Note: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

06-1120, -1162

DAVID L. HILDEBRAND, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. STECK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.,

CORNWELL QUALITY TOOLS COMPANY, MATCO TOOLS, SNAP-ON TOOLS COMPANY, TOOLS USA AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY and MAC TOOLS, Defendants-Cross Appellants,

and ATC PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendant.

David L. Hildebrand , of Denver, Colorado, pro se.

Charles F. Shane , Bieser, Greer & Landis, LLP, of Dayton, Ohio, for defendantscross appellants. With him on the brief was David C. Greer

. Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Colorado Judge Alan B. JohnsonNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

06-1120, -1162

DAVID L. HILDEBRAND, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. STECK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.,

CORNWELL QUALITY TOOLS COMPANY, MATCO TOOLS, SNAP-ON TOOLS COMPANY, TOOLS USA AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY and MAC TOOLS,

Defendants-Cr oss Appellants,

and ATC PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendant.

__________ ________________ DECIDED: May 17, 2007

__________________________

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge , MAYER and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. David L. Hildebrand appeals th e judgment of the United St ates District Court for the District of Colorado based on a jury verdict finding defendan t Steck Manufacturing Co. (“Steck”) liable for non-willful infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,737,981 (“the ’981patent”) and awarding him $74,8 63 in lost profit damages. Steck cross-appeals from

the district court’s refusal to rule as a matter of law that the ’981 patent was anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 1,127,836 (“t he ’836 patent”), and obv ious in light of the prior art.

Hildebrand v. Steck Manuf. Co. , 395 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D. Colo. 2005). We affirm

. The ’981 patent was not anticipated by the ’836 patent, which discloses a device used to screw in bolts, whereas the ’981 pat ent discloses a device used to remove bolts and similar threaded connecting devices. As fo r obviousness, the district court found

this matter a close call but we do not believe it was error to let it go to the jury. Steck failed to carry its burden to convince the jury by clear and convincing evidence that the ’981 patent was obvious. The jury’s finding of non-willful infri ngement was supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, while Hild ebrand reargues the issue of lost profits here, he fails to assert any valid reason why the jury’s finding should be adjusted. The jury’s decision not to award reasonable royalties also is unobjectionable, espec ially because the damage award was adequate to compensate fo r the harm actually caused by the infringement. Hildebrand’s myriad procedural arguments also fail. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not requiring the distributor defendant s to appear at trial, refusing to let Hildebrand amend his complaint after the trial had begun, ex cluding documents that Hildebrand did not attempt to produce until after discovery was co mplete, or allotting

each side one hour for their clos ing arguments. Further, ther e was no harmful error in the jury instructions used by the trial c ourt. Its decision not to award pre-judgment interest or attorney’s fees was similarly not an abuse of its discretion. Finally, it was not

06-1120, -1162 2error for the trial court to deny Hildebrand’s motion to recuse, which was made only one business day before the scheduled start of the trial.

06-1120, -1162 3