alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The STATE of Florida ex rel. The FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Vance J. CASKEY, Jr., Respondent.

Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.

July 31, 1956.

Edmund J. McMullen, Tampa, for Florida Bar, complainant.

No appearance for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

A complaint was filed by the Florida Bar against the respondent, Vance J. Cas-key, Jr., an attorney at law, on the 7th of January, 1955, charging that the said respondent had been guilty of professional misconduct in that he violated Canons 6, 11 and 28, Rule B, of the Code of Ethics Governing Attorneys, 31 F.S.A., as adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida on January 27, 1941.

The referee appointed by this Court in accordance with the Integration Rule filed his report with the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar in which he found that the respondent, Vance J. Caskey, Jr., was guilty of the violation of said Canons 6, 11 and 28 of Rule B, Section I, of the Code of Ethics aforesaid and recommended that the said respondent be suspended from the practice of law in the State of Florida for a period of five years. The Board of Governors of the Florida Bar, upon consideration of the said report of the referee, and his recommendations, adopted the report of the referee and his findings and recommended that a judgment of this Court be entered in accordance therewith. Sixty days having now elapsed since the filing with the Clerk of this Court of the recommendations of the referee and the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar, together with the transcript of the evidence and the other proceedings in said cause, and no petition for review of said recommendations either to deny or to modify the same having been filed, and the Court having duly considered the record in said cause and said recommendations, it is, thereupon,

Ordered that the recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar that the respondent, Vance J. Caskey, Jr., be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years be approved and that said respondent be and he is hereby suspended from the practice of law in this State for a period of five years from the date and entry of this order.

DREW, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, HOBSON, ROBERTS, THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur.
#### Dickey James JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. G.J. GUIRRINO, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-55170. D.C. No. CV-01-01404-MLR.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 24, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument and denies Johnson’s request for oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

California state prisoner Dickey James Johnson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition, which challenges his conviction and life sentence for first-degree murder and kidnaping. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Reviewing de novo, *Miles v. Prunty,*187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), we vacate and remand.

The district court dismissed the instant petition, Johnson’s second, as time-barred. Johnson contends this dismissal was erro*647neous because he is entitled to equitable tolling under two theories. First, Johnson claims he should receive equitable tolling because of counsel’s delay in sending him state court records. However, Johnson has not explained how the lack of records made him unable to file a timely petition. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Johnson is not entitled to equitable tolling on this ground. *See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly),*163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc) (stating that equitable tolling is available when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time”) (internal quotation marks omitted), *abrogated in part on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau,*— U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 1403, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003).

Second, Johnson contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling because the district court did not advise him of the federal statute of limitations when it granted his motion for voluntary dismissal of his first federal petition, which contained exhausted and unexhausted claims. *Cf. Ford v. Hubbard,*330 F.3d 1086, 1102 (9th Cir.2003) (concluding that a second petition relates back to a first petition when the district court improperly dismissed the first petition without explaining the prisoner’s options and the possible consequences). Because *Ford*was decided after the district court ruled in this case, we vacate the dismissal and remand for consideration of whether, in the circumstances of this case, Johnson’s petition is timely under *Ford.*

VACATED AND REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EX-10.1



 Exhibit 10.1 

Amendment No. 3 to the Proppant Supply Agreement 

This Amendment No. 3 to the Proppant Supply Agreement (this “Amendment”) is entered into as of March 24, 2014 (the “Effective
Date”), by and between Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (“Buyer”) and CARBO Ceramics Inc. (“Seller”). Defined terms used herein, but not otherwise defined, shall have such meanings as are set forth in the
Agreement (as defined below). 
 WITNESSETH: 

WHEREAS, Buyer and Seller entered into that certain Proppant Supply Agreement dated August 28, 2008 (as most recently amended on August 26, 2011,
the “Agreement”); 
 WHEREAS, Buyer and Seller wish to amend the Agreement to reflect certain changes as set forth herein in accordance with
Section 11.3 of the Agreement. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the terms and conditions stated herein, and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Parties hereto hereby agree as follows: 
 1. New Section 8.4 of
the Agreement. The following is added and incorporated by this reference to the Agreement as a new Section 8.4: 
  

	8.4	Disclosure of Chemical Samples. For any samples provided under this Agreement, recipient agrees: 

  

	 	a)	Not to analyze, have analyzed or otherwise attempt to ascertain the composition of said sample without prior written permission from the disclosing party; and 


 

	 	b)	Not to transmit said sample to any third party without prior written permission from the disclosing party; and 

  

	 	c)	To return or destroy any portion of said sample not used by recipient unless otherwise notified by the disclosing party; and 

  

	 	d)	Not to use said sample for any other purpose other than as authorized under this Agreement. 

 2.
Miscellaneous. Except as otherwise expressly modified or amended herein, all terms and conditions contained in the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and shall not be altered or changed by this Amendment. The Agreement, as
amended by this Amendment, shall constitute the entire agreement of the parties. All references to Sections in this Amendment correspond to Sections contained in the Agreement unless otherwise expressly stated. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller and Buyer have caused this Amendment to be duly executed by their authorized representatives as of the Effective Date. 

 

					
	 Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

Signature:
	 		  	 CARBO Ceramics Inc.
 Signature:

			
	 /s/ Kevin Dersch
	 		  	 /s/ Don P. Conkle

	By: Kevin Dersch	 		  	By: Don P. Conkle
	Title: Sr. Category Manager	 		  	Title: Vice President, Sales and Marketing
	Date: March 26, 2014	 		  	Date: March 26, 2014
(No. 23831.

#### Curtis J. Hooper, Appellant, *vs.*The Wabash Automotive Corporation *et al.*Appellees.

*Opinion filed December 10, 1936.*

*31Edwin Hamilton, for appellant.

George Gillette, Charles F. Grimes, Elmer M. Leesman, and Robert F. Munsell, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a direct appeal to this court from an order of the superior court of Cook county vacating a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Curtis Hooper, on motion of defendants, the Wabash Automotive Corporation and others. The judgment was entered in an ejectment suit.

The only question presented on this appeal is whether or not the motion to vacate sufficiently complies with the terms of section 72 of the Civil Practice act. This is a question of procedure. A freehold is not involved, because the only effect of vacating the judgment is to leave the cause for trial with the issues undetermined. A freehold is involved only where the necessary result of the judgment or decree is that one party gains and the other loses a freehold or where the title is so put in issue by the pleadings that the decision of the case necessarily involves a decision of such issue. *(Becker*v. *Fink,*273 Ill. 560.) Neither party gained or lost a freehold by the order vacating the judgment, and the issue on the sufficiency of the motion did not involve any question of freehold. Even if a freehold is involved in the original judgment or decree but not in the point assigned for error the appeal should be taken to the Appellate Court. *Carney*v. *Quinn,*358 Ill. 446; *McGrath*v. *Dunne,*363 id. 549; *Hajicek*v. *Goldsby,*309 id. 372.

The cause is transferred to the Appellate Court for the First District.

*Cause transferred.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Feliciano VELAZQUEZ-CAMPOS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-50188.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 20, 2003.

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Feliciano Velazquez-Campos appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Velazquez complains that his sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) based on a prior conviction. He argues that the sentencing provision is unconstitutional. Velazquez thus contends that his sentence should not exceed the maximum terms of imprisonment prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

In *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*528 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. *Id.*at 239-47, 118 S.Ct. 1219. Velazquez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres,*but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review.

*Apprendi*did not overrule *Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi*530 U.S. at 489-90, 120 S.Ct. 2348; *United States v. Dabeit,*231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir.2000). This court must follow *Almendarez-Torres*“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” *Dabeit,*231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**







In
      connection with the amended Annual Report of Arotech Corporation (the “Company”)
      on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2005 filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Thomas J. Paup, Vice President -
      Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
      Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, hereby certify that the Report fully complies with the requirements of
      Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.









By:  /s/
      Thomas J. Paup


Thomas
      J. Paup,


Vice
      President -
      Finance and CFO


(Chief
      Financial
      Officer)





Date:
      June 15, 2006
|   | 1.     | Such      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31,      2008, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                                           |
|--------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|   | 2.     | The      information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for      the period ending December 31, 2008, fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      China Advanced Construction Materials Group,  Inc. |

| Date:      February 12, 2009                                  |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                          |
| /s/Chin      Hsiao                                            |
| Chin      HsiaoPrincipal      Financial and AccountingOfficer |

----
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

RICARDO BIGIO,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-1205

[September 15, 2021]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael A. Usan, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 03-19481CF10A.

Ricardo Bigio, Arcadia, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, GROSS and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Order entered October 7, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00711-CV

EHRING ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL., Appellants

V.

