DISMISS and Opinion Filed August 31, 2018 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00794-CV 

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. AND 

TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Appellants 

V. 

BENJAMIN THOMAS REAVIS AND KRISTI CAROL REAVIS, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF E.R. AND O.R., CHILDREN, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-15296 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Evans, and Justice Brown 

Opinion by Chief Justice Wright 

In their notice of appeal filed on July 11, 2018, appellants Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. 

and Toyota Motor Corporation (collectively Toyota) state they are appealing the trial court’s 

March 5, 2018 order denying their motion for a permanent sealing order and the July 10, 2018 

order denying their motion to reconsider. By letter, this Court questioned its jurisdiction over this 

appeal because an order denying a motion to reconsider is not an appealable interlocutory order 

and the notice of appeal was untimely as to the March 5 order. As requested, the parties filed letter 

briefs addressing the jurisdictional issue. 

Toyota filed a motion for a permanent sealing order of certain documents it claimed were 

privileged. On March 5, the trial court denied the motion. In its order, the trial court found, in 
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part, that the documents were “currently available to the public and are accessible without 

restriction in the public domain including unrestricted public access through the website of the 

Texas Supreme Court; the PACER search engine of the federal court system; public access to the 

Court records of the State of California and through a general search of the internet.” On April 

13, Toyota filed a motion to reconsider the March 5 order. In the motion, Toyota informed the 

trial court that the documents were no longer available on the Texas Supreme Court’s website. By 

order signed on July 10, the trial court denied the motion to reconsider. The following day, Toyota 

filed its notice of appeal. 

Rule 76a of the rules of civil procedure sets forth the procedure for obtaining an order 

sealing court records. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a. Any order “relating to sealing or unsealing court 

records” is deemed to be severed from the case and a final judgment which may be appealed. Id. 

at 76a(8). A party may file a post-judgment motion within thirty days after a final judgment is 

signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a). When a party does not file a timely post-judgment motion, a 

notice of appeal is due thirty days after the date the judgment is signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. 

An order denying a motion to reconsider is not an appealable order. See CTL/Thompson Texas, 

LLC v. Morrison Homes, 337 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied); Pitts 

v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., No. 05-17-00115-CV, 2017 WL 474468, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Feb. 6, 2017, no pet.). 

 In its letter brief, Toyota focuses on the July 10 order. It asserts that the July 10 order is 

appealable because it was issued pursuant to the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over sealing 

orders. To support its argument, Toyota states: “Rule 76a(7) expressly provides trial courts with 

continuing jurisdiction to ‘enforce, alter, or vacate’ orders sealing or denying sealing.” With 

regard to the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over a sealing order, the rule states: “A court that 

issues a sealing order retains continuing jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate that order.” Id. 
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76a(7). As appellees point out in their letter brief, the trial court did not issue a sealing order on 

March 5. Rather, it issued an order denying a motion to seal records. 

The March 5 order was an order “relating to sealing” of court records. Accordingly, it was 

deemed to have been severed from the case and a final judgment that was appealable. Id. 76a(8). 

For this reason, Toyota’s alternative request to treat this appeal as a mandamus is not an option. 

See In re Deere & Co., 299 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) 

(mandamus relief not available when there is an adequate remedy by appeal). 

Because Toyota’s motion to reconsider was not filed within thirty days of the March 5 

judgment, it did not extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the notice of appeal 

was due on April 4. See TEX.R. APP. P. 26.1. Toyota filed the notice of appeal on July 11. Because 

the notice of appeal was untimely and the July 10 order denying the motion to reconsider is not an 

appealable order, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. 

We dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). 

180794F.P05 

 

/Carolyn Wright/ 

CAROLYN WRIGHT 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. 

AND TOYOTA MOTOR 

CORPORATION, Appellants 

No. 05-18-00794-CV V. 

BENJAMIN THOMAS REAVIS AND 

KRISTI CAROL REAVIS, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT 

FRIENDS OF E.R. AND O.R., 

CHILDREN, Appellees 

 On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-15296. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. 

Justices Evans and Brown participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellees BENJAMIN THOMAS REAVIS AND KRISTI CAROL 

REAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF E.R. AND O.R., CHILDREN recover 

their costs of this appeal from appellants TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. AND 

TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION. 

Judgment entered August 31, 2018.