### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 11, 200 4 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. DA RY L EU GEN E F ORT NER

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty

No. 40100012 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2003- 00950-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 25, 2004

Following a jury

trial, the def

endant wa s convicted of two counts of attempted first deg ree murder, Class A felonies. He wa s also convicted of one count of

ag g ravated burg lary , a Class C felony . The defe ndant contends on a

ppeal that (1) the evidenc e was insuffic ient to establish the requisite intent require d for c ommi t t i n g first deg ree murder, ( 2) the trial c ourt err ed in instructing the jury on diminis hed capac ity
, and (3) the s entenc e wa s excessive. Finding no reve rsible er ror, we aff

irm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed

J OHN E V E R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

J ack A . Butler , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Dary l Eug ene F ortner.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporte r; Richard H. D unavant, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; John W esley

Carney , J r., District Attorney Ge n er al ; and Da niel Br ollier, J r., Assistant District Attorney , for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

A M on tg ome ry

Cou nty jury c on vic te d the de fe nd a nt, Da ryl E ug e ne F ortne r, of

tw o c ou nts of attempted f

irst deg ree murder, Class A f elonies, of his wife and step-son. H e wa s also convicted of one c ount of ag g ravated burglary , a C lass C felony . Following a sente ncing hearing, the trial court sentenc ed the de fenda nt to twenty y ear s i n t h e T en n essee Depa rtment of Corre ction for e ach attempted first de g ree murder conviction and five y ear s for the ag g ravated burg lary conviction. The trial court or dere d that the t wenty -y ear sentenc es be se rved c onsecutively to eac h other, with the five

y ear sentenc e to be se rved concur rently
, for a total effe ctive sente nce of forty y ear s. The def

endant tim e ly fi le d h is n oti c e of app eal

. He conte nd s o n a pp e a l th a t ( 1) the e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o
e sta bli sh the re qu isi te int e nt re qu ir e d fo r c omm itt ing fi rs t de g re e mur de r, (2 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in-2-

instruct i n g t h e jury

on diminis hed ca

pacity , and (3) the sentenc e wa s excessive. Finding no
re ve rs ibl e e rr or , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

F acts

Th e de fe nd a nt, Da

ryl Fo rt ne r, a nd on e of the vic tim s, Ti na F ortne r, we re marrie d in Au g us t 19 99 . So on a ft e r the y marrie d, the c ou ple be g a n ha vin g pr ob le ms. Th e c ou ple pu rc ha se d a mob ile home and lived tog ether

in J oelt o n , T en n es s ee. I n J anuary 2000, Mrs. Fortner’s a dult son, Cory Edwar ds, moved in with the couple. The marital problems c ontinued, and Mrs. F ortner obta ined an

or de r o f p ro te c tio n a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt i n Jun e or July 20 00 . T he mob ile ho me wa s mo ve d to Clarksville, Tennesse e whe re the defe ndant aga in moved i n with his wife and her son. How ever , the

c ou ple ’s pr ob le ms c on tin ue d. Th e de fe nd a nt m ov e d o ut a g a in, a ndin O c tob e r 2 00 0, he ma de thr e a ts that h e w a s g o in g to “ g e t” M r s

. F o r tn e r a n d h e r s o n a n d w a s “ g o in g to b u r n [t h e ir ] tr a il e r to the g round.”

L ate one night in November 2000, a loud noise awa kened Mr s. Fortne r while she and her son

wer e asle ep in the mobile home. She wa lked into the kitchen ar ea of the mobile home and notice d that th e g la ss o n th e ba c k d oo r wa s c ra c ke d. Sud de nly , a pie c e of c on c re te c ra sh e d th ro ug h th e g la ss of the ba c k d oo r. Th e de fe nd a nt r eache d th roug h th e br ok e n g la ss, un loc ke d th e do or , a ndc a me inside. As the victim y elled for her son, the defendant placed a full can of g asoline down on the f loor in the utilit y

room. He the n shoved Mrs. Fortner into he r bedroom and pushed her down on the bed. The de fenda nt turned off

the bedr oom light. Mrs. F ortner immediate ly g ot up from the bed to turn

on the nig hts ta ndlig ht. As sh e aro se fr om the be d, sh e he arda g un sh ot and saw a

fl a sh of lig ht. Up on turnin g on the lig ht, sh e sa w the de fe nd a nt s ta nd ing ne ar the fo ot o f the be d w ith a g un sti ll pointing towar d the pillow where her he ad had be en sec onds earlier. The bullet f ired fr om the g un went into the pillow where the victim had bee n ly ing.

After hearing the commotion in the other room, Edwa rds ca me down the ha ll to his mother’s bedroom. The defe ndant pointed the g un at Edwards and orde red him into the bedroom. As a ll three of them we re in the be droom, the def endant be g an telling them that he wa s g oing to kill them. At some point, the defe ndant droppe d a g love on the floor that he had appa rently broug ht to the scene

. Whil e the de fenda nt and Mrs. Fortner we re discussing the situation, she told the defe ndant that she

wa nte d a c ig are tte . T he de fe nd a nt tol d Edw ard s to go int o the oth e r r oo m a ndbring ba c k a c ig are tte for hi s mother. Edwa

rds complied, during which time the def endant wa s still pointing the g un at them and telli ng them that he was g oing to kill them. The trio soon mana g ed to move into the living room. The de fenda nt pushed Edwar ds down into a cha ir, pulled out a pac kag e conta ining f ifty fee t of ny lon rope, a nd told Mrs. Fortner to tie up her son. She re fused a nd went towar d the front door

. The defenda nt g rabbe d her from behind and hit her in the he ad with the g un. Edwar ds lunge d from the c ha ir a nd g ra

bb e d the de fe nd a nt. Th e tw o me n be g a n wr e stl ing on the fl oo r o f the liv ing ro om. As the strug g le continued, Edw ards told hi s mother to g o for he lp. Mrs. Fortne r ra n outside and beg an ca lling for

help. While the defe ndant and Edw ards we re w restling for control of the g un, a shot was fire d striking Edw ards in the a rm. The de fendant then left the mobile home a nd drove

away

.-3-

Ty ler B arr ett, a C larksville pol ice of fice r, re sponded to a c all about the shooting . He r ece ived a desc ription of the suspect and his vehicle. B arr ett passed a vehicle matching the desc ription and turned a round to follow the vehic le. B efor e the of fice r init i at ed a st op, the vehicle pulled over be c a us e of

a fl a t ti re . U ns ur e wh e the r this wa s th e sa me ve hic le i nv olve d in the sh oo tin g , B arr e tt cautiously

pulled in behind the vehicle. As the def endant attempted to exi t the vehicle, the office r order ed him to ge t back inside. While Ba rre tt called in the license plate number of the ve hicle, the defe ndant jumped out and beg an running toward a wooded a

rea . Ba rre tt pointed his weapon at the defe ndant and or dere d him to st op. The de fendant com p l ied and wa s taken into custody . A .25- caliber handg un was found in the d ef endant’s vehicle. Af

ter re moving the de fendant from the backse at of the police car , officer s d is c o v e r ed appr ox imately thirty rounds of .25-c aliber ammuniti on the def endant ha d dropped onto the f loor while being transporte d.

At trial, the def

ense w as ce ntere d around a theory of diminished capa city . The de fendant did not deny

that he was the per

petrator of the a lleg ed off enses. The defe ndant’s son, Clint Fortner, and his daug hter-in- law, Tammy Fortner, testified that the def endant a cted more like a child than a n adult. They

said that the def

endant liked to play

with toy s and video g ames. Clint Fortner testified that his father purcha sed video g ames a nd children’ s movies for his own enjoyment. Tammy Fortner testified that the def

endant ha d trouble with rea ding, w riting, a nd math.

Dr. Wil liam A nderson, an expert in f orensic psy cholog y , testified on behalf of the de fense

. Dr. Ande rson examined the def endant a nd determined that he functioned at a third or fourth g rade level. His testing indicated that the defe ndant had an I Q of 74, a ccor ding to the Wexler sy stem, and an I Q of 58, a c c o r d in g to th e r e v is e d We xle r s y s te m. H e a ls o d e te r mi n e d th a t th e d e f e n d a n t was suffe ring from mild depre ssion. According to Dr. Ande rson, an I Q of 58 fits into the categ ory of mil d me nta l re tard a tio n. Th e Sta te of fe re d te sti mon y by Dr

. Me lin da L a ff e rt y , a n e xpe rt

in f or e ns ic psy cholog y , as re buttal evidence

. Dr. L aff erty determined that the def

endant e x hibited no evidence of se ve re me nta l di se a se or

de fe c t.
Throug h t h e def

endant’ s wife, Tina

Fortner, the State introduc ed seve ral c ards a nd letters written by

th e d ef en d an t

. Mrs. Fortner testified that she had ne ver obse rved any indications of problems with the def

endant’ s mental ca

pacity . Marv i n Ba skin, the g ener al manag er w here the defe ndant was e mploy ed, also testified on be half of the S t at e. He stated that the de fendant had

wo rk e d f or him app ro xima te ly

fo ur or fi ve y e ars and wa s a

g oo d e mpl oy e e . T he de fe nd a nt w a s a route delivery driver responsible for delivering products to various restaurants. W hile perf orming his job , th e de fe nd a nt h a nd le d mo ne y a ndinv oic e s.

Th e ju ry c on vic te d the de fe nd a nt of tw o c ou nts of a tte mpt e d fi rs t de g re e mur de r, Cla ss A fe l o n i es , an d o n e co u n t o f aggr av at ed b u rgl ar y , a C l as s C fe l o n y

. Fo l l o wi n g a s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, the trial court sentenc ed the defe ndant to twe nty y ear s in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection for e ach attempted first deg ree murder c onviction and five y ear s for the a g g ravated burg lary conviction. The trial court ordere d that the t wenty -y ear sentenc es be se rved c onsecutively to eac h oth e r, wi th the fi ve -y e ar s e nte nc e to b e se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y , f or a tot a l effec tiv e se nte nc e of fo rt y y ear s.-4- Ana lys is

I . Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e

Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s o n a pp e a l th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh the re qu isi te intent require d for c ommitt ing f irst deg ree murder. When a def endant c halleng es the suff iciency of the e vid e nc e , th e sta nd ardof re vie w i s w he the r, a ft e r v ie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t fa vo ra ble to the Sta te , a ny

ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me bey ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P

. 13(e) ; J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, (1979); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-91 (Te nn. 1992). On a ppeal, the State is e ntitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable or leg itimate inf ere nces which may

be d ra wn t h er ef

ro m

. S t at e v

. E l k i n s , 1 0 2 S

. W

. 3 d 5 7 8
, 5 8 1 (T en n

. 2 0 0 3 ). T h i s C o u rt wi l l n o tre -w ei gh the evidence, r eeva luate the e vidence , or substitute its evidentiary infere nces f

or those re ache d by the jury

. State v. Carey
, 914 S.W .2d 93, 95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . Furthermore , in a criminal trial, g reat weig ht is given to the r esult rea ched by the jury . State v. J ohnson, 910 S.W .2d 897, 899 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.
On c e app ro ve d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt , a

jury ve rd ic t a c c re dit s th e wi tne sse s p re se nte d b y the Sta te and re solves all conflicts in favor of t he S tate. State v. Wil liams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983)

. The c redibility

of wit n esses, the w eig ht to be g iven their testimony , and the r econc iliation of conflicts in the proof a

re matters entrusted e x clusively to the jury

as trier of fa ct. State v. Sheffie ld, 6 76 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984) ; State v. Bre wer , 932 S.W .2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. A jury ’s g uiltyverdic t removes the presumption of innocenc e enjoy ed by the def endant at trial and raises a presumption of g uilt. S tate v. Tug g le, 639 S .W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . The de fendant then bea rs the burde n of overcoming this presumption of guilt on appea l. State v. Bla ck, 815 S.W.2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991)

.
Th e d e f e n d a n t ar g u e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t ab l i s h t h a t h e i n t e nd e d to murder the v i ct i m s. Acc ording to the defe ndant’s theory , even thoug h he had nume rous op po rtun iti e s to a c tua lly

kil l th e vic tim s, he did no t. Th e re fo re , h e didno t in te ndto mur de r the m. We find the defe ndant’s ar g ument unpersua sive.

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tio n 39-13-202( a)( 1) def ines first deg ree murder a s “[a] pr e me dit a te d a ndint e nti on a l ki lli ng of a no the r. ” Th e fo llo wi ng de fi nit ionof c ri min a l a tte mp t is g iven in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-12-101: (a ) Ape rs on c omm its c ri min a l a tte mpt wh o, act ing wi th the kin d o f c ulp abil ity otherwise r equire d for the of fense : (1) Intentionally

eng ag es in action or cause s a result that would constitut e an offe nse if th e c ir c u ms tan c e s s u rr o u n d in g th e c o n d u c t w e r e a s th e p e r s o n b e li e v es them to be; (2) Ac ts with intent to cause a result that is an ele ment of the off ense, and believes the conduct will cause the res u l t without further c onduct of the pe rson’s part; or-5- (3 ) A c ts w ith int e nt t o c omp le te a c ou rs e of a c tio n o r c a us e a re su lt that w ou ld constitute the offe nse, under the circ umstances surr ounding the conduct a s the person believes the m to be, and the c onduct c o n s t itutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offe nse. (b) Conduct doe s not c onstitut e a substantial step under subdivision (a)(3) unle ss the person’ s entire course of action is c orrobor ative of the intent to commit the of fense

. (c) I t is no defe nse to pr osecution for criminal attempt that the offe nse attempted wa s actua lly committed.

The e vidence shows that the defe ndant drove to the victims’ residenc e with a loade d g un, at least thirty

rounds of a mmuniti on, g loves, a rope , and a full can of g asoline. The de fendant broke into the residenc e, for ced Mr s. Fortne r i nto the bedroom, and pushed her onto the bed. Af

ter turning

ou t th e lig ht, the de fe nd a nt f ir e d th e g un a t the sa me loc a tio n wh e re the vic tim wa s lo c a te d mo me nts

e arl ie r. Whil e ho ldi ng he r andhe r s on a t g un po int , h e re pe a te dly tol d th e m tha t he wa s g oin g to kill them. The defenda nt pushed Edwards i nto a chair and told Mrs. Fortner to tie him up. When she

re f u s e d a n d a tt e mp te d to e s c ap e , h e s tr u c k h e r in th e h e a d w ith th e g u n

. E d w ar d s g r ab b e d the defe ndant and strug g led for the g un while Mrs. F ortner e scape d and sum moned help. Whil e the two

men wre stled, Edwar ds was shot. Only at this point did the defe ndant attempt to flee . We conclude that th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh int e nt.

I I . J ury I nstructions

The defe ndant next contends that the trial court err ed in instruc ting the jury on diminis hed

c ap a c i t y. T h e tr i a l c o u r tg a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s tru c t i o n c o n c e r n i n g d i m i n i s h e d c ap a c i t y: The state must prove bey ond a re asonable doubt the culpable mental state of the a c c us e d. Cul pa

ble me nta l state me a ns the state of min d o f the a c c us e d at th e tim e of the offe nse. This me ans that y ou must c onsider all of the evidenc e to determine the state of mind of the acc used at the time of the co mmissi on of the off ense. The state of mind which the state must prove is contained in the elements of the off enses as outlined in these instructions above

. I n this case, y ou have he ard e vidence that the defendant mi g ht have suff ere d from a me ntal defe ct or condition w hich could have aff ecte d his capa city

to form the culpable me ntal state re quired to commit a particular off ense. I f y ou fi nd fr om the e vid e nc e that the de fe nd a nt’ s c apa c ity to f orm a c ulp able

me nta l st a te ma y ha ve be e n a ff e c te d, the n y ou mus t de te rm ine be y on d a re a so na ble doubt what the mental state of the defendant was at t he ti me of the commissi on of the

o f f e n s e t o d e t e r m i n e o f

w h i c h
, i f a n y, o f f e n s e h e i s g u i l t y.

Whe the r the de fe nd a nt h a d th e c apa c ity to fo rm the c ulp able me nta l st a te re qu ir e d to c omm it

a p ar t i c u l ar

o f f e n s e i s n o tt o b e c o n f

u s e d w i t h t h e d e f

e n s e o f i n s a n i t y.-6-

U n d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d T e n n e s s e e C o n s t i t u t i o n s , a d e f e n d a n t h a s a r i g h tt o tr i a l b y j u r y. State v. Gar

rison, 40 S.W .3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000). A def endant a lso has a rig ht to a corr ect a nd complete c harg e of the law so that ea ch issue of f act raised by the evidenc e will be submitt ed to the jury on proper

instructions. I d. I n e va luatin g c la ims of e rr or in j ury ins truc ti on s, cou rt s mu st

reme mber that “ ‘jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of mea ning.’ ” State v. Va nn, 976 S.W .2d 93, 101 (quoting Boy de v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380- 81, 110 S. Ct . 1190, 108 L . Ed. 2d 316 (1990))

. There fore
, we revie w eac h jury char g e to determine if it fairly define d t h e l ega l i s s u es involved and did not mislead the jury . See State v. Ha ll, 958 S.W .2d 679, 696 (Tenn. 1997)

.
The State a

rg ues that this issue has bee n wa i ved bec ause the defe ndant fa iled to make a contempora neous ob

j ection to the jury

instruction. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a ). Howe ver, w e conclude that t h e i s s u e is properly befor e us. Althoug h counsel must raise a contempora neous objection to an incomplete jury char g e, State v. Hay nes, 720 S.W .2d 76, 84-85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 8 6 ), t h ere is no require ment for a n objection to the inclusion of an e rrone ous instruction or otherwise ina ccur ate c harg e. State v. Ly nn, 924 S.W .2d 892, 898-99 (Te nn. 1996). The de fenda nt included the issue in his motion for new tria l, and he may now see k appellate revie w.

