Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 19, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00034-CV

HELEN MAYFIELD, Appellant

V.

THE EAGLE NEWSPAPER, HOLLY HUFFMAN, MATTHEW WATKINS, 

AND JOHN P. BARNWELL, CEO OF 

THE EVENING POST PUBLISHING CO., Appellees

On Appeal from the 129th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-26254

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Helen Mayfield, sued appellees, an entity she named as “The 

Eagle Newspaper,”1 Holly Huffman, Matthew Watkins, and John P. Barnwell, 

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Evening Post Publishing Co., for libel, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and business disparagement based on 

1 Although Mayfield named “The Eagle Newspaper,” appellees assert the correct name is 

“Bryan-College Station Eagle.” We will refer to it as “The Eagle.”

 
allegedly defamatory articles about Mayfield published in The Eagle. Mayfield 

appeals (1) a summary judgment in favor of appellees on all of Mayfield’s claims, 

and (2) an order denying Mayfield’s post-judgment motion for sanctions. We 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mayfield, a disbarred attorney, appears pro se in the present appeal. In

August 2007, she was arrested for multiple counts of felony forgery. In July 2008, 

a Brazos County jury convicted Mayfield, and she was sentenced to two years’ 

confinement in state jail. The Waco court of appeals affirmed the conviction, and 

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Mayfield’s petition for review. See

Mayfield v. State, Nos. 10-08-00292, 293, 294, 295-CR, 2010 WL 2953199 (Tex.

App.—Waco July 28, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem op., not designated for publication).

At relevant times, appellees Huffman and Watkins were journalists for The 

Eagle. Huffman wrote an article about the charges against Mayfield and her arrest,

which was published in The Eagle on August 12, 2007. According to Huffman, 

she obtained all of her information regarding Mayfield from “Probable Cause 

Statement[s]” which were executed by College Station police officers and publicly 

available in the Brazos County district clerk’s office. Watkins wrote several 

articles about Mayfield’s trial and conviction, which were published in The Eagle 

during July 2008. All of the above-cited articles were published on the Internet 

version of The Eagle on the same day they were published in the newsprint 

version.

In April 2011, Mayfield sued appellees for libel, alleging the articles were 

defamatory. In addition to asserting claims against The Eagle, Huffman, and 

Watkins, Mayfield sued Barnwell, alleging he, or the company for which he is 

Chief Executive Officer, owned The Eagle. Appellees filed a motion for 

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traditional summary judgment on several grounds and set a hearing for December 

12, 2011. Three days before the hearing, Mayfield filed two separate documents 

that she referred to as her summary judgment response and counter motion for 

summary judgment. On the same day, she filed an amended petition, adding 

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and business disparagement.

On December 12, 2011, the trial court signed an order granting the 

appellees’ motion for summary judgment and ordering that Mayfield take nothing 

on all of her claims. While the trial court retained plenary power, Mayfield filed a 

“Motion for Sanctions” alleging, inter alia, appellees failed to serve her with a 

complete copy of the motion for summary judgment or any notice of the hearing 

on that motion. Appellees filed a response to the motion for sanctions. On 

February 6, 2012, after a hearing, the trial court signed an order denying the 

motion for sanctions.

II. ANALYSIS

Mayfield’s appellate brief is deficient in that many of her assertions are 

unclear, difficult to understand, and unsupported by record references, argument, 

or authorities, as required by the appellate briefing rules. See Tex. R. App. P. 

38.1(g), (i).2 However, liberally construing the brief, we glean that Mayfield’s 

issues pertinent to this appeal (numbered differently at various points throughout 

her brief) fall into three categories: (1) her complaint regarding service of the 

motion for summary judgment and notice of hearing; (2) substantive challenges to 

2 Additionally, Mayfield includes matters irrelevant to challenging the trial court’s orders 

at issue. She essentially attacks her conviction and the actions of authorities relative to the 

criminal prosecution. Further, she claims the trial court and appellees altered items in the clerk’s 

record and appellees or their counsel burglarized Mayfield’s home to steal her legal files. 

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the summary judgment;

3 and (3) an assertion that the district clerk did not file a 

complete record in our court.

A. Service of Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice of Hearing

Mayfield contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment and 

denying Mayfield’s motion for sanctions because appellees did not serve her with a 

complete copy of the motion for summary judgment and notice of hearing. 

Mayfield raised these complaints for the first time in her post-judgment “Motion 

for Sanctions,” which, for purposes of this appeal, we will construe as a motion for 

both a new trial and sanctions.4

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

When service is by mail, a motion for summary judgment and notice of 

hearing shall be filed and served on the non-movant at least twenty-four days 

before the time specified for hearing. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), 21(a); Lewis v. 

Blake, 876 S.W.2d 314, 315–16 (Tex. 1994). We apply the abuse-of-discretion 

3 Mayfield also suggests the trial court erred by denying Mayfield’s counter motion for 

summary judgment. However, she waived that contention by failing to obtain a ruling on the

counter motion, which was filed only three days before the trial court heard and granted 

appellees’ motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A).

4 In the motion, Mayfield requested only sanctions based on these complaints and did not 

expressly request the trial court to set aside the summary judgment. See Babajide v. Citibank 

(South Dakota), N.A., No. 14–04–00064–CV, 2004 WL 2933575, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing non-movant seeking to set aside 

summary judgment on ground she received no notice of hearing must preserve error in a postjudgment motion). Relative to a different complaint raised in the motion for sanctions, Mayfield 

requested that appellees be precluded from supporting their defenses with certain evidence, 

which arguably was an implicit request for a new trial. Then, at the hearing on the motion, 

Mayfield represented she was not seeking a new trial, at least on her complaints regarding lack 

of service, although appellees acknowledged a “generous” reading of her motion might glean 

such a request. Even if we construe the motion as implicitly requesting a new trial based on 

these complaints (despite her subsequent representation), the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying that request for the same reason it did not abuse its discretion by denying 

sanctions.

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standard when reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial alleging the 

non-movant was not served with a motion for summary judgment or notice of 

hearing. See Dowell v. Theken Spine, LLC, No. 14–07–00887–CV, 2009 WL 

1677844, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem 

op.).

Additionally, if a party fails to serve on or deliver to the other party a copy 

of a motion, in accordance with the rules for service, the trial court may, in its 

discretion, after notice and hearing, impose an appropriate sanction. See Tex. R. 

Civ. P. 21b. Accordingly, we review a trial court’s denial of sanctions under Rule 

21b for abuse of discretion. See id.; Spellmon v. Collins, 970 S.W.2d 578, 580–81 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision on 

conflicting evidence and some evidence supports its decision. Unifund CCR 

Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009). In an abuse-of-discretion 

review, the trial court, as fact finder, is sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses 

and evidence. Prince v. Am. Bank of Tex., 359 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2012, no pet.).

The Record

The motion for summary judgment was filed on November 3, 2011.5

 The 

filed copy contains a certificate attesting to service on Mayfield the same day via 

certified mail, return receipt requested. It is undisputed the summary-judgment 

hearing was held on December 12. 

In her affidavit attached to the motion for sanctions, Mayfield averred as 

follows: on November 3, appellees’ counsel mailed Mayfield “a lot of plain pages 

5 All references to dates in this discussion are to 2011.

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and cut off pages” with no certificate of service or conference; and on November 

14, counsel mailed Mayfield an envelope “with a Motion for Summary Judgment.” 

Mayfield did not aver that the latter motion was incomplete other than stating it

lacked a certificate of service. Mayfield further averred there was no notice of 

hearing included with either mailing, although she did not affirmatively state that 

she never otherwise received notice. Mayfield attached to her motion for sanctions 

what she contends are the incomplete copies of the motion for summary judgment 

that she allegedly received.

In response to the motion for sanctions, appellees presented the affidavit of 

their counsel who averred, 

• On November 3, he sent a true and correct copy of the motion for 

summary judgment to Mayfield’s address, as shown on her pleadings, by 

certified mail, return receipt requested. Counsel did not receive the 

return receipt (“green card”) for that mailing. Therefore, he confirmed on 

the postal service website that the mailing was delivered to Mayfield’s 

address on November 5. 

• When counsel mailed the motion, he had not yet obtained a hearing date 

but obtained one later that day. On November 4, he sent a notice 

advising the hearing was set for December 12, to Mayfield at the same 

address, by certified mail, return receipt requested, and regular mail. 

Subsequently, counsel received the green card, signed by “Lucille 

Martin” and showing delivery of that mailing on November 5. 

• Because counsel did not have a green card for service of the motion, on 

November 14, he again sent true and correct copies of the motion and 

notice of hearing to Mayfield at the same address, by certified mail, 

return receipt requested, and regular mail. He received a green card 

signed by Mayfield showing delivery on November 16.

Counsel attached the following to his affidavit: the printed postal service 

webpage showing delivery of the motion for summary judgment on November 5; 

the green card showing delivery of the notice of hearing on November 5; and the 

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green card showing delivery of the motion and notice of hearing again on 

November 16.

As counsel mentioned in his affidavit, the green card for the November 16 

delivery appears to be signed by “Helen Mayfield,” although the name “J. 

Johnson” is printed in the box below the signature. Counsel averred that Mayfield 

has written that same name on green cards for other deliveries, including in a 

different suit. Counsel attached examples of such green cards to his affidavit.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion for sanctions. At the hearing, 

Mayfield did not present any additional evidence; she reiterated she was not served 

with a complete motion for summary judgment or notice of hearing and accused 

appellees’ counsel of forging Mayfield’s signature on the green cards.

Discussion 

In its order denying the motion for sanctions, the trial court recited that it 

considered both the motion for sanctions and the response and found that (1) 

Mayfield was served with the motion for summary judgment and notice of hearing 

on November 14, (2) she received those items on November 16, and (3) her motion 

for sanctions was “entirely without merit.” Appellees’ evidence, recited above,

supported the findings. Because Mayfield was served with those items more than 

twenty-four days before the summary judgment hearing, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying any motion for new trial and the request for 

sanctions. 

B. Substantive Challenges to the Summary Judgment

Mayfield’s substantive challenges fall into two general categories: (1) some 

of appellees’ summary judgment evidence was inadmissible; and (2) appellees 

failed to establish their summary-judgment grounds. 

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1. Admission of Evidence

In one of her stated issues, Mayfield argues her “conviction” and 

“documents” from her criminal trial were inadmissible as summary-judgment 

evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 609(e) because appeal of the conviction 

was pending in the United States Supreme Court. Rule 609 is wholly inapplicable

in this case; it prescribes circumstances under which a prior criminal conviction is 

admissible for purposes of impeaching a witness and provides that pendency of an 

appeal renders a conviction inadmissible for that purpose. See Tex. R. Evid. 609, 

609(e).

Additionally, in the “Summary of Argument” section of her appellate brief, 

Mayfield also complains the probable cause statements presented by appellees 

were not certified. We reject this complaint because the summary-judgment rules 

provide, “Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 

affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f)

(emphasis added). In her affidavit supporting the motion for summary judgment,

Huffman swore the probable cause statements attached to the motion were true and 

correct copies of documents she obtained from the district clerk. 

2. Summary Judgment Grounds

Appellees moved for summary judgment on several grounds applicable to all 

appellees: (1) the articles were constitutionally and statutorily privileged as 

accurate reporting of legal documents and proceedings; (2) the articles were 

substantially true; and (3) Mayfield’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A party moving for traditional summary judgment must establish there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 

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Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 

211, 215–16 (Tex. 2003). A defendant moving for traditional summary judgment 

must negate at least one element of each of the plaintiff’s theories of recovery or 

plead and conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Science 

Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). If the defendant 

establishes his right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to 

the plaintiff to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Centeq 

Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). We review a summary 

judgment de novo. Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215. We take all evidence favorable to 

the nonmovant as true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any 

doubts in her favor. Id.

When, as in the present case, the movant asserts multiple summary judgment 

grounds and the trial court does not specify in the order the ground on which 

summary judgment was granted, the appellant must challenge all independent 

grounds on appeal, and we may affirm if any ground is meritorious. See Star–

Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995). Mayfield has not 

established the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on, at least, the 

ground that the articles were statutorily privileged.6

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized a common law 

judicial proceedings privilege applicable to a publisher. Neely v. Wilson, 418 

S.W.3d 52, 68 (Tex. 2013) (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492, 

95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975)). In Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 

6 Appellees also presented a summary judgment ground, with supporting evidence,

applicable only to Barnwell: neither he nor his company was involved in newsgathering, 

reporting, or editing articles for The Eagle, including the articles about Mayfield. We affirm 

summary judgment in his favor on that ground because it is unchallenged on appeal. See Star–

Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 473. Regardless, our disposition relative to the privilege ground 

applies equally to Barnwell.

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Code section 73.002, entitled “Privileged Matters,” the Texas Legislature codified 

the judicial proceedings privilege and expanded it to other official proceedings. 

Id.; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.002 (West 2011). The statute 

provides, in pertinent part, that “publication by a newspaper . . . is privileged and is 

not a ground for a libel action” if the publication is “a fair, true, and impartial 

account of . . . a judicial proceeding . . . [or] an official proceeding, other than a 

judicial proceeding, to administer the law.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §

73.002(a), (b)(1)(A), (B). The privilege extends only to statements that are (1) 

“substantially true and impartial reports of the proceedings,” and (2) “identifiable 

by the ordinary reader as statements that were made in the proceeding.” Neely, 

418 S.W.3d at 68 (citing Denton Publ’g Co. v. Boyd, 460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 

1971)). Where the facts are undisputed and the language used in the publication is 

not ambiguous, the question of privilege is ordinarily one of law for the court. 

Boyd, 460 S.W.2d at 884.

The Record

Even under a liberal construction of her brief, we conclude that Mayfield 

does not attack the privilege ground relative to the articles written by Watkins; the

entire focus of Mayfield’s argument on this ground is Huffman’s article. 

Accordingly, Mayfield has waived any challenge to the summary judgment on her 

claims based on Watkins’s article. See Star–Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 473; 

Sonic Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Croix, 278 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (holding appellant waived challenge to summary 

judgment on claim to the extent it was based on one alleged wrongdoing of 

defendant by advancing argument on appeal only with respect to a different alleged 

wrongdoing); San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex.

App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (recognizing that, although our court 

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reasonably and liberally construes briefs, appellant must present some specific 

argument and analysis to attack summary-judgment ground). We will consider the 

privilege ground only with respect to Huffman’s article.

In her affidavit supporting the motion for summary judgment, Huffman 

averred,

I wrote the newspaper article dated August 12, 2007, titled “Police 

charge woman in scam” and which appeared in the Bryan-College 

Station Eagle. The only information I had about the matters in the 

article came from the College Station Police Department Probable 

Cause Statements that were publicly available in the Brazos County 

District Clerk’s Office. The article I wrote accurately stated what was 

contained in the Probable Cause Statements. I did not doubt the 

accuracy of anything I wrote, nor did I have any reason to question the 

accuracy of anything in the Probable Cause Statements. The “College 

Station Police Department Probable Cause Statements” that are 

attached to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit A 

are true and correct copies of the documents I obtained from the 

District Clerk’s Office and on which I based my August 12, 2007 

article.

Appellees also presented Huffman’s article, which reported,

College Station police ended a seven-month investigation Saturday 

with the arrest of a 59-year-old lawyer who admitted to participating 

in six e-mail scams over the past five years, authorities said.

Helen Mayfield told police she was the victim of a common financial 

scam that generally features a supposed foreign dignitary offering 

millions in exchange for help. But police, who worked with the FBI 

on the case, said the College Station woman was a willing participant 

seeking financial gain.

Mayfield was charged with 12 counts of forgery of a financial 

instrument after police said she cashed fake $500 American Express 

Travelers Cheques at First National Bank, where she had an account.

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She cashed 14 checks, according to police. The bank contacted police 

after a dozen were returned.

Mayfield told police she cashed the checks for a client in exchange for 

a percentage of the cash. The client, she said, was a West African 

widow having trouble accessing her late husband’s $15 million 

fortune.

Investigators discovered she was wiring money to Nigeria, Hong 

Kong, Taiwan, Ontario, Ghana and the Netherlands. She told police 

she was involved in six scams since 2002, saying she continued 

hoping someday to get money she was promised.

Mayfield remained jailed Saturday in lieu of $240,000 bail.

In her pleading, Mayfield complained of the following portions of the 

article:

• Mayfield admitted she was involved in six e-mail scams over the 

past five years (since 2002). 

• According to police, Mayfield cashed fourteen fake travelers 

checks at a bank where she had an account. 

• Mayfield told police that she cashed the checks in exchange for a 

percentage of the cash.

Appellees also presented three probable cause statements: one was executed 

by the investigating officer, apparently to obtain an arrest warrant, and detailed the 

basis for the forgery charges; the other two were executed by an assisting officer 

and provided supplemental information.

Discussion

Mayfield does not argue there is no section 73.002 privilege when a 

publication is based on a probable cause statement, such as those executed by the 

police relative to Mayfield’s criminal case; i.e., she does not dispute appellees’ 

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contention that such a statement constitutes “a judicial proceeding . . . [or] an 

official proceeding, other than a judicial proceeding, to administer the law.” See

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.002(a), (b)(1)(A), (B). Rather, Mayfield

attacks the privilege ground by contending (1) Huffman’s affidavit was perjured,

(2) the probable cause statements were not public records, and (3) Huffman did not 

report in the article that it was based on the statements.

With respect to the first two contentions, Mayfield did not timely present 

any evidence controverting Huffman’s averments that she (1) based her article on,

at least, the first probable cause statement, (2) did not doubt its accuracy, and (3) 

obtained the statements from the district clerk’s records, much less evidence 

showing the affidavit was perjured.

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 Mayfield’s summary judgment responses

were not timely because they were filed three days before the hearing. See Tex. R. 

Civ. P. Rule 166a(c) (providing that, except on leave of court, a summaryjudgment response must be filed no later than seven days before hearing date). 

Because nothing in the record indicates the trial court granted leave for late filing, 

we presume it did not consider the responses. See INA of Texas v. Bryant, 686 

S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex. 1985); Pipkin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 383 S.W.3d 655, 663 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). Therefore, we will not 

consider whether any evidence attached to the responses controverted Huffman’s 

affidavit. Instead, Mayfield is limited to challenging the legal sufficiency of 

7 We recognize Huffman broadly suggested her article was based on all three probable 

cause statements when the two supplemental statements were executed after publication of the 

article. However, Mayfield presented no evidence that the incorrect suggestion the article was 

also based on the two latter statements rose to the level of perjury. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

37.02(a) (West 2011) (providing perjury includes “intent to deceive” element). In fact, Mayfield 

does not argue Huffman’s affidavit was perjured or otherwise defective because two of the 

statements were executed after the article. Even Mayfield views the first statement as the sole 

relevant one because she argues only that Huffman’s article was not based on that statement. 

Therefore, we will address the probable cause statement that preceded her article.

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appellees’ privilege ground. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 

337, 343 (Tex. 1993). 

In this regard, to support her “perjury” contention, Mayfield primarily 

attacks the truth of the police officer’s allegations in the probable cause statement. 

However, the “official/judicial proceedings privilege assesses whether the 

reporter’s account of the proceedings (not the underlying allegations made in those 

proceedings) was fair, true, and impartial.” Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 68. Mayfield 

does not expressly compare the article to the probable cause statement. 

Nonetheless, we have performed such comparison and conclude the portions of the 

article complained of in Mayfield’s pleading were “fair, true, and impartial”

accounts of the allegations in the probable cause statement. 

Mayfield also complains Huffman did not report in the article that it was

based on the probable cause statement and reported the facts as though they were 

true. However, she cites no authority that Huffman was required to specifically 

identify the document from which she obtained her information. Significantly, the 

contents of the article were “identifiable by the ordinary reader as” allegations 

made by the police, rather than Huffman’s own portrayal of facts underlying the 

criminal allegations. See id.at 68.

Finally, as mentioned above, after appellees moved for summary judgment, 

Mayfield amended her petition to add claims for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress and business disparagement. Therefore, these causes of action were not 

directly addressed in the motion for summary judgment. However, Mayfield does 

not complain on appeal that the privilege ground failed to also address the new 

claims and the trial court granted more relief than requested by appellees by 

dismissing all claims on that ground. Consequently, Mayfield has waived any such 

contention. See Sonic Sys Int’l, 278 S.W.3d at 384–85.

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In summary, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment on all 

of Mayfield’s claims.

C. Complaint Regarding the Record

Mayfield contends her due process rights were violated because she is 

indigent and entitled to a free record but the district clerk omitted exhibits to her 

petition from the record filed in our court. We reject this contention because the 

gist of the argument is not that the district clerk inadvertently failed to file a 

complete record but rather an unsupported claim that the trial court ordered 

removal of the exhibits from the record. Moreover, Mayfield did not request the 

clerk to supplement our record with any allegedly omitted exhibits to her petition, 

as she was permitted to do if she believed a requisite item was missing. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 34.5(c)(1). Nor did she invoke the procedure for correcting the record 

if an item is lost or destroyed. See id. 34.5(e). And, the allegedly omitted exhibits 

are immaterial to our disposition because Mayfield asserts they concern the statuteof-limitations ground, which we need not address.

We overrule all of Mayfield’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ John Donovan

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Donovan and Brown.

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