alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2





STATEMENT OF MANAGING DIRECTOR


PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE








Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned, Richard J. DeGarmo, Managing Director of Biofuels Power Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certifies that:





The Company’s Form 10-Q/A Report for the three months ended March 31, 2013 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) and Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/ Richard J. DeGarmo


Richard J. DeGarmo, Managing Director


Dated: December 30, 2013
----

----

BONJ 10-Q

|         |   |   | /s/ Albert F. Buzzetti                |   |
|--------------|--------|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|         |   |   | Albert F. Buzzetti                    |   |
|         |   |   | Chief Executive Officer               |   |
|         |   |   | (Principal Executive Officer)         |   |
|         |   |   |                                  |   |
|         |   |   |                                  |   |
|         |   |   | /s/ Michael Lesler                    |   |
|         |   |   | Michael Lesler                        |   |
|         |   |   | President and Chief Operating Officer |   |
|         |   |   | (Principal Financial Officer)         |   |
|         |   |   |                                  |   |
| May 14, 2010 |   |   |                                  |   |
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.12


   DESCRIPTION OF THE REINSURANCE AGREEMENT FOR 2004 BETWEEN ACIC AND AMERICAN
       REINSURANCE COMPANY, ASPEN INSURANCE LTD. AND MAX RE LTD. EFFECTIVE
                                 JANUARY 1, 2004

The Company, on behalf of American Compensation Insurance Company (ACIC), its
wholly owned subsidiary, entered into reinsurance contracts for the fiscal year
beginning January 1, 2004. The following summarizes the significant terms of
these reinsurance agreements.

LIABILITY OF THE REINSURER

The Reinsurers shall pay to ACIC, with respect to Workers' Compensation and
Employers' Liability Business, the amount of Net Loss for each Occurrence, as
defined in the contracts, in excess of ACIC's retention, but not exceeding the
Limits of Liability of the Reinsurer as follows:

<Table>
<Caption>
LOSS LAYER                   REINSURER                       COMMENT
---------------------------  ------------------------------  -------
<S>                          <C>                             <C>
$800,000 excess of $200,000  42.5% American Reinsurance Co.  *
                             35.0% Max Re Ltd.
                             22.5% Aspen Insurance Ltd.
</Table>

----------

*        All business written by the Company.
         Recoveries from the MN WCRA will inure to the benefit of this treaty 2%
         Annual aggregate deductible, subject to a minimum of $1,100,000.

COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION

The agreement shall apply to new and renewal policies of ACIC becoming effective
at and after 12:01 A.M., January 1, 2004, and to policies in force at 12:01
A.M., January 1, 2004, with respect to losses resulting from Occurrences taking
place at or after the aforesaid time and date.

Parties may terminate these agreements at any December 31st by sending to the
other, by registered mail to its principal office, not less than 90 days prior
written notice. The Reinsurer may also terminate the agreements in the event of
significant adverse events at ACIC or in the event of a change in control of
ACIC or RTW, Inc.

REINSURANCE PREMIUM

ACIC agreed to pay the reinsurers based on premiums earned for the Loss layer as
shown above. This rate is in excess of the rates that we paid in 2003.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Thomas Lee McDaniel v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 18

- 00891

- CR

Trial court case number: 1527579

Trial court: 351st District Court of Harris County

Appellant is represented by appointed counsel, Cheri Duncan. Counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw on May 3, 2019. On May 15, 2019, appellant filed a pro se document expressing his desire to withdraw his appeal.

A defendant is no t entitled to hybrid representation. See Porter v. State , 540 S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, to the extent appellant requests dismissal of his appeal, that request is denied without prejudice to appellant’s c ounsel filing a motion to dismiss the appeal within 10 days that complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature:

____ . /s/ Peter Kelly

____

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __ May 30, 2019

_____
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                      <C> 
<PERIOD-TYPE>            12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1998
<CASH>                                        16193000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 11836000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                   84152000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             113908000
<PP&E>                                          634000
<DEPRECIATION>                                  442000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               113908000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         82765000
<BONDS>                                       19700000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 113908000
<SALES>                                      198074000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             198074000
<CGS>                                        164335000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                190318000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (2955000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              264000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               10447000
<INCOME-TAX>                                  10447000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           10447000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  34000
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  10481000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-60405 Summary Calendar

__________________ OSCAR ARNOLDO LOPEZ; ANA FRANCESCA LAZO-MONTIEL DE LOPEZ, Petitioners,

v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent.

