J-S36019-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAMAR JONES,

Appellant No. 3598 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order of October 31, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014691-2007

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 12, 2017

Appellant, Jamar Jones, appeals pro se from the order entered on 

October 31, 2016, dismissing as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

[...Appellant] entered a negotiated guilty plea to the charges 

of third-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, robbery and 

possession of an instrument of crime, generally on 

December 19, 2012. On December 27, 2012 [the trial 

court] imposed an aggregate sentence of thirty to sixty 

years’ incarceration upon him. [Appellant] did not file either 

a post-sentence motion or a notice of appeal.

On March 6, 2014, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition 

pursuant to the PCRA wherein he claimed that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to file post-sentence motions and 

a requested direct appeal. Following [Appellant’s] filing of 

his pro se PCRA petition, Todd Mosser, Esquire was 

appointed to represent him. On September 26, 2016, Mr. 
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Mosser filed a “[n]o [m]erit” letter pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988) [(en banc)]; Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 

927 (Pa. 1988), and a [m]otion to [w]ithdraw as [c]ounsel. 

Upon reviewing the letter and the entire record, [the PCRA 

court] sent [Appellant] a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 [n]otice of 

[i]ntent to [d]ismiss. [Appellant] did not file a response and 

on October 31, 2016, [the PCRA court] issued an order 

dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition without a hearing and 

granting counsel’s motion to withdraw. Subsequent 

thereto, [Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/17/2016, at 1-2. 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues, pro se, for our 

review:

1. Whether the PCRA court erred when the court denied 

Appellant an appeal, nunc pro tunc, whereas PCRA 

counsel provided deficient performance for failing to 

investigate [Appellant’s] claim that trial counsel failed to 

honor [Appellant’s] request to file a requested appeal via 

numerous letters []?

2. Whether the PCRA court erred when the court 

determined that an evidentiary hearing will not be 

granted to determine if trial counsel abandoned 

[Appellant’s] right to [a] direct appeal after [Appellant] 

plead [sic] guilty; whereas counsel’s failure to file an 

appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (complete capitalization omitted).

Appellant contends that he “sent numerous letters to defense counsel 

requesting that counsel file an appeal on his behalf[;] instead, counsel 

abandoned [him] during the appellate phase of the proce[e]ding.” Id. at 

5. He avers that he had “a right to appeal his sentence, even though he 

plead [sic] guilty, and the failure to file an appeal constituted ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” Id. at 6. Appellant further claims the PCRA court 
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erred by failing to hold “an evidentiary hearing to determine if in fact 

defense counsel had a reasonable basis for failing to file a direct appeal on 

behalf of” Appellant. Id. at 5.

Our standard of review is well-settled:

[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court's findings of 

fact to determine whether they are supported by the record, 

and reviews its conclusions of law to determine whether 

they are free from legal error. The scope of review is 

limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party at the trial level.

Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768, 775 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted).

Further, we review the PCRA court's dismissal of a PCRA petition 

without a hearing for an abuse of discretion:

[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction 

petition is not absolute. It is within the PCRA court's 

discretion to decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner's 

claim is patently frivolous and has no support either in the 

record or other evidence. It is the responsibility of the 

reviewing court on appeal to examine each issue raised in 

the PCRA petition in light of the record certified before it in 

order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its 

determination that there were no genuine issues of material 

fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting 

an evidentiary hearing.

* * *

Before we may address the merits of Appellant's arguments, 

we must first consider the timeliness of Appellant's PCRA 

petition because it implicates the jurisdiction of this Court 

and the PCRA court.
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Pennsylvania law makes clear that when a PCRA petition is 

untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has 

jurisdiction over the petition. The period for filing a PCRA 

petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; 

instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended 

only if the PCRA permits it to be extended[.] This is to 

accord finality to the collateral review process. However, an 

untimely petition may be received when the petition alleges, 

and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited 

exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992–993 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). “Any petition under [the PCRA] 

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

In this case, the trial court imposed Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

on December 27, 2012. Because no direct appeal was filed, his judgment of 

sentence became final “when the time for seeking direct review expire[d].” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). A litigant has 30 days to file a notice of appeal 

from a final order, unless the appeal period falls on a weekend or legal 

holiday. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Thus, Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence became final on Monday, January 28, 2013. Because 

Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition on March 6, 2014, it is patently 

untimely.

Appellant does not plead or prove any of the three exceptions to the 

PCRA’s jurisdictional timing requirement. Moreover, our Supreme Court has 

consistently stated, “that couching post-conviction issues in terms of 

ineffectiveness cannot ‘save’ an untimely filed PCRA petition that does not 
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fall into any of the exceptions to the PCRA's jurisdictional time bar.”

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 182 (Pa. 2016) (citation 

omitted). Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to address Appellant’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims and an evidentiary hearing was 

unwarranted.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/12/2017