UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

BURTON, SALADINO, and HAGLER 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist ISIAH K. HALL 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20160644 

Headquarters, United States Army Alaska 

Sean F. Mangan and Kenneth W. Shahan, Military Judges 

Colonel Erik L. Christiansen, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Carrier, JA; Major Julie L. 

Borchers, JA; Captain Oluwaseye Awoniyi, JA (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel 

Tiffany D. Pond, JA; Major Julie L. Borchers, JA; Captain Oluwaseye Awoniyi, JA 

(on reply brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Steven P. Haight, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Stafford, 

JA; Major Hannah E. Kaufman, JA; Captain Jessika M. Newsome, JA (on brief). 

8 April 2019 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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SALADINO, Judge: 

 Appellant raises three assignments of error related solely to his conviction for 

sexual abuse of a child. We need address only one. After a careful review of the 

record, we find a dearth of evidence supporting appellant’s conviction of sexual 

abuse. We therefore hold appellant’s conviction of that specification is factually 

insufficient. 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of two specifications of assault consummated by a battery, 

three specifications of assault consummated by a battery upon a child under the age 

of sixteen years, and four specifications of aggravated assault, in violation of Article 

128, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928 [UCMJ]. The military judge 

also convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of sexual abuse 

of a child, one specification of simple assault, seven specifications of assault 
HALL—ARMY 20160644 

2 

consummated by a battery, one specification of assault consummated by a battery 

upon a child under the age of sixteen years, and one specification of aggravated 

assault, in violation of Articles 120b and 128, UCMJ. The military judge sentenced 

appellant to a dishonorable discharge, eleven years of confinement, and reduction to 

the grade of E-1. The convening authority approved appellant’s sentence to a 

dishonorable discharge, ten years and eleven months of confinement, and reduction 

to the grade of E-1. Appellant was credited with one day against his sentence to 

confinement. 

 On brief, appellant challenges only his conviction of sexually abusing a 

child.1

 We agree with appellant that his conviction of sexually abusing a child was 

not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We set aside and dismiss appellant’s 

conviction of that charge and specification and reassess his sentence accordingly. 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant was the husband and father of a family of six. Over a period of 

several years, he perpetrated terrible violence against his wife and four children. 

After a particularly brutal assault by appellant against his wife on Christmas Day, 

2013, one of appellant’s children called the police. After the police responded to the 

initial call, further investigation revealed appellant had brutally abused his family 

for years. One allegation stood out as different from appellant’s other acts of 

violence: appellant’s wife indicated that their three-year-old daughter, LH, reported 

that appellant had touched her “cukolotch”—the word LH used to refer to her genital 

area. 

Subsequent investigation resulted in mixed reports from LH about the nature 

of the alleged touching. The government elected to charge appellant with three 

specifications under article 120b, UCMJ. Specification 1 of Charge I alleged 

appellant penetrated LH’s vulva “with a pink object.” Specification 2 alleged 

appellant penetrated LH’s vulva “with an object identified as a hanger.” 

Specification 3 alleged appellant committed a lewd act by touching LH’s vulva “with 

a substance identified as pink glue.” 

Appellant was acquitted of Specification 1 and Specification 2. He was 

convicted of Specification 3, but the military judge acquitted him of the words “with 

a substance identified as pink glue.” Thus, appellant was convicted of committing a 

lewd act by touching LH’s vulva, and the modality of the touching was unspecified. 

 

1

 We have considered the matters personally raised by appellant under United States 

v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), and find they merit no relief. 
HALL—ARMY 20160644 

3 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

Article 66, UCMJ, establishes our statutory duty to review a record of trial for 

legal and factual sufficiency de novo. United States v. Walters, 58 M.J. 391, 395 

(C.A.A.F. 2003). We may affirm only those findings of guilt that we find correct in 

law and fact and determine, based on the entire record, should be affirmed. Id. 

In weighing factual sufficiency, we take “a fresh, impartial look at the 

evidence,” applying “neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of 

guilt.” United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002). To affirm a 

conviction, “after weighing the evidence in the record of trial and making 

allowances for not having personally observed the witnesses, [we must be] 

convinced of [appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 

Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987). 

The military judge convicted appellant of touching LH’s vulva, but he did not 

specify how.2

 To various adults, LH reported that appellant touched her with “pink 

glue,” a “green hanger,” and some other “pink” object. The military judge acquitted 

appellant of the charges or charged language relating to each of these specific items. 

We have scoured the record to ascertain the military judge’s basis for 

convicting appellant of touching LH in a way that constitutes a lewd act, where the 

touching was neither with a hanger, nor with a substance identified as glue, nor with 

some other pink object. We draw two conclusions: First, we can only speculate as 

to the theory under which the military judge convicted appellant of sexually 

touching LH.3

 Second—and more fundamentally—following a thorough and 

complete review of the record, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 

appellant touched LH in a sexual way at all. 

 

2

 We do not mean to suggest that the modality of touching must be specified to state 

the offense of sexual abuse of a child under Article 120b. In this case, however, the 

potential ambiguity of the findings presents other issues, discussed below. 

3

 Our need to speculate as to the theory under which appellant was convicted raises 

serious issues as to our ability to review appellant’s conviction of Specification 3 of 

Charge I. This is especially true considering the military judge acquitted appellant 

of the three mostly likely means of abusing LH based on her statements to 

interviewers. See generally Walters, 395-97. See also United States v. Swift, 76 

M.J. 210, 216 (C.A.A.F. 2017). Because we ultimately find we have reasonable 

doubt that appellant touched LH in any way that would constitute a lewd act, we 

need not attempt to untangle the issue of ambiguous findings with which we might 

otherwise have to contend.
HALL—ARMY 20160644 

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LH is a child of tender age who has evidently lived in dangerous domestic 

circumstances for the first three years of her life. Perhaps it should come as no 

surprise that she was unable to articulate what happened to her. Despite several 

professionals attempting to assist LH in expressing what happened to her, we have 

no clear picture of if, much less how, LH was sexually abused. During one 

interview, LH reported she was touched on her “cukolotch” with “hangers,” 

“toothpaste,” “bubbles,” and “papers.” When asked if appellant had touched her 

“cukolotch” with anything else, she responded “yeah,” and then held up a toy 

vehicle she had found in the interviewer’s office and proclaimed “with this!” 

Appellant was acquitted of penetrating LH’s vulva with a “hanger.” As for 

“toothpaste,” “bubbles,” and “papers” these words are consistent with how a very 

young child might describe diaper ointment, soap, and wet wipes—three items that 

parents commonly apply to the private areas of their infants for reasons of hygiene. 

We are merely speculating as to what LH might have meant when she said she was 

touched with these items. In a way, that is the point—based on our review of the 

evidence in the record, any hypothesis as to what LH was attempting to convey is 

speculative. Such speculation simply cannot carry the burden of proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

To be clear, LH cannot be blamed in any way for her inability to articulate 

what, if anything, happened to her. She is a young child. Neither, however, can we 

affirm appellant’s conviction on nothing more than LH’s understandably incomplete 

reports. In some such cases, other evidence fills the gaps in a child’s incomplete 

report. This is not one of those cases. 

We may only affirm convictions that we ourselves are convinced have been 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We have reviewed the evidence, and taken into 

consideration that the military judge saw and heard the witnesses and we did not. 

As to appellant’s conviction of sexually abusing LH, we find appellant’s guilt was 

not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

CONCLUSION 

Appellant’s conviction of Specification 3 of Charge I and Charge I are SET 

ASIDE and both Specification 3 of Charge I and Charge I are DISMISSED. The 

remaining findings of Guilty are AFFIRMED. 

 To determine whether to reassess a sentence or order a sentence rehearing, we 

consider the totality of the circumstances presented; whether there are dramatic 

changes in the penalty landscape and exposure; whether appellant chose sentencing 

by members or a military judge alone; whether the nature of the remaining offenses 

captures the gravamen of criminal conduct included within the original offenses; 

whether significant or aggravating circumstances addressed at the court-martial 
HALL—ARMY 20160644 

5 

remain admissible and relevant to the remaining offenses; and whether the remaining 

offenses are of a type that we have the experience and familiarity with to reliably 

determine what sentence would have been imposed at trial. See United States v. 

Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013), United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 

305, 307-08 (C.M.A. 1986). 

Applying the principles of Sales and Winckelmann, we conclude it is 

appropriate for us to reassess appellant’s sentence rather than return this case for a 

sentence rehearing. Our decision changes the penalty landscape by lessening 

appellant’s maximum exposure to confinement from forty-five years and nine 

months, to twenty-five years and nine months. We recognize the significance of the 

change to the penalty landscape. We also recognize that the maximum punishment 

for appellant’s remaining crimes remains in a range reserved for serious felony 

offenses. Further, because appellant was sentenced by a military judge as opposed 

to members, we are more certain of how the court-martial would have sentenced 

appellant on the remaining offenses. See Winckelmann 73 M.J. at 16. We are 

familiar with the remaining offenses and have the experience to reliably determine 

what sentence would have been imposed at trial. 

Although a sexual offense against a child is a very serious crime, this was an 

unusual case wherein the sheer volume and gravity of appellant’s assaults against his 

family form the overwhelming weight of his misconduct. Appellant’s violent crimes 

span multiple years. He was convicted of strangling his wife three times, slamming 

her head against a concrete floor twice, stomping on her head, throwing her down a 

flight of stairs, and beating nearly every member of his household. We are confident 

that the military judge would have imposed a sentence at least as severe as that 

which we affirm in this decision for appellant’s remaining convictions. 

Reassessing the sentence on the basis of the errors noted, the entire record, 

and in accordance with the principles of Sales and Winckelmann, we AFFIRM only 

so much of the sentence as provides for a dishonorable discharge, nine years of 

confinement, and reduction to the grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and property 

of which appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of his sentence set 

aside by this decision are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c) and 75(a). 

Senior Judge BURTON and Judge HAGLER concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: