J-A35017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ETHAN HANNOLD,

Appellant No. 1088 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 18, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-16-CR-0000170-2013

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ETHAN HANNOLD,

Appellant No. 1089 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 18, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-16-CR-0000041-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2016

Appellant, Ethan Hannold, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered June 18, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County. 

We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual history of these cases as 

follows:
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These cases involve two brutal and senseless attacks on 

innocent women. During the one incident, at case number 170 

CR 2013, [Appellant] executed a plan of running a young woman 

off the road with his car and then coming to her aide for the 

bizarre purpose of making himself feel good about helping 

someone. When the young woman told [Appellant] her father 

was coming and she did not need his help, he felt rejected and 

became incensed and punched her many times through her open 

car window, breaking her nose and bloodying her face. He then 

sexually assaulted her by grabbing her between her legs and 

ripping her pants off. He tried to pull her out through the 

window, but he fell down and she managed to get away.

In the second case, number 41 CR 2014, [Appellant] drove 

up behind a woman who was walking in town in a residential 

area. Without warning, he ran her down with his car and then 

fled the scene. She suffered a traumatic brain injury.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/14, at 1.

As a result of both incidents, Appellant was charged with multiple 

crimes. Appellant proceeded to negotiate plea agreements in both cases. At 

170 CR 2013, Appellant entered a guilty plea on August 28, 2013, to 

aggravated assault, robbery by threat of immediate serious injury, recklessly 

endangering another person (“REAP”), and indecent assault by forcible 

compulsion. All other charges were nol prossed by the Commonwealth. The 

indecent assault charge required an assessment by the Sexual Offenders 

Assessment Board to determine if Appellant was a sexually violent predator 

“SVP”). Appellant moved for appointment of his own expert psychiatrist and 

for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. The trial court granted both motions. 

Prior to the SVP hearing, the Commonwealth filed a motion to compel 

Appellant to produce his expert witness report. The trial court granted the 
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motion to compel Appellant to provide the expert report, and subsequently 

denied Appellant’s motion to reconsider that decision. The SVP hearing was 

held on May 16, 2014. Following the hearing, the trial court deemed 

Appellant to be an SVP. 

At 41 CR 2014, Appellant entered a guilty plea on June 18, 2014, to 

aggravated assault. All other charges were nol prossed by the 

Commonwealth.

On June 18, 2014, Appellant was sentenced, at both dockets, to an 

aggregate sentence of twenty-five to fifty years of incarceration in 

conformity with the plea agreements. The sentence included lifetime 

registration as an SVP. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial 

court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether [Appellant’s] guilty plea was not knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily made because (1) [Appellant] was 

not made aware of all defenses potentially available in his case, 

including insanity or mental infirmity and (2) [Appellant] suffers 

from mental illness such that he was incapable of making a 

knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea.

II. Whether [Appellant’s] trial, guilty plea, and sentencing 

counsel, John Lackatos, Esquire, was incompetent and or 

ineffective in the following ways (1) in failing to obtain a mental 

health examination of [Appellant] to determine his competency 

to participate in his defense, (2) in failing to attend [Appellant’s] 

sex offender assessment interview, (3) in failing to advise 

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1

 This Court, sua sponte, consolidated the appeals by order entered 

August 8, 2014. 
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[Appellant] on the defenses of insanity or mental infirmity, and 

(4) in failing to present evidence of [Appellant’s] mental illness 

as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing.

III. Whether the trial court, by order granting motion to 

compel [Appellant] to provide expert report signed on April 29, 

2014 and order denying motion to reconsider entered on May 

12, 2014, committed reversible error by ordering that the 

defense produce a report of an expert who the defense did not 

intend to call as a witness at a sexually violent predator hearing.

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (full capitalization omitted).

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

accepting his guilty pleas because the pleas were not knowingly, intelligently 

and voluntarily made. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant asserts two bases 

for this alleged error. Appellant first contends that the pleas were not 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because Appellant was not 

made aware of all defenses potentially available to him. Id. at 15-16. 

Appellant also maintains that he suffers from mental illness such that he is 

incapable of making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. Id. at 16-

17. 

Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we first note that a 

defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct 

appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to 

withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), 

(B)(1)(a)(i); Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-610 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). “Failure to employ either measure results in waiver.” Id. at 

610. 
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Here, Appellant did not object during either of his plea colloquies. As 

noted by the trial court, “[t]o the contrary, [Appellant] stated during written 

and verbal plea colloquies . . . that he had not been a patient in a hospital, 

he was not under doctor’s care or taking medication and he understood his 

rights and had no questions.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/14, at 6. 

Furthermore, Appellant did not seek to withdraw his plea through a postsentence motion within ten days of sentencing. Thus, this issue is waived. 

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 

accepting Appellant’s guilty pleas because trial counsel was ineffective. 

Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to obtain a mental health examination of Appellant; failing to 

attend Appellant’s sex offender assessment interview; failing to advise 

Appellant on the defenses of insanity or mental infirmity; and failing to 

present evidence of Appellant’s mental illness as a mitigating factor at the 

time of sentencing. Id. at 18-21. 

Due to the procedural posture of this matter, Appellant’s issue is not 

properly before our Court. In Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 

(Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court reiterated the holding from Commonwealth 

v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), and stated that generally, “claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA[2]review; trial 

____________________________________________

2

 Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
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courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon post-verdict 

motions; and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal.” 

Holmes, 79 A.3d at 576. The Holmes Court, however, recognized two 

exceptions to the general rule whereby claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel could be raised on direct appeal: (1) where the trial court 

determines that a claim of ineffectiveness is both meritorious and apparent 

from the record so that immediate consideration and relief is warranted; or 

(2) where the trial court finds good cause for unitary review, and the 

defendant makes a knowing and express waiver of his entitlement to seek

PCRA review from his conviction and sentence, including an express 

recognition that the waiver subjects further collateral review to the time and 

serial petition restrictions of the PCRA. Id. at 564, 577 (footnote omitted). 

Here, Appellant did not satisfy either of the aforementioned 

exceptions. The trial court did not conclude that Appellant’s claim of 

ineffectiveness is meritorious and apparent from the record necessitating 

immediate consideration, and Appellant has not expressly waived his right to 

pursue PCRA review. Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/14, at 5. Accordingly, we 

dismiss this claim without prejudice to Appellant’s right to seek collateral 

review under the PCRA.

In his third claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

compelling Appellant to provide to the Commonwealth the report from an 

expert whom Appellant did not intend to call as a witness at the SVP 
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hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant contends that the court’s 

mandated production of this report violated the work product privilege. Id. 

at 22. More troubling however, Appellant contends, is the fact that the 

report was ordered to be turned over to the Commonwealth prior to 

Appellant pleading guilty at 41 CR 2014. Id. at 22-23. Appellant maintains 

that information in that report may have been incriminating to Appellant and 

may have impacted the charges brought against him at 41 CR 2014.3 Id. at 

23. Appellant asserts that such action violates his Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination. Id. 

We are unable to reach the merits of Appellant’s claim because he has 

waived this issue. As this Court has explained: 

Settled Pennsylvania law makes clear that by entering a 

guilty plea, the defendant waives his right to challenge on direct 

appeal all nonjurisdictional defects except the legality of the 

sentence and the validity of the plea. Commonwealth v. 

Pantalion, 957 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Indeed, a defendant routinely waives a plethora of 

constitutional rights by pleading guilty, including the 

right to a jury trial by his peers, the right to have the 

Commonwealth prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and his right to confront any witnesses 

against him. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 

S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (knowing and 

voluntary guilty plea waives privilege against selfincrimination, right to jury trial, and right to 

confront one’s accusers). Furthermore, a defendant 

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3

 We note that the charges filed against Appellant at 41 CR 2014 were not 

of the nature that would require a determination as to whether Appellant 

was an SVP. 
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is permitted to waive fundamental constitutional 

protections in situations involving far less protection 

of the defendant than that presented herein. [See,

e.g.], Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 

111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991) ([stating:] 

“The most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... 

subject to waiver”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 

458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) 

([stating] sixth amendment right to counsel may be 

waived).

Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729, 735–36 

(Pa.Super.2003).

Lincoln, 72 A.3d at 609 (emphasis added).

Appellant’s claim does not challenge the court’s jurisdiction. 

Furthermore, Appellant’s stated issue does not pertain to the legality of his 

sentence or the validity of his plea. Accordingly, Appellant has waived his 

right to raise this claim on direct appeal. 

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/5/2016