Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-CR-2597 | May 10, 2018 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Andrew R. Falk

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Henry A. Flores, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cynthia S. Gordon,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 10, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

32A01-1711-CR-2597

Appeal from the Hendricks Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Daniel F. Zielinski, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32C01-1502-FA-4

Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Cynthia S. Gordon appeals the trial court’s revocation of her placement in work 

release. She contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her 

placement and that the court violated her due process rights in failing to provide 

a clear statement of the reasons for revocation. Finding no abuse of discretion 

and no due process violation, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2015, Gordon was charged with level 6 felony theft, level 6 felony 

assisting a criminal, and level 4 felony burglary. She subsequently pled guilty to 

level 4 felony burglary in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. Pursuant 

to the plea agreement, on October 26, 2015, the trial court sentenced Gordon to 

2190 days, with 730 days suspended, and 1449 1/3 days to be served on work 

release.

[3] In August 2017, Gordon fell in the bathroom at the work release facility and 

broke her pelvis. Thereafter, on August 17, 2017, the director of the work 

release facility filed a petition and notice of work release violation. The notice 

requested a change of placement for Gordon based on the following:

1. On 8/17/17, Ms. Gordon went to the doctor and returned to 

the facility with a note that stated that she needs to be placed on 

bed rest and have access to a wheelchair when up and about. 

They specifically said that she is to rarely be on crutches and 

suggested that she be home for at least the first month to aid in 

the healing process. The expected healing period is 3-6 months.
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2. Because medical care is not provided in the facility and her 

doctor has given such strict guidelines, she is no longer a viable 

candidate for the program.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2. at 59.1 The probable cause affidavit that accompanied 

the notice also alleged that on three prior occasions Gordon had violated the 

conditions of work release as follows:

1. On 12/14/15, Ms. Gordon was written up and sanctioned by 

the Conduct Adjustment Board due to testing positive for 

Buprenorphine and Nor-Buprenorphine without a valid 

prescription on 12/1/15. Good time credit in the amount of 30 

days/22 actual were revoked due to being convicted of a level 4 

felony.

2. On 6/25/16, Ms. Gordon was written up and sanctioned by 

the Conduct Adjustment Board due to a failure to follow 

medication procedures. She had 30 good time/22 actual days 

revoked.

3. On 8/5/17, Ms. Gordon was written up and sanctioned by 

the Conduct Adjustment Board for being terminated from 

employment for disciplinary reasons. She was sanctioned a loss 

of 60/45 actual good time credit days.

Id. at 60. Accordingly, the notice requested Gordon’s removal from the work 

release facility based on her possession or consumption of illegal drugs without 

a prescription, her failure to follow medication procedures, her termination 

 

1 While Gordon’s medical restrictions could serve as a basis for a change of her placement, her medical 

restrictions do not constitute a “violation” of probation or the conditions of placement and should never have 

been characterized as such by the work release director, the State, or the trial court.
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from employment for disciplinary reasons, and her current medical restrictions. 

Some preliminary hearings were held, and Gordon did not return to the work 

release facility but was placed on temporary home detention, over the State’s 

objection, until the revocation hearing.

[4] A revocation hearing was held on October 5, 2017. During the hearing, the 

director of the work release program, Bridgett Collins, testified regarding

Gordon’s injury as well as her prior violations. Collins stated that Gordon has 

“had a few write ups” during her time in work release and that “she doesn’t 

accept responsibility for her actions.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 26. Collins explained that 

“right before [Gordon] was hurt” and needed to be removed from the program 

for medical issues, “she was already on the verge of being removed from the 

program” based on her prior “discipline issues.” Id. Collins gave specifics 

about Gordon’s December 2015 violation, her June 2016 violation, and her 

August 2017 violation of the conditions of work release. Collins indicated that 

Gordon’s use and misuse of medications was especially problematic because 

the work release facility is “filled with addicts” and individuals like Gordon are 

“triggers” for others. Id. at 28, 31. Collins stated that about a week after 

Gordon was terminated from her employment for disciplinary reasons, she was 

injured and needed a wheelchair and to be on bed rest. Collins explained that 

Gordon’s medical issues were “beyond” what the facility can handle. Id. at 30. 

[5] Gordon stated that her injury had now healed and requested that she be 

allowed to continue in the work release program or that she be placed on home 

detention. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated,
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The evidence shows that the defendant has had at least three 

violations, she’s not a candidate for work release or home 

detention, she violates. She agreed in her plea that she would 

serve her time either on work release or the department of 

corrections. She’s not a candidate for work release. She’s not 

fine, she won’t be a burden, I’m going to sentence her to the 

Indiana Department of Corrections for one thousand four 

hundred forty-nine days, give credit for seven hundred and 

twelve plus one hundred and sixteen.

Id. at 45. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

revoking Gordon’s work release placement.

[6] Gordon asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her work 

release placement. We treat a hearing on a petition to revoke a placement in a 

community corrections program the same as we do a hearing on a petition to 

revoke probation. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999). “A defendant is 

not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a community corrections 

program.” Id. “Rather, placement in either is a ‘matter of grace’ and a 

‘conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.’” Id. (quoting Million v. State, 646 

N.E.2d 998, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).

[7] “Our standard of review of an appeal from the revocation of a community 

corrections placement mirrors that for revocation of probation.” Monroe v. State, 

899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A revocation hearing is civil in 

nature and the State need only prove an alleged violation by a preponderance of 
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the evidence. Id. We will consider all the evidence supporting the judgment of 

the trial court without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of the 

witnesses. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the 

trial court’s conclusion that a defendant has violated any terms of probation or 

community corrections placement, we will affirm the court’s decision to revoke. 

Id.

[8] Gordon argues that the State’s “primary reason” for seeking revocation of her 

work release placement, her pelvic injury and required medical care, had been 

resolved at the time of the revocation hearing. Appellant’s Br. at 10. Thus, she 

argues, revocation of her placement was no longer necessary and the trial court 

abused its discretion in doing so. However, as Collins’s testimony and the 

probable cause affidavit attached to the petition to revoke made clear, Gordon 

had already violated the conditions of her placement on three prior occasions. 

It is well settled that the violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient 

to revoke probation. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013).

Accordingly, it was reasonable for the trial court here to determine that 

revocation of Gordon’s work release placement was warranted based on the 

substantial evidence of her three prior violations.

[9] To the extent that the trial court also relied on Gordon’s medical restrictions as 

one of the reasons for revocation of placement (oral reference to Gordon not 

being “fine” and stating that she “won’t be burden” to the work release facility, 

and abstract of judgment listing medical restrictions as reason for revocation), 

this was error, as the evidence supports Gordon’s assertion that she is no longer 
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medically restricted. However, any such error was harmless in light of the clear 

evidence of her three prior violations. See Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (probationer not harmed by trial court’s error in light of 

evidence of multiple probation violations). The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in revoking Gordon’s work release placement.2

Section 2 – The trial court did not violate Gordon’s due 

process rights.

[10] Gordon next asserts that the trial court violated her due process rights by failing 

to issue a sufficient statement explaining the reasons for revocation. One 

requirement of due process provided to a probationer at a revocation hearing 

includes a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and 

reasons for revoking probation. Parker v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1997) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). “Due Process 

requires that the reasons for revoking probation be clearly and plainly stated by 

the sentencing judge not merely to give appellant notice of the revocation, but 

also to facilitate meaningful appellate review.” Medicus v. State, 664 N.E.2d 

1163, 1164 (Ind. 1996). Stated another way, “the purposes of the written 

statement requirement are to help ‘[e]nsure accurate factfinding with respect to 

 

2 Gordon suggests a double jeopardy issue by stating that she has “already been punished” by the work 

release facility for her prior violations. Appellant’s Br. at 14. We note that “a violation of a condition of 

community corrections does not constitute an offense within the purview of double jeopardy analysis.” 

McQueen v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Indeed, “[d]ouble jeopardy protection applies 

only to criminal proceedings, and revocation of community corrections placement proceedings are not 

criminal proceedings....” Id. at 1244. Thus, regardless of the disciplinary actions taken by the work release 

facility, the trial court retained the authority to revoke her placement and to revise her sentence accordingly.
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any alleged violation’ and to provide ‘an adequate basis for review to determine 

if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence.’” Id. 

(quoting Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1985)).

[11] Gordon argues that neither the trial court’s written order nor its oral statement 

during the revocation hearing provide its specific reasons for revoking her work 

release placement, and thus her due process rights were violated. However, 

when the court’s oral and written statements are considered along with the 

hearing transcript, they indicate that the trial court revoked Gordon’s placement

for both valid and invalid reasons. This is sufficient for due process purposes. 

Specifically, the trial court stated at the conclusion of the revocation hearing 

that it was revoking placement because Gordon “has at least three violations,” 

clearly referring to the violations alleged in the probable cause affidavit, which 

included: (1) possession/consumption of illegal drugs without a prescription; 

(2) failure to follow medication procedures; and (3) termination from 

employment for disciplinary reasons. Tr. Vol. 2 at 45. Additionally, as noted 

above, the trial court improperly relied on Gordon’s medical restrictions in 

revoking her placement, as the abstract of judgment listed only medical 

restrictions as the reason for revocation.

[12] Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s written order and its 

oral statement, when coupled with the hearing transcript, satisfy the writing 

requirement, as they clearly indicate the court’s reasons (both valid and invalid)

for revoking Gordon’s probation and serve the purpose of facilitating and 

ensuring meaningful appellate review. See Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 
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621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (trial court’s written revocation order, which provided 

reasons for revocation, and hearing transcript, which provided evidence 

underlying revocation, “provide[d] an adequate basis for appellate review” and 

were “adequate to satisfy the separate writing requirement.”); Wilson v. State, 

708 N.E.2d 32, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (trial court’s oral hearing statement in 

which court found that “State has met its burden of proof and [f]ound the 

defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation as alleged in 

Item 3A, 3B, 3C, D, E, and F and G” met the written statement requirement 

and did not violate probationer’s due process rights); Clark v. State, 580 N.E.2d 

708, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that trial judge’s oral statement from 

bench stating reasons for revocation that was later reduced to writing in hearing 

transcript satisfied due process). Thus, the trial court did not violate Gordon’s 

due process rights.3 The trial court’s revocation of Gordon’s work release 

placement is affirmed.

[13] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

 

3 We do suggest that it is prudent for a trial court to issue a detailed written order regarding its reasons for 

revocation, as obviously some hearing transcripts may not provide us an adequate basis for meaningful 

appellate review.