Filed 5/2/13 In re Martin M. CA4/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

In re MARTIN M., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

MARTIN M., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 G047568 

 (Super. Ct. No. DL042308) 

 O P I N I O N 

 Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Nick 

A. Dourbetas, Judge. Affirmed. 

 John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William W. Wood and 

Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

 Appellant Martin M., a minor, contends the juvenile court imposed an 

unreasonable condition on his probation. We disagree and affirm the judgment against 

him. 

FACTS 

 On July 16, 2012, appellant admitted allegations contained in a wardship 

petition that he shoplifted beer and illegally possessed alcohol in May 2011. The 

admission was part of a negotiated disposition pursuant to which the court declared 

appellant a nonward and placed him on probation subject to various terms and conditions. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725.) The court also ruled appellant could move to withdraw his 

plea and have the allegations dismissed in six months, in January 2013, if he complied 

with the terms of his probation and had “no new legal violations.” 

 Two weeks later, on August 1, 2012, a second petition was filed against 

appellant. The petition alleged appellant tampered with and took personal property from 

several vehicles. The crimes were alleged to have occurred in June 2012, but they were 

not brought to the court’s attention when it accepted appellant’s plea on the first petition 

the following month. Consequently, they were not factored into the negotiated 

disposition the court accepted in that matter. 

 The prosecutor did not want that scenario to repeat itself. While 

negotiating with the defense on the second petition, he was willing to let appellant remain 

on probation as a nonward if he admitted the new allegations. And, as before, he was 

willing to let appellant move to withdraw his plea and seek a dismissal in January 2013 if 

he complied with the terms of his probation and he had “no new legal violations.” This 

time, however, the prosecutor insisted on defining the term “no new legal violations” to 

include both future violations of the law and any newly discovered violations that 

appellant had committed in the past. To that end, the parties’ disposition agreement 

stated appellant could only seek to withdraw his plea if he had no new legal violations, 

“even predating today.” 
3

 Appellant, his attorney and the prosecutor signed the agreement on 

September 14, 2012. However, when it was submitted to the court later that day, 

appellant’s attorney objected to the “even predating today” language on the basis it 

constituted an unreasonable probation condition. The court did not see it that way. 

Instead, it construed the language as a permissible aspect of the parties’ agreement and 

accepted the agreement as written. Thus, after appellant admitted the allegations 

contained in the second petition, the court continued him on probation as a nonward and 

determined he could seek to withdraw his plea in January 2013, so long as he complied 

with the terms of his probation and no new legal violations, either past or present, came 

to light prior to that time. 

DISCUSSION 

 Appellant contends the notion that not only future, but prior violations of 

the law can doom his probation is anathema to the goal of probation, which is to guide 

future conduct and deter future criminality. He sees no rehabilitative purpose being 

served by conditioning his probation on past behavior because that is not something over 

which he has any control. 

 Appellant’s argument misses the point. He construes the requirement that 

he have no new legal violations “even predating today” as a condition of probation. But 

as the trial court correctly observed, that requirement was actually part of the agreement 

which allowed appellant to move to withdraw his plea in January 2013. We know this 

because the agreement about possible plea withdrawal was conditioned on appellant not 

having any new legal violations and complying with the terms of his probation. Use of 

the conjunction “and” indicates these were separate and distinct preconditions to 

withdrawal, meaning the language about predated violations was not a component of 

appellant’s probation. It is more accurately read as a guarantee by the minor that he is 

worthy of lenient treatment because he has not committed other—not yet discovered—

crimes. We see nothing inappropriate about a plea bargain that is so conditioned. 
4

 Moreover, our review of the superior court file shows the trial court denied 

appellant’s request to withdraw his pleas on January 16, 2013.1 Judging from the file, the 

denial was not based on any new or newly discovered legal violations, but on the fact 

appellant tested positive for marijuana five times between August and December 2012. 

Because the court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion to withdraw his pleas was based 

on grounds unrelated to the condition that he have no new legal violations, the condition 

no longer has any bearing on him. It is simply off the table as far as this case is 

concerned. Therefore, appellant’s challenge to the condition is moot, and there is no 

basis for granting him relief. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 

 BEDSWORTH, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J. 

IKOLA, J. 

 

 1 We take judicial notice of the file pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d) and 

459, subdivision (a). (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 306, fn. 2 [appellate court may take judicial notice of 

subsequent action reflected in superior court records when it helps complete the context of the case].)