RD MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Appellee

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-04770-b

ORDER

The Court has before it appellants’ October 1, 2013 unopposed motion for extension to 

file appellants’ brief. The Court GRANTS the motion and ORDERS appellants to file their 

brief by October 15, 2013. No further extensions will be granted absent a showing of 

exceptional circumstances.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
##### 



Exhibit 10.7
 GARDNER DENVER, INC.
PHANTOM STOCK PLAN
FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS
(Effective November 8, 2005)
 Purpose .
 Effective Date; Purpose of Amendment and Grandfathered Status .
 Phantom Share Units .
   1




---



##### 



Dividend Equivalents .
 (a)
    
    the product of (i) the dividend per Share that is payable
with respect to such dividend record date, multiplied by (ii) the number of
Units credited to the directors Account as of such dividend record date;
 divided by
 (b)
    
    the average closing price of a Share during the thirty
(30) trading days immediately preceding (but not including) the dividend
record date as reported on the composite tape of the New York Stock Exchange
or such other primary market or stock exchange on which Shares may be traded
in the future.
 2




---



##### 



Distribution of Account Value .
      Beneficiary Designation .
   3




---



##### 



Financial Hardship Distribution .
 Transferability .
 Rights Associated with Units .
 Changes in Shares .
   4




---



##### 



Change of Control .
   Company Successors .
 Administration .
 Amendment and Termination .
 5
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 677 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 677

   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the special 
 $15,000,000 limitation on the amount of a tax-exempt bond issue which 
               may be used to provide an output facility.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 25, 1995

  Mr. Neal of Massachusetts introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the special 
 $15,000,000 limitation on the amount of a tax-exempt bond issue which 
               may be used to provide an output facility.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF $15,000,000 LIMITATION ON AMOUNT OF TAX-EXEMPT 
              BOND ISSUE WHICH MAY BE USED TO PROVIDE AN OUTPUT 
              FACILITY.

    (a) In General.--Subsection (b) of section 141 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to private business tests) is amended by 
striking paragraph (4) and by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (9) 
as paragraphs (4) through (8), respectively.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (2) of section 141(d) of such 
Code is amended by striking ``(within the meaning of subsection 
(b)(4))''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to obligations issued after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Charles L. STRINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wayne HERBERT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-60897.

Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 7, 2003.

*342Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Charles L. Stringer’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against appellee Wayne Herbert, a judge, was dismissed with prejudice by the district court. The district court’s dismissal was based on its entry of summary judgment against Stringer and in favor of Herbert. On appeal, Stringer challenges only the district court’s denial of his own summary judgment motion, the grant of Herbert’s summary judgment motion, and an order entered declaring one of Stringer’s evidentiary motions moot.

The district court granted Herbert’s summary judgment motion, and denied Stringer’s summary judgment motion as moot, on the basis that Herbert was entitled to absolute judicial immunity from the claims brought in Stringer’s complaint. After *de novo*review of the record, we conclude that the summary judgment evidence supports the district court’s actions and that Stringer has not shown on appeal that summary judgment was not properly entered against him. *See*Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); *Guillory v. Domtar Indus., Inc.,*95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir.1996); *Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37*F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc); *Brinkmann v. Johnston,*793 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir.1986).

The district court’s denial as moot of Stringer’s motion for *de novo*review of the magistrate judge’s evidentiary ruling was filed on the same day that the district court issued its opinion and order disposing of Stringer’s complaint on summary judgment. We thus conclude that the district court’s dismissal of Stringer’s motion as moot was not an abuse of discretion. *See HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Houston,*201 F.3d 544, 549 (5th Cir.2000).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5


<LEGEND>
                             FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE
                         FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1999
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               jun-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                    jun-30-1999
<CASH>                                  780,000
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                           0
<ALLOWANCES>                            0
<INVENTORY>                             122,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        941,000
<PP&E>                                  10,797,000
<DEPRECIATION>                          5,165,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                          7,462,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                   6,534,000
<BONDS>                                 4,450,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                             1,000
<COMMON>                                3,000
<OTHER-SE>                              (7,513,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>            7,462,000
<SALES>                                 9,502,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        9,603,000
<CGS>                                   515,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           515,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        11,904,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      1,435,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         (4,207,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     (4,207,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         213,000
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                            (3,994,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                             (1.76)
<EPS-DILUTED>                           (1.76)



</TABLE>
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 01-11328

DICH G. HOANG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

CHRIS HOSTRUP, ET AL., 

Defendants,

CHRIS HOSTRUP; K. W. MURPHY, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

No. 3:01-CV-217-H

December 17, 2002

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

After reviewing the record and considering the briefs of the

parties and argument of counsel, we agree with the district court

that the defendant police officers are entitled to qualified
2

immunity.

AFFIRMED.