2021 IL App (4th) 200455-U 

NO. 4-20-0455 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re A.V., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

A.V., 

Respondent-Appellant). 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

McLean County 

No. 19JD9

Honorable 

Jason J. Chambers, 

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the minor’s commitment to the Illinois 

 Department of Juvenile Justice was not excessive, did not violate the 

 proportionate penalties clause, and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing 

 to cross-examine one of the juvenile victims. 

¶ 2 In January 2019, the State charged respondent, A.V., with 16 counts of various 

offenses against three juvenile victims. Seven of the counts alleged criminal sexual abuse, four 

counts alleged unlawful restraint, four counts alleged criminal sexual assault, and one count 

alleged cyberstalking. Respondent was 17 years old at the time of the detention hearing and the 

victims’ ages were 15, 16, and 18 years of age. The State dismissed four of the counts before 

proceeding to a bench trial. At trial in February 2020, respondent was convicted of 11 counts and 

adjudged to be a delinquent minor. At sentencing, respondent was sentenced to an indeterminate 

term in the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ), not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances 

allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

February 1, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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¶ 3 On appeal, respondent argues the sentence to IDJJ violated the proportionate 

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, the sentence to IDJJ was excessive, and trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to cross-examine one of the juvenile victims. We affirm. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In January 2019, the State charged respondent with 16 criminal offenses against 

three victims. Seven of the counts were criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.50(a)(1) (West 

2016)), four of the counts alleged unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2016)), four counts 

alleged criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2016)), and one count alleged 

cyberstalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.5(a)(1) (West 2016)). After several pretrial hearings to address 

discovery issues, the matter was set for trial in September 2019. 

¶ 6 When the case was called for trial in September 2019, the State sought to bar a 

defense witness or alternatively continue the trial, claiming defense counsel’s late disclosure of 

Dr. Terry Killian as a defense witness, along with his psychiatric report and defendant’s notice 

raising a new defense—insanity—was untimely, violative of the victims’ right to timely 

disposition under the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 

2018)), and prejudicial to the State. The trial court ordered defense counsel to provide the State 

with all notes and reference materials used by the doctor in compiling his report. Between 

September and December, the State obtained additional discovery and sought its own psychiatric 

expert. In December, the State moved to continue the trial, indicating it retained two experts, Dr.

Lawrence Jeckel and Dr. Robert Hanlon. Dr. Jeckel reviewed the defense expert’s report, 

conducted an evaluation of respondent, and requested additional testing by a neuropsychologist. 

Dr. Hanlon then conducted the testing requested and submitted a report; however, Dr. Jeckel 
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needed additional time to incorporate these findings into his report. By agreement of the parties, 

the bench trial was continued to January 2020. 

¶ 7 Before the start of trial, the State dismissed 4 of the counts and proceeded on the 

remaining 12 counts against respondent. The trial court also discussed with respondent and his 

counsel a last-minute plea offer tendered by the State, which was rejected by respondent. 

¶ 8 A. Bench Trial

¶ 9 1. A.S. 

¶ 10 A.S. was 19 years old and attending college when she testified. She attended the 

same high school as respondent and started her freshmen year in 2015. She resides in McLean 

County with her parents and a brother. She said she first met respondent after her swimming 

practice when she was a sophomore. They met because their respective athletic practices were in 

essentially the same place after school each day. Respondent messaged her on social media 

asking for her phone number, which she provided, and they began to communicate back and 

forth via text messages. They became “really good friends,” and although they communicated by 

text messaging and attended one class together, A.S. did not “hang out” with respondent outside 

of school because she was aware her parents “didn’t really like him.” After a period of time 

when they did not communicate, she said they began texting again. Throughout her sophomore 

year, communication between them broke off several times, she said, primarily because of what 

she described as “mean things” he would say, or the anger he exhibited from time to time. She 

testified she was “afraid of him.” By October of her sophomore year, she said they became 

friends again, although A.S. told respondent “he needed to work on keeping his temper in 

check.” In October 2017, respondent asked her to meet him at his car in the high school parking 

lot after her swim practice. According to A.S., upon entering respondent’s car he said he wanted 
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to talk with her about something, but he was waiting until another student left the area. When 

A.S. told respondent she needed to leave and attempted to exit the vehicle, respondent locked her 

door by means of an electronic lock on his side and “grabbed me from behind” which she 

described as reaching with one hand around her waist and with the other he “grabbed my face.” 

He then started kissing her. She told him “no,” but he did not stop. He put his hands up her shirt 

and felt her breasts over her sports bra. She was not sure how long this lasted but estimated 

“around five minutes.” As she attempted to exit the car, respondent told her “not to tell anyone or 

there would be consequences.” He then unlocked her door and she exited. A.S. testified she sat in 

her car and started crying. A.S. said it was one or two weeks later when her brother confronted 

her after overhearing her crying in her room that she first disclosed some of what had occurred. 

She testified she was unable to tell him everything until a few months before the trial. She further 

explained how she was unable to tell her boyfriend or other members of her family until some 

months before the trial. Sometime after the incident, respondent texted her, saying she was about 

to be called in to the school office due to respondent’s report that her brother was threatening to 

fight respondent. She then disclosed to school administrators what respondent had done to her in 

the car. According to A.S., the only action taken by the school was for the assistant principal to

tell respondent to stay away from A.S. A.S. testified they both agreed to stop talking to one 

another, and they blocked each other from their phones. The next semester, they were in class 

together and she said the friendship began again. 

¶ 11 During that summer, she agreed to go on two different hikes with respondent, 

emphasizing each time there was to be no touching and they were doing so only as friends. On 

each occasion they drove themselves to the park and left in separate vehicles. Respondent agreed 

to her conditions. Nothing unusual occurred on the first hike. Prior to the second hike, A.S. said 
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she had started to feel uncomfortable around respondent and “didn’t want to be alone with him.” 

To that end, when they discussed the second hike, she mentioned bringing a friend, respondent 

objected, and she eventually acquiesced. On the second hike in July 2018, after they found 

themselves on an unfamiliar path, he grabbed her around the waist from behind. She elbowed 

him, telling respondent to let her go and he did. He then grabbed her around the waist again with 

a stronger grip and backed up against a tree with her in front of him. She told him to let her go, 

but he refused, started kissing her, and put his hands up her shirt and under her bra, touching her 

breasts. Respondent then put his hands up her shorts and began penetrating her vagina. She told 

him several times to stop but when it started to hurt, she stopped moving and began to cry. He 

told her she had to have sex with him or “do oral.” She refused, and he took her hand and placed 

it down his pants forcing her to touch his penis. She pulled her hand away and they started 

walking. After a phone call from his mother, respondent left her alone in an unfamiliar part of 

the forest. She eventually found her way back to her car, sat inside and cried, then she went to 

meet a friend, never telling anyone about what happened until much later. On cross-examination, 

when asked whether any of these incidents were “consensual,” she said in each instance, she told 

him “no.” A.S. said during her senior year, they became friends again and began communicating 

on the social media forum Snapchat. He expressed to her his desire “to try again” and that they 

both “could learn together *** how to love each other,” but she refused, insisting she wanted to 

stay with her boyfriend. Respondent then informed her via text he had a gun in his car and sent 

her a picture of the gun held to his head claiming he was going to kill himself. A.S. said she 

“started to freak out because I actually thought he would hurt himself.” The State admitted a 

portion of their text messages and a photograph of a pistol recovered pursuant to a search warrant 

into evidence. 
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¶ 12 A.S. recalled an incident in October 2018, when respondent became angry with 

her because she was with her boyfriend at her house, and respondent kept texting her that he was 

coming to her house, that she knew “what he had in his car,” and he sent texts counting down the 

minutes until his arrival at her home. She was aware when he arrived because she saw his car 

pass by and heard loud music coming from it. In addition, her brother happened to arrive home 

and saw respondent there. Through their conversations, A.S. was able to learn respondent was 

keeping track of her location from the global positioning system on Snapchat. On 

cross-examination, she stated she disclosed these events to the police almost two years later

“[b]ecause [respondent] had done this stuff and I was tired of being quiet about it.” On redirect

examination, she stated it took her two years to tell the entire story of what respondent did to her 

because she feared him and was not ready to tell her parents. She said she was afraid of him 

because, among other threats he made, he threatened to impregnate her and beat up her 

boyfriend. 

¶ 13 2. T.S.

¶ 14 T.S., A.S.’s brother and a junior in high school, testified he was aware his sister 

was “going out” with respondent when he was a freshman in the 2017-2018 school year. He 

knew respondent but was not friends with him or involved in his circle of friends. T.S. recalled 

one evening when A.S. came home and was crying. He stated A.S. told him “[respondent] had 

done some things that she didn’t like,” and as she was crying, she relayed some of the details to 

him. She told him about the incident after swim practice in respondent’s car when he locked the 

doors and would not let her out. T.S. described how A.S.’s behavior changed during this time 

and how she became uncommunicative and locked herself in her room frequently. He witnessed 

respondent sitting outside of their house on the evening A.S. described in her testimony. 
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According to T.S., his sister told him “on multiple occasions” that “she couldn’t get away from” 

respondent. Admitting, “we’re not fans of each other,” T.S. said he and respondent were sending 

threatening text messages back and forth even before he became aware of the incident with his 

sister. At one point, he said, they planned on fighting in a nearby park before the school 

administration found out. He said respondent sent him a text message the evening of the same 

day he was called into the office, indicating he had a gun in his car and was “coming for me.” 

¶ 15 3. L.M.

¶ 16 L.M., A.S’s boyfriend at the time of trial, testified A.S. told him about the sexual 

assault in the woods “a little after we had started dating” in “late summer of 2018.” He said 

initially she did not tell him everything, but eventually he received “the whole story.” L.M. 

described the incident in October 2018 when he was at A.S.’s house and respondent showed up 

uninvited. He said respondent was texting with A.S., telling her “he was going to come over 

there and proceed to shoot me.” L.M. said respondent was sending “Snapchats” giving him the 

impression he was on his way to A.S.’s home. Although he never saw respondent that night, he 

“did see a vehicle circle around the house a few times,” and when A.S.’s brother came home he 

said respondent had been there. On cross-examination, he stated he has never texted or had any 

form of electronic communication with respondent. He also explained A.S. disclosed more 

details about what respondent did to her as time went by. 

¶ 17 4. C.C.

¶ 18 C.C. was 18 at the time of the trial and a senior in high school, while also taking 

college courses online. She recalled first meeting respondent during her freshman year, 

2016-2017. The first time she spoke with him was over Snapchat. She acknowledged sending 

him pictures of her “half-naked body” wearing only underwear. She knew his friend group and 
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had seen him around school before, but she did not remember speaking to him in person until a 

school event during her sophomore year. She and respondent communicated by Snapchat after 

that. Sometime later respondent replied to her request for a ride to school from a remote parking 

lot, indicating he would pick her up from the parking lot as she had requested. 

¶ 19 That Monday morning in February 2018, C.C. arrived in the parking lot, parked 

behind respondent, and got in the passenger side of his car. After some small talk, respondent 

began kissing her. She said it was a little uncomfortable, but she kissed him back. As he 

continued to kiss her, he pulled down her pants to her knees, and she said she “kind of froze, but 

*** didn’t tell him to stop or anything.” Respondent started putting his fingers inside of her 

vagina, and C.C. “didn’t say anything, but *** was kind of starting to freeze up and *** stopped 

kissing him.” She said she was too embarrassed to tell him to stop or to say no, so she just 

waited. At some point, he stopped and drove them to school. She kept sending messages to him 

on social media throughout the day because she was “kind of confused and I was embarrassed”

but “just pretended that it was okay.” She acknowledged there was nothing she said or did to 

indicate that what happened was not consensual. 

¶ 20 The next day, respondent sent her a picture of the road and said he was on his way 

to pick her up. She drove to the parking lot where she again entered respondent’s car. C.C. 

testified she noticed respondent “seemed really quiet” when she got into the car and she felt

awkward. Eventually class time was approaching so she asked if they were going to leave. 

Respondent said, “I want to do something first.” She said she felt like “it happened quick.” He 

started to kiss her, and she started to kiss back, until she felt uncomfortable and pushed him 

away, saying, “[n]o, this is—I’m not doing this; I don’t want to do this.” He tried to calm her 

down and kiss her again, but she said she would just leave, went to grab the door handle, and 
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respondent “tensed up and reached over and pushed the lock down.” C.C. said she felt like her 

comment “made him frustrated or angry.” She said she started to panic as he started to kiss her 

again. Although she tried to move away, she felt “out of control” and “stuck.” Respondent kept 

telling her, “[i]t’s okay; it’s okay.” He pulled her pants down and inserted his fingers inside her 

vagina, and she said she felt “numb and confused” and “felt completely frozen and scared.” She 

started crying, and said, “[p]lease, stop.” She said at one point he asked if she wanted to get in 

the backseat and she said no. He then asked if she would perform oral sex on him and she said 

no. He “seemed annoyed” but stopped and drove them to school in silence. She said she “was 

really afraid of what had just happened.” 

¶ 21 Once they arrived at school, as C.C. was “fumbling, like trying to get my pants 

up,” he said, “[t]hank you” and got out, leaving her in the car. She eventually texted her 

boyfriend, telling him “it was [respondent] and that like he locked me in his car and that it wasn’t 

consensual.” Only after her boyfriend threatened to tell her mother if she did not, C.C. texted her 

mother to pick her up, telling her only that “something bad happened with a boy.” When she got 

into her mother’s car she immediately began crying and told her what happened. She left school 

about a month after the incident because she was experiencing “flashbacks and panic attacks and 

disassociation,” and she began to inflict self-harm and have suicidal ideations. She was 

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and felt like she was seeing respondent 

everywhere she went. She described the physical effects of the assault as soreness in her vagina, 

some bleeding, and she had some bruises on her thighs. The State admitted photographs 

depicting the bruising on her thighs taken two weeks after the incident. C.C. eventually told the 

police what happened in September, approximately seven months after the incident, because, “I 
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had had enough.” She said she could not “keep being controlled by someone else *** because of 

something that happened to me.” 

¶ 22 C.C. described how she learned A.S. had a similar experience with respondent 

and also recounted how one of her best friends informed her there was another girl, G.M., who 

had a similar occurrence with respondent, and the two began communicating on social media.

¶ 23 5. M.B.

¶ 24 M.B., C.C.’s mother, also testified. In February 2018, C.C. sent her a text in the 

morning stating, “something happened and I’m scared and I need to go home.” When M.B. 

arrived at school, she said C.C. “was shakey [sic]. She was crying. She looked scared.” C.C. 

related what occurred between her and a boy in his car in the parking lot, but she did not identify 

the assailant at that time. M.B. said C.C. initially “wanted to go back to some sense of normal” 

but was having panic attacks, which lasted for two years. Her behavior changed dramatically, she 

was unable to sleep, and she was tired all the time. She was unable to drive a car because of the 

panic attacks, and although she had previously loved school and was a good student, she 

eventually had to switch to homebound school and her grades dropped dramatically. At the time 

of the trial, C.C. was seeing a counselor, a psychiatrist, and taking medication for anxiety, panic 

attacks, and depression. M.B. helped C.C. obtain a no stalking order against respondent because 

he began appearing at her church. She said C.C. has had suicidal thoughts and has been to the 

emergency room because of self-harming behavior. 

¶ 25 6. T.M.

¶ 26 T.M. was 17 years old and is C.C.’s boyfriend. He recounted how C.C. disclosed 

to him in February 2018 that something happened but did not provide specifics other than to say 

she had asked for a ride, got into someone’s car, and wanted to leave but could not. He said he 
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could tell she was upset, she looked sad, and her voice was “quivering” when she told him. He 

encouraged her go home and tell someone what happened. On cross-examination, he noted she 

was acting very unusual on the day she disclosed what happened in the car. He said based on the 

way she was acting, “I assumed something happened.” 

¶ 27 7. C.H.

¶ 28 C.H. was 16 years old and attending Leroy High School at the time of the trial. 

She met G.M., another victim in this case, during the summer of 2018, and the two became 

“pretty close” friends. Their friendship ended in March or April 2019. C.H. said in August 2018, 

she had a video call with G.M., who appeared “shocked” and “upset.” She said G.M.’s face “was 

kind of red and she had some tears” and appeared short of breath. G.M. told C.H. that respondent 

had just raped her, and G.M. called her immediately after respondent left. Although this 

testimony was not accepted by the court substantively under the excited utterance exception, on 

redirect examination C.H. confirmed, without objection, G.M. told her respondent used force 

during the assault. On cross-examination, C.H. acknowledged G.M. sometime later said she did 

not say “no” to having sex with respondent. 

¶ 29 8. G.M. 

¶ 30 G.M. testified she was 16 years old and a sophomore in high school. She lived in 

the town of Leroy before moving to Bloomington in September 2019. She met respondent 

though social media in the summer of 2018. After knowing each other only through social 

media, and only for a month, she said respondent asked her to send him some pictures of her 

naked, but she refused. Respondent, however, sent her unsolicited pictures of his erect penis. In 

August 2018, she invited him over to her home in Leroy at about 11:30 p.m. Two of her friends 

and her mother were present at the time, although her mother was sleeping and unaware of their 
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presence. When her friends left at approximately 12:30 a.m., respondent remained, and they sat 

on her bed “listening to music.” Eventually, respondent pulled her towards him and started to 

move his hands on her chest and lower body over her clothing. She asked him what he was 

doing, and his response was, “it’s fine.” As he began touching her breasts and her vagina over 

her clothes, she pulled his hand away. He stopped, but then put his hands underneath her clothes, 

touching her breasts, and attempted to penetrate her vagina with his fingers. She told him to stop 

and pulled away from him. Respondent then put her on her back and got on top of her, pinning 

her hands down above her head with one hand, while he pulled her pants down with the other. 

