alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
192 La. 1049

#### LEE et al. v. PERKINS.

No. 34791.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 29, 1939.

*127Jackson & Mayer, of Shreveport, for appellants.

John T. Campbell, of Minden, for ap-pellee.

ODOM, Justice.

Plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant on August 19, 1936, to cancel an oil, gas, and mineral lease, and a mineral deed, executed in their names in favor of defendant by one claiming to be their agent but who was alleged to have had no such authority. Subsequently, in a supplemental petition, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, Perkins, to whom the lease had been granted, had assigned it to a third person for a consideration of $1200, and they prayed for judgment against defendant for the said amount.

The case was tried on February 19, 1937, and judgment was rendered rejecting plaintiffs’ demands and dismissing their suit. They appealed.

Appellants in their motion to remand alleged that the transfer or assignment by the defendant of the lease during the pen-dency of the, suit was a sale of a litigious right, and that they were entitled to the privilege granted by Article 2652 of the Revised Civil Code, which provides: “He against whom a litigious right has been transferred, may get himself released by paying to the transferree the real price of the transfer, together with the interest from its date.”

They prayed that the case be remanded to the district court in order that they may amend their pleadings, file in evidence the transfers above described, and deposit in the registry of the court the amounts paid to the defendant by the transferrees in order that they may be released from the claims of the defendant.

In the case of Langston v. Shaw et al., 147 La. 644, 85 So. 624, 625, where the identical situation was presented, defendants opposed the motion to remand on the ground that the provisions of the Code with reference to the purchase of litigious-rights applied solely to sales made by plaintiffs and not by defendants, and were intended as a protection to defendants only. In disposing of the motion to remand, we said: “The articles of the Code, dealing with the purchase of a litigious right, do not seem to be confined to either side to a lawsuit.”

That case is on all fours with this one. See also Smith et al. v. Cook, 189 La. 632, 180 So. 469.

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that this case be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the lower court for the purposes stated in the motion to remand, all costs to await the final decision of the case.

FOURNET, J., absent.
EXHIBIT 31.2

Certification

I, Anthony R. Cole, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of BCSB Bancorp, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying
officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                     |  |                              
|-------------------- |  | -----------------------------
|Date: March 21, 2008 |  |                              
|                     |  | /s/ Anthony R. Cole          
|                     |  | Anthony R. Cole              
|                     |  | Executive Vice President     
|                     |  | (Principal Financial Officer)
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 1, 2021

No. 04-21-00028-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF N.M.B., A CHILD,

From the 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016-EM5-06049

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

On August 16, 2021, we ordered Appellant Channel Beverly to file written proof that she 

had designated, in writing, the portions of the proceedings she desired court reporter Mary M. 

Wilson to include in the reporter’s record and that she provided written proof that she had paid or 

made arrangements to pay the court reporter’s fee for preparing the reporter’s record. On August 

26, 2021, Appellant Channel Beverly filed written proof that she had done both. We therefore 

ORDER court reporter May M. Wilson to file the reporter’s record on or before October 1, 

2021.

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 1st day of September, 2021.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                            4256                   23613
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     8108                    6835
<ALLOWANCES>                                       339                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 13292                   30909
<PP&E>                                            7642                    4347
<DEPRECIATION>                                    3242                    1277
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   17692                   34084
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             6620                    3781
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                           862                     842
<OTHER-SE>                                        9135                   28409
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     17692                   34084
<SALES>                                          22525                   20658
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 22525                   20658
<CGS>                                            15035                    9852
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    27032                   18512
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  26                     134
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (4199)                    2116
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                     111
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0                    2005
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (4199)                    2005
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.63)                     .73
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.63)                     .30
        

</TABLE>
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4121

To amend title 18, United States Code, to penalize those who endanger

children in hostage situations.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 19, 1996

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts introduced the following bill; which was referred

to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to penalize those

who endanger children in hostage situations.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Hostage Act of

5 1996’’.

6 SEC. 2. ENDANGERMENT OF CHILDREN DURING LAW EN7 FORCEMENT SITUATIONS.

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 73 (relating to obstruc9 tion of justice) of title 18, United States Code, is amended

10 by adding at the end the following:
2

•HR 4121 IH

1 ‘‘§ 1518. Endangerment of children during law en2 forcement situations

3 ‘‘(a) Whoever, having custody or control over an indi4 vidual under the age of 18 years, knowingly keeps that

5 individual, with reckless disregard for the safety of the in6 dividual, in a situation in which the individual could be

7 endangered during a Federal law enforcement action shall

8 be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than

9 2 years, or both.

10 ‘‘(b) As used in this section the term ‘Federal law

11 enforcement action’ means any action to enforce a crimi12 nal law in which a Federal law enforcement officer partici13 pates.’’.

14 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

15 at the beginning of chapter 73 of title 18, United States

16 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

17 item:

‘‘1518. Endangerment of children during law enforcement situations.’’.

Æ
#### Vernon PRAIRIE and Dora Prairie, Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Appellee.

No. 72-1606.

.United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Nov. 14, 1972.

*1086Vernon Prairie, pro se.

Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Meyer Rothwacks, Atty., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., and Lee H. Henkel, Jr., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MATTHES, Chief Judge, and HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Vernon Prairie (and wife) appeals pro se from a decision and order of the United States Tax Court dismissing his petition contesting the deficiencies of $2,-785.16 assessed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the years 1966 and 1967. He also claims over $600,000 is due from the Government. This matter originally came before an administrative panel1 of our Court for possible appointment sua sponte of counsel to assist appellant in the prosecution of his pro se appeal. Upon review of the file it appeared that the appeal was frivolous. Pursuant to Local Rule 9 the matter was then referred to a panel of our Court for disposition.

We have carefully reviewed appellants’ complaints on this appeal and the Tax Court file and are satisfied that the appeal is frivolous and entirely without merit. Appellants2 filed their petition in the Tax Court on November 17, 1969. Appellant failed to appear on three occasions when his cause was set for trial (June 21, 1971, March 7, 1972, and June 5, 1972), allegedly because appellant was in poor health. We are satisfied that the Tax Court afforded appellant every opportunity to present his claims, but he failed to do so. We are convinced that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for lack of prosecution, and in ordering and deciding that there are deficiencies due from the appellants for the taxable years 1966 and 1967 in the amounts of $1,798.-31 and $450.88 respectively. See, Bree v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 368 F.2d 116 (CA8 1966).

The decision and order of the Tax Court are affirmed.3

1

. 28 U.S.C. Local Rule 2(c) (CA8 1971).

2

. Appellant’s wife Dora Prairie is shown as joining in the original petition before the Tax Court.

3

. Appellant in letters to this Court makes numerous other claims which are completely unsupported, i. e., he alleges that he has a tax claim against the Government for $831,814 which was not invalidated by the Tax Court decision. We note too that various other claims were made in the tax court by letters and news clippings which were utterly devoid of support. These claims are frivolous and do not merit discussion here.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONMNLAED

PR 20-0005

IN RE THE MOTION OF NICHOLAS J. MONTAGUE

FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE STATE OF

MONTANA

MAY 2 6 2020

Bowen Greenwood

":lerk of Supreme Court

Stote nf Montana

ORDER

Nicholas J. Montague has filed a motion for admission to the Bar of the State of

Montana pursuant to Rule V of the Rules for Admission, Admission on Motion. The Bar

Admissions Administrator of the State Bar of Montana has informed the Court that the

Commission on Character and Fitness has certified that Montague has provided the

necessary documentation and has satisfied the requirements prerequisite to admission on

motion under Rule V. Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon payment of any application fees and

completion of any other processing requirements as set forth by the Bar Admissions

Administrator, Nicholas J. Montague may be sworn in to the practice of law in the State of

Montana. Arrangements for swearing in may be made by contacting the office of the Clerk

of the Montana Supreme Court.

The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this order to Petitioner and to the State

Bar of Montana.

DATED this e-.6. day of May, 2020.

Chief Justice

05/26/2020

Case Number: PR 20-0005
, 4. JJ, . i
Opinion filed November 29, 2018



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

___ _____ _ _ __ ____



### No s

. 11

- 1 8

- 00 296

- C R & 11

- 1 8

- 00 297

- CR

____ _ _ _____ _____



### MARVIN THOMPSON

, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 35 th District Court

Brown County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No s

. CR25531 & CR25532

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss in both of his appeals . In each motion,

he states that he no longer wishes to pursue the appeal and requests that the appeal

be dismissed. In accordance with T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 4 2.2 , t he motion s are signed by

Appellant and his counsel.

The motion s are granted

, and the appeal s are dismissed.

November 29, 2018 PER CURIAM

Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Wright, S.C.J. 1

Willson, J., not participating.

1 Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland,
sitting by assignment.
Exhibit 99.4

ANNUAL SUBSERVICER'S CERTIFICATE

GE
COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION FINANCE CORPORATION

---

Re:    YAMAHA
MOTOR MASTER TRUST

---

The
undersigned, duly authorized representative of GE Commercial Distribution Finance Corporation, a Nevada Corporation ("GECDF"), as
Servicer pursuant to the Servicing Agreement, dated as of March 1, 1994 (as amended, the "Servicing Agreement"), by and among Yamaha Motor
Corporation, U.S.A. ("Yamaha"), and GECDF (f/k/a Deutsche Financial Services Corporation, which was f/k/a ITT Commercial Finance Corp.), does hereby certify to the best of his or her knowledge after
reasonable investigation that:



[Document continues with signature page.]

