The Honor able Ave rn Cohn, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0797n.06 F iled: Novem ber 14, 2007 No. 05-6088 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT United States of Amer ica, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. Trevis L ove, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT CO URT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF TENNESSEE O P I N I O N

BEFORE: BOGG S, Chief Judge; McK

EAGU E, Circuit Judge; COHN, Distric t Judge * McK eague, Circ uit Jud ge. Followinga jury trial, Tre vis L ove wa s convicted of conspirac y to distribute a

nd possess with intent to distribute more tha n five kilog rams of c ocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)( 1). Ove r def ense c ounsel’s object i o n , t h e dis trict court a dmitted evidenc e—pursua

nt to Fede ral Rule of Evide nce 404( b)—of L ove’s e ight- y ear -old state cour t conviction for selling at least .5 g rams of coca ine. L ove timely appea led. For the rea s o n s s tated below, we AF F IRM the dec ision of the district court. I. BACKG ROUND On Octobe r 28, 2003, L ove and eig ht of hi s associate s wer e indi cted by a federa l gr and jury on char g es of conspirac y to distribute and possess with intent to distribute f ive kilogr ams or more of coc aine. The char g es re sulted from a drugconspirac y spanning the y ear s of 1998 throug h 2003No. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 2 - that primarily

i n v o l ved the importation of c ocaine from var ious points i n the United States for distribution i n Tenne ssee. L ove’s involvement in the conspirac y beg an in 2002. Unlike seve ral of his c o- c on sp ir a tor s who ple a de d guil ty and late r t e sti fi e d a g a ins t hi m, L ov e pr oc e e de d to a jur y tr ia l. Duringpre- trial proce eding s, the g overnme nt timely indicated its desire to introduce L ove’s 19 94 c on vic tio n f

or tr a ff ic kin g a t le a st . 5 g ra

ms o f c oc a ine a s e vid e nc e of int e nt u nd e r F e de ra l Ru le of Evidenc e 404(b) . After consideringthe ar g uments of counse l, th e district cour t concluded that the prior conviction was admissible to pr ove L ove’s spe cific intent to par ticipate in the cha

rg ed drug conspirac y . At trial, the g overnme nt introduced the prior conviction at t he conclusion of its case- inchief by way of a stipulation indicating that L ove had be en pr ev i o u s l y convicted in 1994 of traff icking at least .5 g rams of c ocaine . The stipulation was immedi ately followed by

a limiting ins tr uc tio n in fo rm ingthe jur

y that: You m ay not consider this evidenc e to prove the proposition that me re ly be c a us e [L ov e ] may have e ng a g e d in c ri min a l a c ts i n th e pa st, [he] , there fore , did the acts for which [he is] on trial in this case. You may consider the o t her c riminal conduct only for the pur

pose of deter mining the issue of whether or not [L ove] had the re quisite intent to commit the conspiracy alleg ed in the indictment. No w, re me mbe r that [L ov e is] o n tr ia l he re on ly fo r t he a c ts a lle g e d in th e ind ic tme nt a nd no t f or any oth e r a c t, a

nd [he ] sho uld not be convicte d unless y ou find that t h e gover nment has prove n be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t [L ov e ] kno wi ng ly c omm itt e d th e a c ts char g ed in the indictment. J oint App’x at 848-49. At th e co m pletion of closing arguments, the district court once ag ain instructed the jur y reg ardingL ove’s pr ior drugconviction. Ultimately , the jury found L ove guilty

of the c onspiracy

c ha rg e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt

pr oc e e de d to sen te nc e him to the mand a tor y min imum of

tw e nty y e ars ’No. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 3 - imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (A)( ii)(I I ). This a ppeal followed, alleg ing that the district court e rre d by

admitting L ove’s 1994 dr ug traff icking conviction into e vidence under Rule 404( b). II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review This c ourt’s prec edent is inc onsistent r eg arding what standard of revie w applies to a district court’s de cision to admit evidence under Rule 404( b). On e l i ne of c ases state that we r eview a district court’s admission of Rule 404(b) evidenc e for an abuse of discre tion. See, e .g. , United States v. Mac k , 2 58 F .3 d 5 48 , 5 53 n. 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 1) ; United States v. Gonzalez , 5 01 F .3 d 6 30 , 6 37 (6 th Cir. 2007). Yet a

nother li ne of case s outlines a three -tiere d standard of revie w to be applied in suc h situations. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . M att he ws , 440 F.3d 818, 828 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 126 S.Ct . 2370 (2006). Ac cordingto Ma tth e ws :

First, we revie w fo r cl ear err or the district cour t’s fac tual de te rm inat ion

tha t su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e e xists that th e oth e r a c ts occur red. Sec ond, we review de novo whether the district court c o r re c tly de te rm ine d th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s a dmi ssi ble fo r a le g iti mate purpose. Third, w e re view for abuse of discretion the district court’s deter mination that the “other acts” evidenc e is more proba t i v e than prejudicia l under Rule 403. Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Comer , 9 3 F .3 d 1 27 1, 12 77 (6 th C ir . 1 99 6) ). How e ve r, a c los e examination of both this court’s prec edent as well as Supreme Court c ase law indicates th at t he three -tiere d approa ch has be en re jected, a nd the prope r standardof re view for Rule 404(b) deter minations is abuse of discre tion. P r i o r t o 1 9 9 7 , t h e t h r e e - t i e r e d an a l ys i s a

p p l i e d b y Ma tth e ws wa s th e law g ov e rn ingthi s circ uit’s review o f Ru l e 4 0 4(b) de terminations. Se e Un ite d S tates v . G essa , 971 F.2d 1257, 1261No. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 4 - (6th Cir. 1992) (e n banc) . Howeve r, in 1997 the Supreme Court e x plained that “a buse of discr etion is the proper standard of

revie w of a

district court’s e videntiary ruling s.” Gen. Ele c. Co. v. J oiner , 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997). I n light of Joiner , this court expressly repudiated the three -tiere d standard of re vie w fo r R

ule 40 4( b) de te rm inatio ns . See U nited States v. Hay wood , 2 80 F .3 d 7 15 , 7 20 (6 th Ci r. 2002 ); se e als o Mack , 2 58 F .3 d at 55 3 n .1 (e xpla ini ngthat po st- Joiner a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s Rul e 404(b) de terminations are revie wed f or an a buse of discr etion). Thus, to the extent that cases af ter Haywood

and Mack

ap p l y t h e t h ree-tiere d standard of revie w, they

are err ant bec ause “ when a later de cision of this court conf licts with one of our

prior published decisions, we a re still bound by

the holding o f the ea

rlier c ase.” Darrah v. City of Oak Pa rk, 255 F.3d 301, 310 ( 6th Cir. 2 001). Aside f rom beingbound by

our own pre cede nt, we ar e bound by the Supreme Court’s holdingin Joiner ; the ref ore, we revie w the district cour t’s admission of L ove’s pr ior coc aine tra ffickingconviction for a n abuse of

discret i on. “An a

buse of discr etion

occur s when a

district court re lies on clea rly err oneous finding s of fa ct, improperly applies the law

or uses a n err oneous leg al standar d.” Unit ed S t ates v. Dix on , 413 F.3d 540, 544 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Un de r t his sta nd ard , w e wi ll onl y re ve rs e a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e vid e nti ary de c isi on s if

“ we are le ft

wi th the def inite and firm convic tion” that the district court e rre d. Id

. B. D isc uss ion Pursuant to Rule 404(b), evide nce o f a def endant’ s prior bad a cts is inadmissibl e for p r o p e n s i t y p u r

p o s e s . H o w e v e r , s u c h e v i d e n c e m ay b e a dm i s s i b l e “ a s p r o o f o f m o t i v e , o p p o rtu n i t y, intent, prepa

ration, plan, knowle dg e, id en t ity , or abse nce of mistake or ac cident.” F ed. R. Evid. 404(b). We have previously explained that prior to admitting Rule 404(b) evidenc e, the district cour tNo. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 5 - mu s t: ( 1 ) ma

k e a p r e li mi n ar

y f in d in g a s to w h e th e r

s u f f ic ie n t e v id e n c e e xis ts th a t t h e p r io r a ct

oc c ur re d; ( 2) de te rm ine that th e oth e r a c t is a dmi ssi ble fo r o ne of the pr op e r p ur

po ses outli ne d in Rule 404(b); and (3) apply Rule 403 balanc ing to de termine whe ther the e vidence ’s probative value is s ub sta nti a lly outw e ig he d b y

the da ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e or the oth e r co nc e rn s emb od ie d in Rul e 403. Mack

, 258 F.3d at 553. Given that the pr ior bad a ct introduce d in this case involved a stipulated-to convic tion, there is no d i s p u t e t hat the ac t occur red. Thus, L ove’s a

rgument cente rs on whethe r the e vidence was admitted for a

proper purpose an d wh ether

the district court prope rly conducte d the balanc ing require d by

Rule 403. 1. P r ope r P ur pos e De te r m ina ti on Whe re a de fe nd ant i s c ha

rg e d w itha

sp e c if ic int e nt o ff

e ns e , e vid e nc e of

his prio r b a d a c ts may be admissible under

Rule 404(b) for

the purpose of proving such intent. Un ite d S tates v . M y e rs , 102 F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 1996). A drug conspiracy char g e—such as that broug ht ag ainst L ove— is a specif ic intent offe nse. Id

. Wit h reg ards to the use of prior bad acts to pr ove specific intent under Rule 404(b) , this court ha s st a te d th a t:

[W]he re the re is thr

us t up on the g ov e rnme nt, e ith e r by vir tue of the de fe ns e raised by the defendant or by virtue of the e lements of the c rime cha rg ed, the aff irmative dut y to prove that the unde rlying pr ohibited act wa s done with a sp e c i f i c c r i m i n a l i n t e n t , o t h e r

a c t s e v i d e n c e m ay

b e i n t r o d u c e d u n d e r Rul e 404(b). United States v. J

ohnson , 27 F.3d 1186, 1192 ( 6th Cir. 1994). I n Johnson , the def endant wa s char g ed with po s s e s s io n

w it h intent to dist ribute coc aine, a nd—pursuant to Rule 404(b)—the districtNo. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 6 - c ourt a dmi tte d th e de fe nd ant’ s p ri or na rc oti c s c on vic tio n f

or the purp os e of

provi ng his sp e c if

ic intent to distribute. Id . at 1186, 1192. Aff irming the district court, Johnson explained that when the crime c harg ed require s proof of specific intent, the prosec utor may use the prior

bad ac ts to prove that intent “notwithstanding a ny def en s e t h e defe ndant might r aise.” Id . at 1192. Expanding on Johnson , another

panel of this court opined that when a defe ndant pleads not guilty , it trigg ers the g overnme nt’s duty to prove his specific intent bey ond a re asonable doubt, even if the defe nse ra ised cente rs on another

element of

the offe ns e. United States v. Lattner , 385 F.3d 947, 957 ( 6th Cir. 2004). I n the pre sent ca se, L ove wa s char g ed with and plea ded not g uilty to eng ag ing in a conspirac y to distribute cocaine ; the ref ore, the g overnme nt was re quired to prove his specific intent be y ond a

rea sonable doubt. S

e e g e n e r a l l

yM y e rs , 102 F.3d at 234. Howeve r, L ove ar g ues that the 1994

c on vic tio n w a s n ot o ff

e re d f or a pr op e r p ur

po se un de r R

ule 40 4( b) be c a

us e he did

no t se ri ously contest intent at t rial. This court’s holdings in Johnson and Lattner square ly reje ct L ove’s a

rgument be c a us e the g ov e rnme nt’ s a

bil ity to i ntr od uc e pr ior ba d ac ts a s e vid e nc e of the de fe nd ant’ s sp e c if

ic intent is not de pendent on the par ticular de fense raised. A s in Lattner , L ov e ple a de d n ot guil ty to the c on sp ir a c y

c ha rg e ; thus , as an e le me nt of the c ri me , the g ov e rnme nt w a s r e qu ir e d to pr ov e his specific inte n t rega

rdless of his par

ticular de fense strateg y . See J ohnson , 27 F.3d at 1192. Mo reov er, “[w]e have re pe a te dly re c og nize d th a t pr ior

dr ug -d ist ri butio n e vid e nc e is a dmi ssi ble [under Rule 404(b)] to show intent to dist ribute.” United States v. Ay oub , 49 8 F .3 d 5 32 , 5 48 (6 th Cir. 2007).No. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 7 - 2. Sub stantially S im ilar and Reasonab ly Near in Tim e Re qui rem ents I n addition to being of

fer ed for a proper purpose, to be admissible under Rule 404(b) a

prior bad ac t must be “substantially simil ar a nd rea sonably

near in time to the offense s for whic h the defe ndant is being tried.” United States v. Carney , 387 F.3d 436, 451 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Relying on this re quirement, L ove ar g ues that his 19 9 4 conviction for tr a ff ic kin g a t le a st . 5 g ra

ms o f c oc a ine sh ou ld h a ve be e n e xclu de d b e c a us e it w a s n ot s ub sta

nti a lly sim ila r t o th e ins ta

nt c on sp ir a c y

c ha rg e , a nd the e ig ht- y e ar g a

p re nd e rs it no t re a so na

bly ne ar in t ime to the char g ed conspira cy . Both of these arguments fail in lig ht of this court’s pre cede nt and that of our sister cir cuits. Reg ardingthe “substantially simil ar” require ment, when the pr ior bad a cts evidenc e is being offe red f or the purpose of showing i ntent, it “need not duplicate exactly the instant char g e, but nee d only be sufficie ntly analog ous to suppor t a n infere nce of criminal intent.” United States v. Be nton , 852 F.2d 14 5 6 , 1 4 6 8 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 8 8 ) ( f

in d in g e v id e n c e o f

p r io r a c c e p ta n c e o f b r ib e s inv o lv ing bootleg g ing to be substantially simil ar to the c harg e of a cce ptance of money to protect drugdeale rs);

s e e a l so United States v. Be amus , 110 F. App’ x 513, 516 (6th Cir. 2004) (e x plaining that “substantially

simil ar” does not requir e identica l fac tual circ umstances)

. I n th e sp e c ific con text of dr ugtr a ff ic kin g , to be su

bs tanti a lly

sim ila r f or purp os e s o f R

ule 404(b) a prior drugconviction nee d not involve the same qua ntity of nar coti cs that under lie the

curr ent cha

rg es. See U

nited States v. Hick

s , 798 F.2d 446, 4 5 1 (1 1 t h C i r. 1 986). In Hicks , the Eleventh Circuit addr essed a situation analog ous to that curre ntly befor e this court. The de fenda nt in Hicks appea led his conviction for coca ine distribution on the gr ounds, inte r a lia , that the districtNo. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 8 - court e r r e d b y a dmi tt in g u n d e r Ru le 4 0 4 ( b ) a dr u g d e a le r ’ s le d g e r in d ic a ti n g th a t H icks had previous l y en gage d i n the sale of small quantities of coca ine. Id . at 450-51. Rejec ting the defe ndant’s ar g ument that the prior coca ine transac tions we re not substantially simil ar to the curr ent char g es, the Hicks court stated that: “Although the amounts note d i n t h e d i ary entries we re

su bs tanti a lly sma lle r tha

n the qu anti ty of c oc a ine a pp e lla nt wa s c ha

rg e d wi th i mpo rt ing , th e e xtri ns ic and cha rg ed o ff en s es s h o w a similar willingne ss to traffic in coca ine.” Id . at 451. L ikewise, in a

rec ent un p u b li s h e d o p in io n , this court upheld the admission of a de fenda nt’s prior methamphe tamine conviction in her later methamphe tamine distribution trial because althoug h involving “dif fer ent quantities of methampheta mine and d iffer ent deg ree s of produc tion, they both involved methamphetamine possession and tra fficking .” United States v. Miller , 2 27 F . App ’x 44 6, 45 9 ( 6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 128 S.Ct . 219 (2007), and cert. de nied , 128 S.Ct . 242 (2007). Applying this pre cede nt to the instant case, L ove’s a rgument that his prior coc aine tra fficking

c on vic tio n is no t su

bs tanti a lly sim ila

r be c a us e it inv olv e s d if

fe re nt q ua nti tie s o f t

he same na

rc oti c lacks mer it. L ike the prior dr ug traff icking involved in Hicks and Miller , L ove’s 1994 c onviction for tra ffickingat least .5 g rams of coca ine is substantially simil ar to the curr ent cha rg e of c onspiracy to distribute five kilogr ams or more of co ca i n e—re g ardle ss of the diffe renc e in the quantity of

coca ine under ly ing the two char g es. L ove further argues that the district c ourt abused its discr etion in a dmitt i n g h i s 1994

c on vic tio n b e c a

us e the e ig ht- y e ar g a

p b e tw e e n it

and the c urr ent char ge r e nd e rs it t oo te mpo ra lly remote. A lthough a

prior convic tion admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) must be “ne ar in time to[] the offe nses cha

rg ed in the indictment,” Un ite d S tates v . I sm ail , 756 F.2d 1253, 1259 ( 6th Cir. 1985),No. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 9 - the re is “ no a

bs olute ma ximum numbe r of y e ars that may se pa rate a pr ior a c t and the off ense char g ed.” Id . at 12 60 . In f a c t, t his c ourt ha s tw ic e pr e vio us ly

he ld t hat e vid e nc e of

an e ig ht- y e ar- old prior drugtransac tion is not too remote to be admitt ed as evidenc e of intent in a later drugtraff icking prosec ution. Ma tth e ws , 4 40 F .3 d at 83 0; United States v. Pe rsinger , 83 F. App’ x 55, 59 (6th Cir. 2003). I n Ma tth e ws , the def endant wa s convicted of possession with i ntent to distribute crac k

c oc a ine , a nd on a pp e a l he argue d th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d b y a dmi tti ngevi den c e of

a dr ugsa le that occur red eig ht y ear s previous. Id

. at 830. Acc ording to Ma tth e ws , “ the dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y decide d that even e ight- y ear -old drug sales wer e probative” and admissible unde r Rule 404(b). Id .;

se e als o Persinger , 83 F. App’ x at 59 (findingno abuse of discretion in the district court’s a dmission of an e ight- y ear -old prior na rcotics c onviction under Ru l e 404(b)). L ikewise, other courts have found no er

ror in the a dmission of prior bad acts rang ing from eight y ear s old to eighte en y ear s old. See Un ite d S

tates v . M att he ws , 431 F.3d 1296, 13 1 2 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. de nied , 127 S.Ct . 166 (2006) ( finding no err or in the admission of an eig ht-y ear -old prior drugconviction as e vidence of de fe nd ant’ s in te nt t o jo in a dr ugc on sp ir a c y

); United States v. Mac edo , 406 F.3d 778, 793 ( 7th Cir. 20 05 ) (u ph old ing the a dmi ssi on of a nin e -ye ar- old

pr ior c on vic tio n) ; Un ite d Sta te

s v . H ur n , 496 F.3d 78 4, 78 7- 88 (7 th C ir . 2 00 7) (f ind ingno e rr or in the a dmi ssi on of a te n- y e ar- old

c on vic tio n) ; United States v. Foley , 683 F.2d 273, 278 ( 8th Cir. 1982) (findingno err or in the admission of an e leveny ear -old conviction); United States v. Engleman , 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir. 1981) (a ffirmingthe

a dmi ssi on

of a thi rt e e n- y e ar- old

pr ior c on vic tio n) ; Un ite d S

tates v . H e rn an de z- Gu e v ara , 162 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding the admission of an e ighte en-year -old prior c onviction).No. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

Despite findingerr or in the district cour t’ s Ru le4 0 4 ( b) dete rmination, the Mejia-Uribecourt 1 ref used t o reve rse the defe ndant’s conviction beca use t he error was harmless. Mejia-Uribe , 75 F.3d at 399. - 10 - I n an ef fort to avoid t he force of this prec edent, L ove relies on the Ei g hth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Me

jia-Uribe , 75 F.3d 395, 398- 99 (8th Cir. 1996), wher ein the cour t found err or 1 in the district court’s a dmission of a thirteen-year -old prior n ar co t ics sale a s evidenc e in his later dr ugc on sp ir a c y

tr ia l un de r R

ule 404(b ). W hi le L ov e is c or re c t th a t Mejia-Uribefound the prior conviction to be too re mote, nothing in the c ourt’s dec ision neg ates the f orce and effec t of the prec edent c ited above. I n particula

r, Mejia-Uribedo e s n ot u nd e rc ut t his c ourt ’s de cis ions i n Ma tth e ws and Persinger

wher e we upheld the admission of eig ht-y ear -old p ri o r d rug convic tions under Rule 404( b) in situations factually analog ous to the case curr ently befor e this court. Ba sed on the above- mentioned prec edent and the f actua l circumstanc es of the instant c ase, the e xiste nc e of

an e ig ht- y e ar g a

p b e tw e e n L ov e ’s pr ior

c on vic tio n a

nd his c ur re nt c ha rg e is insufficient to re nder a dmission of the 1994 conviction an abuse of discre tion. 3. F e de r al R ule of Ev ide nc e 40 3 A nal ys is Ne xt, it is n e c e ssa

ry to c on sid e r whe the r L ov e ’s pr ior c on vic tio n is re nd e re d in a dmi ssi ble by the c o n s i d er at i o n s set forth in F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 403. See M ack, 258 F.3d at 553. Pur su ant t o Ru le 40 3, a

pr ior ba d a c t th a t c ompli es wi th R ule 40 4( b) is a dmi ssi ble un le ss “ its pr ob a tiv e va lue is s u

b s t a nt ia lly ou tw e ig he d b y

the da ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e , c on fu sio n o f t

he iss ue s, or misleading the jury , or by considerations of undue delay , waste of time, or nee dless prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” F ed. R. Evid. 403. I n the ins t an t ca s e, L o ve ar g ues that the probativeNo. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 11 - value of his prior conviction wa s substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of unfair pr ejudice a nd the needle ss presentation of cumulative evide nce. F urthermor e, he asserts that the district cour t erre d by not conducting an ade quate Rule 403 ba lancingon the re cord. F or the re asons stated be low, L ov e ’s argume nts are wi tho ut me ri t and the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s Rul e 40 3 de te rm inatio n wa s not a n a bu se of discre tion. a. P robative Value and Danger of Unf air P rej udi ce D ete rm ination This court af

fords dis t ri ct courts “broad discr etion in weig hing pr ior-drug -sale e vidence under Rule 403.” Ma tth e ws , 440 F.3d at 830. When r eviewing a Rule 403 deter mination “we look at the evide nce in a

light most favor able t o i t s proponent, maximi zing its probative value and minimi zing its prejudicial ef fec t.” Un ite d Sta te

s v . P e rry , 438 F.3d 642, 648 ( 6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 1 2 6 S

. C t

. 2 0 4 5 (2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . Zi pk in , 729 F.2d 384, 389 ( 6th Cir. 1984)). I n terms of the probative value of L ove’s prior cocai n e t ra ff i ck i n g co n v i ct i on, we have

re pe a te dly

re c og nize d th a t e vid e nc e of pr ior dr ug dis tr ibutio n is pro bativ e of a de fe nd ant’ s in te nt t o later e ng ag e in drug -re lated ac tivity

. See, e .g. , Ma tth e ws , 4 40 F .3 d a t 83 0; Un ite d S tates v . Tr uji llo , 376 F.3d 593, 606 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (finding that the probative value of the def endant’ s prior nar cotics

c on vic tio n w a s n ot s ub sta nti a lly outw e ig he d b y

the da ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e ). Th is c ourt ha s a lso held that the pre

judicial eff

ect r esulting f

rom the admission of such prior bad acts evidenc e may be reduc ed by

the use of a st rong cautionar y instruction pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 105. See United States v. Foster , 3 76 F .3 d 5 77 , 5 92 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ; se e als o Un ite d S tates v . D av is , 707 F.2d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 1983) (e x plaining tha t al t h o u gh “the c hance of pre judice is alwa

y s prese nt in aNo. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 12 - 404(b) situation” the district c ourt may reduc e tha t p rejudice “by g iving the jur

y a limiting instruction informing the m” of the pr oper use of the prior bad ac ts evidence ). I n th e ins tant c a se , e vid e nc e of L ov e ’s 19 94 c oc a ine tr a ff ic kin g c on vic tio n w a s h ig hly probative of

his specific intent to eng ag e in the coc aine tra ffickingconspirac y curr ently at issue. Ad mitte dly , ev ide nc e of

his pr ior c on vic tio n ma

y have be e n p re

jud ic ia l, b ut “ [e]v ide nc e that is pr e jud ic ia l on ly

in t he se ns e that it

pa int s th e de fe nd ant i n a ba d li g ht i s n ot u n

fai rlyprejudicia l pursuant to Rule 403.” U n i t e d S ta t es v . Ch am be rs , 44 1 F .3 d 4 38 , 4 56 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) (e mph a sis added)

. Fur

thermore , as in Fo ste r and Da v is , the prejudicia l impac t of the evidenc e wa s reduc ed by the district court’s issuanc e of a limit ing instruc tion both im mediately afte r the introdu ct i o n of L ov e ’s 19 94 c on vic tio n a nd a t th e c on c lus ion

of the tr ia l. On

a pp e llate re vie w, we mus t pr e sume that the jury followed the district c ourt’s instructions a nd considere d the evidenc e only for its proper purpose. Se e Fran c is v . F ra nk lin , 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985) (pr esuming that jurors “att end closely the par ticular languag e of the trial court’ s instructions in a criminal case ”). Thus, we r ejec t L ove’s ar g u me n t th a t th e p r o b a ti v e v a lu e o f h is p r io r c o n v ic ti o n w a s s u b s ta n ti a ll y o u tw e ighed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. b. N e e dle ss P r e se nt at ion of C um ula ti ve Evi de nc e De te r m ina ti on L ove also a sserts that the district c ourt abused its discr etion under Rule 403 beca use evide nce of his prior convic tion was unnec essar ily cumulative. As the Seve nth Circuit has expl ained: Evidence is “cumulative” when it adds ve ry littl e to the probative fo rc e of the oth e r e vid e nc e in the c a se , so that if it w e re a dmi tte d it s c on tr ibutio n to the de te rm inatio n of t ruth w ou ld b e outw e ig he d b y its contributi o nto th e le n g th o f th e tr ia l, w it

ha ll th e p o te n ti a l f

orNo. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 13 -

c on fu sio n, a s w e ll a s pre jud ic e to o the r l iti g ants , w ho mus t w a it longe r for their trial, that a longtrial cre ates. United Stat es v. W

illiams , 81 F.3d 1434, 1443 ( 7th Cir. 1996). The fa ct that another piece of evidenc e spea

king to a n element of

the offe nse has a lrea dy

been introduc ed does not r ender a later piece of evide nce ne edlessly cumulative. See Vasquez v. Jones , 496 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 2007) (explainin g th a t “ [t ]h e me r e f a c t th a t o n e o th e r w it

n e s s h a s te s ti f

ie d to a p arti c u la

r f a c t does not rende r other te stimony

on that point ‘cumulative.’” ). Her e, Lov e arg ues that his prior convic tion was nee dlessly cumulative bec ause the g ov e rnme nt a lr e a dy

ha d e vid e nc e of h is inte nt t hr ou g h th e te sti mony

of his c o- c on sp ir a tor s. Appl yi n g W

illiams ’s d ef

i n i t i o no f “ cu m u l at i v e, ” Lov e’ s 1 9 9 4 co n v i ct i o nadded to the probative for ce of the other evidenc e in the case (i.e., the co- conspirator s’ testimony that L ove ag g ressively

attacke d

a s se lf -s e rv ing ) a

nd did no t le a d to the le ng the nin g of the tr ia l. As wi th th e a dd iti on a l w itn e ss i n Vasquez , mere ly

beca use testimony

was pre viously

admitted reg arding L ove’s intent to join the conspirac y

does not rende r his prior convic tion needlessly cumulative. c. Suf fi ciency of the Distric t Court’ s Rule 403 Balan cing Finally , L ove ar gu es t h at t he district cour t erre d by not conductinga suff

icient Rule 403 balanc ing on t h e re cord. W e have car efully revie wed the tr anscr ipt of the district court’s consideration of this is sue, and ba sed on that re view we hold that the district co u rt d i d p ro v ide a sufficie nt on the re co rd ex p l anation of its reasons for a dmitti ng the evidenc e Se e ge ne ra lly J oint App’x at 172-90. As t h e re cord r efle cts, the district court he ld a hea ring perta ining to the 1994 conviction in which it hear d oral a rguments reg ardingthe proprie ty of admitting the convi ct i o n,No. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 14 - asked nume rous questions of the attorney s, and ultimately conclude d that the probative value of the evidenc e wa s not substantially outweig hed by the dang er of unfair pr ejudice unde r Rule 403. See id . at 185-90. Additionally , the district co u rt s t at ed t h at t he evide nce a t issue in this case did not appea r to be more unfairly prejudicia l tha n that held admissible in prior Six th Circuit decisions. The

c on te xt of the h e ari ng , in c lud ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt ’s nume ro us qu e sti on s and c omm e nts , a

nd its statement of the Rule 403 standa rd, illustrates that the district cour t ga ve due c on s i d er ati on to the issue; this is not a case wher e the district c ourt summarily admitted evidenc e without providing any indication that it c onsidered the import of Rule 403. There fore , we are unable to conc lude that the district court fa iled to conduct a pr oper Rule 403 ba lancingbefor e admitting the 1994 conviction. Mo re ov e r, e ve n w e re L ov e c or re c t tha t the dis tr ic t court did no t c on du c t an a de qu a te Rul e 403 balanc ing on the rec ord, such a n err or does not nec essitate re versa l where the def endant did not specific ally

reque st such expli cit finding s. United States v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 582 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 127 S.Ct . 446 (2006) (re jecting the defe ndant’s argument that the district court e rre d by failing to properly weig h the evidenc e under Rule 403 on the rec ord whe re no r equest for such

e xplic it f ind ing s w a s ma de ). Thus , alt ho ugh the d istri c t c ourt mig ht h a ve sa id m or e re g ard ingits ba lanc ingde te rm inatio n, “ thi s Ci rc uit do e s no t re qu ir e dis tr ic t c ourt s to utt e r a ny ‘m a g ic wo rd s’ ” in order to comply

with Rule 403. Persinger , 83 F. App’ x at 59 (findingno err or in the district court’ s failure to expl icitly

rec ite on the re cord how it conducte d the Rule 403 balanc ing) . Fur thermore , as in Abboud , th e re is n o in dic a tio n in the re c or d that L ov e re qu e ste d e xplic it f ind ing s w ithre g ard

to the district court’s Rule 403 a naly sis.No. 05-6088

U.S.A. v. Love

- 15 - L ov e ’s 19 94 c on vic tio n wa s a dmi tte d fo r a pr op e r purp os e un de r Rul e 40 4( b) an d i ts probativ e v alue was not substantially outweig hed by

the consider ations set forth in Rule 403. Acc ording ly , we f

ind no abuse of disc retion in the district court’ s decision.

III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the dec ision of the district court.