alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Clyde C. Bryant v. State

No. 25584.

December 19, 1951.

*525Hon. David McGee, Judge Presiding.

*Jack Ray*and A. *Foy Curry, Jr.,*by A. *Foy Curry, Jr.,*Ft. Worth, for appellant.

*Stewatb W. Hellman,*Criminal District Attorney, *W. H. Tolbert, Charles Lindsey,*and *Ronald Aultman,*Assistants Criminal District Attorney, Ft. Worth, and *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 10 days in jail and a fine of $100.00.

Two members of the highway patrol testified that on the day in question, while on duty, they observed an automobile passing a group of automobiles without sufficient clearance, thus causing the automobiles which were meeting him to pull off on the shoulder of the highway to avoid being hit. They testified that they gave chase and were finally able to bring this automobile to a halt and observed that appellant was driving it and that he was intoxicated.

Appellant testified and admitted having drunk one bottle of beer, but denied that he was intoxicated. In this, he was supported by his witnesses. The jury accepted the state’s version thereof.

Appellant presents us three bills of exception, each one containing the entire testimony, both on direct and on cross-examination, of three different witnesses, with a general objection leveled at all of such testimony.

In Cagle v. State, 147 Tex. Cr. R. 354, 180 S. W. (2d) 928, we cited with approval Section 211, Branch’s Annotated Texas Penal Code, as follows: *“A*bill of exception is too general to be considered if it includes a number of statements some of which are clearly admissible, and there is nothing in the objections to directly challenge or single out the supposed objectional evidence.”

In Clifton v. State, No. 25,524, (Page 655, this volume), 246 S. W. (2d) 201, we said: “However, for the purpose of clarifica*526tion, it appears that appellant is laboring under the impression that no witness may be allowed to testify as to anything he observed subsequent to the moment of arrest. In this, he is mistaken. It has long been the holding of this Court that, ‘If such acts or declarations were part of the res gestae they are admissible notwithstanding the fact that they may not be admissible as confessions or as admissions, for the rule of res gestae is independent of, superior to and cannot be limited by the rules relating to confesisons *or*admissions after arrest.’ 18 Tex. Juris., Sec. 193, p. 313.”

Bill of Exceptions No. 3 seeks to complain about a question asked by the prosecutor, but the bill does not show what the question was.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.2
 
 CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Medite Cancer Diagnostics, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2016 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert F. McCullough, Jr., as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 
 By:
/s/ Robert F. McCullough, Jr.
Dated:
September 2, 2016Robert F. McCullough, Jr.Title:
Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Financial Officer)
 
 This certification is being furnished to the SEC as an exhibit to the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
 
 A signed copy of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided by the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
224 So.2d 672

#### Pattie L. McGEE v. Benny Lee McGEE.

8 Div. 328.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 26, 1969.

Keller & Hill, Florence, for appellant.

John D. Clement, Jr., Tuscumbia, for appellee.

MERRILL, Justice.

Appellant, the ex-wife of appellee and mother of their two children, petitioned the trial court for a modification of a prior custody agreement which gave the custody of the children to the father, appellee, and had been ratified by the trial court. The court denied and dismissed the petition and this appeal followed.

The parties were married in 1959, and they had a daughter, age 8, and a son, age *7,*at the time of the hearing. In 1966, appellant was granted a divorce from appellee and the parties agreed that the father, appellee, would have the custody of the children, subject to the right of appellant to have them three week ends of each month, the months of June, July and August, and rights of reasonable visitation. It was alleged and proved that appellant consented to the custody agreement contrary to the advice of her counsel in the divorce proceedings. He testified that she told him she was going to do it to “^et out of it,” and she said, “That’s all right. I’ll file a petition in about a month and get them back.”

Appellant alleged and attempted to prove four different changes of circumstances to justify a modification of the original agreement and decree. We see no reason to set them out because it is obvious that the evidence did not convince the trial court because the petition was dismissed after a hearing at which some nineteen witnesses testified.

Where evidence in a child custody case was heard orally before the trial court, as it was in this case, the trial court’s findings as to the facts will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly erroneous or palpably and manifestly wrong. Wilkes v. Wilkes, 270 Ala. 341, 118 So.2d 906; Long v. O’Mary, 270 Ala. 99, 116 So.2d 563.

A prior decree of custody is attended by all reasonable presumptions, and the burden of showing such changed con*321ditions or other substantial reasons for its modification rests upon the party seeking a change in custody. Sparks v. McGraw, 270 Ala. 159, 117 So.2d 372; Messick v. Messick, 261 Ala. 142, 73 So.2d 547. Apparently, after hearing the evidence, the trial judge felt that these circumstances were not changed to such a decree that a modification was necessary.

It is not necessarily a question as to what view this court might have of the evidence; but if, under any reasonable aspect, the decree below is fairly supported by credible evidence, then it is our duty to affirm it. Wilkes v. Wilkes, 270 Ala. 341, 118 So.2d 906.

Affirmed.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and HARWOOD, JJ„ concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                         5
       
<S>                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-1997
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<SECURITIES>                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                     1,259,000
<ALLOWANCES>                      51,000
<INVENTORY>                       2,669,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  4,034,000
<PP&E>                            130,000
<DEPRECIATION>                    935,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    5,885,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             4,351,000
<BONDS>                           0
<COMMON>                          15,849,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>             0
<PREFERRED>                       0
<OTHER-SE>                        (14,524,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      5,885,000
<SALES>                           5,434,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  5,434,000
<CGS>                             3,008,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     5,593,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  (8,000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                133,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   (284,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                      0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               (284,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                   0
<CHANGES>                         0
<NET-INCOME>                      (284,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                     (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                     (0.05)
        


</TABLE>
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3956

To eliminate automatic pay adjustments for Members of Congress, and for

other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 2, 1996

Mr. CHRISTENSEN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on House Oversight, and in addition to the Committee on

Government Reform and Oversight, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions

as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To eliminate automatic pay adjustments for Members of

Congress, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Balance the Budget

5 First Act of 1996’’.

6 SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF AUTOMATIC PAY ADJUSTMENTS.

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (2) of section 601(a)

8 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C.

9 31(2)) is repealed.
2

•HR 3956 IH

1 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 601(a)(1)

2 of such Act is amended—

3 (1) by striking ‘‘(a)(1)’’ and inserting ‘‘(a)’’;

4 (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B),

5 and (C) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively;

6 and

7 (3) by striking ‘‘, as adjusted by paragraph (2)

8 of this subsection’’.

9 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

10 It is the sense of the Congress that pay for Members

11 of Congress should not be increased until such time as

12 the Federal budget has been balanced, as certified by the

13 Congressional Budget Office.

Æ
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



In connection
with the Quarterly Report of MEDITE Cancer Diagnostics, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2015, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Robert McCullough, Jr., Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 that, to my knowledge:



1. The Report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



2. The information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition as of the dates presented and the results of operations
of the Company for the periods presented.



| |  | /s/
    Robert F. McCullough, Jr.
| |  | ---------------------------------
| |  | Robert F. McCullough, Jr.        
| |  | Chief Financial Officer          
| |  | Dated:  May 20, 2015
#### HANSON v. HAYNES, Sheriff, et al.

No. 5393.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Dec. 11, 1936.

For former opinion, see 170 So. 257.

Malcolm E. Lafargue, of Shreveport, for 'appellants.

A. S. Drew, of Minden, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In our written opinion on the original hearing of this case, we said: “He [counsel for appellant] specifically calls our attention to the fact that the instrument sued on was dated May 14, 1932, and contains a confession of judgment, and then argues that the one-year prescriptive period began orí that date. The theory underlying this argument is that plaintiff discovered and was aware of the alleged fraud in connection with the judgment when she signed the confessioft of judgment note and that her inactivity for more than four years thereafter defeated her rights under the premises.”

This statement is partly erroneous, for counsel contended, as shown by his brief, that “ * * * a confession of judgment signed by a defendant is his answer to any subsequent suit brought on said confession of judgment by the plaintiff when said confession of judgment is made the basis of the suit. And furthermore, that when such a judgment is signed by the judge the party cast shall be considered duly notified of the -judgment so rendered and signed. This, together with the fact that in article 622 of the Code of Practice, the law spe*147cifically provides, that, ‘If the judgment has been rendered where no appeal lies, or on confession of one of the parties, the party wishing to make use of it may prosecute the execution immediately * * the appellee was put on notice of said judgment on November 22, 1932, and had one year from that date to bring an action of nullity.”

Although the commission of this error is regretted, it in no manner affects the decision reached herein. Our conclusion and the reasons given in support thereof are the same under the correct contention.

There might be merit in counsel’s argument and contention if fraudulent practice, in the obtaining of the judgment sought to be annulled, had not been alleged by plaintiff herein. Because of these allegations of fraud, however, we think the doctrine urged by counsel to be inapplicable.

DREW, J., recused.
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Stratasys, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, S. Scott Crump,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

| |  |                                                                              
| |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | By: /s/ S. Scott Crump                                                       
|
| |  |                                                                              
| |  | S. Scott Crump
            Chief
Executive Officer
            March 25, 2003
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 633

To amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to clarify the financial responsibility

requirements for offshore facilities.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 23, 1995

Mr. HAYES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Transportation and Infrastructure

A BILL

To amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to clarify the

financial responsibility requirements for offshore facilities.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBIL4 ITY REQUIREMENTS.

5 Section 1016(c)(1) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990

6 (33 U.S.C. 2716(c)(1)) is amended to read as follows:

7 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—

8 ‘‘(A) EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL RESPON9 SIBILITY REQUIRED.—Except as provided in

10 paragraph (2), each responsible party with re-
2

•HR 633 IH

1 spect to an offshore facility located seaward of

2 the United States coastline that is—

3 ‘‘(i) used for drilling for, producing,

4 or processing oil; or

5 ‘‘(ii) has the capacity to transport,

6 store, transfer, or otherwise handle more

7 than 1,000 barrels of oil at any one time,

8 shall establish and maintain evidence of finan9 cial responsibility in the amount required under

10 subparagraph (B) or (C), as applicable.

11 ‘‘(B) AMOUNT REQUIRED, GENERALLY.—

12 Except as provided in subparagraph (C), for

13 purposes of subparagraph (A) the amount of fi14 nancial responsibility required is $35,000,000.

15 ‘‘(C) GREATER AMOUNT.—If the Secretary

16 determines that an amount of financial respon17 sibility greater than the amount required by

18 subparagraph (B) is appropriate for an offshore

19 facility, based on an assessment of the risk

20 posed by the facility that includes consideration

21 of the relative operational, environmental,

22 human health, and other risks posed by the

23 quantity and quality of oil that is transported,

24 stored, transferred, or otherwise handled by the

25 facility, for purposes of subparagraph (A) the
3

•HR 633 IH

1 amount of financial responsibility required is

2 equal to the lesser of—

3 ‘‘(i) the amount of liability to which

4 the responsible party could be subjected

5 under section 1004(a) with respect to the

6 facility in a case in which the responsible

7 party would be entitled to limit liability

8 under that section, as determined by the

9 Secretary; or

10 ‘‘(ii) $75,000,000.

11 ‘‘(D) MULTIPLE FACILITIES.—In a case in

12 which a person is the responsible party for

13 more than one facility subject to this sub14 section, evidence of financial responsibility need

15 be established only to meet the maximum liabil16 ity applicable to the facility having the greatest

17 maximum liability.’’.

Æ
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-14-00510-CV

Donald Hendrickson

v.

Action Realty

On Appeal from the

92nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas

Trial Cause No. C-0102-12-A

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against 

appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

June 18, 2015
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                          54,539
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   69,923
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  1,041,532
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                22,587
<PP&E>                                       2,627,794
<DEPRECIATION>                                 716,305
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,125,687
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          593,270
<BONDS>                                          9,629
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       353,406
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,169,382
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,125,687
<SALES>                                      1,015,187
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,015,187
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               635,387
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,368
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                337,603
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            337,603
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   337,603
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File
Nos. 333-09135, 333-57141, 333-40940, 333-65084, 333-106280, 333-125961, 333-133185, and
333-134781) of LiveWire Mobile, Inc. of our report dated March 31, 2009, relating to the financial statements, financial statement schedules and the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form 10-K.

/s/
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Boston,
Massachusetts
March 31, 2009

---



QuickLinks
#### Elverton R. Chapman and Others, Appellants, v. National City Bank, Respondent.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion.
226 So.2d 149

#### STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO. v. Linda McINNISH, pro ami.

6 Div. 605.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 6, 1969.

Rehearing Denied April 10, 1969.

Simpson and Lawson, JJ., dissented.

Izas Bahakel, Birmingham, for petitioner.

Clarence M. Small, Jr., and Rives, Peterson, Pettus & Conway, Birmingham, opposed.

COLEMAN, Justice.

Citation is scarcely necessary to support the rule which has been stated as follows :

> “If an insurance contract is so drawn as to be equivocal, uncertain or ambiguous, or to require interpretation because fairly susceptible to two or more different interpretations, the one will be adopted, which, if consistent with the objects of insurance, as most favorable to the insured.....” Trans-Continental Mutual Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 262 Ala. 373, 377, 78 So.2d 917, 921, 51 A.L.R.2d 917.

The policy provision here under consideration is stated by the Court of Appeals as follows:

> *493“ ‘Coverage D — Comprehensive

> ♦ * * * * * “‘(2) To pay for loss caused by fire, lightning, flood, falling objects, explosion, earthquake, or theft of the entire automobile, to wearing apparel and luggage owned by the first person named in the declarations or, while residents of the same household, his spouse and the relatives of either, while such property is in or upon the owned automobile.’ ” 45 Ala.App., 102, 226 So.2d 147.

The provision is a single sentence which contains fifty-seven words and ten commas but no other punctuation mark. By construction and interpretation, the insurer says the policy means that the insurer agrees to pay for loss to wearing apparel and luggage in the automobile caused by theft if, and only if, the entire automobile is stolen.

From reading the entire sentence as it is written, it seems to us that a fair interpretation of the language is that the insurer agrees: “To pay for loss caused by fire .... or theft .... to wearing apparel and luggage .... while such property is in . . . . the . . . . automobile.”

The sentence is not remarkable for clarity. Perhaps both interpretations are possible. In that event, the construction favorable to the insured must prevail. For that reason, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL, HARWOOD and BLOODWORTH, JJ., concur.

LAWSON and SIMPSON, JJ., dissent.

SIMPSON, Justice

(dissenting).

I think the opinion of the Court of Appeals is correct and would affirm the judgment.

LAWSON, J., concurs.