Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Carranza CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VICTOR CARRANZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D082083

 (Super. Ct. Nos. EMH000313, 

EMH000480, EMH000633)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, 

Jeffrey B. Jones, Judge. Reversed with directions.

Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, 

Collette C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

Victor Carranza appeals an order extending his civil commitment to the 

state hospital system as a person found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)
2

on a charge of attempted murder. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187; 664.) Carranza 

contends substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s findings that 

he (1) met the felony predicate requirement and (2) represented a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others because of his severe mental disorder. 

Carranza also argues that he established a medication compliance 

affirmative defense. 

We requested and received supplemental briefing on issues relating to 

the trial court’s jurisdiction. Although we now decline to reverse the order on 

jurisdictional grounds, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support a 

finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Carranza currently poses a 

substantial danger of physical harm to others under section 1026.5, 

subdivision (b)(1). Accordingly, we reverse the court’s recommitment order

on that ground alone.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Carranza’s Commitment 

In 2003, Carranza heard voices telling him that the Mexican Mafia was 

planning to torture his uncle, so Carranza attacked his uncle with a metal 

bar believing that he was saving him from torture.2 Carranza was using 

methamphetamine at the time of the offense and was subsequently diagnosed 

with schizophrenia. The People’s recommitment petitions state that he was 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

2 No exhibits or documents were admitted into evidence at the hearing to 

extend Carranza’s commitment, even though the parties’ expert witnesses 

both testified about information from state hospital records. However, since 

neither party objected to the experts’ reliance on those records, and neither 

party now contends that their testimony is inadmissible on hearsay grounds, 

we include facts from the experts’ testimony here.
3

charged with attempted murder (§§ 664, 187) and assault with a deadly 

weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).3 Carranza pled not guilty, and after a hearing,

the trial court found Carranza NGI of attempted murder. The court ordered 

him committed to a state hospital for treatment under section 1026 et seq., 

which governs the commitment and release of individuals found NGI.

Carranza has remained under civil commitment since 2004. During 

this time, the state has twice discharged him to an outpatient conditional 

release program (CONREP). During his first CONREP discharge in 2008, 

Carranza spent three years in the program before being re-hospitalized 

because he had delusions that he contracted a contagious disease and was 

going to be attacked. The hospital referred Carranza to CONREP again in

2016, but the state revoked his participation in 2018 after he tested positive 

for methamphetamine and marijuana and behaved erratically. 

B. Recommitment Petitions

On November 20, 2019, the People filed a petition to extend Carranza’s 

commitment for another two years under section 1026.5, subdivision (b), from 

March 8, 2020, to March 8, 2022. At a hearing in January 2020, the People 

and the trial court confirmed that Carranza’s release date pursuant to section

1026.5 was March 8, 2020. The court proposed setting a trial date for the 

petition in February 2020 to comply with the time limits in section 1026.5, 

subdivision (b)(4).4 The parties agreed to waive time so that Carranza’s

3 Although Carranza contends the prosecution failed to prove he was 

charged with a felony for purposes of section 1026.5, subdivision (a) 

requirements, we need not decide that issue and note his alleged commitment 

offenses only to provide relevant context. 

4 Section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4), provides in relevant part: “The court 

shall conduct a hearing on the petition for extended commitment. . . . The 

trial shall commence no later than 30 calendar days prior to the time the 
4

counsel could have him evaluated for CONREP eligibility. The court 

characterized the time waiver as a “self-commitment” and set the matter for 

a trial setting conference in February 2020. 

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Carranza’s CONREP application, and 

defense counsel’s requests for additional time after the state hospital denied 

CONREP discharge, the matter was continued several times. Carranza’s 

counsel continued to waive time. Apart from applying for CONREP, at no 

point did Carranza request pre-trial release. 

In response to the court’s inquiry during a July 2020 hearing, the 

People filed a statement asserting that March 8, 2020, was still Carranza’s 

maximum commitment date, and that his “present commitment stems from 

the petition to extend commitment that was timely filed by the prosecution 

on November 20, 2019[.]” The People also noted that the time requirement 

for trial under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4), had “been waived on several 

occasions and thus the matter remains on a setting stage[.]” 

At a subsequent hearing in August 2020, confusion arose as to 

“procedural issues” regarding Carranza’s time of commitment, and his 

counsel waived time and requested another continuance. At another hearing 

that month, Carranza stated he “wishe[d] to extend his commitment,” so his 

counsel requested another continuance to discuss that with his client. The 

record again notes that Carranza waived time and the court found “good 

cause to continue the matter.” Numerous continuances followed—at defense 

counsel’s request—to allow additional time to address communication and

procedural issues, time calculation, research, and obtain an expert witness. 

