alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Joseph M. MARBLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAYOR, CITY OF SOUTHFIELD; City of Southfield; Department of Treasury; Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service; Michigan District Director; IRS/CID Division Chief; John Doe, Police Chief, City of Southfield, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-1944.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Aug. 11, 2003.

Before BATCHELDER and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; and RUSSELL, District Judge.*

*

The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

*ORDER*

Joseph M. Marbly appeals a district court order that denied his petition for leave to file his civil rights complaint in which he sought to assert claims for various civil rights violations. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(l), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a).

Plaintiff has filed numerous federal lawsuits in which he has alleged that agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) harassed him and kept him under surveillance after he filed employment discrimination complaints and lawsuits involving his employment with the IRS. Eventually, the district court entered an order enjoining plaintiff from filing any further vexatious lawsuits to relitigate these matters, and this court affirmed the district court’s injunctive order on appeal. *Marbly v. Kay,*No. 00-1530, 2000 WL 1827783 (6th Cir. Dec.8, 2000). Here, the district court properly denied plaintiffs petition for leave to file another complaint. Plaintiff has attempted to file similar lawsuits in the wake of the district court’s injunction. *See Marbly v. Southfield Mayor,*No. 01-2414, 2002 WL 1363554 (6th Cir. June 21, 2002), *cert. dismissed,*537 U.S. 1042, 123 S.Ct. 627, 154 L.Ed.2d 512 (2002); *Marbly v. Mayor, City of Southfield,*No. 01-2073, 2002 WL 123583 (6th Cir. Jan.28, 2002), *cert. denied,*535 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 1795, 152 L.Ed.2d 653 (2002); *Marbly v. City of Southfield,*No. 01-1778, 2001 WL 1587416 (6th Cir. Dec.11, 2001). While the specific claims asserted in this case differ slightly from those alleged in his prior lawsuits, plaintiffs petition is another attempt to litigate similar claims. It is noted that plaintiffs complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted in any event. *See Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank,*823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.1987). Accordingly, the district court properly denied plaintiffs petition.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is affirmed. Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
#### John Aitken, Individually and as Trustee, etc., Appellant, v. Charles H. Young, as Executor of George Ferguson, Deceased, and The American Bonding Company of Baltimore, Respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

NEIL L. WHITESELL; NLW HOLDINGS, )

LLC; WHITESELL CORPORATION; and )

WHITESELL PRECISION COMPONENTS, ) 

INC. )

)

Appellants, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-3401

)

BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE )

AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT; WHITESELL )

FORMED COMPONENTS, INC.; and )

WHITESELL CANADA CORPORATION, )

)

Appellees. )

)

Opinion filed February 28, 2018

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 

from the Circuit Court for Collier County; 

Lauren L. Brodie, Judge.

Steve I. Silverman, Alan J. Kluger, Erin E. 

Bohannon, and Christina M. Himmel of 

Kluger, Kaplan, Silverman, Katzen & 

Levine, P.L., Miami; and Alex Figares and 

Edmond E. Koester of Coleman, 

Yovanovich & Koester, P.A., Naples; and 

Lewis J. Liman and Thomas J. Moloney of 

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, 

New York, New York, for Appellants. 

Nicholas P. Mizell, Edward K. Cheffy, and 

Maria Vigilante of Cheffy Passidomo, P.A., 

Naples; and George Zimmerman, Jonathan 

L. Frank, Colm P. McInerney, and Julie E. 

Cohen, of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher 
- 2 -

& Flom LLP, New York, New York, for 

Appellee Bayerische Motoren Werke 

Aktiengesellschaft. 

No appearance for remaining Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

LaROSE, C.J., and CASANUEVA and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 3, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

____________

NO. 14-12-00464-CR

NO. 14-12-00465-CR

____________

MONDRE KETCHUM, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 338th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 1314068 & 1314266

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant entered guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly 

weapon. In accordance with the terms of a plea bargain agreement with the State, the trial 

court sentenced appellant in each case to confinement for 25 years in the Institutional 

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant filed a pro se notice of 

appeal. We dismiss the appeal. 

The trial court entered certifications of the defendant’s right to appeal in which the 

court certified that these are plea bargain cases, and the defendant has no right of appeal. 
2

See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court’s certifications are included in the records

on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). The records support the trial court’s 

certifications. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Christopher, and Jamison.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the
Quarterly Report of Paradise, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Melvin S. Gordon, as Chief Executive Officer of Paradise,
Inc., certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of Paradise, Inc.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                     |  |  |  |                      
|------------------------------------ |  |  |  | ---------------------
|/s/ Melvin S. Gordon                 |  |  |  | Date: August 14, 2009
|Melvin S. Gordon                     |  |  |  |                      
|Chief Executive Officer and Chairman |  |  |  |
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Form S-8 Nos. 333-131324, 333-126773, 333-112417 and 333-108937) pertaining to the Amended and Restated 1991 Employee and Consultant Stock Plan, the Amended and Restated 1993 Director Stock
Option Plan, the Amended and Restated 1993 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, the Amended and Restated 2001 Stock Incentive Plan and 2003 Israeli Share Option Plan of DSP Group Inc. and its subsidiaries of our reports dated March 14, 2006, with respect
to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of DSP Group Inc. and its subsidiaries, DSP Group Inc. managements assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control
over financial reporting of DSP Group Inc. included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005.



/S/    KOST FORER GABBEY &
KASIERERKost Forer Gabbay & KasiererA Member of Ernst & Young Global


Tel-Aviv, Israel

March 14, 2006
Exhibit 13.2


CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(B)
UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 0F 1934




In
connection with the Annual Report of Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd. (the
“Company”) on Form 20-F for the year ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Peter
Li, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350,
that:




(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition of the Company as of June 30, 2010 and results of
operations of the Company for the year ended June 30, 2010.




/s/ Peter LiName:
            Peter
      LiTitle:
            Chief
      Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)Date:
            December
      21, 2010




The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350 and is not being filed as part of this Annual Report or as a separate
disclosure document.
EXHIBIT 31.2
                       CERTIFICATION

I, Neal E. Schmale, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Pacific
Enterprises;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this Quarterly Report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this Quarterly Report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial
information included in this Quarterly Report fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this Quarterly Report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and we have:

a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information relating
to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this Quarterly Report is being
prepared;

b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this Quarterly Report
our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this Quarterly Report, based on such evaluation; and

c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting;

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing
the equivalent function):

a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal controls over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and

b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.

November 6, 2003

/S/ NEAL E. SCHMALE
Neal E. Schmale
Chief Financial Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6098 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6098

To amend the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 to provide reimbursements 
    for licensing and exam fees under the Veteran Rapid Retraining 
       Assistance Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 30, 2021

 Mr. Wittman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 to provide reimbursements 
    for licensing and exam fees under the Veteran Rapid Retraining 
       Assistance Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REIMBURSEMENTS FOR LICENSING AND EXAM FEES UNDER VETERAN 
              RAPID RETRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

    Subsection (c) of section 8006 of the American Rescue Plan Act of 
2021 (Public Law 117-2; 38 U.S.C. 3001 note prec.) is amended by adding 
at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(5) Licensing and exam fees.--In carrying out retraining 
        assistance under this section, the Secretary shall provide 
        reimbursements to eligible veterans for licensing and exam fees 
        in a manner the Secretary determines appropriate.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Curtis R. DAVY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE; United States of America, Respondents-appellees.

No. 02-6395.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 28, 2002.

Decided Nov. 7, 2002.

Curtis R. Davy, Appellant Pro Se. Kevin Frank McDonald, Office of the United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Curtis R. Davy appeals the district court’s order granting the Respondents’ motion to dismiss his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district *123court, *see Davy v. INS,*No. CA-01 — 4033-6-13AK (D.S.C. filed Jan. 4, 2002 & entered Jan. 8, 2002), and on the reasoning of our recent decision in *Chambers v. Reno,*307 F.3d 284 (4th Cir.2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | The Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended June 30, 2013 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |

|    |                                                                                                                                                     |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |

|                                                   |
|---------------------------------------------------|
|                                                   |
| /s/ Christopher T. Weber                          |
|                                              |
| Christopher T. Weber                              |
| Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 November 24, 2020

a1116

Order 

Clerk

November 24, 2020

161111(88)

DAX ELLIOT CARPENTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 161111

COA: 344512 

Eaton CC: 2008-000929-DM

JULIE ELIZABETH CARPENTER,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s September 8, 

2020 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that 

reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).
#### Vernon G. Jenkins v. State.

No. 24869.

October 4, 1950.

*C. H. Tupper, W. E. Hall,*and *W. A. Johnson,*San Angelo, for appellant.

*126
      *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Murder is the offense; the punishment, twenty-five years in the penitentiary.

That appellant killed his father-in-law by shooting him with a high-powered rifle is not disputed, but admitted by appellant. The jury rejected the self-defense theory.

Two bills of exception appear complaining of statements made in the opening argument of state’s counsel.

It would serve no useful purpose to set out the argument complained of. It is sufficient to say that it violated no statutory mandate; nor was it obviously harmful, prejudicial, or manifestly improper; nor was any new fact thereby injected into the case. Reversible error is therefore not reflected. Vineyard v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 401, 257 S. W. 548; Heidle v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 201, 86 S. W. 2d 641; Tadlock v. State, 139 Tex. Cr. R. 316, 139 S. W. 2d 796; McMahon v. State, 147 Tex. Cr. R. 508, 182 S. W. 2d 712; Mickle v. State, 149 Tex. Cr. R. 53, 191 S. W. 2d 41.

The remaining bills of exception complain of the admission of testimony. These bills of exception cannot be considered because they are drawn in question-and-answer form, with no accompanying certificate of the trial judge that such was necessary.

Appellant contends that the bills were by the trial court ordered drawn in question-and-answer form and that such fact is reflected by the following and unattached order:

> “I, John F. Sutton, Judge of the District Court of Tom Green County, 51st Judicial District of Texas, hereby certify that in order to clearly understand Bills of Exception Numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 in the above entitled and numbered cause the same should be put in question and answer form and same are so approved in such form.”

The order was filed in the trial court long after the expiration of the time allowed for filing bills of exception.

The numbers set out in the order identify the bills of exception relating to the admission of testimony.

*127It will be noted that there is nothing in the order to show that it was made at the time the bills of exception were approved by the trial court, or that it was made within the time allowed for the filing of the bills of exception in the trial court. For the order to be effective, it was necessary that it be made within such time.

The conclusion is reached that as same appears in the record, the order is insufficient to authorize consideration of the question-and-answer bills of exception.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
#### Wilhelm Vollmer, Respondent, *v.*The Hayes Machine Company, Appellant.

Second Department,

December 30, 1908.

Contract — agreement to manufacture and deliver machine — recovery of earnest money.

Where the defendant contracted to manufacture and deliver a special machine at an agreed price, payable on delivery, and failed to complete the machine or offer delivery, the plaintiff is entitled to recover earnest money paid, even though the defendant suspended the work because the plaintiff refused to pay an extra sum for changes which increased the cost of construction.

Appeal by the defendant, The Hayes Machine Company, from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Brooklyn, in favor of the plaintiff, rendered on the 30th day of June, 1908.

*Jonathan Deyo,*for the appellant.

*Joshua Haberman,*for the respondent.

Woodward, J.:

There is no dispute that the plaintiff went to the defendant and entered into a contract for the construction of a special machine at the agreed price of $200, the plaintiff submitting plans and a rough working model, and the defendant rendering a bill for the same for the agreed amount, and acknowledging in such bill the receipt of $100 on account. It is likewise not disputed that the defendant has not delivered the machine, but has refused to do so. The plaintiff brings this action to recover the amount of his payment, and the defendant counterclaims for $166.22, it being alleged that subsequent to the making of the contract the plaintiff ordered various changes in the work, which largely increased the cost; that the plaintiff was told these changes would increase the cost, and that when the defendant demanded the payment of more money, which plaintiff refused to pay, the work was suspended. There was a clear conflict of evidence, the plaintiff denying that he ordered any changes subsequent to the making of the contract, and the defend*427ant producing a 'witness who testified to various changes. The defendant appeals from the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

The defendant has never completed the machine and offered it for delivery, and it is doubtful if he would be entitled to recover anything for the work performed, assuming the changes to have been ordered, without fulfilling the contract as modified. There is no evidence of any modification of the contract as to the payments. The bill was rendered for $200, with a credit of $100 on account, which clearly implied the condition that the balance of the sum was to be paid upon the delivery of the machine. Ho delivery having been tendered, and the defendant refusing to deliver, it would have no basis for an action to recover on the counterclaim. There is no dispute that it has not made and delivered the machine which it contracted to make and deliver, and the plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover his advance payment.

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

Hooker, Gaynor, Rich and Miller, JJ., concurred.

Judgment of the Municipal Court, affirmed, with costs.
#### Victor J. ARTHUS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEMOCRATIC PARISH COMMITTEE OF ST. BERNARD PARISH et al., Defendants and Appellees.

No. 16299.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Dec. 5, 1935.

J. Bernard Cocke and Bertrand I. Cahn, both of New Orleans, for appellants.

Lawrence W. Bergeron and John R. Perez, both of New Orleans, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

It is conceded by counsel that the issues presented here cannot be distinguished from those which confronted the Supreme Court in the matter entitled Paul Adolph Brown v. Democratic Parish Committee of St. Bernard Parish et al., 165 So. 167, and in various other cases decided by the Supreme Court in the same opinion and decree rendered in the Brown Case on December 3,. 1935,

For the reasons assigned by the Supreme Court in that case, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be affirmed.

Affirmed.