J-A09039-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM CARL BROWN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 650 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-53-CR-0000230-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JULY 23, 2024

Appellant William Carl Brown appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment

of sentence imposed after he entered an open plea of no contest to one count 

of corruption of minors.

1

 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in rejecting 

an earlier plea agreement and challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. We affirm.

The facts of this case are well known to the parties. See Trial Ct. Op., 

7/19/23, at 1-2. Briefly, Appellant was arrested and charged with corruption 

of minors and endangering the welfare of a child (EWOC) based on allegations 

that he sexually abused A.D. (the victim) between March 15, 2017 and March 

14, 2019. At the time of the abuse, the victim was between sixteen and 

seventeen years old, and Appellant was nearly sixty years old. Appellant

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
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resided with the victim’s mother (Mother), and he provided childcare for the 

victim and the victim’s younger sister while Mother was working. During this 

time, Appellant showed the victim pornographic videos and made her dress 

up in Mother’s lingerie while Appellant masturbated. Appellant also touched 

the victim’s breasts both over her clothing and skin-to-skin, and Appellant 

made the victim touch his penis with her hand and perform oral sex on him. 

See id. at 1-2.

On March 16, 2021, the Commonwealth and Appellant entered into a 

plea agreement in which Appellant agreed to plead no contest2to corruption 

of minors, graded as a first-degree misdemeanor, and the Commonwealth 

would nolle prosse the charge of EWOC. The Commonwealth also agreed to

recommend a sentence of five years’ probation. 

At the plea hearing, the trial court acknowledged that there was a plea 

agreement with a negotiated sentence. See N.T., 3/16/21, at 2-12. However, 

the trial court stated that its acceptance of Appellant’s plea was conditioned 

on its review of the presentence investigation (PSI) report.

3

 See id. at 10. 

Ultimately, after reviewing the PSI, the trial court issued an order stating:

[T]he [c]ourt having previously advised [Appellant] that the 

acceptance of the plea tendered on March 16, 2021[,] was subject 

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2

In terms of its effect upon a case, a plea of nolo contendere or no contest,

is treated the same as a guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Prieto, 206 

A.3d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2019).

3 The record reflects that the trial court stated: “I accept the plea subject 

however to review of the [PSI] in case something else may come to my 

attention after I receive the [PSI].” N.T., 3/16/21, at 10.
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to further review by the [c]ourt of the [PSI]; having carefully 

considered this matter the [c]ourt hereby rejects [Appellant’s] 

plea as stated. The [c]ourt will not accept a binding plea 

agreement in this matter.

Order, 5/6/21; see also N.T., 6/30/21, at 1 (reflecting that the trial court 

rejected Appellant’s March 16, 2021 plea agreement after reviewing the PSI 

report). 

After the trial court rejected Appellant’s March 16, 2021 plea, Appellant 

was permitted to withdraw the plea. At that time, Appellant informed the trial 

court that he would not enter another plea and that he wanted to go to trial. 

See N.T., 6/30/21, at 3. However, on November 24, 2021, Appellant agreed 

to enter an open plea of no contest to corruption of minors. See N.T., 

11/24/21, at 4. The trial court ultimately accepted the open plea and

sentenced Appellant to a term of twenty-four to forty-eight months of 

incarceration followed by a consecutive term of twelve months of probation 

for corruption of minors. See N.T., 1/5/22, at 14. Appellant filed a timely 

post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence, 

which the trial court denied. Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which this 

Court dismissed due to Appellant’s prior counsel’s failure to perfect the appeal, 

file a docketing statement, and file a brief. See Order, 281 WDA 2022, 

9/13/22. 
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On March 24, 2023 Appellant filed a Post Conviction Relief Act4 (PCRA)

petition alleging that prior counsel was ineffective with respect to Appellant’s 

direct appeal. On May 31, 2023, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s PCRA 

petition, reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, and 

appointed Kelsey Hanes-Lewis, Esq. as appellate counsel. Appellate counsel 

filed a timely direct appeal nunc pro tunc.

5 Both the trial court and Appellant 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in rescinding its 

earlier acceptance of the parties’ initial negotiated plea 

agreement? 

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

Appellant in excess of the aggravated range of the sentencing 

guidelines without offering sufficient and adequate reasons for 

doing so?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Plea Agreement

Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

rejected his March 16, 2021 no-contest plea. Appellant’s Brief at 24-25. In 

support, Appellant asserts that the trial court accepted Appellant’s plea at the 

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4 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

5 Counsel erroneously appealed from the order denying Appellant’s postsentence motion. However, it is well settled that in a criminal case, the appeal 

lies from the judgment of sentence, and we have corrected the caption 

accordingly. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 

(Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (correcting caption where the appellant misstated

from where the appeal lies). 
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initial hearing and there were no intervening circumstances that permitted the 

trial court to reject Appellant’s plea. Id. at 24-28. Therefore, Appellant 

concludes that he was entitled to the benefit of his bargain. See id. at 24-

28. 

The Commonwealth responds that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by rejecting the prior plea agreement. Commonwealth’s Brief at 9-

11. In support, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court provided merely 

a conditional acceptance of Appellant’s no-contest plea on March 16, 2021,

pending review of the PSI report, and the trial court retained discretion to 

reject Appellant’s plea. See id. at 10. The Commonwealth explains that the 

trial court reviewed the PSI report, and the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in concluding that the March 16, 2021 negotiated sentence would 

not serve the interests of justice. See id. at 7, 12.

“It is well settled that a plea of guilty amounts to a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 A.3d 

970, 972 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Generally, after the defendant 

enters a plea, he may only appeal “matters concerning the jurisdiction of the 

court, the validity of the guilty plea, and the legality of the sentence.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Here, the record reflects that after the trial court rejected Appellant’s 

March 16, 2021 no-contest plea, Appellant withdrew the plea, and he 

subsequently entered a new open no-contest plea. As stated, the trial court 

accepted the new open plea, and it subsequently imposed sentence. See
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N.T., 1/5/22, at 14; N.T., 11/24/21, at 4. The issue Appellant now raises does 

not challenge the validity of the new open plea that was accepted by the trial 

court, the legality of the sentence imposed, or the trial court’s jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, because Appellant subsequently entered an open no-contest plea 

and was sentenced, we are constrained to conclude that Appellant waived any 

challenge to the earlier March 16, 2021 plea which the trial court rejected.6 

See Brown, 240 A.3d at 972. 

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6

In any event, were we to reach this issue, we would conclude that Appellant 

is not entitled to relief. It is well settled that trial courts have broad discretion 

in accepting or rejecting plea agreements, and there is no absolute right to 

have a plea accepted. See Commonwealth v. Chazin, 873 A.2d 732, 737 

(Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Rosario, 613 A.2d 1244, 1249 (Pa. 

Super. 1992). “[O]ur Courts have reaffirmed that ‘while the Commonwealth 

and a criminal defendant are free to enter into an arrangement that the parties 

deem fitting, the terms of a plea agreement are not binding upon the court.

Rather the court may reject those terms if the court believes the terms do not 

serve justice.’” Chazin, 873 A.2d at 737 (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 

787 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Pa. Super. 2001)) (formatting altered). Further, the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “[a]t any time before

the imposition of sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon 

motion of the defendant, or direct, sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of 

guilty or nolo contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(a). Were we to reach this issue, we would conclude that 

there was no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court rejecting 

Appellant’s March 16, 2021 no-contest plea. See Chazin, 873 A.2d at 737; 

Rosario, 613 A.2d 1249; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(a). The record reflects 

that the trial court’s acceptance of the March 16, 2021 plea agreement was 

clearly conditioned on the trial court’s review of Appellant’s PSI report. See 

N.T., 3/16/21, at 10. After reviewing the PSI report, the trial court concluded 

that accepting the March 16, 2021 plea agreement was not in interests of 

justice. See Order, 5/6/21; Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/23, at 1; see also N.T., 

1/5/22, at 11. Accordingly, the trial court exercised its discretion and rejected 

Appellant’s plea agreement, and Appellant would not be entitled to relief. See 

Chazin, 873 A.2d at 737; Rosario, 613 A.2d 1249; Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(a). 
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Sentencing

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence.7 Appellant maintains that the sentence imposed was manifestly 

excessive. Appellant’s Brief at 29-31. Appellant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in imposing an unreasonable sentence, which was 

outside of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines, and it failed to 

provide reasons for its sentence. Id. at 29-31. Appellant argues that the trial 

court primarily focused on the gravity of the offense and its impact on the 

victim, and he asserts that the court failed to consider the factors set forth in 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) and failed to consider Appellant’s age, character, and 

failed to provide its reasons for sentencing Appellant outside the sentencing 

guidelines. Appellant’s Brief at 32-40. 

“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle 

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such 

claims, we must determine:

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved 

his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P. 

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7 As noted above, Appellant ultimately entered an open plea to one count of 

corruption of minors. See N.T., 11/24/21, at 4. We reiterate that, generally, 

when a defendant enters a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, he waives 

all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, and he may only appeal matters 

involving the jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and the legality 

of the sentence. See Brown, 240 A.3d at 972. However, when a defendant 

enters an open plea agreement with no bargain for a specific or stated term 

of sentence, such as in the instant case, he is not precluded from appealing 

the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed. See id. 
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2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of 

sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a 

substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the 

sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted). 

“To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an 

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. 

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d 

1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “A substantial question 

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the 

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant preserved his sentencing claims in a post-sentence 

motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included the issue in his Rule 

1925(b) statement. Appellant has also included a Rule 2119(f) statement in 

his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 29-32. Additionally, we conclude that 

Appellant’s claim raises a substantial question for review. See 
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Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en 

banc) (stating that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an 

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a 

substantial question” (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 

204, 206 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that the courts of this Commonwealth 

have found that a “claim that the sentencing court imposed an unreasonable 

sentence by sentencing outside the guideline ranges presents a substantial 

question for our review” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 

Accordingly, we will consider the merits of Appellant’s challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence.

Our standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and 

(d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:

The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand 

the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the 

sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines 

erroneously;

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing 

guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the 
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application of the guidelines would be clearly 

unreasonable; or

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the 

sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the 

sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

In reviewing the record, we consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any [PSI].

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some 

citations omitted and some formatting altered).

“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the 

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public, 

[the] gravity of [the] offense in relation to [the] impact on [the] victim and 

[the] community, and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation 

omitted and formatting altered). Additionally, the trial court “must consider 

the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 848 (citation omitted). Where a PSI report 

exists, this Court will “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of 

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 
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considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). 

The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the 

sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant and all 

witnesses firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa. 

Super. 2023), appeal granted on other grounds, 306 A.3d 1287 (Pa. 2023). 

In conducting appellate review, this Court “cannot reweigh sentencing factors 

and impose judgment in place of [the] sentencing court where [the] lower 

court was fully aware of all mitigating factors[.]” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, the record reflects that the trial court considered the PSI and the 

victim impact statement before imposing a sentence. In its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s sentencing claims as follows:

[O]n January 5, 2022 the [c]ourt imposed a sentence above the 

aggravated range at 24 to 48 months followed by 12 months of 

consecutive probation, with RRRI eligibility. A post[-]sentence 

motion was denied on January 24, 2022. 

At the sentencing hearing, the [c]ourt had received and 

considered the PSI and related documents and placed on the 

record that the sentence was being imposed for the following 

reasons: 

• The sexual assaults took place over two years when 

[Appellant] was at least 59 and the child was 16 and during 

this time [Appellant] stood in a place of authority, a 

caregiver and father figure to the victim.

• There was substantial impact upon the victim as she did 

not have ability to protect herself and was groomed by 

[Appellant]. Her testimony at the sentencing hearing

indicated battling with the consequences of the crime for the 

rest of her life.
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• [Appellant] showed pornographic videos to the victim to 

break down the child’s resistance to his advances.

• The . . . impact upon the community was substantial.

• [Appellant] had significant need for extensive 

rehabilitation as stated in the documents contained in the 

PSI documents. 

The [c]ourt considered the previously mentioned sexual offender 

evaluation of [Appellant] dated January 5, 2022 and the victim 

impact statement contained within the PSI but did not recite 

details in open court at the time of sentencing. The [c]ourt directs 

that the PSI, including the evaluation and victim impact statement 

and guidelines be sent under seal to the Superior Court for review.

[Appellant] intimidated and groomed the victim thereby breaking 

down her resistance by showing her videos of a family member 

engaging in sexual acts. Greater detail of [Appellant’s] efforts to 

manipulate the victim and punish her mother can be found in the 

evaluation and victim impact statement contained in the PSI.

Based upon the information available to the [c]ourt at the time of 

sentencing, the [c]ourt felt compelled to impose a sentence above 

the aggravated range. The [c]ourt carefully considered the factors 

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) and referenced them in the 

opinion.

Accordingly, it is the [c]ourt’s determination that the crime was 

committed in an extreme and particularly objectionable fashion. 

[Appellant’s] behaviors in perpetrating the crime including, 

coercion, manipulation, grooming and threats made to the 

[victim] to not report the assaults, justified the sentence above 

the aggravated range.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/23, at 3-5 (citations omitted and some formatting altered). 

See also N.T., 1/5/22, at 12-14 (reflecting the trial court’s consideration of 

Appellant’s relationship to the victim and her family, the manipulation and 

grooming that occurred, the facts of the crime, the sentencing guidelines, the 

PSI, the victim impact statement, the need to protect the public, and the 

impact of Appellant’s crimes on the victim and the community).
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Following our review of the record, including the PSI, sex offender 

evaluation, and victim impact statement sent to this Court under seal, we

discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253; 

see also Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. As noted previously, the trial court ordered 

a PSI report, which it reviewed prior to sentencing. See N.T., 1/5/22, at 12-

13. Therefore, we presume that the trial court was fully aware of the relevant 

sentencing factors and considered them when imposing Appellant’s sentence. 

See Watson, 228 A.3d at 936; see also Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. 

Additionally, the record reflects that the trial court aptly considered the facts 

of this case, provided its rationale for the sentence and for sentencing outside 

the guidelines. See N.T., 1/5/22, at 12-13. Although Appellant claims that 

the trial court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors such as his age, 

we will not re-weigh the trial court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing 

factors on appeal. See Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. For these reasons, we 

conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

DATE: 07/23/2024