J. A02032/20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

BRIAN PAUL SIMPSON, : No. 324 WDA 2019

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 30, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County

Criminal Division at No. CP-37-SA-0000092-2018

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 10, 2020

Brian Paul Simpson appeals pro se from the January 30, 2019 judgment 

of sentence of a $300 fine plus the costs of prosecution imposed after he was 

found guilty in a trial de novo of disorderly conduct.1 After careful review, 

we affirm the judgment of sentence.

2

The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

On Thursday, April 5, 2018, Trooper Jerel T. Smith 

and Trooper Robert Cox were working the midnight to 

8[:00] A.M. shift out of the New Castle Barracks of the 

Pennsylvania State Police. The Pennsylvania State 

Police received a noise complaint about shooting at 

around 3:00 A.M. made by [appellant’s] neighbor, 

either John Argiro or his wife. The State Police 

dispatch contacted [appellant] and requested him to 

proceed to a nearby Dollar General so the responding 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(2).

2 The Commonwealth has not filed a brief in this matter.
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officers could speak to him safely. Trooper Smith was

first dispatched to the house of John Argiro before 

meeting [appellant] at the Dollar General with 

Trooper Cox.

Trooper Smith had been involved with a previous call 

in March of that year where he and another officer 

warned [appellant] to not shoot his firearm at that 

time of night or he would probably be cited. The same 

procedure of meeting at the Dollar General was used 

in the prior incident. [Appellant] was not charged 

based on this prior incident.

Returning to the night of the charged behavior, at 

2:50 A.M., Troopers Smith and Cox arrived at Argiro’s 

residence, who was the complainant in the previous 

encounter between [appellant] and Trooper Smith. 

Argiro testified [appellant] would fire his gun in the 

general orientation towards his residence, not to shoot 

at the residence, but such that he could see the light 

from the muzzle flash. Argiro did not see a flash on 

the particular incident in question.

Argiro also testified that [appellant] does not shoot 

during the daytime, only in the early morning.

While it was clear Argiro and [appellant] were having 

a personal dispute and some of the Argiro testimony 

was disputed, this court credited these basic facts as 

credible.

When contacted about the shooting on April 5, [2018]

Trooper Smith indicated the reason [appellant] gave 

for shooting at that time was because he did not like 

some lights [that] shone into his bedroom and 

disturbed his sleep.

This court credited Trooper Smith as credible.

Trial court opinion, 4/12/19 at 1-3 (citations to notes of testimony and 

footnotes omitted).
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Appellant was found guilty of disorderly conduct by the magisterial 

district judge and appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County. 

On January 29, 2019, appellant proceeded to a trial de novo and was found 

guilty of one count of disorderly conduct in violation of Section 5503(a)(2). 

The trial court found appellant not guilty of disorderly conduct under

Sections 5503(a)(1), (3), and (4). That same day, the trial court sentenced 

appellant to pay a $300 fine plus the costs of prosecution. This timely pro se

appeal followed.3

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Was it prejudicial to [appellant’s] rights for the 

trial court to change an essential element of the 

charge that appellant was convicted of at the 

summary court, during the trial, when 

[a]ppellant was neither charged with or 

convicted of that charge, and the charge was 

not indicated as such on the citation?

2. Was the evidence sufficient to prove that 

[a]ppellant intentionally caused or recklessly 

risked a public inconvenience, annoyance or 

alarm by target shooting on his five acre 

property in a rural neighborhood where target 

shooting and hunting is common?

3. Was it an abuse of the trial court[’]s discretion 

to not allow [a]ppellant to elicit testimony from 

the witness when [the]witness opened the door 

to this testimony and that his testimony was not 

hearsay, but in fact circumstantial evidence that 

he was aware of the North Beaver Township 

Police determination that [a]ppellant was legally 

in compliance with Pennsylvania law while 

 

3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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target shooting on his private property, and was 

that determination correct?

4. Did appellant[’]s use of his private target 

shooting range after daylight hours violate 

18 P[a.]C.S.A. [§] 5503(a)(2) when the [trial] 

court said using it during day light [sic] hours 

did not?

5. Does 34 P[a.]C.S.A. [§] 2507(b)(4) and 35 P.S. 

[§] 4501 prevail over 18 P[a.]C.S.A. 

[§] 5503(a)(2) in providing immunity from 

prosecution for making noise from target 

shooting while on one’s own private target 

shooting range?

6. Was 18 P[a.]C.S.A. [§] 5503(a)(2) 

unconstitutional as applied to appellant[’]s use 

of his target shooting range in after dark hours?

Appellant’s brief at 4-5.4

We begin by addressing appellant’s claim that he is immune from 

prosecution for disorderly conduct, based on the purported statutory defense

set forth in Section 2507(b)(4) of the Game and Wildlife Code, 34 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 101 et seq. (Id. at 38-52.) We disagree.

Here, appellant was found guilty of one count of disorderly conduct in 

violation of Section 5503(a)(2), which provides that “[a] person is guilty of 

disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 

alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he . . . makes unreasonable 

noise[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(2) (emphasis added). “Pennsylvania law

 

4 For the ease of discussion, we elect to address appellant’s claims in a 

different order than presented in his appellate brief.
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defines unreasonable noise as not fitting or proper in respect to the 

conventional standards of organized society or a legally constituted 

community.” Commonwealth v. Forrey, 108 A.3d 895, 898 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, 

the Commonwealth must prove “that the noise here was unreasonable, i.e., 

inconsistent with neighborhood tolerance or standards.” Id. at 899 (citation 

omitted).

Section 2507(a) of the Game and Wildlife Code governs restrictions on 

shooting and provides as follows:

(a) General rule.--It is unlawful for any person 

during the open season for the taking of any big 

game other than turkey to:

(1) Shoot at any mark or target other 

than legal game or wildlife with a 

firearm of any kind or a bow and 

arrow.

(2) Discharge at any time any firearm 

or release an arrow at random in the 

general direction of any game or 

wildlife not plainly visible for the 

purpose of routing or frightening 

them.

(3) Discharge at any time any firearm 

or release an arrow at random or in 

any other manner contrary to this 

section.

34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(a).
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Section 2507(b), in turn, sets forth several exceptions to this general 

prohibition against “target shooting” during open hunting season5 by allowing 

target practice at an approved location. Specifically, Section 2507(b)(4) 

provides as follows:

(b) Exceptions.--This section shall not be 

construed to apply in any manner to:

. . . .

(4) Shooting at a properly constructed 

target or mark or a dead tree 

protected by a natural or artificial 

barrier so that the ball, bullet or 

arrow cannot travel more than 

15 yards beyond the target aimed 

at, after making due allowance for 

deflection in any direction not to 

exceed an angle of 45 degrees. 

Target shooting shall only be lawful 

when it is done:

(i) Upon property owned by the 

shooter or by a guest of the 

property owner.

(ii) Within 200 yards of the 

camp or other headquarters 

where the person shooting is 

quartered or is an invited 

guest or visitor.

34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(b)(4). 

 

5 “Open season” is defined in 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 102 as “the indicated periods of 

the calendar year and the daily hours during which game or wildlife may be 

legally hunted, taken or killed and includes both the first and the last day of 

the season or period of time designated by this title or by regulation of the 

commission.” Id.
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Here, appellant’s reliance on Section 2507(b)(4) as a purported defense 

to his disorderly conduct charge is misplaced because the exceptions set forth 

in Section 2507(b) only apply to those offenses listed in Section 2507(a), and 

not the disorderly conduct statute, which is essentially a noise control law. 

See Forrey, 108 A.3d at 898-899; see also 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(b)(4)

(noting exceptions to Section 2507(a)). Appellant was not charged with 

violating Section 2507(a), and accordingly, his claim is meritless.

In a related claim, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing 

to interpret 35 P.S. § 4501 to provide him with “immunity from prosecution 

for making noise from target shooting while on one’s own private target 

shooting range.” (Appellant’s at 5, 53-57.) Again, we disagree.

When addressing a question of statutory construction, 

our standard of review is de novo and the scope of 

our review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Barbaro, 

94 A.3d 389, 391 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Interpretation of a statute is guided by the polestar 

principles set forth in the Statutory Construction Act, 

1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1501 et seq., which has as its 

paramount tenet that the object of all interpretation 

and construction of statutes is to ascertain and 

effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.

Commonwealth v. Hart, [28 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 

2011)] (quoting 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(a)).

Commonwealth v. Markun, 185 A.3d 1026, 1029 (Pa.Super. 2018) (internal 

quotation marks and brackets omitted; citation formatting amended).

Section 4501 of Title 35, Health and Safety, governs the general 

immunity provided to owners of shooting ranges from any civil or criminal 

action based on noise or noise pollution, and provides as follows:
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All owners of rifle, pistol, silhouette, skeet, trap, 

blackpowder or other ranges in this Commonwealth 

shall be exempt and immune from any civil action or 

criminal prosecution in any matter relating to noise or 

noise pollution resulting from the normal and accepted 

shooting activity on ranges, provided that the owners 

of the ranges are in compliance with any applicable 

noise control laws or ordinances extant at the time 

construction of the range was initiated. If there were 

no noise control laws or ordinances extant at the time 

construction of the range was initiated, then the 

immunity granted by this act shall apply to said 

ranges.

35 P.S. § 4501.

The crux of appellant’s claim on appeal is premised on his belief that his 

private property qualifies as a shooting range under Section 4501. Although

the term “shooting range” is not defined in the statute, our review of the 

record supports the trial court’s determination that “[appellant’s] informal 

activity of target shooting on his property does not make him an owner of a

range for the purposes of Section 4501.” (Trial court opinion, 4/12/19 at 13.) 

As the trial court properly recognized in its opinion, such a finding 

would lead to a near infinite variety of absurd results 

if all shooting on one’s own property was to be 

immunized from noise control. . . . [T]he extreme 

informality of [appellant’s] specific shooting activity 

makes it difficult for this court to characterize him as 

an ‘owner of a range’ even wh[en] that phrase is taken 

in a very broad sense.

Id.

In any event, even if this court were to construe appellant’s property as 

a shooting range for purposes of Section 4501, the immunity provided for in 
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this section applies only to “the normal and accepted shooting activity on 

ranges[.]” 35 P.S. § 4501. Appellant’s act of repeatedly shooting his firearm 

in the pitch black at approximately 3:00 a.m. on a weeknight in an area with

neighboring residential properties with children can hardly be considered a 

“normal and accepted shooting activity” in any community, rural as it may be. 

(See notes of testimony, 1/29/19 at 5-11, 28; see also 35 P.S. § 4501.) The 

interpretation of Section 4501 urged by appellant is clearly unreasonable. If 

that interpretation were followed, it would favor the private interest of the 

owner of such a shooting range over the interests of all adjoining landowners. 

Accordingly, appellant’s purported defense under Section 4501 must fail.

Appellant also argues that the citation charging him with disorderly 

conduct violated his due process rights (see appellant’s brief at 11-21); that 

there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the requisite mens rea to 

recklessly create a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm sufficient 

to sustain his conviction under Section 5503(a)(2) (see appellant’s brief at 

22-30); and that the Commonwealth failed to prove: (a) he created a public 

harm or inconvenience because he was on his private property at the time the

shooting occurred (see id. at 31-34), and/or (b) the noise he created was 

inconsistent with the standards of the neighborhood (see id. at 35-37).

Our review reveals that the trial court authored a comprehensive and 

well-reasoned opinion that thoroughly addresses and disposes of appellant’s 

remaining claims. Accordingly, we adopt the pertinent portions of the trial 
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court’s April 12, 2019 opinion as our own for purposes of this appellate review

of these claims. (See trial court opinion, 4/12/19 at 3-6, 9-11.)

For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s January 30,

2019 judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/10/2020