Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FREDDIE H. MATHIS v. DAVID J. SHULKIN, 

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 

No. 16–677. Decided June 26, 2017
 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

 Statement of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial

of certiorari. 

This petition raises important questions about how the

Government carries out its obligations to our veterans.

The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) applies a rebuttable presumption when reviewing veterans’ disability

claims: The medical examiner whose opinion the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) relied on to deny a veteran’s 

claim is presumed competent, absent a specific objection

by the veteran. To raise an objection, a veteran needs to 

know the medical examiner’s credentials. And yet, the VA

does not provide veterans with that information as a 

matter of course. Nor does it always provide veterans 

with that information upon request. The only road to

guaranteed access to an examiner’s credentials runs

through a Board order. The Board, however, has sometimes required the veteran to have already raised a specific objection to an examiner’s competence before ordering

the VA to provide the credentials. This places a veteran in

“a catch-22” where she “must make a specific objection to 

an examiner’s competence before she can learn the examiner’s qualifications.” 834 F. 3d 1347, 1357 (CA Fed. 2016) 

(Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

As JUSTICE GORSUCH explains, see post, at 1, the Board’s 

presumption is questionable. But the presumption is not

the only problem. A decision by the VA to deny benefits in 
 

 

2 MATHIS v. SHULKIN 

Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

reliance on an examiner’s opinion, while denying the 

veteran access to that examiner’s credentials, ensures that 

the presumption will work to the veteran’s disadvantage.

The petitioner here did not ask the VA to provide the 

examiner’s credentials, and so this petition does not allow

review of both the VA’s practice and the Board’s presumption. Full review would require a petition arising from a

case in which the VA denied a veteran benefits after declining to provide the medical examiner’s credentials. 

Until such a petition presents itself, staying our hand 

allows the Federal Circuit and the VA to continue their 

dialogue over whether the current system for adjudicating

veterans’ disability claims can be squared with the VA’s

statutory obligations to assist veterans in the development

of their disability claims. 
 

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FREDDIE H. MATHIS v. DAVID J. SHULKIN, 

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 

No. 16–677. Decided June 26, 2017

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting from denial of certiorari. 

Lower courts often presume that Department of Veterans Affairs medical examiners are competent to render

expert opinions against veterans seeking compensation for 

disabilities they have suffered during military service. 

The VA appears to apply the same presumption in its own

administrative proceedings.

But where does this presumption come from? It enjoys

no apparent provenance in the relevant statutes. There 

Congress imposed on the VA an affirmative duty to assist—not impair—veterans seeking evidence for their 

disability claims. See 38 U. S. C. §5103A(a)(1). And consider how the presumption works in practice. The VA 

usually refuses to supply information that might allow a 

veteran to challenge the presumption without an order 

from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. And that Board 

often won’t issue an order unless the veteran can first 

supply a specific reason for thinking the examiner incompetent. No doubt this arrangement makes the VA’s job

easier. But how is it that an administrative agency may 

manufacture for itself or win from the courts a regime that

has no basis in the relevant statutes and does nothing to 

assist, and much to impair, the interests of those the law 

says the agency is supposed to serve? 

Now, you might wonder if our intervention is needed to

remedy the problem. After all, a number of thoughtful

colleagues on the Federal Circuit have begun to question 

the presumption’s propriety. See Mathis v. McDonald, 
 

2 MATHIS v. SHULKIN 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

834 F. 3d 1347 (2016). And this may well mean the presumption’s days are numbered. But I would not wait in 

hope. The issue is of much significance to many today 

and, respectfully, it is worthy of this Court’s attention.