IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

PROAMPAC HOLDINGS, INC., 

Appellant, 

v. Case No. 5D21-2019

LT Case No. 2019-CA-000787

RCBA NUTRACEUTICALS, LLC 

D/B/A RONNIE COLEMAN SIGNATURE 

SERIES, WESTERN PACKAGING, 

INC. AND POLYFIRST PACKAGING, INC., 

Appellees. 

________________________________/

Opinion filed September 2, 2022

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Seminole County, 

Jessica J. Recksiedler, Judge.

Sara A. Brubaker, Megan Costa 

DeLeon and Riya Resheidat, of 

Akerman LLP, Orlando, for Appellant. 

Miguel Aristizabal and William 

R. Clayton, of Clayton Trial 

Lawyers, Fort Lauderdale, for 

Appellee, RCBA Nutraceuticals, 

LLC d/b/a Ronnie Coleman 

Signature Series. 
2

No appearance for other appellees.

SASSO, J.

ProAmpac Holdings, Inc. (“ProAmpac Holdings”) appeals an order 

denying its motion to dismiss RCBA Nutraceuticals, LLC’s (“RCBA”) 

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree that the operative 

complaint lacks sufficient allegations to extend long-arm jurisdiction over 

ProAmpac Holdings. As a result, we reverse. 

FACTS

RCBA is a Florida limited liability company in the nutritional supplement 

business that sells supplements in plastic zipper bags. RCBA purchased the 

zipper bags from Western Packaging, Inc. (“Western”), who, RCBA alleges, 

then outsourced the manufacturing of the bags. It is the identity of the 

manufacturer that gives rise to the personal jurisdiction dispute as to 

ProAmpac Holdings.

The record reflects that Western initially contracted with PolyFirst 

Packaging, Inc. (“PolyFirst”) to manufacture the zipper bags. Then, in 

September 2017, ProAmpac Holdings acquired PolyFirst. A third entity,

ProAmpac LLC, appears to be affiliated with ProAmpac Holdings, although

ProAmpac Holdings and ProAmpac LLC remain separate and distinct legal

entities. 
3

On March 12, 2019, RCBA filed suit in Seminole County, Florida, 

against Western and ProAmpac LLC for damages allegedly caused by 

defects in the zipper bags. After an amended complaint, still naming only 

Western and ProAmpac LLC, ProAmpac LLC took several actions including 

filing a motion to strike/motion to dismiss Western’s cross-claim, a motion to 

compel against RCBA, and a stipulation for substitution of counsel.

Then, on February 19, 2020, counsel for ProAmpac LLC and 

ProAmpac Holdings emailed RCBA indicating that PolyFirst was the proper 

party defendant, in place of ProAmpac LLC. Ultimately, the parties stipulated 

to the substitution of the party defendant from ProAmpac LLC to PolyFirst. 

During discovery, RCBA served upon non-party ProAmpac Holdings several 

subpoenas duces tecum. ProAmpac Holdings, as a non-party, objected to 

and moved to quash the subpoenas.

After further discovery, and on April 5, 2021, RCBA filed its third 

amended complaint, this time naming Western, PolyFirst, and ProAmpac 

Holdings as defendants.1 The third amended complaint identified ProAmpac 

Holdings as “a Delaware corporation doing business in Florida.” RCBA 

1 While the record reflects that counsel for ProAmpac Holdings 

accepted service of the third amended complaint on behalf of ProAmpac 

Holdings, the parties dispute whether service was accepted via email or at a 

deposition. 
4

alleged Western and Poly entered into an agreement to defraud RCBA and 

that they “solicited and/or approached [RCBA] and offered to manufacture 

[the] plastic zipper bags” by offering material and false statements or 

promises. RCBA further alleged ProAmpac Holdings joined into the 

agreement when it acquired PolyFirst in September 2017 and, by that time, 

“Pro assumed and/or affirmatively undertook all of the duties owed to [RCBA] 

that were previously owed to [RCBA] by Poly from that date on. From that 

date on, Pro, instead of Poly, also continued to manufacture the Zipper Bags 

for [RCBA].” It additionally alleged that, beginning in July 2017, the 

defendants shipped the zipper bags to RCBA’s packager, Nutrablend, in 

New York and to JW Nutritional, LLC, a packager in Texas. Further, “the 

Purchase Orders from Poly and later Pro showed the vendor was Pro and

the bags were ‘ship to’ ‘Ronnie Coleman Signature Series’ located in Lake 

Mary.”

On May 5, 2021, ProAmpac Holdings moved to dismiss the third 

amended complaint, alleging lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non 

conveniens.2 ProAmpac Holdings argued, inter alia, RCBA failed to 

2 In between the filing of the third amended complaint, when RCBA first 

named ProAmpac Holdings as a defendant, and ProAmpac Holding’s motion 

to dismiss, ProAmpac Holdings: 1) appeared at a hearing on RCBA’s motion 

for sanctions, filed against ProAmpac Holdings when it was a non-party, and 
5

sufficiently plead personal jurisdiction over ProAmpac Holdings, failed to 

show a general nexus between ProAmpac Holdings and Florida, failed to 

show a specific nexus between its claims and Florida, and failed to allege 

any tortious actions occurred in Florida. ProAmpac Holdings concluded that 

the third amended complaint should be dismissed due to lack of personal 

jurisdiction or, alternatively, dismissed for forum non conveniens.

In response, RCBA argued, inter alia, ProAmpac Holdings waived 

personal jurisdiction because it, via its attorney, was served with process in 

Florida and actively litigated the lawsuit beginning back in July 2019. It 

concluded that the court did have personal jurisdiction over ProAmpac 

Holdings, contending that the motion to dismiss “must be defeated because 

it is based on declarations that directly contradict sworn deposition testimony 

and documents produced by Pro.”

Ultimately, on July 19, 2021, the court entered an order denying the 

motion to dismiss, simply finding that RCBA “has sufficiently refuted the 

allegations in [ProAmpac Holdings’] Motion to Dismiss and Declarations to 

prove jurisdiction.” This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS

2) sent a letter to the trial court seeking a Stipulated Protective Order 

between ProAmpac Holdings, Western, and PolyFirst.
6

“In Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989), the 

Florida Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether a 

Florida state court has long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident.” Yarger v. 

Convergence Aviation Ltd., 310 So. 3d 1276, 1279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021).

3

First, the court must determine whether “the complaint alleges sufficient 

jurisdictional facts” to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193, 

Florida Statutes, Florida’s long-arm statute. Id. “Second, the court must 

determine ‘whether sufficient “minimum contacts” are demonstrated to 

satisfy due process requirements.’” Id. (quoting Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. 

v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000)). “Both prongs must 

be satisfied in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 

defendant.” Estes v. Rodin, 259 So. 3d 183, 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). 

However, if the complaint fails to meet the first part of the test, the inquiry 

ends. See Parisi v. Kingston, 314 So. 3d 656, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (noting 

“Venetian Salami’s burden shifting analysis is triggered, and the parties’ 

competing affidavits become relevant, only when the operative pleading 

adequately alleges a basis for extending long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant”). 

3 We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction de novo. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC v. Gilbert, 222 So. 3d 

656, 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
7

As to the first part of the test, a complaint may establish personal 

jurisdiction through allegations demonstrating either specific long-arm 

jurisdiction, pursuant to section 48.193(1), or general long-arm jurisdiction, 

pursuant to section 48.193(2). Yarger, 310 So. 3d at 1279. We conclude that 

the allegations in RCBA’s third amended complaint did not establish either

specific or general jurisdiction. We therefore need not reach the second part 

of the test.

a. Specific Jurisdiction:

Section 48.193(1)(a) outlines the actions that cause a party to submit 

themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state and provides, in 

pertinent part: 

A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, 

who personally or through an agent does any of the acts 

enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself 

and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal 

representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any 

cause of action arising from any of the following acts:

1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a 

business or business venture in this state or having an office or 

agency in this state. 

2. Committing a tortious act within this state.

. . . . . 

6. Causing injury to persons or property within this state 

arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this 

state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either: 
8

. . . . 

b. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or 

manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or 

consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, 

trade, or use.

We analyze each of the above provisions as applied to the operative 

complaint as follows.

As to subsection 48.193(1)(a)1., the parties acknowledge there are 

only two allegations within the third amended complaint to support this 

provision. First, RCBA alleged ProAmpac Holdings “is a Delaware 

corporation doing business in Florida.” But this allegation, standing alone, is 

insufficient to plead jurisdiction. Cf. Fasco Controls Corp. v. Goble, 688 So. 

2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“The supreme court in Venetian Salami 

opined that a plaintiff has the option of pleading the supporting facts or 

pleading the language of the statute. This does not include summing up the 

statutory language in a phrase . . . not included in the statute such as ‘doing 

business.’” (internal citations omitted)).

The second allegation in the third amended complaint is that “the 

Purchase Orders from Poly and later Pro showed the vendor was Pro and 

the bags were ‘ship to’ ‘Ronnie Coleman Signature Series’ located in Lake 

Mary.” But this allegation also does not save RCBA’s complaint. A careful 
9

reading of the operative complaint demonstrates the allegations were that

PolyFirst and ProAmpac Holdings shipped the zipper bags to Nutrablend 

Foods (in New York) and to JW Nutritional, LLC (in Texas). There is no 

similar language alleging the bags were actually shipped to Florida—only 

that a purchase order reflects the “ship to” address was Florida. Further, the 

purchase orders attached to the third amended complaint do not reference 

ProAmpac Holdings at all, and the only one to show a “ship to” address in 

Florida referenced Western, not ProAmpac Holdings. For these reasons, the 

complaint does not allege ProAmpac Holdings actually shipped the defective 

bags to Florida.

Without an actual allegation that ProAmpac Holdings shipped the

zipper bags to Florida, or that it conducted any other business in Florida, 

RCBA’s mere assertion that ProAmpac Holdings “is a Delaware corporation 

doing business in Florida” is insufficient to allege personal jurisdiction. As a 

result, RCBA does not satisfy the first jurisdictional prong, and the inquiry 

ends.

As to subsection 48.193(1)(a)2., RCBA’s allegations similarly fall short 

of demonstrating that ProAmpac Holdings committed a tortious act within 

Florida. This is so because a finding under section 48.193(1)(a)2. requires, 

as the statute expressly states, that the tort be committed in Florida. See, 
10

e.g., Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Gangapersaud, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D1347,

D1348–49 (Fla. 2d DCA June 22, 2022). And as to both negligence and civil 

conspiracy, RCBA has failed to allege that any of the three defendants 

committed any tortious act in Florida. Cf. Parisi, 314 So. 3d at 660 (observing 

that if any member of the conspiracy “committed tortious acts in Florida in 

furtherance of that conspiracy, then all of the conspirators are subject to the 

jurisdiction of Florida through its long-arm statute”). Even so, RCBA attempts 

to invoke long-arm jurisdiction under this portion of the statute by again 

relying on the “ship to” designation in a purchase order, while overlooking 

the allegations demonstrating that the bags were actually shipped to 

locations other than Florida. And so, because the conduct allegedly giving 

rise to the tort occurred outside of Florida, RCBA’s alleged injury suffered in 

Florida is insufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction under this prong. See, 

e.g., Thompson v. Doe, 596 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (“This

court has held that the occurrence of injury in Florida standing alone is 

insufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) and that part 

of a defendant’s tortious conduct must occur in this state.”).

As to subsection 48.193(1)(a)6., RCBA’s allegations fall short because 

this part requires an act or omission by the defendant (who is outside of 

Florida) to cause an injury to persons or property within Florida, with 
11

economic harm as the only alleged injury being insufficient. See Identigene, 

Inc. v. Goff, 774 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“[T]here must be 

allegations of personal bodily-injury or property damage. Mere allegations of 

economic damage will simply not suffice.”). Importantly, to the extent RCBA’s 

complaint alleges property damage, it does not allege the damage was to 

property within Florida.4 Instead, the complaint alleges the “Zipper Bags 

were discovered to be defective at over twelve (12) of Plaintiff’s major 

distributors around the world” and at its Nutrablend plant in New York. No 

allegations tie anything other than pure economic damage to Florida. Thus, 

RCBA’s alleged injury is insufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction under 

this prong.

b. General Jurisdiction:

Next, we consider whether RCBA established general jurisdiction. “To 

establish general jurisdiction, section 48.193(2) requires a defendant to have 

engaged in ‘substantial and not isolated’ activity in this state.” Aegis Def. 

Servs., LLC, 222 So. 3d at 659. “Florida courts have defined ‘substantial and 

not isolated’ to mean ‘continuous and systematic general business contact 

with Florida.’” Id. (quoting Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So. 3d 245,

4 But see Premix-Marbletite Mfg. Corp. v. SKW Chems., Inc., 145 F. 

Supp. 2d 1348, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“Florida law does not consider 

property that the defective product is integrated into to be other property.”). 
12

250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). “Continuous and systematic contacts occur where 

a nonresident defendant’s activities are ‘extensive and pervasive, in that a 

significant portion of the defendant’s business operations or revenue [are] 

derived from established commercial relationships in the state’ or where ‘the 

defendant continuously solicits and procures substantial sales in Florida.’”

Id. (quoting Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Ocean World, S.A., 12 So. 3d 788, 793 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).

As to this issue, ProAmpac Holdings properly argues that the third 

amended complaint “contains nothing remotely resembling an allegation that 

ProAmpac Holdings’ contacts with Florida are so substantial and pervasive 

that it is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Florida.” We agree. The 

complaint contains no allegations that ProAmpac Holdings has a business 

presence in Florida, no allegations that ProAmpac Holdings shipped the 

bags to Florida, and no allegations that ProAmpac Holdings interacted with 

Florida in any material way. Overall, RCBA did not allege general jurisdiction 

under section 48.193(2). By failing to do so, RCBA consequently failed to

establish the first jurisdictional prong.

c. Waiver:

Finally, we reject RCBA’s argument that ProAmpac Holdings waived 

any objections to personal jurisdiction by virtue of its participation in litigation. 
13

Primarily, we do so because RCBA conflates objections ProAmpac Holdings

lodged when it was a non-party, and specifically upon receipt of the 

subpoena duces tecum, with actions a party to litigation may take which 

would be inconsistent with maintaining an objection to personal jurisdiction. 

Foreign subpoenas are covered by section 92.251, Florida Statutes, 

while long-arm jurisdiction is specifically enumerated in section 48.193, 

Florida Statutes. Being distinct procedurally, we reject RCBA’s argument that 

actions taken in response to receipt of a foreign subpoena necessarily 

constitute waiver of personal jurisdiction for a later-filed suit. See CMI, Inc.

v. Ulloa, 73 So. 3d 787, 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“The long-arm statute does

not extend the subpoena power of a Florida court to command the in-state 

attendance of a non-resident, non-party person or entity, or compel that 

person or entity to produce documents.”); Trs. of Columbia Univ., 12 So. 3d 

at 795 (“The general rule is that by bringing an action, a plaintiff ‘subjects 

itself to the jurisdiction of the court and to such lawful orders which are 

thereafter entered with respect to the subject matter of the action.’” (quoting

Palm Beach Towers, Inc. v. Korn, 400 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981))). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, RCBA failed to sufficiently allege facts 

showing personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1., 48.193(1)(a)2., 
14

48.193(1)(a)6., and 48.193(2). As a result, RCBA failed to meet the first 

prong of the Venetian Salami test, and we therefore do not consider whether 

ProAmpac Holdings had requisite minimum contacts under the second 

prong. See Yarger, 310 So. 3d at 1281–82 (“Because Convergence failed to 

allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the cause of action within the 

ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute, we need not address whether Yarger had 

sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy federal due process 

requirements.”). We therefore reverse the order denying ProAmpac

Holdings’ motion to dismiss and remand for additional proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.