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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

TREVONN HANCOCK

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1158 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered September 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-11-CR-0001280-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

ROMEO M. TREXLER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1159 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered September 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-11-CR-0001117-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

AARON JAMES FINDLEY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1160 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered September 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-11-CR-0001119-2021
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BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: June 9, 2023

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the September 2, 

2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County (trial court) 

granting the motions to suppress filed by Trevonn Hancock (Hancock), Romeo 

M. Trexler (Trexler) and Aaron James Findley (Findley) (collectively, the 

Defendants).

1

 We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Following a traffic stop during which two firearms were recovered, the 

Defendants were each charged with two counts of persons not to possess a 

firearm and two counts of carrying a firearm without a license.2 Hancock was 

additionally charged with one count of tampering with evidence and Findley 

was charged with three counts of drug-related driving under the influence 

(DUI).3 The Defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence gleaned from 

the vehicle stop, arguing that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the vehicle and were subjected to a prolonged illegal detention for a minor 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Because the Commonwealth has raised the same issues in each appeal, we 

have consolidated these cases sua sponte. Pa. R.A.P. 513.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1) & 6106(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4910(2), 3802(D)(1)(i), 3802(D)(1)(iii) & 3802(D)(2).
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vehicle violation. They contended that no valid probable cause, exigent 

circumstances, consent or search warrant rendered the search constitutional. 

The trial court aptly summarized the facts adduced at the suppression hearing:

On or about August 16, 2021, Officer Dalton K. Geisel of the East 

Conemaugh Borough Police Department performed a traffic stop 

of a silver Jeep operating without illuminated headlights on 

Second Street in East Conemaugh Borough. Officer Geisel 

approached the subject vehicle and spoke with the driver, later 

identified as Defendant Findley, and requested his driver’s license, 

registration, and proof of insurance. Defendant Findley provided 

a driver’s license, but failed to provide valid registration or 

insurance for the vehicle. Notably, Officer Geisel later reported 

that he detected some signs that Defendant Findley may have 

been intoxicated while operating the vehicle, including “bloodshot 

and glassy eyes.” Officer Geisel also asked the three passengers 

in the vehicle to provide identification. None of the passengers 

provided physical identification, but a Mr. Jashon Gordon identified 

himself accurately and Defendant Hancock claimed that his name 

was “Marquis/Marcus Phillips.”

Shortly after the traffic stop began, Defendant Trexler’s mother, 

Jacqueline Trexler, arrived on scene and provided Officer Geisel 

and Detective Deffenbaugh of the East Taylor Police Department, 

who had arrived shortly before, with the vehicle’s insurance

information. Officer Geisel, based on signs which he detected at 

the onset of the stop, believed that the driver, Defendant Findley, 

might be operating the vehicle under the influence. Officer Geisel 

removed Defendant Findley from the vehicle, performed a Terry[4]

frisk, and then handcuffed him and ordered him to sit on the 

nearby sidewalk. Officer Geisel also requested that the 

passengers exit the vehicle and performed Terry frisks of each of 

them, then handcuffed them and ordered them to sit on the 

sidewalk. Officer Geisel looked into the vehicle through one of the 

open doors and then asked Ms. Trexler several times for her 

consent to search it. Ms. Trexler, as the registered owner of the 

vehicle, provided Officer Geisel with verbal consent for him to 

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4 Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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perform a search of the car’s interior. Officer Geisel retrieved a 

loaded AK-47 from the backside passenger seat behind the driver 

that was covered by a jacket. Officer Geisel also found a loaded 

Taurus 9-millimeter in the trunk of the vehicle, which was 

accessible from the passenger compartment.

Officer Geisel then performed field sobriety tests for Defendant 

Findley, but did not detect any additional signs of impairment. 

Detective Deffenbaugh then transported Defendant Findley to 

Conemaugh Hospital for a blood alcohol content (BAC) test while 

Ms. Trexler was permitted to retake custody of the vehicle. Before 

releasing the vehicle to Ms. Trexler, Officer Geisel secured the 

aforementioned weapons and also discovered a THC packet, 

leading him to suspect that one or more of the vehicle’s occupants 

had been under the influence of THC at the time of the stop. This 

was confirmed by the BAC test performed on Defendant Findley, 

which showed traces of Delta-9 and Carboxy THC in his system.

Opinion and Order, 9/2/22, at 1-3. The traffic stop was recorded on Officer 

Geisel’s body camera and the footage was introduced as an exhibit at the 

suppression hearing. The Commonwealth also submitted the transcript of the 

joint preliminary hearing for Findley, Gordon and Trexler; the Defendants’ 

criminal records; and Findley’s toxicology report.

The trial court granted the Defendants’ motions to suppress, concluding 

that Officer Geisel lacked probable cause to arrest the passengers based on 

Findley’s alleged DUI, and that he lacked probable cause to arrest Findley 

based on his performance on the field sobriety tests. Because the Defendants 

were improperly detained, the trial court held that Ms. Trexler’s consent to 

search the vehicle was invalid and the evidence uncovered during the stop 
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must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Commonwealth timely 

appealed and it and the trial court complied with Pa. R.A.P. 1925.

II.

The Commonwealth raises two issues5 on appeal: whether the trial 

court erred by failing to determine whether the Defendants had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the Jeep, and whether it erred in holding that 

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5 As Findley points out in his brief, the Commonwealth refers only to the trial 

court’s suppression of the AK-47 rifle and does not at any point reference the 

9-milimeter pistol or the blood test performed on Findley. Similarly, the 

Commonwealth’s concise statement references the AK-47 in its first statement 

of error and the vehicle search generally in its second statement of error. 

However, the Defendants were each charged with two counts of persons not 

to possess and carrying a firearm without a license, one for each weapon 

recovered from the Jeep, and Findley was charged with three counts of DUI 

based on the results of his blood test. Because the Commonwealth has not 

raised any argument on appeal challenging the suppression of Findley’s blood 

test results, we agree that it has waived any claim of error relating to that 

portion of the trial court’s order. See Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citation omitted) (“Any claim for which an appellant fails to include citation 

to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful 

fashion capable of review is waived.”). However, both firearms were 

recovered from the same vehicle search and the legal arguments related to 

suppression of the rifle are identical to the arguments related to suppression 

of the pistol. Accordingly, the Commonwealth’s claims on appeal regarding 

the Defendants’ expectation of privacy in the Jeep and Ms. Trexler’s consent 

to search the vehicle encompass the recovery of both firearms, and we decline 

to find waiver simply because the Commonwealth did not specifically identify 

the pistol in its concise statement and brief as evidence recovered during the 

challenged search. See Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v) (“Each error identified in the 

Statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue that was raised in 

the trial court.”).
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suppression was proper because the search emanated from an illegal seizure 

of its occupants, notwithstanding Ms. Trexler’s consent to search the vehicle.6

Here, the Defendants were detained when Officer Geisel removed them

from the Jeep, placed them in handcuffs and informed them that they were

being detained but were not under arrest. The law governing investigative 

detentions is well-settled:

To maintain constitutional validity, an investigative detention 

must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 

the person seized is engaged in criminal activity and may continue 

only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion.

The asserted grounds for an investigative detention must be 

evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. So long as the 

initial detention is lawful, nothing precludes a police officer from 

acting upon the fortuitous discovery of evidence suggesting a 

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6

When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an appellate

court is required to determine whether the record supports the

suppression court’s factual findings and whether the inferences

and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression court from those

findings are appropriate. [Where the defendant] prevailed in the

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the

defense and so much of the evidence for the Commonwealth as

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as

a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse

only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

However, where the appeal of the determination of the

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the

suppression court’s conclusions of law are not binding on an

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression

court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Tillery, 249 A.3d 278, 280 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted).
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different crime than that initially suspected[.] However, an 

unjustified seizure immediately violates the Fourth Amendment 

rights of the suspect, taints the evidence recovered thereby, and 

subjects that evidence to the exclusionary rule.

Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119, 1127-28 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 927-28 (Pa. 2019)). In 

contrast, a custodial detention that is the functional equivalent of arrest must 

be supported by probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (citation 

omitted). “Probable cause is made out when the facts and circumstances 

which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of 

which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a 

man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is 

committing a crime.” Id.

In the context of a vehicle stop, an officer may conduct “mission related” 

inquiries into the vehicle violations that prompted the stop and incidental 

matters concerning the safe operation of the vehicle, such as checking the 

driver’s licensure status, the vehicle’s registration and insurance status, or 

whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver. Commonwealth 

v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 150 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Rodriguez v. U.S., 

575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). An officer may ask whether there are weapons in 

the vehicle, order the occupants of the vehicle to exit the vehicle for officer 

safety, or, alternatively, to remain in the vehicle until the stop is completed 
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without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.; see also 

Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 564 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Importantly, “[t]he authority to carry out these actions do not, in and of 

themselves, expand the grounds for detaining or investigating passengers 

who are merely present in a lawfully stopped vehicle.” Id. With this 

background, we proceed to the Commonwealth’s claims.

A.

In its first argument, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court 

erred by failing to determine whether the Defendants had a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the Jeep, as they did not own the vehicle or have Ms. 

Trexler’s permission to use the vehicle. It maintains that a reasonable 

expectation of privacy is a threshold requirement to seek suppression of the 

firearms found in the vehicle, and the Defendants had none. Relying primarily 

on Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278 (Pa. 2017), the Defendants

respond that they are not required to establish a reasonable expectation of 

privacy because they were illegally detained before the search of the vehicle 

took place.7 We agree.

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7

In the trial court, the Defendants argued that they had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the Jeep and, in the alternative, even if they did not 

have such an expectation, they were entitled to challenge the vehicle search 

because it resulted from their illegal detention. In its opinion, the trial court 

did not squarely address whether the Defendants had a reasonable 
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It is axiomatic that a defendant seeking suppression of evidence must 

have standing8 and a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched 

in order to prevail on the merits of his claim. See Commonwealth v. Viall, 

890 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Super. 2005). “An expectation of privacy will be found 

to exist when the individual exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of 

privacy and that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as 

reasonable.” Id. In Viall, a case in which no party challenged the legitimacy 

of the vehicle stop, we held that “an ordinary passenger in an automobile does 

not by his mere presence have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the entire 

passenger compartment of that vehicle . . . it would be unreasonable to 

maintain a subjective expectation of privacy in locations of common access to 

all occupants.” Id. at 423; see also Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 

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expectation of privacy in the Jeep. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/22, at 5

(stating only that it “agrees with Defendants” and will proceed to the merits 

analysis). It went on to conclude that the Defendants were subjected to an 

illegal arrest not supported by probable cause, as discussed infra. Based on 

our review of the certified record and the parties’ arguments, we find Shabezz

dispositive of this issue. “To the extent our legal reasoning differs from the 

trial court’s, we note that as an appellate court, we may affirm on any legal 

basis supported by the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 125 

A.3d 425, 433 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2015).

8 There is no dispute that the Defendants had standing to seek suppression, 

as they were charged with possessory crimes related to the firearms.

Commonwealth v. Perea, 791 A.2d 427, 429 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[U]nder 

Pennsylvania law, a defendant charged with a possessory offense has standing 

to challenge a search.”).
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428, 436 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (finding no reasonable expectation of 

privacy when the defendant did not own the vehicle and was not authorized 

by the owner to drive it); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 14 A.3d 907, 911 

(Pa. Super. 2011) (same). “Nevertheless, a driver who does not own a vehicle 

may still establish an expectation of privacy in the vehicle if he can prove he 

has permission or authority from the owner to drive the vehicle.” 

Commonwealth v. Peak, 230 A.3d 1220, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2020).

In Shabezz, our Supreme Court held that when a vehicle was stopped 

without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the defendant did not need 

to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle in order to seek 

suppression of the evidence recovered therein as fruit of the poisonous tree. 

Shabezz, supra, at 280. There, officers participating in a narcotics 

enforcement operation stopped a red Acura on suspicion that the occupants 

had been involved in a drug transaction. When the vehicle stop was initiated, 

the defendant fled from the passenger side of the vehicle on foot. He was 

quickly apprehended and a search of his person and the Acura revealed 

narcotics, drug paraphernalia and a firearm. Id. at 282.

At a suppression hearing, the trial court determined that the police 

lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle and 

suppressed all evidence recovered from the defendant and the Acura. On 

appeal, the Commonwealth contended that because the defendant was a mere 
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passenger, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle 

and, thus, was not entitled to suppression. Id. at 283.

Our Supreme Court held that “evidence derived from an illegal 

automobile search constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree as a result of the 

illegal seizure (unless the taint is removed), and that no further demonstration 

of a privacy interest in the area from which the evidence was seized is required 

by the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 287.