Minute orders show that the court expressly noted good cause or time 

person would otherwise have been released, unless that time is waived by the 

person or unless good cause is shown.”
5

waivers in connection with most of the continuances. Even after the court 

initially set the case for trial in August 2021, that date was also continued 

numerous times at defense counsel’s request, including to discuss a potential 

agreement to resolve the case before trial. 

Meanwhile in September 2021, the People filed a second petition to 

extend Carranza’s commitment, stating that per the unadjudicated original 

petition, Carranza would be released on March 8, 2022. The second petition 

requested that Carranza’s commitment be extended for another two years

from May 10, 2022, to March 8, 2024.5 A new case number was assigned to 

the second petition, and the court heard the original and second petitions

together. 

The People filed the third and most recent petition for recommitment 

on March 9, 2023, which sought to extend Carranza’s commitment from 

March 8, 2023, to March 7, 2025. The People explained they did so out of an 

“abundance of caution,” and the court noted this “might be a conservative 

way to go about it[.]” At that point, the parties and the court were operating 

under the assumption that the relevant maximum release date was March 8, 

2023—rather than March 8, 2022, the end date for the second petition—for 

reasons that remain unclear, even after we received the parties’

supplemental briefing. 

After the parties were unable to resolve the matter, the court 

consolidated the three petitions and the case proceeded to a bench trial in 

May 2023. 

5 The People note in their supplemental letter brief that “[i]t is unclear 

from the record why the [second] petition has a May 10, 2022 date for the 

requested extension if the previous petition’s extension was set to expire on 

March 8, 2022.” 
6

C. Trial Testimony

The People called Dr. Jason Rowden and Carranza called Dr. Alan 

Abrams to testify as medical experts. The experts agreed that Carranza 

suffers from schizophrenia, a severe mental disorder. They disagreed,

however, about whether Carranza would pose a substantial danger of 

physical harm to others if released. Carranza also testified. 

1. Dr. Rowden

Dr. Rowden, a clinical and forensic psychologist, interviewed Carranza

three times in 2021 and 2022 and reviewed Carranza’s previous evaluation 

reports. Dr. Rowden noted that in 2021, Carranza reported having auditory 

hallucinations involving the Mexican Mafia attempting to control him or 

“sexually assaulting him[.]” But during a December 2022 interview, 

Carranza said he was no longer hearing voices or experiencing paranoia. 

Dr. Rowden noted that Carranza had been taking Risperidone for “quite some 

time” but was not open to increasing his dosage or trying different medicines 

“to more fully treat what he struggles with at times.” When Dr. Rowden 

asked Carranza about his medication, Carranza said it was “working fine” 

and he did not think he needed any changes. Dr. Rowden said Carranza was 

not fully compliant with his medication because even though he took his

prescribed dose and the hospital had not sought an involuntary medication 

order, Carranza was unwilling to be “open-minded or flexible about trying 

different things or increasing meds to adequately treat” ongoing symptoms. 

Dr. Rowden opined that Carranza had “limited insight” into his mental 

condition because, although he had a “basic awareness of some of the 

symptoms,” he was “not fully aware” of, or not “fully forthright” about all of 

them. Carranza was “somewhat guarded or paranoid” about discussing his 

symptoms, and according to Dr. Rowden, his unwillingness to openly talk 
7

about his symptoms suggested an “[in]adequate understanding of his risk for 

future dangerous behavior.”

Dr. Rowden noted that Carranza’s lack of insight could also lead to a 

relapse into substance abuse, which “often result[s]” in criminal and violent 

behavior. But Dr. Rowden acknowledged Carranza had not engaged in 

violence or threats of violence, had never been administered emergency 

medication, had consistently attended group therapy, and showed “some sign 

of some improvement,” with no indication of drug use since 2018. 

Dr. Rowden attributed Carranza’s success to “being in a highly structured 

and secure setting” at the hospital where access to drugs and alcohol is 

limited, and staff monitors medication compliance. 

When asked about Carranza’s previous CONREP discharges, 

Dr. Rowden said that for Carranza to qualify for CONREP, Carranza’s 

treatment team would have had to believe he had “adequate insight” into his 

mental illness, took responsibility for past actions, and had “a basic 

understanding” of how his mental illness was involved in the committing 

offense. Carranza would have had to show, among other things, that he was 

“consistently participating in . . . and complying with treatment,” including 

medication or group therapy. Dr. Rowden found it concerning, however, that 

Carranza “still ha[d] difficulty acknowledging the reasons for why he was 

revoked from CONREP in the past,” which demonstrated that Carranza 

lacked insight and was “likely to repeat the same mistakes that led to those 

problems[.]” 

