NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

NORMAN A. HARRIS,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2019-2421

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 17-3923, Chief Judge Robert N. Davis.

______________________

Decided: March 23, 2020

______________________

NORMAN A. HARRIS, Greenville, IN, pro se. 

 ANTONIA RAMOS SOARES, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD,

ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, DEREK 

SCADDEN, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

Case: 19-2421 Document: 24 Page: 1 Filed: 03/23/2020
2 HARRIS v. WILKIE

 ______________________

Before WALLACH, PLAGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Norman A. Harris appeals a decision of the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans 

Court”), affirming the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ 

(“Board”) denial of entitlement to an effective date before 

July 29, 2002, for the award of service-connected disability 

benefits for Mr. Harris’s skin condition. Harris v. Wilkie, 

No. 17-3923, 2019 WL 1995773, at *3–4 (Vet. App. May 7, 

2019). Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard 

“The jurisdiction of this court to review decisions of the 

Veterans Court is limited by statute.” Gazelle v. Shulkin, 

868 F.3d 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). We 

may “review and decide any challenge to the validity of any 

statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof . . .

and . . . interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 

to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 

38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2012). Absent a constitutional issue, 

however, we lack subject matter jurisdiction over “(A) a 

challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to 

a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular 

case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2); see Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d

1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

II. We Lack Jurisdiction over Mr. Harris’s Appeal 

Mr. Harris’s appeal involves neither the interpretation 

of a statute or regulation nor a constitutional issue; instead, Mr. Harris raises only issues of fact that we may not 

review. See generally Appellant’s Br. First, Mr. Harris 

contends that “[t]he Board refused to grant service connection benefits for his diagnosed skin condition[] effective to 

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HARRIS v. WILKIE 3

1985 by attempting to discredit [his] evidence[.]” Id. at 3. 

Mr. Harris, a U.S. Army veteran who served in Vietnam, 

A. App. 87,1 “suffers from a service-connected skin condition, characterized as contact dermatitis and a latex allergy,” Harris, 2019 WL 1995773, at *1. On January 24,

1985, a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) medical examiner diagnosed Mr. Harris with “[m]aculopapular 

exfoliative dermatitis . . . highly suggestive of contact dermatitis, with a history of allergy to rubber and new plastics . . . , but not related to Agent Orange.” A. App. 87, 89–

90.2 In 2001, however, a different VA medical examiner 

concluded that “Mr. Harris’s skin condition resulted from 

exposure to Agent Orange.” Harris v. McDonald, No. 14-

0649, 2015 WL 6087176, at *1 (Vet. App. Oct. 16, 2015). 

On July 29, 2002, the VA received a document “indicat[ing] 

that [Mr. Harris] wanted to claim service connection for 

[his] skin condition . . . as a result of Agent Orange exposure.” In re Harris, No. 07-16 417, slip op. at 12 (Bd. Vet. 

App. June 27, 2017). In 2006, the VA regional office 

granted Mr. Harris service connection for his skin condition “with an evaluation of [ten] percent effective July 29, 

2002.” A. App. 92; see A. App. 92–94 (Rating Decision). Mr. 

Harris appealed to the Board, arguing that two forms completed during his 1985 VA medical examination constituted a claim for disability benefits, and thus, the effective 

date for his skin condition should be the date of that examination, i.e., January 24, 1985. Harris, slip op. at 10; see A. 

App. 83–91 (1985 Medical Examination Forms). In the decision from which Mr. Harris currently appeals, the Board 

found, and the Veterans Court affirmed, that “neither 

[form] constitute[d]” a claim for disability benefits, Harris, 

1 “A. App.” refers to the Appellee Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ Appendix attached to the response brief. 

2 Agent Orange is an “herbicide agent” used during 

the Vietnam War. Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371, 1373 

(Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc). 

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4 HARRIS v. WILKIE

slip op. at 12, and thus, Mr. Harris was not “[e]ntitle[d] to 

an effective date prior to July 29, 2002[,]” id. at 21. To the 

extent Mr. Harris seeks review of this finding, it is a factual 

determination that cannot be disturbed by this court. See 

38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)(A); see also Ellington v. Peake, 541 

F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that “we lack jurisdiction to consider [the veteran’s] claim for entitlement” 

to an earlier effective date for his service-connected medical conditions, as “the interpretation of the contents of a 

claim for benefits [i]s a factual issue over which we d[o] not 

have jurisdiction”). 

Second, Mr. Harris contends that the Veterans Court 

erred in affirming the Board’s reliance on Ellington. See 

generally Appellant’s Br. Specifically, Mr. Harris argues

that, by relying on Ellington, the Board misapplied the 

“standards” set forth in Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306

(Fed. Cir. 2004), Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370 (Fed.

Cir. 2004), and Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed.

Cir. 2001), Appellant’s Br. 5–6, which require the VA to 

“fully and sympathetically develop the veteran’s claim to 

its optimum before deciding it on its merits[,]” Roberson, 

251 F.3d at 1383 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). As with the veteran in Ellington, however, 

Mr. Harris “[can]not argue that the Veterans Court failed 

to consider or misinterpreted Moody, Szemraj, or Roberson[,]” as the Veterans Court “explicitly acknowledged 

[the] obligation to sympathetically read Mr. [Harris’s] 

claims in light of [those cases].” Ellington, 541 F.3d at 1372

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Harris, 2019 WL 

1995773, at *3 (explaining that the Board’s findings were

based on a “sympathetic or liberal reading” of the evidence); Harris, 2015 WL 6087176, at *4 (remanding to the 

Board for consideration of the evidence in light of Moody, 

Szemraj, and Roberson). Rather, Mr. Harris essentially argues that the Veterans Court erred in concluding that the 

Board satisfied its duty to sympathetically construe his 

claim when it concluded that his 1985 medical examination 

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HARRIS v. WILKIE 5

forms did not raise an informal claim for disability benefits, 

see, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 5–7, “a matter over which we lack 

jurisdiction,” as it “implicate[s] the application of law to 

fact,” Ellington, 541 F.3d at 1372; see 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2)(B). 

Finally, Mr. Harris broadly alleges “violation[s] of [his] 

Constitutional Rights for fair and impartial review,” Appellant’s Br. 11, and “due process of law,” id. at 7; see id. at 4, 

5. Mr. Harris’s arguments are, however, “constitutional in 

name only,” as “he has simply put a [constitutional] label 

on his contention” that the Veterans Court erred in affirming the Board’s reliance on Ellington. Helfer v. West, 174 

F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Payne v. McDonald, 

587 F. App’x 649, 651 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Absent an explanation providing an adequate basis for [the veteran’s] 

claims, mere assertions of constitutional violations cannot 

invoke our jurisdiction.”). See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 5 (“The 

Veterans Court ha[s] instead affirmed the Board[’s] review 

of the evidence of ‘that case[,’] Ellington, introduced by the 

Board, without the required standard of review for ‘prejudicial error[,’] . . . violating [Mr. Harris’s] due process for 

fairness.”). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over Mr. Harris’s appeal. 

CONCLUSION 

We do not have jurisdiction to review this appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Harris’s appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is 

DISMISSED 

Case: 19-2421 Document: 24 Page: 5 Filed: 03/23/2020