J. S57008/16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

CHRISTY PERRI, : No. 926 WDA 2015 

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, March 3, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0010832-2014 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 21, 2016 

 Christy Perri appeals from the March 3, 2015 aggregate judgment of 

sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment, followed by two years’ 

probation, imposed after she pled guilty to possession of a firearm, carrying 

a firearm without a license, and the summary offense of driving under 

suspension.1 After careful review, we affirm. 

 The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case, as gleaned from 

the guilty plea hearing, as follows: 

[O]n or about Friday, [August 1, 2014], at 

approximately 2130 hours, City of Pittsburgh Police

were on patrol in a marked unit in full uniform in the 

Uptown area of Pittsburgh. They observed a white 

Dodge Charger with Pennsylvania registration 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 6106 and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543, respectively. 
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HWV2753 traveling inbound on Fifth Avenue. When 

it came to the intersection of Washington Place, they 

observed that none of the brake lights were 

functioning on the vehicle. They effectuated a traffic 

stop and approached [appellant], who was the driver

of the vehicle. They detected a faint odor of burnt 

marijuana coming from the vehicle’s compartment. 

[Appellant] stated that she did not have a valid 

driver’s license. The officers asked [appellant] and 

the occupants, based on their nervous behavior, to 

remove themselves from the vehicle for the officer’s 

safety. A pat–down of the occupants was completed,

and during that time an unnatural bulge in 

[appellant’s] waistband was noticed by the officers. 

[Appellant] appeared to be attempting to cover the 

bulge by folding her hands over top. Officer McGee

recovered a Rossi .38 Special revolver, Serial 

No. D656556 with five live rounds from [appellant’s] 

waistband, concealed beneath her clothing. The 

Commonwealth would have submitted Laboratory 

Case No. 1407301 to show that this was a 

.38 Special caliber revolver that was in good 

operating condition. [Appellant’s driver’s] license 

had been suspended, and [appellant] stated that she

had recently been the victim of a home invasion 

where she suffered a gunshot wound, that she had 

taken her aunt’s firearm to use for protection. 

Trial court opinion, 1/4/16 at 2 (citation to notes of testimony omitted). 

 Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with the 

aforementioned offenses, as well as receiving stolen property, prohibited 

offensive weapons, and the summary offense of general lighting 

requirements.2 On November 18, 2014, appellant pled guilty to possession 

of a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, and the summary offense 

of driving under suspension. The Commonwealth withdrew the remaining 

 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3925, 908, and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303, respectively. 
J. S57008/16 

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charges. Following the completion of a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) 

report, the trial court sentenced appellant to four to eight years’ 

imprisonment, followed by two years’ probation, on March 3, 2015.3 On 

March 10, 2015, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, 

which was denied by the trial court on March 13, 2015. On April 8, 2015, 

appellant filed, inter alia, a motion for leave to file supplemental postsentence motions nunc pro tunc.

4

 The trial court granted said motions on 

April 13, 2015. Thereafter, on May 4, 2015, appellant filed a supplemental 

post-sentence motion, which was denied by the trial court on May 12, 2015. 

This timely appeal followed.5

 On appeal, appellant raises the following issue for our review: 

I. Did the trial court err in imposing a sentence 

that was manifestly excessive, unreasonable, 

and an abuse of discretion when the trial court 

overlooked and/or failed to carefully consider 

relevant factors when sentencing [appellant], 

including the unique facts and circumstances of 

the crime, and her background and 

rehabilitative needs; and the [trial] court relied 

on erroneous, improper and impermissible 

factors; and failed to impose an individualized 

sentence? 

 

3

 Appellant’s sentence fell within the mitigated range of the Pennsylvania 

Sentencing Guidelines, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701, et seq.

4

 The record reflects that this motion was filed by appellant’s newly 

appointed counsel, William E. Brennan, Esq., and the trial court granted said 

motion on April 13, 2015, the last day for filing an appeal from the denial of 

the March 13, 2015 order. 

5

 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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Appellant’s brief at 5. 

 Generally, our standard of review in assessing whether a trial court 

has erred in fashioning a sentence is well settled.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion 

of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is 

not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the 

record, that the sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for 

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). 

 Where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her 

sentence, as is the case here, the right to appellate review is not absolute. 

See Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of her sentence 

must invoke this court’s jurisdiction by satisfying the following four-part 

test: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether 

Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether 

Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the 

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and 

(4) whether the concise statement raises a 

substantial question that the sentence is appropriate 

under the sentencing code. 
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Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted). 

 Instantly, the record reveals that appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal and has preserved her issue in her supplemental post-sentence 

motion. Appellant has also included a statement in her brief that comports 

with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Accordingly, we must determine 

whether appellant has raised a substantial question. 

 “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 

932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013) 

(citation omitted). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant 

advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were 

either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or 

(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 63 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “At a minimum, 

the Rule 2119(f) statement must articulate what particular provision of the 

code is violated, what fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the 

manner in which it violates that norm.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 2016 

WL 1625810, at *15 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). 

 In her Rule 2119(f) statement, appellant argues that her sentence 

“was manifestly excessive, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion[.]” 
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(Appellant’s brief at 12.) In support of this claim, appellant contends that 

the trial court “failed to consider all relevant factors, particularly the unique 

circumstances of the crime[] and [her] background and rehabilitative 

needs[,]” as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). (Id. at 12-13.) 

Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed to consider her background 

and rehabilitative needs raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth 

v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 

161 (Pa. 2014) (finding “[a]ppellant’s claim that the sentencing court 

disregarded rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the offense in 

handing down its sentence presents a substantial question for our review.”); 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 86 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2014) (finding, inter alia, an assertion that the 

trial court failed to account for appellant’s rehabilitative needs was a 

substantial question suitable for review). 

 Appellant further avers that the trial court considered “erroneous, 

improper and impermissible factors” in sentencing her and “failed to impose 

an individualized sentence tailored to her and the attendant facts of her 

case.” (Appellant’s brief at 13.) We have recognized that “a claim that a 

sentence is excessive because the trial court relied on an impermissible 

factor raises a substantial question.” Allen, 24 A.3d at 1064-1065 (citation 

omitted). Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Ahmad, a panel of this court 

concluded that a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider an 
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appellant’s individualized circumstances in its imposition of sentence raised a 

substantial question. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 887 (Pa.Super. 2008). 

Accordingly, we proceed to consider the merits of appellant’s discretionary 

sentencing claims. 

 Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing 

to consider “the unique circumstances of the crime” and her “background 

and rehabilitative needs” when it imposed sentence. (Appellant’s brief at 

18.) Appellant contends her sentence was not individually “tailored to her 

and the attendant facts of her case.” (Id. at 18-19.) We disagree. 

 This court will not disturb a trial court’s sentence absent a finding the 

court failed to weigh the sentencing considerations in a meaningful fashion. 

“When reviewing sentencing matters, this Court must accord the sentencing 

court great weight as it is in [the] best position to view the defendant’s 

character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the overall 

effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 

1128, 1134 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 161 (Pa. 2009) 

(citation omitted). 

 Herein, the record reveals that the trial court considered and weighed 

numerous factors in fashioning appellant’s sentence, including the 

sentencing guidelines, the gravity of the offense, her prior criminal history, 

and the fact that her “adjustment to supervision has been poor.” (Notes of 

testimony, 3/3/15 at 6, 15-16; see also trial court opinion, 1/4/16 at 5-6.) 
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At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard evidence from appellant’s 

counsel on her background and the underlying violent crime that led her to 

possess the firearm in question. (Notes of testimony, 3/3/15 at 3-4, 6-7.) 

The trial court also heard testimony on appellant’s background from 

appellant’s niece, Lucianna Perri, who stated she would like appellant to “go 

through some kind of drug and alcohol rehabilitation,” as well as from 

appellant herself. (Id. at 10-12, 14-15.) 

 Although the record reflects that the trial court did not specifically 

state at the sentencing hearing that it considered appellant’s rehabilitative 

needs, the trial court was in possession of a PSI report. Where the trial 

court has the benefit of a PSI report, as is the case here, “we shall . . . 

presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information 

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along 

with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 

736, 761 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) 

(citation omitted).6 The record further reflects that the trial court heard 

 

6

 We note that appellant has failed to ensure that the PSI report was made a 

part of the certified record. Generally, 

[i]t is the obligation of the appellant to make sure 

that the record forwarded to an appellate court 

contains those documents necessary to allow a 

complete and judicious assessment of the issues 

raised on appeal . . . A failure by appellant to insure 

that the original record certified for appeal contains 

sufficient information to conduct a proper review 
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testimony from a number of witnesses regarding appellant’s rehabilitative 

needs. Specifically, both Tomilyn Ward, a master in professional counseling 

who had been working with appellant, and Kristen George, who developed 

an outpatient service plan for appellant in conjunction with Justice Related 

Services, testified at the March 3, 2015 hearing. (Notes of testimony, 

3/3/15 at 8-10, 12-13; see also trial court opinion, 1/4/16 at 6.) 

 Appellant also claims that the trial court considered impermissible 

factors in fashioning her sentence; specifically, the effect imposing a 

sentence of probation or home confinement would have on the trial judge’s 

reputation. (Appellant’s brief at 18, 20.) This claim is belied by the record. 

The record reveals that the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing 

that, “if something goes wrong it’s my name that goes in the paper, not 

yours[,]” albeit inappropriate, was not a factor the trial court considered in 

imposing sentence. (See notes of testimony, 3/3/15 at 13.) Rather, this 

statement was made in direct response to the following statement by 

appellant’s counsel: 

[Counsel]: Your Honor, just in closing, I understand 

the Court’s position with respect to my client and its 

intention with respect to the sentence. I’ve gotten to 

know this young lady very well over the last 

 

constitutes waiver of the issue sought to be 

examined. 

Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 263 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 996 A.2d 491 (Pa. 2010) (citations and brackets omitted). As our 

review was not impeded, however, we decline to find waiver in this instance. 
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7 months, and if Your Honor would consider an 

electronic monitoring program or some such program 

that doesn’t involve the state prison, and if it does 

involve electronic monitoring my client – I don’t 

doubt that my client will not disappoint this Court, 

Your Honor. And if she did I would be just as equally 

disappointed. 

Id. Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, appellant’s challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of her sentence must fail. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/21/2016