alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF

PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Gas
Transmission Northwest Corporation for the quarter ended March 31, 2005, I, Harold N. Kvisle, Chief Executive Officer of Gas Transmission Northwest Corporation, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:



| | (1) | such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2005, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2005, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of Gas Transmission Northwest Corporation.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|             |  |  |  |                        
|------------ |  |  |  | -----------------------
|             |  | 
|May 12, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ Harold N. Kvisle   
|             |  |  |  | Harold N. Kvisle       
|             |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer



A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Gas Transmission Northwest Corporation and will be retained by Gas Transmission Northwest Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
Motion Granted and Reinstatement Order filed February 6, 2018.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 16

- 00633

- CV

____________ WAUGHSUP, LLC, JOSEP H MARTIN, CALTECH MA NAGEMENT, INC.,

AND TURNO INTERNATIO NAL, INC. , Appellant s

V.

CHA RLES WATKINS AND PAU LA DAVILA , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 269th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012

- 64701



### REINSTATEMENT ORDER Appellee, Charles Watkins, petitioned for voluntary bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Co urt for the Southern District of Texas, under cause
number 17

- 33611 . Because a stay is automatically effected by Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, when this court received notice of appellee’s bankruptcy filing, on June 15, 2017 , we stayed all procee dings in the appeal. See Tex. R. App.
P. 8.2.On January 31, 2018, appellants filed a motion to reinstate the appeal

pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 8.3(a). Attached to the motion is a true copy of the bankruptcy court ’ s order dismissing the bankruptcy case.
The motion is granted. Accordingly, the case is ordered REINSTATED and placed on the court ’ s active docket.
Appellees ’ brief is due to be filed with the clerk of this court on or before March 8, 2018

.
PER CURIAM
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Small Business Administration

          - [Disaster Declaration # 11371] 

# AGENCY:

U.S. Small Business Administration. 

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This is a notice of an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) declaration for the State of Massachusetts, dated 08/15/2008. 

*Incident:*                         Fire.                     

*Incident Period:*                         07/04/2008.                     

*Effective Date:*                         08/15/2008.                     

*EIDL Loan Application Deadline Date:*                         05/15/2009.                     

# ADDRESSES:

Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

M. Mitravich, Office of Disaster Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416. 

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Notice is hereby given that as a result of the Administrator's EIDL declaration, applications for economic injury disaster loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally announced locations. 

The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster:

*Primary Counties:*                     Dukes                

*Contiguous Counties:*

Massachusetts: Barnstable

The Interest Rate is: 4.000. 

The number assigned to this disaster for economic injury is 113710. 

The States which received an EIDL Declaration number are Massachusetts.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59002)

Dated: August 15, 2008. 

Jovita Carranza, 

Acting Administrator.

[FR Doc. E8-19372 Filed 8-20-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### Guadalupe Cantu v. State.

No. 24468.

November 23, 1949.

Rehearing Denied January 4, 1950.

*Fidencio G. Garza,*Mercedes, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

The offense is assault with intent to murder, with punishment assessed at fifteen years in the penitentiary by reason of a prior conviction for assault with intent to murder, as provided by Art. 62, P. C.

Avila, the injured party, a deputy sheriff, was called to the town of LaVilla, in Hidalgo County, to investigate a disturbance there by a man reported to be “shooting up the town.” Upon the deputy sheriff’s arrival, the man was identified as the ap*100pellant. With the assistance of other peace officers, appellant, armed with a pistol, was apprehended on a public highway. Avila ordered him to drop the gun as he was arresting him. Thereupon, appellant opened fire upon Avila, none of the three shots fired taking effect. Avila then shot the appellant.

Testifying in his own behalf, appellant said that, due to the drinking of “Habanera” some time before, he knew nothing about what happened. He denied any enmity or ill-will toward Avila or any intent to kill him.

The facts abundantly support the verdict.

Appellant contends that the prior conviction relied upon to enhance the punishment was that of assault with intent to murder without malice, and was not an offense of the same nature as that of assault with intent to murder with malice.

Assault to murder without malice is, nonetheless, an assault with intent to murder; malice, or the absence of malice, in the commission of such offense, affects only the punishment.

