NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, 

Appellee,

v.

RIGOBERTO MEZA-CONTRERAS, 

Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0458

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201300435

The Honorable Lee Frank Jantzen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Adele Ponce

Counsel for Appellee

Law Offices of Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson

By Harriette P. Levitt

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MEZA-CONTRERAS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Rigoberto Meza-Contreras (Defendant) appeals his 

convictions and sentences for transportation of dangerous drugs for sale

(methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia

(methamphetamine). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Department of Public Safety Officer Callister conducted a 

traffic stop of a northbound pickup truck on I-15 in northwestern Arizona 

after noticing that a Global Positioning System (GPS) device affixed to the 

truck’s windshield was unlawfully obstructing the driver’s view. 

Defendant was the truck’s sole passenger. Alonso, the driver, presented 

Officer Callister with his driver’s license and a rental agreement showing 

the truck had been rented the previous day in California by Defendant’s 

wife. The rental agreement indicated that she was the only authorized 

driver of the truck, and the vehicle was to remain in California during the

one-week rental period.

¶3 Officer Callister had Alonso exit the truck and proceed to the 

patrol vehicle. In response to Officer Callister’s questioning, Alonso stated 

he and Defendant were going to Colorado and planned to stay for fifteen

days to visit friends. When Officer Callister returned to the truck, 

Defendant stated that he and Alonso were going to stay in Colorado for one 

day to visit family before returning to California. 

¶4 After speaking with Defendant, Officer Callister returned the 

driver’s license and rental agreement to Alonso, issued him a warning 

regarding the GPS device attached to the windshield, and asked if he could

search the truck. According to the trial evidence, either Alonso or 

Defendant consented to a search, and Officer Callister ultimately found 

fourteen one-pound bags of methamphetamine located in the driver and 

passenger door panels. 
STATE v. MEZA-CONTRERAS

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The State charged Defendant with one count of transportation 

of dangerous drugs for sale (methamphetamine) (Count 1), a class 2 felony; 

and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (methamphetamine)

(Count 2), a class 6 felony. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the 

drugs, arguing they were seized pursuant to an unconstitutional 

warrantless search of the truck. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing 

and denied the motion. Defendant also moved in limine to preclude, on

hearsay grounds, Alonso’s statements to Officer Callister regarding his and 

Defendant’s travel plans to Colorado. The court denied the motion. 

¶6 Defendant was found guilty on both counts, sentenced, and 

timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of 

the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 

12-120.21.A.1, 13-4031, and -4033.A.1 (West 2016).1 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Suppress

¶7 Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress, arguing Officer Callister unreasonably detained him during the 

traffic stop. Defendant, a native Spanish speaker, also argues that his 

consent to search the truck was involuntary because of his limited English 

proficiency. Specifically, Defendant contends he was unaware that he 

could withhold his consent to the search, and he believed he was required 

to sign a consent form so Officer Callister could check the truck for 

“driveability.” 

¶8 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article 2, Section 8, of the Arizona Constitution prohibit 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amends. IV (“The right of 

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”), XIV; ARIZ.

CONST. art. 2, § 8 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his 

home invaded, without authority of law.”). In general, the federal and state 

protections are coterminous except in cases involving warrantless home 

entries. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 22 n.3, ¶ 19 (App. 2007). We therefore 

rely on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in reviewing the trial court’s 

suppression ruling.

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred.
STATE v. MEZA-CONTRERAS

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 Generally, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment. State v. Branham, 191 Ariz. 94, 95 (App. 1997)

(citing State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 389 (1986)). However, a warrantless 

search is valid if the search is conducted after voluntary consent is given. 

State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 612 (App. 1991). “The voluntariness of a 

defendant’s consent to search is a question of fact determined from the 

totality of circumstances.” Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 

248-49 (1973)). It is the State’s burden to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that a defendant’s consent was freely and intelligently given. Id.

¶10 “An investigatory stop of a motor vehicle constitutes a seizure 

under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116,

118 (1996). An officer needs only reasonable suspicion that the driver has 

committed an offense to stop a vehicle. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,

439 (1984). Reasonable suspicion exists when the totality of circumstances 

provides a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting the particular 

person has violated the law. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. at 118 (quoting 

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).

¶11 The exclusionary rule prevents the introduction of evidence 

seized in violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights. State v. 

Hackman, 189 Ariz. 505, 508 (App. 1997). In reviewing the denial of a motion 

to suppress evidence purportedly seized in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment, we review only the evidence submitted at the suppression 

hearing, State v. Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 631 (1996), and we view those facts 

in the manner most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling. State v. 

Sheko, 146 Ariz. 140, 141 (App. 1985). The trial court determines the 

credibility of witnesses. State v. Ossana, 199 Ariz. 459, 461, ¶ 7 (App. 2001). 

Although we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations, we review de 

novo its ultimate legal conclusion. State v. Valle, 196 Ariz. 324, 326, ¶6 (App. 

2000). 

¶12 Here, the record reveals, and Defendant does not dispute, that 

Officer Callister reasonably suspected Alonso was driving the truck in 

violation of Arizona law, which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle 

with an object affixed to the windshield in a manner that obstructs or 

restricts the driver’s clear view. See A.R.S. § 28-959.01.B; see also A.R.S. § 28-

1594 (An officer “may stop and detain a person as is reasonably necessary 

to investigate an actual or suspected violation” of Title 28). Accordingly, 

the initial stop of the truck to investigate the placement of the GPS device 

and Officer Callister’s review of Alonso’s driver’s license and the rental 

agreement did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Paredes, 167 Ariz. at 

611.
STATE v. MEZA-CONTRERAS

Decision of the Court

5

¶13 Instead, Defendant contends that the stop became an 

unconstitutional detention after Officer Callister issued Alonso the warning 

and returned the license and rental agreement to him.2 Defendant does not 

assert, and the record does not reflect, that his post-warning encounter with 

Officer Callister was involuntary or was unreasonably prolonged. See 

Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 24 (citing United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 

505, 510-11 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that “an officer does not violate the 

Fourth Amendment by asking a few questions about matters unrelated to 

the traffic violation, even if this conversation briefly extends the length of 

the detention”). Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment not only permits an 

investigating officer to ask questions unrelated to the traffic stop, it allows 

the officer to request consent to search the vehicle. See generally Ohio v. 

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (consent to search was voluntary where a 

defendant was stopped for speeding, officer gave a verbal warning and 

returned defendant’s driver’s license, and then asked defendant if he had 

any contraband or weapons in the car; defendant replied “no” and 

consented to search of the car). “An officer’s inquiries into matters 

unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter 

into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as the inquiries do not 

measurably extend the stop’s duration.” Ariz. v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 325

(2009). 

¶14 The traffic stop here was not “measurably” delayed to the 

extent it became unlawful. The record shows Officer Callister, immediately 

after issuing the warning, had a short conversation with Alonso about the 

weather and asked if he had anything illegal in the truck. When Alonso 

said that he did not, Officer Callister requested and obtained Alonso’s 

signature on a consent form that detailed Alonso’s rights in both English 

and Spanish. Officer Callister then returned to the truck where Defendant 

was seated and obtained his oral and written consent to search the truck. 

As the trial court noted, nothing in the record indicates Officer Callister 

exhibited overbearing authority at any time during his encounter with 

Defendant. Importantly, Defendant testified at the suppression hearing 

that he felt free to leave the scene. Under these circumstances, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in finding Defendant’s short post-warning 

 

2 The State argues this issue should be reviewed for fundamental error 

because Defendant did not raise these specific arguments with the trial 

court. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005). However, 

because we discern no error, we need not engage in fundamental error 

review. See State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 385 (1991) (“Before we may engage 

in a fundamental error analysis, however, we must first find that the trial 

court committed some error.”). 
STATE v. MEZA-CONTRERAS

Decision of the Court

6

encounter with Officer Callister was consensual. No Fourth Amendment 

violation occurred. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 325.

