alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## F I FTH 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________ Case No. 5D23- 0617 LT Case No. 2017

- CF

- 000430

_____________________________ J OHN B RENNAN B ALL , Appella nt,

v. S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee

.

_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County. Lisa D. Herndon, Judge. Lori Wurtzel, of Wurt zel Law, PLLC, Winter Park, for Appellant. Ashley M oody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ka ylee D. Tatman , Assistant Attorney Genera l, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
M arch 22, 2024

P ER C URIAM

. J ohn Brennan Ball (“Appellant”) appeals the trial court’s order finding him to be retroactively competent following a nunc pro tunc competency hearing. This Court previously determined that the trial court erred when it relied solely on counsel’s stipulation in finding Appellant competent and failed to2 independently evaluate the expert’s written report and make an independent determination of competency as to three of his counts. Ball v. State , 319 So. 3d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). We remanded for the trial court to “conduct a nunc pro tunc competency evaluation, if it can, to determine whether Appellant was competent to proceed at the time of his trial and to enter an appropriate order regarding his competence.” Id.
On remand , the trial court held a nunc pro tunc competency hearing, following which it found Appellant to be retroactively competent. Both before and during the hearing, Appellant repeatedly requested to be appointed counsel to represent him at the hearing. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for counsel. Appellant contends that the court erred when it declined his request for appointed counsel. The State concedes error in that a nunc pro tunc competency hearing is a crucial stage of the proceedings at which Appellant was entitled to be represented by counsel. We agree. See generally Dickerson v. State , 228 So. 3d 658, 659

– 60 (Fla. 5th 2017) (noting that defendants are entitled to counsel at each crucial stage of the proceedings, and defining “crucial stage” as any stage that may significantly affect the outcome of the proceedings); see also United States v. Ross , 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit have considered whether a competency hearing is a ‘critical stage.’ ‘However, every federal court of appeals to take up the que stion has answered it affirmatively.’” (internal citations omitted))

. We therefo re reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct a nunc pro tunc competency hearing at which Appellant is represented by counsel. We do not address the other issues raised on appeal.
R EVERSE and R EMANDED with instructions.

J AY , E ISNAUGLE , and B OATWRIGHT , JJ., concur.3 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331
.

_____________________________
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-2527 

MILTON MCCRAY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

SUSQUEHANNA BANK,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (CA04-1382-RDB)

Submitted: February 24, 2005 Decided: March 4, 2005

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Milton McCray, Appellant Pro Se. Donald A. Rea, Kimberly Grimsley,

GORDON, FEINBLATT, ROTHMAN, HOFFBERGER & HOLLANDER, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Milton McCray appeals the district court’s order denying

relief on his claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district

court. See McCray v. Susquehanna Bank, No. CA-04-1382-RDB (D. Md.

filed Oct. 29, 2004 & entered Nov. 1, 2004). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6042 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 13, 2022 

Received 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 213 William Hilton Parkway in Hilton Head 

Island, South Carolina, as the ‘‘Caesar H. Wright Jr. 

Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 6042 RDS

1 SECTION 1. CAESAR H. WRIGHT JR. POST OFFICE BUILD2 ING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 213 William Hilton Parkway in 

5 Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, shall be known and 

6 designated as the ‘‘Caesar H. Wright Jr. Post Office 

7 Building’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

10 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

11 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Caesar H. Wright 

12 Jr. Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 12, 

2022. 

Attest: CHERYL L. JOHNSON, 

Clerk. 

By KEVIN F. MCCUMBER, 

Deputy Clerk. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
18283.

#### Powell *v.*Powell.

Submitted July 13, 1953

Decided September 14, 1953.

*Emory L. Rowland,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. C. Brinson,*contra.

Wyatt, Justice.

Where, in this case, the sole question was whether or not the plaintiff had executed to the defendant a deed to certain property, delivered the deed to the defendant, and then put the unrecorded deed in the safety deposit box of the plaintiff for safe keeping, and the evidence was in sharp conflict on this question, after a verdict in favor of the defendant it was not error to deny the motion for new trial, based only on the general grounds.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, PJ., not participating.*
HE A~~OIZNEP GENERAL OFTEXAS GERAID C. MANN A~JSTIN I,.TEXAU

Honorable 0. P. Lockhart, Chairman Board of Insurance Commissioners Austin, Texas Dear Sir: OpFnionNo. O-5539 Re: Mortuary funds of'mutual assessment associations;Phether such fundsmay be used ~topay the occupation tax leviedby Article 7064a,Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. The answer to the-questionabove stated, submitted in your letter ofAugust 11, 1943, is ruled by our Opinionsnumbered O-2988 and O-5337.

In the latter opinl.on,a copy ofwhlch you have,'we rul'edthat mortuary or reserve funds are not taxable~as in; cbme under the"Federa1Revenue Act of 1936. Our conclusion ln that opinionwas based up&i the proposition that the funds'are, by legislativeact,'irrevocablgdedicated for the use and protectfon of the policyholdersand are not income.

In our~Opinion~Ro.'O-298&we ruled that the tax levied by Article 7064a,Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, could not be paid out of the mortuary fund because of Section 12 of Artlcle 5068-1,Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. We enclose a copy of that opinion for a clear discussion of the matter. We therefore advise that the occupation tax above referred to cannot be paid out of the mortuary fund but must be paid out of the statutory expense fund as providedby law. Very truly your,3 ATTORNEX GEWERAL OF TEXAS ER:db:wc By:.skElbert Hoopei ElbertRooper APPRO- SEP 2, 1943 Assistant s/Gerald C, Mann ATTORNEYGENERAL OF TEXAS Approved Opinion CommitteeBy s/BWB Chairman
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
AUDITED BALANCE SHEET OF PARADIGM MEDICAL INDUSTRIES, INC. AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1997, AND THE RELATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         886,558
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  120,853
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    833,930
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,857,128
<PP&E>                                         182,691
<DEPRECIATION>                                (61,417)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,452,574
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,055,223
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         95
<COMMON>                                         3,799
<OTHER-SE>                                     311,461
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,452,574
<SALES>                                        464,062
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               521,365
<CGS>                                          333,156
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,933,327
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (29,476)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,774,594)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,774,594)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,774,594)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.76)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.76)
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Michael J. ARMSTRONG, Appellant. Michael J. ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 62965, 64407.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Aug. 16, 1994.

*936Ellen H. Flottman, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Mary Moulton Bryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and GARY M. GAERTNER and CRAHAN, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals the judgment upon his conviction by a jury of assault in the first degree and armed criminal action. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty-four years for assault and three years for armed criminal action. Defendant also appeals from an order denying, after an evidentiary hearing, his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. However, Defendant has abandoned that appeal by failing to brief any errors pertaining to the denial of post-conviction relief.

With respect to Defendant’s direct appeal, no error of law appears and an opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law would have no precedential value. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order. The judgment is affirmed in accordance with Rules 30.25(b) and 84.16(b).
|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company      at the dates and for the periodsindicated. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:      May 29, 2009                                                                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                          |
| By:                                                                                           | /s/ Paul F. Norris |   |
|                                                                                          |
| Name:      Paul F. Norris                                                                     |
| Title:      Executive Vice President, Acting Chief Financial Officer and General      Counsel |

----
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report of SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership (the
Partnership), on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), each of the undersigned, Kevin L. Foxx, President and Chief Executive Officer of
SemGroup Energy Partners G.P., L.L.C., and Michael J. Brochetti, Chief Financial Officer of SemGroup Energy Partners G.P., L.L.C., certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to his
knowledge:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
the Partnership.



|                                                                                                                                 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Kevin L. Foxx                                                                                                                
|Kevin L. Foxx                                                                                                                    
|President and Chief Executive Officer of SemGroup
Energy Partners G.P., L.L.C., general partner of SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P.

November 14, 2007



|                                                                                                                   
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Michael J. Brochetti                                                                                           
|Michael J. Brochetti                                                                                               
|Chief Financial Officer of SemGroup Energy Partners G.P., L.L.C., general partner of SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P.

November 14, 2007
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>   5

<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary information extracted from the Ampersand
Medical Corporation Consolidated Balance Sheet; (Unaudited) for
September 30, 1999 and the Consolidated Statement of Operations (Unaudited)
for the Nine Months ended September 30, 1999 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>


<S>                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>          9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>      DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>           SEP-30-1999


<CASH>                                  5
<SECURITIES>                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                         296
<ALLOWANCES>                          0
<INVENTORY>                            57
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                      516
<PP&E>                                216
<DEPRECIATION>                         34
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      2,027
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>               2,965
<BONDS>                               0
<COMMON>                            1,916
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<OTHER-SE>                            0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>        2,027
<SALES>                               912
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      912
<CGS>                                 600
<TOTAL-COSTS>                         600
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                    2,287
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     49
<INCOME-PRETAX>                    (2,147)
<INCOME-TAX>                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                (2,147)
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                       (2,147)
<EPS-BASIC>                       (0.16)
<EPS-DILUTED>                       (0.16)




</TABLE>
<Page>

                                  EXHIBIT 23.1

                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

To the Shareholders of Protection One, Inc.:

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation by
reference in this Form 10-K of our report dated February 13, 2002, into the
Company's previously filed Registration Statement File Numbers 033-83494,
033-99220, 033-95702, 033-97542, 333-02828, 333-02892, 333-20245, 333-24493,
333-50383, 333-64021, 333-77295, 333-30328 and 333-40158.

Arthur Andersen LLP

Kansas City, Missouri,
March 27, 2002
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CESAREO TAPIA-IBARRA, AKA Julio 

Cesar-Hernandez, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-73410 

Agency No. A205-489-712 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 27, 2018**

Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Cesareo Tapia-Ibarra, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an 

immigration judge’s order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings 

conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 30 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-73410 

abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and we review de novo 

questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). 

We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Tapia-Ibarra’s

motion to reopen for failure to establish exceptional circumstances, where he did 

not show that he failed to appear at his hearing due to circumstances beyond his 

control. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) (defining 

exceptional circumstances as circumstances beyond the control of the alien);

Valencia-Fragoso v. INS, 321 F.3d 1204, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2003) (no exceptional 

circumstances where petitioner was late to her hearing due to confusion about the 

time and did not show eligibility for relief).

We reject Tapia-Ibarra’s contentions that the BIA failed to consider relevant 

evidence, that Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2002), controls the result of 

his case, or that the agency otherwise applied the wrong standard. See Najmabadi 

v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the BIA adequately 

considered evidence and sufficiently announced its decision); Fernandez v. 

Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner did not overcome the 

presumption that the BIA did review the record); Valencia-Fragoso, 321 F.3d at 
3 16-73410 

1205-06 (distinguishing Singh).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### The State, ex rel. Bauer, *v.*Director of Agriculture.

(No. 23487

Decided May 25, 1932.)

*Mr. John B. Osmun*and *Mr. Gerard Pilliod,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Gilbert Bettman,*attorney general, and *Mr. Isadore Topper,*for defendant in error.

It is found that the cause was an original suit in the Court of Appeals, heard on the pleadings and evidence and decided upon questions of fact. It further appearing that no bill of exceptions was allowed in the Court of Appeals, and this Court being of opinion that the errors complained of are not properly presented without a bill of exceptions, it is ordered that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen, Kinkade and Stephenson, JJ., concur.
OPTICAL COATING LABORATORY, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                                        
EXHIBIT 11.  COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
                                        
For the three months ended January 31, 1997 and 1996
(Amounts in thousands, except per share data)             1997       1996

PRIMARY SHARES:

Average common shares outstanding                        9,777      9,514
Common equivalent shares outstanding                       388        605
                                                        10,165     10,119

Net income                                                $907      $ 740
Less dividend on preferred stock                          (240)      (240)

Net income applicable to common stock                     $667      $ 500

Net income per common and common
 equivalent share, primary                               $ .07      $ .05

FULLY DILUTED SHARES:

Average common shares outstanding                        9,777      9,514
Common equivalent shares outstanding                       388        605
Potential dilution of preferred stock                    1,143      1,143
                                                        11,308     11,262

Net income applicable to common stock                    $ 667      $ 500
Add back dividend on preferred stock                       240        240

Net income for calculating fully diluted
 earnings per share                                       $907      $ 740

Net income per common and common
 equivalent share, fully diluted                         $ .08     $  .07



NOTE: Fully diluted earnings per share do not result in dilution of
      three percent or more or are anti-dilutive and, therefore, are not
      separately presented in the consolidated statements of income.