If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appell ee , UNPUBLISHED November 14, 2019

v No. 344850 Wayne Circuit Court

JOI MARIE BONNER

, LC No. 18

- 000668

- 01

- FC

Defendant

- Appell ant.

Before: M. J. K ELLY

, P .J., and F ORT H OOD and S WARTZLE , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Defendant appeals as of right her jury

- trial conviction of assault with intent to murder,

argu ing that the evi dence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain her conviction on a theory of aiding and abetting. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the shooting of Desmon Green at a house on Otsego St reet in Detroit, Michigan. Green had sold drugs to defendant for two years and considered defendant to be a friend. One evening

, Green was selling narcotics at the Otsego house. Defendant arrived at
the Ots ego house and briefly talked with Green , and then left without incident. Later that evening, defendant knocked on th e front door to the Otsego house. Green saw defendant outside

but did n ot see anyone else at that time. Green opened the door to let defendant in from the front steps. Once Green opened the door, defendant spoke briefly to Green and went t o the farthest

side of the room opposite from the door

. Green remained standing in the doorway. As Green turned to face the outside porch, defendant’s significant other, Martin Luther Sims

, r an up the front steps and shot Green three times

. To escape further danger

, Green ran to the back of the

house and out the side door

. There was no evidence that anything was taken from the Otsego

house after Green fled

.

Although the trial court initially charged defendant with several crimes, the trial court dismissed two charge s on defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and the jury acquitted defendant of a third charge. The jury, however, convicted defendant of assault with intent to- 2

- murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 8 to 20 years in prison for the AWIM conviction. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably infer that she possessed either the requisite intent or that she participated in the

comm ission of the assault while knowing that the principal actor, Sims, had the necessary intent

to com mit the assault.

A. STANDARD OF REVI EW

This Court reviews de novo defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

. People v Meissner , 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt

. Id

. C ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences derived from such evidence can constitute sufficient proof of the elements of the crime. People v Carines , 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “[B]ecause it can be difficult to prove a defendant’s stat e of mind on issues such as knowledge and intent, minimal circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish the defendant’s state of mind, which can be inferred from all the evidence presented.” People v Kanaan , 278 Mich App 594, 622; 751 NW2d 57 (2008).

B. APPLICATION

“[T]he offense of assault with intent to murder requires proof of an assault, committed with actual intent to kill, which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Brown

, 267 Mich App 141, 155; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). Under a n aiding and abetting theory

, one who procures, counsels, aids, or abets in the commission of a crime may be convicted as if she had directly committed such offense

. People v Robinson , 475 Mich 1, 5

- 6; 715 NW2d 44 (2006) ; MCL 7 67.39. To convict a defenda nt of an offense under an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor must demonstrate:

(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the

commission of the c rime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that

the defendant gave aid and encouragement. [ Robinson , 475 Mich at 6, (cleaned up) .]

“ Mere presence, even with kno wledge that an offense is about to be committed or is being committed, is insufficient to establish that a defendant aided or assisted in the commission

of the crime.” People v Norris , 236 Mich App 411, 419

- 420; 600 NW2d 658 (1999). Yet , the

amount of ad vice, aid, or encouragement provided by a defendant is immaterial so long as the defendant has provided assistance that has the effect of inducing the commission of the crime. People v Moore , 470 Mich 56, 71 ; 679 NW2d 41 (2004) . To establish the requisit e intent, the

prosecut or must demonstrate that the defendant either specifically intended to aid or abet the- 3

- offense, or, in the alternative, ha d knowledge of the principal’s intent to commit the offense.

Robinson , 475 Mich at 15. The defendant’s state o f mind may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances in evidence, including “a close association between the defendant and the principal, the defendant’s participation in the planning or execution of the crime, and evidence of flight after the crime .” Carines , 460 Mich at 757

- 758 (cleaned up).

Defendant argues that the prosecut or failed to provide sufficient evidence that she participated in the assault with knowledge of Sims’s intent to commit the assault. Specifically,

defendant argue s that she was merely present at the scene of the assault and the only reasonable inference to be drawn from her return to the Otsego house was that she intended to consume or

procure drugs.

To the contrary, t here was sufficient evidence that defendant assisted Sims in the commission of the assault while knowing that Sims intended to commit the assault. The prosecutor presented evidence that defendant did not ask for drugs at her first visit to the Otsego

hous e on the day of the assault

, which was a deviation from her typical conduct

. Green had provided defendant with free drugs in the past, yet defendant did not request drugs or mention a

desire to consume drugs during defendant’s first visit to the Otsego ho use that day

. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that defendant was engaging in recon naissance of the Otsego house.

Additionally, in the two years during which defendant had known Green, the night of the

assault was the first instance whe n defendant had come to the Otsego house twice in one evening. During her second visit to the Otsego house on the day of the assault , defendant

entered the home qui ckly and proceeded to a space farthest from the front door, while Green

remained in the doo rway. Green testified that he would not have opened the door had he seen

someone else outside. Immediately after defendant’s entrance into the Otsego house, Sims ran up to the front steps and opened fire. Contrary to defendant’s argument , such evidence does not exclusively support an inference that defendant returned to the Otsego house to consume drugs.

“T he fact

- finder is not prevented from making more than one inference in reaching its decision. That is, if each inference is independently supported by established fact, any number of inferences may be combined to decide the ultimat e question.” People v Hardiman

, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002) (cleaned up).

In this case, the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant knocked on the door and entered the Otsego house to coax Green to open the door and allow Sims access to shoot while defendant evaded the gunfire. “We do not interfere with the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of witnesses or the evidence , and the elements of an offense may be

established on the basis of circumstantial evidence and reasonab le inferences from the evidence.

It is the jury’ s duty to determine the weight to be accorded any inferences.” People v Dunigan

, 299 Mich App 579, 582; 831 NW2d 243 (2013) (c itations omitted )

.

This evidence was sufficient for a jury to find defendant’s conduct to constitute aiding or abetting the assault, as both reconnaissance and drawing Green into the range of fire would have

had the ef fect of aiding the commission of the offense. The evidence presented was sufficient to support an inference that defendant was not merely present when Sims approached Green in the doorway of the Otsego house, but rather participated in the commission of t he assault.- 4

- Defendant alternatively argues that the evidence presented fails to support a reasonable inference that defendant had the requisite mental state for conviction as an aider or abettor. Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence does not demonstrate defendant’s intent to assist in the commission of the assault or knowledge of Sims’s intent to commit the assault. See

Robinson , 475 Mich at 15. The facts in evidence demonstrate that Sims and defendant were in a romantic relationship at the time of the assault. The cellular data from the telephones associated with Sims and defendant suggest frequent communication in the period between defendant ’s first and second visits to the Otsego house that evening, and places both te lephones in the are a of the Otsego house before the shooting occurred. Upon entering the Otsego house on defendant’s second visit, defendant immediately moved to an area of the room farthest from the open doorway where Green stood. Directly after defendant entered the Otse go house, Sims arrived

while visibly brandishing a lethal weapon and i mmediately began shooting at Green. See People

v Johnson , 54 Mich App 303, 304; 220 NW2d 705 (1974) (“The intentional discharge of a firearm at someone within range is an assault. The usual result and purpose of such an assault is death. The unjustified and unexcused intention to kill when committing an assault ” constitutes

AWIM. ) Green was shot in both the chest and stomach. See People v Mills , 450 Mich 61, 71; 537 NW2d 909 (1995) (noting that evidence of the victim’s injuries can demonstrate an intent to kill). The frequent telephone communication and exchanges, and defendant’s movement away from the area of the shooting upon entry

, was suffi cient for a jury to find that defendant was aware of Sims’s intent to shoot Green prior to the commission of the assault. Therefore, the evidence presented supports a determination that defendant assisted Sims in the commission of

the assault with knowled ge of Sims’s intent to commit the assault.

III. CONCLUSION

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant of assault with intent to murder under an aiding or abetting theory.

Affirm ed.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle