In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3497

Tuf Racing Products, Inc.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

American Suzuki Motor Corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 94 C 50392--Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.

Argued March 31, 2000--Decided July 24, 2000

 Before Posner, Chief Judge, and Ripple and Rovner,

Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Chief Judge. Tuf, a dealer in

motorcycles in DeKalb, Illinois, in 1987 signed a

franchise contract with Suzuki that the latter

terminated in 1994, precipitating this diversity

suit by Tuf under the Illinois Motor Vehicle

Franchise Act, 815 ILCS 710/1 et seq. Although

Tuf carried other brands as well as Suzuki and so

was able to survive the termination, it claims to

have suffered damages of some $1.2 million from

the alleged breach. A jury agreed that the

termination had been wrongful but awarded Tuf

only $137,000, to which, however, the judge added

$391,318 in attorneys’ fees under the franchise

act’s fee-shifting provision, 815 ILCS 710/13,

which requires such an award if the plaintiff

"substantially prevails."

 Construed as favorably to Tuf as the record

permits, which is the correct approach in light

of the verdict, the facts reveal that Suzuki

became angry at Tuf for selling motorcycles

outside the geographical area in which its

dealership was located, some of these to other

Suzuki dealers for resale. The franchise

agreement did not forbid either practice (sales

for resale are forbidden except to other Suzuki

dealers), but apparently Suzuki received

complaints from its other dealers about Tuf’s

"poaching" on their markets, and so it wrote Tuf
complaining about its conduct. The letter focused

on sales for resale but Suzuki’s regional manager

called Tuf’s owner and told him that Suzuki had

been getting complaints about Tuf’s selling

outside its immediate vicinity too and that it

should not do that either. When Tuf did not

desist from the practices complained of, Suzuki

decided to precipitate a breach of the franchise

contract by Tuf, which it did by such tactics as

denying standard credit terms and then accusing

Tuf of failing to maintain a regular plan for

sales on credit, as required by the franchise

agreement.

 All the grounds Suzuki gave in its notice of

termination--not only failure to maintain a

regular credit plan, but also inadequate sales

volume, insufficient inventory, and inadequate

promotion--were pretextual, the real reason for

termination being that Tuf had irritated Suzuki’s

other dealers by the two practices that Suzuki

had asked it to desist from. The invocation of

"pretext" in this context is puzzling. In the law

of contracts, while procuring a breach by the

other party to your contract would excuse the

breach, United States v. Peck, 102 U.S. 64

(1880); Herremans v. Carrera Designs, Inc., 157

F.3d 1118, 1124 (7th Cir. 1998); Swiss Bank Corp.

v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 141 F.3d 689, 692

(7th Cir. 1998); Mendoza v. COMSAT Corp., 201

F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2000); E. Allan

Farnsworth, Contracts sec. 8.6, p. 544 (3d ed.

1999), merely having a bad motive for terminating

a contract would not. If a party has a legal

right to terminate the contract (the clearest

example is where the contract is terminable at

will by either party), its motive for exercising

that right is irrelevant. Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779

F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1985); Harrison v.

Sears Roebuck & Co., 546 N.E.2d 248, 255-56 (Ill.

App. 1989). The party can seize on a ground for

termination given it by the contract to terminate

the contract for an unrelated reason. So if Tuf

gave cause for termination (other than "cause"

procured by Suzuki’s own misconduct, for example

in withholding standard credit terms), that would

be the end of the case--at least if Tuf were

charging merely a breach of contract.

 But it is not; we are under the franchise act,

which requires franchisors to deal with their

franchisees in good faith. 815 ILCS 710/4(b);

Kawasaki Shop of Aurora, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors

Corp., U.S.A., 544 N.E.2d 457, 462-63 (Ill. App.

1989). Tuf appears to think that the good-faith

provision entitles it to complain about a

pretextual termination even if there is good

cause for termination. This is incorrect. The

cases cited in the preceding paragraph hold that

the fact that there is a duty of good faith read
into every contract does not justify judicial

inquiry into motive. A party can stand on his

contract rights; what he cannot do is resort to

opportunistic or otherwise improper behavior in

an effort to worm his way out of his contractual

obligations. In Dayan v. McDonald’s Corp., 466

N.E.2d 958, 974 (Ill. App. 1984), we read that

"no case has been cited nor has our research

revealed any case where a franchise termination

for good cause was overcome by the presence of an

improper motive. As a general proposition of law,

it is widely held that where good cause exists,

motive is immaterial to a determination of good

faith performance." Dayan was not decided under

the franchise act, but we are given no basis in

case law or common sense for supposing that the

duty of good faith created by the act sweeps

beyond the common law duty. The judge’s charge to

the jury, however, though not a model of clarity,

is consistent with Dayan. For although the jury

was asked to decide whether Suzuki had acted in

bad faith in terminating Tuf for any of the

reasons given in its notice of termination, it

was also told that Suzuki would have an

affirmative defense if any of the reasons were

grounds for termination in the contract, even if

the other reasons cited in the notice were not.

It would have been more straightforward to

instruct the jury to determine simply whether the

termination had been a breach of the contract,

but Suzuki is not complaining about the charge.

 Its main argument for reversal is that the judge

improperly allowed Tuf to inject a new ground at

trial, what Suzuki calls the "match-up" theory of

a breach of the franchise agreement. To

understand this argument requires us to delve

into the agreement. Section 9.1 provides that if

the dealer fails to conduct his business in

conformity with the agreement, Suzuki may

terminate him upon written notice. Section 9.2

lists 15 violations that Suzuki can base

termination on with only 15 days’ notice to Tuf,

and section 9.3 lists 11 more violations on which

termination can be based provided that 60 days’

notice is given. The first list contains the more

serious violations, like insolvency, and the

second the lesser ones, such as failing to

maintain the sales volume agreed upon with

Suzuki. Suzuki terminated Tuf with 60 days’

notice, but the list of violations in the notice

does not match up completely with the list in

section 9.3. Suzuki argues that even so, given

section 9.1, the termination could still be

proper. The judge disagreed, and did not let

Suzuki argue that, but instead allowed Tuf to

argue that the failure of the notice to match the

list of violations in section 9.3 showed that the

termination was improper.
 Read most naturally, section 9.1 does not create

a separate basis for termination. All it says is

that "if Dealer does not conduct its business in

accordance with the requirements set forth

herein, Suzuki may terminate this Agreement by

giving Dealer written notice of termination," and

all this seems to mean is that Suzuki can

terminate the franchise agreement if the dealer

does not comply with it but that Suzuki must give

written notice of the termination. The succeeding

sections indicate how much written notice must be

given, which depends on the gravity of the

violation. If there are grounds for termination

other than the 26 listed in sections 9.2 and 9.3,

they do not appear in the contract. Were they

assumed to exist nevertheless, the contract would

have a hole, since it doesn’t indicate how much

written notice Suzuki must give if it wants to

terminate on the basis of a ground for

termination not stated in the contract. The

contract contains no provision to the effect that

"termination based on a violation of the

franchise agreement that is not listed in

sections 9.2 or 9.3 requires ___ days’ written

notice." The 26 grounds taken as a whole seem

pretty exhaustive, moreover; there is no

compelling reason to interpolate additional

grounds and thus embrace the ambiguity just

identified. The most plausible reading of the

contract, therefore, is that a notice of

termination that fails to specify any of the 26

listed grounds for violation violates the

contract.

