alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Alexander MITCHELL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dr. George J. BETO, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 72-2206.

United. States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct 24, 1972.

Crawford Martin, Atty. Gen., Roland Daniel Green, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellant.

Ted Fair, Waco, Tex. (Court-Appointed), for petitioner-appellee.

Before DYER, SIMPSON and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The court below granted the petitioner-appellee, Alexander Mitchell, a Texas State prisoner, habeas corpus relief from his 1957 conviction for robbery, on grounds of inefffective assistance of counsel. Mitchell v. Dr. George J. Beto, W.D.Texas, 1972. On this appeal, the respondent-appellant has not demonstrated error 1 in that ruling.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1

. In 1970, the convicting State district court, following a hearing, recommended the granting of habeas corpus relief. Relief was denied, however, by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex parte Mitchell, 462 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971). The proceedings below followed.
#### Ted Williams v. State.

No. 25144.

February 7, 1951.

*440
      *Collier & Pepper,*Houston, for appellant.

A. *C. Winborn,*District Attorney, *E. T. Branch,*Assistant District Attorney, and *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

WOODLEY, Judge.

Appellant was charged by complaint and information with the offense of theft of property of the value of over $5 and under $50, it being further alleged that he had been twice previously convicted of misdemeanor theft.

The trial was before the court upon a plea of not guilty and resulted in a judgment finding appellant “guilty of Theft (Habitual), a misdemeanor,” with a punishment of two years in jail.

H. C. Mackey, a police officer of the city of Houston, while on duty near the Rubenstein Dry Goods Store of which M. Becker, the alleged owner of the property, was the manager, saw appellant going into the store about 8:30 A.M. He was acquainted with appellant and observed him as he entered and left the store.

This officer testified that he noticed as appellant entered the store that his pants legs were stuffed into his socks and appeared normal, but when he came out his pants legs were very large, and because of their bulkiness, he suspected that he had stuffed some stolen merchandise in his pants. He approached appellant and took him back into the store.

Appellant there pulled the nine nightgowns identified by Mr. Becker as belonging to him from his pants legs.

Proof was offered establishing the previous convictions as alleged.

Appellant did not testify or offer witnesses in his behalf.

There is one bill of exception which relates to the overruling of appellant’s objection “to anything that the officer might testify to which was revealed by a search of the defendant.”

*441Testimony of the officer elicited by appellant for the purpose of this objection is set out in this bill. He testified that he had no warrant for the arrest of appellant, had not seen him commit any breach of the peace, had not been informed by anyone that he had committed a felony, and that he had no search warrant authorizing the search.

The bill does not, however, negative the right of the officer to prevent the consequences of theft. See Art. 325, C.C.P.; Munoz v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 223, 233 S.W. 2d 494.

The testimony which the witness gave as to the results of the search is not shown in the bill. See Martinez v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 576, 240 S. W. 550.

Furthermore, Mr. Becker, who was present at the time, testified without objection that appellant had the nightgowns in his overalls and pulled them out when the officer brought- him back into the store.

The evidence being sufficient to sustain the conviction and no error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 159 (Friday, August 15, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48002-48003]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18913]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i> 11308]


Illinois Disaster Number IL-00016

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 4.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Illinois 
(FEMA-1771-DR), dated 06/24/2008.
    Incident: Severe Storms and Flooding.
    Incident Period: 06/01/2008 through 07/22/2008.
    Effective Date: 07/30/2008.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 08/25/2008.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration,

[[Page 48003]]

409 3rd Street, SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for Private Non-Profit organizations in the State of 
Illinois, dated 06/24/2008, is hereby amended to include the following 
areas as adversely affected by the disaster.

Primary Counties: Greene.

    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008)

James E. Rivera,
Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. E8-18913 Filed 8-14-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 475

To repeal provisions of the Clean Air Act dealing with stratospheric ozone

protection.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 11, 1995

Mr. DELAY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Commerce

A BILL

To repeal provisions of the Clean Air Act dealing with

stratospheric ozone protection.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF CLEAN AIR ACT PROVISIONS RE4 LATING TO STRATOSPHERIC OZONE PROTEC5 TION.

6 Title VI of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 and

7 following) is hereby repealed.

Æ
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

March 27, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
129736 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 129736 COA: 254863 Macomb CC: 03-003049-FH GREGORY ARTHUR ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal th e September 29, 2005 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

t0320 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 27, 2006

Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1477

EYVONNE ARTIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

U.S. FOODS SERVICE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge. 

(1:13-cv-02870-JKB)

Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: February 9, 2016

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eyvonne Artis, Appellant Pro Se. Christine Mary Costantino, 

Karla Grossenbacher, SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Eyvonne Artis appeals the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment to U.S. Foods Service on her claims under Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 

2000e-17. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the 

district court. Artis v. U.S. Foods Serv., No. 1:13-cv-02870-

JKB (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2015). We deny Artis’ motion to appoint 

counsel and dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court, and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit










AMENDMENT #1
 TO
HUBBELL INCORPORATED
 EXECUTIVE DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN
As Amended and Restated Effective as of January 1, 2016


This Amendment #1 (the “Amendment”) is adopted by Hubbell Incorporated, a Connecticut corporation (the “Company”) for purposes of amending that certain Hubbell Incorporated Executive Deferred Compensation Plan (as Amended and Restated Effective as of January 1, 2016) (as amended, the “Plan”), as of December 4, 2019 (the “Amendment Effective Date”).  Capitalized terms used in this Amendment and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings assigned to such terms in the Plan.


WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 10.1 of the Plan, except as limited by applicable law, the Plan may be wholly or partially amended by the Committee administering the Plan from time to time, which Committee shall be the Board or a committee appointed by the Board and no such committee has been appointed with authority to amend the Plan;


WHEREAS, the Board has determined that it is advisable and in the best interests of the Company to amend the Plan as set forth herein to provide Participants with Company Contributions that generally reflect, but diverge in part from, the terms of the Savings Plan, as amended and restated, and that such amendment is permitted under Section 10.1 of the Plan.


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing recitals, the Plan is hereby amended as follows, effective as of January 1, 2020:


1.    Section 1.7 of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:


“1.7    “Bonus” shall mean any cash incentive or bonus compensation that is in addition to Base Salary, earned by a Participant under any Employer’s annual bonus and cash incentive plans, but shall not include any stock option, stock appreciation rights, other equity-based incentive award or a replacement of an award originally granted as equity compensation, commission, retention bonus or fringe benefits.  A Participant’s Bonus shall be calculated before reduction for compensation voluntarily deferred or contributed by the Participant pursuant to all qualified or nonqualified plans of any Employer and shall be calculated to include amounts not otherwise included in the Participant’s gross income under Code Sections 125, 402(e)(3), 402(h), or 403(b) pursuant to plans established by any Employer; provided, however, that all such amounts will be included in compensation only to the extent that had there been no such plan, the amount would have been payable in cash to the Employee.  


2.    Except as modified by the forgoing, the terms and conditions of the Plan shall remain in full force and effect following the adoption of this Amendment. 




        













IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has adopted this Amendment #1 to the Executive Deferred Compensation Plan as of the Amendment Effective Date 


HUBBELL INCORPORATED


By:      /s/ Katherine A. Lane            


Print Name: Katherine A. Lane


Title: Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary


Date: December 4, 2019
#### Lofton *v.*The State of Ohio.

(No. 22775

Decided May 27, 1931.)

*Mr. L. P. Henderson,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. John L. Davies*and *Mr. Booster Evans,*for defendant in error.

It is ordered and adjudged that said petition in error be, and the same is hereby, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Petition in error dismissed.*

Marshall, O. J., Jones, Matthias, Day and Robinson, JJ., concur.
18387.

#### YOUNG *v.*YOUNG.

Submitted October 14, 1953

Decided November 9, 1953.

*Cohen Anderson, Geo. M. Johnston, E. J. Goodwin,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. G. Neville, W. J. Neville,*contra.

Almand, Justice.

In a pending action brought by Veronica L. Young against Johnson Young for divorce, alimony, and custody of children, and a cross-action by the defendant praying that he be granted a divorce and that the prayers of the plaintiff for divorce and custody of the children be denied, and that he be awarded the custody of the minor children, the court, on June 27, 1953, passed an order awarding custody of the three youngest children to the defendant, and on July 16, 1953, *165amended, this order by allowing the children awarded to the defendant to visit their mother at certain times. On August 14, 1953, the plaintiff filed her petition, in which she prayed that the order awarding custody of the children to the defendant be amended so as to give the custody of Leo Young, age 12 years, to her. In this petition she alleged: that Leo Young, since being in the custody of the defendant, had lost considerable weight and was highly nervous, and cried at night to be with her; that said child does not complain to his father nor cry in his presence, because of fear he would be severely punished; that The plaintiff is in a highly nervous condition as the direct result of being unable to sleep and eat properly as the direct result of being away from the youngest son; and that said child is dissatisfied with staying with his father and prefers to stay with the plaintiff. When the petition to modify came on for a hearing, counsel for the defendant made an oral motion to dismiss the petition, on the grounds that it set out no cause of action, and that its allegations were insufficient to authorize a modification of the judgment. To the judgment sustaining this motion a bill of exceptions was sued out by the mother.

The facts alleged in the motion to modify the order granting the custody of the minor children to the defendant failed to show that there has been a sufficient change in the condition and circumstances since the custody of the minor child was awarded to the defendant, that affected the welfare of said child, to authorize the modification sought. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in sustaining the motion to dismiss the petition to modify. *Shields*v. *Bodenhamer,*180 *Ga.*122 (178 S. E. 294); *Pope*v. *Pope,*209 *Ga.*326 (72 S. E. 2d 308).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Duck-worth, C. Jnot participating.*
#### People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore Redd, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 50,589. (Abstract of Decision.)

First District, Second Division.

November 4, 1966.

Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, of Chicago (Marshall A. Patner, Frederick F. Cohn and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant; Daniel P. Ward, State’s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Carmen V. Speranza, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion by PRESIDING JUSTICE BRYANT. Not to be published in full.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 159 (Friday, August 15, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47951-47952]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18909]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Decision 
To Evaluate a Petition To Designate a Class of Employees for the Tyson 
Valley Powder Farm, St. Louis, MO, to be included in the Special 
Exposure Cohort

AGENCY: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) gives notice 
as required by 42 CFR 83.12(e) of a decision to evaluate a petition to 
designate a class of employees for the Tyson Valley Powder Farm, St. 
Louis, Missouri, to be included in the Special Exposure Cohort under 
the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 
2000. The initial proposed definition for the class being evaluated, 
subject to revision as warranted by the evaluation, is as follows:
    Facility: Tyson Valley Powder Farm.
    Location: St. Louis, Missouri.
    Job Titles and/or Job Duties: All employees.
    Period of Employment: January 1, 1942 through December 31, 1949.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Larry Elliott, Director, Office of 
Compensation Analysis and Support, National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH), 4676 Columbia Parkway, MS C-46, Cincinnati, 
OH 45226, Telephone 513-533-6800 (this is not a toll-free number). 
Information requests can also be submitted by e-mail to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e9a6aaa8baa9aaadaac7aea6bf"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4a05090b190a090e09640d051c">[email protected]</span></a>.


[[Page 47952]]


    Dated: August 11, 2008.
 Christine M. Branche,
 Acting Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health.
[FR Doc. E8-18909 Filed 8-14-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-19-P


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</html>
Opinion issued May 1 6 , 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 13
- 00149
- CR

———————————

EX PARTE JESUS BRAVO ESTEBAN , App licant

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 1857690

MEMORANDUM OPINION Applicant, Jesus Bravo Esteban, has moved to dismiss the appeal. The motion complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). See T EX
. R.
A PP
. P. 42.2(a). We have not issued a decision in the appeal. The Clerk of this Court has sent a duplicate copy of the motion to the trial court cle rk. See i d.2 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 43.2(f). We direct the Clerk to issue the mandate within 10 days of the date of this opinion. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 18.1.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Bland

. Do not publish. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2( b).
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

WILLIAM VAUGHN,

Appellant,

v.

MEGHAN VAUGHN,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-2895 

[July 25, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, 

Martin County; Michael J. McNicholas, Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-649 DR.

Michael Rebuck of Michael Todd Rebuck, P.A., Palm City, for appellant.

Karen O’Brien Steger and Lori I. Steger of Steger Law, Stuart, for 

appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The former husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage

and equitable dissolution of marital assets. Because the trial court failed 

to make statutorily required factual findings in support of its distribution 

scheme, it erred as a matter of law.1 See Callwood v. Callwood, 221 So. 

3d 1198, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). Therefore, we reverse.

Section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes (2017), which governs the instant 

dispute, requires that “any distribution of marital liabilities . . . be 

supported by factual findings in the judgment or order based on competent 

substantial evidence with reference to the factors enumerated in 

subsection (1).” That section also requires specific written findings with 

regard to “any other findings necessary to advise the parties or the 

reviewing court of the trial court’s rationale” for its distribution. § 

61.075(3)(d), Fla. Stat.

Here, the trial court failed to make the requisite section 61.075(3)(d) 

1 Further, the trial court failed to make these findings even though the former 

husband generally requested such findings in his motion for rehearing.
2

findings and did not refer to the section 61.075(1) factors in its final 

judgment as required by the statute. Instead, its final judgment included 

only a general conclusory statement that certain items were determined to 

be marital and others non-marital. Most of the contested assets were not 

specifically discussed, nor was the evidence supporting distribution 

identified so as to “advise the parties or the reviewing court” of the basis 

for the distribution. See § 61.075(3)(d), Fla. Stat. 

Reversible error occurs where “the equitable distribution in the final 

judgment is not supported by factual findings with reference to the factors 

listed in section 61.075(1), as required by section 61.075(3) when ‘a 

stipulation and agreement has not been entered and filed.’” Richardson v. 

Knight, 197 So. 3d 143, 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting § 61.075(3), Fla. 

Stat.). We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to incorporate 

the requisite factual findings into its final judgment.

Reversed and remanded with instructions. 

DAMOORGIAN, LEVINE and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1

                        COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                 1994              1995               1996
                                                             -------------     --------------     -------------
<S>                                                             <C>                <C>               <C>
Net Income                                                      3,623,204          7,119,701         7,098,556
Weighted average shares outstanding                             5,681,222          6,700,890         7,226,352
Option issued within twelve months of
  initial public offering assumed to be cheap
  stock and treated as outstanding for all
  periods.  Number of shares calculated
  using the treasury stock method in
  accordance with APB15.                                         ----              ----               ----
Number of shares calculated using the
  treasury stock method in accordance with
  APB15                                                           530,574            648,076           595,027
                                                             -------------     --------------     -------------
Total weighted average shares outstanding                       6,211,796          7,348,966         7,821,379
EARNINGS PER SHARE                                              $0.58              $0.97             $0.91
</TABLE>