alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-11-00073-CV

______________________________

OSCAR DEAN DAVIS, Appellant

V.

WALTER EARL STEPHENSON, SR., Appellee

 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Cass County, Texas

Trial Court No. CCL-11-C-167

 

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Oscar Dean Davis, appellant, filed his notice of appeal July 20, 2011.

Davis filed a motion to extend time “to complete appeal,” which this Court granted to 

September 21 for the filing of the record. Davis is not indigent and is therefore responsible for 

payment of the clerk’s record and reporter’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. app. C (B)(1); 20.1. 

The clerk’s record was due on September 21, 2011. There is no information to indicate 

Davis has made efforts to have the clerk’s record filed with this Court. On October 21, 2011, we 

contacted Davis by letter, giving him an opportunity to cure the various defects, and warning him 

that if we did not receive an adequate response within ten days, this appeal would be subject to 

dismissal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), (c).

On September 23, 2011, we received Davis’ brief in this matter, which we returned to him, 

explaining that the clerk’s record had not been filed and that his brief would be due thirty days after 

the clerk’s record had been filed. Appellate courts must base their decisions on the record as 

made and brought forward, not on a record that should have been made or that could have been 

made. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998). Although the 

jurisdiction of a court of appeals is invoked by timely filing documents showing a bona fide intent 

to appeal, see Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. 1997), we cannot decide a case 

without an adequate record, and with no clerk’s record, we have nothing to review, and therefore 

we cannot find error.
3

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jack Carter

Justice

Date Submitted: November 29, 2011

Date Decided: November 30, 2011
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-63,775-25

EX P ARTE THO MAS WAYNE F LORENCE, App licant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 10CR1217-83- 10 IN THE 56T H DISTRICT COURT

F ROM GALVEST ON COUNTY

Per curiam . O R D E R Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Tex as C o d e o f Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S. W

. 2 d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of sexual assault of a c hild and sentenc ed to seve nty year s’ imprisonment. In his prese nt application, Applicant raises three grounds. This application, howeve r, prese nts a more serious question. This Court’s rec ords ref lect that Applicant has filed six prior applications perta ining to this conviction. It is obvious from the rec ord that Applicant continues to raise issues that have been prese nted and reje cted in previous applications or that should have been2

prese nted in previous applications. The writ of habea s corpus is not to be lightly or easily abused. Sanders v. U.S. , 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Ex p a r t e Carr , 511 S.W .2d 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Be cause of his repe titive claims, we hold that Applicant’s claim s ar e barred from revie w under Article 11.07, § 4, and are waived and abandone d by his abuse of the writ. This appli ca tion is dismiss ed. There fore , we instruct the Honora ble Abel Acosta, Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appea ls, not to acc ept or file the ins t an t ap p lication for a writ of habea s corpus, or any future application perta ining to this conviction unless Applicant is able to show in such an application that any claims prese nted have not been raised previously and that they could not have been prese nted in a previous application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Bilton , 602 S.W .2d 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Copies of this order shall be sent to the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal Justice-Corr ectional Institut ions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Filed: Mar ch 1, 2017 Do not publish
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 696 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 696

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore the deduction for 
  the health insurance costs of self-employed individuals for taxable 
                        years beginning in 1994.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 26, 1995

Mr. Bartlett of Maryland (for himself, Mr. Crane, Mr. Stump, Mr. Burton 
 of Indiana, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Hancock, Mr. Hoke, Mr. Gilchrest, and Mr. 
    Upton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore the deduction for 
  the health insurance costs of self-employed individuals for taxable 
                        years beginning in 1994.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Bartlett-Mfume Health Insurance 
Deduction Act''.

SEC. 2. RESTORATION OF DEDUCTION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS OF SELF-
              EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING IN 1994.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (6) of section 162(l) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to special rules for health insurance 
costs of self-employed individuals) is amended by striking ``December 
31, 1993'' and inserting ``December 31, 1994''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1993.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. 1350





I, Frank
Slootman, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of
Data Domain, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008, fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of Data Domain, Inc.




Date:
      November 7, 2008
            
            By:
            
            /s/
      FRANK SLOOTMANFrank
      SlootmanChief
      Executive Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0316

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

JESSE ALAN BAYLOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including November 6, 2023, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 29 2023

09/29/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0316
#### Reuben Ross, Respondent, v. James P. Beckwith and James Philpot, Individually, as Well as Executors and Trustees Named in an Instrument in Writing Purporting to Be the Last Will and Testament of Elizabeth Cooley Ross, Deceased, and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with Eva L. McClellan.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion. Woodward, Jenks, Hooker, Gaynor and Miller, J.T., concurred.
<PAGE>   1


                                 EXHIBIT (15)(a)


<PAGE>   2

                                                                 Exhibit (15)(a)





April 27, 2001


CMS Energy Corporation:

We are aware that CMS Energy Corporation has incorporated by reference in its
Registration Statements No. 33-55805, No. 33-60007, No. 333-27849, No.
333-32229, No. 333-37241, No. 333-45556, No. 333-47464, No. 333-51932, No.
333-52560, No. 333-58686, and No. 333-76347 in its Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended March 31, 2001, which includes our report dated April 27, 2001 covering
the unaudited interim financial information contained therein. Pursuant to
Regulation C of the Securities Act of 1933, that report is not considered a part
of the registration statement prepared or certified by our firm or a report
prepared or certified by our firm within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the
Act.


Very truly yours,


/s/ Arthur Andersen LLP
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.35


IDACORP, Inc. and Idaho Power Company Compensation for
Non-Employee Directors of the Board of Directors
(Effective January 1, 2020)


All directors of IDACORP also serve as directors of Idaho Power.  The fees and other compensation discussed below are for service on both boards.  Employee directors receive no compensation for service on the boards.  


	
					
	Form of Fee
	 
	Amount

	Base Board Annual Retainer
	 
	$
	80,000
	


	 
	 
	 

	Base Committee Annual Retainers
	 
	 

	Audit Committee
	 
	12,000
	


	Compensation Committee
	 
	7,000
	


	Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee
	 
	6,000
	


	Executive Committee
	 
	3,000
	


	 
	 
	 

	Additional Chair Annual Retainers
	 
	 

	Chairperson of the Board of Directors
	 
	100,000
	


	Chair of the Audit Committee
	 
	14,000
	


	Chair of the Compensation Committee
	 
	12,000
	


	Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee
	 
	10,000
	


	 
	 
	 

	Annual Stock Awards
	 
	110,000
	


	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 

	 






Deferral Arrangements


Directors may defer all or a portion of their annual IDACORP, Idaho Power, IDACORP Financial Services, Inc., and Ida-West Energy retainers and meeting fees and receive a lump-sum payment of all amounts deferred with interest or a series of up to 10 equal annual payments after they separate from service with IDACORP and Idaho Power. Any cash fees that were deferred before 2009 for service as a member of the board of directors were credited with the preceding month’s average Moody’s Long-Term Corporate Bond Yield for utilities, or the Moody’s Rate, plus 3%, until January 1, 2019 when the interest rate changed to the Moody’s Rate. All cash fees that are deferred for service as a member of the board of directors after January 1, 2009 are credited with interest at the Moody’s Rate. Interest is calculated on a pro rata basis each month using a 360-day year and the average Moody’s Rate for the preceding month.


Directors may also defer their annual stock awards, which are then held as deferred stock units with dividend equivalents reinvested in additional deferred stock units. Upon separation from service with IDACORP and Idaho Power, directors will receive either a lump-sum distribution or a series of up to 10 equal annual installments. Upon a change in control the directors’ deferral accounts will be distributed to each participating director in a lump sum. The distributions will be in shares of IDACORP common stock, with each deferred stock unit equal to one share of IDACORP common stock and any fractional shares paid in cash.
#### Henrietta Hahn, Respondent, v. National Mortgage Company, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs, with leave to defendant to withdraw demurrer, and to answer on payment of costs. Ho opinion.
#### Curtis v. Lathrop.

Parties— Intervention.— The denial of a petition to intervene in an action brought to establish a trust in certain real estate in favor of plaintiff, by one claiming the legal title to and possession of a certain portion of the premises involved, is not error; it not appearing that the lights or remedies of the intervenor could be affected by a judgment between the parties to the suit.

*170
      *Error to District Court of Clear Lalce County.*

Mr. L. H. Curtis, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. T. B. Bryan, H. W. Hobson and M. *Q.*Cage, for defendant in error.

Stallcup, C.

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the order of the district court denying the application of the plaintiff in error, Charles H. Curtis, to be permitted to intervene in the cause of *Rhoba Lathrop v. Charles W. Pollard,*which application was made after remand of that cause upon the first appeal to this court. The relation of the said Curtis to the said cause is shown by the statement and opinion just filed in this court upon the second appeal thereof. There was nothing alleged in the petition of the plaintiff in error showing that his rights or remedies could be affected in any way by the judgment which might be rendered between the parties plaintiff and defendant in that cause. The interest claimed by him was the legal title to and possession of a certain portion of the real-estate premises known as the “ Emma Mine,” involved in that cause. He could not be divested of the title thereto, nor disturbed in the enjoyment thereof, by the direct legal operation of a judgment between the parties plaintiff and defendant in that cause while he was not party thereto. No right of his, therefore, was affected by the denial of his petition to intervene. *Limber g v. Higgenbotham,*11 Colo. 316.

The judgment should be affirmed.

De Eranoe and Rising, 00., concur.

Per Curiam.

Eor the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion the judgment is affirmed.

*Affirmed.*
EXHIBIT 31.1

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael Leeb, the Chief Executive Officer of Skyline Multimedia
Entertainment, Inc., certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Skyline Multimedia
Entertainment, Inc;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

     a)   designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
          material information relating to the registrant, including its
          consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
          entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report
          is being prepared;

     b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
          and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
          this annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

     c)   presented in this annual report our conclusions about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
          evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

     a)   all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
          controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
          record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
          identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in
          internal controls; and

     b)   any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
          controls.