Dr. Rowden concluded Carranza would be a danger to the community if 

released because of his “difficulty fully acknowledging his symptoms,”

inconsistent success with CONREP, and guardedness about discussing 

symptoms and medication changes. Dr. Rowden further opined that the 
8

stress of adapting to release could trigger more mental health symptoms or a 

drug relapse, which could lead to violent behavior. In his view, Carranza was 

not likely to comply with outpatient treatment because he did not “have an 

adequate plan for how to manage his mental health condition.” But 

Dr. Rowden acknowledged that Carranza said he wanted to continue taking 

his medication, attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, have an AA 

sponsor, and continue seeing his doctor. He noted that Carranza appeared to 

recognize that he would have to take medication for the rest of his life, unless 

his doctor instructed otherwise. Dr. Rowden also agreed that Carranza had 

“a rudimentary understanding” of potential triggers for his mental illness 

and drug use and said he would seek help from his doctor or his family if he 

was having issues. 

2. Dr. Abrams

Dr. Abrams, a psychiatrist specializing in addiction and forensic 

psychiatry, interviewed Carranza once in 2022 and reviewed Carranza’s prior

evaluation reports. He concluded that Carranza would not pose a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others because his underlying offense was “highly 

related” to his substance abuse, and Carranza had a violence-free history 

since then. Dr. Abrams noted that Carranza was committed to a sober 

lifestyle, he had worked with a sponsor in CONREP, and there was “no 

evidence” that Carranza “is likely to relapse.” 

Dr. Abrams also based his opinion on his view that Carranza was 

unlikely to stop his medications “whether under supervision or not.” He 

noted that Carranza had “never been written up for refusing medications or 

not going along with his treatment plan,” and that Carranza appeared 

sincere about not using drugs in the future. Dr. Abrams believed that 

“without substance abuse and without going unmedicated, people with severe 
9

mental illness pose no greater risk of danger than the baseline population 

rate.” 

Dr. Abrams further testified that Carranza had sufficient insight to 

understand that he “suffers from a mental illness[,]” that “he can never use 

illicit intoxicants again,” and that “he needs to see a doctor for the rest of his 

life and take the prescribed treatment.” Carranza was also able to 

understand that he attacked his uncle because he was abusing drugs and his 

“imagination went crazy.” Carranza seemed willing and able to commit to a 

lifetime of AA meetings, having a sponsor, seeing a psychiatrist, and seeing a 

social worker or counselor. His thoughts were also “logical, linear, and 

coherent” without disorganization or tangentiality. Dr. Abrams observed no 

overt symptoms and noted that there was no indication Carranza’s treatment 

team ever increased his medication dosage. 

Dr. Abrams acknowledged, however, that it was “a possibility” 

Carranza could relapse, and he went on to say that as an addiction 

psychiatrist, “my line is everyone relapses at some point” and that “25 years 

of sobriety is not a guarantee against relapse.” When asked again whether it 

was possible that Carranza might one day relapse, Dr. Abrams said it was “a 

possibility” that could not be predicted with certainty, and that “anybody can 

start using drugs and become dangerous.” Nevertheless, in light of 

Carranza’s commitment to seeking treatment and support, Dr. Abrams 

believed that Carranza could be released into the community without posing 

a substantial risk of danger. 

3. Carranza

Carranza testified briefly on his own behalf and said that he had been 

attending AA meetings for the past 20 years, he previously had an AA

sponsor, and he intended to get another sponsor upon release. He expressed 
10

a desire to seek post-release mental health treatment to get his medications, 

and he also intended to continue his education because he “was a straight A 

student in college” and “got a certificate in air conditioning” during his first 

CONREP discharge. Carranza said he would take medication as 

recommended by his psychiatrist, and that he had been taking medication 

without refusal for the past 20 years. He believed that he was “doing just 

fine” on his current dosage according to what “the doctors told [him],” and 

that there was no reason to increase it. 

D. Court’s Findings

After hearing testimony, the trial court first found that Carranza was 

still suffering from schizophrenia, a severe mental disorder. The court 

further found that Carranza posed a substantial danger of physical harm to 

others. Crediting Dr. Abrams’s testimony that Carranza’s substance abuse 

played “an enormous role” in the underlying offense, the court went on to

conclude—based on Dr. Abrams’s “line” that “everyone relapses” and 

Carranza’s 2018 positive drug screen in CONREP—that Carranza would “at 

some point relapse to the use of methamphetamine.” The court extended 

Carranza’s commitment from March 8, 2023, through March 7, 2025, the 

period covered by the People’s third petition. 

The court ordered the People to prepare and submit a final 

commitment order for signature. However, because no final order was 

prepared at the time Carranza filed his notice of appeal, his appeal was 

initially premature. (Salowitz Org. v. Traditional Indus. (1990) 219 

Cal.App.3d 797, 808 [“Where findings of fact or some other type of formal 

evidence of the judgment or order is required, an appeal does not lie from a 

minute order.”]; see also Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953) 41 Cal.2d 300, 304–

306 [minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is 
11

not itself appealable].) At our request, the People obtained a final signed 

commitment order dated September 13, 2023, which states that Carranza 

continues to pose a substantial danger of harm to others. We now construe 

the premature notice of appeal as being from the final commitment order. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.483(a)(1), 8.308(c).)

DISCUSSION

I

We begin by discussing a procedural question we asked the parties to 

address in supplemental briefing. Specifically, we first requested briefing on 

whether the third petition granted by the trial court, which requested 

Carranza’s re-commitment from March 8, 2023, to March 7, 2025, was filed 

after his maximum commitment date had already expired. Second, if it had 

in fact expired, we asked whether the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on 

that petition. (See People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 235–236 [“As we 

explained in [People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91], if an extension petition is 

not filed before the current commitment ends, the defendant is no longer 

subject to constraint under the NGI or [mentally disordered offender (MDO)]

statutes.”].) 

If Carranza’s maximum commitment date was March 8, 2023, as the 

court and the parties apparently believed when the third petition was filed on 

March 9, 2023, then that petition was filed one day late. The parties both 

admit in their letter briefs, however, that there is no discernible explanation

for why the trial court and the parties believed Carranza’s maximum 

commitment date was March 8, 2023 at the time the People filed the third 

petition. The first petition covered the period from March 8, 2020 to March 8, 

2022, and the second petition (filed in September 2021) covered the period 

from May 10, 2022 to March 8, 2024. The People stated in their letter brief 
12

that they intended to file “consecutive petitions,” but admitted that they had 

no explanation for the May 10, 2022 beginning date for the second petition, 

nor could they explain the March 8, 2023 beginning date for the third 

petition. One would expect that the third petition would cover March 8, 2024 

through March 8, 2026, the two-year period immediately following expiration 

of the period covered by the second petition. If it had, because the People 

filed the third petition in March 2023, it would have fallen well before the 

end of the period covered by the second petition. Yet neither the court nor 

the parties explained why the third petition requested a two-year extension 

from March 8, 2023 through March 7, 2025, and it is further unclear why the 

trial court only granted the third petition. 

Regardless, the parties do not dispute that the People timely filed the

original November 2019 petition. The record also shows that the trial court 

granted continuances from the initial filing up through the May 2023 trial 

date at defense counsel’s request, usually with express reference to time 

waivers and good cause shown. (See § 1026.5, subd. (b)(4).) Furthermore, 

given the confusion in the record and the lack of an explanation for treating

March 8, 2023 as the relevant date for maximum commitment purposes, we 

cannot conclude that the third petition was untimely. Though the record is 

unclear on many things, it does indicate that Carranza and his counsel 

requested multiple continuances and essentially agreed to extend his civil 

commitment voluntarily until the petitions could be adjudicated. 

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s granting of the third 

petition was improper on jurisdictional grounds. Rather, for the reasons that 

follow, we reverse the trial court’s order because we agree with Carranza’s 

contention that there was insufficient evidence to support his recommitment. 
13

II

“[W]e review the entire record in the light most favorable to the 

extension order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the requirements of section 1026.5(b)(1) beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

(People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1165 (Zapisek).) Under 

section 1026.5, a person who is found NGI may be committed to a state 

hospital for a period no longer than the maximum prison sentence for his or 

her offenses. (§§ 1026, 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) This commitment may be 

extended in up to two-year increments if, because “of a mental disease, defect, 

or disorder, [the person] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to 

others.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1), (8).) To establish the substantial danger of 

physical harm element, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the person has, “ ‘at the very least, serious difficulty controlling 

his [or her] potentially dangerous behavior.’ ” (People v. Redus (2020) 54 

Cal.App.5th 998, 1010 (Redus), quoting Zapisek, at p. 1165; People v. 

Williams (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 861, 872.)

The parties do not dispute that Carranza has a mental disorder, so we 

focus on the substantial danger analysis. The People’s sole expert witness, 

Dr. Rowden, recommended against release and reasoned that Carranza’s lack 

of insight could lead to a relapse into substance abuse, which often results in 

criminal and violent behavior. Dr. Rowden also believed Carranza had an 

inadequate plan for how to comply with outpatient treatment and “manage 

his mental health condition.” 

While a single expert opinion may be sufficient to constitute 

substantial evidence to support recommitment (Zapisek, supra, 147 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1165), the opinion cannot be based on a “ ‘ “guess, surmise 

or conjecture, rather than relevant, probative facts” ’ ” (In re Anthony C. 
14

(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1504). Here, there was little evidence beyond 

conjecture and vague generalities that Carranza’s lack of insight would likely 

lead to a relapse into substance abuse and a substantial danger of violence. 

As Dr. Abrams observed, and Dr. Rowden did not refute, Carranza had 

enough insight to understand that he “suffers from a mental illness[,]” that 

“he can never use illicit intoxicants again,” and that “he needs to see a doctor 

for the rest of his life and take the prescribed treatment.” Carranza was also 

able to understand that he attacked his uncle because he was abusing drugs 

and his “imagination went crazy.” The People presented no evidence as to 

why this level of insight, even if limited, would make Carranza sufficiently 

likely to relapse into drug use such that he would pose a substantial danger 

of physical harm to others. 

Furthermore, Dr. Rowden acknowledged that Carranza had a “basic 

understanding” of how his mental illness was involved in the committing 

offense, and Carranza indicated he understood that he would have to take 

medication for the rest of his life, unless instructed otherwise. Dr. Rowden 

observed that Carranza was “somewhat guarded or paranoid” about 

discussing his symptoms and resistant to increasing his medication dosage, 

but he did not explain how this made Carranza’s insight into his symptoms so 

inadequate that he met the standard for recommitment under section 1026.5. 

In other words, while Dr. Rowden pointed out ways in which Carranza could 

have more insight into his illness and triggers, he did not explain why

Carranza’s “basic” level of insight supported a conclusion that he posed a 

substantial danger of physical harm. (Cf., e.g., People v. Kendrid (2012) 205 

Cal.App.4th 1360, 1370 [substantial evidence to support NGI defendant’s 

commitment where it was undisputed that defendant had “ ‘absolutely no 

insight into his behaviors that lead to violence’ ”].)
15

The trial court also erroneously relied on an isolated comment 

Dr. Abrams made that his “line” as an addiction psychiatrist “is everyone 

relapses at some point[,]” even though he said just before that comment, and 

shortly after, that it was only “a possibility” Carranza might relapse. And

earlier in his testimony, Dr. Abrams expressly said there was “no evidence 

that Mr. Carranza is likely to relapse.” He went on to say that the possibility 

of relapse could not be predicted with certainty, and that “anybody can start 

using drugs and become dangerous.” Considering the totality of his 

testimony, Dr. Abrams’s passing comment that “everyone relapses” is not a 

basis for recommitting Carranza.

As for Carranza’s plans for managing his symptoms upon release, 

Dr. Rowden acknowledged that Carranza had “a rudimentary understanding” 

of potential triggers for his mental illness symptoms and drug use—including 

not taking medication—and that Carranza would seek help from his doctor or 

his family if needed. He noted that Carranza planned to continue 

participating in AA, was looking to get an AA sponsor, and would continue 

taking his prescribed medication as he had been doing for decades. Carranza 

also told Dr. Rowden that he would report voices when he heard them, as he 

has done in the past. Although Dr. Rowden opined that Carranza did not 

have an “adequate plan” for managing his symptoms, it is unclear why

Carranza’s plan was not adequate, especially given his proven ability to 

participate in AA, attend group therapy, and take his medication. 

Our Supreme Court has recognized that in civil commitment schemes, 

a “person’s amenability to voluntary treatment is a factor in determining 

whether commitment is necessary. [Citations.]” (People v. Superior Court 

(Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 928, citing People v. Bolden (1990) 217 

Cal.App.3d 1591, 1600 [in NGI recommitment proceeding, defendant may 
16

present evidence that medication is effective and he will take medication]; 

People v. Williams (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1476, 1482–1483 [in NGI sanity 

restoration proceeding, trial court erred by instructing that person could not 

be restored to sanity unless it was shown he needed no medication].) Even if 

Carranza’s understanding was “rudimentary,” the People presented no 

evidence showing why his understanding of potential triggers, and his plans 

for how to avoid them, were so inadequate that he posed a substantial risk of 

physical harm to others. 