Other matters appearing in the record cannot be considered, in the absence of bills of exception.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.

ON APPELLANT’S motion for rehearing.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Motion for rehearing in this case raises no question other than that discussed in the original opinion. The motion was presented by able oral argument. We have given consideration to this and have carefully reviewed the record. It appears that the original opinion disposed of all issues properly and that further discussion of the same would not be helpful.

■ Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
Exhibit
32.1








Certification
of Principal Executive Officer, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350,


as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of BLS Media, Inc. a Nevada corporation
(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), Brittany Prager, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certifies to
the best of her knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
BLS Media, Inc., and will be retained by BLS Media, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





/s/
      Brittany PragerBrittany
      Prager
              Chief
      Executive Officer
              November
      13, 2009
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-7224

LARRY ALBERT FORD, Petitioner - Appellant, versus GENE M. JOHNSON, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (CA-04-747-RAJ-TEM) Submitted: November 17, 2005 Decided: November 29, 2005 Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Larry Albert Ford, Appellant Pro Se. John H. McLees, Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Larry Albert Ford seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ford has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6676

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TONY JAMES MARTIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Robert D. Potter, Senior

District Judge. (CR-92-36-P, CA-96-21-5-P)

Submitted: July 23, 1996 Decided: August 6, 1996

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Edward Parrish, Conway, South Carolina, for Appellant.

Harry Thomas Church, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte,

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988), as amended by Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1217. We have reviewed the record and the district court's

opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Martin, Nos. CR-92-36-P; CA-96-21-5-P

(W.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
March 17, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

GLYNN CHASE WASHINGTON, Appellant

NO. 14-13-00678-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. 

Having considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the 

judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED.

We further order appellant pay all costs expended in the appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott LEISNER and Steven Zatsky, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 72-2325

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 2, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 27, 1972.

Alan E. Weinstein, Miami Beach, Fla., for Leisner.

Harvey S. Swickle, Miami Beach, Fla., for Zatsky.

Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., Michael P. Sullivan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before GEWIN, AINSWORTH and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants were convicted of violation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. The sole contention on appeal is that the Act is unconstitutional because it fails to require proof of a specific connection between the prohibited drugs and interstate commerce as a prerequisite for conviction. This identical contention has been considered and rejected by us several times. See United States v. Lopez, 5 Cir., 1972, 459 F.2d 949; United States v. Lane et *337al., 5 Cir., 1972, 461 F.2d 343; United States v. Lopez, et al., 5 Cir., 1972, 461 F.2d 499; United States v. Mather, 5 Cir., 1972, 465 F.2d 1035.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999             JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         $47,747                 $54,229
<SECURITIES>                                        $0                      $0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 $820,932                $673,124
<ALLOWANCES>                                        $0                      $0
<INVENTORY>                                $12,912,919             $12,172,012
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           $15,080,123             $13,426,357
<PP&E>                                     $19,766,437             $18,633,930
<DEPRECIATION>                             $13,792,075             $13,154,653
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             $21,743,684             $19,605,117
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      $10,803,170              $9,559,313
<BONDS>                                     $2,125,984              $2,300,561
<COMMON>                                      $174,926                $174,926
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               $0                      $0
<PREFERRED>                                         $0                      $0
<OTHER-SE>                                  $9,302,853              $8,415,762
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               $21,743,684             $19,605,117
<SALES>                                     $2,429,927              $2,314,891
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            $2,467,841              $2,351,842
<CGS>                                       $2,180,638              $1,906,870
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               $2,180,638              $1,906,870
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              $381,656                $365,549
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    $0                      $0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            $132,519                $167,469
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           $(1,502,091)            $(1,265,553)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        $0                      $0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       $(1,502,091)            $(1,265,553)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      $0                      $0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     $0                $809,079
<CHANGES>                                           $0                      $0
<NET-INCOME>                              $(1,502,091)              $(456,474)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  $(2.89)                 $(0.88)
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</TABLE>
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JAMAL A. MILLER, 

Appellant, 

v. Case No. 5D23-296

LT Case No. 16-2016-CF-08450-A

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Appellee. 

