FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 06-30414 Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-05-00355-ALH

UHURU NAVANDA CREWS,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ancer L. Haggerty, Chief Judge, Presiding

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 06-30589 Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-05-00400-GMK

EBONIQUE MANUS,

OPINION Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 13, 2007—Portland, Oregon

Filed September 10, 2007

Before: Cynthia Holcomb Hall and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and Kevin Thomas Duffy,*

Senior District Judge.

*The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior United States District

Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

12045
Opinion by Judge Duffy

12046 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
COUNSEL

Stephen F. Peifer, Assistant United States Attorney, for appellant the United States of America. 

Lisa Hay, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for defendant

Uhuru Navanda Crews.

Francesca Freccero, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for

defendant Uhuru Navanda Crews. 

12048 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
Raivio, Kohlmetz & Steen, P.C., by Andrew Kohlmetz, Esq.,

for defendant Ebonique Manus. 

OPINION

DUFFY, Senior District Judge: 

Most of the arguments raised in these two cases arise from

the execution of one search warrant at 6731 SE 82nd Avenue,

Apartment 3 (“Apartment 3”) in Portland, Oregon. As residents of Apartment 3, Uhuru Navanda Crews and Ebonique

Manus (“Crews” and “Manus,” or collectively “Defendants”)

continue to attack the validity of the underlying affidavit upon

which the search warrant was based. Defendants argued

below, and continue to argue, that the affidavit is so lacking

in indicia of probable cause that no police officer could have

reasonably relied upon it in good faith. The search warrant

resulted in two indictments—one for each defendant—

separately charging each with being a felon in possession of

a firearm. The case against Crews (05-355-ALH) was

assigned to Chief Judge Haggerty, and that against Manus

(05-400-GMK) was assigned to Judge King. In each case, the

defendant moved to suppress all evidence flowing from the

warrant. Chief Judge Haggerty held a hearing on the motion.

At the behest of the parties, Judge King relied upon the hearing before Chief Judge Haggerty. The district courts agreed

with the Defendants’ arguments and in each case ordered suppression of the evidence seized during the search and inculpatory statements made by Defendants as tainted fruits of an

unlawful search. The Government appeals these orders, contending that there was probable cause supporting the search,

and even if there was not, the good faith exception applies

pursuant to United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 (1984).

FACTS

At about 2:00 a.m. on July 2, 2005, a police officer

attempted to pull Crews over for failing to properly signal a

UNITED STATES v. CREWS 12049
turn while driving. Rather than comply, Crews, a convicted

felon, increased his speed and then jumped from the vehicle

in an attempt to elude the police. After a brief chase on foot,

officers arrested Crews for attempting to elude the police pursuant to Section 811.540 of the Oregon Revised Statutes and

for other state and city violations. After the officers advised

Crews of his Miranda rights, Crews verbally waived them and

admitted that he fled because of an outstanding arrest warrant

in the state of Washington, a warrant that, unbeknownst to

Crews, was non-extraditable. The officers impounded the car

Crews had been driving, a 1985 Oldsmobile Cutlass registered to Manus, also a convicted felon, and registered to

Manus’s address at Apartment 3, 6731 SE 82nd Avenue, Portland, Oregon. Crews’ arrest had taken place only a few blocks

from that location. Neither the Portland Police Data System

nor Crews’s invalid drivers license listed the address of

Manus’s apartment as Crews’s residence. 

After conducting a sweep of the area where Crews was

arrested, officers found a .22 caliber revolver under some

shrubbery. As convicted felons, both Crews and Manus were

forbidden from possessing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1

Because the car Crews had been driving was registered to

Manus at Apartment 3, police officers focused their surveillance at that address for two days. On the first day, officers

observed Crews walking within the complex where Apartment 3 is located and then leave with an unknown person in

an unknown car that had been parked in the space reserved for

Apartment 3. The next day, officers observed Manus walk

from the area of Apartment 3 and leave in a Pontiac that had

been parked in the space reserved for Apartment 3. Meanwhile, officers observed Crews walking from the complex and

then return. After Manus returned, officers watched as Manus

1The relevant portions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) states that “[i]t shall be

unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to

. . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . .”

12050 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
and Crews emerged together from the area where the doorway

to Apartment 3 was located. They then proceeded to walk

back and forth from Apartment 3 to the Pontiac multiple times

before eventually leaving together in the Pontiac, with Crews

driving. 

Based on these observations and his experiences and general knowledge of firearm possession, Officer Peter McConnell prepared an eight-page affidavit in support of a search

warrant for Apartment 3, Crews’s person, the Oldsmobile,

and the Pontiac for evidence of the crimes of “attempting to

elude police” and “felon in possession of a firearm.” The warrant was issued on July 14, 2005, and permitted police officers to search Apartment 3 for .22 caliber ammunition,

firearm cleaning kits, magazines, receipts and other evidence

of firearm possession, as well as items of identification that

would show dominion over the places searched.2 Within fifteen minutes of receiving the warrant, police officers found

and picked up Crews off the street near Apartment 3 and

advised him of his Miranda rights, which Crews said he

understood. Crews denied living at Apartment 3 and stated

that he did not believe there to be any firearms there. Eventually, Crews was taken into custody. 

The police officers then executed the search at Apartment

3. There, Manus stated that she and Crews had been living

together at Apartment 3 for a month and a half, but that there

were no firearms inside. Manus was then taken into custody.

During the search of Apartment 3, officers discovered a .38

caliber derringer and ammunition inside of a bedroom dresser

drawer containing women’s undergarments. The officers also

found Crews’s wallet on top of that dresser. No evidence was

found on Crews’s person or in the automobiles. 

2

In addition to Apartment 3, the affidavit also permitted police officers

to search the Oldsmobile, the Pontiac, and Crews’s person. 

UNITED STATES v. CREWS 12051
The officers returned to the precinct and separately interviewed Crews and Manus. Officer McConnell removed

Crews’s handcuffs and reminded him that his Miranda rights

still applied, which Crews acknowledged. Crews proceeded to

admit having previously handled the .38 derringer, but said it

belonged to Manus and that he did not know she still kept it

at Apartment 3. Crews then stated that he did not live at

Apartment 3, but did admit that he stayed there about 70 percent of the time, including the previous night.3

 Finally, Crews

confessed that he had possessed the .22 revolver that was previously found in the bushes. He said he kept it for protection

and that it was the primary reason that he attempted to elude

the police the previous night. As for Manus, after being

advised of her Miranda rights, she confessed to Officer

McConnell that the .38 derringer was hers and that she kept

it for protection. 

Defendants were each indicted and charged with being a

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). Through counsel, Defendants both pled not

guilty. Crews moved to suppress his inculpatory admission of

possession of the .22 revolver and Manus moved to suppress

the .38 derringer seized as well as her admission of ownership

of the firearm. Defendants both argued that there was no

probable cause to search Apartment 3 and that the good faith

reliance exception did not apply. The district courts below

agreed and suppressed the .38 derringer and Defendants’

admissions as tainted fruit of an unlawful search. Additionally, the district court in Crews’s case found that the waiver

of his Miranda rights was not knowing and voluntary because

he was detained and interrogated in conjunction with an

3

It was eventually revealed that both Crews and Manus were listed on

the lease agreement as co-lessees of Apartment 3. During oral argument,

Crews’s counsel alluded to the fact that Crews, in fact, may not have been

a resident of Apartment 3. Such an argument does not help Crews, for if

it were true, Crews would be confronted with problems of standing to pursue this appeal. However, as an undisputed resident of Apartment 3,

Manus does have standing to challenge the search and seizure. 

12052 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
invalid warrant. The Government now appeals these suppression orders, contending that there was probable cause to

search Apartment 3, and that even if there was not, the “good

faith reliance” exception applies, and that Crews’s waiver was

knowing and voluntary.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the district courts’ rulings on the motions to

suppress and the validity of a search warrant de novo. United

States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.

denied, Reinhold v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 568 (2006). “A

magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause is entitled to

great deference and this court will not find a search warrant

invalid if the magistrate judge had a ‘substantial basis’ for

concluding that the supporting affidavit established probable

cause.” United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 831, 834 (9th Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1119 (1995). Furthermore, “[i]n

borderline cases, preference will be accorded to warrants and

to the decision of the magistrate issuing it.” United States v.

Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

We also review de novo the district courts’ application of the

good faith reliance exception. United States v. Kurt, 986 F.2d

309, 311 (9th Cir. 1993). Finally, we review for clear error a

district court’s finding of whether a defendant has made a

knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. United

States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DISCUSSION

I. The Affidavit Was Not So Lacking in Indicia of Probable

Cause as to Render Reliance Objectively Unreasonable

[1] It is well settled that evidence seized during an unlawful

search cannot constitute proof against the victim of the search.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). This

“exclusionary rule” extends to both direct and indirect products of such unlawful searches. Id. Therefore, the Supreme

UNITED STATES v. CREWS 12053
Court has held that “verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry . . . is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the

unwarranted intrusion.” Id. at 485. The Government has conceded that Defendants’ statements and the discovery of the

.38 derringer derived from the search warrant and its execution. Thus, if the search was unlawful, the Government concedes that Defendants’ statements and the firearm should be

suppressed. However, in United States v. Leon, the Supreme

Court set out an exception to the exclusionary rule for a

search conducted in good faith reliance upon an objectively

reasonable search warrant. 468 U.S. 897, 925 (1984).4 Before

embarking on the exercise of determining whether the affidavit supported probable cause, we may proceed directly to the

issue of whether there was good faith reliance. See id. at 923-

25 (recognizing that courts have discretion in deciding

whether to address the issue of probable cause before turning

to the issue of good faith reliance). For the reasons below, we

find the good faith reliance exception applicable and therefore

need not address whether the affidavit demonstrated that

Crews was anything but a casual social guest. 

[2] For the good faith reliance exception to apply, the officers must have relied on the search warrant in an objectively

reasonable manner. United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 831, 835

(9th Cir. 1994). The affidavit “must establish at least a color4Search and seizure laws are designed to punish police for improperly

compromising defendants’ rights for the sake of investigatory economy.

The Supreme Court has stated that the exclusionary rule’s “prime purpose

is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). The good

faith reliance exception recognizes that if “the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances[,] [e]xcluding

the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make

him less willing to do his duty.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920

(1984) (citation omitted). Therefore, punishment is unwarranted where

there can be no deterrent effect. 

12054 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
able argument for probable cause” for the exception to apply.

United States v. Luong, 470 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2006).

Therefore, if there is a colorable argument that the search of

Apartment 3 was supported by probable cause, the officer’s

reliance on the search warrant was objectively reasonable.

This ends the inquiry without having to belabor the issue of

whether the affidavit stated probable cause. 

There are four circumstances in which the good faith

exception does not apply because reliance is per se unreasonable: (i) where an affiant misleads the issuing magistrate or

judge by making a false statement or recklessly disregarding

the truth in making a statement; (ii) where the magistrate or

judge wholly abandons her judicial role in approving the warrant, acting only as a “rubber stamp” to the warrant application rather than as a neutral and detached official; (iii) where

the warrant is facially deficient in detail as to the place to be

searched or the things to be found that the officers could not

reasonably presume it to be valid; or (iv) where the affidavit

upon which the warrant is based is so lacking in indicia of

probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon it in

good faith. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923-26. 

The district courts below found that the good faith reliance

exception was inapplicable because the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the police officers should

have known that the search was illegal and because the officer’s affidavit misled the issuing state judge. Specifically, the

courts found that the officers were objectively unreasonable

in believing they would find additional evidence of the crime

of “felon in possession of a firearm” because the affidavit did

not sufficiently link Crews to Apartment 3. We disagree. For

the following reasons, the district courts erred in failing to

apply the good faith reliance exception. 

[3] On its face, the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia

of probable cause as to render reliance upon it objectively

unreasonable. For probable cause, an affidavit must establish

UNITED STATES v. CREWS 12055
a reasonable nexus between the crime or evidence and the

location to be searched. United States v. Chavez-Miranda,

306 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2002). It need only be reasonable

to seek the evidence at the location indicated in the affidavit.

United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993). The

affidavit showed indicia of such a reasonable nexus between

the crime of “felon in possession of a firearm” and Apartment

3 by demonstrating a sufficient link between Crews, Manus,

firearm evidence, and Apartment 3 such that an officer could

have reasonably relied upon it in good faith. 

[4] The affidavit stated that police officers sought evidence

of the crime of “felon in possession of a firearm” and that

Crews and Manus were convicted felons forbidden from possessing firearms. The affidavit also stated that Crews and

Manus had convictions for delivering and manufacturing controlled substances and that Officer McConnell’s training and

experience has shown that persons that sell controlled substances often possess firearms for protection. It further

explained that on the night Crews was arrested for attempting

to elude police, he had been driving Manus’s car which was

registered to Apartment 3. It stated that the police had reason

to believe that the .22 revolver discovered where Crews had

been arrested had been discarded by Crews during the foot

chase and that they had reason to believe that Crews carried

the .22 revolver out of Manus’s car when he attempted to

elude police. The facts in the affidavit allowed the reasonable

inference that the .22 revolver belonged to Crews (because he

carried it) or Manus (because it was in her car). If Crews or

Manus kept a firearm in the car, it is reasonable to believe

perhaps that they also kept evidence of possession of a firearm at Apartment 3, the registered address of the car and the

residence where Crews was frequently seen shortly after

police discovered the .22 revolver. 

[5] The affidavit further showed that Crews and Manus

were closely associated with each other at Apartment 3.

Crews was arrested for attempting to elude the police mere

12056 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
blocks from Apartment 3. That night, Crews had been driving

Manus’s Oldsmobile registered to that same address. During

surveillance, Crews was seen driving away from Apartment

3’s complex in a car parked in the space reserved for Apartment 3. He and Manus were observed together walking back

and forth from Apartment 3 to a Pontiac parked in the space

reserved for Apartment 3. These facts, combined with Officer

McConnell’s statements that his experience has shown him

that further evidence of possession of firearms is often found

at a suspect’s residence, provide a sufficient link between

Crews, Manus, firearms evidence, and Apartment 3 to find

that there is a colorable argument for probable cause in this

case. “[W]hile the affidavit supporting the . . . search warrant

may not have been the model of thoroughness, it cannot be

said that the document ‘d[id] not link this location to the

defendant.’ ” United States v. Ramos, 923 F.2d 1346, 1354

(9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137,

140 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, we find that the officers were

objectively reasonable in their reliance on the warrant and

affidavit in executing their search of Apartment 3 for evidence of possession of firearms. 

The district courts also found that the officers were objectively unreasonable in searching Apartment 3 for evidence of

the crime of “attempting to elude police” because they had

already obtained sufficient evidence to convict Crews of that

crime. We need not delve into whether the officers reasonably

believed they would discover additional evidence of attempting to elude police because we have already found that the

affidavit did contain indicia of probable cause to search

Apartment 3 for evidence of felon in possession of a firearm.

Therefore, the officers’ reliance on the warrant was not objectively unreasonable for lack of indicia of probable cause. 

UNITED STATES v. CREWS 12057
II. The Affidavit Was Not Misleading as to Material Facts

and Omissions

The district court in Crews’s case found that the good faith

reliance exception was not available as to the crime of felon

in possession because the affidavit contained superfluous

information that was misleading to the state judge.5 Defendants and the district court cited United States v. Sartin for the

proposition that including a “forest of irrelevant and sometimes misleading information” precludes good faith. See

United States v. Sartin, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (D. Or.

2003). In Sartin, the search warrants were procured by (i) a

misrepresentation “which police knew was almost certainly

not true;” (ii) a misrepresentation that the suspect’s brother

had not reported his change of address, when he had; and (iii)

a pretext whereby police stated that the search was for proof

of violating sex offender registration laws, when they really

only wanted to search for drugs. 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.

Such clear indicia of bad faith are not present in this case. 

