alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4287 Introduced in House (IH)]

  2d Session
                                H. R. 4287

To require the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to 
 address the aircraft noise problems of Queens and the north shore of 
                         Long Island, New York.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 28, 1996

 Mr. Ackerman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To require the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to 
 address the aircraft noise problems of Queens and the north shore of 
                         Long Island, New York.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Queens and North Shore of Long 
Island Aircraft Noise Correction Act of 1996''.

SEC. 2. REDUCTION IN AIRCRAFT NOISE OVER QUEENS AND NORTH SHORE OF LONG 
              ISLAND, NEW YORK.

    (a) Comprehensive Plan.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration shall develop and publish, without compromising safety, 
a comprehensive plan to reduce aircraft generated noise in Queens and 
the north shore of Long Island, New York.
    (b) Requirement.--The plan shall include assurances that any 
diversion of air traffic from New Jersey or Staten Island, New York, 
will not result in an increase in aircraft generated noise in Queens or 
the north shore of Long Island, New York.
    (c) Implementation.--The Administrator shall begin implementation 
of the plan on or before the 90th day after the date of publication of 
the plan.
                                 <all>
```
B R A Z O S C O U N T Y A T T O R N E Y ’ S O F F I C E 

R O D N E Y W . A N D E R S O N , C O U N T Y A T T O R N E Y 

October 23, 2015 

Clerk of the Court 

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 

P.O. Box 12308 

Austin, Texas 78711 

Re: PD-1316-15, State of Texas v. Cristan Drayce Williams 

Clerk of the Court, 

This case is on appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Brazos County, Texas. The 

trial and appellate prosecutor for the State is the Brazos County Attorney’s Office. 

Notices from the Court thus far have been provided instead to the Brazos County District 

Attorney’s Office. The State respectfully requests notice be provided to: 

Rodney Anderson 

Brazos County Attorney 

300 E. 26th Street Suite 1300 

Bryan, Texas 77803 

For notice via e-mail, the Brazos County Attorney’s Office requests notice be sent to 

equisenberry@brazoscountytx.gov. 

Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. 

Eric K. Quisenberry 

Assistant County Attorney 

Brazos County Attorney’s Office 

300 E. 26th Street, Ste. 1300 

Bryan, Texas 77803 

Phone: (979) 361-4300 

Fax: (979) 361-4312 

equisenberry@brazoscountytx.gov

Copied to: 

Benton Watson 

John Paschall 

Lisa McMinn 

PD-1316-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 10/23/2015 11:49:14 AM

Accepted 10/23/2015 12:54:20 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
#### Highway Trailer Industries, Inc., a Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. A. Lowther, Jr., The Lowther Corporation, a Corporation, Empire Truck Leasing, Inc., a Corporation, and Fred Gary, Defendants, Fred Gary, Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 51,010.

First District, First Division.

September 19, 1966.

Maurice M. Loman, of Chicago, for

appellant; Herbert A. Ellis, Arthur A. Ellis and Morris W. Ellis, of Chicago (Ellis & Ellis, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion by

JUSTICE BURMAN.

Not to be published in full.
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39620

STATE OF IDAHO
,

Plaintiff-Respondent
,

v.

QUINTON JARMAIN ROWE
,

Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 685

Filed: October 19, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixt h Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Hon. Stephen S. Dunn , District Judge.

O rder denying I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed

.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jordan E. Taylor, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent

.

________________________________________________
Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Quinton Jarmain Rowe pled guilty to an amended charge of possession of a controlled

substance . I.C. § 37

- 2732(c)(1) . In exchange for his guilty plea, the state also dismissed a

sente ncing enhancement. The district court sentenced Rowe to a unified term of seven years,

with a minimum period of confinement of three years . The district court retained jurisdiction

and, following successful completion of his rider, Rowe was placed on probation. Rowe

thereafter violated the terms of his probation, and the district cou rt revoked probation and

ordered execution of Rowe’s original sentence. Rowe filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, which the

district court denied. Rowe appeals.

A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton , 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d2 23, 24 (2006); S tate v. Allbee , 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of

new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the

motion. State v. Huffman , 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). An appeal from the

denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent

the presentation of new information. Id. Because no new or a dditional information in support of

Rowe ’s Rule 35 motion was presented, the district court did not abuse its discretion. For the

foregoing reasons, the district court’s order denying Rowe ’s Rule 35 motion is affirme d.
#### FOLSE v. BURG.

No. 17370.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Feb. 13, 1940.

Bruce Nunez, of St. Bernard, and A. Gif-fen Levy and Geo. M. Leppert, both of New Orleans, for appellant.

R. A. Dowling, of New Orleans, for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Louis H. Folse, brought this action for the purpose of having declared null and void the Democratic Primary Election held on January 16, 1940, insofar as was concerned the Democratic nomination for the office of representative for the Parish of St'. Bernard.

From a judgment maintaining an exception of no right or cause of action and dismissing the suit, plaintiff appealed to this court.

There has been filed with us a stipulation of counsel reading as follows:

> “It is hereby agreed and stipulated that the above numbered and entitled appeal, which is pending in this Honorable Court involves the same identical questions of law and of facts as were involved in case No. 35719 of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, entitled Manuel Molero v. Celestin F. Rowley, 194 So. 7, and which case was decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana on Friday, February 9th, 1940.

> “It is further agreed and stipulated by the attorneys representing the appellant and appellee that the above numbered and entitled cause is now submitted to this Honorable Court on the record herein and on the decision rendered and decree rendered by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, No. 35719, Manuel Molero v. Celestin F. Rowley, 194 So. 7, and decided on February 9th, 1940, a copy of which decree is made part of this record.

> “ (Signed) A. Giffen Levy,

> “Attorney for Appellant.

> “R. A. Dowling,

> “Attorney for Appellee.”

In the case referred to, to-wit, Manuel Molero v. Celestin F. Rowley, 194 So. 7, Supreme Court, the decree of the Supreme *11Court affirmed the judgment maintaining the exceptions. Accordingly, and in view of the stipulation, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment appealed from be and it is affirmed at the cost of appellant.

Affirmed.
#### JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO.

No. 5077.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 26, 1936.

J. V. Thompson, of Alexandria, for appellant.

Thornton, Gist & Richey, of Alexandria, for appellee.

DREW, Judge.

Plaintiff instituted this suit under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended), and made defendant the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. He did not sue his employer. He claims total and permanent disability, and prays for compensation to the extent of 65 per cent, of his weekly wage for a period of 400 weeks, under the general disability provisions of said act; he further prays for $50, medical expenses incurred by reason of his injury.

Plaintiff bases his claim on an injury received in an accident on November 6, 1933, wherein the fibula of his right leg, about two or three inches above the ankle, was broken.

Defendant admits the accident on the date above alleged, and admits that plaintiff was accidentally injured while performing the duties arising out of and in the course of his employment, that the employment was hazardous and that the defendant her.ein carried compensation insurance for plaintiff’s employer. Defendant denies, however, that plaintiff’s injuries disabled him for a period longer than 12 weeks, for which period they paid him compensation.

The judgment of the lower court was one rejecting plaintiff’s demands, from which judgment he prosecutes this appeal.

Plaintiff, in the case of Johnson v. Continental Casualty Company, 183 La. 1042, 165 So. 194, filed suit on an accident insurance policy based upon the same accident for which he is now seeking compem sation, and the Supreme Court of this state, in the above-cited case, held that his disability caused by the accident of November 6, 1933, lasted for a period of 3 months. The case above cited was tried *116upon the same evidence that we have before us, and, since the Supreme Court has found the period of plaintiff’s disability, caused by the accident of November 6, 1933, lasted only 3 months, and plaintiff admits he received compensation from the defendant herein for that period of time, we are constrained to find that the judgment of the lower court rejecting his demands for 'further compensation is correct.

It is therefore affirmed, with costs.
The HONORABLE HAROLD D. VIETOR, United States District Judge 1

for the Southern District of Iowa.

___________

No. 96-2943

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Southern District of Iowa.

Steven Alan Voshell, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: December 23, 1996

 Filed: January 3, 1997

___________

Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Steve Alan Voshell appeals the 180-month sentence imposed by the

district court after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of 1

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Voshell

argues that the district court erred by sentencing him under the Armed

Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because one of his

predicate convictions--a 1984 Iowa conviction for second-degree burglary--

did not constitute a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. We affirm.

Under section 924(e), a defendant convicted of being a felon in

possession of a firearm faces a minimum term of fifteen years imprisonment

if he has three prior convictions for violent felonies. "Burglary" is

included in the definition of "violent
-2-

felony." See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). For purposes of section

924(e), the Supreme Court has defined "burglary" generically as "any crime

. . . having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or

remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime."

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).

We conclude the district court correctly sentenced Voshell as an

armed career criminal. The state charging paper and judgment indicate that

Voshell pleaded guilty to a charge meeting the generic burglary definition.

See United States v. Carpenter, 11 F.3d 788, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1993)

(burglary offense qualified as "generic burglary" where defendant pleaded

guilty to charge including entry of structure, intent to commit felony, and

no right, license, or privilege to do so), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1530

(1994); United States v. Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1991);

United States v. Payton, 918 F.2d 54, 55-56 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 948 (1991). We reject Voshell's contention that the government

was required to offer proof of the factual basis underlying his plea. Cf.

Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02 (court may not conduct factual examination of

underlying conviction).

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 16.2


                                ARTHUR ANDERSEN

                                                       ________________________
                                                       Arthur Andersen LLP

                                                       ________________________
                                                       101 Eisenhower Parkway
                                                       Roseland NJ 07068-1099
                                                       201 403 6100

February 17, 1997

Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20349

     We have read Item 4 in the  attached  Form 8-K dated  February  14, 1997 of
Paramark  Enterprises,  Inc.  to be  filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission and are in agreement with the statements contained therein.

Very truly yours,

