2021 IL App (1st) 200576-U 

 THIRD DIVISION

May 26, 2021

No. 1-20-0576 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) 

 ) Appeal from the 

BELLIAPPA NANAIAH BACHINADANDA, ) Circuit Court of

 ) Cook County

 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 17 D 3483 

and ) 

 ) Honorable 

PONNAMMA NANAIAH BACHINADANDA, ) Timothy Murphy,

) Judge Presiding

Respondent-Appellant. ) 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices McBride and Burke concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Affirmed; motion to dismiss denied. Court has jurisdiction, as appellant filed 

notice of appeal within 30 days of denial of her post-trial motions. We find no error in 

any claim raised by appellant.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The parties, Belliappa and Ponnamma Bachinadanda, are Indian citizens, who married 

while living in India. In 2009, Ponnamma gave birth to their first child while the couple was still 

in India. 

¶ 4 Ponnamma works for an Indian business, Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd., that staffs 

technology companies around the world. In 2014, the family moved to the United States after she 
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was given an opportunity to work on a project in New Jersey. Because of her employment, 

Ponnamma was issued an “L1” Work Visa, while her husband Belliappa received an “L2” Visa 

as Ponnamma’s dependent spouse.

¶ 5 After the New Jersey Project ended in 2016, Ponnamma was assigned to work for the 

Chicago Tribune. Because of the Tribune assignment, the parties moved to Illinois. While living 

here, Ponnamma gave birth to the couple’s second child. The record shows that while Ponnamma 

was consistently employed, Belliappa had difficulty securing employment commensurate with 

his education.

¶ 6 The timeline in this case is not entirely clear, and the parties’ statements of fact are quite 

argumentative. From what we can glean, the Tribune project was scheduled to finish at the end 

of 2017. That summer, Ponnamma was offered a position in Texas that would begin after the end 

of the Tribune project. Ponnamma fully intended to accept the Texas posting, and the family was 

preparing to move.

¶ 7 However, in October 2017, before the end of the Tribune Project, Belliappa filed for 

dissolution. According to Ponnamma, the dissolution prohibited her from taking the children to 

Texas. As such, she informed her employer that she could not take the Texas Project. She claims 

her employer then recalled her to India. In fact, about a month after the petition for dissolution 

was filed, Ponnamma filed an “Emergency Motion to Dismiss Petition for Dissolution of 

Marriage,” arguing that she had initiated divorce proceedings through the Indian Consulate in 

Chicago and was being required to return to India to avoid termination of her employment. But 

Belliappa says she was not required to return to India and only wanted to return so she could 

litigate the divorce in a more favorable jurisdiction. Ultimately, Ponnamma did not return to 

India, was not assigned to another project in the States, and was placed on leave without pay.
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¶ 8 In December 2017, the court denied Ponnamma’s motion to dismiss. In the same order, 

the court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) and ordered Ponnamma to “turn over the 

children’s Passports to the possession of [the GAL] within 48 hours.”

¶ 9 In May 2018, Ponnamma gave notice of her intent to permanently relocate the children to 

India. Belliappa objected, noting that this was her second attempt to relocate the children. It does 

not appear that a hearing was held on this notice. Ponnamma did not relocate the children.

¶ 10 In November 2018, Ponnamma again attempted to relocate by filing an “Emergency 

Petition for relocation to India with both kids.” In it, she argued that she needed to return to India 

for work. Specifically, she alleged that she had been on “Leave without Pay” and was finding it 

difficult to survive without income. The court denied emergency relief but entered and continued 

the motion to allow Belliappa to respond. The court did not immediately rule on this petition, and 

the case proceeded to trial.

¶ 11 Just before trial, Belliappa filed a motion to quash subpoenas that Ponnamma issued to 

her employer; Kelly Combs, Ph.D (the psychological evaluator); and Beata Leja (an immigration 

attorney). Belliappa argued that the subpoenas were untimely, as they were issued after the close 

of discovery, and that the witnesses were not properly disclosed. The court agreed and quashed 

each of these subpoenas in September 2019.

¶ 12 We do not have an official transcript of the trial. However, the circuit court certified a 

Bystander Report prepared by Belliappa’s counsel.

