alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit
31.2**
 
 **CERTIFICATIONS**
 
 I, David
J. Kvapil, certify that:
 
 1. I have
reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Company, LP;
 
 2. Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;
 
 3. Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;
 
 4. The
registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 
 (a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;
 
 (b)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and
 
 (c)
Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
 
 5. The
registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 
 (a) All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and
 
 (b) Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting.
 
 
 
 
 Date: May
10, 2005
 
 /s/
DAVID J. KVAPIL
 David J.
Kvapil
 Executive
Vice President and
 Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 155 (Monday, August 11, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 46703]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18476]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 6313]


Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Art & Empire: Treasures From Assyria in the British 
Museum''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236 
of October 19, 1999, as amended, and Delegation of Authority No. 257 of 
April 15, 2003 [68 FR 19875], I hereby determine that the objects in 
the exhibition ``Art & Empire: Treasures from Assyria in the British 
Museum,'' imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the 
United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported 
pursuant to a loan agreement with the foreign owner or custodian. I 
also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at 
the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, MA, from on or about September 21, 
2008, until on or about January 4, 2009, and at possible additional 
exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national 
interest. Public Notice of these Determinations is ordered to be 
published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Julie Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: (202-
453-8050). The address is U.S. Department of State, SA-44, 301 4th 
Street, SW., Room 700, Washington, DC 20547-0001.

    Dated: August 4, 2008.
C. Miller Crouch,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, Department of State.
 [FR Doc. E8-18476 Filed 8-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
18530, 18541.

#### GAULDING *et al. v.*GAULDING *et al.;*and *vice versa.*

Argued March 8, 1954

Decided April 14, 1954

Rehearing denied May 13, 1954.

*641*R. Howard Gordon, Susan H. Brown, Rwpert A. Broion,*for plaintiffs in error.

*C. 0. Baker, Robert E. Gibson,*contra.

Sutton, Justice.

When the bill of exceptions, assigning error on the decree of October 2, 1952, which revoked the decree of September 1, 1952, and construed item 6 of the will of Mrs. Julia A. Gaulding as passing a fee-simple estate in the bonds in question to Geneva Gaulding, was dismissed by the Supreme Court as having been prematurely brought *(Gaulding*v. *Gaulding,*209 *Ga.*456, 74 S. E. 2d 9), no exceptions pendente lite having been filed to said decree, such decree of October 2, 1952, became the *642law of the case in this respect. *West*v. *Standard Accident Ins. Co.,*176 *Ga.*755 (168 S. E. 766); *McFall*v. *Griffin,*209 *Ga.*83 (70 S. E. 2d 772). Furthermore, “where during the progress of a trial exceptions pendente lite are filed to rulings of the judge, and after a final judgment is rendered the cause is brought to this court for review, and the judgment is reversed, resulting in a new trial; and where after a new trial is had the case is, upon another writ of error, brought to this court, it is too late in the last bill of exceptions to complain of errors alleged to have been committed previous to the issuing of the first writ of error.” *Hodgkins*v. *Marshall,*102 *Ga.*191 (29 S. E. 174); *Williams Realty &c. Co.*v. *Simmons,*188 *Ga.*184 (4) (3 S. E. 2d 580); *Albany Federal Savings &c. Assn.*v. *Henderson,*200 *Ga.*79 (1) (36 S. E. 2d 330); *Drischel*v. *Drischel,*51 *Ga. App.*97 (1) (179 S. E. 577); *Wilson-Weesner-Wilkinson Co.*v. *Collier,*62 *Ga. App.*457 (1) (8 S. E. 2d 171). What is said above is true irrespective of the act approved December 22, 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dee. Sess., pp. 440, 453), abolishing exceptions pendente lite.

Applying the above-stated principles to the facts of the present case, the decree of October 2, 1952, which construed item 6 of the will of Mrs. Julia A. Gaulding as devising to Geneva Gaulding a fee-simple estate in the Government bonds therein referred to, whether right or wrong, became the law of the case. *Langston & Crane*v. *Anderson,*69 *Ga.*65; *Cannon*v. *Central of Ga. Ry. Co.,*111 *Ga.*837 (36 S. E. 99); *Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank*v. *Clark,*172 *Ga.*625 (158 S. E. 297).

Accordingly, the trial judge erred, as complained of in the main bill of exceptions, in entering a final decree construing item 6 of the will as devising a life estate in said Government bonds to Geneva Gaulding. In this view it becomes unnecessary to pass upon other questions raised in the main bill of exceptions.

Regardless of whether the trial judge erred as complained of in the cross-bill of exceptions, it does not appear that the defendants in error were injured by any of the rulings there complained of to which timely exceptions were made.

*Judgment reversed on the main bill of exceptions, and affirmed on the cross-bill of exceptions.*

*All the Justices concur.*
DENIED and Opinion Filed June 7, 2024 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-00464-CV IN RE ASHLEY NICO LE HORNE, Relator Original Proceeding from the 255th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-20-03505 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Pedersen, III, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Smith In her April 18, 2024 petition for writ of mandamus, relator sought relief from the trial court’s denial of her demand for jury trial and certain aspects of the trial court’s temporary orders. In a memorandum opinion and order dated April 24, 2024, the Court denied relator’s re quested relief. On April 25, 2024, relator filed a Motion for Rehearing and Leave to Amend Petiti on and an amended mandamus petition. We deny the motion for rehearing, gr ant the motion for leave to amend petition, withdraw our opinion and vacate our order of April 24, 2024, and issue this new memorandum opinion and order of this date in their place.–2– On original submission, the Court de nied relief because relator failed to provide a certification that satisfied the re quirements of rule 52.3(j), and we noted that relator had omitted a statement of th e case and did not support her statement of facts with citations to competent evid ence included in the appendix or record. Relator moved for rehearing and filed an amended petition that complies with the Texas Rules of Appellate Proce dure and seeks the same relief as the original petition. Because relator had removed the tec hnical grounds on which the Court’s memorandum opinion rested, the Court re quested a response to the motion for rehearing and the amended petition. Real pa rty in interest filed a response, and relator filed a reply. We now consider the merits of relator’s amended petition. Entitlement to mandamus relief requires a relator to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the re lator lacks an adequa te appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). After reviewing relator’s am ended petition and the record before us, we conclude that relator ha s failed to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny relator’s am ended petition for wr it of mandamus. See
T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.8(a). We also lift the stay issued by this Court’s May 17, 2024 Order.

240464F.P05 /Craig Smith / CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE
#### Albert G. Carle, Pltff in Error *v.*The People, Defts in Error.

ERROR TO CHAMPAIGR.

The proper mode of recovering a penalty from a person for voting, who does not possess the proper qualification, is by an action of debt.

The facts of this case, are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.

A. Gridley and 0. Peters, for Pltff in Error.

Ho indictment will lie against a person for voting, who is not qualified, but the remedy is by an action on behalf of the people to recover the penalty. Revised Stat., §20, ch. 88.

The indictment is insufficient, because it does not show, that the election at which the voting took place was a legal election, or an election held in conformity to law: nor that the vote was received, or deposited in the ballot box, as required by the law of 1849; nor for whom he voted, whether for County officer or otherwise; nor that he knowingly, corruptly, or wilfully voted.

*288McGuire *v.*The State; 7 Humph., *55;*Lequat *v.*The People, 11 Ills., 330.

The indictment does not show what was the want of qualification, whether non-age, non-residence, &c.

D. Campbell, Dis-trict Atty., for the People,

cited, Rev. stat, ch. 35, secs. 17, 20, 39, 40, 41; 2d Hawk’s, P. 0. ch. 25, §4; 1 Russel on Crimes, p. 9, 44, 47, 48, 49.-

Treat, C. J.

The plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted, for voting at an election, without possessing the qualifications of a voter. The indictment was framed on the 20th sec. of the 37th chap, of the Revised Statutes, which reads thus: “If any person shall voto at any election, who is not a qualified voter, he shall forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding fifty dollars, nor less than twenty five, to be recovered in the same manner as other penalties under this chapter.” Upon a careful consideration of this section in connection with the other provisions of the chapter, we are clearly satisfied, that the penalty is not recoverable by indictment. By a reference to the other parts of the chapter, the intention of the Legislature will be apparent. There are five provisions in this chapter, in which penalties are imposed for the violation of particular duties connected with elections, in each of which it is declared, that the party offending, “shall forfeit and pay” a specified sum, “to be recovered by an action of debt.” The chapter also defines five distinct offences, which are punishable by indictment. Of one, it is provided that the offender “shall be fined, in the sum of one hundred dollars, to be recovered by indictment;” of three, “he shall be liable to be indicted,” and fined and imprisoned; and of the other, he “shall be liable to indictment,” and “fined in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars.” The penalty in question falls directly within the first class of eases, and is recoverable in an action of debt, in the name of the People. The same language is employed in imposing this penalty, as in those for the recovery of which the action of debt is specifically given; and the direction as to the mode of recovering it, must be understood as ■referring to the remedy prescribed in these cases.

The judgment will be reversed.

*Judgment reversed.*
#### Thomas Fitch, Respondent, Appellant, v. Delia Bolden, as Executrix, etc., of David Jamission, Deceased, Appellant, Respondent.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs against the defendant. Order unanimously affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements against the. plaintiff.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Raymond Ocasio, Appellant.

[678 NYS2d 257]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Martin Rettinger, J.), rendered March 14, 1995, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 41/2 to 9 years, unanimously affirmed.

The *Batson*colloquy demonstrates that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the People’s peremptory challenge in question was motivated by a discriminatory intent *(People v Bolling,*79 NY2d 317, 325). The issue of whether a prima facie showing was made is not moot *(see, Hernandez v New York,*500 US 352, 359). Although the court did ask the People for an explanation of the challenge, and although the record is not always clear as to which *Batson*step was under consideration, a fair reading of the totality of the record establishes that the court *did*rule that there was no prima facie showing, and did *not*rule on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination *(supra).*In any event, we find that defendant’s present claims relating to the People’s response to the *Batson*application are unpreserved and without merit. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Nardelli, Rubin, Tom and Mazzarelli, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 15-1712 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s “Presentation of Ultimate Evidence,” ECF 

No. 16, which is construed as a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b) allows the Court to relieve a party from a final judgment for one of 

five specific grounds, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(5), none of which apply in this case, or for 

“any other reason that justifies relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) 

should be granted only if the moving party demonstrates “‘extraordinary circumstances’ 

justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia,

633 F.3d 1110, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005)); 

see Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that 

“this form of relief should only be sparingly used”). 

Plaintiff has been entitled to receive widow’s insurance benefits under Title II of the 

Social Security Act since May 2006 on the record of her deceased husband, Eugenio Navarro. 

Brief in Support of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 9, Nicoll Decl. ¶ 3(a). In 

Susana B. Navarro, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

Commissioner of Social Security, :

:

Defendant. :
March 2009, defendant notified plaintiff that the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) would 

deduct Federal income taxes from her widow’s insurance benefits. Nicoll Decl. ¶ 3(b). Plaintiff 

sought reconsideration, but the “information [she] submitted did not provide a basis to stop such 

deductions.” Id. SSA advised that it would “stop deducting the tax” if plaintiff could 

demonstrate either that she become a United States citizen, or that she lives in the United States, 

Canada, Egypt, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Romania, Switzerland or the United 

Kingdom. Id., Ex. 3 (Notice of Change in Benefits dated September 19, 2013) at 1. 

The Court dismissed this case because plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative 

remedies as 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requires before filing her complaint. Plaintiff has attached 

exhibits to her motion presumably for the purpose of demonstrating that her late husband was a 

United States citizen. Mr. Navarro’s citizenship is irrelevant, however, to the issue of exhaustion 

of administrative remedies. Because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate extraordinary 

circumstance to warrant the relief she demands, the Court denies her motion for relief from 

judgment.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment [16] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

DATE: December 5, 2017 /s/

COLLEEN KOLLAR KOTELLY

United States District Court Judge
#### Henry Hart v. A. L. Clarke & Company.

Motion denied, with' ten dollars costs.
#### Samuel P. Norton and George W. Norton, Appellants, v. American Exchange National Bank, Respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs, with leave to plaintiff to amend on payment of costs. No opinion.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-1393

ARTHUR B. BOYD, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versusUNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION, d/b/a R. Adams Cowley Shock Trauma Center; JOEL LEE; THE BALTIMORE SUN COMPANY, d/b/a “The Sun” Newspaper; DOUGLAS BIRCH; THE WASHINGTON POST COMPANY, d/b/a The WashingtonPost; BRIAN MOOAR; JOURNAL NEWSPAPERS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Prince George’s Journal; JOHN DOE; AMERICAN MEDIA, INCORPORATED, d/b/a National Enquirer, Incorporated, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, District Judge. (CA-96-3105-WMN) Submitted: July 30, 1998 Decided: August 25, 1998 Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.2 Arthur B. Boyd, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Peter Edward Keith, David William Kinkopf, GALLAGHER, EVELIUS & JONES, Baltimore, Maryland; Douglas D. Connah, Jr., VENABLE, BAETJER & HOWARD, Baltimore, Maryland; Kevin Taylor Baine, Max Ian Stier, Paul Martin Wolff, Julie C. Hilden, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY, Washington, D.C.; Mary R. Craig, MARY R. CRAIG, P.A., Towson, Maryland; Alice Neff Lucan, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* This appeal was interlocutory when filed. The case was closed in the district court on May 18, 1998. 3 PER CURIAM: Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have thirty days withinwhich to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The district court entered its order on Jan. 16, 1998; Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on March 12, 1998, which is beyond the thirty-day appeal period. Appellant’s failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leavesthis court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequate-4 ly presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

This certification is provided pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and accompanies the quarterly report on Form 10-Q(the “Form 10-Q”) for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 of ManhattanBancorp (the “Company”).

 

I, Deepak Kumar, President and ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.                    The Form 10-Qfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

 

2.                    The informationcontained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the datesand for the periods presented in the financial statements included in suchreports.

 

 
| Dated:  August 13, 2010 |                                   |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
|                         |                                   |
|                         |                                   |
|                         | /s/  Deepak Kumar                      |
|                         | Deepak  Kumar                          |
|                         | President  and Chief Executive Officer |

 

----