NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0129n.06

No. 23-1779

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARSHALL ALDERSON, aka George Anderson,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: GRIFFIN, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Marshall Alderson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 

controlled substances, and the district court sentenced him to eight years in prison. Less than two 

years later, he moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on his 

family circumstances, health, and an allegedly low recidivism risk, but the district court denied his 

motion. We affirm.

“We review a district court’s denial of a compassionate release motion for abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 2021). A district court considers 

three criteria when ruling on a motion for compassionate release: “extraordinary and compelling 

reasons for release; the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors; and any applicable policy statements.” Id. 

“[W]e can affirm a district court’s denial of a compassionate release motion based on the 

defendant’s failure to meet any one of those criteria.” Id. And the district court need not 

exhaustively explain its reasoning for denying compassionate release if the record shows that it 
No. 23-1779, United States v. Alderson

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“considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal 

decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation

omitted).

When denying Alderson’s motion, the district court found Alderson was ineligible for relief 

because there existed no extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence, and it 

separately concluded the § 3553(a) factors did not favor doing so even if he were eligible. We 

need not decide whether Alderson’s family circumstances were an extraordinary and compelling 

reason to reduce his sentence because the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors 

and determined that they weighed against release even assuming Alderson’s eligibility for 

compassionate release.

Before turning to the § 3553(a) factors, we note that Alderson has likely forfeited any

argument on the district court’s balancing of § 3553(a) factors because his brief is “skeletal” at 

best and requires us “to put flesh on its bones,” which we are loath to do. United States v. 

Hendrickson, 822 F.3d 812, 829 n.10 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). To the extent that he

makes any § 3553(a) argument, Alderson contends that the district court failed to give proper 

weight to his reduced risk of recidivism based on his age, release plan, and completion of the 

Residential Drug Abuse Program. We disagree.

The district court addressed “the need to protect the public from further crimes by” 

Alderson and “commend[ed]” him for his “purported compliance with the terms of bond, efforts 

at rehabilitation, and commitment to his family.” In doing so, it effectively contemplated 

Alderson’s rehabilitation efforts and his recidivism risk upon release—i.e., the exact 

considerations Alderson argues the district court ignored. At any rate, the district court weighed 

Alderson’s good behavior against the seriousness of his drug offense—the record shows he 
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maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, was 

a dealer in a drug conspiracy, and was found responsible for more than 5,000 kilograms of 

converted drug weight—and his criminal history that started when he was only nineteen years old 

with a similar controlled-substance offense. Given this analysis, the district court explained its 

reasoning in far more detail than in similar compassionate-release denials we have upheld. See, 

e.g., United States v. Harvey, 996 F.3d 310, 312, 314–15 (6th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); Navarro, 

986 F.3d at 669–72. And especially after considering that Alderson had served less than a quarter 

of his sentence when he moved for compassionate release, we cannot conclude that the district 

court abused its discretion by denying his motion.

We affirm the district court’s order denying Alderson’s motion for compassionate release.