alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Katharine T. Martin and Alrick H. Man, Executors, etc., of Mary J. Martin, Deceased, Respondents. Caroline M. Robinson, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion.
#### Mary Fahey v. Thomas F. Lynch

Motion granted. Settle order on notice.
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, F. William Weber, Chief Executive Officer (Principal ExecutiveOfficer), certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Webco Industries, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect tothe period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report; 4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:        a) Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;        b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of theend of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and        c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant'sauditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):        a) All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting whichare reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and        b) Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant'sinternal control over financial reporting. 

Date: October 28, 2003 

/s/ F. William Weber F. William WeberChief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)
UNITED STATES                                                   SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION                                                         WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549 
**FORM 10-Q**

[X]     QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THESECURITIES           EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDEDJUNE 30, 2002. 

                                                                  OR 

[ ]       TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES           EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 

 Commission File Number 1-7461 

**ACCEPTANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INC. **                                        (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) 

                                 **Delaware    **                                                              **31-0742926 **                       (State or other jurisdiction of                                              (I.R.S. Employer                          incorporation or organization)                                            Identification Number) 

                                 **535 West Broadway                                  Council Bluffs, Iowa                                                    51503 **                      (Address of principal executive offices)                                 (Zip Code) 

                                          Registrant's Telephone Number, Including Area Code:                                                             (712) 328-3918 

Indicate by check markwhether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12months (or for such shorter period that the registrant has been required to filesuch reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past90 days. 
                                   YES    X                        NO   ____
The number of shares ofeach class of the Registrant’s common stock outstanding on August 8, 2002 was: 
                       Class of Common Stock                            No. of Shares Outstanding                    Common Stock, $.40 Par Value                                14,449,901 
**ACCEPTANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INC. ANDSUBSIDIARIES **
**FORM 10-Q **

**TABLE OF CONTENTS **
**PART I. FINANCIAL INFORMATION** Item 1.Financial Statements (unaudited):  Consolidated Balance SheetsJune 30, 2002 and December 31, 2001  Consolidated Statements of Operations Three Months and Six Months Ended June 30, 2002 and  2001 Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows Six Months Ended June 30, 2002 and 2001  Notes to Interim Consolidated Financial Statements Item 2.Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial      Condition and Results of Operations  Item 3.Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosure about Market    Risk  **PART II. OTHER INFORMATION** Item 1. Legal Proceedings  Item 4.Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security    Holders  Item 5.Other Information  Item 6.  Exhibits and Reports on Form 8-K Signatures  Exhibit Index 
 

**PART I. FINANCIAL INFORMATION**
#### LAWLER et al. v. STANFORD.

8 Div. 102.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

May 7, 1935.

William Stell, of Russellville, for appellants.

Travis Williams, of Russellville, for appel-lee.

RICE, Judge.

We have no : fault to find with appellants’ proposition of law No. 1, upon which all their counsel’s argument is based, to wit: “Where, in the absence of an expressed contract, valuable services are rendered by one person to another, which are knowingly accepted, the law will assume an obligation to pay for such services what they are reasonably worth.” McFarland v. Dawson, 125 Ala. 428, 29 So. 327; Irvin v.. Strother, 163 Ala. 484, 50 So. 969. But this principle does not apply to improvements on leased land voluntarily made by the lessee. Alabama & Southern Digest, vol. 18, Landlord and Tenant, &wkey; 157(6). We apprehend, because the making of the improvements is primarily, perhaps altogether, for the lessee’s own comfort, convenience, and accommodation.

Since the above is true, those assignments of error argued here on behalf of appellants are seen to be without merit. All are 'based in one way or another on rulings of the court denying appellants’ right (they being the tenants of appellee) to recover compensation for improvements claimed to have been put upon appellee’s land during the year 1931, when, admittedly, appellants had no agreement with appellee- that she would pay for same.

The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### Thomas E. MONTFORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. Joseph CURRAN, Jr., Maryland State Attorney General, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 03-6066.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 26, 2003.

Decided March 26, 2003.

Thomas E. Montford, Appellant Pro Se.

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Thomas E. Montford seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying as successive his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), and denying his motion for reconsideration.1 We deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district *608court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” *Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr.,*434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (I960)).

The district court’s order denying Mont-ford’s § 2254 petition was filed on October 24, 2002, and entered on the docket on October 25, 2002. The notice of appeal was filed on December 2, 2002.2 Because Montford failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Turning to Montford’s appeal of the district court’s order denying relief on his motion for reconsideration, we find that the filing the district court construed as a motion for reconsideration would be more appropriately construed as a third § 2254 petition. So construed, we find no reversible error in the district court’s denial of relief given that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a third § 2254 petition without authorization from this court to do so. Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal on that basis.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

1

. Although Montford did not file a notice of appeal from the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration, we have jurisdiction over the appeal because his timely filed informal brief is the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. *Smith v. Barry,*502 U.S. 244, 245, 112 S.Ct. 678, 116 L.Ed.2d 678 (1992).

