UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, CELTNIEKS, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Sergeant First Class GREGORY L. MCQUEEN, JR. 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20150166 

Headquarters, III Corps and Fort Hood 

Rebecca K. Connally, Military Judge 

Colonel Ian G. Corey, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Lieutenant Colonel Travis L. Rogers, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Melissa R. Covolesky, JA; Major Andres 

Vazquez, Jr., JA; Captain Katherine L. DePaul, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Courie III, 

JA; Major Anne C. Hsieh, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Karen J. Borgerding, JA (on 

brief). 

25 May 2017 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of four specifications of attempted pandering, one 

specification of conspiracy to patronize a prostitute, one specification of conspiracy 

to solicit prostitution, one specification of conspiracy to solicit a prostitute, two 

specifications of violating a lawful general regulation, one specification of 

dereliction of duty, two specifications of maltreatment of a subordinate, one 

specification of adultery, and two specifications of pandering in violation of Articles 

80, 81, 92, 93, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 881, 

892, 893, 934 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. Additionally, the military judge 

convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of assault 

consummated by battery in violation of Article 128, UCMJ. The convening 
MCQUEEN—ARMY 20150166 

2

authority approved the adjudged sentence of a dishonorable discharge, confinement 

for twenty-four months, and reduction to the grade of E-1.1

This case is before us for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellate defense 

counsel assigns one error to this court, and appellant personally raises matters 

pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). After due 

consideration, we find the assigned error warrants discussion and relief; the matters 

raised under Grostefon are without merit. 

BACKGROUND

In Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge III, appellant was charged with violating a 

lawful general regulation in violation of Article 92, UCMJ, as follows: 

Specification 1: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, at or 

near Fort Hood, Texas, on divers occasions, between on or 

about 1 February 2013 and on or about 25 March 2013, 

violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph 3c, 

III Corps and Fort Hood Regulation 210-65, dated 1 May 

1995, by wrongfully purchasing for, and giving an 

alcoholic beverage to, Private First Class [(PFC) SD], a 

person under 21 years of age. 

Specification 2: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, at or 

near Fort Hood, Texas, between on or about 1 February 

2013 and on or about 25 March 2013, violate a lawful 

general regulation, to wit: paragraph 3c, III Corps and 

Fort Hood Regulation 210-65, dated 1 May 1995, by 

wrongfully purchasing for, and giving an alcoholic 

beverage to, Private [(PV2) AG], a person under 21 years 

of age. 

At trial, the military judge recited the elements for these specifications: 

(1) That there was in existence a certain lawful general 

regulation . . . ; 

(2) That you had a duty to obey such regulation; and 

(3) That on divers occasions, between on or about 

1 February 2013 and on or about 25 March 2013, at or 

                                                                 1

 Prior to action, the convening authority deferred automatic forfeitures of all pay 

and allowances and reduction in grade, effective 26 March 2015 until 13 June 2015. 
MCQUEEN—ARMY 20150166 

3

near Fort Hood, Texas, you violated this lawful regulation 

by wrongfully giving an alcoholic beverage to PFC [SW], 

a person under 21 years of age. 

. . . . 

(3) That between on or about 1 February 2013 and on or 

about 25 March 2013, at or near Fort Hood, Texas, you 

violated this lawful regulation by wrongfully giving an 

alcoholic beverage to [PV2 AG], a person under 21 years 

of age. 

The military judge did not define “wrongfully” in the context of the 

Article 92, UCMJ, violations. During the providence inquiry regarding these 

specifications, the military judge asked appellant: 

MJ: How old was PFC [SW]? 

ACC: At the time, I believe, she was 19 or 20, ma’am. 

MJ: And how do you know her age? 

ACC: I just found out subsequently. 

MJ: But you know now that she was under 21 years of age? 

ACC: Yes, ma’am. 

. . . . 

MJ: Okay. How old is [PV2 AG]? [sic] Was she between 

February, 2013 and 25 March 2013? 

ACC: I believe at the time she was 20. 

MJ: So, she was under 21? 

ACC: Yes, ma’am. 

There was no further discussion about the respective ages of PFC SW and PV2 AG 

in the colloquy. The military judge found appellant’s pleas provident and accepted 

them.2

                                                                 2

 Appellant pleaded guilty except the words, “purchasing for, and” to both 

specifications. Additionally, the military judge found appellant not guilty of the 

words “on divers occasions” in Specification 1 of Charge III. 
MCQUEEN—ARMY 20150166 

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LAW AND DISCUSSION 

Appellant now alleges there is a substantial basis in law or fact to question the 

providency of his pleas of guilty to violating a lawful general regulation under 

Article 92, UCMJ. Specifically, appellant cites United States v. Gifford, 75 M.J. 

140 (C.A.A.F. 2016), a case decided by our superior court after appellant’s courtmartial that directs the military judge to address the unstated mens rea required for a 

conviction of an Article 92, UCMJ, offense. Appellant argues his pleas were 

improvident because the providency inquiry failed to establish he knew or was 

reckless as to whether PFC SW and PV2 AG were under age twenty-one at the time 

he provided them with alcohol. 

While there was no abuse of discretion by the military judge at the time, 

appellant is nonetheless entitled to avail himself of a “new rule” when the law 

changes while his case is on direct appeal. See United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 

154, 160-61 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (Ryan, J., concurring). Here, the military judge did not 

have the benefit of our superior court’s opinion in Gifford during appellant’s 

providence inquiry. As a result, the providence inquiry was not sufficient to 

establish the mens rea required to make appellant’s violation of the lawful general 

regulation wrongful. We will take appropriate action in our decretal paragraph. 

CONCLUSION 

The findings of guilty of Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge III are set aside and 

DISMISSED. The remaining findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. We are able to 

reassess the sentence on the basis of the error noted and do so after conducting a 

thorough analysis of the totality of circumstances presented by appellant’s case and 

in accordance with the principles articulated by our superior court in United States 

v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013), and United States v. Sales, 22 

M.J. 305, 307-08 (C.M.A. 1986). Based on the entire record and appellant’s course 

of conduct, we are confident the military judge would have imposed a sentence of at 

least that which was adjudged, and accordingly we AFFIRM the sentence. 

We find this reassessed sentence is not only purged of any error but is also 

appropriate. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has been 

deprived by virtue of that portion of the findings set aside by our decision, are 

ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58a(b), 75(a). 

FOR THE COURT: 

JOHN P. TAITT 

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court 

JOHN P. TAITT 

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: