IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-60558

Summary Calendar

SARA LOURDES GUERRA-DE CARDOZA; EMILIA VALENCIA-DE GUERRA; 

JACQUELINE PAOLA CARDOZA-GUERRA; CARLOS ANTONIO CARDOZAGUERRA; GENESIS VALERIA CARDOZA-GUERRA,

Petitioners

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A208 274 075

BIA No. A208 274 076

BIA No. A208 274 077

BIA No. A208 274 078

BIA No. A208 274 079 

Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Petitioners Sara Lourdes Guerra-De Cardoza (Guerra), on behalf of herself 

and her three children, and Guerra’s mother, Emilia Valencia-De Guerra

(Valencia), natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek review of the Board of 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 24, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-60558

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Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissing their consolidated appeal from the 

immigration judge’s (IJ) denying their applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). (Because 

petitioners fail to brief any challenge to the denied CAT relief, this claim is 

abandoned. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation 

omitted).) 

Guerra contends the BIA erred by finding her proposed social group—

“Salvadoran women unable to escape domestic violence by their domestic 

partners”—is not cognizable. More specifically, she claims the BIA incorrectly: 

gave retroactive effect to Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018), 

vacated in part, Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal 

docketed, No. 19-5013 (D.C. Cir. 30 Jan. 2019); and concluded her proposed group

was principally defined by characteristics of the alleged persecution and was 

impermissibly circular. Valencia contends the BIA erred by finding the claimed 

persecution was motivated by the alleged persecutor’s (Guerra’s former partner) 

desire for money, rather than by membership in her proposed particular social 

group, “immediate family members” of Guerra. (Before the BIA, Valencia also 

contended she was a member of a group comprised of “Salvadoran women unable 

to escape domestic violence from a child’s partner”. Her failure, however, to brief 

any challenge to the BIA’s finding this group non-cognizable has abandoned the 

issue. See Soadjede, 324 F.3d at 833 (citation omitted).)

In considering the BIA’s decision (and the IJ’s decision, to the extent it 

influenced the BIA’s decision), our court reviews legal conclusions de novo; factual 

findings, for substantial evidence. Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 517–

18 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). On substantial-evidence review, a factual 

finding will not be disturbed unless petitioner demonstrates “that the evidence is 

so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary 

conclusion”. Id. at 518 (citation omitted). Among such factual findings are an 

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alien’s not being eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. Zhang v. Gonzales, 

432 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

To be eligible for asylum, an alien must show, inter alia, she was 

persecuted, or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, based on a statutorily 

protected ground: “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion”. Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 518 (italics and 

citations omitted). In this instance, petitioners claim membership in several 

particular social groups, each of which requires petitioners’ “show[ing] that they 

are members of a group of persons that share a common immutable characteristic 

that they either cannot or should not be required to change because [the 

characteristic] is fundamental to [their] individual identities or consciences”. Id.

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Such a group must, inter alia: 

be particular; “exist independently of the harm asserted”; and not be defined 

circularly by the persecution suffered. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 230, 

232 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Regarding Guerra’s retroactivity claim, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)’s 

administrative-exhaustion requirement for review of final orders of removal

means this issue must have been raised in the first instance before the BIA, either 

in a motion to reopen or motion for reconsideration, for our court to have 

jurisdiction to consider it. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 319–21 (5th Cir. 

2009) (citations omitted) (holding claims of error in “BIA’s act of decisionmaking” 

that “neither party could have possibly raised prior to the BIA’s decision” must 

first be exhausted through “available and adequate means”, including motions to 

reopen and for reconsideration). Guerra’s briefing asserts: she filed a motion for

reconsideration with the BIA that raised this issue; and this motion remains 

pending (as of 29 March 2019, when Guerra filed her reply brief; the record does 

not disclose the motion’s status). Her petition for review, however, seeks review 

only of the BIA’s order of removal, issued when it dismissed her appeal from the 

IJ’s denying relief, and does not seek review of any motion for reconsideration. 

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Because the “BIA’s denial of an appeal and its denial of a motion to reconsider are 

two separate final orders, each of which requires their own petitions for review”, 

Guevara v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted), our 

court lacks jurisdiction to consider this issue in this petition for review. 

For Guerra’s claim that the BIA erred by concluding her proposed social 

group was principally defined by characteristics of the alleged persecution and 

was impermissibly circular, she did not raise this claim before the BIA, instead 

analogizing to the now-overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 

2014), overruled by Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018). Because 

this failure means the issue is unexhausted, our court lacks jurisdiction to review 

it. See, e.g., Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448, 452–53 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations 

omitted). 

As for Valencia’s claim the BIA erred by finding the claimed persecution 

was not motivated by her membership in her asserted particular social group

(“immediate family members” of Guerra), Valencia, Guerra, and Guerra’s oldest 

daughter each testified they believed Guerra’s former partner (the alleged 

persecutor) targeted the family because he wanted money. The BIA (as did the 

IJ) relied on this testimony to find the alleged persecution was not motivated by 

Valencia’s membership in her claimed social group. She has not demonstrated 

that no reasonable factfinder could have reached a contrary conclusion. See 

Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 518 (citation omitted).

Regarding withholding of removal, because neither Guerra nor Valencia 

has established a protected ground for asylum, their withholding claims 

necessarily fail. See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 2002).

 DISMISSED IN PART; DENIED IN PART.

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