RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 11a0159p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

FREDERICK C. BOWERMAN, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

EARL W. BURKHOLDER, JR., aka Earl W.

Buckholder, Jr.; HAROLD COOK; LAWRENCE

S. FOX; JAMES GARN; DAVID C. GRABOWSKI;

THOMAS GREGORY; RALPH MIKOLAJEZYK;

RICHARD MIKOLAJEZYK; MICHAEL F.

MILLER; JACK D. PATTERSON; WILLIAM L.

PEARSALL; DANNY C. PENN; GORDON T.

STAHL; CHARLES W. BENDER; HERBERT W.

BIDDLE; FRANK BOBROSKI; KEITH BRUNS;

DENNIS E. DALMAN; ROBERT E. DURELL;

JAMES DUSSEAU; WILLIAM HAMILTON;

ROGER HOFFMAN; DANIEL KLIMEK;

KENNETH L. MCKENZIE; MICHAEL J. NOWAK;

GARY K. RICHARDSON; THOMAS E.

RUTHERFORD; EDWARD SADOWY; EDWARD

L. SEEL; DAVE SMITH; DENNIS STEPHENSON;

WILLIAM T. STROUD; DANIEL TAYLOR;

RICHARD TENNEY; CHARLES E. VAN

WASSHNOVA; FRANK VITALE; JEFF

VOGELSANG; WILLIAM WOODWARD; RICK

BUNGE; DAVE DILLON; ESTILL JOHNSON;

TIMOTHY M. KRAFT; GERALD W. HEARST;

NICHOLAS HARTMAN; DANIEL L.

GERSCHUTZ; ALLEN BROSE; PETE W. LEE;

THOMAS R. CHROMIK; RON SUMNER; REX

MAZE; WILLIAM HAMEISTER; and RAYMOND

T. KLAWITTER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED

AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF

AMERICA, Local No. 12; INTERNATIONAL

UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE

AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS

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No. 10-3500

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No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 2

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Defendants-appellees Daimler Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler Group, L.L.C. are parties to

this lawsuit for purposes of necessary relief only.

OF AMERICA; DAIMLER CHRYSLER

CORPORATION; and CHRYSLER GROUP,

L.L.C.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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N

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo.

No. 02-07422—James G. Carr, District Judge.

Argued: April 22, 2011

Decided and Filed: June 21, 2011 

Before: NORRIS, ROGERS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Thomas A. Sobecki, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellants. Thomas J. Gibney,

EASTMAN & SMITH LTD., Toledo, Ohio, Joan Torzewski, HARRIS RENY

TORZEWSKI, L.P.A., Toledo, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Thomas A. Sobecki,

Toledo, Ohio, for Appellants. John T. Landwehr, EASTMAN & SMITH LTD., Toledo,

Ohio, Joan Torzewski, HARRIS RENY TORZEWSKI, L.P.A., Toledo, Ohio, for

Appellees. 

_________________

OPINION

_________________

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants are machine repairmen presently

or formerly employed by Chrysler Group, L.L.C. or Daimler Chrysler Corporation

(“Chrysler”) at two plants located in Toledo, Ohio. Plaintiffs claim that their union,

defendants-appellees International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and

Agricultural Implement Workers of America (“UAW”) and International Union, United

Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local No. 12

(“Local 12”),1

 breached their duty of fair representation by favoring certain skilled

workers – millwrights and electricians – over plaintiffs – machine repairmen.
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 3

2

Indeed, the most recent negotiations between the UAW and Chrysler will result in the

combination of the millwright and machine repair trades into one larger trade designation: “mechanical

technician.”

In October 2007, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, holding that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust internal union remedies. On

appeal, this court reversed, instructing the district court to consider whether plaintiffs’

claims were barred by the statute of limitations. On remand, defendants again moved

for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, holding that a portion of

plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the remaining claims

failed on their merits. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge both of these findings. Upon

review, we affirm the district court in all respects.

I.

Chrysler employs several kinds of skilled tradesmen at two Toledo plants, the

“North Cove” plant and the new “Toledo North” plant. This case implicates three

groups of skilled tradesmen: machine repairmen, millwrights, and electricians.

Plaintiffs are machine repairmen.

Until 1997, the skilled tradesmen at Chrysler’s Toledo plants were represented

by two unions. The UAW represented, among others, millwrights and electricians, and

the Mechanics Education Society of America (“MESA”) represented the machine

repairmen. In 1997, former MESA members became UAW members subject to the new

1997-2002 collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).

In 1999, when Chrysler built the Toledo North plant, problems developed in

establishing its “lines of demarcation,” which delineate what responsibilities are

assigned to each skilled trade. Disputes over lines of demarcation were not an unusual

occurrence at the Chrysler plants. In particular, millwrights, electricians, and machine

repairmen have some overlap with regard to their trade skills,2

 resulting in disputes over

work assignments. However, the lines of demarcation at the North Cove plant became

well-settled over time.
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 4

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Around this same time period, Chrysler discontinued production of the Jeep Cherokee and

significantly reduced the production volume of Jeep Wranglers. This resulted in significant layoffs from

August 2001 until August 2002.

Before 1997, line of demarcation disputes were resolved through the grievance

process by relying in substantial part on past practice. However, the 1997-2002 CBA

provided for several changes. Emphasizing the need for a cooperative work

environment, the CBA noted that there must be “flexibility in job assignments and job

transfers[.]” Specifically addressing the issue of lines of demarcation, the CBA

provided: “Skilled Trades classification shall be effectively reduced to reflect the

consolidation of former M.E.S.A. classifications with UAW, Local 12 in addition to

minimizing traditional lines of demarcation with respect to job responsibilities.” The

CBA further noted that “many tasks are properly performed within the scope of two or

more classifications.”

In August 1999, before the Toledo North plant began operations, certain

specifically assigned coordinators, along with maintenance manager Ted Roberts,

attempted to establish lines of demarcation for the plant. This process resulted in

numerous disagreements, causing concern among the skilled tradesmen.

In January 2001, Local 12 announced the creation of a Lines of Demarcation

Committee (the “LDC”) to draft the lines of demarcation for the Toledo North plant.

Representatives from each skilled trade were elected, establishing the LDC by January

30, 2001.3

 Thereafter, the LDC viewed plant equipment, conducted meetings, and voted

on the lines of demarcation. Eight trades were represented on the LDC, each with one

vote. Richard McIntyre, Jeffrey Ghigo, Gary Soncrant, and Bill Hameister each served,

in succession, as LDC members representing the machine repairmen. The decisions of

the LDC, numbered 1-10, with one unnumbered decision and one clarification decision,

were issued between June 5, 2001, and May 31, 2002.

Following publication of the LDC decisions, many skilled tradesmen were left

dissatisfied. As a result, a petition was circulated requesting that the UAW visit the

Toledo North plant and make recommendations regarding appropriate lines of
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 5

demarcation. In accordance with this request, Jerry Brown, a staff representative for the

UAW, visited the Toledo North plant on three occasions. Brown examined the disputed

areas of the plant and provided written recommendations. However, several skilled

tradesmen were still dissatisfied with these recommendations, resulting in inconsistent

job allocations and grievances.

In 2003, Local 12 and Chrysler negotiated a new CBA. During negotiations, it

became clear that the lines of demarcation issue needed to be resolved. Accordingly, a

letter agreement was drafted providing that a joint task force would be created to address

work assignments. Dan Henneman, the Local 12 chairman, assigned Fritz Edwards, the

skilled trades committeeman, to work with Chrysler to establish mutually agreed upon

lines of demarcation. Edwards thereafter called a meeting with the skilled trade stewards

to discuss the issue. Richard McIntyre, the machine repair steward, attended the

meeting, but left early when frustrated with the meeting’s progress. Another meeting

was scheduled, but McIntyre was unable to attend. Following these failed meeting

attempts, Edwards continued his work on the lines of demarcation without input from

the stewards, obtaining information from skilled tradesmen on the plant floor, center

managers Chuck Velez and Bill Beeker, and from personal observation.

When Edwards’ lines of demarcation were published in 2005, no one was

completely satisfied. Several machine repairmen felt that the demarcations reassigned

significant portions of their work to millwrights and electricians. Such reassignments,

they felt, were contrary to past practice and training.

Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit on August 26, 2002, alleging that Local 12 and

the UAW used their influence to favor millwrights and electricians at the expense of the

machine repairmen. They also contended that the creation of the LDC was not

authorized by the union bylaws or constitution.

On May 19, 2006, defendants moved for summary judgment on numerous

grounds. The district court granted defendants’ motion, holding that plaintiffs failed to

exhaust internal union remedies. On appeal, we reversed the grant of summary

judgment, holding that the district court had failed to address “a threshold statute of
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 6

4

The holding of Molpus, relied upon by this court in reversing the district court’s grant of

summary judgment, is currently the subject of en banc review in Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, No. 10-

3616 (6th Cir. filed May 14, 2010).

limitations issue that could render the case untimely.” Burkholder v. UAW, 299 F.

App’x 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). In addition, we held that the district court

had not addressed whether the exhaustion of internal remedies would be excused as a

result of the union’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation. Id. at 535-36

(citing Williams v. Molpus, 171 F.3d 360, 369 (6th Cir. 1999)).4

Upon remand, defendants once again moved for summary judgment, asserting

that a majority of plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Additionally, defendants asserted that plaintiffs’ claims failed on their merits. On March

19, 2010, the district court granted defendants’ motion, holding that several of plaintiffs’

claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that all remaining claims failed on

their merits. Plaintiffs thereafter filed this timely appeal.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Longaberger

Co. v. Kolt, 586 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is proper “if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When determining whether the movant has met

this burden, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 861 (6th Cir. 2007).

III.

The first issue is whether plaintiffs’ claims pertaining to LDC decisions and

layoffs made before February 26, 2002, are barred by the statute of limitations. In

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), “the

Supreme Court established a six-month period of limitations for claims alleging breach

of [the] duty of fair representation[.]” Ratkosky v. United Transp. Union, 843 F.2d 869,
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 7

873 (6th Cir. 1988). “As a general rule, the limitations period begins to run when the

potential plaintiff ‘knows or should have known of the union’s alleged breach of its duty

of fair representation.’” Id. (quoting Dowty v. Pioneer Rural Electric Co-Op., Inc., 770

F.2d 52, 56 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985)). In this case, because

plaintiffs filed suit on August 26, 2002, the district court held that claims pertaining to

LDC decisions and layoffs finalized before February 26, 2002, were barred by the statute

of limitations. We agree.

In asserting that they may rely upon all of the LDC decisions to support their fair

representation claim, plaintiffs contend that such decisions constitute a “continuing

violation.” When a continuing violation is found, “a plaintiff is entitled to have the court

consider all relevant actions allegedly taken pursuant to the [wrongful] policy or

practice, including those that would otherwise be time barred.” Sharpe v. Cureton, 319

F.3d 259, 267 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This court

most commonly applies the continuing-violation doctrine in Title VII cases, id., but has

considered applying it to claims under § 1983, see, e.g., Tolbert v. Ohio Dep’t of

Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 940-41 (6th Cir. 1999), and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, see e.g., Sherman v. Chrysler Corp., 47 F. App’x 716, 721 (6th Cir.

2002) (unpublished). We assume for purposes of argument that this doctrine could also

be applied to a fair representation claim. See Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., Jeep Div.,

32 F.3d 997, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 1994).

This court recognizes two categories of continuing violation. The first is “where

the plaintiff can show prior [wrongful] activity that continues into the present,” and the

second is “where the plaintiff can show a longstanding and demonstrable policy of

discrimination.” Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, plaintiffs do not assert that the

statute of limitations should be tolled under the second continuing-violation category.

Accordingly, we will not address it.

Under the first category, “plaintiffs are . . . precluded from establishing a

continuing violation exception by proof that the alleged [wrongful] acts . . . occurring
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 8

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Plaintiffs rely on Lewis v. Local Union No. 100 of the Laborers’ International Union of North

America, AFL-CIO, which applied the continuing-violation doctrine to a fair representation claim. 750

F.2d 1368, 1379 (7th Cir. 1984). However, this case was decided prior to Morgan, which imposed the

“discrete acts” rule that is dispositive in this case.

prior to the limitations period are sufficiently related to those occurring within the

limitations period.” Sharpe, 319 F.3d at 268 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)). Thus, “discrete acts of which [the plaintiffs were]

immediately aware when they occurred,” Bell, 351 F.3d at 248, such as “termination,

failure to promote, denial of transfer, [and] refusal to hire,” do not constitute a

continuing violation. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs rely on numerous discrete occurrences of which they

were immediately aware: the issuance of the LDC decisions. Each decision set forth a

set of demarcations providing what skilled trades would perform what jobs in different

areas of the Toledo North plant. Thus, each LDC decision was discrete and potentially

actionable. See Lyons v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 09-6084,

2011 WL 1042271, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished) (noting that a series of

“discrete” acts with “discrete consequences” does not constitute a continuing violation).

Indeed, the heart of plaintiffs’ claim is that Local 12 violated its fair representation duty

when it transferred work away from the machine repairmen without a rational basis.

Accordingly, if plaintiffs’ assertions are true, there was no barrier to filing suit after the

first LDC decision was published that allegedly transferred work away from plaintiffs

without reason.5

While plaintiffs contend that they “had no way to know that [the first LDC

decision] was the first of a string of decisions that would cumulatively transfer a large

body of work from machine repairmen to millwrights and electricians[,]” plaintiffs did

not need to know the extent of the alleged breach of the duty of fair representation to file

a claim. If Local 12 transferred a small amount of work away from the machine

repairmen in a fashion that was improperly discriminatory, in bad faith, or arbitrary,

there is no reason such an occurrence would not be actionable. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386

U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (“A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 9

6

Plaintiffs also assert that the continuing-violation doctrine applies to layoffs that occurred before

February 26, 2002. For the same reasons described above, plaintiffs are incorrect. The Supreme Court

in Morgan expressly noted that a “termination” is a discrete act that does not constitute a continuing

violation. 536 U.S. at 114. The same is true with regard to plaintiffs’ claims regarding the establishment

of the LDC, which is a discrete act taking place outside the limitations period.

when a union’s conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,

discriminatory, or in bad faith.”). Moreover, ten of the twelve LDC decisions occurred

prior to February 26, 2002. Thus, plaintiffs cannot (and do not) claim that they were not

aware of a significant number of job transfers prior to that date. See Ratkosky, 843 F.2d

at 873 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“As a general rule, the limitations

period begins to run when the potential plaintiff knows or should have known of the

union’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation.”). Accordingly, because the

LDC decisions issued before February 26, 2002, are discrete and potentially actionable

events, there is no continuing violation. These decisions are barred by the statute of

limitations.6

IV.

A.

The next issue is whether Local 12 violated its duty of fair representation by

favoring the millwrights and electricians, over plaintiffs, machine repairmen. Primarily,

plaintiffs contend that the union wrongfully favored the millwrights and electricians by

transferring substantial amounts of work through the lines of demarcation provided by

the LDC in 2001 and 2002, and by Edwards in 2005. In addition, plaintiffs contend that

the union favored the electricians and millwrights in the areas of cross-training,

apprenticeship training, and “job bank” opportunities.

In Vaca v. Sipes, the Supreme Court held that “[a] breach of the statutory duty

of fair representation occurs only when a union’s conduct toward a member of the

collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” 386 U.S. at 190.

A union’s actions are arbitrary “only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the

time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a wide range of

reasonableness as to be irrational.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65,
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 10

67 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, a union’s

judgments are not arbitrary “even if those judgments are ultimately wrong,” Marquez

v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1998), negligent or mistaken, Poole v.

Budd Co., 706 F.2d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1983).

A union’s actions are improperly discriminatory if they are “intentional, severe,

and unrelated to legitimate union objectives[,]” Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec., Ry. &

Motor Coach Emps. of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971), and they are in bad

faith if made with improper intent or motive, Williamson v. Lear Corp., 183 F. App’x

497, 505 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). In addition, to recover for a breach of the duty

of fair representation, the plaintiff must demonstrate injury. See Spellacy v. Airline

Pilots Ass’n-Int’l, 156 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 1998); Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide,

Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 585 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that a union’s failure to present favorable

evidence during a grievance procedure is actionable only if such evidence would have

brought about a different result).

B.

Here, plaintiffs assert that the union had a more demanding duty of fair

representation regarding the lines of demarcation because it was acting as a “hiring hall.”

In making this argument, plaintiffs rely on language contained in Breininger v. Sheet

Metal Workers International Association Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67 (1989).

In Breininger, the Supreme Court addressed the duty of fair representation in the

context of a union-run hiring hall. 493 U.S. at 70. Plaintiffs claimed that the union

breached its duty of fair representation by exercising, in an improper discriminatory

manner, its ability to refer union members for employment. Id. at 70-71. In defending

against this claim, the union asserted that when it operates a hiring hall, it “should be

relieved entirely of its duty of fair representation.” Id. at 87. The Court rejected this

argument, holding that the duty of fair representation applies to union-run hiring halls,

and noting that “if a union does wield additional power in a hiring hall by assuming the

employer’s role, its responsibility to exercise that power fairly increases rather than

decreases.” Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 11

7

While plaintiffs assert that the union’s lines of demarcation were so arbitrary as to demonstrate

discrimination and bad faith, plaintiffs do not put forth any arguments or evidence demonstrating the bad

faith or discriminatory intent of the union. 

Citing Breininger, both the D.C. and Ninth Circuits have held that a more

demanding duty of fair representation is required in the hiring-hall context. Lucas v.

NLRB, 333 F.3d 927, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2003); Jacoby v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 611, 616-17

(D.C. Cir. 2000). However, a panel of this court has held to the contrary. In Hoskins v.

Local 1853 International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement

Workers of America, 188 F.3d 507, 1999 WL 618074 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished),

union members asserted that Breininger required “a higher duty of fair representation”

for unions running a hiring hall. 1999 WL 618074, at *4. In rejecting this argument, the

Hoskins court held that the Supreme Court in Breininger “did not impose a higher duty

of fair representation[,]” but merely held that the duty was applicable to union-run hiring

halls. Id.

We need not decide whether Breininger requires a higher duty of fair

representation in the hiring-hall context because Local 12 was not running a hiring hall.

In Breininger, the union ran an exclusive hiring hall over which the employer had no

authority or responsibility. 493 U.S. at 71 n.1. The same was true in Lucas and Jacoby.

See Lucas, 333 F.3d at 929 n.2; Jacoby, 233 F.3d at 613. In contrast, the union in this

case was merely designating which skilled trades were to perform what work at the

Toledo North plant, a decision subject to Chrysler’s ultimate approval. The union was

not selecting individual union members for employment. Thus, because the union was

not operating a hiring hall, a higher duty of fair representation is not required.

C.

Having determined that Breininger does not impose a higher standard in this

case, we now move to the merits of the claim. In asserting that Local 12 breached its

duty of fair representation through setting the lines of demarcation, plaintiffs rely

exclusively on their assertion that the lines of demarcation were made without reason

and in contrast to prior practice and training, thereby rendering them arbitrary.7
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 12

However, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the union’s actions were wholly “irrational”

in order to establish arbitrariness, a demanding standard. Because plaintiffs have failed

to submit evidence demonstrating that the lines of demarcation were “so far outside a

wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational[,]” O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 67 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this

claim.

As a practical matter, unions are rarely able to negotiate agreements that

completely satisfy the desires of all its represented members. Indeed, as the Supreme

Court has noted:

Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms

of any . . . agreement affect individual employees and classes of

employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them

invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly

to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a

statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents,

subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the

exercise of its discretion.

Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). Accordingly, we “are careful not

to substitute [our] judgment[] for those of the authorized labor organization.” Ratkosky,

843 F.2d at 876. In this case, plaintiffs do not dispute that there is no one “correct” set

of demarcations that would be agreeable to all skilled tradesmen. Accordingly, we will

not disturb the union’s proper exercise of its discretionary judgment. The fact that the

lines of demarcation “favor[] one group more than another does not in itself constitute

a breach of the union’s duty.” Id.

Plaintiffs rely upon “past practice” and prior training at the North Cove plant in

asserting that the lines of demarcation at the Toledo North plant are arbitrary. However,

plaintiffs acknowledge that the concept of past practice is elusive, as the skilled

tradesmen are often unable to agree on what constitutes past practice. Indeed, many jobs

were shared by multiple skilled trades at the North Cove plant. Moreover, the 1997-

2002 CBA provided for the minimization of traditional lines of demarcation, recognizing

that many jobs are properly performed by two or more trade classifications. Thus, while
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 13

8

Plaintiffs present several criticisms regarding the processes that resulted in the lines of

demarcation, not the least of which is Edwards’ refusal to consider McIntyre’s opinions regarding the 2005

demarcations. While perhaps it is unfortunate that the skilled trade stewards were not more involved in

the setting of the lines of demarcation, this failure does not render the demarcations irrational.

past practice and training may not have been emphasized as desired by plaintiffs, this

fact alone does not render the demarcations irrational in light of the circumstances

presented in setting lines of demarcation for a new plant under a new CBA.

Plaintiffs further contend that the demarcations established in the Toledo North

plant are arbitrary because of the sheer amount of transferred work. However, the fact

that the demarcations are more favorable to the electricians and millwrights is not

enough to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. See Ratkosky, 843 F.2d

at 876. Plaintiffs’ emphasis on the end result of the long-fought battle over the lines of

demarcation pays short shrift to the process through which the demarcations were made.

This process is highly relevant to whether Local 12 violated its duty of fair

representation. See O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 78 (holding that courts must “take into account

. . . the facts and the legal climate that confronted the [union] at the time the decision was

made”). The undisputed facts establish that after the skilled tradesmen were dissatisfied

with the proposed allocation of work at the Toledo North plant, a committee was elected

to make recommendations based upon majority vote. When several skilled tradesmen

were still dissatisfied, a UAW representative was brought to the plant to provide

recommendations, and when the skilled tradesmen were yet still dissatisfied, Local 12

assigned Edwards to create new lines of demarcation. Thus, while no process resulted

in a set of demarcations agreeable to all union members, the process itself was

reasonably fair, and certainly not irrational.8

Moreover, while plaintiffs claim that a significant number of machine repairmen

jobs were unreasonably transferred to millwrights and electricians, plaintiffs fail to

quantify this transfer for the court. Plaintiffs cannot rely on the cumulative effect of the

line of demarcation decisions as evidence of arbitrariness without submitting evidence

establishing that effect. Mere conclusory statements that the machine repair trade was

“gutted” is insufficient to satisfy plaintiffs’ burden of establishing arbitrariness. See
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 14

9

In their reply brief, plaintiffs assert that Local 12 had a motive to transfer positions to the

electricians and millwrights to protect them from layoffs at the expense of the machine repairmen.

However, plaintiffs provide no citations to the record to support this theory of nefarious intent.

Lynott v. Story, 929 F.2d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that conclusory statements are

insufficient to meet the burden of production and persuasion).

Finally, while plaintiffs contend that the lines of demarcation were made without

explanation, the record indicates to the contrary. For example, the LDC assessed pieces

of equipment in the Toledo North plant, debated which trade should rightfully perform

the work, and then determined the lines of demarcation by majority vote. While neither

party sets forth in the record the precise issues debated before the vote, there is no

evidence establishing that the reasons underlying the majority vote were irrational.

From what can be gleaned from the record, it appears that some work was transferred

from machine repairmen to millwrights because the work required more than one

employee, necessitated “rigging,” or because the work involved “rollers.” Moreover,

while plaintiffs assert that the machine repairmen had superior training for the

transferred positions, there is no evidence in the record indicating that the other skilled

trades were unable to adequately perform the jobs to which they were assigned.

In sum, plaintiffs have failed to submit evidence demonstrating that Local 12’s

decisions regarding the lines of demarcation were irrational. The mere fact that plaintiffs

“were adversely affected by the actions” does not establish a breach of the duty of fair

representation. Ratkosky, 843 F.2d at 878-79.9

 Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of

plaintiffs’ claim regarding the lines of demarcation.

V.

Plaintiffs place little emphasis on their remaining claims of unfair representation

against Local 12. First, plaintiffs assert that Local 12 unfairly allocated cross-training

opportunities. Chrysler approves voluntary training courses for its skilled tradesmen,

designating what trades may attend what classes. When a class is not filled with

employees of the designated trade, it is possible for other tradesmen to attend.
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 15

While the record indicates that millwrights and electricians were able to attend

machine repair training courses, it does not appear that machine repairmen have been

able to receive similar cross-training. However, there is no evidence indicating that

millwrights and electricians were able to receive cross-training in violation of Chrysler

rules, i.e., were able to attend classes already filled with employees of the designated

trade. Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that machine repairmen were unable

to attend classes designated for other trades when such classes were not full. In fact,

there is nothing in the record showing that any plaintiff was ever denied requested crosstraining. Thus, there is simply no evidence that the union acted in bad faith, with

discriminatory intent, or irrationally with regard to cross-training.

Next, plaintiffs claim that Local 12 violated its duty of fair representation in

denying machine repair apprentices nationally required training hours on “machining.”

Once again, this claim is without merit. The Toledo Chrysler plants do not require

machine repairmen to perform machining work, and therefore denied apprenticeship

hours in that area. However, apprentices were nevertheless able to complete their

apprenticeships and obtain their journeyman cards. Accordingly, Local 12 was not

irrational in denying such training, and even if it had been, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate

the harm required to assert a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation.

Plaintiffs also argue that Local 12 violated its duty of fair representation by

unfairly allocating “job bank” positions. We disagree. The job bank is a part of the

Employment Security System provided under the CBA. Laid-off employees can be

placed in the job bank and receive one hundred percent of their wages. Generally,

employees must have three years of seniority to be eligible for the job bank. However,

exceptions to this rule are made when community-related positions require certain skills.

Plaintiffs contend that while no machine repairmen with less than three years

seniority were placed in the job bank, a small number of millwrights and electricians

without the requisite seniority did receive job bank positions. This discrepancy is

reasonably explained, however, as a small number of millwrights and electricians were

paid out of the job bank, despite their lack of seniority, because certain community-based
No. 10-3500 Bowerman, et al. v. UAW, et al. Page 16

projects required their skills. Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence contradicting this

explanation. Accordingly, the union’s actions were not irrational, discriminatory, or

made in bad faith.

VI.

Finally, plaintiffs assert that the UAW breached its duty of fair representation in

providing recommendations regarding the lines of demarcation for the Toledo North

plant. However, as described above, the UAW visited the Toledo North plant, reviewed

the disputed positions, and made advisory recommendations. There is no evidence

indicating that these actions were improperly discriminatory, made in bad faith, or

arbitrary.

VII.

In sum, we hold that plaintiffs’ claims regarding the LDC decisions and layoffs

made before February 26, 2002, are barred by the statute of limitations. In addition, we

hold that plaintiffs’ remaining claims fail on their merits. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.