2020 IL App (4th) 180013-U 

NO. 4-18-0013 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

ERIC K. NOBLE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

)

) 

)

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Adams County 

No. 16CF728 

Honorable 

Robert K. Adrian, 

Judge Presiding. 

 

 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court dismissed the appeal because defendant did not withdraw his 

guilty plea before attempting to challenge his sentence as excessive, as required 

by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d). 

¶ 2 Defendant, Eric K. Noble, entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the offense of 

aggravated domestic battery in exchange for, in relevant part, the State’s promise to cap its 

sentencing recommendation at nine years’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the State recommended 

a nine-year sentence, which the trial court ultimately imposed. Defendant appeals, arguing his 

federal due process rights were violated by the court’s reliance on an improper aggravating 

factor. Pursuant to our supreme court’s recent holding in People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, 

¶¶ 1, 57, 129 N.E.3d 1239, we must dismiss defendant’s appeal, as he has failed to comply with 

the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

May 29, 2020 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
- 2 - 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. Charges 

¶ 5 The State charged defendant by information with aggravated domestic battery 

(count I) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2014)), aggravated battery (count II) (id. § 12-

3.05(d)(2)), and attempt (first degree murder) (count III) (id. § 8-4(a)). All three counts alleged

“that [defendant] choked [the victim] by placing his hands around her neck, knowing [the victim] 

to be pregnant ***.” 

¶ 6 B. Negotiated Plea Agreement

¶ 7 Defendant pleaded guilty to count I—aggravated domestic battery—in exchange 

for the State’s promise to, among other things, dismiss the remaining charges and cap its 

sentencing recommendation at nine years’ imprisonment. Prior to accepting defendant’s plea, the 

trial court admonished him that count I carried with it a statutory sentencing range from 3 to 14 

years in prison. 

¶ 8 C. Postplea Proceedings 

¶ 9 Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He alleged his plea 

was invalid because the day before he entered it, he had “refused and did not receive his late 

evening dose of” a prescribed mood stabilizer. At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the 

following exchange occurred between defendant and the trial court: 

“THE COURT: The court has considered the evidence and the arguments 

of Counsel. The court would deny the [d]efendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. 

 [Defendant] is obviously lying to the [c]ourt when he gets up here and 

testifies that he doesn’t remember. [Defendant] seems to remember whether or not 

he took medication on the day when he doesn’t remember whether or not he took 
- 3 - 

the plea. He—you can go ahead and take him back there. He knows where he’s 

going. 

 DEFENDANT: Yeah, I know. You’re racist. That’s what the f*** you is. 

That’s what the f*** it is. You’re a racist. 

 THE COURT: You can take him out. Your motion is denied. 

 DEFENDANT: F*** you. 

* * * 

 THE COURT: Okay. [Defendant] should be advised *** that his 

comments in this courtroom today will certainly be considered in the sentencing 

hearing. And I’m going to direct the [court] reporter to provide, if she took down, 

provide the transcript of what was said as [defendant] was walking out of the 

courtroom and provide that to the [d]efendant and put that in the record because 

the [c]ourt will certainly make note and will use that as consideration in the 

sentencing.” 

¶ 10 D. Sentencing Hearing

¶ 11 In imposing a nine-year prison sentence, the trial court stated the following to 

defendant at the sentencing hearing: 

“THE COURT: * * * 

 The court would note that your record also shows, and although you 

apologized to the court today, and the court accepts your apology for that. You 

have shown disrespect to this court, and the court would note other courts which, 

because the court is aware of your sentencing in the last case, where you showed 

disrespect to that court, and also you have at least two violations of order[s] of 
- 4 - 

protection[], which means there were court orders that you violated. So that shows 

disrespect to the court and disrespect to the law.

 * * * 

 The court notes that you got a negotiation which cut down on the cap for 

your sentence in this case. It is a cap of nine years.

 * * * 

 The court is going to sentence you to nine years in the [D]epartment of 

[C]orrections on this case. It is an [85%] sentence by law. It will be followed by 

four years of mandatory supervised release.” 

¶ 12 E. Postsentencing Proceedings 

¶ 13 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, raising an excessive-sentence 

claim, which the trial court denied. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his plea 

following his sentencing. 

¶ 14 This appeal followed. 

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court violated his federal due process rights 

by denying him both the benefit of his plea bargain and a fair sentencing hearing, “when the 

court sentenced him to the maximum sentence due to its treating of his behavior in court as an 

improper factor in aggravation.” The State responds by asserting the requirements of Rule 604(d) 

prevent us from reaching the merits of defendant’s appeal. The proper application of Rule 604(d) 

is reviewed de novo. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶ 22. 

¶ 17 A. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) 
- 5 - 

¶ 18 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), governs the procedure 

criminal defendants must follow when challenging a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty. It 

provides, in relevant part: 

 “No appeal shall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty 

challenging the sentence as excessive unless the defendant, within 

30 days of the imposition of sentence, files a motion to withdraw 

the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. For purposes of this 

rule, a negotiated plea of guilty is one in which the prosecution has 

bound itself to recommend a specific sentence, or a specific range 

of sentence, or where the prosecution has made concessions 

relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge 

or charges then pending.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

The timely filing of a Rule 604(d) motion “is a condition precedent to an appeal from a judgment 

on a plea of guilty.” People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 300-01, 802 N.E.2d 1174, 1180 (2003). 

Failure to comply with the rule does not deprive this court of jurisdiction, but it does preclude us 

from considering the appeal on the merits, which requires dismissal. Id.

¶ 19 The rationale underlying the Rule 604(d) filing requirement is premised on “the 

nature of the plea agreement” and “the application of contract law principles.” Johnson, 2019 IL 

122956, ¶ 27. When a plea agreement includes sentencing concessions by the State, “the guilty 

plea and the sentence ‘go hand in hand’ as material elements of the plea bargain.” People v. 

Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332, 673 N.E.2d 244, 250 (1996). As such, our supreme court has held 

that it would violate principles of contract law to allow a defendant to attempt to unilaterally 

modify the bargained-for sentence, while simultaneously holding the State to its end of the 
- 6 - 

bargain. People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 74, 708 N.E.2d 1169, 1172-73 (1999). In other words, 

“[b]y agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap, a defendant is, in 

effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below that cap on the grounds it is 

excessive.” Id. 

¶ 20 B. Our Supreme Court’s Holding in Johnson

¶ 21 Recently, our supreme court resolved a split in authority in the appellate court

over the issue of “whether a defendant who enters into a negotiated plea agreement may 

challenge a sentence that conforms to the plea agreement, on the ground that the trial court relied 

on improper aggravating factors, without withdrawing his guilty plea under [Rule 604(d)].” 

Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶ 1. Answering this question in the negative, the supreme court 

rejected the defendant’s attempt to distinguish his claim from an excessive-sentence claim, on 

the basis that “his challenge is one of constitutional dimension that implicates due process and 

fundamental fairness.” Id. ¶ 36. The court found the argument “to be a distinction without a 

difference for purposes of Rule 604(d)” (id. ¶ 41): 

“[W]hen a defendant contends the court improperly 

considered a statutory aggravating factor that was implicit in the 

offense, the defendant is asserting that the court imposed a harsher 

sentence than might otherwise have been imposed had the court 

not considered the improper statutory factor. [Citation.] 

 Thus, defendant’s argument is essentially that, had the trial 

court not erred in its application of the statute and had it not 

erroneously considered those statutory factors, he would have 

gotten a lower sentence than the 11-year sentence that was
- 7 - 

imposed. Stated another way, defendant contends the court 

imposed an excessive sentence.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 38-39. 

To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, “would result in making Rule 604(d)’s requirements 

superfluous” by “allow[ing] almost every sentencing challenge in a criminal case to be restated 

in a constitutional due process framework as a way to avoid the rule.” Id. ¶ 41. The court further 

found that, where “the defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement to a sentence that was 

authorized by statute and was within the terms of the agreement[,]” it “does not undermine 

judicial integrity” to hold that the “defendant’s recourse is to seek to withdraw the plea and 

return the parties to the status quo ***.” Id. ¶ 53. 

¶ 22 The Johnson court concluded by stating “we hold that a defendant who enters into 

a negotiated plea agreement may not challenge his sentence on the basis that the court relied on 

improper statutory sentencing factors. This type of sentencing challenge is an excessive sentence 

challenge. Under Rule 604(d), a defendant’s recourse is to seek to withdraw the guilty plea and 

return the parties to the status quo before the plea.” Id. ¶ 57. 

¶ 23 C. Rule 604(d) Precludes 

 Consideration of the Merits of Defendant’s Appeal 

¶ 24 The instant case closely resembles Johnson. Here, defendant moved to withdraw 

his guilty plea but was unsuccessful. On appeal, defendant has abandoned any argument that his 

request to withdraw his guilty plea was erroneously denied. Instead, he argues the trial court 

“sentenced him to the maximum sentence [under the negotiated plea] due to its treating of his 

behavior in court as an improper factor in aggravation.” According to Johnson, this is essentially 

an excessive sentence challenge which is not allowed under the circumstances.
- 8 - 

¶ 25 Defendant attempts to skirt the holding in Johnson by arguing “[t]he trial court 

altered the terms of [his] plea agreement by considering an improper factor at sentencing, which 

denied [him] the benefit of his bargain where he did not waive his constitutional rights to a fair 

sentencing hearing and violated his federal due process rights.” Defendant goes on to claim 

“[t]he term of the plea agreement altered by the trial court was [defendant’s] understanding that 

he would be sentenced based on proper sentencing factors.” 

¶ 26 We find defendant’s argument to be without merit. Indeed, according to 

defendant’s theory, in any case involving a negotiated guilty plea, if a trial court were to err in its 

consideration of a factor in aggravation, it would constitute an error of constitutional magnitude 

as it would have “altered the terms of [the defendant’s] plea agreement”—because “he did not 

waive his constitutional rights to a fair sentencing hearing”—thus, denying the defendant the 

benefit of his bargain. Defendant has not cited to any authority supporting his theory that a 

court’s error in sentencing as described is tantamount to an alteration of the terms of a plea 

agreement. We decline to so find. 

¶ 27 Here, where defendant was sentenced according to a negotiated plea agreement, 

his only recourse was to move to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 604(d). He was 

unsuccessful in doing so and has abandoned any claim of error in that regard. The claim he 

makes on appeal is an excessive sentence claim which is not allowed according to Johnson. 

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeal. 

¶ 30 Appeal dismissed.