alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit
32.1**
  **CERTIFICATION**
  In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Stratasys, Inc. (the
“Company”) for the period ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, S. Scott Crump,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
that:
  (1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 ****Date:
      March 23, 2005
    By:
    /s/  S.
      Scott CrumpS.
      Scott CrumpChief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.1

DSP GROUP, INC.

CERTIFICATION

In connection with the annual report of DSP Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Eliyahu Ayalon, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United
States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
indicated.
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This Certification has not been, and shall not be deemed,
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Date: March 17, 2008



/s/ Eliyahu AyalonEliyahu Ayalon Chief Executive
Officer
IIA

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 848

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 11, 1996

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural

Resources

AN ACT

To increase the amount authorized to be appropriated for

assistance for highway relocation regarding the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park in Georgia.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

HR 848 RFS

1 SECTION 1. INCREASE IN AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA2 TIONS.

3 Section 1(c) of the Act entitled ‘‘An Act to authorize

4 and direct the National Park Service to assist the State

5 of Georgia in relocating a highway affecting the Chicka6 mauga and Chattanooga National Military Park in Geor7 gia’’, approved December 24, 1987 (101 Stat. 1442), is

8 amended by striking ‘‘$30,000,000’’ and inserting

9 ‘‘$51,900,000’’.

Passed the House of Representatives June 10, 1996.

Attest: ROBIN H. CARLE,

Clerk.

By LINDA NAVE,

Deputy Clerk.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 159 (Friday, August 15, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48006-48007]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18798]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION


Rustic Canyon Ventures SBIC, L.P. License No. 09/79-0450; Notice 
Seeking Exemption Under Section 312 of the Small Business Investment 
Act, Conflicts of Interest

    Notice is hereby given that Rustic Canyon Ventures SBIC, L.P., 2425 
Olympic Blvd., Suite 6050 West, Santa Monica, CA 90404, a Federal 
Licensee under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended 
(``the Act''), in connection with the financing of a small concern, has 
sought an exemption under Section 312 of the Act and Section 107.730, 
Financings which Constitute Conflicts of Interest of the Small Business 
Administration (``SBA'') Rules and Regulations (13 CFR 107.730 (2008)). 
Rustic Canyon Ventures SBIC, L.P. proposes to provide equity security 
financing to Fulcrum BioEnergy, Inc., 2425 Olympic Blvd., Suite 560 
East, Santa Monica, CA 90404. The financing is contemplated for 
development and expansion of production facilities and for general 
corporate purposes.
    The financing is brought within the purview of Sec.  107.730(a)(l) 
of the Regulations because US Renewables Group HoldCo III, LLC 
(``USRG''), an Associate of Rustic Canyon Ventures SBIC, L.P., owns 
more than ten percent of Fulcrum BioEnergy, Inc. Therefore, Fulcrum 
BioEnergy, Inc., is also considered an Associate of Rustic Canyon 
Ventures SBIC, L.P., as defined at 13 CFR 107.50 of the SBIC 
Regulations.
    Notice is hereby given that any interested person may submit 
written comments on the transaction to the Associate Administrator for 
Investment, U.S. Small Business Administration,

[[Page 48007]]

409 3rd Street, SW., Washington, DC 20416.

A. Joseph Shepard,
Associate Administrator for Investment.
[FR Doc. E8-18798 Filed 8-14-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-M
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Susanna PEREZ-SANCHEZ, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-50267.

D.C. No. CR-97-01339-RMB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 19, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Susanna Perez-Sanehez appeals the sentence imposed following revocation of her term of supervised release. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s revocation of *931a term of supervised release for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Daniel,*209 F.3d 1091,1094 (9th Cir.2000). We review the legality of a sentence de novo. *United States v. Hanna,*49 F.3d 572, 576 (9th Cir.1995). We affirm.

Pursuant to a request by the probation office, the district court issued a bench warrant for Perez-Sanchez to appear and show cause why her federal supervised release term should not be revoked based on, *inter alia,*her state conviction for conspiracy to bring a controlled substance into a state prison. The warrant was executed after Perez-Sanchez completed her state prison term.

Perez-Sanchez contends that the order to show cause should have been dismissed because the government’s failure to execute the federal arrest warrant before her state prison term expired deprived her of an opportunity to have the district court consider whether to run her federal sentence concurrently with her state sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).

We find this argument unpersuasive. *See Moody v. Daggett,*429 U.S. 78, 80-81, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976) (rejecting argument that parole board should have executed warrant immediately so that defendant’s imprisonment for parole violation could run concurrently with his prior sentence); *United States v. Garrett,*253 F.3d 443, 450 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding that the federal government is not required to writ defendant out of state custody and bring him before the federal court for a revocation hearing before the conclusion of state custody), *cert. denied,*535 U.S. 977, 122 S.Ct. 1451, 152 L.Ed.2d 393 (2002).

AFFIRMED.1

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. The Clerk shall file appellant’s reply brief received December 6, 2002.
No. 77-6327.

#### Moore *v.*United States.

C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
EXHIBIT 23.2

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No.
333-76624, 333-76592, 333-64478, 33-84042, 33-77132, 33-86156, 333-84816,
333-75424, 333-96205 of IGEN International, Inc on Form S-8 dated January 11,
2002, Form S-8 dated January 11, 2002, Form S-8 dated July 3, 2001, Form S-8
dated September 15, 1994, Form S-8 dated April 1, 1994, Form S-3 dated April 12,
2002, Form S-3 dated March 22, 2002, Form S-3 dated December 19, 2001, and Form
S-3 dated February 4, 2000, respectively, of our report dated June 4, 2002
(relating to the financial statements of Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC. at
December 31, 2001 and 2000, and for the three years in the period ended December
31, 2001 and for the period November 30, 1995 (inception) through December 31,
2001), appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of IGEN International, Inc
for the year ended March 31, 2002.


/s/Deloitte & Touche LLP
------------------------

Deloitte & Touche LLP
McLean, Virginia
July 16, 2002
### UNITED STATES NAVY

- MARINE CORPS

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

M.D. MODZELEWSKI, F.D. MITCHELL, J.A. FISCHER

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JEREMY G. MCMURRY

AVIATION MAINTENANCE ADMINISTRATIONMAN SECO ND CLASS (E

- 5),

U.S. NAVY

NMCCA 201300398

GENERAL COURT

- MARTIAL

**Sentence Adjudged:** 27 June 2013.

**Military Judge:** CAPT Andrew H. Henderson, JAGC, USN.

**Convening Authority:** Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station,

Lemoore, CA

. **Staff Judge Advocate's Reco mmendation:**  LT D.A. Christenson,

JAGC, USN

. **For Appellant:** CDR Suzanne Lachelier, JAGC, USN.

**For Appellee:** LT Ann Dingle, JAGC, USN.

**30 January 2014** 

**---------------------------------------------------**

**OPINION OF THE COURT**

**-------------------------- -------------------------** 

After careful consideration of the record, submitted

without assignment of error, we affirm the findings and sentence

as approved by the convening authority. Art. 66(c), Uniform

Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c)

.

For the Court

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT 23.1

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No.
333-76624, 333-76592, 333-64478, 33-84042, 33-77132, 33-86156, 333-84816,
333-75424, 333-96205 of IGEN International, Inc on Form S-8 dated January 11,
2002, Form S-8 dated January 11, 2002, Form S-8 dated July 3, 2001, Form S-8
dated September 15, 1994, Form S-8 dated April 1, 1994, Form S-3 dated April 12,
2002, Form S-3 dated March 22, 2002, Form S-3 dated December 19, 2001, and Form
S-3 dated February 4, 2000, respectively, of our report dated May 22, 2002 (June
19, 2002 as to Note 12 of notes to consolidated financial statements), appearing
in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of IGEN International, Inc for the year ended
March 31, 2002.



/s/Deloitte & Touche LLP
Deloitte & Touche LLP
McLean, Virginia
June 28, 2002
#### Glasscock *v.*The State of Ohio.

(No. 23260

Decided March 23, 1932.)

*Messrs. Looker, Green, Woods & Lauscke,*for plaintiff in error. . .

*76
      *Mr. Ray T. Miller,*and *Mr. P. L. A. Lieghley,*prosecuting attorneys, and *Mr. Thomas A. Burke, Jr.,*for defendant in error.

Bf the Court.

Glasscock was charged with murder in the first degree. There was but one count in the indictment, and that was based upon Section 12402-1, General Code, and charged that the defendant unlawfully, purposely and maliciously killed James Ryan, a policeman, while he was in the discharge of his duties as such policeman. Upon trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty, without a recommendation of mercy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and upon motion the record was certified to this court for review.

The question presented is whether error prejudicial to the rights of the defendant, Glasscock, resulted from the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury relative to the lesser degrees of homicide and to inform the jury that a verdict could be so returned if they found the defendant guilty of only such lesser offense.

The difficulty in this class of cases arises out of the action of the prosecuting attorney in preparing an indictment with only one count, and could readily be obviated by including an additional count. This court had before it a similar question in the case of *Freeman*v. *State,*119 Ohio St., 250, 163 N. E., 202. It was there held, as it had been held in other cases cited in the opinion, that, where the evidence justifies it, the lesser degrees of an included offense should be charged in accordance with the provisions of Section 13692 (now 13448-2), General Code. In this case, however, while error was committed, it was favorable to the defendant and not prejudicial to his rights. The court instructed the jury in substance that .they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that Ryan was a policeman, and that they could *77not return a verdict of guilty unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that Ryan was a police officer. The theory urged on behalf of the defendant was that he fired in self-defense, and on that issue the court quite fully instructed the jury in all respects favorably to the defendant.

Finding no prejudicial error the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

*Judgment*affirmed.

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen, Kjnkadb and Stephenson, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________
No. 95-50299 Summary Calendar

__________________

GLYNDA S. COYLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, Department of the Air Force,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas (CA-SA-94-376)

______________________________________________

May 21, 1996

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Glynda S. Coyle, proceeding p ro se and in forma pauperis

(IFP), filed a gender discrimination suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et seq., against the Air Force in connection with her civil

service employment. The magistrate judge conducted a bench trial

and determined that Coyle failed to show any discriminatory or

retaliatory acts. Coyle then moved for a transcript at government2

exp ense. The district court found that she failed to present a

substantial question for review and therefore denied the motion.

On appeal, this Court revoked her IFP status and denied her

request for a transcript at government expense, concluding that her

financial affidavit reflected that she had the resources to afford

the costs of her appeal without undue hardship.

Coyle argues that the magistrate judge's factual findings are

clearly erroneous. However, Coyle has not provided this Court with

a transcript of the trial in accordance with Rule 10(b)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Consequently, we are unable

to determine whether the findings are clearly e rroneous. S ee

Marshall v. Neptune Maritime, Inc.
, 838 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir.

1987); Archie v. Christian

, 812 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1987).

Additionally, to support her argument that the magistrate judge

erred, she refers to her trial notes, which she has included in the

record excerpts. Those notes are not contained in the record on

appeal, and therefore, we are barred from considering them. G alvin

v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration , 860 F.2d 181, 185

(5th Cir. 1988).

Coyle also argues that certain Equal Employment Opportu nity

(EEO) or military regulations were violated. In his memorandum,

the magistrate judge stated that Coyle failed to identify the

specific regulations. Moreover, the violations alleged would not

establish that the magistrate judge clearly erred in concluding

that there was "nothing to indicate that any actions taken were

motivated by any discriminatory intent or in retaliation for

plaintiff's EEO activity."3

Accordingly, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.46


FIRST Amendment to Employment Agreement




This First Amendment (“Amendment”) to the March 18, 2013 Employment Agreement, effective March 18, 2013 (“Employment Agreement”), between Michelle Bryan (the “Executive”) and Intelsat Corporation is entered into by the undersigned parties and is effective as of April 18, 2013.


1.The second sentence of Section 4(d)(i) of the Employment Agreement is amended to read as follows:
In the event of such termination or any termination of employment due to the Company’s nonrenewal pursuant to Section 1, in addition to the Accrued Compensation and Prior Year Bonus (which shall be based on actual performance results and paid on the date bonuses for the applicable prior year are paid to other senior executives of the Company), the Executive shall be entitled to receive severance pay in an aggregate amount equal to one and one-half (1.5) times the sum of (A) the Executive’s Base Salary plus (B) the Executive’s target Annual Bonus for the fiscal year in which such termination occurs (the “Severance Amount”), payable in a lump sum on the next regular payday that is at least 14 days following the Executive’s delivery of an effective, irrevocable release of claims pursuant to Section 4(d)(ii).
     2.    As amended and modified by this Amendment, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
3.    If there is any conflict between the terms of the Employment Agreement and this Amendment, the terms of this Amendment shall prevail.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of April 18, 2013.


INTELSAT S.A.




By: /s/ David McGlade
     David McGlade
     Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


 
INTELSAT INVESTMENTS S.A.




By: /s/ David McGlade
     David McGlade
     Chairman and Chief Executive Officer




INTELSAT MANAGEMENT LLC




By: /s/ David McGlade
     David McGlade
     Chairman and Chief Executive Officer




THE EXECUTIVE 




/s/ Michelle Bryan
 Michelle Bryan
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 99.2

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael Leeb, the Principal Financial Officer of Skyline Multimedia
Entertainment, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my
knowledge:

(1)      the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the fiscal year
         ended June 30, 2002 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements
         of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
         U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

(2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

Dated: October 10, 2002

                                                /s/ Michael Leeb
                                                ----------------
                                                Name: Michael Leeb
                                                Title: Chief Financial Officer
#### James M. Stryker et al. v. John B. Pendergast.

1. *Practice—Where Exceptions Are Not*Preserved.—Where no exceptions ai*e preserved to evidence or rulings in the trial court they can not be considered in this court.

2. *Same—Judgment Not Reversed for Technical Error.*—A judgment for damages in an action of debt will not be reversed merely for a technical error.

3. *Process—Effect of Technical Defects After Party Has Submitted Himself to the Jurisdiction of the*Court.—Technical defects in the summons are of no consequence after a party has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, since the only use of process is to bring parties into court.

Debt.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1901.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed January 16, 1903.

Henry W. Magee, attorney for appellants.

William H. Dickson, attorney for appellee.

Mr. Justice Freeman

delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit is brought upon a bond, the condition of which required appellant Stryker to pay over to appellee all sums of money received by him for appellee, or for the insurance company of which both were agents. Appellee sued originally in covenant, but subsequently filed a declaration in debt, and afterward obtained leave of court to change the form of the action. An order was entered so amending all papers in the cause.

Appellants’ demurrer to the first of the two counts in debt was sustained, and issue having been joined on the second count, the cause proceeded to trial and judgment. No exceptions appear to have been taken, certainly none are preserved of record. We are precluded, therefore, from considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment; nor can we consider the rulings on motions since no exceptions whatever appear to have been taken to any ruling of the court. Wehrheim v. The Thiel Detective Co., 87 Ill. App. 565.

*414Technical defects in the summons are of no consequence after a party has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, since *“*the only use of process is to bring parties into court.” Baldwin v. Murphy, 82 Ill. 485. The court had power to allow an amendment changing the form of the action. (Sec. 24, Practice Act, Chap. 110.) Any informality in the entry of the orders without objection must be deemed to have been waived.

It is said judgment was entered in assumpsit. The abstract does not show the form of the verdict nor that of the judgment. Mo exception having been taken to the form of entry of the verdict nor to the denial of the motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, the question was. not raised in the trial court pursuant to section 57 of the practice act, and it can not be here. A judgment for damages in an action for debt will not be reversed for such technical error (Bowden v. Bowden, 75 Ill. 111), if indeed there was such error, which the abstract of record before us fails to show. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
#### Walter C. Jordan v. Frank Keenan.

Motion denied on terms stated in order.
#### John Gillilan et al., Appellants, *v.*Daniel S. Gray et al., Appellees.

APPEAL FROM KANE.

A variance in names between the obligatory and conditional parts of an appeal bond are fatal.

The Supreme Court has no authority to allow an amendment of an appeal bond from the Circuit Court.

The appellees, Daniel S. Gray and Ralph Gray, recovered a judgment in the Kane Circuit Court, at the August term there*706of. against John Gillilan and Horace Hubbard; who then prayed an appeal, which was allowed, upon condition that they should give the usual bond, with Henry E. Hunt as surety. The recital in the condition of the bond is, that said Daniel S. Gray and Edward Gray recovered a judgment; whereas the obligatory part of the bond described the parties who recovered the judgment as Daniel S. Gray and Ralph Gray. A motion was made by appellees to dismiss the appeal for the foregoing defect. The appellants entered a cross motion for leave to amend the bond.

Church & Willard, for appellees.

C. McClure, for appellants.

*Per Curiam.*

The motion to dismiss the appeal is sustained. The variance between the obligatory and the conditional parts of the bond is fatal to it. The cross motion of the appellants, asking leave to amend the appeal bond, is overruled.

This court has no authority to allow an amendment of an appeal bond, taken in the Circuit Court, as preliminary to the-removal of a cause for examination here.