### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 3, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CH RIST OPH ER DEM OTTO L INSE Y

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 40100547 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2002- 01299-CCA -R3-C D - F iled April 16, 2004

Th e De fe nd a nt, Chris to phe r D e mot to Lins e y , p le d g uil ty to s imp le po sse ssi on of

c oc a ine , a

Cla ss A misdemeanor . As part of his plea ag ree ment, he ex pressly rese rved with the consent of the trial

c o u r t a n d th e St a te th e r ig h t to ap p e a l a c e r ti f ie d q u e s ti o n o f la w p u r s u a n t to T e n n e s s e e Ru le of Criminal Procedure 37(b)( 2)(i). The certified question of law stems f rom the trial court’s denial of the Def endant’ s motion to suppress the evidenc e seized as a result of a police off

icer stopping the De fe nd a nt’ s auto mob ile . We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J
., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J ERRY L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

R o g e r E

. N e l l
, C l ark s v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , C h r i s t o p h e r D e m o t t o L i n s e y.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; John Carn e y , D ist

ri c t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a ndArthu r F . B ie be r, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

On Janu ary

9, 20 01 , O ff

ic e r D a vidO’ De ll o f the Cla rk sv ill e Pol ice Dep art me nt a ndhis pa rt ne r w e re on pa tr ol in an un mark e d ca r. Of fi c e r O’ De ll obs e rv e d th e De fe nd a nt d ri vin g a c ar i n the opposite direc tion. The o ff i ce r t urned his vehic le ar ound to follow the Def endant. When the De fe nd a nt ca me to a sto p sig n, he turne d rig ht, a nd he fa ile d to use his turn s ig na l. O ff ic e r O ’D e ll then ac tivated his blue lights and effe cted a traff ic stop. After

explaining the re ason why he stopped the Def endant, Of

fice r O’De ll r equeste d consent to se arc h his person and ve hicle. The Def endant ref used to g ive conse nt to searc h his vehicle, but he allowed Off icer O’De ll to search his pe rson. As Off icer O’De ll was sear ching the Def endant, Offic er Fr edric k McClintock I I I
, who was ba cking up Of fi c e r O’ De ll du ri ng the tr a ff ic sto p, ob se rv e d a ba g fa ll fr om the De fe nd a nt’ s ja c ke t poc ke t. Offic er Mc Clint ock re trieved the bag , and the substanc e inside field- tested positive for c ocaine

.-2-

The De fenda nt filed a motion to sup p ress the e vidence that was obtaine d as a r esult of the
tr a ff ic sto p. I n h is m oti on , th e De fe nd a nt a sse rt e d th a t th e po lic e of fi c e rs didno t ha ve pr ob able

cause to be lieve that he had committed a crime. I n his a rg ument on the motion, the Defe ndant cited Sta te v. Go nza le z, 5 2 S. W.3 d 90 (T e nn . Crim . App . 200 0) , for the pr op os iti on that the fa ilu re to u se one’s turn sig nal is not a traf fic violation unless it could have a ffe cted other motorists. See id. at 99. He c ontended that no tra ffic c ould have be en af fec ted by his right turn. There fore , he asse rted that it wa s not ne cessa

ry for him to use his turn signa l, a nd Offic er O’De ll wa s conseque n t l ywi t h o ut probable cause to eff

ect a traff ic s top. The trial c ourt overr uled the De fenda nt’s motion, st ating that the circ umstances we re disting uishable fr om those in G o n z al ez i n that there wer e other vehicles around the Def

endant, na mely t h e p o lice off icer s, who could have been a ffe cted by his right turn. Th e De fe nd a nt s ub se qu e ntl y ple d g uil ty

to s imp le po sse ssi on of

c oc a ine . H ow e ve r, he e xpre ssl y

re se rv e d th e ri g ht t o a

pp e a l a c e rt if ie d que sti on of

la w. I n it s o rd e r a c c e pti ng the De fe nd a nt’ s g uil ty plea, the tria l c o u r t s tate d th e c e r ti f ie d q u e s ti o n a s f

o ll o w s : “ T h a t th e tria l c o u r t s h o u ld ha ve suppressed the crack c ocaine seized from def endant’ s person be cause the ar resting police off

icer s lacke d probable cause under Clar ksville Cit y

Ordinanc e 9-401 or Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 8-143(a ) to initi ate a

traff i c stop of def

endant a nd that the subsequent se arc h of def endant wa s unconstitutional.”

Tenne ssee Rule of C ri m inal Procedur e 37(b) (2) pr ovides that an a ppeal lies fr om any jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n e nte re d p ur su a nt t o a ple a of g uil ty or no lo c on te nd e re if

(i ) Th e de fe nd a nt e nte re d int o a ple a a g re e me nt un de r Rul e 11 (e) b ut explic itl y

rese rved w ith the consent of the sta te and of t he court the right to appea l a ce rtified que s ti o n o f la w th a t is d is p o s it iv e o f th e c a s e , a n d th e f o ll o w in g r e q u ir e me nts are

me t:

(A) T he judg ment of convic tion, or other doc ument to which such judg ment ref ers that is f il e d b e f o r e th e n o ti c e o f

ap p e a l, mu s t c o n ta in a

s tate me n t o f

th e c ertified question of law r eser ved by defe ndant for a

ppellate r eview;

(B ) The que stion of law must be stated in thejudgme nt or document so as to identify clea rly the scope and limits of the leg al issue re serve d;

(C ) T he jud g me nt o r d oc ume nt mus t re fl e c t that the c e rt if ie d q ue sti onwa s e xpre ssl y

rese rved w ith the consent of the sta te and the trial judge ; and

(D) T he judg ment or docume nt must reflec t that the defendant, the state, and the trial judge are of the opinion that the ce rtified question is dispositi ve of the case [.]

Th e pr e re qu isi te s f

or c on sid e ratio n o f the me ri ts o f a c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w a s r e qu ir e d b y

Rul e 37 (b )( 2) (i ) h a vin g be e n me t, w e be g in o ur a na ly sis of wh e the r the po lic e of fi c e rs ha d pro ba

ble c a us e to stop the Defe ndant’s ca r.-3-

F ir st o f a ll, it i s c le ar tha t th e off ice rs’ st op of

the De fe nd a nt d id c on sti tut e a F ou rth Amendment seizure. A se izure occur s when a police off

icer , “by means of phy sical for ce or show of authority , has in some way restra ined the liberty

of a citizen.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct . 1 86 8, 20 L . E d. 2d88 9 ( 19 68 ). I n th is c a se , O ff ic e r O’ De ll a c tiv a te d his e me rg e nc y lig hts wh e n th e De fe nd a nt tur ne d r ig ht at a sto p s ig n w ith ou t si g na lin g a turn. Th e De fe nd a nt sto pp e d h is

car , and the of

fice r req u es t ed that he g et out of the ve hicle. When he did, the of fice r aske d for permission to searc h him. W e conc lude that the stop of the De fenda nt’s vehicle was a seizure unde r the F ou rth A me nd me nt.

Next, we must de termine whether the office rs had probable cause to believe that a crime ha d been c ommitt ed so as to justify the stop of t he Defenda nt. Tennesse e Code Annota ted sec tion 55-8- 14 3( a ) s ta te s:

Ev e ry dr ive r w ho int e nd s to sta

rt , s top or turn, or pa rt ly turn f ro m a dir e c t li ne , s ha ll first see tha t such movement ca n be made in sa fety
, and whene ver the oper ation of

a ny oth e r v e hic le ma y

be a ff e c te d by su c h mov e me nt, sh a ll g ive a sig na l r e qu ir e d in this section, plainly visible to the driver of suc h other ve hicle of the intention to make

su c h mo ve me nt.

L ike wi se , s e c tio n 5 5- 8- 14 2( a ) s ta te s th a t no on e sh a ll

turn a ve hicle fr om a direc t course or move rig ht or left upon a roadwa y , unless and until such movement can be made wi t h reasonable sa fety . No per son shall so turn any vehicle without g iving an appropriate sig nal in the manner provided in §§ 55-8- 14 3 a nd55 -8 -1 44 in the e ve nt a ny oth e r tr a ff ic ma y be a ff

e c te d by su c h mo ve me nt.

I n State v. Gonzalez, 52 S.W .3d at 99, this Court interpre ted these statutes a s not requiring a per son to s ig na l a turn u nle ss i t w ou ld a ff

e c t othe r dr ive rs

. Th e re fo re , the tr ia l cou rt ’s re a so nin g in this c a se

wa s c o rr e c t th a t, if o th e r mo to r is ts c o u ld h a v e b e e n a f f e c te d b y th e D e f

e n d a n t’ s tu r n , th e n he wa s require d by

law to ac tivate his turn signa l. See id.

Howeve r, this case is disti ng uishable fr om Gonzalez in t hat the cityof Clarksville also has an ordina nce r eg arding the use of tur n signa ls. The re levant text of Clarksvil l e C ity Ordinanc e

se c tio n 9 -4 01 pr ov ide s: “ B e fo re sta rt ing
, turnin g , slo wi ng , or sto pp ing a

ve hic le , th e op e rator

sh a ll g ive a sig na l c le arl y

ind ic a tin g the mov e me nt c on te mpl a te d. Th e sig na l sh a ll be pla inl y vis ibl e to all persons who mig ht be a ff ec t ed an d g iven in ample time to g ive ade quate wa rning to such pe rs on s. ” I n c on tr a st t o th e Te nn e sse e statut e s, wh ic h d ic ta te that a turnin g sig na l sh a ll b e us e d “ in the eve nt any other traffic may be affec ted by such m ovement” and “wheneve r the ope ration of a ny other ve hicle m ay b e affecte d by such movement,” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55- 8-142(a ), -143( a), the Clarksville ordinance mandates tha t, before turning , the operator of a ve hicle “sha ll give a signa l

c le arl y ind ic a tin g the mov e me nt co nte mpl a te d. ” Cla rk sv ill e , Te nn ., Or din a nc e § 9 -4 01 (e mph a sis added) . The ordina nce the n describes to whom the signa l shall be visible, but it in no way relieve s drivers of the duty to give a sig nal bef

ore the y turn. We note the g ener al r u l e t hat municipal-4-

ordinanc es that conf

lict with St ate law are invalid. See S outhern Ry

. Co. v. Knoxvi lle, 442 S.W .2d 61 9, 62 1 ( Te nn . 1 96 8). How ever , w he re , a s h e re , a mun ic ipa lit y

a dd s a dd iti on a l r e qu ir e me nts , which do not conf

lict with the State law, the municipal ordina nce w ill st and. See id. a t 622.

The De fenda nt failed to abide by the C larksville ordinance when he made a rig ht turn without activating his turn signa l. There fore , the police office rs had probable cause to believe that he had violated the municipal ordina nce, a nd their stop of the Def endant was constitutional. The trial court did not err by overr

uling the Def

endant’ s motion to suppress the evidenc e obtained as a re sult of the stop.

CO NC LU SION

The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE