[Cite as Work v. Work, 2018-Ohio-3104.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

LARRY A. WORK 

 Appellant 

 v. 

TINA L. WORK, et al. 

 Appellees 

C.A. No. 17CA011228 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 16CV190298 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: August 6, 2018 

 

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Larry A. Work, Jr. appeals the orders of the Lorain County Court of Common 

Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of Tina L. Work and Jeanne Marie SullivanDiFrancesco. We affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} In August 2016, Mr. Work filed his complaint for intentional interference with an 

expectancy of inheritance against Tina L. Work, Jeanne Sullivan-DiFrancesco, and Jennifer 

Work-Smith, and filed an amended complaint in January 2017. Ms. Work-Smith was dismissed 

in September 2017. The decedent, who passed away in 2013, was the father of Mr. Work and 

brother to Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco. Tina Work is the ex-wife of the decedent, with the couple 

divorcing in 2012. The decedent’s will named Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco as the administrator, 

however no probate proceedings have been initiated. 
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{¶3} Ms. Work and Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco filed motions for summary judgment in 

August 2017. In response, Mr. Work filed briefs in opposition along with motions for 

continuances in order to obtain discovery. The trial court denied the motions for continuances, 

noting that the discovery deadline had been agreed to by the parties, had been extended by two 

months, and that no motion to compel had been filed by Mr. Work. The trial court granted the 

motions for summary judgment in favor of Ms. Work and Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco. Mr. Work 

now appeals, raising one assignment of error. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENANTS’-APPELLEES’ 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A CLAIM FOR 

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH AN EXPECTANCY OF AN 

INHERITANCE. 

{¶4} In his assignment of error, Mr. Work argues the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of defendants on his claim for intentional interference with an 

expectancy of an inheritance. Specifically, Mr. Work contends that Ms. Work and Ms. SullivanDiFrancesco failed to provide sufficient and proper evidence showing that there was no genuine 

issue as to any material fact. We disagree. 

{¶5} Appellate review of an award of summary judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio 

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 

when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of 

the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is 

adverse to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), 

citing Civ.R. 56(C). A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
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party and must resolve any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 

Ohio St.3d 356, 358–359 (1992). A trial court does not have the liberty to choose among 

reasonable inferences in the context of summary judgment, and all competing inferences and 

questions of credibility must be resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor. Perez v. Scripps–

Howard Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 215, 218 (1988). 

{¶6} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth the nature of this burden-shifting 

paradigm: 

[A] party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party 

cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the 

basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the 

nonmoving party’s claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden 

under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving 

party has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to 

specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which 

affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support 

the nonmoving party’s claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial 

burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the 

moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a 

reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, 

summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party. 

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). 

{¶7} Mr. Work’s amended complaint alleged that Ms. Work committed an intentional 

tort by failing to turn over all assets belonging to the decedent to either the decedent himself 

while he was still living or to Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco after his death. The amended complaint 

further alleged Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco committed an intentional tort in failing to probate the 

decedent’s estate and distribute to the appellant his share of the estate. 

{¶8} With regard to Ms. Work, her affidavit attached to her motion for summary 

judgment averred the following: (a) that she did not have any control over the decedent’s assets 
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for the last year prior to his death; (b) that prior to their divorce she and the decedent maintained 

separate bank accounts; (c) that the decedent’s 1948 GMC truck is at the Sheffield Village 

residence and remains titled in the decedent’s name; (d) that she was the beneficiary of the 

decedent’s 403(b) retirement account, that she received a letter from Mutual of America advising 

her as to that fact, and that she completed the application for death benefits and received the 

proceeds sometime later; and (e) that she has not interfered with any of the decedent’s assets or 

Mr. Work’s expectancy of inheritance. 

{¶9} With regard to the Sheffield Village residence, she averred that she owned the 

home with the decedent as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, and that pursuant to the 

divorce decree, they were to sell the home and split any proceeds. She averred that they listed 

the property, but failed to sell it, and that after the decedent had passed away, it was not listed for 

sale again. She further averred that she had made all mortgage, insurance, and tax payments 

since the decedent’s death. She also stated the property can only be transferred out of the 

decedent’s name through a probate estate proceeding. 

{¶10} In the affidavit attached to his brief in opposition, Mr. Work averred that Ms. 

Work interfered with his expected inheritance by: 

Not selling and continuing to reside in the home located [in Sheffield Village] * * 

*; (b) not dividing the joint checking and savings accounts they had with First 

Place Bank; (c) cashing in and keeping one hundred percent of [] Larry Allen 

Work’s 403b Thrift account with Mutual of America; [and] (d) keeping Larry 

Allen Work’s 1948 GMC Truck at her residence. 

{¶11} Mr. Work has provided no evidence of the existence of any joint accounts 

containing funds to which he may be entitled, and has provided no rationale as to why he would 

have an expectancy of any funds contained in the decedent’s 403(b) account with Mutual of 

America. As to the Sheffield Village residence and the GMC truck, Mr. Work suggests no 
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argument that would prevent these assets from being properly divided if probate proceedings 

were initiated. 

{¶12} With regard to Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco, as we have noted, the complaint 

alleged that she committed an intentional tort by failing to probate the estate or distribute to Mr. 

Work his share of the estate. In the affidavit attached to her motion for summary judgment, Ms. 

Sullivan-DiFrancesco averred the following: (1) she was named in her brother’s will to be 

appointed as executrix; (2) she did not approach the probate court to be appointed executrix; (3) 

she repeatedly offered to step aside to allow Mr. Work to become the executor; (4) she has done 

nothing to interfere or deprive Mr. Work of any inheritance; (5) she has taken no action on behalf 

of the estate except to file a 2014 tax return and submit forms to Mutual of America with regard 

to a life insurance policy; (6) she deposited a $1,200.00 tax return check into the decedent’s bank 

account; and (7) she disclaims and waives her nomination to serve as executrix. 

{¶13} In the affidavit attached to his brief in opposition, Mr. Work averred that Ms. 

Sullivan-DiFrancesco interfered with his expected inheritance by taking actions involving the 

decedent’s assets after his death without being named as executrix or administrator by the 

probate court. 

{¶14} In his amended complaint, Mr. Work alleged that Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco 

committed an intentional tort by failing to probate the estate or distribute to Mr. Work his share 

of the estate. There is no requirement that an executrix named in a will accept the appointment. 

See R.C. 2113.05 (“When a will is approved and allowed, the probate court shall issue letters 

testamentary to the executor named in the will * * * if the executor * * * is suitable, competent, 

accepts the appointment, and gives bond * * *.”). Consequently, there was no requirement that 

Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco accept the appointment, probate the estate, and distribute a share to 
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Mr. Work. Furthermore, Mr. Work’s affidavit fails to refute the affidavit evidence of Ms. 

Sullivan-DiFrancesco, and fails to offer any evidence that she interfered with his inheritance. 

{¶15} We conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. Ms. Work 

and Ms. Sullivan-DiFrancesco met their burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of 

material fact, and Mr. Work failed to meet his reciprocal burden of providing evidence to set 

forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial. 

{¶16} Mr. Work’s assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶17} Mr. Work’s assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 
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 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 THOMAS A. TEODOSIO 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

RANDOLPH R. ROTH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

BRIAN G. DATTILO, Attorney at Law, for Appellee. 

HENRY W. CHAMBERLAIN, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.