alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 160 (Monday, August 18, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48234-48235]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19006]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1768-DR]

Wisconsin; Amendment No. 15 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Wisconsin (FEMA-1768-DR), dated June 14, 2008, and 
related determinations.

DATES: Effective Date: August 8, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peggy Miller, Disaster Assistance 
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3886.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that pursuant to the 
President's June 30, 2008, amended declaration authorizing Federal 
funds for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal 
assistance, at 90 percent Federal funding of total eligible costs under 
the Public Assistance program, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's National Weather Service River Forecast Center has 
established that the rivers in the State of Wisconsin, which have 
experienced historical flooding, fell below flood stage on July 26, 
2008.

    (The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 
(CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, 
Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis 
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster 
Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance 
Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and 
Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, 
Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance--Disaster Housing 
Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially 
Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households--Other 
Needs; 97.036,

[[Page 48235]]

Disaster Grants--Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared 
Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.)

R. David Paulison,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. E8-19006 Filed 8-15-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-10-P
```
<PAGE>
 
                                                                     EXHIBIT 23
 
                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
 
  We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
of MapInfo Corporation on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 33-74660, 33-74662, 33-74664,
33-78406, 33-88780 and 333-4268) of our report dated November 5, 1996, on our
audits of the consolidated financial statements and financial statement
schedule of MapInfo Corporation and Subsidiaries as of September 30, 1995 and
1996, and for the years ended September 30, 1994, 1995, and 1996, which report
is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A.
 
                                          COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.
 
Albany, New York
January 2, 1997
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

August 6, 2013

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RICKY LEE NELSON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 89-04384, 89-04385 & 89 J. Robert Carter, Jr., Judge

No. W2012-00741-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 27, 2014

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., concurring opinion.

I write separately to express my opinion that the result of this case is mandated by the

following language in Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 55 (Tenn. 2011):

Inevitably, determining whether a petitioner should be afforded DNA

testing involves some conjecture, as “it is difficult to anticipate what results

DNA testing may produce in advance of actual testing.” State v. Peterson,

364 N.J. Super. 387, 836 A.2d 821, 827 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).

Under section 40-30-304(1) of the Act, however, we begin with the

proposition that DNA analysis will prove to be exculpatory. Payne v. State,

W2007-01096-CCA-R3-PD, 2007 WL 4258178, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Dec. 5, 2007); Shuttle v. State, No. E2003-00131-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL

199826, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2004). As one jurisdiction has

ruled, “the trial court should postulate whatever realistically possible test

results would be most favorable to [the] defendant in determining whether

he has established” the reasonable probability requirement under that

jurisdiction’s DNA testing statute. Peterson, 836 A.2d at 827. We hold the

same to be true under Tennessee’s Act.

Id.

While we review the trial court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard,

Thomas Edward Kotewa v. State, No. E2011-02527-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App.

LEXIS 872, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2012), in my opinion the trial court’s width

of discretion has been extremely narrowed.

___________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### F LORIDA



### S ECOND 

### D ISTRICT

CHARLES COMBS

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee.

No. 2D 20 23

- 0 7 6 8

May 24 , 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Philip J. Federico

, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Andrea M. Norgard

, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and J. Wade Stidham,

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee

.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed

.

SLEET , C.J.

, and ATKINSON and SMITH

, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
#### BLOOMENSTIEL v. TRIDICO (WILBERT, Intervener).

No. 1204.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Jan. 22, 1934.

For former opinion, see 149 So. 912.

Chas. T. Wortham, of Donaldsonville, for appellant.

O. C. Weber, of Donaldsonville, for appel-lee.

MOUTON, Judge.

On his application for the .rehearing, counsel says that the nullity of the sale was not absolute but only relative.

The cases to which he refers as supporting his contentions refer to relative and not to absolute nullities.

In our original opinion, we held, for the reasons, stated in the opinion, unnecessary to repeat, that the sheriff had refused to give the seizing creditor the time to draw his instructions to delay or defer the sale, that he acted without authority in making the sale of the automobile, and which was therefore illegal and null.

Obviously, under the decisions cited in the opinion, this nullity was absolute, which debars applicant from relief on the ground that the nullity is relative; and to which the decisions cited by counsel have reference.

This court inadvertently dismissed the third opposition.

This error can, however, be corrected without granting a rehearing. - *,*

It is therefore ordered and decreed that! our decree dismissing the third opposition be, *80and is hereby, annulled and set aside; that third opponent pay the cost of this appeal; and in other respects our judgment remain undisturbed.

The rehearing is refused.
Exhibit 99.2





CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002.





In connection with the
accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of PG&E Gas Transmission, Northwest Corporation for the quarter ended September 30, 2002, I, John R. Cooper, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of PG&E Gas Transmission,
Northwest Corporation, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:





| | (1) |  | such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2002, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




| | (2) |  | the information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2002, fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of PG&E Gas Transmission, Northwest Corporation.
| | --- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Date: November 12,
2002





/S/    JOHN R.
COOPER


John R. Cooper


Senior Vice President,
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
Exhibit 15




November 10, 1998



Orion Capital Corporation
Farmington, Connecticut

We have made a review, in accordance with standards  established by the American
Institute of Certified Public  Accountants,  of the unaudited  interim financial
information of Orion Capital  Corporation and subsidiaries for the periods ended
September  30, 1998 and 1997, as indicated in our report dated October 23, 1998;
because  we  did  not  perform  an  audit,  we  expressed  no  opinion  on  that
information.

We are aware  that our  report  referred  to above,  which is  included  in your
Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter  ended  September  30,  1998,  is
incorporated  by  reference  in  Registration  Statements  No.  2-80636  and No.
333-58941 on Form S-8 relating to the Orion Capital  Corporation  1982 Long-Term
Performance  Incentive Plan, No. 333-58905 on Form S-8 relating to Orion Capital
Corporation  Equity  Incentive  Plan, No. 2-63344 and No.  333-58889 on Form S-8
relating to the Orion Capital 401(K) and Profit  Sharing Plan, No.  33-59847 and
No.  333-58939 on Form S-8 relating to the Orion Capital  Corporation 1994 Stock
Option Plan for  Non-Employee  Directors,  No. 333-44901 on Form S-8 relating to
the Wm. H. McGee & Co., Inc.  401(K) and Profit Sharing Plan,  No.  333-55671 on
Form S-8 relating to Orion Capital  Corporation  Employees' Stock Purchase Plan,
and  No.333-62951 on Form S-8 relating to Retirement  Savings Plan for Employees
of Guaranty National Insurance Company.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report,  pursuant to Rule 436(c) under
the  Securities  Act of  1933,  is not  considered  a part  of the  Registration
Statement  prepared  or  certified  by an  accountant  or a report  prepared  or
certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP



Hartford, Connecticut
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6087 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6087

   To amend chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to cover, for 
   purposes of workers' compensation under such chapter, services by 
   physician assistants and nurse practitioners provided to injured 
                Federal workers, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 30, 2021

  Mr. Courtney (for himself and Mr. Walberg) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to cover, for 
   purposes of workers' compensation under such chapter, services by 
   physician assistants and nurse practitioners provided to injured 
                Federal workers, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Improving Access to Workers' 
Compensation for Injured Federal Workers Act''.

SEC. 2. INCLUSION OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS AND NURSE PRACTITIONERS IN 
              FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT.

    (a) Inclusion.--Section 8101 of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``, other eligible 
        providers,'' after ``osteopathic practitioners'';
            (2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraphs (18) and 
        (19);
            (3) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (20) and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (4) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(21) `other eligible provider' means a nurse practitioner 
        or physician assistant within the scope of their practice as 
        defined by State law.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--Chapter 81 of title 5, United States 
Code, is amended--
            (1) in section 8103(a)--
                    (A) by inserting ``or other eligible provider'' 
                after ``physician'' in each instance; and
                    (B) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``or other 
                eligible providers'' after ``physicians'';
            (2) in section 8121(6), by inserting ``or other eligible 
        provider'' after ``physician''; and
            (3) in section 8123(a)--
                    (A) by inserting ``or other eligible provider'' 
                after ``The employee may have a physician''; and
                    (B) by inserting ``or other eligible provider'' 
                after ``United States and the physician''.
    (c) Regulations.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall finalize rules to carry out 
the amendments made by this Act.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 160 (Monday, August 18, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48211-48212]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-19089]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-8705-9]

Proposed CERCLA Administrative Cost Recovery Settlement; Soiland, 
Inc., and Stephen H. Trombly, Grugnale Waste/Drum Disposal Site, 
Milford, NH

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency.

ACTION: Notice of proposed settlement; request for public comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with Section 122(i) of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended 
(``CERCLA''), 42 U.S.C. 9622(i), notice is hereby given of a

[[Page 48212]]

proposed administrative settlement for recovery of past costs 
concerning the Grugnale Waste/Drum Disposal Superfund Site in Milford, 
New Hampshire with the following settling parties: Soiland, Inc. and 
Stephen H. Trombly. The settlement requires the settling parties to pay 
$35,000 to the Hazardous Substance Superfund. The settlement includes a 
covenant not to sue the settling parties pursuant to Section 107(a) of 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a). For thirty (30) days following the date of 
publication of this notice, the Agency will receive written comments 
relating to the settlement. The Agency will consider all comments 
received and may modify or withdraw its consent to the settlement if 
comments received disclose facts or considerations which indicate that 
the settlement is inappropriate, improper, or inadequate.
    The Agency's response to any comments received will be available 
for public inspection at One Congress Street, Boston, MA 02114-2023.

DATE: Comments must be submitted by September 17, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be addressed to Gretchen Muency, Senior 
Enforcement Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I, 
One Congress Street, Suite 1100 (SES), Boston, Massachusetts 02114-2023 
(Telephone No. 617-918-1896) and should refer to: In re: Grugnale 
Waste/Drum Disposal Superfund Site, U.S. EPA Docket No. 01-2008-0061.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A copy of the proposed settlement may 
be obtained from Gretchen Muench, Senior Enforcement Counsel, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Region I, One Congress Street, Suite 
1100 (SES), Boston, Massachusetts 02114-2023 (Telephone No. 617-918-
1896; E-mail [email protected]).

    Dated: July 29, 2008.
James T. Owens, III,
Director, Office of Site Remediation and Restoration.
[FR Doc. E8-19089 Filed 8-15-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
```
18588.

