## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

Augu st v. Hanlon , 2012 IL App (2d) 111252

Appellate Court Caption CHA RL ES AUGUST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT T. HANL ON, Def endant- Appellee .–CHARLES AUGUST, Plaintiff-Appellee
, v. ROBERT T. HA NL ON, De fenda nt-Appellant.

District & N o. Second District Docke t Nos. 2-11-1252, 2-11- 1280 cons.

Filed Rehea ring denied September 6, 2012

October 17, 2012

Held ( Note : Th is syl lab us

c ons ti tut es no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the R epo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The Citi zen Participation Act, I llinois ’s ve r s ion of an anti-SL APP statute, did not immuniz e defe ndant from liability in plaintiff’s action for slander and false light invasion of privac y , since plaintiff’s complaint was not based solely on defe ndant’s constitutional rig hts and p articipation in
g overnme nt and the burden never shifted to plaintiff to show defe ndant was immune under

the Act.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of McHe nry County
, No. 06-LA-371; the Hon. Michae l W. Feetter er, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment No. 2-11-1252, Re verse d and re manded. No. 2-11-1280, A ffirme d.Counsel on

Appea l R

. M ar k Gum merson, Adrian M. Gosch, and J amie R

. Wombacher, all of Gummerson Rausch Wand L ee Wombacher, LL C, of Woodst ock, for Charles Aug ust.

Ger ald P. Ba g g ott I I I
, of L aw Offic es of Robert T. Hanlon & Associates, P.C., of W oodstock, for Robert T. Hanlon.

Panel J USTI CE HUDSON deliver ed the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustices Z enoff

and B urke c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Charles Aug ust, filed in the circ uit court o f M cH en ry C o u n ty a complaint
ag ainst defe ndant, Robert Hanlon. As amende d, the complain t c o n ta in e d o n e count of slander
per quod and one count of false light invasion of privac y

. The trial court g rante d defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt o n t h e basis that the Citi zen Participation Act (Ac t) (735 I L CS 110/ 1 et seq. (West 2010)) provide d defe ndant i mmunity from the c laims alleg ed by plaintiff. In conjunction with the j udg ment, the trial court denied defe ndant’s reque st for attorney fee s. There afte r, eac h party filed a motion to rec onsider and defe ndant filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994). The trial court denied the relief reque sted by the parties, and they both appealed. I n appea l No. 2-11-1252, plaintiff arg ues that the trial court err ed in finding that the Act applies to this case

. I n appea l No. 2-11-1280, defe ndant challeng es the trial court’s denial of attorney fee s and sanctions. On o u r o wn motion, we consolidated the parties’ appea ls. For the rea sons that follow, we find that the Act does not apply to the fa ct s o f t his case and that, there fore
, defe ndant’s
reque sts for attorney fee s and sanctions are moot. Acc ording ly
, the judgme nt of the trial court is affirme d in part and r ever sed in part a nd the cause is rema nded for further proce eding s.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 This case involves the application of the Act, I llinois ’s version of an anti-SL APP statute. 735 I L CS 110/1 et seq. (West 2010). The term “SL APP” is an acr onym for “S t ra teg ic L awsuits Ag ainst Public Participation.” Sandholm v. Kuecker , 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 1. SL APPs

are lawsuits aimed at pre venting citizens from exercising certain constitutional rights or at punishing those who ha ve done so. W right Dev elopment Group, LLC v. W alsh , 238 I ll. 2d 620, 630 (2010); Mund v. Brown , 393 I ll. App. 3d 994, 995 (2009). SL APPs use the threat of money damag es or the prospec t of the cost of defe nding ag ainst the suits to “c h i ll” a party ’s speec h or protest activity and discourag e opposition by others. Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 34 (citing J ohn C. Ba rker
, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem

-2-of SLAPPs
, 26 L oy

. L .A. L . Rev. 395, 396 (1993)) ; W right Deve lopment Group, LLC
, 238 I ll. 2d at 630; see al s o 7 3 5 I L CS 110/15 (West 2010) (discussing t he publi c poli cy behind the Act)

. ¶ 4 The Act, which became eff ective in Aug ust 2007 (Pub. Act 95-506 (ef f. Aug

. 28, 2007);

see 735 IL CS 110/99 (West 2010)), seeks to exti ng uish SL APPs and protec t citizen participation in g overnme nt in three principal way s ( W right Dev elopment Group, LLC
, 238 I ll. 2d at 632). First, it immuniz es citizens from civil actions “base d on, relate[d] to, or *** in response to” any acts made “in furtheran ce o f the [citi zens’] constitutional rig hts to petition, speec h, association, and participation in g overnme nt.” 735 I L CS 110/15 (West 2010); W right De velopme nt G roup, LLC
, 238 I ll. 2d at 632. Second, the Act establishes an expedited leg al proce ss to dispose of SL APPs in both the trial court and the appellate court. 735 I L CS 110/5, 20 (West 2010); W right Dev elopment Group, LLC
, 238 I ll. 2d at 632. Third, the Act mandates that a party who preva ils in a motion under t h e Ac t shall be awa rded “re asonable attorney ’s fe es and costs incurre d in connec tion with the motion.” 735 I L CS 110/25 (West 2010); W

right Dev elopment Group, LLC
, 238 I ll. 2d at 632. We note that the Act has been written more broadly than anti-SL APP statutes in other states (Mar k J

. Sobczak, Comment, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citi zen Participatio n A ct , 2 8 N. I ll. U. L

. Rev. 559, 573 (2008)) and that the leg islature has mandated that the Act be liber ally construed ( 735 I L CS 110/ 30(b) ( West 2010)). ¶ 5 The initial complaint in t his case w as filed on Nove mber 22, 2006. The complaint was amende d on November

14, 2007, and S eptember 9, 2008. The second amended complaint alleg ed as f

ollows. Pl aintiff wa s a business ag ent and union organizer for L ocal 150 of the I ntern ati o n a l U n ion of Oper ating Eng ineer s. On J une 5, 2006, defe ndant, an attorney licensed
to prac tice law in I llinois
, filed in the circ uit court of McHe nry County a complaint on behalf of Merryman Ex cavation, I nc. (Mer ry man), and ag ainst multipl e parties, including plaintiff. The Mer ry man lawsuit alleg ed that plaintiff a nd another individual (R.W . Smit h, J r.) stole
money from Merry man by soliciting a donation for a charitable ende av o r t hroug h Smit h’s business, a food and drink establishment named “Jesse Oaks,” but keeping the money rathe r than forw arding it to a charity

