### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 19

- 2521
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.
E DMUNDO M ANRIQUEZ

- A L V ARADO , Defendant

- Appellant

.

____________________ Appeal from the Unit ed States District Court for the Central District of Illinois

. No. 18

- 20045

- 001

— James E. Shadid , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED M ARCH 3, 2020

— D ECIDED M ARCH 24, 2020

____________________

Before E ASTERBROOK , K ANNE , and S T

. E VE , Circuit Judges

. E ASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

. Edmundo Manriquez

Alvarado, a citizen of Mexico, has entered the United States repeatedly by stealth . How often we d o not know, but the record shows that he was ordered removed in 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2017, each time foll owing a criminal conviction. (His record includes convictions for burglary, domestic violence, trafficking illegal dr ugs, and unauthorized reentry.) The gaps between the removal orders stem from2 No. 19

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the time it takes to catch him, plus time he spends in prison following his convictions. Manriquez

- Alvarado was found in the United States yet again in 2018 and indicted for illegal reentry. 8 U.S.C. §1326(a), (b)(2). His drug crime is defined by 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(B) as an “aggravated felony”. This increases the maximum punishment for unauthorized reentry. After the district court de nied his motion to dismiss the indictment, Manriquez

- Alvarado pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 39months’ imprisonment. The plea reserved the right to contest on appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. All of the convictions for reentry rest on the 2008 removal order. Man riquez

- Alvarado contends that this order is invalid because immigration officials never had “jurisdiction” to remove him . That’s because a document captioned “N otice to Appear” that was serv ed on him in February 2008 did not include a date for a hearing. Pereira v. Sessions , 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), holds that a document missing this information does not satisfy the statutory requirements , 8 U.S.C. §1229(a)(1), for a Notice to Appear. We held in Ortiz

- Santiago v. Barr , 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019), that Pereira identifie s a claims

processing doctrine rather than a rule limiting the jurisdiction of immigration officials. Manriquez

- Alvarado wants us to overrule Ortiz

- Santiago , but that’s not in the cards. Noother circuit has disagreed with its holding, and its reasoning is powerful. That’s not all. Manriquez

- Alvarado supposes th at, if Pereira establishes a jurisdictional rule, then an y earlier removal decision is void . Established law is otherwise. Lawyers have it drilled int o them that jurisdictional deficiencies may be raised at any time . What this means, however, is any timeNo. 19

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during the litigation to which the prob lem applies. Suppose a suit is filed in which the plaintiff alleges the parties’ “residence” rather than their “citizen ship.” That is a jurisdictional defect. E.g., Gilbert v. David , 235 U.S . 561 (1915); Steigleder v. McQuesten , 198 U.S. 141 (1905); Denny v. Pironi , 141 U.S. 121 (1891); Rober tson v. Cease , 97 U.S. 646 (1878) . But if the problem escapes notice , and the case goes to judgment on the merits, the result is conclusive; the decision cannot be collaterally akacked on the ground that the jurisdictional allegations were defective. See, e.g. , Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey , 557 U.S. 137 , 152

– 53 (2009)

. This principle is equally applicable to administrative deci sions

— after all, agencies operate outside Article III, which is the source of judges’ punctiliousness about their own jurisdiction

— which means that the 2008 removal order could not be set aside even if we were to overrule Ortiz

- Santiago

. Older removal orders are potentially open to collateral akack, but not because a defect in a long

- closed proceeding could be called “ju risdictional.” T o mount a belated challenge the alien must show : (1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly dep rived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. 8 U.S.C. §1326(d)

. This statute requires the alien to show all three ; one or two won’t suffice. See United States v. Hernandez

- Perdomo , 948 F.3 d 807, 810

– 11 (7th Cir. 2020 ) ; United States v. Watkins , 880 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Estrada , 876 F.3d 885, 887 (6th Cir. 2017); United4 No. 19

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States v. Lopez

- Collazo , 824 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Soto

- Mateo , 799 F.3d 117, 120 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Cordova

- Soto , 804 F.3d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Lopez

- Chavez , 757 F.3d 1033, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Torres , 383 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Fernandez

- Antonia , 278 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2002). The removal proceedings in 2008 charged Manriquez

Alvarado with being in the United S tates without authorization, having commiked a crime of moral turpitude that cut off avenues for discretionary relief. He could have contestedthose charges, taking his arguments to the Board of Immigration Appeals (§1326(d)(1)) and the court of appeals (§1326(d)(2)). Likewise he could have argued that the Notice to Appear did not satisfy the statute, pursuing both admi nistrative and ju dicial relief. He did none of those things. Instead he stipulat ed to his removal and waived his rights to a hearing, to administrative review, and to judicial review. The agency did not issue a new notice with a hearing date, because Manrique z
- Alvarado did not want a hearing. After signing this waiver he was removed. Now he tells us that it would have been futile to pursue administrative and judicial remedies in 2008 . In a sense this is irrefutable: once he waived his procedural rights and agreed to be removed, of course it would have been futile to continue resisting. But the remedies were nonetheless “available” to Manrique z
- Alvarado, had he decided to stand

on his rights. That Manriquez

- Alvarado waived those rights makes the 2008 order les s amenable to collateral akack and not more, as he supposes.No. 19

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Manriquez

- Alvarado asserts that seeking review would have been futile in a second sense: Pereira was not decided until 2018, so he could not have relied on it in 2008. Once again this is irrefutable, but Pereira int erpreted a statute that long predates 2008. Manriquez

- Alvarado was fr ee to rely on that statute. If the agency and court ruled against him, the relevant decisi on by the Supreme Court might have carried his name rather than Pereira’s. Most likely, however, if he had complained that the Notice omiked a hearing date, the agency would have issued another with the blank filled in. That would have made an appeal “fut ile” in the sense that itwould have done nothing but postpone the inevitable (Manriquez

- Alvarado does not contend that he had any substantive defense to removal), but it would have protected all of his procedural entitlements.

T he statute does not ask whether administrative and judicial remedies would have been futile. It asks whether they

were available . The best way to determine whether a remedy works is to use it and see wha t happens, rather than to bypass it and speculate years later about what migh t have happened. One might say that a remedy is not “available” ifit is sure to be ukerly useless, but as we’ve explained Manriquez

- Alvarado could have used his remedies to seek a Notice to Appear with a hearing date , and if one were not forthcoming to p resent his arguments to the Board, to this court, and to the Supreme Court. That opportunity is all the statuterequires to make a remedy “available”; the condition is satisfied whether or not the alien would have prevailed. See Bousley v. Unite d States , 5 23 U.S. 614, 622

– 23 (1998) (adverseprecedent in the local court of appeals does not excuse failure to present an argument unless the claim was so novel that counsel could not have imagined it ). Cf. Porter v. Nussle ,6 No. 19

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534 U.S. 516 (2002) (an administrative remedy is “available” for the purpose of a different exhaustion rule if it offers the prospect of any relief, even if not the remedy the applicant wants). Much the same may be said about Manriquez

- Alvarado’s contention that the removal order was “fundament ally unfair”. He asserts that because he waived his rights without knowing about Pereira , which lay a decade in the future, the waiver was necessarily involuntary. To repeat: Pereira is a statutory decisio n, and Manriquez

- Alvarado could have consulted the statute and invoked its benefit, small as that was. (Recall that th e only effect of securing a complete Notice to Appear would have been a slight delay in removal.) We held in Ortiz

- Santiago , 924 F.3d at 964

– 65, that the statute creates a pro cedural right that is lost if not asserted or the failure excused , and we applied that rule to an al ien whose removal order predated Pereira . If that did not produce a fundamental ly unfair outcome for Ortiz

- Santiago, it does not produce one for Manriquez

- A lvarado either. His removal was the result of his criminal conduct, coupled with the fact that he lacked permission to enter the United States at all. He has never asserted a legitimate claim of entitlement to be in the United States. It is not unfair, fun damentally or otherwise, to order such an alien to depart.
A FFIRMED