October 15, 2004




/s/   Michael Leeb
------------------
Name: Michael Leeb
Title: Chief Executive Officer
#### Mrs. J. W. Hutchinson et al. v. Ernest A. Sine et al.

1. Appellate Court *Practice—Where the Judgment Has Been Erroneously*Entered.—Where the clerk of the trial court in writing up the judgment makes an erroneous entry of judgment against one not brought under its jurisdiction, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded generally.

Assumpsit.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridqe Haneoy, Judge presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1901.

Reversed and remanded.

Opinion filed January 16, 1903.

Rehearing denied February 3, 1903.

C. O. Garmire and Grant Newell, attorneys for appellees.

William Gibson and F. W. Becker, attorneys for appellants.

Mr. Justice Freeman

delivered the opinion of the court.

Judgment was entered in this case, reciting as follows : “ Therefore it is considered by the court that the plaintiffs do have and recover of and from the defendants, Mrs. J. W. Hutchinson, S. S. Hutchinson and W. S. Hemby, his said damages of $1,184.17 in form as aforesaid by the jury assessed, together with his costs and charges in this behalf *639expended, and have execution therefor.” It appears that while the suit as begun included the three defendants named against whom the judgment was rendered, only two of them were served with summons, and the third defendant, W. S. Hemby,who was not served, never entered his appearance. He does not appeal, and the attention of the trial court does not seem to have been called to the erroneous entry of judgment against one not brought under its jurisdiction. It was probably an oversight or mistake by the clerk in writing up the judgment. Nevertheless the law in this state is apparently settled, that in such case the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded generally. In Knights of Honor v. Goldberger, 175 Ill. 19, the trial court had entered judgment against two defendants, one of whom was not served and had entered no appearance. The Appellate Court reversed the cause because of the same error, but inasmuch as the evidence supported the verdict against the party which had been properly brought in by summons, the Circuit Court was directed to enter judgment on the verdict against such defendant.

The Supreme Court says: “ The judgment was a unit as to both defendants, and should have been reversed as to both and remanded generally.” We are precluded, therefore, from endeavoring to correct the mistake in order to give effect to the judgment in the case at bar against the parties properly served. There seems to be no way of avoiding a new trial for all parties.

The judgment bad as to one is bad as to all. See, Grace v. Casey-Grimshaw Marble Co., 62 Ill. App. 149, and cases cited; also cases cited in Knights of Honor v. Goldberger, *supra.*The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded.
# U nit edStates C ou rt o f App eal s For t h e Firs t C ircu it

No. 08-2108 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,

v . FÉLIX ALBERTO CASTRO-DAVIS, a/k/a Belto, a/k/a Bertito, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 08-2109 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,

v . FÉLIX GABRIEL CASTRO-DAVIS, a/k/a Gaby,

Defendant, Appellant.

ERRATA SHEET The opinion of this Court issued on July 16, 2010, is amended as follows: On page 11, lines 13-14: delete "a violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(4)(a)," On page 14, line 4 of footnote 9: insert an "a" between "has been" and "lack" On page 19, line 6: substitute the comma after "area" with a semi-colon On page 27, line 3: insert a closing parenthesis after "(1st Cir. 2003)." On page 33, lines 3-4 of footnote 6: should read "On October 28, 2009, just before oral argument, Gabriel ..."
#### Russell Conklin and Others, Plaintiffs, v. Charles F. Whitbeck and Others, Defendants.

Decision of motion reserved until hearing of the appeal. Proceedings by the plaintiffs under the judgment stayed until hearing and determination of such appeal, provided the same be brought to argument at March term.
#### In re House Resolution Relating to House Bill No. 116.

Municipal Corporations —Amendment on Charters.—A clause in an act declaring that “ this act shall apply to all cities and towns in this state, anything in their charters to the contrary notwithstanding,” makes the act operative in all cities in the state, including those whose charters have contrary provisions.

The resolution of inquiry is as follows: “Resolved, that the following questions be submitted to the supreme court, wjth a request that an opinion' thereon be handed down at the earliest practicable moment:

“Will house bill No. 116, as amended and printed, if enacted into a law, be operative in the cities of Denver, Central, Georgetown and Black Hawk, or either of them?

‘ ‘ Will a clause inserted in said bill in these words: *‘*This act shall apply to all cities and towns in this state, anything in their charters to the contrary notwithstanding,’ bring said above-named cities or either within the provisions of said bill, notwithstanding anything in their charters to the contrary? ”

Pee Oueiam.

We are of the opinion that with the insertion of the clause specified in the second branch of the interrogatory above submitted the act would be operative in the cities named, as well as in all other cities in the state.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
               PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Report of Indigenous Global Development
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Deni Leonard, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ Deni Leonard
-------------------------------------
Deni Leonard
CEO and CFO
September 30, 2004
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 28, 2009 

d0921 

Order 

 

September 28, 2009 

137456(34) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137456 

 COA: 285167 

Muskegon CC: 06-054169-FH 

CECIL RAYMOND HAWKINS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s June 23, 2009 

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.