alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANTTO**

** SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18,UNITED STATES CODE,**

** AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

** SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002**

Pursuant toSection 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, theundersigned, as principal executive officer and principal financial officer ofSirtris Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the “Company”), do hereby certify that totheir knowledge:

1)                            theCompany’s Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2007 fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2)                            theinformation contained in the Company’s Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarterended June 30, 2007 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.
|                        |   | /s/ Christoph Westphal                |
|------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|
|                   |   | Christoph Westphal                    |
|                   |   | President and Chief Executive Officer |
|                   |   | (principal executive officer)         |
|                   |   |                                  |
|                   |   |                                  |
|                   |   | /s/ Garen Bohlin                      |
|                   |   | Garen Bohlin                          |
|                   |   | Chief Operating Officer               |
|                   |   | (principal financial officer)         |
|                   |   |                                  |
|                   |   |                                  |
| Dated: August 13, 2007 |   |                                  |

 

----
<PAGE>




                                EXHIBIT (15)(b)
<PAGE>


                                                      [ANDERSEN LOGO]


                                                                 Exhibit (15)(b)


                                                      ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

                                                      Suite 2700
                                                      500 Woodward Avenue
                                                      Detroit MI 48226-3424

April 30, 2002                                        Tel 313 596 9000
                                                      Fax 313 596 9055

                                                      www.andersen.com

Consumers Energy Company:

We are aware that Consumers Energy Company has incorporated by reference in its
Registration Statement No. 333-73922 its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March
31, 2002, which includes our report dated April 30, 2002 covering the unaudited
interim financial information contained therein. Pursuant to Regulation C of the
Securities Act of 1933, that report is not considered a part of the registration
statement prepared or certified by our firm or a report prepared or certified by
our firm within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.


Very truly yours,


[ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP SIGNATURE]
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-18-00278-CR 

LEVI STUART NICHOLS AKA LEVI STUART NICHOLAS, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 108th District Court 

Potter County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 74,586-E, Honorable Douglas R. Woodburn, Presiding 

 

February 26, 2020 

 

ORDER 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ. 

Pending before the Court is appellant’s motion for rehearing. We clarify one matter 

addressed in the motion and otherwise deny it. The matter concerns the first footnote in 

our opinion. Through it, we observed that 1) the circumstances could raise suspicions 

about whether the sole purpose of the inventory was to search for drugs, and 2) appellant 

did not so argue below or on appeal as grounds for suppressing the contraband eventually 

found. Appellant replied to those observations by arguing that: 

In addition, the substance of footnote 1 of this Court’s opinion seems to 

imply that trial counsel below should have requested the trial court to issue 
2

fact findings on whether the totality of the circumstances evinced an intent 

on the part of the police to conduct a pretextual inventory search. However,

pretextual seizures are permitted under the current state of the law. 

Therefore, to request such a finding in the instant case would have 

accomplished little.

We make no comment on whether “pretextual seizures are permitted under the 

current state of the law.” Rather, our intent was to indicate that appellant did not question 

whether the inventory was undertaken in good faith or merely as a subterfuge to justify a 

general search for contraband. As said in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 

738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987), “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory 

procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 374 

(emphasis added). Similarly, our United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Wells, 495 

U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990), explained that inventory searches were 

permissible due to “the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a 

general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Id. at 4 (emphasis 

added). Because appellant did not contend that, under the circumstances at bar, the 

inventory procedures were not administered in “good faith” or were invoked merely as “a 

ruse for a general rummaging . . . to discover incriminating evidence,” that topic fell 

outside the scope of our review. See Washington v. State, 152 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.) (holding that the issue of whether the trial court erred in 

refusing to suppress evidence was waived because the grounds asserted on appeal did 

not comport with those proffered to the trial court). 

With that, we deny the motion for rehearing.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

JACOB HERC, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-3616

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

________________________________ )

Opinion filed February 14, 2018.

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 

9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for 

Pasco County; Kim Campbell, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

KELLY, KHOUZAM, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of BLS Media, Inc. a Nevada corporation
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), Brittany Prager, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certifies to
the best of her knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
BLS Media, Inc., and will be retained by BLS Media, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




/s/
      Brittany PragerBrittany
      Prager
                  Chief
      Executive Officer
                  November
      12, 2008
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUI T

________________________ No. 16

- 15875 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 5:15

- cr - 00010

- WTH

- PRL

- 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus RAMON VALLES, III , Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

________________________ (November 16, 2017) Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM : The Government ’ s motion to dismiss this appeal pursuant to the appeal waiver in Appellant ’ s plea agreement is GRANTED. See United States v. Bushert , 997 F.2d 1343, 1350

- 51 (11th Cir. 1993) (sentence appeal waiver will be enforced

Case: 16-15875 Date Filed: 11/16/2017 Page: 1 of 22 if it was made knowingly and voluntarily); United States v. Bascomb , 451 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 20 06) (appeal waiver “ cannot be vitiated or altered by comments the court makes during sentencing ” ); United States v. Grinard

- Henry , 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005) (waiver of the right to appeal includes waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debat able legal issues or even blatant error). Case: 16-15875 Date Filed: 11/16/2017 Page: 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                               JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                 DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                             2,837
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                          0
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       0
<PP&E>                                         1,206,536
<DEPRECIATION>                                   115,128
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,198,664
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  0
<BONDS>                                          726,103
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                             278
<OTHER-SE>                                       415,831
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,198,664
<SALES>                                          145,656
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 147,569
<CGS>                                                  0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     51,878
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                33,506
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   56,883
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               56,883
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      508
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                      56,375
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       2.26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       2.26
        

</TABLE>
#### LOUDAN v. METROPOLITAN UFE INS. CO.

No. 16131.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

May 13, 1935.

Maurice B. Gatlin, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps & Dunbar and W. B. Spencer, Jr., all of New Orleans, for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

This matter comes before us on motion to dismiss the appeal on two grounds: (1) That there was no citation of appeal issued or served on appellee; and, *(2)*that appellant has acquiesced in the judgment by withdrawing from the registry of the district court the amount deposited by defendant as admittedly due.

We shall first consider the contention that the appeal should be dismissed because of the failure to issue and serve citation of appeal.

The judgment was rendered on March 23,

1934, and was signed on March 29,1934. The motion for the appeal was made on March 2S,

1935, at a term of court subsequent to that at which the judgment had been rendered. It follows that there should have been a citation of appeal. . Code Prac. art. 573. The failure to issue and serve the citation is chargeable to appellant, because there is no prayer that it be issued and served. In Bass v. Lane et ah, 169 La. 681, 125 So. 853, 85-1, which was a case involving the very question which we are now discussing, the Supreme Court said:

> “It is the uniform ruling of this court that the omission of appellant to ask for citation of appeal and to have it served on appellee, when the order has been granted on motion in open court at a term different from that on which the judgment was rendered, is fatal to the appeal, which must be dismissed. Smith v. O’Reilly Co., 134 La. 635, 64 So. 494; King v. First Methodist Church, 137 La. 879, 69 So. 593; McGaw v. O’Bierne, 124 La. 989, 50 So. 819; Duere v. Succession of Ducre, 167 La. 133, 118 So. 864; Palmisano v. Bonner, 167 La. 1014, 120 So. 630.

> “The failure to issue and to serve a citation of appeal in this case was attributable primarily to the appellant who neglected to ask for such citation in his motion for the appeal. The penalty is the dismissal of his appeal.”

It is unnecessary that we consider the other ground.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that this appeal be, and it is, dismissed at the cost of appellant.

Appeal dismissed.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with this Report of Uplift Nutrition, Inc. (the "Registrant") as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the " Report"), I, Gary C. Lewis, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:  (1) This Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Registrant.


|      |                  |  |  |                                                          
|----- | ---------------- |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------
|      |                  |  |  |                                                          
|Date: | November 1, 2010 |  |  | /s/Gary C. Lewis                                         
|      |                  |  |  | Gary C. Lewis President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)




|      |                  |  |   |                                                                                 
|----- | ---------------- |  | - | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|      |                  |  |   |                                                                                 
|Date: | November 1, 2010 |  | : | /s/Gary C. Lewis                                                                
|      |                  |  |   | Gary C. Lewis Principal Financial Officer (CFO) and Principal Accounting Officer
**Exhibit 32**

**CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANTTO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

Pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1350 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63of Title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of ArcadeAcquisition Corp. (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’sknowledge, that:

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q forthe quarter ended June 30, 2007 of the Company fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934and information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| Dated: | August 13, 2007 | /s/ Jonathan Furer             |   |
|--------|-----------------|--------------------------------|--------|
|   |            | Jonathan Furer                 |   |
|   |            | Chief Executive Officer        |   |
|   |            | (Principal Executive Officer)  |   |
|   |            |                           |   |
|   |            |                           |   |
| Dated: | August 13, 2007 | /s/ John Chapman               |   |
|   |            | John Chapman                   |   |
|   |            | Chief Financial Officer        |   |
|   |            | (Principal Financial  Officer) |   |

 

----
#### Ex Parte Carl C. Calloway.

No. 25,275.

April 4, 1951.

Rehearing Denied May 9, 1951.

*61Hon. Henry King, Judge Presiding.

Relator represented himself.

*Henry Wade,*Criminal District Attorney, *Charles S. Potts,*Assistant District Attorney, Dallas, and *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

MORRISON, Judge.

Relator filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Honorable Henry King, Judge of the Criminal District Court No. 2 of Dallas County, Texas, who granted the same and made it returnable to this court.

From the writ it appears that relator was on June 24, 1939, convicted as an habitual criminal in the district court of Tar-rant County and given a life sentence.

Relator was at liberty by virtue of reprieves, extensions of reprieve, and a conditional pardon from 1941 until 1947.

On January 9, 1947, the Governor revoked a conditional pardon theretofore granted relator and ordered relator’s return to the penitentiary to serve the balance of his original sentence and denied him credit for any time while he was at liberty under clemency.

Relator contends that this revocation is void because the order of revocation does not show that he was guilty of a violation of any of the conditions of the conditional pardon.

*62The conditional pardon was predicated upon Executive Proclamation #4795, dated July 30, 1942, which provided that the same might be revoked if relator “is guilty at any time of any misconduct or violation of the law or — for any other reason the Governor may deem sufficient.”

This became a contract, and relator is bound by its terms.

This court will not inquire into the reasons motivating the Governor in revoking relator’s conditional pardon. The writ is denied.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.

WOODLEY, Judge.

As suggested in our original opinion, the conditional pardon granted to appellant was predicated upon and was an enlargement and extension of the clemency granted relator by proclamation of July 30, 1942, and the extensions thereof.

The conditional pardon was granted upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Paroles in order that relator might be inducted into the armed forces; was conditioned upon his acceptance by the armed forces and limited by its terms to the period of his military service only.

In his proclamation of January 9, 1947, the Governor found “that the said Carl C. Calloway has not proved himself worthy of the trust and confidence placed in him when he was released, and that he has violated, and failed to perform and fulfill the terms and conditions of the conditional pardon heretofore granted unto the said Carl C. Calloway under date of January 17, 1944, by Proclamation No. 37-2078.”

For the reasons stated in the proclamation, the Governor revoked the conditional pardon and ordered relator returned to the penitentiary.

It is not contended or alleged that relator was in fact in the military service at the time of the revocation of the conditional pardon.

We remain convinced that the relief prayed for was properly denied.

*63Relator’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion approved by the court.
#### Solomon Lindenborn v. Lillian B. Vogel.

Motion granted to the extent stated in order.
#### Mamie Peycke, Respondent, v. Waterbury Company, a Corporation, Appellant.

Judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Woodward, Hooker, Gaynor, Rich and Miller, JJ., concurred.
Order entered November 3 , 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 14

- 00563

- CR
BILLY JOE CAMPBELL, Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial C ourt Cause No. 416

- 81619

- 2012



### O RDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.
On October 27, 2014, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding wh y the
reporter’s record had not been filed. On November 3, 2014, we received the reporter’s record.

Theref ore, in the interest of expediting the appeal, we VACATE the November 27, 2014 order
requiring findings.
Appellant’s brief is due within thirty days of the date of this order.

/s/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE
#### Union Water, Light and Power Company, Respondent, v. Selwyn N. Blake, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Cochrane, J., dissenting, and Smith, P. J., not voting.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000915767
<NAME>                        Helicon Group, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                               3,694
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                          997
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     6,101
<PP&E>                                              84,369
<DEPRECIATION>                                      49,289
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      72,607
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                6,791
<BONDS>                                            143,342
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                                         (77,953)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        72,607
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    42,946
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       33,905
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 (14,520)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (5,357)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (5,357)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (5,357)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                            0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0



</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

February 3, 2016 

# Order

February 3, 2016

152851 ( 48 )

GEORGE K. TRUCHAN

, Plaintiff

- Appell ant

,

v

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF ADRIAN, JIM

KOEHN, and RICHARD L. GERMOND

, Defendant s

- Appell ees

. SC: 152851

COA: 323624

Lenawee CC: 2012

- 004423

- CZ

________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff

- appellant to extend the time

for filing his reply is GRANTED. The reply will be accepted as timely filed if submitted

on or before February 15, 2016.