alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 563

To amend the National Historic Preservation Act to prohibit the inclusion

of certain sites on the National Register of Historic Places, and for

other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 18, 1995

Mr. HERGER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Resources

A BILL

To amend the National Historic Preservation Act to prohibit

the inclusion of certain sites on the National Register

of Historic Places, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCLUSION ON NATIONAL

4 REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES.

5 Section 101(a)(6) of the National Historic Preserva6 tion Act (16 U.S.C. 470 and following) is amended by in7 serting ‘‘(A)’’ after ‘‘(6)’’ and by adding the following at

8 the end thereof:
2

•HR 563 IH

1 ‘‘(B) After the date of the enactment of this subpara2 graph, any unimproved or unmodified natural landscape

3 feature which does not contain artifacts or other physical

4 evidence of human activity that have unique significance

5 in history or pre-history shall not be—

6 ‘‘(i) eligible for inclusion on the National Reg7 ister of Historic Places;

8 ‘‘(ii) included on the National Register of His9 toric Places; or

10 ‘‘(iii) considered to be a historic or pre-historic

11 property or historic resource for purposes of this Act

12 or any other Federal law.

13 Nothing in this subparagraph shall invalidate or otherwise

14 affect any determination made under this Act or under

15 any other Federal law prior to the enactment of this sub16 paragraph with respect to any site.’’.

17 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF DESIGNATION OF MT. SHASTA

18 The Mt. Shasta area in the State of California, as

19 generally depicted on the United States Forest Service

20 map entitled ‘‘Geographic Limits Multiple Property Form

21 Mt. Shasta Native American Culture and History’’, num22 bered 1, and dated April 1993, may not be designated by

23 any agency or authority of the United States as a historic

24 district, historic site or national monument under the Na25 tional Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470 and fol-
3

•HR 563 IH

1 lowing) or the Antiquities Act (16 U.S.C. 431–433). Any

2 designation made prior to the enactment of this Act which

3 is inconsistent with the preceding sentence shall cease to

4 have any force and effect upon the enactment of this Act.

5 The map referred to in this section shall be on file and

6 available for public inspection in the offices of the United

7 States Forest Service, Department of Agriculture.

Æ
Exhibit 32.1









CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







In connection with the annual report of Veracity Management Global, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the nine months ended March 31, 2011 (the “Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Gregory L. Paige, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Gregory L. Paige





Gregory L. Paige


Chief Executive Officer


Dated: May 19, 2011





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Veracity Management Global, Inc. and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report
on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 of Everest Reinsurance Holdings, Inc., a coporation
organized under the laws of Delaware (the Company), filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as enacted by section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the
               Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
|-- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
               respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

March 18, 2004

|                            | 
|--------------------------- | 
|/s/ JOSEPH V. TARANTO       | 
|Joseph V. Taranto          
|Chairman and Chief         
|Executive Officer          
|                            | 
|/s/ STEPHEN L. LIMAURO      | 
|Stephen L. Limauro         
|Executive Vice President   
|and Chief Financial Officer
#### James Majors v. State.

No. 24843.

June 21, 1950.

*89No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor in such county, a dry area, and fined the sum of $100.00, and he appeals.

On or about the 26th day of August, 1949, Ed Hofacket and R. H. Kennedy, police officers, armed with a search warrant, searched the premises of the appellant for intoxicating liquors. They found one pint of whisky, two cases of beer, and ten cans of beer. The pint of whisky was found over a clothes closet under some clothes. The ten cans of beer were in the ice box, and two cases of beer were up in the attic. The whisky was found in the living room.

The “dryness” of the area where the liquor was possessed seems to have been amply established by the testimony.

The court’s charge, upon which the case was submitted to the jury, appears to have been entirely satisfactory to the appellant, no objection appearing in the record as to such charge, and no special requested charges having been asked for.

