Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1

JOHN CRANE, INC. 

v. Record No. 062164 OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 

 ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 September 14, 2007 

WANDA T. JONES, ADMINISTRATRIX 

OF THE ESTATE OF GARLAND F. JONES, JR. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

C. Peter Tench, Judge 

Garland F. Jones, Jr. was employed as an outside machinist 

at Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company from 1963 to 

1967. In January 2005, he was diagnosed with malignant 

mesothelioma, a fatal cancer in the lining of the lung which is 

caused only by exposure to asbestos dust or fibers. On March 

22, 2005, Garland and Wanda T. Jones filed an amended motion 

for judgment against John Crane, Inc. (Crane) and other 

companies, alleging that Crane manufactured and/or sold 

asbestos-containing products to Garland Jones' employers, and 

that he was exposed to these products while building and 

repairing various marine vessels.2

 The Joneses sought $10 

 1

 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 

August 16, 2007. 

2

 In addition to John Crane, the complaint named the 

following parties as defendants: Garlock Sealing Technologies, 

LLC; Dana Corporation; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; 

General Electric Company; Foster-Wheeling USA Corporation; 

Warren Pumps, Inc.; Goulds Pumps, Inc.; Borg-Warner 

Corporation; Honeywell International, Inc.; Pneumo Abex 
2

million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive 

damages. Garland Jones died in July of 2005. Wanda Jones, as 

administratrix of the estate of Garland F. Jones, Jr., (the 

Estate) filed a second amended motion for judgment adding a 

wrongful death count.

Following a seven day trial, the jury returned a verdict 

in favor of the Estate awarding $10.4 million in damages. The 

jury apportioned 34 percent of the damages to Crane, and the 

remaining 66 percent equally between two other defendant 

companies. The trial court reduced the damage award to $10 

million to conform to the amount sought in the motion for 

judgment. Crane's damage liability amounted to $3.4 million. 

Crane appeals to this Court asserting that the judgment 

should be reversed and the case remanded on four separate 

grounds. Crane first assigns error to the trial court's 

refusal to set aside the jury verdict as excessive. In two 

other assignments of error, Crane challenges the trial court's 

evidentiary rulings regarding the testimony of a Crane employee 

and two of Crane's expert witnesses. Finally, Crane asserts 

that the trial court should have applied Virginia law, rather 

than general maritime law. For the following reasons, we 

 

Corporation; General Motors Corporation; and Genuine Parts 

Company. None of these defendants are parties to this appeal. 
3

conclude that there was no error in the challenged rulings and 

we therefore will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

DISCUSSION

I. MARITIME LAW 

We first address Crane's assertion that the trial court 

erred in applying general maritime law to the Estate's action.3 

Whether general maritime law applies to this case presents a 

question of law which we review de novo. 

The application of general maritime law has evolved from a 

simple "location test," under which maritime law "govern[ed] 

only those torts occurring on the navigable waters of the 

United States," Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 

205 (1971), to a location and connection test, initially 

established in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990), and most 

recently discussed in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes 

Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995). In Grubart, the United 

States Supreme Court explained that a party seeking to apply 

maritime law to a case 

must satisfy conditions both of location and of 

connection with maritime activity. A court applying 

the location test must determine whether the tort 

occurred on navigable water or whether injury 

suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable 

water. The connection test raises two issues. A 

 3

 Under general maritime law, the Estate was allowed to 

recover damages for pain and suffering in addition to the 

damages authorized by Code § 8.01-52 in a wrongful death 

action. Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 583 (1974). 
4

court, first, must assess the general features of the 

type of incident involved, to determine whether the 

incident has a potentially disruptive impact on 

maritime commerce. Second, a court must determine 

whether the general character of the activity giving 

rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship 

to traditional maritime activity. 

Id. at 534 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

As the parties recognize, the location prong of the test 

is met in this case because the incident giving rise to Garland 

Jones' injury, inhalation of asbestos, occurred while repairing 

and constructing ships at the Newport News Shipyards in the 

James River. However, according to Crane neither prong of the 

connection test is met because the inhalation of asbestos does 

not have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce 

and because Crane's activity in the manufacture of asbestoscontaining products did not have a substantial relationship to 

traditional maritime activity. We disagree. 

In applying the first prong of the connection test the 

impact of the incident is evaluated "at an intermediate level 

of possible generality" in order to determine whether the 

incident is "within a class of incidents that posed more than a 

fanciful risk to commercial shipping." Grubart, 513 U.S. at 

538-39 (citations omitted). The disruptive impact need only be 

potential, not actual. Id.

Applying the test enunciated in Sisson and Grubart, other 

courts have concluded that exposure to asbestos came within the 
5

general category of the risks of unsafe working conditions that 

have a potential impact on commercial shipping. In Lambert v. 

Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 70 F.Supp.2d 877, 884 (S.D. Ind. 1999), 

the court observed that "[u]nsafe working conditions aboard a 

vessel have consistently been held to pose a potentially 

disruptive impact upon maritime commerce." The Lambert Court 

concluded that "asbestos exposure in the boiler room of a ship 

– could potentially disrupt maritime commerce by rendering the 

boiler room too hazardous to operate." Id. See also Bartel v. 

A-C Product Liability Trust, 461 F.Supp.2d 600, 602 (N.D. Ohio 

2006) (claim based on merchant seaman's exposure to asbestos 

while aboard a vessel was governed under admiralty law); Weaver 

v. Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc., 255 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir. 

2001) ("[W]ithout doubt an injury to . . . crew [of a 

"commercial boat"] disrupts its participation in maritime 

commerce."); Alderman v. Pacific Northern Victor, Inc., 95 F.3d 

1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Unsafe working conditions aboard 

a vessel under repairs, maintenance, or conversion, therefore, 

pose a potentially disruptive impact upon maritime commerce."); 

Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 

1995) ("[W]orker injuries, particularly to those involved in 

repair and maintenance, can have a disruptive impact on 

maritime commerce by stalling or delaying the primary activity 

of the vessel."). 
6

 Accordingly, we conclude that Garland Jones' inhalation of 

asbestos fibers while engaged in the repair and construction of 

vessels on navigable waters had the potential to disrupt 

maritime commerce. Injury to Garland Jones that occurred 

during these activities could potentially slow or frustrate the 

work being done on the vessel. Such a result could, in turn, 

have a disruptive impact on maritime commerce.4

 The second prong of the connection test – whether the 

activity giving rise to the incident bears a substantial 

relationship to traditional maritime activity – requires a 

definition of the relevant activity "not by the particular 

circumstances of the incident, but by the general conduct from 

which the incident arose." Sisson, 497 U.S. at 364. This 

inquiry demands a "broad perspective." Id. In Grubart, the 

Supreme Court explained that this inquiry is guided by 

principles of proximate causation, and that "[t]here is . . . 

no need . . . for imposing an additional nonremoteness hurdle 

in the name of jurisdiction." Id. at 538. 

We applied these principles in Garlock Sealing 

Technologies, LLC v. Little, 270 Va. 381, 384-86, 620 S.E.2d 

773, 775-77 (2005), and determined that the defendant's acts 

 4

 We do not address Crane's argument that Garland Jones 

worked only on new ship construction which does not have a 

potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. The record 
7

of omission and commission in manufacturing asbestos-containing 

material used by Little to create gaskets used on submarines

"had a significant connection with maritime activity," and held 

that maritime law applied. 

In the case now before us, Crane urges again that the 

manufacture and sale of asbestos-containing products into the 

stream of commerce is too far removed from traditional maritime 

activities to create the necessary relationship. Again we 

disagree. The record in this case reflects that during the 

time Garland Jones was exposed to asbestos-containing products 

manufactured by Crane, Crane marketed gaskets and packing 

material directly for the marine industry and advertised its 

products for "marine engine and general ship use." Crane also 

advertised its products in publications about maritime 

activity. This activity bore a substantial relationship to 

traditional maritime activities. The fact that Crane did not 

directly undertake any activity aboard a maritime vessel does 

not obviate this connection. 

In summary, for the reasons set out above, we find that 

the circumstances of this case satisfied both the location and 

connection tests required under Grubart and therefore, the 

trial court did not err in applying general maritime law. 

 

shows that Garland Jones' exposure to asbestos occurred while 

working on new vessels and repairing existing vessels. 
8

II. TESTIMONY OF TERRENCE MCNAMARA 

Crane next asserts that the trial court erred in allowing 

the Estate to call Terrence McNamara as a witness "solely for 

the purpose of impeachment, when the substance of his testimony 

was unchallenged." McNamara was Crane's custodian of records 

and the designated corporate representative responsible for 

reviewing and certifying responses to discovery propounded upon 

Crane from 2000 until June 2004, including discovery in this 

case. A number of Crane's responses to interrogatories, 

submitted under McNamara's verification, were untruthful. Over 

Crane's objection, the trial court allowed the Estate to call 

McNamara as an adverse witness to impeach Crane's credibility.

Generally, we review a trial court's decision to admit or 

exclude evidence using an abuse of discretion standard and, on 

appeal, will not disturb a trial court's decision to admit 

evidence absent a finding of abuse of that discretion. 

Riverside Hosp. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518, 529, 636 S.E.2d 416, 

421 (2006). While a "trial court has no discretion to admit 

clearly inadmissible evidence, a great deal must necessarily be 

left to the discretion of the court of trial, in determining 

whether evidence is relevant to the issue or not." Id., 636 

S.E.2d at 421-22 (internal citations omitted). "Evidence is 

relevant if it has any logical tendency to prove an issue in a 

case." Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 461, 470 S.E.2d 
9

114, 127 (1996). "[R]elevant evidence may be excluded only if 

the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative 

value." Id.

Crane's primary complaint is based on the legal 

proposition that a party may not impeach his own witness. 

While we agree that the Estate could not call McNamara for the 

sole purpose of impeaching him, see Virginia Electric & Power 

Co. v. Hall, 184 Va. 102, 105-06, 34 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1945), 

this is not what occurred at trial. Rather, the Estate argued 

to the trial court that it intended to call McNamara in order 

to show the "pattern of untruthful behavior exhibited by John 

Crane." Such a pattern, if it existed, was relevant, to a 

primary issue in the case, whether Crane knew or had reason to 

know of the health risks posed by the asbestos-containing 

products it manufactured. Because McNamara's testimony 

concerned an improper discovery verification procedure, it 

tended to undermine the credibility of Crane’s assertion that 

he employed proper procedures with respect to researching the 

dangers posed by asbestos or to disseminating that information 

and that Crane was forthcoming with regard to other statements 

it made. Thus, McNamara's testimony did have a "logical 

tendency" to prove an issue in the case, and we cannot say that 

it was irrelevant. 
10

Crane further argues that, because it conceded that 

McNamara's actions regarding discovery were improper, 

McNamara's testimony did not concern any factual issues in the 

case, but was merely "calculated to inflame the passion and 

prejudices of the jury." We reject this argument because 

first, as stated above, McNamara's testimony was relevant to 

the issue of Crane's credibility, and thus did concern a 

factual issue in the case. Furthermore, the jury's allocation 

of damages among the defendants belies any argument that 

McNamara's testimony unduly prejudiced Crane. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing McNamara to testify.

III. TESTIMONY OF CRANE'S EXPERTS 

 In its third assignment of error, Crane argues the trial 

court erroneously interpreted the disclosure requirement of 

Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) resulting in a 

dramatic and unfair limitation of the expert testimony of Dr. 

Victor Roggli and Henry Buccigross. Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) 

states: 

A party may through interrogatories require any other 

party to identify each person whom the party expects 

to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the 

subject matter on which the expert is expected to 

testify, and to state the substance of the facts and 

opinions to which the expert is expected to testify 

and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
11

In reviewing the trial court's decision to exclude expert 

testimony, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Tarmac 

Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 

S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995). 

A. Dr. Victor Roggli

The trial court sustained the Estate's objection to Dr. 

Roggli's testimony regarding his opinion on the amount of 

asbestos in the ambient air and its relationship to the cause 

of mesothelioma because this opinion was not disclosed pursuant 

to Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). We have not previously examined the 

degree of specificity required by Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). 

Nevertheless, any application of this rule begins with 

determining whether the opinion at issue was disclosed in any 

form. See, e.g., Griffett v. Ryan, 247 Va. 465, 468, 443 

S.E.2d 149, 151 (1994) (reviewing trial court decision to allow 

expert testimony by first examining content of the pretrial 

disclosure). 

Crane made the following pretrial disclosure of Dr. 

Roggli's testimony: 

Dr. Roggli will testify as to the pathological 

diagnosis and the testing performed by him and others 

at Duke University to determine if a mesothelioma 

exists. Dr. Roggli may testify as to the association 

between asbestos (including the various types) and 

the alleged disease process involving the plaintiff. 

Dr. Roggli may testify as to the contribution, if 

any, of exposures to John Crane's products and 

products of other companies in the causation of 
12

plaintiff's asbestos-related disease. Finally, Dr. 

Roggli will testify as to the burden of asbestos 

(including the various types) in plaintiff's lungs 

and its contribution, if any, in causing plaintiff's 

asbestos-related disease if any. Dr. Roggli's 

reports have already been or will be provided. 

Crane subsequently provided the Estate with a report containing 

the results of Dr. Roggli's examination of tissue samples taken 

from Garland Jones' lungs. The report did not contain any 

reference to levels of asbestos in the ambient air. Crane 

argues that in excluding Dr. Roggli's testimony, the trial 

court interpreted Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) too strictly. According 

to Crane, Dr. Roggli's opinions including those regarding 

asbestos in the ambient air, were "well known" to the Estate 

because it questioned Dr. Roggli about the opinions during his 

deposition. Thus, even if the disclosures were insufficient, 

according to Crane, the error was cured at Dr. Roggli's 

deposition. 

Nothing in Crane's disclosure reveals that Dr. Roggli 

might testify about asbestos in the ambient air. Furthermore, 

a party is not relieved from its disclosure obligation under 

the Rule simply because the other party has some familiarity 

with the expert witness or the opportunity to depose the 

expert. Such a rule would impermissibly alter a party's burden 

to disclose and impose an affirmative burden on the non-
13

disclosing party to ascertain the substance of the expert's 

testimony. We reject this reading of Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in ruling that Dr. Roggli's opinion testimony regarding 

asbestos in ambient air was inadmissible because Crane failed 

to comply with the disclosure requirement of Rule 

4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). 

B. Henry Buccigross 

Prior to trial, Crane disclosed that Buccigross would 

offer testimony on, among other topics, his "research and/or 

his testing of various asbestos insulation products," including 

"Unibestos" and "Kaylo," as well as his research and testing of 

Crane products.5

 Although the disclosure referenced a report by 

Buccigross on his testing of Unibestos and Kaylo, Crane 

admitted the report was not attached to the disclosure. The 

trial court refused to allow Buccigross to testify about the 

tests he had conducted on Kaylo and Unibestos products because 

the Estate had not received Buccigross' report relating to this 

subject. Crane assigned error to this ruling. 

Crane argues, as it did to the trial court, that 

regardless of its failure to provide Buccigross' report, the 

Estate knew the substance of Buccigross' testimony because the 

 5

 Unibestos and Kaylo were asbestos-containing products of 

other manufacturers. 
14

Estate's counsel had cross-examined Buccigross "at trial about 

his reports going back to the '90s." Crane also pointed out 

that the Estate had failed to depose Buccigross or to ask Crane 

for representative samples of Buccigross' testimony, either of 

which would have allowed the Estate to ascertain the actual 

substance of the testimony.

Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) requires that the substance of 

opinions to be rendered be disclosed. Here, while Crane did 

disclose the topic of Buccigross' testimony, Crane did not 

disclose the substance of Buccigross' opinions in the 

disclosure or through Buccigross' report. Crane thus failed to 

comply with the Rule and the trial court did not err by 

excluding the testimony. As we stated when considering Crane's 

challenge to the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of 

Dr. Roggli's testimony, an opponent's ability to depose an 

expert or familiarity with such expert through prior litigation 

does not relieve a party from complying with the disclosure 

requirements of Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). 

Crane also argues that the trial court should have allowed 

the testimony of both Dr. Roggli and Buccigross because the 

Estate admitted that the disclosures regarding Roggli and 

Buccigross were "exemplary, in comparison to Dr. Feingold's," 

another of Crane's intended expert witnesses. 
15

The record shows that the Estate's statement regarding the 

quality of Crane's disclosures at issue was made as a 

comparison to the fact that Crane had not disclosed any of the 

expected testimony of Dr. Feingold. The statement cannot be 

fairly taken as a concession that Crane complied with the 

requirements of the disclosure rule for all purposes. 

In summary, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in refusing to allow the testimony at issue 

because Crane did not disclose that Dr. Roggli would render an 

opinion on asbestos in the ambient air and did not identify the 

substance of Buccigross' opinion as required by Rule 

4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). 

IV. AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT 

Crane asserts that the trial court erred in failing to set 

aside the verdict because it was excessive when compared to 

verdicts in similar cases and based on the facts of this case, 

it was the product of passion and prejudice. 

Citing our prior decisions in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 

Co. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194, 101 S.E. 415 (1919), and P. 

Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, 104 S.E. 384 (1920), Crane 

urges us to compare the verdict in this case to the verdicts 

rendered in other cases involving similar facts. Crane 

acknowledges that this Court has "recently declined to engage 

in verdict comparison," but argues that the practice of 
16

comparing verdicts does not appear to be "foreclosed" in 

Virginia. In the two cases primarily relied upon by Crane the 

plaintiffs sought damages for the loss of a limb. In those 

cases, the Court looked to verdicts in other cases involving 

the same injury as one part of its determination whether the 

verdict in the case before it was excessive. Arrington, 126 

Va. at 218, 101 S.E. at 423; P. Lorillard, 127 Va. at 756, 104 

S.E. at 391. 

 Since these two cases, however, this Court has routinely 

rejected the use of an "average verdict rule" in determining 

whether a verdict is excessive. As early as 1925, in Farris v. 

Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 141 Va. 622, 126 S.E. 673 

(1925), we stated that the rule "cannot be invoked where the 

injuries are internal, and have produced a condition of greatly 

impaired earning capacity, continuous pain and suffering, and a 

dislocated kidney that may or may not produce serious results." 

Id. at 626, 126 S.E. at 674. 

Subsequent cases did not use an "average verdict rule" 

where issues of pain and suffering were involved. Rather, this 

Court reviewed the facts and circumstances of each case to 

determine whether the verdict was excessive and the product of 

jury passion and prejudice or misapprehension of the case. 

See, e.g., National Fruit Product Co. v. Wagner, 185 Va. 38, 

40-41, 37 S.E.2d 757, 758-59 (1946); Williams Paving Co. v. 
17

Kreidl, 200 Va. 196, 204, 104 S.E.2d 758, 764 (1958); Lilley v. 

Simmons, 200 Va. 791, 797, 108 S.E.2d 245, 249-50 (1959); 

Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 205 Va. 198, 203, 135 S.E.2d 777, 780-81 

(1964); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 48, 325 S.E.2d 713, 

744-45 (1985) (relying on record to find that verdict bore "no 

relationship to the loss actually sustained by the plaintiff" 

and was excessive); Reel v. Ramirez, 243 Va. 463, 467, 416 

S.E.2d 226, 228 (1992) ("we examine the record . . . to 

determine if the trial judge abused his discretion" in granting 

a remittitur on grounds that verdict was allegedly excessive); 

Norfolk Bev. Co. v. Cho, 259 Va. 348, 354-55, 525 S.E.2d 287, 

290-91 (2000) (analyzing record to determine jury verdict was 

not excessive); Shepard v. Capitol Foundry of Virginia, Inc., 

262 Va. 715, 720-21, 554 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2001) (analyzing 

excessiveness of verdict based on the record); Allstate Ins. 

