alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          55,889
<SECURITIES>                                    24,661
<RECEIVABLES>                                      276
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                81,277
<PP&E>                                           3,278
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,151
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  85,129
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,083
<BONDS>                                          1,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            13
<OTHER-SE>                                      80,006
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    85,129
<SALES>                                            194
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   675
<CGS>                                               56
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   17,566
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 143
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (15,701)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        16
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (15,717)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (15,717)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.59)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.59)
        

</TABLE>
#### Martin ESCARDO-NACIANCENO, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 01-71586. INS No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 16, 2003.

Decided Feb. 11, 2003.

Before HUG, ALARCÓN and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Petitioner Martin Escardo-Nacianceno (“Escardo”), a Philippines citizen, seeks review of the denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of deportation. He contends that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred by finding that internal relocation within the Philippines was a reasonable way to avoid future persecution. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), and we deny the petition for review.

Escardo argues that he is entitled to asylum and withholding of deportation because he has a well-founded fear of persecution from the New People’s Army (“NPA”), a communist guerrilla organization operating in the Philippines. The BIA found that internal relocation was reasonable for Escardo and that he had failed to carry his burden of proof in demonstrating that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution.

*194Because the facts are known to the parties, we do not recite them here.

Even if we were to find that Escardo suffered past persecution, entitling him to the rebuttable presumption of future persecution, we hold that his fear of future persecution is not well founded because the INS has carried its burden by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it is reasonable for him to relocate internally within the Philippines.

No evidence was presented to show that, after the eight years he has been gone, the NPA is still interested in him. In fact, Escardo’s wife and children have remained in different parts of the Philippines for the past eight years without incident. *See Cuadras v. INS,*910 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir.1990) (stating that appellant’s claims were undercut by the fact that his father and brother have not been harmed and remained in El Salvador for five years). The State Department’s report on conditions in the Philippines shows that the NPA number fewer than 8,000 members, are diminishing in size and resources, and have a significant presence in less than two percent of the country, principally in the southern Island of Mindanao. Finally, Escardo testified that while working in other areas of the Philippines, including Legaspi, he had no problems with the NPA.

PETITION DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
================================================================================

                                  EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection  with the Annual Report of Paradigm  Medical  Industries,
Inc. (the  "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2007, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Raymond P.L.  Cannefax,  President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge
and belief:

      (a)  the Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
           15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (b)  the  information  contained  in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
           material respect, the financial condition and result of operations of
           the Company.




                                        /s/ Raymond P.L. Cannefax
                                        --------------------------------------
Date: May 15, 2008                      Raymond P.L. Cannefax
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer






--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EX-34 (a)
(logo) ERNST & YOUNG

Ernst & Young LLP
Sears Tower
233 S. Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606

Phone: (312) 879-2000
www.ey.com

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying Management
Assessment of Compliance with Applicable Servicing Criteria, that ABN AMRO
Mortgage Group, Inc. ("AAMG" or "the Company"), a wholly owned subsidiary of
LaSalle Bank Midwest National Association, complied with the servicing criteria
set forth in Item 1122 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
Regulation AB for individual residential mortgage-backed transactions subsequent
to January 1, 2006 where AAMG has been appointed servicer and where the pool
assets for such transactions, serviced by AAMG, reside on its Fidelity loan
servicing system ("the Platform") as of and for the year ended December 31,
2006, except for those criteria which the Company has determined are not
applicable to the activities performed by them with respect to the Platform
covered by this report. See Appendix A of management's assertion for a list of
servicing criteria determined by the Company to be applicable to the activities
performed by them with respect to the Platform. Management is responsible for
the Company's compliance with those servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to
express an opinion on management's assertion about the Company's compliance with
the servicing criteria based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with standards of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining,
on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the applicable
servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered
necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of less than
all of the individual mortgage transactions that comprise the platform, testing
of less than all of the servicing activities related to the Platform, and
determining whether the Company processed those selected transactions and
performed those selected activities in compliance with the servicing criteria.
Furthermore, our procedures were limited to the selected transactions and
servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this
report. Our procedures were not designed to determine whether errors may have
occurred either prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the
balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period
covered by this report for the selected transactions or any other transactions.
We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our
examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company's compliance
with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company complied with the
aforementioned servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2006
for the Platform is fairly stated, in all material respects.


/s/ Ernst & Young LLP

February 27, 2007


A Member Practice of Ernst & Young Global
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRISTOBAL GONON TZUN,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney

General,

Respondent. No. 16

- 73897

Agency No. A070

- 939

- 711

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 22, 2018 **

Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Cristobal Gonon Tzun, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the Board o f Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his motion to reopen deportation

proceedings conducted in absentia. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 29 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 73897

§ 1252. We review for abuse of discre tion the denial of a motion to reopen and

review de novo constitutional claims. Mohammed v. Gonzales , 400 F.3d 785, 791

-

92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion or violate du e process in denying

Gonon Tzun’s motion to reopen for failure to establish lack of notice of his

deportation h e aring, where the record contains a signed Order to Show Cause

(“OSC”) and evidence of personal service

. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2)

(a motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order may be filed at any time if the

alien demonstrates lack of notice of his hearing); 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2) (1994)

(requiring written notice of the time and place of proceedings be personally served

on the alien or if personal service is not practicable, requiring written noti ce be

given by certified mail). The record does not support Gonon Tzun’s contention that

the agency failed to consider evidenc e. See Najmabadi v. Holder , 597 F.3d 983,

990 (9th Cir. 201 0) ; Fernandez v. Gonzales , 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006)

(petitioner did not overcome the presumption that the BIA did review the record)

.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Gonon Tzun’s unexhausted contention that

service was improper because the OSC was not read to him in a language he could

understand. See Tijani v. Holder , 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We lack

jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative

proceedings before the BIA.”).3 16

- 73897

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
#### Carlos Isidro CONTRERAS-MARROQUIN, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Respondent.

No. 02-71523.

INS No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 20, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument, and denies Contrera-Marroquin’s request for oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Carlos Isidro Contreras-Marroquin, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“Convention”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review.

We review for substantial evidence a determination that an applicant has not established eligibility for asylum, and must uphold that decision unless the evidence compels a contrary result. *Molina-Mor*
      *233
      *ales v. INS,*237 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). We review de novo due process challenges to final orders of removal. *Sanchez-Cruz v. INS,*255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Contreras-Marroquin failed to establish past persecution on account political opinion, imputed political opinion, or membership in a social group. *See Molina-Morales,*237 F.3d at 1051-52.

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Contreras-Marroquin failed to demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of persecution in light of current country conditions. *See Kazlauskas v. INS,*46 F.3d 902, 906 n. 3 (9th Cir.1995) (“Fundamental social or political changes in the applicant’s homeland are highly relevant to the likelihood of future persecution”).

Because Contreras-Marroquin failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See id.*at 907.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Contreras-Marroquin failed to show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon returning to Guatemala, and therefore was not entitled to relief under the Convention. *See Kamalthas v. INS,*251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.2001).

The BIA properly concluded that the IJ did not deprive Contreras-Marroquin of due process by conducting the asylum hearing before Contreras-Marroquin obtained counsel because the IJ granted Contreras-Marroquin three continuances and over four months to obtain counsel. *See Vides-Vides v. INS,*783 F.2d 1463, 1469-70 (9th Cir.1986).

Contreras-Marroquin’s motion to abate the appeal pending the disposition of his motion to reopen before the BIA is denied. *See Stone v. INS,*514 U.S. 386, 394-95, 115 S.Ct 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE O F FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME E XPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

DA RIUS DESHAUN POOLE , A ppellant ,

v. Case No. 5D 22

- 1153 LT Case No. 2016

- CF

- 28593

STAT E OF FLORIDA ,

Appellee

. ________________________________/

Decision filed September 27, 2022 3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County , Lis a Da vids on , Judge.

Matthew R. Mc L ain, of McLain Law, P.A. , Longwood, for Appellant. Ashley M oody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan , Ass istan t Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. LAMBERT, C .J., WALLIS and EDWARDS , JJ. , concur.
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Michael P. Howard, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and AccountingOfficer), certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A ofWebco Industries, Inc.; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report; 

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:        a) Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;        b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of theend of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and        c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant'sauditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):        a) All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting whichare reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and        b) Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant'sinternal control over financial reporting. 

Date: March 4, 2004 

/s/ Michael P. Howard Michael P. HowardChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.47


SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


This Second Amendment (“Amendment”) to the March 18, 2013 Employment Agreement (“Employment Agreement”) by and among Michelle Bryan (the “Executive”), Intelsat S.A. and Intelsat Management LLC is entered into by the undersigned parties.


WHEREAS, effective on or about December 24, 2018, Intelsat Management LLC will merge with and into Intelsat US LLC, with Intelsat US LLC being the surviving company (the “Merger”); and


WHEREAS, following the Merger, the Executive’s employment will be transferred from Intelsat Management LLC to Intelsat US LLC.


NOW THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
		
	1.
	Effective as of the consummation of the Merger, the Executive’s employment is transferred from Intelsat Management LLC to Intelsat US LLC, and the rights and obligations of Intelsat Management LLC under the Employment Agreement are hereby assigned to Intelsat US LLC.  All references in the Employment Agreement to the Company shall be deemed to refer to Intelsat US LLC.


		
	2.
	The effectiveness of this Amendment is subject to the consummation of the Merger.




		
	3.
	As amended and modified by this Amendment, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. For the sake of clarity, Executive agrees that the modifications provided in this Amendment shall not give Executive grounds to terminate his employment or the Employment Agreement for Good Reason (as defined in the Employment Agreement). 




		
	4.
	If there is any conflict between the terms of the Employment Agreement and this Amendment, the terms of this Amendment shall prevail. 






IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of December 24, 2018.




INTELSAT S.A.


By:     /s/ Stephen Spengler
Name: Stephen Spengler
Title: Chief Executive Officer




INTELSAT MANAGEMENT LLC


By:     /s/ Jacques Kerrest
Name: Jacques Kerrest
Title: Manager


INTELSAT US LLC


By:     /s/ Stephen Spengler
Name: Stephen Spengler 
Title: Chief Executive Officer




THE EXECUTIVE


/s/ Michelle Bryan
Michelle Bryan
#### Murray Hilton v. State.

No. 24974.

November 15, 1950.

Rehearing Denied (Without Written Opinion) January 17,1951.

*394
      *Percy Foreman,*Houston, (on motion for rehearing only) for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

WOODLEY, Judge.

Appellant was found guilty of the offense of assault with intent to murder with malice, under a count of the indictment charging such an assault by shooting a gun into a private residence. The jury assessed the punishment at 10 years in the penitentiary.

The injured party, Myrtle Payne, and appellant, though not married, had been living together. They separated, and Myrtle Payne went to live with her sister in an upstairs apartment.

Appellant came to the apartment at night, armed with a shotgun, which he testified he had for the purpose of threatening suicide if Myrtle refused to return to him. Myrtle was sleeping on a pallet. Lonnie Bess, the owner of the apartment, went to the door and told appellant that Myrtle did not care to see him. Appellant fired through the screen door, the shot striking Myrtle Payne in the region of the lower back and buttocks, as she lay on the pallet. Some of the shot were removed at the hospital and others were not removed because of their depth in the body.

Appellant testified that he fired into the floor, without any intent to hit anyone, and that he did not see Myrtle and did not know she was on the pallet on the floor.

Bess testified that appellant asked him if that was Myrtle laying on the pallet, and immediately fired when told that it was.

The court properly submitted the issues thus raised and the jury by their verdict decided against appellant’s contention.

*395By this Bill of Exception No. 1, appellant complains that the court refused to submit the law of self-defense in his charge. The trial court in his qualification to this bill expresses the opinion that such issue was not raised by the evidence. We are in accord with the trial court’s view, and find no error shown by this bill.

The remaining bill of exception complains of the argument of the district attorney wherein he said “within six months after he comes out of the penitentiary he commits this offense.” This bill is insufficient to show reversible error.

It is not shown that the argument complained of was not provoked or invited by the argument of appellant’s counsel. See Trammell v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 173, 232, S.W. 2d 719.

Also appellant’s objection was sustained by the court, the remark withdrawn by the district attorney, and the court instructed the jury that the evidence as to prior conviction was admitted solely on the question of the credibility of the witness.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.