If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

WORD NETWORK OPERATING COMPANY, 

INC.,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

March 2, 2023

v No. 360140

Oakland Circuit Court

QUENTON ROSS and Q11 PHOTOGRAPHY, 

LLC,

LC No. 2020-181159-CB

Defendants/Counterplaintiffs/ThirdParty Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

and

MALEA HOWARD,

Defendant/Counterplaintiff/ThirdParty Plaintiff, 

and

KEVIN ADELL and RALPH LAMETI,

Third-Party Defendants.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and BORRELLO and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Quenton Ross and Q11 Photography, LLC (“Q11 Photography”) appeal as of 

right a judgment for plaintiff The Word Network (“TWN”), entered after a jury trial, awarding 

plaintiff $28,000 on its claims for common-law and statutory conversion. Defendants also 

challenge the trial court’s postjudgment order awarding plaintiff case evaluation sanctions. For 

the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND

TWN is a cable television network carrying religious programming. It appears that there 

is an affiliated radio station as well. Ross worked for TWN for over 10 years and held the position 

of senior editor and director of production. His responsibilities included overseeing production of 

shows that aired on the network, creating content for TWN, and working on various projects as 

directed by TWN’s owner and CEO, Kevin Adell. 

In addition to his position with plaintiff, Ross operated his own photography company, 

Q11 Photography. Page Alston testified that she had simultaneously worked for both TWN, as a 

production assistant where she reported to Ross, and Ross at Q11. She sometimes did Q11 work 

during her TWN work hours. 

There was evidence that on March 23, 2020, TWN laid off all non-essential personnel, 

including production and studio staff, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, although Ross 

admitted that he was told to go home and was not among those employees that would continue to 

report to work, Ross nonetheless maintained that he was never told that he was laid off or that he 

would not be returning to work at TWN. Ross testified that Adell merely told him that the station 

would be put on “auto-pilot” and that only essential employees would continue to report to work

during that time.

Pete Glass, the director of engineering for TWN, was one of the employees who was 

deemed essential and continued to report to work after March 23. He testified that TWN continued 

to produce one live half-hour show each day during this time, using Skype so as to avoid the need 

to bring the host to the studio. Producing and airing the show involved using the “switcher,” which 

apparently was some type of production or control board, that was located in the production truck

outside the studio.

Glass went to the studio on April 3, 2020, and discovered that monitors in the master 

control room were not operating correctly. He went out to the production truck and discovered 

that the switcher and a computer in the production truck were “inoperable.” Glass also testified 

that the videos and graphics stored on the internal hard drive of this computer had been deleted. 

Glass was unable to get the equipment to operate and it was needed to air the live show that day 

using Skype. However, he was eventually able to use Skype by bypassing the production truck.

Glass was asked to investigate whether anyone had entered the production truck during the

previous evening. Closed-circuit security video recordings showed that Ross entered the 

production truck on the night of April 2, 2020. The surveillance video then showed Ross entering 

the building where his office was located and entering his office, where he remained for almost an 

hour. He did not have a backpack when he entered the building, but he was carrying a backpack

when he left. TWN’s security records showed that Ross used an unassigned, backup keycard to 

enter the premises rather than using the security keycard assigned to him. Ross was at plaintiff’s 

premises from approximately 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m.

TWN also discovered that an iMac computer in Ross’s office was no longer operable. 

There was no sign-on screen to allow someone to enter the system to access content stored on the 

computer. The computer was sent out for forensic analysis, but it was apparently not possible to 
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recover the data from the computer without Ross’s administrator username and password. Glass 

indicated that he would have expected this computer to contain shows, graphics, and artwork for 

TWN. Adell testified that he would have expected there to be “years and years of stuff that we 

could call back” stored on Ross’s computer, such as old shows and interviews. Adell explained 

that it was common to reuse old content, and that the material on Ross’s computer was not 

replaceable. However, Adell also seemed to indicate that there were other hard drives and servers 

where this content may have been stored, while simultaneously claiming that content was 

“probably” missing and that he did not know what was stored on backup servers because he 

maintained a “50,000 foot overview” of operations at TWN.

Testimony was introduced at trial that the switcher in the production truck was no longer 

operable and was no longer being used. There was also testimony that everything in the production 

truck had been working on April 2, 2020, when Glass checked at 5:00 p.m., before Glass left for 

the day and before Ross went into the production truck later that night. 

At trial, Ross admitted that he entered the production truck and his office in the editing 

suite that night. He admitted going into the production truck to “delete” the “user preferences”

that he had created on the switcher and that he did not have permission to do so. Ross also admitted 

that he deleted videos and files from his office computer on the night of April 2, 2020. He claimed 

he “was deleting files that we no longer use” and that he was acting for a legitimate business 

reason. Ross maintained that anything he deleted was obsolete and that content he created was 

still available to TWN on other computers or servers. He sent an e-mail at some point to staff with 

a photograph of items he claimed were in the backpack that he took from his office. Those items 

consisted of a coffee mug, a Bible, and two external hard drives that Ross claimed were his 

personal property. TWN requested that Ross produce those hard drives during discovery, but Ross 

claimed that they had been lost.

There was evidence at trial that TWN made an insurance claim for the switcher, that the 

damage was determined to be about $25,000, and that TWN consequently received a $19,000 

payment from its insurer after the insurance company factored in TWN’s deductible. There was 

additional evidence that TWN was seeking $600,000 in damages from Ross, which was the amount 

of Ross’s salary over the past 5 years during which he created the content that TWN alleged was 

deleted.

The jury found defendant Ross liable for common law conversion and statutory conversion, 

and the jury found defendant Q11 Photography liable for statutory conversion. The jury awarded 

plaintiff damages of $28,000 against defendants Ross and Q11 Photography. This appeal 

followed.

I. DIRECTED VERDICT AND JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

Defendants first argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a directed 

verdict at trial and by also denying their subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict (“JNOV”). Defendants contend that the trial evidence was insufficient to identify the 

converted property and that the damages awarded were based on speculation such that defendants

were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
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This Court reviews “de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict.” 

Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 345; 871 NW2d 136 

(2015). “A party is entitled to a directed verdict if the evidence, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, fails to establish a claim as a matter of law.” Id. If the evidence 

could cause reasonable jurors to disagree, the trial court is not permitted to substitute its judgment 

for that of the jury. Lamson v Martin (After Remand), 216 Mich App 452, 455; 549 NW2d 878 

(1996). 

This Court also reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for JNOV. 

Craig ex rel Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 77; 684 NW2d 296 (2004). This Court must 

“review the evidence and all legitimate inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party” and “[o]nly when the evidence viewed in this light fails to establish a claim as a matter of 

law is the moving party entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).” Id. (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). “[I]f reasonable jurors could have honestly reached different 

conclusions, the jury verdict must stand.” Hecht v Nat’l Heritage Academies, Inc, 499 Mich 586, 

605-606; 886 NW2d 135 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[U]nless a plaintiff’s 

case is wholly lacking evidence on an element of a claim, the jury is allowed to make reasonable 

inferences from the evidence and make credibility determinations.” Id. at 606 n 29. It is the jury’s 

task to make determinations about witness credibility and the weight to be given to witness 

testimony. Id.

This action involves claims of both common-law conversion and statutory conversion. 

“Under the common law, conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over 

another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.” Aroma Wines, 497 

Mich at 346 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has held that commonlaw conversion is a tort that “broadly encompasse[s] any conduct inconsistent with the owner’s 

property rights.” Id. at 353. Statutory conversion is defined in MCL 600.2919a and is a separate 

cause of action that is similar, but not identical, to common-law conversion. Aroma Wines, 497 

Mich at 353-354, 361. An action under MCL 600.2919a may be pursued “in addition to any other 

right or remedy the person may have at law or otherwise.” MCL 600.2919a(2).

Here, defendants do not make any distinction in their appellate arguments between the 

common-law and statutory conversion claims. Defendants appear to argue that they were entitled

to judgment as a matter of law in their favor on both types of conversion claims because there was 

insufficient evidence to identify any property that was actually converted and the claimed damages 

were based on speculation. 

These two particular issues—property alleged to have been converted and alleged 

damages—are clearly common to both common-law and statutory conversion claims. See Aroma 

Wines, 497 Mich at 346 (defining common-law conversion as “any distinct act of dominion 

wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights 

therein”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); id. at 347-348 (“The word ‘converting,’ used in 

MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), is one word that has acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the 

law because it is derived from the common-law [conversion] tort . . . and is used in that context 

here.”); Willis v Ed Hudson Towing, Inc, 109 Mich App 344, 349; 311 NW2d 776 (1981) (“The 

measure of damages for the conversion of personal property is the value of the property at the time 

of the conversion, in the absence of any testimony establishing a peculiar value in the goods to the 
-5-

owner.”); MCL 600.2919a(1) (providing for recovery of “3 times the amount of actual damages 

sustained” as a result of the conduct described in the statute). Thus, as the argument has been 

presented by defendants on appeal, we need not address the differences between common-law and 

statutory conversion to resolve the issue presented on appeal.

Here, there was evidence that Ross entered TWN’s premises late at night and that the 

switcher and computer in the production truck that had previously been functional were no longer 

operable the next morning after Ross—admittedly—deleted material that he personally deemed 

obsolete. The computer in Ross’s office was also inoperable. There was evidence that the 

insurance company determined the value of the switcher, and there was evidence of the amount 

Ross had been paid to create content for TWN. The jury awarded damages that were significantly

less than the damages claimed by TWN. 

To the extent defendants’ appellate arguments focus on witness credibility and defendants’

views on the relative strength of evidence, these are questions that are reserved for the jury and do 

not provide a proper basis for this Court to conclude that there was error in denying defendants’

motion for a directed verdict or motion for JNOV. Aroma Wines, 497 Mich at 345; Lamson, 216 

Mich App at 455; Craig, 471 Mich at 77; Hecht, 499 Mich at 605-606, 606 n 29. 

Contrary to defendants’ assertions in their briefing and at oral argument, there was 

evidence of the value of converted property introduced into the record. Willis, 109 Mich App at 

349. Defendants merely disagree with the jury’s view of this evidence and have attempted to retry 

their case in this Court, which is not a proper manner of obtaining appellate relief.1 Lamson, 216 

Mich App at 455; Hecht, 499 Mich at 605-606, 606 n 29.

To the extent defendants argue in the alternative, without citing any relevant legal authority 

in support, that the damages award should be reduced to $5,000 because that was the amount of 

TWN’s insurance deductible, this argument is without merit. This Court has stated with respect 

to a statutory conversion claim:

The definition of “actual damages,” however, does not contemplate the victim’s 

receipt of insurance proceeds in determining actual damages. Actual damages must 

exist in the first instance before the question of insurance proceeds properly arises. 

Once inflicted and created, actual damages do not change simply because an insurer 

has a contractual obligation to compensate the victim in whole or in part. The 

statute in question is not designed or intended to minimize a defendant’s liability 

for his criminal conduct if his victim had the wherewithal to purchase insurance 

coverage to protect itself from the criminal conduct of third parties. It is the 

embezzler’s misconduct, not the interplay between the embezzler and the victim’s 

 

1 We note that defendants’ arguments about contradictions in various testimony merely go to the 

strength and weight of evidence; such arguments do not establish, as defendants contend, that there 

was no evidence on a given matter.
-6-

insurer, that creates actual damages. [Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Hague, 283 Mich App 

99, 103-104; 767 NW2d 668 (2009).]

Although this Court in Alken-Ziegler discussed a defendant who had embezzled money, 

embezzlement is merely one form of the wrongful conduct, in addition to conversion, that is 

proscribed in MCL 600.2919a.2 We conclude that the above reasoning quoted from Alken-Ziegler

applies with equal force to damages for common-law conversion, which are generally measured 

by “value of the property at the time of the conversion,” Willis, 109 Mich App at 349. For these 

reasons, we affirm the trial court’s rulings denying defendants’ motions for directed verdict and 

JNOV.

II. Q11 PHOTOGRAPHY’S LIABILITY FOR CONVERSION

Next, defendants argue that Q11 Photography cannot be liable for statutory conversion, 

contrary to the jury’s verdict, because Q11 Photography was no longer a defendant in the action 

by the time the trial started. Defendants contend that because TWN was permitted to orally amend 

its complaint before trial to dismiss its tortious-interference-with-a-business-relationship claims

against defendants, and because this was the only claim against Q11 Photography in the complaint, 

Q11 Photography should have been dismissed from the case and the jury should not have been 

permitted to find Q11 Photography liable for statutory conversion. Further, defendants maintain 

that TWN never requested to amend its complaint to add any claims for conversion against Q11

Photography.

On the first day of trial, before jury selection began, TWN requested to amend its complaint 

to dismiss its tortious interference claims. Defendants’ counsel objected to this request because 

defendants had prepared to defend all of the claims, and defendants’ counsel further argued, “I 

think that they should be forced to proceed forward on those claims, because it’s gonna basically 

 

2 MCL 600.2919a provides:

(1) A person damaged as a result of either or both of the following may 

recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable 

attorney fees:

(a) Another person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property 

to the other person’s own use.

(b) Another person’s buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in 

the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property when the person 

buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, 

embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or 

converted.

(2) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other right or 

remedy the person may have at law or otherwise.
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expose the -- this entire thing is meritless in my opinion.” The trial court overruled defendants’

objections and granted TWN’s request to amend.

When the jury panel was brought into the courtroom, the trial court informed the jury that 

Ross and Q11 Photography were the defendants. Once the jury was selected, the trial court’s 

preliminary instructions informed the jury that there was a claim for statutory conversion against 

both Ross and Q11 Photography and generally described the elements of the claims. After the

preliminary instructions were concluded, the jury was excused and defendants’ counsel raised “two 

procedural questions” for the court. As relevant to the issue on appeal, defendants’ counsel stated, 

“the plaintiffs have -- (undecipherable) -- a motion and it’s granted, dismiss their tortious inference 

by -- (undecipherable) – only -- the only count for Q11 is the tortious interference. So I’m -- I’m 

assuming that they’re no longer gonna be a defendant . . . .” The parties then proceeded to present 

argument regarding the other procedural question raised by defendants. This discussion is not 

relevant to our present analysis. Defendants never returned to the first issue raised regarding Q11’s 

status as a defendant, and it appears defendants never obtained a ruling from the trial court on this 

issue.

The trial proceeded. Before the trial court read the final jury instructions to the jury, 

defense counsel specifically responded, “Yes, Judge,” when the trial court asked if the submitted 

final jury instructions were acceptable. During final jury instructions, the trial court instructed the 

jury in relevant part:

In addition to the common law conversion claim, plaintiff also serves a 

claim for statutory conversion. If you find from the evidence that defendant Ross 

stole or converted plaintiff’s property to his own use or that the defendant Q11

received, possessed, concealed, or aided in the concealment of stolen or converted

property, knowing that the property was stolen or converted, then your verdict will 

be for the plaintiff on its claim of statutory conversion.

Additionally, the trial court read the contents of the jury verdict form into the record as 

follows:

No questions having been asked, I have approved a verdict form for your 

use in the jury room, and the jury form reads as follows.

Question number one, is defendant Quenton Ross liable for common law 

conversion of plaintiff’s property? You may answer yes or no.

Question number two, is defendant Quenton Ross liable for statutory 

conversion? You may answer yes or no.

With respect to question number three, is defendant Q11 Photography, LLC 

liable for statutory conversion? You can answer yes or no.

And question four, is -- if your answer to any or all of the questions one, 

two, or three are “yes,” what is the amount of damages, if any, suffered by the

plaintiff?
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While the jury was deliberating, a question was posed for the trial court. The following 

discussion occurred between the trial court and the attorneys on the record regarding the question:

The Court: All right. Counselors, I have a -- a note from the jury. I believe 

I know what the answer should be, but just to make sure that everybody’s on the

same page. The question is do we need to answer yes or no to each question?

[TWN’s Counsel]: I would think so.

[Defendants’ Counsel]: Yes, right?

[TWN’s Counsel]: Sorry, I was confused there.

[Defendants’ Counsel]: Yes.

After discussing the matter with the attorneys, the trial court indicated that it would instruct 

the jury, “You are to answer yes or no to questions one through three, and whatever amount of

damages, if any, you determine for question number four.” TWN’s counsel and defendants’

counsel specifically approved this instruction. As previously stated, the jury answered “yes” to 

the first three questions and awarded $28,000 in damages.

Under these circumstances, defendants expressly waived this argument for appeal. “A 

waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Nexteer Auto Corp v 

Mando America Corp, 314 Mich App 391, 395; 886 NW2d 906 (2016). “An affirmative 

expression of assent constitutes a waiver[,]” id., and “the use of specific key words is not required 

to waive a right[,]” id. at 396. See also Landin v Healthsource Saginaw, Inc, 305 Mich App 519, 

545; 854 NW2d 152 (2014) (“A party is deemed to have waived a challenge to the jury instructions 

when the party has expressed satisfaction with, or denied having any objection to, the instructions 

as given.”). 

Here, defendants expressly approved the jury instructions and verdict form instructing the 

jury to determine whether Q11 Photography was liable for statutory conversion and, by extension, 

expressly approved including Q11 Photography as a defendant against whom a statutory 

conversion claim was alleged. Nexteer Auto Corp, 314 Mich App at 395, 396; Landin, 305 Mich 

App at 545. Thus, to the extent there could have been error,

3

it was extinguished by defendants’

waiver and appellate review is precluded. Landin, 305 Mich App at 545.

Moreover, MCR 2.118(C)(1) provides: 

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied 

consent of the parties, they are treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings. 

 

3 We express no opinion whether there could have been error on the ground asserted by defendants 

on appeal.
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In that case, amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence and to raise 

those issues may be made on motion of a party at any time, even after judgment. 

Here, the same facts that demonstrate defendants’ waiver also demonstrate defendants’

implied consent to treating the complaint as if it had alleged a statutory conversion claim against 

Q11 Photography. Defendants on appeal have not established error requiring reversal on this 

ground.

III. CASE-EVALUATION SANCTIONS

Finally, defendants also argue that the trial court erred by awarding plaintiff case evaluation

sanctions under MCR 2.403(O) after that rule was amended to remove the sanctions provisions.

The judgment in this case was entered on December 22, 2021, awarding TWN $28,000 

against defendants. On January 18, 2022, TWN moved for case evaluation sanctions under MCR 

2.403(O). TWN argued that it was entitled to case evaluation sanctions because it had accepted 

the $25,000 award recommended by the case evaluation panel and defendants had rejected this 

recommendation. Defendants opposed the motion for case evaluation sanctions. As relevant to 

defendants’ appellate argument, defendants argued that the Michigan Supreme Court had recently 

amended MCR 2.403 to delete the provision that provided for case evaluation sanctions. 

Defendants expressly stated on the record that they did not contest the amount requested by TWN. 

The trial court granted TWN’s motion for case evaluation sanctions, reasoning that the prior rule 

was in effect when the parties had case evaluation and the amendment did not take effect until 

January 1, 2022.

MCR 2.403(O)(1) formerly provided in relevant part that if “a party has rejected an 

evaluation and the action proceeds to verdict, that party must pay the opposing party’s actual costs 

unless the verdict is more favorable to the rejecting party than the case evaluation.”

4 However, in 

a December 2, 2021 order, our Supreme Court adopted amendments to MCR 2.403, which were 

to become effective on January 1, 2022. 508 Mich ___ (2021). In relevant part, the amendment 

completely eliminated Subrule (O), thereby eliminating case evaluation sanctions. Id. at ___.

Hence, the issue on appeal becomes whether the former rule continued to apply to this case, 

in which essentially the entire action had concluded and a judgment in TWN’s favor had been 

entered before the amendment took effect but TWN had not filed its postjudgment motion for case 

evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O) before the amendment took effect.

“A trial court’s decision whether to grant case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O) 

presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.” Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 

526; 751 NW2d 472 (2008) (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.). Additionally, the “proper interpretation 

and application of a court rule is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.” Haliw v 

City of Sterling Hts, 471 Mich 700, 704; 691 NW2d 753 (2005).

 

4 Former MCR 2.403(O) contained further details about the operation of case evaluation sanctions, 

but we need not discuss these details for purposes of resolving the issue presented in this appeal.
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This Court has stated that, with respect to newly adopted or amended court rules, the 

general rule is to apply newly adopted or amended court rules “to pending actions unless there is 

reason to continue applying the old rules.” Reitmeyer v Schultz Equip & Parts Co, Inc, 237 Mich 

App 332, 337; 602 NW2d 596 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). There is not a brightline rule to determine whether the new or old rule applies in a given case; instead, “a court must 

look more closely to the particular circumstances of the case at issue and at the purpose of the 

amendment.” Id. at 342.

In Reitmeyer, this Court held that determining whether a newly amended or adopted court 

rule applies in a given case is governed by MCR 1.102 “because MCR 1.102 provides its own 

specific rules for the application of new and amended court rules that should take precedence over 

the generalized rules of retrospectivity and prospectivity.” Reitmeyer, 237 Mich App at 337. In 

relevant part, MCR 1.102 provides that a “court may permit a pending action to proceed under the 

former rules if it finds that the application of these [new] rules to that action would not be feasible 

or would work injustice.” “[A] trial court’s decision whether application of new court rules would 

‘work injustice’ under MCR 1.102 entails an exercise of discretion.” Reitmeyer, 237 Mich App at 

336. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision “is outside the range of reasonable and 

principled outcomes.” Hecht, 499 Mich at 604.

“[A] new court rule would ‘work injustice’ ‘where a party acts, or fails to act, in reliance 

on the prior rules and the party’s action or inaction has consequences under the new rules that were 

not present under the old rules.’ ” Reitmeyer, 237 Mich App at 337 (citation omitted). “[A]n 

injustice is not present merely because a different result would be reached under the new rules.” 

Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We have explained that MCR 1.102 “focuses on 

‘injustice’ in the context of whether changes in rules in the midstream of the legal process have 

operated unfairly on one of the parties” and “is premised on the fundamental ‘rule of law’ notion 

that parties should be able to rely on the rules as they exist at the time that they undertake conduct.” 

Id. at 339-340. Thus, although a new or amended rule may usually not be unfair or unworkable 

such that it should apply to pending cases “most of the time,” a “change in the rules when a party 

has already made decisions relying on the former rules will more clearly and logically result in 

‘injustice’ than when both parties have relied on the same rules throughout a case . . . .” Id. at 340.

Finally, this Court has explained that “while the results may be different between the old 

and new rule, as may ordinarily be expected, this is not the dispositive factor in the analysis. 

Rather, . . . several factors must be considered when determining the ‘injustice’ in a particular case 

and whether a party ‘relied’ on a court rule to the extent that it would be ‘unjust’ to alter the rule 

in midstream.” Id. at 345. These factors include the substance of the rule, the timing of relevant 

actions, and the reliance or lack of reliance on the old rule at the time pertinent decisions were 

made in the case. Id.

Here, the sanction provisions of MCR 2.403(O) were in effect at all times throughout the 

case evaluation process, while the parties were deciding whether to accept or reject the case 

evaluation award, during trial, and up until entry of a final judgment. The potential liability for 

case evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403 was one of the factors for the parties to consider in 

their negotiations and decisions whether to proceed to trial and in considering the relative strengths 

and weaknesses of their cases relative to the case evaluation award. All events establishing 

plaintiff’s entitlement to case evaluation sanctions occurred before the effective date of the 
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amended court rule. Applying the amended version of the rule after all of the pertinent decisions 

had been made under the old rule would essentially result in a windfall to defendants under these 

circumstances. Because the parties acted in reliance under the old rule in proceeding to trial, and 

the decision to proceed to trial carried consequences and rights that were eliminated by the new 

rule, there was a valid reason to apply the pre-amendment version of MCR 2.403(O) to avoid an 

injustice. Reitmeyer, 237 Mich App at 337. Accordingly, defendants have not shown that the trial 

court abused its discretion by determining that the new amendment should not apply under the 

circumstances of this case. Hecht, 499 Mich at 604.

Affirmed. Plaintiffs having prevailed are entitled to costs. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Noah P. Hood