alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Solomon Shaffer, Plaintiff in Error, *v.*Daniel Currier, Defendant in Error.

ERROR TO OGLE.

A party who commences suit before a justice of the peace, may dismiss his suit after appeal in the Circuit Court, even though the defendant obtained a judgment in his favor against the plaintiff; but he must dismiss the suit at his own costs.

The judgment before the justice was -opened by the appeal, and, as a matter of course, the judgment fell with the dismissal of the case.

Daniel Currier sued Shaffer before a justice of the peace. On the trial before the justice, Shaffer recovered a judgment against the plaintiff Currier, for the sum of thirty dollars.

Currier took an appeal from the decision of the justice, to the Circuit Court of Ogle county.

At a special term of the Ogle Circuit Court, held in January, 1852, Wilkinson, Judge, presiding, the cause was tried before a jury; the jury found for the defendant Shaffer, and assessed his damages at the sum of five cents. Thereupon Currier moved for a new trial, which was allowed by the court. Afterwards *668Currier moved that the judgment obtained by Shaffer before the justice be reversed, and that the cause pending in the Circuit Court be dismissed; which motion was sustained, and the following judgment was rendered in the premises. “ It is ordered by the court, that the cause be dismissed at the costs of the said Solomon Shaffer; and that the judgment in the court below be reversed at the costs of the said Shaffer. And that the said Daniel Currier have and recover of the said Solomon Shaffer his costs and charges in this behalf expended, and that he have execution therefor. • '

To this decision Shaffer excepted, and brought the cause to this court by writ of error.

The errors assigned are, the rendering a judgment for costs against Shaffer, and the reversing of the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace.

E. S. Leland and. Van U. Higgins, for plaintiff in error.

J. Marsh, for defendant in error.

Treat, C. J.

Currier, to the use of Marshall, brought an action against Shaffer before a justice of the peace, which resulted in a judgment in favor of the latter for $30. Currier prosecuted an appeal to the Circuit Court, where the cause was tried, and a verdict returned in favor of Shaffer for five cents. A new trial was granted on his application. The Court then sustained a motion made by Currier, to dismiss the suit at the costs of Shaffer. The judgment for costs against Shaffer was clearly erroneous. Currier being the plaintiff", had an undoubted right to dismiss the suit, but it should have been done at his costs. If a plaintiff voluntarily abandons his case, he must be adjudged to pay the costs. He is not entitled to a judgment for costs against the defendant, until he has successfully prosecuted the action to final judgment against him. The judgment before the justice was opened by the appeal, and, as a matter of course, fell with the dismissal of the case.

The judgment for costs must be reversed, and the cause be remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to enter a judgment against Currier for the costs of the case.

*Judgment reversed.*
Document

Exhibit 10.21

			
	THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT, AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED, A SOLICITATION FOR CONSENTS TO ANY CHAPTER 11 PLAN OF REORGANIZATION PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 1125 AND 1126 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE OR A SOLICITATION TO TENDER OR EXCHANGE ANY CLAIMS OR INTERESTS.  EACH CONSENTING CREDITOR’S VOTE ON THE PLAN SHALL NOT BE SOLICITED UNLESS AND UNTIL SUCH CONSENTING CREDITOR HAS RECEIVED A DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND RELATED BALLOT(S), AS APPROVED BY THE BANKRUPTCY COURT.




FIRST AMENDMENT TO RESTRUCTURING SUPPORT AGREEMENT
This First Amendment to Restructuring Support Agreement (“Amendment”) dated as of October 24, 2019 (the “Amendment Effective Date”), is entered into among (i) PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, as debtors and debtors in possession in the Chapter 11 Cases (each, a “Debtor” and collectively, the “Company” or the “Debtors”), and (ii) each of the undersigned Consenting Creditors party hereto who collectively constitute the Requisite Consenting Creditors.  Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms used herein that are defined in the RSA (as defined below) shall have the meanings given such terms in the RSA.
RECITALS:
WHEREAS, the Debtors and the Consenting Creditors are party to that certain Restructuring Support Agreement, dated as of September 22, 2019 (as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified on or before the Amendment Effective Date, the “RSA”, and as amended by this Amendment, the “First Amended RSA”);
WHEREAS, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein, the parties hereto have agreed to amend the RSA pursuant to Section 9 thereof in the manner set forth below.
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements herein contained and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged and agreed, the Debtors and the undersigned Consenting Creditors hereby agree as follows:
SECTION 1.  Amendment.  Effective as of the Amendment Effective Date, the definition of “RSA Deadline” in Section 1(a) of the RSA is hereby amended and restated as in its entirety as follows:
“RSA Deadline” means November 14, 2019, which date may be amended or extended by agreement of the Debtors and the Requisite Consenting Creditors pursuant to Section 9 hereof.”
[Signature Pages Follow]













IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be duly executed by their respective authorized officers on the date and year first above written.
									