. ¶ 6 On J une 7, 2006, defe ndant had a telephone conver sation with Charle s Ke es h an , a newspa per r eporte r. Keeshan informed def endant that hewas g athering inf ormation for a n article to be published in the Daily Herald conce rning the Merry man lawsuit and that he was seeking defe ndant’s comm ents about the alleg ations there in. On J une 8, 2006, Kee shan’s article was published in the Daily Herald . Charles Ke eshan, Businessman Alleges He W as Scamme d Out of $10,000

, Daily Her ald, J une 8, 2006. The article states that Merryman filed suit acc using plaintiff, Smit h, and a third individual of defr auding it out of the $10,000 that Merry man thought was g oing to charity

. In the article
, defe ndant i s quoted as stating that “[Merryman] opened up [i ts] chec kbook and wrote a big chec k, only to find out that not only did none of the money g o to a disabled kid, but that J esse Oaks isn’t a kid, it’s a biker bar.” As alleg ed in the article , defe ndant also cla imed that he “a sked for Smit h’s documentation proving the m oney was donated but so far his reque sts have gone unanswe red.” Also with
respe ct to the reque st for documentation, defe ndant is quoted as say ing that he and Merry man had “se en nothing like that. This isn’t a case of a me re misunder standing .”

-3-¶ 7 Acc ording to plaintiff, defe ndant’s statements to Kee shan “we re fac tual comments on a

pending lawsuit which was desig ned to falsely acc use [pl aintiff] of defr auding and stealing from d ef endant’s client.” Plaintiff alleg ed that defe ndant, in the prese nce of Kee shan, “uttere d and published false and defamatory statements about, of and conce rning [hi m] .” Plaintiff asserted that a third party rea ding the Daily Herald article in which the statements

w e re p u b li s h e d “ w o u ld rea sonably understand the defamatory statements com p la in e d o f w e r e of and conce rning [pl aintiff] at t he ti me s aid s tateme nts wer e made.” P laintiff complained that defe ndant’s statements to Kee shan contained “fa lse alleg ations” that plaintiff had stolen

m oney from Merryman when plaintiff solicited the charitable donation. Acc ording t o plaintiff, defe ndant had rec eived documentation and a letter from Smit h’s attorney identify ing the charities that rec eived Merryman’s donation. Plaintiff alleg ed that defe ndant “knew or should have known his comments would be further published in the Daily Herald
, thus extending his utteranc e and pub l i ca t i o n bey ond the newspa per reporter and to the
g ener al public.” ¶ 8 Count I of the complaint alleg ed slander per quod

. Plaintiff alleg ed that defe ndant’s fa lse and de famatory statements “maliciously slandere d Plaintiff, wrong fully intending to bring Plaintiff into publi c disg rac e and sc andal a nd further wrong fully intending to injure and to destroy the P l ai n t i ff ’s g ood name, cre dit and reputation throug hout McHe nry County and adjoining counties and to bring him into disrepute among his colleag ues and co-w orker s, and otherwise; and to g ener ally discredit him by

falsely and maliciously speaking
, uttering and publishing, conce rn ing Plaintiff, said defamatory false and scanda lous words.” Plaintiff claimed that, as a direc t and proxi mate result of defe ndant’s false and defa matory comments, he was not selec ted t o run for the pos ition of t rea surer of L ocal 150, a p o s i t i o n that would have benef

itted him with an annual salary incre ase of betwee n $40,000 and $45,000. Plaintiff also claimed t h at , as a direc t and proxi mate result of defe ndant’s false and defa matory comments, he wa s unable to ac t in his role as a princ ipal fundraiser for a loca l charity

. ¶ 9 C o u n t I I of the complaint alleg ed false light invasion of privac y

. Plaintiff alleg ed that defe ndant’s false and defa matory statemen t s “m aliciously slandere d [hi m]
, wrong fully intending to bring [pl aintiff] into public d i s grac e and scanda l and further wrong fully intending to injure and to de stroy [pl aintiff’s] g ood name, cre dit a nd reputation throug hout McHe nry County and adjoining counties and to bri ng him into disrepute among his colleag ues and co-w orker s, cause him to be reg arde d as a person unfit and untrustworthy to discharg e the duties of h i s empl oy ment and office
, cause him to be reg arde d as a person having committed c rimin al a c ts in v o lv in g moral turpitude, prejudice him with his colleag ues, and co-w orker s, and ot h er wi se; and to g ener ally discredit him by falsely and maliciously speaking
, uttering and publishing conce rning [ p l aintiff], said defa matory false and scanda lous words.” Plaintiff a lleg ed that defe ndant’s false statements place d him in a false light befor e the public and wer e made with actual malice. I n support of this claim, plaintiff
ag ain cited his claims that he was not selec ted t o run for the pos ition of t rea su re r o f L o ca l 150 and that he w as unable to act in his role as a principal fundr aiser f

or a loc al cha

rity

. ¶ 10 On Dec ember 2, 2008, defe ndant filed a motion to strike “desig nated immaterial matter” and multipl e motions for judgme nt on the pleading s. S ee 7 3 5 I L C S 5/2-615(a)
, (e) (West 2008). On May 8, 2009, the t rial court enter ed a written order gra nti n g in part defendant’s

-4-motion to strike but deny ing all of defe ndant’s motions for judgme nt on the pleadin gs

. I n

addition, the court order ed defe ndant to file an answe r to the second- amende d complaint. On Marc h 17, 2011, defe ndant’s attorney of rec ord was g rante d leave to withdraw from
repr esenting defe ndant. Subsequently , defe ndant filed his pro se appea ranc e. ¶ 11 On Marc h 29, 2011, defe ndant filed a pro se motion for summary judgme nt based upon immunit y under the Act (735 I L CS 5/2-1005 (West 20 1 0 ); 7 3 5 I L CS 110/1 et seq. (West 2010)). Defe ndant also filed a m em o ra n d u m o f l aw in support of hi s motion for summ ary judgme nt , with various attachme nts, including his own aff idavit. Def

endant alleg ed that plaintiff’s lawsuit amounted to a SL APP action in that the claims there in “ar e not only based

on [defendant’ s] actions as an office r of the court, but acc ording to the complaint are based
upon and relate to the actions undertaken by [defendant] on behalf of his c lients to petition
t h e g overnme nt for redr ess of g rieva nces.” I n conjunction with his reque st for s u m m ar y judgme nt, defe ndant re quested re imbursement for “ costs and attorne y fee s in bring ing this motion.” See 735 IL CS 110/ 25 (West 2010). ¶ 12 On May 16, 2011, plaintiff filed a response to defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt and a memorandum of l aw i n support there of. Among other things, plaintiff arg ued in his memorandum that defe ndant is not entitled to i m munity under the Act, beca use the acts complained of in plaintiff’s complaint wer e not “base d upon, relate[d] to, or in response to”
any act of defe ndant in furthering his own constitutional rig hts. See 735 I L CS 110/15 (West 2010). I nstead, plaintiff asserted, his complaint was broug ht to seek damag es for the injuries he sust ained as a re sult of defe ndant’s wr ong ful conduc t. Plainti ff a lso arg ued that the Act does not apply to defe ndant b ecause he was not exercising his own constitutional rig ht to petition but was mere ly repr esenting Merry man in the exercise of its constitutional rig hts. I n addition, plaintiff contende d that the Act does not apply retroa ctively

to case s such as this, which we re f

iled prior to its effe ctive date

. ¶ 13 On J uly 28, 2011, the court held a hearing on defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt. After the parties arg ued their respe ctive positions, t h e co urt g rante d defe ndant’s motion. I nitially
, the court, relying on Shoreline Towers Condominium Ass’n v. Gassman
, 404 I ll. App. 3d 1013 (2010), held that the Act is proce dural and there fore applies retroactively

. Next, the court reje cted plaintiff’s arg ument that the Act does not apply to defe ndant beca use he was not exercising his own constitutional rig ht to petition but was merel y re p rese nting Merry man in the exercise of its constitutional rig hts. The court noted that the Act define s the word “per son” to inc lude “two or more persons who have a joint or common interest.” See 735 I L CS 110/10 (West 2010). Ho we v er , u nable to find any case law from I llinois addre ssing whether the Act protec ts the statements and actions of an at t o rney made in the

course of his or her repr esentation of a client, the court looked to c ase law from California. See, e.g. , Taheri Law Group v. Ev ans , 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) . The c ourt interpre ted the ca se law f rom California a s “consistently h[ol ding] that the California a ntiSL APP immunit y can apply to t h e ac t i o n s of extrajudicial statements of attorney s made during the scope of their repr esentation.” This body of case law from California, combined with the Act’s definition of “per son” and the Act’s require ment that it be liberally construed (see 735 I L CS 110/ 30(b) ( West 2010)), persua ded the court that the Act “can apply to and aff ord immunityto attorney s who petition the g overnme nt on behalf of their clients.”

-5-¶ 14 The court then revie wed plaintiff’s second amende d complaint and determined that it is

“base d upon the actions of De fenda nt.” The c ourt determined that defe ndant’s act of filing

a lawsuit ag ainst plaintiff on Merryman’s behalf constituted “conduc t g enuinely aimed at procuring favor able g overnme nt action, result or outcome.” The court also determined that defe ndant’s comments to Kee shan, which ref ere nced the Merr

y man lawsuit, are co v ere d under the Act. The court further found that “ther e was nothing else to rea lly look at or prese nt to me on behalf of the Plaintiff that clea rly establishes that the Def endant’ s comments wer e not cover ed by the [Act] .” The court denied defe ndant’s reque st for attorney fee s g iven that defe ndant re prese nted himself in the ca se. ¶ 15 On Aug ust 26, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to rec onside r t h e t ri al co u rt ’s gra nt of
summary judgme nt in defe ndant’s favor. On Aug ust 29, 2011, defe ndant fil ed a motion t o

rec onsider the trial court’s denial of his reque st for attorney fee s. That same day
, defe ndant also filed a motion for sanctio n s p u rsuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (ef f. Feb. 1, 19 9 4 ). In the latter motion, defe ndant urg ed the trial court to sanction plaintiff and his attorney “for advanc ing this case without any fac t u al b as i s fo r its claims in support of the al l eg ations contained in [pl aintiff’s] complaint.” Def endant reque sted sanctions “i n an amount equal to the total am o u n t o f att orney s fee s and costs incurre d by [defendant] in defe nse of this a ction.” On November 1, 2011, the trial court denied defe ndant’s motion to

rec onsider, but continued the matter until November 8, 2011, for ruling on plaintiff’s motion
to rec onsider and defe ndant’s motion for sanctions. On November 8, 2011, the t ri al court denied both plaintiff’s motion to rec onsider and defe ndant’s motion for sanctions. Plaintiff filed a n o t i ce o f ap peal on Dec ember 7, 2011, and defe ndant filed a notice of appea l on Dec ember

8, 2011.

¶ 16 I I . ANAL YSI S ¶ 17 I n appea l No. 2-11-1252, plaintiff arg ues that the trial court err ed in g ranting defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt. Plaintiff raises three contentions in support of his arg ument. Rely ing on the supreme court’s rec ent decision in Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, plaintiff first contends that the Act does not apply to the fac ts of this case

. Second, plaintiff contends that defe ndant does not fall within the Act’s definition of “per son,” beca use he was not exercising his own constitutional right to petition but was merely repr esenting a client in the e x erc ise of its const i t u t i o n al rig hts. Finally
, plaintiff asserts that the trial court err ed in looking to Californi a l aw i n determining that defe ndant was a “per son” as define d under the Act. I n appea l No. 2-11-1280, defe ndant challeng es the trial court’s denials of his reque st for attorney fee s under the Act and his motion for sanctions pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (ef

f. F eb. 1, 1994). ¶ 18 Prio r t o ad d re s s i n g the merits of the issues raised on appea l, we revie w the pertinent
p o rtions of the Act to place the parties’ arg uments in context. As noted abo v e, t h e Ac t became eff

ective in Aug ust 2007. 735 IL CS 110/99 (West 2010). Section 5 of the Act (735 1

Bef ore thi s cou rt , pla i n t i f

f d o e s not exp re ssl y re new his ar gum ent tha t the Act doe s not 1
app ly re tr oac ti vely. Indeed, as the tr ia l cou rt not ed, the onl y publi she d opi nio n tha t has add re sse d

-6-I L CS 110/5 (West 2010) ), which sets forth the public policy considerations unde rly ing the statute, provides:
“Pursuant to the fundame ntal philosophy of the Americ an constitutional fo rm of
g overnme nt, it is decla re d t o b e the public policy of the State of I llinois that the constitutional ri gh ts of citi zens and orga nizations to be invol ved and participate freely in the proce ss of g overnme nt must be encour ag ed and safe g uarde d with g reat diligenc e. The information, reports, opinions, claims, arg uments, and other e x pressions provided by citizens are vital to eff ective law enfor ceme nt, the operation of g overn m en t , the making of public policy and decisions, and the continuation of repr esent ative democr acy

