alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
18351.

#### Moore *et al. v.*Berry.

Submitted September 15, 1953

Decided October 14, 1953.

*Ronald F. Adams,*for plaintiff in error.

Hawkins, Justice.

1. The assignment of on-or in the bill of exceptions that the court erred in failing to sustain a general demurrer, based upon the ground that the petition failed to state a cause of action, is without merit, since it does not appear from the record that any such demurrer was interposed to the petition in the trial court.

2. The plaintiffs in error designate the proceeding in the trial court as a habeas corpus proceeding, seeking to recover custody of a minor child. Exception to the final judgment on the ground that no process was affixed to the original petition is without merit, since the rule nisi issued by the court served upon the defendants is substantially in the form of the writ of habeas corpus prescribed by Code § 50-106.

3. So much of the judgment of Long Superior Court, of the. Atlantic Judicial Circuit, as adjudged the respondents in contempt of court because of an alleged disobedience of a judgment of Chatham Superior Court, of the Eastern Judicial Circuit, is erroneous. While “Every court has power to compel obedience to *its*judgments, orders, and processes *(Gaston*v. *Shunk Plow Co.,*161 *Ga.*287, 298, 130 S. E. 580) ; . . . only the court offended . . . has power to punish for the contempt, or to entertain proceedings to that end.” *Goodrum*v. *Goodrum,*202 *Ga.*135 (42 S. E. 2d 450). See also, in this connection, *Hammock*v. *Hammock,*209 *Ga.*751 (76 S. E. 2d 15).

4. The judgment awarding the custody of the child to the applicant was not erroneous for any reason assigned.

*Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.*

*All the Justices concur.*
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-10095 Summary Calendar

SUZETTE ELWONGER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus BRUCE CROWELL; JOSÉ GOMEZ; MIKE SCOTT; DEBRA GOMEZ, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:95-CV-783-J

- - - - - - - - - - August 7, 1996 Before KING, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Suzette Elwonger appeals the district court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants, Bruce Crowell and Mike Scott. Elwonger argues that the district court erred in holding that Crowell was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in obtaining and executing an arrest warrant against her. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for essentially the reasons given by the district court.No. 96-10095 - 2 - Elwonger v. Crowell , No. 3:95-CV-783-J (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 1995).
AFFIRMED.
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 803

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the credit

for increasing research activities.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 2, 1995

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut (for herself, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. HERGER, and

Mr. NEAL) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make

permanent the credit for increasing research activities.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CREDIT FOR INCREASING RESEARCH ACTIVI4 TIES MADE PERMANENT.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 41 of the Internal Reve6 nue Code of 1986 (relating to credit for increasing re7 search activities) is amended by striking subsection (h).

8 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Paragraph (1) sec9 tion 28(b) of such Code is amended by striking subpara10 graph (D).
2

•HR 803 IH

1 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

2 this section shall apply to taxable years ending after June

3 30, 1995.

Æ
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,

Respondent

v.

STEVE A. FREMPONG,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 79 EAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 12th day of September, 2023

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.

Justice Brobson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
#### Succession of MINTER. Opposition of UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO.

No. 4506.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 30, 1933.

Theus, Grisham, Davis • & Leigh, of Monroe, for appellant.

Stephens & Stephens, of Coushatta, for ap-pellee.

MILLS, Judge.

The succession of W. L. Minter was duly opened and Mrs. Hazel Minter Jordan appointed and qualified as administratrix. She applied to the court for permission to sell the entire property of the succession, consisting of movables, to pay its debts.

The Union Central Life Insurance Company intervened and prayed that it be decreed the owner of certain cotton claimed to belong to the succession and that said cotton be separately sold and the proceeds paid to intervener. This was done, the cotton selling for $1,214.27. The administratrix then filed a provisional account showing the total assets of the succession to be $2,478.71 and a total indebtedness of $9,642.20, of which amount $4,228,71 is privileged.

The Union Central Life Insurance Company then filed an opposition to the provisional account, on the same grounds, which was dismissed, the provisional account homologat-ed and the funds ordered paid accordingly. From this judgment, the third opponent prosecutes this appeal.

The jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal in cases of this character is limited by the Constitution to those wherein the amount in dispute or the funds to be distributed, irrespective of the amount claimed, shall not exceed $2,000 exclusive of interest. The Constitution of 1921, art. 7, §§ 10 and 29; Succession •of Johnson, 141 La. 842, 75 So. 743.

In this case the record shows that, while the amount claimed is only $1,214.20, the fund to be distributed is $2,478.71. The succession being insolvent, each item on the provisional account is affected by the judgment in this case, thereby distinguishing the situation herein presented from that in cases where the succession is solvent and the account is homologated and the creditors ordered paid, in so far as it is not opposed. It is therefore apparent that in the present case this court is without jurisdiction to pass upon the appeal, which should be and is transferred to the Supreme -Court; the record to be deposited in the Supreme Court within thirty days after the record has been returned to the district court, otherwise the appeal is to stand dismissed.
|                (1) | the Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                     |
|                (2) | the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Pacific Gas and Electric Company. |

|                                                                                                                                                                                       |                 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                       | CHRISTOPHER P. JOHNS |
|                                                                                                                                                                                       | CHRISTOPHER P. JOHNS |
|                                 | President            |

----

|                 (1)      | the Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                |                                                                                                                                                     |
|                 (2) | the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Pacific Gas and Electric Company. |

|   |                                                |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|
|   | BARBARA L. BARCON                                   |
|   | BARBARA L. BARCON                                   |
|   | Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer |
|   |                                                |
SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION OF CFO





I, Arthur J. Ayres, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Migenix Inc.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The companys other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:



a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;



c)

Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The companys other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the audit committee of companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the companys internal control over financial reporting.





|Date: | September 17, 2004  |                              
|----- | ------------------- | -----------------------------
|      |                     | Arthur J. Ayres              
|By:   | /s/ Arthur J. Ayres |                              
|      |                     | (Principal Financial Officer)
#### Ex Parte Neal Edgar Aeby.

No. 24828.

April 19, 1950.

Motion for Rehearing Denied (Without Written Opinion) May 17,1950.

*Hardin & Hardin,*and *Mays & Mays*and *Dave Miller,*Ft. Worth, for relator.

*Stewart W. Hellman,*Criminal District Attorney, *W. H. Tolbert*and *James E. Whitmore,*Assistants Criminal District At*576torney, Ft. Worth, and *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Judge.

This is a second application for a writ of habeas corpus by relator, his first application being bur No. 24,784, decided March 22, 1950 (Page 391 of this volume) ; such last numbered case being affirmed in which a denial of bail by the trial court was upheld.

In his present case, relator alleges that since his first application for the writ of habeas corpus was heard and disposed of, “there has come to his knowledge new, important and material evidence in his behalf, none of which was produced on any of the previous trials, and none of which was known to him until this the 3rd day of April, 1950.”

In his allegation relator was evidently governed by Article 171, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P., which reads in part as follows:

> “A party may obtain the writ of habeas corpus a second time by stating in application therefor that since the hearing of his first application important testimony has been obtained which it was not in his power to produce at the former hearing,” etc.

Attached to this application we find the affidavit of one, Odessa Coyle, which says in substance that she saw relator about the hour of 7:00 or 7:30 o’clock P. M., on January 17, 1950, at Dallas, Texas; that he delivered some clothes at her-house in Dallas at such hour.

Relator does not show that the testimony of this witness was not in his power to produce at the former hearing other than he says he did not remember at such hearing that he had visited this witness’ home in Dallas at such time; that he could not remember about this trip at the first hearing.

We are impressed with the belief that the fact now offered as new and important testimony was known to him at the time of the first hearing and should not be used by the trial court in this second hearing. The materiality of such testimony is only shown that on January 17, 1950, near 7:30 o’clock P. M., he was seen at Dallas, Texas. The indictment in the original cause alleges the offense to have been committed on January 17, 1950, in Tarrant County, Texas, and the proof in our Cause No. 24,784, shows that the offense charged took place “late at night”,. *577appellant being identified by the two parties who were robbed at such time. The fact that relator was seen in Dallas at about 7:30 P. M., would not be evidence that he was not seen thereafter “late at night” in Fort Worth, in an adjoining county.

We think the trial judge was correct in holding that relator was not entitled to a second writ of habeas corpus, and also correct in remanding him to jail without bond.

The judgment is affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                EXHIBIT (15)(a)





July 28, 2000



CMS Energy Corporation:

We are aware that CMS Energy Corporation has incorporated by reference in its
Registration Statements No. 33-60007, No. 33-61595, No. 33-62573, No. 333-32229,
No. 333-60795, No. 333-63229, No. 333-68937 and No. 333-76347 its Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended June 30, 2000, which includes our report dated July 28, 2000
covering the unaudited interim financial information contained therein. Pursuant
to Regulation C of the Securities Act of 1933, that report is not considered a
part of the registration statement prepared or certified by our firm or a report
prepared or certified by our firm within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the
Act.


Very truly yours,



/s/ Arthur Andersen LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED TASHAUNA SIMPSON ,

Petitioner ,
v. Case No. 5D 17

- 2007 STATE OF FLORIDA ,

Respondent

. ________________________________/ Opinion filed October 6, 2017 Petition for Belated Appeal A Case of Original Jurisdiction. Tashauna Simpson, Ocala , pro se. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tall ahassee, and, Kaylee D. Tatman , Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM. The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed
with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the July 22, 2016 , judgment s and sentence s in C ase N o s

. 2015

- CF

- 003187

- A

- O, 2015

- CF

- 004451

- A

- O , in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)( 6 )(D).

PETITION GRANTED

.
SAWAYA, EVANDER and EDWARDS , JJ., concu r.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1998
<CASH>                                           5,850
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   37,040
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,063
<INVENTORY>                                     26,883
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                79,458
<PP&E>                                         190,010
<DEPRECIATION>                                  94,649
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 182,791
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           39,485
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           91,635
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      28,742
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   182,791
<SALES>                                         64,345
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                64,345
<CGS>                                           42,484
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   42,484
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                15,395
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 927
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,620
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,163
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,049
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,049
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .25
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 74 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 74

To amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to provide for State 
disapproval of issuance of permits for the taking of marine mammals in 
                        protected State waters.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

   Mr. Goss introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                         Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to provide for State 
disapproval of issuance of permits for the taking of marine mammals in 
                        protected State waters.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Marine Mammal Capture Reform Act of 
1995''.

SEC. 2. STATE DISAPPROVAL OF ISSUANCE OF PERMITS FOR TAKING OF MARINE 
              MAMMALS IN STATE WATERS.

    Subsection (d) of section 104 of the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1374) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(7)(A) The Secretary may not issue a permit under subsection 
(c)(2) for the taking of any marine mammal from protected State waters 
for the purpose of public display, if--
            ``(i) issuance of the permit would be inconsistent with 
        State law; and
            ``(ii) the Governor of the State in which the taking would 
        occur submits to the Secretary notice of State disapproval of 
        the permit, including an explanation of the reasons for the 
        disapproval, not later than 30 days after the date of 
        publication of notice of application for the permit pursuant to 
        paragraph (2).
    ``(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term `protected State 
waters' means State waters that--
            ``(i) receive special protection by State law from certain 
        activities; or
            ``(ii) have been designated by State law as having special 
        value.''.
                                 <all>
```
FILED

September 9, 1996

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

For Publication

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) Filed: _9/9/96________

Appellee, )

)

)

Vs. ) Shelby Criminal

)

)

RICHARD ODOM, a/k/a ) No. 02-S-01-9502-CR-00014

OTIS SMITH, )

)

Appellant. )

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR

The State has requested a rehearing in this case. The Court has

considered the petition and finds it to be without merit. The petition to rehear is

denied. The Members of the Court adhere to the positions stated in the original

Opinions in this cause.

It is so ORDERED.

PER CURIAM