Docket No. 91522–Agenda 12–January 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 

								ROBERT S. LIDSTER, Appellee.

Opinion filed Ocrt5otober 18, 2002.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Du Page County

convicted defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol (625

ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 1996)). The appellate court found that

the roadblock where the police arrested defendant did not comply

with the constitutional standards set forth in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000). Accordingly, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction.

319 Ill. App. 3d 825. We granted the State’s petition for leave to

appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and allowed the Illinois Association

of Chiefs of Police to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the

appellate court.

BACKGROUND

	On August 30, 1997, the Lombard police department set up a

roadblock on North Avenue in Lombard, Illinois. A police officer

stopped defendant at the roadblock and directed him to a side

street where another police officer had defendant perform several

field-sobriety tests. Defendant failed a number of the tests and was

taken into custody.

	Defendant was subsequently charged with the offense of

driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion to quash

his arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing on the motion,

Detective Ray Vasil testified that Lieutenant Glennon, third in

command at the Lombard police department, authorized the

roadblock. The purpose of the roadblock was to obtain information

from motorists regarding a hit-and-run accident that took place one

week earlier, at the same location, and at the same time of day. In

particular, the police wanted information regarding a Ford Bronco

or full-sized pickup truck implicated in the accident.

	The Lombard police department has a general order regarding

the use of roadblocks. The order, however, does not contain

guidelines regarding the use of roadblocks to obtain information

from crime witnesses. The roadblock at issue was not videotaped.

Further, the police did not publicize the roadblock.

	Between 6 and 12 police vehicles participated in the

roadblock. Detective Vasil wore an orange reflective vest with the

word “Police” on it, and stood between the eastbound lanes of

North Avenue, 15 feet from the roadblock. A line of cars formed

at the roadblock. As each vehicle pulled up to Detective Vasil, he

handed a flyer to the driver of the vehicle requesting information

regarding the accident. Because defendant’s Mazda minivan

almost hit him, Detective Vasil requested defendant’s driver’s

license and insurance card. Detective Vasil smelled alcohol on

defendant’s breath and noticed that defendant’s speech was

slurred. Detective Vasil directed defendant to a side street where

Detective Roy Newton had defendant perform several sobriety

tests.

	The trial court denied defendant’s motion.

	At defendant’s subsequent bench trial, Detective Newton

testified that he was assigned to the corner of North Avenue and

Craig. His duties were to ensure that drivers did not skirt the

roadblock and to provide help to the officers in the event they

experienced any problems with the vehicles or drivers stopped at

the roadblock. The officers at the roadblock directed several cars,

including defendant’s vehicle, to Detective Newton’s location. At

Detective Newton’s request, defendant produced a driver’s license

and insurance information. Detective Newton then had defendant

perform several sobriety tests and placed defendant under arrest.

	The court found defendant guilty of driving under the

influence of alcohol. The court sentenced defendant to one year of

conditional discharge and required that defendant participate in

counseling, complete 14 days in the “Sheriff’s Work Alternative

Program,” and pay a fine of $200.

ANALYSIS

	As noted above, the appellate court relied on Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447, in finding the

roadblock at issue invalid. In Edmond, the United States Supreme Court invalidated checkpoints set up by the police on Indianapolis

roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. Initially, the Court

observed:

			“The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and

seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily

unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of

wrongdoing. [Citation.] While such suspicion is not an

‘irreducible’ component of reasonableness [citation], we

have recognized only limited circumstances in which the

usual rule does not apply. For example, we have upheld

certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the

program was designed to serve ‘special needs, beyond the

normal need for law enforcement.’ [Citations.] ***

			We have also upheld brief, suspicionless seizures of

motorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed to

intercept illegal aliens, Martinez-Fuerte, [428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976)], and at a

sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from

the road, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444[, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481] (1990).”

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 340-41, 121 S. Ct. at 451-52.

The Edmond Court then reviewed its decisions in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, detailing the need for the checkpoints at issue and the important governmental interests they served. The Court observed:

			“We have never approved a checkpoint program whose

primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary

criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have

recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that

a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of

individualized suspicion. We suggested in Prouse that we would not credit the ‘general interest in crime control’ as

justification for a regime of suspicionless stops.

[Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 671 n.18, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 n.18 (1979).] Consistent with this suggestion, each of the checkpoint

programs that we have approved was designed primarily

to serve purposes closely related to the problems of

policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway

safety.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 343, 121 S. Ct. at 454.

The Edmond Court firmly rejected the suggestion that the Indianapolis checkpoints could be upheld pursuant to Martinez- Fuerte and Sitz:

			“Petitioners propose several ways in which the

narcotics-detection purpose of the instant checkpoint

program may instead resemble the primary purposes of

the checkpoints in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. Petitioners state that the checkpoints in those cases had the same

ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of

committing crimes. *** Securing the border and

apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law

enforcement activities, and law enforcement officers

employ arrests and criminal prosecutions in pursuit of

these goals. [Citations.] If we were to rest the case at this

high level of generality, there would be little check on the

ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for

almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose.

Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily

to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth

Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions

from becoming a routine part of American life.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 343-44, 121 S. Ct. at 454.

The Edmond Court concluded that the Indianapolis checkpoints were invalid, stating:

			“The primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics

checkpoints is in the end to advance ‘the general interest

in crime control,’ [citation]. We decline to suspend the

usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the

police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the

ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot

sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-

present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some

crime.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455.

See also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205, 218-19, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1290 (2001) (in invalidating

a program at a state hospital whereby urine samples from pregnant

women were tested for drugs and the results communicated to the

police, the Court stated: “Respondents argue in essence that their

ultimate purpose–namely, protecting the health of both mother and

child–is a beneficent one. In Chandler [v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997)], however, we did not

simply accept the State’s invocation of a ‘special need.’ Instead,

we carried out a ‘close review’ of the scheme at issue before

concluding that the need in question was not ‘special,’ as that term

has been defined in our cases. [Citation.] In this case, a review of

the M-7 policy plainly reveals that the purpose actually served by

the [hospital] searches ‘is ultimately indistinguishable from the

general interest in crime control.’ Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)”).

	In the present case, the appellate court held the roadblock at

issue invalid under Edmond. The appellate court noted “that the roadblock’s ostensible purpose was to seek evidence of ‘ordinary

criminal wrongdoing.’ ” 319 Ill. App. 3d at 828. The court

concluded “[t]his is the type of routine investigative work that the

police must do every day and does not justify the extraordinary

means chosen to further the investigation.” 319 Ill. App. 3d at 828.

	The State asserts that Edmond is distinguishable because the roadblock at issue had a specific purpose of assisting the

authorities in solving a crime that had already been committed and

was known to the police. Thus, police efforts were not directed at

general crime control. Unlike in Edmond, the Lombard police department did not seek to interrogate and inspect motorists to

ferret out evidence that the motorists themselves had committed

crime that was as yet unknown to police. Defendant was only

subjected to further investigation because he narrowly missed

hitting an officer in the area where vehicles were stopped.

	The State’s interpretation of Edmond is incorrect. First, as the Court reaffirmed in Edmond, the general rule is that “a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized

suspicion of wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 340, 121 S. Ct. at 451. The checkpoints upheld in Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) (immigration checkpoints located near the Mexican border), and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint), are

“limited exceptions to the general rule.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 343, 121 S. Ct. at 454. Certainly the Lombard

roadblock does not fall within the scope of the limited exceptions

heretofore approved by the Supreme Court.

	Second, the Court in Edmond was keenly aware that an exception for roadblocks “designed primarily to serve the general

interest in crime control” would abrogate the general rule requiring

individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See 4 W. LaFave, Search

& Seizure §9.6 (3d ed. Supp. 2002). Accordingly, the Court drew

a bright line that when the primary purpose of a roadblock is

general crime control, the roadblock is unconstitutional. The Court

explained:

		“Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed

primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the

Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such

intrusions from becoming a routine part of American

life.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 121 S. Ct. at 454.

The Court declined “to suspend the usual requirement of

individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a

checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating

crimes.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455.

	In the case at bar, the State ignores the concerns expressed by

the Court in Edmond. In spite of the clear admonishment in Edmond against the use of roadblocks to advance “the general interest in crime control,” the State requests that we allow a

roadblock for precisely that purpose.