¶ 13 According to the Bystander Report, “[b]efore any witnesses were called, [Belliappa’s]

Counsel, [Ponnamma, pro se], and Judge Murphy discussed the initial Petition for Dissolution of 

Marriage and [Ponnamma’s] Petition to Relocate and the Responses to each. Then, [Ponnamma] 

raised the issue of Psychological Evaluations that were conducted by Chicago Forensic School. 
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[Belliappa’s] Counsel told Judge Murphy that she never received [the] report and that it would 

be prejudicial to allow these reports into evidence.” The court told counsel to file a motion in 

limine on the issue (discussed below).

¶ 14 The testimony at trial primarily revolved around two topics. First, testimony about assets, 

income, debts, etc., typical of dissolution proceedings. But the questioning also heavily revolved 

around the parties’ visa/work authorization statuses and Ponnamma’s desire to relocate to India.

The facts surrounding Belliappa’s work authorization were heavily disputed. Because his visa 

was derivative of hers, he claimed that she was intentionally delaying his ability to work and 

forcing him to be a stay-at-home dad. On the other hand, Ponnamma testified there was only a

short delay because her employer had to wait for her paperwork to clear before Belliappa could 

apply for his extension. Ponnamma also insisted that their immigration statuses were in peril and 

there was a looming threat of deportation.

¶ 15 Broadly speaking, the GAL testified that the parties were “taking good care of their kids.” 

However, he expressed some concerns:

“Mom wants to return to India. Divorce in India is very stigmatized, and dads 

aren’t given parental rights. If mom goes to India with the kids, that would be bad for the 

kids’ development. If dad goes with them, he might have no rights, which would not be 

in the best interest of the children. Mother does not think much of father, or his parenting. 

Does not want to agree to more time. She is not making efforts to protect his time. It’s not 

clear if she’s trying to cut him out, but I wouldn’t trust her to decide his time.” 

¶ 16 It was thus the GAL’s “recommendation” not to allow Ponnamma “to return to India with 

the children at this time.” The GAL noted: “Also, the son is a US citizen, so he wouldn’t be 

‘returning’ to India.”
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¶ 17 As instructed, during the second day of testimony, Belliappa’s counsel presented a 

written motion in limine. Counsel argued that she “did not receive the [psychological] reports” 

and thus requested “that the Psychological evaluation reports be barred from admission in trial.” 

When asked for her response, Ponnamma stated: “I did not receive the Psychological Reports in 

email. Someone from Mr. Bender’s office gave me my Psychological evaluation copies. I have 

included my report in the trial exhibits. We had many status dates with Judge Romanek to follow 

up on the status of this report. It was never updated to the court then that the reports were not 

received by Ms. Peters. It was told that [Belliappa] is attending the evaluations and is getting it 

done.”

¶ 18 In ruling on the motion, the court stated: “Reports were not delivered to Petitioner nor to 

Respondent. The Rule is clear. Reports need to be issued within 21 days. Petitioner’s Motion is 

granted to bar both psychological evaluations from being admitted into evidence and being 

referenced in testimony.” The Bystander Report also reflects that: “Upon review of the Supreme 

Court Rule 215, Judge Murphy took consideration of the issue and entered an Order barring the 

admission of the psychological evaluations.”

¶ 19 That written order specifically found that the parties entered into an Agreed Order in June 

2018 “that provided for ‘Psychological testing for both parents’ to be done by Chicago School 

Forensic Center” and that the testing was done in January 2019. The order continues: “That JILL 

PETERS, counsel for the [Belliappa] testified, and plead, that she did not receive a copy of either 

report and was unaware of the issuance thereof until September 20, 2019, some eleven (11) days 

before this trial commenced, and that on September 27, 2019, Judge Romanek stated that she did 

not have the Reports.” Given these facts, the court concluded that the evaluations were barred 

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215.
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¶ 20 At some point during trial (the Bystander Report is not clear), Ponnamma attempted to 

call Leja (the immigration attorney) to testify as a Rule 213(f)(3) witness. After questioning 

regarding the parties’ immigration status, the Bystander Report reflects that “[Respondent 

inquired about witness. Argument ensued, and a written Order was entered.]” That is essentially 

all we know about the argument—that Belliappa’s counsel objected to allowing Ponnamma to 

call Leja. The court agreed, entering a written order sustaining the objection and barring the 

witness.