		PG&E CORPORATION	
		By:	/s/ Janet C. Loduca
		

	Name: Janet C. Loduca

		

	Title: Senior Vice President, General Counsel







									
		PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY	
		By:	/s/ Janet C. Loduca
		

	Name: Janet C. Loduca
		

	Title: Senior Vice President, General Counsel










[Signature Pages of Consenting Creditors Omitted and on File with the Registrant]
Signature Page to First Amendment to Restructuring Support Agreement
NO. 07-11-0126-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
PANEL A MAY 16, 2011

__________________ ____________ IN RE RICHARD DEWAYNE SNELSON, RELATOR

__________________ _______________ ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ARIS ING OUT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE 181 ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY; NO. 16,447-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE PRESIDING

__________________ _____________ Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, Richard Dewa yne Snelson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis files this original proceeding seeking to com pel the Honorable John B. Board to enter a ruling on motions filed challenging an Order to Withdraw Inmate Funds signed on February 25, 2010, authorizing f unds to be withdrawn from Relator's inmate account to satisfy $2,228.50 for court cost, fines and fees. 1 On March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a ruling on Relator' s challenges and signed an Amended Order to Withdraw
Funds . Judge Board has performed his ministeria l duty to rule on the pending motion.

1 Snelson filed a motion to rescind the order of Fe bruary 25, 2010, and then appealed the partial denial of that motion. By an opinion issued toda y, this Court disposed of that appeal. See Snelson v. State , No. 07-10-0259-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS __ (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2010, no pet. h.).2 See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia , 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.A pp.--San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding). A particular ruling, however, is generally discretionary. In re Washington , No. 09-07-0246-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6449, at *2 (Tex.App.-- Beaumont Aug. 16, 2007, orig. proceeding). Consequently, Relator's request for mandamus relief is rendered moot.

Patrick A. Pirtle Justice
#### William Koster, Jr., Appellant, v. Harry G. Smith, Respondent.

Judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Woodward, Hooker, Gaynor, Rich and Miller, JJ., concurred.
##### 



Exhibit 10.11
 2007  CERTIFICATE OF REINSURANCE  for the  Agreement of Reinsurance  between the  WORKERS COMPENSATION REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION  and  RTW Inc  American Compensation Insurance
Company 0030392 Bloomington
Compensation Insurance Company 0012311
 Coverage Period:
    
    January 1, 2007  December 31, 2007
    
    Retention Limit:$400,000(12:01 a.m. Standard Time)
  Workers Compensation Reinsurance
Association-s- Carl W. Cummins IIICarl W. Cummins IIIPresident and Chief Executive OfficerDated: December 26, 2006
 Workers
Compensation Reinsurance Association®
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. The City of Syracuse, Appellant.

Motion granted.
#### L. N. Ashley v. Henry Heinrichs.

1. Verdict— *VWiere Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain it, it Will Not Be*Reversed.—Where the evidence is sufficient on the part of the plaintiff to sustain the verdict and the judgment, it will not be reversed because of evidence tending to prove the defendant’s claim. In such cases it is the province of the jury to determine where the truth lies.

Trespass on the Case.—Damages caused by damming up an open drain. ■ Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ford County; the Hon. John H. Moffett. Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1902.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed, November 1, 1902.

*103Cloud & Moffett, attorneys for appellant.

Schneider & Schneider and Kerr & Bindley, attorneys for appellee.

Mr. Justice Burroughs

delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee, Henry Heinrichs, sued the appellant, L. N. Ashley, in the Circuit Court of Ford County, to recover damages to his crops alleged to have been occasioned by the wrongful damming up of an open drain which had been constructed and maintained through the lands of each, under an agreement made prior to July 1, 1889, which agreement had not been revoked before that time.

The case was tried by jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee for $630.04.

The appellant having moved for a new trial, which was denied, excepted, and he brings the case to this court by appeal, and to effect a reversal of the judgment argues that the court ruled erroneously on the evidence and upon the instructions to the jury, and that the verdict and judgment are against the evidence.

