Filed 11/26/14 Patel v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

KHAPABHAI PATEL et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B248240
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS135645)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Robert H. O’Brien, Judge. Affirmed.

Frank A. Weiser for Plai ntiffs and Appellants.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Gregor y P. Orland, Brian I. Cheng, and Lisa Berger, Deputy City Attorneys fo r Defendants and Respondents.2 Khapabhai Patel and Pramilaben Patel (a ppellants), co-owners of the Alvarado Palms Motel (the property), appeal from a judgment entered by the trial court denying their petition for writ of mandate and dismi ssing the entire action with prejudice. Through the writ, appellants challenged resp ondent Los Angeles H ousing Department’s (LAHD) determination that the property is a residential hotel under the Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance (RHO) (L.A. Mun. Code, § 47.70 et seq.). 1 Appellants also asserted a cause of action for inverse condemnation. We find no error in the trial court’s decision deny ing the writ and dismissing the entire action with prejudice. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
CONTENTIONS Appellants contend that: (1) the RHO is unconstitutionally vague; (2) there was no substantial evidence to support the determ ination that the property is a residential hotel; and (3) the trial court erred in dismi ssing the entire action, in cluding the cause of
action for inverse condemnation.
THE RHO
The RHO was enacted in 2008 “to benef it the general public by minimizing the adverse impact on the housing supply and on di splaced low-income, elderly, and disabled persons, which results from the loss of resi dential hotel units through conversion and demolition.” (§ 47.71.) The RH O established guidelines for “establishing the status of residential hotel units, . . . regulating the de molition and conversion of these units to other uses, and . . . establishing appropriate administ rative and judicial remedies.” (§ 47.71.) Pursuant to the RHO, a residential hotel is defined as: “ . . . any building containing six or mo re guest rooms or efficiency units, intended or designed to be used, or wh ich are used, rented, or hired out, to be occupied, or which are occupied, for sleeping purposes by guests, and which is also the primary residence of those guests. The term Residential Hotel excludes any building containi ng six or more guest rooms or efficiency units, which is primarily used by transient guests who do not occupy units in that building as thei r primary residence.” (§ 47.73(S).)

1 All further section references are to the Los Angeles Municipal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 A residential unit is defined as: “. . . any guest room, li ght housekeeping room, effi ciency unit, or dwelling unit in a Residential Hotel that was occupied as a primary residence on October 11, 2005. If a unit was vacan t on October 11, 20 05, a Residential Unit shall mean any guest room, light housekeeping room, efficiency unit, or dwelling unit in a Residential Hotel that, on the first day that the unit was subsequently occupied, was occupi ed as a primary residence.” (§ 47.73(T).)

A tenant is defined as “a Person who is entitled to occupy and occupies a
Residential Unit for at least 31 c onsecutive days.” (§ 47.73(U).) The LAHD is charged with determini ng whether a given building should be designated a residential hotel. (§ 47.75(A).) Hotel owners are permitted to appeal to the LAHD after a determination that their property is a residential hotel. (§ 47.75(B).) The owner has the burden of provin g by a preponderance of the ev idence that the property is not a residential hotel. (§ 47.75(C)(3).) Ce rtain exemptions are av ailable under section 47.74, and hotel owners are permitted to file claims of exemption (§ 47.77).
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND In September 2008, the LAHD notified a ppellants that it had determined that the property should be categorized as a resident ial hotel. Appellants filed a timely appeal pursuant to section 47.75(C). On February 24, 2009, LAHD affi rmed its original determination that the proper ty is a residential hotel. Appellants filed a timely appeal of th e February 2009 decision to the LAHD General Manager’s Hearing Officer. Appellant s contended that the property is used mainly as a transient occupancy hotel and that the use of the property does not conform to the defined use of a residential hotel subject to the provisions of the ordinance. Appellants also claimed violations of the federal and state takings clauses, the due process clauses and the equal protection clause s of the federal and state constitutions. The General Manager found, based on a preponde rance of the evidence, that the property was properly deemed a residential hot el pursuant to the relevant laws.4 Appellants initiated federal litigation in Au gust 2009. They included in their federal complaint a state claim for a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5 and a state claim for inverse condemnation. In February 2011,
the district court decided to abst ain from exercising jurisdiction under Railroad Com. of
Texas v. Pullman Co. (1941) 312 U.S. 496. It stayed appellants’ federal constitutional causes of action and dismissed appellants’ st ate causes of action. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision on October 13, 2011. Appellants initiated this state court pr oceeding on January 23, 2012, claiming a
cause of action for writ of mandate under Co de of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and a cause of action alleging an inverse condem nation taking. Appellants argued that the RHO was unconstitutionally vague. They alleged: “The ordinance does no[t] define the term ‘primary residence’ and the ordinance is vague, circular and highly confusing as to the use and application of this certain term in the ordinance and the definitional terms ‘Residential Hotel,’ ‘Residential Un it,’ ‘Tenant,’ and ‘Tourist Unit’ contained at LAMC Sections 47.73S-[47].73V.”

Appellants argued there was no substantia l evidence to support the decision and the determination that the property is a resi dential hotel subject to the RHO is a taking compensable under article I, section 19 of the California Constitution. A hearing on the petition was held on February 22, 2013. On March 11, 2013, the superior cour t issued its judgment denying the petition and dismissing the ac tion with prejudice. On April 19, 2013, appellants filed their notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review “In reviewing a decision of the [agenc y], the superior court exercises its independent judgment on the evidentiary record of the administrative proceedings and inquires whether the findings of the administra tive agency are supported by the weight of the evidence. [Citations.]” ( Lozano v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1982) 1305 Cal.App.3d 749, 754 ( Lozano ), citing Code Civ. Proc., § 10 94.5, subds. (b), (c).) In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a writ of mandate, the appellate court is ordinarily confined to an inquiry as to whether the findings and judgment of the trial court are supported by substantial, credib le and competent evidence. ( Lozano , at p. 754.) However, where the probative facts are not in dispute, the determination of the trial court may be reviewed as a matter of law. ( Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 575, 585 .) Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. ( People ex rel. Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.Ap p.4th 619, 632.) II. Constitutionality of the RHO A. Applicable legal standards There is a “‘strong presumption that legi slative enactments “must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, pos itively, and unmistakably appe ars. [Citations.] . . .”’ [Citation.]” ( Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 568.) A statute will not be “‘“held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language”’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) “Some imprecision in statutory language is allowable
and a statute is not unconstitutio nally vague if there is some matter of degree in the definition of a statutory term or the words used do not have a uni versally recognized meaning. Instead, a statute will be deemed sufficiently precise if its meaning can be fairly ascertained by references to similar statutes or other judicial determinations, or to the common law or the dictionary, or if the words have a common a nd generally accepted meaning. [Citation.]” ( In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 435.) B. A reasonable and practical construc tion can be given to the RHO language Appellants’ first argument is that the RH O violates the due process clauses of the
United States and California Constitutions. Specifically, appellants argue that the ordinance does not adequately define th e terms “residential unit” and “primary residence.” Because of this inadequacy , appellants argue, there are insufficient guidelines as to how the LAHD determines whether a building is a residential hotel under section 47.75(A).6 The meaning of the term “residential unit,” as used in the RHO, is reasonably clear. As set forth above, the term is specifically defined in section 47.73(T). The term is used to refer to any guest room, light h ousekeeping room, efficien cy unit, or dwelling unit that was occupied as a primary re sidence on October 11, 2005. The term “residential” has a generally accepted m eaning which is comm only understood. Merriam-Webster gives a practical definition: “used as a residence or by residents.” (Merriam-Webster Online Dict . (2014) <http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/residential>). The term is universally understood to relate to a place where people live. The term “unit” is also commonly used and understood. A unit is generally defined as “a single thing . . . that is a part of something larger.” (Merriam-Webster Online Dict., supra , <http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary/unit>). The two common words, taken together, clearly refer to a single subdivision of a larger residential housing area. Because the term “residential unit” has been specifically defined in the ordinance, and because the term is also easily defined u nder common usage, we decline to find it unconstitutionally vague. Appellants argue that the definition of “residential unit” introduces a new, undefined term, “dwelling unit,” not found in the definition section. However, like the terms described above, we find the term “dwe lling unit” sufficiently simple to understand given the commonly accepted uses of the words in the phrase. A dwelling is “a shelter (as a house) in which people live. ” (Merriam-Webster Online Dict., supra , <http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary/dwelling>.) Paired with the term “unit,” discussed above, we conclude that most read ers would understand this phrase to mean a portion of a larger shelter where humans reside. Again, we see no unconstitutional vagueness in the use of the term. Appellants also take issue with the us e of the terms “tenant” and “primary
residence.” The term “tenant” is defined in section 47.73(U) as “a Person who is entitled to occupy and occupies a Residential Unit fo r at least 31 consecutive days.” Appellants complain that the term “tenan t,” while defined in the ordinance, appears nowhere in the7 definitions of the terms “residential hotel ” or “residential unit. ” Instead, the term “primary residence” is used in those definitions. The term “primary residence,” however,
is not defined in the ordinance. Under the circumstances, appellants argue, building
owners are unable to understand how their bu ildings will be classified as residential
hotels. The ordinance certainly would have been more clear if the drafters had used the
term “tenant” rather than th e term “primary residence” in sections 47.73(S) and (T). 2 Use
of the term “tenant” in the definitions of “residential hote l” and “residential unit” would have made it very clear that the criteria for determining whet her a unit is a residential unit is whether the guest occupies the unit for 31 consecutive days. However, despite the absence of the wo rd “tenant” from th e definitions of “residential unit” and “residential hotel,” we find that the ordinance as a whole is not unconstitutionally vague. A tenant, defined as a person who rents or leases a residential unit for at least 31 consecutive days, is different from a transient or a tourist. The common use of the term
“tenant” is an individual who rents or leases from a landlord and possesses real property pursuant to agreement. The wo rd “tenant” is frequently used to describe a person who is renting an apartment where he or she re sides. (Merriam-Webster Online Dict., supra , http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary/tenant>.) Thus , the building owner can reasonably conclude that a tena nt, who stays at a hotel for at least 31 days, is considered to be using the unit as his or her primary residence. Reading the basic terms of the ordinan ce together, the ordinance thus may be reasonably interpreted as follows: a resident ial hotel is any build ing containing six or
more residential units. A residential unit is a guest room in a hotel that was occupied as a primary residence on October 11, 2005. From both the de finition and the common usage

2 For example, the drafters could have written “A Residential Unit is any guest room . . . that was occupied by a tenant on October 11, 2005,” rath er than “A Residential Unit is any guest room . . . that was occ upied as a primary re sidence on October 11, 2005.”8 of the term “tenant,” the read er can reasonably understand that a primary residence is a unit occupied by a tenant -- i.e., someone who occupies the unit for at least 31 consecutive days. While it is not a model of clarity, a re asonable construction can be given to the language of the RHO, and we decline to find the ordi nance unconstitutionally vague.
C. City of San Bernardino Hotel/Motel A ssn. v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 237 (San Bern ardino), is distinguishable
In San Bernardino , cited by appellants, a hotel and motel association brought an action challenging the validity of a transien t occupancy tax adopted by the city. A violation of any of the ordina nce’s provisions was a crimin al misdemeanor. One of the association’s arguments was that the ordinanc e violated due process of law because the
definitional sections of the ordinance were “vague, circular, and contradictory.” ( San Bernardino, supra , 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 245.) In par ticular, the association objected that the statute used a 30-day occu pancy rule to define “hotel,” while using a 90-day rule to
define “transient.” 3 In addition, the association cont ested the use of the word “dwelling” in defining the term “occupancy, ” contending that this was c ontradictory to renting on a transient basis. ( Id. at p. 247.) The Court of Appeal agreed with the association’s arguments, finding that “the definitional problems in the statute render it vague and
therefore unconstitutional under the Fifth Ame ndment. The problems are accentuated by the fact that this is a penal statute. In our view, the definiti ons do not adequately distinguish between a person li ving from day-to-day or week-to-week in a motel and an apartment dweller on month-to-month tenancy.” ( Id. at p. 250.)

3 The San Bernardino ordinance defined “hotel” as a structure occupied by transients “for a period of thirty days or less” ( id. at p. 246), but defined a “transient” as any person who occupies premis es intended for transient occupancy for a period of less than 90 consecutiv e calendar days ( id. at p. 247). In addition, the definition of “transient” also included individuals who stayed in a hotel for more than 90 da ys without contracting for occupancy on a permanent basis. ( Id. at p. 249.)9 In contrast to the ordinance at issue in San Bernardino , the RHO is not a penal statute. Further, it does not provide dir ectly contradictory information, as the San
Bernardino ordinance did. Because the meani ng of the statute can reasonably be ascertained, we decline to find it unconstitutionally vague. III. Substantial evidence supports the administrative decision Appellants point out that the LAHD eviden ce submitted showed that more than six units at the property were rented on a tr ansient basis on October 11, 2005, taking into
account the vacant units that were subsequently re nted for less than 30 days. 4 Appellants argue that the property should thus be exem pted under the language of section 47.73(S) which states that “[t]he te rm Residential Hotel excludes any building containing six or more guest rooms or efficiency units, which is primarily used by tr ansient guests who do not occupy units in that buildin g as their primary residence.”
While it is true that more than six units were being used, or were subsequently used, as transient units on Octo ber 11, 2005, this evidence doe s not dictate a finding that the property was primarily used by transient guests. The word “primarily” means “for the most part: chiefly.” (M erriam-Webster Online Dict., supra , <http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/primarily>.) Duri ng the relevant time frame for LAHD’s evaluation, more units were being used as resi dential units than as transient units. Thus, the property was primarily being used by re sidents who occupied un its as their primary residence, resulting in a dete rmination that the property should be classified as a
residential hotel. The ordinance contains no language sugges ting that, if a property has six or more units occupied by transient guests, the property should not be classified as a residential

4 The evidence showed that on October 11 , 2005, 10 units in the property were occupied by guests who had already rented or would rent the unit for more than 31 consecutive days. Two units were vacant and next occupied by a guest who would rent the unit for 31 consecutive days. Two units we re occupied by guests who would rent the unit for less than 30 days; and nine units were vacant and were next occupied by a guest who would rent the unit for less than 30 days. Thus, under the definition set forth in section 47.73(T), 12 units at the property were residential units; 11 were transient units.10 hotel. Appellants argue that because six resi dential units makes a residential hotel, six transient units should point to the opposite outcome. Appellants are reading into the statute language that does not exist. There is no language in the st atute allowing us to
assume that the drafters of the ordinance intended the outcome that appellants desire. Appellants also argue that all the guests staying at the property listed an address other than the motel as their primary resi dence. Thus, appellants argue, there is no evidence that any guest staying at the hotel on October 11, 2005, intended to use the property as his or her primary residence. As set forth above, we find that the or dinance can be reasonably interpreted to mean that a tenant -- i.e., an individual who st ays at the hotel for more than 31 days -- is using the unit as his or her primary residenc e. The ordinance does not suggest that the tenant’s intent, or the existence of an alternative address, has any bearing on the
determination as to whether the hotel is th e tenant’s primary residence. Therefore evidence on these subj ects is irrelevant. 5
The evidence showed that under the defin itions set forth in section 47.73, more than six units were used as the guests’ prim ary residence. Thus, the evidence supported the administrative decision that the building met the definition of a residential hotel.
IV. Dismissal of the inverse condemnation cause of action Appellants’ final contention is that the trial court erred in dismissing the entire action, including their inverse condemnation ca use of action. Appellants argue that the

5 Appellants point to Government Code section 244, subdivi sion (f) as requiring a “union of act and intent” before an individual can change hi s or her residence. Section 244, subdivision (b) also specifies that “[t]he re can only be one residence.” Reading this part of the Government Code as a whole, it is apparent that these Government Code sections are meant to define the group of people who ar e citizens of the State of California. Appellants have not presente d any compelling argument that the laws defining a resident of the stat e should be applied to determin e the primary residence of an individual under the RHO. Therefore we reject this argument. For the same reason, we reject appellants’ complaint that the R HO is unclear as to whether the landlord-tenant law, specifically Civil Code se ction 1940, is relevant in determining residential hotel status. The RHO makes no reference to this provision of the Civil Code, therefore we find it is inapplicable in determ ining residential hotel status.11 trial court heard and ruled upon their writ pe tition but did not hear or rule upon their inverse condemnation cause of action. Appellants cite Zinermon v. Burch (1990) 494 U.S. 113, 127 for the proposition that “the [Supreme] Court usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property. [Citations.]” Appellants were provided with a heari ng on their writ petition, which took place on February 22, 2013. The cause of acti on for inverse condemnation was contained within the same pleading as their cause of action for writ of administrative mandamus. Appellants have not suggested that they were prevented from being he ard on their inverse condemnation cause of action at the February 22, 2013 hearing. Nor did they provide any substantive argument on the inverse condem nation claim in their brief in support of the petition for writ of mandate. The trial court was not required to ra ise the issue of inverse condemnation; instead, it was up to appellants to prosecute their claims. ( People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 128 [party has the obligation to bring an issue to the attention of the trial court]; Kashmiri v. Regents of th e University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 830 ( Kashmiri ) [“‘each party has the obligation to ra ise any issue or infirmity that might subject the ensuing judgment to attack’”].) In addition, appe llants point to no place in the record where they ob jected to the trial court’s fa ilure to address their inverse
condemnation cause of action. The cases cited by appellants in suppo rt of their due process claim are distinguishable. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306 ( Mullane ), the Supreme Court addressed the c onstitutional sufficien cy of notice to beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accoun ts by the trustees of a common trust fund. ( Id. at p. 307.) The only notice provided was a publication in a local newspaper. ( Id. at p. 309.) Under those circumstances, the high court held that notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appr ise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present objections. [Citations.]” ( Id. at p. 314.) Similarly, in Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80 ( Peralta ),12 the Supreme Court addressed a situation where a default judgment was entered against an
individual defendant who had never been personally served with original service of process. In answer to the argument that th e individual had shown no meritorious defense, the high court stated: “Where a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most basic tents of due proc ess, ‘it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits.’ [Citation.]” ( Id. at pp. 86-87.) Here, in contrast to Mullane and Peralta , there is no issue regarding the sufficiency of notice provided for the hearin g. As set forth above, it was appellants’
burden to raise the inverse condemnation issu e at the hearing and object to the trial
court’s failure to address it. Because appellants failed to raise the i ssue of inverse condemnation in their trial brief or at the hearing, and because they di d not object to the tr ial court’s failure to address the issue, we find that they have forfeited this claim. ( Kashmiri, supra , 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 830 [“‘“we ignore arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the trial court”’”].)
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_______ _______________ ______, J. CHAVEZ

We concur:

________________ __________, Acting P. J. ASHMANN-GERST

___________________ _______, J. HOFFSTADT