### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 539 -CR

Int e r nat ion al F ide lit y I nsur anc e Co m pany , A ppe lla nt
v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 167TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GV-08- 0020 87 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I nternational Fidelity I nsuranc e Company (“I nterna tional Fidelity ”) a

ppeals the tria l
c ourt ’s jud g me nt a

wa rd ing $3 0, 00 0 plus c ourt c os ts to the Sta te of Te xas i n a

bo nd -f or fe iture su it
a g a ins t A rm a nd o G ome z, a s p ri nc ipa l, a nd I nte rn a tio na l F ide lity , a s su re ty . T he State file d s uit wi thi n th e fo ur -y e a r s ta tut e of lim itatio ns, but f

a ile d to pr op e rl y

se rv e I nte rn a tio na l F ide lity un til three -and- one-ha lf mo n t hs after the limitations period ha d expired. The trial c ourt found that the State was dilig ent in its e ffor ts to serve I nterna tional F idelity and ente red a

judgme nt in favor of

the Sta te . I nte rn a tio na l Fid e lity c la ims that the statut e of lim itatio ns ba rr e d the a c tio n b e c a

us e the Sta te failed to e x erc ise due dilig ence in eff ecting service
. Be cause we c onclude that ther e wa s sufficient
e vid e nc e to s up po rt

a fi nd ingof

du e dil ig e nc e , w e wi ll a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.T h i s o r i g i n a l j u d g m e n tn i s i w a s l a t e r a m e n d e d t o n a m e In t e r

n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y a s s u r e t y. 1 Moore be came I nternational Fi d el i t y ’s reg istered a g ent in 2004 and re mained its ag ent 2 thr ou g ho ut t

he tim e pe ri od

re le va nt t o th is a

pp e a l. 2 BACK GR OUND Gomez w as arr ested for sexual a ssault a nd his ba il wa s set for $30,000. Roel Z amora , then an a g ent of International Fidelity , posted a bond for Gomez. When Gomez failed to appe ar f or tr ia l on Se pte mbe r 3 0, 20 04 , a jud g me nt fo r $30 ,0 00 plu s cou rt c os ts w a s r e nd e re d a g a ins t hi m. The 1 State took no immediate action to sec ure pa y ment of the judg ment. Se ve ra l y e a rs la te r, I nte rn a tio na l Fid e lity re qu e ste d the re tur n o f t he $5 0, 00 0 s e c ur ity it had provided to the Travis County Ba il B ond Boa rd. The secur ity was a condition for I nterna tional F ide lity ’s lic e ns e to make ba il bo nd s thr ou g h Z a mor a , wh o, a s o f 2 00 4, no lon g e r h a d th e a uth or ity to act on beha lf of I nternational Fidelity
. T o d eter mine whether

a re turn of the se curity

was appropr iate, Sharon Ta lley , the Assistant Travis County Attorney repr esenting the Ba il B ond Boa rd, conduc t ed resear ch into I nternational Fidelity ’s outstanding bond-for feiture liability . Talley discovere d five pe nding bond- forf eiture suits and one bond forf eiture, Gomez’s, on which suit had
no t y et been fi le d. On

Se pte mbe r 9 , 2 00 8, Ta lle y ob ta ine d a

n ame nd e d ju dg me nt n isi a g a ins t I nternational Fidelity , and filed suit a g ainst Gomez a nd I nterna tional F idelity
. Also on September 9, Talley reque sted that the district cler k’s office issue citations to be serve d on the def endants. She testified at trial that she did not believe she told the cler k whom to serve a s I nterna tional Fidelity ’s ag ent, but that she had filed an updated “g uideline sheet” with the cler k’s office that same day , listi ng various sure ties’ ag ents for se rvice of proc ess, including Roge r Moore , I nterna ti o n al Fide lity ’s
a t t o r n e y, a s a g e n tf

o r In t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y. On S eptember 10, 2008, Talley sent an e mail to Moore 23

w i t h a n a t t a c h e d s p r e a d s h e e t i d e n t i f yi n g t h e s i x o u t s t a n d i n g b o n d

- f o r f e i tu r e s u i t s f

o u n d b y T a l l e y, including the cause number for the suit she had filed the day befor e ag ainst Gomez and I nterna tional Fidelity , stating, “ Call me if y ou have a ny questions.” A citation naming Z am o ra as the re cipient of ser vice on be half of I

nternational Fidelity was de livered on O ctober 13, 2008 to I rene Cavazos, a t h i rd p ar t y wh o has neve r bee n employ ed by

I nternational Fidelity , at an a ddress unoc cupied by I nterna tional Fidelity since 2004. Talley testified that the mistake in put ting Za mora’s name on the citation was “ not by [her] office,” sug g esting that she believed it to be a mistake by the cler k’s offic e. Ta lley

further testified that the Travis County Attorney ’s Offic e was not g iven a copy of the off icer ’s re turn, as it is not customary fo r the c on sta

ble to se nd a c op y of the re tur n of se rv ic e to the m. I ns te a d, Ta lle y re lie d o n F AC TS,
a ca s e i n fo rm ation databa se kept by the cler k’s offic e, to conf

irm that proper

service had bee n complet e d
. O n O c to b e r 1 3 , 2 0 0 8 , th e F A CT S f il e r e f le c te d a n e xe c u te d s e r

v ic e o f c it ation on I nternational Fidelity , but did not indicate to w hom the citation was a ddresse d. No furthe r ef fort wa s
ma de by the Sta te to s e rv e Mo or e un til Ta lle y a sk e d T im L a

ba die , a lso a n A ssi sta

nt T ra vis County Attorney , to look into t he six outstanding Interna tional Fidelity case s. L abadie testified that he sa w the notation of citation in FA CTS, but was conce rned be cause he had not y et re ceive d an answ er fr om M oo re , w ho m he ha d wo rk e d wi th in t he pa st a nd wh o ty pic a lly a ns we re d p ro mpt ly . B e c a us e of this c oncer

n, L abadie looked at the office r’s return and discovere d that Moore ha d not been se rved
a s Inte rn a tio na l F ide lity ’s a g e nt. Up on dis c ov e ri ng the fa ile d s e rv ic e on Janu a ry 14 , 2 00 9, L a

ba die promptl y p re p ar ed a new citation and aske d the cler k’s offic e to complete se rvice on Moore. A4

c itatio n w a s p re pa

re d a nd de liv e re d to t

he c on sta ble on Janu a ry 15 , a nd Mo or e wa s su c c e ssf

ull y
serve d as I nternational Fidelity ’s ag ent on J anuar y 27. At tr ia l, I nte rn a tio na l Fid e lity too k th e po sit ion that th e Sta te ’s bo nd -f

or fe iture su it was ba rre d by the applica

ble statute of limitations. T h e t ri al co urt deter mined that the statute of limit ations was not a ba

r t o the S tate’s action beca use t he S tate exerc ised due dilig ence in serving I nte rn a tio na l F ide lity . I t awa rd e d th e Sta te $3 0, 00 0 p lus c ourt c os ts. I nte rn a tio na l F ide lity a pp e a ls, challeng ing the trial court’ s determination that the State a cted with due dilig ence . STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Whe the r a

pla int if f a c te d w ithdu e dil ig e nc e is g e ne ra lly a qu est io n of

fa c t. E i ch el v. Ul lah , 8 3 1 S. W. 2 d 4 2 , 4 3 ( T e x. A p p . — E l Pa s o 1 9 9 2 , n o w r it )
. T h e qu e s ti o n o f due diligenc e may

be answ ere d as a matter of law only when a delay in service is “unexplained or patently unrea sonable.” Pr ou lx

v . W e lls , 235 S.W .3d 213, 216 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). Whether d il ig e n c e is la c k in g a s a matt e r o f la w is a c o n c lu s io n o f la

w to b e r e v ie w e d d e n ovo. S ee, e .g. , Ashley v . Hawkins , 293 S.W .3d 175, 180-81 (Te x . 2009). W e will uphold the trial court’ s conclusion of law if the judg ment can be sustained on any leg al theory

supported by

the evidenc e. BMC Software Belg. N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W .3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).

I n a be n ch trial wher e, as in this case , no finding s of fact or conclusions of law are fi le d o r r e qu e ste d, we wi ll in fer tha t th e tr ia l c ourt ma de a ll the ne c e ssa

ry fi nd ing s to su

pp or t it s judgme nt. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v . Heine , 835 S.W .2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). Be cause a re porter’ s
rec ord wa s fi l ed , t h ese impl ied finding s may be cha lleng ed for

evidentiar

y sufficie ncy . Id. at 84. T h e s t an d ar d s o f r ev i ew ar e t h e s am e a s t h o s e ap p l i ed t o j u ry fi n d i n gs an d

a c o u rt ’s ex p re s s fi n d i n gsWe rec og nize the court of c riminal appea ls’ rec ent opinion in Br oo k s v . S tat e , __ S.W .3d 3 __, No. PD 0210-09, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. L EXI S 1240 (Tex. Crim. App. October 6, 2010) , which merg ed the f

