In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-3105

ERNEST A. ODEI and

SPIRIT OF GRACE OUTREACH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 17-cv-06019 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

____________________

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ernest Odei traveled from his native 

Ghana to the United States in 2017 to meet with academic 

advisors and to perform missionary work. When he arrived 

in Chicago, border patrol agents barred his entry because he 

did not have the proper visa. After a short detention, immigration authorities gave Odei the option to withdraw his 
2 No. 18-3105

application for admission and return to Ghana. He chose to 

do so, but several months later he brought this lawsuit 

challenging the inadmissibility determination. 

The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which bars judicial 

review of any “order of removal pursuant to” the expedited

removal procedure in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Odei argues 

that the jurisdictional bar does not apply because it refers

only to “order[s] of removal” and there was no order of 

removal here because he withdrew his application for 

admission. Under the relevant statutory definitions, however, an “order of removal” refers to both an order to remove as 

well as an order that an alien is removable. Odei is challenging the latter, so the jurisdictional bar applies.

I. Background

Odei is a pastor of a Christian church in Ghana and a 

founding board member of the Spirit of Grace Outreach, a 

nonprofit religious group in the United States. He is also a

Ph.D. candidate in an online educational program sponsored 

by a Christian university in Tennessee. In 2017 Spirit of 

Grace invited him to visit the United States to participate in 

its religious activities. Odei also planned to speak at churches and youth groups, perform missionary work, and meet 

with his academic advisors at the university. Before his trip 

Odei applied for a B-1/B-2 visa, which the U.S. Consulate in 

Ghana approved.

When Odei arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International

Airport, agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

agency questioned him about his trip. They eventually 

determined that his visa was invalid for his intended mis-
No. 18-3105 3

sionary and academic purposes, which meant he was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). They found him inadmissible and canceled the visa. They did not immediately 

remove him, however, because he answered “yes” when 

asked if he feared returning to Ghana. They transferred him 

to the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

and he was held in the McHenry County Jail. A week later 

Odei dropped his asylum claim. That would normally 

require immediate removal under § 1225(b)(1), but the 

Department of Homeland Security gave Odei the opportunity to withdraw his application for admission and return to 

Ghana immediately. He did just that.

This lawsuit came a few months later. Odei and Spirit of 

Grace sued the Department of Homeland Security and 

Customs and Border Protection challenging the decision not 

to admit him. He raised claims under the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedure Act, 

and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.1 The district 

judge dismissed the suit based on the INA’s jurisdictionstripping provision. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

We start with a brief overview of the statutory scheme. 

When an immigration officer concludes that an immigrant 

lacks a valid visa and thus is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7), 

 1 The complaint also named Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 

the McHenry County Sheriff as defendants, alleging that Odei was 

denied access to a Bible during his detention and that no one told him of 

his rights under the Vienna Convention to contact consular officials and 

have the Ghanaian consulate notified of his detention. Finally, the 

complaint alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act. These 

claims were either dropped or dismissed and are no longer at issue.
4 No. 18-3105

the officer “shall order the alien removed from the United 

States without further hearing or review.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 

This is commonly called “expedited removal,” but there are 

two exceptions. The officer may not order immediate removal if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for 

asylum ... or a fear of persecution.” Id. And the officer need 

not order removal if the alien withdraws his application: 

“An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of 

the Attorney General and at any time, be permitted to 

withdraw the application for admission and depart immediately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). Because 

Odei initially claimed that he feared persecution but then 

withdrew his application for admission and left the country 

voluntarily, there was no expedited removal.

As relevant here, the INA provides that “no court shall 

have jurisdiction to review ... any individual determination 

or to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or 

relating to the implementation or operation of an order of 

removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i);

see also Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329–30 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(explaining the operation of the jurisdictional bar). Odei 

argues that there was no “order of removal” because he 

withdrew his application and voluntarily left the county, so

§ 1252(a)(2)(A) does not apply.

This argument misreads the INA. The term “order of removal” is synonymous with the term “order of deportation.” 

Mejia Galindo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018); 

Guevara v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 972, 796 (7th Cir. 2007). The 

term “order of deportation” refers not only to a decision 

“ordering deportation” but also to an order “concluding that 

the alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A).
No. 18-3105 5

That means courts lack jurisdiction to review orders to 

remove and also orders that an alien is removable. This case 

falls in the latter category. Border patrol agents determined

that Odei was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) and cancelled 

his visa. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), the Department of Homeland Security was required to remove him once he dropped 

his asylum claim. Though that never happened because 

Odei withdrew his application for admission, the initial 

determination that he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) 

and § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) was nonetheless an “order of removal.” 

Compare Odei’s case to the circumstances at issue in

Guevara. Eusebio Guevara, a Honduran native and lawful 

permanent resident, was placed in removal proceedings 

based on convictions for retail theft and two counts of 

fourth-degree sexual assault. Guevara, 472 F.3d at 973. An 

immigration judge found him removable after classifying

the sexual-assault convictions as crimes of moral turpitude. 

But the judge granted discretionary relief in the form of a 

waiver of removal. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals 

reversed the latter determination and ordered Guevara 

removed. Id. Guevara argued that the Board cannot issue a 

removal order in the first instance, and because the immigration judge had granted a waiver, there was no removal 

order. Id. at 975–76. We disagreed, explaining that “if an 

[immigration judge] decides that an alien is removable but 

does not ultimately order removal due to a grant of a waiver, cancellation, or the like, the decision that the alien is 

removable is nonetheless an ‘order of deportation’” that can

be given effect by the Board if it reverses the judge’s decision 

regarding discretionary relief. Id. at 976.
6 No. 18-3105

Odei’s case is similar. Indeed, it involves application of a 

parallel provision of the same statute: Odei was found 

inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) while Guevara was found 

inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2). 

Odei argues in the alternative that the jurisdictionstripping provision should have no effect when an alien 

challenges the admissibility decision under the Religious 

Freedom Restoration Act. He first notes that the Act has its 

own right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person 

whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of 

this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in 

a judicial proceeding ... .”). He then points to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000bb-3, which says that all federal statutory law is 

subject to the Act “unless such law explicitly excludes such 

application by reference to this chapter.” He emphasizes that 

the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision never specifically 

refers to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—though we 

note that it does expressly say that it applies 

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or 

nonstatutory).” § 1252(a)(2)(A).

Nothing in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act overrides § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar. The mere existence 

of a private right of action under a federal statute does not 

eliminate jurisdictional obstacles. See Harris County v. 

MERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate both that a federal court will 

have jurisdiction over their claim, and also that they (the 

plaintiffs) have a right of action to initiate that claim. In other 

words, establishing the court’s jurisdiction and the litigants’ 

right of action are two requirements that must be satisfied 

independently.”) (emphasis added); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 
No. 18-3105 7

510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (explaining that the questions of 

sovereign immunity and the existence of a right of action are 

“analytically distinct”); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l 

Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974) (same, with 

standing). Whether or not the inadmissibility order burdened Odei’s religious practice, § 1252(a)(2)(A) precludes 

judicial review all the same.

We’ve explained that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) “a court has 

jurisdiction to inquire only ‘whether such an order in fact 

was issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There 

shall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal.’” Khan, 608 F.3d at 

330 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)). In other words, in deciding whether § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar applies, the 

specific nature of a claimant’s statutory challenge simply 

doesn’t matter. To the contrary, the jurisdictional bar is 

designed to preclude courts from examining those specifics 

in the first place. This case was properly dismissed.2

AFFIRMED

 2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a related review-preclusion clause in 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of 

habeas corpus. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 

1119 (9th Cir. 2019). The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari. 

Our case does not involve habeas corpus, so we do not need to address 

Thuraissigiam.