DISMISS and Opinion Filed August 31, 2018 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-00794-CV TOYOTA MOTOR SALES , U.S.A., INC. AND TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Appellants V. BENJAMIN THOMAS REAVIS AND KRISTI CAROL REAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND S OF E.R. AND O.R., CHILDREN, Ap pellees On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-15296 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Wright, J ustice Evans, and Justice Brown Opinion by Chief Justice Wright In their notice of appeal file d on July 11, 2018, appellants To yota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. and Toyota Motor Corporation (col lectively Toyota) state they a re appealing the trial court’s March 5, 2018 order denying their motion for a permanent sealin g order and the July 10, 2018 order denying their motion to reconsider. By letter, this Cour t questioned its jurisdiction over this appeal because an order denying a motion to reconsider is not a n appealable interlocutory order and the notice of appeal was untimely as to the March 5 order. As requested, the parties filed letter briefs addressing the jur isdictional issue. Toyota filed a motion for a permanent sealing order of certain documents it claimed were privileged. On March 5, the trial court denied the motion. In its order, the trial court found, in–2– part, that the documents were “currently available to the publi c and are accessible without restriction in the public domai n including unrestricted public access through the website of the Texas Supreme Court; th e PACER search engine of the federal cou rt system; public access to the Court records of the State of California and through a general search of the internet.” On April 13, Toyota filed a motion to reconsider the March 5 order. In the motion, Toyota informed the trial court that the documents were no longer available on the Texas Supreme Court’s website. By order signed on July 10, the tria l court denied the motion to r econsider. The following day, Toyota filed its notice of appeal. Rule 76a of the rules of civil procedure sets forth the procedu re for obtaining an order sealing court records. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 76a. Any order “relating to sealing or unsealing court records” is deemed to be severed from the case and a final judg ment which may be appealed. Id

. at 76a(8). A party may file a post-judgment motion within thir ty days after a final judgment is signed. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 329b(a). When a party does not file a timely post-judgment motion, a notice of appeal is due thirty days after the date the judgment is signed. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.1. An order denying a motion to reconsider is not an appealable or der. See CTL/Thompson Texas,
LLC v. Morrison Homes , 337 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied); Pitts v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. , No. 05-17-00115-CV, 2017 WL 474468, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 6, 2017, no pet.). In its letter brief, Toyota focuses on the July 10 order. It asserts that the July 10 order is appealable because it was issued pursuant to the trial court’s continuing jurisdic tion over sealing orders. To support its argument , Toyota states: “Rule 76a(7) e xpressly provides tr ial courts with continuing jurisdiction to ‘enforce, alter, or vacate’ orders s ealing or denying sealing.” With regard to the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over a seal ing order, the rule states: “A court that issues a sealing order retains continuing jurisdiction to enfor ce, alter, or vacate that order.” Id

.–3– 76a(7). As appellees point out i n their letter brief, the tria l court did not issue a sealing order on March 5. Rather, it issued an or der denying a motion to seal r ecords. The March 5 order was an order “relating to sealing” of court r ecords. Accordingly, it was deemed to have been severed from the case and a final judgment that was appealable. Id . 76a(8). For this reason, Toyota’s alternative request to treat this app eal as a mandamus is not an option.
See In re Deere & Co. , 299 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (per curia m) (mandamus relief not available wh en there is an adequate remedy by appeal). Because Toyota’s motion to reconsider was not filed within thir ty days of the March 5 judgment, it did not extend the time to file a notice of appeal . Accordingly, the notice of appeal was due on April 4. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.1. Toyota filed the notice of appeal on July 11. Becaus e the notice of appeal was untimely and the July 10 order denying the motion to reconsider is not an appealable order, this Court l acks jurisdiction over this appea l. We dismiss the appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.3(a).

180794F.P05 /Carolyn Wright/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE–4– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. AND TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Appellants
No. 05-18-00794-CV V.
BENJAMIN THOMAS REAVIS AND KRISTI CAROL REAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF E.R. AND O.R., CHILDREN, Appellees On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-15296. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. Justices Evans and Brown participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appe al is DISMISSED

. It is ORDERED that appellees BENJAMIN THOMAS REAVIS AND KRISTI CAROL REAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF E.R. AND O.R., CHIL DREN recover their costs of this appeal from appellants TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. AND TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION.
Judgment entered August 31, 2018.