_______________ 

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

State of California 

ROB BONTA 

Attorney General 

: 

OPINION : 

: No. 22-803 

of : 

: January 26, 2023 

ROB BONTA : 

Attorney General : 

: 

CATHERINE BIDART : 

Deputy Attorney General : 

LYNN BOONE applies to this office for leave to sue DEIDRE DUHART in quo 

warranto to remove Duhart from her public office as a member of the Compton City 

Council on the ground that Duhart did not receive the requisite number of votes under the 

Compton City Charter to be appointed to that office. As a separate matter, Boone alleges 

that the Compton City Attorney took certain improper and ultra vires actions in declaring 

Duhart’s appointment to be valid. 

We conclude that there is no substantial question of law regarding Duhart’s 

appointment to the City Council, and that it is therefore not in the public interest to 

authorize the proposed quo warranto action challenging her appointment. In addition, we 

conclude that the alleged actions of the Compton City Attorney in this matter do not give 

rise to an action in quo warranto. Consequently, the application for leave to sue is 

DENIED. 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 

The City of Compton is a charter city that is governed by a five-member city 

council. In March 2022, former Compton City Councilmember Michelle Chambers 

resigned from the Council. The appointment to fill this vacancy was placed on the 

agenda for the regular council meeting held April 5, 2022. At that meeting, the four 

remaining members considered several motions to appoint a replacement. The votes on 

1 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the motion to appoint now-Councilmember Duhart were two in favor, one against, and 

one abstaining. The official minutes from the council meeting describe the motion as 

having “failed” by this vote count.1 The Council then considered subsequent motions to 

appoint other candidates, but none of those motions passed.2 One week later, however, 

City Attorney Eric Perrodin announced, and produced a memorandum by his office 

concluding, that the motion to appoint Duhart had passed. Duhart was then sworn into 

office. She continues to occupy that office. 

The applicant here is an individual named Lynn Boone, who asserts that Duhart’s 

appointment was invalid, and seeks our permission to sue Duhart in quo warranto to 

remove her from the City Council. Boone and Duhart agree that Compton’s City Charter 

governs the appointment of a Compton City Councilmember.3 They also recognize that, 

unless the specific terms of the Charter provide otherwise, the vote count on the motion 

to appoint Duhart to the Council—two votes in favor, one vote against, and one 

abstention—would constitute a majority of the four-person quorum that attended the 

meeting in question, and therefore would suffice to act for the City Council. Put another 

way, “[i]n the absence of express contrary indication, a simple majority of a collective 

body constitutes a quorum, and a majority of a quorum is empowered to act for the 

body.”4 And, as we have previously observed, “the basic parliamentary rule” is that “the 

direct approval of more than half of those members actually voting for or against the 

measure becomes the act or choice of the body,” such that an abstention acts as an 

acquiescence “in the action taken by the majority of those who vote affirmatively or 

negatively.”5 Thus, the abstention in this case would serve as an acquiescence to the twovote majority of the three members who cast affirmative or negative votes on the motion 

to appoint Duhart. 

1 Compton City Council Meeting Minutes, April 5, 2022, p. 5. 

2 Id. at pp. 5-6. 

3 See generally Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5. 

4 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 47, 49 (1992), citing FTC v. Flotill Products (1967) 389 U.S. 

179, 183; People v. Harrington (1883) 63 Cal. 257; 66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 336 (1983); 

62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 698 (1979); 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 706 (1975); 

55 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 26 (1972)). 

5 62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 700, italics omitted; see also Dry Creek Valley Assn., 

Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 839, 843; 94 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 100, 

106-108 (2011) (reviewing relevant cases and Attorney General opinions and describing 

abstention as acquiescence to modified decision-making process through which particular 

outcome will be determined). 

2 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

While Boone acknowledges what normal parliamentary rules would provide in the 

absence of the Charter providing otherwise, she contends that the Charter indeed requires 

a higher vote threshold under these circumstances, and that the vote count for Duhart did 

not meet that threshold. Specifically, she asserts that section 607 of the Charter requires 

at least three affirmative votes to appoint a councilmember.6 Boone argues further that 

the City Attorney’s actions in declaring Duhart’s appointment valid were improper and 

ultra vires (that is, beyond his lawful authority). Duhart disputes those arguments. For 

the reasons that follow, we conclude that Boone’s allegations do not warrant granting her 

application to proceed in quo warranto. 

ANALYSIS 

Quo warranto is a civil action that is used to challenge the lawfulness of a public 

official holding a given public office.7 A private party who seeks to pursue such an 

action must first obtain the consent of the Attorney General.8 In deciding whether to 

grant consent, the Attorney General has broad and extensive discretion.9 

When considering a quo warranto application, we do not attempt to resolve the 

merits of the controversy. Instead, we grant leave to sue if we determine that (1) quo 

warranto is a proper remedy to resolve the issue presented; (2) the application presents a 

substantial question of law or fact warranting judicial resolution; and (3) granting the 

application would serve the public interest.10 As explained below, Boone’s allegations 

regarding the City Attorney’s allegedly improper actions raise an issue as to which quo 

warranto is not a proper remedy, and her allegations regarding Duhart’s allegedly 

improper appointment do not present any substantial question of law or fact warranting a 

judicial resolution. Accordingly, we deny Boone’s request for leave to sue. 

6 Charter section 607 provides in relevant part: “Unless a higher vote is required by other 

provisions of this Charter the affirmative votes of at least three members of the City 

Council shall be required for the enactment of any ordinance or resolution, or for the 

making or approving of any order for the payment of money.” 

7 See Code Civ. Proc., § 803; Nicolopulos v. City of Lawndale (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 

1221, 1225; People ex rel. Pennington v. City of Richmond (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 107, 

117. 

8 International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of Oakland (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 687, 

693-698. 

9 Rando v. Harris (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 868, 875, 880-882. 

10 Id. at p. 879; 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 36, 40 (2013). 

3 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Availability of Quo Warranto 

Quo warranto is an appropriate remedy to determine whether a public official is 

unlawfully holding a public office. Here, Boone principally argues that Duhart is 

unlawfully holding public office as a Compton City Councilmember on the ground that 

Duhart received an insufficient number of votes to secure appointment to that office. 

Thus, quo warranto is an available and appropriate remedy insofar as Boone challenges 

Duhart’s appointment on that basis. Consequently, we will proceed to determine whether 

this claim also meets our other criteria for granting leave to sue. 

As for Boone’s related allegations involving the City Attorney’s alleged improper 

and ultra vires actions in this matter, we conclude that those allegations do not form the 

basis of an action in quo warranto as they are collateral to the issue of whether Duhart’s 

appointment was valid. That is, the validity of Duhart’s appointment as challenged here 

depends on how many votes were required for her appointment under the City Charter— 

not on an evaluation of the City Attorney’s alleged actions in announcing his 

determination with respect to that appointment. Quo warranto is not available to address 

Boone’s allegations concerning the City Attorney’s actions, and we therefore put those 

allegations aside as we consider whether Boone’s allegations regarding the Charter’s 

vote-count requirements present a substantial issue of law that would warrant a judicial 

resolution.11 

2. There Is No Substantial Legal Issue with Respect to the Validity of Duhart’s 

Appointment 

To determine whether a substantial legal issue exists as to whether Duhart’s 

appointment required three affirmative votes, we must interpret the City Charter. We 

interpret a charter using the same rules for interpreting a statute.12 As the Court of 

Appeal has explained, “In construing a provision adopted by the voters our task is to 

ascertain the intent of the voters. We look first to the language of the charter, giving 

effect to its plain meaning.”13 And we employ the ordinary canons of interpretation, such 

as the rule that, “Where the words of the charter are clear, we may not add to or alter 

them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the charter or from its 

legislative history.”14 

11 See 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 46-47, and fn. 55. 

12 San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 349, 

375. 

13 Id. at p. 376, ellipsis omitted. 

14 Id. at p. 376. 

4 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Compton’s Charter provides that the City Council shall fill a vacancy in any 

elective office by appointment. In relevant part, section 505 states that “[a] vacancy in 

any elective office, from whatever cause arising, shall be filled by appointment by the 

City Council.”15 The provision is silent on the number of votes required, and Boone does 

not rely on section 505 to support her view that Duhart’s appointment was invalid. 

Instead, Boone asserts that section 607—which addresses ordinances, resolutions, 

and orders for payment of money—requires three affirmative votes for the appointment 

of a councilmember. As mentioned, the relevant part of section 607 states as follows: 

“Unless a higher vote is required by other provisions of this Charter the affirmative votes 

of at least three members of the City Council shall be required for the enactment of any 

ordinance or resolution, or for the making or approving of any order for the payment of 

money.” If indeed section 607 required three affirmative votes for the appointment of a 

councilmember, the vote count here of two in favor, one against, and one abstaining 

would not have been sufficient.16 Thus, we now consider whether a councilmember 

appointment is an “ordinance,” “resolution,” or “order for the payment of money” within 

the meaning of section 607. 

We can quickly dispense with the notion that a councilmember’s appointment 

constitutes an “order for the payment of money.” While Boone points out that 

councilmembers receive compensation, the appointment itself cannot reasonably be 

understood to be an “order for the payment of money,” and we doubt that the drafters of 

the Charter would have used such a roundabout and imprecise way of describing the 

action of appointing a councilmember if that is what they had meant. Indeed, as 

discussed further below, several other Charter sections expressly pertain to 

“appointments,” so the omission of that term in section 607 weighs heavily against 

implying it there. As stated in the analogous context of statutory interpretation, “[w]hen 

the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has excluded it in another, 

it should not be implied where excluded.”17 

This leaves the question whether Duhart’s appointment was an “ordinance or 

resolution” within the meaning of section 607. Boone points to a 1993 Attorney General 

opinion, also arising out of an application regarding the Compton City Council, in which 

we concluded that the three questions presented in that application warranted resolution 

15 Compton City Charter, art. V, § 505. It is undisputed that the office of a Compton 

Councilmember is an elective office. 

16 See 94 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 106-110. 

17 Furtado v. Sierra Community College (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 876, 881–882, quoting 

Grubb & Ellis Co. v. Bello (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 231, 240. 

5 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

by a court in a quo warranto action.18 One of those questions was whether a 

councilmember’s vote for himself to be mayor was invalid under the doctrine against 

self-appointments.19 The opinion observed that, if the councilmember’s vote proved to 

be invalid, the vote count would have been two in favor, one against, and one 

abstaining—the same vote count here.20 The opinion briefly asserted that, in that event, 

whether the member’s appointment was an “ordinance or resolution” requiring three 

affirmative votes would be “but another question of law that merits judicial review and 

resolution.”21 But the opinion did not elaborate further on that point and did not examine 

any other provisions of the Charter with regard to that additional question—presumably 

because it was not one of the three questions directly presented for consideration. Now 

that we are directly confronted with the question, and have examined the Charter 

comprehensively with a focus on the sole issue at the center of the controversy here, we 

conclude that no substantial legal issue exists as to whether a councilmember 

appointment is an “ordinance or resolution.”22 

First, as mentioned above, the Charter’s drafters could have expressly referred to 

appointments in section 607, but they did not. That weighs against concluding that they 

meant to include appointments by implication when they instead used the terms 

“ordinance” and “resolution” in that section. In addition, although the Charter does not 

provide an express definition for either “ordinance” or “resolution,” we may glean the 

intended meaning of those terms from the Charter provisions that govern them.23 

We turn first to the term “ordinance.” The Charter’s provisions governing 

ordinances make apparent that they apply to local legislation: 

• section 608 mandates the use of an enactment clause for an ordinance (“The City 

Council of the City of Compton does ordain as follows”); 

18 76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 254 (1993). 

19 Id. at pp. 256-259. 

20 Id. at p. 257. 

21 Ibid. 

22 Duhart directs our attention to a court order dismissing the ensuing quo warranto 

lawsuit; however, the order of dismissal does disclose the basis of the court’s ruling, nor 

whether the court even reached the issue now directly before us. We therefore give no 

weight to the court’s order of dismissal in that earlier case. 

23 See San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 376 (stating that provisions susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation 

should be considered in light of “overall statutory scheme”). 

6 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• section 609 directs the City Clerk to publish adopted ordinances or summaries of 

them; 

• section 610 authorizes the codification of enacted and published ordinances; 

• section 611 provides that ordinances are effective 30 days after enactment (except 

those relating to specified matters, such as elections); 

• section 612 sets forth the punishments for violation of an ordinance; 

• section 613 requires the Council to amend an ordinance by its reenactment with 

amendments; and 

• section 700(b) requires the City Clerk to number all ordinances and to maintain 

them in a book. 

These provisions make clear that the term “ordinance” in the Charter refers to local 

legislation of general application—as opposed to a specific and discrete action taken by 

the legislative body, such as an appointment. That understanding is consistent with 

Compton’s municipal code and court opinions, which describe ordinances in a like 

manner.24 For these reasons, a particular council action to make an appointment cannot 

plausibly be viewed as an “ordinance” under the Charter. Thus, we discern no substantial 

issue as to whether an appointment is an ordinance requiring three affirmative votes 

under Charter section 607. 

The Charter’s text supports a similar conclusion with regard to the term 

“resolution.” The Charter requires the City Clerk to number resolutions and maintain 

them in a book (like ordinances).25 It also requires the title of a resolution to be read 

24 See, e.g., Compton Mun. Code, § 1-3 (stating that ordinance “[s]hall mean any act of 

local legislation . . . so long as it is adopted by the procedure required for the adoption of 

an ordinance and so long as it remains in force and effect pursuant to the law,” and that 

ordinance “refers to an ordinance of the City of Compton”); San Diego City Firefighters, 

Local 145 v. Bd. of Admin. of San Diego City Employees. Ret. Sys., 206 Cal.App.4th 594, 

607 (2012) (“ordinance is a local law which is adopted with all the legal formality of a 

statute”); Porter v. City of Riverside (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 832, 836 (“An ordinance 

stands in the same relationship to a city charter as does a statute to the constitution of the 

state”). 

25 Compton City Charter, art. VII, § 700(b) (requiring recording and numbering in books 

of ordinances and resolutions). 

7 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

aloud and the remainder of the resolution to be read aloud upon request. 26 Nowhere does 

the Charter refer to the action taken for an appointment as a “resolution.”27 On the other 

hand, there is a Charter provision, governing appointments to the City’s Planning 

Commission, Personnel Board, and Recreation and Parks Commission, that expressly 

refers to the act of proposing the appointment as a “motion,” providing further evidence 

that the Charter does not envision appointments to be “resolutions.”28 Tellingly, this 

same provision specifies a four-affirmative-vote requirement for those appointments, 

illustrating once again that when the Charter’s drafters intended to address the subject of 

appointments—and, in that instance, to require a higher vote threshold for certain types 

of appointments—they knew how to do so. 

Boone asserts that the higher vote count required in this provision and in others 

indicates an intent for a higher vote count on councilmember appointments as well.29 In 

our view, however, it is unlikely that these provisions, which are not directly related to 

councilmember appointments, evince any intent as to such appointments. If anything, 

their applicability to positions other than councilmember supports the conclusion that the 

specified higher vote thresholds do not apply in the context of councilmember 

appointments.30 

And when we consider the particular appointment at issue here, the motions to 

appoint at the meeting in question were not identified on the meeting agenda or elsewhere 

26 Id., art. VI, § 607 (“At the time of adoption of a resolution it need be read in full only 

if, after reading of title thereof, the further reading thereof is requested”). 

27 Cf. Cozzolino v. City of Fontana (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 608, 610-612 (indicating that, 

in absence of statutory requirement otherwise, motion rather than resolution is sufficient 

to appoint and remove officer). 

28 See Compton City Charter, art. X, § 1002. 

29 Boone cites to provisions that require at least four affirmative votes. (See, e.g., id., art. 

VI, § 607 (emergency ordinances introduced and adopted at same meeting), art. XIV, 

§§ 1408 (specified budget changes) & 1409 (relating to forgoing bid process for public 

works exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, if either city employees themselves will 

perform work, or urgent work is needed to preserve life, health, or property).) 

30 See footnote 17, ante. Nor does it strike us as particularly surprising that the Charter 

requires a greater number of affirmative votes in these contexts than it does in the context 

of councilmember appointments. As a practical matter, when there are one or more 

Council vacancies to fill, there will be fewer councilmembers available to vote on the 

appointment, making it all the more difficult to satisfy a supermajority requirement. In 

any event, the Charter specifies the types of appointments that require a higher number of 

affirmative votes, and councilmember appointments are not among them. 

8 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

as resolutions, and were not titled or numbered as such in the meeting minutes.31 The 

agenda item for the appointment was simply listed as “CITY COUNCIL, DISTRICT 1 

APPOINTMENT (DISCUSSION/ACTION).”32 In contrast, the agenda for the same 

meeting contained multiple agenda items for resolutions, each of which were expressly 

identified on the agenda as “A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY 

OF COMPTON . . . .”33 For each agenda item regarding a resolution, the agenda packet 

contained draft written Resolutions.34 The meeting minutes identified each resolution 

with a title and a number.35 Yet Boone makes no attempt to argue that Duhart’s 

appointment, which Boone views as a “resolution,” was improper for failing to conform 

to the requirements for resolutions.

36 

Instead, Boone argues that Duhart’s appointment meets a definition of 

“resolution” that lies outside of the Charter, in Black’s Law Dictionary. In full, that 

definition states: 

resolution (17c) 1. Parliamentary law. A main motion that formally 

expresses the sense, will, or action of a deliberative assembly (esp. a 

legislative body). • A resolution is a highly formal kind of main motion, 

often containing a preamble, and one or more resolving clauses in the form, 

“Resolved, That . . . .”[37] 

Boone argues that the Charter intends for “resolution” to have this broad meaning and 

that it encompasses an appointment. But no provision of the Charter uses the term 

“resolution” to describe the means for making an appointment. Instead, where the 

Charter does describe the means of appointment (in an article addressing councilappointed boards and commissions), it states that “members of . . . such boards or 

commissions shall be appointed, and shall be subject to removal, by motion of the City 

Council” adopted by the requisite number of votes.38 While a dictionary may provide 

31 Compton City Council Meeting Minutes, April 5, 2022. 

32 Compton City Council Meeting Agenda, April 5, 2022, p. 3. 

33 Id. at pp. 3-4. 

34 See, id. at pp. 18, 24, 38, 74, 121, 132. 

35 See, e.g., Compton City Council Meeting Minutes, April 5, 2022, pp. 4, 6-7. 

36 See City of Pasadena v. Paine (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 93, 96 (explaining that city 

council’s disregard of its parliamentary rule on resolution procedure will not invalidate 

action taken, but that council cannot disregard mandatory rules in its charter). 

37 Black’s Law Dict., 11th ed. 2019, ellipsis in original, italics omitted. 

38 See Compton City Charter, art. X, § 1002, italics added. 

9 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

insight into the meaning of an otherwise undefined term, an examination of the Charter as 

a whole illustrates that it is implausible that the Charter intended “resolution,” and its 

concomitant requirements, to encompass a motion to appoint a councilmember.39 

Lastly, Boone argues that the Charter does not state anywhere that a council action 

of any sort may be taken by fewer than three affirmative votes. She notes that the Charter 

sometimes requires at least four affirmative votes, and reasons that it would be 

anomalous for the Charter not to require at least three affirmative votes here as well.40 

We decline to interpret silence on the number of votes for the appointment at issue here 

as imposing a specific vote requirement.41 If the Charter had intended a specific vote 

requirement to apply to councilmember appointments, we think it would have expressly 

stated as much, like it does elsewhere for other types of appointments. Instead, given the 

Charter’s silence on the number of votes required for councilmember appointments, the 

most reasonable interpretation is that such appointments are governed by the general 

parliamentary rule that a majority of a quorum suffices for the council to take action.42 

In sum, we do not find the vote count issue raised in the application to be a 

substantial one that warrants judicial resolution. Even where (unlike here) an issue 

presented for our consideration is debatable, the Attorney General has “considerable 

discretion” in determining whether a particular claim is sufficiently substantial to warrant 

the initiation of a quo warranto lawsuit and the resulting expenditure of judicial 

resources.43 And as the Court of Appeal has explained, an arguable interpretation of a 

city charter provision does not automatically elevate a claim into a substantial question of 

law or fact for purposes of determining the appropriateness of quo warranto.44 Here, 

39 See Stennett v. Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 284, 293, fn. 4 (cautioning against 

selective court reliance on dictionary definitions to determine statutory intent and 

explaining that meaning must be discerned with reference to purpose inferred from 

context). 

40 See, e.g., Compton City Charter, art. X, § 1002 & footnote 29, ante. 

41 See footnote 6, ante; see also Siminoff v. Jas. H. Goodman & Co. Bank (1912) 18 

Cal.App. 5, 11, quoting Estate of Apple (1885) 66 Cal. 432, 434 (“Where the Code is 

silent, the common law governs”); Gov. Code, § 36512 (general law provision is likewise 

silent on number of votes for councilmember appointment). 

42 See footnote 4 and accompanying text, and footnotes 6 and 30, ante. 

43 Rando v. Harris, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 875; see id. at p. 882 (“[T]he Attorney 

General retains discretion whether to grant leave to sue in quo warranto where an issue is 

fair or debatable”). 

44 Id., at pp. 875, 880-882; 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 48, 49 (2013); see also City of Campbell 

v. Mosk (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 640, 650 (“We do not believe . . . that the debatable issue 

10 

22-803 
 

 

 

 

 

 

while Boone has ably articulated her views and arguments, we conclude that the Charter 

cannot reasonably be read as requiring three affirmative votes to appoint a 

councilmember. Accordingly, we find there is no substantial legal issue as to the validity 

of Duhart’s appointment that would warrant a judicial resolution. 

3. It Is Not in the Public Interest To Authorize the Proposed Quo Warranto Action 

Given our conclusions that (1) there is no substantial issue of law or fact 

concerning Duhart’s appointment to the Compton City Council, and (2) the allegations 

concerning the City Attorney’s actions in this matter do not form the basis of a quo 

warranto action, it follows that it would not serve the public interest to authorize the 

proposed action. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the application for leave to sue in quo 

warranto is DENIED. 

inevitably produces the quo warranto. Indeed, the Attorney General’s exercise of 

discretion is posited upon the existence of a debatable issue. . . . The crystallization of an 

issue thus does not preclude an exercise of his discretion; it causes it. . . . [¶¶] The 

exercise of the discretion of the Attorney General in the grant of such approval to sue 

calls for care and delicacy. Certainly the private party’s right to it cannot be absolute; the 

public interest prevails”). 

11 

22-803