#### Davis *v.*Deariso *et al.*

Argued May 11, 1954

Decided June 14, 1954.

*W. J. Forehand, E. L. Smith,*for plaintiff in error.

*S. B. Lippitt, P. B. Ford,*contra.

Hawkins, Justice.

1. In the absence of valid zoning regulations or restrictive covenants to the contrary, the right to use one’s property for lawful business purposes is to be protected by the law just as much as is the right to use one’s property for residential purposes, both being lawful purposes and being rights inherent in the ownership of the property. This court has consistently held, although in most instances by a divided bench, that a filling station in a residence neighborhood and in close proximity to residences does not constitute a nuisance per se, and that the proper operation of such filling station with its usual, natural, and necessary noises, odors, reflection of lights in adjoining residences, increased fire hazards, and consequent depreciation of the value of adjoining residential property, and the annoyances and inconveniences to adjacent residents and landowners do not make of filling stations operated in the usual and orderly way a nuisance per accidens, the construction and operation of which in a lawful manner will be enjoined by a court of equity. *Standard Oil Co.*v. *Kahn,*165 *Ga.*575 (141 S. E. 643); *Thompson*v. *Texas Co.,*166 *Ga.*315 (143 S. E. 376); *Wilson*v. *Evans Hotel Co.,*188 *Ga.*498 (4 S. E. 2d 155, 124 A. L. R. 373); *Rushing*v. *Thigpen,*200 *Ga.*313 (37 S. E. 2d 180).

2. While the petition in the instant case, brought by the owners of residences adjoining and in close proximity to the property of the defendant, to enjoin the defendant from constructing a filling station upon his property in a residential section, has been ably and painstakingly prepared and has practically exhausted the English language in describing the objectionable and annoying features of a filling-station business operated in a residential section, it contains no allegation in this respect which has not heretofore been made in some former petition before this court, seeking to enjoin the erection or operation of a filling station in a residential section; and under the rulings in the cases above cited, as applied to the allegations here, the petition failed to state a cause of action, and the trial judge erred in overruling the general demurrer thereto.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, P. J., who dissents.*
THEATI-ORNEYGENEEZAL 

OFTEXAS 

AUSTIN. TEXAS 78711 

November 15, 1963 

Honorable William H. Hunter Cninion NO. c-178 

District Attorney 

69th Judicial District 

Dalhart, Texas 

Re: 

Dear Mr. Hunter: 

Construction of House Bill 

3959 Acts 196& 58th Leg, p 

R.S., Ch. 327, pa 857. 

We are in receipt of your request for opinion regarding 

our construction of House Bill 395 of the 58th Legislature, codified as Article 6252-14 of Vernon’s Civil Statutes. The Commissioners’ Court of Deaf Smith County is considering the establishment 

of a retirement program for county employees age 65 and desires our 

opinion in connection with House Bill 395. 

House Bill 395 of the 58th Legislature states as follows: 

“Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the 

policy of the State of Texas that Do nerson shall 

be denied the iaht to wo rk, to earn a living, and 

to support himielf and his family solely because of 

&ggo 

“Sec. 2. & agency, board, commission, department, or institution of the government of the State 

of Texas, nor any gplitical subdivision of the Stcitizen of this Stat: be denied employment by any such 

agency, board, commission, department or institution 

or any political subdivision of the State of Texas 

solely because of age; provided. hovever. not,- 

not aonlv to institutions of higher education with established retirement rwoRramsqll (Emphasis added) 

In Section 1 of the statute in question the Legislature 

has declared it to be the policy of the State that no person shall 

be refused employment solely because of age. Seetion 2 of the Act 

places maximum and minimum limits on the State or it8 subdivisions 

-872- 
Hon. William H. Hunter, page 2 (C-178) 

in using age alone as a 

Commissioners~ Court of 

basis for denial of employment. Since the 

Deaf Smith County does not desire to place 

the maximum age limit under sixty-five years of age, it is clear 

that they may do so within the provisions of House Bill 395’. The 

only restriction on the maximum age limit which they must consider 

in the establishment of their retirement program 1s~ that the age 

for conrnulsorg retirement cannot be under sixty-five years. 

The CommissionersP Court of Deaf Smith County 

may establish a retirement program for county employees as long as the age for compulsory retirement 

is not under sixty-five years, Articie 6252-14, 

V.C.S. 

F'DW:wb 

APPROVEDs 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Malcolm Quick 

Mary K. Wall 

James M. Strock 

Yours very truly, 

WAGGONER CARR 

Attorney Gener 

Fred D. Ward 

Assistant 

APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BYs Stanton Stone 

. .
#### State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Jerry Barker, appellant.

178 N. W. 2d 270

Filed June 19, 1970.

No. 37482.

Yost, Schafersman, Yost & Lamme, for appellant.

Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General, and Ralph H. Gillan, for appellee.

*660Heard before Spencer, Boslaugh, Smith, McCown, and' Newton, JJ., and Colwell, District Judge.

Boslaugh, J.

The defendant appeals from a sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment after conviction upon his plea of guilty to malicious destruction of property. The assignments of error allege that the sentence was excessive.

The record shows that following the arraignment, the matter was continued for pre-sentence investigation. The pre-sentence report does not appear in the record. The record does indicate that other charges pending against the defendant were dismissed as a result of the defendant’s plea of guilty to the charge of malicious destruction of property.

The sentence imposed in this state was within the limits prescribed by the statute. § 28-572, R. R. S. 1943. There is no evidence to support the defendant’s contention that the sentence was excessive. A sentence within the limits prescribed by statute will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Sheldon, 179 Neb. 377, 138 N. W. 2d 428.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed.