"[t]his court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve 

actual controversies by an enforceable judgment"). As a result, this court 

ordered the parties to show cause why Docket No. 60157 should not be 

dismissed as moot. Both parties have filed responses as directed. 

In its response, appellant/cross-respondent State Farm Fire 

and Casualty Company contends that Docket No. 60157 continues to 

present a live controversy with regard to whether the district court 

properly entered the preliminary injunction restraining State Farm from 

conducting a second examination under oath of the insured, Nancy Quon. 1 

In particular, State Farm argues that a resolution of whether the 

injunction was proper may be determinative of whether it will ultimately 

deny Quon's insurance claim on the ground that she failed to comply with 

the express terms of her insurance policy. Respondent/cross-appellant 

Robert Ansara, on the other hand, argues not only that the preliminary 

injunction issue in Docket No. 60157 is moot, but also that the death of 

Quon rendered all of the issues in both appeals moot, with the exception Of 

the propriety of the district court's decision finding that State Farm was 

entitled to the $10,000 bond posted by Quon for the preliminary 

injunction. 

Having considered the parties' responses, we conclude that 

Ansara's argument is correct. The order on appeal in Docket No. 60157 

did four things. First, it granted partial summary judgment to the insured 

Quon to the extent that the court found that appellant/cross-respondent 

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company was required to produce its claim 

'Quon was the plaintiff in the action below. Respondent/crossappellant Robert Ansara was substituted in place of Quon after she died 

while the proceedings were pending. 

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file related to Quon's claim. Second, it extended a previously imposed 

preliminary injunction until State Farm produced the file. Third, it 

ordered that State Farm was entitled to recover damages up to the 

amount of the $10,000 bond posted by Quon for the preliminary 

injunction. And finally, it directed that a $1,000 bond posted by Quon for 

a temporary restraining order be returned to her. 

While the portion of the order extending the preliminary 

injunction may have been substantively appealable, see NRAP 3A(b)(3) 

(providing for an appeal from an order granting an injunction), the 

propriety of the injunction was rendered moot by the entry of the district 

court's final judgment, which lifted the injunction. See Personhood 

Nevada, 126 Nev. at , 245 P.3d at 574. As to the remaining portions of 

the order, no final judgment was entered at that time and the directives 

contained in the challenged order were not substantively appealable. See 

NRAP 3A(b) (identifying appealable orders); Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe 

Homeowners Ass'n, 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000) (recognizing 

that this court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the appeal 

is authorized by statute or court rule); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 

426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (explaining that "a final judgment is one 

that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for 

the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such 

as attorney's fees and costs"). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and 

cross-appeal in Docket No. 60157. 

To the extent that respondent/cross-appellant Robert Ansara 

argues that the forfeiture of the $10,000 bond involves a live controversy, 

that issue may be raised in his cross-appeal from the final judgment in 

Docket No. 60911. See Consolidated Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins 

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Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998) (recognizing 

that interlocutory orders entered before final judgment may properly be 

reviewed in an appeal from the final judgment). The remaining issues in 

that appeal and cross-appeal, however, were rendered moot by the death 

of Quon during the pendency of the proceedings. In particular, the order 

challenged in Docket No. 60911 resolved Quon's request for declaratory 

judgment, which she sought in order to determine whether State Farm 

could require her to submit to a second examination under oath. In that 

order, the district court found that Quon was required to submit to further 

examination, but that she was entitled to first receive State Farm's 

investigative file as to her claim. At this time, State Farm has already 

released the investigative file and further examination of Quon is 

impossible in light of her death. And while we recognize that this court's 

review of the challenged order could influence State Farm's decision with 

regard to the pending insurance claim, this court's role is not to issue 

advisory opinions. 2 See Personhood Nevada, 126 Nev. at , 245 P.3d at 

574. 

In short, this court's review of the challenged order would 

have no practical effect. Moreover, given the unique factual situation 

presented by this case, we conclude that review under the capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine is not 

appropriate. See Personhood Nevada, 126 Nev. at , 245 P.3d at 575 

(indicating that a matter is unlikely to be of public, widespread 

importance when its resolution is highly fact specific). Accordingly, we 

2We also note that State Farm did not file any claim in the district 

court seeking a determination that Quon had failed to comply with the 

requirements of her insurance policy. 

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?irdesty 

"V06.0t 

' J. 

guirre 

Cherry 

dismiss the appeal filed by State Farm in Docket No. 60911. See Morrow 

v. Morrow, 62 Nev. 492, 497-98, 156 P.2d 827, 829 (1945) (dismissing an 

appeal from a divorce action as moot following the death of one of the 

parties when there was no property to be divided, such that the only issue 

was the personal status of the parties); see also Casillas v. Cano, 79 

S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App. 2002) (explaining that a party's death renders an 

appeal moot when the death results in the inability of the judgment to 

have any practical effect on a live controversy). Ansara's cross-appeal in 

Docket No. 60911, however, may proceed only as to the forfeiture of the 

bond. 

Therefore, Ansara shall have 45 days from the date of this 

order to file and serve the opening brief. Briefing shall thereafter proceed 

in accordance with NRAP 31(a)(1). 

It is so ORDERED. 

cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge 

Ara H. Shirinian, Settlement Judge 

Kravitz, Schnitzer, Sloane & Johnson, Chtd. 

Alverson Taylor Mortensen & Sanders 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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