IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RANDY COKER, :

 :

Plaintiff, : C.A. No. K14C-07-013 JJC

 : (Consolidated)

 v. : In and For Kent County

 :

REBECCA TENNEY-ANDREWS :

and DEBORAH WALNICKI, et al :

 :

Defendants. :

ORDER

Submitted: October 21, 2016

Decided: November 10, 2016

On this 10th day of November, 2016, having considered Defendant Rebecca 

Tenney-Andrew’s (hereinafter “Andrews’s”) Motion for Summary Judgment and the 

Plaintiff Randy Coker’s (herein “Coker’s”) response in opposition thereto, it appears 

that:

1. Before the Court is Andrews’ Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to 

Superior Court Civil Rule 56. The facts cited herein are those viewed in the light 

most favorable to Coker as the non-movant. On July 20, 2012, Coker was driving 

his car on Route 1 Southbound when an accident occurred in front of him. To avoid 

hitting the vehicles involved in the accident, he stopped his car. Andrews was driving 

behind Coker and stopped quickly but avoided striking him. A third vehicle, driven 

by Defendant Deborah Walnicki (hereinafter “Defendant Walnicki”), was driving 

behind Andrews and was unable to bring her car to a stop before striking the rear of 

Andrews’ vehicle. This, in turn, pushed Andrews’ vehicle into Coker’s vehicle, 
2

causing him personal injury. Coker subsequently filed a negligence suit against both 

Andrews and Defendant Walnicki.

2. Coker’s complaint alleges that Andrews and Defendant Walnicki were joint 

tortfeasors and that their separately negligent acts proximately caused the collision. 

Specifically, Coker alleges that Andrews stopped her vehicle too abruptly with too 

short of a stopping distance. Furthermore, Coker alleges that the two defendants 

were negligent in that they followed the vehicles in front of them too closely, were 

traveling at an unsafe speed, failed to keep a proper lookout, drove in a careless 

and/or inattentive manner, and drove recklessly. Andrews filed a motion for 

summary judgment alleging that she was not negligent, as a matter of law, because 

she was able to completely stop her car before Defendant Walnicki struck the rear of 

her vehicle and pushed her into Coker. Defendant Walnicki, who has cross-claims 

against Andrews, does not oppose the motion for summary judgment. 

3. In support of her motion, Andrews emphasizes her deposition testimony where 

she testified that she completely stopped her car before then being pushed into 

Coker’s car. She also emphasized the separate deposition testimony of both Coker 

and Defendant Walnicki in which the other two drivers admit that they do not know 

whether or not Andrews’ car completely stopped before Defendant Walnicki struck it.

4. In response to Andrews’ motion, Coker contends that there are several material 

facts still in dispute. First, Coker contends that the timing of the events surrounding 

the accident remain in dispute because the only evidence that Andrews stopped 

comes from her own testimony. Furthermore, he argues that there is a dispute

regarding the final resting place of the vehicles after the accident which generates a 

dispute as to the mechanics of the collision. Coker also points to the fact of record 

that Andrews admitted she pressed the brakes quickly and was using a GPS system 

for the first time to reach a new destination. Coker also emphasizes that Defendant 

Walnicki claimed in an interrogatory response that Andrews “slammed on her 
3

brakes” in front of her. Defendant Walnicki also separately testified in a deposition 

that it seemed as though Andrews slammed on her brakes. Finally, Andrews 

admitted in her deposition that she braked quickly. Coker argues that a reasonable 

inference from this evidence is that Andrews was not paying attention while driving

and that she maneuvered her car unsafely, thus also proximately causing Coker’s 

injuries.

5. Summary judgment is appropriate if, when viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.”1In doing so, the Court must accept all undisputed 

factual assertions and accept the nonmoving party’s version of any disputed 

facts.2The burden is on the moving party to show that there are no material facts in 

dispute.3 When the facts of record “permit a reasonable person to draw only one 

inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter of law.”4 However, the 

Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.5

6. Delaware courts consistently recognize that issues of negligence are generally 

not appropriate for a decision at the summary judgment stage.6The Delaware 

 

1

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).

2

Sztybel v. Walgreen Co., 2011 WL 2623930, at *2 (Del. Super., June 29, 2011).

3 Moore, 405 A.2d at 680.

4

Friel v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1813293, at *2 (Del. Super. May 6, 2014) aff’d Friel v. 

Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 108 A.3d 1225 (Del. 2015) (citing Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 

1967)). 

5 Direct Capital Corporation v. Ultrafine Technologies, Inc., 2012 WL 1409392, at *1 (Del. Super. 

Jan. 3, 2012) (citing Merrill v. Crothall—American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 100 (Del. 1992)).

6

E.g., Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469 (Del. 1962); Rollins v. Thomas, 2007 WL 

710101, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 2000).
4

Supreme Court also recognizes that “questions of proximate cause except in rare 

cases are questions of fact ordinarily to be submitted to the jury for decision.”7 Of 

course, this does not mean that a negligence suit will never be dismissed on a motion 

for summary judgment. As Andrews cites in her motion, Delaware courts find

summary judgment to be appropriate in negligence cases where it is clear there are no 

material facts in dispute.8 Consequently, while it is difficult to obtain summary 

judgment on a negligence case, it is not impossible. 