actua l a nd leg al sufficie ncy standards in its revie w of a c riminal conviction. Id . at *57. Howeve r, bec ause bond- forf eiture c ases a

re reg ulated by the rules that g overn c ivil actions, the new criminal standar d of re view outlined in Br oo k s is not applicable to the fa cts of this case
. 5 o f f act. W a d e v. Commission for Law

yer D iscipline , 961 S.W .2d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Di st. ] 19 97 , no wr it)
. Whe n th e imp lie d f ind ing s o f f

a c t are su pp or te d b y the e vid e nc e , w e mus t aff irm the judg ment on any

theory of law a pplicable to the c ase. In re W .E.R. , 669 S.W .2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984). We reviewthe trial cour t’s fac tual fi n d i n g fo r leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the evidenc e. While bond-forf eiture pr ocee dings a

re c riminal case s in which the Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls has final state-c ourt jurisdiction, se e Sa fe ty Nat ’l Cas . Co rp . v . S

tat e , 305 S.W .3d 586, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), appellate revie w of bond for feiture s is controlled by the same r

ules that g overn the revie w of c ivil actions. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc . Ann. ar t. 44.44 (West 2006). For this reaso n , we ap ply

civil case law re g arding I nterna tional Fidelity ’s leg al and f actua l sufficie ncy

challeng e. 3 I n conducting a leg al-suff iciency revie w, a c ourt must consider evidenc e in the lig ht
mos t f a vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t, a nd ind

ulg e e ve ry re a so na

ble inf e re nc e that wo uld su

pp or t it
. City of Kelle r v. W ilson , 1 68 S.W. 3d

80 2, 82 2 ( Te x. 20 05 ). Th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly su ff ic ie nt i f i t w ou ld
en ab l e fa i r-minded people to rea ch the f inding unde r re view. Id. a t 8 2 7
. I n r e v ie w in g f a c tu al sufficie ncy

of the e vidence , we must consider and weig h all the evidenc e and should set a side the judgme nt only if it is so contra ry to the overw helming weig ht of the evidenc e as to be clea rly wrong and unjust. Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). We do not eng ag e in our6

own fa ctual re view. Rather , the trial judge is the “sole judge of the c redibility of the witnesse s and the weig ht to be g iven their testimony .” McG alliard v. Kuhlmann , 7 2 2 S
. W
. 2 d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). We may

not substit ute o u r judgme nt for that of the trial court. W alker v

. Gutierrez , 111 S.W .3d 56, 63 (Tex. 2003).
DI SCU SSIO N

I nternational Fidelity

argues that the State’s a ction is barre d by the s tatute of limit ations for bond for feiture actions. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 22.18 (West Supp. 2009). I t cl ai m s t hat, bec ause the State offe red no e x planation for the delay in serving I nternational Fidelity , diligenc e is lacking as a mat t er o f law, a nd the statute of limitations acts as a complete defe nse.

Article 22.18 of t he Tex as C ode of Criminal Procedur e crea tes a four -y ear statute of limit ations on bond forfe iture ac tions by the State, re quir i n g a s u i t t o be broug ht on or befor e the fourth annive rsar

y of the date that the principal fails to appea r in court. See id . G ome z’s fa ilure to appea r occ urre d on September 30, 2004; there fore the State had until September 30, 2008 to file a n acti o n to f

o r f e it th e b a il b o n d
. I t is u n d is p u te d th a t T a ll e y in it iate d th e s u it within the lim itati on s period, bu t th a t Mo or e wa s n ot p ro pe rl y se rv e d a s Inte rn a tio na l F ide lity ’s a g e nt u nti l J anuar y 14, 2009, approximately

three -and- one-ha lf months after limi tations had ex pired. W hen a plaintiff files suit within the statute of limit ations, but doe s not serve the defe ndant until after the statute of limitations has run, the date of s er v i ce r elates ba ck to the date of filing if the plaintiff exercised due diligenc e in ef fec t i n g s ervic e. Gant v. De Leon , 786 S.W .2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990) (p er cu ri am ) ( ci t i n g Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum , 5 2 0 S
. W
. 2 d 8 8 9 , 8 9 0 ( T e x . 1 9 7 5 ) ( p e r c u r i a m ) )
. If7

due dilige nce w as not exercised, the l aw s u i t is deemed f iled on the date of

service
. Id. The questions be fore this Court are twofold: whe ther the tria l court er red by not concluding that diligenc e was lac king a s a matter of law, and whether the evidence is leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the t rial cour

t’s finding that the State exercised dilig ence in obtaining se rvice upon In t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y. Diligence as a Matter of Law

