[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11429

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JOHN OIRYA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus

MANDO AMERICAN CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00635-ECM-CWB

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11429

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant Mando American Corporation (“Mando”) 

terminated plaintiff John Oirya for sleeping on the job. 

Subsequently, Oirya filed this action alleging that Mando failed to 

accommodate his medical conditions that caused drowsiness and 

retaliated against him for requesting an accommodation and 

complaining about disability discrimination, all in violation of the 

American Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 

On appeal, Oirya challenges: (1) the magistrate judge’s order 

denying Oirya’s second motion for leave to amend his complaint; 

and (2) the district court’s order granting summary judgment in 

favor of Mando on Oirya’s claims. After review of the parties’ 

briefs and the record, we dismiss Oirya’s appeal of the magistrate 

judge’s denial of Oirya’s motion to amend because we lack 

jurisdiction to review it. We affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment because Oirya failed to establish a prima facie

case as to his failure-to-accommodate or his retaliation claims. 

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I. BACKGROUND1

A. Mando’s Employment Policies 

Oirya worked at Mando as a training coordinator under the 

supervision of April Regier, the corporate training supervisor. 

When promoted to training coordinator, Oirya was given 

Mando’s salary employee handbook. The handbook included an 

ADA policy that (1) instructed employees to request an 

accommodation for a disability by notifying Human Resources and 

(2) reserved the right to request medical documentation. Similarly, 

the handbook instructed employees to report discrimination or 

retaliation to Human Resources. 

The employee handbook also included a conduct policy that 

stated, “Some examples of misconduct, which may result in 

immediate termination, include, but are not limited to . . . 

[s]leeping on the job.” Salaried employees were supposed to take 

their lunch breaks around midday, and they could also take 

comfort breaks throughout the day as needed. Comfort breaks 

allowed employees to take a few moments to regroup, if needed. 

It was acceptable for employees to sleep during their lunch break, 

but not while working. 

1 These are the summary judgment facts, construed in the light most favorable 

to Oirya, as the non-moving party. See Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 

1322 (11th Cir. 2018).

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B. Oirya’s Medical Conditions Causing Drowsiness

Oirya suffered from several medical conditions, including 

major depression and PTSD, for which he received treatment at 

Columbus Psychological Associates. And Columbus diagnosed 

Oirya with a sleep disorder. Oirya also had chronic bouts of 

gastrointestinal problems, including food poisoning, stomach flu, 

and severe stomach pains. Oirya maintained that he notified all of 

his supervisors, including Regier, of these disabilities. As a result of 

his conditions, Oirya sometimes had trouble sleeping at night and 

then could not stay awake at work. To treat his symptoms, Oirya 

took over-the-counter medications that also made him drowsy. 

C. February 2, 2018: Oirya Disciplined for Sleeping on Job

In late 2018 and early 2019, Oirya’s supervisor Regier was 

advised by Mando’s then-Human Resources manager, Darlene 

Schumacher, that three Mando employees, Brandon Yoon, Kayte 

Dulaney, and Felix Owen, had observed Oirya on multiple 

occasions sleeping at his desk while not on a break. Because 

sleeping on the job violated Mando’s conduct policy, Regier 

decided to issue Oirya a “Last Chance Agreement,” a decision 

approved by senior Human Resources manager, Gerald Wyatt. 

At a February 2, 2018 meeting, Regier presented Oirya with 

the Last Chance Agreement. In the Last Chance Agreement, 

Regier noted that on February 1, 2018, Oirya was witnessed 

violating Mando’s conduct policy “by sleeping on the job and 

abusing [his] designation [sic] lunch period.” The Last Chance 

Agreement stated that, in lieu of termination, Oirya was being 

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placed under the terms of the Agreement and was required to 

review and sign Mando’s conduct policy. The Last Chance 

Agreement stated that Oirya’s continued employment was

contingent on following Mando’s policies for conduct and behavior 

and would remain in effect for two years. 

Oirya denied the accusations of the other Mando employees 

that he had been sleeping on the job and challenged Regier to 

produce evidence supporting the accusations. In response, Regier 

conceded she had not investigated the accusations and did not have 

evidence to prove them. 

Oirya explained to Regier about his diagnosed medical 

conditions and that he “took frequent breaks whenever [his] 

medical disabilities were active, during which [he] took drowsycausing stomach flu capsules to manage [his] bouts of stomach flu 

symptoms.” Oirya also told Regier he laid down on his back during 

those breaks until his stomach pains subsided. Oirya said that these 

accommodations—frequent breaks and lying down during 

breaks—“enabled [him] to resume the essential functions and 

responsibilities of [his] job.” Oirya pointed out that his prior 

supervisors when he worked as an operator 2 at Mando had 

“readily granted [him] the reasonable accommodation of breaks.” 

Oirya refused to sign the Last Chance Agreement. Oirya 

complained that it was “unfairly issued” and “devoid of any 

meaningful due process” since Regier did not obtain his side of the 

story and witness accounts. Oirya asked Regier to “grant [him] an 

interactive process” before taking disciplinary action that included

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advanced notice in the form of a full written complaint, a “full 

evidentiary hearing,” a written decision, and an opportunity to 

appeal. 

Oirya also asked for an opportunity to respond to the Last 

Chance Agreement. Regier agreed and told Oirya she would place 

his response in the file with the agreement. 

D. February 9, 2018: Oirya’s Written Response to Discipline

A week later, on February 9, 2018, Oirya sent a written 

statement to Regier explaining why he had not signed the Last 

Chance Agreement. Oirya’s written explanation complained that: 

(1) there was a lack of meaningful due process before the Last 

Chance Agreement was issued; (2) the “alleged incident” was 

protected by Mando’s ADA policy; and (3) the “prescribed 

solutions were provided at the disciplinary meeting” rather than 

when the employees’ reports of sleeping on the job were made and 

could be investigated. 

Oirya’s written explanation also stated that at the time of the 

February 1 “alleged incident,” he “was suffering the effects of food 

poisoning with stomach flu symptoms, due to having eaten 

sandwiches that were ‘on sale’ at Walmart,” for which he had taken 

flu capsules and antacid medication. Oirya maintained that 

Mando’s ADA policy had “an inherent ‘accommodation for a 

disability’ within it, in the form of breaks. Accordingly, the food 

poisoning did not require [him] to ask for costly accommodation,

since the company-provided breaks are already provided for in this 

policy.” 

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Regier reviewed Oirya’s written explanation and gave a 

copy to Human Resources managers, including Schumacher and 

Wyatt, to review and to place it in Oirya’s file. Oirya’s written 

explanation did not change Regier’s position on the propriety of 

the Last Chance Agreement. Regier had received numerous 

reports of Oirya sleeping on the job and did not believe she needed 

to interview him before disciplining him. Regier also did not 

believe Oirya’s sleeping caused by food poisoning was protected by 

Mando’s ADA policy. In any event, Oirya had never asked Regier 

“for an accommodation for a medical condition, additional breaks, 

or any other changes to his job duties or responsibilities due to a 

medical condition.” 

Similarly, Schumacher did not consider Oirya’s written 

explanation to be a request for an accommodation. Schumacher 

read the written explanation as Oirya disagreeing with the Last 

Chance Agreement and complaining that he was not interviewed 

before being issued discipline. Schumacher said that Mando did 

not require employees to be interviewed before being disciplined 

and that it was not unusual for employees to be disciplined before 

being interviewed. Like Regier, Schumacher did not think Oirya’s 

food poisoning was a disability under the ADA, and Oirya never 

asked for additional breaks due to his medical conditions. 

E. April 2018: Oirya Sent Home for Food Poisoning

In April 2018, Oirya reported to Human Resources manager 

Schumacher that he was not feeling well after eating at a pizza 

buffet. Schumacher consulted with Regier and then sent Oirya 

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home, telling him to return to work with a doctor’s note. Oirya

was treated at Auburn Urgent Care for stomach pains, diagnosed 

with food poisoning, and prescribed Zofran and acidophilus 

capsules. 

F. December 3, 2018: Oirya Terminated for Sleeping on Job

In November 2018, Mando’s new Human Resources 

manager, Audie Swegman, notified Regier that two Mando 

employees, Shinae Pak and Beth Yates, had witnessed Oirya 

sleeping on the job, and one of them had taken a photograph of 

Oirya sleeping at his desk. In particular, after the lunch break, at 

3:00 p.m., Pak observed Oirya sleeping for a long period of time at 

his desk. Yates also observed Oirya sleeping, “laid back in his chair 

at his desk,” and discussed it with Pak, who used her cell phone to 

take the picture.2 

Based on the employees’ reports and the photograph, Regier 

and Swegman concluded Oirya had been sleeping on the job in 

violation of Mando’s conduct policy. Regier told Swegman about 

the Last Chance Agreement, and the two agreed that Oirya’s 

termination was warranted. Before concurring in Regier’s 

recommendation, Swegman reviewed Oirya’s personnel file, 

including the Last Chance Agreement and Oirya’s written 

explanation. 

2 Oirya did not dispute that he was sleeping at his desk. When asked at his 

deposition whether he fell asleep on the job in November 2018, Oirya said he 

could not recall. 

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On December 3, 2018, after obtaining approval from senior 

Human Resources manager James Kendrick, Swegman and Regier 

met with Oirya. Swegman notified Oirya that he was terminated 

for sleeping on the job while on the Last Chance Agreement. 

II. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

In September 2019, Oirya, proceeding with counsel, filed a 

complaint alleging two ADA claims. Count I alleged that Mando 

denied Oirya a reasonable accommodation for his disabilities of a 

“sleep disorder that was a symptom of clinical major depression 

and PTSD, and bouts of severe food poisoning and allergies.” 

Count II alleged that Mando terminated Oirya in retaliation “for 

requesting a reasonable accommodation, and for opposing or 

protesting against unlawful disability discrimination” when he 

complained to Mando about being deprived of the opportunity “to 

confront the disability-related allegations” during the disciplinary 

process. 

The deadline to amend pleadings was April 9, 2020. On 

November 24, 2020, seven months after the deadline, Mando filed 

a first motion to amend his complaint to add two new ADA 

claims—Count III alleging disparate treatment and Count IV 

alleging wrongful termination. As to the disparate treatment claim 

in Count III, Oirya’s proposed amended complaint alleged that a 

“similarly situated” employee, Veronica Alfa, was accused of 

sleeping on the job, and Mando treated her more favorably by 

giving her a reasonable accommodation for her disability, which 

required medication that caused drowsiness. 

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The district court denied Oirya’s motion to amend his 

complaint as untimely and concluded Oirya had offered “no good 

cause for the delay.” 

On March 14, 2021, Oirya filed a second motion for leave to 

amend his complaint. This time, Oirya sought to add two claims 

of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

based on employee Alfa’s more favorable treatment. Specifically, 

Oirya’s proposed amended complaint alleged in Count III that he 

received disparate disciplinary treatment from Alfa and in Count 

IV that he was denied a reasonable accommodation that Alfa was 

granted. 

After briefing on Oirya’s second motion to amend 

concluded, Oirya’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which the 

district court granted. In the same order, the district court referred

the case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 “for all 

pretrial proceedings and entry of any orders or recommendations 

as may be appropriate.” 

Thereafter, on January 14, 2022, the magistrate judge 

entered an order denying Oirya’s second motion to amend his 

complaint as untimely. The magistrate judge found that Oirya 

lacked diligence in pursuing his proposed Title VII claims and had 

not shown good cause for failing to seek leave to amend earlier. 

Oirya did not appeal the magistrate judge’s order or otherwise 

object to it in the district court. 

On appeal, Oirya now challenges the magistrate judge’s 

ruling on his second motion to amend, arguing that he 

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demonstrated both diligence and good cause to excuse the 

untimeliness of his motion.3 Before we can consider Oirya’s 

arguments that the magistrate judge erred, we must determine that 

we have jurisdiction to do so. See Peden v. Stephens, 50 F.4th 972, 

977 (11th Cir. 2022). 

We ordinarily have jurisdiction to review only decisions of 

the district court that are “final.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court has 

long held that when a magistrate judge is proceeding under the 

supervision of the district court pursuant to § 636(b), its decisions 

“are not final orders and may not be appealed until rendered final 

by a district court.” Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061, 

1066-67 (11th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 

1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The law is settled that appellate courts 

are without jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from federal 

magistrates.” (quotation marks omitted)). Thus, where a party did 

not appeal a magistrate judge’s order to the district court, we lack 

jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s ruling on appeal. See 

Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1362-63.

Here, the magistrate judge was proceeding under § 636(b) 

when he denied Oirya’s second motion to amend his complaint. 

Because Oirya did not challenge the magistrate judge’s January 14, 

2022 order in the district court, the order is not final and appealable 

under § 1291. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the 

magistrate judge’s order denying the second motion to amend and 

3 On appeal, Oirya does not challenge the district court’s denial of his first 

motion to amend as untimely.

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must dismiss Oirya’s appeal as to that ruling. See id.; Donovan, 693 

F.2d at 1066-67.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On appeal, Oirya, proceeding pro se, argues the district court 

erred in granting summary judgment to Mando on both his failureto-accommodate and retaliation claims under the ADA.4 We 

address each claim in turn.5 

A. Reasonable Accommodation Principles

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against 

an employee because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a 

plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled; (2) he is a qualified

individual; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination 

because of his disability. Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 

1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007). An employer unlawfully 

discriminates against a disabled employee when it fails to provide 

reasonable accommodations for known physical or mental 

4 We have appellate jurisdiction to review the summary judgment ruling 

because the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation over Oirya’s objection. See Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1359-60 

5 We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing 

all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual inferences, in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Amy v. Carnival Corp., 961 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2020) 

(quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

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limitations unless the accommodation would impose an undue 

hardship on the employer’s business. Id. at 1262; 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(b)(5)(A).

A reasonable accommodation is a modification or 

adjustment that enables the employee to perform the essential 

functions of the position. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 

(11th Cir. 2016); see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 

399-401 (2002). A reasonable accommodation depends on the 

circumstances, but can include modifying work schedules or 

policies. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402-03; 

Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1255.

“The employee has the burden of identifying an 

accommodation and demonstrating that it is reasonable.” FrazierWhite, 818 F.3d at 1255. Further, an employer’s duty to provide a 

reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless the employee 

makes a specific demand for an accommodation. Gaston v. 

Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 

1999). If the employee provides this information, the employer 

may need to “initiate an informal, interactive process” with the 

employee to identify the employee’s limitations resulting from the 

disability and determine the appropriate reasonable 

accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); Frazier-White, 818 F.3d 

at 1257. However, absent a specific request for an accommodation 

and a denial, “there can be no failure to accommodate under the 

ADA.” Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 

2018).

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B. Oirya’s Failure-to-Accommodate Claim

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment 

to Mando on Oirya’s failure-to-accommodate claim. For purposes 

of this appeal, we assume that Oirya met the first two prongs of a 

prima facie case—that is, that Oirya’s medical conditions qualified 

as a disability and that he was a “qualified individual” under the 

ADA. 

We agree with the district court, however, that Oirya did 

not satisfy the third prong because he failed to present evidence 

from which a jury could find that he made a specific demand for a 

reasonable accommodation. And absent such a showing, Oirya did 

not trigger Mando’s obligations to provide a reasonable 

accommodation or to engage in an interactive process with him

and cannot prevail on his failure-to-accommodate claim. 

In the February 2, 2018 meeting with Regier and in his 

follow-up written explanation, Oirya explained that his medical 

conditions and the medications he took sometimes made him 

drowsy at work and that he managed his drowsiness by taking 

frequent breaks. Oirya also explained that he sometimes had 

gastrointestinal issues, which he managed by lying down on his 

back during his breaks. But Oirya denied sleeping at his desk when 

not on breaks and claimed that other Mando employees’ reports to 

the contrary were false. 

More importantly, Oirya did not request that Regier modify 

any of Mando’s work or break policies and schedules, such as 

asking for longer breaks or to be allowed to nap at his desk even 

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when not on a break. In fact, Oirya maintained that he did not need 

an accommodation from Mando because he was able to use the 

breaks that Mando already provided to manage his symptoms

when they were active. In the February 2, 2018 meeting, Oirya 

specifically advised Regier that what he was already doing—taking 

frequent breaks and lying on his back during breaks—enabled him 

to perform the essential functions of his job. 

Instead, Oirya’s primary complaint to Regier was that it was 

unfair for her to issue a Last Chance Agreement without first 

investigating the employees’ (false) reports that he was sleeping on 

the job and giving him a chance to defend himself. Contending he 

was deprived of “meaningful due process,” Oirya asked Regier to 

change Mando’s disciplinary procedures to provide him with 

written notice of the complaints against him, a full evidentiary 

hearing at which Oirya could present evidence and cross-examine 

witnesses, and a chance to appeal the decision. 

Oirya’s request to modify Mando’s disciplinary procedures 

to give him due-process-type protections does not constitute a 

request for reasonable accommodation under the ADA. A 

reasonable accommodation is one that enables the employee to 

perform the essential functions of his job. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256; 

see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (defining “reasonable 

accommodation” to mean modifications or adjustments that 

enable an employee with a disability “to perform the essential 

functions” of a position). 

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Further, as part of the obligation to make a specific demand 

for an accommodation, “an employee must link her disability to 

her requested accommodation by explaining how the requested 

accommodation could alleviate the workplace challenges posed by 

her specific disability.” Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student 

Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1333-34, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (involving 

a failure-to-accommodate claim under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act, which, in the employment context, applies the 

same standards as an ADA claim). “[I]f an employee does not 

require an accommodation to perform her essential job functions, 

then the employer is under no obligation to make an 

accommodation . . . .” D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 

1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2020). 

Oirya’s requested modifications to Mando’s disciplinary 

procedures were not ones that would alleviate workplace 

challenges posed by his disability or enable him to perform the 

essential functions of his job as a training coordinator. Rather, they 

would enable Oirya to challenge Regier’s decision to discipline him 

for what Oirya said were false reports of sleeping on the job. 

Because, even under Oirya’s version of events, he did not make a 

specific demand for an accommodation, Oirya failed to show 

Mando denied him a reasonable accommodation or that Mando 

had a duty to initiate an interactive process with him to determine 

whether there was a reasonable accommodation. See Batson, 897 

F.3d at 1327, Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1255, 1257; Gaston, 167 F.3d 

at 1363.

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C. ADA Retaliation Principles

The ADA prohibits retaliation against an individual 

“because such individual has opposed any act or practice made 

unlawful [by the Act] or . . . made a charge, testified, assisted, or 

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 

hearing under [the Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). 

When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, courts 

evaluate an ADA retaliation claim using the same burden-shifting 

framework applied to Title VII retaliation claims. Todd v. Fayette 

Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1219 (11th Cir. 2021). Under that 

framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation. Batson, 897 F.3d at 1328-29. To establish a prima facie 

case of retaliation under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that:

(1) he engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) he suffered an 

adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists 

between the two. Id. at 1329.

Here, the parties agree that Oirya’s termination satisfied the 

second element, but dispute whether Oirya presented evidence of 

the other two elements of a prima facie case of retaliation. 

As to the first element, an employee participates in protected 

expression when he opposes a practice the ADA makes unlawful or 

when he makes a request for a reasonable accommodation. 

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1258. To establish 

the first element, “it is sufficient that an employee have a good 

faith, objectively reasonable belief that his activity is protected by 

the [ADA].” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 

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(11th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa 

Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).

As to the third causation element, the plaintiff need only 

“prove that the protected activity and the adverse action are not 

completely unrelated.” Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). This 

element is satisfied if the plaintiff “provides sufficient evidence of 

knowledge of the protected expression and that there was a close 

temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse 

action.” Id. (quotation marks and ellipses omitted). For temporal 

proximity alone to be sufficient circumstantial evidence of a causal 

connection, it “must be very close.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

“If there is a substantial delay between the protected expression 

and the adverse action in the absence of other evidence tending to 

show causation, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of 

law.” Id. This Court has concluded that a one-month period 

between the protected activity and the adverse action was “not too 

protracted,” but that “a three to four month disparity” was 

insufficient to show a causal connection. Id.

D. Oirya’s Retaliation Claim

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment 

to Mando because Oirya failed to present evidence establishing a 

prima facie case of retaliation. 

As to the first element, Oirya contends he engaged in 

protected activity during the February 2, 2018 meeting with Regier 

and in his February 9, 2018 written statement. As we have already 

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explained, Oirya did not show that he asked for a reasonable 

accommodation during these February 2018 interactions with 

Regier. Thus, Oirya did not establish that he had engaged in 

protected activity on that basis. See Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1258.

Opposing a practice that the ADA makes unlawful also 

constitutes protected expression. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Oirya 

contends he engaged in protected activity when he refused to sign 

the Last Chance Agreement. Even assuming Oirya’s conduct—in 

either the meeting or in his follow-up written explanation—

qualified under the ADA’s opposition clause, we agree with the 

district court that Oirya did not present evidence establishing a 

causal connection between his February 2018 conduct and his 

December 3, 2018 termination. A span of ten months between 

Oirya’s conduct and his termination, without more, is too 

temporally remote to permit a reasonable inference that the two 

were causally connected. See Higdon, 393 F.3d at 1220.

Finally, Oirya suggests that the act of taking a companyprovided break to manage disability-related symptoms is itself 

protected activity under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) and that Mando 

terminated him for taking such breaks. Oirya argues that 

terminating an employee for exercising his ADA-protected rights 

violates the ADA. 

This argument ignores that there was no evidence that 

Oirya requested additional breaks, was ever denied breaks, or was 

terminated for taking breaks. Even Oirya’s evidence showed he 

was terminated for sleeping on the job while under the Last 

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Chance Agreement, not for taking breaks. In any event, Oirya’s 

argument conflates an ADA interference claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(b) with an ADA retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (making it “unlawful to coerce, 

intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise 

or enjoyment of, . . . any right granted or protected by” the ADA). 

Oirya did not assert an ADA interference claim in the district court.

Even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 

Oirya, a reasonable jury could not conclude that his termination 

was causally connected to any activity protected under the ADA. 

Because Oirya failed to establish a prima facie case, the district court 

properly granted summary judgment to Mando on his retaliation 

claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, we dismiss Oirya’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s 

order denying his second motion to amend his complaint for lack 

of appellate jurisdiction. We affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Mando on Oirya’s failure-toaccommodate and retaliation claims under the ADA.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.

USCA11 Case: 23-11429 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2024 Page: 20 of 20