In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 04-2383

LINDA JAMES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MCDONALD’S CORPORATION,

SIMON MARKETING, INCORPORATED,

and ANTE ENTERPRISES LLC, doing

business as MCDONALD’S RESTAURANT,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 02 C 2791—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________

ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2005—DECIDED AUGUST 2, 2005

____________

Before POSNER, RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Linda James filed this action in the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Kentucky alleging state law contract and tort claims against

McDonald’s Corporation, Simon Marketing, Inc. and the

owner-operators of two McDonald’s restaurants (collectively “McDonald’s”). The action was transferred to the

Northern District of Illinois, under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), as
2 No. 04-2383

part of the In re McDonald’s Corporation Promotional Game

Litigation, No. 1437, multi-district proceeding. The district

court granted McDonald’s motion to compel Ms. James to

arbitrate her claims and to stay judicial proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration. Ms. James did not pursue

arbitration; instead, nearly a year later, she asked the district

court to reconsider its order. The district court denied the

motion and later dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.

Ms. James has appealed. For the reasons set forth in the

following opinion, we now affirm the judgment of the

district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

In 2001, McDonald’s was promoting sales of its food

products by sponsoring a game called “Who Wants to be a

Millionaire.” Ms. James obtained a game card in May of

2001 when she purchased an order of french fries at the

drive-thru window of a McDonald’s restaurant in Franklin,

Kentucky. She believed the game card to be a grand prize

winner worth one million dollars. In order to redeem her

prize, Ms. James sent in the original game card to the

McDonald’s redemption center. On June 14, 2001, however,

the redemption center sent her a letter explaining that,

“[t]hrough security codes on your Game Card we have been

able to determine that it is a Low-level Prize Game Card.

Low-level prizes included food prizes and $1 to $5 in cash.”

R.1.

In August 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

arrested eight employees of Simon Marketing who allegedly

had stolen the winning game cards from the “Who Wants to
No. 04-2383 3

be a Millionaire” game and another McDonald’s promotion.

Ms. James filed suit alleging that McDonald’s induced her

to purchase its food products by the chance to win the

“Who Wants to be a Millionaire” game when it knew that,

due to the theft of winning game cards, the odds of winning

were less than represented. She also alleged that, as part of

its fraud scheme, McDonald’s had used a false pretense to

refuse to honor her winning game card.

McDonald’s filed a motion to compel Ms. James to arbitrate her claims. It relied on an arbitration clause contained

in the rules for the “Who Wants to be a Millionaire” game

(“Official Rules”), which stated:

Except where prohibited by law, as a condition of participating in this Game, participant agrees that (1) any

and all disputes and causes of action arising out of or

connected with this Game, or any prizes awarded, shall

be resolved individually, without resort to any form

of class action, and exclusively by final and binding

arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration

Association and held at the AAA regional office nearest

the participant; (2) the Federal Arbitration Act shall

govern the interpretation, enforcement and all proceedings at such arbitration; and (3) judgment upon such

arbitration award may be entered in any court having

jurisdiction.

R.1, Ex.A at 12. McDonald’s presented evidence, credited by

the district court, that the Official Rules were posted openly

in participating restaurants. The rules were posted near the

food counter, on the back of in-store tray liners and near the

drive-thru window. Also, the french fry cartons to which

game cards were affixed had language directing participants to see the Official Rules for details.
4 No. 04-2383

B.

On February 4, 2003, the district court granted

McDonald’s motion to compel Ms. James to arbitrate her

claims. Applying Kentucky law, the district court concluded

that Ms. James could not avoid the arbitration clause by

claiming that she never saw or read the Official Rules. Next,

the court determined that arbitration, not the court, was the

appropriate forum for resolving Ms. James’ claim that the

arbitration clause should not be enforced because McDonald’s fraudulently had induced her to participate in the

game. This was because the alleged fraud related to the

entire contract, as opposed to the agreement to arbitrate in

particular. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,

388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967). Finally, the district court found

unavailing Ms. James’ claim that it should not enforce the

arbitration clause because the costs of arbitration were prohibitive. The district court noted that Green Tree Financial

Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), and the other

cases upon which Ms. James relied, concerned a party’s

ability to pursue federal statutory claims. In contrast,

Ms. James submitted no authority to support the proposition that prohibitive costs could defeat an agreement to

arbitrate common law or state law claims.

Despite the district court’s order, Ms. James did not file a

demand for arbitration. At a status hearing held in August

2003, her counsel informed the district court that Ms. James

had not initiated arbitration because she could not afford to

advance the necessary costs. On December 15, 2003, Ms.

James’ counsel explained that Ms. James still had not

proceeded to arbitration due to the costs. At that time,

counsel requested the district court to transfer the case back

to the Western District of Kentucky. Counsel sought to file

in the transferor court a motion for reconsideration of the

district court’s order compelling arbitration. The district
No. 04-2383 5

court denied the motion on the ground that granting it

would defeat the purpose of the multi-district litigation

process. The district court set a deadline of January 15, 2004,

for Ms. James to file any requests for reconsideration.

On January 15, 2004, Ms. James filed a motion for reconsideration; in the alternative, she requested that her case be

dismissed “so that she may exercise her right of appeal.”

R.28 at 9. The district court denied the motion as untimely.

In essence, the court explained that Ms. James merely reiterated her original arguments and was “not entitled to forego

arbitration, wait nearly a year, and only then seek reconsideration.” R.32 at 3. The court further held that, even if the

motion was deemed timely, it had no merit. Among other

things, the court explained that no genuine factual issue

existed as to whether a contract was entered:

Ms. James has not contradicted the factual showing

made by McDonald’s that the french fry carton that

contained her game piece made specific reference to the

contest rules and told her what she needed to do to

review them. Her only contention is that she did not

actually see the rules. Under the circumstances, this

amounts to a claim that she did not read the rules even

though they were clearly and undisputably identified to

her as being part of the contest.

Id. at 4. In concluding its order, the district court expressed

that “[i]t is clear from the events since our February 2003

order that James does not intend to pursue her claim in

arbitration.” Id. at 6. Therefore, the court granted Ms. James

one week to file a motion to show cause why her case

should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute in arbitration.

Three weeks later, Ms. James filed a one-page submission

containing the same arguments previously raised. The
6 No. 04-2383

district court concluded that Ms. James “will not pursue the

case in the manner the court has ruled the law requires. This

amounts to a failure to prosecute.” R.34 at 1. Accordingly,

the court dismissed Ms. James’ case with prejudice.

II

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s decision, under the Federal

Arbitration Act (“FAA”), to compel parties to arbitrate their

disputes de novo. See Fyrnetics (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Quantum

Group, Inc., 293 F.3d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 2002). We review

the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Id.

B. Arbitration

Ms. James contends that the district court erred by ordering her to submit her claims to arbitration on three grounds:

(1) that she did not enter into a valid agreement to arbitrate

her claims; (2) that she cannot afford the costs of arbitration;

and (3) that the contract is invalid because it was induced by

fraud.

1. Agreement to Arbitrate

The FAA provides that a “written provision in any . . .

contract . . . to settle by arbitration” any future controversy

arising out of such contract “shall be valid, irrevocable, and

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
No. 04-2383 7

1 Section 2 of the FAA provides in full:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract

evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by

arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such

contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or

any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to

arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in

equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2.

equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.1 The

FAA was designed “to reverse the longstanding judicial

hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place [them]

on the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/

Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (2000). The FAA embodies

a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.

1, 24-25 (1983). Any doubts with respect to arbitrability

therefore should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id.

However, a party can be compelled to arbitrate only those

matters that she has agreed to submit to arbitration. First

Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995);

Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126,

1130 (7th Cir. 1997) (“An agreement to arbitrate is treated

like any other contract. . . . If there is no contract there is to

be no forced arbitration.” (internal quotation and citation

omitted)). In deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter, federal courts generally should rely

on state contract law governing the formation of contracts.
8 No. 04-2383

2 The parties dispute whether Kentucky or Illinois law applies in

this case. See Appellant’s Br. at 9-10; Appellee’s Br. at 13-14.

However, neither party argues, nor do we conclude, that the

outcome of this case would be different depending on which law

we apply. The principles of contract construction in this case are

“matters of hornbook law.” Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc.,

134 F.3d 1054, 1061 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998).

First Options of Chicago Inc., 514 U.S. at 944.2

Ms. James contends that she should not be forced to arbitrate her claims because she never entered into an agreement

to arbitrate her dispute. She submits that she was not aware

of the Official Rules, much less that the rules deprived her

of a jury trial. For the same reasons, Ms. James contends

that, if there was an agreement to arbitrate, it is unconscionable and should not be enforced. To support her position,

Ms. James submits that one cannot assume that she knew of,

and accepted, the arbitration clause in the Official Rules

simply because she ate at a McDonald’s restaurant. She

maintains that customers cannot be expected to read every

container of food they purchase in order to know that they

are entering a contract. Rather, she submits that it was

McDonald’s burden to assure her understanding of, and

willingness to be bound by, the arbitration provision.

Certainly, as Ms. James urges, a contract includes only

terms on which the parties have agreed. See ProCD, Inc. v.

Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). However, one

of the things that Ms. James agreed to by participating in the

“Who Wants to be a Millionaire” game was to follow the

game’s rules in order to win the promised prize. As a

general rule, a participant in a prize-winning contest must

comply with the terms of the contest’s rules in order to form

a valid and binding contract with the contest promoter. The

promoter’s obligation is limited by the terms of the offer,
No. 04-2383 9

3 See, e.g., Workmon v. Publishers Clearing House, 118 F.3d 457, 459

(6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. McDonald’s Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1038,

1042-43 (E.D. Ark. 1999), aff’d, 230 F.3d 1362 (8th Cir. 2000)

(unpublished); Nat’l Amateur Bowlers, Inc. v. Tassos, 715 F. Supp.

323, 325 (D. Kan. 1989); Johnson v. BP Oil Co., 602 So. 2d 885, 888

(Ala. 1992); Harlem-Irving Realty Inc. v. Alesi, 425 N.E.2d 1354,

1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on

Contracts § 3.10, at 260-62 & n.34 (3d ed. 2004); 1 Richard A. Lord,

Williston on Contracts § 4.3, at 360 (1990); Michael P. Sullivan,

Annotation, Private Contests and Lotteries: Entrants’ Rights and

Remedies, 64 A.L.R. 4th 1021 (1988).

including the conditions and rules of the contest that are

made public.3

Ms. James challenges the district court’s reliance on

Kentucky case law that provides that a party who had the

opportunity to read a contract, but did not, is bound by the

contract terms. Merten v. Vogt, 208 S.W.2d 739, 740

(Ky. 1948); Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335,

341 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). Ms. James insists that these cases

are inapposite because they involve contracts that were

negotiated and signed by the parties. Instead, she relies on

Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Sprowls, 82 S.W.3d 193, 199

(Ky. 2002), which held that an employee could not validly

agree to arbitrate without “actual notice” of the employer’s

arbitration policy. The district court’s ruling is not inconsistent with Oakwood, however, because the court found that

the Official Rules were “clearly and undisputably identified

to [Ms. James] as being part of the contest.” R.32 at 4. It is

axiomatic that a contest normally has rules regarding eligibility to win the promised prize. Moreover, Ms. James cannot claim, on the one hand, that a valid contract obligates

McDonald’s to redeem her prize and, on the other hand,

argue that no contract binds her to the contest rules. A con-
10 No. 04-2383

test participant cannot pick and choose among the terms

and conditions of the contest; the rules stand or fall in their

entirety.

Outside the promotional-contest context, this court has

held that parties are bound to an arbitration provision even

if they did not read the provision. For instance, in Hill v.

Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 808 (1997), the purchasers of a computer conceded that

they had noticed the terms printed inside the box in which

their computer was shipped. However, they maintained that

they had not read it closely enough to see the arbitration

clause. See id. at 1148. We held that the arbitration clause

was enforceable because the purchasers had the opportunity

to return the computer after reading the terms. We stated

that “[a] contract need not be read to be effective; people

who accept take the risk that the unread terms may in

retrospect prove unwelcome.” Id.; see also ProCD, 86 F.3d at

1452 (binding consumer to arbitration clause printed inside

box of software because consumer had the opportunity to

return the software after reading the terms). In Hill, we

explained that

[p]ractical considerations support allowing vendors to

enclose the full legal terms with their products. Cashiers

cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at that the

other end of the phone for direct-sales operations such

as Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of

terms before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the

droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten

many potential buyers. Others would hang up in a rage

over the waste of their time. And oral recitation would

not avoid customers’ assertions (whether true or

feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them, or

that they did not remember or understand it.
No. 04-2383 11

Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149; see also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. The

situation faced by McDonald’s presents an apt comparison.

To require McDonald’s cashiers to recite to each and every

customer the fourteen pages of the Official Rules, and then

have each customer sign an agreement to be bound by the

rules, would be unreasonable and unworkable. The Official

Rules were identified to Ms. James as part of the contest,

and that identification is sufficient in this case to apprise her

of the contents of the rules.

2. Costs of Arbitration

Ms. James also contends that the arbitration clause should

not be enforced because the high up-front costs of arbitration prohibit her from pursuing a remedy in that forum. Ms.

James relies on Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 81, in which the

Supreme Court recognized that “the existence of large

arbitration costs may well preclude a litigant . . . from

effectively vindicating” statutory rights in arbitration.

Ms. James’ reliance on Green Tree is misplaced. In Green Tree,

the Court was concerned with whether the existence of a

federal statutory right under the Truth In Lending Act

(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1608 et seq., evinced Congress’ intent

to supersede the FAA when necessary to provide access to

a legal forum. 531 U.S. at 80-81. It remains unclear whether

the rationale of Green Tree applies to situations that do not

involve the assertion of federal statutory rights. See Richard

M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer

Contracts: A Call for Reform, 28 Hous. L. Rev. 1237, 1253

(2001); see also Brown v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 257 F.3d 821,

825 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001) (declining to

extend to non-statutory claims a prior holding prohibiting

an employer from requiring an employee to arbitrate all

disputes relating to the employment relationship as a
12 No. 04-2383

condition of employment and also to require the employee

to bear all or part of the costs of arbitration). The cases relied

on by Ms. James similarly involve federal statutory claims.

See Appellant’s Br. at 15-18.

Without deciding whether Green Tree extends to common

law or state law claims, we note that, in any event,

Ms. James has not made a showing that the expenses that

she necessarily and definitely would incur would make

arbitration prohibitive. “[A] party seeking to invalidate an

arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would

be prohibitively expensive bears the burden of showing the

likelihood of incurring such costs.” Green Tree, 531 U.S. at

81. Ms. James relies on the affidavit of Michael Eiben, who

is a member of the Panel of Neutrals for the American

Arbitration Association (“AAA”), to establish the costs of

arbitration. Eiben estimated that Ms. James would have to

pay $38,000 to $80,000 in fees and service costs before arbitration commenced in order to pursue her claims. See R.28,

Ex.2 at 1. Ms. James filed a sworn affidavit stating that she

does not have the financial resources to advance those fees.

See R.28, Ex.1 at 2.

The AAA’s Commercial Rules contain provisions to protect parties from prohibitive expenses. The Eighth Circuit

has recognized that the

AAA . . . has a fee waiver procedure. It decides whether

or not to waive, in whole or in part, a fee on the basis of

a claimant’s financial situation. It is clear, however,

from our reading of the evidentiary hearing transcript,

that the [plaintiff] never fully explored the AAA’s fee

waiver procedures because [he] refused to provide his

family’s financial information to the AAA. This is an

important step that must be taken before an

unconscionability determination can be made.
No. 04-2383 13

4 We are not persuaded, in contrast, by McDonald’s submission

that, if the arbitrator imposes burdensome costs on Ms. James,

she can return to the district court and seek review of the cost

allocation. See DeGroff v. Masotech Forming Techs.-Fort Wayne, Inc.,

179 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (“[S]hould [plaintiff]

appeal any arbitration award, the reviewing court could assess

whether unreasonable arbitration fees were imposed.”). Ms.

James maintains that she cannot afford to pursue arbitration in

the first instance. A review of the allocation of costs conducted

after the arbitration would be of little help to her. Also, we find

little relevance to McDonald’s claim that it offered to pay Ms.

James the costs of arbitration, if she would be willing to conduct

the arbitration according to the AAA’s Consumer DisputeRelated Rules. These rules have a truncated procedure and apply

to claims that do not exceed ten thousand dollars. Ms. James

believed her claim was worth at least one million dollars, the

purported value of her game card, plus interest and costs.

Therefore, she was under no obligation to accept McDonald’s

limiting offer.

Dobbins v. Hawk’s Enters., 198 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1999);

see also American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702,

712 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003) (“[T]he

rules of the AAA provide . . . sufficient avenues to request

fee-paying relief, if necessary.”). Ms. James has submitted

no evidence indicating how her financial situation would be

factored into an assessment of the arbitration costs under

this hardship provision.4

 Furthermore, Ms. James has not

provided any evidence concerning the comparative expense

of litigating her claims. The cost differential between arbitration and litigation is evidence highly probative to Ms. James’

claim that requiring her to proceed through arbitration,

rather than through the courts, will effectively deny her

legal recourse. See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys.,

Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying a case-bycase analysis in the employment discrimination context

focused on “ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the
14 No. 04-2383

5 Ms. James relies on a contrary statement of the law in Marks v.

Bean, 57 S.W.3d 303 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). However, Marks was

overruled expressly by Louisville Peterbilt, Inc. v. Cox, 132 S.W.3d

850 (Ky. 2004), which applied the Prima Paint standard to the

Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act. In any event, Kentucky’s

(continued...)

expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation

in court, and whether the cost differential is so substantial

as to deter the bringing of claims”).