She struggled to get away, repeatedly telling him to “stop” when respondent pulled her pants 

down. He pulled his pants down and began having sex with her. She said she was “[s]cared” and

“completely terrified.” Afterwards, he put his clothes back on, said, “That was fun,” and left at 

approximately 2 a.m. She called her friend, C.H., on the video application Facetime about five 

minutes after he left and told her what happened. 

¶ 31 When she next saw respondent at a high school football game, she started 

“panicking, kind of like freaking out, and I started crying.” In January 2019, Detective Karen 

DeRosa from the Normal police department contacted her, and she told the detective about what 

happened. She said she had not reported it earlier because she was the one who had “snuck” 

people over to her house and knew her mother would be mad. She admitted on 

cross-examination that she invited respondent and was aware her mother was sleeping in the next 

room during the assault. G.M. testified about how she used to be involved in sports and student 

council at school, but after the incident, she lost interest in extracurricular activities because she 

“just wanted everything to stop” and started to isolate herself. Afterwards she was prescribed 

medication for depression and anxiety, diagnosed with PTSD, and started to see counselors and 
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psychiatrists. She said she misses a lot of school because of her inability to function and has 

made three suicide attempts. She moved to Bloomington to get away from Leroy, because 

remaining in Leroy at her house reminded her of the incident. G.M. said the only other time she 

saw respondent between the night of the incident and court was when he appeared outside the 

window during a girl’s sleepover at C.C.’s house. 

¶ 32 The State called respondent’s father to testify about respondent’s height, weight, 

and physical features. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked about the neck injury 

respondent sustained in a swimming accident in the summer of 2017 and how it affected his 

strength, mobility, and athletic activity for a number of months. 

¶ 33 9. Kendra DeRosa

¶ 34 Kendra DeRosa, a 16-year veteran of the Normal Police Department, was

assigned to the criminal investigation division (CID) as a juvenile detective. She had 600 hours 

of training specifically related to crimes against children and about 150 hours of training in 

forensic interviewing. She said she was trained in what she referred to as the “child-first 

protocol” of asking non-leading questions of children in order to allow them to describe 

experiences in their own words. She had conducted approximately 166 such interviews. Of the 

approximately 550 cases assigned to her since starting in CID, she said approximately 203 of 

those involved juvenile sex offenses. She also works with the McLean County Children’s 

Advocacy Center (CAC) as part of a multi-disciplinary team and has designed and conducted 

training in the investigation of child sex offenses. 

¶ 35 Detective DeRosa described how her involvement with this case began in 

February 2018, when C.C.’s father contacted the Normal Police Department to report her sexual 

assault. He initially asked questions about how the investigation would proceed and later 
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informed the department “they had decided that they didn’t want to do anything further with it.” 

When she later spoke with C.C.’s mother, Detective DeRosa learned the first name of the alleged 

perpetrator. She then called the school resource officer to view security footage on the day C.C. 

alleged respondent assaulted her in the car. The resource officer later reported the video showed 

respondent and C.C. entering the school through different doors at approximately the same time. 

In September 2018, C.C.’s parents contacted DeRosa saying respondent had contacted C.C. on 

several occasions, which scared her, and she was now willing to be interviewed and move 

forward with the investigation. C.C. disclosed the sexual assault and Detective DeRosa 

subpoenaed phone records from respondent and C.C., and through search warrants, she was able 

to view extensive contacts between them on social media. She also discovered that G.M. was 

another potential victim. She contacted G.M. and her mom and set up an interview for her at the 

CAC, where G.M. disclosed how respondent sexually assaulted her. DeRosa also learned from 

C.C. that A.S. had also been assaulted by respondent, contacted A.S., and interviewed her at the 

CAC as well. Based on A.S.’s statement, she obtained a search warrant and seized respondent’s 

phone and a gun provided by respondent’s father. 

¶ 36 Respondent was initially uncooperative with the investigation, ultimately turning 

himself in to the Normal police department in January 2019. While DeRosa was taking 

respondent to be booked in, respondent made an unsolicited comment about how he “figured this 

was coming” and “what he did was stupid.” 

¶ 37 Discussing her experience with victims of sexual assault, DeRosa said it was very 

common with victims, especially juvenile victims, to blame themselves and delay the reporting 

of a sexual assault. According to DeRosa, all three victims delayed reporting the assault, and all 

three have experienced anxiety, sleeplessness, self-blame, and have become more withdrawn. All 
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three also expressed to DeRosa how afraid they were of respondent and fearful of what he would 

do to them. 

¶ 38 At the close of the State’s evidence, defense counsel moved for a directed finding

on all counts. The trial court granted the motion as to count 3K, a count of criminal sexual 

assault as to G.M. which alleged sexual penetration with his fingers. The trial court found there 

was evidence of touching but not of penetration. Respondent elected not to testify, and the 

defense rested. 

¶ 39 The trial court summarized the testimony of all three victims, A.S., C.C., and 

G.M., found each of the victims credible, and found all remaining allegations proved. The court 

then adjudicated respondent minor delinquent and set sentencing for June 2020. Respondent filed 

a motion for a new trial in March 2020, which was addressed immediately preceding the 

sentencing hearing. Respondent alleged: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of the allegations 

beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the court erred in denying respondent’s motion for a directed 

finding at the close of the State’s evidence, and (3) the State failed to prove every material 

allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. 

