alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 WESLEY L. HATMON , ) ) Movant

- Appellant , ) )
v. ) No. SD36289 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Filed: July 29, 2020 ) Respondent

- Respondent

. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DALLAS COUNTY
Honorable Lisa Carter Henderson , A ssociate Circuit Judge
REVERSED & REMA NDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS Wesley L. Hatmon (“Movant”), following an ev identiary hearing on an amended motion, was denied post

- conviction relief under Rule 24.035. 1 Unfortunately, we must reverse and remand, not on the merits, but for an independent evidentiary inquiry on whether Movant was abandoned by post

- conviction counsel. Both Movant and the State agree that the amended motion w as untimely . The notice of filing of guilty plea and

sente ncing transcript, filed by post

- conviction counsel, erroneously stated the due date for

1 All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2020), unless otherwise specified.2 the amended motion. 2 The issue of the timeliness of the amended motion was neither mentioned in the Rule 24.035 evidentiary hearing, nor addressed in the findings of facts
and conclusions of law

. We must address the timeliness of the amended motion. Moore v. State , 458 S.W.3d 822, 826

- 27 (Mo. banc 2015). “ The filing deadline s for post[

- ] conviction relief are mandatory, and cannot be waived. ” Watson v. State , 536 S.W.3d 71 6 , 717 (Mo. banc
201 8 ) (internal quotations and citation omitted)

. “ The untimely fili ng of an amended motion by post[

- ] conviction counsel creates a presumption of abandonment. ” Id. at 719. When the presumption of abandonment arises, “ the motion court is obligated to conduc t an independent inquiry to determine whether the movant was actually abandoned. ”
Milner v. State , 551 S.W. 3d 476, 479

- 80 (Mo. banc 2018). We, therefore, have no choice but to reverse the judg ment and remand the case to
the motion cou rt with instructions to mak e an independent inquiry on the abandonment
issue

.

Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, P. J.

– Opinion Author Daniel E. Scott, J.

– Concurs William W. Francis, Jr. , J.

– Concurs

2 Separate counsel relied upon that date in the filing of the amended motion.
18331.

#### Town of Garden City *et al. v.*Long *et al.*

Argued September 14, 1953

Decided September 15, 1953

Rehearing denied September 28, 1953.

*Myrick & Myrick, Ernest J. Haar,*for plaintiffs in error.

*William A. Searcy, Aaron Kravitch,*contra.

Candler, Justice.

This case is controlled by the decision in *Phillips*v. *City of Atlanta,*ante.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, PJ., not participating.*
#### Violet Cross, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Appellant, v. Paul Cross, Defendant-Counter Plaintiff, Appellee.

Gen. No. 50,666.

First District, First Division.

July 25, 1966.

Rehearing denied August 15, 1966.

Edward Stasukaitis, of Chicago, for appellant; Murray R. Haddon and Louis Z. Grant, of Chicago, for appellee.

Opinion by

PRESIDING JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI.

Not to be published in full.
#### The City of New York, Respondent, v. Frederick P. Fowler, Appellant.

Order modified by requiring as a condition of discontinuance the payment of all costs in the action to be taxed, and as modified affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to appellant. No opinion. Settle order on notice.
_______________________________________ __ 

### Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



## September 9, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


## 136417 Michael F. Cavanag h Elizabeth A. Weave r Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. 

## BAERE COMPANY, Stephen J. Markman, 

## Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/ J ustices 

## Appellant,

v SC: 136417 COA: 268238 Kent CC: 04-012262-CH ADVANTAGE 99 TD, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/ Appellee.

________________ _________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 1, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

p0828 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 9, 2008

Clerk
#### Gary L. DeTEMPLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George PAUGH, Chief of Police; Patrick Dacey, Officer; Mark D. Panepinto; Mr. Weekley, Locksmith; Arthur Mckenzie, Mayor of Bethlehem; Vil*602lage of Bethlehem, A municipal Corporation, West Virginia; Joseph Roxby, Officer; Dwayne Davis, Individual, Defendants-Appellees, and John Doe, Officer, Defendant.

No. 02-2122.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 20, 2003.

Decided March 25, 2003.

Gary L. DeTemple, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Gary L. DeTemple appeals the district court’s orders accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge to deny relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint and denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See DeTemple v. Paugh,*No. CA-01-126-5 (N.D.W. Va. July 8, 2002; July 26, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
DWFCM International Access Fund L.P. and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                      36,135,527
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  130,006<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              36,874,230<F2>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                36,874,230<F3>
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             (570,989)<F4>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,490,494
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,061,483)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,061,483)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,061,483)
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Receivables include interest receivable of $130,006.
<F2>In addition to cash and receivables, total assets include net
unrealized gain on open contracts of $608,697.
<F3>Liabilities include redemptions payable of $526,756, accrued
management fees of $92,010, and accrued administrative expenses
of $70,250.
<F4>Total revenue includes realized trading revenue of $(3,118,414),
net change in unrealized of $1,054,886 and interest income of
$1,492,539.
</FN>


</TABLE>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________ No. 1D 2024

- 1008

_____________________________ M. D

. D ., Mother o f J. A

. D

. G ., M. E

. G

. B ., M. D

. M

. B ., Minor Children , Appellant,

v.
D EPARTMENT O F C HILDREN A ND F AMILIES , Appellee.

_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Randall Todd Harris , Judge

. August 29, 2024

P ER C URIAM

. D ISMISSED

. N.S.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs. , 843 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2003) ( approving procedure that includes dismissal when, after counsel withdraws, the appellant fails to timely file his or her own brief in support of appeal of termination of parental rights ).
R AY , M.K. T HOMAS , and N ORDBY , JJ., concur
.2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331
.

_____________________________
M.D.D., pro se , Appellant. Sarah J. Rumph, Appellate Counsel, Children ’ s Legal Services, Tallahassee , for Appellee ; Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals and Caitlin E. Burke, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division, Statewide Guardian ad Litem, Tallahassee

.
18425.

#### Jackson *v.*Commercial Credit Corporation.

Argued January 11, 1954

Decided January 12, 1954.

*Robert L. Cork,*for plaintiff in error.

*Franklin, Eberhardt & Barham,*contra.

Head, Justice.

The plaintiff’s action is based upon a contract made by him for the purchase of an automobile. Ho alleges that the defendant contracted to receive, and did actually receive, more than the legal rate of interest on the contract. He prays for the recovery of the alleged excessive charges as “damages.” Where the prayers of a petition seek only legal relief, jurisdiction of the writ of error is vested in the Court of Appeals, and not in this court; and this is true although some of the allegations of the petition might be germane to a proceeding in equity. *Taylor Lumber Co.*v. *Clark Lumber Co.,*159 *Ga.*393 (125 S. E. 844); *Robinson*v. *Lindsey,*184 *Ga.*684 (192 S. E. 910).

*Transjerred to the Court of Appeals.*

*All the Justices concur, except Duckworth, C. J., not participating.*
**Exhibit 23.1**


Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm




Sonic
      Solutions


Novato,
      California





We
      hereby
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
      Form
      S-3 (No. 333-112523, No. 333-103624, and No. 333-102396) and Form S-8 (No.
      333-127627) of Sonic Solutions of our reports dated June 21, 2008 relating
      to
      the consolidated financial statements and schedule, and the effectiveness of
      Sonic Solutions’ internal control over financial reporting, which appear in the
      Annual Report to Shareholders, which is incorporated by reference in this Annual
      Report on Form 10K.







BDO
      Seidman, LLP


San
      Francisco, California


June
      21,
      2008
#### People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James McClelland, Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 10,673.

Fourth District.

July 25, 1966.

Raymond L. Terrell, State’s Attorney of Sangamon County, of Springfield, for appellant.

Olsen, Cantrill & Miller, of Springfield, for appellee.

CRAVEN, J.

The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of five counts of a 20-count indictment. After a verdict of guilty, the court granted the defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment. This is an appeal by the State from the order entered arresting judgment.

The motion in arrest claimed numerous errors in the trial proceedings, asserting error in instruction of the jury, admission of evidence, sufficiency of the proof and other matters not cognizable in a motion in arrest of judgment. Such a motion is limited in scope and, by statute, reaches only the two questions of whether the indictment states an offense and whether the court has *411jurisdiction of the cause. Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 38, § 116-2; see also People v. Bridges, 67 Ill App2d 236, 214 NE2d 539 (1966).

The only portion of this lengthy motion in arrest of judgment that is within the statutory limitation is the claim that the indictment failed to state a cause of action against the defendant in that it failed to specify the time and place of the offense as nearly as could be done within the language of § 111-3, c 38, Ill Rev Stats 1963. It is apparent, although not expressly stated, from this record that the action of the trial court in arresting judgment was based upon the holding of this court in People v. Blanchett, 55 Ill App2d 141, 204 NE2d 173 (1965). On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the holding of this court was reversed and an indictment alleging an offense specifying only the county as to the place of the offense was upheld. People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill2d 527, 212 NE2d 97 (1965).

In view of the ultimate holding of the Supreme Court, the action of the circuit court of Sangamon County in granting the motion in arrest of judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

TRAPP, P. J. and SMITH, J., concur.
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###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice 6314]

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681,                         *et seq.*; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note,                         *et seq.*), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236 of October 19, 1999, as amended, and Delegation of Authority No. 257 of April 15, 2003 [68 FR 19875], I hereby determine that the objects to be included in the exhibition “Louvre Atlanta: The Louvre and the Masterpiece,” imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owner or custodian. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at the High Museum of Art, Atlanta, GA, from on or about October 11, 2008, until on or about September 6, 2009; at the Minneapolis Institute of Arts, Minneapolis, MN, from on or about October 18, 2009, to on or about January 10, 2010; and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. Public Notice of these Determinations is ordered to be published in the                         **Federal Register**                        .                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For further information, including a list of the exhibit objects, contact Carol B. Epstein, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202/453-8048). The address is U.S. Department of State, SA-44, 301 4th Street, SW., Room 700, Washington, DC 20547-0001.

      ( print page 47250)    
Dated: August 6, 2008.

C. Miller Crouch,

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

[FR Doc. E8-18781 Filed 8-12-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 10412 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

− Appellee ,

v ersus
ADALBERTO PRIETO

- GARCIA , Defendant

− Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas No. 3:16

- CR

- 372

- 2

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Adalberto Prieto

- Garcia has moved

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 16, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-10412 Document: 00514474614 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/16/2018No. 17

- 10412

2 for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Prieto

- Garcia h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record.
We question whether c ounsel’s certification that the g overnment will enforce the appellate waiver is sufficiently specific to the waiver in this case. S ee United States v. Davis , 530 F.3d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 2008)

. But we need not
reach that issue , because it is not jurisdictional and because counsel examines all potential appellate claims, even those covered by the waiver, in the brief

. Se e United States v. Story , 439 F.3d 226, 230

− 31 (5th Cir. 2006).
We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no non

frivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, an d the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 17-10412 Document: 00514474614 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/16/2018
#### The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl R. Tucker, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 10,686.

Fourth District.

July 7, 1966.

Chester Thomson, Public Defender, of Bloomington (Jerome Mirza, of counsel), for appellant; Hugh A. Henry, Jr., State’s Attorney, of Bloomington, for appellee.

Opinion by

PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP.

Not to be published in full.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the
Quarterly Report of Paradise, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Melvin S. Gordon, as Chief Executive Officer of
Paradise, Inc., certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of Paradise, Inc.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                     |  |  |  |                        
|------------------------------------ |  |  |  | -----------------------
|/s/ Melvin S. Gordon                 |  |  |  | Date: November 14, 2008
|Melvin S. Gordon                     |  |  |  |                        
|Chief Executive Officer and Chairman |  |  |  |
##### 



Exhibit 31.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, F. William Weber, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer),
certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Webco Industries,
Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and have:  a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as
of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth quarter in the
case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which
are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting. Date: October 29, 2004 /s/ F. William Weber  Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)