Arthur Andersen LLP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION §

OF JAMARR CANNON FOR A WRIT § No. 114, 2018

OF MANDAMUS §

Submitted: March 14, 2018

 Decided: March 16, 2018

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.

O R D E R

This 16th day of March 2018, upon consideration of the petition of Jamarr 

Cannon for a writ of mandamus and the State’s answer and motion to dismiss, it 

appears to the Court that:

(1) The petitioner, Jamarr Cannon, was convicted on January 29, 2018 of 

multiple drug offenses following a bench trial. His sentencing is currently scheduled 

for March 28, 2018. He filed this petition seeking to invoke the original jurisdiction 

of this Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Superior Court to make 

additional findings related to its February 15, 2018 Order denying Cannon’s motion 

for reconsideration of its denial of his suppression motion. The State has filed a 

motion to dismiss Cannon’s petition on the ground that it manifestly fails to invoke 

this Court’s original jurisdiction. We agree.

(2) A writ of mandamus is designed to compel a trial court to perform a 

duty if it is shown that: the complainant has a clear right to the performance of the 

duty; that no other adequate remedy is available; and that the trial court has 
2

arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty.1 A writ of mandamus will not be 

issued “to compel a trial court to perform a particular judicial function, to decide a 

matter in a particular way, or to dictate the control of its docket.”2 

(3) A writ of mandamus is not warranted under the present circumstances

because Cannon cannot establish that the Superior Court has arbitrarily refused to 

perform a duty owed to him and that he has no other adequate remedy. Once Cannon 

is sentenced, then he may appeal to this Court from the Superior Court’s final 

judgment, which will bring up any interlocutory rulings for review, including the 

denial of his suppression motion.

3

 This Court has no jurisdiction to review an 

interlocutory order in a criminal case.4 Cannon cannot use the extraordinary writ 

process to overcome that constitutional hurdle.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of 

mandamus is DISMISSED. 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice

 

1

In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988).

2

Id.

3 Middlebrook v. State, 2000 WL 975060 (Del. May 30, 2000).

4 DEL. CONST. art IV, § 11(1)(b).
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

             In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of MapInfo Corporation (the "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, K. Wayne McDougall, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

             (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

             (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 21, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-50751 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus MARTIN ANTUNEZ-PINEDA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. DR-02-CR-748-1-AML

-------------------- Before JOLLY, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Martin Antunez-Pineda appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Antunez-Pineda contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been alleged in his indictment. Antunez-Pineda maintains that heNo. 03-50751 -2- pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for that offense.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Antunez-Pineda acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
#### J. R. Castleberry v. State.

No. 24992.

January 17, 1951.

*384No attorney of record on appeal for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for felony theft with ten years’ sentence in the penitentiary.

The state’s evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Appellant was found in possession of the property, admitted his guilt, and showed the officers where a portion of the same was hidden. He made no denial of his guilt and offered no evidence in his behalf.

The only bill of exception in the case complains of the introduction of the records showing former convictions for felonies in other counties. The record discloses that such convictions were shown for a person of the same name, in accordance with the allegations in the first count of the indictment. No proof was made that appellant was the same person.

There was a second count in the indictment which alleged the commission of the felony described the same as that in the first count, but it does not allege the former convictions. When the evidence was closed the court submitted the case to the jury on the second count only. The verdict was rendered accordingly and gave appellant the maximum penalty of ten years. We held in Rodgers v. State, 137 Texas Crim. Rep. 442, 131 S.W. 2d 766, in an identical situation, that no error was committed.

We observe that in sentencing the defendant the court failed to apply the indeterminate sentence law in that he was sentenced to serve not less than ten years and not more than ten years. The sentence is reformed so as to commit him for a term of not less than two years nor more than ten years.

We find no reversible error and the judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002



In connection with
the Quarterly Report of Cytocore, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2012, filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Robert McCullough, Jr., Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 that, to my knowledge:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



2. The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition as of the dates presented and the results of operations of the
Company for the periods presented.



| | /s/ Robert F. McCullough, Jr.
| | -----------------------------
| | Robert F. McCullough, Jr.    
| | Chief Executive Officer and  
| | Chief Financial Officer      
| | Dated: August 20, 2011
Exhibit
99.4
 
 
 CERTIFICATE
PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report (the “Report”) on the Form 10-Q of Sona
Resources Inc. (the “Company”) for the six months ended March 31, 2009 and for
the period from January 18, 2007 (date of inception) to March 31, 2009, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Monika Sagar,
Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief:
 
 1.    The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 
 2.     The
information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
 
 
 April
29,
2009                                                  MONIKA
SAGAR
 Monika
Sagar
 Chief
Accounting Officer,
 Chief
Financial Officer and Director
 
 
 
 1