alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit



AMENDMENT NUMBER TWO
COLFAX CORPORATION 
NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN
The Colfax Corporation Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plan (the “Plan”) is hereby amended as follows, effective as of December 12, 2018:
		
	1.
	Section 1.18 is hereby deleted in its entirety and amended and restated as follows:


“Disability” or “Disabled” shall mean that a Participant is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. A Participant shall be considered Disabled only if he or she meets one or more of the following criteria: 
(a)      He or she has been determined under the Employer’s long-term disability plan as eligible for benefits thereunder; 
(b)      He or she has been determined by the Social Security Administration as eligible for Social Security disability benefits; or 
(c)  He or she has been determined to be Disabled (as defined above) by the Participant’s physician.
In all other respects the Plan, as amended herein, is hereby ratified and confirmed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Colfax Corporation has caused this instrument to be signed by its duly authorized officer as of this 12th day of December, 2018.
COLFAX CORPORATION
By:/s/ Gunnar Gustafson_______________________
Its:  Vice President, HR and Total Rewards_______


1
##### 



Exhibit 10.5
 OTTER TAIL CORPORATION
1999 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN
2006 RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AWARD AGREEMENT
    Restricted Stock Unit Award
 Rights of the Participant with Respect to the Shares
 Vesting
 Change of Control




---



##### 



Additional Vesting Rules; Forfeiture
  2




---



##### 



Restriction on Transfer
 Issuance of Shares
 Adjustments
 Income Tax Matters
  3




---



##### 



Miscellaneous
         4




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##### 



OTTER TAIL CORPORATION
1999 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN
 RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AWARD CERTIFICATE
     Grant Type:
    
    Restricted Stock Unit AwardNumber of Common Shares Subject to Award:Grant Date:
    
    April 10, 2006Vesting Date:
    
    [April 8, 2010]
  OTTER TAIL CORPORATIONBy:[Name of Authorized Officer][Title][Name of Participant]
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6046 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to allow passenger ferry boats in 

nonurbanized areas to qualify for certain grants. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 18, 2021 

Mr. ROUZER (for himself, Mr. PRICE of North Carolina, Mr. MURPHY of 

North Carolina, and Mr. BUTTERFIELD) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to allow passenger 

ferry boats in nonurbanized areas to qualify for certain 

grants. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PASSENGER FERRY GRANTS. 

4 Section 5307(h) of title 49, United States Code, is 

5 amended by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(4) PASSENGER FERRIES IN NONURBANIZED

7 AREAS.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) 

8 and subsection (a), the Secretary may also make 

9 grants under this subsection to passenger ferry 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6046 IH

1 projects in nonurbanized areas regardless of popu2 lation size. Such grants shall be subject to the re3 quirements of section 5311 of title 49, United States 

4 Code.’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 13.2


CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(B) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 0F 1934





In connection with the Annual Report of Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the year ended June 30, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Peter Li, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of June 30, 2011 and results of operations of the Company for the year ended June 30, 2011.





/S/ Peter LiName:
Peter LiTitle:
Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Financial Officer)Date:
September 20, 2011





The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of this Annual Report or as a separate disclosure document.
Exhibit (32)

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Owens Corning (the Company) on Form 10-Q
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2006 (the Report), I, David T. Brown, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ David T. Brown     
|Chief Executive Officer

May 2, 2006



---

Exhibit (32)

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Owens Corning (the Company) on Form 10-Q
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2006 (the Report), I, Michael H. Thaman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Michael H. Thaman  
|Chief Financial Officer

May 2, 2006
#### Nagle *v.*City of Cleveland.

(No. 23688

Decided October 13, 1932.)

*Mr. Louis Fernberg*and *Mr. Hubert J. McCaffery,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. W. George Kerr,*director of law, *Mr. Frank M. Surtz*and *Mr. M. Keith Wilson,*for defendant in error.

It is ordered and adjudged that said petition in error be, and the same is hereby, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Petition in error dismissed.*

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen and Stephenson, JJ., concur.

Kinkade, J., not participating.
224 So.2d 906

#### Bryce U. GRAHAM v. STATE.

8 Div. 369.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 10, 1969.

Bryce U. Graham, pro se.

MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., opposed.

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.

Petition of Bryce U. Graham for certiorari to the Court'of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision in Graham v. State, 45 Ala.App. 79, 224 So.2d 905.

Writ denied.

SIMPSON,.. COLEMAN and BLOOD-WORTH, JJ., concur.
#### State of Nebraska, appellee, v. William Washington, appellant.

175 N. W. 2d 620

Filed March 20, 1970.

No. 37286.

A. Q. Wolf and Lynn R. Carey, Jr., for appellant.

Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General, and Melvin K. Kammerlohr, for appellee.

Heard before White, C. J., Carter, Spencer, Boslaugh, Smith, McCown, and Newton, JJ.

White, C. J.

A manslaughter conviction is sought to be reversed *330because of a failure to- instruct the jury as to the right of the defendant to use force in the defense of another. We reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.

In a State accepted version of the facts, the defendant’s testimony, supported by the chief prosecution witness, is that in the early morning hours of September 20, 1968, at Twenty-fourth and Lake Streets, Omaha, Nebraska, decedent was running rapidly pursuing a young woman, an acquaintance of defendant. Just before this the decedent, in a camper truck, was observed pursuing the same woman in her automobile. The defendant stepped into the line of pursuit and hit the decedent one blow with his fist in the chest-stomach region. Combined with blows struck by others, decedent’s death resulted.

No Nebraska precedent is available, but the prevailing rule, almost without contradiction, says that a defendant may lawfully do in another’s defense what such other might lawfully do in his own defense, but no more. See 40 C. J. S., Homicide, § 108 a, p. 968. See, also, Griffin v. State, 229 Ala. 482, 158 So. 316; People v. Will, 79 Cal. App. 101, 248 P. 1078; People v. Spranger, 314 Ill. 602, 145 N. E. 706; State v. Borwick, 193 Iowa 639, 187 N. W. 460; Hendrick v. State, 63 Okla. Cr. 100, 73 P. 2d 184; Martinez v. State, 142 Tex. Cr. 313, 152 S. W. 2d 369; People v. Roe, 189 Cal. 548, 209 P. 560; People v. Sullivan, 345 Ill. 87, 177 N. E. 733.

Our standard instruction on self-defense is well established. See NJI 14.33, p. 315. See, also, Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N. W. 571 (1895); State v. Kimbrough, 173 Neb. 873, 115 N. W. 2d 422 (1962); State v. Archbold, 178 Neb. 433, 133 N. W. 2d 601 (1965). It is readily adaptable to fit a proper submission of the issue of defense in this case.

The theory of the defense was clearly presented in the evidence. In fact it was the only one, and it was specifically called to the attention of the trial court. A *331jury could reasonably infer, if the defense testimony was believed, that the elements required by our law of self-defense were present. It was error not to give an instruction on this issue.

Other contentions of the defendant have been examined and are without merit.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.
EXHIBIT 32   CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRICIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 (AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)  The undersigned do hereby certify that to the best of their knowledge and belief, the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on  October 15, 2007 by DiaSys Corporation, to which this certification is appended, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of DiaSys Corporation.  Dated: October 15, 2007  /S/ Frederic H. Neikrug Frederic H. Neikrug, President and Chief Executive Officer (principal executive officer)  Dated: October 15, 2007  /s/ Morris Silverman Morris Silverman, Chief Financial Officer (principal financial officer)  F:\DIASYS\SECFilingsDrafts\10-KSB2007\Exhibits\Exhibit 32.doc
#### Louis Segall, Respondent, *v.*Rosie Bernstein Segall, Appellant.

*Pleading*— *bill of particulars*— *restriction of issues. .*

Appeal from an order of Special Term; entered in the Mew York county clerk’s office on the 18th day of January, 1909, framing issues, etc.

Per Curiam:

The parties on the , argument having conceded that since the framing of the issues in this case a bill of particulars has been served, limiting the general allegations of the complaint, the issues as framed should be confined to the charge as made in the bill of particulars. The order should therefore be reversed and the case sent back to Special Term to frame issues in accordance herewith, with ten dollars- costs and disbursements of this appeal to the appellant to abide the event. Present — Ingraham, McLaughlin, Laughlin, Clarke and Scott, JJ. Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to appellant to abide event, and case remitted to Special Term as stated in opinion. Settle order on notice.
**EXHIBIT 12.2**SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY**COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES**(Dollars in millions)
Three months
ended
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
March 31, 2006
Fixed Charges:
Interest
 $                     70 
 $                     47 
 $                     48 
 $                     40 
 $                     50 
 $                    19 
Interest portion of annual rentals
3 
2 
2 
                          2 
                          3 
                          1 
Total fixed charges for purpose of ratio
 $                     73 
 $                     49 
 $                     50 
 $                     42 
 $                     53 
 $                    20 
Earnings:
Pretax income from continuing operations
 $                  377 
 $                  391 
 $                  360 
 $                  387 
 $                  309 
 $                    86 
Add: total fixed charges (from above)
73 
49 
50 
42 
53 
20 
Total earnings for purpose of ratio
 $                  450 
 $                  440 
 $                  410 
 $                  429 
 $                  362 
 $                  106 
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges
6.16 
8.98 
8.20 
10.21 
6.83 
5.30********
#### Jesse Myers, Respondent, v. San Domingo Improvement Company of New York, Appellant.

Judgement affirmed, with costs, with leave to defendant to amend on payment of costs. No opinion.
#### J. S. Boardman, Appellant, v. James R. Vaughan, Respondent.

St. Louis Court of Appeals,

April 21, 1891.

Practice, Trial: filing of bill of exceptions. When the time for the filing of a bill of exceptions is extended by the trial court beyond the term, the judge of the trial court cannot, after the expiration of the period of extension, allow further time for the filing of such bill.

*Appeal from the Qreene County Circuit Court.*— Hon. W. D. Hubbard, Judge.'

Affirmed.

*Harrington <& Havens,*for appellant.

*James R. Vaughan,*for respondent.

Rombauer, P. J.

The first question to be determined is, whether a ■ paper purporting to be a bill of exceptions forms part of the record. The respondent claims that it does not. The appeal was taken on the ninth day of August, 1890, and on said day leave was granted to the plaintiff to file his bill of exceptions within twenty days from that date. On the twentieth day of August, and after the expiration of the twenty days thus granted, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a written stipulation extending this time ten days beyond the time theretofore fixed. This stipulation was approved by the judge, and filed with the clerk in vacation. The pretended bill of exceptions was filed on the eleventh day of September, 1890, and after the expiration of the extension provided for by the stipulation.

We have decided at the present term in *McHoney v. Ins. Co., ante,*p. 426, following a similar ruling of the *550supreme court in *State v. Hill,*98 Mo. 570, that, after the extended time expires, the judge cannot in vacation make a further order of extension. Even if a question of estoppel can be considered in matters of practice, there are no elements of estoppel in this case, since the stipulation was entered into at a time when the appellant ’ s right to file a bill of exceptions was gone, and the bill of exceptions was not even filed within the time provided for by the stipulation. We must conclude, therefore, that we are not warranted in looking to the paper purporting to be such, as a bill of exceptions in this case.

Being thus remitted to the record proper, we see no error therein warranting a disturbance of the judgment. The action is one by a real-estate agent to recover commissions claimed to be earned in the sale of real estate. It was instituted before a justice of the peace, where judgment went in favor of defendant. Upon trial on appeal in the circuit court the defendant again recovered judgment. No part of the record proper is challenged by the appellant, and, as the evidence and instruction are not before us, we must affirm the judgment. All the judges concurring, it is so ordered.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**P & FINDUSTRIES, INC.**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ending June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Joseph A. Molino, Jr., Principal Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 that:

 

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Joseph A. Molino, Jr.   |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Joseph A. Molino, Jr.       |
| Principal Financial Officer |
| May 17, 2004                |

 

----
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00151-CR

Jason Eugene Jury

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From the 355th District Court

of Hood County (CR12575)

August 25, 2015

Opinion by Justice Gardner

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By __/s/ Anne Gardner_______________

 Justice Anne Gardner
#### PEARSON v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.

No. 6988.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Feb. 17, 1947.

*71Henry W. Bethard, Jr., of Coushatta, for plaintiff.

Melvin F- Johnson, of Shreveport, for defendant.

KENNON, Judge.

Under the permanent disability benefit clause of his policy of insurance with the defendant company, plaintiff sued for $50 per month from April 6, 1944, together with penalties (under Act No. 310 of 1910) of $50 per month and attorney’s fees of $750.

Judgment was rendered in the district court on September 6, 1946, decreeing plaintiff to be disabled within the meaning of the policy and awarding judgment for the nine months benefit due prior to the filing of the suit and also for similar monthly disability payments up to the signing of the judgment and for return of premiums paid. Plaintiff’s demands for attorney’s fees and penalties were rejected. Both plaintiff and defendant appealed.

It appears that this Court is without jurisdiction of the appeal. The prayer of the petition discloses that plaintiff asked for $50 a month as disability.payments and an additional $50 a month as penalties under Act No. 310 of 1910, together with’ attorney’s fees and recognition of waiver of premium benefits provided in the policy. At the time the petition was filed, there were nine monthly payments due and twelve monthly payments became due between the filing of the suit and rendition of judgment, all at the rate (with penalties) of $100 a month, making a total for monthly disability payments and penalties of $2100. In addition, there is a demand in the petition for attorney’s fees and waiver of premiums.

Appellate jurisdiction in civil suits pf this nature where the amount in dispute exceeds $2000, exclusive of interest, is vested by Section 10 of Article 7 of the Constitution of 1921 in the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Under the provisions of Act No. 19 of 1912, it is the duty of this Court to transfer the case to the proper Court.

It is therefore ordered that this appeal be transferred to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana; the transfer to be made within sixty days after this judgment becomes final, and if not so made, the appeal shall be deemed dismissed at defendant’s cost. If the transfer is made, all costs to await final determination of the case.
#### William Lanman Bull and Others, Respondents, v. Chester Glass, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion.
**EXHIBIT32.2**

** **

**P&F INDUSTRIES, INC.**

** **

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Joseph A. Molino, Jr., Principal Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that:

 

(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/  Joseph A. Molino, Jr.  |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Joseph A. Molino, Jr.       |
| Principal Financial Officer |
|                        |
|                        |
| November 12, 2007           |

 

----
Exhibit



EXHIBIT 10.27



December 2019 Amendment


CFG Voluntary Executive Deferred Compensation Plan Second Amendment




Effective for Plan Years beginning on and after January 1, 2020, the CFG Voluntary Executive Deferred Compensation Plan Amended and Restated September 1, 2014 (the "Plan"), is hereby amended to reflect that commission pay shall be an added deferral source for certain eligible Employees.




Definition of Eligible Compensation


Subsection 2.11 of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety as follows:


"Eligible Compensation" means the amount of a Participant's Total Compensation that is attributable to base salary, annual bonuses and commission pay, if applicable. For avoidance of doubt (i) "annual bonuses" eligible for deferral include only unrestricted cash bonuses; and (ii) "commission pay" eligible for deferral includes only commissions earned and paid after January 1, 2020 from the Home Mortgage Compensation Plans and CSI Sales Compensation Plan.






Commission Pay Deferral Commitment


Subsection 3.2 of the Plan is hereby amended by the addition of the following new subsection (c) at the end thereof:


(c)    Commission Pay Deferral Commitment.  A Participant may elect to defer from 1 percent to 80 percent of his or her commission pay to be paid by the Employer.  The Deferral Commitment for commission pay shall be delivered to the Plan record keeper prior to the beginning of the Plan Year and shall apply only to commissions payable for services to be performed in the next succeeding Plan Year.






Deferral Commitment by a Newly Eligible Participant


Subsection 3.3 of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety as follows:


The initial Deferral Commitment of a Newly Eligible Participant shall be made by the Participant and delivered to the Committee not later than 30 days after the Employee is advised by the Plan record keeper that he or she is eligible to participant in the Plan (i.e. after his or her first day of eligibility); provided that the Deferral Commitment for this first Plan Year shall apply only to the base salary paid or commission pay paid for services to be performed subsequent to the election.




Except as amended herein, the Plan is confirmed in all other respects.






Executed this 9th day of December, 2019 by and on behalf of Citizens Financial Group, Inc. by its duly authorized officer.


                            	
	
	Citizens Financial Group, Inc.

	 

	By: /s/ Sal J. Di Liberti

	Name: Sal J. Di Liberti, SVP

	Date: 12/9/19