alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Commonwealth *v.*Jung Jow, Appellant.

*Criminal law*— Murder—New *trial*— Discretion *of court.*

Where three men have been tried together and convicted of murder, it is not an abuse of discretion in the court to grant a new trial for one of the prisoners, and to refuse it for the others; and this is especially so where it appears that the two were arrested on the spot of the killing with the weapons still in their hands, while the other was not taken until thirty or forty minutes afterwards, and then unarmed, at a house several blocks away.

Argued Oct. 28, 1907.

Appeals, Nos. 221 and 222, Jan. T., 1907, by defendant, from judgment of O. & T. Phila. Co., Aug. Term, 1906, No. 303, on verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree in case of Commonwealth v. Jung Jow and Commonwealth v. Mock Kung.

Before Mitchell, C. J., Fell, Mestrezat, Potter and Elkin, JJ.

Affirmed.

Indictment for murder.

Before Barratt, J.

The assignment of error was in the following form:

The error of the learned court consisted in its refusal to grant a new trial, such refusal constituting a clear abuse of its discretion.

*Harvey K. Zollinger,*with him *David J. Smyth,*for appellants.

*174
      *William Findlay Brown,*with him *Samuel P. Rotan,*district attorney, and *Morris Wolf,*assistant district attorney, for appellee.

November 4, 1907:

Per Curiam,

Appellants seek to escape from the rule that a refusal to grant a new trial is not assignable for error, by calling the refusal an abuse of discretion. The assignment of error does not show any ground upon which such charge of abuse is predicated and ought therefore to be dismissed without further comment. But looking at the argument we find that the abuse is charged to consist in granting a new trial to one of three prisoners tried together, and refusing it to the other two. It would be hard to find in the books a more inconsequent and frivolous argument. There is nothing to indicate in any way that if any error at all was made by the court below, it was not in granting the new trial to the one rather than in refusing it to the others.' But no error appears anywhere.

It is asserted that the evidence was the same as to all three prisoners who were tried together, and therefore the discrimination in treatment must have been arbitrary. But it is not the fact that the evidence was the same. The two appellants were arrested on the spot of the shooting with the weapons still in their hands, the other was not taken until thirty or forty minutes afterwards and then' unarmed at a house several blocks away. His defense was an alibi and the jury might well have acquitted him while convicting the others. What the first jury might have done the court might well permit another jury to do.

Judgment affirmed and record remitted to the court below for purpose of execution.
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential. 

# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

__________________________ MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Appellant,

v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Appellee,

AND MOTOROLA MOBILITY, LLC (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.), Intervenor.

__________________________ 2012-1445

__________________________ On appeal from the United States International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-744.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

- MOTOROLA MOBILITY, LLC (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.), Appellant,

v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Appellee, Case: 12-1445 Document: 52 Page: 1 Filed: 12/14/2012MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. ITC 2

AND MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Intervenor.

__________________________ 2012-1535

__________________________ On appeal from the United States International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-744.

__________________________ ON MOTION

__________________________ O R D E R Microsoft Corporation moves without opposition for leave to intervene. Motorola Mobility, LLC and Microsoft moves without opposition to “c oordinate” this appeal with appeal No. 2012-1445 and to set the briefing schedule. Upon consideration thereof,
I T I S O RDERED T HAT : (1) The motion for leave to intervene is granted. The revised official caption is reflected above. (2) The motion to coordinate is granted to the extent that this appeal and appeal No. 2012-1445 will be argued together before the same merits panel. (3) In appeal No. 2012-1445, the International Trade Commission’s response brief and Motorola’s intervenor brief are due January 14, 2013. Microsoft’s reply brief is due February 11, 2013. Case: 12-1445 Document: 52 Page: 2 Filed: 12/14/2012MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. ITC 3
(4) In appeal No. 2012-1535, the Commission’s response brief and Microsoft’s intervenor brief are due February 27, 2013. Motorola’s reply brief is due March 27, 2013.

F OR T HE C OURT
/s/ Jan Horbaly Jan Horbaly Clerk

s26 Case: 12-1445 Document: 52 Page: 3 Filed: 12/14/2012
178 La. 564

#### BAKER v. SELNIK.

No. 31782.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 2, 1934.

P. A. Middleton, of New Orleans, for Mrs. Elizabeth Selnik.

OVERTON, Justice.

Plaintiff brought this suit to have a receiver or liquidator appointed to take charge of the affairs of a partnership known as the S. & B. Stable, which is alleged to own three face horses, and some personal property, connected with the racing business.

The ground alleged for the appointment of a receiver is that one creditor has run an attachment against the property, and that the remaining creditors are threatening to do likewise. It is urged that these conditions and threats make the appointment of a receiver or liquidator necessary.

The partnership of the S. *&*B. Stable, it is alleged, is composed of Paul Baker, the plaintiff herein, and Henry Selnik, the defendant.

The trial court, after a hearing had, appointed a receiver, and the defendant has appealed. Pending the appeal, the defendant died. His widow, the administratrix, has been made defendant in his place.

Theodore H. McGiehan, Esq., representing himself as having been of counsel for plaintiff, filed, in this court, a motion to withdraw as counsel. This motion rests upon the grounds that he is unable to locate plaintiff, and that plaintiff has made an affidavit and confession, of which he was entirely ignorant, declaring that at no time was he a partner of defendant, and that no such partnership existed as the S. & B. Stable. In these circumstances McGiehan alleged that he could not consistently represent plaintiff, and asked that his name be stricken from the record, which was granted.

The foregoing sworn confession, the present defendant urges, calls for vacating the judgment appointing a receiver and for the dismissal of plaintiff’s suit.

Besides the foregoing as ground for a dismissal of plaintiff’s demand, defendant urges that she now occupies the position of both plaintiff and defendant, by virtue of a purchase made by her of all the rights and interests of plaintiff in this suit, the sale having been provoked, without opposition thereto, in the case of J. T. Gibbons, Inc., v. S. & B. Stable et al. (La. App.) 144 So. 641, on a writ issued by the First city court of New Orleans.

The foregoing 'are matters, however, that came into existence pending the appeal in this case. As this court cannot receive evidence on appeal, there is nothing else <to do but to vacate the judgment rendered and remand the case to the end that a full hearing may be had concerning these matters and the proper judgment rendered.

For these reasons, the judgment appealed from is set aside, and the case is remanded to be proceeded with consistently with the foregoing directions.
*       *        *       *       *
 EXHIBIT
31: Rule 13a-14(b) Certification













Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of China Jianye Fuel, Inc.
(the “Company”) certifies that:




1.           The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the period ended September
30, 2008 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
and




2.           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






Date: November
      14, 2008
              /s/ Jianye
      Wang
 Jianye Wang, Chief Executive Officer


This
certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
226 So.2d 332

#### Lottie DEESE v. L. C. Joe ESPY et al.

7 Div. 806.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Aug. 28, 1969.

*552Hawkins, Rhea & Mitchell, and Larry H. Keener, Gadsden, for appellant.

Simmons & McCrary, Lusk, Swann, Burns & Stivender, Gadsden, for appellees.

SIMPSON, Justice.

The appellant is the mother of appellee Espy. She sued her son for injuries which she suffered in a fall at his home, charging that her fall and the injuries she suffered were “the direct and proximate consequence of the negligent manner in which Defendant maintained said premises by negligently permitting * * * loose block or blocks of wood, rock or other foreign materials to be situated at * * * doorway.” The count also alleged that at the time and place complained of that the plaintiff was a guest or invitee of the defendant.

The defendant joined as a third-party defendant appellee Nations, who was the contractor remodeling the home of defendant Epsy at the time of the fall.

At the conclusion of the evidence the court gave, at the request of the defendant and the third-party defendant, the general affirmative charge. Judgment was entered on the verdict in favor of the defendants; the appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was timely denied. This appeal is from the final judgment.

The evidence in the case is undisputed. The appellant went to the home of her son, at the invitation of her daughter-in-law. She was attempting to enter the house via the back door. There were no steps, as such, but instead wood blocks were serving as steps into the house. The plaintiff testified that all kinds of debris lay about as a result of the work being done on her son’s house. The block turned over under the weight of appellant and she fell on her back, suffering a fracture.

*553The only contention made by appellant is that the court erred in giving at the request of the two defendants the affirmative charge, contending" that in giving this charge, the court violated the scintilla rule. We cannot agree. The evidence in the case clearly establishes that the appellant was a social guest at the home of the defendant at the time of the accident.

In Morgan v. Kirkpatrick, 276 Ala. 7, 158 So.2d 650, this court for the first time held with the majority of jurisdictions, that a social guest is a mere licensee, entitled to no affirmative care to prepare the premises for his reception. The duty owed to a licensee is to refrain from putting traps in his way. Scoggins v. Atlantic & Gulf Portland Cement Co., 179 Ala. 213, 60 So. 175. The record in this case is devoid of any evidence that the defendants breached a duty owing to the plaintiff. The trial court correctly granted the requests for the affirmative charge.

Affirmed.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and COLEMAN and BLOODWORTH, JJ., concur.
Order entered September 19, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00641-CV

JERRON C. HILL, M.D., ET AL., Appellants

V.

TX-AN ANESTHESIA MANAGEMENT, LLP, ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-07088-K

ORDER

The Court has before it appellees’ September 17, 2013 joint motion for extension of time 

to file their answering briefs, which is unopposed. The Court GRANTS the motion and 

ORDERS appellees to file their briefs by October 30, 2013.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2



                Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Molecular Diagnostics, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Michael A. Brodeur, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ MICHAEL A. BRODEUR
---------------------------------------
    Michael A. Brodeur
    Executive Vice President
    and Chief Financial Officer

November 18, 2002
Order entered December 19, 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 14
- 01216
- CV THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
V. DALLAS COUNTY, ET AL ., Appellee s On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Tri al Court Cause No. TX
- 12
- 30113 

### O RDER
We GRANT appellees’ December 17, 2014 motion for an extension of time to file a brief. Appellees shall file their brief by JANUARY 16, 2015 . We caution appellees that no further extension of time will be granted in this accelerated appeal absent extraordinary circumstances.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG

- MIERS JUSTICE
SCWC-13-0000030
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

STATE OF HAWAI # I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. ANTHONY R. VILLENA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-13-0000030; CASE NO. 1DTA-12-01321)
ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Reck tenwald, C.J., Nak ayama, Mc Kenna, Po llack, an d Wilson, JJ.)

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Anthony R. Villena’s application for writ of certiorari filed on August 15, 2015, is hereby accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. The parties will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, September 30, 2015. Phyllis J. Hironaka for petitioner /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack /s/ Michael D. Wilson Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-13-0000030 30-SEP-2015 01:15 PM
#### MILLER v. WHITE.

No. 5026.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Feb. 12, 1935.

John T. Campbell, of Minden, for appellant.

Watkins & Watkins, of Minden, for appellee.

MILLS, Judge.

Plaintiff seeks, under the provisions of Act No. 55 of 1926, to eject defendant from a predial estate in Webster parish.. In article 1 of his petition he alleges .“that Sam T. White, resident of Webster Parish, Louisiana, was the tenant of your petitioner for the year 1934 * * * ” of the land in question. In subsequent articles he asserts the expiration of the lease, the giving of the required notice to vacate, and the refusal of defendant to do so.

In answer to the rule, defendant admitted the allegations of article 1 and the retention of possession. He denied the expiration of the lease, setting up the special defense that the terms of the cotton acreage reduction contract between plaintiff and the United States Secretary of Agriculture authorized his continuance in possession." As defendant, on the trial of the issue, did not urge this defense, it is not considered.

At the trial, plaintiff rested after proving the delivery of notice to vacate. Defendant offered no evidence whatever. Whereupon, the trial judge rendered the following decision: ' “In this cause the demands of the plaintiff are dismissed as of non-suit on the ground and for the reason that no evidence was introduced by the plaintiff to prove a termination of the lease.”

Defendant, relying upon the same grounds, in his brief significantly distorts the language of the admitted article 1 by saying that defendant was the tenant of plaintiff “in 1934,” and again; that defendant admits that he was lessee “during 1934.” Tfie petition alleges that the lease was “for the year 1934”,; not that it was entered into in or during that year. This is a direct averment that the term was for and expired with the year 1934. Defendant must have so understood it as he filed no exception of vagueness and interposed a special defense. If not clear, the averment is aided by article 2687 of our Civil Code, which provides: “The lease of a predial estate, when the time has not been specified, is presumed to be for one year, as that time is necessary in this State to enable the farmer to make his crop, and to gather in all the produce of the estate which1 he has rented.”

We are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from is erroneous and that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. It is accordingly reversed and judgment rendered ordering defendant, Sam T. White, to deliver to plaintiff, J. R. Miller, possession of the leased premises, described as the south half of the southwest quarter of northeast quarter; west half of southeast quarter; east half of southwest quarter; and northwest quarter of southwest quarter, all in section 23, township 20 north, range 9 west, Webster parish, La., containing 220 acres, together with improvements thereon within twenty-four hours. Defendant in rule to pay costs of both courts.
#### Liborio (Lee) GUARISCO et ux. v. PENNSYLVANIA CASUALTY COMPANY.

No. 2667.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Dec. 13, 1944.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 1945.

Writ of Error Granted Feb. 19, 1945.

Rene H. Himel, of Franklin, and J. Y. Gilmore, of Morgan City, for appellant.

W. H. McClendon Jr., of New Orleans, for appellee.

’DORE, Judge.

This case involves the same issue as the case of Eustache Honore Le Blanc et ux. v. Pennsylvania Casualty Company, La. App., 20 So.2d 32. In this case the parents of Peter Lovelace Guarisco are suing for the death of their minor son resulting from the same accident set forth in the Le Blanc case, supra.

For the reasons assigned in the Le Blanc case, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Minnie H. Vogel, Deceased. David R. Heine, Appellant; Nathan D. Stern, Executor, etc., of Minnie H. Vogel, Deceased, Respondent.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

January 29, 2014

p0122 

# Order

Clerk January 29, 2014

147093

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 147093

COA: 314431

St. Joseph CC: 11

- 017611

- FH

MASON ALAN FULLER,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 14, 2013 order

of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of

granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for

consideration, as on leave granted, of the issue whether the police officers unlawfully

expanded a “knock and talk” procedure by entering the defendant’s backyard and

walking onto a wooden deck, which was attached to the home, and, if a constitutional

violation occurred, whether the good

- faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies

under these facts. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### John Rankin, Plaintiff in Error, *v.*Charles Ballance, Defendant in Error.

ERROR TO PEORIA.

Where a judgment has keen reversed on appeal and stands for hearing *de novo*in the Circuit Court, a writ of error will not lie to hear exceptions to the same judgment.

Ranicin recovered a judgment against Ballance, at the May term, 1851, of the Peoria Circuit Court. Ballance prosecuted an appeal to the succeeding June term of this court, during which the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded. *707Prior to the hearing of the case on the appeal, Rankin sued out a writ of error to the Circuit Court, returnable to the present term, of this court. Ballance now enters a motion to dismiss the writ of error.

Ballance, *pro se,*for the motion.

N. H. Purple, contra.

*Per Curiam.*

The motion must prevail. There is now no judgment to be affirmed or reversed. The various rulings of the Circuit Court have in effect been set aside. The cause is now pending for trial *de novo*in that court. If the judgment had been affirmed on the appeal, the plaintiff in error might still prosecute his writ of error, and have his exceptions considered. But the exceptions fell with the judgment. The writ of error will be dismissed.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.6

                      2005 PERFORMANCE PROFIT SHARING PLAN

Employees of the Company are eligible to receive cash profit sharing based on
the 2005 year-end results of RTW, Inc. and its Subsidiary. All employees of the
Company are eligible to participate in this program. Under the program, a
portion of plan pre-tax earnings and pre-tax earnings in excess of planned
results, excluding investment income, are contributed to a general pool and
distributed in 2006. Profit sharing amounts will be distributed as a percentage
(%) of salary and on a discretionary basis to employees. Any profit sharing plan
payment will be made annually after completing the year-end audit.

Executive officers, additionally, earn stock options based upon exceeding the
company's pre-tax, pre-profit sharing pre-investment income earnings plan for
2005 and are eligible for an additional discretionary bonus. Executives are
eligible for a fixed number of options, pro-rated on a sliding scale, in excess
of the profit plan, up to a maximum level. Any stock option grant will be made
annually after completing the 2005 year-end audit.
#### In the Matter of the Contested Will of Susan Canton, Deceased. John E. Hepenstall, Appellant; Thomas M. Canton, Respondent.

Decree affirmed, with costs. No opinion.