2

*.*For purposes of this portion of the appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).
The Attorney General of Texas 

April 24, 1981 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

Mr. Robert 0. Viterna 

Executive Director 

Opinion No. Mu-328 

Texas Commission on Jail Standards 

1414 Colorado, Suite 500 

Austin, Texas 78711 

Re: Whether article 5115.1, 

V.T.C.S., requires the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement 

Officer Standards and Education to 

establish minimum standards for 

persons employed in city jails under 

contract with counties to house 

county prisoners 

Dear Mr. Viterna: 

You ask whether a city jail holding county prisoners pursuant to a 

contract entered into under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, article 

4413(32c), V.T.C.S., thereby becomes a county jail for purposes of having its 

employees certified by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer 

Standards and Education. 

Article 5115.1, V.T.C.S., defines “county jail” as %ny jail, lockup, or 

other facility that is operated by or for a county.” Sec. 2 (emphasis added1 

Every word of a statute must be Fmed to have been used for a purpose 

and must be given effect if possible. Eddins - Walcher Butane Co. v. 

Calvert, 298 S.W. 2d 93 (Tex. 1957); L & M-Surco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Winn 

Tile Co., 580 S.W. 2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1979, writ dism’d). If the 

language ‘Ior for a county” is to have meaning, it must include jails operated 

by a city but utilized by a county under contract to confine county prisoners. 

Thus, such city jails would constitute county jails for purposes of article 

5115.1, V.T.C.S. 

Article 5115.1, V.T.C.S., provides in section 14 as follows: 

Sec. 14. (a) The Commission on Law Enforcement 

Officer Standards and Education shall establish 

minimum physical, mental, educational, and moral 

standards for persons employed or utilized in the 

operation of county jails. 

As we have defined “county jails,” the personnel of city jails under contract 

with the county for the retention of prisoners are subject to the provisions 

of section 14. This construction serves an underlying purpose of article 
Mr. Robert 0. Vitema - Page Two (MU-328) 

5115.1, V.T.C.S., that only suitably qualified jail personnel shall participate in the 

handling of county prisoners 

SUMMARY 

A city jail holding county prisoners pursuant to contract 

thereby becomes a county jail for purposes of article 5115.1, 

V.T.C.S., so that its employees are required to be certified by 

the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards 

and Education. 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

RICHARD E. GRAY III 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Susan L. Garrison 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMlTTEE 

Susan L. Garrison, Chairman 

Jon Bible 

Rick Gilpin 

Bruce Youngblood 

p. 1058
Exhibit 4.1


 


Advisors Asset Management, Inc.

18925 Base Camp Road

Monument, Colorado 80132


February 21, 2020


 


Advisors Disciplined Trust 2004


c/o The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee


BNY Atlantic Terminal


2 Hanson Place, 12th Floor


Brooklyn, New York 11217


 


Re: Advisors Disciplined Trust 2004 (the “Fund”)


Ladies and Gentlemen:


We have examined
the Registration Statement File No. 333-236352 for the above captioned Fund. We hereby consent to the use in the Registration Statement
of the references to Advisors Asset Management, Inc. as evaluator.


You are hereby authorized
to file a copy of this letter with the Securities and Exchange Commission.


 


 


 





	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 	 
	 	Advisors Asset Management, Inc.
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	By	/s/ ALEX R. MEITZNER
	 	 	Alex R. Meitzner
	 	 	Senior Vice President
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Matthew Krieg, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Generation Zero Group, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2010 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Generation Zero Group, Inc.





By:/s/ Matthew Krieg


Matthew Krieg


Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer


(Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)





May 24, 2010
#### The Harry Goldberg Co. *v.*Emerman.

(No. 23289

Decided April 27, 1932.)

*239*Mr. Ira Krulak*and *Mr. L. 8. Sobel,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Wolf <& Kruehkoff,*for defendant in error.

Jones, J.

Defendant below, the plaintiff in error here, claims that the trial court, in overruling its oral demand for a jury at the opening of the trial, violated the provision of the Constitution which guarantees that the right of a trial by a jury shall be inviolate (Article 1, Section 5).

Section 1579-24, General Code, applying to the Municipal Court of Cleveland, reads: “All causes in the municipal court, both civil and criminal, shall be tried by the court unless a jury trial be demanded by a party entitled to the same. The time for making a demand for a jury trial in civil cases may be fixed and limited by rule of court.”

The Cleveland Municipal Court had adopted a rule requiring the demand to be made at a time previous to the trial. The rule was made pursuant to the authority of the statute, and was a reasonable provision. *240A statute authorizing courts to formulate a rule providing how long before the trial a demand for a jury-should be made, and requiring such demand to be in writing, is constitutionally valid. It merely regulates the method of making the demand in the interest of economy and orderly procedure. It does not deny a party his right to a jury trial. The authorities supporting that principle are numerous and may be found in the copious notes attached to the text in 35 Corpus Juris, page 212, Section 128. This court has held that, in the trial of misdemeanors, statutes requiring a demand for a jury before trial are not unconstitutional. *Hoffman*v. State, 98 Ohio St., 137, 120 N. E., 234.

It is claimed, however, that the demand made at the opening of the trial was sufficient for the reason that a paper containing such demand had in fact been filed in the municipal court. So far as this record discloses, we have only the statement of counsel to that effect. No proof was offered in its support, nor is the paper writing contained in the record. The judgment was rendered on July 3, 1931, and a motion for a new trial was filed July 20, 1931. Upon the hearing of the motion for a new trial defendant’s counsel stated they wanted the record to show that a jury was demanded before trial. No legal profert was made in support of that statement; but, had there been, the testimony would have been incompetent because the proof should have been submitted to the court by the defendant before the trial and not after the judgment was rendered against it. The reason is obvious. Otherwise a party before trial might offer no proof or but a modicum of proof supporting his demand for a jury, and could withhold his substantial proof until after he had lost his case by trying it to the court.

Since the record fails to show that the municipal court rule had been complied with, and a written de*241mand made for a jury pursuant thereto, the case must be affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Marshall, C. J., Matthias, Day, Allen, Kinkade and Stephenson, JJ., concur.
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 745

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for special immigrant status for NATO civilian employees in the same manner as for

employees of international organizations.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 30, 1995

Mr. PICKETT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide

for special immigrant status for NATO civilian employees

in the same manner as for employees of international

organizations.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘NATO Special Immi5 grant Amendments of 1995’’.
2

•HR 745 IH

1 SEC. 2. SPECIAL IMMIGRANT STATUS FOR CERTAIN NATO

2 CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 101(a)(27) of the Immi4 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)) is

5 amended—

6 (1) by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end of subparagraph

7 (J),

8 (2) by striking the period at the end of sub9 paragraph (K) and inserting ‘‘; or’’, and

10 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub11 paragraph:

12 ‘‘(L) an immigrant who would be described in

13 clause (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of subparagraph (I) if

14 any reference in such a clause—

15 ‘‘(i) to an international organization de16 scribed in paragraph (15)(G)(i) were treated as

17 a reference to the North American Treaty Or18 ganization (NATO);

19 ‘‘(ii) to a nonimmigrant under paragraph

20 (15)(G)(iv) were treated as a reference to a

21 nonimmigrant classifiable under NATO–6 (as a

22 member of a civilian component accompanying

23 a force entering in accordance with the provi24 sions of the NATO Status-of-Forces Agree25 ment, a member of a civilian component at26 tached to or employed by an Allied Head-
3

•HR 745 IH

1 quarters under the ‘‘Protocol on the Status of

2 International Military Headquarters’’ set up

3 pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, or as a

4 dependent); and

5 ‘‘(iii) to the Immigration Technical Correc6 tions Act of 1988 or to the Immigration and

7 Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994

8 were a reference to the NATO Special Immi9 grant Amendments of 1995.’’.

10 (b) CONFORMING NONIMMIGRANT STATUS FOR CER11 TAIN PARENTS OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT CHILDREN.—

12 Section 101(a)(15)(N) of such Act (8 U.S.C.

13 1101(a)(15)(N)) is amended—

14 (1) by inserting ‘‘(or under analogous authority

15 under paragraph (27)(L))’’ after ‘‘(27)(I)(i)’’, and

16 (2) by inserting ‘‘(or under analogous authority

17 under paragraph (27)(L))’’ after ‘‘(27)(I)’’.

Æ
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### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 97-5074 Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgag e
The following modifications have been made to t he Court's opinion issued on April 15, 1998 in the above-entit led appeal and will appear as part of the final version of the opi nion:

1) On page 6 of the slip opinion, the first full pa ragraph, third line: the ";" should be replaced with a ":", that is, the semi-colon should be a col on. 2) Page 7, second full paragraph, 5th line at the e nd: "not under  1447(d)" should be "not under  1447(c)", that is, the (d) should be a (c). 3) On page 10, third line, "as tool" should be repl aced with "as a tool". 4) On page 10, end of the first paragaph, just befo re subsection B, remove the comma before "a nonreviewable one" so the last line reads: "inappro priate a nonreviewable one." 5) Page 12, 1st full paragraph, 1st word, replace " By" with "In", so the line starts off, "In contrast".

/s/ P. Dou glas Sisk, Clerk

April 22, 1998