---

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Annual Subservicer's Certificate as of May 31, 2003.

| |  | SERVICER:                                       
| |  | ------------------------------------------------
| |  | GE COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION
FINANCE CORPORATION  
| |  | By:                                             
| |  | Name:  Paul R. Puma
Title:    Sr. Vice President

---

QuickLinks
Exhibit
99.2





CERTIFICATE
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Quarterly Report (the “Report”) on the Form 10-Q of Sona
Resources Inc. (the “Company”) for the three months ended December 31, 2009 and
for period from January 18, 2007 (date of inception) to December 31, 2009, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Ajeeta
Pinheiro, Chief Executive Officer, President and Director, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:





1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of
      the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
  and





2.
            The
      information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
      Company.








February
3, 2010       
                                                         AJEETA
PINHEIRO


Ajeeta
Pinheiro


Chief
Executive Officer,


President
and Director











-1-
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

January 12, 2023

No. 04

- 22

- 00675

- CV

BEXAR APPRAISAL DISTRICT

, Appellant /Cross

- Appellee

v.

ABASTO PROPERTIES LLC, ET AL.

, Appellee /Cross

- Appellant

From the 407th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018

- CI

- 12685 Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

On January 10 , 202 3 , appellant filed a n Unopposed Motion to File a Copy of a Reporter’s Record . After consideration, we GRANT the motion.

_________________________________ Beth Watkins , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 12th day of January, 2023

.

_________________________________ M ichael A. C ruz , Clerk of Court
<PAGE>
                            1999 GAIN SHARING BONUS PLAN



All employees of the company are eligible to receive annual cash bonuses based
on annual results.  The components used to determine the ultimate bonus payment
are as follows:

IN FORCE PREMIUM         In force premium is the annualized total premiums in
                         effect at any one point in time.

NET INCOME               Pre-tax, pre-bonus operating profit. 


Targets were established for each of the identified components above based on
the 1999 business plan goals.  The amount of the bonus payment is determined
based on actual performance compared to the established Gain Sharing Bonus Plan
targets.
Exhibit 4.2

 


Consent of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm


We have issued our
report dated February 13, 2020, with respect to the financial statement of Advisors Disciplined Trust 1991 contained in Amendment
No. 1 to the Registration Statement on Form S-6 (File No. 333-234727) and related Prospectus. We consent to the use of the aforementioned
report in the Registration Statement and Prospectus, and to the use of our name as it appears under the caption “Experts”.




	 	/s/ GRANT THORNTON LLP






 


Chicago, Illinois


February 13, 2020
#### Sam Calloway v. State.

No. 24961.

November 15, 1950.

*C. L. Harris,*and (counsel on appeal only) *Boling, Smith & Allen,*Lubbock, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of the liquor laws in Lubbock County, and by a jury fined $500.00 and awarded a term of six months in the county jail. He appeals.

On the date in question the appellant was driving recklessly in the city of Lubbock and was thus observed by two policemen running through red lights. He finally abandoned his car and entered a building back of a service station carrying a sack in his hand. When he got out of his car the back seat thereof was up. Appellant entered the building with a paper sack in his left hand which appeared to have something in it. An officer followed appellant into this building and saw him lay this paper sack on a coil of garden hose. The officer looked inside of the sack and found a bottle of whisky therein. The officers then arrested appellant and took him and the sack of whisky to the police station. Both the sack and the whisky bottle were offered in evidence and identified upon the trial.

*246One of the appellant’s witnesses testified that this whisky belonged to him and was purchased by him in Dallas; that he placed same on this coil of hose, intending to go back for the same, but the officers took it away when they arrested the appellant. The jury failed to give credence to such testimony.

Appellant’s Bill of Exceptions No. 1 relative to a peremptory instruction in his favor is without merit and is overruled.

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is multifarious, it containing objections to the testimony of three different witnesses as to three separate transactions.

Bill No. 3 complains because the county attorney made the statement in the presence of the jury as follows:

> “In this connection, the record shows that the preceding witness testified that Tiny told him on that occasion that Sam Calloway was bootlegging.”

This statement of the county attorney was objected to and the court was asked to instruct the jury not to consider the same. Such was contended to be an incorrect statement, and was an indirect attack upon appellant, whose reputation had not been placed in the record. This was also an improper statement, not borne out by the record, and might have had some influence upon the jury in their verdict herein. The trial court refused to instruct the jury to disregard the same, and we think he fell into error which requires a reversal of this cause.

The judgment will therefore be reversed and the cause remanded.