Bill No. 1 complains that when the Policeman Kennedy was testifying on cross-examination, defense counsel asked him, “Mr. Kennedy, state to the jury in your opinion how long ten cans of cold beer would last in the business where it was being sold. In other words, was that a pretty cold stock, or do you think he should have had more than ten cans cold if he was selling beer there at these premises?” State’s counsel objected to the question on the ground that it was opinion evidence, and *90the court sustained the objection. This bill goes to the refusal of the trial court to permit the witness to answer the question. In the first place, we see no materiality in such question; and again, the bill is insufficient in that nowhere therein is it shown what the answer of the witness would have been had he been allowed to give his opinion. Authorities are so numerous that they need not be mentioned.

Bill No. 2 relates to the introduction of the fruits of the search of appellant’s premises because of certain claimed defects in such warrant. We think the court’s qualification disposes of any such defects, if such there be, because it is shown that both appellant and his wife testified to the possession of all the intoxicating liquor found in their home, claiming that they were rather heavy beer drinkers and had same for their own personal use. See 4 Tex. Jur., p. 586, sec. 414, et seq.

Bill No. 4 seems to have occurred during the cross-examination of appellant’s wife, who testified: “We’ve never sold any beer before this offense.” Whereupon the county attorney said, “That is, before,” and immediately appellant moved for a dismissal of the case. The trial court sustained appellant’s objection to the remark of the county attorney and instructed the jury not to consider the question of the county attorney for any purpose. We see no error shown therein.

Finding no reversible error shown in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 47903 

[FR Doc. E8–18640 Filed 8–14–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–C 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

[Transmittal Nos. 08–95] 

36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification 

AGENCY: Department of Defense, Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing the unclassified text of a 

section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. 

This is published to fulfill the 

requirements of section 155 of Public 

Law 104–164 dated 21 July 1996. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601–

3740. The following is a copy of a letter 

to the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives, Transmittals 08–95 

with attached transmittal, policy 

justification, and Sensitivity of 

Technology. 

Dated: August 5, 2008. 

Patricia L. Toppings, 

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, 

Department of Defense. 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–M 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES

47904 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 


mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICESEN15AU08.033</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 47905 


mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICESEN15AU08.034</GPH>
47906 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 


mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICESEN15AU08.035</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 47907 


mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICESEN15AU08.036</GPH>
47908 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 

[FR Doc. E8–18642 Filed 8–14–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–C 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

[Transmittal Nos. 08–76] 

36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification 

AGENCY: Department of Defense, Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing the unclassified text of a 

section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. 

This is published to fulfill the 

requirements of section 155 of Public 

Law 104–164 dated 21 July 1996. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601–

3740. 

The following is a copy of a letter to 

the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives, Transmittals 08–76 

with attached transmittal, policy 

justification, and Sensitivity of 

Technology. 

Dated: August 5, 2008. 

Patricia L. Toppings, 

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, 

Department of Defense. 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–M 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
#### Ronald W. Sadewater, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. City of Champaign, Illinois, a Municipal Corporation, and L. E. Kirby, as Superintendent of Building Inspection of the City of Champaign, Illinois, and Frank K. Robeson, Defendants-Appellants.

Gen. No. 10,769. (Abstract of Decision.)

Fourth District.

August 11, 1966.

*196Busch, Harrington & Porter, of Champaign (Thomas E. Harrington, of counsel), and Albert Tuchorn and James W. Evans, of Champaign, for appellants; Webber, Balbach, Thies & Follmer, of Urbana (Richard L. Thies, of counsel), for appellees.

Opinion by JUSTICE SMITH. Not to be published in full.
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONSOLIDATED
BALANCE SHEET, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF
CASH FLOWS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
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<CASH>                                           2,954
<SECURITIES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           50,726
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<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        38,138
<OTHER-SE>                                    (68,752)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    24,894
<SALES>                                         55,988
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                55,988
<CGS>                                           48,778
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   48,778
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,916
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,032
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,301)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (11,301)
<DISCONTINUED>                                (30,541)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (41,842)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (7.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (7.68)
        

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18488.

#### Gibson *v.*The State.

Wyatt, Presiding Justice.

Elijah Gibson was convicted of murder without recommendation, in Pulaski Superior Court. His motion for new trial, as amended, was denied. The exception here is to that judgment. *Held:*

1. The evidence as to the facts surrounding the killing was ample to establish an unmitigated killing. The evidence as to the mental condition of the accused was conflicting. It follows, there is no merit in the general grounds of the motion for new trial.

2. The first special ground of the motion for new trial contends that a new trial should have been granted because of newly discovered evidence. This evidence concerned the mental condition of the accused, and was entirely cumulative of evidence adduced upon the trial of the case. It was, therefore, not error to deny this ground of the motion for new trial. See Code § 70-204 and annotations.

*441Submitted February 8, 1954

Decided March 8, 1954.

' *John F. Floyd, D. C. Chalker,*for plaintiff in error.

*Roger H. Lawson, Solicitor-General, Lovejoy Boyer, Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Rubye G. Jackson,*contra.

3. The second special ground complains of the following excerpt from the charge of the court: “Where the issue of insanity is involved, the burden is on the defendant to show, to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time of the alleged commission of the act charged against him he was insane. Whether or not that has been done, either by evidence from the State or established by evidence from the defendant or both is a question for the jury.” It is contended that the language, “Whether or not that has been established, either by evidence from the State or established by evidence from the defendant, or both, is a question for the jury,” was error, for the reason that the law places the burden on the defendant and not on the State to establish insanity. There is no merit in this contention. It is true that the law places the burden of establishing the fact of insanity upon the defendant in a criminal case, but certainly the jury should consider all the evidence on the question, whether offered by the State or the defendant. It follows, it was not error to deny a new trial for any reason assigned.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### Michele Perricone, an Infant, by Michela Perricone, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. The Godwin Construction Company, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion. Woodward, Jenks, Hooker, Gaynor and Miller, JJ., concurred.
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of TJS Wood Flooring, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Brandi Iannelli, Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  1. The Report fully complies with requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  /s/ Brandi Iannelli Brandi Iannelli Title: President and Chief Financial Officer   July 17, 2007
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Form 10-QSB
for the Quarterly Period Ended September 30, 2000, and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
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<PERIOD-START>                          JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                            SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                        1,003
<SECURITIES>                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                                18,773
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<INVENTORY>                               3,513,121
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<PP&E>                                       65,159
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<PREFERRED>                                       0
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<OTHER-SE>                               (3,287,919)
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         11,458,374
<CGS>                                     9,218,769
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            11,299,752
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</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARTHUR MARCELO,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

MATTHEW CATE,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 08-56609

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01328-CAS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 21, 2010** 

Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. 

California state prisoner Arthur Marcelo appeals from the district court’s

judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging the Board of

Prison Terms’s 2004 and 2005 decisions denying parole. We dismiss.

FILED

NOV 28 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-56609

 The record reflects that Marcelo received a new parole hearing in 2010 and

has been released on parole. Thus, there is no injury that can be redressed by a

favorable decision, and the case is moot. See Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996,

999-1001 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1097-98

(9th Cir. 1997) (“Because Munoz has been released . . . , we can no longer provide

him the primary relief sought in his habeas corpus petition”). 

The state’s motion for judicial notice is granted. 

William Charles Melcher’s motion to withdraw as Marcelo’s counsel is also

granted. 

DISMISSED.
#### Rourke Realty Company, Respondent, v. Gilbert Everingham and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with Ernest Flagg, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with ten, dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion. Hirschberg, P. J,, Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor and Miller, JJ., concurred.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM MAGNUM
RESOURCES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1996
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  512,350
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (11,701)
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,916,063
<PP&E>                                       3,135,048
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,611,465)
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<CGS>                                        5,491,706
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,491,706
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                11,701
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              33,171
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (261,180)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (15,000)
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</TABLE>