IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2014-CA-00251-COA PATRICK HIGGINS A/K/A PATRICK J. HIGGINS A/K/A PATRICK JOSEPH HIGGINS A/K/A PATRICK HIGGINS, SR. APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/24/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. M. JAMES CHANEY JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: W A RREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DAVID NEIL MCCARTY GRAHAM PATRICK CARNER SAGE EGGER HARLESS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ALISON O’NEAL MCMINN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANT’S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FOR W RONGFUL CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED – 06/07/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., FAIR AND WILSON, JJ. IRVING, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. I n Decem

ber 1994, a W a rren County jury f ound Patrick J. Higgins guilt y o f t h r e e
counts of issuing and delivering bad checks. S ubsequently , Higgins was sentenced to three
y ears f or each count, to run concurrently in t he c ustody of t he Mississippi D epartm ent of Corrections. H owever, in 1998, that conviction was reversed and rendered i n an unpublished opin i o n o n a p p eal. Higgins v. State , 95-KA-00124-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1998).
In F ebruary 2012, Higgins f iled an action under M ississippi Code Annotated section 11-44-1(Rev. 2012) 1 a gainst the State of Mississippi i n the W arr e n C ounty Circuit Court, wherein

he s o ught com

pensation f

or the tim e that he ser v e d i n p r i s o n because of his crim inal conviction. Af

t er f inding that Higgins c ould not withstand attacks to his credibility , the trial

court r uled i n f avor of the S tate. Higgins appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by : (1) apply ing the statutory presum ption of f raudulent intent, and ( 2) im properly rely i ng on highly prejudicial evidence when weighing his credibility

. ¶2. Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS ¶3. In 1992, Higgins operated a n d s e r v e d as the president of Delta Glass Repair Inc. (Delta Glass). On Septem b e r 16, 1992, Higgins opened a business account f or Delta Glass with First National Bank of Vicksburg (FNB). In 1 993, Delta Glass, by a n d through Higgins, began doing business with Southern Lock & Supply (Southern Lock), a wholesale locksm ith supply com

pany based out of Pinellas Park, Florida. In August 1993, Higgins, on behalf of Delta Glass, placed a t elephone order with Southern Lock. During that transaction, Higgins

was a ssisted by S outhern Lock’s credit m anager, Joan Hart. Following the telephonic order, Southern Lock shipped Higgins’s order, in three separate deliveries , v i a United Parcel

1 Section 11-44-1 provides, in pertinent part: The Legislature f

inds that i nnocent persons who have been w rongly c onvicted of f elony crim es and subsequently im prisoned have been uniquely v ictim ized, have distinct problem s reentering society , and should be com pensated. In light of the particular and substantial horror of being im prisoned f or a crim e one did not com m it, the Legislature intends by en a ctm ent of the provisions o f this chapter that i nnocent people who are wrongf ully c o nvicted be able t o r eceive m onetary com pensation. 2Service ( UPS), with the item s being cash-on -delivery (COD) to Higgins’s residence in

Vicksburg, Mississippi. Because the order was sent in three separate packages and was COD, Delta Glass, b y a nd through Higgins, sent S outhern Lock three separate c hecks. The three checks, dating f

r om August 20 to August 27, 1993, were f rom D elta Glass’s F NB
account. 2 However, the business account at FNB was closed b y the bank on August 27, 1993, bef ore Delta G lass w as able to m ake good on the checks. UPS f orwarded all three of

t h e c h e c k s t o Southern Lock. Southern Lock attem pted to negotiate the checks, but FNB returned them

to Southern Lock, m arked “account closed.” ¶4. Thereaf

ter, Hart contacted, via telephone, both Higgins and the W arren County District Attorney ’s Of

f ice’s W orthless C heck Unit in regard to the returned checks. Hart’s call to the district attorney ’s o f f ice led to Hart’s correspondence with Andrea Hunter, who served as the victim s’ assistance coordinator and h elped develop the W orthless C heck Unit. 3
Hunter advised Hart to provide Higgins with a f if t een-day l e g a l notice, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-19-57(1) (Supp. 2015), which requir e d H i g g ins to
pay the f ull am ount of the returned checks w ith i n f i f t e e n day s of receipt o f the notice. Consistent w ith Hunter’s advice, Hart m ailed Hi g g ins, v ia certif i ed m ail, three f

if teen-day notices—one f

or each returned check. The n otices w ere m ailed to Delta Glass’s post-of f ice

2 The checks were f

or the f ollowing am o unts: ( 1) check num ber 15154, dated August 20, 1993, was m ade pay able in the am ount o f $434.01; (2) ch e c k n u m b er 15155, dated August 26, 1993, was m a d e pay able in the am ount of $1,326.21; and (3) check num ber 15156, dated August 27, 1993, was m ade pay able in the am ount of $1,313.84.

3 H u n t e r h a s s i nce rem arried and is n ow known as Andrea Kitchens. However, throughout this opinion she will be ref erred to as “Hunter.” 3box, and Hart f o rwarded copies of the legal notices to H unter. Following the notices, Hart f ollowed up by s peaking with Higgins about t he m atter via t elephone. Thereaf t er, Higgins

sent Hart a $900 cashier’s check, which was only s uf f icient to cover t wo unrelated and previously dishonored checks f rom Higgins to Southern Lock. Af ter Hart applied the $900

to the unrelated c hecks, Hart ref unded a lef

tover b alance of $16.82 to Higgins. H art testif ied th a t she d id not did not apply the $16.82 to Delta Glass’s account because she understood that i f Southern Lock accepted the partial pay m ent, then the district attorney ’s o f f ice could

not prosecute Higgins. Subsequently , Higgins sought p erm ission to return the item s related

to t he returned checks i n lieu of pay m ent, but Southern L ock ref used to let him d o that as well. ¶5. In February 1994, H unter initiated talks with Higgins a b o u t h o n oring the checks.
How e v e r , d espite s everal attem pts by b oth Hunter and Hart, Higgins did not repay the checks. As such, Southern Lock proceeded with c rim inal charges against H iggins. On April 27, 1994, H unter i ssued a warrant f or Higgins’s arrest. H i ggins was indicted f or three counts of issuing and delivering the three dishonored checks in violation of M i s s issippi Code Annotated section 9 7 -19-55 (Supp. 2015). On Decem b er 5 , 1994, a jury f

ound Higg i n s guilty of three counts of issuing and delivering b ad checks. On D ecem ber 16, 1994, Higgins

was sentenced to three y ears on each count, with the sentences to run consecutively , resulting in a total of nine y ears, and a $3,000 f ine, w hich was l ater suspended by the court. However,

on March 10, 1998, this C ourt rever s e d a n d rendered Higgins’s convictions, which was f ollowed by a m a ndate that was issued on August 13, 1998. Af ter serving f

o ur y ears and two

4m onths in prison, Higgins was released.

¶6. On February 22, 2012, Higgins f iled a com

plaint against the State f

or com pensation under sec t i on 11-44-1, alleging that he was wrongf ully convicted a nd im

prisoned by the State. On Decem

ber 2 0, 2012, Higgins f

iled a m o tion f

o r partial sum m ary judgm e nt, wherein he so u g h t s u mma r y judgm e nt o n the issue of his innocence. W ithin that m otion, Higgins cl a i me d that his innocence h ad been conclusively established by this Court’s reversal and

r endering of his conviction and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied , t h e r e b y

s a t i s f y ing Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-44-7 (Rev. 2012). However, on May 3 , 2013, the trial court issued a n order deny ing Higgins’s m otion f or partial sum m ary j udgm ent, f inding t hat this Court’s reversal and rendering due to insuf f icient evidence in the crim inal trial was not the sam e thing as p rov i n g H i g gins’s innocence in the civil m atter and that, pursuant to section 11-44-7(1)(b), Higgins had f a iled to prove by a pre ponderance of the evidence that he did not com m it the f elonies f or which he was s entenced or that the acts or

om m issions f

or which he w as sentenced did n ot constitute f elonies. In its order a ddressing Higgins’s m otion f

or p artial sum m ary judgm ent, the trial court also f ound that co l lateral estoppel did n ot apply because the issue o f H i g g i n s ’ s actual innocence had never been litigated. ¶7. On Decem

ber 18, 2013, the trial court conducted a bench t rial where both Higgins and the State put on testim ony and evidence. Higgins served as his one and only witness. During his t estim ony , Higgins claim ed that Delta Glass had r eceived $10,000 in pay m ents t wo weeks prior to him writing the checks, but he stated that he did not know whether t hat m oney was

5placed into D elta Glass’s FNB account or not. On J anuary 24, 2014, the trial court entered

a j udgm ent in f

avor of the State, f

inding that H iggins had n ot established by a p reponderance of the evidence that he did not com m i t the f elonies. This appeal f

ollowed. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8. “W hen reviewing a judgm ent f rom a bench trial, [ the appe l l a t e c ourt] em ploy s the substantial evidence/m anif est error rule.” E

s t a t e o f Sykes e x r el. Campbell v. Calhoun Health Servs., 6 6 So. 3d 129, 133 (¶14) (Miss. 2 011) ( i n t ernal quotations and citations om itted). The Mississippi Suprem e C ourt has def ined “ substantial evid e n c e ” a s “ such relevant evidence a s reasonable m inds m ight accept as adequate t o support a c onclusion.” Pub. Emps.
Ret. Sys. v. Marquez , 774 So. 2d 421, 425 (¶13) (Miss. 2000). I t i s well established that “trial judges enjoy a great deal of d iscretion a s to the relevancy and adm issibility of evidence.” Cole v. State, 126 So. 3d 88 0 , 8 8 3 (¶13) (Miss. 2013). In addition, we apply a de novo standard of review when determ ining issues concerning questions of law. Starcher v. Byrne , 687 So. 2d 737, 739 (Miss. 1997). DISCUSSION I. Statutory Presumption ¶9. Higgins argues that the trial court erred by apply i ng the statutory presum ption of guilt
p u r s u a nt to Mississippi Code Annotated section 9 7-19-57(1) (Rev. 2014). Section 97

- 1 9

- 57(1) reads as f

ollows: As against the m aker, drawer or pay or t hereof , the m aking, drawing, issuing, uttering, delivering, or initiation of a check, draf t, o r d e r , electronically converted check, o r electronic com m ercial debit pay m ent o f which is ref

used by the drawee, s hall be prim a facie evidence and create a presum ption of

6intent to defraud and of know ledge o f insufficient funds in, o r on deposit

w ith, such bank, c o r p oration, firm or person, p rovided such m a ker, draw er or p ay or s h all not h ave paid the holder or p ay ee thereof t he am ount due thereon, together w ith a service c h a r g e of Forty D ollars ($40.00), w ithin fifteen (15) day s af ter receiving notice t hat such check, draf t, order, electronically converted check, or electronic com m ercial debit has not been paid by

the drawee or pay or’s bank. (Em phasis added). However, we point out that the trial court f ound that Higgins “ intended

to def r aud” Southern Lock even w ithout apply ing t he presump tion. T h at notion is echoed within the trial court’s judgm ent, wherein it stated: [ E]ven without the presum p tion of the statute, this [ c]ourt is of the opinion t hat Higgins intended to def

raud Southern Lock not only when he f ailed to com

ply w i t h t he [ f

if teen]-day n o tices, but also when h e f ailed to p ay f

or the goods af ter he was a ware that the check s w ere dishonored and af ter he knew the checks he [ had] previously issued had been dishonored, and because he has no idea what happened to the $20,000.00 [4] in f e e s his business received the t wo (2) weeks prior thereto. Notwithstanding the tri a l court’s explicit f indings, Higgins continues to assert that the
presum ption was erroneously applied. In response, the State m aintains that this issue lacks

m erit, and we agree. However, we address this issue i n an ef f ort to c larif

y his interpretation of the law. ¶10. Higgins argues that p r e s u mptions are unconstitutional and that s ection 97-19-57

serves a s an im

proper shif

ting of the burden of proof

. In support of his argum ent, he cites

a crim inal case, Durham v. State , 74 So. 3d 9 0 8 ( M i s s . Ct. App. 2011). In Durham the def endant was convicted of f our f elony counts f

or writing bad c hecks. Id. at 909 (¶1). At

4 W e note that th i s am ount is a m isstatem ent. Higgins actually t estif ied that Delta Glass received $10,000 in p ay m ents, not $ 20,000. H owever, he still could not r e m em ber what happened to the pay m e nts. 7trial, D urham testif ied that he did not have f

raudulent intent, which i s one of the e l em ents of the crim e charged. Id. at 91 4 (¶19). However, the j ury was given a j ury instruction that closely r e s e m

bled the language f

o und in section 97-19-57. D urham , 74 So. 3d at 911-12 ( ¶ 1 0 )

. The jury instruction at issue stated that if the jury f ound “f rom t he evidence and bey ond a r easonable doubt [ that Durham ] did not pay to the holder of the check the am ount due t ogether with the service charge, within f if teen (15) day s af

ter receiving notice

. . . , then the m aking, drawing, issuing, uttering or delivering o f said check, draf t or order, pay

m ent of which i s ref

used b y the d

rawee, shall be prim a f

acie e v idence and cre a t e a presum ption of intent t o def

raud

. . . .” Id. at 912 (¶10). On appeal, Durham ’ s conviction was reversed and

rem anded because the subject jury instruction “created a m andatory p resum ption or m erely

a perm issible inf

erence.” Id. a t (¶13). W e f ound that the instruction could n ot be considered harm less because “Durham ’ s intent was disputed at trial, a nd the issue of intent directly af f ected the verdict.” Id. a t 915 (¶19). ¶11. Here, the State argues that b ecause it was no longer p ursuing a crim inal m atter against Higgins, it no longer had the burden of proving b ey ond a reasonable dou b t t h a t Higgins

com m itted the c rim e. Rather, Higgins, who was seeking recovery f rom the State, had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not c om m it the f elonies f or which he was charged, c onvicted, and sentenced. Accordingly , the S tate a rgues that Higgins did not prove his actual innocence and, theref ore, is not entitled to judgm ent in his f avor. ¶12. As m entioned above, at trial, Higg i n s s e rved as his only witness and t he only party bef ore the trial judge providing credibility f or his recitation of

events. However, the State

8put on f

o ur witnesses in o p position to Higgins’s testim on y . A l t h ough Higgins claim s that he had no knowledge o f whether Delta Glass’s F NB c hecking account h ad suf f icient f unds

to cover the am ount, he stated that he handled ninety -f ive p ercent of the b usiness, t hat “[ he]

was the boss,” a nd that “the buck stop[ ped] with [ him ].” He also tes t i f i e d t h at he did not know how m

u ch was in the account because he was “too b usy ” t o b a l ance the c heckbook.
In addition, as previously m entioned, Higgins testif i ed that Delta G lass received pay m ents totaling $10,000 during the two weeks prior to him w riting t he three checks, y et he did not know whether those pay

m ents were d e p o s i t e d into the business account or not. Higgins f urther t estif

ied that he did not rem em ber wh e t h e r h e r eceived the f if t een-day notices. However, he did a dm it that the phy sical and p ost-of f ice-box num

bers on the notices were

c o r r e c t

. In addition, the certif ied-m ail receipt, dated Septem ber 23, 1 993, had the correc t post-of f ice b ox f or Delta Glass, and, although it is unknown who signed it, t he receipt was signed. Higgins went on to state that he only gave key s to the p ost-of f ice box to people that he trusted, so he had n o reason to b elieve any one w ould have s igned f or the envelope and not given it to him

. ¶13. W e agree with the State’s position. W e note that, despite Higgins’s argum ent t h at Durham rested on intent a nd its interplay with s e ction 97-19-57, Durham a ctually establishes the position that a j ury instruction is unconstitutional when it im properly s h i f

t s the burden of proof in a crim inal trial. Howeve r , t h a t w as because D urham was a crim inal case, and, in c rim inal p roceedings, there m ay not be any presum ptions that excuse the State f rom its burden of proving every e lem ent o f t h e c r i me bey o nd a reasonable doubt. The m atter

9currently bef ore us is a civ i l m atter. More specif ically , this m atter i s g overned by Mississippi ’s statute providing f or com pensation to victim s of wrongf ul conviction and im p risonm ent, section 11-44-1, and the burden of proof r esides w ith Higgins, n ot the State. The prerequisites f

or a c laim of wrongf

ul conviction and i m

p risonm ent u

n d e r s e c t i o n 1 1

- 4 4 -1

are set out in Mississippi Code Annotated section 1 1-44-3 ( Rev. 2012). 5 In addition, we

5 Section 11-44-3 reads: (1) In order to present an actionable claim f o r wrongf

ul conviction and im p risonm ent un d e r this chapter, a c laim a nt m ust establish by docum entary evidence that: ( a ) The claim ant has been c onvicted of one or m ore f elo n i e s a n d subsequently sentenced to a term of im p risonm ent and h as s erved all or any part of

the sentence; (b) On grounds not inconsistent with innocence: (i) The claim ant was pardoned f o r the f elo n y or f elonies f o r which sentenced and which are the grounds f or the com

plaint and the pardon is based on the innocence of t he c laim ant wh i c h m ust be af f irm atively

stated in the pardon; or (ii) T he judgm ent of conviction was vacated and/or reversed; (c) If th ere was a vacatur or r eversal, either the accusatory instrum ent was dism issed or n ol prossed; or if a new trial was held, the def

endant was f

ound not guilty ; (d) The claim ant’s claim is n ot tim e-barred by the provisions of this chapter; and (e) The claim ant did not intentionally waive any a p p e l l a t e or post-conviction rem edy otherwise available i n order to be n e f i t under this chapter.

10note: If a claim ant establishes a claim under section 1 1-44-3, he m u st t hen m eet the burden of p r oof under

. . . section 11-44-7(1)

. . . . If a claim a n t me e t s this burden, he or she i s entitled to “Fif ty T housand D ollars ($50,000.00) f or each y ear o f incarceration regardless of the num ber of f elonies f or w hich a claim ant was convicted” and reasonable attorney ’ s f ees. Jefferson v. State, 95 So. 3d 709, 711 (¶4) (Miss. C t. App. 2012). However, section 11-44- 7(1)(b) states that a claim ant m ust prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “[ h]e did

not com m it the f

elony or f e lonies f or which he w as sentenced a nd which are the grounds f or the com plaint

. . . .” Our suprem e court has def ined preponderance of the evidence as “evidence m ore convincing to the [ trier o f f act] as worthy of belief than t hat in opposition thereto, or such evidence as, w hen weigh e d w i t h that o pposed to it, has m ore convincing f orce.” Gregory v. W

illiams, 203 Miss. 455, 469, 35 So. 2d 451, 453 (1948). ¶14. Here, the trial court noted, twice, that there is a s tark contrast between being innocent until proven guilty in a crim inal trial and having t o p r ove y our innocence in a civil trial, noting that proving innocence by a preponderance of t he evidence i s a f ar m ore dif

f icult task than establishing reasonable doubt. In Hymes v. State, 121 So. 3d 938, 943 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), this Court held: In a crim inal trial, the individual that the State has accused of wrongdoing is entitled to a presum

ption of innocence until the State proves his guilt bey o nd a reasonable doubt. Thus, Hy m es, during his crim inal trial, was entitled t o the
(2) The claim

shall be verif

ied by the claim ant. (3) If the c ourt f

i nds af ter reading the claim that the claim a n t has not dem onstrated the f

oregoing, it s hall dism iss t he claim , either on its own m otion or on the state’s m o tion. This dism issal shall be without prejudi c e t o a l l o w adequate ref

iling within ninety

(90) day s. 11p r esum ption of innocence until the State p roved bey ond a reasonable do u b t each elem ent o f the o f

f ense charged.

. . . [ I]n his trial f or com pensation, which is civil in n ature, Hy

m e s was no longer entitled to that presum ption. During the civ i l trial, it was Hy m es’s burden to prove his innocence by a preponderance o f the evidence. Allowing Hy m e s to retain the presum

ption of inn ocence throughout his civil trial would absolve h im f r om p roving an essential elem e nt of

his claim against the State—his innocence. (Internal citations and q

uotation m arks om itted). As such, it w as Higgins’s duty to disprove
every e lem ent of the crim e f or which he was charged and convicted. Higgins had the burden of producing credible evidence to (1) establish t h at he did not intend to def raud Southern Lock and (2) rebut the p resum ption that his f

ailure to pay the dishonored checks af ter receipt of the f if teen-day notices evidenced his intent to def raud. ¶15. W e f

ind that despite being given am ple opportunity to prove h is innocence, Higgins f ailed to d o so. As s uch, he was u nable to rebut the properly applied statutory presum ption. This issue is without m erit.
II. Factual and Evidentiary Rulings ¶16. Higgins also a r g u e s that the trial c ourt erred by considering highly p rejudicial evidence w hen w eighing his credibility

. More specif ically , Higgins argues t hat it was error f or the trial court to adm it evidence that Higgins had pleaded guilty to thef t b y deception in 2011. Higgins contends that the State was allowed to introduce evidence of other bad acts “in o rder to show that [ H iggins] acted in c onf orm ity t herewith.” Higgins also contends that the trial court’s reliance on such evidence constitutes reversible e rror. And Higgins argues that t he trial court relied on evidence that was not in l ine with the e vidence produced at the civil trial. More specif

i cally , Higgins contends that the trial court erred b y repeatedly

12ref

erring t o the pay

m ents m ade t o Delta Glass, prior t o the checks being signed, as $20,000, rather than $10,000, the actual am ount that H iggins testif ied to. H iggins also c o ntends that the trial court erred in noting that, during h is crim inal trial, Higgins had pointed the f inger

at his wif e by alleging that she had signed the checks in order to obtain a d ivorce, s u ggesting that he did so because he knew that she c o u l d not be c a lled due to spousal im m unity

. In support, H iggins alleges that the only evidence that he had m ad e s u c h a claim resided in a handwritten letter, which was not a dm itted into evidence due to his counsel’s o bjections, and that the trial court had relied on that letter when m aking its f inding. ¶17. In response, the State argues that there was substantial e vidence, on the r ecord, to support the trial court’s f

inding that Higgins was not a credible witness, and, theref ore, not entitled to com

pensation under section 11-44-1. The State acknowledges that the trial court incorrectly s tated the am ount of m oney t h a t H i ggins alleged Delta Glass received, via
pay m ents, during the two weeks prior t o the subject checks bein g m ade o ut, but the State contends that the trial court’s i naccurate recitation o f the am ount did not p rejudice Higgins.
In addition, the State argues that it is debata b l e w h e t her the trial court relied on the handwritten letter, and, regardless of if it did, there was still suf f i cient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s f indings. A. Prior Conviction ¶18. As to Higgins’s argum ent that the trial court erred b y allowing testim ony on the f act that he pleaded guilty to thef t by deception i n 2011, which p e r tained to him obtaining approxim a tely $19,000 in disability , workers’ com pensation, and unem

ploy m ent benef

its,

13Higgins c o ntend s that the trial court relied on this evidence to determ ine that he “acted in

conf orm i ty therewith,” in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. In
response, the State argues that the inf orm ation was properly introduced under Rule 609 of the Mississippi Rules of

Evidence. ¶19. W h e n d e t e r mining both the credibility of a witness and the weight o f the witness’s testim o ny , it is well settled that [ i]t is the f

unction of the [ f

act-f i n d e r ] to pass u

pon the credibility of the evidence.

. . . [ T]he strength or w eakness o f testim ony is not m e asured by the num ber o f witnesses. [ T]he [ f act-f inder] m ay accept t he testim on y o f s om e witnesses a nd reject that of others, and m ay accept in p art and reject in part the testim ony of any witnesses, or m ay believe part of the evidence on behalf of the [ S]tate a nd p art of that f or the accused, and the cr e d i b i lity of such witnesses is not f

or the reviewing court, but only f or the [ f act-f inder]. Groseclose v. S

tate , 440 S o. 2d 297, 300-01 (Miss. 1983) (internal citations om itted). W hen the trial judge serves a s t h e f a c t -f inder, he h as the sole authority t o determ ine a witness’s credibility

. Bell v. Parker , 563 So. 2d 594, 597 (Miss. 1990). ¶20. Rule 609(a)(2) states that “evidence that any w itness has b een convicted of a crim e shall b e adm itted i f it involved dishonesty or f alse s tatem ent, regardless of p unishm ent,” to attack a witness’s character f o r truthf ulness. A s s u c h, Higgins’s prior t hef t-by -deception conviction was not used to show that he had a c t e d in c onf orm i ty t herewith, as Higgins argues; rather, it was introduced as a way of dim inishing his credibility as a witness. ¶21. Once the State put o n evidence o f H i g g ins’s past dishonesty , it was well within the trial judge’s discretion as f act-f i nder to determ ine H iggins’s credibility

. W i th that in m ind, the trial court noted in i ts order that it had to w eigh the testim ony of both Higgins, who stood

14to gain six f igures and was f

acing a separate, u nrelated c o n v i c t i o n , and the State’s f our witnesses—all having nothing to gain f rom testif y ing at the civil t rial som e twenty y ears af ter the crim inal tr ial. Based on the testim ony and evidence presented, t he trial court, af ter drawing all reasonable inf erences and weighing the credibility of the witnesses, concluded that Higgins did, in f

act, receive the f

if t een-day notices a nd that he f a iled to act upon them in a t i me l y ma n ner. A s s uch, the trial court f ound that Higgins’s f

ailure to tim ely respond served as prim a f

acie evidence o f his intent to def raud a n d that Higgins f

ailed to overcom e
t h a t p r e s um

ption. In addition, the trial court f o und that Higgins also intended to def raud Southern Lock w hen he f ailed to pay f

o r the goods even af

ter he was m ade a ware of the returned checks through correspondence with Hart. ¶22. W e c annot f

i n d t h a t t h e trial court a bused its discretion i n allowing the State to introduce evidence regarding the 2011 conviction in the State’s ef f orts to attack H iggins’s credibility . This issue is without m erit.

B. Trial Court’s Misstatement Regarding Payment A m ount ¶23. W e now turn to Higgins’s assertion as to t he tri al court’s m i squote regarding the

am ount of m oney that Delta Glass received p rior to Higgins w r iting the three checks. W hile the trial court did incorrectly quote Higgins’s testim ony regarding t he m oney that he alleged Delta G lass received in pay m e nts f rom August 15-22, 1993, t his m i sstatem ent was slight in

nature and did not prejudice Higgins. I n addition, we again reiterate that because this case is centered around whether Higgins actually com m itted the f elony f or which he was charged, convicted, and served tim e, this c ase hinges o n Higgins’s credibility

. However, as previously

15stated, H iggins o nly of f ered his own self

-serving testim ony . There i s no need f o r a recitation of the r elevant parts of his testim ony because they have been discussed in the previous issue. However, w e e x p o u n d o n the previously provided i nf orm ation by m entioning that there is

n o e v i d e n ce that any of the m oney that Higgins claim s Delta Glass received was e v e r deposited into the FNB account o r a s t o why the business account was closed f or being overdraf t ed by $1,564.68. In addition, as previously m e ntioned , Higgins testif ied that he could not rem em

ber w hat happened to the $ 10,000. In m aking its ruling, it is clear that the trial court relied on Higgins’s lac k o f c o r roborated testim ony and f ailure to rem em

ber key details, not the a m o unt o f the m oney . As such, the trial c ourt’s m isstatem ent of $20,000 instead of $10,000 is harm less error. This issue is without m e r it. C. Handwritten Letter ¶24. As t o H i g g i n s ’ s contention that the trial court erred in determ ining h is credibility because (1) it noted in its opinion and order that he pointed the f inger at his wif

e by alleging that she h a d signed the checks i n o r d e r t o obtain a divorce and (2) its only source f or that inf orm ation was a handwritten letter that was not adm itted into evidence during his crim inal trial, w e agr e e w i t h t h e State’s position, arguing that it is debatable whether t he trial court relied o n the handwritten letter and that there was suf f icient evidence in t he r ecord to support the trial court ’ s f

i n d i ngs. More specif

ically , we note t hat the only ref erence that the trial

court m ade about Higgins’s w if e in its o pinion and order was as f ollows: “Moreover, during the crim inal trial, Higgins pointed the f inger at h is w if

e, knowing t he State could not call her

to testif y , claim ing she s igned t h e c h e c k s i n order to procure a d ivorce.” That statem ent

16alone is not enough to e stablish that the trial court relied solely on that b it of inf orm ation in determ ining Higgins’s credibility or that it was even a m ajor part of the trial court’s decision

m aking. This issue is without m erit. Accordingly , we af f irm the trial court’s judgm ent. ¶25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFF I R MED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES AND JAMES, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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