alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
183 La. 965

#### ROUSSEAU v. DEMOCRATIC PARISH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR PARISH OF ST. MARTIN. CHAMPAGNE et al. v. SAME.

Nos. 33736, 33735.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 1935.

Labbe & Guidry, of St. Martinsville, and Geo. M. Wallace, of Baton Rouge, for re-lators.

Jacob S. Landry and Porteous R. Burke, both of New Iberia, and Xavier Mouton, of Lafayette, for respondent.

HIGGINS, Justice.

If a strict interpretation is placed upon the language of the Primary Election Law (Act No. 97 of 1922, as amended), and the notice of intention to become a candidate and the affidavit accompanying the notice are considered in that light, the candidate has not properly qualified. But, in the previous decisions of this court, we have repeatedly said that, since the right of the people to choose their public officials is indirectly affected, and this being the fundamental principle involved in all elections, a liberal construction should be placed upon the provisions of the statute.

The Court of Appeal treated the case in a liberal manner, which was in accordance with the announced policy of this court. Therefore, its judgment is correct and the writs are refused.

O'NIELL, Chief Justice

(concurring in the refusal to grant writs).

I doubt that this court has authority to review the decision of the Court of Appeal in a case like this, under the provisions of section 11 of article 7 of the Constitution; and my opinion is that the court should consider and decide that question before refusing the writ on the ground that the judgment of the Court of Appeal is correct. If we should consider that question and decide that we have authority to issue a writ of review in a case like this, I would subscribe to the refusal to grant the writ in this case, on the ground that the judgment of the Court of Appeal is correct. But the Court of Appeal refused to consider, or to act upon; a petition for a rehearing in this case, on the ground that, according to section 27 of Act No. 97 of 1922, as amended by Act No. 28 of the Second Extra Session of 1935 (section 1), a rehearing is not allowable in a case like this. The section of the law referred to has reference to contested election cases; but the eleventh section of the statute (Act No. 97 of 1922), as amended by Act No. 110 of 1934 (section 1), declares that, in suits of this kind, the procedure and appeal shall “in all things and as far as applicable” be as provided for contested election cases under section 27 of the act. The question whether we have authority to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal in a case like this depends upon an interpretation of the clause “as far as applicable.” I express no opinion on the question of interpretation of this clause, because none is expressed in the order refusing to grant a writ of certiorari or review. But my opinion is that we ought to decide the question of our jurisdiction or authority in the premises before considering the merits of the case.
EXHIBIT
      32





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of PCMT Corporation (the "Company") on
      Form
      10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Nachman Shlomo Kohen,
      Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
      1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that, to the
      best
      of my knowledge and belief:




(1)
      the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of the operation of the
      Company.





Date:
              November 8, 2007
            By
            /s/ Nachman
              Shlomo KohenNachman
              Shlomo Kohen,Chief
              Executive Officer and Principal Accounting
              Officer




This
      certification accompanies this Report pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, be deemed filed by Registrant for the purposes of ss.18 of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. This certification shall not be
      incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933,
      as
      amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made
      before or after the date of this Report), irrespective of any general
      incorporation language contained in such filing.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by ss.906 has been provided to
      the
      Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glenn Carson MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-6299.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted July 18, 2003.

Decided Aug. 12, 2003.

Glenn Carson Moore, Appellant Pro Se. Rudolf A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Glenn Carson Moore, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1040, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,*534 U.S. 941, 122 S.Ct. 318, 151 L.Ed.2d 237 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Moore has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny the motion to construe the informal brief as a certificate of appealability, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6077 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6077

 To authorize the National Cyber Director to accept details from other 
 elements of the Federal Government on nonreimbursable basis, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 23, 2021

  Mr. Neguse introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                   Committee on Oversight and Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To authorize the National Cyber Director to accept details from other 
 elements of the Federal Government on nonreimbursable basis, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORITY FOR NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR TO ACCEPT DETAILS ON 
              NONREIMBURSABLE BASIS.

    Section 1752(e) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (8) as 
        subparagraphs (A) through (H), respectively, and indenting such 
        subparagraphs two ems to the right;
            (2) in the matter before subparagraph (A), as redesignated 
        by paragraph (1), by striking ``The Director may'' and 
        inserting the following:
            ``(1) In general.--The Director may'';
            (3) in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
                redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (H) as 
                subparagraphs (D) through (I), respectively; and
                    (B) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the 
                following new subparagraph (C):
                    ``(C) accept officers or employees of the United 
                States or member of the Armed Forces on a detail from 
                an element of the intelligence community or from 
                another element of the Federal Government on a 
                nonreimbursable basis, as jointly agreed to by the 
                heads of the receiving and detailing elements, for a 
                period not to exceed three years;''; and
            (4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(2) Rules of construction regarding details.--Paragraph 
        (1)(C) shall not be construed to impose any limitation on any 
        other authority for reimbursable or nonreimbursable details. A 
        nonreimbursable detail made under such paragraph shall not be 
        considered an augmentation of the appropriations of the 
        receiving element of the Office of the National Cyber 
        Director.''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit
10.28  Amendment
#1  The STANDARD FORM COMMERCIAL
LEASE  (the Agreement) dated the 5th
day of February in the year 2008, as between LiveWire Mobile, Inc. of
100 Crossing Boulevard, Framingham, MA 01702 USA (LESSEE) and FPK Realty LLC
(the LESSOR) of 105 Bartlett Street, Marlborough, MA, is hereby amended (this
Amendment) for the promises and mutual covenants herein and for other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged and accepted by both parties. 
This Amendment is effective as of February 11th, 2008.  The following
modifications are made to the Agreement:  Section 2.
PREMISES:  The rentable square footage
shall be modified from 25,390 rentable square feet in the original document to
now read 30,000 rentable square feet.  Section 4. RENT
shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following language:  Section 4.
RENT: During months 1-3 of the lease term, the LESSEE shall not be responsible
for paying fixed rent.  During months 4-15
of the lease term, the LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR fixed rent in advanced
monthly installments of $29,062.50 (this equates to $15.50 per square foot for
22,500 square feet).  During months 16-27
of the lease term, the LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR fixed rent in advanced
monthly installments of $32,812.50 (this equates to $15.75 per square foot for
25,000 square feet).  During months 28-39
of the lease term, the LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR fixed rent in advanced
monthly installments of $40,000 (this equates to $16.00 per rentable square
foot).  During months 40-51 of the lease
term, the LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR fixed rent in advanced monthly
installments of $40,625.00 (this equates to $16.25 per rentable square
foot).  During months 52-63 of the lease
term, the LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR fixed rent in advanced monthly
installments of $41,250.00 (this equates to $16.50 per rentable square
foot).  All rent shall be payable without
offset or deduction.  All other terms and
conditions in the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.  In the event of a conflict between the
Agreement and this Amendment, this Amendment shall prevail.  The Agreement, including
this Amendment, is the entire understanding between the parties concerning the
subject matter herein, and supersedes, waives, and rescinds all prior written
or oral representations, negotiations, agreements or understandings with
respect thereto.  This
Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts and when the respective
signature pages are attached together, it will be the same as an original
agreement.  The parties also agree that
facsimile signatures will have the same binding force as original signatures.  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the
Company and NMS have caused this Amendment to be executed by their respective
authorized representatives.  FPK Realty LLC
  
  NMS COMMUNICATIONS
  CORPORATION(LESSOR)
  
  (LESSEE)By:
  /s/ Fred Daley
  
  By:
  /s/ Joel HughesName:
  Fred Daley
  
  Name: Joel HughesTitle:
  President
  
  Title: PresidentDate:
  February 12, 2008
  
  Date: February 11,
  2008
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS

Appeal of

- )

)

Tootle Construction

, LLC ) ASBCA No. 63581

)

Under Contract No. FA4819

- 15

- D

- 0002 )

APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT : Laurence J. Zielke III, Esq.

Janice M. Theriot , Esq.

Zielke Law Firm, PLLC

Louisville, KY

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Caryl A. Potter III, Esq.

Air Force Deputy Chief Trial Attorney

Aaron J. Weaver, Esq.

Trial Attorney

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The parties have settled the dispute and appellant consented to the

government’ s motion to dismiss. We grant the motion and dismiss this appeal with

prejudice.

Dated: February 9, 2024

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Order of Dismissal of the

Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 63581

, Appeal of Tootle

Construction, LLC , rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter.

Dated: February 12, 2024 DANIEL S. HERZFELD

Administrative Judge

Armed Services Board

of Contract Appeals

PAULLA K. GATES

- LEWIS

Recorder, Armed Services

Board of Contract Appeals
#### Archie SLEDGE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-3646.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

March 14, 2003.

Before MOORE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; and LAWSON, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable David M. Lawson, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

*ORDER*

Archie Sledge, Jr., through counsel, appeals a district court judgment that affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits. The Commissioner expressly waived oral argument in this appeal, and Sledge has been deemed to have waived oral argument by his silence on the matter. Upon consideration, we unanimously agree that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a).

In 1996, Sledge fell down a flight of stairs and injured his back. On January 22, 1997, a disk was removed from his spine. According to Sledge, he continued to suffer severe back pain. He sought social security benefits in early 1997, claiming that he was disabled due to back problems, a sleeping disorder, and a nervous condition. The Commissioner denied benefits at all stages of review.

Sledge then sought review in the federal district court. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court affirm the Commissioner’s decision. At the closing of the magistrate judge’s report, Sledge was cautioned that he was required to submit timely objections to the report or that his right to appeal would be waived. Nearly two months later, with no objections registered, the district court adopted the findings and the recommendation of the magistrate judge.

In his timely appeal, Sledge does not address his failure to object to the magistrate judge’s report.

