BLD-033 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 11-3730

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IN RE: JAMES ANDERSON, a/k/a J. Hendel,

Petitioner

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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21

November 3, 2011

Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 1, 2011)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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PER CURIAM.

Petitioner James Anderson, a/k/a James J. Hendel, pleaded guilty to aggravated 

assault and unlawful restraint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. On July 8, 

1993, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5-17 years, to be followed by four

years of probation. On September 11, 1997, Anderson filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania. The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that Anderson’s 

claims were barred from federal habeas review due to a procedural default, and he could 
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not show cause for the default or that failure to consider his claims would result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 

Anderson appealed, and we denied his application for a certificate of appealability in 

C.A. No. 98-1753 on November 26, 1999.

Anderson was paroled on November 6, 2009. He was rearrested and adjudicated 

guilty of a probation violation on March 16, 2010. Anderson then was sentenced on the 

probation violation to a new term of imprisonment of 2-4 years, to be followed by one 

year of probation.

In June, 2003, Anderson filed a second habeas corpus petition. It was transferred 

to this Court to be treated as an application to file a second or successive habeas corpus 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), and we denied the application (C.A. No. 04-1527). 

In 2005, Anderson filed a request for permission to file a second or successive habeas 

corpus petition. We denied the application (C.A. No. 05-2085). In 2007, Anderson filed 

a request for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. We denied 

the application (C.A. No. 07-1099).

Recently, Anderson filed another application in this Court for authorization to file 

a second or successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C § 2254. He also filed a 

motion to be exempt from the filing requirements of Third Cir. LAR 22.5. On April 27, 

2011, we granted his motion to be exempt from the filing requirements of Third Cir. LAR 

22.5, denied his application to file another section 2254 petition challenging his 1993 

sentence, and advised him that he did not need authorization from us to challenge his new 

sentence of 2-4 years’ imprisonment on the probation violation.
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Anderson now files a petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651,

in which he argues that his access to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 

has been, and is being, obstructed by the state court sentencing judge, the Honorable 

Paula Pryor Dembe, the Clerk of Courts, and John Wetzel, Secretary of the Department 

of Corrections. He seeks an order from us compelling the nominal respondents – Judge 

Dembe, DOC Secretary Wetzel, and the state Clerk of Courts – to cease and desist from 

blocking his correspondence with the state courts; to “formally enter” certain orders on 

the state court docket in order to reopen the time for appeal; to furnish him with certain 

records from his trial; and to correct all “errors and/or frauds” in the criminal record of 

his case, among other things. Eventually, Anderson hopes to file another application for 

authorization to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C § 

2254. (Petition, at 9.) 

We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. Our jurisdiction derives from 28 

U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 

aid of [our] . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” A writ of 

mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary situations. See

Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Traditionally, it may be 

“used ... only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed 

jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’” Id.

(quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 n.2 (1967)).

Anderson does not allege an action or omission by a United States District Court 

within this circuit over which we might exercise our authority by way of mandamus. Cf.
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United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1981) (focal question for federal 

appellate court is whether action of District Court impedes appellate jurisdiction granted 

in some other provision of law). He does not allege an action or omission by a federal 

officer, employee, or agency over which a United States District Court would have 

mandamus jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (“The district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of 

the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”) 

Anderson asks only that we issue a writ of mandamus compelling action by state 

officials, but, under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and Kerr, we lack authority to compel the nominal 

respondents to perform their duties in accordance with his wishes. See White v. Ward, 

145 F.3d 1139, 1139 (10th Cir. 1998) (federal court lacks authority to direct state court to 

perform its duty); Demos v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Wash., 925 F.2d 

1160, 1161 (9th Cir.1991) (same).

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.