. The laws, courts, and other ag encie s of this State must provide the utmost protec tion for fre e exercise of these rig hts of petition, speec h, association, an d g overnme nt participation. Civil actions for money damag es have been filed ag ainst citizens and org anizations of this State as a result of their valid exercise of their constitution al ri gh t s t o petition, speak fre ely
, associate fre ely
, and otherwi s e participate in and communicate with
g overnme nt. There has been a disturbing incre ase in lawsuits termed ‘Strateg ic L awsuits Ag ainst Publi c Participation’ in gove rnment or ‘ SL APPs’ as they arepopularly

called. The threat of SL APPs signific antly chills and dimi n i s h es citizen participation in
g overnme nt, voluntary public service
, and the exercise of these important constitutional ri ghts. This abuse of the judicial proce ss can and has been used as a means of intimi dating
, hara ssing, or punishing citizens and org anizations for involving the ms e lv e s in public affairs.
I t is in the public interest and it is the purpose of this Act to strike a balanc e betwee n the rig hts of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rig hts of persons to petition, speak fre ely
, associate fre ely
, and otherwise participate in g overnme nt ; to protec t and encour ag e public participation in g overnme nt to the maxi mum extent permitted by law; to establish an eff icient proce ss for identification and adjudication of SL APPs; and to provide f or attorne y ’s fe es and c osts to prevailing movants.” ¶ 19 Section 15 of the Ac t provides:

“This Act appli es t o any motion to dispose of a claim in a judicial proce eding on the
g rounds t hat t he claim is based on, relates to, or i s in re s ponse t o any act or acts of the moving party in further ance of the moving party ’s rig hts of petition, speec h, association, or to otherwise participate in g overnme nt. Acts i n further ance o f t h e constit utional rig hts to petition, speec h, association, and participation in government are immune from liability , reg ardle ss of intent or purpose, except when not g enuinely aimed at procuring favor able g overnme nt action, re s u lt, or outcome.” 735 I

L CS 110/ 15 (West 2010). ¶ 20 Section 10 of the Act define s cer tain ter m s u s ed i n the Act. For instance, a “cla im” is

the re tr oac ti vity is sue hel d tha t the Act is pro ced ura l and the re for e appl ie s ret roa ct ively. Shor el ine Towers Con domi niu m Ass ’n , 404 I ll . App. 3d a t 1 022-23.

-7-define d to inc lude “any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-cla im, counterc laim, or other

judicial pleading or filing alleg ing injury .” 735 I L CS 110/10 (West 2010). “Gove rnment” is define d as “a branc h, department, ag ency , instrumentality
, officia l, employ ee, ag ent, or other
person acting und er color of law of the United States, a state, a subdivision of a state, or another public authority including the elec torate.” 735 I L CS 110/1 0 ( We st 2010). A “per son” under the Act includes “any individual, corpor ation, association, org anization, partne rship, 2 or more persons having a joint or common interest, or other leg al entity .” 735 IL CS 110/10 (West 2010). ¶ 21 Section 20 of the Act sets forth the expedited leg al proce ss applicable to alleg ed SL APPs. Under that provision, when a motion is filed pursuant to the Act, “a hear ing and decision on the motion must occur within 90 day s afte r notice of the motion is g iven to responde nt.” 735 2 I L CS 110/ 20(a) (West 2010). The Act require s the appellate court to “expedite any appea l

or other writ, whether interlocutory or not, from a trial court order deny ing that motion o r from a trial court’s failure to rule on that motion within 90 day s.” 735 I L CS 110/20(a) (West 2010). Although discovery is suspended pending a decision on the motion, “discove ry may be taken, upon leave of court for g ood cause shown, on the issue of whether the movants acts

are not immuniz ed from, or are not in further ance of acts immuniz ed from, liability by [t he] Act.” 735 I

L CS 110/ 20(b) ( West 2010). The trial court is require d to g rant the motion and dismiss the claim “unless the court finds that the r es p o n d i n g p arty has produced clear and convincing evidenc e that the acts of the moving party are not immuniz ed from, or are not in further ance of acts immuniz ed from, liability by [t he] Act.” 735 I L C S 1 1 0 / 2 0(c) (West 2010). Section 25 of the Act provides that the court “shall awa rd a moving party who
preva ils in a motion under [t he] Act rea sonable at t o rn ey ’s fee s and costs incurre d in

connec tion with the motion.” 735 I L CS 110/25 (West 2010)

. Furthermore
, as noted above, the leg islature expressly provided that the Act “shall be construed liberally to e ffe ctuate its
purposes and intent fully .” 735 I L CS 110/30(b) (West 2010). Wit h these principles in mind, we turn f irst to plaintiff’s appea l.

¶ 22 A. Appea l No. 2-11-1252 ¶ 23 Plaintiff contends that the trial court err ed in g ranting defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt based on the immunit y provided by the Act. I nitially
, plai n t i ff sug g ests that we should revie w t h e t ri al court’s ruling on defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt as a dismiss al pursuant to section 2-619(a )(9) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (Code) (735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (9) (W es t 2 0 1 0)). We disag ree

. The Act applies to “ any motion to dispose of a claim in a judicial proce eding .” (Emphasis added.) 735 I L CS 110/15 (West 2010). Further, for the purposes of the Act, a “motion” is def ined as “any motion to dismiss
, for summary judgment
, or to strike, or any other judicial pleading filed to dispose of a j u d i ci al claim.” (Emphasis added.) 735 I L CS 110/10 (West 2010). I n this case , defe ndant soug ht to dispose of plaintiff’s claim by filing a motion for summary judgme nt, and the Act expressly permitted him to do so. See W right Dev elopment Group, LLC
, 238 I ll. 2d at 642 (Free man,

I n t he p re sen t c ase , de fe nda nt wai ved the 90- day dec is ion per iod

. 2

-8-J
., specia lly concur ring
, joined by Thomas and Bur ke, J J .) (sug g esting that movants asserting immunit y under the Act must do so pursuant to the normal means provided under the Code

as sec tion 10 ex pressly

direc ts). 3 ¶ 24 I n any event, for purposes of our analy sis, any distinction betwee n a motion for summary judgme nt and a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a )(9) is imm at er i al

. Summary judgme nt is appropriate wher e the pleading s, aff idavits, depositions, and admissions on file, when viewed in the light most fa v o ra b l e to the nonmoving party , show that there is no g enuine issue of materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law. 735 I L CS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010); Mye rs v. Levy
, 348 I ll. App. 3d 906, 913 (2004). Simi larly , in review ing a motion to di smiss under section 2-619( a)( 9), the re levant inquiry is “ ‘whe ther the exis tence of a g enuine i s sue of materia l fac t should have prec luded the dismiss al or, absent such an issue of fac t, w hether dismiss al is proper as a matter of law.’ ” Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 55 (quoti n g K ed z ie & 103rd Currency Exc hange, Inc. v. Hodge
, 156 I ll. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993)) ; see also International Profit Associates, Inc. v. Linus Alarm Corp.
, 2012 I L App (2d) 110958, ¶ 9 (noting that a section 2-619 dismiss al rese mbles the g rant of a motion for summary judgme nt). The interpre tation and application of the Act
prese nts a n issue of law, subjec t to de novo revie w. W right De velopme nt G roup, LLC
, 238 I ll. 2d at 634; Hammons v. Society of Permane nt Cosmetic Professionals
, 2012 I L App (1st) 102644, ¶ 13. L ikewise, we revie w de novo a g rant of summary judgme nt. Colburn v. Mario Tricoci Hair Salon & Day Spas, Inc

