alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### PRICE et al. v. TOWN OF RUSTON.*

No. 4537.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Dec. 1, 1933.

For former opinion, see 148 So. 512.

. Barksdale, Warren & Barksdale, of Ruston, for appellant.

Elder & Elder, of Ruston, for appellees.

*

For opinion denying second application for rehearing, see 151 So. 664.

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

The scope of the rehearing granted herein was restricted to the question of the rental value, or value of the use, of the third story of the Price building in the town of Ruston for the time it was in the town’s possession while a suit involving the ownership of the story was pending in the courts. 148 So. 512.

We are now quite clear that we did not give sufficient weight to the evidence of the realtors who testified in the case, especially so in view of the character and location of this property. This story was designed and constructed purely for lodge purposes. To be of use for office purposes, its interior would have to be completely rearranged at considerable expense; and, when this is done, the fact that it is not serviced by elevator would affect its desirability for office quarters. These realtors hesitated, in fact declined, to state what the rental value of the hall was worth during the period mentioned, as there was no rent demand for that character of property. The fact that the lower story yielded rent of $165 per month and that the second story brought $150 monthly does not argue strongly in support of, and is not convincing of, the contention that the third story is worth as much as $100 per month as an assembling place for lodge members, or as a hall for pleasure and recreation of those seeking such, or for any other purpose.

In considering this question, what amount constitutes a fair and reasonable return on the investment is a factor to be' weighed. Plaintiffs paid $3,100 for the story. The carrying charges should not be great, as they owned the two lower stories. An annual gross return of $1,200 on this investment would certainly not be expected, and would,i in its nature, be most exceptional for an investment of this kind and nature. As said by us in our original judgment, plaintiffs are entitled to some amount for the deprivation of the use and possession of the hall while its title was in litigation. We have decided that $50 per month would be fair.

For the reasons herein assigned, our former decree herein, which awarded judgment to plaintiffs for $1,326.66, is amended by reducing this amount to $663.33, and, as thus amended, our said decree is now reinstated and made the final judgment of the court.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)*





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Blueknight Energy Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership (the “Partnership”), on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), each of the undersigned, James C. Dyer, Chief Executive Officer of Blueknight Energy Partners G.P., L.L.C., and Alex G. Stallings, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Blueknight Energy Partners G.P., L.L.C., certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to his knowledge:





(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Partnership.








/s/ James C. Dyer, IV


James C. Dyer, IV


Chief Executive Officer of


Blueknight Energy Partners G.P., L.L.C.,


general partner of Blueknight Energy Partners, L.P.





May 10, 2010








/s/ Alex G. Stallings


Alex G. Stallings


Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of


Blueknight Energy Partners G.P., L.L.C.,


general partner of Blueknight Energy Partners, L.P.





May 10, 2010

















*A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Partnership and will be retained by the Partnership and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Report.
#### Supreme Council American Legion of Honor v. James D. Stewart et al.

1. *Presumptions—Where a Caséis Tried Without a Jury and No Propositions Of Law are*Submitted.—Where a case is tried without a jury and no propositions of law are submitted to be held by the court, it will be presumed that all questions of law were correctly decided, and no question of law properly arises on appeal.

2. *Same—As to Incompetent Evidence Where Case is Tried Without a*Jury.—When a case is tried by the court without a jury, and the competent evidence strongly tends to support the finding and judgement, if there has been any incompetent evidence admitted, the presumption is that the court, in passing upon the issues, ignored it.

Assumpsit, on a certificate of life insurance. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Massac County; the Hon. Oliver A. Harker, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the August term, 1902.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed March 2, 1903.

Charles M. Fouts, attorney for appellant.

C. L. V. Mulkey and James C. Courtney, attorneys for appellees.

Mr. Justice Creighton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action of assumpsit, in the Circuit Court of Massac County, by appellees against appellant, to recover on a certificate of life insurance. Jury waived. Trial by the court without a jury. Finding and judgment in favor of appellees for $3,125.61.

The declaration is in the usual form, setting out the benefit certificate sued on, *in haee verba.*To this declaration appellant pleaded the general issue, and the parties stipulated that all evidence tending to establish right of action or defense might be introduced.

ifo propositions to be held as law were submitted to the court by either party, nor were any questions of either law or fact raised in the trial court, by motion for new trial.

“ Where a case is tried without a jury and no propositions of law are submitted to be held by the court, it will be presumed that all questions of law were correctly *606decided.” Davies v. Phillips, 27 Ill. App. 387. “Where the trial is by the court without a jury, no question of law properly arises on appeal unless propositions of law have been submitted to the trial court.” Allison v. Leslie, 40 Ill. App. 441; Boehm v. Griebenow, 78 Ill. App. 675; Smith v. Billings, 169 Ill. 294. When a case is tried by the court without a jury, and the competent evidence strongly tends to support the finding and judgment, “if there has been any incompetent evidence admitted, the presumption is that the court, .in passing upon the issues, ignored it.” Mallers v. Crane Co., 92 Ill. App. 514.

This record presents no question for our determination, except as to the weight of the-evidence relative to ttm issues of fact involved, and in this respect we find no material error.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
#### Maturo Pontoleans, as Administratrix, etc., of Antonio Pontoleans, Deceased, Appellant, v. Wells Brothers Company of New York, Respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Williams and Kruse, JJ., who dissented.
1 John T. Boyd , Chi efJustice (Ret.), Seventh Co urt of Appeal s, si tt ing by assignment. Tex. Gov’t Code An n. §7 5.00 2(a) (1) (V erno n Su pp. 2 003 ). NO. 07-03-0244-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL E JULY 25, 2003

______________________________ STEPHANIE MAR IE PIERCE, Appellant
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 222 ND DISTRIC T COURT O F DEAF SMIT H COUNTY; NO. CR-02B-018; HON. H. BRYAN POFF, JR., PRESIDING

_______________________________ Before JOHNSON, C.J., QUINN, J., and BOYD, S.J. 1 Appellant

Stephanie Mari e Pierce, by and through her

attorney, has filed a motion to dismiss thi s appeal because she no l onger desir es to prosecuteit. Without passing on the merits of the case, we grant the motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)

and dismiss t he appeal. Having dismissed the appeal at appellant’s request, no motion for

rehearing will be entertained, and our manda te will issue forthwith. Brian Quinn Justice Do not publish

.
#### Union Pac. R’y Co. v. Moffatt.

*Appeal from District Court of Jefferson County.*

Messrs. Teller & Orahood and E. R. French, for appellant.

Mr. J. W. Horner, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

This case and the case of *Railway Co. v. De Busk, ante,*p. 294 (just decided in this court), were instituted and tried at the same time in the district court of Jefferson county. The two cases are founded on the same state of facts substantially; that is, the claims of different individuals for damages caused by the same fire. The proceedings in the court below were also the same, so that the same legal questions are presented for our consideration in both cases. The additional assignment of error concerning the amount of injury to appellee’s fence does not seem to demand serious consideration. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, for the reasons given in the *Case of De Bush, supra.*

*Affirmed.*
### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 13-20185 Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. CRISTOBAL JUSTINO VAZQUEZ-HERNANDEZ, a lso known as C r istobal Vasquez, also known as Cristobal Justino Vasquez Hernandez, Defendant-Appellant

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:12-CR-592-1
Before JOLLY, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Appealing the j udgment in a criminal case, Cristobal Justino V azquezHernandez raises an argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States
v. Rodriguez , 711 F.3d 5 41, 5 62 & n.28 (5th Cir. 2013) ( en banc), p etition for cert. filed ( June 6, 2013) (No. 1 2

- 1 0 6 9 5 ), in which t his court concluded t hat the g eneric, contemporary definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” does n o t requ i r e that the age of consent be lower than 17 years old and does not include an ageU n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D October 25, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R
. R

. 47. 5, the court has d eterm ined that this op inion should not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R
. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 13-20185 Document: 00512419368 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/25/2013No. 13-20185

differential requireme n t
. The appellant’s motion f or summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 13-20185 Document: 00512419368 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/25/2013
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 574

To provide for the operation of laboratories to carry out certain publichealth functions for the region along the international border with Mexico.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 19, 1995

Mr. COLEMAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Commerce

A BILL

To provide for the operation of laboratories to carry out

certain public-health functions for the region along the

international border with Mexico.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Southwest Public

5 Health Laboratory Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. PUBLIC-HEALTH LABORATORIES FOR SOUTHWEST7 ERN BORDER REGION.

8 The Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting

9 as appropriate through the Director of the Centers for

10 Disease Control and Prevention or through other agencies,
2

•HR 574 IH

1 may make grants to States for the operation of labora2 tories to protect the public health through analyzing

3 human, wildlife, air, water, and soil samples. The purposes

4 for which the Secretary may authorize such a grant to

5 be expended include the establishment of the laboratories,

6 increasing the capacity of existing facilities, and collecting

7 the samples to be analyzed by the laboratories. The Sec8 retary may make such a grant only if the State involved

9 agrees that the laboratory will be operated by the State,

10 and will serve the region along the international border

11 between the United States and Mexico (in the States of

12 California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas). The Sec13 retary shall ensure that such a laboratory is established

14 in an urban area that is centrally located in such region,

15 that the laboratory is located within 25 miles of such bor16 der, and that the laboratory receives the principal amount

17 of assistance under this section.

Æ
#### Thomas F. Moore, Appellant, v. Charles F. Taylor, as Surviving Partner of the Firm of Charles F. Taylor & Co., Respondent.

Judgment and order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. Held, that the facts and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom are sufficient to permit the jury to find that the plaintiff made an arrangement with Taylor and Dunfee whereby his trench machine was to be leased to them as Charles F. Taylor & Co., and that he was not to be a partner in the business of said firm, and that such arrangement was to be effective from June 10,1900. All concurred, except McLennan, P. J., and Kruse, J., who dissented.
nsit-ex105_739.htm



EXHIBIT 10.5

 

FIRST AMENDMENT 

TO THE INSIGHT ENTERPRISES, INC.

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT SEPARATION PLAN

 

Effective January 1, 2008, Insight Enterprises, Inc. (the “Company”) adopted the Insight Enterprises, Inc. Executive Management Separation Plan (the “Plan”).  The Plan was most recently amended and restated effective August 29, 2019.  By this instrument, the Company now desires to amend the Plan as set forth below. 

1.Except as otherwise provided, this First Amendment shall be effective as of February 1, 2020. 

2.Section 2.1(k) (Definitions – Employee) is hereby amended by the addition of the following new sentences to the end thereof to read as follows:

Effective on and after February 1, 2020, certain individuals who were employed by PCM, Inc. (“PCM”) and affiliates of PCM and who are participants in the PCM Inc. Separation Plan will become employees of the Company (each a “Former PCM Employee”).  Former PCM Employees shall not be treated as “Employees” for purposes of this Plan and shall be ineligible to participate in this Plan. 

 

3.Section 3.2 (Certain Employees Ineligible for Benefits) is hereby amended by the addition of the following new subsection (i) to the end thereof to read as follows:

(i)Former PCM Employees.

4.This First Amendment amends only the provisions of the Plan as noted above, and those provisions not expressly amended shall be considered in full force and effect.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, this First Amendment shall supersede the provisions of the Plan to the extent those provisions are inconsistent with the provisions and intent of this First Amendment. 

 

 



 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this First Amendment to be executed as of this 31st day of January 2020. 

INSIGHT ENTERPRISES, INC. 

By: /s/ Lisanne Steinheiser 

Its: Assistant Secretary
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

JUAN MANUEL CASTRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50074

D.C. No. 

3:15-cr-01793-LAB-1

ORDER

Before: REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

The memorandum disposition, filed on August 22, 2017, is amended as

follows: On page 2, lines 15–16, the phrase “because there was sufficient evidence

of the chain of custody without these documents” is deleted.

With the foregoing amendment, Appellant’s petition for panel rehearing,

filed October 5, 2017, is DENIED. The panel votes to deny the petition for

rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en

banc, and no judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed.

R. App. P. 35. The petition for rehearing en banc, filed the same date, is DENIED. 

No future petitions shall be entertained.

FILED

NOV 01 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
#### John J. Gutheil, Respondent, v. The City of New York, Appellant.

Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Present — Woodward, Jenks, Hooker, Rich and Miller, JJ.
Exhibit
        23.2


**Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**




We
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
      Form
      S-3 (Nos. 333-95361, 333-33986, 333-37630, 333-45818, 333-49628, 333-59346,
      333-63514, 333-99559, 333-99673, 333-106420, 333-110729, 333-112611, 333-124959,
      333-124961, 333-128497 and 333-129713), and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-74197, 333-86728
      and 333-124960) of Arotech Corporation of our report dated March 30, 2006,
      with
      respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Arotech
      Corporation included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
      December 31, 2006.




/s/ Kost,
                Forer, Gabbay & KasiererKost,
                  Forer, Gabbay & Kasierer
                A
                  Member of Ernst & Young Global


Tel-Aviv,
      Israel


April
      16,
      2007
Exhibit 24**POWER OF ATTORNEY**The undersigned directors of Gardner Denver, Inc., a Delawarecorporation (the “Company”), which anticipates filingwith the Securities and Exchange Commission (the“Commission”) under the provisions of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”) an Annual Report onForm 10-K (the“Annual Report”) for the fiscal year endedDecember 31, 2005 (together with any and all subsequentamendments) does hereby constitutes and appoints Ross J.Centanni and Tracy D. Pagliara, and each of them, with fullpower of substitution and resubstitution, as attorney orattorneys to execute and file on behalf of the undersigned, intheir capacity as a director of the Company, the Annual Reportand any and all other documents to be filed with the Commissionpertaining to the Annual Report with full power and authority todo and perform any and all acts and things whatsoever requiredor necessary to be done in the premises, as fully as to allintents and purposes as he could do if personally present,hereby ratifying and approving the acts of said attorneys andany of them and any such substitution.Dated: February 21, 2006   **Signature** **Title**        /s/ Donald G. Barger, Jr.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 23 (Monday, February 4, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 6499]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-1928]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. PR08-13-000]


Houston Pipe Line Company, L.P.; Notice of Petition for Rate 
Approval

January 28, 2008.
    Take notice that on January 22, 2008, Houston Pipe Line Company, 
L.P. (HPL), filed a petition for approval of rates for transportation 
service, pursuant to section 284.123(b)(2) of the Commission's 
regulations. Commencing January 22, 2008, HPL requests that the 
Commission approve a maximum interruptible transportation rate of 
$0.3980 per MMBtu and a maximum fuel retention cap that varies by zone 
from 0.01 percent to 0.83 percent.
    Any person desiring to participate in this rate proceeding must 
file a motion to intervene or to protest this filing must file in 
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Protests will be considered 
by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, 
but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Any 
person wishing to become a party must file a notice of intervention or 
motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices, motions, or protests 
must be filed on or before the date as indicated below. Anyone filing 
an intervention or protest must serve a copy of that document on the 
Applicant. Anyone filing an intervention or protest on or before the 
intervention or protest date need not serve motions to intervene or 
protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an 
original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' 
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail 
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For 
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#87c1c2d5c4c8e9ebeee9e2d4f2f7f7e8f5f3c7e1e2f5e4a9e0e8f1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="cc8a899e8f83a2a0a5a2a99fb9bcbca3beb88caaa9beafe2aba3ba">[email protected]</span></a>, or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time Monday, February 11, 2008.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E8-1928 Filed 2-1-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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#### In the Matter of Grade Damage Commission. (In the Matter of Kurzman; In the Matter of Kratzer.)

Motion granted. Settle orders on notice.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

THOMAS J. MCKEE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 69610

No. E2000-00008-CCA-R3-PC

JUDGMENT

Came the defendant, Thomas J. McKee, pro se, and the state, by the Attorney

General, and this cause was heard on the record on appeal from the Criminal Court of Knox County;

and upon consideration thereof, this court is of the opinion that there is reversible error in the

judgment of the trial court.

It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the trial court is reversed

and the case is remanded to the Criminal Court of Knox County for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

Costs of the appeal are taxed to the State of Tennessee. 

Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.

Judge David G. Hayes

Judge Norma McGee Ogle