As noted, we accept here that the seizure was without the 

requisite level of suspicion. The Commonwealth nonetheless 

maintains that the illegal seizure does not lead automatically to 

suppression. The Commonwealth argues that Shabezz must also 

demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas 

within which incriminating evidence was found. The flaw in the 

Commonwealth’s argument is that it assigns no constitutional 

significance to the illegal seizure, ignoring the fact that the seizure 

itself was a constitutional violation. The Commonwealth would 

require Shabezz to prove two constitutional violations before 

being entitled to suppression on one. The United States Supreme 

Court has never endorsed this additional layer of proof as a 

constitutional prerequisite to relief following an illegal seizure. Nor 

are we prepared to do so.

Id. at 288 (emphasis added). Accordingly, it held that if a seizure is illegal, 

the Court is then obliged to determine whether any evidence recovered as a 

result of the illegal seizure is fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. at 289. No 
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further showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle was 

required.9

Applying Shabezz, we conclude that the Defendants were not required 

to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Jeep in order to seek 

suppression of the evidence therein as fruit of their illegal seizure. At the 

outset, it is crucial to distinguish between the multiple seizures and searches 

that occurred in this interaction. The first seizure occurred when Officer Geisel 

initiated a traffic stop of the Jeep for failure to use headlights, and no party 

contends that this seizure was illegitimate. The next seizure occurred when 

Officer Geisel ordered the Defendants to exit the vehicle, placed them in 

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9 The Shabezz Court opined in dicta that in a case where the initial vehicle 

stop was constitutional, a passenger would indeed have to demonstrate a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle in accordance with earlier 

precedents. Shabezz, supra, at 290. This statement was not an essential 

holding of the case. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly 

recognized that all search and seizure cases are fact-specific and must be 

evaluated under the totality of the circumstances presented, and the nature 

of a citizen-officer interaction may evolve as the facts develop in any given 

situation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Singletary, 267 A.3d 1267, 1275-

77 (Pa. Super. 2021). In some cases, such as Shabezz, a vehicle stop may 

be entirely unsupported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, resulting 

in a different analysis than in a vehicle stop that is well within an officer’s 

authority under the Vehicle Code. In others, as here, what begins as a 

legitimate vehicle stop may lose that character when the officer steps outside 

the bounds of what is constitutionally permissible or extends the stop beyond 

what is necessary to address the violation that initiated it. See, e.g., Malloy, 

supra.
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handcuffs, and ordered them to sit on the curb with their ankles crossed.10 

These seizures coincided with the first searches in the case, in which Officer 

Geisel performed Terry frisks of the Defendants that did not yield any 

contraband. The final relevant search occurred when Officer Geisel asked Ms. 

Trexler for consent to search the Jeep and, on receiving it, uncovered the AK47 and pistol from the vehicle. Under this timeline of events, the 

Commonwealth’s argument that the Defendants must establish a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the vehicle after being subject to an illegal arrest is 

precisely the argument that our Supreme Court rejected in Shabezz. 

Shabezz, supra, at 288 (“The Commonwealth would require Shabezz to 

prove two constitutional violations before being entitled to suppression on one.

The United States Supreme Court has never endorsed this additional layer of 

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10 The trial court first held that Officer Geisel did not have reasonable suspicion 

to detain the passengers in this way, even if he had such suspicion to 

investigate Findley’s DUI, as Trexler and Hancock were merely passengers not 

engaged in any behavior indicative of criminal activity. See Opinion and 

Order, 9/2/22, at 6. It further concluded that by handcuffing the Defendants 

and ordering them to sit on the curb with their ankles crossed, Officer Geisel 

escalated the encounter to the functional equivalent of arrest, which was not 

justified with regard to any of the Defendants. Id. at 6-7. The Commonwealth 

does not challenge either of these holdings on appeal; it contends only that 

the Defendants did not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in Ms. 

Trexler’s vehicle, and that the trial court erred in declining to make an explicit 

finding on that issue. Accordingly, for our analysis, we accept the trial court’s 

finding that the detentions outside of the vehicle were arrests unsupported by 

probable cause.
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proof as a constitutional prerequisite to relief following an illegal seizure. Nor 

are we prepared to do so.”).

