Interim Decision #2085 

MATTER OF OCAMPO-OCAMPO 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-19720615 

Decided by Board June 25, 1971 

Since there is no invariable rule as to the period of voluntary departure 

time, the special inquiry officer has authority to fix voluntary departure 

time for a period of less than 30 days where the circumstances of the case 

so warrant. In assessing the factors pertinent to a judgment as to what 

constitutes a proper time limit, the special inquiry officer must take into 

account not only the needs of effective law enforcement, but also the individual circumstances of the alien involved. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2) ]—Entered 

without inspection. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Samuel D. Myers, Esquire 

134 N. La Salle Street, Suite 1616 

Chicago, Illinois 60602 

(Brief filed) 

Respondent appeals from an order of a special inquiry officer 

dated April 1, 1971 finding him deportable on the above-captioned 

charge and granting him until April 7, 1971 to depart voluntarily 

from the United States. The appeal will be dismissed. 

The facts are not in dispute. Respondent is an unmarried 24-

year-old male alien, a native and citizen of Mexico, who entered 

the United States without inspection on or about February 1, 

1971. At a deportation hearing before the special inquiry officer 

on April 1, 1971, at which he was represented by present counsel, 

he admitted the truth of the factual allegations of the order to 

show cause and conceded deportability. Our review of the record 

satisfies us that deportability has been established by evidence 

which is clear, convincing and unequivocal. 

The only point urged on appeal is that the time allowed for voluntary departure is too short. Since less than thirty days was 

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fixed, appeal is not precluded by 8 CFR 3.1 (b) (2), as amended, 

36 Fed. Reg. 316 (January 9, 1971) . 

There is very little in the record relating to voluntary departure. On examination by his attorney, respondent testified, among 

other things, that he has no close relatives in the United States ; 

that this was his first trip to the United States ; that he was not 

presently employed ; that he could pay for his own ticket if granted 

voluntary departure; that he had $150 and a ticket to Mexico would 

cost about $116; that prior to his apprehension by the Service 

about a week previously, he had had no difficulty with the Service. All that appears with respect to departure time is the following (p. 4): 

Q. If you were given the privilege of leaving the United States voluntarily rather than being deported and you were given a period of 

thirty days or less, could you, and would you, leave within thirty 

days? 

A. Yes. 

On examination by the special inquiry officer, respondent testified that he had not worked since he had been in the United 

States; that he had been "here" (presumably, meaning Chicago) 

only two weeks; and that he was then residing in Chicago. Counsel for respondent, when asked, stated he had nothing further to 

offer. The special inquiry officer then entered his order on Form 

1-39, giving respondent until April 7, 1971 (a period of six days) 

within which to depart. 

While the record does not reflect why the special inquiry officer 

fixed such a short departure time, counsel for respondent has 

given us an explanation in his brief on appeal. With refreshing 

:andor, he states: 

The S.I.O. explained, off the record, that respondent had been in the U.S. 

)nly a few months, testified that he had not worked, and that he had about 

;160. The Hearing Officer felt he, the respondent, would do better to go back 

o Mexico quickly with a few dollars in his pocket while he could pay for a 

icket. Frankly, I sought to persuade my client to do exactly that because I 

hink that position makes some sense. The respondent, however, feels he 

hould be allowed one month to leave. He is getting free room and board, he 

ells me. 

Counsel asserts that this Board has said that, absent unusual 

'actors, thirty days was an appropriate time for voluntary deparure. He contends that, in actual practice, thirty days has been 

`almost an invariable rule." 

An alien granted the privilege of voluntary departure should be 

•ven a reasonable time within which to depart. In Matter of 

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M—, 4 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA, 1952), we referred to voluntary departure "within a reasonable time, usually at least 30 days," and 

stated, "The normal period of voluntary departure is 30 days . 

There is, however, no invariable rule and it would be inappropriate to set up any hard and fast formulation. What is a reasonable time in any case must depend upon the circumstances of that 

case. 

The fixing of voluntary departure time, originally committed 

exclusively to the Service's District Directors, is now confided initially to special inquiry officers, 8 CFR 244.1. This grant of authority to special inquiry officers apparently resulted from 

charges by the organized immigration bar that District Directors 

could frustrate the grant of voluntary departure by arbitrarily 

fixing an inordinately short departure time.' In assessing the factors pertinent to an informed judgment as to what constitutes a 

proper time limit, the special inquiry officer must take into account not only the needs of effective law enforcement, but also the 

individual circumstances of the alien involved. 

The time specified for voluntary departure should be sufficient 

to make the privilege a meaningful one. It would certainly be improper to adopt a pat formula that 30 days will be sufficient in 

each case, on the notion that additional time can always be 

sought, if needed, from the District Director under 8 CFR 244.2. 

On the other hand, where the alien's circumstances are such that 

he can readily and conveniently depart in less than 30 days, there 

appears to be no reason why he should be accorded any more time 

than he actually needs or asks for. 

Although the six-day period fixed in this case is shorter than 

usual, counsel has not indicated that that it is unreasonably short 

under the circumstances. Indeed, he agrees that the special inquiry officer's position "makes some sense." By taking this appeal, respondent has obtained the benefit of the automatic stay 

accorded by 8 CFR 3.6, and has gained an additional period of almost three months. We see no reason to disturb the special inquiry officer's order. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and it is hereby dismissed. 

It is further ordered that, pursuant to the special inquiry 

officer's order, the respondent be permitted to depart from the 

I See Immigration Bar Bulletin, Vol. XX, No. 1, January—June, 1967, pp. 

5-6. 

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United States voluntarily within six days from the date of this 

order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by 

the District Director; and that, in the event of failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the special 

inquiry officer's order. 

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