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THOMAS BROCHARD v. BRITT BROCHARD

(AC 37435)

Beach, Keller and West, Js.

Argued February 9—officially released May 24, 2016
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, Regional Family Trial Docket, Gordon, J.

[dissolution judgment]; Gould, J. [motion for contempt,

motion to reargue].)

Britt Brochard, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).

Thomas Brochard, self-represented, the appellee

(plaintiff).
Opinion

WEST, J. The defendant, Britt Brochard, appeals from

the postdissolution judgment of the trial court denying

her motion for contempt. In her motion for contempt,

the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the plaintiff,

Thomas Brochard, had failed to provide her with an

authorization form in compliance with the order of the

court, Gordon, J. The defendant claims that the court,

Gould, J., denied her motion based on the incorrect

belief that it had already been ruled on. We reverse the

judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. In a memorandum of decision dated

July 6, 2011, the court, Gordon, J., dissolved the parties’

marriage. In doing so, it set forth the following facts.

The parties were married on August 27, 1995, in Ridgefield. They have two children. The plaintiff instituted the

divorce action in 2008 following the parties’ separation.

The court found their marriage had irretrievably broken

down. The court issued a number of orders, ruling that

the plaintiff, who was employed, would pay alimony to

the defendant, who was a homemaker. It ordered that

the defendant would be awarded all right, title, and

interest in the marital home and would be responsible

for all costs associated with the home.

On July 20, 2011, the defendant filed a postjudgment

motion for an order, alleging that the plaintiff had not

made payments on the mortgage on the family home

since March, 2011. The mortgage was solely in his name.

The defendant requested that ‘‘the plaintiff be required

to bring the mortgage current, including all attorney’s

fees and other charges. In the alternative, the defendant

moves that the plaintiff be required to immediately provide the bank with authorization to speak directly to

the defendant, timely file all necessary paperwork in

the foreclosure action to allow the parties to participate

in the foreclosure mediation, that the plaintiff attend

the foreclosure mediation sessions along with the

defendant, and that the plaintiff agree to any resolution

the defendant comes to with the bank.’’

Judge Gordon held a hearing on the defendant’s

motion for an order on August 12, 2011.1 At the hearing,

the plaintiff’s attorney presented an authorization,

claiming that the proffered authorization would satisfy

the defendant’s motion. The court ruled that in order

to effectuate a modification of the mortgage, the authorization ‘‘has to say more than converse and negotiate. It

has to say that she’s his authorized agent for conversing,

negotiating, entering into an agreement, all that kind

of stuff. I mean, they’re not going to let her—they—I

mean, it’s got to be specific that she has the authority . . . .’’2

On November 13, 2013, the defendant filed a motion

for contempt, claiming that the plaintiff had violated
Judge Gordon’s August 12, 2011 order by, inter alia,

failing ‘‘to execute an authorization allowing the defendant to speak with and represent the plaintiff with the

mortgage loan holder, Wells Fargo, as the mortgage has

been in the name of the plaintiff solely; said authorization to make [the] defendant the plaintiff’s ‘authorized

agent for conversing, negotiating, entering into an

agreement, all that kind of stuff’ with Wells Fargo to

modify the mortgage loan to avoid foreclosure. Said

authorization was ‘to be specific that she has the

authority.’ ’’

The defendant’s motion for contempt was heard by

the court, Munro, J., on November 14, 2013. Judge

Munro examined an authorization agreement drafted

by the defendant’s attorney and asked if the plaintiff

consented to it. The plaintiff’s attorney replied that he

did not, due to language that stated that the defendant

would ‘‘have full and complete authority to negotiate,

agree and execute proposed settlements with said mortgages.’’ The plaintiff was concerned that this language

would permit the defendant to extend the term of the

mortgage, thereby further tying up his ability to obtain

a new mortgage for a house of his own. The court

subsequently told the defendant that ‘‘if he signs something that allows you to negotiate, it should not be

something that puts him on the hook for any more

liability than he has now. Do you understand that?’’ The

defendant replied that she believed that the intent of

Judge Gordon’s order was to allow modification of the

loan, and that Judge Munro should consult the full transcript containing Judge Gordon’s order. Thereupon,

Judge Munro stated: ‘‘I’m going to stop. I hear you. This

is a complicated problem. It’s not going to be dealt

with on short calendar with an audience full of people

waiting. I’m going to give you a three day hearing, and

this will be rolled into the three day hearing.’’ Following

the short calendar hearing, on November 26, 2013, the

plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion

for contempt, attaching an authorization form and

asserting that ‘‘Judge Munro has already told the defendant that Judge Gordon did not intend that the defendant could expand the plaintiff’s exposure under the

new mortgage.’’

The case subsequently was transferred to the regional

family trial docket. At a hearing on February 6, 2014,

regarding the transfer, Judge Munro asked, ‘‘[a]ll right,

and the motions I sent to regional are motions regarding

modification of custody. Any financial motions at all?’’

The defendant replied: ‘‘A number of financial motions,

there’s a motion outstanding for contempt on not paying

half the children’s expenses; contempt on medical

expenses; contempt on alimony; [and] contempt on not

signing the authorization for me to be able to modify

the home.’’ Judge Munro stated, ‘‘I remember that.’’ The

parties then began discussing the plaintiff’s financial

disclosure and did not mention the contempt
motions further.

The court, Gould, J., held a hearing on various matters on June 10, 2014. After concluding the custody and

visitation portion of the hearing, Judge Gould indicated

that he intended to turn to financial issues. The defendant stated that she wished to proceed to the authorization issue. The plaintiff objected stating that he needed

a few days to prepare. Judge Gould queried whether the

authorization issue was before him orin the foreclosure

court. The defendant replied that it was before him,

after which Judge Gould stated that they would proceed

with outstanding motions on financial issues at a

later date.

The defendant filed a motion for an emergency hearing on August 1, 2014, in which she asserted that the

court never returned to the authorization issue. This

motion was heard by Judge Gould on September 11,

2014. Judge Gould stated that it was his understanding

that there was a ruling that the authorization did not

have to be provided.3 The defendant protested that

Judge Munro’s ruling indicated otherwise. Judge Gould

then stated, ‘‘I’m not indicating [Judge Munro] ruled

on [the authorization]. I’m indicating it was ruled on

previously; it did not have to be provided.’’

The defendant filed a motion to reargue on October

3, 2014,4 asserting that Judge Gould’s ruling of September 11, 2014, was based on a misapprehension of fact.

She contended that Judge Gould incorrectly believed

that the motion for contempt regarding the authorization had previously been ruled on. She attached an

order from the foreclosure court, Ecker, J., extending

the sale date and noting that ‘‘the record in this matter

does not indicate that [the plaintiff] has made any

efforts whatsoever in this proceeding to resist foreclosure or assist his ex-spouse’s ongoing attempts to save

the home through mediation or negotiation.’’

Judge Gould considered the defendant’s motion to

reargue on November 6, 2014. He stated that ‘‘[t]his

court said there was a prior ruling the authorization for

modification of the mortgage would not have to be

provided, and I have a specific recollection for issuing

that order.’’ The plaintiff asserted that the issue had

been decided by three judges, and offered to quote from

Judge Munro; Judge Gould told the plaintiff’s attorney,

‘‘[y]ou don’t have to . . . I recall this specifically.’’ The

defendant asserted that the transcripts demonstrated

that the issue had not been ruled on. The plaintiff quoted

the statement by Judge Munro that the plaintiff should

not be on the hook for more liability. Judge Gould

then denied the defendant’s motion to reargue with

prejudice, noting that she could take an appeal if she

chose.

The defendant filed the present appeal on November

24, 2014. She claims two grounds, but the essence of
both is that Judge Gould’s ruling on the motion for

contempt forthe plaintiff’s failure to provide an authorization was an abuse of discretion because it was based

on an incorrect understanding of the procedural history.

In response, the plaintiff asserts that Judge Munro’s

statements at the November 14, 2013 hearing constituted a denial of the defendant’s motion. Prior to oral

argument before this court, on October 19, 2015, the

defendant filed an amended appeal form amending the

appeal to include a decision by Judge Gould from September 28, 2015.

