NUMBER 13-22-00384-CR

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

DAVID MICHAEL ISASSI, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 105th District Court 

of Kleberg County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

Appellant David Michael Isassi appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his 

community supervision, adjudicating him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon, a second-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), and 

sentencing him to twenty years’ imprisonment. In one issue, Isassi argues his twenty-year 
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sentence is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. 

amend VIII. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A grand jury returned an indictment charging Isassi with two counts of aggravated 

assault. The first count alleged that Isassi caused bodily injury to the complainant while 

using or exhibiting a hammer. See id. The second count alleged that Isassi threatened

the complainant with imminent bodily injury while using or exhibiting a knife. See id. Isassi

pleaded guilty to count two pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange for the State’s 

recommendation to dismiss count one. The trial court accepted Isassi’s guilty plea,

ordered the dismissal of count one, and placed Isassi on deferred adjudication-community 

supervision for seven years. 

The trial court later held a hearing on the State’s second amended motion to revoke 

community supervision and adjudicate guilt, during which the State proceeded on the 

following alleged violations: 1 (1) failing to abide by zero tolerance supervision; 

(2) possessing a firearm; (3) tampering with evidence; (4) associating with persons of 

disreputable or harmful character; (5) admitting to marijuana use; (6–7) testing positive 

for cocaine and marijuana; (8) failing to report to Isassi’s community supervision officer; 

(9) failure to submit to a urinalysis; and (10–19) failing to pay court costs, fines, and fees.

Isassi pleaded not true to each alleged violation.

1 The State filed two previous motions to revoke and adjudicate guilt, which resulted in the trial 

court amending the conditions of Isassi’s community supervision. We renumber the allegations set out in 

the State’s live motion to reflect its abandonment of four counts.
3

After hearing evidence, the trial court found the allegations that Isassi tampered 

with evidence and tested positive for cocaine and marijuana not true. The trial court found 

true the remaining allegations. The trial court revoked Isassi’s community supervision, 

adjudicated him guilty for aggravated assault, and sentenced Isassi to twenty years’

imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II. CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

The Eighth Amendment—made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment—prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments, which includes 

extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Graham v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 48, 58–60 (2010); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be 

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); id. 

amend. XIV. An allegation of excessive or disproportionate punishment is a legal claim 

based on a “narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the crime 

and the sentence.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing 

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). A successful 

challenge to proportionality is exceedingly rare and requires a finding of “gross 

disproportionality.” Id. at 322–23 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). To 

determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, “a court must judge the 

severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the 

culpability of the offender, and the offender’s prior adjudicated and unadjudicated 

offenses.” Id. at 323 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60). “In the rare case in which this 
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threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, the court should 

then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders 

in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 

jurisdictions.” Id. “If this comparative analysis validates an initial judgment that the 

sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual.” Id.

“Only twice has the Supreme Court held that a non-capital sentence imposed on 

an adult was constitutionally disproportionate.” Id. (first citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 

277 (1983) (holding that life imprisonment without parole was a grossly disproportionate 

sentence for the crime of uttering a no-account check for $100); and then citing Weems 

v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that fifteen years punishment in a prison 

camp was grossly disproportionate to the crime of falsifying a public record)). A trial 

court’s discretion to assess punishment within the statutory range is essentially 

unfettered. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Generally, 

punishment assessed within the statutory limits is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See 

Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. 

ref’d). Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a second-degree felony punishable by 

imprisonment “for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years.” TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 12.33(a).

B. Preservation

“[We] may not reverse a judgment of conviction without first addressing the issue 

of error preservation.” Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (first 

citing Gipson v. State, 383 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); and then citing
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Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). To preserve a 

complaint that a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must 

present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds 

for the ruling desired. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Navarro v. State, 588 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2019, no pet.) (holding that to preserve a disproportionate-sentencing complaint, the 

defendant must make a timely, specific objection in the trial court or raise the issue in a 

motion for new trial); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (same).

C. Analysis

Isassi did not object in the trial court that his sentence was disproportionate to the 

offense charged or unconstitutional in any manner. Furthermore, the trial court’s twentyyear sentence falls within the statutory punishment range for a second-degree felony. 

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33(a). Accordingly, we hold that Isassi failed to preserve 

this complaint for our review. See Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927–28 (“Because the sentence 

imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude that the rights 

[appellant] asserts for the first time on appeal are not so fundamental as to have relieved 

him of the necessity of a timely, specific trial objection.”). 

Even if we were to address Isassi’s Eighth Amendment claim and assume a 

threshold inference of disproportionality, he presented no evidence in the trial court, and 

presents no argument on appeal, “compar[ing] [his] sentence with the sentences received 

by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same 
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crime in other jurisdictions.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. Absent this comparative 

analysis, we are unable to conclude that the sentences are grossly disproportionate. See 

id.; Quick v. State, 557 S.W.3d 775, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet ref’d)

(concluding that twenty-year sentence for aggravated assault was not grossly 

disproportionate); see also Esquivel v. State, No. 13-21-00179-CR, 2022 WL 17492274, 

at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 8, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge where appellant 

offered no comparative evidence of sentences received by other offenders). We overrule 

Isassi’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

L. ARON PEÑA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the

8th day of June, 2023.