 Tuf has been shy about making this argument,

maybe because a defect in notice would be a

technical violation from which no damages could

be shown to flow. In any event it argues merely

that Suzuki’s failure to conform to the

requirements of section 9.3 is further evidence

of Suzuki’s bad faith in terminating the

franchise agreement. But here Suzuki drops the

ball, failing to argue that bad faith in the

sense of bad motive is not a violation of the

franchise act. Instead Suzuki contends that Tuf

did argue in the district court that the failure

of the notice of termination to match the grounds

for termination listed in the contract was an

independent breach, and complains that the judge

prevented it from meeting the argument by

forbidding it to cite section 9.1 as an

independent basis for termination. However this

may be (as near as we can determine, Tuf didn’t

make the argument but the judge instructed the

jury as if it had!), since Suzuki has never

explained how its interpretation could be right

given the hole in the contract that such an

interpretation would create, no injustice was

done by its being forbidden to present the

interpretation to the jury. Probably no injustice
was done by Tuf’s "bad faith" theory either

(which may be why Suzuki has failed to oppose

it), for remember that the jury was correctly

instructed that Suzuki should prevail if it had a

basis in the contract for terminating Tuf.

Evidently the jury concluded that it did not; and

Suzuki’s contention that it had a ground for

termination not stated in the contract is unsound

for the reasons we’ve explained.

 We move on to the issue of damages. Tuf

presented its theory of damages by way of its

accountant (a C.P.A.), and in the district court

Suzuki argued that the accountant should not have

been permitted to testify as an expert witness

because he does not have a degree in economics or

statistics or mathematics or some other

"academic" field that might bear on the

calculation of damages. The notion that Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.

579 (1993), requires particular credentials for

an expert witness is radically unsound. The

Federal Rules of Evidence, which Daubert

interprets rather than overrides, do not require

that expert witnesses be academics or PhDs, or

that their testimony be "scientific" (natural

scientific or social scientific) in character.

Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,

150 (1999); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., No. 99-2656,

2000 WL 709895, *3 (7th Cir. June 2, 2000);

United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1441

(7th Cir. 1996); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity

Industries, Inc., 67 F.3d 435, 444 (2d Cir.

1995). Anyone with relevant expertise enabling

him to offer responsible opinion testimony

helpful to judge or jury may qualify as an expert

witness. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Advisory Committee’s

Notes to 1972 Proposed Rule 702; United States v.

Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245, 1261 (7th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Williams, supra, 81 F.3d at

1441; City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals,

Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 563 and n. 17 (11th Cir.

1998). The principle of Daubert is merely that if

an expert witness is to offer an opinion based on

science, it must be real science, not junk

science. Tuf’s accountant did not purport to be

doing science. He was doing accounting. From

financial information furnished by Tuf and

assumptions given him by counsel of the effect of

the termination on Tuf’s sales, the accountant

calculated the discounted present value of the

lost future earnings that Tuf would have had had

it not been terminated. This was a calculation

well within the competence of a C.P.A.

 The accountant calculated Tuf’s damages at about

$1.2 million, yet the jury awarded only a bit

more than 10 percent of that--leading Suzuki to

argue that the damages award should be set aside

as "speculative," since the jury of course did
not explain the path that led to the award and it

is unclear what that path may have been. We think

it pointless, although it might assist defendants

who seek to win by attrition, to credit a

defendant’s complaint that an award of damages

should be set aside because it was too small to

make sense, which is at root what Suzuki is

arguing. The argument implies that upon a retrial

the plaintiff is likely to obtain a higher award

(since the previous award was irrationally low)

that the appellate court will sustain. In any

event, such an argument is blocked by the

principle that if the award is within the bounds

of reason, the fact that the jury may not have

used reason to arrive at it--may instead have

negotiated an unprincipled compromise in order to

avoid deadlock--will not prevent it from being

upheld. Kasper v. Saint Mary of Nazareth

Hospital, 135 F.3d 1170, 1177 (7th Cir. 1998);

Outboard Marine Corp. v. Babcock Industries,

Inc., 106 F.3d 182, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1997). In

other words, the court looks only at the "bottom

line," to make sure it’s reasonable, and doesn’t

worry about the mental process that led there.

Since the jury is a collective body rather than a

single mind, since it does not write up its

findings as the judge does when he’s the finder

of fact, and since the law protects jurors from

being interrogated about their reasoning

processes, it really isn’t feasible to insist

upon a demonstration that the jury arrived at its

reasonable bottom line by reasoning to it the way

a professional judge would do, rather than by

guesswork, intuition, or compromise.

 Suzuki’s other complaints about the award are

niggling and we move on to the last issue, that

of attorneys’ fees. Suzuki argues that Tuf did

not prevail because it obtained so much less than

it asked for. It prevailed in the literal sense,

but did it substantially prevail? We cannot find

any cases that interpret this term in the

franchise act. The parties assume as shall we

that we can turn for guidance to the case law

that has developed around the issue of when a

plaintiff who has won much less than he sought is

entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under

rules or statutes entitling prevailing parties to

"reasonable" such fees. That case law indicates

that had Tuf obtained merely nominal damages, it

would not have been entitled to any award of

fees, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992);

Fletcher v. City of Fort Wayne, 162 F.3d 975, 976

(7th Cir. 1998); Bristow v. Drake Street Inc., 41

F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1994); Coutin v. Young &

Rubicam Puerto Rico, Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 339 (1st

Cir. 1997), and that if it had incurred

attorney’s fees that were disproportionate to a

reasonable estimate of the value of its claim, it

could not recover all those fees, but only the
reasonable proportion, which is to say the amount

that would have been reasonable to incur had the

value of the claim been estimated reasonably

rather than extravagantly. Farrar v. Hobby,

supra, 506 U.S. at 115; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Suzuki has shown neither of

these things. But it argues in addition that the

rule in this circuit is that a plaintiff who

fails to obtain an award of damages equal to at

least 10 percent of the amount he sought will be

denied any award of fees, and at one point before

trial Tuf had asked for $1.5 million although

before trial it scaled down its demand. (Its

complaint did not demand a specific amount, but

only an amount greater than the then

jurisdictional minimum in a diversity case of

$50,000, since raised by Congress to $75,000.)

 Several cases in this circuit do suggest that a

plaintiff’s failure to obtain at least 10 percent

of the damages it had sought will weigh heavily

against any award of attorneys’ fees. Indeed,

Perlman v. Zell, 185 F.3d 850, 859 (7th Cir.

1999), states this in a way that makes it sound

like a rule, although the cases it cites for the

rule treat it, rather, merely as a factor to

consider along with other factors weighing for or

against an award of attorneys’ fees. Cole v.

Wodziak, 169 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1999); Fletcher

v. City of Ft. Wayne, supra, 162 F.3d at 976. (We

cannot find a case in any other court that

mentions the 10 percent rule or factor.) Since a

defendant must take seriously a large demand and

prepare its defense accordingly, it is right to

penalize a plaintiff for putting the defendant to

the bother of defending against a much larger

claim than the plaintiff could prove. But here

the plaintiff scaled back its claim before trial

and obtained more than 10 percent of the scaledback demand from the jury. That seems to us

enough to take the case out of the "rule" for

which Suzuki contends.

 The fact that the attorneys’ fees awarded exceed

the damages award is not decisive either. Because

the cost of litigating a claim has a fixed

component, a reasonable attorney’s fee in the

sense of the minimum required to establish a

valid claim can exceed the value of the claim.

Hyde v. Small, 123 F.3d 583, 584-85 (7th Cir.

1997). Yet one purpose of fee shifting is to

enable such claims to be litigated, and the

purpose would be thwarted by capping the

attorneys’ fees award at the level of the damages

award. There is no evidence that the $391,000

that Tuf expended to establish its claim--an

amount that was, incidentally, little more than a

third as great as Suzuki’s expenditure in

defending against it--was more than was

reasonably necessary for Tuf to prevail.
 The cases we have cited on the issue of

attorneys’ fees are cases interpreting federal

fee-shifting statutes, but Tuf’s entitlement is

created by the law of Illinois. In default of

relevant Illinois cases, however, the parties

have cited to us federal cases, assuming,

reasonably enough, that the common-sense

principles that guide federal courts in

determining attorneys’ fees issues would commend

themselves to Illinois courts as well. But in

addition we have found one Illinois case that

makes the essential point that the damages award

does not cap the fee award. Pitts v. Holt, 710

N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. 1999).

Affirmed.