While the People emphasize that Carranza’s compliance can be 

attributed to being in a hospital setting, the fact that Carranza continued to 

take medication during CONREP discharges, and attend group therapy, at 

least suggests that he would comply with prescribed treatment in the 

community. The People’s argument would be more persuasive if Carranza 

had resisted taking prescribed medication in the past or refused to 

acknowledge his need for treatment. Without considering each individual’s

particular circumstances, the People’s argument—that a structured hospital 

setting contributes to compliance—could be used against every committed 

person. Moreover, as one Court of Appeal noted, while a court may be

“understandably concerned about [a committed person’s] ability to function 

and keep himself safe if he were to stop taking his medication and 

decompensate after being released from the hospital[,]” the person’s “risk of 

danger to others, not his own welfare, is what was at issue” at his

recommitment trial. (People v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 96, 110, italics 

omitted (Johnson).)

The trial court relied on the fact that Carranza had a positive drug 

screen while on CONREP the second time, but even then Carranza did not 

engage in physically violent behavior. This undercuts the implication that 
17

substance abuse would lead Carranza to be violent. The court in Redus—in 

finding insufficient evidence to support an NGI recommitment—found it

significant that there was no indication in the record of violent or aggressive 

behavior, “even through CONREP releases and medication lapses.” (Redus, 

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012 [reversing commitment extension for 

insufficient evidence despite the NGI defendant’s continuing delusions and 

lack of insight about his underlying murder offense].) Although Dr. Rowden 

testified that Carranza was reported to have displayed “erratic” and

“aggressive” behavior during his second CONREP discharge, when asked to 

clarify, he said Carranza was “unwilling to admit to any wrongdoing”—but 

made no mention of any physical aggression. Indeed, there is no evidence in 

the record of any violence or any medication lapses by Carranza during his 

20-year commitment, despite recurring symptoms during his first discharge,

and a drug relapse during his second. 

Lastly, the People rely on the fact that Carranza reported delusions in 

2021, and on Dr. Rowden’s testimony that Carranza continues to have 

“occasional auditory hallucinations[.]” But Dr. Rowden acknowledged that in 

December 2022, Carranza said he no longer hears voices, and neither expert 

concluded that Carranza exhibited any psychosis during their interviews. 

Even if Carranza was experiencing active symptoms of mental illness, 

that fact alone would not be sufficient to support recommitment under the

case law. In People v. Cheatham (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 782 (Cheatham), the 

Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence that Cheatham, who was found 

NGI for escaping custody and resisting an officer, would pose a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others. (Id. at p. 786.) He was diagnosed with 

schizoaffective disorder and, like Carranza, substance abuse disorder. (Ibid.)

Evidence showed that while Cheatham’s medication did not stop his 
18

symptoms altogether in that he still heard voices, his medication made him

better able to manage his symptoms. (Ibid.) The prosecution’s experts in 

Cheatham opined that given his past drug use, he might resort to drugs upon 

release, which would “likely increase his mental health symptoms,” and in 

turn “decrease his compliance with taking medications.” (Id. at pp. 787–788.) 

Like Carranza, Cheatham acknowledged his mental illness and past 

substance abuse and asserted that he would participate in AA, would not 

relapse, and would rely on medication to help him cope with his auditory 

hallucinations. (Id. at p. 788.) 

In reversing Cheatham’s recommitment order, the Court of Appeal 

concluded that while “some individuals with Cheatham’s mental disorder 

could have serious difficulty controlling their dangerous behavior in the event 

that they discontinued their medication and their hallucinations . . . 

resumed, there was no evidence that tied such a conclusion to Cheatham. 

Our focus is not on some hypothetical person who shares Cheatham’s mental 

disorder, but on Cheatham himself.” (Cheatham, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 790.) The court noted that even while Cheatham exhibited mental health 

symptoms while on supervised release, the record included no reference to 

dangerous behavior. (Ibid.) The court stated: “Although we accept that 

Cheatham could relapse into drug and alcohol use if released, which could

then increase his mental health symptoms, we find this speculative outcome 

insufficient in itself to support continued commitment due to substantial risk 

of danger.” (Id. at p. 793.)

Such is the case here. While Dr. Rowden’s testimony may support a 

finding that someone with Carranza’s mental disorders could become 

dangerous, the evidence did not connect that speculative possibility to 

Carranza’s particular circumstances and history so as to support a finding 
19

beyond a reasonable doubt that Carranza posed a substantial risk of physical 

harm to others. And while Cheatham’s underlying offense did not involve 

violence in the way Carranza’s offense did, the numerous similarities in their 

treatment and behavioral histories, and in the expert opinions presented at 

trial, support the conclusion that there is also insufficient evidence to support 

recommitment here. This aligns with the court’s conclusion in Cheatham

that we cannot assume that people with an extended record of non-violent 

behavior “will struggle to control dangerous behavior simply because they 

have, or are likely to have, active mental health symptoms—whether 

triggered by drug use, alcohol use, or something else.” (Cheatham, supra, 82 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 793–794.)

Other cases have reached a similar result even when the defendant’s 

commitment offense was violent. In Redus, for example, the commitment 

offense was a murder involving postmortem intercourse with the victim. The 

appellant in Redus was found NGI, and he still suffered from psychosis and 

delusional thoughts involving “fixed false beliefs” at the time the People 

sought his recommitment. (Redus, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1001, 1002–

1003.) Evidence also showed that Redus did not believe he had a mental 

disorder, and that he had “homicidal thoughts” while on supervised release. 

(Id. at pp. 1002–1003, 1005, 1007.) Moreover, his release to CONREP had 

been revoked on three or four occasions. (Id. at p. 1002.) The Court of Appeal 

nonetheless reversed his recommitment for lack of substantial evidence that 

he would have serious difficulty controlling his potentially dangerous 

behavior, finding no “hint of violence, threatening behavior, or aggressiveness 

of any kind on the part of appellant over multiple decades, even through 

CONREP releases and medication lapses. Rather, the evidence showed that 

[Redus] has controlled his dangerous behavior for decades, despite his 
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ongoing delusions and paranoia.” (Id. at p. 1012.) For these reasons, the 

court concluded that the evidence failed to “provide the required link between 

appellant’s ongoing mental illness and his purported difficulty in controlling 

his potentially dangerous behavior.” (Id. at p. 1013.)

The same is true here, and the record contains even more facts in 

Carranza’s favor than Redus had. Unlike Redus, Carranza’s auditory 

hallucinations appeared to be in remission, or were at least reduced, as of 

December 2022. At no time did Carranza express having homicidal or violent 

thoughts towards others, as Redus did. Dr. Abrams observed no indications

of psychosis, and Carranza at least has sufficient insight to acknowledge that 

he suffers from a mental disorder. Furthermore, Carranza, unlike Redus, 

experienced no medication lapses. These facts reinforce our conclusion that 

“substantial evidence simply does not support the court’s finding that 

[Carranza’s] mental illness causes, ‘at the very least, serious difficulty 

controlling his potentially dangerous behaviors.’ ” (Redus, supra, 54 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1013.)

This court’s recent opinion in Jenkins is also analogous, even though 

that case involved a mentally disordered offender proceeding under section 

2970. (People v. Jenkins (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 142, 145 (Jenkins).) Jenkins 

attacked her elderly landlord with a hammer and imprisoned him for several 

hours in response to paranoid ideation. (Id. at pp. 145–146.) After she was 

convicted of attempted murder and committed to a state hospital, the People 

petitioned for recommitment and presented evidence that she remained 

focused on delusions and maintained paranoid beliefs about her landlord. 

(Id. at pp. 146–147.) The People’s experts reported that Jenkins had limited 

insight, wanted to decrease or eliminate her medications, had a history of 

failing to comply with prescribed medications, and exhibited aggressive 
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behavior. (Id. at pp. 147–148.) But Jenkins also expressed a desire to live in 

a board and care facility upon release, continue with her medications and 

therapy, and get support from a church group. (Id. at pp. 148–149.) Like 

Carranza, Jenkins’s commitment offense was the only evidence in the record 

that she had ever been violent or dangerous. (Id. at p. 151.)

We concluded in Jenkins that there was insufficient evidence to support 

a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins represented a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others. (Jenkins, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 145.) 

Given that she had not been violent or physically aggressive since her 

commitment offense, and because her behavior had improved and she had 

significant medical issues and decreased mobility, this court reversed the 

trial court’s recommitment order. (Id. at pp. 145, 153, 155–156.) We noted 

that even though it is unnecessary to have “proof of a recent overt act” to 

support recommitment (Jenkins, at p. 154, quoting People v. McKee (2010) 47 

Cal.4th 1172, 1203), the court cannot overlook “ ‘the statutory requirement of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person currently poses a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others’ ”6 (Jenkins, at p. 154, quoting Johnson, 

supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 106–107).

