alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>               5
<MULTIPLIER>            1
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                Jan-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                  Dec-31-1997
<CASH>                             85,949
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                     196,235
<ALLOWANCES>                            0
<INVENTORY>                        54,897
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  678,081
<PP&E>                          4,181,422
<DEPRECIATION>                  1,499,072
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  3,538,140
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           1,622,927
<BONDS>                                 0
<COMMON>                           36,347
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                             0
<OTHER-SE>                      1,167,512
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    3,538,140
<SALES>                         4,456,887
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                7,116,777
<CGS>                           2,493,806
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   2,493,806
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                5,645,634
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                158,821
<INCOME-PRETAX>                (1,181,484)
<INCOME-TAX>                      (83,789)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (987,376)
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                     (987,376)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                        (.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                        (.27)


</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 14, 2014

NO. 03-13-00268-CR

Reynaldo Hernandez, Jr., Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, GOODWIN, AND FIELD

MODIFIED AND, AS MODIFIED, AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no error in the court’s

judgment requiring reversal. However, there was error in the judgment that requires correction. 

Therefore, the Court modifies the trial court’s judgment to reflect that appellant pleaded true to 

the enhancement allegations. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed. Because appellant is 

indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
Blueprint




 






Exhibit
10.2

 

STOCK
AGREEMENT

 


WHEREAS, [NAME] is
employed by the Company (“Employee”) and has performed
duties of his employment in a capable and efficient manner,
resulting in substantial benefit to the Company; and


 


WHEREAS, the
Company desires to modify and extend the Stock Agreement dated
December 28, 2017 (Original Agreement), of the Employee, and
Employee is desirous of committing himself to continued service to
the Company on the terms herein provided. The terms herein
supersede and replace the terms of the Original
Agreement.


 


WHEREAS, The Board
of Directors has previously awarded [NUMBER] shares of the
Company’s common stock (the “stock”), subject to
certain milestones and forfeiture clauses to the
Employee.


 


The
Board of Directors acknowledges that the Original Agreement
Milestone 1 and Milestone 2 were successfully achieved, and in an
effort to incentivize the Employee, has modified and extended
Milestone 3 and 4 as set forth below to the following
terms:


 



3. Up-List to The Nasdaq or NYSE


The
date the Company up-lists to The Nasdaq or NYSE, the Employee will
retain 25% of the stock ([NUMBER] shares). The milestone expiration
date is hereby extended to December 28, 2020. If not obtained
within the 12 month extension, 25% of the stock ([NUMBER] shares)
will be forfeited by the Employee.


 



4. $5.50 per share


When
the Company obtains an average closing price of $5.50 per share
(adjusted for stock splits) for any 10 consecutive trading days,
the Employee will retain 25% of the stock ([NUMBER] shares). The
milestone expiration date is hereby extended to December 28, 2020.
If not obtained within the 12 month extension, 25% of the stock
([NUMBER] shares) will be forfeited by the Employee.


 



Termination of Service



Except to the extent inconsistent with the terms of this agreement
and notwithstanding any other agreement between the Employee and
the Company, the following terms and conditions shall apply with
respect to the Employee’s Termination of Service with the
Company within the 12 month extension:



 



The Employee’s then outstanding shares of stock shall expire
and be forfeited:


 




a.

Immediately, if
such termination is a for the reason of Resignation by the Employee
or a Termination of Service for Cause by the Company;






 




b.

Thirty (30) days
from the date of Service Termination, if such termination is for a
reason other than the Resignation by the Employee or a Termination
of Service for Cause by the Company.






 



Change of Control


In the
event of a Change of Control, all outstanding shares shall
immediately vest upon the date of the change of control. Change of
Control shall be defined as outlined in the Liberated Syndication
Inc. 2018 Omnibus Equity Incentive plan.

 

 

ACCEPTED
AND AGREED TO:

 

By:
__________________________________

Name:

 

Liberated
Syndication Inc.

 

By:
_______________________________

Name:

Title:
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Stacey A. LANNERT, Appellant.

No. 63563.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.

Sept. 19, 1995.

Ellen H. Flottman, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

*930Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Traci J. Sanders, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRAHAN, P.J., and CRANDALL and DOWD, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appealed her judgments of conviction by a jury of first degree murder, § 565.020, RSMo 1986, and armed criminal action, § 571.015, RSMo 1986, as well as the denial of her Rule 29.15 Motion for post-conviction relief. *See State v. Lannert,*889 S.W.2d 131 (Mo.App.E.D.1994). We affirmed in all respects except we remanded for a *gender-Batson*hearing. *Id.*at 135. The trial court denied her objection that the State impermissibly used its preemptory strikes in a gender-biased manner. Defendant claims this was error. We affirm. We have reviewed the record and find the claims of error are without merit. An opinion would have no precedential value nor serve any jurisprudential purpose. Rule 30.25(b).
#### Fred WALLACE, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. S. DOTSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-7353.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 13, 2003.

Decided March 21, 2003.

Fred Wallace, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Drummond Bagwell, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

*ON PETITION FOR REHEARING*

PER CURIAM.

Fred Wallace, Jr., a state prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), on procedural default grounds. To be entitled to a certificate of appealability, Wallace must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. *600§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). When a district court dismisses solely on procedural grounds, the movant “must demonstrate both (1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’ ” *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.) (quoting *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)), *cert. denied,*534 U.S. 941, 122 S.Ct. 318, 151 L.Ed.2d 237 (2001). Upon examination of Wallace’s petition, we cannot conclude that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the district court correctly concluded that the petition was procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### Tsige DEGE, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 02-71327.

INS No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 20, 2003.

*232Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suit-able for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Tsige Dege, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum and withholding of deportation. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). *Kalaw v. INS,*133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997). We review adverse credibility findings for substantial evidence and will uphold the findings unless the evidence compels a contrary result. *Singh-Kawr v. INS,*183 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1999). We deny the petition.

The BIA identified material inconsistencies between Dege’s asylum affidavit and her testimony regarding whether and when she was imprisoned in Ethiopia. Because these inconsistencies go to the heart of her asylum claim, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility finding. *See Chebchoub v. INS,*257 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.2001). Accordingly, Dege failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of deportation. *See Hakeem v. INS,*273 F.3d 812, 816-17 (9th Cir.2001).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit



EXHIBIT 10.26





March 2019 Amendment
CFG Voluntary Executive Deferred Compensation Plan First Amendment


Effective March 1, 2019, Schedule I to the CFG Voluntary Executive Deferred Compensation Plan Amended and Restated September 1, 2014 (the “Plan”), is hereby amended to read as follows:


SCHEDULE I


EMPLOYERS EFFECTIVE MARCH 1, 2019


The following list represents the Participating Employers, based on the nomenclature and corporate organization of each such employer as of the respective dates each such employer became a Participating Employer.
Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania
Citizens Bank, NA
Citizens Asset Finance, lnc.
CCO Investment Services, Corp.
Citizens Financial Group, Inc.
CSB Investment Corporation
Franklin American Mortgage Company
Clarfeld Financial Advisors, LLC
Bowstring Advisors




Except as amended herein, the Plan is confirmed in all other respects.
Executed this 4th day of March 2019 by and on behalf of Citizens Financial Group, Inc. by its duly authorized officer. 


                        	
	
	Citizens Financial Group, Inc.

	 

	By: /s/ Sal J. Di Liberti

	Sal J. Di Liberti, Head of Benefits

	Date: March 4, 2019
#### In the Matter of Daniel Tepper, Petitioner, v Arthur Lonschein, as Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.

[675 NYS2d 898]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of prohibition, in effect, *inter alia,*to prohibit the respondent Arthur Lonschein, a Justice of the Supreme Court, from enforcing against the *436petitioner a temporary restraining order contained in an order to show cause signed by the respondent Justice on December 31, 1997, in the underlying action entitled *Fidelity Holdings, Inc. v Progressive Polymeries International, Inc.,*Index No. 13505/96, presently pending in the Supreme Court, Queens County.

Ordered that the proceeding is converted to an application pursuant to CPLR 5704 (a) to vacate the temporary restraining order contained in the order to show cause dated December 31, 1997, in the underlying action insofar as it purports to restrain the petitioner, the application is granted, without costs or disbursements, and the temporary restraining order contained in the order to show cause dated December 31, 1997, is vacated.

It is well settled that the extraordinary remedy of prohibition “does not lie, even if there has been an excess of jurisdiction, if there is available an adequate remedy, by way of appeal or otherwise” *(Matter of Molea v Marasco,*64 NY2d 718, 720; *Matter of State of New York v King,*36 NY2d 59, 62).

The petitioner is not a party to the underlying action between Fidelity Holdings, Inc. and Progressive Polymetrics International, Inc., which is presently pending in the Supreme Court, Queens County, under Index No. 13505/96. Accordingly, so much of the temporary restraining order contained in the order to show cause dated December 31, 1997, as purports to restrain him was improperly granted by the respondent Justice *(see,*CPLR 6301, 6313 [a]). However, as the petitioner has available an adequate remedy to correct this error, i.e., an application pursuant to CPLR 5704 (a) to vacate the temporary restraining order, we deem the proceeding to be such an application pursuant to CPLR 5704 (a), grant the application, and vacate the restraint. Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 13.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of WNS
(Holdings) Limited (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | the accompanying annual report on Form 20-F of the Company for the year ended March 31, 2015 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: May 5, 2015



|       |  |                              
|------ |  | -----------------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Sanjay Puria             
|Name:  |  | Sanjay Puria                 
|Title: |  | Group Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and is
not being filed either as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure statement, and is not to be incorporated by reference into the Report or any other filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless
of any general incorporation language in such filing. The foregoing certification shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to the liabilities of
Section 18 or Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 01-11328

DICH G. HOANG, Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
CHRIS HOSTRUP, ET AL., Defendants, CHRIS HOSTRUP; K. W. MURPHY, Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas

No. 3:01-CV-217-H December 17, 2002 Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * After reviewing the record and considering the briefs of the parties and argument of counsel, we agree with the district court that the defendant police officers are entitled to q ualified2

immunity. AFFIRMED.
#### MOORE v. O’HARA.

No. 17621.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

May 11, 1942.

Matthew S. Braniff, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Bentley G. Byrnes and Warren Coleman, both of New Orleans, for appellee Mover.

JANVIER,. Judge.

This appeal was taken by plaintiff from a judgment dismissing his suit for $53,583.-47, damages for slander and libel.

Defendant moves to dismiss the appeal because of our alleged want of jurisdiction ratione materia since the amount in controversy is in excess of $2,000.

Of course, where the true amount in controversy exceeds $2,000, this court is without jurisdiction unless the suit is one for damages for physical injuries. Par. 3, Sec. 10, Art. 7, Constitution of 1921. See Spearman v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 164 La. 677, 114 So. 591; Clarke v. Bandelin, 6 La.App. 564.

There is no claim for physical injury involved where the suit is one for slander. In Trascher v. Johnson, 163 So. 431, we held that “ * * * since under the jurisprudence of this state no award of damages, upon a similar cause of action, [slander] has ever been approved in excess of the sum of $2,000 * * * ”.

Wherever a sum greater than $2,000 is sued for as damages for slander or libel, it will be held that the amount is fictitiously inflated and that, in reality, the amount in controversy is less than $2,000. That conclusion was questioned in 10 Tulane Law Review, 307, in an article in which it was shown that there had been cases in Louisiana in which amounts greater than $2,000 had been allowed for libel and slander. See Schwing v. Dunlap, 130 La. 498, 58 So. 162, where $5,000 was allowed for libel, and Jackson v. Briede, 156 La. 573, 100 So. 722, in which $2,500 was allowed for libel. We later recognized this and, in Jumonville v. Frey’s, Inc., et al., La.App., 171 So. 590, referred to the article in Tulane Law Review and conceded that our conclusion in Trascher v. Johnson had been incorrect.

We are now of opinion that where, in a suit for libel or slander, or both, a sum in excess of $2,000 is prayed for and the suit is dismissed, plaintiff’s appeal cannot come to this Court, However, since, by Act 19 of 1912, we are authorized to transfer such an appeal as this to the Supreme Court, we will follow that course.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that this appeal be, and it is hereby transferred to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, to be disposed of according to law, the transfer to be made within sixty days after this judgment becomes final, and if not so made, then the appeal is to be deemed dismissed. Appellant to pay the costs of appeal in this court; the remaining costs to await final determination of the matter.