Although the qu es t i o n of dilige nce is g ener ally a fa ct question, a plaintiff ma y de mon str a te a

la c k o f d ili g e nc e a s a

ma tte r o f l a w, “ wh e n one or mor e la ps e s b e tw e e n s e rv ic e e ff

or ts
are unexplained or patently unrea sonable.” Pr ou lx , 235 S.W .3d at 216. L ack of diligenc e may

be found even in the face of an offere d explanation, if that explanation aff irmatively establishes lac k of re asonable diligenc e. Id . When a def endant ha s aff

irmatively

pleade d the def

ense of limit ations
a nd sh ow n th a t se rv ic e wa s n ot t ime ly , a s Inte rn a tio na l Fid e lity ha s d on e he re , th e burd e n s hif ts t o the pl aintiff to prove dili g ence . Id. (citing Murray v . San Jacinto Age ncy, I nc. , 800 S.W .2d 826, 830 (Tex. 1990)). I f the plaintiff’ s expl anation for the delay raises a materia l fac t issue conce rning the dil ig e nc e of

se rv ic e e ff

or ts, the burd e n s hif

ts ba c k to the de fe nd a nt to co nc lus ive ly sh ow wh y , a s a matter of la

w, the explanation is insufficient. Id. The S tate’s ex planation for the delay consisted of the f ollowing: the State attempted to promptly

serve I n t er n ational Fide lity , the er ror in ser vice wa s not the State’s err or, the c lerk’s office aff irmatively

repres en t ed that service ha d been suc cessf ully completed throug h its notation of ser vice in the F ACTS sy s t em , an d i m mediately upon lear

ning of the er ror, the State e ffe cted service on Moore a s I nternational Fidelity ’s age nt. I nterna tional Fidelity argues t hat t his ex planation8

by the Sta te wa s n ot a

n e xplanatio n at a ll, and that di lig e nc e is l a c kin g a s a ma tte r o f l a w b e c a

us e the three -month delay was an unexplained la pse of diligenc e. I nterna tional F idelit y , h o we ver, conflates lack of explanation with inactivity , arguing that beca use t he S tate did not take a ny actions for months, and be cause it did not ex plain how the miscommun i cation with the cle rk’s off ice
occur red, it wa s not dili g ent. Thoug h there wer e sever al months of inactivity , the State did provide an explanation: it relied on the F AC T S s y s tem’s notation that service had bee n eff ecte d, unawa

re that a mistake by

the cler k’s offic e made service unsucce ssful. The c ases c ited by I nternational F idelity as examples of lack of diligenc e as a

matter of law diff

er f rom the cur

rent fact s , as t h ey

involve situations in which the plaintiffs provided no explanation at all for one or more pe riods of inac tivity
. See R igo Mfg. Co. v. Thomas , 458 S.W .2d 180, 182 (Tex. 1970) (holding l ack of diligenc e ex isted as matter of law whe n responde nts waited
se ve nte e n mont

hs a ft e r le a rn ing of imp ro pe r s e rv ic e to c or re c t it ); Pe rk

ins v . G ro ff , 936 S.W .2d 661, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, wr it denied) (upholding summary judgme nt beca

use there was “ no
e xplana tio n f

or the de lay ” in s e rv ic e ); Liles v. Phillips , 6 77 S. W. 2 d 8 0 2 , 8 0 9 ( T e x. App.—For

t Worth 1984, writ ref

’d n.r.e.) (holding l ack of dilige nce e x isted as matter of law whe n ap p e ll e e “ o f

f e r e d n o e xp la

n a ti o n w h a ts o e v e r c o n c e r n in g th e d e la

y b e tw e e n f

il in g s u it a n d

service of c itatio n” ); Allen v. Be ntley Labs, Inc. , 538 S.W .2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1976, writ re f’ d n . r.e.) (upholding summary judgme nt finding la ck of dilig ence as matter of law whe n appellant “ did not plead o r o ffer any excuse for the delay

of almost six months in serving [appellee]”); W

i l liams v. Houston-Citizens Bank & Trust C o. , 531 S.W .2d 434, 436 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (upholding j udg ment finding lack of diligenc e9

as matter of

law whe n appellee “off

ere d no explanation of the delay betwee n issuance of the first and
se c on d c itatio ns ” ); Buie v. Couch , 126 S.W .2d 565, 567 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1939, wr it ref’ d) (holding , when a

ppellee f ailed to asc erta in whether the cler k had pre pare d ci t at i o n , that “[s] uch conduct on his par

t, without any

excuse t h er ef

o re , i s wholly

inconsistent with due diligenc e and constitutes neg lige nce a s a matter of law”)
. Fur thermore , case law supports the e x istence of a fa ct question when a

plaintiff attempts timely

service , but miscommuni cations or mistakes by the district cler

k’s offic e unknown to the plaintiff re sult in service be ing unsuc cessf ul. See Ho dg e v . S

mi th , 8 5 6 S. W. 2 d

2 1 2 , 2 1 7 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Dis t.] 199 3, wr it d e nie d) ; Valdez v. Charles Orsinger Buick Co. , 715 S.W .2d 126, 128 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1986, no writ). I n Hodge , the district cler k provided a

postcard notice to pla intiff that the def endant had bee n serve d via publication, even though the plaintiff’s inadve rtent fa ilure to sign the supporting aff idavit rende red se rvice ineffe ctive. 856 S.W .2d at 217. Rely ing on the postcard, counsel for the plaintiff delay ed in obta ining pe rsonal ser vice f or seve ral months. Id . The Hodge court re verse d the trial court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt based on limitations. Id. The court found that the attorne y ’s
e xplana tio n fo r the de lay c re a te d a fa c t iss ue c on c e rn ing dil ig e nc e be c a us e “ a jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly conclude that the unintentional, ina dverte nt f ailure to sig n the af

fidavit . . . and the f

ailure to discove r the mis ta ke [] we re wi thi n the re a lm of wh a t an or din a ry , pru de nt pe rs on mig ht d o und e r t he same circ umstances.” Id.

I n Valdez , a miscommunication betwe en the law firm’s sec reta

ry and the c lerk’s off ic e r e g a r d in g th e f

e e r e qu ir e d to s e r

v e b o th d e f

e n d a n ts r e s u lt e d in o n ly o n e d e f e ndant beingTh e c ourt inRodriguez v. Tinsman & Houser, Inc

. descr ibed Hodge and Valdez as ca ses 4 involving “miscalculated attempts to eff ect service that, due to miscommunication or inadver tence , wer e not discover ed until after the expiration of the limitations period,” distinguishing them from case s in which servic e wa s not attempted until after the limit ations period had r un. 13 S.W .3d 47, 51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). 10 timely serve d. 715 S.W .2d at 127. The Valdez court h el d t h at t h e offere d explanation, miscommunication, was suff i cient to ra ise a fa ct issue as to whe ther the pla intiff exercised
rea sonable dilig ence . Id. at 128. 4

Her e, as in Hodge and Valdez , the Sta te ma de a n uns uc c e ssf ul atte mpt to e ff e c t ti me ly service that, due to a miscommunication with the cler k’s offic e, wa s not discovere d until after the limit ations period had ended. Be cause I nterna tional Fidelity provided an explanation for the de lay in e ffe cting service that was not pa tently unrea sonable, we conclude that the trial court did not er r in r e so lvi ng the iss ue of

du e dil ig e nc e a s a

qu e sti on of fa c t. Diligence as a Fact Question

Having deter

mined that diligenc e is not lacking as a matter of law, we now re view the trial cour

t’s due-dilig ence finding for suff iciency of the e vidence . Due dili gence re quires that the pla int if

f e xer c ise “ that di lig e nc e to proc ur e se rv ic e wh ic h a n o rd ina ri ly pr ud e nt p e rs on

wo uld have use d under the sam e o r s i m ilar circ umstances.” Gonzalez v. Phoe nix Frozen Foods, Inc

. , 884 S.W .2d 587, 590 (Tex. A pp.—Corpus Christi 1994, no writ). I t a lso r equire s that the plaintiff diligently pursue se rvice on the def endant. Hodge , 856 S.W .2d at 215. Testimo n y fr o m trial ind i ca t es t h at t h e State did in fac t make ef forts to serve Moore. Thoug h the initial citation was defe ctive, the State did not discover this fact until J anuar

y 2009 beca

use i t never

rec eived a

copy of11

the offic er’ s return, and the FACTS sy stem, which the County Attorney ’s office relied on, indicated that service had bee n completed. Upon disc overing the def ect, the State immediate ly obtained proper service
. Given these fac ts and the applicable ordinarily -prude nt-person standa rd, we cannot conclude that the trial cour t’s finding of due dilig ence is unsuppor ted by the evidenc e or so c ontrary to the overw helming w eig ht of the evide nce a s to be clea rly wrong or unjust. Be cause the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the trial court’s fi n d i n g t h at t he State acte d with due dilige nce in attempting to s erve I nterna tional Fidelity , we a ffirm the tria l
c ourt ’s jud g me nt.
CO NC LU SION

We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

______________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Henson Affir med Filed: Nove mber 3, 2010 Do No t Pu

bli sh