STATE OF MISSOURI, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) No. SD33054 

 ) Filed: January 28, 2015 

KENNY DEAN KOCH, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUTLER COUNTY 

Honorable Michael M. Pritchett, Circuit Judge 

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

 A jury convicted Kenny Dean Koch (“Koch”) of the class D felony of possession of 

methamphetamine-related drug paraphernalia with the intent to use, in violation of section 

195.233.1

 Koch was sentenced, as a prior and persistent offender, to seven years in the Missouri 

Department of Corrections, with credit being given for all time served. In Koch’s single point, 

he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Finding merit to Koch’s 

claim, we reverse the judgment and remand with directions. 

 

1

 All references to statutes are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 

Facts and Procedural Background 

 We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, rejecting all 

contrary evidence and inferences. See State v. Newberry, 157 S.W.3d 387, 390 (Mo.App. S.D. 

2005). 

 The evidence adduced at trial was that on April 11, 2012, Koch, and another man, Larry 

Rushing (“Rushing”), arrived at Michelle Swihart’s (“Swihart”) mobile home around 6:30 a.m. 

Swihart had known Koch since 2007, but had not seen him for a long time. Both men stayed 

until about 10:00 a.m. Koch returned later that afternoon with Jamie Dent (“Dent”) and asked 

Swihart to do some laundry that he had brought in a backpack. Swihart agreed, and Dent and 

Koch remained at the residence while Swihart did the laundry. However, Swihart made Dent 

and Koch leave around 4:30 p.m. because Koch discharged a firearm outside around Swihart’s 

children. 

Sometime after 10:00 p.m., Swihart testified she was in bed with her children, in the far 

end of her mobile home, when she awoke hearing voices outside her bedroom window. She 

identified the voices as being that of Rushing and another man, Joey2

 Kellis (“Kellis”). From the 

conversation, she believed she was about to be robbed and called 9-1-1. Swihart told the 

dispatcher that she was alone in her mobile home with her three children and “was being 

robbed.” 

 At 1:30 a.m. on April 12, 2012, Ripley County sheriff’s deputies, Jesse Drumm (“Deputy 

Drumm”) and Jeremy Walter (“Deputy Walter”) were dispatched to Swihart’s mobile home on 

suspicion of an armed burglary in progress. They arrived approximately ten minutes after 

 

2

 Joey Kellis was sometimes referred to as “Kelly” Kellis in the record. 
3 

receiving the call from dispatch. Upon arrival, Deputy Walter observed through the front 

window a man standing inside who then turned and ran toward the other end of the mobile home. 

 Deputy Drumm opened the front door, identified himself, and entered the residence with 

his gun drawn. He moved left to the kitchen area where he “staged” himself behind the 

refrigerator and looking down the hallway, began ordering people to come out; the living room 

was to his right. Deputy Drumm repeated his order to come out at least three times before 

Swihart came out of the back bedroom with a young child. Swihart told the officers there were 

three men and one woman still in the home with two firearms, and they were in the back room 

with her other children. Swihart appeared to be under the influence of drugs. Deputy Walter 

took Swihart and the child to his patrol car. 

 Upon re-entering the Swihart residence, Deputy Walter saw a “one[-]pot meth lab” 

(“meth lab”) in the living room and so advised Deputy Drumm. The meth lab consisted of 

chemicals mixed in a twenty-ounce Mountain Dew bottle. Deputy Walter then called for 

assistance at which time Sergeant Mike Barton (“Sgt. Barton”); Trooper Brian Arnold (“Trooper 

Arnold”), a narcotics investigator with the Division of Drug and Crime Control of the Missouri 

State Highway Patrol; and several other law enforcement officers responded to the scene. 

 Upon arrival, Sgt. Barton announced his presence and Dent came out holding Swihart’s 

nine-month-old child. Eventually, the remaining occupants of the residence were removed: 

Swihart’s third child, Rushing, and Koch—who was the last to come out. Before coming out, 

Koch was seen by an officer, looking through a back door, standing in the bathtub. The 

bathroom was located between two bedrooms toward the back of the mobile home and across 

from a small hallway leading to the back door. Koch appeared to be under the influence of 

methamphetamines or heavy narcotics. 
4 

 Swihart consented to a search of her residence and Trooper Arnold, who had been called 

to assist with the meth lab, entered Swihart’s home. Trooper Arnold observed in the living room 

the Mountain Dew bottle and a black duffle bag containing numerous items of drug 

paraphernalia, all of which used to manufacture methamphetamine. The Mountain Dew bottle 

had ingredients in it for making methamphetamine, and Trooper Arnold recognized it as a meth 

lab. 

 Trooper Arnold also found a black backpack in the “middle bedroom” of the mobile 

home along with firearms and substances that later tested positive for methamphetamine; the 

backpack also contained several items used to make methamphetamine. 

 Arrests were made and Koch was originally charged in Ripley County in a seven-count 

information. Venue was changed to Butler County, and Koch proceeded to jury trial on only 

three counts: attempt to manufacture a controlled substance (Count 1), in violation of section 

195.211; possession of methamphetamine-related drug paraphernalia with intent to use it to 

produce methamphetamine (Count 2), in violation of section 195.233; and unlawful possession 

of a firearm (Count 3), in violation of section 571.070.3

 Specifically, Count 2 charged that on 

April 12, 2012, Koch “possessed a one[-]pot meth lab, which was drug paraphernalia, knowing it 

was drug paraphernalia, with intent to use it to produce methamphetamine, a controlled 

substance.” 

 A jury trial was held on August 1, 2013. Koch did not testify, but Swihart, Dent, Officer 

Drumm, Trooper Arnold, and several other law enforcement officers did. 

 

3

 These charges and counts do not correspond to those set forth in the Amended Information and Judgment. In the 

Amended Information and Judgment, Count 2 is designated as “Count 5” and Count 3 is designated as “Count 6.” 

The numbering was changed by the State for the purposes of trial “to make things logical and orderly” as four of the 

original counts had been dismissed. The verdicts for each count correspond to the renumbering. 
5 

 Koch filed motions for judgment of acquittal both at the close of the State’s evidence and 

at the close of all the evidence—the trial court overruled both motions. 

 The jury found Koch not guilty of Counts 1 and 3, but guilty of Count 2, “Possession of 

Methamphetamine Related Drug paraphernalia” (the one-pot meth lab) with intent to use to 

produce methamphetamine. Because of Koch’s status as a prior and persistent offender, the trial 

court sentenced Koch and sentenced him to a term of seven years in the Missouri Department of 

Corrections with credit being given for all time served. This appeal followed. 

 In his sole point, Koch contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion for 

judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence and entering judgment on the guilty verdict, 

because there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed 

the one-pot meth lab. 

 The issue for our review is whether there was sufficient evidence that Koch possessed the 

one-pot meth lab to support his conviction. 

Standard of Review 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine 

whether sufficient evidence permits a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005). 

This inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant 

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). 
6 

 We accept all evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment, and 

disregard contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Ramsey, 358 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Mo.App. 

S.D. 2012). “However, we cannot supply missing evidence or give the state the benefit of 

unreasonable, speculative, or forced inferences.” Id. 

Analysis

 Koch was convicted of felony possession of methamphetamine-related drug 

paraphernalia with intent to use to produce methamphetamine. § 195.233. “Possession” is the 

central issue presented on this appeal. 

 The State was required to show that Koch “possessed drug paraphernalia, was aware of 

its presence, and possessed it with intent to use [it] to manufacture a controlled substance.” State 

v. Mickle, 164 S.W.3d 33, 47 (Mo.App. W.D. 2005); § 195.010(34).4

 “Possession” does not 

require exclusive control; rather, ‘“[p]ossession may . . . be sole or joint. If one person alone has 

possession of a substance[,] possession is sole. If two or more persons share possession of a 

substance, possession is joint.”’ State v. Watson, 290 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Mo.App. S.D. 2009) 

(quoting § 195.010(34)). The fact that persons other than Koch had access to the area where the 

contraband was found does not preclude a finding of possession. State v. Keller, 870 S.W.2d 

255, 260 (Mo.App. W.D. 1994). 

A person has actual possession of contraband where the contraband is on his person or 

within easy reach and convenient control. § 195.010(34); State v. McLane, 136 S.W.3d 170, 

173 (Mo.App. S.D. 2004). The parties agree that Koch did not have actual possession of the 

one-pot meth lab. 

 

4

 References to section 195.010(34) are to RSMo Cum.Supp. 2011. 
7 

“Where actual possession is not present, the State carries the burden of proving 

constructive possession coupled with facts that buttress the inference of possession.” State v. 

Power, 281 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Mo.App. E.D. 2009). A person has constructive possession of 

contraband where that person “has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise 

dominion or control over the substance either directly or through another person or persons[.]” 

§ 195.010(34). “To demonstrate constructive possession, the State must show at a minimum the 

defendant had access to and control over the premises where the substance was found.” Power, 

281 S.W.3d at 848. 

In the record before us, there was evidence of joint control over the premises where the 

one-pot meth lab was found. “Where there is evidence of joint control over the area where a 

controlled substance is found, the State must present additional evidence that connects the 

defendant to the controlled substance.” Id. We examine the totality of the circumstances to 

determine whether sufficient evidence of additional incriminating circumstances has been 

shown. Id. In so doing, “[t]here is . . . no precise formula[.] [W]e look to the facts of each case 

in determining if the totality of the circumstances supports the finding of possession.” State v. 

Kerns, 389 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Mo.App. S.D. 2012). 

Mickle provides categories of additional incriminating circumstances to consider in the 

totality of the circumstances sufficient to support possession, including: 

(1) being in close proximity to the item seized; (2) presence of a chemical odor 

associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine; (3) giving false statements 

to police; (4) defendant’s personal belongings found with the items or substance; 

(5) routine access to the place where the item is found; and (6) the presence of a 

gun[.] 

164 S.W.3d at 43-44 (internal citations omitted). While we review this case on its own unique 

facts, Kerns, 389 S.W.3d at 248, we nevertheless note that facts from these categories are largely 
8 

missing here: (1) Koch was not in close proximity to the one-pot meth lab—he was discovered 

in the bathroom of Swihart’s residence, and the one-pot meth lab was discovered in the living 

room; (2) there was no evidence of a chemical odor associated with the manufacture of 

methamphetamine in Swihart’s residence; (3) there was no evidence that Koch gave false 

statements to police; (4) Koch’s personal belongings were not found commingled with the onepot meth lab; (5) Koch was at Swihart’s premises intermittently over the course of one day and 

the very early hours of the next morning, he did not own the premises, did not have the right to 

exclude others from the premises, and he himself was excluded from the premises earlier in the 

day by Swihart; and (6) a firearm was not discovered in close proximity to the one-pot meth lab. 

 Under these circumstances, the mere fact that the one-pot meth lab was in plain view in 

the living room (along with a bag containing methamphetamine ingredients) does not support the 

inference that Koch possessed them. 

There was testimony that Koch had ingested methamphetamine or some other heavy 

narcotic, but there is no evidence to distinguish Koch’s consciousness of guilt from ingestion of 

an illegal drug, distinguished from possible consciousness of guilt connected to possession of the 

one-pot meth lab. See State v. Franco-Amador, 83 S.W.3d 555, 558-59 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002). 

Finally, while two firearms were found in a vent in Swihart’s “middle bedroom,” there 

was no evidence connecting Koch to this room. There was no testimony that Koch had been in 

the bedroom, or had access to it. 

 Evidence of suspicious circumstances are insufficient to meet the State’s burden to 

adduce additional evidence tying a defendant to contraband in a joint possession case—the State 

was required to produce evidence which, if believed, probatively furthered the reasonable 
9 

inference that defendant had possession of the one-pot meth lab. See Ramsey, 358 S.W.3d at 

591-92. That evidence is lacking under the facts of this case. 

This conclusion is consistent with other decisions by this Court. In State v. Politte, 391 

S.W.3d 537, 358 (Mo.App. S.D. 2013), we concluded the evidence was insufficient to connect 

defendant to a large quantity of marijuana found in a garage attached to a home, which defendant 

occupied, even where defendant had routine access to the living room and bedroom of the home 

where marijuana was found; defendant was in close proximity to paraphernalia and marijuana 

found on the living room table; and defendant admitted to police that he was aware of drugs on 

the premises. We concluded: 

 The record may indicate [defendant]’s familiarity with drugs and [his 

roommate]’s illegal activities, and [defendant]’s knowledge that drugs were on 

the premises, but [this] does not justify an inference that he possessed or 

controlled the felonious quantities of compressed marijuana. Even if [defendant] 

had routine access to the living room, the evidence showed many others did as 

well, and there was no showing that [defendant] used the detached garage. 

Id. at 540 (internal quotation and citations omitted).

 Similarly, in Ramsey, 358 S.W.3d at 591-92, where a man and a woman shared a house 

and slept in the same bedroom where marijuana was found, and the State failed to offer evidence 

that “either enjoyed exclusive or even superior control of the room, or to whom the hidden drugs 

belonged[,]” we found there was insufficient evidence of possession to support defendant’s 

conviction. 

 In State v. Moses, 265 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Mo.App. E.D. 2008), police found in the 

kitchen of a mobile home, rocks of cocaine and a pipe that was still warm; in the living room, a 

bag of marijuana, a box of bullets, and a copper filament; and in a bedroom, a sawed off .22 rifle 

and some of defendant’s personal items in plain view, including mail addressed to him at the 

address of the mobile home and his identification. Defendant, at the time the officers arrived, 
10 

fled the scene and escaped. The court there found that this evidence was insufficient to support 

an inference that defendant possessed the cocaine, suggesting that while the evidence may 

support the inference that defendant was aware of the cocaine, the evidence did not indicate that 

defendant exercised dominion or control over the cocaine. 

The State argues that it met its burden to produce additional evidence of possession, 

pointing to the following evidence: (1) the meth lab was in plain view in Swihart’s living room, 

and ingredients used in the production of methamphetamine were found in a duffle bag near the 

bottle and in a backpack in a back bedroom;5

 (2) Koch was present several times on April 11, 

2012, and was present when the meth lab was discovered; (3) when police arrived and ordered 

the occupants of the home to come out, Koch secreted himself in the bathroom; (4) at the time 

police discovered him, Koch appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamines or heavy 

narcotics. 

Using this evidence, the State then argues State v. Keller, 870 S.W.2d 255 (Mo.App. 

W.D. 1994), demonstrates this was sufficient to support Koch’s conviction. In Keller, 

contraband was found in a hotel room registered to defendant in defendant’s name. There was 

evidence of only one other person in the hotel room during the relevant time period. There was 

also specific evidence that the amount of drugs in the room was not typical of that used for 

personal consumption, but more likely used for distribution. Specifically, the police found 

approximately 87 grams of cocaine (worth $16,000 on the street); scales; baking soda; gram 

baggies (commonly used in distribution); and $1,400 in a safety deposit box. When police 

entered the hotel room, Keller ran to the bathroom area. Id. at 257. 

 

5

 The State attempts to suggest that a backpack containing contraband found in a “middle bedroom” supports the 

conclusion that Koch possessed the one-pot meth lab in the living room. However, there is no evidence specifically 

connecting Koch to this backpack—no one testified that the backpack was Koch’s, that Koch knew of the backpack, 

or that Koch had access to that bedroom. See Politte, 391 S.W.3d at 539-40. 
11 

Keller is not controlling based on the record before us. Here, there was joint control over 

the area and the contraband was in plain view. However, defendant in Keller, had far superior 

control and dominion over the premises—the hotel was registered to defendant alone (and he 

likewise had the right to exclude others), and there was evidence of only one other person who 

was in the room with defendant. Here, the premises in question belonged to Swihart, not Koch. 

In addition, unlike Keller, Koch did not have the ability to exclude others and was apparently 

excluded himself from the premises by Swihart earlier in the day. Further, there was evidence 

that numerous individuals had access to Swihart’s residence at various times during April 11 and 

12, 2012—Swihart, Dent, Rushing, Kellis, and Koch. During this time, Koch was present only 

intermittently. See Ramsey, 358 S.W.3d at 592. 

 Further, Koch’s location in the bathroom, unlike the retreat in Keller, is lacking in 

sufficient evidence. Unlike the defendant in Keller, Koch appeared to be high on 

methamphetamines or some other heavy narcotic. “Flight does not establish a defendant’s guilty 

knowledge of a particular crime in comparison to other possible charges and is alone 

insufficient to support a conviction.” Franco-Amador, 83 S.W.3d at 558-59 (internal quotation 

and citation omitted) (emphasis added). The State fails to direct us to evidence supporting the 

inference that such consciousness of guilt was related to Koch’s concurrent or former possession 

of methamphetamine drug paraphernalia with the intent to use as distinguished from 

consciousness of guilt stemming from mere knowledge of the meth lab or drugs, or recent 

ingestion of an illegal drug. See Moses, 265 S.W.3d at 866. 

 That Koch appeared to be high on methamphetamine or another heavy narcotic does not, 

in combination with the other facts before us, sufficiently show that Koch possessed and 

intended to use the methamphetamine paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine. 
12 

§ 195.233. This evidence may support the inference that Koch ingested methamphetamine; 

however, the State was required to prove that Koch possessed the one-pot meth lab with intent to 

use it to produce methamphetamine.6

 Under the totality of the circumstances on the record before us, we find there was 

insufficient evidence to show that Koch possessed the one-pot meth lab with intent to use it to 

manufacture methamphetamine under section 195.233. The judgment of the trial court is 

reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment for acquittal of Koch for the charge 

of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use under section 195.233. 

WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., C.J./P.J. - OPINION AUTHOR

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. - Concurs 

DANIEL E. SCOTT, J. - Concurs in Separate Opinion 

 

6

 The evidence indicates that the one-pot meth lab had been “cooked out,” and that it was not clear when the lab had 

been used. The prosecutor explicitly stated: “We can concede that. We don’t know exactly when this bottle was 

put together. It might have been five days before or it might have been that day. But, it is there.” The evidence 

presented indicates that Koch was only on the premises intermittently on April 11, 2012, and the very early hours of 

April 12, 2012. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) No. SD33054 

 ) 

KENNY DEAN KOCH, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant. ) 

CONCURRING OPINION

Of necessity, “our opinions often cite facts that we cannot consider in deciding 

if any evidence supports the judgment” because outside readers may need context to 

understand a case. Smith v. Great American Assur. Co., 436 S.W.3d 700, 705 

(Mo.App. 2014). Even so, we have tunnel vision in checking sufficiency of evidence, 

considering only what aids the respondent and ignoring all else because “if evidence 

does support the judgment, no amount of counter-proof erases it.” Id. 

This case so viewed, like others cited in the principal opinion, “presents 

circumstances that might indicate that the defendant had knowledge of the [one-pot 

meth lab], but no circumstances that could indicate that the defendant exercised 
 2

control over [it]. Evidence of both is required to support a conviction.” State v. 

Politte, 391 S.W.3d 537, 540 (Mo.App. 2013). I concur. 

DANIEL E. SCOTT, J. – CONCURRING OPINION AUTHOR