J-S27006-22

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.D.-M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.D., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 829 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered March 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-DP-0001561-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.L.-A.D.-M., 

A MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.D., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 830 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-AP-0000371-2021

 

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2022

S.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree entered March 1, 2022, in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, involuntarily terminating her 
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parental rights to her son, D.D.-M (“Child”), born in March 2019.1 Mother also 

appeals from the March 1, 2022 order in Child’s dependency case changing 

his permanency goal from reunification to adoption. After careful review, we 

affirm the termination decree and dismiss the appeal from the goal change 

order as moot.

We begin with an overview of the relevant facts and procedural history. 

The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed a dependency 

petition with respect to then six-month-old Child on September 30, 2019. The 

petition alleged that DHS had been aware of the family since February 2016,

and, in March 2018, DHS learned that another child of Mother, who was fourmonths-old, died in her care. The petition further alleged that, on July 23, 

2019, DHS visited Mother’s home after receiving allegations that Mother drank 

alcohol in excess; all her children were born with fetal alcohol syndrome; her 

children were often dirty; Mother had difficulty managing anger; and she was 

non-compliant with previous court orders. On the same date, DHS presented 

at Mother’s residence, confirmed the disarray in the home, and, for the first 

time, became aware of Child.

On October 9, 2019, the court adjudicated Child dependent. In the 

adjudication order, the court directed Mother to the Clinical Evaluation Unit 

____________________________________________

1 On March 1, 2022, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of J.M. 

(“Father”) and any unknown putative father. J.M. did not file a notice of 

appeal.
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(“CEU”) for assessment, full drug and alcohol screen, dual diagnosis screen, 

and three random drug and alcohol screens. At that time, Child remained with 

Mother, but on November 20, 2019, the court removed Child from Mother and 

placed him in the custody of DHS because the court found Mother noncompliant with her permanency plan. Child was placed in kinship care with 

his maternal aunt, and he remained there for the duration of the case. N.T.,

3/1/2022, at 1.

DHS provided Mother with single case plan objectives: 1) supervised 

visits twice a week at the agency; 2) Mother will make herself available to 

DHS and inform DHS of her whereabouts; 3) complete Clinical Evaluation Unit

dual-diagnosis assessments and three random drug screens, and follow any 

recommendations made by CEU; 4) complete Achieving Reunification Center

(“ARC”) services for housing, employment, and financial counseling; 5) 

complete a parenting capacity evaluation (“PCE”); and 6) complete a 

consultation or evaluations at Behavioral Health System (“BHS”). N.T., 

3/1/2022, at 12; Permanency Review Order, 11/20/2019. These objectives 

remained the same throughout the tenure of the case. At each permanency 

review hearing, the trial court found Mother to be either minimally compliant 

or non-compliant with her objectives. 

On July 9, 2021, when Child was two years old, DHS filed a petition for 

a goal change to adoption and another petition for the involuntary termination 

of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 
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(8), and (b). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 1, 

2022. Mother was represented by counsel but did not testify. DHS presented 

the testimony of CUA case manager Asia White. Child was represented by a 

guardian ad litem.

2

At the close of the March 1, 2022 hearing, the trial court terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

and (b) and changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption. By separate decree 

and order entered the same date on the respective dockets, the trial court 

memorialized its determination. On March 29, 2022, Mother timely filed 

notices of appeal from the termination decree and goal change order along 

with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On May 16, 2022, this Court consolidated 

Mother’s appeals sua sponte. In lieu of an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a), on May 4, 2022, the trial court directed this Court to its rationale for 

its decision articulated on the record at the close of the March 1, 2022 hearing.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [M]other pursuant to Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) 

without clear and convincing evidence of [M]other’s intent 

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2

Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to 

his young age, the court did not appoint separate legal counsel for Child. See 

In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-1093 (Pa. 2018) (holding, “if the preferred 

outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very 

young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal 

interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section 

2313(a) of the Adoption Act” is satisfied.). 
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to relinquish her parental claim or refusal to perform her 

parental duties.

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2) 

without clear and convincing evidence of [M]other’s present 

incapacity to perform parental duties.

3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(5) 

and (8) without clear and convincing evidence to prove that 

reasonable efforts were made by [DHS] to provide [M]other 

with additional services and that the conditions that led to 

placement of [Child] continue to exist.

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) 

without clear and convincing evidence that there is no 

parental bond between [M]other and [C]hild and that 

termination would serve the best interest of [Child].

5. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency 

goal to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 6351 without 

clear and convincing evidence that adoption is in [Child’s] 

best interest.

6. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency 

goal to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 6351 without 

clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts were 

made by the servicing agency to reunify [Child] with 

[M]other.

7. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency 

goal to adoption in contravention of the mandate of 42 

Pa.C.S.A. [§] 6302 to preserve the unity of the family 

whenever possible.
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Mother’s Brief at 8.3, 4

We review involuntary termination decrees for an abuse of discretion, 

which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of 

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When 

applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the trial court’s 

findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the 

record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the 

trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court 

may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law 

or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 

2021). 

“[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing 

court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support 

an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012). 

Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to 

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3 The guardian ad litem for Child filed a brief in support of affirming the order 

and decree.

4 Of note, Mother’s brief does not conform to Pa.R.A.P. 124(a)(3) because the 

text is not double-spaced. We remind counsel of the necessity of following 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings. 

S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must 

balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the 

care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs 

for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 358. 

Termination of parental rights has “significant and permanent consequences 

for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. As such, the law of 

this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory 

grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, 

direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,

255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds 

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary 

termination.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 359; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-

(11). In evaluating whether the petitioner proved grounds under Section 

2511(a), the trial court must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a 

“balancing or best interest approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 

n.6 (Pa. Super. 2021). If the trial court determines the petitioner established 

grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing 
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evidence, the court then must assess the petition under Section 2511(b), 

which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 

267 (Pa. 2013). 

The orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

5

 Here, we analyze the court’s 

termination decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as 

follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

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5

In order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with 

the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section

2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must show three 

components: (1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent 

for at least 12 months; (2) that the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of 

J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

Unlike other subsections, Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court 

to evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led 

to the placement of the children. In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 

2017). “[T]he relevant inquiry” regarding the second prong of 

Section 2511(a)(8) “is whether the conditions that led to removal have been 

remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at 

the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Further, the Adoption Act prohibits the court from considering, as part of the 

Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, “any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described [in the petition] which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

We observe that Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b) both require a court 

considering a termination petition to assess the needs and welfare of the 

relevant child or children. However, the needs and welfare analysis required 

by Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from the needs and welfare analysis required 
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by Section 2511(b), and must be addressed separately. See In re C.L.G., 

956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). 

This Court has recognized “that the application of [Section 2511(a)(8)] 

may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward 

resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children.” In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led 

to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute 

implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. 

Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates 

only a short period of time, to wit [18] months, in which to 

complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child 

who has been placed in foster care.

Id.

As referenced supra, this court need only agree with the trial court as 

to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b); 

accordingly, we need not review Mother’s first or second issue. Regarding her

third issue, Mother argues that there was no legal basis to terminate her

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) because DHS did not present 

clear and convincing evidence. Mother’s Brief at 16. Specifically, Mother 

contends that DHS only presented the testimony of Ms. White who did not 

have personal knowledge nor documentation regarding whether Mother went 

to CEU or engaged in mental health services. Id. According to Mother, “[t]he 
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presentation of undocumented hearsay testimony does not satisfy the clear 

and convincing standard.” Id.

We conclude that Mother’s issue is waived. As noted in DHS’s brief, to

preserve a hearsay argument for appellate review, a contemporaneous 

objection must be made at trial. DHS Brief at 15-17. This Court has 

explained:

Claims which have not been raised in the trial court may not be

raised for the first time on appeal. Our Supreme Court has

frequently stressed the necessity of raising claims at the earliest

opportunity, . . . [to] eliminate the possibility that an appellate

court will be required to expend time and energy reviewing claims

on which no trial ruling has been made.

Jahanshahi v. Centura Development Co., Inc., 816 A.2d 1179, 1189 (Pa. 

Super. 2003) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 

At trial, counsel for Mother only raised one objection based on hearsay

regarding a diagnostic testing report. On the basis of the objection, DHS 

withdrew the exhibit. N.T., 3/1/2022, at 15-16. Counsel did not raise any 

other hearsay objections during Ms. White’s testimony. Accordingly, Mother’s 

issue is waived.

Even if Mother did not waive this issue, her argument would still fail. 

Regarding the first element of Section 2511(a)(8), it is uncontradicted that 

Child has been in the custody of DHS since November 2019, approximately 

twenty-eight months at the time of the hearing. N.T., 3/1/2022, at 33. 

Additionally, testimony from Ms. White, the CUA case manager,

indicated that Mother has made no progress in remedying the issues that 
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brought Child into DHS’s care in the first place. Id. at 19-20. Ms. White 

testified that visits remained supervised throughout the case, and Mother’s 

last visit occurred on August 2, 2021. Id. at 13. Additionally, according to 

Ms. White, despite being referred to CEU, to ARC, and for a PCE, Mother never 

availed herself of any of these services, and she did not present for any 

random drug screens. Id. at 14, 17-18. Ms. White related that Mother did 

attend a BHS consultation, which referred her to therapeutic services. 

However, Mother did not participate in these services. Id. at 16-17. Overall, 

Ms. White testified that Mother has made no progress towards her goals. Id.

at 18-19.

With respect to the final element of Section 2511(a)(8), Ms. White 

testified that she does not believe Mother and Child have a parent-child 

relationship because Mother does not have visits with Child and Child does not 

identify her as a support system. Id. at 21. According to the January 29, 

2021 permanency review order, Mother participated in nine visits, but she 

missed twenty-six. Similarly, the subsequent permanency review order, 

dated June 2, 2021, stated that Mother is inconsistent with visitation. 

Furthermore, Mother’s last visit with Child occurred on August 2, 2021, when 

Child was two years old. Id. at 13. 

Ms. White confirmed that she does not believe Child would experience 

irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated. Id. at 21-22. Ms. White 

testified that Child is bonded with his resource parent and identifies her as his 
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mother. Id. at 22. Ms. White testified that Child calls her “mom” and she 

meets Child’s needs. Id. The trial court found Ms. White’s testimony 

“credible” and “uncontradicted.” Id. at 51. Additionally, the trial court 

appropriately found that “this [C]hild does not know [his] [M]other and 

father.” Id. at 51-52. 

Thus, even if the issue had not been waived, the trial court was well 

within its discretion to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(8) because Child has been removed from Mother’s care far in excess 

of the 12-month statutory minimum; the conditions which led to Child’s

removal continue to exist; and termination would best serve the needs and 

welfare of Child.

We turn now to Section 2511(b), which requires the court to “give 

primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and 

welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has made clear that 

Section 2511(b) requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of 

bond between a parent and child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-85 (Pa. 

1993). Nevertheless, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child 

to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.” 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. In evaluating a parent-child bond, the court does not 
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have to use expert testimony, and it may rely upon the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super.

2010). To the extent there is a bond, the trial court must examine whether 

termination of parental rights will destroy a “necessary and beneficial 

relationship,” thereby causing a child to suffer “extreme emotional 

consequences.” E.M., 620 A.2d at 484-85. 

“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect 

of the [s]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one 

of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the 

best interest of the child.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

“In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as 

the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent.” Id. In determining needs and welfare, the court may properly 

consider the effect of the parent’s conduct upon the child and consider 

“whether a parent is capable of providing for a child’s safety and security or 

whether such needs can be better met by terminating a parent’s parental 

rights.” L.W., 267 A.3d at 524.

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates 

that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children 

are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing the 
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bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the 

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court 

observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an 

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . 

the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

In the instant case, Mother addresses Section 2511(b) in her fourth 

issue and argues that she and Child have a strong emotional bond. Mother’s 

Brief at 17. Mother relates that she was Child’s caregiver during the formative 

time of Child’s life and that there is a “indisputable and unbreakable bond” 

that formed during this period and is crucial to Child’s well-being. Id. Mother 

argues that no evidence has been offered that she cannot provide for Child or 

that she lacks the capacity or ability to meet Child’s needs. Id. Mother states 

that because clear and convincing evidence was not offered at trial that 

termination best serves Child’s interest, there are “no legal grounds to 

terminate [M]other’s parental rights.” Id.

We disagree with Mother’s bald assertions. As referenced supra, Ms. 

White testified that Child and Mother do not have a parent-child relationship

because Mother’s visitation with Child has been inconsistent and her last visit 

with Child occurred on August 2, 2021, when he was two years old. N.T., 

3/1/2022, at 21-22. As such, Ms. White testified that she does not believe 

Child knows Mother. Id. Therefore, Ms. White testified that, if the court 
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terminated Mother’s parental rights, Child would not experience irreparable 

harm. Id. 

Ms. White also testified that Child is closely bonded to his resource 

parent, who is a pre-adoptive resource, and identifies her as his mother. Id.

at 21-22. Based on Ms. White’s testimony, the trial court aptly determined

that “This [C]hild’s entire life has been in the home of [the resource parents] 

. . . the best interests of this [C]hild are to change the goal . . . and to allow 

this [C]hild to be [adopted].” Id. at 51-52. The trial court found Ms. White 

credible and had sufficient evidence to conclude that terminating Mother’s 

parental rights will serve Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). Therefore, Mother’s fourth issue 

fails.

In Mother’s fifth, sixth, and seventh issues, she asserts that the trial 

court abused its discretion by changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption. 

Given our disposition affirming the termination decree, Mother’s issues 

pertaining to the goal change order are moot. See In the Interest of D.R.-

W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if 

in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal 

force or effect.”) (citation omitted).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s 

parental rights and dismiss as moot the order changing the permanency goal 

to adoption.
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Termination decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/12/2022