The Commonwealth distinguishes Shabezz with Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 294 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Feb. 8, 2022) (unpublished 

memorandum).11 There, the defendant was a passenger in a Volvo that was 

stopped for a window tint violation. The driver did not have a valid license 

and on further investigation, officers learned that there was an active arrest 

warrant for one of the other passengers. The driver consented to a search of 

the Volvo and officers recovered a firearm and magazine therein. Upon 

discovering the firearm, Jackson and the driver were handcuffed and the 

officers informed them that they would both be placed under arrest for 

conspiracy if no one claimed ownership of the weapon. After receiving 

Miranda12 warnings, Jackson told the officers that he had purchased the 

firearm, hidden it in the car without the knowledge of the driver and did not 

have a license to carry it. Id. at *1-2.

Jackson sought suppression of the firearm, magazine and his 

confession, arguing that the traffic stop was illegal and the evidence was fruit 

of the poisonous tree. The trial court denied suppression on the basis that the 

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11 Non-precedential opinions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, are not 

binding but may be cited for their persuasive value. Pa. R.A.P. 126(b).

12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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initial traffic stop was legal. Id. at *2. On appeal, this Court agreed that the 

stop for the window tint violation was supported by probable cause. Id. at 

*6. Jackson argued in the alternative that the officers illegally extended the 

stop past the time necessary to address the window tint violation, rendering 

the driver’s consent to search the vehicle coerced. Relying on Shabezz, he 

argued that this seizure allowed him to seek suppression even though he could 

not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Volvo.

Upon review, this Court concluded that even though the purpose of the 

initial stop had concluded, the interaction had evolved over time and the 

officers had the requisite level of suspicion for each detention and search. Id.

at *8 (“For example, what began as an investigative detention may devolve 

into a mere encounter. . . . Alternatively, what started as a stop supported 

by probable cause may transform into a continued detention buoyed by 

reasonable suspicion.”). We held that the basis for detaining the occupants 

of the vehicle evolved based on the window tint, then the non-licensure of the 

driver and investigation into whether one of the passengers could legally 

remove the car, the arrest warrant for the other passenger, and finally the 

valid consent to search given by the driver. Id. at *8-9. As a result, Jackson 

was not excused from his burden of establishing a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the vehicle under Shabezz.
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Again, multiple searches and seizures took place during the instant 

interaction between Officer Geisel and the Defendants. Much like the case in 

Jackson, the initial vehicle stop here was supported by probable cause. 

However, that is where the similarities end—as explained supra, we accept 

the trial court’s determination that the Defendants were arrested without 

probable cause prior to the vehicle search. Ms. Trexler was already at the 

scene of the traffic stop and had provided vehicle insurance and registration 

information before Officer Geisel removed the Defendants from the vehicle, 

frisked them and detained them in handcuffs. While Officer Geisel detained 

the passengers in part to determine Hancock’s true identity, any further 

investigation into that matter was not a “mission related inquiry” incident to 

the purpose of the traffic stop.

13

 Malloy, supra, at 150. Officer Geisel offered 

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13 Officer Geisel did not merely ask the passengers to exit the vehicle for officer 

safety while he investigated Findley’s sobriety. He ordered them out of the 

vehicle, frisked them, placed them in handcuffs, informed them that they were

being detained and ordered them to sit on the curb with their ankles crossed 

for the remainder of the stop. He repeatedly scolded them for moving their 

legs as he searched the vehicle and consulted with Detective Deffenbaugh. 

This detention went far beyond simply asking a passenger to wait outside the 

vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 17 A.3d 1274, 1277 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (citation omitted) (explaining that during a legal vehicle stop, an officer 

is entitled to ask occupants to exit the vehicle “as a matter of right”).

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170 (Pa. Super. 2016), cited by the 

Commonwealth, is instructive in this regard. There, following a lawful vehicle 

stop, the officer ordered all occupants, including Palmer, to exit the vehicle so 

it could be towed. Id. at 171-72. Based on Palmer’s nervous demeanor, 

repeated reaching toward his pockets, refusal to comply with directions and 
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no justification for detaining Trexler, who was merely present for the stop, 

and as explained in note 10, supra, the trial court held that Findley was 

arrested without probable cause prior to undergoing field sobriety testing. In 

contrast, the Jackson Court held that at all times the officers possessed the 

requisite level of suspicion to detain the vehicle occupants. As the officers 

here lacked probable cause to arrest the Defendants, Jackson is inapposite 

and any subsequent search flowing from their illegal arrest falls within the 

Shabezz exception if it is fruit of the illegal seizure. The Commonwealth’s 

first issue merits no relief.

