United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 20-1894 

___________________________ 

Brad Jennings

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Daniel F. Nash; James Michael Rackley; Dallas County; George Knowles

 Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________ 

Submitted: February 17, 2021

Filed: May 21, 2021 

[Unpublished]

____________ 

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM. 

Brad Jennings spent over eight years in prison after a jury found him guilty of 

murdering his wife. Once a Missouri court overturned his convictions, Jennings 

sued two of the investigating officers, one of their supervisors, and Dallas County 

for violating his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jennings lost at trial 

on one of the claims and at summary judgment on the others. We affirm.
-2-

I. 

We begin with the numerous challenges to the district court’s1 summaryjudgment order. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Jennings and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in his favor. See Cronin v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1187, 1193 (8th Cir. 2020). 

Several of the claims were based on the failure of Sergeant Daniel Nash and 

Sheriff James Rackley to disclose another officer’s personnel report before the 

murder trial. The complaint alleges individual claims against both of them, another

for civil conspiracy, and one more against Dallas County, Rackley’s employer, for 

an unconstitutional policy or custom. We agree with the district court that all of 

these claimsfail because the report was neither exculpatory nor material. See McKay 

v. City of St. Louis, 960 F.3d 1094, 1099 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining that a dueprocess claim based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), requires a showing 

that the undisclosed “evidence was material” and exculpatory); see also Engesser v. 

Fox, 993 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2021) (“With no actual deprivation . . . , there can 

be no [conspiracy] liability.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kingsley v. 

Lawrence County, 964 F.3d 690, 703 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[A]bsent a constitutional 

violation by a county employee, there can be no § 1983 or Monell liability for the 

county.” (brackets and quotation marks omitted)).

The remaining conspiracy claims meet a similar fate. Sergeant Nash and 

Sheriff Rackley could not be liable for failing to tell Jennings that his wife had 

previously attempted suicide, because that fact was known and “readily available to 

the” defense. See Helmig v. Fowler, 828 F.3d 755, 761–62 (8th Cir. 2016); 

Engesser, 993 F.3d at 632. And there was no evidence that Nash and Rackley agreed

to withhold the gunshot-residue test that ended up being the basis for overturning his

1

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Missouri. 
-3-

convictions. See Helmig, 828 F.3d at 763 (observing that plaintiffs “must allege 

with particularity and specifically demonstrate” an agreement (quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Finally, Lieutenant George Knowles was entitled to qualified immunity on the 

claim that he failed to adequately supervise Sergeant Nash. See S.M. v. Krigbaum, 

808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). Jennings did not even allege, much less show,

that Knowles directly participated in any violation of his constitutional rights, and 

there is no evidence that he “authorized” or “was deliberately indifferent to” a 

“pattern of unconstitutional acts.” Id.

II. 

Jennings also raises numerous challenges to the way the magistrate judge2

conducted the trial. Like the rulings at summary judgment, there was no reversible 

error at trial either.

First, there was no abuse of discretion when the magistrate judge allowed the 

prosecutor from Jennings’s criminal trial to testify that probable cause supported the 

murder charge. See Valadez v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 758 F.3d 975, 980 (8th 

Cir. 2014) (reviewing evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion). Jennings

himself made probable cause a central issue by arguing that there had been no reason 

to suspect him of murder. It was fair game for Sergeant Nash to then call the 

prosecutor “to rebut the impression left by” testimony that Jennings had introduced. 

Wright v. Ark. & Mo. R.R. Co., 574 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 2009); see id. (discussing 

the opening-the-door doctrine).

Second, the magistrate judge did not mishandle the testimony of any

witnesses. Some of Jennings’s arguments on appeal just misinterpret the record, like 

2

The Honorable Willie J. Epps, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the 

Western District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by 

consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
-4-

the one claiming that his expert witness was never able to testify about why she 

believed that Jennings’s convictions were unlawful, when, in fact, she did. 

Similarly, despite Jennings’s argument to the contrary, his gunshot-residue expert

was able to explain how the dried blood on his hands suggested that he had not 

washed them. And when the prosecutor speculated that Jennings might have rinsed

off the gunshot residue before the police arrived, the judge instructed the jury to 

disregard hisstatement. See Smith v. SEECO, Inc., 922 F.3d 406, 414 (8th Cir. 2019) 

(explaining that we presume that juries follow instructions to disregard inadmissible 

evidence). 

For the remaining challenges, we agree with the reasoning of the magistrate 

judge, who addressed them all in an order denying Jennings’s motion for a new trial.

3

 

See 8th Cir. R. 47B; Whitmore v. Harrington, 204 F.3d 784, 785 (8th Cir. 2000) (per 

curiam). Simply put, none justifies overturning the jury verdict. 

III. 

We accordingly affirm the judgment.

______________________________

3

The only exceptions are Jennings’s vague argument about “propensity 

evidence” and the evidentiary challenges he raises for the first time in his reply 

brief—none of which are properly before us. See Montin v. Moore, 846 F.3d 289, 

295 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[C]laims not raised in an opening brief are deemed 

waived . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)); Watson v. O’Neill, 365 F.3d 609, 615 (8th 

Cir. 2004) (“address[ing]” only those “objectionable evidentiary rulings” that had 

been “sufficiently identified and discussed in [the plaintiff’s] brief”).