alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.9

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350,
chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited (the "Company"), hereby certifies, to such officer's
knowledge, that:

The
Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2014 (the "Report") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.

/s/ V. Prem Watsa V. Prem Watsa
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Date:    March 6, 2015


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited and will be retained by
Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

1

---



Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63
of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited (the "Company"), hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that:

The
Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2014 (the "Report") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.

/s/ David Bonham David Bonham
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Date: March 6, 2015


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited and will be retained by
Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

2

---



QuickLinks
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**Certification
      Pursuant to**


**18
      U.S.C. Section 1350,**


**as
      Adopted Pursuant to**


**Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**





In
      connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Panhandle Eastern Pipe
      Line
      Company, LP (the "Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2005 as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
      I, Julie H. Edwards, as Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
      the
      Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that (i) the Report fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
      of
      1934, as amended; and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly
      presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.





/s/
      JULIE H. EDWARDS


Name:
      Julie H. Edwards


Title:
      Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


Date:
      November 9, 2005














This
      Certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
      2002, and shall not be deemed “filed” by the Company for purposes of Section 18
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and shall not be
      incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities
      Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
      whether made before or after the date of this Report, irrespective of any
      general incorporation language contained in such filing.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other documents
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
      Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
      upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack Damian WELP, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 72-2308.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Oct. 26, 1972.

Peter L. Powers, Weatherford, Thompson, Horton & Jordan P. C., Albany, Or., for defendant-appellee Citizens Valley Bank.

Sidney I. Lezak, U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for defendant-appellee United States of America.

Jack Damian Welp, pro per.

Before HAMLIN and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, District Judge.*

*

 Honorable William J. Jameson, Senior United States District Judge, District of Montana, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

A search incident to an arrest for robbery of the Citizens Valley Bank, Shedd, Oregon, revealed $369.00 cash on Welp’s immediate person. Welp was subsequently tried and convicted of that bank robbery, and we affirmed. United States v. Welp, 446 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1971).

The money in question was turned over to the said bank. Appellant filed a petition with the District Court seeking the return of the money to him. After a hearing, the District Court dismissed appellant’s petition, having found that the $369.00 was a product of the bank rob-ery, and belonged to the bank. Welp appeals from this determination.

Questions of fact determined by the trial judge must be upheld on review unless “clearly erroneous.” Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493, 83 S.Ct. 1356, 10 L.Ed.2d 501 (1963); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 85 (9th Cir. 1962). A “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was committed below is a prerequisite to appellate reversal. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1940).

Applying these standards we hold that under the facts of this case the judgment must be affirmed.

It is so ordered.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1272
GINA OLWOCH, Petitioner,
versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-1898
GINA OLWOCH, Petitioner,
versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A72-727-129) Submitted: January 31, 2006 Decided: February 16, 2006 Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.- 2 - Petitions denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. No. 05-1272, Rachel S. Ullman, JOHNSON, YANG & ULLMAN, P.C., Wheaton, Maryland; No. 05-1898, Randall L. Johnson, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Assistant Director, Carol Federighi, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 3 - PER CURIAM: In these consolidated petitions for review, Gina Olwoch, a native and citizen of Uganda, petitions for review of two separate orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”): (1) affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s denial of her application for cancellation of removal; and (2) denying her motion to reopen immigration proceedings to apply for adjustment of status. Based on our review of the record, we find that substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s finding that Olwoch gave false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit and is the refore statutorily barred from establishing the requisite good moral character necessary for a grant of cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2000) (“No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or was one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaini ng any benefits under this chapter.”); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (setting forth requirements for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents). Contrary to Olwoch’s assertions, we find no evidence to suggest that the immigration judge failed to make the necessary findings regarding her subjective intent in- 4 - misrepresenting that she had no children. We therefore deny the petition for review in No. 05-1272. Additionally, our review of the record reveals that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Olwoch’s motion to reopen immigration proceedings. We therefore deny the petition for review in No. 05-1898 for the reasons stated by the Board. SeeIn re: Olwoch , No. A72-727-129 (B.I.A. July 22, 2005). Accordingly, we deny the petitions for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITIONS DENIED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6564
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus ROBERT MILLER, Defendant - Appellant, and $154,863 US CURRENCY, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CA05-520-1-JFM) Submitted: December 15, 2005 Decided: December 20, 2005 Before WIDENER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert Miller, Appellant Pro Se. A. David Copperthite, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.- 2 - Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 3 - PER CURIAM: Robert Miller appeals the district court’s order forfeiting $154,863 to the United States. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See United States v. Miller , No. CA-04-520-1-JFM (D. Md. Feb. 1, 2005). Because the court has filed and considered Miller’s partial informal brief and his addendum to the informal brief, we deny Miller’s motion to strike the court’s order of September 8, 2005, which denied as moot the motion for extension of time to file Miller’s informal brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
HE A~~OIZNEP GENERAL 

OFTEXAS 

GERAID C. MANN A~JSTIN I,. TEXAU 

Honorable 0. P. Lockhart, Chairman 

Board of Insurance Commissioners 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Sir: OpFnion No. O-5539 

Re: Mortuary funds of'mutual assessment associations; Phether such 

funds may be used ~to pay the occupation tax levied by Article 

7064a, Vernon's Annotated Civil 

Statutes. 

The answer to the-question above stated, submitted in 

your letter of August 11, 1943, is ruled by our Opinions numbered O-2988 and O-5337. 

In the latter opinl.on,a copy ofwhlch you have,'we 

rul'ed that mortuary or reserve funds are not taxable~as in; 

cbme under the"Federa1 Revenue Act of 1936. Our conclusion ln 

that opinion was based up&i the proposition that the funds'are, 

by legislative act,'irrevocablg dedicated for the use and protectfon of the policyholders and are not income. 

In our~Opinion~Ro.'O-298&we ruled that the tax levied 

by Article 7064a, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, could not 

be paid out of the mortuary fund because of Section 12 of Artlcle 5068-1, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. We enclose a 

copy of that opinion for a clear discussion of the matter. 

We therefore advise that the occupation tax above referred to cannot be paid out of the mortuary fund but must be 

paid out of the statutory expense fund as provided by law. 

Very truly your,3 

ATTORNEX GEWERAL OF TEXAS 

ER:db:wc By:.skElbert Hoopei 

ElbertRooper 

APPRO- SEP 2, 1943 Assistant 

s/Gerald C, Mann 

ATTORNEYGENERAL OF TEXAS 

Approved Opinion Committee By s/BWB Chairman
### The HONORAB LE HAROLD D. VIETOR, United States District Judge 1 

### for the Southern District of Iowa. ___________ No. 96-2943

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Steven Alan Voshell, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: December 23, 1996 Filed: January 3, 1997

___________ Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

Steve Alan Voshell appeals the 180-month sentence imposed by th e district c ourt after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of 1
a f irearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Voshel l argue s that the district court erred by sentencing him under the Arme d Career Cri minal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because one of hi s predicate convictions--a 1984 Iowa conviction fo r second-degree burglary-- did not constitute a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. We affirm.

Under sec tion 924(e), a defendant convicted of being a felon i n possession of a firearm faces a minimum term of fifteen years imprisonment if he has three prior convictions for violent felonies. "Burglary" i s included in the definition of "violent

### -2-

felo ny." See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). For purposes of sectio n 924(e), the Supreme Court has defined "burglary" generically as "any crime . . . having the basic elements of unlawful or u nprivileged entry into, or remai ning in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. " Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).

We conclude the district court correctly sentenced Voshell as a n armed career criminal. The state charging paper and judgment indicate tha t Voshell pleaded guilty to a charge meeting the generic burglary definition
. See Unite d States v. Carpenter , 11 F.3d 788, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1993 ) (burglary offense qua lified as "generic burglary" where defendant pleaded guilty to charge including entry of structure, intent to commit felony, an d no right, license, or privilege to do so), cert. denied , 114 S. Ct. 1530 (1994 ); United States v. Cornelius , 931 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1991) ; United States v. Payton , 918 F.2d 54, 55-56 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 948 (1991). We reject Voshell's contention that the government was required to offer proof of the factual basis underlying his plea. Cf. Taylor , 495 U.S. at 600-02 (court may not conduct factual examination of underlying conviction). Accordingly, we affirm.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 17

- 00100

- CR

Gregorio Manuel Baladez

v. The State of Texas

On a ppeal from the 377th District Court of Victoria County , Texas Trial Cause No. 12

- 27068

- D

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered t his cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance.
November 16 , 2017
EXHIBIT 10.3
                                                                    ------------

              The CIT Group/Commercial Services, Inc.            T: 212 382-7000
              1211 Avenue of the Americas
              New York, NY 10036

[GRAPHIC OMITTED]
     CiT

                                             July 26, 2006

Mr. Robert A. Levinson
1035 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10028

                                        Re:  BLUMENTHAL/LANSING COMPANY LLC
                                             WESTWATER INDUTRIES, LLC
                                             LEVCOR INTERNATIONAL, INC.
                                             (collectively the "Clients")


Dear Mr. Levinson:

We refer to the Factoring and Financing Agreements with the above referenced
Clients, as supplemented and amended (herein the "Agreements"). The Clients'
Obligations under the Agreements were guaranteed by you pursuant to an Amended
and Restated Limited Guaranty dated May 13, 2003. Effective as of even date
herewith Robert A. Levinson is released from his Guaranty and the Guaranty is
terminated in accordance with its terms.

Except as herein specifically provided, the Agreement with the Client remains in
full force and effect in accordance with its terms.


                                       Very truly yours,

                                       THE CIT GROUP/COMMERCIAL SERVICES, INC.

                                       By: /s/ ANTHONY MONTEMARANO
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Name:  Anthony Montemarano
                                           Title: Vice President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           1,526
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   72,393
<ALLOWANCES>                                       164
<INVENTORY>                                     72,922
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               160,266
<PP&E>                                         296,688
<DEPRECIATION>                                 123,468
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 411,180
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           82,578
<BONDS>                                        110,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           103
<OTHER-SE>                                      77,960
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   411,180
<SALES>                                        588,544
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               588,544
<CGS>                                          496,062
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  560,913
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,036
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,636
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,959
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (6,139)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             14,098
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    14,098
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.47
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The
undersigned, Xianfu Han, the Chief Executive Officer of CHINA ADVANCED
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS GROUP, INC. (the “Company”), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY
that:





1.      The
Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2009
(the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.      Information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operation of the Company.





IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned has executed this statement this 9th
day of February, 2010.





/s/
      Xianfu HanXianfu
      HanChief
      Executive Officer(Principal
      Executive Officer)





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
China Advanced Construction Materials Group, Inc. and will be retained by China
Advanced Construction Materials Group, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The
forgoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission pursuant to § 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not being filed for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether
made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation
language in such filing.
EXHIBIT 32(a)


                      18 U.S.C. Section 1350 Certifications


I hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that
the accompanying Form 10-K of Southwest Bancorp, Inc. ("Southwest") for the
annual period ended December 31, 2003, fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
78o(d)); and that the information contained in this Form 10-K fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
Southwest.


By: /s/ Rick Green                                    March 12, 2004
    --------------------------------------            -----------------
    Rick Green                                               Date
    President and Chief Executive Officer
    (Principal Executive Officer)
(173 La. 405)

#### STOKES v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, Inc.

No. 29903.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 1929.

*196Long, Fields & O’Neal, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Dufour, Rosen & Rammer, of New Orleans, and Clarence R. Wharton, of Houston, Tex., for appellee.

OVERTON, J.

V. P. Stokes, agent for E. Landresse, instituted this suit to recover of defendant $1,-150, with legal interest from judicial demand, for alleged illegal overcharges collected from him on electric current bills; to obtain a decree declaring that the only valid and legal rates for electric current are the normal prewar rates, fixed by Ordinance No. 3651, Commission Council Series, and by a contract entered into by the city of New Orleans with the New Orleans Railway & Light Company, the predecessor of defendant, on October 27, 1916, pursuant to said ordinance; to obtain a decree declaring any other rates in excess of those fixed by said ordinance and contract null and void; to enjoin defendant from exacting any other rates than those fixed by the aforesaid ordinance and contract; and, in the alternative, tó obtain a decree declaring Ordinance No. 6822, Commission Council Series, unconstitutional, if it be held that said ordinance was intended to perpetuate the temporary increase of rates, sanctioned by Ordinance No. 5257, Commission Council Series, passed during the recent war, and permitting an increase in rates of 30 per cent, over those fixed by Ordinance No. 3651.

The trial court rejected plaintiff’s demand. Plaintiff then obtained an appeal to this court. He now rules defendant to show cause why the appeal should not be transferred to the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans, for the reason that this court has not jurisdiction of the demand; the Court of Appeal alone, it is urged, having appellate'jurisdiction thereof.

It is obvious that the $1,150, sued for by plaintiff, is not the only thing involved in this suit. The suit also involves the right of defendant to continue charging, under the authority of Ordinances Nos. 5257 and 6822, the increase of 30 per cent, over the charges authorized by Ordinance No. 3651 and the contract entered into by the city, with defendant’s predecessor, pursuant thereto. This right is distinctly alleged in plaintiff’s petition to be worth far in excess of $2,000. An analysis of the petition clearly supports that allegation. Since the amount involved is in excess of $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal. Const. art. 7, § 10; Black v. New Orleans Railway & Light Co., 145 La. 180, 82 So. 81; Marx v. Meyer Bros., 50 La. Ann. 1236, 23 So. 923; Ready v. City of New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 169.

The rule to transfer the appeal is therefore denied.

O’NIELL, C. J., absent, takes no part.