[6] First, Defendants argue that Officer McConnell misled

the state judge by claiming there was probable cause for the

searches. There is no indication that the state judge wholly

abandoned her judicial role and simply adopted Officer

McConnell’s opinions and beliefs or authorized the search in

a “rubber stamp” manner. This contention is without merit. 

[7] Next, Defendants argue that Officer McConnell made

material omissions by stating that his experience has shown

that felons often flee because of possession of a firearm, but

did not mention that felons may also flee because of an outstanding warrant. This contention is also without merit as

5

In United States v. Leon, the Court acknowledged that the good faith

reliance exception would not be available where the affiant officer misled

the magistrate by including information in the affidavit that the officer

knows is false or would know is false but for his reckless disregard of the

truth. 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). 

12058 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
Officer McConnell candidly acknowledged in the affidavit

that Crews said he fled because of the arrest warrant. Officer

McConnell reasonably included possession of a firearm as

another driving force for why felons flee, as his experience

has shown. 

[8] Defendants further argue that the affidavit was misleading because it omitted the fact that no officer actually saw

Crews enter or exit Apartment 3 and omitted the number of

apartments that were in the same complex as Apartment 3.

The affidavit makes several references to seeing Crews by

“the area of” Apartment 3, and stated that Crews had been in

a car parked in the space reserved for Apartment 3 on two

separate occasions. Although “the area of” Apartment 3 does

not necessarily mean Crews actually entered or exited Apartment 3 rather than another apartment within the complex, the

reasonable inference can be made that it was in fact Apartment 3, considering Crews’s undisputed connection to the

Oldsmobile registered to Apartment 3, Crews’s use of the

parking space reserved for Apartment 3, and Crews’s documented presence at the complex with Manus, the undisputed

tenant of Apartment 3. Therefore, Defendants’ contention is

without merit. 

[9] Defendants also argue that the affidavit was misleading

as it suggested that Apartment 3 was Crews’s residence, while

Officer McConnell was aware that Crews had a different

address listed as his residence on his driver’s license and in

the Portland Police Data System. This argument is also without merit. The affidavit included the fact that Crews’s license

and the Data System stated a different address for Crews’s

residence. The state judge had all the facts before her and reasonably concluded that Apartment 3 could possibly be an

additional or new residence, or at least a reasonable location

to search for evidence. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321,

339 (1983) (recognizing that a person can have one domicile,

but several residences). 

UNITED STATES v. CREWS 12059
[10] Defendants also argue that the affidavit contained

superfluous information that misled the state judge. The affidavit requested authority to search for “magazines” which

were not applicable to the .22 revolver discovered in the

bushes. While magazines would not indicate possession of a

.22 revolver, it does not seem materially misleading to include

one inapplicable item amongst many other items that would

specifically apply to possession of a .22 revolver such as

ammunition, cleaning kits, holsters, shell casings, firearm

cases, laser sights, trigger locks, a safe, and receipts. Additionally, Defendants argue that the inclusion of their felony

records created the false impression of probable cause. We

find that such information was not misleading, but was of particular relevance since the police officers were seeking evidence of the crime of “felon in possession of a firearm.” 

[11] Lastly, Defendants argue that including requests to

search for paperwork to link the Oldsmobile to Crews, a

search that would not yield any necessary evidence for a conviction of attempting to elude police, merely padded the affidavit and misled the state judge. In the absence of a pretext

or other outright lies, merely requesting authority to seek

additional—albeit unnecessary—evidence of a crime is not

misleading. See Sartin, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (holding it

was misleading to request a search for additional evidence of

one crime as a pretext for searching evidence of another

offense). Defendants’ contentions are without merit. 

III. Crews Knowingly and Voluntarily Waived his Miranda

Rights

Regarding Crews, the district court held that:

because the police advised defendant that his detention that day was due to the warrant, and then interrogated defendant exclusively in conjunction with

the improper execution of that warrant, defendant’s

waiver of his constitutional rights that day cannot be

12060 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
construed fairly as sufficiently knowing and voluntary . . . Because that warrant was invalid and no

good faith exception is applicable to excuse its execution, defendant’s statements made during his

detention and interrogation . . . are inadmissible. 

United States v. Crews, No. 05-355-HA, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 47409, at *14-15 (D. Or. July 10, 2006). The Government argues that the district court suppressed Crews’s statements solely as tainted fruit of an unlawful search, and not

because of any Miranda defects. Crews argues that the district

court suppressed his statements as tainted fruit and on the separate grounds that the record shows that, under the totality of

the circumstances, he did not knowingly and voluntarily

waive his Miranda rights. It seems that the district court concluded that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary solely

because police “interrogated [him] exclusively in conjunction

with the improper execution of [the] warrant” as the opinion

makes no mention of any typical Miranda defects. However,

having found that the search was objectively reasonable, we

will address whether Crews’s waiver was sufficiently knowing and voluntary. 

[12] There is a presumption against waiver, of which the

Government bears the burden of overcoming by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534,

536 (9th Cir. 1998). To meet this burden, generally, the Government must prove that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant was aware of the nature of the right

being abandoned and the consequences of such abandonment.

Id. Several factors to consider are (i) the defendant’s mental

capacity; (ii) whether the defendant signed a written waiver;

(iii) whether the defendant was advised in his native tongue

or had a translator; (iv) whether the defendant appeared to

understand his rights; (v) whether the defendant’s rights were

individually and repeatedly explained to him; and (vi)

whether the defendant had prior experience with the criminal

justice system. Id. at 537-39. 

UNITED STATES v. CREWS 12061
[13] Although there was no written waiver, the totality of

the circumstances show that Crews did, in fact, knowingly

and voluntarily waive his rights. There is nothing in the

record to suggest that Crews was of any diminished mental

capacity that prevented him from understanding the nature of

his rights or the consequences of abandoning them. Upon

detaining Crews, Officer McConnell read him his Miranda

rights in English, a language Crews fluently spoke and understood without the need of a translator. Crews stated that he

understood his rights.6 Officer McConnell read Crews his

rights individually as Crews was the sole detainee present.

Later at the precinct, Officer McConnell again reminded, and

Crews acknowledged, that his constitutional rights still

applied. Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances,

Crews’s waiver of his constitutional Miranda rights was sufficiently knowing and voluntary. 

IV. The Information in the Affidavit Was Not Stale by the

Time the Warrant Was Executed

[14] Finally, Manus argues that the information regarding

Crews’s alleged possession of the .22 revolver on July 2, 2005

was rendered “stale” by the time police executed the search

warrant on July 14, 2005. “Staleness must be evaluated in

light of the particular facts of the case and the nature of the

criminal activity and property sought.” United States v.

Greany, 929 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1991). The total elapsed

time from the foot chase until the execution of the search warrant at Apartment 3 was only twelve days. Neither the Government or Manus cites a case where staleness was found in

such a short period of time. Moreover, it is reasonable to

believe that ammunition, cleaning kits, cases, and other evi6The record shows that upon being read his Miranda rights, Crews first

nodded, then said he did not understand, but then said he did. In fact,

Crews told Officer McConnell that it was not his rights that he did not

understand, but rather what was happening. At that point, Officer McConnell explained the search warrant to Crews. 

12062 UNITED STATES v. CREWS
dence of firearm possession would have still been present at

Apartment 3 after only twelve days even if the .22 revolver

was discarded. “One may infer that equipment acquired to

accomplish a crime will be kept for some period of time.”

United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir.

1991), overruled on other grounds Muscarello v. United

States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). Therefore, Manus’s staleness

claim is without merit. 

CONCLUSION

While this case is not a model of flawless procedure, it does

demonstrate objective reasonableness. The amount of work

that went into the police investigation, surveillance, and execution of the search warrant further demonstrates the good

faith efforts of the police officers in this case. Pursuant to

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), it is abundantly

clear that the police officers were deserving of the good faith

reliance exception to the exclusionary rule. We therefore

REVERSE the suppression orders as to both Crews and

Manus and REMAND to the district courts for further proceedings. 

UNITED STATES v. CREWS 12063