alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. 07-05-0110-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

APRIL 14, 2005

______________________________

$1,364.00, ONE 1997 FORD THUNDERBIRD, ONE PHILLIPS VCR TELEVISION,

ONE REMINGTON MONITOR AND CAMERAS, ONE SENTINEL INTERCOM,

AND ONE SET OF TANITA SCALES, APPELLANTS

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 72ND DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2004-525,492; HONORABLE BLAIR CHERRY, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Alvin L. Gaither, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal challenging

the trial court’s forfeiture order of $1,364, one 1997 Ford Thunderbird, one Phillips VCR

television, one Remington monitor and cameras, one Sentinel intercom and one set of
2

Tanita scales. By letter dated March 25, 2005, this Court directed Gaither to pay the

required filing fee of $125 within ten days noting that failure to do so might result in

dismissal of the appeal. Unless a party is excused from paying, the Clerk of this Court is

required to collect filing fees set by statute or the Supreme Court when an item is

presented for filing. See Tex. R. App. P. 5 and 12.1(b). Although the filing of a notice of

appeal invokes this Court’s jurisdiction, if a party fails to follow the prescribed rules of

appellate procedure, the appeal may be dismissed. Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b). Thus,

because the filing fee of $125 remains unpaid, we must dismiss the appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure and with a notice from the Clerk requiring payment of the filing fee.

Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c).

Don H. Reavis

 Justice
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## August 01, 2024

08/01/2024
No. 72-6387.

#### Woolsey *v.*Estelle, Corrections Director.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### James Lorin PORTER, Sr., Plaintiff—Appellant, v. LINCOLN CITY, a Municipality; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 02-16674.

D.C. No. CV-01-01778-FCD.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 10, 2003.*

Decided March 21, 2003.

Before CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

James L. Porter, Sr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Lincoln City and several media companies violated his due process rights and the Ex Post Facto Clause. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo dismissals for failure to *986State a claim under the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Porter’s due process claims because the California statute granting the public the right to submit information to the Board of Prison Terms for consideration in making parole decisions does not create a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. *See*Cal.Penal Code § 3043.5(b) (requiring the parole board to consider information submitted by the public but giving the board discretion to determine whether the prisoner “would pose a threat to the public safety if released on parole”); *Baumann v.*Ariz. *Dept. of Corr.,*754 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir.1985) (only state regulatory measures that impose “substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion” may create a liberty interest). Nor does Porter have a constitutional right to receive parole. *See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex,*442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979).

There is no legal basis for Porter’s claim that the Lincoln City resolution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because the resolution does not “alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” *See Souch v. Schaivo,*289 F.3d 616, 620 (9th Cir.) (internal quotation omitted), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 231, 154 L.Ed.2d 98 (2002). Similarly, because the resolution does not legislatively determine guilt or inflict punishment, it does not constitute a bill of attainder. *See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.,*433 U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Porter’s pendent state law claims for fraud, misrepresentation, libel, slander, and violations of the California Constitution. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); *Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Co-hill,*484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well”) (internal quotation omitted).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
177 La. 7

#### PEARLSTINE v. MATTES.

No. 32150.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 27, 1933.

Gerald Netter, of New Orleans, for appellant.

H. W. Kaiser and John H. Plammel, Jr., both of New Orleans, for appellee.

ST. PAUL, Justice.

This is a rule taken in a suit for separation from bed and board. It was taken by the wife against her husband for alimony pen-dente lite for the support of herself and the two children of the marriage who are under her custody. She asks for $100 a week; the trial judge allowed her $50 a week, and the husband appeals.

The only question involved is how much can the husband pay; for, whatever the wife’s needs may be, that is all that the husband should be required to pay or can be made to pay.

His testimony is that from January, 1932, until September following, his gross income has dwindled from something more than $900 a month to something less than $500 á month, and is still dwindling. This is corroborated by the wife herself. Meanwhile his professional expenses, such as office rent, etc., have remained the same, to wit, about $200 to $225 a month, thus leaving him a net income, if things get no worse, of between $275 and $300 a month, out of which must be deduct-' ed $00 a month to keep up the payments on the house which is now occupied by his wife and children. This leaves him a net income somewhere between $215 and $240 a month, or say an,average of $230 a month.

Now it is clear that he is entitled to something for his own living; and the testimony shows that his own rent and living expenses amount to about $100 a month, thus leaving available for his wife and children a balance of $130 a month and the occupancy of the house for which he is paying $60 a month. It therefore seems clear that, whatever may be the needs of the wife and children, $130 a month and the occupancy of the house is all that the husband can afford to give them, and is therefore all that he should be required to give them.

To put it another way, the net income of the husband, after deducting his office expenses, is from $275 to $300 per month, and if out of this the husband pays $130 a month in cash to his wife and pays $60 a month for the house in which she is living with the children, this amounts to $190 a month which he will be paying for his wife and children, or practically two-thirds of his net income.

