Filed 5/30/14 Sanders v. Langmuir-Logan CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

NICHOLAS A. SANDERS, as Trustee, 

etc.,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GARFIELD LANGMUIR-LOGAN et al.,

 Defendants and Appellants.

 G048524

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2011-00468519)

 ORDER MODIFYING OPINION;

 DENYING REQUEST FOR 

 REHEARING; NO CHANGE IN

 JUDGMENT

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 14, 2014, be modified. 

At the bottom of page 6 and continuing to the top of page 7, the following 

three sentences will be deleted: “As indicated above, we reversed the judgment only as 

to the Company. The judgment against Logan was affirmed. The Trust, as the prevailing 

party, may recover fees against Logan, but not the Company.” 

These sentences will be replaced by the following two sentences: “As 

indicated above, the judgment against Logan and the Company was affirmed. The Trust, 
2

as the prevailing party, may recover attorney fees.” The footnote remains unchanged at 

the end of the first paragraph on page 7. 

This correction is a modification that does not change the judgment.

The petition for rehearing is denied.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, J.

THOMPSON, J.
Filed 5/14/14 Sanders v. Langmuir-Logan CA4/3 (unmodified version)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

NICHOLAS A. SANDERS, as Trustee, 

etc.,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GARFIELD LANGMUIR-LOGAN et al.,

 Defendants and Appellants.

 G048524

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2011-00468519)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Richard W. Luesebrink, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

Logan Law and Rhonda L. Morgan; Everett L. Killman for Defendants and 

Appellants.

Hicks, Mims, Kaplan & Burns, Robert H. Garretson and Stephen L. Kaplan 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

In a concurrently filed opinion we addressed challenges made to a 

judgment entered against Garfield Langmuir-Logan (Logan) and his limited liability 

company, Institutional Secured Properties (the Company), after they were found liable 

for elder financial abuse, deceit, and breach of fiduciary duty. (Nicholas A. Sanders 

et al., v. Garfield Langmuir-Logan et al. (May14, 2014, G047997) [nonpub. opn.] 

(Sanders I).) The victims were Joseph L. and Kathleen H. Sanders (and their family trust 

(the Trust)). The underlying lawsuit was filed by their son Nicholas A. Sanders

(Nicholas),

1 as trustee of the Trust. 

In the Sanders I opinion, we rejected the argument the Trust lacked 

standing to bring a direct action against Logan and Company (hereafter collectively 

referred to as “Logan” for convenience, unless the context requires otherwise), and we 

concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s verdict. (Sanders I, supra, 

G047997.) In this appeal, Logan maintains the court erroneously granted the Trust’s 

motion for attorney fees as the prevailing party on the elder financial abuse claim. 

Alternatively, he asserts the amount of fees awarded must be reduced. We conclude the 

arguments lack merit. The postjudgment order is affirmed.

I

We incorporate by reference our statement of the underlying facts, provided 

in greater detail in Sanders I, supra, G047997. Suffice it to say, Logan induced Joseph 

and Kathleen to invest money (the Trust’s assets) in his real estate investment limited 

liability company and took a large share of the profits for himself. 

Kathleen died in July 2006, and the following month Joseph resigned his 

position as trustee, appointing his two children, Nicholas and Leah K. Boyd as 

 

1 “[W]e refer to the parties by their first names for purposes of clarity and not 

out of disrespect. [Citations.]” (Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 

1136, fn. 1.)
3

co-trustees. When Joseph died four years later in February 2010, Leah resigned as 

trustee, leaving Nicholas as the sole trustee. Nicholas discovered Logan, his parent’s 

financial planner, facilitated several different investments for the Trust. When Nicholas 

attempted to investigate the status of those investments, Logan and the Company 

withheld much of the necessary information forcing Nicholas to file the underlying 

lawsuit and seek a full accounting. 

The petition alleged six causes of action. The first three requested an

accounting and inspection of records, statutory damages, and the transfer of property 

back to the Trust pursuant to Probate Code sections 850 and 859. The remaining claims 

alleged civil causes of action for (1) financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult (fourth 

cause of action), (2) deceit (fifth cause of action), and (3) breach of fiduciary duty (sixth 

cause of action). 

The Trust sought to hold liable the following entities: (1) Logan; 

(2) the Company; (3) Statewide Barstow, LLC; (4) Statewide Barstow II; 

(5) Statewide Ministorage LLC., (6) Statewide Ministorage/Barstow, LLC; 

(7) ISP/Jurupa, LLC; (8) Montrose Apple Valley, LLC; (9) Wealth Management 

Resources, Inc. (WMR); and (10) Capital Financial Consultants, Inc. At trial, the Trust 

dismissed all the defendants except Logan and the Company. 

After considering the evidence and briefing from the parties the court ruled 

in favor of the Trust. In its statement of decision, the court explained it was necessary to 

discuss the background of the dispute “to appreciate the factual and legal difficulties 

presented by this case.” The court explained the petition was filed by Nicholas, the 

successor trustee and the initial trustors were both deceased. It stated, “Beginning in 

1995, or thereabouts . . . Logan had discussions with Kathleen and Joseph about investing 

the [T]rust’s assets with Logan, which allegedly [they] did. The Trust’s assets were 

invested in various entities including limited liability companies [(LLCs)], corporations, 

and other entities. Besides Logan, the other remaining [r]espondent is [the Company] of 
4

which Logan is apparently the CEO, director, and sole shareholder. All other 

[r]espondents were dismissed.” 

The court noted the petition alleged Joseph and Kathleen invested at least 

$784,000 of Trust assets with Logan and Wealth Management Resources. It concluded, 

“The [c]ourt finds from the evidence presented that Logan and [the Company] ‘took 

secreted, appropriated and/or retained real or personal property that belonged to Joseph 

and Kathleen as trustee and beneficiary of the Trust for a wrongful use or with intent to 

defraud.’ [The court cited paragraph 83 of the petition’s fourth cause of action.] 

Likewise, the fifth cause of action incorporates paragraph 83 [of the petition] and alleges 

that Logan suppressed information, failed to disclose information and mislead Joseph and 

the [Trust] in [six] different respects. In the sixth cause of action [the Trust] incorporates 

paragraph 83 as well as the preceding paragraphs and further in paragraph 96 that Logan 

‘breached his [f]iduciary [d]uties to the Trust by failing to account, refusing to provide 

documentation, investing the Trust’s money in high risk investments, self-dealing with 

entities in which both Logan and the Trust had an economic interest, and self-dealing 

with entities for which Logan was a manager, officer, or agent, and in which the Trust 

had invested funds.’ Based upon all of the evidence presented both testimonial and 

documentary, the court is satisfied that [the Trust] proved the allegations in the [fourth, 

fifth, and sixth] causes of action—the [fourth] cause of action by clear and convincing 

evidence.” 

In addition, the court commented the relationship between Logan and the 

Company was one and the same, stating, “Logan was [the Company] and the result was 

an abominable lack of documentation and record-keeping of [the Trust’s] account 

without justification and in violation of [r]espondent’s fiduciary duties to [the Trust.] 2 

 

2 It is unclear if the trial court trial court’s reference to “respondent” in this 

sentence was referring to Logan or the Company, and consequently we have left the 

court’s ruling as written.
5

As a result the [c]ourt’s decision is that [the Trust] proved economic damages of 

$207,220.79 and is entitled to [j]udgment on the [fourth, fifth, and sixth] causes of action 

as well as attorney fees. [¶] In the event [r]espondents satisfy the judgment in part or in 

whole, the distribution shall be applied to reduce [the Trust’s] interest in [the Company] 

but in no event below zero.” (Italics added.)

The following month, the Trust filed a motion for attorney fees and costs on 

the grounds it was the prevailing party in the elder abuse claim (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 15657.5, subd. (a)),

3 and because the Company failed to comply with record inspection 

rights as required by the Corporations Code. The Trust requested $158,946, supported by 

the declaration of its attorney, Robert Garretson. The Trust submitted copies of billing 

records (30 pages long) generated in the case and explained the Trust was billed on a 

hourly basis. Garretson requested an additional $2,600 for preparing the attorney fee 

motion (eight hours at his billing rate of $325 per hour). 

Logan filed an opposition arguing, inter alia, the fees were not reasonable 

because the bills included work done litigating against the defendants ultimately 

dismissed from the lawsuit. He asserted a reasonable fee would require an equal 

allocation of time spent between the various defendants up to the time of trial, and 

calculated those fees would be $77,430.80. The Company separately filed an opposition, 

raising the same contentions. 

The Trust filed a reply arguing, inter alia, the fees were reasonable because 

it “received the total amount of compensatory damages it sought during trial, that the 

facts, evidence and work needed were [sic] the same for all the causes of action, and the 

reason that [the Trust] included multiple entities because [Logan and the Company’s] 

‘abdominable lack of documentation and recordkeeping’ made it impossible to determine 

 

3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, 

unless otherwise indicated.
6

what entities were responsible. [(Citing the court’s January 9, 2013, statement of 

decision.)].” The Trust explained the legal fees should not be reduced because it pursued 

multiple causes of action (some of which did not provide for attorney fees) and “the work 

was the same of any of the legal theories.” In addition, the Trust reasoned the inclusion 

of multiple defendants was necessary and did not significantly increase the costs. It 

noted many of the entities had similar names and the attorney fees related to determining 

who received funds because the Company’s records were inadequate in this regard. 

Logan provided documentation right before the trial date enabling the Trust to finally 

determine which entities were responsible and which ones could be dismissed. Finally, 

the Trust argued the requested fees were reasonable and necessary.

A few days before the scheduled hearing, the court issued a minute order 

asking the Trust to supply supplemental briefing. The order provided, “[The Trust] is to 

submit additional information to the [c]ourt that breaks down the fees sought by the 

number of hours spent by each attorney and paralegal with his or her billing rate. [The 

Trust] is to also submit information about each attorney to justify his or her billing rate.” 

The Trust filed a supplemental motion addressing the court’s concerns. Garretson 

provided more detailed information about the credentials, hours worked and billing rates 

regarding himself and several attorneys in his firm who also worked on the case 

(Chadwick Bunch, Casey Kempner, Jerad Belz, and paralegal Joann Bales). 

The court held a hearing and took the matter under submission. It granted 

the motion awarding $156,346 in attorney fees and $5,171.30 in costs. It did not award 

the Trust for the fees generated to file the motion. It ordered the clerk to amend the 

judgment filed on January 10, 2013, to include the attorney fee and cost award.

II

A. Prevailing Party

Logan and the Company first allege that if they prevail on appeal in 

Sanders I, supra, G047997, the attorney fee award must also be reversed. As indicated 
7

above, we reversed the judgment only as to the Company. The judgment against Logan 

was affirmed. The Trust, as the prevailing party, may recover fees against Logan, but not 

the Company.4

B. Reasonable Fees for Financial Elder Abuse

As the prevailing plaintiff in a financial abuse case, the Trust was 

statutorily entitled to recover its reasonable attorney fees: “Where it is proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is liable for financial abuse . . . the court 

shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The term “costs” 

includes, but is not limited to, reasonable fees for the services of a conservator, if any, 

devoted to the litigation of a claim brought under this article.” (§ 15657.5, italics added.)

Logan argues the attorney fees awarded were excessive the court relied on 

improper criteria when making the award. We disagree.

An attorney fees award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Citizens 

Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 213, 233.) Abuse of 

discretion will be found only when it is shown there was no reasonable basis for the trial 

court’s action. (Ibid.) “‘[T]he appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial 

court exceeded the bounds of reason.’ [Citation.]” (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 

Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785.) “‘The “experienced trial judge is the 

best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his 

judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court 

is convinced that it is clearly wrong’—meaning that it abused its discretion. [Citation.]” 

(PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group).)

The trial court is not required to issue a statement of decision addressing 

disputed legal and factual issues when ruling on a motion for attorney fees. (Rebney v. 

 

4 In addition, because we conclude fees were warranted and reasonable under 

the financial elder abuse statutory scheme, we need not provide a dicta opinion about 

whether fees were also recoverable under Corporations Code. 
8

Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349.) “No specific findings reflecting 

the court’s calculations [are] required. [Citation.] ‘The record need only show that the 

attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.’ 

[Citation.] On appeal we infer all findings in favor of the prevailing parties. [Citation.]” 

(Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254.)

“[T]he lodestar method requires the trial court to first determine a 

touchstone or lodestar figure based on a careful compilation of the time spent and 

reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. [Citations.] The trial court may then 

augment or diminish the touchstone figure by taking various relevant factors into 

account. [Citations.]” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 

440, 445-446; see Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49.)

The record reflects the trial court engaged in the appropriate lodestar 

method in fashioning the attorney fees award. The Trust’s motion was accompanied by 

two declarations from attorney Garretson and billing statements detailing the number of 

hours expended by each attorney and paralegal who worked on this case, the experience 

of each, and the billing rate of each. The moving papers contained a graph clearly 

demonstrating the number of hours worked at hourly rates ranging from $185 for the 

paralegals to $325 for associates, for a total amount of $156,346. We can infer the court 

determined the hourly billing rates and total number of hours worked (502.7) were 

reasonable because it did not augment or diminish the amount requested. 

Logan contends the award must be reduced because it is obvious the court 

“did not satisfy its duty to review the invoices submitted to determine the hours 

reasonably spent.” (Italics omitted.) He explains fees related to inefficient or duplicative 

efforts are not subject to compensation. (Citing Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 

24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [court must carefully review documentation of hours expended, 

looking for “‘padding’”].) We agree the trial court has a duty to review the documents. 

However, Logan fails to explain why he believes the court breached this duty. We 
9

consider the point waived because his argument is devoid of any reasoned legal analysis 

or citation to authorities. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 

784-785 (Badie) [when appellant raises issue “but fails to support it with reasoned 

argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”]; see also Kim v. 

Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 [same].) And, in any event, it can 

reasonably be inferred from the court’s request for supplemental briefing that it reviewed 

the billing statements and noticed there were entries for several people not mentioned in 

the original motion for attorney fees, and there was no information about their hourly 

rates. The Trust supplied the information missing from the billing statements. We must

presume the court performed its duty to examine the evidence submitted. 

Logan also contends the court failed to satisfy its duty “to apportion the 

fees and costs between those causes of action for which statutory fees are permissible and 

those in which they are not.” (Italics and underline omitted.) He asserts a litigant may 

not increase his recovery of attorney fees by joining a cause of action in which attorney 

fees are not recoverable. Logan relies primarily on Bell v. Vista Unified School District 

(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672 (Bell), but the case is inapt.

Plaintiff in Bell alleged four causes of action relating to violation of the 

Brown Act (for which statutory attorney fees were available) and 11 causes of action 

related to various torts, including wrongful termination. (Bell, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 687.) The majority of claims for damages did not carry attorney fees. Nevertheless, 

after Plaintiff prevailed on his Brown Act claim and tort causes of action, the court 

awarded attorney fees on all causes of action. The appellate court found the award was 

an abuse of discretion, stating, “Although the Brown Act violation may have procedurally 

facilitated the wrongful termination or retaliatory firing, it did not substantially beget it. 

Simply stated, they constitute two separate and distinct claims, one entitled to statutory 

fees and the other not.” (Id. at p. 688.) The court also noted plaintiff’s counsel made 

candid admissions that suggested the fees could be apportioned between the Brown Act 
10

violations and the tort actions. (Id. at p. 689.) And the billing statements showed most of 

the attorney’s time was spent on the nonstatutory claims.

In this case there was not a distinct boundary between the elder abuse claim 

and the other causes of action. All the causes of action centered on the same facts and 

allegations of misconduct. It appears the work on the case proceeded concurrently on all 

causes of action and there is no basis for parsing out hours spent only on the elder abuse 

claim that were unrelated to the other claims. As acknowledged by the court in Bell, 

“Apportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would 

be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and 

noncompensable units. [Citations.]” (Bell, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 687.)

We also reject Logan’s assertion the court abused it discretion by failing to 

apportion the fees and costs between the party the Trust prevailed against (Logan) from 

fees relating to parties whom the Trust did not prevail. The two cases cited by Logan to 

support his contention both hold the court has “broad discretion” to apportion fees. 

(Zintel Holdings, LLC v. McLean (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 431, 443 (Zintel); Heppler v. 

J.M. Peters Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1297-1298 (Heppler).) 

For example, in the Zintel case, the court determined it was an abuse of 

discretion to not apportion attorney fees between the two tenants represented by counsel. 

In that case, the landlord brought an action against two tenants. (Zintel, supra, 

209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 442-443.) The tenant who filed a cross-complaint was not entitled 

to contractual attorney fees, but other tenant who did not cross-complain was entitled to 

fees. The court refused to award any fees, refusing to exercise its discretion and 

apportion the fees between the tenants. (Id. at p. 443.) The matter was remanded to 

permit the trial court to determine the reasonable amount of fees to which one tenant was 

entitled. (Id. at p. 444.)
11

The other case cited by Logan also does not assist him. In Heppler, the 

plaintiffs sued a contractor, who cross-complained against four subcontractors for 

construction defects. (Heppler, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273-1274.) 

The trial court awarded plaintiffs all their requested attorney fees against one 

subcontractor, Martin, pursuant to a contract provision. The appellate court concluded 

this was an abuse of discretion, stating, “Martin’s part of the case could have been tried in 

considerably less time than seven weeks had the trial not taken up issues that involved the 

other nonsettling subcontractors. It strikes us as eminently unfair to tag Martin with all of 

plaintiffs’ attorney fees for the entire seven-week trial. [¶] . . . [¶] Not all the issues 

involving Martin’s case were integrally associated with the other issues in the case; at the 

very least, some of them could have been severed and isolated for purposes of the 

attorney fees award.” (Id. at p. 1297.)

In both Zintel and Heppler, it was clearly possible to identify attorney fees 

expended unrelated to the prevailing party’s attorney fees. In Zintel, the court determined 

the award could be apportioned so as to not include those incurred in pursuing the 

cross-complaint. (Zintel, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 442-443.) In Heppler, the court 

determined the trial would have been shorter and involved less issues without the four 

subcontractors. (Heppler, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297.) The same cannot be said in 

this case. The trial court reasonably concluded the work reflected in the billing 

statements applied regardless of whether there was one or nine defendants. This is 

because all the defendants were initially entities or companies that appeared to be 

controlled by or used by Logan in his one deceitful scheme. And although a small sum of 

additional fees might have been incurred to sort out the status of these entities, the court 

could reasonably conclude these fees should be included because they were directly 

caused by Logan’s failure to timely disclose the requested information. Given Logan’s 

failure to provide the Trust with adequate records, and the inextricably intertwined issues 
12

shared by the Trust’s causes of action, we conclude it would be impractical, if not 

impossible, to separate the Trust’s legal team’s activities into compensable and 

non-compensable fees. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said the court’s fee award 

was an abuse of its discretion.

And finally, Logan argues it should not have taken the Trust’s attorney’s 

49 hours to prepare and serve the complaint. Just because Logan believes it should take 

less time, does not prove the bill was padded, or more importantly that the court abused 

its discretion. As stated above, “‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the 

value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course 

subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is 

clearly wrong’—meaning that it abused its discretion.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th 

at p. 1095.) We consider Logan’s contention waived because his argument is devoid of 

any reasoned legal analysis or discussion of the relevant case law. (See Badie, supra,

67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)

III

The postjudgment attorney fee order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover 

his costs on appeal.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, J.

THOMPSON, J.