. , 2012 I L App (2d) 110624, ¶

32. ¶ 25 Turning to t h e m er i t s, plaintiff first arg ues that the supreme court’s rec ent decision in Sandholm
, 2012 IL 111443, which interpre ted section 15 of the Act, prec ludes d ef endant from obtaining relief under the Act. I n Sandholm
, the plaintiff was employ ed as a basketba ll

coac h and athletic direc tor at a public high school. Although the plaintiff re ceive d positive evaluations of his job perf ormanc e during his entire tenure , the defe ndants beg an a campa ign
to re move hi m as basketball coac h and athletic direc tor due to their di sag ree ment with his

coac hing sty le. The plaintiff filed a complaint ag ainst the defe ndants, alleg ing that they made multipl e fals e an d defa matory statements in various media as part of their campa ign to

We re cognize tha t the sup re m e co urt has st at ed tha t a “motion to dis mis s bas ed on the 3 imm uni ty conf

er re d by the Act *** is m ore app rop ri at el y r ai sed in a sec ti on 2- 619( a) (9) m oti on.” Sandhol m , 2012 I L 1114 43, ¶ 54. However, in so hol din g, the Sandhol m cou rt was not dea li ng wit h

a m oti on for summ ar y j udgm ent

. I nst ead
, the Sandhol m cou rt m ade thi s re m ar k in t h e c o n te xt of dis ti nguish ing bet ween a m oti on to dis m is s pur sua nt to sec ti on 2- 615 of the Code (73 5 I LCS 5/2

- 615 (W est 2008 )) and a m oti on to dis m is s unde r sec ti on 2- 619( a) (9) of the Code (73 5 I LCS 5/2

- 619( a) (9) (W est 2008 ))

. T he cou rt exp la ine d tha t a m oti on pur sua nt to sec ti on 2- 615 cha ll enges onl y the le gal suf fi ci enc y of a complai nt and al le ges onl y def ect s on the fa ce of the complai nt. Sandhol m , 2012 I L 1114 43, ¶ 54. I n con tr ast , a m oti on to dis m is s unde r sec ti on 2- 619( a) (9) of the Code admits the le gal suf fi ci enc y of the pla int if

f’ s complai nt ( Joh anne sen v. Eddi ns , 2011 I L App (2d ) 1101 08, ¶ 15)
, but

ass er ts an af

fi rmati ve def

ens e or oth er m at te r tha t avoids or def eat s the pla int if

f’ s cl ai m ( Sandhol m , 2012 I L 1114 43, ¶ 54)

. T he cou rt re aso ned tha t a moti on to dis mis s fi le d in acc ord anc e wit h the Act is m ore pro per ly cat egori zed as a sec ti on 2- 619( a) (9) m oti on bec aus e the imm uni ty the Act pro vides i s a n af fi rmati ve m at te r avoidi ng the le gal ef fe ct of or def

eat ing the cl ai m

. Sandhol m , 2012 IL 1114 43, ¶ 54

.
-9-remove him. The plaintiff’s complaint consisted of multipl e counts of defamation per se ,

false light invasion of privac y , civil con s pirac y to interfe re with prospec tive business advanta g e, and slander per se

. The defe ndants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on the basis that the Act provided them with immunit y

. The trial court g rante d the defe ndants’ motion, and this court aff

irmed. See Sandholm v. Kuecker , 405 I ll. App. 3d 835 (2010). The
supreme c ourt allowed the plaintiff’s petition for lea ve to appe al. ¶ 26 The supreme court determined that t h e l egi s l at u re intended the Act “to targ et only meritless, reta liatory SL APPs and did not i n t en d to establish a new absolute or qualified privileg e for defa mation.” Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 50. The c ourt stated that, if it wa s the intent of the leg islature to cre ate such a privileg e, it would have expl i ci t l y s t at ed so. Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 50. I n acc ordanc e with this determination, and invoki ng the rules of statutory construction, the supreme court interpre ted the phrase “ ‘base d on, relates to, or is in response to’ ” in section 15 of the Act to mean “ solely based on, relating to, or in
response to ‘ any act or acts of the moving pa rty in further ance of the moving party ’s rig hts of petition, speec h, association, or to otherwise participate in g overnme nt.’ ” (Empha sis in orig inal.) Sandholm
, 2012 I L 1 1 1 4 43, ¶ 45 (quoting 735 I L CS 110/15 (West 2008)). The
court expounded, “[s] tated another way , wher e a plaintiff files suit g enuinely seeking relief for damag es for t h e al l eged defa mation or intentionally tortious acts of defe ndants, the lawsuit is not solely based on defe ndant’s ri gh t s o f p etition, speec h, association, or participation in g overnme nt. I n that case , the suit would not be subject to dismiss al under the Act.” Sandholm , 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 45. ¶ 27 The court explained that its interpre tation of the Act “allows a court to identify meritless SL APP suits subject to the Act” and serve s “to ameliorate the ‘particular dang er inhere nt in anti-SL APP statutes *** that when constructed or construed too broadly in protec ting the rig hts of defe ndants, t h ey may impose a counter active chilling eff ect on prospec tive plaintiffs’ own rig hts to seek redr ess from the courts for injuries suffe red.’ ” Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 48 (quoting Mark J

. Sobczak, Comment, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citi zen Participation Act
, 28 N. I ll. U. L

. Rev. 559, 575 (2008))

. The court further explained that “construing t h e Ac t to apply only to meritless SL APPs

acc ords with another express g oal in section 5 [of the Act]: ‘to strike a balanc e betwee n the rig hts of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rig hts of persons to petition, speak fre ely
, associate fre ely
, and otherwise participa t e in g overnme nt.’ [C itation.] ” Sandholm , 2012 I L

