UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ BRANDON BAKER,
Pl aintiff-Appellant,

v. CITY OF LOVELAND; LOVELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT; LT RICK ARNOLD, in official and individual capacity; SGT.JEFF PYLE, in official and indi vidual capacity; OFFICER ANDRES SALAZAR, in official and indi vidual capacity; LARIMER COUNTY DA GORDON MCLAUGHLIN, in official and individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees. No. 16-1435 (D.C. No. 1:15- CV-01920-MJW) (D. Colo.)

__________________ _______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

__________________ _______________ Before HARTZ , HOLMES , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________

* We conclude that oral argument would not material ly help us to decide this appeal. As a result, we are deciding the appeal based on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgme nt does not constitute bi nding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be ci ted for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 26, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Mr. Brandon Baker sued the City of Loveland, the Loveland Police Department, Mr. Rick Arnol d, Mr. Jeff Pyle, Mr. Andres Salazar, and Mr. Gordon McLaughlin. Mr. Baker’s amended compla int spans 42 singlespaced pages, contains 398 paragraphs , and includes 17 causes of action. The district court dismissed the amen ded complaint wit hout prejudice for failure to satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rule s of Civil Procedure. Mr. Baker appeals, arguing that

 the defendants are subjec t to judicial estoppel,

 the district court shou ld have stricken the immaterial parts of the amended complaint rather than order dismissal, and

 the cause of action consists of a “primary right” and a breach, not a remedy. In addressing whether the district c ourt erred in dismissing the amended complaint, we must affirm unless the district court abused its discretion.
See Nasious v. Two Un known B.I.C.E. Agents , 492 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 2007). In our view, the distri ct court acted with in its discretion. Therefore, we affirm.
I. The district court had discretion to order dismissal based on a failure to comply with Rule 8. Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e, the complaint must contain “a short and plain statem ent of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relie f.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8( a). This requirement is designed to force plainti ffs “to state their claims intelligibly so as to3 inform the defendants of the legal claims being asserted.” Mann v. Boatright , 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007). 1 Prolixity of a compla int undermines the utilit y of the complaint. See Knox v. First Sec. Bank of Utah , 196 F.2d 112, 117 (10t h Cir. 1952) (“The purpose of [Rule 8(a)] is to eliminate prolixity in pleading and to achieve brevity, simplicity, and clarity.”). Thus, we have held that a complaint can run afoul of Rule 8 thr ough unnecessary length a nd burying of material allegations in “‘a morass of irrelevancies.’” Mann , 477 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp. , 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003)). The district court concluded that Mr. Baker had failed to comply with Rule 8, and this conclusion was correct. The amended complaint is

 filled with unnecessary lega l arguments and detail and

 lacking clarity about wh at each defendant allegedly did to incur liability. In 42 single-space d pages, the amended comp laint includes numerous matters that are both unnecessary and irrelevant at this stage:

 argument for ab stention under Pullman and Younger (pp. 1-2),

1 Mr. Baker is pro se, so we liberall y construe the amended complaint. Jordan v. Sosa , 654 F.3d 1012, 1018 n.8 (10th Ci r. 2011). Nonetheless, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rule s of Civil Procedure. See Ogden v. San Juan Cty. , 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n appellant’s pro se status does not excuse the ob ligation of an y litigant to comply with the f undamental requiremen ts of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).4  reference to a bar complaint ag ainst one of th e defendants (p. 5),

 legal argument about the accrual date for claims of malicious prosecution, false, arrest, and false imprisonment (p. 6),

 legal argument about the appli cable law on tolling of the limitations period (p. 7),

 legal argument about th e length of the limita tions period for the § 1983 claims (p. 9),

 legal argument about su mmary judgment (p. 13),

 legal argument about strict scrutiny of the state’s alleged inhibition of religious practice (pp. 15, 17),

 reference to past st ops by officers who ar e not parties (without any apparent allegation of wrongdoing) (p. 19),

 legal argument about Colorado’s suppress ion of improperly obtained evid ence (p. 21),

 legal argument about the unreliability of the sense of smell (p. 21), and

 legal argument about the determination of probable cause (p. 27). Buried in the amended complaint are allegations that might alert particular defendants to allegations of wrongdoing. But other allegations appear to lump all of th e defendants together, without saying who did what or identifying conduct that would trigger liability. Thus, the district court properly dismissed th e amended complaint.5 II. The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply. Mr. Baker argues that the defendants cha nged their position, triggering judicial estoppel, which in turn foreclosed challenges to the amended complaint. 2 This characterizat ion is incorrect. The original complaint was filed in another case. In that case, the district court explained that the comp laint had failed to satisfy Rule 8. Order, passim , Baker v. Loveland , No. 15-CV-1864-LTB (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2015), ECF No. 5. Th e problem was the co mplaint’s vagueness. Id . at 2-3. The court told Mr. Baker that to state a claim in fede ral court, he had to specify (1) what that defendant had don e, (2) when the defendant had done it, (3) how the defend ant’s action had resulted in harm; and (4) what specific legal right the defendant had violated. Id at 3 (bold typeface omitted). 3

2 The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits partie s from changing positions after prevailing based on the earlier positions. Johnson v. Lindon City Corp. , 405 F.3d 1065, 1069 (10th Cir. 2005).

3 The original complaint and order ar e not in our reco rd on appeal. We take judicial notice of these documents because they apparently are what Mr. Baker is referring to in his opening brief. See St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC , 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial syst em, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”).6 In an amended complaint newly filed in our case, 4 Mr. Baker again failed to explain what each defendan t had done, when the defendant had done it, how it had resulte d in harm, and what sp ecific right had been violated. Instead, Mr. Baker added unnecessary legal arguments and details. These additions did not cure the earlier pleading defects, and the doctrine of judicial es toppel does not apply.
III. The district court had the dis cretion to dismiss the amended complaint rather than stri ke the immaterial parts. Mr. Baker argues that the district court shou ld have stricken the excess allegations rather than dismiss the amended complain t. In different circumstances, striking the excess a llegations might suffice as a remedy. See Salahuddin v. Cuomo , 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Ci r. 1988) (stating that when the complaint is not short and plain, the district court can strike the redundant or immaterial parts under Rule 12(f)); see also Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc. , 269 F.3d 818 (7th Ci r. 2001) (holding that when the complaint otherwise satisfied Rule 8, inclusion of irrelevant materi al did not justify dismissal of the suit). Bu t sifting through the exces s allegations here would have imposed a considerable burden, and Mr. Baker never suggested in district court that he would withdraw his extraneous allegations or legal arguments. In these circum stances, the district co urt had the discretion to

4 Mr. Baker did not try to rectify these deficienci es in the earlier case. Instead, he filed the ame nded complaint in our case.7 dismiss the amended complaint rather th an sua sponte order the striking of immaterial allegations.
IV. Mr. Baker’s characterization of a “primary right” does not affect the outcome. Mr. Baker also argues that the dismissal was erro neous because a cause of action consists of a primar y right and breach, as opposed to a remedy. But this obse rvation does not affect the district court’s reasons for ordering dismissal. Thus, Mr. Baker’s characterization of the cause of action would not affect the outcome of this appeal.
V. Conclusion In the amended complaint, Mr. Baker failed to provide a short and plain statement of the claims. As a result, the district court had the discretion to dismiss th e amended complaint, wi thout prejudice, for noncompliance with Ru le 8. We affirm. 5

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge

5 Mr. Baker requests leave to procee d in forma pauperis . We grant this request.