The evidence on the part of the appellee is amply sufficient to sustain the verdict and the judgment, and while that on the part of the appellant tends to establish a revocation by him prior to July 1, 1889, of the agreement to continue the drain, yet it was the province of the jury to determine where the truth was, and the record does not warrant ns in concluding that the jury have made a mistake in the conclusion they arrived at.

A. careful examination of the rulings of the trial court upon the evidence and instructions convinces us that no prejudicial error was committed against the appellant in any of them, but on the contrary such rulings were fair and just to both parties, and it seems to us that on the whole record the conclusions which the trial court reaches in this case, does justice to both parties, and therefore the judgment rendered ought to be and will be affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 158 (Thursday, August 14, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 47613]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18768]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION


Notice of Appointment of Individuals To Serve as Members of 
Performance Review Board

AGENCY: United States International Trade Commission.

ACTION: Appointment of Individuals To Serve as Members of Performance 
Review Board.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DATES: Effective: July 4, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Cynthia Roscoe, Director of Human 
Resources, U.S. International Trade Commission, (202) 205-2651.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Chairman of the U.S. International Trade 
Commission has appointed the following individuals to serve on the 
Commission's Performance Review Board (PRB):
    Chair of the PRB: Vice-Chairman Daniel R. Pearson.
    Vice-Chair of the PRB: Dean A. Pinkert.
    Member: David Beck.
    Member: Robert G. Carpenter.
    Member: Robert B. Koopman.
    Member: Karen Laney-Cummings.
    Member: Lynn I. Levine.
    Member: James M. Lyons.
    Member: Stephen A. McLaughlin.
    Member: Robert A. Rogowsky.
    Member: Lyn M. Schlitt.
    This notice is published in the Federal Register pursuant to the 
requirement of 5 U.S.C. 4314(c)(4). This notice replaces the notice 
published at 73 FR 46334 (August 8, 2008); that notice is withdrawn. 
Hearing-impaired individuals are advised that information on this 
matter can be obtained by contacting our TDD terminal on (202) 205-
1810.

    Issued: August 8, 2008.

    By order of the Chairman.
Marilyn R. Abbott,
Secretary to the Commission.
[FR Doc. E8-18768 Filed 8-13-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
EXHIBIT 32.2
                                  ------------


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Paradigm Medical  Industries,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2004, as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Luis A. Mostacero, Controller of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

         (a)  the Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (b)  the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
              material respect, the financial condition and result of operations
              of the Company.




                                          /s/ Luis A. Mostacero
                                         ----------------------
Date: April 27, 2005                     Luis A. Mostacero
                                         Controller
<page>
			            EXHIBIT 32.01



CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of Morgan Stanley Charter
Aspect L.P. (the ?Partnership?) on Form 10-K for the period ended
December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the ?Report?), I, Walter Davis,
President of Demeter Management Corporation, the general partner
of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Partnership.





By:	  /s/	Walter Davis

Name:		Walter Davis
Title:	President

Date:		March 27, 2008
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 660

To amend the Fair Housing Act to modify the exemption from certain

familial status discrimination prohibitions granted to housing for older

persons.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 24, 1995

Mr. SHAW (for himself, Mr. BONO, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. GOSS, Mr. LEWIS of

California, Mr. CANADY of Florida, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr.

EMERSON, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. MILLER of

Florida, and Mrs. SCHROEDER) introduced the following bill; which was

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend the Fair Housing Act to modify the exemption

from certain familial status discrimination prohibitions

granted to housing for older persons.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Housing for Older Per5 sons Act of 1995’’.
2

•HR 660 IH

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF HOUSING FOR OLDER PERSONS.

2 Subparagraph (C) of section 807(b)(2) of the Fair

3 Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3607(b)(2)) is amended to read

4 as follows:

5 ‘‘(C) that meets the following requirements:

6 ‘‘(i) The housing is in a facility or commu7 nity intended and operated for the occupancy of

8 at least 80 percent of the occupied units by at

9 least one person 55 years of age or older.

10 ‘‘(ii) The housing facility or community

11 publishes and adheres to policies and proce12 dures that demonstrate the intent required

13 under clause (i), whether or not such policies

14 and procedures are set forth in the governing

15 documents of such facility or community.

16 ‘‘(iii) The housing facility or community

17 complies with rules made by the Secretary for

18 the verification of occupancy. Such rules shall

19 allow for that verification by reliable surveys

20 and affidavits and shall include examples of the

21 types of polices and procedures relevant to a de22 termination of compliance with the requirement

23 of clause (ii). Such surveys and affidavits shall

24 be admissible in administrative and judicial pro25 ceedings for the purposes of such verification.’’.
3

•HR 660 IH

1 SEC. 3. GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT AT COMPLIANCE DEFENSE

2 AGAINST CIVIL MONEY DAMAGES.

3 Section 807(b) of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C.

4 3607(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

5 ‘‘(5) An individual who engages in conduct with a

6 reasonable good faith reliance on the existence of the ex7 emption of this subsection relating to housing for older

8 persons is not personally liable for money damages for a

9 violation of this Act that such an exemption would have

10 vitiated. For the purposes of this paragraph, a person en11 gaged in the business of residential real estate trans12 actions is presumed to have such a good faith reliance if

13 that person has no actual knowledge that the facility or

14 community is not or will not be eligible for such exemption

15 and the facility or community gives such person a written

16 certification stating the compliance of the facility or com17 munity with the requirements for such exemption.’’.

Æ
T HE S TATE EX REL
. L LOYD , A PPELLANT , v. I NDUSTRIAL C OMMISSION OF O HIO ET

AL ., A PPELLEES
. [Cite as State ex rel. Lloyd v. Indus. Comm. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] Workers’ compensation – Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. (No. 97-1096 – Submitted October 27, 1998 – Decided December 30, 1998.) Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD03-304.

__________________ Spitler & Williams-Young Co., L.P.A., and William R. Menacher , for appellant. Betty D. Montgomery , Attorney General, and Cordelia A. Glenn , Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission.

__________________ The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed consistent with the opinion of the court of appeals.
M OYER , C.J., D OUGLAS , R ESNICK , F.E. S WEENEY , P FEIFER , C OOK and
L UNDBERG S TRATTON , JJ., concur.
#### PEDERSEN v. CAPITOL STORES, Inc., et al.

No. 2293.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Oct. 8, 1941.

Rownd & Tycer, of Hammond, for appellant.

Sanders & Miller, of Baton Rouge, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

An exception of no cause or right of action filed in this suit was sustained and judgment rendered dismissing the plaintiff’s suit. The judgment rendered was read and signed in open Court on March 14th, 1940. As far as the record which is presently before us shows, on March 7th, 1941, plaintiff petitioned the lower Court and obtained from it an order for a devolu-tive appeal returnable to this Court on or before the 30th day of April, 1941, conditioned upon the appellant furnishing bond in the sum of $50. Service of the petition and order for appeal was accepted and citation waived and the appeal bond duly filed on March 13th, 1941.

The appellant apparently took no further steps in the matter and the record was never transmitted to this Court by the Clerk of the District Court. In a certificate signed by a Deputy Clerk of Court and attached to the motion now under consideration, it is made to appear that the appeal was not lodged in this Court for the reason that the record was taken from the Clerk’s office by Counsel for plaintiff and it was impossible to prepare the transcript of appeal, all of which was due to no negligence on the part of the Clerk of Court.

In the motion of the defendant-appellee, Capitol Stores Inc., to dismiss the appeal, it is averred that the record was recently located in the office of counsel for plaintiff-appellant, and was thereupon returned to the Clerk of the District Court from whom it was received and attached to the motion solely for the purpose of considering and acting upon the said motion. It is only in this manner that the record was lodged in this Court and that was not until Oct. 3rd, 1941, more than five months after the return date.

On the showing made, it appearing that it was not through any fault or <negligence on the part of the Clerk of the District Court that the transcript of appeal was not filed in this Court on or before the return date, the motion to dismiss the appeal is well urged and will be sustained.

For the reasons stated, it is therefore ordered that the said motion be and the same is hereby sustained and that the appeal herein taken be dismissed at the cost of appellant.
#### PENDLETON v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 16245.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Nov. 18, 1935.

Charles J. Mundy, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps & Dunbar and Wood Brown,- all of New Orleans, for ap-pellee.

*171McCALL, Judge.

Pendleton brought suit against the insurance company on a life insurance policy which he averred was issued to his wife, who died on December 24, 1934. It is averred that the policy contained the name of no beneficiary, but that all premiums were paid by plaintiff with money earned by him. An exception of no cause of action was maintained by the trial court.

We consider this disposition of the case correct as the mere fact that the plaintiff may have paid the premiums does not give him any standing to contend that he was the beneficiary under the policy. As already pointed out, by averring that there was no beneficiary, he clearly concedes that he was not the beneficiary.

Judgment affirmed.