The September 28, 2015 memorandum of decision

recounts that hearings on a number of postjudgment

motions were held on June 3, 4, and 10, 2014, and April

20, 21, and 22, 2015. Among other issues, it discusses

the defendant’s motion for contempt from November

13, 2013, stating that the motion claimed that the plaintiff was in contempt because ‘‘the plaintiff was ordered

to bring the outstanding mortgage on the family home,

where the defendant resides with the two children, current from March, 2011 through July, 2011, that the plaintiff would be responsible for any attorney’s fees, interest

and/or penalties relating to foreclosure actions on the

subject home, that the plaintiff was ordered to execute

an authorization permitting the defendant to speak

with the mortgage loan holder, and that the plaintiff

was to provide the defendant with any and all communications received from the bank.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The decision does not reference the statements by

Judge Gordon related to the authorization, but it does

state that the plaintiff alleged that ‘‘the court, Munro,

J., has previously ordered that the plaintiff did not have

the duty to agree to a mortgage modification that would

substantially increase the length of indebtedness to the

bank.’’ It also states that ‘‘[i]n his objection, the plaintiff

further alleges and provides evidence of a September

1, 2011 letter from his attorney to the defendant [that]

enclosed the requested authorization referred to above,

and further alleging that the defendant has been directly

and actively dealing with the lender since September,

2011.’’ The decision concludes that ‘‘the recitation of

the court’s orders and findings made by the plaintiff to

be accurate. The undersigned also finds thatthe plaintiff

provided the subject authorization to the defendant.’’

The court then denied the motion for contempt.5

At oral argument before this court on February 9,

2016, the parties discussed the impact of the September

28, 2015 decision. The defendant maintained that Judge

Gould had not provided her with a chance to argue

her case before issuing the decision.6 She conceded,

however, that she had not filed transcripts of subsequent hearings, which would demonstrate that she was

not afforded an opportunity to argue her position. The

plaintiff asserted that the September 28, 2015 decision

was based on Judge Munro’s decision. The plaintiff

did not claim, despite this court’s questioning of the
defendant, that a hearing had been held between

November 6, 2014 and September 28, 2015, at which

both parties were given sufficient opportunity to be

heard regarding the authorization issue.

The defendant claims that Judge Gould abused his

discretion when he determined that the authorization

issue raised by the defendant’s motion for contempt

was already decided, and when he purported to decide

the issue in his September 28, 2015 memorandum of

decision. We agree.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review and

the relevant legal principles. ‘‘Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power

to punish for such an offense.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 692, 935

A.2d 1021 (2007). Our Supreme Court recently clarified

that we should utilize a two step inquiry when analyzing

a judgment of contempt: ‘‘First, we must resolve the

threshold question of whetherthe underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and

unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt.

. . . This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review.

. . . Second, if we conclude that the underlying court

order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must

then determine whetherthe trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a review of the trial court’s

determination of whether the violation was wilful or

excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.’’

(Citations omitted.) Id., 693–94. ‘‘A finding of . . . contempt [occurring outside the presence of the court]

must be established by sufficient proof that is premised

on competent evidence presented to the trial court and

based on sworn testimony. . . . A trial-like hearing

should be held if issues of fact are disputed.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Mekrut v. Suits, 147 Conn.

App. 794, 803, 84 A.3d 466 (2014), see also Kennedy v.

Kennedy, 88 Conn. App. 442, 443, 869 A.2d 1252 (denying motion for contempt without hearing from guardian

ad litem was abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 275

Conn. 902, 882 A.2d 671 (2005).

These principles provide guidance in how we should

analyze the defendant’s claim. In the context of this

case, in order to rule on the motion for contempt, the

trial court was required to determine whetherthe authorization forms proffered by the plaintiff complied with

Judge Gordon’s order of August 12, 2011.7 Our task is

to determine whether any court ruled on the merits of

this issue, and, if so, whether it did so following an

evidentiary hearing. Determining whether a court ruled

on an issue is a matter of law which, like whether an

order is ambiguous, requires de novo review, while the

issue of whether a hearing was required is reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard. See Mekrut v.

Suits, supra, 147 Conn. App. 804; Kennedy v. Kennedy,
supra, 88 Conn. App. 443.

The record contains several authorization forms

which were signed by the plaintiff. An August 2, 2011

authorization was provided with a September 6, 2011

letter from the defendant’s then attorney stating that

the defendant ‘‘might as well use it if you can while we

try to negotiate a more detailed authorization.’’ It is

signed by the plaintiff and states that ‘‘[t]he undersigned

hereby authorizes the mortgage holder, Wells Fargo

Bank, to converse and negotiate with Britt Brochard

relative to all aspects of the mortgage and mediation

process.’’ An authorization titled ‘‘third party authorization form’’ and dated August 15, 2011, is signed by the

plaintiff and states in pertinent part: ‘‘I/we Thomas C.

Brochard give authorization to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage to discuss my loan with: Name: Britt Brochard

. . . .’’ A September 1, 2011 letter and authorization

were attached to the plaintiff’s November 26, 2013

objection to the motion for contempt, to which the

September 28, 2015 memorandum of decision refers.

This authorization states in pertinent part that ‘‘[t]he

purpose of this authorization is to allow [the defendant]

to have (1) full access to all communications and data

concerning both mortgages (2) to be allowed to negotiate with the mortgage holders and to effectuate a modification of the mortgages (3) to acknowledge [the

plaintiff] will fully cooperate with the mediation process

by providing any data required and executing any settlement documents. This authorization is not meant to (a)

expand any duties [the plaintiff] has pursuant to the

divorce judgment in the above dissolution matter (b)

it will not cause him to pay any funds towards the

mortgage arrearage, refinance of the mortgages or any

other costs associated with the mortgages orthese modifications (c) it does not require him to execute any

documents which increase his exposure under the

existing loan agreements including, but not limited to,

exposure for a deficiency judgment.’’

Finally, an unsigned authorization dated August,

2011, states that the defendant would have ‘‘full and

complete authority to negotiate, agree, and execute proposed settlements with said mortgagees.’’ This mirrors

the language to which the plaintiff objected before

Judge Munro.

The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff provided

the defendant with an authorization providing access

to information; Judge Gordon determined that such an

authorization was insufficient. The defendant’s contention is that the plaintiff is in contempt of Judge

Gordon’s order of August 12, 2011, because he has failed

to sign an authorization making the defendant his

‘‘authorized agent for conversing, negotiating, entering

into an agreement . . .’’ as ordered by Judge Gordon.

On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude

that Judge Munro never ruled on whether any of these
authorizations met the requirements ordered by Judge

Gordon because Judge Munro specifically stated that

she would hold a further hearing. Although Judge

Munro expressed that any authorization ‘‘should not be

something that puts [the plaintiff] on the hook for any

more liability than he has now,’’ she continued to discuss the issue with the parties and, after the defendant

asserted that the intention of Judge Gordon’s ruling

was for the loan to be modified, Judge Munro stated

that it was a complicated problem that she would not

rule on then. She also had previously stated that it was

not her intention to get into the substance of the issue,

and the defendant had asserted that she did not have

the necessary documentation with her. Moreover, the

plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion

following the hearing with Judge Munro, suggesting that

he did not consider the matter settled at that point.

Judge Munro therefore did not rule on the defendant’s

motion for contempt and did not interpret the substance

of any authorization in light of Judge Gordon’s order

and the facts regarding the mortgage modification. Her

statements indicate that the proper scope of the authorization was a complex issue that would require more

extensive argument, a thorough examination of Judge

Gordon’s decision, and the presentation of evidence.

Likewise, we conclude that Judge Gould did not rule

on whether any authorization met the requirements

ordered by Judge Gordon. Judge Gould’s statements

prior to his September 28, 2015 memorandum of decision indicate that he believed that the matter had been

decided previously. He did not specify when it had been

decided, and the September 28, 2015 ruling demonstrates that it was not ruled on prior to the September

28, 2015 memorandum of decision.

We now turn to whether Judge Gould abused his

discretion by denying the defendant’s motion in his

September 28, 2015 memorandum of decision. The

record before us indicates that no evidentiary hearing

was held before the decision was issued. The defendant

asserted at oral argument that she needed an evidentiary hearing in order to provide evidence, including

testimony from the mortgagee, regarding the scope of

authorization that would be necessary to effectuate a

modification of the mortgage. This is consistent with

Judge Munro’s statement that the authorization issue

was a complex one requiring a more lengthy hearing.

When asked at oral argument before this court whether

Judge Gould gave both parties an opportunity to be

heard regarding the authorization issue before issuing

the memorandum of decision, the plaintiff again

asserted that the hearing before Judge Munro was dispositive. The plaintiff did not suggest that the September 28, 2015 decision was based on a subsequent, full,

hearing, but, rather, that it was based on the prior decision of Judge Munro. The decision itself does not state

whether any argument related to the authorization
occurred on the three hearing days that followed the

November 6, 2014 denial of the defendant’s motion to

reargue, it does not refer to any evidentiary hearing on

the authorization issue, and it does not find that a hearing would be unnecessary.8 We, therefore, conclude that

Judge Gould’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing

constituted an abuse of discretion.9

The judgment is reversed with respect to the trial

court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was not in contempt

for failing to provide an adequate authorization and the

case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that

issue consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Whether all costs associated with the home included payment of the

mortgage was an additional matter brought before Judge Gordon at the

August 12, 2011 hearing.

2 The following exchange occurred regarding the authorization:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, if I might, I may save the court

some time here. The alternative relief requested is for a signed authorization.

[The plaintiff] has a signed authorization. I do—from him today that I can

give counsel if that solves that.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: It doesn’t solve everything, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: It solves part of it. Okay.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: It solves, it solves part of it, and I’d be happy

to take that—

‘‘The Court: Okay. Good.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: —signed authorization. I don’t know that

that—but that doesn’t resolve—

‘‘The Court: Okay.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: —all of it, and I think this issue is addressed

in some other motions as well.

* * *

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Just like to follow up with that. So, this is

an authorization to converse and negotiate with Wells Fargo Bank depending

on where all of this goes to, I’d like Your Honor’s decision to address if in

addition he needs to—

‘‘The Court: Well, it has to say more than converse and negotiate. It has

to say that she’s his authorized agent for conversing, negotiating, entering

into an agreement, all that kind of stuff. I mean, they’re not going to let

her—they—I mean, it’s got to be specific that she has the authority—

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: If counsel will draft up an authorization that

satisfies her, [the plaintiff] will sign it.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I will draft an authorization.

‘‘The Court: Okay. Good.’’

3 The following exchange occurred:

‘‘The Court: All right, I’ve reviewed the motion, the emergency motion,

I’ve reviewed the objection to it, and I reviewed the response. My situation

with this, unless I hear differently from one side or the other, is this has

already been ruled upon and/or any additional information will be taken up

at the time of the hearing which is my understanding is October 27 and 28,

is that correct?

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: That’s correct, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: All right. Ms. Brochard, anything else?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes. Judge Munro started to hear it, I have the entire

transcript for you; she did not finish hearing it. She said it was complicated,

that I had not given her the full goods. I want the opportunity to present

my arguments, okay, because Judge Gordon’s orders were not complied

with, and I need that authorization in order to remove the house from

foreclosure because the last time I went to foreclosure court, there were

two things that were missing. One was that authorization because without—

‘‘The Court: And wasn’t there a ruling that that authorization did not have

to be provided?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No, there was not.

‘‘The Court: Well, that’s my understanding. That’s my understanding and

my interpretation of it, ma’am.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I have the transcript, Your Honor.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I have the transcript, too, Your Honor. At the end
of the transcript, Judge Munro states, okay, that I have not given her the

full goods and that she understood that it was complicated, that she heard

me, and she was going to roll that into a hearing. There was no other part

of the mortgage that was heard that day. Further, in a later transcript, several

months later, which I included as part of my reply, Judge Munro states—

asks us are there any financial motions on the table that are being sent to

Middletown, and I named some of them and included in one of them the

modification—the authorization on the house, and she said, I remember

that. She never said she ruled on it because she did not.

‘‘The Court: I’m not indicating she ruled on it. I’m indicating it was ruled

on previously; it did not have to be provided. That’s going to—

‘‘[The Defendant]: No.

‘‘The Court: Going to remain the ruling today.

‘‘[The Defendant]: There was—there was—

‘‘The Court: Anything else?

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.

‘‘[The Defendant]: There was never any—when was it ruled on, Your

Honor? There was never any ruling on it.

‘‘The Court: Ms. Brochard, I’ve ruled for today, thank you.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I don’t understand your ruling, Your Honor, there was

no ruling.

‘‘The Court: I’ve ruled for today, ma’am. Thank you.’’

4 Practice Book § 63-1 provides that an appeal, or a motion to reargue

extending the appeal period, should be filed within twenty days of the court’s

judgment. The defendant filed her motion to reargue twenty-three days after

the judgment. This is a nonjurisdictional defect, the plaintiff has not moved

to dismiss the appeal due to late filing, and we may exercise our discretion

to consider the appeal. See Alliance Partners, Inc. v. Voltarc Technologies,

Inc., 263 Conn. 204, 209–10, 820 A.2d 224 (2003) (‘‘[T]he twenty day time

limit provided by Practice Book § 63-1 (a)is not subject matterjurisdictional.

. . . In the absence of jurisdictional barriers, appellate tribunals must exercise their discretion to determine whether a late appeal should be permitted

to be heard.’’ [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).

5

In this appeal, we address only the defendant’s challenge to Judge Gould’s

determination of the authorization issue.

6 The defendant acknowledged that Judge Gould did ask about the authorization again, but that the plaintiff’s attorney stated that the issue was part

of an appeal, and the defendant did not have all of her materials. The

defendant later stated that the judge never took up the contempt issue again.

7

If the authorization forms did not comply, it would be the task of the

trial court to provide clarification as to what authorization was required.

See Sablosky v. Sablosky, 258 Conn. 713, 722, 784 A.2d 890 (2001) (‘‘[t]he

doors of the courthouse are always open; it is incumbent upon the parties

to seek judicial resolution of any ambiguity in the language of judgments’’);

but see In re Leah S., supra, 284 Conn. 700 (distinguishing Sablosky).

8 Although we were concerned during oral argument before this court

regarding the defendant’s failure to provide transcripts of all the hearings,

we determine that the record is adequate for our review because there is

no dispute regarding whether the court addressed the issue on a day for

which we do not have the transcript; neither party claims that any argument

or evidence related to the appeal was heard on those hearing days, and the

court’s memorandum of decision does not indicate that argument or evidence related to the authorization occurred on those hearing days. See

O’Halpin v. O’Halpin, 144 Conn. App. 671, 675–76, 74 A.3d 465 (where

parties disputed whether court addressed issue during hearing, appellant

was required to provide transcript of that hearing), cert. denied, 310 Conn.

952, 81 A.3d 1180 (2013); Cianbro Corp. v. National Eastern Corp., 102

Conn. App. 61, 71–72, 924 A.2d 160 (2007) (same).

9

In addition, the lack of analysis of Judge Gordon’s order demonstrates

an abuse of discretion. The September 28, 2015 memorandum of decision

misstates the defendant’s argument by stating that the defendant contended

‘‘that the plaintiff was ordered to execute an authorization permitting the

defendant to speak with the mortgage loan holder . . . .’’ It does not reference Judge Gordon’s order of August 12, 2011, regarding the authorization,

although it does reference other aspects of Judge Gordon’s order. It references Judge Munro’s statement regarding the plaintiff’s liability, but not

Judge Munro’s statement that a further hearing was necessary. It also makes

no mention of Judge Gould’s September 11, 2014 ruling that the motion for

contempt had already been decided, or his November 6, 2014 ruling that

the prior ruling was with prejudice and that the defendant could appeal if

she chose. It refers to the September 1, 2011 letter in which the plaintiff
enclosed an authorization form, but does not refer to the contents of that

authorization, or to whether the defendant had an opportunity to present

argument regarding the adequacy of the authorization proffered with the

September 1, 2011 letter. Finally, it refers to the ‘‘authorization referred to

above,’’ or ‘‘the subject authorization,’’ referring back to the authorization

referred to earlier in the memorandum of decision as the ‘‘authorization

permitting the defendant to speak with the mortgage loan holder . . . .’’

As previously stated, Judge Gordon had ordered that the plaintiff was

required to furnish a more extensive authorization.