¶ 40 B. Sentencing Hearing

¶ 41 Before proceeding to sentencing, the trial court heard arguments and denied 

defendant’s motion for a new trial. In aggravation, the State introduced a document entitled 

“Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice Comprehensive Youth Development and Reentry 

Planning Model,” which contained an outline of the programs and activities located within the 

facilities of the IDJJ and demonstrating the access to programs respondent would have if 

sentenced to IDJJ. The State also introduced Dr. Hanlon’s neuropsychological evaluation of 

respondent conducted before trial in November 2019. Dr. Hanlon was critical of the reports by 
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defense experts Dr. Killian and Dr. Willett in a number of respects. The State also presented 

written victim impact statements from each of the three victims, as well as from various family 

members. 

¶ 42 In mitigation, respondent called Dr. Terry Killian, the forensic psychiatrist 

respondent earlier obtained to investigate a possible insanity defense. Dr. Killian explained his 

process of reading and obtaining information from various sources, including respondent’s 

mother’s journal entries, the police reports, and respondent’s medical records. He also conducted 

a lengthy interview of respondent and his mother. Dr. Killian rendered an earlier medical opinion 

respondent was “not guilty by reason of insanity” prefaced on the assumption respondent’s head 

injury from the pool accident had been “fairly severe.” He later acknowledged this came 

primarily from reports by respondent and his mother. However, his later review of Dr. Hanlon’s 

report, a person he believed to be “a very, very fine psychologist and honest,” and the 

information upon which Dr. Hanlon relied caused Dr. Killian to modify his opinion, recognizing 

the severity of the injury was not as previously reported. His opinion at the time of sentencing 

was that respondent’s neurological testing reports revealed “apparent residual damage, but 

mostly normal functioning” and “two-and-a-half years after the head injury *** testing results 

were even better.” He testified it was very common for individuals to have personality and 

behavior issues after head injuries, which can “manifest in a wide variety of abnormal and 

aggressive behavior and then frequently that gets better with time.” Dr. Killian said he also 

reviewed the sex offender evaluation and found nothing wrong with it. He admitted on 

cross-examination respondent may have “a somewhat abnormal view” of sex and sexual 

relations, although he said, “[i]t may just be immaturity.” 
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¶ 43 Respondent also called three family friends to testify essentially as character 

witnesses. All three agreed they would be there to support respondent if given a term of 

probation. 

¶ 44 Defendant next called his sister and mother, also as character witnesses. His sister 

discussed his head injury and asserted he was different afterwards. She also testified about her 

relationship with respondent and her observations about him. Respondent’s mother also 

discussed the pool accident and the effect she believed it had on his personality and behavior. 

She also discussed respondent’s current personality and work habits in general. Defense counsel 

also submitted a number of letters in support of respondent. 

¶ 45 The State recommended a sentence to IDJJ for an indeterminate term. Defense 

counsel argued that a community-based sentence was more appropriate in order to help treat 

respondent’s issues. 

¶ 46 After respondent’s statement in allocution, the trial court acknowledged its duty, 

when fashioning a sentence in juvenile court, to “focus on rehabilitation and public safety.” The 

court also indicated it considered the evidence presented at trial and sentencing, the letters in 

support, the social investigation report, the sex offender evaluation, the IDJJ comprehensive 

youth development plan, as well as testimony and reports of the experts in deciding what the 

appropriate disposition should be. The trial court specifically noted the sex offender evaluation 

characterized respondent as a low-moderate to moderate recidivism risk—something different 

than that represented by Dr. Killian, the defense expert. The court then outlined the various 

statutory factors it was to consider in imposing sentence—whether the parents were unfit or 

unable to care for, protect, train, or discipline respondent, or were unwilling to do so. Although 

the court expressly found they were not unwilling, the court agreed with the State that they were 
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unable to adequately monitor respondent’s behavior. The court also found placement was 

necessary to ensure the protection of the public based on the conduct proved. Next, the court 

acknowledged its obligation to make findings as required to determine whether secure placement 

was “necessary” after considering respondent’s age, criminal background, results of any 

assessments, educational background, physical, mental, and emotional health, viability of 

community-based services, and whether the services available in IDJJ would meet respondent’s 

needs. Having done so, the court concluded that “removal from the home is in the best interest of 

the minor and minor’s family and the public,” also concluding less restrictive alternatives were 

not available and “[t]hat community-based interventions are not possible due to significant 

public safety risk.” 

¶ 47 The trial court then sentenced respondent to an indeterminate term at IDJJ, not to 

exceed his twenty-first birthday, and ordered him to register as a sex offender. 

¶ 48 This appeal followed

¶ 49 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 50 A. Proportionate Penalties

¶ 51 Addressing respondent’s constitutional challenge first, respondent argues the 

indeterminate sentence to IDJJ, not to exceed his twenty-first birthday, violates the eighth 

amendment and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. U.S. Const., 

amend. XIII; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. We disagree. 

¶ 52 Article I, section 11 of the Illinois Constitution (otherwise referred to as the 

proportionate penalties clause) provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according 

to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful 

citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “A defendant can raise a proportionate penalties 
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challenge on the basis that the penalty for a particular offense is too severe under the ‘cruel or 

degrading’ standard or that the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense that 

contains identical elements.” People v. Williams, 2015 IL 117470, ¶ 9, 43 N.E.3d 941 (citing 

People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521, 839 N.E.2d 492, 517 (2005)). 

¶ 53 In the first instance, the challenger must establish the penalty would constitute 

cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution 

(U.S. Const., amend. VIII), which our supreme court and this district have both noted is 

coextensive with the proportionate penalties clause of our constitution. See In re Rodney H., 223 

Ill. 2d 510, 518, 861 N.E.2d 623, 628 (2006); In re Maurice D., 2015 IL App (4th) 130323, ¶ 25, 

34 N.E.3d 590. 

¶ 54 Although respondent’s brief correctly notes the proportionate penalties clause 

does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, he argues instead the sentence, coupled with 

the claimed failure by the court to properly consider certain factors in mitigation, somehow 

brings it within the ambit of cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent does so without any 

citation to authority supporting his position. Argument must “contain the contentions of the 

appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record 

relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Furthermore, “[m]ere contentions, without 

argument or citation to authority, do not merit consideration on appeal.” Hall v. Naper Gold 

Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12, 969 N.E.2d 930. “ ‘The failure to provide 

proper citations to the record is a violation of Rule 341(h)(7), the consequence of which is the 

forfeiture of the argument.’ ” Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke, 2019 IL App (4th) 

150544-B, ¶ 43, 123 N.E.3d 1271 (quoting Hall, 2012 Il App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12). However, 

where the appellate court finds the flaws were not “so serious as to interfere with [the appellate 
- 20 - 

court’s] ability to understand and adjudicate [the] case,” the court may address the issue 

presented. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Burke, 2016 IL App (2d) 150462, 

¶ 22, 51 N.E.3d 1082. In spite of the deficiencies of respondent’s brief, we elect to address the 

issue because it can be dealt with summarily.