111443, ¶ 49. ¶ 28 Apply ing the fore g oing, the supreme court noted that under the Act the defe ndants had the initial burden of proving that the plaintiff’s lawsuit was solely based on, related to, or in
response to the defe ndants’ acts in further ance of th ei r rig hts of petition, speec h, or association, or to participate in g overnme nt. Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 56. I f the defe ndants met their burden, then, and only then, w o u ld the burden shift to the pl aintiff to provide c lear

and convinc ing e vidence that the defendants’ a cts wer e not immuniz ed fr om liability under the Act. Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 56. After ex amining the parties’ pleading s, the supreme court conclude d that the plaintiff’s lawsuit was not solely based on, related to, or in response to the acts of the defe ndants in further ance of their rig hts of petition and spee ch. Sandholm , 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 57. The c ourt determined that the “true g oal” of

-10-the plainti ff ’s l aw s uit was not to chill participation in g overnme nt or stifle political

expression, but to seek damag es for the persona l harm to his reputation from the defe ndants’ alleg ed def

amatory and tortious acts. Sandholm , 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 57. ¶ 29 Sandholm was decide d on J anuary 20, 2012, while this case was pending appea l. We note that, as a g ener al rule, a decision of our supreme court applies retroa ctively to cause s pending
at the time it is announce d, including case s on direc t revie w in the appellate court. Miller v. Gupta , 174 I ll. 2d 120, 128 (1996). Ac cording to plaintiff, application of Sandholm to this

case demonstrates that the trial court err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt to defe ndant under the Act. We ag ree

. ¶ 30 Pursuant to the proce du re s et fo rt h i n S a n dholm
, defe ndant had the initial burden of proving that plaintiff’s lawsuit was solely based on, related to, or in response to defe ndant’s
acts in further ance of his ri gh t s of petition, speec h, or association, or to participate in
g overnme nt. Viewing the pleadings, aff idavits, depositions, and admissions on file in the light most favor able to plaintiff, we find that defe ndant has fa iled to meet this burden. I nstead, we find that plaintiff’s objective in filing suit was n o t solely to interfe re with and burden defe ndant’s rig ht to petition, but to seek damag es fo r t h e persona l harm to his reputation resulting from defe ndant’s alleg edly false and defa matory statements. We note for instance that, in coun t I of plaintiff’s complaint, which alleg ed slander per quod
, plaintiff alleg ed that the comments d ef en d ant made to Kee shan “maliciously slandere d Plaintiff,
wrong fully intending to bring Plaintiff into public disgr ace and scanda l and further
wrong fully intending to injure and to destroy the Plaintiff’s g ood name, cre dit and reputation throug hout McHe nry County and adjoining counties and to bring him into disrepute among his colleag ues and co-w orker s, and otherwise.” Moreove r, plaintiff alleg ed that, as a direc t and proxi mate result of defe ndant’s false and defa matory statements, he was not selec ted to

run for trea surer of L ocal 150. Plaintiff claimed that holding the position of trea surer would hav e b enef

itted plaintiff with $40,000 to $45,000 per y ear in additional income. Plaintiff further alleg ed that, as a dir ec t an d proxi mate result of defe ndant’s false and defa matory statements, he wa s unable to ac t in his role as a princ ipal fundra iser for a loca l charity

. ¶ 31 Simi l ar l y , i n count I I of the complaint, which alleg ed false light invasion of privac y , plaintiff alleg ed that defe ndant “maliciously slandere d [hi m]
, wrong fully intending to bring [pl aintiff] into public disgr ace and scanda l and further wrong fully intending to injure and to destroy [pl aintiff’s] g ood name, cr ed i t and reputation throug hout McHe nry County and adjoining counties and to bring him into disrepu t e am ong his colleag ues and co-w orker s,

cause him to be reg arde d as a pe rson unfit and untrustworthy to discharg e the duties of his employ ment and office
, cause him to be reg arde d as a person having committed criminal acts in v o lv in g mor al turpitude, prejudice him with his colleag ues, and co-w orker s, and otherwise ; and to g ener ally discredit him by falsely and maliciously speaking
, uttering and publishing,

conce rning [pl ain ti f

f ], s aid d e f ama to r y f a ls e and scanda lous words.” Plaintiff supported these alleg ations with the same examples provided with respe ct to count I

. I n other words, the alleg ations in plai n t i ff ’s complaint, which wer e supported by concr ete examples, wer e at least, in part, undertaken to protec t plaintiff’s reputation and g oodwill in the community

. I n this reg ard, we also note that, despite the fac t that defe ndant fi led multipl e section 2-615 motions to dispose of plaintiff’s complaint, the trial court found that the alleg ations in

-11-plaintiff’s complaint wer e sufficie nt to survive al l o f those motions and the court order ed

defe ndant to answe r the complaint. Thus, the trial court believed that defe ndant had pleade d sufficie nt fac ts for his complaint to g o forwa rd. We there fore conclude that defe ndant has failed to prove that plaintiff’s complaint was solely based on defe ndant’s exercise of his constitutional rig hts of petition, spe ech, association, or to pa rticipate in g overnme nt. T hus, the burden never shifted to p l aint iff to provide clea r and convincing evidenc e that defe ndant’s acts are not immune from liability under the Act. Acc ording ly
, we find that the trial court e rre d in gr anting defe ndant summary judgme nt. ¶ 32 Def

endant nevertheless insists that he made the threshold showing that plaintiff’s lawsuit was ba sed on, re lated to, or in re sponse to his petitioning activities alone. I n his appellee ’s brief, this arg ument is not clea rly articulated and is larg ely undeve l o p ed

. As a result, we would be wa

rra nted in finding this arg ument forf eited. S ee I ll. S. Ct. R. 341(h)( 7), (i) (ef f. J uly 1, 2008); Sobczak v. Gene ral Motors Corp.
, 373 I ll. App. 3d 910, 924 (2007). Def endant attempted to clarify this position during oral arg ument. I n particula r, defe ndant claimed that alleg ations in plaintiff’s complaint reg arding his failure to be selec ted to run for trea surer of L ocal 150 wer e not true. I n support o f t h is claim, defe ndant relied principally on two documents: the aff

idavit attache d to the memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgme nt and a document from the g ener al counsel for L o ca l 150. We find defe ndant’s position unpersuasive. ¶ 33 I n his complaint, plaintiff alleg ed that, “[a]s was customary , ever y candidate selec ted to

run on the slate of President Bill Dug an was elec ted to their respe ctive positions in the 2007 L ocal 150 elec tions.” Plaintiff further alleg ed that the individual who was ultimately selec ted
to repla ce plaintiff and run on Dug an’s slate of candidates for the trea surer position was, in fac t, elec ted as trea surer

