alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Reuben Vose, *et*al., Pltffs in Error, *v.*James Hart, Deft in Error.

ERROR TO LAKE.

The plea of *non*cepit, in an action of replevin, only puts in issue the taking of the property, and does not authorize a judgment of *retorno hdbendo.*

This was an action of replevin in the Lake Circuit Court, brought by plaintiffs in error, and tried before Dickey, Judge, and a jury, at October term, 1850; and a verdict and judgment for the defendant. ■ Damages for $15.85' with costs, and a return of the property replevied, were awarded by the judgment. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and a bill of exceptions taken. The only plea filed, denied the taking of the goods in the said declaration mentioned, or any of them, in manner and form, as the said plaintiffs alleged. Issue was joined on this plea.

T. S. Dickey & H. W. Blodgett, for Pltffs in Error.

The judgment of the Circuit Court was erroneous in awarding a return of the property, upon the finding of the issue of *non*cepit, in favor of the defendant. Anderson *et al. v.*Talcott, 1 Gill., 871; 2 Starkie’s Ev., 715; 1st Williams’ Saunders, 347: 1 Chitty’s Pl., 537; Johnson *v.*Howe, 2 Gil., 342; 2 Saunders’ Pl. and Ev., 287; 2 Greenleaf’s Ev., sec. 562, p. 532.

The plea of *non cepit*admits the property in the plaintiff, and only puts the taking in issue. 8 Monroe, 421; Selwyn’s *Nisi*Prius, 1028; 3 Wendell, 671; Whitwell *v.*Wells, 24 Pick., 28.

Perry & Searls, for Deft in Error.

Treat, C. J.

Declaration in replevin. Plea *non cepit.*Verdict for the defendant. Judgment that he recover his costs, and have a return of the 'goods replevied. The judgment cannot be sustained. It is broader than the issue. The defendant was only entitled to a judgment for costs, the right of property not being in issue. The plea of *non cepit*admitted the right of property to be in the plaintiffs, and merely put in issue the taking of the goods. If the defendant desired a return of the goods, he *379should have put the right of property in issue, by formally traversing the plaintiff’s allegation of right, or by pleading specially that the right was in some other person. In one of these ways only, could he controvert the plaintiffs’ claim, and impose on them the burden of showing that the goods replevied were their property. As the case stood, the jury had only to pass on the matter of the caption by the defendant. Anderson *v.*Talcott, 1 Gilman, 365. The Court erred, therefore, in awarding a writ of *retorno hdbendo.*The judgment will he reversed, and the cause remanded, with leave to the defendant to put the right of property in the goods in issue, by the filing of additional pleas.

*Judgment*reversed.
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.44




SUMMARY OF NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION


Under our director compensation program, each non-management director receives annual compensation that is comprised of a combination of cash and equity-based compensation. Management directors do not receive any additional compensation for services as a director.  Each non-management director receives an annual retainer of $85,000, which is paid in quarterly installments, and additional applicable retainers or fees as set forth in the following paragraph.


Directors who chair Board committees receive additional retainer amounts annually for their committee chair responsibilities. The Audit Committee Chair receives $20,000 and the Compensation Committee Chair receives $15,000.  The chair of each of the other Board committees receives $10,000. The independent Board Chair (or the independent Lead Director in the event the Board Chair is not independent) receives an additional $100,000 annual retainer.


Each non-management director may elect to receive all or a portion of his or her retainer amounts on a deferred basis in the form of deferred stock units, or DSUs.  Each DSU is equivalent to one share of our common stock.  Dividends paid by us are credited toward the purchase of additional DSUs and are distributed together with the underlying DSUs.  DSUs are payable in the form of common stock to participating directors over a specified period of time as elected by the participating director, or whenever their Board service ends, whichever is sooner.


In addition, each non-management director receives equity compensation valued at $155,000 per year. The equity compensation is awarded annually in the form of DSUs, granted to directors shortly after the date of the annual stockholder meeting, and will be distributed in common shares after the director’s service on the Board ends.  Board members who are appointed at any time other than at the annual meeting receive a prorated DSU award with a grant value based upon the number of months from their election date until the next annual stockholder meeting. The annual grant of DSUs may vest pro-rata based upon the number of months the director has served during the current term in the event that a director’s service as a member of the Board ends before May 1 of the calendar year following the Company’s most recent annual meeting.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20 - 0494 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v. DAVID ALAN SPAGNOLO ,

Defendant and Appellant,

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s unopposed motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including January 3 1 , 202 2 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

December 22 2021

12/22/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0494
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss. 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  the  undersigned  President  and  Chief  Executive
Officer of the Company certifies that, to his knowledge:


      1.    The Company's  Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended  September 30, 2005
            (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
            or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

      2.    The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

                                          /s/ David Weissberg, M.D.
                                          ----------------------------------
                                          David Weissberg, M.D.
                                          President and Chief Executive Officer
                                          Dated:  November 21, 2005
#### John HANDLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janie M. COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; Jason T. Heaton, Warden; Ronald C. Fox, Major, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-40382.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 20, 2003.

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

John Handley, Texas prisoner # 582374, appeals the magistrate judge’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l). Handley argues that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety in that they refused to place him in protective custody despite threats that were made against him because he is an ex-police officer. The record indicates that prison officials did not ignore or act with deliberate indifference to Handley’s complaints. They conducted several life endangerment studies, but in*436vestigations did not corroborate Handley’s allegations. They also placed him in safekeeping, which minimized his contact with inmates in the prison’s general population. Therefore, the magistrate judge did not err in dismissing Handley’s claim as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. *See Horton v. Cockrell,*70 F.3d 397, 400-02 (5th Cir.1995).

Handley’s appeal is without arguable merit and, therefore, is DISMISSED as frivolous. 5th Cir. R. 42.2; *see also Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.1983). The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous and the magistrate judge’s dismissal of Handley’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim each count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Adepegba v. Hammons,*103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir.1996). Handley is cautioned that if he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed *in forma pauperis*in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

APPEAL DISMISSED; THREE-STRIKES WARNING ISSUED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Denver Circle R. Co. v. Bigler.

*Appeal from Superior Court of Denver.*

Messrs. J. P. Brockway, E. L. Johnson and C. E. G-ast, for appellant.

Messrs. Browne and Putnam, for appellee.

Beck, C. J.

The same questions are presented in this case as in the case of *Railroad Co. v. Nestor*(decided at the present sitting). They arise also on substantially the same state of facts, save that the property injured is situated in Elmwood’s addition to the city of Denver, which 'was dedicated to the city after the state constitution went into effect. We are of opinion that the law and evidence warrants an affirmance of the judgment, and 'it is accordingly done.

*Affirmed.*
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The undersigned, Jeremy Goodwin, Chief Financial Officer of CHINA ADVANCED CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS GROUP, INC. (the “Company”), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:





1. The Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011 (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.      Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned has executed this statement this 13th day of May, 2011.





/s/ Jeremy GoodwinJeremy GoodwinChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to China Advanced Construction Materials Group, Inc. and will be retained by China Advanced Construction Materials Group, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The forgoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to § 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

             In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of MapInfo Corporation (the "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, Mark P. Cattini, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

             (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

             (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
#### Ralph Ellis LEYVAS, Petitioner—Appellant, v. People of the State of CALIFORNIA; Kenneth Dow, Respondents— Appellees.

No. 01-56636.

D.C. No. CV-99-00269-RT.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 14, 2003.

Decided Feb. 19, 2003.

*195Before HALL, KOZINSKI and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM*

The state trial court’s determination that Leyvas knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel was not “contrary to, or ... an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The court reasonably credited the opinion of Leyvas’s preliminary hearing counsel in determining whether a competency hearing was necessary. Leyvas’s hypertension, migraine headaches and dizziness, and his accusations that appointed counsel was conspiring against him, did not give the court reason to doubt his competency, and thus did not require a hearing. *See Godinez v. Moran,*509 U.S. 389, 401 n. 13, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993).

The court reasonably determined that Leyvas’s waiver of his right to counsel was unequivocal. The court asked Leyvas whether he wanted to represent himself, and he responded, “Yeah. I’ll represent myself.” The court then listed the benefits Leyvas was foregoing and asked if he understood, to which he responded, “I most certainly do.” Finally, the court asked whether he thought he could perform as counsel, and he said, ‘Tes, ma’am, I do.” Leyvas’s subsequent refusal to waive his right to bring ineffective assistance claims does not render his waiver of counsel equivocal. His remark that he did not want to “give up any of [his] rights” does not render his waiver of counsel equivocal, because it was also consistent with his invocation of the right to self-representation. *See Faretta v. California,*422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

*196The state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court law by failing to inform Leyvas of the sentence he faced. No Supreme Court decision requires the court to impart that information. The court must ensure the defendant is aware of the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,” *id.*at 835, but this requirement does not clearly extend to information about potential penalties.

Nor did the court unreasonably apply Supreme Court law by failing to inform Leyvas that he would not have the assistance of a competent investigator who could subpoena witnesses for him. Because the court specifically told Leyvas he would have to subpoena witnesses himself, a further warning that an investigator would not do so for him would have been redundant.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF EQUITY INNS, INC. FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997,
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>                       
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                          1
<CASH>                                                 190
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        9,809
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         0
<PP&E>                                             617,072
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     635,525
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                               349
<OTHER-SE>                                         359,823
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       635,525
<SALES>                                             71,761
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    45,316
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  12,601
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     26,445
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      1,984
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                        23,543
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .88
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .82
        



</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.36

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of GCI, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ronald A. Duncan,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.


Date:  August 6, 2003                  /s/
                                       Ronald A. Duncan
                                       Chief Executive Officer
                                       GCI, Inc.

                                       1
<PAGE>
          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of GCI, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John M. Lowber, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.



Date:  August 6, 2003                  /s/
                                       John M. Lowber
                                       Chief Financial Officer
                                       GCI, Inc.


                                       2
Exhibit










Exhibit 10.40


THIRD AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




This Third Amendment (“Amendment”) to the March 18, 2013 Employment Agreement (“Employment Agreement”) by and among Stephen Spengler (the “Executive”), Intelsat S.A. and Intelsat Management LLC is entered into by the undersigned parties and is effective as of December 31, 2017.
		
	1.
	Section 3(a) of the Employment Agreement is amended and restated in its entirety, as follows:


“During the Term, effective as of December 11, 2014, for all services rendered under this Agreement, the Executive shall receive an aggregate annual base salary (“Base Salary”) at an initial rate of $650,000, which rate shall increase to $750,000 effective April 1, 2015, increase to $850,000 effective on or about March 1, 2016 (at the time that regular salary increases become effective for senior executive employees of the Company generally), increase to $950,000 effective on or about March 1, 2017 (at the time that regular salary increases become effective for senior executive employees of the Company generally), decrease to $750,000 effective January 1, 2018 and return to $950,000 effective January 1, 2019.  Base Salary shall be subject to review by the Board in its sole discretion. References in this Agreement to “Base Salary” shall be deemed to refer to the most recently effective annual base salary rate; provided that for purposes of such references, the decrease in annual base salary for calendar year 2018 shall be disregarded.  The Executive agrees that the reduction in Base Salary for calendar year 2018 described above (and any resulting effect on the Executive's Annual Bonus opportunity) will not constitute grounds for the Executive to terminate his employment or the Employment Agreement for Good Reason." 


		
	2.
	As amended and modified by this Amendment, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.




		
	3.
	If there is any conflict between the terms of the Employment Agreement and this Amendment, the terms of this Amendment shall prevail. 


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of December 31, 2017.




  INTELSAT S.A.




By:     /s/ Michelle V. Bryan
Name: Michelle V. Bryan
Title: Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Chief Administrative Officer






INTELSAT MANAGEMENT LLC




By:     /s/ Michelle V. Bryan
Name: Michelle V. Bryan
Title: Deputy Chairman and Secretary




THE EXECUTIVE


/s/ Stephen Spengler
Stephen Spengler
#### Ahmad MUHAMMAD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Joseph BROOKS, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-7727.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 6, 2003.

Decided March 13, 2003.

Ahmad Muhammad, Appellant Pro Se.

*594Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Ahmad Muhammad seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2254 petition solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’ ” *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.) (quoting *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595,146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)), *cert. denied,*534 U.S. 941, 122 S.Ct. 318, 151 L.Ed.2d 237 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Muhammad has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Muhammad’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*