A litigant is required to file specific and timely objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), in order to preserve the right to appeal a subsequent order of the district court adopting that report. *Thomas v. Arn,*474 U.S. 140,155, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); *United States v. Walters,*638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir.1981). Although a waiver may be excused under exceptional circumstances in the interest of justice, *Thomas,*474 U.S. at 155 & n. 15, no exceptional circumstances have been cited in this appeal.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 69

To amend section 424 of the Housing and Community Development Act

of 1987 to modify the requirements for minimum property standards

regarding individual residential water purification and treatment units

for properties subject to mortgages insured under the single-family housing mortgage insurance program.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. BEREUTER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Banking and Financial Services

A BILL

To amend section 424 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 to modify the requirements for

minimum property standards regarding individual residential water purification and treatment units for properties subject to mortgages insured under the singlefamily housing mortgage insurance program.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘FHA Water Purifi5 cation Standards Amendments Act’’.
2

•HR 69 IH

1 SEC. 2. APPROVAL OF POINT-OF-USE PURIFICATION SYS2 TEMS AND TESTING OF SYSTEMS.

3 Section 424 of the Housing and Community Develop4 ment Act of 1987 (12 U.S.C. 1701z–15) is amended—

5 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting after the pe6 riod at the end the following new sentence: ‘‘The

7 Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall

8 provide for the approval under subsection (c) of both

9 point-of-use and point-of-entry water treatment

10 equipment and water purification systems that meet

11 the standards established under this section.’’;

12 (2) in the first sentence of subsection (b), by

13 striking ‘‘general standards recognized by the De14 partment as modified for local or regional condi15 tions’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘standards for

16 testing using (1) industry-accepted product testing

17 protocols, or (2) protocols that utilize technically

18 valid methodology using analytical testing methods

19 of the Environmental Protection Agency for drinking

20 water quality and maximum contaminant levels or

21 equivalent methods.’’;

22 (3) by redesignating subsection (b) (as amended

23 by paragraph (2) of this section) as subsection (c);

24 and

25 (4) by inserting after subsection (a) the follow26 ing new subsection:
3

•HR 69 IH

1 ‘‘(b) POINT-OF-USE EQUIPMENT.—For any property

2 in which the water treatment or purification system in op3 eration employs point-of-use equipment, the Secretary

4 may not require that a treatment or purification system

5 be employed on any water supply source serving the prop6 erty that provides water that will not be used primarily

7 for human consumption.’’.

8 SEC. 3. REGULATIONS.

9 The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

10 shall issue any regulations necessary to carry out section

11 424 of the Housing and Community Development Act of

12 1987, as amended by section 2 of this Act, not later than

13 the expiration of the 6-month period beginning on the date

14 of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
THE STATE EX REL. LLOYD, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET 

AL., APPELLEES. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Lloyd v. Indus. Comm. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 

Workers’ compensation – Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 

(No. 97-1096 – Submitted October 27, 1998 – Decided December 30, 1998.) 

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD03-304. 

__________________ 

 Spitler & Williams-Young Co., L.P.A., and William R. Menacher, for 

appellant. 

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Cordelia A. Glenn, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 

__________________ 

 The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed consistent with the opinion 

of the court of appeals. 

 MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and

LUNDBERG STRATTON,JJ., concur.
#### Michael Rosalio, Respondent, v. The City of New York, Appellant.

Judgment of the Municipal Court reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide the event. Opinion by Gaynor, J.* Hirschberg, P. J., Woodward, Jenks and Miller, JJ., concurred.
EXHIBIT 12



GAS TRANSMISSION NORTHWEST CORPORATION

SEC FILINGFORM 10-QThird Quarter 2003

EXHIBIT 12RATIO OF EARNINGS TO
FIXED CHARGES

($ in millions)



|                                   |  | For the Nine months Ended
|---------------------------------- |  | -------------------------
|                                   |  | September 30,2003        
|Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges |  |                          
|                                   |  |                          
|Earnings                           |  |                          
|Net income                         |  | $                        
|Adjustments:                       |  |                          
|Income taxes                       |  |                          
|Fixed charges (as below)           |  |                          
|                                   |  |                          
|Total adjusted earnings            |  | $                        
|                                   |  |                          
|Fixed charges:                     |  |                          
|Net interest expense               |  | $                        
|Adjustments:                       |  |                          
|Interest component of rents        |  |                          
|AFUDC debt                         |  |                          
|                                   |  |                          
|Total fixed charges                |  | $                        
|                                   |  |                          
|Ratio of earnings to fixed charges |  |                          
|                                   |  |
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 848 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  2d Session

                               H. R. 848

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

  To increase the amount authorized to be appropriated for assistance 
   for highway relocation regarding the Chickamauga and Chattanooga 
                   National Military Park in Georgia.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 848

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To increase the amount authorized to be appropriated for assistance 
   for highway relocation regarding the Chickamauga and Chattanooga 
                   National Military Park in Georgia.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASE IN AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    Section 1(c) of the Act entitled ``An Act to authorize and direct 
the National Park Service to assist the State of Georgia in relocating 
a highway affecting the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military 
Park in Georgia'', approved December 24, 1987 (101 Stat. 1442), is 
amended by striking ``$30,000,000'' and inserting ``$51,900,000''.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 10, 1996.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
```