No. 85-442 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

MARK A. GAUB, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY, 

and KIMBERLY A. TANNER, 

Defendants, 

and 

LARRY TANNER and JUDY TANNER, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lake, 

The Honorable C.B. McNeil, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Ha.sh, Jellison, OtBrien & Bartlett; James C. Bartlett, 

Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg; Gary R. 

Christiansen, Kalispell, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 14, 1985 

Decided: March 20, 1986 

Filed: MAR 2 0 1986 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

The plaintiff appeals an ord.er from the Lake County 

District Court granting summary jud-gment to defendants Larry 

Tanner and Judy Tanner. Plaintiff contends on appeal tha-t 

5 61-5-108, MCA, requires any negligence of a minor to be 

imputed to the minor's parents when (a.) both parents signed 

the minor's application for a driver's license and (b) no 

proof of financial responsibility accompanied the minor's 

applicati-on for a driver's license. We affirm the District 

Court's order granting summary judgment to the parents. 

The following facts are taken from the District Court's 

order: 

Defendant Kimberly A. Tanner drove a motor vehicle 

which was involved in a collision with plaintiff's vehicle in 

December 1983. She is the minor daughter of defendants Larry 

and Judy Tanner. Both parents signed Kimberly Tanner' s 

application for a driver's license in December 1982. They 

maintained liability insurance on the motor vehicle which she 

drove at the time of the accident. The amount of insurance 

was twice the minimum amount required to satisfy Montana's 

financial responsibility laws. The parents provided proof of 

liability insurance to the Motor Vehicle Division of the 

State of Montana by complying with its directives to the Lake 

County Treasurer when they licensed and registered the motor 

vehicle. No proof of financial responsibility accompanied 

Kimberly Tanner's application for a driver's license. 

Plaintiff's sole issue on appeal concerns the meaning 

of § 61-5-108, MCA: 

Can parents who signed a minor's application for a 

driver's license invoke a limit on damages i.n the amount of 
their liability insurance coverage when (a) 50th parents 

have signed the a.pplication for the minor to obtain a driver's license, and (b) no proof of financial responsibility 

accompanied the minor's application for a driver's license? 

Section 61-5-108, MCA, states: 

(1) The application of any person under 

the age of 18 years for an instruction 

permit or operator's license shall be 

signed and verified before a person 

authorized to administer oaths by both 

the father and mother of the applicant, 

if both are living and have custody of 

him, or by the surviving parent, or in 

the event neither parent is living or has 

custody, then by the person or guardian 

having such custody or by an employer of 

such minor, or in the event there is no 

guardian or employer then by some other 

responsible person who is willing to 

assume the obligation imposed under this 

chapter upon a person signing the application of a minor. 

(2) Any negligence or willful misconduct 

of a minor under the age of 18 years when 

driving a motor vehicle upon a highway 

shall be imputed to a person who has 

signed the application of such minor for 

a permit or license, which person shall 

be jointly and severally liable with such 

minor for any damages caused by such 

negligence or willful misconduct, except 

as otherwise provided in subsection (3) 

of this section. 

(3) In the event a minor deposits or 

there is deposited upon his behalf proof 

of financial responsibility in respect to 

the operation of a motor vehicle owned by 

him, or if not the owner of a motor 

vehicle, then with respect to the operation of any motor vehicle, in form and in 

amounts as required under the motor 

vehicle fina.ncia1 responsibility laws of 

this state, then the department may 

accept the application of such minor when 

signed by one parent or the guardian of 

such minor, and while such proof is 

maintained such parent or guardian shall 

not be subject to the liability imposed 

under subsection (2) of this section. 

Appellant focuses on the last two phrases in subsection 

(3) to support his interpretation. He argues that subsection 
(3) is available only when "one parent or the guardian of 

such minor" signs the application and that it is not available when both parents or the minor's employee or some other 

responsible person signs the application. He also contends 

that the proof of financial responsibility must be submitted 

at the time of application. The District Court concluded, 

from reading 5 61-5-108, MCA, as a whole that in subsections 

(1) and (2), the legislature intended a minor should receive 

a driver's license only if the application is co-signed by a. 

person who shall be responsible for any negligence of the 

minor while operating a motor vehicle. The court further 

concluded that, in subsection (3), the legislature eliminated 

this imputed liability for that responsible person so long as 

proof of financial responsibility is provided and maintained. 

Finally, the District Court concluded that the express languilge of subsection (3) contains no time limitation within 

which proof of financial responsibility must be deposited. 

Th.e fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intention of the 

legislature controls . . . The intention 

of the legislature must first be determined from the plain meaning of the words 

used . . . [Citations omitted.] 

Missoula County v. American Asphalt, Lnc. (Mont. 1985), 701 

P.2d 990, 992, 42 St.Rep. 920, 922. In the search for plain 

meaning, "the language used must he reasonably and logically 

interpreted, giving words their usual and ordinary meaning." 

