alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-4.9(c)





 Exhibit 4.9(c) 

Schedule of Omitted Supplements to Security Agreement 

The supplements to the security agreement referenced below are substantially identical in all material respects to the Supplement No. 1 dated as of
October 27, 2011 to the Security Agreement dated as of September 30, 2011, as supplemented (the “Security Agreement”) and filed as Exhibit 4.9(b) to the Company’s annual report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2019 (the “Annual Report”), except as to the names of the additional subsidiary grantors listed on the signature pages thereto and the dates on which such supplements to the Security Agreement were entered into. These
supplements to the Security Agreement are not being filed as exhibits to the Annual Report in reliance on Instruction 2 to Item 601 of Regulation S-K. 

Supplements to the Security Agreement entered into among HCA Inc., Bank of America, N.A., as collateral agent, and the following subsidiaries as additional
subsidiary grantors, as of the dates indicated: 
  

					
	 Supplement Number
	  	 Date
	  	 Additional Subsidiary Grantors

			
	No. 2	  	November 4, 2011	  	Spalding Rehabilitation L.L.C.
			
	No. 3	  	January 27, 2012	  	 •  HealthTrust Workforce Solutions, LLC

•  Parallon Business Solutions, LLC

•  Parallon Enterprises, LLC

•  Parallon Health Information Solutions, LLC

•  Parallon Payroll Solutions, LLC

•  Parallon Physician Services, LLC

•  PTS Solutions, LLC

			
	No. 4	  	December 7, 2012	  	HCA American Finance LLC
			
	No. 6	  	December 6, 2013	  	Poinciana Medical Center, Inc.
			
	No. 7	  	December 6, 2013	  	U.S. Collections, Inc.
			
	No. 8	  	December 6, 2013	  	West Florida – MHT, LLC
			
	No. 9	  	December 6, 2013	  	West Florida – PPH, LLC
			
	No. 11	  	December 6, 2013	  	North Texas – MCA, LLC
			
	No. 12	  	March 25, 2014	  	AR Holding 31, LLC
			
	No. 12	  	January 9, 2015	  	 •  Citrus Memorial Hospital, Inc.

•  Citrus Memorial Property Management, Inc.

•  CHCA Pearland, L.P

•  Columbia Healthcare System of Louisiana, Inc.

•  HCA Pearland GP, Inc.

•  Mountain Division – CVH, LLC

•  Pearland Partner, LLC

•  Primary Health, Inc.

•  Sarah Cannon Research Institute, LLC

•  SCRI Holdings, LLC

•  Southpoint, LLC

•  Vision Consulting Group LLC

•  Vision Holdings, LLC

•  WCP Properties, LLC















					
			
	No. 13	  	November 9, 2015	  	 •  PatientKeeper, Inc.

•  Putnam Community Medical Center of North Florida, LLC

			
	No. 14	  	January 10, 2017	  	 •  East Florida – DMC, Inc.

•  H2U Wellness Centers, LLC

•  JPM AA Housing, LLC

•  MediCredit, Inc.

•  Oklahoma Holding Company, LLC

•  Outpatient Services Holdings, Inc.

•  Oviedo Medical Center, LLC

•  SSHR Holdco, LLC

•  Parallon Revenue Cycle Services, Inc.

			
	No. 15	  	January 3, 2018	  	 •  Cy-Fair Medical Center Hospital, LLC

•  Houston NW Manager, LLC

•  Houston – PPH, LLC

•  North Houston – TRMC, LLC

•  Savannah Health Services, LLC

•  Sebring Health Services, LLC

•  Southeast Georgia Health Services, LLC

•  Weatherford Health Services, LLC



  
 2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-50571 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus CARLOS MARTINEZ-HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. DR-01-CR-651-1-WWJ

-------------------- February 20, 2003 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Carlos Martinez-Hernandez appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the sentence is invalid because it exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Martinez-Hernandez complains that his sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). He argues that the sentencing provision is unconstitutional. Alternatively, Martinez-Hernandez contends that 8 U.S.C.No. 02-50571 -2- § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence was an element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been alleged in his indictment.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Martinez-Hernandez acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his arguments for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres

. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                       2,107,000
<SECURITIES>                                 1,037,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,162,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (166,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  6,080,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            11,713,000
<PP&E>                                       4,636,000
<DEPRECIATION>                             (2,474,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              16,829,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,428,000
<BONDS>                                      3,803,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       304,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,901,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                16,829,000
<SALES>                                      9,791,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             9,791,000
<CGS>                                        5,897,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,897,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,690,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             250,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                194,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            194,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   194,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .09


</TABLE>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1 D 2 0 23

- 1499

_____________________________
A NDRELO L. W ITCHER , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. James M. Colaw , Judge

.

