48290 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 19, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

TABLE 1—APPLICABILITY

Boeing model— As identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin— 

737–100, –200, and –200C series airplanes ........................................... 737–53A1197, dated August 25, 2006. 

737–300, –400, and –500 series airplanes .............................................. 737–53A1188, Revision 2, dated May 9, 2007, or 737–53A1197, dated 

August 25, 2006. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from reports of cracks 

found at the cutout in the web of body station 

frame 303.9 inboard of stringer 16L. We are 

issuing this AD to detect and correct such 

cracking, which could prevent the left 

forward entry door from sealing correctly, 

and could cause in-flight decompression of 

the airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Repetitive Inspections: Service Bulletin 737–

53A1188 

(f) For airplanes identified in Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–53A1188, Revision 2, 

dated May 9, 2007, including airplanes 

modified by the repair/preventive change 

specified in the original version, dated April 

9, 1998; or Revision 1, dated March 18, 1999; 

of the service bulletin: Do detailed and high 

frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections 

in the web and doubler around the slotted 

holes in the frame web at stringers 15L and 

16L, in accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Revision 2 of the service 

bulletin. Do the inspections at the applicable 

time specified in paragraph 1.E. of Revision 

2 of the service bulletin, except as provided 

by paragraph (h) of this AD. Do all applicable 

corrective actions before further flight in 

accordance with Revision 2 of the service 

bulletin, except as provided by paragraph (i) 

of this AD. Repeat the inspections at intervals 

not to exceed 4,500 flight cycles until 

accomplishment of the repair/preventive 

change in accordance with Revision 2 of the 

service bulletin, which terminates the 

repetitive inspection requirements. A repair/ 

preventive change done in accordance with 

the original version or Revision 1 of the 

service bulletin does not terminate the 

repetitive inspections, but the repetitive 

inspections may be terminated after the 

existing kit is replaced with a new kit in 

accordance with paragraph 3.B., Part II, step 

3, or Part III, step 3, of Revision 2 of the 

service bulletin. 

Repetitive Inspections: Service Bulletin 737–

53A1197 

(g) For airplanes identified in Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–53A1197, dated August 

25, 2006: Do an ultrasound inspection of the 

slot-shaped cutout in the web for the door 

stop strap at stringer 16L, an HFEC 

inspection of the web along the upper and 

lower edges of the doubler around the 

doorstop strap at stringer 16L, and a detailed 

inspection of the web around the doubler for 

the cutout at stringer 16L, in accordance with 

the Accomplishment Instructions of the 

service bulletin. Do the inspections at the 

applicable time specified in paragraph 1.E. of 

the service bulletin, except as provided by 

paragraph (h) of this AD. Do all applicable 

corrective actions before further flight in 

accordance with the service bulletin, except 

as provided by paragraph (i) of this AD. 

Repeat the inspections at intervals not to 

exceed 4,500 flight cycles, until 

accomplishment of the repair/preventive 

change in accordance with the service 

bulletin, which terminates the repetitive 

inspections. 

Exceptions to Service Bulletin Specifications 

(h) Where Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–53A1188, Revision 2, dated May 9, 2007, 

and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

53A1197, dated August 25, 2006, specify a 

compliance time after release of the service 

bulletin, this AD requires compliance within 

the specified time after the effective date of 

this AD. For the initial inspection, the grace 

period for airplanes that have exceeded the 

specified threshold is extended to 4,500 

flight cycles after the effective date of this 

AD. 

(i) Where Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–53A1188, Revision 2, dated May 9, 2007, 

and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–

53A1197, dated August 25, 2006, specify to 

contact Boeing for appropriate action, 

including repair of damage outside the scope 

of the service bulletin, repair using a method 

approved in accordance with the procedures 

specified in paragraph (j) of this AD. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(j)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, ATTN: Howard 

Hall, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, 

ANM–120S; telephone (425) 917–6430; fax 

(425) 917–6590; has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector 

(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District 

Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 

FSDO. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair 

required by this AD, if it is approved by an 

Authorized Representative for the Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes Delegation Option 

Authorization Organization who has been 

authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to 

make those findings. For a repair method to 

be approved, the repair must meet the 

certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically refer to this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(k) You must use Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–53A1188, Revision 2, dated 

May 9, 2007; or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–53A1197, dated August 25, 2006; as 

applicable; to do the actions required by this 

AD; unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 

Washington 98124–2207. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information incorporated by reference at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 

6, 2008. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–18812 Filed 8–18–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0622; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–064–AD; Amendment 

39–15642; AD 2008–17–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited 

(Jetstream) Model 4101 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 19, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 48291 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank 

wiring installations required by SFAR 88 

(Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 

equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation 

Authorities/European Aviation Safety 

Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified 

* * * features in the Jetstream 4100 where 

the need for design changes was apparent. 

* * * 

Internal fuel tank wiring chafing damage, 

if not corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel 

vapours and subsequent fuel tank explosion. 

* * * * * * * 

We are issuing this AD to require 

actions to correct the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

September 23, 2008. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of September 23, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–1175; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on June 9, 2008 (73 FR 32488). 

That NPRM proposed to correct an 

unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank 

wiring installations required by SFAR 88 

(Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 

equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation 

Authorities/European Aviation Safety 

Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two 

features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need 

for design changes was apparent. One of 

these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) 

J41–28–014 which introduces changes to the 

wiring harness installations to the left (LH) 

and right (RH) fuel boost pumps, identified 

by modification number JM41672. In 

addition, to detect excessive cable lengths 

and evidence of chafing damage, SB J41–28–

014 provides instructions to inspect and 

correct, as necessary, the internal fuel tank 

wiring routed to the LH and RH high level 

sensors. 

Internal fuel tank wiring chafing damage, 

if not corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel 

vapours and subsequent fuel tank explosion. 

For the reason stated above, this EASA 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires the 

replacement of the (LH and RH) fuel boost 

pump metallic conduit assemblies with loom 

assemblies and the inspection of internal fuel 

tank high level sensor wiring, including 

corrective actions, as necessary. 

Corrective actions include replacing 

any damaged internal fuel tank high 

level sensor wiring and removing excess 

wiring. You may obtain further 

information by examining the MCAI in 

the AD docket. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the NPRM or 

on the determination of the cost to the 

public. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have required different 

actions in this AD from those in the 

MCAI in order to follow our FAA 

policies. Any such differences are 

highlighted in a NOTE within the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 7 

products of U.S. registry. We also 

estimate that it will take 47 work-hours 

per product to comply with the basic 

requirements of this AD. The average 

labor rate is $80 per work-hour. 

Required parts will cost about $7,000 

per product. Where the service 

information lists required parts costs 

that are covered under warranty, we 

have assumed that there will be no 

charge for these parts. As we do not 

control warranty coverage for affected 

parties, some parties may incur costs 

higher than estimated here. Based on 

these figures, we estimate the cost of 

this AD to the U.S. operators to be 

$75,320, or $10,760 per product. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains the NPRM, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 


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48292 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 19, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2008–17–04 BAE Systems (Operations) 

Limited (Formerly British Aerospace 

Regional Aircraft): Amendment 39–

15642. Docket No. FAA–2008–0622; 

Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–064–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective September 23, 2008. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems 

(Operations) Limited Model Jetstream 4101 

airplanes, certificated in any category, all 

serial numbers. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28: Fuel. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) states: 

Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank 

wiring installations required by SFAR 88 

(Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and 

equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation 

Authorities/European Aviation Safety 

Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two 

features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need 

for design changes was apparent. One of 

these is addressed by Service Bulletin (SB) 

J41–28–014 which introduces changes to the 

wiring harness installations to the left (LH) 

and right (RH) fuel boost pumps, identified 

by modification number JM41672. In 

addition, to detect excessive cable lengths 

and evidence of chafing damage, SB J41–28–

014 provides instructions to inspect and 

correct, as necessary, the internal fuel tank 

wiring routed to the LH and RH high level 

sensors. 

Internal fuel tank wiring chafing damage, 

if not corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel 

vapours and subsequent fuel tank explosion. 

For the reason stated above, this EASA 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires the 

replacement of the (LH and RH) fuel boost 

pump metallic conduit assemblies with loom 

assemblies and the inspection of internal fuel 

tank high level sensor wiring, including 

corrective actions, as necessary. 

Corrective actions include replacing any 

damaged internal fuel tank high level sensor 

wiring and removing excess wiring. 

Actions and Compliance 

(f) Unless already done: Within 24 months 

after the effective date of this AD, do the 

following actions. 

(1) Modify the LH and RH wing fuel boost 

pump wiring in accordance with paragraphs 

2.B. and 2.C. of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) 

Limited Service Bulletin J41–28–014, 

Revision 1, dated December 21, 2007. 

(2) Inspect the LH and RH wing fuel high 

level sensor wiring in accordance with 

paragraph 2.D. of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) 

Limited Service Bulletin J41–28–014, 

Revision 1, dated December 21, 2007. 

(3) When excess wiring and/or damaged 

wiring is found during the inspection 

required by paragraph (f)(2) of this AD, before 

next flight, accomplish the corrective actions 

as specified in paragraph 2.D. of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited Service 

Bulletin J41–28–014, Revision 1, dated 

December 21, 2007. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/ 

or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(g) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Send information to ATTN: Todd Thompson, 

Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, 

ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 

227–1175; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using 

any approved AMOC on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify your 

appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the 

FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), 

or lacking a PI, your local FSDO. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

has approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness 

Directive 2008–0041, dated February 27, 

2008; and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 

Service Bulletin J41–28–014, Revision 1, 

dated December 21, 2007; for related 

information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use BAE Systems (Operations) 

Limited Service Bulletin J41–28–014, 

Revision 1, dated December 21, 2007, to do 

the actions required by this AD, unless the 

AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact British Aerospace Regional 

Aircraft American Support, 13850 Mclearen 

Road, Herndon, Virginia 20171. 

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 

5, 2008. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–18810 Filed 8–18–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0649; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–CE–038–AD; Amendment 

39–15646; AD 2008–17–08] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; DG 

Flugzeugbau GmbH Model DG–500MB 

Powered Sailplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

A DG–500MB experienced, after the engine 

shutdown, an uncommanded retraction of its 

powerplant. 

Investigations revealed that some bolts of 

the extension retraction mechanism had 


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