan Basin Oil And
Gas Interests As Of 31 December 2009 Executive Summary” and all references to
our firm included in or made part of the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A Amendment
No. 1 for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2009 of BreitBurn Energy Partners L.P.




SCHLUMBERGER
      TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION/s/ Charles M. Boyer IICharles
      M. Boyer II, PG, CPGScientific
      AdvisorUnconventional
      ReservoirsPittsburgh,
      PennsylvaniaOctober
      21, 2010