In re Matter of McCabe (1975), 168 Mont. 334, 339, 544 P.2d 

825, 828. A court's function, when construing a statute, is 

to ascertain what it contains, 

not to insert what has been omitted nor 

to omit what has been inserted . . . A 

statute must be read and considered in 

its entirety and the legislative intent 

may not be determined from the wording of 
any particular section or sentence, but 

only from a consideration of the whole 

... [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis 

added. 1 

State ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson (1972), 160 Mont. 175, 

184, 500 P.2d 921, 926-927, cert. den. 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 

We agree with the District Court's construction of the 

statute which considers the statute as a whole. Under appellant's construction, if one parent signs the application and 

provides proof of financial responsibility, that parent has 

no imputed liability; but if both parents sign and provide 

the required proof, both parents have imputed liability. 

Similarly, a guardian having custody who signs the application and provides the required proof escapes imputed liability; but some other "responsible person" having custody who 

signs the application and provides the required proof remains 

subject to imputed liability. Such an interpretation is 

neither reasonable nor logical. "Statutory construction 

should not lead to absurd results i.f a rea.sonable construction will avoid it." State ex rel. Ronish v. School Dist. 

No. 1 (1960), 136 Mont. 453, 460, 348 P.2d 797, 801, 78 ALR2d 

1012. A reasonable construction of subsection (3) , when 

considering the statute in its entirety, permits the 

person(s) who signed the application to be relieved from the 

operation of subsection (2) so long as proof of financial 

responsibility is provided and maintained. 

If a statute requires construction, a review of the 

title of the original bill is a necessary first step to aid 

that construction. Matter of Senate Bill No. 23 Ch. No. 491, 

M. S. L. of 1973 (1975), 168 Mont. 102, 105, 540 P.2d 975, 

976. The title of H. B. 207, the bill which was enacted in 
1947 and codified as § 61-5-108, MCA, describes the bill as 

". . . providing for the method of application for licenses 

for minors by the parents, guardian or other responsible 

person and providing for the liability of such parents, 

guardian or other person in certain instances; providing for 

the release from liability by such parents, guardian or other 

person . . . " Thus, the title, part of this statute's 

legislative history, supports the District Court's construction, as well. 

Section 61-5-108 (3) , MCA, makes no direct reference to 

the time within which proof of financial responsibility must 

be submitted. It states, in part, " [iJ n the event [proof of 

financial responsibility is deposited], in form and in 

amounts as required under the motor vehicle financial 

responsibility laws of this state . . . " (Emphasis added.) 

The plain meaning of this is that so long as the proof complies in form with §§ 61-0-101 et seq., MCA, the Motor Vehicl-e Safety Responsibility Act, there is no imputed liability. 

That Act requires the owner of the motor vehicle to certify 

that he possesses insurance or one of the listed. alternatives 

before the vehicle is registered. Section 61-6-302 (1) , MCA. 

Without this Court inserting a time limit which has been 

omitted from 5 61-5-108 (3), MCA, a reading of 5 61-6-302 (I), 

MCA, only requires providing proof of motor vehicle insurance 

at the time the vehicle is registered. We will not insert a 

different time limitation into 5 61-5-108f3), MCA, when the 

legislature did not require it. The District Court correctly 

reasoned that, 

. . . from the time proof of financial 

responsibility is deposited on behalf of 

a minor, whether such deposit be made 

prior to, simultaneous with, or at any 

time after the submission of the 
application, that the person or persons 

who signed the application are not subject to the imputed liability of subsection (2). . . 

Thus, so lony as liability insurance is, in fact, in force at 

the time of an accident, proof offered at any time releases 

the signers from imputed liability. Similarly, if proper 

proof had been deposited at one time but the insurance was 

not in force at the time of the accident, that would be 

sufficient proof that financial responsibility had not been 

retained and imputed liability would be reimposed. 

Appellant cites Moore v. Jacobsen (1953), 127 Mont. 

341, 263 P.2d 713, for his contention that the proof of 

financial responsibility must accompany the minor's application for a license. Moore held that the second subsection 

applied and that there was no evidence either party resorted 

to the third subsection. This Court noted that the record 

did not disclose that proof of financial responsibility had 

been deposited "at the time the application wa.s made for a 

license, or at any other time." 127 Mont. at 348, 263 P.2d 

at 717. The subsequent statement that proof must be made at 

the time of application is dicta and not controlling authority for the case at bar. Further, on motion for rehearing, 

this Court stated nothing in the record indicated proof of 

financial responsibility was deposited at "any place or any 

time," and stated no requirement that proof was required at 

the time of application. Moore, 127 Mont. at 365, 263 P.2d 

at 726. Moore is distinguishable on the facts from this case 

as well. Here, the parents provided proof of financial 

responsibility at the time the vehicle was registered and 

licensed and the insurance was in effect at the time of the 
accident, in contrast to the responsible person in -- Moore, 

discussed above. 

We hold that S 61-5-108(3), MCA, relieves the person 

who signed an application of a minor from the imputed liability of subsection (2) so long a-s financial responsibil-ity is 

maintained as required under the motor vehicle financial 

responsibility laws of this state and that so long as such 

financial responsibility is maintained, proof offered at any 

time releases the signer from the imputed liability of 

subsection (2). 

The District Court's order is affirmed. 

We concur: 

/ 

Chief Justice