UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4798

SAT-DARSHAN SINGH KHALSA, a/k/a

Edward Francis Hendricks,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

William L. Osteen, District Judge.

(CR-01-171)

Submitted: April 30, 2002

Decided: June 3, 2002

Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Mary Katherine Nicholson, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph,

Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Sat-Darshan Singh Khalsa appeals his conviction after a conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin in

violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999 &

Supp. 2001), and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking

crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (West 2000).

Khalsa challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence

obtained during an allegedly illegal stop at the Greensboro, North

Carolina, train station. 

Khalsa contends that the police officers did not possess sufficiently

reliable information to warrant an investigatory stop. The district

court held that Khalsa’s encounter with the police was not a detention

or a stop. We review the district court’s factual findings on a denial

of a suppression motion for clear error and its legal conclusions de

novo, United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992),

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who

prevailed below. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th

Cir. 1998). The encounter at issue occurred in a public area, the train

platform, and two plain clothed officers with concealed weapons

identified themselves and asked to speak to Khalsa while another officer waited at a distance. Khalsa agreed to speak with the officers. On

these facts, we conclude this was not an investigatory stop under

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,

497 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54

(1980). 

Khalsa further contends his consent to the search of his baggage

was involuntary because the investigating officer did not respond to

his inquiry regarding his right to refuse consent to a search of his baggage; he raises this claim under the Fifth Amendment as interpreted

in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996). The police are not

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required to inform investigative subjects of their rights prior to seeking consent to search. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).

Khalsa’s argument does not demonstrate clear error in the district

court’s ruling, after the hearing on the motion to suppress, that Khalsa

consented to the search of his bags. Rusher, 966 F.2d at 873; see

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying Khalsa’s

motion to suppress. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

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