Transferred to Supreme Court.
#### Hathaway Linton, Adm’r, &c., of Royal A. Nott, dec’d, Pltff in Error, *v.*Valentine S. Anglin, Deft in Error.

ERROR TO CLARK.

Where a declaration avers that the cause of action arose in the county from which the process issued, and that the plaintiff resides in such county, process may issue to any other county.

The Circuit Court having acquired jurisdiction to issue process beyond its territorial limits, the defendant may be served in any other county where lie may be found.

Linton, as administrator of Nott, deceased, sued Anglin in the Clark Circuit Court, for the sum of $535 18, in an action of debt.

The declaration avers that plaintiff resided in the county of Clark, at the time of the commencement of the suit. The process, which was a *capias ad res:*was issued to Coles county, and executed there. The pleadings were heard before Wilson, Justice, at May term, 1848. Linton sued out the writ of error. The errors assigned, are the overruling of the demurrer to the plea in abatement, and in not giving judgment for plaintiff, on the demurrer.

S. T. Logan, for Pltff in Error.

Lincoln & Herndon, for Deft in Error.

Caton, J.

The declaration in this case, shows that the cause of action arose in the county .of Clark, and that the plaintiff was a resident of that county. This, according to the uniform decisions of this Court, authorized the process to be issued to a foreign county. The defendant filed a plea in abatement, averring that the writ was issued to, and served upon him in the county of Coles, and that he was not a resident of that county, to which a demurrer was filed, which was overruled by the ‘Court, and the plea held to be good.

This is assigned for error. The statute .provides that “ it •shall not be lawful for any plaintiff to sue a defendant out of the county where the latter resides, or may be found, except in ” certain specified cases, “when process may issue against the defendant, to the county where he resides.”

We have no doubt that the legislature intended to use the *287. word “ resides,” in such a sense as to include the place where the defendant, for the time being, might be, whether that was his permanent place of residence, or not. Were a different construction to prevail, transient persons would be placed on a better footing than permanent residents, which, taking the whole law together, we, think was not the intention of the legislature. The Court having acquired the jurisdiction to issue its process beyond its territorial jurisdiction, the object was to reach the defendant; and if he could only be reached at the place of his permanent residence, the object of the law in conferring the jurisdiction, would often be defeated. We think the demurrer should have been sustained. The case of Haddock *v.*Waterman, 11 111., 474, we think in point in this case.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

*Judgment reversed.*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

BOOMERANG RECOVERIES, LLC,

Petitioner

v.

GUY CARPENTER & COMPANY, LLC AND 

MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES, INC.,

Respondents

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 6 EAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of June, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
#### Martha Watenpaugh Currie, appellee, v. L. L. Coryell & Son et al., appellants.

297 N. W. 612

Filed April 18, 1941.

No. 31037.

*Walter C. Weiss, Richard B. Travis*and *Tunison & Joyner,*for appellants.

*Baldwin & Pike, contra.*

Heard before Simmons, C. J., Rose, Eberly, Paine, Carter and Yeager, JJ.

Simmons, C. J.

This is an action for damages to real property caused by a fire alleged to have been started by negligence of defendant Hebei, an employee of defendant L. L. Coryell & Son. Verdict was for plaintiff. Defendants appeal, assigning as error the refusal of the trial court to sustain their motion for an instructed verdict.

*Watenpaugh v. L. L. Coryell & Son,*135 Neb. 607, 283 N. W. 204, was an action for damages to personal property resulting from the same fire. The allegations of negligence in both cases are the same. The testimony as to the fire and conditions in the building varies in some particulars but does not change in any way the ultimate facts stated or conclusions reached in the *Watenpaugh*case. We have reexamined the authorities cited in the *Watenpaugh*case and those relied upon by the plaintiff. The conclusion is that the *Watenpaugh*case was correctly decided and is controlling in the instant case.

Reversed and dismissed.