alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
** **

**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CertificationPursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350**

** **

Pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1350 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350,Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of StoneTan China Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to suchofficer’s knowledge, that:

 

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterended March 31, 2008 of the Company fully complies with the requirementsof Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934and information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
| May 13,  2008 | /s/  Richard Tan |
|--------------------|------------------|
|               |   Name:     | Richard  Tan |
|               |   Title:    | Chief  Executive Officer, President and |
|               |             | Director  (Principal Executive and   Principal Financial Officer) |

 

 

----
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Inconnection with the quarterly report of Veracity Management Global, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2007 (the“Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof, I, Michael Rideman, CEO of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Michael Rideman

Michael RidemanCEODated: February 14, 2008

A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906 has been provided to Veracity Management Global, Inc.and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.
<PAGE>   1


                                                                EXHIBIT 23.1


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

The Board of Directors
The Cerplex Group, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos.
33-84946 and 333-18431) on Form S-8 and the registration statement (No.
333-12581) on Form S-3 of The Cerplex Group, Inc. of our report dated February
21, 1997 except as to Notes 12(a), 12(b) and the first and second paragraphs of
Note 18 which are as of April 9, 1997, Note 20 which is as of April 11, 1997 and
Note 1(o) which is as of October 14, 1997, relating to the consolidated balance
sheets of The Cerplex Group, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1996 and
1995, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders'
equity (deficiency) and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year
period ended December 31, 1996, and the related schedule, which reports appear
in the December 31, 1996 annual report on Form 10-K of The Cerplex Group, Inc.
Our report noted above contains an explanatory paragraph that states that the
Company adopted the provisions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 121, "Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived
Assets to Be Disposed of," during 1996.



                                                KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP


Orange County, California
October 14, 1997
#### Leander M. Dix, Appellant, v. The Village of Randolph, Respondent.

Motion denied, with ten dollars costs.
18355.

#### Shurley *v.*The State.

Hawkins, Justice.

Barney W. Shurley, Sr., was tried for the offense of rape and sentenced from 5 to 7 years. The question of consent is not involved, for the reason that the alleged victim was under the age of 14 years. The defendant’s motion for a new trial on the general grounds and one special ground, complaining of the charge, was denied and he excepted. *Held:*

1. “A pauper affidavit filed for the purpose of relieving the plaintiff in error and his counsel from the payment of the costs accruing in this court must be entitled in the cause referred to in the bill of exceptions, or otherwise show upon its face that it is connected therewith.” *Franklin*v. *Kriegshaber,*114 *Ga.*947 (2) (41 S. E. 47). Where, as here, a pauper affidavit is filed which is not in conformity with the above ruling, but merely recites: “Personally appeared . . . Barney W. Shurley, *137Sr., who on oath deposes and says that he is the plaintiff in error in the foregoing bill of exceptions,” is not' entitled in the cause, and does not name the defendant in error, or otherwise disclose the bill of exceptions to which it refers, which affidavit was not attached to the bill of exceptions in the present case, and was filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court one day after the filing of the bill of exceptions — such affidavit is insufficient; and where counsel for the plaintiff in error has paid the costs in this court, they will not be refunded. *Brucker*v. *O’Connor,*115 *Ga.*95, 97 (41 S. E. 245); *Perkins*v. *Rowland,*69 *Ga.*661 (1a); *Summerour*v. *State,*172 *Ga.*560 (1c) (158 S. E. 327).

Submitted September 15, 1953

Decided October 14, 1953.

*George B. Culpepper, Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*Wm. M. West, Solicitor-General, Chas. F. Adams, Assistant Solicitor-General, Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Rubye G. Jackson,*contra.

2. Where, as here, the trial judge omitted in the charge originally given to the jury any instruction with reference to the defendant’s statement, but upon his attention being called thereto, and before the jury left the jury box, properly instructed them with reference to such statement, a ground of a motion for new trial assigning error because such instruction was omitted from the charge originally given to the jury is without merit. *Davis*v. *State,*122 *Ga.*564 (3) (50 S. E. 376); *Patterson*v. *State,*122 *Ga.*587 (1) (50 S. E. 489); *Wallace*v. *State,*126 *Ga.*749 (1) (55 S. E. 1042); *Russell*v. *Tucker,*136 *Ga.*136 (5) (70 S. E. 1018); *Blount*v. *Dean,*187 *Ga.*494 (7) (1 S. E. 2d 653).

3. A careful examination of the record in this case reveals some evidence to corroborate the testimony of the alleged victim, and “it is not for this court to pass upon its probative value; but the verdict of the jury under a proper charge from the court, having resolved that issue and having the approval of the trial judge, will not be disturbed.” *Dorsey*v. *State,*204 *Ga.*345, 347 (1) (49 S. E. 2d 886); *Climer*v. *State,*204 *Ga.*776, 779 (1) (51 S. E. 2d 802); *Strickland*v. *State,*207 *Ga.*284 (61 S. E. 2d 118).

*Judgment affimed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
**EXHIBIT 21.0**

 

**SUBSIDIARIES**

 

•              TransWorld Gaming of Louisiana, Inc.

 

•              TransWorld Gaming Management Corp.-Cyprus

 

•              TransWorld Gaming Finance Corp.

 

•              TransWorld Gaming International U.S. Corporation

 

•              21stCentury Resorts

 

•              AmericanChance Casinos (formerly LMJ Casino Rozvadov)

 

•              LMJSlots

 

•              ArtMarketing Ltd. (d/b/a Totenham & Co.)

 

•              SC98A,sro

 

•              AtlanticProperties, sro

 

•              TransWorld Corp. Europe, Ltd.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          19,993
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   84,615
<ALLOWANCES>                                       797
<INVENTORY>                                     95,642
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               225,470
<PP&E>                                         378,176
<DEPRECIATION>                                 187,292
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 500,175
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          116,270
<BONDS>                                        186,094
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         21
<COMMON>                                            55
<OTHER-SE>                                      11,700
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   500,175
<SALES>                                        593,060
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               593,060
<CGS>                                          501,349
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  598,348
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,414
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              17,251
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (18,635)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (19,674)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,039
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (6,696)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,657)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.65)


</TABLE>
(No. 24175.

#### The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, *vs.*James Causey *et al.*Plaintiffs in Error.

*Opinion filed December*15, *1937.*

G. C. Borders, for plaintiffs in error.

Otto KERNER, Attorney General, Louis P. ZerwEcic, State’s Atorney, A. B. Dennis, and R. V. Gustin, for the People.

Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs in error were convicted at the January, 1936, term of the circuit court of St. Clair county of the crime of robbery. The verdict of the jury was returned on March 19, 1936. A motion for a new trial was denied on March 24, 1936, and the plaintiffs in error were sentenced to the penitentiary, where they have since been incarcerated. More than a year later; on April 8, 1937, plaintiffs in error sued out a writ of error from this court and a bill of exceptions was certified by the trial judge on May 3,1937. The grounds urged for reversal are that the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction, errors in the admission of testimony, and in the giving and refusal of instructions.

Defendant in error has filed a motion to strike the bill of exceptions on the ground that it was not filed in due *462time. We have held consistently, in many cases, that a bill of exceptions must be filed within the term of court at which judgment was entered or within a time fixed during that term. *(People*v. *Keller,*353 Ill. 411; *People*v. *Jenkins,*353 id. 152; *People*v. *Duyvejonck,*337 id. 636; *People*v. *Irwin,*283 id. 51; *People*v. *Ellsworth,*261 id. 275; *People*v. *Strauch,*247 id. 220; *People*v. *Dougherty,*118 id. 160.) Here, the bill of exceptions was filed more than a year after the entry of the judgment and no extension was ever sought or obtained. The motion to strike the bill of exceptions must, therefore, be allowed. Inasmuch as the errors complained of do not appear in the common law record there is nothing for us to review, and the judgment is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### Ex Parte Tony Marteliano.

No. 24989.

November 1, 1950.

*222
      *Oxford & Ramsour,*Edinburg, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the 93rd District Court of Hidalgo County alleging that he was arrested in Tennessee and brought back to said county and incarcerated on a charge of murder. From an order of the court refusing to reduce his bail from three thousand dollars to one thousand dollars he has appealed.

The statement of facts in the record shows that appellant could make bond in the sum of one thousand dollars, but that the people who had agreed to sign that bond would not sign one for three thousand dollars. It is shown that he is a stranger in the county and has no other person upon whom he may call for bond. Neither the merits of the case nor the defense which he makes to the charge are indicated by the record. We are aware of no reason why we should not sustain the order of the trial court.

It is claimed in the pleading that appellant has been confined in the jail for a period of approximately one year, during which time he has continuously demanded a trial. There is no evidence to sustain this allegation. If appellant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial he should have relief, but the question is not before us in the state of the record.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 23.1 - Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 Nos. 33-78412 and 333-4540) pertaining to the McWhorter Technologies,
Inc. 1994 Stock Incentive Plan, McWhorter Technologies, Inc. Employee 401(k)
Savings Plan, McWhorter Technologies, Inc. 1996 Incentive Stock Plan and
McWhorter Technologies, Inc. 1996 Nonemployee Director Stock Option and Award
Plan of our report dated November 18, 1998, with respect to the consolidated
financial statements of McWhorter Technologies, Inc. included in the Annual
Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended October 31, 1998.




                              ERNST & YOUNG LLP



Chicago, Illinois
January 25, 1999
#### Elmer Hardy v. State

No. 25626.

January 9, 1952.

Hon. Ira Gallaway, Judge Presiding.

*R. E. Murphey,*Coleman, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The conviction is for possession of whiskey for the purpose of sale in a dry area with punishment assessed at 60 days in jail and a fine of $250.

The statement of facts has been carefully examined, and we find no proof showing the dry status of the area in which the liquor was found.

It follows that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction.

*560In view of another trial, attention is directed to the cases of Wood v. State, (Page 419, this volume), 243 S.W. (2) 31, and Buck v. State, (Page 456 of this volume), 243 S.W. (2) 700, wherein search warrants were held invalid because of the use of “and/or” in setting* forth the name of the person in charge of the premises to be searched.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Opinion approved by the court.
#### T. L. BERGAMINI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mrs. J. F. BRENNAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16106.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

June 24, 1935.

Michel Musson, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Harold J. Winling, of New Orleans, for appellee.

LECHE, Judge.

Plaintiff, as holder and owner thereof, filed this suit against defendant as the in-dorser of a certain promissory note in the sum of $500, with interest and attorney’s fees. The defendant filed her answer admitting the note and her signature thereto, but setting up the special defense that the whole transaction was involved in the gambling business contrary to the laws of this state, consequently there was no valid consideration therefor, and praying that the suit be dismissed. Plaintiff then filed a motion to show cause why judgment should not be rendered on the face of the pleadings, inasmuch as defendant had admitted certain material allegations of fact contained in plaintiff’s petition, and judgment was so rendered. It is from this judgment that defendant appeals.

It is true that defendant admitted certain allegations of fact contained in the petition, but it is obvious from a perusal of the answer that defendant intended to and did allege a special defense that the note sued on was involved in a gambling transaction, and therefore illegal, null, and void. Our interpretation of the answer convinces us that defendant is entitled to a trial on the merits and an opportunity to prove the special defense set up by her, and, for the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is annulled, avoided, and reversed, and it is now ordered that this case be remanded to the civil district court for the parish of Orleans for further proceedings according to law and not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-01-00018-CR

Chris Aguilar, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 0991193, HONORABLE WILFORD FLOWERS, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

Appellant Chris Aguilar pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 22.021 (West Supp. 2001). The district court adjudged him guilty and assessed

punishment at imprisonment for twenty-five years, as called for in a plea bargain agreement.

Appellant filed a general notice of appeal.

When a defendant pleads guilty to a felony and the punishment assessed does not

exceed that recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant, the notice of appeal

must state that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect, or that the substance of the appeal was raised

by written motion and ruled on before trial, or that the trial court granted permission to appeal. Tex.

R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3). Appellant’s notice of appeal did not comply with this rule and fails to confer

jurisdiction on this Court. Whitt v. State, No. 03-00-00194-CR (Tex. App.—Austin April 19, 2001,

no pet. hist.); see also Cooper v. State, No. 1100-99, slip op. at 6-8 (Tex. Crim. App. April 4, 2001).
2

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Puryear

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: April 26, 2001

Do Not Publish
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection withthe Annual Report of NMS Communications Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the year ending December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert P. Schechter,Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, asadopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best ofmy knowledge:

(1)   the Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)   the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.
| /s/  ROBERT P. SCHECHTER |   |
|------------------------------------|--------|
| Robert P. Schechter                |   |
| Chief Executive Officer            |   |
| March 16, 2007                |   |

 

This Certification shall not be deemed part of theReport or incorporated by reference into any of the Company’s filings with theSecurities and Exchange Commission by implication or by any reference in anysuch filings to the Report.

----
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  EXHIBIT 21.1


                   SUBSIDIARIES OF ELTRON INTERNATIONAL, INC.

1.    Donner Media, Incorporated, a Wisconsin corporation (80% owned subsidiary)

2.    Privilege S.A., a French corporation

3.    RJS, Inc., a California corporation

4.    Eltron International, FSC, a Barbados corporation

5.    Eltron Holdings Limited, a United Kingdom corporation

6.    Russet Limited, a United Kingdom corporation

7.    Eltron International Limited, a United Kingdom corporation

8.    Eltron Singapore, a Singapore corporation
#### Succession of MORRIS.*

No. 13281.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

May 30, 1932.

Theo. Cotonio and Theo. Ootonio, Jr., both of New Orleans, for appellant John Segretto.

Chas. J. Mundy, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee Luella Morris Brandon.

*

 Rehearing denied June 27, 1932.

WESTEBPIELD, J.

George Morris died in the city of New Orleans on March 21, 1923. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company had issued three policies of insurance upon Morris’ life, which John Segretto claimed had been pledged to him in repayment of advances made to Morris during his lifetime and in recognition of his generosity toward him. Luella Brandon Morris, claiming to be the heir of the deceased,-George Morris, contested the right of Segretto to the avails of the policies and was maintained in her position by this court. See Succession of Morris, 7 La. App. 645. The ease was here again when, in 10 La. App. 650, 121 So. 358, we affirmed a judgment of the trial court ordering the clerk of that court to turn over to Luella Morris Brandon the funds deposited, by the insurer, following that court’s dismissal of an intervention ‘filed by Segretto. Subsequent to the two decisions by this court to which we have referred and an unsuccessful attempt in each case to obtain a writ of review from the Supreme Court, Segretto, through his active and industrious counsel, applied for an injunction to prevent the clerk of the civil district court from paying to Luella Morris Brandon the proceeds of the life insurance policies, which had, in the meantime, been deposited in the registry of the civil district court upon the ground that Luella Morris Brandon was not, in fact, the heir of the deceased, George Morris. To this petition of injunction counsel for Luella Morris Brandon filed exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action, which, after hearing, were maintained and plaintiff’s suit dismissed. A devolutive appeal was taken from this judgment, and, upon the argument of the case before us, both counsel informed the court that the clerk had, since the rendition of the judgment, paid over the proceeds of the life insurance policies to Luella Morris Brandon, as, indeed, the clerk was obliged to do, since such action was in compliance with an order of the court, from which no suspensive appeal had been prosecuted.

The situation before us, therefore, involves the right of plaintiff to enjoin an act which has already been done and is an accomplished fact. This is not the function of injunction. Trevigne v. School Board, 31 La. Ann. 105; Adams v. Town of Ruston, 3 La. App. 188. If plaintiff has any claim against Luella Morris Brandon, the recipient of the proceeds of the insurance policies on the life of George Morris, and is entitled to any sort of judgment as against her, he mlist assert his claim in some other proceeding.

Whether the district court was right or wrong in refusing the injunction is a matter of no concern, since it cannot be issued at this time following the commission of the act which it was sought to prevent.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.