2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-30-2013

George Taylor III v. Attorney General Pennsylvania

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1660

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DLD-023 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 12-1660

_________________

GEORGE J. TAYLOR, III,

 Appellant

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA;

JOSEPH P. NISH, SUPERINTENDENT

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 1:11-cv-00642)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit

L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and on Appellant’s Request for a

Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

October 25, 2012

Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 30, 2013)

_________________

OPINION

_________________

PER CURIAM

George Taylor, a Pennsylvania prisoner, appeals from an order dismissing his 

habeas corpus petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies. We 
2

will vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Because our decision today is narrow, we will not recite the factual history of this 

case, with which the parties are familiar. Taylor filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in 

January 2010 (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1:10-cv-00206), in which he appeared to challenge the 

processes used to issue a Pennsylvania state detainer, as well as the procedures 

surrounding a then-upcoming parole revocation hearing. The District Court swiftly 

dismissed the petition without prejudice as unexhausted on February 1, 2010. Taylor 

then filed his second such petition—the one at issue in this appeal—in which he again 

challenged the detainer and/or parole proceedings. In fact, the parties disagreed on the 

main thrust of the petition; the Commonwealth took the view that Taylor was trying to 

attack his parole revocation and urged that the petition be dismissed as procedurally 

defaulted or, alternatively, as meritless, whereas Taylor reiterated that the “sole reason” 

for his challenge was that there had “never been a detainer lodged [against him]” and thus 

that he was held in custody illegally. Once again, the District Court dismissed Taylor’s 

petition without prejudice as unexhausted, determining that he had “failed to exhaust his 

state court remedies with respect to the detainer” because his attempts to pursue state 

remedies had all been dismissed for failure to comply with procedural requirements. See 

generally Taylor v. Nish, No. 1:11-CV-0642, 2012 WL 258659 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2012). 
3

Taylor timely appealed,1

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).

again arguing that the detainer lodged by the Commonwealth 

was invalid.

2

of the District Court’s exhaustion analysis is plenary. 

Our review

See Holloway v. Horn

91 707, 713 (3d Cir. 2004). Summary action is appropriate when an appeal presents no 

substantial question. 

, 355 F.3d

See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam); see also

While Taylor’s habeas petition may indeed be “unexhausted,” that should not 

portend the end of the inquiry, especially if the respondents urge (as is the case here) that 

parts of the petition are either procedurally defaulted or, in the alternative, are moot; were 

we to leave the judgment of the District Court undisturbed, Taylor would be able to file 

another habeas petition based on the same set of facts, requiring an additional investment 

of time and expense by Taylor, the respondents, and the courts. 

3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

See Coleman v. 

Thompson

 1 The case was originally stayed due to a pending post-judgment motion. The motion has 

been resolved, but since Taylor has not amended his notice of appeal, it is not currently 

before the Court. See United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000). 

, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (discussing procedural default). While 

resolution of Taylor’s petition is complicated by the fact that he and the Commonwealth 

are arguing at cross purposes—he about the detainer, the Commonwealth primarily about 

2 Taylor’s request for a certificate of appealability is granted, as the dismissal of

his habeas petition on the ground of non-exhaustion is debatable, and the petition, at least

as measured against the limited record before this Court, can be said to state a valid dueprocess claim. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 
4

the parole issue—it appears that Taylor’s claims pertaining to the detainer may have been 

mooted by the passage of time, and that his parole concerns may now be procedurally 

defaulted due to a lack of an available state remedy. Although the Commonwealth urges 

us to summarily affirm rather than remand, we believe that these inquiries are better 

conducted by the District Court in the first instance.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of the District 

Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.