¶15 Regarding Defendant’s consent to the vehicle search, the 

record reflects that he read—or at least had the opportunity to read—and 

signed a consent form that, in both English and Spanish, explained he could 

refuse to allow the search, he could withdraw his consent at any time, and 

any evidence discovered during a search could be used in court. Although 

Defendant testified he did not read the consent form and he believed that 

Officer Callister was going to inspect the truck not for contraband but for 

“driveability” based on the officer’s use of the Spanish word “inspeccionar” 

rather than “revisar,” the court was not required to accept this testimony. 

Indeed, the consent form expressly uses the terms “revisado” and

“revisen,” conjugations of the Spanish verb “revisar,” and Officer Callister 

testified that Defendant appeared to understand his oral request in English 

to search the truck after Defendant denied anything illegal was in it. 

¶16 Defendant’s encounter with Officer Callister after Alonso 

received the traffic warning was consensual and the traffic stop was not 

unduly extended. Defendant also voluntarily consented to the vehicle 

search. Accordingly, Officer Callister’s search of the truck and the resulting 

seizure of the methamphetamine did not violate Defendant’s rights under 

the Fourth Amendment. The court did not err in denying the motion to 

suppress. 

II. Motion in Limine

¶17 Defendant argues the court should have granted his motion 

in limine to preclude admission of Alonso’s statements to Officer Callister 

explaining he and Defendant were planning to stay in Colorado for fifteen 

days. Defendant contends these statements are hearsay and their improper 

admission violated his constitutional right to confront Alonso. “‘Hearsay’ 

[is] a statement . . . offer[ed] in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted[,]” and generally is not admissible as evidence. Ariz. R. Evid. 

801(c), 802. 

¶18 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment protects a 

defendant’s ability to prove a witness’s motive or bias. U.S. CONST. amend. 

VI; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974). “[T]he Confrontation Clause 

prohibits the admission of testimonial evidence from a declarant who does 

not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had 

a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” State v. King, 213 Ariz. 

632, 637, ¶ 17 (App. 2006) (citing Crawford v. Wash., 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).
STATE v. MEZA-CONTRERAS

Decision of the Court

7

“The [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial 

statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 

asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. Thus, the Confrontation Clause is 

inapplicable to non-hearsay statements. 

¶19 We generally review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility 

of evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. King, 213 Ariz. at 636, ¶ 15. 

However, we review de novo challenges to admissibility based on the 

Confrontation Clause. Id. 

¶20 The State’s purpose in admitting Alonso’s statement that he 

and Defendant were going to stay in Colorado for fifteen days was not to 

prove that the two men were, in fact, planning on that length of sojourn. 

Rather, the evidence was presented to show that Alonso and Defendant 

gave different responses about their travel plans. The different responses, 

both of which were in conflict with the one-week rental period of the truck, 

were suspicious and provided a basis for Officer Callister to ask Alonso and 

Defendant whether the truck contained contraband, and when they 

answered in the negative, to request permission to search the vehicle. The 

evidence, therefore, is not hearsay, and its admission did not violate 

Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. We find no abuse of 

discretion or legal error in denying Defendant’s motion in limine.

III. Willits Instruction

¶21 During his search of the truck, Officer Callister noticed a oneinch gap between the driver’s door and the door’s interior panel. He also 

noticed a rivet on the driver-side floor board, which in addition to the gap 

and mud found on the door panel, “showed tampering[.]” Officer Callister 

proceeded to roll down the door window, but the window would not fully 

retract into the door. Officer Callister shined his flashlight inside the door 

panel and observed clear plastic packages containing the drugs, whereupon 

he arrested Defendant and Alonso. Officer Callister proceeded to seize the 

packaged drugs from the door panels. He did not seize the rivet and he did 

not photograph it. 

¶22 Officer Callister also did not seize luggage found in the truck. 

Although he searched the luggage, he found only clothes and toiletries. The 

luggage remained in the truck when the vehicle was eventually returned to 

the rental company. 

¶23 After the close of evidence, Defendant requested the jury be 

instructed pursuant to State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964), with respect to the 
STATE v. MEZA-CONTRERAS

Decision of the Court

8

rivet and the luggage. The trial court declined to give the requested 

instruction, a ruling Defendant argues was reversible error. 

¶24 A Willits instruction tells jurors that they may draw an 

inference from the State’s loss or destruction of material evidence that the 

evidence would have been unfavorable to the State. State v. Fulminante, 193 

Ariz. 485, 503, ¶ 62 (1999). However, a defendant is not automatically 

entitled to a Willits instruction when evidence is destroyed or not retained. 

State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 33 (1995). Further, a Willits instruction is not 

required merely because the State could have undertaken a more thorough 

or exhaustive investigation. Id. To be entitled to a Willits instruction, the 

defendant must prove that the State failed to preserve evidence that is 

material, accessible, and which might tend to exonerate the defendant. Id. 

We review the refusal to give a Willits instruction for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Speer, 221 Ariz. 449, 457, ¶ 39 (2009).

¶25 We do not see the materiality of the rivet and the luggage or

how those items had a tendency to exonerate Defendant. As for the rivet, 

Officer Callister testified that although the rivet initially indicated the truck

had been tampered with, it ultimately did not match the rivets that attached 

the door panel to the door and therefore it had no evidentiary value. 

Regarding the luggage, Officer Callister testified that he did not retain it 

because “there’s nothing there to aid in prosecution or assist in proving 

innocence of anybody there. It’s just items that belonged to them.” 

¶26 Because the rivet and the luggage did not have any apparent

exculpatory value at the time of the search, the State was not required to 

retain the items, and Defendant was not entitled to a Willits instruction. See 

State v. Davis, 205 Ariz. 174, 180, ¶ 37 (App. 2002) (to merit a Willits 

instruction, “[e]vidence must possess exculpatory value that is apparent 

before it is destroyed.”). Furthermore, Defendant’s speculation that the 

contents of the luggage would have tended to support his and Alonso’s 

conflicting statements regarding how long they planned to stay in Colorado 

does not sufficiently establish the exculpatory nature of such evidence as to 

require a Willits instruction.

3 See State v. Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147, 150, ¶ 9 

(2014) (“To show that evidence had a ‘tendency to exonerate,’ the defendant 

 

3 In his brief, Defendant implies that he told Officer Callister he was 

planning to stay in Colorado for one day while Alonso would be staying 

there longer. The record, however, reflects that Defendant informed Officer

Callister that both he and Alonso were going to stay for one day. The record 

also establishes that Alonso explained to Officer Callister that both he and 

Defendant were planning on staying in Colorado for fifteen days. 
STATE v. MEZA-CONTRERAS

Decision of the Court

9

must do more than simply speculate about how the evidence might have 

been helpful. . . . [T]here must be a real likelihood that the evidence would 

have had evidentiary value.”). Nothing in the record indicates what items 

of clothing were in the luggage, and in any event, regardless of the clothing 

items, they would not be probative of Defendant’s knowledge of the 

fourteen pounds of methamphetamine found in the truck’s door panels. 

The trial court acted within its discretion in denying Defendant’s request 

for a Willits’ instruction. 

IV. Count 2: Pronouncement of Sentence

¶27 At sentencing, the trial court ordered a mitigated seven-year 

prison sentence without specifying for which count the sentence was 

imposed. Defendant requests he be resentenced on Count 2, because the 

seven-year sentence was apparently intended to apply to the class 2 felony 

in Count 1, yet could be construed as unlawfully applying to the class 6 

felony in Count 2. 

¶28 Defendant’s request is moot. The trial court issued a 

supplemental ruling approximately three weeks after sentencing 

Defendant. In that ruling, the court clarified that Defendant’s sentence for 

Count 2 is a mitigated ten-month prison term to run concurrently with the 

seven-year sentence imposed for Count 1. 

CONCLUSION

¶29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions 

and the resulting sentences.