* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-30960

Summary Calendar

_____________________

KAREN KARANIEKIS V. LOMAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FIELDCREST CANNON, INC.; JOHN E. CAGNOLATTI,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CV-692

March 3, 1999

Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appellant Karen Lomas appeals the summary judgments in favor

of Encee In c. (improperly named as Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc.) and

John Cagnolatti on Lomas’ employment discrimination and intentional

infliction of emotional distress claims. We AFFIRM.

I.

Lomas began work as a receiving clerk and cashier in 1993 at

a Fieldcrest Cannon factory outlet owned and operated by Encee.- 2 -

Lomas, a black female, was supervised by the store manager,

Cagnolatti, a white male.

Lomas filed this action again st Encee and Cagnolatti in

February 1997, claiming that Ca gnolatti created a hostile work

environment by making racial co mments and engaging in acts of

discrimination towards her. Lomas sought relief under 42 U.S.C.

§2000e, et seq.

, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and L ouisiana antidiscrimination statutes, and under state tort law for intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

For purposes of summary judgment, the following facts, among

others, are taken as true: (1) In 1993, Cagnolatti said he got in

trouble for playing with a “nigger” when he was a child; (2) in

1993 or 1994, Cagnolatti referred to a black customer as “one of

the educated ones”; (3) in 1993 or 1994, Cagnolatti told Lomas she

could buy oven mitts that came in because they had “a black face”

on them; (4) in 1993 or 1994, Cagnolatti remarked to Lomas that

there is no such thing as a black Santa Claus; (5) in September

1994, Cagnolatti remarked to Lomas that she would “relate to” a new

person he hired, because that person was black; (6) in March 1996,

Cagnolatti, in the presence of Lomas, told a white employee that

she could not handle being black, because “black people get beat up

and assaulted”; and (7) Cagnolatti stated to Lomas that he thought

blacks did not like cotton “[b]ecause they had to pick so much back

in the days”. On the other hand, among other things, Cognolatti on- 3 -

several occasions recommended Lomas for raises, and offered her an

assistant manager position.

The district court granted Encee and Cagnolatti’s motions for

s ummary judgment, finding that (1) Lomas failed to demonstrate a

hostile work environment becaus e Cagnolatti’s conduct was not

severe or pervasive enough and because Lomas failed to show it

unreasonably interfered with her job performance; (2) Lomas had no

claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress, because she

did not show that Cagnolatti’s comments were so outrageous and

extreme to be actionable; and (3) mos t of Lomas’ disparate

treatment claims were prescribed, an d the continuing violation

doctrine would not revive them; and such claims that might not be

time-barred failed.

II.

Of course, we review a summary judgment de novo

. E .g.,

Hucka bay v. Moore , 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998). We affirm

for essentially the reasons stated by the district court. L omas v.

Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. , No. 97-692-A (M.D.La., July 28, 1998).

For the first time on appeal, Lomas asserts that the district

court erred in finding that her state law discrimination claims

were prescribed. Lomas contends that L.A. R.S. 23:333, which

became effective August 1, 1997 (several months after she filed the- 4 -

present action), provides for the suspension of the prescriptive

period while the claim is being reviewed by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission or the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights.

Of course, no authority need be cited for the rule that points

raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed only for plain

error. We find none. It is neither “plain” nor “clear” that the

state statute would revive Lomas’ claim; her claim was already

prescribed before the statute became effective, and Lomas does not

assert ( nor do we have any other evidence) that the statute is

mea nt to be applied retroactively to revive prescribed causes of

action. See Cameron Parish Sch. Board v. Acands, Inc. , 687 So.2d

84, 89-90 (La. 1997)(“a clear and unequivocal expression of intent

by the legislature” is required before procedural statute will be

applied retroactively to revive a claim).

III.

For the above reasons, the summary judgments are

AFFIRMED.