alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-6441
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus BONITA JONES LOWRY, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 96-6442
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JONATHAN LOWRY, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Fayetteville. Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge. (CR-89-36, CA-93-50-3-H, CA-93-23-3-H) Submitted: September 5, 1996 Decided: September 17, 19962 Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John Britton Russell, Jr., SHUFORD, RUBIN & GIBNEY, Richmond, Virginia; David Eason Boone, Raymond Archie Carpenter, Jr., BOONE, BEALE, CARPENTER & COSBY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Barbara Dickerson Kocher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Appellants appeal the district court's order dismissing their motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Appellants' cases were referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1988). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Appellants that failure to file timely object ions to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Appellants failed to timely object to the magistrate judge's recommendation. The timely filing of objections to a magistrate judge's recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned that failure to object will waive appellate review. Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985). See generally Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Appellants have waived appellate review by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Clarence L. Barber v. Charles H. Ellingwood (2 cases).

Motions denied, with ten dollars costs.
Exhibit 10.1AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO WARRANT AGREEMENT     This Amendment No. 1 to Warrant Agreement (the “Amendment”) is entered into this ___ day ofMarch, 2007, by and between CytoCore, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”) and theundersigned (the “Holder”), with respect to that certain warrant granted to the Holder by theCompany attached hereto as Attachment 1 (the “Warrant”), pursuant to which the Holder wasgranted the right to purchase                                         shares of the common stock, $.001 par value, of theCompany (the “Common Stock”) upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Warrant.     WHEREAS, the Company may not have available for issuance, upon exercise of the Warrant inaccordance with its terms, sufficient shares of its Common Stock; and     WHEREAS, the Holder is willing to agree to and abide by certain restrictions on exercise ofthe Warrant as set forth in this Amendment.     NOW, THEREFORE, the Company and the Holder hereby agree as follows.     1. Exercise Restriction. The Holder hereby agrees, acknowledges and confirms that theHolder may not exercise the Warrant, and may not purchase any shares of Common Stock upon exercisethereof, unless and until the stockholders of the Company, at a duly and properly called meeting ofstockholders or by written consent in lieu of a meeting, approve either an increase in the numberof authorized shares of Common Stock of the Company by at least 50 million shares or a reversestock split of the Common Stock of the Company at a ratio of at least 1 for every 2 outstandingshares (the “Approval”). The foregoing restriction shall supersede any provisions in the Warrantregarding the exercisability of such Warrant, and such restriction shall not terminate, lapse orexpire unless and until either the Approval is obtained, or the Company and the Holder mutuallyagree in writing to the termination, lapse or expiration of such restriction.     2. Miscellaneous. Except as otherwise specifically set forth herein, the partieshereto hereby ratify and affirm all of the terms and provisions of the Warrant, which shall remainin full force and effect. This Amendment may be executed in two or more counterparts, each ofwhich shall be deemed an original and all of which when taken together shall constitute one and thesame instrument.
 

 
     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment effective as of the dateset forth above.         CYTOCORE, INC.,    a Delaware corporation           By:      Name:       Title:                      HOLDER:         If an entity:         By:      Name:       Title:                      If an individual:             Name:      Address:                 
 

 
Attachment 1Warrant Agreement
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6179 

To prohibit the use of funds for the 2022 and 2026 World Cup until 

the date on which Policy 604–1 of the United States Soccer Federation 

is reinstated. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 8, 2021 

Mr. GAETZ introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To prohibit the use of funds for the 2022 and 2026 World 

Cup until the date on which Policy 604–1 of the United 

States Soccer Federation is reinstated. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE 2022 

4 AND 2026 WORLD CUP. 

5 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Fed6 eral funds may be appropriated or otherwise made avail7 able to provide support for the 2022 and 2026 World Cup, 

8 including support for a host city, a participating State or 

9 local agency, the United States Soccer Federation, the 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6179 IH

1 Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean 

2 Association Football (CONCACAF), or the Fe ́de ́ration 

3 Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), until the 

4 date on which Policy 604–1 of the United States Soccer 

5 Federation is reinstated. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
#### Ranch & Farm Lines, Inc., a nonstock co-op marketing association, appellant, v. Erwin Dressman, appellee.

175 N. W. 2d 299

Filed March 13, 1970.

No. 37536.

Robert E. Paulick, for appellant.

John A. Wolf and Cronin ■& Shamberg, for appellee.

Heard before White, C. J., Carter, Spencer, Boslaugh, Smith, McCown, and Newton, JJ.

*329McCown, J.

We dismiss this appeal for lack of an appealable order. The district court sustained, a special appearance by defendant, an individual resident of Kansas. Objections to personal jurisdiction were directed at the invalidity of issuance, service, and return of summons.

An order sustaining an objection to personal jurisdiction is not final within the meaning of section 25-1902, R. R. S. 1943. See, Erdman v. National Indemnity Co., 178 Neb. 312, 133 N. W. 2d 472; Busboom v. Gregory, 179 Neb. 254, 137 N. W. 2d 825. This action has. not terminated. Plaintiff has the procedural choices pointed out in Busboom v. Gregory, *supra.*

Plaintiff’s appeal from the order sustaining defendant’s special appearance should be, and hereby is, dismissed at plaintiff’s costs.

Appeal dismissed.
DENY and Opinion Filed July 14 , 2022

In t he 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05
- 22
- 00425
- CV IN RE JOHN MICHAEL FITZPATRICK , Relator Original Proceeding from the 429th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 429
- 50901
- 2020 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Reichek, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Carlyle Relator’s May 4, 2022 petition for writ of mandamus challenges the trial court’s “Temporary Orders Pending Appeal.” Entit lement to mandamus relief requires relator to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that he lacks an adequate appellate remedy. In re Copart, Inc ., 619 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co ., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135

– 36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). After reviewing the petition and the record before us, we conclude that relator has not shown his entitlement to the relief requested. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.8(a).– 2

–

Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus

. 220425f.p05 /Cory L. Carlyle/ CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE
NUMBER 13-15-00615-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

JUAN ANGEL GUERRA, Appellant,

v.

FABIAN LIMAS AS RECEIVER OF 10164 

WEST EXPRESSWAY 83, LA FERIA, TEXAS, Appellee. 

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 404th District Court 

of Cameron County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Juan Angel Guerra, attempted to perfect an appeal from the trial court’s 

order denying his motion to recuse the trial court judge in trial court cause number 2014-

DCL-883-G. Because this order is not an appealable order, we dismiss for want of 

jurisdiction.
2

Upon review of the documents before the Court, it appeared that the order from 

which this appeal was taken was not an appealable order. On March 3, 2016, the Clerk 

of this Court notified appellant of this defect so that steps could be taken to correct the 

defect, if it could be done. Appellant was advised that, if the defect was not corrected 

within ten days from the date of receipt of this Court’s letter, the appeal would be 

dismissed. Appellant failed to respond to the Court’s notice. 

In terms of appellate jurisdiction, appellate courts only have jurisdiction to review 

final judgments and certain interlocutory orders identified by statute. Lehmann v. HarCon Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). An order denying a motion to recuse may 

be reviewed only on appeal from a final judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1)(a). 

The Court, having fully reviewed and considered the documents herein, concludes 

that the order appealed from fails to invoke our appellate jurisdiction and is of the opinion 

that the cause should be dismissed. The appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF 

JURISDICTION. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed this the

5th day of May, 2016.
Exhibit 23

 

 

 

 

 

 

Consent of Independent Accountants

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 33-74660, 33-74662, 33-74664, 33-78406, 33-88780, 333-04268, 333-22973, 333-22975, 333-24545, 333-56359, 333-56361, 333-73409, 333-73411, 333-33114, 333-33116, 333-56790, 333-56792, and 333-33110) of MapInfo Corporation and Subsidiaries of our report dated October 26, 2001, except for footnote 9 for which the date is December 21, 2001, relating to the financial statements and financial schedule, which appears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.

 

 

 

Albany, New York

December 21, 2001
#### Dorothee ZADI, Petitioner, v. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE; John Ashcroft, Respondents.

No. 02-1759.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 13, 2003.

Decided March 27, 2003.

Ronald D. Richey, Ronald D. Richey *&*Associates, Rockville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Mark C. Walters, Assistant Director, Christine A. Bither, Senior Litigation, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNited States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Dorothee Zadi, a native and citizen of the Ivory Coast, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming without opinion the *609immigration judge’s order finding her deportable and denying her application for asylum and withholding of deportation. We have reviewed the administrative record and the immigration judge’s decision, which was designated by the Board as the final agency determination, and find that substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s conclusion that Zadi failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution as required to qualify for relief from deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1994);18 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2002).

Additionally, we uphold the immigration judge’s denial of Zadi’s application for withholding of deportation. The standard for withholding of deportation is more stringent than that for granting asylum. *See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,*480 U.S. 421, 430-32,107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). To qualify for withholding of deportation, an applicant must demonstrate a “clear probability of persecution.” *Id.*at 430. Because Zadi fails to show that she is eligible for asylum, she cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of deportation.

Finally, we find Zadi’s due process challenges to the Board’s use of the streamlined review procedure set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) (2002) to be without merit. *See Albathani v. INS,*318 F.3d 365, 375-79 (1st Cir.2003). We further find that summary affirmance was appropriate in this case under the factors set forth in § 3.1(a)(7)(ii).

Accordingly, we deny Zadi’s petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*

1

. We note that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) was repealed by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-128, 110 Stat. 3009, effective April 1, 1997. Because this case was in transition at the time the IIRIRA was passed, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) is still applicable under the terms of the transitional rules contained in § 309(c) of the IIRIRA.
**EXHIBIT32.1**

 

**P & F INDUSTRIES, INC.**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Richard A. Horowitz, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, that:

 

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/  Richard A. Horowitz    |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Richard A. Horowitz         |   |
| Principal Executive Officer |   |
| May 13, 2005                |   |
#### John Strong v. State.

No. 24987.

November 22, 1950.

*W. J. Baldwin,*Beaumont, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The conviction is for sodomy, the punishment asseessed by the jury being ten years in the penitentiary.

*274The evidence shows that appellant, a seaman, committed the offense defined under our code as sodomy by using his mouth on the sexual parts of a 14 year old boy for the purpose of carnal copulation.

The boy named in the indictment testified to such acts, and the trial court instructed the jury that the witness was an accomplice.

According to this accomplice witness, he met appellant on the street, and went with him to a hotel room where he was paid $10.00 by appellant and the appellant committed such act of sodomy.

Later in the day, the boy returned to said room, accompanied by two other boys 14 and 15 years of age. There in the presence of these two witnesses, according to the three boys, appellant again committed the same act on the same boy. He also attempted to treat the other boys in the same manner, but they refused his advances.

Appellant complains of the refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury that the two boys who were present at the last act were also accomplices, and also complains that the court refused to submit to the jury the question of whether they were accomplices.

And upon his contention that all of the boys were in fact accomplices and cannot corroborate each other, appellant insists that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction and that his motion for instructed verdict of not guilty should have been granted.

Each of the boys testified that they went to the room to see if their companion was telling the truth about appellant’s conduct, while the accomplice witness testified that he took the boys with him because he wanted to prove it to them.

Neither of the two consented to or participated in any way in the criminal act between appellant and the boy who was an accomplice under the court’s charge. They were present, but under this record were not shown to be connected with the transaction so as to make them offenders or render them punishable under the statute denouncing the offense. They were therefore not accomplice witnesses. See Stone v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. *275575, 85 S.W. 808; Deatherage v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 181, 237 S. W. 1111.

Appellant denied the acts charged against him in toto. His testimony as to the two boys did not raise the issue that they participated in the criminal act. He says there was no crime committed.

Having disposed of these contentions, the further claim, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, is without basis.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, and no reversible error is shown.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-1506

YVETTE COLE, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant, 

 v. 

SOUTH CAROLINA, State of; HAMPTON, County of, 

 Defendants – Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Beaufort. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District 

Judge. (9:09-cv-00324-SB) 

Submitted: November 5, 2009 Decided: November 19, 2009 

Before DUNCAN and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Yvette Cole, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Yvette Cole appeals the district court’s order denying 

relief on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. The district 

court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2006). The magistrate judge recommended 

that relief be denied and advised Cole that failure to file 

timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate 

review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. 

Despite this warning, Cole failed to object to the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation. 

The timely filing of specific objections to a 

magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve 

appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when 

the parties have been warned of the consequences of 

noncompliance. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th 

Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Cole 

has waived appellate review by failing to timely file specific 

objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OLEKSANDR KRAVCHUK,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-74399

Agency No. A078-759-546

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 17, 2012** 

Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

 Oleksandr Kravchuk, a native and citizen of Ukraine, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen

removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for

FILED

APR 25 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-74399

abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981,

984 (9th Cir. 2009), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kravchuk’s motion to

reopen as untimely because the motion was filed four years after the BIA’s final

decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and Kravchuk did not establish prima facie

eligibility for relief, see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008)

(evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief warranting reopening

based on changed country conditions).

To the extent Kravchuk challenges the BIA’s underlying order summarily

affirming an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, we

decline to consider his contentions because the court previously rejected them in

Kravchuk v. Mukasey, 263 F. App’x 599 (9th Cir. 2008). See Merritt v. Mackey,

932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that under the “law of the case

doctrine,” one panel of an appellate court will not reconsider questions which

another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
18333.

#### Jackson Electric Membership Corp. *v.*Mathews *et al.*

Submitted September 14, 1953

Decided October 13, 1953.

*D. M. Pollock,*for plaintiff in error.

*Howard T. Oliver, Jr.,*contra.

Hawkins, Justice.

A petition for mandamus wás filed in Jackson Superior Court by Mr. and Mrs. T. J. Mathews against Jackson Electric Membership Corporation, seeking to compel the construction of an electric line to their home. To the petition as amended a general demurrer was filed, and the exception here is to the overruling of the demurrer. *Held:*“The only assignment of error in the bill of exceptions being to a judgment overruling the defendant’s demurrer to a petition for mandamus, the bill of exceptions is prematurely brought and must be dismissed.” *Ledford*v. *McConnell,*200 *Ga.*38 (36 S. E. 2d 102). See also *Bridges*v. *Poole,*176 *Ga.*500 (168 S. E. *577); Nichols*v. *Hampton,*198 *Ga.*327 (31 S. E. 2d *659);*Code (Ann. Supp.) § 64-110.

*Writ of error dismissed.*

*All the Justices concur.*