	Third, the State finds a distinction between gathering

information leading to the arrest and prosecution of a motorist as the perpetrator of a crime, and gathering information from a

motorist leading to the identification of another motorist as the perpetrator of a crime. According to the State, gathering

information leading to the arrest and prosecution of a motorist as

the perpetrator of a crime is a part of general crime control.

However, the State maintains that gathering information from a

motorist leading to the identification of another motorist as the perpetrator of a crime is not considered a part of general crime control. Taking the State’s reasoning a step further, a police

investigation tool such as canvassing a neighborhood to find

identification witnesses to a crime is not considered to be a part of

general crime control. In the State’s view, crime control involves

arresting the perpetrator directly; it does not involve gathering

information leading to the arrest of the perpetrator. We must reject

this contention. In investigating and solving any crime, police

efforts are directed at general crime control. This holds true

whether the police happen upon the perpetrator of the crime at the

roadblock or obtain information from a roadblock detainee

identifying the perpetrator of the crime.

	Lastly, an exception for informational roadblocks has the

potential to make roadblocks “a routine part of American life.”

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 121 S. Ct. at 454. In 2000, 870 murders, 49,652 assaults, 25,168 robberies, 77,947

burglaries, 306,805 thefts, 55,222 motor vehicle thefts, and 2,899

arsons were known by police to have been committed in Illinois.

J. Fitch, 2001 Illinois Statistical Abstract 764 (16th ed. 2001). Of

those, 706 murders, 31,655 assaults, 21,691 robberies, 41,464

burglaries, 168,890 thefts, 45,083 motor vehicle thefts, and 1,525

arsons were known by police to have been committed in Cook

County. J. Fitch, 2001 Illinois Statistical Abstract 764 (16th ed.

2001). In the City of Chicago, there were 627 murders, 26,660

assaults, 19,449 robberies, 28,401 burglaries, 105,728 thefts,

35,570 motor vehicle thefts and 1,106 arsons. J. Fitch, 2001

Illinois Statistical Abstract 766 (16th ed. 2001). Should the police

have been allowed to set up roadblocks to obtain information from

potential witnesses for each murder? What of a robbery, an

aggravated criminal sexual assault, an arson or any other serious

crime? According to the State, for a period of at least a week after each crime, police could set up roadblocks with the specific

purpose of making inquiries of persons who were possibly

witnesses to a crime. The troubling specter then arises that the

streets of Cook County, or at least the streets of Chicago, would be

adorned with roadblocks, an outcome clearly unacceptable under Edmond.

	Amicus suggests that exigent circumstances justified the use of the roadblock. Amicus asserts that police needed to act quickly to contact possible witnesses or else risk losing vital information.

The Court in Edmond left open the possibility that an emergency may justify a law enforcement roadblock. The Court explained:

			“Of course, there are circumstances that may justify a

law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose

would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to

ordinary crime control. For example, as the Court of

Appeals noted, the Fourth Amendment would almost

certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up

to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a

dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a

particular route. [Citation.] The exigencies created by

these scenarios are far removed from the circumstances

under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter

of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving

the jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that

may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of

categories, we decline to approve a program whose

primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the

general interest in crime control.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455.

	In the present case, the hit-and-run accident happened a week

before the roadblock. There was no indication that the motorist

involved posed any further danger to local residents or, indeed,

that the motorist remained in the vicinity. There was also no

indication that the motorist was driving recklessly or was driving

under the influence of alcohol. While this court understands the

efforts of the Lombard police department to obtain information

leading to the identification of the motorist, the limited, exigent

circumstances of the nature identified by the Supreme Court in Edmond are not present in the matter at bar. Absent such exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment’s prohibition against

suspicionless seizures should not give way to the normal needs of

law enforcement, be they identified as crime control, criminal

investigation or canvassing efforts to obtain information leading

to the identification and apprehension of the perpetrator of a crime.

	The State and amicus fail in their attempts to distinguish Edmond. Edmond clarifies that “[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at

checkpoints such as here, *** stops can only be justified by some

quantum of individualized suspicion.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 121 S. Ct. at 457.

CONCLUSION

	The laws of this state require that a motorist remain at the

scene of an accident. In the present case, the motorist left the scene

of the accident. The police set up a roadblock to obtain

information regarding the identity of the motorist. The goals of the

police in doing so are laudable.

	This court is sympathetic to the efforts of the police in

identifying the motorist involved in the accident. Sympathy,

however, does not justify the roadblock at issue. As the Supreme

Court observed in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973):

		“The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension

with the Constitution’s protections of the individual

against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely

the predictability of these pressures that counsels a

resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards. It is well to

recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, soon after his

return from the Nuremberg Trials:

				‘These [fourth amendment rights], I protest, are not

mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of

indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights,

none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing

the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every

heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every

arbitrary government.’ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (Jackson,

J., dissenting).” Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273-74, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 603, 93 S. Ct. at 2540.

	The right of an individual to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures is an indispensable freedom, not a mere

luxury. It cannot give way in the face of a temporary need for the

police to obtain information regarding the identity of the motorist

at issue. As the protector of the constitutional rights of all citizens

of this state, this court is commanded to draw a “line at roadblocks

designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control.”

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 121 S. Ct. at 454. Without such a line, the fourth amendment will do little to prevent

intrusive searches and seizures from becoming a routine part of

American life. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 121 S. Ct. at 454.

	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:

	The majority has misconstrued City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000), by reading it to prohibit the type of roadblock at issue here.

Edmond is factually distinguishable, and its language does not condemn the strictly informational roadblock instituted by the

Lombard police department in this case. Additionally, I believe

that the majority erroneously creates a per se rule that roadblocks involving police canvassing for information about a specific,

known crime are constitutionally impermissible. Consequently, the

majority abrogates the balancing test of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979), which is normally

applied in roadblock cases. For all of these reasons and as more

fully explained below, I respectfully dissent.

I. Edmond Is Distinguishable and Is Not Determinative

	In Edmond, the Court considered the constitutionality of an Indianapolis checkpoint program that had as its primary purpose

the interdiction of illegal drugs. In contrast to the 10 to 15 second

stops in the present case, which were conducted for the sole

purpose of handing out an informational flyer, the total duration of

the stops in Edmond lasted between two and five minutes. Moreover, unlike the roadblock here, drivers in Edmond were asked to produce a license and registration while an officer looked

for signs of impairment. The officer also conducted an open-view

examination of the vehicle from the outside. Meanwhile, a

narcotics-detection dog was walked around the outside of the

stopped vehicle. Thus, the nature, purpose, and scope of the

roadblocks were completely different in the two cases.

	In the course of discussing its prior roadblock seizure cases,

the Edmond Court declared that it had never approved “a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect

evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 341, 121 S. Ct. at 452. The Court noted that in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976), it upheld a highway checkpoint

established for the purposes of intercepting illegal aliens because

of the significant interest in policing the nations borders (Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 341, 121 S. Ct. at 452), and in

Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), it upheld a police roadblock

instituted to detect intoxicated drivers because of the gravity of the

drunken driving problem and the obvious connection between

highway safety and the law enforcement practice at issue

(Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 342, 121 S. Ct. at 453). The Court also discussed Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979), which invalidated a

discretionary, suspicionless stop of a single motorist to check his

license and registration, noting that the officer’s conduct in that

case was unconstitutional primarily because of his exercise of

discretion without standards promulgated by the police

department. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 342, 121 S. Ct. at 453. The Court noted with approval the suggestion in

Prouse that the questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock- type stops to ensure that only those qualified to operate a vehicle

are permitted to do so would be a lawful means of serving the

interest in highway safety, but it specifically pointed out that it

considered the purpose of such a hypothetical roadblock “to be

distinct from a general purpose of investigating crime.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 342, 121 S. Ct. at 453.

	In concluding that a checkpoint designed primarily to catch

drug offenders and interdict illegal narcotics violates the fourth

amendment, the Edmond Court stated the following:

		“We decline to suspend the usual requirement of

individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ

a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of

investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that

interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given

motorist has committed some crime.” (Emphasis added.) Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455.

	In applying Edmond to the present case, the majority erroneously seizes upon language in Edmond that prohibits roadblocks “designed primarily to serve the general interest in

crime control,” or stated another way, the “ordinary enterprise of

crime control,” while ignoring other language in the Edmond opinion modifying and explaining what is meant by “ordinary

crime control.” I believe that the majority improperly relies on the

first sentence in the above-quoted passage from Edmond and disregards the second sentence, which, modifying the first, plainly

proscribes checkpoints for the purpose of exposing unknown

crimes to the police. Edmond should not be read as categorically enjoining police from stopping all vehicles pursuant to an

informational roadblock designed to make reasonable inquiry of

persons who were possibly witnesses to a specific crime. Instead,

I would find that absent either exigent circumstances or a

sufficient relationship to highway safety or border concerns,

Edmond categorically prohibits only checkpoints whose primary purpose lies in discovering that the subjects of the seizure have

committed some crime (Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43-44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455). Again, the Court in Edmond specifically noted that it could not sanction stops “justified only by the

generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and

inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.” (Emphasis added.) Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455.

	Here, the roadblock at issue had a specific purpose of

assisting the authorities in solving a crime that had already been

committed and was known to the police. Thus, police efforts were

not directed at general crime control within the meaning of

Edmond. Unlike in Edmond, the Lombard police department did not seek to interrogate and inspect motorists to ferret out evidence

that the motorists themselves had committed a crime that was as

yet unknown to police. The present defendant was subjected to

investigation only because his erratic driving nearly resulted in his

collision with an officer in the area where vehicles were stopped

for purposes of handing out flyers. Once the officers witnessed

defendant’s erratic driving, they clearly had reasonable suspicion

to detain defendant for further inquiry. See People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001); People v. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d 71, 74 (1998). As the Court in Edmond recognized, its holding was not meant to “impair the ability of police officers to act

appropriately upon information that they properly learn during a

checkpoint stop justified by a lawful primary purpose, even where

such action may result in the arrest of a motorist for an offense

unrelated to that purpose.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 121 S. Ct. at 457.

	While Edmond stated that “[a] search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of

wrongdoing” (Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 340, 121 S. Ct. at 451), it did not create a per se rule announcing that henceforward only roadblocks involving DUI checkpoints or

border control would ever be considered constitutional. Instead,

Edmond discussed with approval the rationale of Prouse, which involved a license check. The Court noted that the spot check in

that case was invalid because of a lack of standards to guide the discretion of the patrolling officer. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 342, 121 S. Ct. at 453. As previously noted, the

Edmond Court approved of the assertion in Prouse that the questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops to

ensure that only those qualified to operate a vehicle are permitted

to do so would be a lawful means of serving the interest of

highway safety, and that it considered the purpose of such a

hypothetical roadblock “to be distinct from a general purpose of

investigating crime.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 342, 121 S. Ct. at 453.

	Aside from the fact that the roadblock in this case was distinct

from general crime control because it was not designed to detect

through “interrogation and inspection *** that any given motorist

has committed some crime” (Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455), the purpose of the present roadblock

is also distinct from general crime control because of its

connection to highway safety just as the hypothetical roadblock in Prouse was distinct from general crime control. The canvassing for information about a deadly hit-and-run crime that happened on

the roadway would serve the purpose of highway safety in a

similar fashion to checking licenses to ensure that only qualified

drivers are operating motor vehicles.

	The conclusion that Edmond does not compel the result reached by the majority here is supported by the recent decision of

the Supreme Court of Virginia in Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 541 S.E.2d 872 (2001), which is the only other reported

case decided in the aftermath of Edmond to assess the validity of a roadblock established with the hope of discovering witnesses to

a specific, known crime, as opposed to a roadblock established to

discover evidence of crime in general. There, police set up a

roadblock at a particular location on September 21-22, 1998,

between the hours of 7 p.m. and 11:30 a.m. in the hopes of

discovering witnesses to a brutal murder that occurred in a nearby

house between the same hours on September 20-21, 1998.

According to the sheriff who decided to establish the roadblock,

its purpose was to “ ‘canvas drivers who were passing through the

area, to see whether they had seen or heard anything’ during the

time period when the crime had probably been committed the

previous day.” Burns, 261 Va. at 322, 541 S.E.2d at 883. The sheriff also directed officers to stop all vehicles and to ask the

operators if they had been through that section during the time in question and, if they had, whether they had seen anything of a

suspicious nature in and around the victim’s house. Fortuitously,

the defendant, who was a relative of the victim, was stopped and

eventually made statements implicating himself in the crime.

	In holding that the roadblock did not violate the fourth

amendment, the Supreme Court of Virginia first considered and

weighed the factors enunciated in Brown. Burns, 261 Va. at 322, 541 S.E.2d at 883. The court concluded that the murder was a

matter of grave public concern and that the roadblock advanced

that concern by aiding in the investigation of the crime. Burns, 261 Va. at 322, 541 S.E.2d at 883. Furthermore, the court emphasized

that the roadblock was carried out pursuant to an explicit plan that

contained neutral criteria and limited the discretion and conduct of

the law enforcement officers charged with the responsibility of

stopping vehicles at the roadblock. Burns, 261 Va. at 322, 541 S.E.2d at 883.

	The Virginia Supreme Court then distinguished Edmond, noting that while the roadblock in the case before it was obviously

not related to policing the borders or ensuring highway safety, its

purpose was not “simply to investigate ordinary criminal

wrongdoing as was the checkpoint in Edmond.” Burns, 261 Va. at 323, 541 S.E.2d at 883. Instead, it noted, the roadblock was

“specifically designed to investigate a particular murder that had

recently occurred in the area where the roadblock was placed,” and

police “were not stopping vehicles merely to discover evidence of

crimes in general.” Burns, 261 Va. at 323-24, 541 S.E.2d at 883- 84. Finally, the court noted that Edmond had recognized that “ ‘there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement

checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for

some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control.’ ” Burns, 261 Va. at 323, 541 S.E.2d at 883, quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455. The court concluded that

the roadblock fell within the exception recognized by Edmond and, therefore, did not contravene the fourth amendment. Burns, 261 Va. at 324, 541 S.E.2d at 884.

	Similarly, I would find that the roadblock in the present case

did not violate fourth amendment principles. At the time police set

up the roadblock, the offender remained at large with his identity unknown. Thus, he continued to pose a safety risk to others on the

road. Moreover, even if the perpetrator was not an immediate

threat, the same exigent circumstances found to exist in Burns were present here because police had to move relatively quickly to

canvass the area at the appropriate time or risk losing information

about the crime. At any rate, the underlying purpose behind the

roadblock furthered highway safety because of its potential to

solve this particular road crime. Importantly, police did not stop

vehicles to discover evidence of crime in general, and the

roadblock was appropriately tailored in terms of timing and

placement to provide for the most reasonably likely opportunity of

discovering further information about the crime. Also like Burns, the intrusion on motorists in the present case–they were merely

stopped long enough to alert them of the crime and to ask them if

they had seen anything–was much less than the intrusion in

Edmond.

	Additionally, I note that the roadblock in the present case was

perhaps even more justifiable than the one in Burns when comparing the two cases with Edmond. Here there was the additional connection to roadway safety in that the crime was

accomplished through the use of an automobile at the same

location on the highway where the roadblock was eventually

conducted. Under these circumstances, I would hold that a police

roadblock does not per se violate the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures where the

roadblock is designed to gather information about a specific,

known crime that is a matter of grave public concern.

II. Application of the Brown Balancing Test

	Given my conclusion that Edmond does not categorically prohibit the type of roadblock at issue in the present case, I believe

that it is incumbent upon this court to assess the validity of the

roadblock in relation to the factors noted in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979). It is well settled

that a vehicle stop at a roadblock or highway checkpoint

effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 342, 121 S. Ct. at 453; People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 280 (1985). However, a roadblock where individuals are stopped without probable cause

or individualized suspicion is not a per se violation of the fourth amendment; the question of whether a roadblock violates the

fourth amendment is one of reasonableness, requiring the

weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the

seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public

interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.

Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 361-62, 99 S. Ct. at 2640; Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 280.

	The factors set forth in Brown require a court to balance the State’s asserted interest for the roadblock against the “objective”

and “subjective” intrusion on the motorist. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 669, 99 S. Ct. at 1397; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1128, 96 S. Ct. at 3083. The objective

intrusion is measured by such factors as the length of the stop, the

nature of the questioning, and whether a search is conducted; the

subjective intrusion relates to the concern, fright, or annoyance on

the part of the motorist. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 282. The crucial inquiry in assessing the subjective intrusion involves a

consideration of whether the field officers were acting with

unbridled discretion. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 289. Factors important in that inquiry include the following: (1) whether the decision to

establish the roadblock and its location are made by supervisory

personnel of the police department such as a lieutenant or captain;

(2) whether all vehicles are stopped in a systematic, preestablished

manner such as stopping all traffic in a given direction; (3)

whether guidelines exist on the operation of the roadblock; (4)

whether advance publicity of the intention of police to establish

the roadblock was given; and (5) whether a sufficient show of the

official nature of the operation was made through such means as

the presence of a number of police vehicles with flashing lights

and uniformed officers. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 288-91.

	Application of the Brown factors to the instant case leads to the conclusion that the roadblock established by the Lombard

police department passed constitutional standards. The department

made the decision to set up the roadblock because of a fatal hit-

and-run accident that had been committed in the precise area of the

roadblock, and officials did not know the identity of the offender responsible for the crime. That the perpetrator was still at large

was indeed a matter of grave public concern, and the roadblock

advanced that concern by aiding in the investigation of the crime.

Moreover, the timing of the roadblock, exactly one week after the

crime at approximately the same time of day, was purposely

designed to stop motorists who might routinely travel that route at

the end of their work shift and thus was narrowly tailored for

maximum effectiveness. Thus, I would find that the State’s

interest in the roadblock was sufficient to outweigh a minimal

intrusion on the motorist.

	Additionally, the intrusion in this case was in fact minimal.

Objectively, the physical nature of the intrusion was insubstantial.

Motorists were detained approximately 10 to 15 seconds, just long

enough for police to hand out a flyer and alert motorists of the

accident the previous week. Drivers were not asked for their

names, driver’s licenses, or insurance cards and they were not

checked for seat belt violations. In relation to the vehicle

occupants subjected to the stop, there was indisputably no crime-

detection purpose behind the roadblock.

	Likewise, the subjective nature of the intrusion was minimal.

The record indicates that a high-ranking lieutenant in the police

department called the meeting to inform the officers that they were

to participate in the roadblock. Vehicles were stopped in a

systematic and preestablished manner–all eastbound traffic was

stopped and this was not a roving patrol. Although an officer

participating in the roadblock admitted that there were no written

guidelines for “informational roadblocks” contained in the

department’s written guidelines, the department did have

guidelines for roadblocks generally, and there is no indication that

the officers in the field did not follow the preestablished procedure

for this particular roadblock. Although the roadblock itself may

not have been publicized in advance, it is clear that the basis for

the roadblock had been well-publicized, which would have likely

minimized any apprehension motorists may have otherwise

experienced upon encountering it. Finally, any anxiety motorists

may have felt was dissipated by the official nature of the

operation–there was a large number of emergency vehicles present

with flashing lights and officers clad in orange police vests.

III. Proliferation of Roadblocks

	Lastly, I note that the majority cites statistics of the thousands

of felonies that occur in Illinois each year to support its argument

that, if this particular roadblock were upheld, roadblocks generally

would become a routine way of life. The statistics cited by the

majority, however, are irrelevant to this discussion, and the

majority’s argument based thereon is unfounded and unpersuasive.

The majority misses the point that the justification for this

particular roadblock was that a fatal hit-and-run accident had

occurred on the highway, that the roadblock was also justified by

its connection to highway safety, and that it amounted to mere

canvassing for information. Missing from the list of statistics cited

by the majority is the amount of fatal hit-and-run accidents that occur on major thoroughfares like Route 64, the scene of the fatal

vehicular crime that lead to the roadblock in this case.

	The majority’s reasoning is also defused by the reality that the

amount of roadblocks would be limited by the scarce public

resources available to police. Moreover, even when a police

department determines that it is a justifiable use of their limited

manpower and resources to set up an informational roadblock, the

constitutionality of the roadblock would still be subject to the

three-prong reasonableness test of Brown as well as the principles set forth in Edmond.

IV. Conclusion

	For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the

appellate court and reinstate defendant’s conviction. Accordingly,

I respectfully dissent.

	JUSTICES FITZGERALD Aand GARMAN joins in this dissent.