alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In re CANAL BANK & TRUST CO. (HYAMS, Intervener).

No. 15051.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

May 3, 1937.

Dufour, St. Paul, Levy & Miceli, Philip E. James, and Rene J. Waguespack, all of New Orleans, for Canal Bank & Trust Co.

W. J. Kearney, Jr., of New Orleans, for intervener.

PER CURIAM.

Intervener, on March 1, 1933, deposited in Canal Bank & Trust Company a check for $100, for which his account was duly credited, the amount thereof being immediately made available to him. Thereafter, because of the events which are well known, the Canal Bank went into liquidation. He filed this suit seeking a preference, and in the civil district court judgment was rendered in his favor. The Canal Bank & Trust Company in liquidation has appealed.

Counsel for both parties have filed with , us a statement agreeing that the legal issues presented are the same as those which were found in Re Canal Bank & Trust Company in Liquidation (intervention of John F. Clark & Co.), 181 La. 856, 160 So. 609, 99 A.L.R. 473, and in that of In re Canal Bank & Trust Company in Liquidation (Intervention of Midio) (La.App.) 172 So. 48, and that, therefore, the judgment appealed from should be reversed.

Accordingly, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be, and it is, annulled, avoided, and reversed, and that the intervention of Chapman H. Hyams III be, and it is, hereby, dismissed at his cost.

Reversed.
#### Julia M. Trebing, Respondent, v. The Dime Savings Bank of Williamsburgh and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with Harry Mollenhauer, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion. Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor, Burr and Rich, JJ., concurred.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 13

- 00106

- CV

Barry BROOKS , Heston C. King, Stefen Douglas Brooks, Johanna Barton,

and Jesse Rodriguez Benavides,

Appellants

v.

EXCELLENCE MORTGAGE, LTD.

, Appellee

From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013

- CI

- 01173

Honorable Cathleen M. Stryker, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, 1 JUSTICE BARNARD , AND JUSTICE ALVAREZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this da te, the portion of the trial court’s order

granting Excellence Mortgage, Ltd.’s traditional motion for summary judgment on Appellants’

breach of contract claims is AFFIRMED.

The portion of the trial court’s order disposing of Appellants’ antitrust and interference

with prospective business relations claims is REVERSED.

We REMAND this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

We tax costs of this appeal against the party that incurred them. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 43.4.

SIGNED April 1, 2015.

_____________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

1 Chief Justice Catherine M. Stone, retired, not participating.
Exhibit 32.2




CERTIFICATION




In connection with the Annual Report
on Form 10-K of Stratasys, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended December
31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert F. Gallagher, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:




(1) The Report fully complies with
the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and




(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.




Date: March 8, 2010
            /s/ ROBERT F.
      GALLAGHERRobert F. GallagherChief Financial
  Officer


---
[No. 28888.

Department One.

February 13, 1943.]

#### Fannie J. Elmore, *Appellant,*v. Alfred Alexander Elmore, *Appellant,*Ida A. Fleischmann Bartels, *Respondent.*
      *1*

*563
      *J. A. Kavaney,*for appellant Fannie J. Elmore.

*Geo. G. Hannan,*for appellant Alfred Alexander Elmore.

*Weter, Roberts & Shefelman, Allen Spratlin,*and *Kenneth A. Cox,*for respondent.

Reported in 134 P. (2d) 466.

Millard, J.

— This is an action for divorce. In her complaint, plaintiff joined as a party defendant Ida A. Fleischmann Bartels and prayed for an equitable division of the property of a partnership alleged to exist between Mrs. Bartels and plaintiff’s husband. Defendant husband answered, and, in turn, cross-complained against Mrs. Bartels for an accounting of all property belonging to the alleged partnership, and for the appointment of a receiver to effectuate that purpose. The cause was tried to the court which granted plaintiff an interlocutory decree of divorce and awarded her certain specified property, but dismissed her complaint and the cross-complaint of her husband as against Mrs. Bartels, except as otherwise expressly provided in the interlocutory order. Mr. and Mrs. Elmore have appealed.

The only question raised by their appeals for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in denying prayer of the Elmores for an accounting by Mrs. Bartels of property belonging to the alleged partnership. Any question respecting the divorce is no longer in issue.

The order from which the appeal is prosecuted was filed May 26, 1942. A written notice of appeal therefrom by each appellant was served on counsel for respondent June 25, 1942, and filed the same day. The appeal bond of each appellant was filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court July 1, 1942 (six days later), which was not within the statutory period after notice of appeal was served; therefore, the appeals are *564ineffectual for any purpose, under the statute which provides that:

> “An appeal in a civil action or proceeding shall become ineffectual for any purpose unless at or before the time when the notice of appeal is given or served, or- within five days thereafter, an appeal bond . . . be filed with the clerk of the superior court, ...” Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1721 [P. C. § 7295].

See *Hart v.*Crowell, 198 Wash. 77, 87 P. (2d) 105.

The appeal is dismissed.

Simpson, C. J., Beals, Blake, and Steinert, JJ., concur.
In the Senate of the United States,

July 25, 1996.

Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 782) entitled ‘‘An Act to amend title 18 of the

United States Code to allow members of employee associations to represent their views before the United States

Government.’’, do pass with the following

AMENDMENT:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Federal Employee Rep3 resentation Improvement Act of 1996’’.

4 SEC. 2. REPRESENTATION BY FEDERAL OFFICERS AND EM5 PLOYEES.

6 (a) EXTENSION OF EXEMPTION TO PROHIBITION.—

7 Subsection (d) of section 205 of title 18, United States Code,

8 is amended to read as follows:

9 ‘‘(d)(1) Nothing in subsection (a) or (b) prevents an

10 officer or employee, if not inconsistent with the faithful per-
2

HR 782 EAS

1 formance of that officer’s or employee’s duties, from acting

2 without compensation as agent or attorney for, or otherwise

3 representing—

4 ‘‘(A) any person who is the subject of discipli5 nary, loyalty, or other personnel administration pro6 ceedings in connection with those proceedings; or

7 ‘‘(B) except as provided in paragraph (2), any

8 cooperative, voluntary, professional, recreational, or

9 similar organization or group not established or oper10 ated for profit, if a majority of the organization’s or

11 groups’s members are current officers or employees of

12 the United States or of the District of Columbia, or

13 their spouses or dependent children.

14 ‘‘(2) Paragraph (1)(B) does not apply with respect to

15 a covered matter that—

16 ‘‘(A) is a claim under subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1);

17 ‘‘(B) is a judicial or administrative proceeding

18 where the organization or group is a party; or

19 ‘‘(C) involves a grant, contract, or other agree20 ment (including a request for any such grant, con21 tract, or agreement) providing for the disbursement of

22 Federal funds to the organization or group.’’.

23 (b) APPLICATION TO LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA24 TIONS.—Section 205 of title 18, United States Code, is

25 amended by adding at the end the following:
3

HR 782 EAS

1 ‘‘(i) Nothing in this section prevents an employee from

2 acting pursuant to—

3 ‘‘(1) chapter 71 of title 5;

4 ‘‘(2) section 1004 or chapter 12 of title 39;

5 ‘‘(3) section 3 of the Tennessee Valley Authority

6 Act of 1933 (16 U.S.C. 831b);

7 ‘‘(4) chapter 10 of title I of the Foreign Service

8 Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4104 et seq.); or

9 ‘‘(5) any provision of any other Federal or Dis10 trict of Columbia law that authorizes labor-manage11 ment relations between an agency or instrumentality

12 of the United States or the District of Columbia and

13 any labor organization that represents its employ14 ees.’’.

Attest:

Secretary.
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 782

AMENDMENT
V

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 760

For the relief of Henry Johnson.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 31, 1995

Mr. MCNULTY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on National Security

A BILL

For the relief of Henry Johnson.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the time limitations specified in section 3744(b) of

4 title 10, United States Code, shall not apply with respect

5 to awarding a medal of honor under section 3741 of such

6 title to Henry Johnson (service number 10–33–48) for

7 acts of heroism during World War I while a sergeant in

8 the United States Army.

Æ
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

November 25, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

137055 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

v SC: 137055 

 COA: 285064 

Kent CC: 02-007605-FC 

SCOTT ALAN PARDEE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 30, 2008 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s motion 

for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). 

s1117 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 25, 2008 

 Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

FRANCIS ANTHONY MILLIARD,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 240 WAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 12th day of January, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASON RAY TYLER, Petitioner - Appellant,
v. CHARLES L. RYAN and TERRY L. GODDARD, Respondents - Appellees. No. 12-15966 D.C. Nos. 4:10-cv-00353-RCC 4:10-cv-00543-RCC
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Raner C. Collins, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 5, 2013 San Francisco, California Before: FARRIS, FERNANDEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges. Jason Ray Tyler appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus. We have jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and we affirm. Even assuming the state breached th e first plea agreement by entering a subsequent indictment against Tyler, the state appellate court’s rejection of Tyler’s 

# FILED
NOV 22 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.claim that the breach violated his due process rights was not an unreasonable application of Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257 (1971). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). The state appellate court could make “a principled distinction,” Murdoch v. Castro , 609 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc ), between Tyler’s case and Santobello because Tyler withdrew his motion to dismiss the second indictment and subsequently accepted a guilty plea conditioned on having his sentences for both convictions run concurrently. Nor did the state appellate court unreasonably apply Blackledge v. Perry , 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974), or Menna v. New York , 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975), which establish narrow exceptions to the general rule that a defendant cannot challenge pre-plea constitutional errors once a plea has been entered. See United States v. Broce , 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). Rather, the court assumed that Tyler was entitled to this exception, considered his claim that the second indictment violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and rejected the claim because the first conviction was for a crime that had an element not included in the second conviction, and vice versa. Finally, Tyler has not identified any clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding that a defendant’s right to due process is violated when a state 2court accepts a guilty plea from a defendantwho has raised and abandoned a claim that the prosecution at issue breaches a prio r plea agreement. Accordingly, to the extent this argument was raised to the st ate appellate court, its rejection of the claim was not an unreasonable appli cation of Supreme Court precedent. AFFIRMED
.

3
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 614 Engrossed in House (EH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 614

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey to the State of 
  Minnesota the New London National Fish Hatchery production facility.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE OF NEW LONDON NATIONAL FISH HATCHERY PRODUCTION 
              FACILITY.

    (a) Conveyance Authorized.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law and within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of the Interior shall convey to the State of Minnesota 
without reimbursement all right, title, and interest of the United 
States in and to the property comprising the New London National Fish 
Hatchery production facility, located outside of downtown New London, 
Minnesota, including--
            (1) all easements and water rights relating to that 
        property, and
            (2) all land, improvements, and related personal property 
        comprising that production facility.
    (b) Use of Property.--All property and interests conveyed under 
this section shall be used by the Minnesota Department of Natural 
Resources for the Minnesota fishery resources management program.
    (c) Use and Reversionary Interest.--The property conveyed to the 
State of Minnesota pursuant to this section shall be used by the State 
for purposes of fishery resources management, and if it is used for any 
other purpose all right, title, and interest in and to all property 
conveyed pursuant to this section shall revert to the United States. 
The State of Minnesota shall ensure that the property reverting to the 
United States is in substantially the same or better condition as at 
the time of transfer.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 7, 1995.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.

104th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 614

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

   To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey to the State of 
  Minnesota the New London National Fish Hatchery production facility.
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6699
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus WILLIAM RUSSELL SPEAR, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (CR-75-118-N) Submitted: April 16, 1998 Decided: April 28, 1998 Before WILKINS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William Russell Spear, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion andfind no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Spear , No. CR-75-118-N (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-7631

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RONALD CURETON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (CR-96-41-2, CA-00-484-3-V-2)

Submitted: June 21, 2001 Decided: June 27, 2001

Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald Cureton, Appellant Pro Se. Brian Lee Whisler, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Cureton seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000)

as untimely. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s

opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning

of the district court. United States v. Cureton, Nos. CR-96-41-2;

CA-00-484-3-V-2 (W.D.N.C. filed Oct. 25, 2000; entered Oct. 26,

2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES - OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with theAnnual Report of Protection One, Inc. and Protection One Alarm Monitoring, Inc.(the “Companies”) on Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2005  (the “Report”), which this certificationaccompanies, I, Darius G. Nevin, in my capacity as Executive Vice President andChief Financial Officer of the Companies, certify that to the best of myknowledge the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) orSection 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Companies.

 
| Date: April 10, 2006 |   | /s/     Darius G. Nevin                                                                           |   |
|----------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                 |   | Darius G. Nevin                                                                                                       |
|                 |   | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial  Officer, Protection One, Inc. and Protection One Alarm Monitoring, Inc. |

 

The foregoingcertification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes– Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Companies as part ofthe Report or as a separate disclosure document for purposes of Section 18 orany other provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

 

----
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 June 12, 2019

s0605

Order 

Clerk

June 12, 2019

158986

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 158986

COA: 336596

Jackson CC: 15-004918-FH

JONATHAN RYAN HASTINGS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 27, 2018 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       6,712,379
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  275,197
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                114,362,796
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      27,276,032
<DEPRECIATION>                              (9,988,467)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             153,081,898
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                     78,882,779
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       462,553
<OTHER-SE>                                  43,782,669
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               153,081,898
<SALES>                                     45,229,574
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            49,210,293
<CGS>                                       40,221,225
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               63,332,477
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             9,338,616
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             347,977
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (23,808,777)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (307,261)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (23,501,516)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (23,501,516)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (5.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (5.08)
<FN>
Company reports on a non-classified balance sheet.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### John Clinton Robbins, Respondent, v. Ellen D. Clock, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor, Burr and Rich, JJ., concurred.