alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Daniel BECKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF INDEPENDENCE; Independence Police Department; Wilson, Officer with the Independence Police Department; Hevland, Officer with the Independence Police Department; Roy, Officer with the Independence Police Department; Roberts, Officer with the Independence Police Department; Seefeldt, Officer with the Independence Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-36047.

D.C. No. CV-00-01744-PA.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 7, 2003.*

Decided March 20, 2003.

Before O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Becker appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment against him in his civil rights action against the City of Independence and four police officers (hereafter collectively “the officers”) for alleged use of excessive force. *See*U.S. Const, amend. IV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.

(1) We have reviewed the record, including the videotape of the incident, and we are unable to say that the use of force was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. *See Saucier v. Katz,*533 U.S. 194, 204-05, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2157-58, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); *Graham v. Connor,*490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); *Robinson v. Solano County,*278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc); *Scott v. Henrich,*39 F.3d 912, 914-15 (9th Cir.1994); *see also Young v. Harrison,*284 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir.2002); *cf. Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt,*276 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2002) (no good reason for particular use of force). Thus, the force used was not excessive, and Becker’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

(2) Even if the force used here were determined to be excessive, we would proceed to ask whether the officers’ mistaken belief to the contrary was reasonable. *See Saucier,*533 U.S. at 206-07, 121 S.Ct. at 2158-59. We would have to conclude that *956it was. In other words, no clearly established right of Becker was violated. *See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,*457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); *Robinson,*278 F.3d at 1015-16.1

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. Becker cannot succeed on his appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment on his state tort claims because the judgment rested on two bases, and he does not attack one of them — the failure to give timely notice. *See MacKay v. Pfeil,*827 F.2d 540, 542 n. 2 (9th Cir.1987); *see also First Fid. Bank v. Pub. Serv. Co. (In re Pub. Serv. Co.),*879 F.2d 987, 989-90 (1st Cir.1989).

FISHER, Circuit Judge,

Concurring.

Although I think that Officer Hevland’s repeated use of the sternum rub was excessive under the circumstances of this case, he is entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been “clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” *Saucier,*533 U.S. at 202.
#### SARAH HALL, Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. JOHN KIRCHER and BOYNE USA, INC., a Michigan corporation, Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents.

No. 05-672.

Ordered August 9, 2006.

2006 MT 186.

333 Mont. 99.

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 Counsel for the parties to this appeal have filed a stipulation for dismissal. Their stipulation asks us to remand this case to the Eighteenth Judicial District Court “with instructions to dismiss the case with prejudice[.]”

¶2 Rule 36, M.R.App.P., allows for the voluntary dismissal of an appeal upon stipulation of the parties. Neither Rule 36 nor any other rule of appellate procedure contemplates this Court’s remand of a case, upon the parties’ stipulation, with instructions for the trial court to dismiss, as was requested here, or with instructions for the trial court to approve the parties’ stipulation, as we sometimes have been asked to do in the past. *See, e.g., Peterson v. Montana Schools Group Insurance Authority,*Cause No. DA 06-0363 *dismissal order*(July 26, 2006).

¶3 We have, in the past, remanded cases upon stipulation of the parties for the trial court’s consideration of whether to approve a settlement agreement. We will continue to do so. The stipulation presently before us, however, appears to condition our dismissal upon a remand to the District Court with instructions.

¶4 THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the stipulation for dismissal is DENIED, without prejudice.

The Clerk is directed to mail true copies of this order to all counsel of record.

DATED this 9th day of August, 2006.

/s/ Karla M. Gray, Chief Justice

/s/ John Warner, Justice

/s/ Patricia Cotter, Justice

/s/ W. William Leaphart, Justice

/S/ Jim Rice, Justice
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-10728 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. MARK LINNEAR HAYS Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:04-CV-462 USDC No. 3:95-CR-141-2
Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Mark Linnear Hays, federal prisoner # 46431-019, appeals the distric t court’s order denying his motion under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 60(b) to alter or amend its prior judgment denying Hays’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his 1996convictions and sentences for violating the HobbsAct, using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D March 24, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 06-10728

2 Hays raises three arguments on appeal. First, Hays argues that the district court erred by failing toconduct a denovo reviewbefore denying his Rule 60(b) motion. The record contradicts that argument. Relatedly, Hays asserts that the record fails to demonstrate that the district court conducted a de novo review when it denied his § 2255 motion in September 2000. He also asserts that review of the merits of his ineffective assistance claim was deferred on direct appeal and, thus, the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on that claim. Hays’s claims are without merit. And, to the extent Hays is challenging the underlying judgment denying his § 2255 motion, he is precluded from doing so. See Hessv. Cockrell , 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Hays’s first argument fails. Second, Hays argues that the District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing in considering his Rule 60(b) motion. Hays has not cited any authority for the proposition that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 60(b) motion. We likewise find none. Accordingly, Hays’s second argument fails. Third, Hays argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion

. SeeSeven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi , 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981). Having considered the record and relevant law, we find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Hays’s third argument fails. See id

.
AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 21.1





                        SUBSIDIARIES OF EQUITY INNS, INC.




                                                           Jurisdiction of
Name                                                  Incorporation/Organization
----                                                  --------------------------
Equity Inns Trust                                             Maryland
Equity Inns Services, Inc.                                    Tennessee
Equity Inns TRS Holdings, Inc.                                Tennessee
Equity Inns Partnership, L.P.                                 Tennessee
Equity Inns Partnership II, L.P.                              Tennessee
Equity Inns/West Virginia Partnership, L.P.                   Tennessee
EQI Financing Corporation                                     Tennessee
EQI Financing Partnership I, L.P.                             Tennessee
EQI Financing Corporation II                                  Tennessee
EQI Financing Partnership II, L.P.                            Tennessee
EQI/WV Financing Partnership, L.P.                            Tennessee
EQI Financing Corporation III                                 Tennessee
EQI Financing Partnership III, L.P.                           Tennessee
EQI Financing Corporation IV                                  Tennessee
EQI Financing Partnership IV, L.P.                            Tennessee
EQI Financing Corporation V                                   Tennessee
EQI Financing Partnership V, L.P.                             Tennessee
EQI/WV Financing Corporation                                  Tennessee
EQI/WV Financing Partnership II, L.P.                         Tennessee
E. Inns Orlando, Inc.                                         Tennessee
E.I.P. Orlando, L.P.                                          Tennessee
ENN Leasing Company, Inc.                                     Tennessee
ENN Leasing Company I, L.L.C.                                 Delaware
ENN Leasing Company II, L.L.C.                                Delaware
ENN Leasing Company III, L.L.C.                               Delaware
ENN Leasing Company IV, L.L.C.                                Delaware
ENN Leasing Company V, L.L.C.                                 Delaware
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Michael CHARLESTON, Appellant. Michael CHARLESTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 69075.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.

Dec. 24, 1996.

Ellen H. Flottman, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, David R. Truman, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRANE, P.J., and GERALD M. SMITH and PUDLOWSKI, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of robbery in the second degree and resisting arrest. He also appeals from the denial of his post-conviction motion, Rule 29.15, without an evidentiary hearing. No jurisprudential purpose would be served by an opinion. The findings of fact made on the post-conviction motion are not clearly erroneous. No error of law appears and there was evidence to support the verdict. The parties have been furnished with a statement of the reasons for our decision.

Judgments of conviction affirmed; judgment denying post-conviction motion affirmed. Rules 30.25(b), 84.16(b).
#### Robert Allen MOORE v. STATE BAR OF TEXAS.

No. 96-0802.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Feb. 13, 1997.

Prior report: Tex.App. 932 S.W.2d 132.

The joint agreed motion to grant application for writ of error and remand cause to trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with settlement agreement is granted. This Court’s order of December 13, 1996, denying application for writ of error is with*718drawn and the application for writ of error, as supplemented, is granted without reference to the merits. The judgments of the courts below are vacated without reference to the merits; the cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with the settlement agreement of the parties. The motion to expedite is dismissed as moot.
#### Harold E. CALL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 02-72851. U.S. Tax Ct. No. 2255-02L.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 20, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN and T. G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Harold E. Call appeals pro se the Tax Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, finding the Commissioner could proceed with his action to collect Call’s 1997 federal income tax and imposing sanctions against Call.

The Tax Court properly concluded that because Call received a statutory notice of deficiency, he was precluded from challenging his underlying tax liability during his Collection Due Process hearing. 28 U. S.C. §§ 6320; 6330(c)(2)(B). Because Call failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact, the Tax Court properly granted the Commissioner’s summary judgment motion. *Hansen v. United States,*7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir.1993). The Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against Call pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 6673 on the ground that he instituted the action primarily for purposes of delay.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







In connection with the Annual Report of Arotech Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Robert S. Ehrlich, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, hereby certify that the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.









By:     /s/ Robert S. Ehrlich


Robert S. Ehrlich


Chairman and CEO


(Chief Executive Officer)





Date:           March 30, 2011
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF KPMG LLP, INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

The Board of Directors 

Sonic Solutions: 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-103624, No. 333-102396, No. 333-73412 and No. 333-66187) onForms S-3 and S-8 of Sonic Solutions of our report dated May 21, 2004, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Sonic Solutions and subsidiaries as of March 31, 2004 and 2003, and the related consolidated statements of operations,shareholders’ equity and comprehensive income (loss) and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended March 31, 2004, and the related financial statement schedule, which report appears in the March 31, 2004 annual report onForm 10-K of Sonic Solutions. 

 

/s/ KPMG LLP

 

KPMG LLP 

 

San Francisco, California 

June 14, 2004
Exhibit 32.2
  CERTIFICATION
    PURSUANT TO
    18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
    SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  Form 10-K Rule 13a-14(b)
  (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of
    Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
    1934, as amended; and(2)
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
    material respects, the financial condition and results of
    operations of the Company.  /s/

Helen W.
    CornellHelen W. CornellExecutive Vice President, Finance and
    Chief Financial OfficerGardner Denver, Inc.February 26, 2010
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4251 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4251

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt certain small 
businesses from the required use of the electronic fund transfer system 
             for depository taxes, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 27, 1996

  Mr. Hastings of Washington introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt certain small 
businesses from the required use of the electronic fund transfer system 
             for depository taxes, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXCEPTION FOR SMALL BUSINESSES FROM REQUIRED USE OF 
              ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEM.

    (a) In General.--Subsection (h) of section 6302 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to use of electronic fund transfer 
system for collection of certain taxes) is amended by redesignating 
paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively, and by 
inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:
            ``(3) Exception for small depositors.--
                    ``(A) In general.--A taxpayer who is a small 
                depositor for any calendar year shall not be required 
                to make deposits by electronic fund transfer for taxes 
                attributable to payments made during the following 
                calendar year.
                    ``(B) Small depositor.--A taxpayer is a small 
                depositor for any calendar year if the amount of 
                employment taxes attributable to payments made by such 
                taxpayer during such year is $50,000 or less.''
    (b) Required Percentages of Deposits Frozen at 1996 Level.--
            (1) Subparagraph (B) of section 6302(h)(2) of such Code is 
        amended--
                    (A) by striking ``the applicable required 
                percentage'' in clause (i) and inserting ``20.1 
                percent'', and
                    (B) by striking ``the applicable required 
                percentage'' in clause (ii) and inserting ``30 
                percent''.
            (2) Paragraph (2) of section 6302(h) of such Code is 
        amended by striking subparagraph (C).
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on July 1, 1997.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Robert A. Levinson, certify that:

1.  I have reviewed this Form 10-Q of Levcor International, Inc.;

2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of
    a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
    statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
    were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
    information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
    the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
    registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.  The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
    establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
    in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

         (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
    disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
    ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
    consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
    entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
    prepared;

         (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
    and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
    effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
    the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

         (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
    control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
    recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely
    to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
    reporting; and

5.  The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
    most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
    registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
    directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

         (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
    or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
    reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
    process, summarize and report financial information; and

         (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
    other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
    control over financial reporting.

Date:  August 13, 2007
                                             /s/ Robert A. Levinson
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Robert A. Levinson
                                             Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 2, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Douglas W. Hyde, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|/S/ DOUGLAS W. HYDE    
|-----------------------
|                       
|Douglas W. Hyde        
|Chief Executive Officer
|April 20, 2005         



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc. and will be retained by OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.