[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-10248

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20344-RNS-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MADELINE RODGERS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(December 11, 2015)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Madeline Rodgers appeals her sentence of 72 months of imprisonment and 

her convictions for one count of conspiring to commit bank and wire fraud, 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2, 1349, and two counts of wire fraud that affected a financial 

institution, id. § 1343. Rodgers challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the 

denial of a requested jury instruction, and the substantive reasonableness of her 

sentence. We affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government and the jury’s verdict,

the evidence proved that Rodgers conspired with other persons, including Joel 

Zaldivar, Joaquin Medina, and Carlos Fonte, to defraud financial institutions by 

submitting false loan applications signed by Betsy Garcia, Michael Gaughan, and 

Michelle Gaughan. See id. § 1349; United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 588–89 

(11th Cir. 2015). Garcia, Michael, and Michelle testified that they obtained loans 

and participated in sham residential sales at Rodgers’s request; the loan 

applications they signed later were altered to overstate their incomes and assets and 

to include false employment information; Zaldivar, who did not speak to any of the 

applicants, misrepresented on the applications that he completed the forms using 

information conveyed to him during telephone interviews; and their applications 

contained letters prepared by Zaldivar falsely stating that Garcia and Michelle were 

employed by Medina and that Michael was employed by Lourdes Rodriguez.

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A federal agent who examined real estate records, loan documents, and bank 

accounts prepared a chart that he used to explain how Rodgers and her cohorts

profited from the three loan transactions. See Martin, 803 F.3d at 589. With respect 

to the first loan, which CitiMortgage, Inc., issued for Garcia to purchase Michelle’s 

residence, the agent testified that Michelle used the $64,002.59 she received at 

closing to provide Rodgers a cashier’s check for $63,792.59. As to the second loan, 

in which Citibank, N.A., disbursed $423,020.28 to Michael to purchase Fonte’s

residence, the agent explained that Fonte supplied funds for a down payment by 

giving $45,000 to Rodgers, who gave $43,000 to Michael, who made a down 

payment of $41,325.25, and that Fonte received $88,074.62 and $52,451.43 at

closing, which he shared with Rodgers by giving her a check for $5,000 and a

cashier’s check for $25,000. With respect to the third loan, Citibank disbursed 

$483,616.94 to Michelle to purchase property from Fabiola Llanes, who received 

$475,210.28 at closing and sent a cashier’s check for $106,000 to Fonte, who

wrote three checks to Rodgers for $8,000, $8,500, and $7,575

Bank records proved that Rodgers also paid her cohorts. Rodgers wrote a 

check for $1,300 to Medina before the fraudulent loan applications were submitted 

to the lenders. Rodgers added Garcia and Michael as signatories to her bank 

account and allowed Garcia to withdraw $9,200 from the account. And Rodgers

gave Michelle a “gift” of $5,000. 

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Ample evidence proves that Rodgers and her coconspirators affected 

financial institutions by causing them to transfer loan proceeds using interstate 

wire transmissions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343. CitiMortgage and Citibank disbursed 

more than $900,000 through wire transmissions based on the false loan 

applications submitted by the conspirators. Those disbursements “affected” 

Citibank, a federally insured financial institution, and its related lending company,

CitiMortgage, because they “granted mortgages . . . based on falsified 

representations of [Michael’s and Michelle’s] ability to repay, . . . [which] 

increased [the] risk of loss [to the institutions] through default.” See Martin, 803 

F.3d at 590.

Rodgers argues that she was entitled to an acquittal because none of the 

government witnesses identified her as the “Madeline Rodgers” involved in the 

conspiracy, but this argument fails. We have held repeatedly that a defendant does 

not have to be “pointed out” during trial to prove that she committed the offenses 

charged. United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1983); United 

States v. Darrell, 629 F.2d 1089, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Vahalik, 

606 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1979). The identity of a defendant can be established by 

circumstantial evidence. United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 91, 92 (11th Cir. 1984). 

The jury had before it at least two kinds of evidence connecting Rodgers to 

the conspiracy. First, the jury reasonably could have relied on Rodgers’s driver’s 

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license, which the United States introduced into evidence, to identify Rodgers 

based on her photograph and to compare her signature with that of her namesake 

on the documents and checks generated by the conspiracy. Second, the jury 

reasonably could have inferred that Garcia, who was married to Rodgers’s brother,

was referring to her sister-in-law when testifying about her relationship to and 

transactions with “Madeline Rodgers.”

Rodgers contends that we should vacate her convictions for a lack of 

identification as we did in Darrell, but in that case the government failed to 

provide any evidence to connect the defendant to a signature on a letter and bad 

checks used to prosecute him for mail fraud. 629 F.2d at 1090–91. Unlike in 

Darrell, “the evidence is sufficient to permit the inference that [Rodgers] was the 

person who committed the crime[s]” of conspiracy and wire fraud. Id. at 1091.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rodgers’s

request for a jury instruction about witnesses who testify in exchange for immunity

or to gain favor with the government. “A defendant has the right to have the jury 

instructed on a theory of defense only if the proposed instruction presents a valid 

defense and if there has been some evidence adduced at trial relevant to that 

defense.” United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Rodgers requested that 

the district court instruct the jurors to “consider some witnesses’ testimony with 

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more caution,” like “witnesses who have been promised immunity from

prosecution, or witnesses who hope to gain more favorable treatment in their own 

cases . . . in order to strike a good bargain with the Government,” but Rodgers 

failed to introduce any evidence that the government witnesses testified in 

exchange for actual or potential benefits. See United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 

1144, 1154 (11th Cir. 2013). And the district court gave a jury charge related to 

Rodgers’s theory that Garcia and the Gaughans falsely denied collaborating with 

the conspiracy to avoid prosecution. See Duperval, 777 F.3d at 1334. The district 

court instructed the jury to “decide whether you believe what each witness had to 

say” and whether to “believe or disbelieve any witness in whole or in part” by 

considering if “the witness [had] any particular reason not to tell the truth” or had 

“a personal interest in the outcome of the case.” This instruction apprised the jury 

that they could discount testimony they found incredible.

The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Rodgers 

to 72 months of imprisonment. The district court reasonably determined that a 

sentence within Rodgers’s advisory guideline range of 63 to 78 months of 

imprisonment best satisfied the statutory purposes of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). And the decision to impose a sentence well below Rodgers’s maximum 

statutory sentence of 30 years suggests that her sentence is reasonable. See United 

States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). Rodgers alleges a 

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disparity between her sentence and lesser sentences imposed on Fonte and 

Zaldivar, but Rodgers was not similarly situated to those coconspirators. See 

United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2010). Fonte and 

Zaldivar pleaded guilty and received lesser sentences for their acceptance of 

responsibility. Rodgers’s sentence is reasonable.

We AFFIRM Rodgers’s convictions and sentence.

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