The re striction at issue states that no lot subject to the restric tion shall be used for a ny thing 1 other than sing le-fa

mily , private r esidential purpose s. I t is contained in a doc ument e nti tle d Modified ProtectiveRestrictions and Covenants for Inverne ss Point Subdivision . We will refer to the entire document as the “Deed Restrictions.” We will ref er to the s pecif

ic l and use restric tion at issue her e as the “ L ot Use Restriction.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00568- CV

M ar c We in, App e lla nt

v. Mauree n Jenki ns an d Will iam E. Sh erm an, App ellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN103548 , HO NORAB LE PATRI CK O . KEEL, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This appea l arises fr om the district court’s judg ment that appella n t , M ar c Wein, violated his ne ighbor

hood association’s deed restric tion c oncer ning residential land uses and that he tr e sp a sse d o n a

nd pr oximate ly

c a us e d d ama g e to a

pp e lle e s’ a dja c e nt p ro pe rt y . I n tw o is su e s We in 1 contends that (1) the district c ourt abused its discre tion by issuing an ove rly

broad pe rmane nt inj u n c t i o n p r o h i b i t i n g h i m f r o m u s i n g h i s r e s i d e n c e f o r an y t h i n g o t h e r t h an s i n g l e - f

am i l y , pr iva te residential pur

poses; and (2) the d i strict court’s f inal judgme nt resulted in a double r ecove ry byI n a third issue Wein argued that the district court lacke d jurisdiction to hold an e videntiary 2 hear ing on the appellee s’ motion for contempt alleg ing Wein violated the per manent injunction and improperly

rec ommended aw ardingattorney ’s fe es to the appe llees. We have previously resolved this iss ue in M

a r c W e in v . M a u r e e n J e n k in s &W il li a m S h e rm an , No
. 0 3
- 0 4
- 0 0 5 6 8
- CV( T e x. App.—Austin Fe b. 15, 2005) (or der f inding Wein in contempt and f ining him $5,000). Be cause the boat dock w as floating , it did not constitute a trespass by itself. Howeve r, the 3 a pp e lle e s a lle g e d th a t it

wa s ille g a lly te the re d to the ir pr op e rt y . T he tr amw ay

and sta ir s le a din g to t h e b o a td o c k

w e r e p e r m an e n ts t r

u c tu r e s b u i l tp art i a l l y o nt h e a p p e l l e e s ’ p r o p e rt y. 2 a pp e ll ees, Ma

ur e e n Jenkin s and

Willi am Sh e rm an ( c oll e c tiv e ly the a pp e lle e s)
. B e c a

us e we ho ld 2 that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that the jury ’s awa rd did not compensate the appellee s twice for

the same injury , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s judg ment.

BACK GR OUND Th e a pp e lle e s su e d We in, the ir ne ig hb or , a lle g ingthat he ha d tr e sp a sse d o n their proper ty by building a boat dock and tramway partially on their prope rty

and that he w as oper ating 3

a c omm e rc ia l be d a

nd br e akf a st o ut o f h is h ome in v iol a tio n o f t he L ot Us e Re str ic tio n. Th e su it went to trial, and in May

2004 the jury

found in favor of the appellee s, awa rding them $27,800 for damag es proximately

cause d by Wein’s trespass. In its final judgment, the district c o u r t i n corpor ated the jur y ’s dama g e awa

rd and , b a se d o n th e jur

y ’s fi nd ingthat We in h a d v iol a te d th e L ot U se R es t ri ct i o n , gra n t edt h e ap p el l ee s ’ ap p l i ca t i o nfo r ap erm an en ti n j u n ct i o ns t at i n g: Wein, his age nts, servants, employ ees, a n d any other pe rsons in active c oncer t or participation w i t h W ein are commande d immediately to cea se using the re sidence located a t 19314 I nverne ss Drive, Spicew o o d , T ex as 78669 (the ‘ Property ’) f or an yt h i n g o t h e r

t h a ns i n g l e - f

am i l y, p r i v a t e r e s i d e n t i a l p u r p o s e s . ‘ S i n g l e - f

am i l y, private res i d en t i al purposes’ does not include (a ) oper ating at the Proper ty the business known as ‘The I nn at Inverne ss’; (b) ope ratingat the P ro p er t y an y other commerc ial business in the nature of a hotel, ‘bed & brea kfast,’ inn, or ve nue for pa rt ie s, bu sin e ss m e e tin g s, or re tr e a ts.3 Wein filed a motion to modify the final judgme nt to ref lect the possibilit y

that the L ot Use Restriction could be revised in the f uture. Ar

ticle IX s u b s ec t i o n (4) (the “Ame ndment Provision”) of the De ed Restrictions provides that a ny restric tion or covenant “may be ame nded or
c ha ng e d at any

tim e by the a ff

ir mativ e vo te of the the n own e rs of a t le a st two -t

hir ds (2 /3) of

the lot s shown by the re corde d plat of I nverne ss Point.” Wein argued that if the a ssociation did modify the restric tion to allow some use other than single- family residential, then the lang uag e of the perma nent injunction would unfairly preve nt him from being able to immediately take a dvantag e of the modification. The district cour t denied Wein’s modification re quest. This appea l followed.
Perman ent inj unction

I n his f irst issue, Wein c ontends that the district c ourt abused it discr etion in gr anting the per manent injunction beca

use it (1) i gn o re d the possibilit y that the dee d restric tions may be
ame nd e d und e r t

he Am e ndme nt P ro vis ion , a nd (2 ) pr ov ide s mo re re lie f t ha n th e a pp e lle e s so ug ht. Wein appare ntly

is arguing that the perma nent i njunction as drafted pre cludes him from e x erc ising any potential rig hts that mig ht be cre ated if the L ot U se Restriction is e ver amende d to permit uses oth e r tha n sing le -f amil y re sid e nti a l use . A s d ra ft e d th e pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tio n w ou ld r e qu ir e him to have the injunction dissol ved or modified if the L ot Use Restriction eve r cha ng ed. The g rant or r efusa l of a pe rmane nt injunction is ordinarily with i n t h e trial court’ s sound discretion. Vo ic e of theCor ne rston e Chu rc h Co rp . v . P izz a Pro p. Pa rtn e rs , 160 S.W .3d 657, 667 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.); Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton He alth Plan, Inc. , 94 S.W .3d 841, 851 (Tex. Ap p . — Au s t i n 2 0 02, pet. denied) . A trial cour t “abuse s its dis cre tion when it re ache s a dec ision so ar bitrary and unrea sonable as to a mount to a clea

r and pr ejudicial er

ror4

of law.” BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 8 3 S
. W
. 3 d 7 8 9 , 8 0 0 (T ex . 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Johnson

v . F ou rth Cou rt o

f A pp e als , 700 S.W .2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)). Th e pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tio n d oe s n ot g ra

nt m or e re lie f t

ha n th e a pp e lle e s so ug ht i n th e ir pleading s. I n their eig hth amen d e d o r ig in a l p e ti ti o n

f o r per manent injunction and dama g es, appe llees reque sted that the district court perma nently enjoin Wein f

rom (1) operating his r esidenc e as a be d and bre akfa st, (2) re ntin g o u t ro o m s at his residenc e, and ( 3) re nting out his reside nce f or spec ial
e ve nts su c h as we dd ing s and c or po rate re tr e a ts. Th e pe rm ane nt i nju nc tio n c le arl y

and pr e c ise ly g rante d their re quest, was not overly broad, and did not prevent Wein from e x erc ising a ny leg al rig ht he possessed at the time it was issued.