B.

Next, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in granting 

suppression because Ms. Trexler, the registered owner of the vehicle, gave 

valid consent for Officer Geisel to search the Jeep. It argues that Ms. Trexler 

was not detained at any point or subjected to any coercion or duress before 

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history of firearms offenses, the officer performed a Terry frisk for weapons 

after Palmer exited the vehicle. Id. The frisk uncovered bundles of heroin 

and a firearm. Id. at 172. Palmer sought suppression arguing that the traffic 

stop ended prior to when he was ordered to exit the vehicle, and that the frisk 

was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We concluded that the traffic stop 

was ongoing while the officer was arranging for the vehicle to be towed, and 

Palmer had not argued that the totality of his behavior throughout the stop 

did not create reasonable suspicion to support the frisk. Id. at 173. Thus, 

the frisk was supported by additional facts amounting to reasonable suspicion 

and was not performed by rote simply because Palmer was ordered to exit the 

vehicle. Here, however, the Commonwealth has not challenged the trial 

court’s holding that the Defendants were arrested without probable cause.
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consenting to the search. Rather, it contends that Ms. Trexler readily 

consented to the search after informing Officer Geisel that nothing he would 

find in the vehicle belonged to her. Thus, even if the detentions of the 

Defendants were illegal, Ms. Trexler’s consent was sufficiently independent to 

remove any taint and the firearms seized from the Jeep were not fruit of the 

poisonous tree.

For consent to search to be constitutionally valid, it must be given 

intelligently and voluntarily. “For a finding of voluntariness, the 

Commonwealth must establish that the consent given by the defendant is the 

product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice—not the result of 

duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne—under the totality 

of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855, 862 (Pa. 

2018) (quotations & citation omitted). In assessing the voluntariness of 

consent to search, we consider the following factors:

(1) the presence or absence of police excesses; 2) whether there

was physical contact; 3) whether police directed the citizen’s

movements; 4) police demeanor and manner of expression;

5) the location of the interdiction; 6) the content of the questions

and statements; 7) the existence and character of the initial

investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness;

8) whether the person has been told that he is free to leave; and

9) whether the citizen has been informed that he is not required

to consent to the search.

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 257 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).
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Additionally, we note that “[e]vidence constitutes fruit of the poisonous

tree, and must be suppressed, if it was obtained by ‘exploitation’ of the

illegality [of the police’s conduct] and so long as the taint of that illegality has

not been purged.” Shabezz, supra, at 290 (quoting Wong Sun v. U.S., 371

U.S. 471, 486 (1963)). Taint can be removed from an illegal seizure through

circumstances such as attenuation, inevitable discovery, independent source

or intervening acts and events. Id. “The question of whether evidence is the

‘fruit’ of illegal police conduct is resolved by determining whether, assuming

the primary illegality has been established, the challenged evidence has been

obtained by exploitation of that illegality, or instead, by means sufficiently

distinguishable to be purged of the taint of the primary illegality.” 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912, 924 (Pa. 2019).

In holding that Ms. Trexler’s consent was not voluntary, the trial court

relied on Commonwealth v. Helm, 690 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 1997), and

Commonwealth v. Pless, 679 A.2d 232 (Pa. Super. 1996), for the

proposition that once an individual has been detained without reasonable

suspicion or probable cause, their consent to search is involuntary. Thus, it

held that the firearms were the fruit of the poisonous tree emanating from the

unlawful arrest of the Defendants. While the trial court acknowledged that it

was not Ms. Trexler who was detained without cause but rather the

Defendants, it found this distinction to be inconsequential. See Opinion and
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Order, 9/2/22, at 7 (“While those cases are distinguishable in that they involve

consent given by the individual being improperly detained, as opposed to a

third party with authority to provide consent to search a vehicle, their holdings

are still applicable here because their primary concern is not the voluntariness

of the consent given, but the taint on the evidence gathered due to the illegal

detention.”). Similarly, the Defendants rely principally on Commonwealth

v. McClease, 750 A.2 320 (Pa. Super. 2000), and Commonwealth v.

Newton, 943 A.2d 278 (Pa. Super. 2007), to emphasize that consent to

search obtained after a person has been unlawfully detained cannot be

considered voluntary and uncoerced.

We disagree, as the difference between Ms. Trexler’s position as an

observer of the stop and the Defendants’ as detainees has a material effect

on the voluntariness of her consent to the search. Ms. Trexler was simply not

subjected to the coercive power of an illegal arrest prior to giving consent to

the search. The cases cited by the trial court and the Defendants do not

compel the conclusion that any individual who witnesses an illegal arrest is

unable to give voluntary consent to a search.

The video of the traffic stop reveals the following. After he detained the

Defendants in handcuffs, Officer Geisel confirmed that Detective Deffenbaugh,

who was on scene assisting, had smelled marijuana in the vehicle and opened

the Jeep’s passenger-side doors and looked into their interior pockets. Before
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continuing to search the interior, Officer Geisel said, “well, I’m gonna ask the

owner of the vehicle. Do you mind if I search your vehicle?” Commonwealth

Exhibit 2, 4:16:15-32. As he asked the question, he walked toward Ms.

Trexler, who was seated next to Detective Deffenbaugh’s vehicle

approximately 15 feet down the sidewalk and apart from the defendants.14 

She asked, “Do I have to?” and before he could respond, went on to state, “I

mean, nothing in there is mine.” Id., 4:16:32-37. Officer Geisel said that he

was asking for verbal consent to search and Ms. Trexler reiterated that nothing

in the vehicle belonged to her. Officer Geisel said, “well, you’re the owner of

the vehicle, you weren’t in operation of it and you weren’t in control of it so

I’m not going to blame you for what they’ve possibly put in your vehicle,

okay.” Id., 4:16:42-51. He again asked for verbal consent to search, and

Ms. Trexler assented. Officer Geisel then searched the vehicle and uncovered

the firearms.

15 He did not tell Ms. Trexler that she was free to refuse the

search or ask her to sign a written consent form explaining her rights.

The Defendants’ argument, in essence, overrides Ms. Trexler’s

autonomy. There is no dispute that the lawful, registered owner of a vehicle

can consent to its search, and no party has argued that Ms. Trexler was

____________________________________________

14 At this point, Ms. Trexler had been on the scene for approximately 15 

minutes.

15 Ms. Trexler did not testify at the suppression hearing.
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subject to an investigative detention at the time she gave consent to the

search. In the cases cited by the trial court and the Defendants, consent was

determined to be coerced because of the inherent pressure associated with

the illegal detention of the defendants—in other words, someone who is

subject to illegal detention is far less likely to feel empowered to decline

consent to search. Here, however, Ms. Trexler was not detained. She

voluntarily appeared at the scene of the traffic stop after Trexler called her on

the phone, brought insurance information for the Jeep, and explained that she

had recently purchased the vehicle and had registered it at the time of

purchase. She spoke freely with Officer Geisel before the Defendants were

placed under arrest. While she could view Officer Geisel and Detective

Deffenbaugh as they removed the Defendants from the Jeep and placed them

under arrest, she was by no means similarly situated to the Defendants. To

the contrary, she provided consent only after being assured by Officer Geisel

that she would not be held responsible for anything uncovered in the vehicle.

Turning to the factors set forth in Hawkins, supra, Ms. Trexler was not

subject to any police excesses or physical contact, and Officer Geisel and

Detective Deffenbaugh’s demeanors when interacting with her on the scene

were respectful as they attempted to resolve the registration and insurance

questions. They directed her movement to a minimal extent, asking her to

stay away from the Defendants and the vehicle while they continued to
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investigate. She arrived freely at the scene and was not placed in handcuffs,

frisked or physically restrained. While Officer Geisel did not directly inform

her that she could refuse the search, he did assure her that she would not be

criminally charged for anything found in the Jeep.16 She did not express any

reservations after being assured that she would not be held responsible for

the Jeep’s contents. Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude

that Ms. Trexler freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle

and her consent was sufficiently independent of the Defendants’ illegal arrests

to remove any associated taint from the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse

the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

16 Even though Ms. Trexler asked if she had to give consent to search, she 

immediately went on to say that nothing in the vehicle belonged to her. It 

appears from the video that Officer Geisel did not respond to the question 

merely because Ms. Trexler did not give him the opportunity. Commonwealth 

Exhibit 2, 4:16:32-37.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2023