11-667-cv

Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. v. Kumar

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United

3 States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on

the 13th 4 day of March, two thousand twelve.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,

9 Circuit Judges,

SIDNEY H. STEIN,* 10

11 District Judge.

12 _____________________________________

13

14 Airgas Specialty Gases Inc.,

15

16 Plaintiff-Appellee,

17

18 v. 11-667-cv

19

20 Shivesh Kumar,

21

22 Defendant-Appellant.

23

24 _____________________________________

25

26

27 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Lori B. Alexander, Jason R.

28 Stanevich, Littler Mendelson,

29 P.C., New Haven, Connecticut.

*Judge Sidney H. Stein, of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by

designation.
1

2 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Shivesh Kumar, pro se, Cheshire,

3 Connecticut.

4 Appeal from an order of the United States District

5 Court for the District of Connecticut (Thompson, C.J.).

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

7 AND DECREED that the order of the district court is

8 AFFIRMED.

9 Appellant Shivesh Kumar, proceeding pro se, appeals the

10 district court’s order granting the motion of Appellee

11 Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. (“Airgas”) to enforce a

12 settlement agreement that the parties entered into in May

13 2010. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

14 underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and

15 the issues on appeal.

16 As an initial matter, although the district court did

17 not enter a separate judgment in this case after issuing its

18 order granting Airgas’s motion, this Court nonetheless has

19 jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291

20 because the order clearly indicated the district court’s

21 intent that the order be the final decision in this case. 

22 See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 387-99

23 (1978).

24 In reviewing a district court’s decision whether to

2
1 enforce a settlement agreement, we review its findings of

2 fact with respect to the agreement for clear error and its

3 legal conclusions de novo. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega,

4 S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir. 2005). 

5 Under Connecticut law, a contract is unambiguous where

6 “its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise

7 intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

8 omitted). If a contract does not define a given term, the

9 court should “look to the plain meaning of the language to

10 ascertain whether there is ambiguity” and may refer to

11 “widespread custom or usage” to define the term. Lee v. BSB

12 Greenwich Mortg. Ltd. P’ship, 267 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir.

13 2001)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

14 Kumar argues on appeal that the district court erred in

15 finding that Airgas had satisfied its obligation under the

16 settlement agreement to change Kumar’s record in its Human

17 Resource Management System (“HRMS”) to “reflect a voluntary

18 quit as opposed to an involuntary termination” because the

19 screen shot of Kumar’s record provided by Airgas indicates

20 that the reason for Kumar’s termination was “Resignation21 Other Position.” Kumar contends that “Resignation-Other

22 Position” does not mean the same thing as “voluntary quit.” 

23 According to Kumar, the notation “Resignation-Other

3
1 Position” falsely indicates that he took another position in

2 the same company (Airgas).

3 Kumar’s argument is without merit. A “voluntary” act

4 is one that is “performed, made, or given of one’s free

5 will,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary Unabridged 2564

6 (3d ed. 1961), and to “quit” means “to give up employment,”

7 id. at 1867. Thus, a voluntary quit means to “give up

8 employment” “of one’s free will.” “Resignation” is defined

9 as “[t]he act . . . of surrendering or relinquishing an

10 office,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1336 (8th ed. 2004), and

11 “quit” is a synonym of the verb “resign,” see Roget’s Int’l

12 Thesaurus at entry 448.02 (6th ed. 2001). 

13 Kumar has provided no support for his contention that

14 “Resignation-Other Position” suggests a transfer within the

15 same company, and in any event, interpreting the phrase in

16 that manner is not inconsistent with a finding that he left

17 his original position voluntarily. See Omega Eng’g, 432

18 F.3d at 446. Thus, the district court correctly held that

19 Airgas had satisfied its obligation to modify Kumar’s HRMS

20 record to “reflect a voluntary quit” by changing the reason

21 for Kumar’s termination to “Resignation-Other Position.”

22 Kumar also argues that the district court erred in

23 finding that Airgas had provided Kumar with “proper

4
1 documentation” of its modification of Kumar’s HRMS record

2 because the screen shot provided by Airgas was allegedly

3 “truncated,” as evidenced by the location of the “scroll

4 thumb” on the scroll bar in the screen shot. However, as

5 Kumar has conceded, the settlement agreement merely requires

6 Airgas to provide Kumar with “documentation” of the change,

7 and does not mandate that the documentation be in a specific

8 form. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding

9 that Airgas’s screen shot satisfied the terms of the

10 settlement agreement. See Lee, 267 F.3d at 178.

11 We have considered all of Kumar’s arguments and find

12 them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order

13 of the district court.

14

15 FOR THE COURT: 

16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

17

18

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