alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### TRAMEL v. GRAND LODGE OF KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS OF LOUISIANA.

No. 4536.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 30, 1933.

Rehearing Denied July 15, 1933.

F. B. Smith, of New Orleans, for appellant.

' Boone & Boone, of Many, for appellee.

DREW, Judge.

Defendant has appealed from a judgment of the lower court awarding judgment to plaintiff, as beneficiary of an endowment policy held by her husband, John Tramel, in the de- • fendant lodge.

It is admitted that, if she is entitled to recover, she is entitled to recover the amount sued for, and that John Tramel was in good standing at his death and the holder of the policy alleged on. The defense is that John Tramel was suspended on December 15,1930, for nonpayment of dues, and reinstated the same month; that he died February 4, 1931, less than 90 days after reinstatement, and that under the following clause in the policy: “That reinstatement to membership within three months from date of suspension, forfeits all claim to endowment until the expiration of ninety (90) days from the date of reinstatement,” he is not entitled to recover.

The facts are that John Tramel had been sick for six weeks prior to November 10,1930, and had been awarded the sum of $18, for sick benefits, by the local lodge. This money was not paid to him, but, by agreement with him and at his request, was held by the keeper of records and seals of the local lodge for the purpose of paying his monthly dues as they became due. On this date the keeper of records and seals wrote to John Tramel, stating that he had in his possession sufficient money to pay all dues for him until June 1, 1931, less 25 cents, which would be due on June 1st. The keeper of records and seals was the proper officer to collect the monthly dues. Notwithstanding this letter, on December 13, 1930, John Tramel was, through error, reported suspended for nonpayment of his dues. The error was soon discovered, and during the same month was corrected, and he was reinstated. It is because of this error of the officer of the local lodge that defendant bases its defense, which is entirely without merit.

When John Tramel refused to accept payment for sick benefits and authorized the proper officer of the local lodge to use said money to pay his dues in advance, it was equivalent to his paying to the local lodge that amount as dues. The local lodge, through its proper officer, was the proper agent of the grand lodge for the purpose of collecting dues, and we have repeatedly held payment of dues to the proper officer of the local lodge constitutes payment to the grand lodge, for the reason that the officer of the *142Real lodge is the agent of the grand lodge and not of the member. It therefore follows that! John Tramel had paid all dues owed by him on said endowment policy op until June 1, 1931, and was in good standing at the time he was suspended through error on December 13, 1930, and the suspension was illegal, wrongful, and without effect. He died February 4, 1931, and at that time' payment of the amount of the endowment policy was due to his beneficiary.

The judgment of the lower court is correct, and is therefore affirmed, with all costs.
FILED 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 May 18, 2005 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-13569

 

D. C. Docket No. 03-01489-CV-T-24MSS

and BKCY No. 00-02740-BK-ALP

In Re:

McDILL COLUMBUS CORPORATION,

Debtor,

 

MAYNARD FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

Y.C. FERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

 

(May 18, 2005)

Before DUBINA, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
 11th Cir. R. 36-1 provides:

1

When the court determines that any of the following circumstances exist:

(a) judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous;

(b) the evidence in support of a jury verdict is sufficient;

(c) the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a

whole;

(d) summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the pleadings is supported by the record;

(e) judgment has been entered without a reversible error of law; and an opinion would have no

precedential value, the judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion.

2

PER CURIAM:

AFFIRMED. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1.1
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                               SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Skyview Development Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), the undersigned certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of the undersigned's knowledge, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


Dated: August 10, 2007               By: /s/ Donald R. McKelvey
                                         ------------------------
                                         Donald R. McKelvey, President
                                         (Principal Executive Officer)


Dated: August 10, 2007               By: /s/ Donald R. McKelvey
                                         ------------------------
                                         Donald R. McKelvey
                                         Principal Financial Officer
#### Nicholas A. Garland, Pltff in Error, *v.*Isaac S. Britton, Deft in Error.

ERROR TO SANGAMON.

All process issuing from the Circuit Court, must he sealed with the judicial seal thereof, if there is any. If there is no seal, the clerk must affix his private seal, and certify that no public seal has been provided.

The service of an unsealed writ is without vitality, and unless the defendant appears, a decree or judgment is unauthorized.

This was a bill filed to foreclose a mortgage. The process served, was not attested by any seal. At the return term, the bill was taken for confessed, and a decree was entered by Treat, Justice, at November term, 1847. The plaintiff in error now seeks to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court, and assigns for error, the want of a seal to the summons.

Stuart and Edwards for'Pltff in Error.

S. T. Logan for Deft in Error.

Treat, C. J.

This was a suit in chancery to foreclose a mortgage. " The summons issued and served on the defendant, was not under the seal of the Court. The bill was taken for confessed, and a decree of foreclosure entered. The defendant sued out a writ of error. The statute declares that “ all process issuing from the said Circuit Courts, shall be sealed with the judicial seal which shall be provided for that purpose; but in case there shall not be a judicial seal, the clerk shall affix his private seal until a public one shall be provided.” R. S. ch. 29, §40. This statute is imperative- in its requirements. If a court has a *235judicial seal, it must be affixed to all of its process; if it has not, the clerk must use his private seal, but he ought in such case to certify that no public seal has been provided, for the presumption is that every court has a seal. The writ in this case did not purport to be under the seal of the court, nor the private S'al of the clerk. It was, therefore, without vitality, and the service of the same was .without effect. The defendant not being before the court, by the service of process, or by appearing in the case, the decree was unauthorised, and must be reversed. See Hannum *v.*Thompson, 1 Scammon, 238; and Anglin *v.*Nott, *ibid,*395.

. *Decree reversed.*
#### Joe V. Garza v. State.

No. 25510.

December 19, 1951.

Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing Denied (Without Written Opinion) February 13, 1952.

*7Hon. Harry M. Carroll, Judge Presiding.

*Hector de Pena,*and *Thurman Lee Mulhollan,*Corpus Christi, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is possession of marijuana, a narcotic drug; the punishment, two years in the penitentiary.

Appellant was arrested and searched by police officers who observed him coming out of a dark alley in the business district of Corpus Christi shortly after midnight.

Officer Wilkins testified that he and his fellow officer searched appellant and found a few traces of what he believed to be marijuana in the cuffs of his trousers and a marijuana cigarette in his hat band.

Appellant relies upon two bills of exception. Bill No. 1 complains of the testimony regarding the search, and Bill No. 2 of the marijuana cigarette as an exhibit.

Both bills set out the ground of the objection as follows:-

> “* * * that the results of such search of the defendant was inadmissible under the provisions of Article 727a, Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of Texas, in that the arrest of the defendant was an illegal arrest as being in violation of Articles 212, 213, 215, and 217, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, said arrest being made without a warrant, and that a proper predicate had not been laid under Article 725b of the Penal Code of Texas so as to authorize a search of the defendant * * *”

Nowhere in the bills does the trial court certify that in fact the officers had no search warrant, that in fact the officers had no warrant of arrest, or that in fact a proper predicate had not been laid for the search.

It follows that the bills are deficient and show no reversible *8error. See Martinez v. State, No. 25,563 (Page 91, this volume), 246 S. W. (2d) 633 this day decided and cases there cited.

No reversible error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.
#### In the Matter of the Application of the Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners for the City of New York for the Appointment of Three Commissioners, etc. Brooklyn and Manhattan Loop Lines, Brooklyn Sections.

The order of this court, granted January 25, 1907, will be made to conform to the order now in force in the first department. The application of the Public Service Commission for the first district, as the successor of the board of rapid transit railroad commissioners for the city of New York, for the abrogation of the condition contained in our order is, therefore, denied, hut the time limit contained in said order is extended until October 15, 1911. Hirschberg, P. J., Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor and Miller, JJ., concurred.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Koppers Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the
undersigned hereby certifies in his capacity as an officer of Koppers Inc., pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Koppers and will be retained by Koppers and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



|                        |  |                        
|----------------------- |  | -----------------------
|/s/ Walter W. Turner    |  | /s/ Brian H. McCurrie  
|Walter W. Turner        |  | Brian H. McCurrie      
|Chief Executive Officer |  | Chief Financial Officer
|March 17, 2005          |  | March 17, 2005
... 

# OR\G\NAL Jfn tbe mlniteb**~tates** 

# <!Court of jf 

# eberal <!Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 

# Fl LED No. 16-819V Filed: November 13, 2017 

## NOV 1

## 3 2017 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * CONNOR TOES, 

## * Petitioner,
V. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. 

### * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

## * * * * 

## * * * * 

## * Special Master Sanders U

.S

. C O URT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS Joint Stipulation of Dismissal; Vaccine Rule 21(a); No Judgment; Order Concluding Proceedings

Connor Toes, 

### Pro Se, Manhasset, NY, for Petitioner. Christine Becer, United States Department of Ju stice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
ORDER CONCLUDING PROCEEDINGS 1 On July 11, 2016, Connor Toes ("Petitioner") filed a petition for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S
.C
. §§ 300aa

- 1 to -34 (2012). 2 Petitioner alleged that the administration ofGardasil, varicella, and Menactra vaccines in July of2013 caused him to develop hypothyroidism, autonomic neuropathy, and chronic fatigue. Petition, ECF No. 1
. On November 9, 2017, Petitioner and Respondent submitted a joint Stipulation of Dismissal. Stip., ECF No. 44. Accordingly, pursuant to Vaccine Rule 2l(a), the above-captioned case is hereby dismissed without prejudice
. The Clerk of the Court is hereby instructed that a judgment shall not enter in the instant case pursuant to Vaccine Rule 21(a).

1 This decision shall be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of2002, 44 U
.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), a party has 14 days to identif y and move to delete medical or other information that satisfies the criteria in§ 300aa-12(d)(4)(B). Further, consistent with the rule requirement, a motion for redaction mu st include a propo sed redacted decision . If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within the requirements ofthat provision, such material will be deleted from public access. 2 The Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 et seq. (hereinafter "Vaccine Act," "the Act," or "the Program"). Hereafter, individual section references will be to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa ofthe Act. I 

### REISSUED FOR PUBLICATION DEC 7 2017 OSM U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

### IT IS SO ORDERED.

# ~ Herbrina D. Sanders ( Special Master

2
<Page>


EXHIBIT 21.1

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY
<Table>
<S>                                           <C>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NMS COMMUNICATIONS ASIA LTD.                  INNO MEDIA LOGIC (I.M.L.) COMPANY
1815-16 Concordia Plaza                       4200 rue La Periere
1 Science Museum Road                         Saint-Hubert, Quebec
Tsim Sha Tsui East                            Canada J3Y 9G3
Kowloon, Hong Kong
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NMS COMMUNICATIONS EUROPE S.A.                NMS COMMUNICATIONS TELECOM EUROPE S.A.
Immeuble Pericles                             Immeuble Pericles
144, Avenue Roger Salengro                    144, Avenue Roger Salengro
92370 Chaville, France                        92370 Chaville, France
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NMS COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL, INC.        NMS COMMUNICATIONS EUROPE, INC.
100 Crossing Boulevard                        100 Crossing Boulevard
Framingham, MA 01702                          Framingham, MA 01702
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NMS COMMUNICATIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION     MOBILEE, INC.
100 Crossing Boulevard                        100 Crossing Boulevard
Framingham, MA 01702                          Framingham, MA 01702
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
</Table>
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20389

Summary Calendar 

CHARLES R. ADAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

LIEUTENANT BAILEY; SERGEANT W. JOHNSTON; CORRECTIONAL 

OFFICER WALTSON, 

Defendants-Appellees 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:12-CV-2520

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Charles R. Adams, Texas prisoner # 1247914, appeals the jury verdict in 

favor of the defendants in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging excessive use of force 

and retaliation. He argues that the verdict was against the great weight of the 

evidence. Because Adams did not move before or after the verdict for a 

judgment as a matter of law, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 29, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-20389 Document: 00514134783 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/29/2017
No. 15-20389

2 

verdict is reviewed for plain error to determine “whether there was any 

evidence to support the jury verdict.” Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 

247 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 2001). Defendants Johnston and Bailey testified 

that they used force on Adams, who was resisting being secured, in order to 

subdue him. They stated that they did not slam, kick, hit, elbow, or knee 

Adams. Johnston and Bailey also testified that they did not retaliate against 

Adams for exercising a constitutional right. The jury, as the trier of fact, is 

responsible for resolving conflicting evidence and determining witness 

credibility, and thus could choose to believe the defendants over the testimony 

of Adams and Officer Brooks. See Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 453 (5th 

Cir. 1992). Based on that testimony, there was sufficient evidence to support 

the jury’s verdict. See Flowers, 247 F.3d at 238.

Adams’s motion for the appointment of counsel is denied, as he has not 

shown the existence of exceptional circumstances warranting such an 

appointment. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1982). 

Adams’s motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order 

is also denied because he has not shown that the instant case is an exceptional 

case. See Greene v. Fair, 314 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1963). Adams’s motion to 

expedite a ruling on his motion for an injunction is denied as moot. Finally, 

Adams’s motion to suspend under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 2, 

which the Clerk’s Office construed as motion for leave to file exhibits, is denied 

as unnecessary because the exhibits are contained in the district court record. 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED. 

 Case: 15-20389 Document: 00514134783 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/29/2017
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Solomon, Also Known as Robert Salaman, Appellant.

[679 NYS2d 97]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Daniel FitzGerald, J.), rendered February 7, 1994, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon *693in. the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to a term of 3V2 to 7 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied. We see no reason to disturb the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record (see, *People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761). The court’s instruction on the “place of business” exception of Penal Law § 265.02 (4) was correct. Defendant was not in his “place of business” when he stood on the street corner near his cab, ostensibly waiting to escort a customer to the cab *(People v Figueroa,*207 AD2d 670; *see also, People v Powell,*54 NY2d 524, 531; *People v Buckmire,*237 AD2d 151, 152, *lv denied*90 NY2d 902).

We perceive no abuse of sentencing discretion and find that the sentence was not based on any inappropriate criteria. Concur — Lerner, P. J., Milonas, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6528** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. JOESTILLES DEMARCO BROOKS, a/k/a Rock , Defendant

- Appellant

.

**No. 11**  **- 6738** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. JOESTILLES DEMARCO BROOKS, a/k/a Rock , Defendant

- Appellant.

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia , at Huntington

. Robert C. Chambers , District Judge. ( 3:02

- cr - 00 092

- 1; 3:05

- cv - 00163 )

Submitted : October 27, 2011 Decided: November 3, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.2 Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Joestilles DeMarco Brooks, Appellant Pro Se. Miller A. Bushong, III, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM: In these consolidated appeals, Joestilles De M arco Brooks seeks to appeal the district court ’ s order dismissing Brooks’ petition under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011) and denying his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The se order s are not appealable absent a certificate of appealability issued by the district court or a circuit judge . 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “ a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this st andard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85
. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Brooks has not made the requisite showing as to either order. Accordingly, we deny certificate s of appealability and dismiss the se appeal s . We dispense with oral argument because4 the facts a nd legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is C ourt and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Dempsey K. Mork, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report of Animal Cloning Sciences, Inc., Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the six
months ended June
30, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such
Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition
and results of operations of Animal Cloning Sciences, Inc., Inc.

Date: April 20, 2007

/s/ Dempsey K. Mork
   ------------------------------
Dempsey K.  Mork
President/Chief Executive Officer