Now $30 a week makes exactly $130 a month. Hence we think that the amount allowed by the district judge should be reduced accordingly.

Decree.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is amended by reducing the alimony of the plaintiff from $50 a week to $30 a week, and, as thus amended, the judgment is affirmed; plaintiff to pay costs of appeal and defendant to pay the costs of the lower court.
#### Valentine TORRES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 72-2320.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Nov. 13, 1972.

*652Valentine Torres, in pro. per.

Harry D. Steward, U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for respondent-appellee.

Before MERRILL, CHOY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM;

Torres was found guilty of smuggling narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a and on April 13, 1971 he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. He is now in custody under that sentence.

On February 18, 1972, Torres filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied the motion without a hearing and this appeal followed.

Torres contends that he was deprived of his right to appeal by the failure of appointed counsel to file notice of appeal and properly prosecute his appeal. He also contends that there were evidentiary errors committed at his trial.

At the time of sentencing, petitioner was represented by the trial attorney of record, but the judge failed to inform Torres of his right to appeal. Shortly thereafter, on the same morning, Torres was recalled to the same courtroom. His appointed counsel was absent but the' court advised Torres of his right to appeal within ten days at government expense and that the clerk would enter a notice of appeal if he wished. At that time another attorney who was associated with petitioner’s trial attorney assured Torres and the court that he would tell the trial attorney to talk to Torres about the possibility of an appeal. No request for the appointment of appellate counsel was ever made and no notice of appeal ever filed.

The requirements of F.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2) were met by the sentencing judge. Torres was aware of his right to appeal at government expense and that he had ten days to do so. He concedes this but contends that he did not file notice of an appeal because he assumed that his trial attorney was handling the matter. Yet he waited over five months before he even made any effort to inquire about the status of his appeal. The failure to file a timely appeal was caused by petitioner’s own inactivity. There was a knowing waiver of the right to appeal.

 The contention that there were evidentiary errors is a bald legal conclusion unsupported by factual allegations. Such claims need not be considered on a motion to vacate. Eaton v. United States, 384 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1967). Additionally, trial defects which should have been raised on a direct appeal should not be considered in collateral proceedings. Evans v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1972). Torres cannot now bootstrap himself into the appeal that he waived by his earlier inactivity.

Affirmed.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-30625

Summary Calendar

__________________

JOSEPH HAYES,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

RICHARD P. IEYOUB, Attorney General,

State of Louisiana,

 Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-30625

- - - - - - - - - -

February 21, 1996

Before KING, SMITH and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Joseph Hayes appeals the district court's dismissal with

prejudice of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition because his

fingerprints were not affixed to his bill of information and

because the trial court admitted Xerox copies of his bill of

information and fingerprints to prove his identity as the person

charged in the information.

To the extent that Hayes attempts to argue that his bill of

information is defective, this is a new issue on appeal, and we 
No. 95-30625

-2-

will not consider it. See Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321

(5th Cir. 1991). Also, because Hayes does not argue his

sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, he has abandoned it, and we

will not address it. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25

(5th Cir. 1993).

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for essentially the same reasons given by

the district court.

AFFIRMED.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6040 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

11 Robert Smalls Parkway Suite C, in Beaufort, South Carolina, as 

the ‘‘Robert Smalls Post Office’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 18, 2021 

Ms. MACE (for herself, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. 

TIMMONS, Mr. NORMAN, Mr. CLYBURN, and Mr. RICE of South Carolina) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 

Oversight and Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 11 Robert Smalls Parkway Suite C, in Beaufort, South Carolina, as the ‘‘Robert Smalls Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ROBERT SMALLS POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 11 Robert Smalls Parkway Suite 

6 C, in Beaufort, South Carolina, shall be known and des7 ignated as the ‘‘Robert Smalls Post Office’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6040 IH

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Robert Smalls Post 

5 Office’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6080 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6080

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 5420 Kavanaugh Boulevard in Little Rock, Arkansas, as the ``Ronald 
                       A. Robinson Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RONALD A. ROBINSON POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 5420 Kavanaugh Boulevard in Little Rock, Arkansas, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Ronald A. Robinson Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
or other record of the United States to the facility referred to in 
subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Ronald A. 
Robinson Post Office''.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 28, 2022.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
117th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 6080

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 5420 Kavanaugh Boulevard in Little Rock, Arkansas, as the ``Ronald 
                       A. Robinson Post Office''.
```
#### GILL et al. v. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 10, 1935.

John F. Burket, of Sarasota, for appellants.

Milam, Mellvaine & Milam, of Jacksonville, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is the second appeal in this cause. Gill v. Smith, 157 So. 657. The case is now before this court on a motion by appellee to dismiss the appeal as frivolous and to assess 10 per cent, damages against appellants in accordance with the applicable statute. In re Benedict’s Estate (Fla.) 158 So. 276; section 4639, Comp. Gen. Laws, section 2920, Rev. Gen. St., section 4965, Comp. Gen. Laws, section 3173, Rev. Gen. St. Appellant has subsequently moved for a voluntary dismissal of his own appeal without prejudice, as provided for by our rule. Thompson v. Filer, 99 Fla. 539, 126 So. 766; Supreme Court Rule 23.

The motion of appellee to dismiss the appeal as frivolous, and to assess damages as for a frivolous appeal, having been first filed, is entitled to consideration at the hands of this court despite the motion of appellant for a voluntary dismissal of his own appeal without prejudice. In lieu of dismissing an appeal as -frivolous, we may affirm the decree, order, or judgment appealed from, where the time of the appellate court has been required to be given over to a study of the record and briefs in order to decide the motion, and it has been made clearly apparent to it from such study that no good purpose will be sub-served by continuing the appeal on the Supreme Court’s docket, notwithstanding the appeal cannot be characterized as frivolous within the rule governing dismissal of or *283quashing frivolous appeal. Holtsberg v. McCarty (Fla.) 158 So. 123.

A study of tbe record and briefs in this case has convinced us that while the appeal herein is not frivolous, the orders appealed from are without error, and should accordingly be affirmed under the rule last above stated, with leave to appellee to include the costs of the transcript as advanced by him in the taxable costs allowed to him on this appeal.

Affirmed and remanded.

WHITFIELD, C. J., and BROWN and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

ELLIS, P. J., and TERRELL, and BUFORD, JJ., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Exhibit 32.1

                Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to
              18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to
              Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
              ---------------------------------------------


     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Paradise, Inc. on Form
10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Melvin S.
Gordon, as Chief Executive Officer of Paradise, Inc., certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:


     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
          or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of
          operations of Paradise, Inc.



       /s/ Melvin S. Gordon            Date:  August 16, 2004
       -----------------------------
       Melvin S. Gordon
       Chief Executive Officer and Chairman
#### Louis Goldman, Respondent, *v.*The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, Appellant.

Second Department,

December 30, 1908.

Court — Municipal Court, city of New York — failure to pay costs — stay — appeal from judgment by default — motion to open default denied.

The Municipal Court of the city of New York has no power to stay the proceedings in an action because of a failure to pay costs awarded on the dismissal of a former action for the same cause.

An appeal does not lie from the judgment of said court taken by default.

Where a defendant in said court allows an inquest to be ¡alten because of the denial of a motion to stay proceedings on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to pay the costs on the dismissal of a former action for the same cause, the default will not be opened,

Appeal by the defendant, The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, from an order of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, denying the defendant’s motion to open its default and the inquest taken thereupon and to set aside the judgment entered thereon, and also from such judgment in favor of the plaintiff, rendered on the 13th day of April, 1908.

*Francis R. Stoddard, Jr.,*for the appellant.

*Gilbert Ray Hawes,*for the respondent.

Rich, J.:

When the case was called for issue on November 7,1907, defendant's attorney filed an affidavit alleging non-payment of the costs of a former action between the parties for the same cause, in which the complaint was dismissed, and asked that further proceedings be stayed until the payment of such costs. Counsel differ as to whether the court granted or denied this motion, but it is conceded that no order was entered or'signed making any disposition of it. On April 13, 1908, the action was reached for trial before another justice. Upon the call of the calendar the plaintiff answered “ready,” and counsel for the defendant, as the return shows, *658“ moved for a stay on the ground of failure on the part of plaintiff or his counsel to pay costs of former action. Plaintiff’s counsel states in open court that such motion was made at a 'prior time before another justice and said motion was denied.” Defendant’s motion was denied and the case sent for trial to the justice presiding in Part 2 of said court, where an inquest was taken, and thejudgment appealed from accordingly entered.

There was no power in the Municipal Court to stay the proceedings in this action until the payment of the costs of the former action *(McKown*v. Oppenheimer, 60 Misc. Rep. 98; 111 N. Y. Supp, 609), and an appeal does not lie from the judgment. *(Schwartz*v. *Mutual Alliance Trust Co.,*Id. 610.) We are of the opinion that the motion to open the default and vacate the inquest was properly denied. (*Warth*v. *Moore Blind Stitcher & Overseamer Co.,*125 App. Div. 211; 109 N. Y. Supp. 116.) The contention that the action is for an assault and battery, of which the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction, is without merit *(Hines*v. *Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. R. Co.,*75 App. Div. 391.)

The judgment and order must he affirmed, with costs.

Woodward, Jenks, Hooker and Gaynor, JJ., concurred.

Judgment and order of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs.