* Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in Fifth Circuit Rule

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-60602

Summary Calendar

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MARTHA ELIZABETH REEVES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION; ET AL,

Defendants,

DOLGENCORP INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(3:97-CV-467-LN)

April 23, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Pla int iff Martha Reeves appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claims pursuant to

Defendant Dolgencorp, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

I

Reeves worked as a

st o re manager for Dolgencorp in Pearl, Mississippi. While at work,-2-

Reeves fell and injured her knee. Although she continued to work for several weeks, Reeves

eventually required surgery for her injuries. She returned to work after about two months, but was

terminated three days later. Reeves sued Dolgencorp, alleging that she was terminated in violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.

To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaint iff must show that,

among other things, he or she is a “qualified individual for the job in question.” H amilto n v.

Southw estern Bell Tel. Co.

, 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998). To make that showing, the plaintiff

must demonstrate either that (1) he or she could perform the essential functions of the job in spite of

his disabilit y, or (2) a reasonable accommodation of his or her disability would have enabled him or

her to perform the essential functions of the job. S ee Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.

, 101 F.3d

1090, 1093 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court granted summary judgment on t he grounds that

Reeves failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was

a “qualified individual” under the ADA. Specifically, the district co urt ruled that stocking

merchandise was an essential part of Reeves’s job as store manager, and that Reeves could no longer

perform that function.

II

We review summary judgment rulings de novo , applying the same standard applied by the

distri ct court. S ee Alton v. Texas A&M Univ.

, 168 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1999). Summary

judgment is appropriate where the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F E D

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c). “Where

critical evidence is so weak or tenu o us on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in

favor of the nonmovant, or where it is so overwh elming that it mandates judgment in favor of the

movant, summary judgment is appropriate.” Alton , 168 F.3d at 199.

Included in the summary judgment record is Dolgencorp’s written job description of Reeves’s1 An employer’s “written job description[]” is valid evidence that a particular task is an essential

job function. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

-3- store manager position. 1 This document provides that stocking merchandise, unloading trucks, and

performing other receiving functions are among the “essential jo b functions” of a store manager.

Also in the summary judgment record is Reeves’s deposition. Reeves testified that her knee injury

prevented her from performing any aspects of her job that required standing or walking. She testified

that because of her injuries, she co uld no longer unload trucks. Reeves also testified that her job

normally required her to be on her feet for ten hours a day.

Reeves does not contest that the tasks of stoc king and unloading require standing and

walking. Rather, Reeves argues that the evidence is inconclusive as to whether her essential duties

as manager required her to st o ck goods and unload trucks manually, or whether she was required

merely to oversee that process. She notes that under Dolgencorp’s written description, some of the

manager’s responsibilities include mer ely “ensur[ing]” that certain tasks are accomplished and

“oversee[ing]” such tasks. However, Reeves cites solely to the manager’s “Store Management”

functions. She neglects to point out that among the manager’s essential functions are certain “Clerical

Duties,” which include “[s]tock[ing] merchandise adequately in the store” and “[u]nload[ing] trucks

and perform[ing] other receiving functions properly.” These clerical duties do not require merely that

the store manager ensure that stocking and unloading is accomplished. Rather, they require that the

store manager “[s]tock” and “[u]nload.” Consequently, Reeves fails to raise a genuine issue of fact

as to her essential job functions.

Nonetheless, Reeves argues on appeal that the evidence created a genuine issue as to whether

she could perform the job’s essential fu nct io ns. Reeves notes that during the weeks between her

injury and her surgery, before Dolgencorp terminated her, she was able to work at her job. However,

Reeves does not poin t t o any specific part of the record to support this assertion in her initial

appellate brief. The evidence to which she cites in her reply brief suggests only that Reeves was able

to “maintain regular att endance” during the weeks between her injury and her surgery. Such2 In assessing whether the plaintiff is a qualified individual, we focus on whether he or she was

qualified at the time of his or her termination. S ee Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc.

, 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996).

3 Moreove r, Reeves fails to produce evidence that her capabilities before her surgery were the

same as her capabilities after her surgery. To the contrary, the record suggests that after her surgery,

Reeves was subject to additional restrictions from her doctor.

4 Although Reeves does not mention the VE’s affidavit in her distri ct court memorandum i n response to the summary judgment motion, she does refer generally to the affidavit in her response

to summary judgment motion. Reeves’s response and her memorandum are two separate documents.

However, Reeves’s response does not cite specific parts of the VE’s affidavit, nor does it explain why

the affidavit supports Reeves’s claim that she was qualified under the ADA.

-4- testimony does not indicate that she was able to perform all of her essential duties during that time.

Therefore, this eviden ce fails t o raise an inference that she could perform all of the job’s essential

functions at the time Dolgencorp terminated her. 2 Even if Reeves’s ability to work before her surgery

raises a slight inference that she is a qualified indi vidual, any such inference is overwhelmed by

Reeves’s own testimony that she could not perform any aspects of the job that required standing or

walking. 3

Reeves also cites to the affidavit of a vocational expert (VE) as evidence that she was a

qualified individual. In her memorandum to the district court, however, Reeves failed to argue that

the VE’s affidavit raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was a qualified individu al. 4

Accordingly, we need not consider such evidence on appeal. S ee Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc.

, 101 F.3d

448, 463 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The district court had no ob ligat ion to consider evidence that the

[plaintiffs] did not bring forth in opposition to the summary judgment motions

. . . [a]nd we have no

obligation to do so here on appeal.”) (citations omitted).

Even if we were to examine the VE’s affidavit, we find it insufficient to produce a genuine

issue of fact as to whether Reeves was qualified. The VE acknowledged that Reeves may require

accommodation to perform her stocking responsibi lit ies. Indeed, Reeves admitted in her

memorandum to the district court that the stocking and unloading aspects of her job would require

accommodation. On appeal, however, Reeves fails to suggest any such accommodation. Rather she

simply challenges whether physical unloading and stocking are truly essential functions of her job as-5-

manager. As we explain above, the uncontested evidence is that they are essential functions.

III

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court.