Co. v. Wade, 265 Va. 383, 394-95, 579 S.E.2d 180, 186-87 (2003) 

(stating that verdict is excessive when it shocks the 

conscience of the court and creates impression that jury was 

improperly motivated or confused, and examining record to 

determine that verdict was not excessive as a matter of law). 

The "average verdict rule" was more recently rejected in 

Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 597 S.E.2d 64 (2004). In that 

case, the defendants argued the verdict was excessive in light 

of other verdicts in similar cases. Declining to engage in a 
18

comparison, we applied an abuse of discretion standard, based 

upon the evidence in the record. Id. at 159-60, 597 S.E.2d 77. 

See also Government Micro Resources, Inc. v. Jackson, 271 Va. 

29, 48-49, 624 S.E.2d 63, 74 (2006). In sum, the "average 

verdict rule" is not probative of whether a verdict is 

excessive; rather that determination must be made based on the 

facts and circumstances of each case.

In addition to urging us to consider verdicts in similar 

cases, Crane contends the jury verdict in this case was not 

related to the evidence presented. Crane points out that 

Garland Jones suffered a stroke in 2001, was diagnosed with 

mesothelioma in January 2005, and died six months later, in 

June 2005. According to Crane, these facts and the fact that 

jury's original award exceeded the damages requested, show that 

the jury was motivated by passion or prejudice.

 We find nothing in the record to support Crane's 

contention that the verdict was not the product of an impartial 

decision. At trial, the Estate produced evidence that medical 

expenses for Garland Jones totaled $394,857.01 and that his 

funeral expenses were $9,678.06. Also admitted was a statement 

written by Garland Jones in which he stated he was "devastated" 

to learn he had mesothelioma and described his illness as the 

"bottom" falling out from underneath him and a "roller coaster 

ride." Ashley Higgenbotham, one of Garland Jones' children, 
19

testified that after Jones was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he 

was "barely mobile" and "very depressed," which was 

uncharacteristic for him. Higgenbotham testified that her 

father's death in a nursing home was an "absolute nightmare." 

Michael Jones, another of Garland Jones' children, testified 

that Garland Jones was in the "best health of his life" and 

even volunteered for Meals on Wheels after his 2001 stroke. 

Michael Jones also described how Garland Jones' physical and 

psychological state deteriorated after his diagnosis and until 

his death.

 The jury also heard evidence that Garland and Wanda Jones 

had been married for 41 years and were "very loyal to one 

another" and "loved each other very much." Wanda Jones 

testified about the pain and sorrow she felt upon her husband's 

death.

In addition, the jury heard evidence from Dr. G. Dastgir 

Qureshi, Garland Jones' physician, who testified about 

mesothelioma in general and about the progression of Garland 

Jones' disease. Dr. Qureshi testified about the chemotherapy 

performed on Garland Jones and fact that the chemotherapy 

eventually caused sepsis and acute renal failure. Dr. Qureshi 

also testified about several medical procedures undergone by 

Garland Jones, and described Garland Jones' severely impaired 

physical state at the time of his death. 
20

The jury was given the following instruction on damages, 

without objection from Crane:

If you find for the plaintiff, your verdict shall be 

in such sum as will fully and fairly compensate such 

plaintiff for her damages. In determining damages to 

which she is entitled you shall include, but are not 

limited to, any of the following which you believe by 

the greater weight of the evidence: One, any pain 

and suffering of Garland Jones. Two, any damages for 

sorrow, mental anguish and solace, which may include 

loss of society, companionship, comfort, guidance, 

kindly offices and advice that is suffered by Wanda 

Jones as a result of the injury and death of Garland 

Jones. Three, compensation to Wanda Jones for the 

reasonably expected loss of the services, protection, 

care and assistance provided by Garland Jones. Four, 

expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization of 

Garland Jones that are incident to the injury 

resulting in his death. And five, reasonable funeral 

expenses of Garland Jones. 

 Based on this instruction and the evidence presented at 

trial, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in 

determining that the verdict was not excessive and not so out 

of proportion to the injuries suffered as to suggest that it 

was not the product of a fair and impartial decision. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment 

of the trial court. 

Affirmed.