[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 22 (Friday, February 1, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6216-6218]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-1847]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[EA-07-111,114,117]


In the Matter of: Wackenhut Nuclear Services, Inc.; Confirmatory 
Order (Effective Immediately)

I

    Wackenhut Nuclear Services, Inc. (WNS) provides security related 
services to the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (Turkey Point), operated by 
Florida Power & Light Company (FPL or Licensee). FPL holds License Nos. 
DPR-31 and DPR-41, issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or 
Commission) on July 19, 1972, and April 10, 1973, respectively, 
pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50. The license authorizes the operation of 
Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, in accordance with the conditions 
specified therein. Turkey Point is located on the Licensee's site in 
Florida City, Florida.

II

    On February 24, 2006, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
completed an on-site inspection of security-related matters at FPL's 
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. During the inspection, an investigation was 
initiated by the NRC's Office of Investigations (OI), which was 
subsequently completed on August 23, 2006. The purpose of the 
investigation was to determine whether WNS security personnel rendered 
contingency response weapons non-functional and whether information in 
FPL documents was inaccurate or incomplete in some respect material to 
the Commission. The results of the OI investigation and additional in-
office inspection activity were documented in a letter to WNS dated May 
25, 2007, which identified three apparent violations involving the 
activities of WNS employees. The three apparent violations included:
    A. In August 2005, a broken firing pin from a contingency response 
weapon was discovered at FPL's Turkey Point facility. Based on an 
investigation, the NRC's OI determined that a WNS security officer 
deliberately removed and broke a firing pin from a contingency response 
weapon, rendering the weapon non-functional. This activity caused FPL's 
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant to be in apparent violation of its Physical 
Security Plan, sections 4.1 and 5.4, Revision 0b, and Security Force 
Instruction (SFI) 2404, section 2.3, Revision 21, and caused WNS to be 
in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.5.
    B. In April of 2004, a WNS employee deliberately removed the firing 
pins from two contingency response weapons, rendering the weapons non-
functional. These actions caused FPL to be in apparent violation of a 
February 25, 2002, NRC Order and Interim Compensatory Measures, section 
B.4(f) , and caused WNS to be in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.5.
    C. On or about October 2004, the WNS Project Manager assigned to 
FPL's Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, provided the licensee with 
information in Condition Report (CR) 2004-13573, related to a damaged 
firing pin event, which was not complete or accurate in some respect 
material to the NRC. The CR was provided by FPL to NRC inspectors 
during a February 2006 inspection at Turkey Point, and was used to 
inform the NRC's inquiry regarding additional actions necessary to 
address serious security concerns.

[[Page 6217]]

The NRC preliminarily concluded that the WNS security project manager 
engaged in deliberate misconduct in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.5, 
in that he was aware at the time that the information documented in the 
CR was not complete or accurate. As a result, the WNS security project 
manager's actions caused FPL to be in apparent violation of 10 CFR 
50.9, and caused WNS to be in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.5.

III

    The results of the NRC's preliminary conclusions, as discussed in 
Section II, were provided to WNS by NRC letter dated May 25, 2007. The 
NRC's letter informed WNS that the NRC was considering the apparent 
violations for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC 
Enforcement Policy, and offered WNS a choice to: (1) Attend a Pre-
decisional Enforcement Conference; (2) provide a written response; or 
(3) request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve any disagreement 
on whether violations occurred, the appropriate enforcement action, and 
the appropriate corrective actions. In response, WNS requested ADR to 
resolve the matter. WNS and the NRC participated in an ADR session in 
Atlanta, Georgia, on August 27, 2007. As a result of the ADR session, 
WNS and the NRC reached an Agreement in Principle, which consisted of 
the following elements:
    1. WNS agrees to the underlying facts which give rise to apparent 
violations (A) and (B) as discussed in section II. Regarding violation 
(C), WNS agreed to provide, within 10 business days of the date of the 
Agreement in Principle, subject to 10 CFR 2.390, information on the 
docket to support its view that the subject violation did not occur. 
NRC agrees to review and consider this information during the course of 
its deliberations in this and related matters prior to the issuance of 
a Confirmatory Order.
    2. During the ADR, WNS described its implementation of enhanced 
employment selection programs, many of which are intended to address 
professionalism and high standards of integrity that exceed regulatory 
requirements. NRC and WNS reached a preliminary agreement that WNS will 
continue its initiatives in the following areas to achieve sustained 
enhancements in security:
    1. WNS New Hire/Recruitment Policy; WNS 102, ``New Hire Recruitment 
Policy'';
    2. Site Enhancement Plan related to the Turkey Point facility;
    3. Development of an enhanced program for leadership development 
and WNS' desire to be ``best in class'';
    4. Benchmarking to include audits, self-assessments, and Safety 
Conscious Work Environment;
    5. Ideal Facility Performance Indicators for Turkey Point;
    6. Continual Behavior Observation Program will include ``one-on-
one'' discussions between supervisors and their direct reports to 
discuss behaviors that are adverse to security, and the obligation of 
officers to report adverse behavior and other actions which could 
jeopardize the safety and security of the plant;
    7. Communications with the NRC, to include the following: 
Development and submittal to the NRC of an initial report detailing 
specific information on the above actions, within approximately three 
months of issuance of the Confirmatory Order. Subsequent status reports 
will be submitted to the NRC approximately every six months, for a 
period of two years (four reports in total). At the end of this period 
(approximately 27 months following issuance of the Confirmatory Order), 
a management meeting between the NRC and WNS will occur. The process 
will be completed after 27 months unless reasonable cause exists for 
continuing with required reporting;
    3. The NRC and WNS agreed that the above elements will be 
incorporated into issuance of a Confirmatory Order.
    4. The NRC and WNS agreed that the elements as discussed at the ADR 
meeting of August 27, 2007, are subject to change based on WNS 
operational, management or industry considerations and with prior 
notice to the NRC.

IV

    Because WNS has agreed to take actions to address the NRC's 
concerns, as set forth in section II above, the NRC has concluded that 
its concerns can be resolved through issuance of this Order.
    I find that WNS' commitments set forth in section V below are 
acceptable and necessary, and I conclude that with these commitments 
the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of the 
foregoing, I have determined that public health and safety require that 
WNS' commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the above and 
WNS' consent, this Order is immediately effective upon issuance.

V

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, and 186 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Commission's regulations 
in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 50, It is hereby ordered, effective 
immediately, that:
    WNS will continue its initiatives in the following areas to achieve 
sustained enhancements in security, including:
    1. A WNS New Hire/Recruitment Policy; WNS 102, ``New Hire 
Recruitment Policy'';
    2. A Site Enhancement Plan related to the Turkey Point facility;
    3. Development of an enhanced program for leadership development 
and WNS' desire to be ``best in class'';
    4. Benchmarking to include audits, self-assessments, and Safety 
Conscious Work Environment;
    5. Ideal Facility Performance Indicators for Turkey Point;
    6. Continual Behavior Observation Program will include ``one-on-
one'' discussions between supervisors and their direct reports to 
discuss behaviors that are adverse to security, and the obligation of 
officers to report adverse behavior and other actions which could 
jeopardize the safety and security of the plant;
    7. Communications with the NRC, to include the following: 
Development and submittal to the NRC of an initial report detailing 
specific information on the above actions, within approximately three 
months of issuance of the Confirmatory Order. Subsequent status reports 
will be submitted to the NRC approximately every six months, for a 
period of two years (four reports in total). At the end of this period 
(approximately 27 months following issuance of the Confirmatory Order), 
a management meeting between the NRC and WNS will occur. The process 
will be completed after 27 months unless reasonable cause exists for 
continuing with required reporting;
    The Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, may relax or rescind, in 
writing, any of the above conditions upon a showing by WNS of good 
cause.

VI

    Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other 
than WNS, may request a hearing within 20 days of its issuance. Where 
good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time 
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made in 
writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a statement of good 
cause for the extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted 
to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Chief, 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Copies 
of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Director,

[[Page 6218]]

Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001; to the Assistant General Counsel for Materials 
Litigation and Enforcement, at the same address; to the Regional 
Administrator, NRC Region II, 61 Forsyth Street SW., Suite 23T85, 
Atlanta, GA 30303-8931; and to WNS. Because of the possible disruptions 
in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is 
requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the 
Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission 
to (301) 415-1101 or by e-mail to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#8be3eeeaf9e2e5ecefe4e8e0eeffcbe5f9e8a5ece4fd"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6e060b0f1c0700090a010d050b1a2e001c0d40090118">[email protected]</span></a> and also to the 
Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission 
to (301) 415-3725 or by e-mail to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f7b8b0b4ba969e9bb49299839285b7998594d9909881"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="86c9c1c5cbe7efeac5e3e8f2e3f4c6e8f4e5a8e1e9f0">[email protected]</span></a>. If a person 
other than WNS requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with 
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by 
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d) 
and (f).
    If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely 
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and 
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered 
at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be 
sustained.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in section V above shall be final 20 days from the date of 
this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of 
time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions 
specified in section V shall be final when the extension expires if a 
hearing request has not been received.
    An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate 
effectiveness of this order.

    Dated this 22nd day of January 2008.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Victor M. McCree,
Acting Regional Administrator.
 [FR Doc. E8-1847 Filed 1-31-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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