Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2276 | April 3, 2019 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher L. Clerc

Columbus, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew S. Koressel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Carl Moore,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 3, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2276

Appeal from the Bartholomew 

Superior Court

The Honorable James D. Worton, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

03D01-1703-F5-1550

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2276 | April 3, 2019 Page 2 of 4

[1] Carl Moore appeals the four-and-one-half-year sentence imposed by the trial 

court following his guilty plea to level 5 felony battery. His sole argument is 

that the trial court abused its discretion by not giving his guilty plea significant 

mitigating weight. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

[2] On February 6, 2017, Moore was drinking at a Bartholomew County bar and 

punched another bar patron in the face. The victim suffered numerous fractures 

to his face and eye socket, which required the implantation of multiple plates 

and plastic to repair. The State charged Moore with level 5 felony battery 

resulting in serious bodily injury. Moore agreed to plead guilty as charged. In 

exchange, the State agreed to a two-year cap on the executed portion of his 

sentence, but otherwise Moore’s sentencing was left open to the trial court. 

[3] At Moore’s sentencing, the trial court found four aggravating factors: Moore’s 

criminal history spanning twenty-eight years; the revocation of Moore’s 

probation in a prior case; Moore’s arrest for operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated during his pretrial release; and that the harm suffered by the victim 

was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the 

commission of the offense. Tr. Vol. 2 at 41-42; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 9. 

The trial court assigned “slight” mitigating weight to Moore’s guilty plea,

observing that by pleading guilty he obtained a benefit by receiving a cap on the 

executed portion of his sentence. Tr. Vol. 2 at 42; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 9. 

The trial court sentenced Moore to four and one-half years, with three years 

suspended to probation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2276 | April 3, 2019 Page 3 of 4

[4] On appeal, Moore acknowledges that the trial court gave his guilty plea some 

mitigating weight, but contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

giving it significant mitigating weight. Moore asks us to “reweigh the 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 8. 

[5] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and as 

long as a sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for 

an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), 

clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. A trial court abuses its discretion during 

sentencing by: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a 

sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are 

unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits 

reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing 

statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-

91. The relative weight or value assignable to mitigators and aggravators is not 

subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. at 491.

[6] “[A] defendant who pleads guilty deserves ‘some’ mitigating weight be given to 

the plea in return.” Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221. However, “the significance 

of a guilty plea as a mitigating factor varies from case to case.” Id. Also, “a 

trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors 

as does a defendant.” Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), 

trans denied. Here, the trial court identified Moore’s guilty plea as a mitigating 

factor and gave it some, albeit slight, mitigating weight. Indiana appellate 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2276 | April 3, 2019 Page 4 of 4

courts no longer review the relative weight or value a trial court assigns to 

mitigators and aggravators. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm Moore’s 

sentence.

[7] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.