alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ex Parte James Q. Martin.

No. 25268.

March 21, 1951.

Relator represented himself.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

*559BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Relator is a convict serving the following described sentences in the state penitentiary. He seeks his release on the ground that he has served the full time required of him under the law.

Relator was convicted in Cause No. 6159 in the 35th Judicial District Court, Brown County, on November 4th, 1940, and sentenced to a term of five years. The sentence following the judgment makes no reference to any other sentence.

He was convicted in Cause No. 6160, 35th Judicial District, Brown County, on the 4th of November, 1940, of the offense of robbery and sentenced to a period of ten years. The sentence following this judgment makes no mention of any other conviction.

He was convicted in Cause No. 53712, Criminal District Court No. 2, Harris County, on October 28th, 1943, for the offense of robbery and was assessed a penalty of five years in the penitentiary. The sentence attempts to cumulate this with the Brown County sentences in the following language: “However, James Q. Martin is sentenced cumulative with sentence assessed in the District Court of Brown County, Texas.”

He was convicted in the Criminal District Court No. 2, Harris County, on October 28, 1943, in Cause No. 53714, of the offense of robbery by assault and assessed a penalty of five years in the penitentiary. The sentence following this judgment contains the following order: “Sentenced cumulative with #53712.”

He was convicted in the District Court No. 2, Harris County, Texas, on October 28, 1943, in Cause No. 53716 for the offense of robbery by assault and given a sentence of five years. The sentence on this judgment makes no reference to any other sentence.

The foregoing quoted cumulative order in Cause No. 53712, Criminal District Court No. 2, Harris County, is indefinite and uncertain in its description of the sentence to which the court attempts to make it cumulative. The question has been so frequently before this court that it is not necessary to refer to the authorities.

The order making the sentence in Cause No. 53714, Criminal District Court No. 2, Harris County, cumulative with that in *560Cause No. 53712 has been held to be valid. The result is that relator has a ten year sentence from the Criminal District Court No. 2 of Harris County, Texas, as the result of the three judgments dated October 28,1943. These run with the Brown County sentences described.

The prison record presented to this court, which has been checked by an assistant attorney general, representing the penitentiary officials, shows that on October 25, 1950, relator had total time to his credit of fifteen years, seven months and three days. It, therefore, appears that he should be released from further confinement.

It is accordingly ordered, adjudged and decreed that relator be released from further service so far as he is being held by reason of the foregoing enumerated judgments.
Exhibit 23.1

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 033-95702, 033-97542, 333-02828, 333-02892,
333-20245, 333-24493, 333-30328 and 333-40185 of Protection One, Inc. on Form S-8, and in Registration Statement
No. 333-50383 of Protection One, Inc. and Protection One Alarm Monitoring, Inc. on Form S-3, of our report dated March 23, 2004, appearing in
this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Protection One, Inc. and Protection One Alarm Monitoring, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2003.

|                                     |  | 
|------------------------------------ |  | 
|/s/DELOITTE & TOUCHE                 |  | 
|Kansas City, Missouri
March 23, 2004 |  | 

---
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. John L. Hulshof, Appellant, v. The Board of Education of the City of New York and William H. Maxwell, as Superintendent of Schools of the City of New York, Respondents.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion.
#### BROWN v. TRAVELERS’ INS. CO. et al.

No. 4527.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 30, 1933.

For former opinion, see 146 So. 774.

Foster, Hall, Barret & Smith, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Thatcher, Browne, Porteous & Myers, of Shreveport, for appellees.

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

When considering the ease originally, we found that plaintiff had sustained an accident, within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended), in the nature of a strain, which confined him to bed for a period of nine days, but that, when he left defendant’s employ, he had recovered from the ill effects of the injury, and was not entitled to compensation to any extent for the reasons assigned by us in our opinion. While plaintiff was confined to his room and bed, following the strain complained of, he incurred unusual medical and physician’s expense bills. He sued to recover the amount of these bills. In disallowing him cómpensation, we also rejected his demand in all other respects, as was done by the lower court. On his application, a rehearing was granted to the end that we could reconsider his demand for reimbursement of the amount of these bills.

Counsel for plaintiff correctly argues that, as it was found and held by us that plaintiff did receive injuries compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, any medical or physician’s bill necessarily incurred as a consequence of such injuries were recoverable by him.

Dr. Boyce, the family physician, had been treating plaintiff for prostate trouble, every five to seven days, for a considerable period prior to the date he was injured, but, after the injury, the' doctor’s services were increased and his visits were much more frequent. He charged $75 for his services to plaintiff from November 21st to March 29th. The medical bills for this period amounted to $12.50. Dr. Boyce stated that 80 per cent, of the services rendered by him during said period were necessitated as a result of the strain or injury plaintiff experienced on November 19, 1930; that he would have rendered service to him after the date of injury (if there had been no injury) along the same line and in the same manner he had done pri- or to that time, but that such services were increased 80 per cent, following the date of *291injury. The same ratio of increase is applicable to the medical bill.

We think plaintiff entitled to recover the medical and physician’s bills incurred by him on account of his injury, although, under the peculiar facts of the case, compensation be denied him.

Our former decree and that of the lower court will have to be amended to meet the granting of the relief above mentioned. This amendment affects the question of liability for costs.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the lower court and our former decree herein are amended to the extent of awarding plaintiff judgment for the sum of $70 to cover physician’s and medical bills incurred by him, and casting defendant for costs in both courts. In all other respects, and as amended hereby, our original decree is reinstated and made the final decree of the court.

MILLS, J., recused.
Exhibit








Exhibit 4.57	
					
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 






DESCRIPTION OF REGISTRANT’S SECURITIES 
REGISTERED PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 
A description of the characteristics of the limited liability company membership interest in Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC (the “Registrant”) that are registered pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is set forth in the Registrant’s Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement, filed as an exhibit to this Annual Report on Form 10-K.


E-1
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 740

AN ACT

To confer jurisdiction on the United States Court

Pueblo of Isleta Indian Tribe.of Federal Claims with respect to land claims of
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 740

AN ACT

To confer jurisdiction on the United States Court of Federal

Claims with respect to land claims of Pueblo of Isleta

Indian Tribe.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 740 EH

1 SECTION 1. JURISDICTION.

2 Notwithstanding sections 2401 and 2501 of title 28,

3 United States Code, and section 12 of the Act of August

4 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1052), or any other law which would

5 interpose or support a defense of untimeliness, jurisdiction

6 is hereby conferred upon the United States Court of Fed7 eral Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment on

8 any claim by Pueblo of Isleta Indian Tribe of New Mexico

9 against the United States with respect to any lands or in10 terests therein the State of New Mexico or any adjoining

11 State held by aboriginal title or otherwise which were ac12 quired from the tribe without payment of adequate com13 pensation by the United States. As a matter of adequate

14 compensation, the United States Claims Court may award

15 interest at a rate of five percent per year to accrue from

16 the date on which such lands or interests therein were ac17 quired from the tribe by the United States. Such jurisdic18 tion is conferred only with respect to claims accruing on

19 or before August 13, 1946, and all such claims must be

20 filed within three years after the date of enactment of this

21 Act. Such jurisdiction is conferred notwithstanding any

22 failure of the tribe to exhaust any available administrative

23 remedy.

24 SEC. 2. CERTAIN DEFENSES NOT APPLICABLE.

25 Any award made to any Indian tribe other than the

26 Pueblo of Isleta Indian Tribe of New Mexico before, on,
3

•HR 740 EH

1 or after the date of the enactment of this Act under any

2 judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or any other

3 authority with respect to any lands that are the subject

4 of a claim submitted by the tribe under section 1 shall

5 not be considered a defense, estoppel, or set-off to such

6 claim, and shall not otherwise affect the entitlement to,

7 or amount of, any relief with respect to such claim.

Passed the House of Representatives July 29, 1996.

Attest:

Clerk.
### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE THOMAS J. MCKEE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 69610

No. E2000-00008-CCA-R3-PC
JUDGMENT
Camethe de fendant, Thomas J. McKee, pro se, and the state, by the Attorney General, and this cause was heard on the record on appeal from the Criminal Cou rt o f Kn ox C oun ty; and upon consideration thereof, this co urt i s of the opinion that there is reversible error in the judgment of the tr

ial court. It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is

remanded to the Cr

iminal Court of Knox Cou nty for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Costs of the appeal are taxed to the State of Tennessee.
Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr. Judge David G. Hayes Judge Norma McGe

e Ogle
<PAGE>






                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1



                Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Molecular Diagnostics, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Peter P. Gombrich, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ PETER P. GOMBRICH
---------------------------------
    Peter P. Gombrich
    Chairman and
    Chief Executive Officer

November 18, 2002
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 158 (Thursday, August 14, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 47597]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18838]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-8704-5]


Notice of Proposed Administrative Settlement Pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as Amended; Midway Village/Bayshore Park Site

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency.

ACTION: Notice, request for public comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with Section 122(i) of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (``CERCLA''), 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. 9622(i), notice is hereby given of a proposed 
Administrative Agreement for Recovery of Past Response Costs 
(``Agreement,'' Region 9 Docket No. 2005-18) pursuant to Section 122(h) 
of CERCLA concerning the Midway Village/Bayshore Park Site (the 
``Site''), located in Daly City, San Mateo County, California. The 
settling parties to the Agreement include Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company (``PG&E''), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (``HUD''), and the U.S. Navy (``the Navy''). Through the 
proposed Agreement, PG&E will reimburse the United States $12,596.30 
and HUD and the Navy will reimburse the United States $113,366.66 in 
response costs incurred at a portion of the Site. The Agreement 
provides the settling parties with a covenant not to sue for these past 
response costs, but does not limit EPA's ability to pursue the settling 
parties for future costs or for past response costs incurred at the 
portion of the Site not covered in the Agreement. For thirty (30) days 
following the date of publication of this Notice, the Agency will 
receive written comments relating to the proposed Agreement. The 
Agency's response to any comments received will be available for public 
inspection at EPA's Region IX offices, located at 75 Hawthorne Street, 
San Francisco, California 94105.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before September 15, 2008.

ADDRESSES: The proposed Agreement may be obtained from Sara Goldsmith, 
in the Office of Regional Counsel, telephone (415) 972-3931. Comments 
regarding the proposed Agreement should be addressed to Sara Goldsmith 
at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (ORC-3), 75 Hawthorne 
Street, San Francisco, California 94105, and should reference the 
Midway Village/Bayshore Park Site, and Region IX Docket No. 2005-18.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sara Goldsmith, Office of Regional 
Counsel, (415) 972-3931, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 
9, 75 Hawthorne Street, San Francisco, CA 94105.

    Dated: August 5, 2008.
Nancy Lindsey,
Acting Director, Superfund Division.
[FR Doc. E8-18838 Filed 8-13-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
ingr_Ex10_21



		

			Exhibit 10.21

		





		
			 
		

			
					
						

					
					
						lngredion Janet Bawcom EMPLOYEE SIGN-ON AGREEMENT In connection with my acceptance of lngredion Incorporated's (the Company) conditional offer of employment and my future employment in the position of TITLE, the Company has agreed to provide a one-time payment in the amount of $250,000.00 gross to be paid in one lump sum payment in March 2020, less withholding required by law, and subject to the following: I. If my employment with the Company terminates for any reason other than a reduction in force within 24 months from the payment date of the bonus, I understand that the above sum shall be reimbursed to the company in full. If I have not made arrangements satisfactory to the Company for repayment of the sum prior to my last day of employment, I hereby expressly authorize the Company to deduct the amount from my final compensation. I agree to promptly make payment to the Company for any amount remaining due after deduction from my final compensation. I agree to complete any documentation requested by the Company in connection with the termination of my employment to effectuate this Agreement. 2. I agree to pay any attorney's fees and costs incurred by the Company in seeking repayment of the one-time payment, as well as legal interest on any outstanding balance remaining after my last day of work. 3. Nothing herein shall be construed to constitute a guarantee or contract of employment between me and the Company for the 24 month period outlined in paragraph one (I) above or any other time period. My employment will be at-will. 4. In case of any conflict between this document and any other documents, policies or statements, written or oral, this document shall govern. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Illinois without giving effect to the principles of conflict of laws thereof. 5. I understand that I will not be entitled to the above one-time payment if I do not successfully pass the Company's pre-employment physical examination, drug screening, and background check.

				



		
			 
		

			
					
						                     

					
					
						 

					
					
						        

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						Janet Bawcom

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

					
					
						/s/ Janet Bawcom

					
					
						              2/1/2019

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						Employee Name (Print) 

					
					
						Start Date

					
					
						 

					
					
						Employee Signature

					
					
						                   Date
18306.

#### Hartsfield *et al.,*Trustees, *v.*Mitchell.

Duckworth, Chief Justice.

1. The petitioner, a teacher in the Atlanta School System, complied with the Retirement Act of 1927 (Ga. L. 1927, p. 265) by having deductions made from his salary from the effective date of the act, and, in the absence of action on his part whereby he relinquished his rights thereunder, would have been entitled to receive one-half of the salary he was receiving at the time of his retirement in 1945, as provided in that act. *Trotzier*v. *McElroy,*182 *Ga.*719 (186 S. E. 817); *Bender*v. *Anglin,*207 *Ga.*108 (60 S. E. 2d 756); *Pierce*v. *Rhodes,*208 *Ga.*554 (67 S. E. 2d *771); City of Atlanta*v. *Anglin,*209 *Ga.*170 (71 S. E. 2d 419).

2. But after the original act of 1927 was amended in 1935 (Ga. L. 1935, p. 445), to provide additional benefits, change the amount of deductions from salaries, and fix the amount of retirement not to exceed the maximum sum of S100 per month, the plea and answer shows that this petitioner signed and filed on May 1, 1935, with the board of trustees, a written statement containing the following clause: “I hereby authorize City Controller to make necessary deductions from my wages or salary in order that I may participate in the pension benefits of the 1927 Pension Laws as amended,” and on May 24, 1945, signed and filed a similar statement with the board of trustees. By such statements and for the consideration of additional benefits and changed contributions, the petitioner irrevocably consented to the law as changed by amendment and surrendered any right to claim the amount of retirement pay as originally provided by the pension law. The 1935 amendment became effective March 28, 1935. Code §§ 20-1201, 20-106.

3. Because of the facts set out in headnote 2 this case differs on its facts from the cases cited in headnote 1, and, for this reason, the rule there announced does not apply here. And because of such facts this pe*198titioncr is limited to the amount of retirement provided by the 1935 amendment, which in his case, is the maximum sum of $100 per month which ho has been receiving. It follows that the court erred in sustaining the' demurrer to the plea and answer of the defendants and in making the mandamus absolute.

Argued September 16, 1953

Decided October 14, 1953

Rehearing denied November 12, 1953.

*J. C. Savage, J. C. Murphy, J. M. B. Bloodworth, John E. Feagin, Henry L. Bowden, Hamilton Lokey, Martin McFarland,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Harold Sheats, Guy Parker,*contra.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 653 Engrossed in House (EH)]

    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 653

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the United States courthouse under construction in White 
      Plains, New York, as the ``Thurgood Marshall United States 
                             Courthouse''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The United States courthouse under construction at 300 Quarropas 
Street in White Plains, New York, shall be known and designated as the 
``Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the United States courthouse referred to 
in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Thurgood 
Marshall United States Courthouse''.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 5, 1995.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
104th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 653

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the United States courthouse under construction in White 
      Plains, New York, as the ``Thurgood Marshall United States 
                             Courthouse''.
```
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-15-00250- CV

Ruben P. Chavez , Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F B ELL COUNTY , 27t h JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 195 ,953 -A, H ONO RAB LE JO HN GAUNTT, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Ruben P. Chavez, an inmate, ha s filed a pro se notice of appe al from the district court’s interloc utory order , dated Ma

rch 9, 2015, denying what C havez s tyled as a “notice of appea l.” Ba sed on our revie w of the limit ed rec ord befor e us, Chavez’s “notice of appea l” in the district court appe ars to seek relief in a proce edinginvolving the State’ s enfor ceme nt of Chavez’s child-support oblig ations.

Appellate c ourts g ener ally have jur isdiction ove r final judg ments and interlocutor y order s that the Tex as L eg islature has de emed a ppeala ble. The interloc utory

order at i ssue here i s 1 not among those that we are permitted to revie w. On M ay 7, 2015, we notified appellant th at no 2 final judgme nt or appea lab l e i n t er locutory order appea red in the rec ord befor e us and reque sted
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 51.012, .014; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W .3d 1 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. 2appellant file a response by May 18, 2015, explaining why this Court has jurisdiction in this appea l.

On J une 4, 2015, we g rante d appellant’ s motion for extension of ti m e, extending the deadline to file a r esponse to June 15, 2015, and advised no f urther e x tensions would be g rante d. To date, no response has bee n filed. Ac cording ly , we dismiss this appeal for w ant of jurisdiction. 3

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Pemberton a nd Field Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: Jul y

9, 2015

See Tex. R. App. P . 42.3(a)
. 3 2