If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re DAVIS, Minors. June 23, 2022

No. 358461

Calhoun Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2015-002148-NA

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and SAWYER and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights 

to the minor children, QD and VD, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). On appeal, father argues that the 

trial court erred when it determined that reasonable efforts had been made to reunify the family. 

We disagree and affirm.

I. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise the issue before the 

trial court. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). Arguing that his challenge 

to whether the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite the family is preserved, father represents 

that, during closing arguments at the termination trial, he requested more time and services. 

However, in In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 27; 610 NW2d 563 (2000), this Court explained that 

“[t]he time for asserting the need for accommodation in services is when the court adopts a service 

plan, not at the time of a dispositional hearing to terminate parental rights.” Accordingly, father’s 

request for more time during closing arguments at the termination trial was insufficient to preserve 

his reasonable efforts argument. See id.

Generally, this Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts 

were made to preserve and unify a family. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 

192 (2005).

The clear-error standard controls our review of both the court’s decision 

that clear and convincing evidence supported a ground for termination and that 
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termination served the children’s best interests. Clear error exists when some 

evidence supports a finding, but a review of the entire record leaves the reviewing 

court with the definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a mistake. In 

reviewing the circuit court’s decision, we also must give due regard to the trial 

court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses. [In re Dearmon, 303 Mich 

App 684, 699-700; 847 NW2d 514 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

However, this Court reviews for plain error affecting substantial rights unpreserved issues. 

Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8. “Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted 

in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.” 

People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (quotation marks, citation, and 

alteration omitted).

Father contested termination throughout the trial court proceedings. Therefore, to the 

extent father challenges the trial court’s findings on the statutory grounds for termination or 

whether termination was in the children’s best interests, this claim of error is preserved. See 

Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8.

The trial court must find at least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and 

convincing evidence in order to terminate parental rights. In re Gonzalez/Martinez, 310 Mich App 

426, 431; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). If this Court finds that the trial court did not clearly err as to the 

existence of one ground for termination, this Court need not address any additional termination 

grounds. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Additionally, “[e]ven 

if the trial court finds that the Department has established a ground for termination by clear and 

convincing evidence, it cannot terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also finds by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children.” 

Gonzalez/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434.

II. REASONABLE EFFORTS

The trial court did not plainly err when it found that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to 

reunify the family.

Generally, during the dispositional phase, the DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make 

reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks, 

500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c), and 

MCL 712A.19a(2). “As part of these reasonable efforts, the Department must create a service plan 

outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court 

involvement and to achieve reunification.” Hicks, 500 Mich at 85-86. The case service plan must 

include, in relevant part, a schedule of services “to be provided to the parent, child, and if the child 

is to be placed in foster care, the foster parent, to facilitate the child’s return to his or her home or 

to facilitate the child’s permanent placement.” MCL 712A.18f(3)(d); see also In re Mason, 486 

Mich 142, 156; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). The parent should be given a reasonable time to make 

changes and benefit from services before termination of parental rights. See Mason, 486 Mich 
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at 159. The trial court should regularly update the plan to account for the parent’s progress and 

developing needs. Id. at 156.

The trial court did not plainly error when it found that reasonable efforts had been made to 

reunify the family. As the trial court found, this case did not “begin” in January 2019 when the 

children were removed. The older children had been removed from their home three times. Father 

and mother had an extensive history of involvement with Children’s Protective Services dating 

back to 2015. When QD and the older children were returned to mother’s care, QD was not 

returned to father because father was found to not have benefited from services. Father was offered 

parenting-time visits and drug screens, but his participation in these services was spotty at best. 

Although father reported attending individual counseling, Merridessa Katz, testifying as an expert 

in psychology, testified that she did not see how father had benefited from counseling, even after 

three removals. Caseworkers testified that father refused to participate in services.

Father’s argument about the COVID-19 pandemic is without merit. Termination occurred 

in 2019. COVID-19 related shutdowns in our state first occurred in March 2020. In re Certified 

Questions from the United States Dist Court, 506 Mich 332, 338; 958 NW2d 1 (2020).

As discussed later, any error did not affect father’s substantial rights because the record 

supported the trial court’s findings on the statutory ground for termination and the children’s best 

interests.

III. STATUTORY GROUND

Although father makes no affirmative argument that the statutory grounds for termination 

were not met or that termination was not in the children’s best interests, we have reviewed the 

record and are satisfied with the trial court’s findings.

Father’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), which provides 

as follows:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court 

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent.

Termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) is proper when “[t]here is a 

reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be 

harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” See also Gonzalez/Martinez, 310 Mich 

App at 433-434. This statutory factor considers not only the harm that may result from the parent’s 

conduct toward the child but also harm that might reasonably result from the parent’s conduct 

around the child, such as exposing a child to individuals with criminal backgrounds who might 
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exploit the children or otherwise place them at risk. See In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 712; 846 

NW2d 61 (2014). A parent’s “lengthy period of instability” stemming from mental-health issues, 

combined with a present and “continuing lack of judgment, insight, and empathy” for a child is 

also relevant to this statutory ground. Utrera, 281 Mich App at 25. This Court has recognized 

that Subdivision (j) considers not only the prospect of physical harm, but also the risk of emotional 

harm. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Harm may also include 

the prospect that the parent’s behavior would negatively influence the children. See In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court must “scrutinize 

the likelihood of harm if the child were returned to the parent’s home” at the conclusion of the 

child protective proceedings, not at that exact moment in time. See In re Pops, 315 Mich App 

590, 600; 890 NW2d 902 (2016).

Record testimony properly supported the trial court’s finding that the DHHS had met its 

burden on this statutory ground. Katz testified that father’s psychological evaluation revealed that 

father had narcissistic tendencies, an inability to put the needs of the children ahead of his own, 

and a large need for control, which combined with his suppressed anger and volatility, potentially 

placed the children at risk of harm. Testimony reflected that the children were scared of father. 

Testimony reflected that at least one child witnessed father physically abusing mother. Testimony 

reflected that mother and father would argue and fight in front of the children to a degree that 

caused the children to hide in one of their closets. Testimony reflected that drugs were present in 

the home and that father consistently, when he tested, tested positive for controlled substances. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that the DHHS met its burden on this 

statutory ground.

IV. BEST INTERESTS

“In making its best-interest determination, the trial court may consider the whole record, 

including evidence introduced by any party.” In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 237; 894 NW2d 

653 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s 

parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a 

foster home over the parent’s home,” are all factors for the court to consider when deciding 

whether termination is in the best interests of the child. White, 303 Mich App at 713. A child’s 

placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to consider. Mason, 486 Mich 

at 164; see MCL 712A.19a(6)(a). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic 

violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history 

with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” White, 303 

Mich App at 714. On appeal, this Court places its focus on the child rather than the parent. In re 

Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).

The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination was in QD and VD’s best 

interests. Even though QD was very young, this case was not his first removal. His older siblings 

had been removed three times. Father was found to not have benefited from services in those 

previous cases. Father had been accused of domestic violence, and at least one of the children 

reported seeing father physically abuse mother. The older children reported being afraid of father. 

The numerous removals the older children had faced without significant improvement from father 
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(or mother) in rectifying their consistent barriers reflected a sense that QD and VD would not know 

stability, permanence, or a sense of safety while in father’s care. QD and VD were placed together 

in a preadoptive home, where they had experienced no developmental problems, despite VD being 

born positive for controlled substances.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett