# FILED
May 18, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT KNOXVILLE APRIL 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9706- CR-00230 Appellee, ) ) Roane County V. ) ) Honorable E. Eu gene Eblen, Jud ge JIMMY RAY

BOLDEN, JR., )

) (Sentencing) Appellant. ) )

FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: Joe H. Walker John Knox Walkup District Public Defender Attorney General & Repor ter Walter B. Johnson, II Janis L. Turner Assistant District P ublic Defender Cordell Hull Buildi ng, Second Floor P.O. Box 334 425 Fifth Avenue North Harriman, TN 37748 Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Charles E . Hawk District Attorney General Roger Delp Assistant District A

ttorney General P.O. Box 703 Kingston, TN 37763-0703

OPINION FILED: _______________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMM ERS, Judge

O P I N I O N-2- Appellant Jimmy Ray Bol den, Jr. was indicted for aggravated burgl ary and theft of property over $1000. He pled guilty to both charges. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender, to six year s for the aggravated burglary convi ction and to four years for the theft conviction in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sent ences were to run concur rently to one another but consecutively to the appellant’s prior sentences which he was serving.
The appellant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the tri al court erred by sentencing

the appellant to consecutive sentenc es. We affirm.
The facts of the case show that the appel lant entered the home of Danny and Amanda Estes in Roane County without their consent w ith the intent to commit theft. He stole firearms and a videocassette recorder. He later pawned these ite ms at the EZ Pawn Sho p in Ande rson Coun ty.
The appellant acknowledges that the trial court could , and did, find that the appellant was a career criminal under Tennessee Code A nnotated § 40-35- 115 (1997). However , the appellant contends that the tr ial court “must look to the overall length of the s entences given in the dete rmination of consecutive or concurrent.” The appellant further maintains tha t sentencing him “to another 6 years on top of the lengthy sentences already being served is excess ive.”

The stat e asserts that the trial cour t did not e rr in order ing conse cutive sentences. It contends that the t rial court followed the principles of sentencing and that although the appellant was a Range II, multiple off ender, the trial court sentenced him not only to the mi nimum sentence for aggravat ed burglary and to theft of property valued ov er $1000 but also ordered that hi s sentences be served concurrently

to one another. Furthermore, the state contends that under-3- Tennes see Code Annotat ed § 40-3 5-115 th e trial cou rt may orde r consecu tive sentencing “if the defendant has an ex tensive criminal his

tory and if the instant offense was committed while th e defendant was on probation at the time of the commission of the offense.” The appellant has numerous convictions in several counties, and he was on communit y corrections at the t ime the instant offenses occurred. Finally,the state argues that consec utive sentencing is necessary to protect the public from the appell ant, especially in li ght of his lengthy cr iminal history. We note that his criminal history spans five pag es in this record.
When an appel lant cha llenge s the le ngth, r

ange, or manner o

f servi ce of a sentence, this Court conducts a de novo review with a presumption that the determinations made by the tri al court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d) (1 997). Howe ver, this p resumpt ion is con ditione d on an af firmati ve indication in the record that the trial court consi dered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).
The appellant bears the burden of show ing that the sentence was improper. Id. In determining whether the appellant has met this burden, this Court must consider (a) the evidence adduced at trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the present ence report; (c) the pri nciples of sentencing; (d) the arguments of counsel; (e) the nature and characteristic s of the offense; and (f) the appellant’s potential or lack of potential for rehabil itation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103(5), -210(b) (1997).

The trial court has the “autho rity to consider w hether or not the effective, total sentence will meet the principles and purposes of the Sen tencing Reform Act when assessing w

hat weight applies to those factors which affect both the length of each sen tence fo r the invol ved offe nses and the conse cutive sentencing decision.” State v. Marshall , 888 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tenn. Crim. App.-4- 1994).

We co nclude th at the tri al court d id not err in orderin g consecu tive sentencing. The appellant, w ho was only twenty

-six years old a

t the time of sentencing, already had a lengthy history of criminal activity . Furthermore, because he was on community corrections at the time of the of fenses in this case, he has shown the judi cial system that he is not a rehabilitation candidat e. To say that he is not amenable to correction is charitable. Frankly, the record shows that he is

not eve n curio us about behavi ng himself.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

__________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Ju dge-5- CONCUR:

____________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, Jud ge

____________________________ CURWOOD W ITT, Judge