3. Fraud in the Inducement

Finally, Ms. James claims that the arbitration clause is

unenforceable as a matter of public policy because it was

part of McDonald’s alleged scheme to defraud. The Supreme Court has spoken to this issue:

[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself—an issue which goes to the “making”

of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court may

proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language [of

the FAA] does not permit the federal court to consider

claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally. . . . We hold, therefore, that in passing upon a § 3

[of the FAA] application for a stay while the parties

arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to

arbitrate.

Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403. Thus, “a court may consider a

claim that a contracting party was fraudulently induced to

include an arbitration provision in the agreement but not

claims that the entire contract was the product of fraud.”

Sweet Dreams Unlimited v. Dial-A-Mattress Int’l, Ltd., 1 F.3d

639, 641 n.4 (7th Cir. 1993).5
No. 04-2383 15

5 (...continued)

interpretation of its state arbitration statute does not control this

case. The arbitrability of contracts involving interstate commerce,

such as here, is governed by federal substantive law, not state

law. See Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 1993); Goodwin v.

Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 1984).

Ms. James’ complaint alleged that she was induced into

participating in the “Who Wants to be a Millionaire” game

by McDonald’s allegedly deceptive practices. Her allegations say nothing of fraud related uniquely to the arbitration

clause. Therefore, under Prima Paint, Ms. James’ fraud claim

was a matter to be resolved by an arbitrator, not by the

district court.

In sum, the district court appropriately granted

McDonald’s motion to compel arbitration.

C. Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute

A district court has the authority under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(b) to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal for lack of prosecution. This authority “has generally

been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule

or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to

manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and

expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,

370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). We review a district court’s

dismissal of a complaint for failure to prosecute for an abuse

of discretion. Id. at 633. We shall presume that the district

court “acted reasonably, and reversal is warranted only if it

is plain that the dismissal was a mistake or that the judge

did not consider factors essential to the exercise of sound

discretion.” Sharif v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 376 F.3d

720, 725 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation and citation

omitted).
16 No. 04-2383

“Once a party invokes the judicial system by filing a

lawsuit, it must abide by the rules of the court; a party can

not decide for itself when it feels like pressing its action and

when it feels like taking a break because ‘[t]rial judges have

a responsibility to litigants to keep their court calendars as

current as humanly possible.’ ” GCIU Employer Ret. Fund v.

Chicago Tribune Co., 8 F.3d 1195, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1993)

(quoting Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 795 F.2d 601, 608

(7th Cir. 1986)).

Ms. James contends that dismissal was too harsh of a

sanction. Specifically, she maintains that the delay was not

caused by neglect or dilatory tactics on her part. Rather, she

“very much wanted to pursue her cause,” but could not

because the district court compelled her to arbitrate her

claims, which she could not afford to do. Reply Br. at 8; see

Appellant’s Br. at 19-20. The district court noted that

Ms. James continued to assert the same arguments that it

already had ruled were not meritorious. In denying

Ms. James’ motion for reconsideration and, alternatively, for

dismissal, the court stated:

This request comes far too late in the day. . . . James

took no steps following the Court’s February 2003 order

compelling arbitration to carry out that order’s directive, seek reconsideration, or request certification for an

interlocutory appeal. Our ruling did not give James the

option of foregoing arbitration, waiting nearly a year,

asking this Court for another bite at the same apple, and

then reviving for appeal purposes a ruling made more

than a year ago. If James wanted to appeal the February

2003 order, she should have made that request within a

reasonable time after the order was entered.

R.32 at 6. The district court concluded that the law required

it to compel Ms. James to arbitrate her claims. Once it so

ordered, it was incumbent upon Ms. James to abide by the
No. 04-2383 17

district court’s ruling and not to continue submitting arguments that the district court already had determined were

meritless. Likewise, her failure to pursue promptly the

court’s reconsideration, or this court’s review on interlocutory appeal, shows that the district court did not clearly

abuse its discretion in dismissing Ms. James’ case with

prejudice.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment

of the district court.

AFFIRMED

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—8-2-05