Johnson provides further support for our conclusion. In Johnson, 

another case involving a section 2970 commitment proceeding, Johnson was 

convicted of assault after he struck a stranger repeatedly with a board while 

suffering from a delusion that she owed him money. (Johnson, supra, 55 

6 A concurring opinion in Jenkins also expressed concern that the 

People’s experts did not use any of the available standard violence risk 

assessment tools in formulating their opinions. (See Jenkins, supra, 95 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 156–160 (conc. opn. of Buchanan, J.).) The same is true of 

the People’s expert in this case, Dr. Rowden, who used only his own clinical 

judgment in reaching his opinions. “For decades, we have known that this is 

a notoriously unreliable way of predicting future violence.” (Id. at p. 156.)
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Cal.App.5th at pp. 98–99.) During his commitment as an MDO with 

schizophrenia, Johnson participated in CONREP twice, but was returned to 

the hospital each time for being absent without leave. (Ibid.) During his 

second CONREP discharge, Johnson left supervision and was found in a 

delusional, paranoid, and unmedicated state. (Id. at p. 100.) Johnson often 

refused to participate in group therapy and indicated he did not believe that 

he had a mental illness or needed medication. (Id. at p. 99.) Although 

Johnson had exhibited no violence or aggression during his commitment as 

an MDO, the People’s experts opined that he would be dangerous if released 

because he “did not fully recognize that he had a mental health issue” and 

could “quickly decompensate” outside of a supervised setting, especially if 

unmedicated. (Id. at pp. 99–102, 103.) One expert noted that Johnson still 

had some delusions—including disbelief that he committed the underlying 

offense—and that Johnson did not have a “relapse prevention plan” to 

manage his illness. (Id. at p. 102.) 

In reversing the recommitment order, the Court of Appeal in Johnson

concluded that the record contained no evidence that Johnson’s mental illness 

would lead him to endanger others because “the evidence show[ed] that when 

he did stop taking his medication for two months” while absent from 

CONREP, “although his symptoms of schizophrenia increased, he did not 

engage in any violent behavior whatsoever.” (Johnson, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 109–110.) The court also observed that “a complete absence of violent 

or aggressive behavior of any kind over a long period of time is necessarily an 

important, objective factor that must not be ignored when determining a 

[mentally disordered offender’s] dangerousness.” (Id. at p. 110.) 

Carranza’s case cannot meaningfully be distinguished from this body of 

case law. If we were to determine that the expert testimony in this case 
23

constituted substantial evidence to support recommitment, then it is difficult 

to imagine how any mentally ill person who had committed a violent 

underlying offense, and had a history of substance abuse, could ever meet the 

standard for release under section 1026.5, subdivision (b). While someone 

falling into that category could hypothetically relapse and have serious 

difficulty controlling their dangerous behavior, the People here failed to 

adequately show—without speculating—why and how Carranza himself 

posed an actual and substantial risk of danger, especially given his track 

record for complying with prescribed medication and seeking out various 

forms of treatment and support.

Without any evidence bridging the gap from a purely theoretical risk of 

danger to a real and substantial risk based on Carranza’s particular 

symptoms, history, or other characteristics, we conclude that a rational trier 

of fact could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he represents a 

substantial danger of physical harm to others. (See § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); cf., 

e.g., People v. Sudar (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 655, 663–664 [NGI defendant 

suffered from same delusion he had when he committed underlying offense 

“and consistently maintained that he would do the same thing in the same 

circumstances”]; Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1166–1167 [NGI 

defendant repeatedly acted on delusions and paranoia in inappropriate ways 

“so as to impose a danger to others,” “such as . . . taking steps to escape from 

the hospital for fear that workmen would return to harm him, or aggressively

insisting on money he believed he was owed”]; People v. Bowers (2006) 145 

Cal.App.4th 870, 879 [NGI defendant “continued to experience auditory 

hallucinations which commanded her to hurt herself or others,” had recently 

attempted suicide, had poor impulse and anger control, and had a history of 

assaultive behavior toward others].)
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Because we determine that substantial evidence does not support the

trial court’s order extending Carranza’s NGI commitment, we reverse on that 

ground and do not reach Carranza’s remaining arguments. 

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order of September 13, 2023 extending Carranza’s NGI 

commitment is reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new order 

denying the People’s petition to extend Carranza’s commitment.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.