7. Andrews correctly argues that there is no evidence of record that she failed to 

completely stop her vehicle before it struck Coker. Coker seems to argue that 

because the other two eyewitnesses (himself and Walnicki) could not confirm or deny 

that fact, there remains a genuine issue of material fact. To the contrary, where there 

is no evidence of record to dispute that Andrews brought her vehicle to a stop before 

the impact to her rear pushed her into Coker, there is no genuine issue as to that 

material fact. Separate and apart from that, however, genuine issues of material fact 

remain when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Coker. Namely, 

there is a permissible inference, in this deferential light, that Andrews stopped too 

quickly (i.e. “slammed on her brakes in front of Defendant Walnicki”). Coker argues 

that from this admissible evidence, a reasonable inference can be drawn that Andrews

was following too closely and was not paying attention while driving. The Court 

finds that such evidence of record, when viewed in such a deferential light, could lead 

a reasonable jury to conclude that Andrews was following Coker too closely, was 

travelling at an unsafe speed that made it impossible for Andrews to stop without 

 

7

Ebersole, 180 A.2d at 469.

8

See, e.g., Raczkowski v. Devlin, 2011 WL 5042064 (Del. Super. Oct. 10, 2011) (granting summary 

judgment for a defendant in a negligence case because no issue of material fact remained in 

dispute).
5

slamming on her breaks, and that Andrews did not keep a proper lookout and was 

inattentive in her driving. 

8. Andrews argues that the inference Coker identifies is speculative and 

unreasonable. In support of this position, she cites Smith v. Haldeman, which 

similarly involved a three car collision.9In the Smith case, the driver of the lead car, 

sued the driver of the second and third vehicles.10 As in the case at hand, it was 

undisputed that the second car came to a stop before the collision occurred.11 In an 

attempt to avoid summary judgment, the Plaintiff (hereinafter “Smith”) cited two 

facts in support of an inference of the second vehicle’s negligence.12 Namely, Smith 

argued the second driver was negligent because she failed to stop at a safe distance 

from Smith and that the second driver improperly changed lanes at some unspecified 

point before the collision.13 This evidence, in addition to the fact that there was a 

collision did not support a reasonable inference of negligence.14 The Court held that 

“[t]he mere fact that there was a collision is insufficient to prove negligence. Just 

because Haldeman hit Smith’s car or Haldeman was behind Plaintiff with a distance 

less than the statutory safe distance, doe [sic] not mean Haldeman acted unreasonable 

or was following too closely.”15 The previous change of lanes also did not support 

such an inference.16 Moreover, the deposition testimony of all the drivers involved in 

 

9

2012 WL 3611895 (Del. Super. Aug. 21, 2012). 

10 Id. at *1.

11 Id. at *2.

12 Id. 

13 Id.

14 Id. at 3. 

15 Id.

16Id.
6

the accident established that the second driver acted reasonably.17 As such, there was 

not a material fact in dispute and the second driver defendant was entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. 

9. The current case is distinguishable from the Smith case. Here, there is 

evidence from Defendant Walnicki that Andrews slammed on her breaks to avoid 

hitting Coker’s car. Testimony also comes from Andrews herself that she stopped 

quickly. A reasonable inference from the fact that Andrews had to brake quickly is 

that she was following too closely and that this alleged negligence contributed to the 

collision.

10. Coker also notes that Andrews was using a GPS system for the first time to 

reach a new location. From this, Coker argues that a reasonable inference arises that

Andrews was driving inattentively. While there is deposition testimony that she used 

the GPS while driving, there is no testimony that she was adjusting or otherwise 

engaged with the GPS system at the time of the accident. There is nothing in the 

record that indicates she was operating her GPS in a way that would contribute to a 

reasonable inference that she was driving inattentively. 

11. Finally, Coker’s argument regarding the potential relevance and inferences 

involved in the final resting place of the vehicles does not weigh into the court’s 

decision. Coker did not identify any reasonable inference from the evidence that 

could flow from the vehicles’ final resting place. Under the particular circumstances 

of this case, in the absence of any proffered expert reconstructionist testimony, Coker 

did not identify any relevance of the post-accident vehicle positions. Consequently, 

the fact that the parties dispute where their cars came to rest after the accident is not a 

material fact factoring into the Court’s decision to deny Andrews motion for 

summary judgment. 

 

17 Id.
7

12. The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that chain reaction car 

accidents, such as the one involved here, are generally not suitable for summary 

judgment.

18 Namely, in Ebersole v. Lowengrub, the Court held with regard to a chain 

reaction rear-end collision, that the matter was best “ we think, to be resolved as a 

whole by a jury . . .” requiring all parties’ negligence and proximate cause to be 

submitted to a jury to consider in light of the entire series of events.19 In a situation 

involving alleged joint tortfeasors involved in a rear-end collision, a car allegedly 

stopping too suddenly could proximately contribute to the chain reaction, even if that 

car does not strike the vehicle in front of it under its own power. Ebersole had some 

factual differences to the case at hand, but its recognition of the general 

inappropriateness of dismissing defendants from chain reaction automobile cases on 

summary judgment is instructive. 

13. Here, a reasonable inference could be drawn by a reasonable jury that 

Andrews acted negligently and her negligent actions were one proximate cause of 

Coker’s injuries. Accordingly, there are material facts still in dispute, and Andrews is 

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Defendant Andrew’s motion is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

/s/Jeffrey J Clark

 Judge

 

18 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d at 471 (Del. 1962). Andrews also cites Raczkowski v. Devlin, 

2011 WL 5042064 (Del. Super. Oct. 10 2011). That case involved a bicycle being pushed into the 

path of the defendant, without warning. Id. at *1. In that case, unlike the case at hand, there was no 

evidence of negligent conduct on behalf of the striking vehicle that could even have remotely 

included an inference that such conduct proximately contributed to the collision. Id. at *3.

19 Ebersole, 180 A.2d at 471.