. I nitially
, we note that the signific ance of the do cu ment from the
g ener al counsel is not appar ent to us. Although it ref ere nces another individual serving as the
trea surer of L ocal 150, we do not read it as esta blishing, as de fenda nt claims, that plaintiff

was never sl at ed to run for trea surer , and defe ndant does not explain how this document supports his c laim. A s far as the a ffidavit is conc erne d, defe ndant mere ly asser ted that two of the candidates running on the slate of the candidate challeng ing Dug an for president of L ocal 150 wer e actua lly elec ted. Howeve r, there wa s no assertion that either of these candidates won the rac e for trea surer or that the individual who alleg edly repla ced plaintiff
as t he candidate for t re as u re r o n Dug an’s slate was not elec ted as trea surer

. There fore
, we find this evidence insufficient to shift the burde n to plaintiff. ¶ 34 Alternatively
, defe ndant urg es us to uphold summary judgme nt on the basis of either the attorney -litigation privileg e or the fair- reporting privileg e. I n i t i al l y , we find that these
arg uments have been forf eited beca use defe ndant did not raise them in the trial court. Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 113, 127 (2010). Def endant insists that he raised the attorney -litigation privileg e “within the motion to dismiss befor e the court be lo w

. ” Howeve r, defe ndant filed multipl e motions to dismiss and, in contra vention of the rules of our supreme court, defe ndant do es n o t re fe rence the pag e of the rec ord wher e he raised the attorney

l i t i g ation privileg e in the trial court. See I ll. S. Ct. R. 341(h)( 7), (i) (ef f. J uly 1
, 2 0 0 8 ) (providing that the appellee ’s arg ument shall contain his or her contentions and the rea sons there for, “with citation of t he authorities and the pages of the rec ord relied on ” (emphasis

-12-added) ). Def endant’ s failure to c omply with Rule 341 pr ovides a separ ate basis for finding forf eiture. See People v. Johnson
, 192 I ll. 2d 202, 206 (2000). I n any event, our independe nt revie w of the rec ord indicates that defe ndant raised the attorney -litigation privilege only in
response to plaintiff’s first amende d complaint. He did not raise it with respe ct to the second amende d complaint, which is prese ntly befor e us. ¶ 35 For feiture notwithstanding, we briefly addre ss why neither privileg e is applicable here

. I llinois courts have invoked the attorney -litigation privileg e as set forth in section 586 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g. , Atkinson v. Affronti
, 369 I ll. App. 3d 828, 831-36 (2006); Th o mp s o n v. F rank
, 313 I ll. App. 3d 661, 664-65 (2000). That provisi on states as follows:
“An attorney at law is absolutely privileg ed to publish defamatory matter conce rning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judi ci al proce eding
, or in the instit ution of, or during the course and as a p ar t of, a judicial proce eding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proce eding .” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977)

. The privileg e, which is a

bsolute, is based upon “a

public policy

of sec uring to attorney s as office rs of the court the utmost fre edo m i n t h ei r eff orts to secur e justice for their clients.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 cmt. a (1977). Be cause the privileg e provides complete immunit y , its scop e i s nece ssarily narr ow. Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson
, 338 I ll. App. 3d 156, 165 (2003). Thus, the privileg e is available only when the publication: (1) was made in a judicial proce eding ; (2) had some conne ct i o n o r l og ical relation to the action; (3) was made to achie ve the objects of the litigation; and (4) involved litigants or other participa nts authorized by law. Kurczaba v. Pollock
, 318 I ll. App. 3d 686, 702 (2000). ¶ 36 I n this case , the all ege d l y d efam atory statements wer e made outside of the judicial
proce eding to a newspa

per reporter who was not co n n ec t ed to the lawsuit. Whil e the attorney -litigation privile ge h as been extended to out-of-c ourt communications betwee n opp o sing counsel, to out-of-c ourt communications betwee n attorney and client related to pending litigation, to out-of-c ourt communications betwee n attorney s repr esenting differ ent parties suing the same entities, to st at em en t s made during quasi-judicial proce eding s, to communications nece ssarily preliminary to quasi-judicial proce eding s, an d to posttrial

rema rks related to judical proc eeding s made by an attorney to his or her client (see Golden

v. Mullen
, 295 I ll. App. 3d 865, 870-71 (1997) (and case s cited there in)), defe ndant does not cite any authority that this privileg e applies to extrajudicial statements made by an attorney to a third party with no connec tion to the litigation. I n fac t, the only case defe ndant cites as “instructive,” Cummins v. He a n ey , No. 05 C 3396, 2005 WL 2171066 (N.D. I ll. Aug

. 31, 2005), is rea dily dis t i n gu i s h able. Significa ntly
, Cummins did not involve an attorney ’s
statements to the med i a. R ather
, it involved an out-of-c ourt chain of e-ma ils betwee n attorney s repr esenting opposing parties perta ining to litig ation scheduling

. Thus, Cummins is of no import here. ¶ 37 More import an t , o u r re s earch reve als that I llinois courts have expressly declined to extend the attorney -litigation privileg e to third parties not connec ted with the litigation (see

-13-Kurczaba
, 318 I ll. App. 3d at 705 (“I llinois clea rly limit s the attorney litigation privileg e and has ref used to extend it to third-party communications unrelated to a lawsuit.”); Thompson
, 313 I ll. App. 3d at 664 (holding that attorney -litigation privil ege d o es not apply to out-ofcourt communicatio n b et ween an attorney and an opposing party ’s spouse); Lykowski v. Bergman
, 299 I ll. App. 3d 157, 166 (1998) (noting that statements made to t h e m ed ia

conce rning a case are not part of the judicial proce eding and there fore are not privileg ed (citing Prosser an d Ke et o n o n Torts § 114, at 819-20 (W. Pag e Kee ton et al. eds. 5th ed. 1984))) ; Golden
, 295 I ll. App. 3d at 872 (dec lining to extend attorney -litigation privileg e to out-of-c ourt communication betwee n attorney and former client’s spouse)). Def endant does not provide a cog ent rea son for departing from this authority , and he doe s not ex plain how doing so would further the privileg e’s public policy g oal. For these rea sons, we conclude that the attorney -litigation privileg e is not ap p li c a b le to th e alleg edly defamatory statements made by defe ndant in this case. ¶ 38 L ik ew i s e, we conclude that the fair- reporting privileg e has no application to this case. The fair- reporting privileg e is set forth in section 611 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows: “The publication of defa matory matter conce rning another in a re port of an of

ficial action or officia l pr ocee ding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public conce rn is privileg ed if the report is acc urate and complete or a fair abridg ment of the oc curr encereported.” Restate ment (Second) of Torts § 611 (1977)

. This section was adopted by the I llinois Supreme Court in Catalano v. Pechous
, 83 I ll. 2d 146, 16 7 -6 8 (1 9 8 0 ). “The basis of this privileg e is the interest of the public in having information m ade available to it as to what occur s in officia l proce eding s and public meeting s.” Restatement (Second ) of Torts § 611 cmt. a (1977). Although the privileg e is commonly exercised by newspa pers, broadc asting outlets, and others in the bus i n ess of
reporting news to the public, it is not limit ed to the media. Kurczaba
, 318 I ll. App. 3d at 707; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 cmt. c (1977). I n this case , defe ndant mere ly asserts that “the Daily Herald ’s acc urate reporting of the claims made in the judicial rec ord ar e [ sic ] p ri v ileg ed because of t he publi c’s interest in having information m ade available to it as t o what occur s in judicial proce eding s.” (Empha sis added.) Whil e the fair- reporting privileg e might arg uably apply to the newspa per that published the article upon whi ch p l ai ntiff’s complaint is based, defe ndant fails to explain how the fair- reporting privileg e extends to him

. Acc ording ly , even a

bsent forf eiture, w e would re

ject this arg ument. ¶ 39 As a result of our finding s, we do not addre ss the other arg uments for reve rsal raised by plaintiff. I n addition, we express no opinion on the actua l m er its of plaintiff’s cause s of action. We simply hold that plaintiff’s lawsuit is not a SL APP within the meaning of the Act and, thus, is not subject to summary judgme nt.

¶ 40 B. A ppeal No. 2- 11-1280 ¶ 41 I n appea l No. 2-11-1280, defe ndant insists that the trial court err ed in deny ing r easona ble attorney fee s under the Act in conne ction with its gra nt of summary judgme nt in his favor

. Def endant also challeng es the trial court’s d ec i s i on to deny sanctions pursuant to I llinois

-14-Supreme Court Rule 137 (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994). Plaintiff responds that we lack jurisdiction “to hear the appeal in regard t o [defendant’ s] reque st for awa rding attorney ’s fee s,” beca use defe ndant failed to file his no t ice of appeal within the appropriate time fra me. Plaintiff further arg ues that, in any event, defe ndant is prohibited from rec overing attorney fee s under I llinois law and that the trial court proper ly denied defe ndant’s reque st for sanctions pursuant to Rule 137. We find that we have jurisdiction over defe ndant’s appea l. Howeve r, g iven our decision to reve rse the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt pursuant to the Act, we find that the issue of the pr opriety of an a war d of attorne y

fee s and sanc tions is m oot. ¶ 42 Plaintiff insists that defe ndant’s ap p ea l i s u n t imely beca use the trial court denied his motion to rec onsider the ruling on the attorney fee issue on November 1, 2011, but defe ndant d id not file his notice of appea l until Dec ember 8, 2011, more than 30 day s lat er

. W e disag ree

. I llinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (1) (ef f. May 30, 2008) provides in rele vant part that a notice of appeal “ must be filed with the cler k of the circ uit court within 30 day s afte r the entry of the final judgme nt appea led from, or, if a timely posttrial mo t i o n d i recte d against the judgment is filed *** withi n 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending pos tjudgment motion directed against that judgment or order , irrespe ctive of whether the circ uit court had enter ed a series of final order s that wer e modified pursuant to postjudgment motions.” (Emphasis added.) I n this case , we note the following sequenc e of
events. On J uly 28, 2011, the trial court g rante d defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt and denied defe ndant’s reque st for attorney fee s under the Act. On Aug ust 26, 2011, plaintiff filed a timely motion to rec onsider the tr i al co u rt ’s g rant of summary judgme nt in defe ndant’s favor

. On Aug ust 29, 2011, defe ndant fi led a timely motion to rec onsider the trial court’s denial of attorney fee s under the Act. That same day
, defe ndant filed his motion 4 for sanctions. On November 1, 2011, the trial court denied defe ndant’s motion to rec onsider. On November 8, 2011, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to rec onsider and defe ndant’s motion for sanctions. On December 8, 2011, defe ndant fil ed his notice of appea l. W e find that d ef en d ant’s notice of appea l was timely beca use it was filed within 30 day s afte r the entry of the order disposing of plaintiff’s motion to rec onsider (and defe ndant’s motion for

s an cti ons), which was the last pending postjudgment motion direc ted ag ainst the J u l y 2 8
, 2011, order

. Neve rtheless, beca use we are reve rsing the judgme nt of the trial court g ranting defe ndant’s motion for su m m ary judgme nt under the Act, defe ndant’s claim that the trial
court err ed in denying his reque st for attorney fee s is moot. Sandholm
, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 63. ¶ 43 Def

endant further claims that the trial court abused its discretion in deny ing his request for sanctions pursuant to Rule 137. Def endant rea sons that “[s] ince the L eg islature define d

A pos tj udgm ent m oti on m ust be fi le d wit hin 30 days af te r the tr ia l cou rt ’s rul ing. 735 I LCS 4 5/2

- 1203 (W est 2010 ). Alt hough August 29, 2011
, was m ore tha n 30 days af te r the tr ia l cou rt ’s rul ing, def

end ant ’s m oti on to re con si der was ti m el y bec aus e the thi rt ie th day fe ll on a weekend. See 5 I LCS 70/ 1.11 (W est 2010 ) ( “T he ti m e wit hin whic h any act pro vided by l aw is to be done sha ll be compute d by exc lud ing the fi r s t d a y a nd inc lud ing the la st , unl ess the la st day is Sat urd ay or Sund ay or is a holi day as def ine d or fi xed in any st at ute now or her eaf te r in for ce in thi s Stat e, and the n it sha ll al so be exc l u d e d

. If t h e d ay suc cee din g suc h Sat urd ay, Sund ay or hol ida y is al so a hol ida y or a S at urd ay or Su nda y then suc h su cce edi ng day shal l a ls o be exc lud ed.” ).

-15-a SLAPP as an abuse of the judicial proce ss, and the court [found] the subject action was in

fac t a S LAPP, the decision not to sanction [ plaintiff’s a t t o rn ey ] and the Plaintiff/Appellee demonstrates the denial was an abuse of discretion and sanctions are war rante d.” Howeve r,

we have reve rsed the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt under the Act. Thus, we find defe ndant’s ar g ument for sa nctions moot as well.

¶ 44 I I I . CONCL USI ON ¶ 45 Acc ording ly
, for the rea sons set forth ab o v e, we reve rse the circ uit court of McHe nry County ’s g rant of defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt pursuant to the Act. We aff irm the denials of defe ndant’s re q u es t for attorney fee s and Rule 137 sanctions. This cause is

rema nded for

further proce eding s.

¶ 46 No. 2-11-1252, Re verse d and re manded. ¶ 47 No. 2-11-1280, A ffirme d.

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