June 17, 2024

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R OWE , B ILBREY , and K ELSEY , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Paula C. Coffman, Orlando , for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kristie Regan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
<PAGE>

                                           
                                     EXHIBIT 24.1
                                           

                                  POWER OF ATTORNEY
                                           
KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT, that the undersigned, Dr. Mark W. Dowley, hereby
constitutes and appoints Yehoram Uziel and Robert E. Kassel, or either of them,
his true and lawful attorneys-in-fact and agents, each with full power of
substitution and resubstitution, for him and in his name, place and stead, in
any and all capacities, to sign the Form 10-KSB, Annual Report of Soligen
Technologies, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, for the fiscal year ended March 31,
1997, and any amendments or supplements thereto, and to file this Power of
Attorney and the Form 10-KSB, with all exhibits thereto, and other documents in
connection therewith with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Superintendent of the British Columbia Securities Commission, the American Stock
Exchange and the Vancouver Stock Exchange, granting unto each of said
attorneys-in-fact and agents full power and authority to do and perform each and
every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the
premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in
person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that each of said attorneys-fact and
agents, or his substitutes, may do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

       Dated this   17th  day of June 1997
                 ---------


Signature




/s/ MARK W. DOWLEY
-------------------------------------
Mark W. Dowley, Director
**Exhibit 10.52**

Description of 2005Incentive Compensation Plan 

The Compensation Committee of the Board of Directorsof Remington approved the 2005 Incentive Compensation Plan (the“2005 Plan”) at its December 15,2004 meeting. The 2005 Plan is for the Company’s officers and certain other employees and is based onthe performance of the Company compared to performance targets for 2005 approved by the Board of Directors.The 2005 Plan provides for eligible participants to earn 75% of their potential incentive compensation upon the Company achieving 100% of the performance target, with increases in the portion of the potentialincentive compensation earned with higher performance of the Company.  No incentive compensation will bepayable if the Company fails to achieve 90% or more of the performance target. The unit of measure for the Companyis EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization) as adjusted for certain non-recurringor unusual transactions. The 2005 Plan calls for the payment of earned incentive compensation by the end of theCompany’s first quarter2006.
#### LINER v. AUTHEMENT et al. (two cases).

Nos. 1198, 1199.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Jan. 22, 1934.

For former opinion, see 150 So. 71, 72.

Harris Gagne, of Houma, for appellants.

C. A. Blanchard, of Morgan City, for ap-pellee.

ELLIOTT, Judge.

Alphonse Authement, defendant-appellant, complains of our order, transferring this appeal to the Supreme Court.

He avers in his petition for rehearing on the subject that plaintiff’s demand is inflated and that we have no authority to give orders to the clerk of the district court and sheriff of the parish of Terrebonne, such as were given concerning the matter.

Our authority for transferring the appeal is found in Act No. 19 of 1912. Section 2 of the act provides: “The judges of either Court shall regulate the costs incurred by the Appellant and proceedings to be had in such cases.” This provision has reference to the duty and authority of the judges of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal in the matter of the cost and expenses resulting from the transfer. The orders of which complaint is made had in mind to render the transfer effective, and section 2 of the act seemed to authorize such orders. It did not occur to us at the time, however, that the Supreme Court might send the case back to the Court of Appeal, in which event triplicate copies of the transcript would be unnecessary and a useless expense. We have therefore concluded to modify our original order on that subject. Our original order herein is to that extent revoked and recalled, but our order transferring the appeal to the Supreme Court stands and remains in effect.

 The return day fixed for the appeal to this court had expired at the time the transfer was ordered, and the day fixed by this court as the time when this appeal, was to be lodged in the Supreme Court expired while the application for rehearing as to the transfer was pending. In Dobyns v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 119 La. 72, 43 So. 934, a dis-*116triet judge, in granting an appeal, omitted to fix a determinate day for *the*return as the law requires. Discovering the oversight, he, of his own accord, corrected it by fixing a definite day. The present situation is different from that which existed in the case mentioned, but we will save the appeal, if we can, by fixing a new day on which the appeal is to be lodged in the Supreme Court. February 21, 1934, is therefore fixed as the new day when this appeal is to be lodged in the Supreme Court. It is again ordered that all parties to this suit be duly and timely notified of this order. If the inflation alleged in the petition for rehearing exists to the extent that this court has jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will enter an appropriate order to that effect. We think we can modify our first order herein concerning the making and serving of triplicate copies of the transcript or record and can also ex parte and ex officio fix a new day on which the transfer is to be made, without granting a rehearing. Our original order herein, modified as stated, will stand the transfer to be made in conformity with the new day herein designated.

Rehearing refused.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N NO. 03-14-00294- CV Michael E. Killebrew, Jr., Appellan t

v. BKE Investm ents, Inc., Me rscor p Hold ings, In c., and Everbank , Appellees F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 126 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 2-0 0303 3, H ONO RAB LE AMY CLARK MEACH UM, J UDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this appea l. We g rant the motion and dismi ss the appea l. SeeTex. R. App. P . 42.1(a) (1).

__________________________________________ Scott K. Field, Just ice Be fore J ustices Puryear , Pemberton, and F ield Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion Filed: September

10, 2014
**Exhibit 14**

**ADDENDUM****CODE OF ETHICS FOR FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALSOF WEBCO INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES**

        This Code of Ethics forFinancial Professionals of Webco Industries, Inc. and its Subsidiaries,("Webco") applies to the principal executive officer, the principal financialofficer, the principal accounting officer and the comptroller of Webco and to personsperforming similar functions for Webco. Webco expects all of its employees to act inaccordance with the highest standards of personal and professional integrity in allaspects of their activities, to comply with all applicable laws, rules and regulations, todeter wrongdoing and abide by policies and procedures adopted by Webco that govern theconduct of its employees, including the category of employees to which this Code of Ethicsrelates. This Code of Ethics is intended to supplement the Webco Code of Business Conductand Ethics to which this is an Addendum (the "Webco Code of Conduct").You agree to:        (a) Engage in and promote honest and ethicalconduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interestbetween personal and professional relationships;        (b) Avoid conflicts of interest and to discloseto the Board of Directors of Webco any material transaction or relationship thatreasonably could be expected to give rise to such a conflict;        (c) Take all reasonable measures to protect theconfidentiality of non-public information about Webco and its customers obtained orcreated in connection with your activities and to prevent the unauthorized disclosure ofsuch information unless required by applicable law or regulation or legal or regulatoryprocess;        (d) Produce full, fair, accurate, timely, andunderstandable disclosure in reports and documents that Webco files with, or submits to,the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulators and in other publiccommunications made by Webco;         (e) Comply with applicable governmental laws,rules and regulations, as well as the rules and regulations of self-regulatoryorganizations of which Webco is a member; and        (f) Promptly report any possible violation ofthis Code of Ethics to the Board of Directors of Webco or any of the parties or channelslisted in the Webco Code of Conduct.        You are prohibited from directly or indirectlytaking any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead Webco'sindependent public auditors for the purpose of rendering the financial statements of Webcomisleading.        You understand that you will be heldaccountable for your adherence to this Code of Ethics. Your failure to observe the termsof this Code of Ethics may result in disciplinary action, up to and including terminationof employment. Violations of this Code of Ethics may also constitute violations of law andmay result in civil and criminal penalties for you, your supervisors and/or Webco.        If you have any questions regarding the bestcourse of action in a particular situation, you should promptly contact the CEO or the CFOof Webco. You may choose to remain anonymous in reporting any possible violation of thisCode of Ethics.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Robert HAGEN, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 02-50361.

D.C. No. CR-99-00448-BTM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 21, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Robert Hagen appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate an 18-month term of supervised release imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) following the revocation of his initial supervised release term. Hagen contends that *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348,147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), renders 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) unconstitutional be*993cause it authorizes a possible increase in the penalty beyond the statutory maximum based upon judicial findings proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute, *United States v. Mack,*164 F.3d 467, 471 (9th Cir.1999), and we affirm.

The district court originally sentenced Hagen to 12 months and one day of incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release for bringing illegal aliens into the United States without presentation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). For violating the terms of his supervised release, Hagen was sentenced to an additional 10 months of incarceration followed by an additional 18 months of supervised release.

Hagen’s total sentence of 22 months of incarceration and *%*years of supervised release did not exceed the statutory máximums applicable to his crime. *See 8*U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (B) (iii) (authorizing maximum of ten years’ imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (authorizing five years of supervised release). Accordingly, neither 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) nor Hagen’s additional 18-month term of supervised release is unconstitutional. *See United States v. Sua,*307 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.2002) *(Apprendi*rule is not violated when defendant’s sentence does not exceed the prescribed statutory maximum), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1327, 154 L.Ed.2d 1078 (2003).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 21.1
                              LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

   SUBSIDIARY                                      STATE OF INCORPORATION                      DOES BUSINESS AS
------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------- ---------------------------------
<S>                                              <C>                                       <C>
   Arch Canada Inc.                                 Ontario, Canada
   Arch Communications Enterprises LLC              Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   Arch Wireless Communications, Inc.               Delaware
   Arch Connecticut Valley, Inc.                    Massachusetts                             Arch Wireless Holdings
   Arch Wireless Holdings, Inc.                     Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   Benbow Investments, Inc.                         Delaware
   MobileMedia Communications, Inc.                 Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   MobileMedia Communications Corporation of
     America                                        Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   MobileMedia License Co., LLC                     Delaware
   Paging Network, Inc.                             Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   PageNet SMR Sub, Inc.                            Delaware
   Paging Network Canadian Holdings, Inc.           Delaware
   PageNet, Inc.                                    Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   Paging Network of America, Inc.                  Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   Paging Network of Colorado, Inc.                 Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   Paging Network of Northern California, Inc.      Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   Paging Network of Michigan, Inc.                 Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings
   Paging Network Finance Corp.                     Delaware
   Paging Network International, Inc.               Delaware
   Paging Network of San Francisco, Inc.            Delaware                                  Arch Wireless Holdings

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

NORRISTOWN ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL,

Respondent

v.

NORRISTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 63 MAL 2024

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 9th day of July, 2024

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and

Application to Reinstate Automatic Supersedeas are DENIED

.