Restrictive cove nants are subject to the g ener al r u l es of contrac t construction. Pilarcik v. Em mons , 966 S.W .2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1998). In construinga restric tive covena nt, w e see k to effe ct the intention of the pa rties when the covena

nt was dra fted. Voice of the Cornerstone Church Corp. , 160 S.W .3d at 667. Gene rally , a per manent injunction may

not gr ant re lief that is not prayed for , n o r s h o u l d i t be so broa d as to enjoin a de fenda nt from ac tiviti es that ar e a la wful and proper exercise of

his rights. Holubec v. Brandenbe rger , 1 11 S.W. 3d 32 , 3 9 ( Te x. 20 03 ); Villalobos

v . H olguin , 2 08 S.W. 2d 87 1, 87 5 ( Te x. 19 48 ). An inj un c tio n mu st b e a s d e fi nit e , c le ar, and pr e c ise as possible. Villalobos , 2 08 S.W. 2d a t 87 5; Computek Computer & Office Supplies, Inc . v. W alton , 156 S.W .3d 217, 220-21 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2005, no pe t. h.).

The L ot Use Restriction states t hat “[ n]one of t he lot s or t he improveme nts thereon shall be used f

or any thing other

than sing le-fa

mily , private r esidential purpose s . . . .” The perma nent i n j u n c t i o nc o m m an d e d

W e i nt o c e a s e u s i n g h i s p r o p e rt y f o r an yt h i n go t h e r

t h an“ s i n g l e - f

am i l y,5

private r esidential purpose s.” In the injunction, the district court explained that the phra se “sing lefa mil y , p ri vate re sid e nti a l pu rp os e s” do e s no t inc lud e the op e ratio n of any “ c omm e rc ia l bu sin e ss i n th e n a tu r e o f a h o te l, ‘ b e d

& b r e ak f a s t, ’ inn , o r

v e nu e f o r p arti e s , b u s in e s s me e ti n g s , o r r e tr e a ts.” This expl anation is co n s i s t ent with both the plain lang uag e and the underlying pur pose of the L ot Use Restriction as it existed at the time the injunction was issued.

Wein sug g ests that the district c ourt err ed by not c onditioning t h e i n junction’s prohibitions on the continued exis tence of the L ot Use Restriction. Howe ver, the fac t that the L ot Use Restriction could be ame nded does not mean that the d i s t ri ct cour t abused its discretion by enfor cingthe exist ing ve rsion of the re striction. The Amendme nt Pro v i s i o n d o es not require the district court to assume that the L ot Use Restriction will be ame nded
. The district court construe d the L o t Us e R es t riction as it exis ted at the time of suit. I t would have be en inappr opriate f or the district court to ref

ere nce e ither the De ed Restrictions (includingthe Amendment Provision) or the L ot Use Restriction i n i t s i n j u n ct i on order . Tex. R. C iv. P. 683 (providing that or der g rantingan inj un c tio n s ha ll d e sc ri be in r e a so na ble de ta il, and no t by re fe re nc e to c omp la int or oth e r d oc ume nt, act or acts soug ht to be restra ined). As the supreme court has held i n reve rsing a “modific ation” of
an in jun c tio n, “ the de c re e c ann ot p re jud g e ne w s itu a tio ns , w hic h we re no t be fo re the c ourt in t he fi rs t instance . . . . N or should it be g reatly conce rned w ith rights of the def en d an t s that are asser

ted larg ely in the abstrac t.” San Antonio Bar Ass’n v. Guardian Abstract & Titl e Co. , 291 S.W .2d 697, 702 (Tex. 1956). The supreme court was not c oncer ned about placing the burde n on the enjoined pa rt y to s e e k r e lie f i n th e fa c e of c ha ng e d c ir c ums tanc e s. We r e je c t Wei n’ s c omp la int

tha t he sh ou ldWe n ote that if the L ot U se Re str ic tio n is ame nd e d Wei n may pe tit ion the dis tr ic t c ourt

to 4 vacate or modify

the per manent injunction. See Cit y of San Antonio v. Singleton , 858 S.W .2d 411, 412 (T ex . 1993) (statingthat trial court g ener ally reta ins jurisdiction t o revie w, open, va cate or modify perma nent injunction upon showing of chang ed conditions). 6 not have the bur den of dissolving the perma nent injunction should the L ot Use Restriction eve r be modified. Wei n d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the fi nd ingthat he vio late d the L ot Us e Re str ic tio n b oth befor e and a fter the issuance of the permanent i njunction. Nor doe s he cha lleng e the f act that, at the time the injunction was issued, he did not have the rig ht to use his r esidenc e for any thing other than sin g le -f amil y , p ri vate re sid e nti a l pu rp os e s. Whil e it i s h y

po the tic a lly

po ssi bl e that th e L ot U se Restriction may

be modified, we cannot c o n cl u d e that the dist rict cour t erre d by enfor cingthe restric tion as it ex isted at the time of t he beha vior complained of

by appellee s. Consequently , we

4 hold that the district court did not abuse its discre tion. W ein’s first issue is over ruled.
Do ubl ere c ov e ry Wei n a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi na l jud g me nt imp ro pe rl y re su lte d in

a do ub le
rec overy by the appe l l ee s . See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel , 22 S.W .3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000) (“U nder the one satisf

ac t i o n rule, a

plaintiff is entitled to only one re cover

y for a ny damag es
su ff e re d. ” ). He ins ist s th a t th e dama g e s a wa rd , s te mmi ngfr om h is t

respas s on th e ap pe lle e s’ proper ty , ref lects their double rec overy , in lig ht of the cour t’s order that Wein remove the “ railroa dtie planters, boat dock, and tra mway” at his own e x pense. We disag ree . At trial, Maure en Jenkins, one o f t h e appellees, testified that while Wein was
re no vatin g his ho us e and us in g h e r p ro pe rt y a s a sta g ingare a

fo r e qu ipm e nt a

nd mate ri a ls, hisThe e stimate also included a line item f or installing one hundred and seventy -five f eet of 5 rock bor der be tween the adjoining properties at a cost of $1,689. We note that sales tax has not been inc lud e d in

any of the ind ivi du a l li ne ite m c os ts. 7 contra ctors cle ar- cut a se ction of her lot, which included the removal of a larg e and valuable oak tree
. I n addition, the appellee s offe red two e stimates into evidence to e stablish the damag es ar ising fr om Wein’s trespass on their property
. One estimate indicated that it would cost $68,971.40 to replac e and plant a ne w oak tre e ($22,500) , place er o s i o n co n t rol barr iers on the c lear ed portion of the proper ty ($38,920), a

nd remove the offe nding r ailroad- tie planters ( $1,200). The jury awa rded the 5 appellee s $27,800 in compensatory damag es for

Wein’s trespass. The district court incor porate d the jur y ’s awa rd int o th e fi na l ju dg me nt. Wein sugg ests that b ec au s e the jury also hea rd evide nce that it would cost $7,800 to re mov e the tr amw ay

and sta ir s and

$1 ,2 00 to r e mov e the ra ilr oa d- tie pla nte rs , it is l ike ly that it included those c o s t s in its compensatory awa rd. Since he had to re move the tramway , stairs, and planters at his own ex p en s e, h e argue s that the appe llees would re ceive a double r ecove ry for the da ma g e s ar i s i n g f

r o mh i s t r e s p a s s . H o w e v e r , t h e j u r y ’ s c o mp e n s a t o r

y aw ar d o f $ 2 7 , 8 0 0 w a s l e ss than half of

the estimated c ost of repla cingthe fe lled oak tree and takingprec autions to eliminate the
er o s i o n cause d by

Wein’s wrong ful clea

r-c utting on the a

ppellees’ proper

ty . The jury

could have
arr ived at its awa

rd without including a

ny costs of removing the tramwa y , steps, and planter s, and still had evide nce to support its specified damag es of $27,800. Thus, we cannot c onclude a s a matter of law that th e a

pp e lle e s r e c e ive d a

n im pe rm iss ibl e do ub le re c ov e ry . W ein ’s secon d is su e is
overr uled.8 CO NC LU SION Be ca u s e we h o ld that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in drafting the perma nent injunction and that the jury ’s awa rd of c ompens at o ry d amage s did not compensate the appellee s twice for

the same injury , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s judg ment.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: September

9, 2005