¶ 21 On January 6, 2020, the court issued its judgment regarding relocation. In the relocation 

order, the court discussed each relocation factor. It then discussed the evidence admitted at trial 

relevant to those factors. The court made several findings regarding Ponnamma’s need to return 

to India. The court determined that it “has not been presented with any evidence or 

documentation indicating that PONNAMMA’s employment with [Tata Consultancy Services]

has been terminated;” “any evidence or documentation indicating that [Tata] has terminated the 

Deputation Letter issued to PONNAMMA, nor that the Letter has expired thus necessitating her 

return to India forthwit [sic];” or “any evidence or documentation indicated that PONNAMMA’s 

immigration status has been changed by U.S.C.I.S, that necessitates her return to India forthwit 

[sic].” 

¶ 22 The court also found that “the overwhelming evidence shows that the proposed relocation 

of the children to India would have a substantial negative impact upon the children, as testified to 

by both the Guardian ad Litem and the forensic evaluator.” The court thus concluded that 

“PONNAMMA has failed to establish that it is in the best interest of the children [] that they be 

removed to India and that their mother’s Petition to do so should be granted.” The court denied 

the motion to relocate without prejudice.
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¶ 23 On February 5, 2020, 30 days after the relocation judgment, Ponnamma filed a “Motion 

for ‘Extension of deadline for Reconsideration of Relocation Judgment’ or ‘a Retrial of 

Relocation Motion’ as appropriate.” In the motion, Ponnamma requested more time to file her 

motion to reconsider. However, she also requested a “retrial.” Specifically, she argued that 

“considering the importance of Immigration law expert’s testimony in deciding what is best for 

the kids, Respondent would request this court to consider a retrial so that full impact of not 

relocating to India on minor children can be known.” She continued: “Respondent apologizes for 

not complying with Supreme court [sic] Rule 213 and requests another opportunity to comply. 

Ponnamma being a pro-se [sic] misunderstood supreme court rule 213 and prepared a written 

interrogatory to the witness.”

¶ 24 Two days after Ponnamma’s motion for extension/retrial, the court entered its Division 

and Allocation of Marital Estate order. Pertinent to this appeal, that order addressed—among 

other things—spousal support (maintenance) and GAL fees.

¶ 25 The court noted that “PONNAMMA historically earned well in excess of BELLIAPPA 

due to his Visa status.” But, “[a]t the time of trial PONNAMMA had minimal income and no 

definite position of employment.” That said, the court found no bad faith from either party 

regarding their employment and income situations. Overall, the court found that both parties 

were “similarly situated from a financial standpoint” and had “good prospects to acquire 

additional income and assets from their efforts once their immigration status is settled.” The 

court specifically found “[t]hat both PONAMMA and BELLIAPPA are capable of secure and 

gainful employment and capable of their own support, and have each waived any claim of 

maintenance from the other.” It then ordered that both parties were “barred from any claim of 
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maintenance [from the other] whether past, present or future and is capable of [their] own 

support without contribution from [the other].”

¶ 26 Based on these findings, the court also determined that each party “shall be equally 

responsible for the payment” of the GAL’s fees; “i.e. BELLIAPPA is responsible for one-half of 

the total fees and costs incurred, and PONNAMMA is responsible for one-half of the fees and 

costs incurred.”

¶ 27 On February 18, 2020, Ponnamma also moved to reconsider the division order “on the 

grounds that the evidence presented in trial did not support [her] claims about her employment 

and immigration status in USA.”

¶ 28 On March 5, the court issued an order regarding both of Ponnamma’s motions to 

reconsider. On the first motion, the motion for extension and/or retrial, the court found that 

“PONNAMMA did fail to either file her motion directed against the court’s judgment of January 

6, 2020 nor did she obtain an extension to do so within the thirty (30) day requirement of 735 

ILCS 5/2-1203(a), and that consequently this court lacks jurisdiction to grant an extension at this 

time.” The court denied the motion on the Allocation Judgment because it determined that 

Ponnama failed to adequately support her position and “that all of the claims in the instant 

Motion to Reconsider relate to PONNAMMA’s immigration status and do not address any 

claims related directly to the division and allocation of the marital estate, nor does the Motion set 

forth a nexus between her immigration status and the property in the estate. That even if, 

arguendo, PONNAMMA’s Motion did address property issues between the parties, she raises no 

new evidence, misapplication of the law relative to the property division, or any changes in the 

law.”
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¶ 29 On March 25, 2020, Ponnamma filed her Notice of Appeal, seeking to appeal the 

judgments of January 6, February 7, and March 5.

¶ 30 ANALYSIS

¶ 31 Ponnamma raises six points of error the judge allegedly committed: barring the 

immigration expert, Leja; excluding the psychological evaluations; denying the motion to 

relocate to India; finding that she was not required to travel to India for work; requiring her to 

pay half the GAL fees; and not ordering Belliappa “to contribute to [her] living expenses in US 

since 2017 incurred due to this lawsuit.” 

¶ 32 However, before discussing the merits, Belliappa filed a motion to dismiss, in part, for 

lack of jurisdiction—which we took with the case.

¶ 33 I. Motion to Dismiss

¶ 34 Belliappa says that we lack jurisdiction to review the January 6 relocation order and 

related issues, because Ponnamma failed to file her notice of appeal within 30 days of the order

and her “motion for extension of time” was not a proper post-trial motion that extended the time 

to file this appeal.

¶ 35 There is “no question” that a relocation order qualifies as a “final judgment” for the 

purposes of filing a notice of appeal. In re Marriage of Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 30; see Ill. S. 

Ct. R. 304(b)(6) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Because the judgment qualifies as an appealable order 

pursuant to Rule 304(b)(6), “the time in which a notice of appeal may be filed from a judgment 

or order appealable under this Rule 304(b) shall be as provided in Rule 303.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a)

(eff. Mar. 8, 2016). That is 30 days after judgment or, if a timely “posttrial motion directed 

against the judgment is filed,” within 30 days after the disposition of that motion. Ill. S. Ct. R. 

303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).
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¶ 36 So the question is whether Ponnamma’s “Motion for ‘Extension of deadline for 

Reconsideration of Relocation Judgment’ or ‘a Retrial of Relocation Motion’ as appropriate”

was “directed against the judgment.” When determining whether a motion is a “proper” post-trial 

motion, we look to the relevant provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. See Kingbrook, Inc. v. 

Pupurs, 202 Ill. 2d 24, 28 (2002). 

¶ 37 In a case tried to the bench, the relevant provision states that, “in all cases tried without a 

jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the 

court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a 

retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.” (Emphasis 

added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2018); see In re Marriage of Singel, 373 Ill. App. 3d 554, 

556 (2007) (“a proper postjudgment motion under section 2-1203(a) must request a rehearing, 

retrial, modification or vacatur of the judgment, or similar type of relief against the judgment.”)

When determining whether a motion is a proper post-trial motion, we look to the substance of 

the motion, not its title. R & G, Inc. v. Midwest Region Foundation for Fair Contracting, Inc., 

351 Ill. App. 3d 318, 323 (2004).

¶ 38 Ponnamma’s motion, though styled in part as a motion for extension, was a post-trial 

motion directed against the judgment. Her alternative requested relief was a “retrial,” which is 

sufficient in itself to qualify. 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2018). And she explained, albeit not in 

great depth, that a retrial was warranted to allow her immigration expert, Leja, to testify so that 

the “full impact of not relocating to India on the minor children can be known.” That is enough. 

See Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at 33 (finding that single line motion for reconsideration qualified as 

post-trial motion under section 2-1203(a) and reversing appellate court order dismissing for lack 

of jurisdiction). 
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¶ 39 So Ponnamma’s motion qualifies as a post-trial motion directed against the judgment. 

Since she filed her notice of appeal within 30 days after the court denied this post-trial motion, 

this court has jurisdiction to review the issue. The motion to dismiss is denied.

¶ 40 II. Relocation Issues

¶ 41 Before we discuss the merits of the relocation order, there are a few issues with 

Ponnamma’s brief. Though we have jurisdiction, we would note that Ponnamma does not discuss 

the standard for relocation, the statutory relocation factors, or our standard of review. Nor does 

she explain how her notion of the correct facts ties back to relief in her favor; she states her view

of the facts without any argument for why those facts warrant relief or any supporting case law. 

¶ 42 It is tempting to deem her relocation arguments forfeited for that reason. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 

341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (“Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant 

and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.”); 

see Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370 (2010) (even argument developed “beyond mere list 

or vague allegations may be insufficient if it does not include citations to authority.”); U.S. Bank 

Trust National Association v. Junior, 2016 IL App (1st) 152109, ¶ 19 (“It is a rudimentary rule 

of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without 

presenting any argument in support.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

¶ 43 But we will consider her arguments, in part because Ponnamma, pro se, has extensively 

laid out the facts with citations to the record, and we are able to understand her argument without 

difficulty.

¶ 44 Ponnamma claims that the trial court erred in “concluding that I can report back to work 

in [Tata Consultancy] US and end my Leave without pay without traveling to India.” She claims 

that the trial court misunderstood her documentary evidence, and that the deputation from her 
No. 1-20-0576 

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Indian employer Tata had expired, giving her the difficult choice of returning to India to work 

there (possibly without her children) versus staying in America, losing her job, and being in 

violation of immigration laws, subject to deportation.

¶ 45 As Belliappa notes, it was not that the trial court failed to understand Ponnamma’s 

argument so much as it did not find the claim credible. The court agreed with Belliappa’s 

argument that the deputation letter from Tata did not have an expiration date, that in fact Tata 

had attempted to find other employment for Ponnamma in Chicago, and that Ponnamma had 

even turned down consideration for one job in Chicago due to “personal constraints.” The court 

did not believe that Ponnamma was forced to return to India. We cannot say from this record that 

this finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 46 And while that issue was undoubtedly important to the trial court’s consideration, it was 

by no means the only or predominant consideration. Of particular importance was the GAL’s 

testimony that relocation to India was not in the best interests of the children and the concern 

over Belliappa’s parenting rights (which are far less in India than in America) should they 

relocate, leading to a potentially strained relationship between children and father. The court 

adopted that opinion, finding that relocation would not be in the best interests of the children.

¶ 47 The trial court meticulously reviewed and considered each of the statutory factors

regarding relocation. Though Ponnamma certainly put forth evidence in her favor, we have 

found nothing that convinces us that the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence or constitutes a manifest injustice. See Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32 (“ ‘[a] trial 

court’s determination of what is in the best interest of the child should not be reversed unless it is 

clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence and it appears that a manifest injustice has 

occurred.’ ” (quoting In re Marriage of Eckert, 199 Ill. 2d 316, 326 (1988))).
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¶ 48 III. Barring Immigration Expert Leja

¶ 49 Ponnamma also argues that the court erred when it barred her immigration law expert, 

Leja, from testifying. The Bystander Report in this case does not shed any light on the specific 

argument around this issue. All we know is that the order states that Leja was excluded for “lack 

of notice and failure to comply with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213.”

¶ 50 With respect to a controlled expert witness, Rule 213 requires a party to disclose: “(i) the 

subject matter on which the witness will testify; (ii) the conclusions and opinions of the witness 

and the bases therefor; (iii) the qualifications of the witness; and (iv) any reports prepared by the 

witness about the case.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(f)(3) (eff. Jan 1, 2018). The trial court’s determinations 

about disclosure will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Morrisroe v. Pantano, 2016 

IL App (1st) 143605, ¶ 38. An abuse of discretion occurs if “ ‘no reasonable person would take 

the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting Steele v. Provena Hospitals, 2013 IL App (3d) 

110374, ¶ 93).

¶ 51 Here, there is simply no basis for finding an abuse of discretion. For one, Ponnamma

admits she didn’t comply with the disclosure requirements. She acknowledges that, as a pro se 

litigant, she “misunderstood supreme court rule 213 and prepared a written interrogatory for the 

witness. The interrogatory was also filed on time and has all the questions listed in it. Agreed 

that it is not the same as conclusion of the expert witness, but it still demonstrates that 

Ponnamma was being transparent and did attempt to follow the rules.”

¶ 52 In her brief, Ponnamma tries to cobble together her 213(f)(3) disclosures from 

information “in the subpoena to Beata Leaja [sic]” and what she believes Belliappa should have 

been aware of based on her arguments in the case. But this is not what Rule 213(f)(3) requires. 

Ponnamma was obligated to make her expert disclosures to Belliappa, and nothing in the record, 
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or her argument, shows that she did. Rule 213 disclosures are not suggestions; they “are 

mandatory and subject to strict compliance by the parties.” Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 

2d 100, 109 (2004). And while we are sympathetic to Ponnamma’s misunderstanding, it does not 

excuse her failures. See U.S. Bank Trust National Association v. Junior, 2016 IL App (1st) 

152109, ¶ 16 (pro se litigants are not entitled to more lenient treatment than attorneys).

¶ 53 We cannot say that no reasonable person would adopt the court’s view here. So we 

cannot find that the court abused its discretion by barring Leja from testifying.

¶ 54 IV. Motion in Limine: Psychological Evaluations

¶ 55 Next, Ponnamma contends the court erred by granting the motion in limine to exclude the 

parties’ psychological evaluations (both Beliappa and Ponnamma submitted to those 

evaluations). According to the court’s written order, it specifically found that the reports had not 

been timely disclosed. 

¶ 56 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) governs physical and mental exams 

and requires that “[w]ithin 21 days after the completion of the examination, the examiner shall 

prepare and mail or deliver to the attorneys for the party requesting the examination and the party 

examined duplicate originals of a written report of the examination, setting out the examiner’s 

findings, results of all tests made, and the examiner’s diagnosis and conclusions.” If this doesn’t 

happen, “the examiner’s testimony, the examiner’s findings, X-ray films, nor the results of any 

tests the examiner has made may be received in evidence except at the instance of the party 

examined or who produced the person examined.” Id. Rule 215’s exclusion remedy is mandatory 

and obligates a court to exclude a report that has not been timely disclosed. Batson v. Township 

Village Associates, LP, 2019 IL App (5th) 170403, ¶¶ 18-19, 29.
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¶ 57 Ponnamma does not claim that the reports were ever sent to Belliappa or his counsel. 

Instead, she argues they should have known that they existed and blames the GAL for not telling 

the court that the reports had been completed. Based on the record, it appears that the evaluations 

were completed on January 8, 2019. That same day, the evaluator—Chicago School Forensic 

Center—sent a fax of the report to Judge Romanek and Michael Bender (the GAL). But there is 

nothing in that fax, or the record, which shows that it was sent to Belliappa’s counsel.

¶ 58 In fact, Ponnamma’s argument supports the conclusion that Belliappa’s counsel was not 

aware of the evaluation. She states, “On Jan 10, 2019, JILL PETERS, counsel for the Petitioner 

updated the court that her client is still getting the evaluations done, which was in correct [sic] 

since as per the evidence * * *, the report was faxed on 1/8/2019.” Ponnamma would have us 

believe that counsel made a mistake (or was dishonest) about still waiting for the evaluations. 

But an equally plausible inference would be that she didn’t know. And that makes sense, because 

as just stated, the January 8 fax did not include Belliappa’s counsel as a recipient. 

¶ 59 In any event, the court explicitly found it “clear that the Reports were never delivered to 

counsel for [Belliappa in] a timely manner.” We can only reverse findings of fact if they are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 890 (2004). 

The record clearly supports the conclusion that Belliappa’s counsel did not receive the reports on 

January 8. Nor is there any indication that she was aware of them until just before trial.

¶ 60 As the court found that the reports were not “timely” disclosed, Rule 215 obligated it to 

exclude them from evidence. We find no error.

¶ 61 V. GAL Fees

¶ 62 Ponnamma next challenges the court’s decision to equally split the GAL fees. An order 

approving fees for a GAL “shall require payment by either or both parents, by any other party or 
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source, or from the marital estate or the child’s separate estate.” 750 ILCS 5/506(b) (West 2020) 

In determining the split of fees, the trial court should consider the total circumstances of both 

parents, including their finances and ability to pay. In re Marriage of Patel and Sines-Patel, 2013 

IL App (1st) 1125471, ¶ 147. We may also consider whether the fees were the result of the 

actions of one or both of the parties. Id. ¶ 148. We review the court’s fee distribution for an 

abuse of discretion. McClelland v. McClelland, 231 Ill. App. 3d 214, 228 (1992).

¶ 63 Here, Ponnamma spends much of her argument blaming Belliappa for the divorce 

proceedings. She contends that his decision to file for divorce in Illinois, as opposed to India, 

should obligate him to pay all the GAL fees. However, the circuit court specifically found that

neither party had acted in bad faith regarding their decision to stay in Illinois or Ponnamma’s 

desire to move to India. While the actions of the parties may be a basis for a distribution of fees, 

there is no evidence here that would overcome the court’s finding of good faith. 

¶ 64 The court also specifically determined that both parties were similarly situated 

financially, and their prospects for income were bright, once the immigration issues are resolved. 

Given these findings, it seems entirely reasonable for the court to have split the fees equally, 

given that they were equally financially situated. We find no abuse of discretion.

¶ 65 VI. Support order

¶ 66 Finally, Ponnamma argues that the court erred by not requiring Belliappa to pay her 

living expenses incurred due to the lawsuit. Like the GAL fees, her argument primarily focuses 

on blaming Belliappa for her financial hardship—primarily the loss of the Texas Project. 

Specifically, she asks us “to see through the evidence [and] find the malicious intent of the 

Petitioner [and] order him to contribute to my living expenses in US to an amount that court 

deems appropriate.”
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¶ 67 While it is true that this dissolution proceeding was likely the reason she couldn’t accept 

that position, the court did not find a basis for maintenance or contribution. As an initial point, it 

found that both parties “waived” their right to maintenance and were “barred” from requesting it. 

It’s unclear how the parties waived maintenance—Belliappa’s brief claims it’s because neither 

party requested it, but the court order does not say (and we have no transcript of proceedings, 

just a bystander’s report). In any event, our courts have clearly recognized that maintenance can 

be waived. See In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 3d 152, 172-73 (finding that court did not 

abuse discretion for failing to sua sponte reconsider waiver of maintenance); Berger v. Berger, 

357 Ill. App. 651, 657-58 (2005) (finding antenuptial waiver contract enforceable where there 

was adequate consideration for waiver). Ponnamma does not address the waiver finding, and we 

see no reason to disturb it.

¶ 68 But, again, the court found that the parties were in similar financial positions and were 

entitled to an equal share of the marital estate. Because their situations were relatively equal, the 

court did not believe that the parties required maintenance. It is true that the parties were both 

underemployed at the time of this proceeding. Yet, the court acknowledged their education and 

employment potential. It is clear that the court had high hopes that the parties would be able to 

get back on track and resume earning to their potential once their immigration statuses were 

settled.

¶ 69 As with the other issues, the court went through the parties’ financial positions and 

acknowledged their current hardship before finding that neither was entitled to maintenance. As 

a general rule, a court’s determination on maintenance is presumed to be correct. In re Marriage 

of Nord, 402 Ill. App. 3d 288, 292 (2010). We will only reverse it where the party challenging 
No. 1-20-0576 

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the award can show an abuse of discretion. Id. Like her other arguments, Ponnamma has not met 

that burden.

¶ 70 CONCLUSION

¶ 71 It is clear that Ponnamma worked very hard in a pro se capacity to draft her appellate 

briefs, and the Court appreciates her effort. It is likewise clear that this case is an emotional one, 

like most involving children and dissolutions of marriage. Our review indicates that the trial 

court carefully considered her arguments and entered detailed findings. Under the deferential 

standards of review we employ, we can find no error in the court’s rulings. We thus affirm the 

judgments under review.

¶ 72 Motion to dismiss denied; judgment affirmed.