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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA v. : : CHRISTY PERRI, : No. 926 WDA 2015 : Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, March 3, 2015 , in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0010832-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND STRASSBUR GER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 21, 2016 Christy Perri appeals from the March 3, 2015 aggre gate judgment of sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment, foll owed by two years’ probation, imposed after she pled guilty to possess ion of a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, and the summary offens e of driving under suspension. 1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts of th is case, as gleaned from the guilty plea hearing, as follows:

[O]n or about Friday, [August 1, 2014], at approximately 2130 hours, City of Pittsburgh Police were on patrol in a marked unit in full uniform in the Uptown area of Pittsburgh. They observed a white Dodge Charger with Pennsylvania registration

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cou rt.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 6106 and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543 , respectively.J. S57008/16

- 2 - HWV2753 traveling inbound on Fifth Avenue. When it came to the intersection of Washington Place, th ey observed that none of the brake lights were functioning on the vehicle. They effectuated a tra ffic stop and approached [appellant], who was the driver of the vehicle. They detected a faint odor of burn t marijuana coming from the vehicle’s compartment. [Appellant] stated that she did not have a valid driver’s license. The officers asked [appellant] a nd the occupants, based on their nervous behavior, to remove themselves from the vehicle for the officer’ s safety. A pat–down of the occupants was completed, and during that time an unnatural bulge in [appellant’s] waistband was noticed by the officers

. [Appellant] appeared to be attempting to cover the bulge by folding her hands over top. Officer McGee recovered a Rossi .38 Special revolver, Serial No. D656556 with five live rounds from [appellant’s ] waistband, concealed beneath her clothing. The Commonwealth would have submitted Laboratory Case No. 1407301 to show that this was a .38 Special caliber revolver that was in good operating condition. [Appellant’s driver’s] licens e had been suspended, and [appellant] stated that she had recently been the victim of a home invasion where she suffered a gunshot wound, that she had taken her aunt’s firearm to use for protection. Trial court opinion, 1/4/16 at 2 (citation to notes of testimony omitted). Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged wi th the aforementioned offenses, as well as receiving stole n property, prohibited offensive weapons, and the summary offense of gener al lighting requirements. 2 On November 18, 2014, appellant pled guilty to po ssession of a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, and the summary offense of driving under suspension. The Commonwealth with drew the remaining

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3925, 908, and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303 , respectively.J. S57008/16

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charges. Following the completion of a pre-sentenc e investigation (“PSI”) report, the trial court sentenced appellant to four to eight years’ imprisonment, followed by two years’ probation, on March 3, 2015. 3 On March 10, 2015, appellant filed a motion for recons ideration of sentence, which was denied by the trial court on March 13, 20 15. On April 8, 2015, appellant filed, inter alia , a motion for leave to file supplemental postsentence motions nunc pro tunc

. 4 The trial court granted said motions on April 13, 2015. Thereafter, on May 4, 2015, appell ant filed a supplemental post-sentence motion, which was denied by the trial court on May 12, 2015. This timely appeal followed. 5 On appeal, appellant raises the following issue fo r our review:

I. Did the trial court err in imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion when the trial court overlooked and/or failed to carefully consider relevant factors when sentencing [appellant], including the unique facts and circumstances of the crime, and her background and rehabilitative needs; and the [trial] court relied on erroneous, improper and impermissible factors; and failed to impose an individualized sentence?

3 Appellant’s sentence fell within the mitigated ran ge of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701, et seq.

4 The record reflects that this motion was filed by appellant’s newly appointed counsel, William E. Brennan, Esq., and th e trial court granted said motion on April 13, 2015, the last day for filing a n appeal from the denial of the March 13, 2015 order.

5 Appellant and the trial court have complied with P a.R.A.P. 1925.J. S57008/16

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Appellant’s brief at 5. Generally, our standard of review in assessing whe ther a trial court has erred in fashioning a sentence is well settled.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discreti on of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretio n is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Zirkle , 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal

denied , 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). Where an appellant challenges the discretionary as pects of her sentence, as is the case here, the right to appella te review is not absolute.

See Commonwealth v. Allen , 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2011). Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of her sentence must invoke this court’s jurisdiction by satisfying the following four-part

test: (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether

Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of t he reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; a nd (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropria te under the sentencing code.J. S57008/16

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Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz , 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted). Instantly, the record reveals that appellant has f iled a timely notice of appeal and has preserved her issue in her supplemen tal post-sentence motion. Appellant has also included a statement in her brief that comports with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Accord ingly, we must determine whether appellant has raised a substantial question

. “The determination of what constitutes a substanti al question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Griffin , 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied , 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing j udge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underli e the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Glass , 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied , 63 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “At a minimum, the Rule 2119(f) statement must articulate what par ticular provision of the code is violated, what fundamental norms the senten ce violates, and the

manner in which it violates that norm.” Commonwealth v. Davis , 2016 WL 1625810, at *15 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitt ed). In her Rule 2119(f) statement, appellant argues th at her sentence “was manifestly excessive, unreasonable, and an abu se of discretion[.]”J. S57008/16

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(Appellant’s brief at 12.) In support of this clai m, appellant contends that

the trial court “failed to consider all relevant fa ctors, particularly the unique circumstances of the crime[] and [her] background a nd rehabilitative needs[,]” as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). ( Id. at 12-13.) Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed t o consider her background and rehabilitative needs raises a substantial quest ion. See Commonwealth v. Dodge

, 77 A.3d 1263, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied , 91 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2014) (finding “[a]ppellant’s claim that t he sentencing court disregarded rehabilitation and the nature and circu mstances of the offense in handing down its sentence presents a substantial qu estion for our review.”);

Commonwealth v. Baker , 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal

denied , 86 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2014) (finding, inter alia , an assertion that the trial court failed to account for appellant’s rehab ilitative needs was a substantial question suitable for review). Appellant further avers that the trial court consi dered “erroneous, improper and impermissible factors” in sentencing h er and “failed to impose

an individualized sentence tailored to her and the attendant facts of her case.” (Appellant’s brief at 13.) We have recogni zed that “a claim that a

sentence is excessive because the trial court relie d on an impermissible factor raises a substantial question.” Allen , 24 A.3d at 1064-1065 (citation omitted). Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Ahmad , a panel of this court concluded that a claim that the sentencing court fa iled to consider anJ. S57008/16

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appellant’s individualized circumstances in its imp osition of sentence raised a substantial question. Ahmad , 961 A.2d 884, 887 (Pa.Super. 2008). Accordingly, we proceed to consider the merits of a ppellant’s discretionary sentencing claims. Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider “the unique circumstances of the crime” and her “background and rehabilitative needs” when it imposed sentence. (Appellant’s brief at 18.) Appellant contends her sentence was not indiv idually “tailored to her and the attendant facts of her case.” ( Id. at 18-19.) We disagree.

This court will not disturb a trial court’s senten ce absent a finding the court failed to weigh the sentencing considerations in a meaningful fashion. “When reviewing sentencing matters, this Court must accord the sentencing court great weight as it is in [the] best position to view the defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance or indiffe rence, and the overall

effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Ventura , 975 A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied , 987 A.2d 161 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). Herein, the record reveals that the trial court co nsidered and weighed numerous factors in fashioning appellant’s sentence , including the sentencing guidelines, the gravity of the offense, her prior criminal history, and the fact that her “adjustment to supervision ha s been poor.” (Notes of testimony, 3/3/15 at 6, 15-16; see also trial court opinion, 1/4/16 at 5-6.)J. S57008/16

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At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard ev idence from appellant’s counsel on her background and the underlying violen t crime that led her to possess the firearm in question. (Notes of testimo ny, 3/3/15 at 3-4, 6-7.) The trial court also heard testimony on appellant’s background from appellant’s niece, Lucianna Perri, who stated she w ould like appellant to “go through some kind of drug and alcohol rehabilitatio n,” as well as from appellant herself. ( Id. at 10-12, 14-15.) Although the record reflects that the trial court did not specifically state at the sentencing hearing that it considered appellant’s rehabilitative needs, the trial court was in possession of a PSI r eport. Where the trial court has the benefit of a PSI report, as is the ca se here, “we shall . . . presume that the sentencing judge was aware of rele vant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed tho se considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi , 84 A.3d 736, 761 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied , 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 6 The record further reflects that the trial court heard

6 We note that appellant has failed to ensure that t he PSI report was made a part of the certified record. Generally,

[i]t is the obligation of the appellant to make sur e that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal . . . A failure by appellant to i nsure that the original record certified for appeal conta ins sufficient information to conduct a proper reviewJ. S57008/16

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testimony from a number of witnesses regarding appe llant’s rehabilitative needs. Specifically, both Tomilyn Ward, a master i n professional counseling who had been working with appellant, and Kristen Ge orge, who developed an outpatient service plan for appellant in conjunc tion with Justice Related Services, testified at the March 3, 2015 hearing. (Notes of testimony, 3/3/15 at 8-10, 12-13; see also trial court opinion, 1/4/16 at 6.) Appellant also claims that the trial court conside red impermissible factors in fashioning her sentence; specifically, t he effect imposing a sentence of probation or home confinement would hav e on the trial judge’s reputation. (Appellant’s brief at 18, 20.) This c laim is belied by the record.

The record reveals that the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing that, “if something goes wrong it’s my name that go es in the paper, not yours[,]” albeit inappropriate, was not a factor th e trial court considered in imposing sentence. ( See notes of testimony, 3/3/15 at 13.) Rather, this statement was made in direct response to the follow ing statement by appellant’s counsel:

[Counsel]: Your Honor, just in closing, I understa nd the Court’s position with respect to my client and its intention with respect to the sentence. I’ve gotte n to know this young lady very well over the last

constitutes waiver of the issue sought to be examined. Commonwealth v. Manley , 985 A.2d 256, 263 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied , 996 A.2d 491 (Pa. 2010) (citations and brackets o mitted). As our review was not impeded, however, we decline to find waiver in this instance.J. S57008/16

- 10 - 7 months, and if Your Honor would consider an electronic monitoring program or some such program that doesn’t involve the state prison, and if it do es involve electronic monitoring my client – I don’t doubt that my client will not disappoint this Court , Your Honor. And if she did I would be just as equa lly disappointed.

Id. Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, appel lant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of her sentence must fail. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 7/21/2016