_________________________________________________________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals A29 952 489, A29 952 491

_________________________________________________________________ February 29, 1996 Before KING, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Oscar Lopez and Ana Francesca Lazo-Montiel de Lopez, citizens of El Salvador, assert that the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") abused its discretion in denying their applications for asylum and withholding of deportation. We have reviewed the record and find that the BIA's affirmance of the Immigration Judge's decision denying the Lopezes' applications was supported by substantial evidence. See Faddoul v. INS , 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994). The petition for review is DENIED.
#### Ex Parte L. B. Willis.

No. 24872.

May 10, 1950.

Relator represented himself.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Relator, in original application to this court, alleges that he is illegally restrained of his liberty because he has served his full sentence of three years, received in Bexar County on June 23, 1948. It is also shown that he received a three year sentence in Wilbarger County on July 2, 1948. No claim is made in the petition that his prison record is such as to give him credit sufficient to have satisfied either of these sentences.

This court will not take evidence in a matter of this character unless substantial allegations are made raising a question which, if settled according to relator’s contention, would warrant the relief prayed for.

Attached to relator’s application is a certified copy of the sentence in Cause No. 4496, State of Texas v. L. B. Willis, in Wilbarger County. A paragraph attempting to make this sentence cumulative with some other sentence reads as follows: “And this sentence is here made accumulative with the sentence in the District Court of Bexar County, Texas, as where he was sentenced as Leonard B. Willis, or with any other sentence that he may have received. It shall not be concurrent.”

Under the many decisions of this court, the description of the sentence to which the one before us should be cumulative is *2not sufficient to identify the same with that degree of certainty which will direct the penitentiary authorities in its observation. See Bland v. State, 145 Tex. Cr. R. 267, 167 S.W. 2d 761. This indefiniteness seems to be relied upon by relator as ground for his discharge. While we think it is not effective, the application for writ or habeas corpus is refused because no ground is alleged which would authorize evidence in support of the application.
Order entered November 3, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00563-CR

BILLY JOE CAMPBELL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 416-81619-2012

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.

On October 27, 2014, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why the 

reporter’s record had not been filed. On November 3, 2014, we received the reporter’s record. 

Therefore, in the interest of expediting the appeal, we VACATE the November 27, 2014 order 

requiring findings.

Appellant’s brief is due within thirty days of the date of this order.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
Order entered June 12, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 12
- 01406
- CR
JULIA BREAD CORNELIU S, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial C ourt Cause No. 401
- 82257
- 2011



### O RDER This appeal is REINSTATED

. We VACATE our order of April 25, 2013 requiring the trial court to make findings of fact regarding wh y appellant’s brief was not filed.
We GRANT appellant’s June 6 , 2013 motion for leave t o file a late appellant’s brief. Appellant’s brief tendered to the Clerk of the Court on June 6, 2013 is DEEMED timely filed as
of the date of this order. The State’s brief shall be due THIRTY DAYS from the date of this order.

/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 606

AN ACT

To amend the Dayton Aviation Heritage Preservation Act

of 1992, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That section 201(b) of the Dayton Aviation Heritage

4 Preservation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–419, approved

5 October 16, 1992), is amended as follows:
2

HR 606 EH

1 (1) In paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘from rec2 ommendations’’ and inserting ‘‘after consideration of

3 recommendations’’.

4 (2) In paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘from rec5 ommendations’’ and inserting ‘‘after consideration of

6 recommendations’’.

7 (3) In paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘from rec8 ommendations’’ and inserting ‘‘after consideration of

9 recommendations’’.

10 (4) In paragraph (6), by striking ‘‘from rec11 ommendations’’ and inserting ‘‘after consideration of

12 recommendations’’.

13 (5) In paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘from rec14 ommendations’’ and inserting ‘‘after consideration of

15 recommendations’’.

Passed the House of Representatives March 28,

1995.

Attest:

Clerk.

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 606

AN ACT

To amend the Dayton Aviation Heritage

Preservation Act of 1992, and for other purposes.
SHERRY RADACK

 CHIEF JUSTICE

TERRY JENNINGS

EVELYN KEYES

LAURA CARTER HIGLEY

JANE BLAND

MICHAEL MASSENGALE

HARVEY BROWN

REBECA HUDDLE

RUSSELL LLOYD

 JUSTICES

Court of Appeals

First District of Texas

301 Fannin Street

Houston, Texas 77002-2066

CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

 CLERK OF THE COURT

JANET WILLIAMS

 CHIEF STAFF ATTORNEY

PHONE: 713-274-2700

FAX: 713-755-8131

 www.txcourts.gov/1stcoa.aspx

September 28, 2015

Chance Decker

Gray Reed & McGraw

1300 Post Oak Blvd Ste 2000

Houston, TX 77056-8000

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Jonathan Michael Hyman

Gray Reed & McGraw

1300 Post Oak Blvd Ste 2000

Houston, TX 77056-8000

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 01-15-00821-CV Trial Court Case Number: 2013-41124

Style: Choice! Power, L.P.

v.

Michael Feeley

As of the date of this NOTICE, appellant(s) has not paid the required $205 filing fee to 

prosecute this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5 (requiring payment of fees at time of filing, unless excused); 

see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.207 (Vernon Supp. 2011), § 51.941(a) (Vernon 2005), § 101.041 

(Vernon Supp. 2011) (listing fees in court of appeals); Order Regarding Fees Charged in Civil Cases in 

the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals and Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 

Misc. Docket No. 07-9138 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2007), reprinted in TEX. R. APP. P. app. A § B(1) (listing fees 

in court of appeals).

This is NOTICE to the appellant that this appeal is subject to dismissal, if the filing fee has not 

been paid within 20 days of this NOTICE. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5 (allowing enforcement of rule); 42.3 

(allowing involuntary dismissal).Sincerely,

Christopher A. Prine, Clerk of the Court

FILE COPY

ACCEPTED

01-15-00821-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

9/30/2015 11:19:33 AM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 9/30/2015 11:19:33 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
**UN PUBLISHED**  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7813** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ANDREW CHARLES JACKSON, a/k/a William Benbow, a/k/a Ricky Antonio Bady, a/k/a Sway , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia , at Martinsburg
. John Preston Bailey , District Judge. ( 3:00

- cr - 00006

- JPB

- RWT

- 1 ; 3:00

- cr - 00046

- JPB

RWT

- 1 )

Submitted : April 21, 2016 Decided: April 25, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Andrew Charles Jackson , Appellant Pro Se. Paul Thomas Camilletti, Assistant United S tates Attorney , Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpubli shed opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Andrew Charles Jackson appeals the district court ’ s order denying his “ Petition for Discovery of Voir Dire Examination Habeas Corpus § 121 Evidentiary Hearing .” We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. Jackson , No s . 3:00

- cr - 00006

- JPB

- RWT

- 1; 3:00

- cr - 00046

- JPB

- RWT

- 1 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 14, 2015) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.2





Certification of Principal Financial Officer, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of BLS Media, Inc. a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Gary Prager, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to BLS Media, Inc., and will be retained by BLS Media, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





/s/ Gary PragerGary Prager

Chief Financial Officer

May 14, 2010








22
#### Alice M. McClure v. John J. Hunnewell.

Opinion filed March 9, 1904.

Injunction Pendente Lite — Complaint — Affidavit.

1. To authorize an injunction pendente lite pursuant to subdivision 1, section 5344, Rev. Codes 1899, the complaint must exhibit a right to a judgment of injunction, and the demand for relief must pray that the defendant be restrained from the commission or continuance of the act complained of, .the commission .or continuance of which, during the litigation, would produce injury to plaintiff. A defect in the complaint in this regard cannot be supplied by affidavit.

Appeal from District Court, Ward county; *Palda,*J.

Action by Alice M. McClure against John J. Hunnewell. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.

Reversed.

*James Johnson,*for appellant.

The plaintiff had adequate remedy at law; the action itself was an action at law, only a money judgment being asked. No injunction lies. Stone ,v- Snell, 94 N. W. 525; Ganow v. Denney, 94 N. W. 959; Forman v. Healey, 11 N. D. 563, 93 N. W. 866.

*85(99 N. W. 48.)

*N. Davis,*for respondent, filed no brief.

Cochrane, J.

The parties hereto are rival claimants to a quarter section of public land. The complaint alleges that plaintiff was in possession of the land described under the homestead laws of the United States and that the defendant unlawfully entered upon the land and dug a ditch or tunnel thereon, to plaintiff’s damage in the sum of $200, and prays for a money judgment of $200 and costs. An order to show cause was obtained upon affidavit and, after hearing, an injunction *pendente lite*was issued, restraining “the defendant and each of his servants, employees, agents and each and every person acting for and under him, from in any manner trespassing or going upon the land described for any purpose whatever, and from in any manner interfering with or disturbing plaintiff in her occupation, use and cultivation of said described land, during the pendency of this action.” Defendant appealed from this order.

The complaint does not state a cause of action for injunctive relief and such relief is not demanded in the complaint. The statute (section 5344, subd. 1, Rev. Codes 1899), provides: “When it shall appear by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded', and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of some act, the commission or continuance of which during the 'litigation would produce injury to the plaintiff,” an injunction may be granted. This statute is exclusive, and defects in the complaint cannot be made good through affidavits used to support the motion for temporary injunction. This case is ruled by the case of Forman v. Healey, 11 N. D. 563, 83 N. W. 866.

The order appealed from is reversed.

All concur.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 1, 2019

No. 04-19-00349-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.R., A CHILD,

Appellant

From the County Court at Law, Val Verde County, Texas

Trial Court No. 3688CCL

Honorable Sergio J. Gonzalez, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file his brief is GRANTED IN PART. 

Appellant’s brief is due on or before July 10, 2019.

_________________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 1st day of July, 2019.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle,

Clerk of Court
183 La. 415

#### FOURNET LAND CO., Inc., v. MARTIN FISH CO.

No. 33527.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 4, 1935.

Mouton & Davidson and Dan DeBail-lon, all of Lafayette, for appellant

*157Walter J. Burke, of New Iberia, and Wise & Wise, of Morgan City, for ap-pellee.

LAND, Justice.

This is a suit to fix the northern boundary line between the lands of plaintiff and of defendant, the lands to the south being owned by plaintiff, and the ownership of the lands to the north being claimed by defendant.

Plaintiff alleges that it is the owner of the fractional S. E. 1⁄2 of N. E. 1⁄4 of section 23, township 8 south, range 7 east, Southwest district of Louisiana, and defendant alleges that it owns the fractional N. E. 1⁄4 of N. E. 1⁄4 of the same section, township, and range.

The lands are situated on the west bank of the Atchafalaya river where Morgan’s Louisiana & Texas Steamship Company’s track crosses that stream and are in what is known as the Atchafalaya Swamp.

The major portion of township 8 south, range 7 east, in which the property to be surveyed is located, is a part of the Atcha-falaya Swamp, and is composed of rivers, bayous, lakes, and lagoons. The land therein is very low and swampy, and almost two-thirds of it is under water every year.

Because of the topography of the territory, neither the surveyors nor defendant’s expert were able to find, as a starting-point, any natural or artificial corner or landmark established by the original surveys under the authority of the federal government within township 8 south, range 7 east. For this reason, the surveyors began the survey in the central portion of township 8 south, range 6 east.

The first survey made was opposed. A second survey was ordered and was made at what the surveyors claim to be the only available starting point in the whole territory. This survey was likewise opposed. After taking evidence in full on the merits, the trial judge rejected the second survey, and ordered a new survey, directing the surveyors to do what the evidence shows is a physical impossibility, i. e., locate a “known corner” within the township wherein the lands to be surveyed a're situated and use it as a starting point.

From this ruling of the court, the plaintiff has perfected the present appeal, and defendant now moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is an appeal from an interlocutory judgment.

We do not concur in this view of the matter. A decree rejecting a survey and ordering a new survey to be made, under conditions which make its accomplishment impossible, is, in our opinion, a final judgment from which an appeal lies, notwithstanding the order for a new survey; such order being merely brutum fulmen.

“Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia.” The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. Broom’s Legal Maxims, page 167(222); U. S. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 170 F. 542, 95 C. C. A. 628.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied and overruled.

O’NIELL, C. J., dissents on the ground that the order appealed from is not a final judgment.

FOURNET, J., recused.