¶ 55 Our supreme court has determined the proportionate penalties clause and the 

eighth amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause do not apply to juvenile proceedings 

initiated by a petition for adjudication of wardship. Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d at 520-21; see also 

In re Dave L., 2017 IL App (1st) 170152, ¶ 36, 80 N.E.3d 694; In re Deshawn G., 2015 IL App 

(1st) 143316, ¶ 52, 40 N.E.3d 762; Maurice D., 2015 IL App (4th) 130323, ¶ 26; In re A.P., 2014 

IL App (1st) 140327, ¶ 13, 14 N.E.3d 689. 

¶ 56 The court reasoned a petition for adjudication of wardship is neither criminal in 

nature nor a direct action by the State to inflict punishment upon a juvenile, and thus, neither the 

cruel and unusual punishment clause nor the proportionate penalties clause applies in such cases. 

Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d at 520-21; see also Deshawn G., 2015 IL App (1st) 143316, ¶ 52 (stating 

“neither the eighth amendment nor the proportionate penalties clause apply to juvenile 

proceedings initiated by a petition for adjudication of wardship because ‘a juvenile adjudication 

of wardship was not criminal in nature and did not impose “punishment” within the meaning of 

the eighth amendment and proportionate penalties clause’ ” (quoting In re Isaiah D., 2015 IL 

App (1st) 143507, ¶ 52, 35 N.E.3d 88)). See also In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 101, 15 

N.E.3d 457; People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 208, 909 N.E.2d 783, 799 (2009).

Having failed to direct us to any authority to the contrary, we choose to follow the direction of 

our supreme court and find the proportionate penalties clause is inapplicable to respondent’s 

juvenile adjudication and reject this argument on appeal. 
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¶ 57 B. Excessive Sentence

¶ 58 In connection with respondent’s proportionate penalties argument, respondent 

contends the trial court erred when it failed to consider all the factors in mitigation and sentenced 

him to a “grossly excessive” sentence by committing him to IDJJ. We disagree.

¶ 59 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq.

(West 2018)) gives the trial court wide discretion when determining the appropriate sentence 

after a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent. In re R.D.M., 313 Ill. App. 3d 989, 992, 731 N.E.2d 

421, 424 (2000). A trial court has authority to place a minor on probation or conditional 

discharge, in detention, or commit him or her to IDJJ. See 705 ILCS 405/5-710 (West 2018). We 

review de novo whether the trial court complied with the requirements of the Juvenile Court Act 

in sentencing a juvenile to IDJJ. In re Ashley C., 2014 IL App (4th) 131014, ¶ 22, 8 N.E.3d 1142. 

However, “[a] trial court’s dispositional order is entitled to great deference and will not be 

reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” In re M.Z., 296 Ill. App. 3d 669, 674, 695 N.E.2d 587, 

591 (1998). 

¶ 60 Before the trial court can commit a minor to the IDJJ, it must follow the mandates 

of section 5-750 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-750 (West 2018)). See In re Raheem 

M., 2013 IL App (4th) 130585, ¶ 50, 1 N.E.3d 86. To make a finding that secure confinement is 

necessary, section 5-750(1) requires the court to review the following individualized factors:

“(A) Age of the minor.

(B) Criminal background of the minor.

(C) Review of results of any assessments of the minor, 

including child centered assessments such as the CANS [(Child 

and Adolescent Needs and Strengths)]. 
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(D) Educational background of the minor, indicating 

whether the minor has ever been assessed for a learning disability, 

and if so what services were provided as well as any disciplinary 

incidents at school.

(E) Physical, mental and emotional health of the minor, 

indicating whether the minor has ever been diagnosed with a health 

issue and if so what services were provided and whether the minor 

was compliant with services.

(F) Community based services that have been provided to 

the minor, and whether the minor was compliant with the services, 

and the reason the services were unsuccessful.

(G) Services within the Department of Juvenile Justice that 

will meet the individualized needs of the minor.” 705 ILCS 405/5-

750(1) (West 2018). 

¶ 61 Respondent argues the sentence imposed was excessive because the trial court 

committed him to the IDJJ without considering how respondent’s cognitive abilities were 

affected by a head injury, that respondent was employed, had support from family and friends, 

and it failed to consider “many characteristics of [r]espondent.” Further, respondent argues the 

trial court erred by finding respondent’s parents were “unwilling” to care for, protect, and 

discipline the minor. In essence, respondent claims the sentence was excessive because the trial 

court did not properly consider the evidence in mitigation. 

¶ 62 Compliance with section 5-750(1) will be shown if the record contains evidence 

the trial court considered the statutorily required factors and the trial court’s commitment order 
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reflects it. In re Javaun I., 2014 IL App (4th) 130189, ¶ 32, 5 N.E.3d 304. The statute does not 

require the court to explicitly evaluate on the record the individualized factors required by the 

Juvenile Court Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5-750(1) (West 2018) (“Before the court commits a minor 

to the [IDJJ], it shall make a finding that secure confinement is necessary, following a review of 

the following individualized factors[.]”). Thus, the only question is whether “the record 

contained sufficient information on these factors for the court to consider before sentencing 

respondent to [IDJJ].” Javaun I., 2014 IL App (4th) 130189, ¶ 32. We find the record contained 

more than sufficient information for the court and that the trial court outlined that information as 

it related to the statutory factors to be considered. 