_______________________________/ 

Decision filed February 21, 2023

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Duval County, 

Mark Borello, Judge. 

Jamal A. Miller, Bristol, pro se. 

No Appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LAMBERT, C.J., EVANDER and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 23, 2019

b1216 

# Order

Clerk December 23, 2019

158584

In re ESTATE OF ROBERT BERRY BULLOCK.

__________________________________________

GWENDOLYN MOORE, Co

- Personal

Representative of the ESTATE OF ROBERT

BERRY BULLOCK,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 158584

COA: 338635

Wayne PC: 2017

- 824534

- CZ

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a/k/a

JPMOR GAN CHASE & CO.,

Defendant

- Appellee.

__________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 21, 2018

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### Roy Howard v. State.

No. 24757.

May 10, 1950.

Rehearing Denied June 7, 1950.

*Benson, Anderson & Howard,*by *Hugh Anderson,*Lubbock, for appellant.

*Lloyd A. Wicks, Jr.,*County Attorney, Crosbyton, and *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is a driving-while-intoxicated case; the punishment, a fine of $250 and ninety days in jail.

A highway patrolman arrested appellant for driving and operating his automobile in a dangerous and reckless manner upon a public highway. Upon effecting the arrest, the patrolman discovered that appellant was drunk, and carried him to jail. About three hours thereafter the sheriff of the county saw appellant in jail. He testified that at that time he was drunk.

Appellant denied that he was intoxicated.

*37The sole bill of exception appearing in the record complains of the receipt in evidence of the testimony of the sheriff.

The testimony was admissible as corroborating the state’s witness that the appellant was drunk when he arrested him. Mikeska v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. R. 109, 182 S. W. 1127; Kirby v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. R. 63, 150 S. W. 455; Millican v. State, 143 Tex. Cr. R. 115, 157 S. W. 2d 357.

The time elapsing between the arrest and the sheriff’s seeing appellant was a question addressed to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.

WOODLEY, Judge.

We remain convinced that no error is shown by appellant’s lone bill of exception.

The sheriff was properly permitted to testify that in his opinion appellant was drunk some three hours after his arrest. See Jones v. State, 130 Tex. Cr. R. 102, 92 S.W. 2d 246; King v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. R. 496, 113 S.W. 2d 181.

The surrounding circumstances as well as the time elpased must be considered in passing upon the admissibility of testimony over the objection that it is too remote.

Appellant was in custody from the time of his arrest, and the circumstances are such as to exclude the belief that he had consumed intoxicants after the alleged offense.

Under such circumstances the fact that three hours had elapsed since the time of the alleged offense would not condemn the testimony as too remote. The weight of the evidence was, of course, for the jury.

Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion approved by the court.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1



               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

         We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report
(Form 10-K) of ParcPlace-Digitalk, Inc. of our report dated April 23, 1997,
included in the 1997 Annual Report to Stockholders of ParcPlace-Digitalk, Inc.

         Our audits also included the financial statement schedule of
ParcPlace-Digitalk, Inc. listed in Item 14(a). This schedule is the
responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an
opinion based on our audits. In our opinion, the financial statement schedule
referred to above, when considered in relation to the basic financial statements
taken as a whole, present fairly in all material respects the information set
forth therein.

         We also consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements (Form S-8 No. 333-09807, No. 333-20779, No. 33-96616, and No.
33-78542) pertaining to the 1995 Stock Option / Stock Issuance Plan ( of
Objectshare Systems, Inc. ), 1993 Stock Plan and 1993 Employee Stock Purchase
Plan of ParcPlace-Digitalk, Inc., 1988 Incentive Stock Option Plan, the 1989
Stock Option Plan, the 1992 Incentive and Nonstatutory Stock Option Plan, and
the 1995 Director Stock Option Plan of ParcPlace-Digitalk, Inc. of our report
dated April 23, 1997, with respect to the consolidated financial statements
incorporated herein by reference, and our report included in the preceding
paragraph with respect to the financial statement schedule included in this
Annual Report (Form 10-K) of ParcPlace-Digitalk, Inc.



                                              /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP



San Jose, California
June 30, 1997