alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Murphy v. Hobbs

1. It is not the practice of this court to discuss in opinions all the errors assigned.

3. The rule that facts admitted in the pleadings need not be proved on the trial, *held*not to apply to the matter relied upon in the case at bar.

Or petition for rehearing the following opinion was delivered:

*Per Curiam.*

Two matters are presented upon this application. The first relates to certain testimony admitted over defendant’s objection in the court below. Counsel seems to think that because nothing was said in the opinion as to the assignment upon this subject, it was not considered. In this he is mistaken; the question presented was carefully examined, but was not, deemed of sufficient importance to warrant discussion. It was our judgment that there was no material error in receiving the testimony objected to.

It is not the practice in this court to notice in opinions all of the errors assigned. Counsel always allege as many < errors as their ingenuity can suggest in connection with the record filed; they very rarely rely upon all -of these assignments; and frequently they have little or no con fidence in some of those upon which they present arguments.

We have no special fault to find with this practice; it is doubtless prompted by an “abundance of caution.” But when an assignment is clearly without substance, or *131when it relates to a matter which has been frequently adjudicated, or when for some other reason it does not appear important that it should be discussed, we often decline to lengthen opinions by a discussion thereof. While this is true, it is also true, however, that all assignments of error which are relied upon in argument receive careful consideration, whether mentioned in the opinion or not.

The second objection to the decision in the case refers to an admission in the pleadings.

Counsel is correct in his position that “the facts admitted by the pleadings ” need not be proved upon trial. There is in this case an admission that at the *time of the conversion*defendant was the owner of the promissory note mentioned. But the conversion referred to, took place over ten months before this suit was brought; the note was a negotiable instrument, and at that time was not due. Thus it appears that, the fact admitted, and which need not be proved, is, that nearly a year before suit brought, defendant was the owner of a negotiable promissory note against plaintiff, which was not then due. Can it be said that this admission relieved defendant from pleading, or at least from proving at the trial, that he was still the owner thereof.

It perhaps should be remarked that this note was not connected with the gravamen of the action; it was a matter upon which, if properly pleaded, defendant, provided he was still the owner, might rely in reduction of plaintiff’s damages.

*Behearina denied.*
Exhibit 32


Certification of Principal Executive and Financial Officer
 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to
 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Coyote Resources, Inc. a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Guy Martin, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Coyote Resources, Inc., and will be retained by Coyote Resources, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


/s/ Guy MartinGuy MartinPrincipal Executive Officer, Principal Financial OfficerApril 16, 2013
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4348

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DENNIS RAY HOWARD, a/k/a D,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (5:12-cr-00009-D-1)

Submitted: January 19, 2016 Decided: February 3, 2016

Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joshua B. Howard, GAMMON, HOWARD & ZESZOTARSKI, PLLC, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States 

Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

A federal jury convicted Dennis Ray Howard of conspiracy to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute phencyclidine 

(“PCP”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012); nine counts of 

distribution of PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012); 

and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). The 

district court originally sentenced Howard to life imprisonment 

plus a consecutive mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months of 

imprisonment for the firearm count. Howard appealed and we 

affirmed the convictions, but vacated the sentence and remanded 

for resentencing, finding that the sentence was substantively 

unreasonable. See United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519 (4th 

Cir. 2014).

Upon resentencing, the court sentenced Howard to 175 months 

of imprisonment for the drug convictions, plus the consecutive 

statutory mandatory minimum of 60 months for the firearm 

conviction. Howard again appeals, arguing that the sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review a sentence for abuse of discretion, determining 

whether the sentence is procedurally and substantively 

reasonable. United States v. Heath, 559 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 

2009). “If no procedural error was committed, [we] can only 

vacate a sentence if it was substantively unreasonable in light 
3

of all relevant facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 

2008) (“[A]n appellate court must defer to the trial court and 

can reverse a sentence only if it is unreasonable, even if the 

sentence would not have been the choice of the appellate 

court.”). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 

that the sentence is substantively reasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-4781

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

BEVERLY J. CRAFT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,

District Judge. (CR-04-17)

Submitted: March 9, 2005 Decided: April 7, 2005

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North

Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
*Because the sentencing guidelines relating to revocation of

supervised release have always been advisory, see U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. A, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.

738 (2005), does not impact the sentence imposed upon Craft.

PER CURIAM:

Beverly J. Craft appeals the fourteen month sentence

imposed by the district court for violations of her supervised

release.*

 Craft did not object to imposition of sentence at the

revocation hearing, and thus this court’s review is for plain

error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Four

conditions must be met before this Court will notice plain error:

(1) there must be error; (2) it must be plain under current law;

(3) it must affect substantial rights, typically meaning the

defendant is prejudiced by the error in that it affected the

outcome of the proceedings; and (4) the error must seriously affect

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-37. Craft claims she lacks

control over her actions due to mental illness, but offers no

evidence of insanity, incompetence, or an inability to understand

her actions. The district court considered the relevant factors

and policy statements at issue, and we conclude that the court did

not plainly err in imposing the sentence. Therefore, we affirm.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### John Rodzborski, Respondent, v. American Sugar Refining Company, Appellant.

lant. Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion., Hirschberg, P. J., Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor and Miller, JJ., concurred.
Exhibit 31.4

Certification by Chief Financial Officer

pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) or Rule 15d-14(a) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as

adopted pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, B. Clyde Preslar, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of The Pantry, Inc.; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |  |  |  |  |                                               
|---------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------
|Date: January 24, 2014 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ B. Clyde Preslar                          
|                       |  |  |  |  |  | B. Clyde Preslar                              
|                       |  |  |  |  |  | Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-14-00294-CV

Michael E. Killebrew, Jr., Appellant

v.

BKE Investments, Inc., Merscorp Holdings, Inc., and Everbank, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-12-003033, HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this appeal. We grant the

motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1).

__________________________________________

Scott K. Field, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Field

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: September 10, 2014
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

P ATRICIA KOS TY SHYN , Defendant Below , Appellant,

v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY , Plaintiff Below Appellee. § § § No. 312, 2023 § § Court Below

— Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § C .A. No. N22J

- 02872 § § §
Submitted: November 6 , 2023 Decided: November 7 , 2023
Before VALIHURA , TRAYNOR , GRIFFITHS , Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the notice to show cause and the appellant’s response, it appears to the Court that: (1) The appellant, P atricia Kostyshyn, filed this appeal from a monition action in the Superior Court. On August 30, 2023 and September 26, 2023 , the
C lerk’s office sent letters advising Kostyshyn to pay the filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis , first by September 14, 2023 and then by October 10,
2023

. The Clerk’s Office warned Kostyshyn that if she failed to do so a notice to
show cause would issue. The Clerk’s office sent the letters to the addresses provided by Kost y shyn and her brother, Peter Kostyshyn, who had filed the same documents.2

(2) On September 27, 2023, the Deputy Prothonotary submitted a letter stating that Kostyshyn ha d not paid the Superior Court’s appeal preparation fee. The Clerk’s office sent Kostyshyn a letter withdrawing the record deadline and directing her to pay the Superior Court appeal preparation fee by October 10, 2023 , or a notice
to show cause would issu e. Kostyshyn did not pay this Court’s filing fee or the Superior Court ’s appeal preparation fee

. She also failed to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis

. (3) On October 11, 2023 and October 12, 2023 , the Clerk ’s office issued
notice s , by certified mail, directing Kost y shyn to show cause why this appeal should
not be dismissed for her failure to pay this Court’s filing fee and the Superior Court ’s appeal preparation fee. Postal records show that the October 11, 2023 notice to show

cause wa s delivered on October 12, 2023 and the October 12, 2023 notice to show
cause was returned with the notation “return to send er , vacant, unable to forward.” On October 23, 2023 , the Clerk ’s office reissued the notice s to show cause by first
class mail. Th e Court’s correspondence and notices to show cause were sent to the
address es that the Kostyshyn s provided, and continue to provide, to this Court

. (4) On October 2 5, 2023 , November 3, 2023 , and November 6, 2023 , Kostyshyn filed documents that are deemed to be her response to the notice to show

cause
. The documents do not address her failure to pay th is Court’s filing fee or the3

Superior Court ’s appeal preparation fee. In light of K ostyshyn’s failure to pay th ose fees or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis , this appeal must be dismissed. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rule 29(b),
that this appeal is DISMISSED

.
BY THE COURT: /s/ Gary F. Tray nor Justice
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Inconnection with the amended quarterly report of Veracity Management Global, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2007 (the“Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof, I, Richard Grassano, CFO of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Richard Grassano

Richard GrassanoCFODated: July 2, 2007

A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906 has been provided to Veracity Management Global, Inc.and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.
#### Weaver *v.*Industrial Commission of Ohio.

(No. 23431

Decided June 15, 1932.)

*Mr. James Harrington Boyd,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Gilbert Bettman,*attorney general, *Mr. B. B. Zurmehly*and *Mr. F. E. Galkins,*for defendant in error.

By the Court.

In this action the plaintiff in error, Mabel Weaver, recovered a judgment in the court of common pleas of Lucas county entitling her to partici*466pate in the state insurance fund. Upon prosecution of error proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Lucas county that court reversed the action of the court of common pleas, for the reason that the court of common pleas erred in admitting in evidence certain verbal statements as to the occurrence and nature of the alleged injury made to certain persons by Charles Weaver, the decedent, and also for the reason that the court of common pleas erred in refusing to charge the jury upon the request of the defendant as follows:

> “Defendant requests that the court charge the jury that not only must the injury arise out of and be connected with the employment, but that the death must appear to be the proximate result of the injury, or if there was acceleration of death, that that acceleration must be the proximate result of the injury.”

Upon both of these points the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.

The statements in question in the cases where they are definitely fixed as to time were made the next day after the accident, or subsequently thereto. Under the statute in its present form they were admissible only if they constituted a part of the *res gestae.*Hence these statements lacked the element of spontaneity essential to make them admissible under the *res gestae*rule. 22 Corpus Juris, 451.

With reference to the second ground for reversal, the trial court erred in not giving the charge requested. Section 1465-82, General Code, which governs this case, provides:

> “In case the injury causes death within the period of two years, the benefits shall be in the amount and to the persons following * * *.”

Under this provision the plaintiff in an appeal case from a denial of award by the Industrial Commission for death of a workman or employe has to establish that the injury was the proximate cause of the death, or was the proximate cause of the acceleration of *467death. *West Side Coal & Mining Co.*v. *Industrial Commission,*321 Ill., 61, 151 N. E., 593; *Springfield District Coal Mining Co.*v. *Industrial Commission,*303 Ill., 455, 135 N. E., 789.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen and Kinkade, JJ., concur.

Stephenson, J., not participating.
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Exhibit 31.1  Section 302 Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer   I, Brandi Iannelli, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of TJS Wood Flooring, Inc.  2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;  4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:  a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the Evaluation Date); and  c) presented in this quarterly report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on my evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;  5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrants auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls  6. I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of my most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.  Date: July 17, 2007  /s/ Brandi Iannelli Brandi Iannelli Title: President and Chief Financial Officer