¶ 63 In its preliminary remarks, the trial court recognized the serious nature of the 

offenses; however, it explained how, in a juvenile proceeding, it was bound to “focus on 

rehabilitation and public safety.” The court made mention of the fact that “strong punishment” 

was not to be a major factor in sentencing and that any ruling it made was “not based on trying to 

focus on strong punishment.” The court reiterated the various available sources of information it

had when fashioning a sentence: the State’s exhibit outlining the resources provided in IDJJ, the 

testimony at sentencing, evidence presented at trial, letters of support, the social investigation 

report, the sex offender evaluation, testimony from Dr. Killian, and the report authored by Dr. 

Hanlon. The court then listed the statutory factors it was to consider in imposing sentence—

whether the parents were unfit or unable to care for, protect, train, or discipline respondent, or 

were unwilling to do so. Contrary to respondent’s argument, the court did not find that they were 

unwilling; however, the court agreed with the State that they were unable to adequately monitor 

respondent’s behavior, citing various examples in the evidence indicating respondent had the 

independence to engage in the behaviors he did. Having previously noted his age at sentencing, 
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the court pointed out, if given probation, respondent could stop living with his parents and 

thereby lessen the amount of control or guidance they could provide. After finding it was bound 

to protect the public from consequences of the criminal activity of respondent, the court outlined 

the mandatory statutory factors: respondent’s age, his criminal background, the results of the 

social investigation report, his sex offender evaluation, his educational background, his physical, 

mental, and emotional health, the viability of any community-based services, as well as 

respondent’s family support structure, and whether IDJJ could meet his needs. Respondent 

argues the trial court did not properly consider respondent’s head injury and the issues related 

thereto. In fact, the court listed the services available to address those issues in IDJJ: “mental 

health and behavior evaluations and treatment, including psychiatric diagnoses and treatment 

needs.” The trial court also noted, however, the repeated references to respondent’s “lack of 

remorse, lack of empathy toward others,” and his designation as a low to moderate risk to 

reoffend. Coupled with the actual offenses for which he was found guilty, the trial court 

concluded that “community-based interventions are not possible due to significant public safety 

risk.” Indeed, both the court’s commitment order and the record at sentencing confirm the trial

court considered all of the statutory factors pursuant to section 5-750 before finding commitment 

to IDJJ was the least restrictive alternative. 

¶ 64 It is clear from the record that the trial court acknowledged respondent had no 

previous criminal record and might be amenable to rehabilitation. However, it is equally clear the 

court determined the circumstances and seriousness of the sexual offenses against three different

teenage victims and the protection of the public outweighed the minor’s rehabilitative potential. 

Respondent claims he was “achieving rehabilitation” because he was employed and comes from 

a supportive family. However, respondent fails to support this argument with any statutory or 
- 25 - 

case authority indicating a trial court is precluded from a sentence to IDJJ if a respondent minor 

contends or even shows he has been to some degree “rehabilitated” since the commission of the 

offenses for which he was found guilty. In essence, counsel argues the trial court failed to give 

his mitigating evidence the weight he believes it should. The evidence considered by the trial 

court negates this claim. The sex offender evaluation disclosed respondent denied he committed 

some of the offenses and noted, “he does not seem to be in touch with any significant feelings of 

guilt, shame or remorse, nor does there seem to be any empathy towards the victims being 

present at this time.” Similarly, the social investigation report, while recognizing respondent has 

a supportive family and maintains employment, recommended an indeterminate commitment to 

IDJJ in part because “the [respondent] appears to maintain that the allegations are unfounded; he 

does not demonstrate an appreciable sense of responsibility or remorse.” Dr. Hanlon’s report 

noted respondent’s “personality configuration consisted of the following: histrionic personality 

traits, narcissistic personality features, and obsessive-compulsive personality features. His profile 

suggested that his interpersonal relationships are often shallow, and he manifests a self-centered 

indifference to the welfare of others.” This was consistent with Dr. Kleppin’s sex offender 

evaluation. 

¶ 65 Taking into account the nature and circumstances of the offenses, coupled with 

the effect of a sentence which could not extend beyond his twenty-first birthday, we fail to see 

how his sentence was excessive. Respondent was 19 years old by the time he was sentenced and 

was sentenced to an indeterminate amount of time in IDJJ not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. 

As a result, even if required to serve his full sentence, he would spend less than two years in IDJJ 

for what would have otherwise been Class 1 felonies subject to mandatory consecutive sentences 

totaling 12 to 45 years in prison. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20 (West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a), 
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5-8-4(d)(2) (West 2016). At sentencing, the State introduced the “Illinois Department of Juvenile 

Justice Comprehensive Youth Development and Reentry Planning Model.” The model 

determines a juvenile offender’s length of commitment to IDJJ “by taking into account offense 

type and programmatic needs” according to the Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument. 

Thus, depending on his “needs” according to this model, it is probable respondent could be 

released from IDJJ custody much sooner than his twenty-first birthday. The possibility of early 

release is further codified under section 5/3-2.5-85(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 

ILCS 5/3-2.5-85(c) (West 2018)): 

“[IDJJ] shall establish a process for deciding the date of release on 

aftercare for every youth committed to [IDJJ] ***. The 

establishment, adjustment, and final consideration of the target 

release date shall include consideration of the following factors: 

 (1) the nature and seriousness of the youth’s offense; 

 (2) the likelihood the youth will reoffend or will pose a 

danger to the community based on an assessment of the youth’s 

risks, strengths, and behavior; and 

 (3) the youth’s progress since being committed to the Department.” 

Additionally, a review for aftercare release takes place within the first year of a minor’s 

confinement in IDJJ as the minor is guaranteed to be considered for release “at least 30 days 

prior to the expiration of the first year of confinement and at least annually thereafter.” 730 ILCS 

5/3-2.5-85(a)(3) (West 2018). 

¶ 66 The trial court also explained the possibility of early release to respondent after 

sentencing, reiterating the sentence is an “indeterminate sentence” and reminding respondent to 
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“keep in mind, sometimes the length of time that you spend [in IDJJ] is also determined by that 

progress that you make. So it’s in your best interest to utilize that opportunity.” 

¶ 67 Considering respondent committed 11 serious felonies against three different 

juvenile victims, all in a period of 10 months and, on at least two occasions, on school property,

we cannot conclude that serving a sentence to IDJJ of less than two years is excessive. The trial 

court complied with the requirements of the Juvenile Court Act in sentencing a juvenile to IDJJ. 

See Ashley C., 2014 IL App (4th) 131014, ¶ 22. “A trial court’s dispositional order is entitled to 

great deference and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” M.Z., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 

674. We cannot conclude, from this record, the court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 68 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

¶ 69 Respondent argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine 

C.C., one of the victims. We disagree.

¶ 70 A defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the 

two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Veach, 

2017 IL 120649, ¶ 29, 89 N.E.3d 366. To prevail on such a claim, “a defendant must show both 

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defendant.” People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (2010). To establish 

deficient performance, the defendant must show “counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.’ ” People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 14, 67 N.E.3d 233 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Prejudice is established when a reasonable probability exists that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 219-20, 808 N.E.2d 939, 953 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard, and the failure to 
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satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Clendenin, 

238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18, 939 N.E.2d 310, 319 (2010). 

¶ 71 In order to prove deficient performance, defendant “must overcome the strong 

presumption that the challenged action or inaction may have been the product of sound trial 

strategy.” People v. Bates, 2018 IL App (4th) 160255, ¶ 47, 112 N.E.3d 657. “Whether and how 

to conduct a cross-examination is generally a matter of trial strategy.” People v. Sturgeon, 2019 

IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 83, 126 N.E.3d 703. This is so because the decision whether to engage in 

cross-examining a witness involves the exercise of counsel’s professional judgment. People v. 

Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 326, 677 N.E.2d 875, 891 (1997). Only if defendant can prove trial 

counsel’s approach to cross-examination was objectively unreasonable can he prevail on an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d at 327. It is not objectively 

unreasonable if defense counsel fails to cross-examine a witness because any cross-examination 

would have only reinforced the same information on direct examination. People v. Leeper, 317 

Ill. App. 3d 475, 483, 740 N.E.2d 32, 39 (2000). Equally important, we are mindful of a defense 

counsel’s dilemma when confronted with any cross-examination of young sexual assault victims. 

Counsel must decide whether and how to approach such an examination, weighing the benefit to 

be gained against the possible damage to be caused in the eyes of the trier of fact, be it judge or 

jury. 

¶ 72 The direct examination testimony of C.C. takes up approximately 46 pages of the 

record detailing two incidents of sexual contact with respondent, one consensual and the other 

nonconsensual. Her testimony regarding the second incident included details about respondent 

locking her inside his vehicle after she attempted to leave, forcibly kissing her, pulling her pants 

down, and digitally penetrating her. Respondent stopped only when she began crying and begged 
- 29 - 

him to stop. She described to the court the physical consequences of the assault: vaginal 

soreness, some blood, and visible bruising on her thighs two weeks after the incident. She also 

outlined in detail the psychological impact respondent’s assault had on her. She had to leave 

school permanently shortly after the incident because of flashbacks and panic attacks, and she 

began to inflict self-harm and experience suicidal ideations. She was diagnosed with PTSD, 

prescribed several different medications, and became completely paranoid that she was seeing 

him everywhere. 

¶ 73 Reviewing a cold record, we are obviously unable to observe her emotional 

expressions and demeanor while relaying how respondent assaulted her and the negative 

psychological and emotional impact she suffered from the attack. Based on her testimony, it is 

plausible any questioning of this witness would potentially reinforce her direct examination 

testimony, thereby allowing the trial court to hear C.C. twice describe the assault and the 

psychological aftermath. Defense counsel may have realized this from the previous day when 

cross-examining one of the other victims, A.S. During counsel’s cross-examination of A.S., she 

was able to reference for a second time the assault she suffered in respondent’s car, the assault 

during their hike in the woods, and that respondent sent her a video of himself with a gun. 

¶ 74 Equally unable to observe A.S.’s demeanor during her testimony, we note how 

after defense counsel’s cross-examination, the State asked A.S. if she needed a tissue or wanted 

to take a break. The trial court even stated it was prepared to take a break if needed, before A.S.

stated, “it’s okay,” and indicated she was willing to proceed. Further, based on defense counsel’s 

cross-examination of A.S., the State, on redirect examination, was able to reinforce A.S’s direct 

examination testimony that she was afraid of respondent, and he threatened her and her 

boyfriend. 
- 30 - 

¶ 75 Moreover, after C.C.’s direct examination, defense counsel asked for “a little 

time,” indicating he took some time to consider how to handle C.C.’s testimony before opting to 

forgo cross-examination. Under these circumstances, we cannot say it was unreasonable trial 

strategy to forgo cross-examination of yet another sexual assault victim as an exercise of 

counsel’s professional judgement. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d at 326. It should also be noted that at 

sentencing, several witnesses mentioned the apparent behavior of respondent during certain 

unidentified witnesses’ testimony, indicating he was “laughing” and “smirking” during 

testimony. This could not have gone unnoticed by his counsel, and it could just as easily have 

entered into his decision to forgo certain cross-examination topics or cross-examination in its 

entirety. The trial court was able to judge the credibility of witnesses, and the minimal benefit to 

be gained by further cross-examination, as suggested by respondent, may have been outweighed 

by counsel’s recognition the case was being tried before the judge and not a jury. Regardless, we 

cannot find defense counsel’s failure to cross-examine C.C. was objectively unreasonable. 

Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d at 327. Because respondent cannot satisfy the first prong of the Strickland 

standard, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d at 317-18. 

¶ 76 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 77 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 78 Affirmed.