alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6080 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 5420 Kavanaugh Boulevard in Little Rock, 

Arkansas, as the ‘‘Ronald A. Robinson Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 6080 EH

1 SECTION 1. RONALD A. ROBINSON POST OFFICE. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 5420 Kavanaugh Boulevard in 

4 Little Rock, Arkansas, shall be known and designated as 

5 the ‘‘Ronald A. Robinson Post Office’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, or other record of the United States 

8 to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed 

9 to be a reference to the ‘‘Ronald A. Robinson Post Office’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 28, 

2022. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6080 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postinson Post Office’’. in Little Rock, Arkansas, as the ‘‘Ronald A. Rob- al Service located at 5420 Kavanaugh Boulevard
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM TOTAL
CONTROL PRODUCTS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF
MARCH 31, 1996 AND 1997 AND FOR EACH OF THE THREE YEARS IN THE PERIOD ENDED
MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         221,967
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                7,804,823
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  7,984,041
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            17,565,807
<PP&E>                                       2,393,137
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              31,462,367
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,943,723
<BONDS>                                        176,983
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    24,613,624
<OTHER-SE>                                 (4,707,047)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                31,462,367
<SALES>                                     40,820,717
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            40,820,717
<CGS>                                       20,663,482
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               20,663,482
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               560,789
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                68,758
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             582,911
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,377,151)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,040,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,564,440)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,564,440)<F1>
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.83)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.83)<F1>
<FN>
<F1> Net income or loss excludes a non-cash charge of $9,061,037 for
accretion to redemption value of common stock which is included in the
computation of earnings per share.
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0618

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

vs. 

ANDREW DAVID LARSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

GRANT

Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the 

Appellant is given an extension of time until February 5, 2024, to 

prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s opening brief.

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

December 27 2023

12/27/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0618
CONVERTIBLE
      PROMISSORY NOTE





$3,138.49                                                                                                          Denver,
      Colorado


January
      1,
      2004




FOR
      VALUE RECEIVED, PARK-PREMIER MINING
      COMPANY, a Utah corporation (the “Maker”), herby promises to pay to the order of
      Janet Atkins (the “Holder”), the principal sum of Three Thousand One Hundred
      Thirty-eight and 49/100 US Dollars ($3,138.49), together with interest on the
      unpaid balance at the rate of Twelve Percent (12%) per annum, on or before
      January 1, 2007, subject to conversion as described below.  Accrued
      interest will be added to the principal of the note on each annual anniversary
      date if not paid.




This
      Note may be converted into shares
      of Maker’s common stock at the conversion price of $.10 per share or such other
      conversion price as the board of directors may deem appropriate, not in excess
      of $.10 per share, until the due date hereof, at the Holder’s
      option.





This
      Note is subject to prepayment, in
      whole or in part, at the option of the Maker without penalty.  Such
      prepayments shall be applied first to interest accrued and then to the principal
      due hereunder.





In
      case the Note shall not be paid in
      full whenever it shall become due, the Maker agrees to pay all costs and
      expenses of collection including reasonable attorney’s fees, not to exceed 15%
      of the unpaid balance.




All
      rights and obligations hereunder
      shall be governed by the laws of the State of Colorado.  If any part
      of the assets or capital stock of maker is sold or transferred without Holder’s
      prior written consent, except sales and transfers in the ordinary course of
      business and except transfers by devise, descent or by operation of law upon
      the
      death of a joint tenant:  (1) Holder may, at Holder’s option, declare
      all the sums due under this Note to be immediately due and payable, and (2)
      if
      the sale or transfer involves substantially all of the assets of Maker, the
      transferee shall be deemed to have assumed all of the obligations of Maker
      under
      this Note.





This
      Note is unsecured.





IN
      WITNESS WHEREOF, the Maker has
      signed his Note effective as of the date first above written.





PARK-PREMIER
      MINING
      COMPANY





By:     /s/
      Robert W. Dunlap


Its:     President


Description:  Unreimbursed
      expenses
Order entered June 7, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05 - 12 - 00173 - CR No. 05 - 12 - 00174 - CR MAHIR ABDALRAZZAAQEL, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1

Dallas Coun ty, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F11 - 00580 - H , F11 - 00581 - H



### O RDER In these cases, appellant raises issues related to the costs assessed against him. The records, however, do not contain costs bills or other documents with itemized lists of costs

assesse d in the cases. Accordingly, we ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file, within FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order, supplemental clerk’s records containing detailed itemizations of the costs assessed in the cases, including, but not limited to, specific court costs, fees, and court

appointed attorney fees. The supplemental clerk’s records shall also include documents explaining any and all abbreviations used to designate a particular fee, cost, or court

- appointed attorney fee.We DIRECT the Cler k to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to Gary

Fitzsimmons, Dallas County District Clerk; the Dallas County District Clerk, Criminal Records Division; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-30304 

Conference Calendar

 

JACOB JENNINGS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RICHARD L. STALDER, Secretary, 

Department of Public Safety 

and Corrections; ED DAY, Warden,

Washington Correctional Institute,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CV-2754-I

- - - - - - - - - -

October 24, 1996

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jacob Jennings, Louisiana inmate #205182, appeals the

judgment for the defendants following bench trial. He challenges

the conclusions of law and findings of fact by arguing, based on

his selective review of the trial evidence, that there was no

evidence to support the disciplinary board’s determinations of
No. 96-30304

- 2 -

rule violations. We have carefully reviewed the record and the

appellate arguments. For essentially the same reasons as

expressed by the magistrate judge at the close of the trial, we

detect no clear error in the findings of fact or error of law in

the conclusion of no due process violation. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

52(a). 

AFFIRMED.
18257.

#### Burns *et al. v.*Ralston Purina Company.

Argued July 13, 1953

Decided September 15, 1953

Rehearing denied September 28, 1953.

*A. C. Wheeler, Wheeler, Robinson & Thurmond,*for plaintiff in error.

*Kenyon, Kenyon & Gunter, A. R. Kenyon,*contra.

Duckworth, Chief Justice.

The case as reported by the Court of Appeals in *Burns*v. *Ralston Purina Co.,*87 *Ga. App.*876 (75 S. E. 2d 563), discloses both in the facts and in the opinion that (1) petitioners acquired turkey feed manufactured, advertised, and sold by the defendant as being good for turkey poults; (2) that this feed was purchased and fed to petitioners’ poults; (3) that this feed was molded; (4) that molded feed will kill turkey poults; and (5) that within a very short time thereafter large numbers of petitioners’ turkeys died from eating molded feed. While this evidence did not prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that all of the turkeys did not die from eating other molded feed or other causes, nevertheless, the evidence as listed above was sufficient to go to the jury, and the Court of Appeals erred in stating that, while these facts created a suspicion, they did not authorize an inference that Purina feed was responsible for the deaths on the basis that the hypothesis that the deaths could have resulted from other feed fed to the turkeys at the same time was not excluded and the actual deaths of the turkeys could only be arrived at by conjecture or speculation. The evidence would have been clearly sufficient to authorize a jury to find that Purina feed caused the deaths of these turkeys, and the Court of Appeals erred in not so holding. See *McPherson*v. *Capuano & Co.,*31 *Ga. App.*82 (121 S. E. 580); *Copeland*v. *Curtis,*36 *Ga. App.*255 (136 S. E. 324); *Armour & Co.*v. *Miller,*39 *Ga. App.*228 (147 S. E. 184); s. c. 169 *Ga.*201 (149 S. E. 698); *Criswell Baking Co.*v. *Milligan,*77 *Ga. App.*861 (50 S. E. 2d 136).

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, P. J., not participating.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997             MAR-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1996             APR-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997             MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                           4,806                   1,086
<SECURITIES>                                         0                   2,106
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,693                   5,791
<ALLOWANCES>                                       588                   1,690
<INVENTORY>                                      1,275                   1,881
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                11,080                  12,268
<PP&E>                                           5,994                   4,262
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,840                   1,578
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  16,614                  16,832
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,092                   3,195
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                        13,840                  13,133
<OTHER-SE>                                      (5,410)                   (221)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    16,614                  16,832
<SALES>                                         15,911                  13,944
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                15,911                  13,944
<CGS>                                            7,432                   7,344
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   13,574                  11,502
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 182                      28
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (5,191)                 (4,726)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                  (1,169)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (5,191)                 (3,557)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (5,191)                 (3,557)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.69)                  (0.48)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0                       0
        

</TABLE>
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 616

To require the Secretary of the Treasury to redesign the $1 coin to

commemorate Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 20, 1995

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Banking and Financial Services

A BILL

To require the Secretary of the Treasury to redesign the

$1 coin to commemorate Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND FINDINGS.

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the

5 ‘‘Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 1 Dollar Coin Act’’.

6 (b) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:

7 (1) Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was a pre8 eminent spokesman for human civil rights in his

9 time.
2

•HR 616 IH

1 (2) The work of Dr. King affected the lives of

2 more Americans of all races and people around the

3 world than any other American reform leader of the

4 20th century.

5 (3) Dr. King was one of America’s most erudite

6 scholars and social and religious activists.

7 (4) Dr. King, because of his lifelong achieve8 ments and moral vision, was a recipient in 1964 of

9 the Nobel Peace Prize.

10 (5) Dr. King mobilized leaders of all faiths,

11 races, and creeds to support the passage of the his12 toric civil rights laws in the 1960s.

13 (6) Dr. King inspired activists for human rights

14 around the world by applying a philosophy of non15 violence.

16 (7) Dr. King helped to mobilize the African17 American civil rights movement as a founder of the

18 Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

19 (8) Dr. King has been honored by the Nation

20 with the designation of the third Monday in January

21 as a national holiday in his name.

22 (9) The largest collection of materials relating

23 to Dr. King is in the Martin Luther King, Jr. Cen24 ter for Nonviolent Social Change in Atlanta, Geor25 gia.
3

•HR 616 IH

1 SEC. 2. REDESIGN OF $1 COIN TO COMMEMORATE

2 DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

3 Section 5112(d)(1) of title 31, United States Code,

4 is amended—

5 (1) by striking the 5th and 6th sentences and

6 inserting the following: ‘‘The obverse side of the dol7 lar shall have the likeness of Dr. Martin Luther

8 King, Jr. The reverse side of the dollar shall have

9 a design emblematic of Dr. Martin Luther King,

10 Jr.’’; and

11 (2) in the 4th sentence, by striking ‘‘dollar, half

12 dollar, and quarter dollar’’ and inserting ‘‘half dollar

13 and quarter dollar’’.

Æ
18352.

#### Smith, by next friend, *v.*Pyles *et al.*

Submitted September 15, 1953

Decided October 13, 1953.

*W. B. Mitchell, Alvin B. Mitchell,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. D. Aultman,*contra.

Almand, Justice.

Walter I. Smith, an incompetent, by and through his next friend, Carrie Lou Smith, brought an action in ejectment against John P. Pyles and Ralph Pyles, to recover a certain tract of land particularly described in the petition. The plaintiff relied for recovery solely upon his actual adverse possession of the described tract for more than twenty years. At the conclusion of evidence introduced by the plaintiff and the defendants, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial upon the general grounds only, no error being assigned on the direction of the verdict. The motion being denied, the case is here on a bill of exceptions assigning error on said order. *Held:*

The evidence, construed most strongly in favor of the plaintiff, failed to show that he had ever been in possession of the whole tract of land sued for. It showed that he went into possession, at different times, of a small part of the described tract, but that he failed to identify the part of which he was in possession and distinguish it from that of which he was not, and the verdict in favor of the defendants, regardless of the evidence in support of their title, was demanded by the evidence. *Whitehead*v. *Pitts,*127 *Ga.*774 (1) (56 S. E. 1004). It was not error to deny the motion for new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GREGORY BRIAN WILLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DETROIT POLICE SERGEANT

JIM GRAHAM and INVESTIGATOR AMIR

SMITH,

Defendants.

______________________________/

Case Number: 09-13406

HONORABLE AVERN COHN

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (Doc. No. 33)

AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 12)

I.

This is a prisoner civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is suing defendants claiming that he was

wrongfully prosecuted, that defendants lacked probable cause for the prosecution, and

that the prosecution was undertaken with recklessness and malice. The matter has

been referred to a magistrate judge for all pretrial proceedings. Plaintiff filed a motion

for summary judgment. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

(MJRR) recommending that plaintiff’s motion be denied.

II.

Neither party has filed objections to the MJRR and the time for filing objections

has passed. The failure to file objections to the report and recommendation waives any

further right to appeal. Smith v. Detroit Federation of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d
2

1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Likewise, the failure to object to the magistrate judge's

report releases the Court from its duty to independently review the motions. Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). However, the Court has reviewed the MJRR and agrees

with the magistrate judge.

III.

Accordingly, the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are ADOPTED

as the findings and conclusions of the Court. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

 S/Avern Cohn

AVERN COHN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 3, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to Gregory Willis,

207545, 11075 McKinney, Detroit, MI 48224 and the attorneys of record on this date,

August 3, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Julie Owens

Case Manager, (313) 234-5160
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 1 8

- 14955 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 5:17

- cr - 00005

- LGW

- BWC

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus CEDRIC L. KING , Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia

________________________ (September 5, 2019) Before WILLIAM PRYOR , MARTIN , and GRANT , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Cedric King appeals the substantive reasonableness of his 268

- month sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances.

Case: 18-14955 Date Filed: 09/05/2019 Page: 1 of 32 The government argues this appeal should be dismissed based on the appeal waiver in King’s written plea agreement. “We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.” United States v. Johnson , 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Ci r. 2008). “A sentence appeal waiver must be made knowingly and voluntarily.” Id. “The waiver is valid if the government shows either that : (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.” Id. King’s plea agreement included the following appeal waiver: Defendant waives his right to appeal on any ground, with only three exceptions: he may appeal his sentence if (1) tha t sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, (2) that sentence exceeds the advisory Guidelines range determined by this Court at sentenc ing , or (3) the government appeals. By signing the plea agreement, Defendant explicitly instructs his attorney not to file an appeal unless one of the three exceptions is met. When King entered his plea, the district court described the terms of the appeal waiver and asked King if he had any questions about it. King said he did not. After the plea colloquy, the district co urt found King’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The district court correctly concluded King knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the sentence appeal waiver. See United States v. Buchanan , 131 F.3d 1005, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (exp laining a sentence waiver was

Case: 18-14955 Date Filed: 09/05/2019 Page: 2 of 33 knowingly and voluntarily entered where the plea “colloquy establishe[d] that the defendant understood the nature and extent of the appeal waiver and agreed to it”). Also, none of the three exceptions to King’s appeal waiver are present. We will therefore enforce King’s appeal waiver and dismiss this appeal. DISMISSED. Case: 18-14955 Date Filed: 09/05/2019 Page: 3 of 3