The de fenda nt conclusively states, wit hout citing any rele vant authority , that the instruction g iven by the trial court conce rning diminis hed capa city was e rrone ous. Specifically , the def endant takes issue with the lang uag e “mig ht have suff ere d.” We have f

ound no persua sive authority that supports the defe ndant’s conte ntion. I n fac t, the instruction give n by the trial court wa s taken verbatim from the Tenne ssee Pattern J ury I nstructions. See T. P. I

. Crim. No. 42.22 (4 ed. 1995); th State v. Coulter, 6 7 S

. W

. 3 d 3
, 69-70 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2001) (appr oving use of almost identical ins truc tio n) ). Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

I I I . Sentencing

The de fenda nt contends on appe al that his sentence is e x cessive. This Court’s review of the

se nte nc e imp os e d by

the tr ia l c ou rt

is de novo with a pre sumption of corre ctness. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). This presumption is c onditioned upon an aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial judg e conside red the sentenc ing principles and a l l rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s. State v. Pettus, 986 S.W .2d 540, 543 (Tenn. 1999). I f the trial court fails to c omply wi t h t h e st atutory di rec tiv e s, the re is n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss andou r r e vie w i s de novo

. St a te v

. Po o le , 945 S.W. 2d93 , 9 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 7)

. The bu rd e n is up on the app e a lin g pa rt y to s ho w that th e se nte nc e is improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) , Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments. I n conducting our revie w, we a

re r equire d, pursuant to T ennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-35-210, to consider the fo l l o wi n g fa ct o rs i n s en t en ci n g: (1) [t ]he e vidence
, if any , rec eived at the trial and the sentenc ing hearing; (2 ) [ t] he prese ntence report; (3) [t] he princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing alternatives; ( 4) [t ]he nature a nd char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) [e] vidence and information offer ed by the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating-7-

fac tors in §§ 40-35-113 and 40- 35-114; and (6) [a] ny statement t he def endant wishe s t o m ak e i n t h e d ef

en d an t ’s o wn b eh al f a b o u ts en t en ci n g.

The de fenda nt submit s that the tri al court erre d by not considering his potential for

re ha bil itatio n in de te rm ini ng the le ng th of his se nte nc e

. Ho we ve r, a s the Sta te c or re c tly po int s o ut, the re cord e stablishes that the trial court did c o n s i d er t h e defenda nt’s potential for r ehabilitation. The trial c ourt noted that the def endant wa s on probation for c ommitt ing an assault ag ainst his wife when he co m m i t t ed the cur rent off enses. Additionally , the def endant ha d been instruc ted that he could not possess firea

rms beca use of the dome stic violence g un law. I n spite of this instruction, the defe ndant obtained a

handg un. The rec ord adequately establishes that the trial court considere d the

se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt f a c ts andc ir c ums ta nc e s. Th e re fo re , o ur re vie w i s de novo wi th

a pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss.

The de fen d an t n ex t contends that the trial c ourt err ed in the application of miti g ating and enhanc ement fa ctors. The weig ht g iven t o eac h enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tor is in the discretion of the trial c ourt, assuming the trial court has complied w i t h t h e purpose s and principles of the sentenc ing a ct and its finding s are supported by the re cord. State v. Ma dden, 99 S.W.3d 127, 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002)

. T h e s t at u t es prescribe no pa rticular w eig ht for an e nhance ment or mitigating fac tor. State v. Gosnell, 62 S.W .3d 740, 750 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) . A def endant’ s sentenc e “is not dete rmined by the mathematica l proce ss of adding the sum total of enhanc ing f actor s prese nt then subtracting from this fig ure the mitigating fac tors prese nt for a ne t number of y ear s.” State v. Alder, 71 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) ( quoting State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) ). Additionally , the wrong ful ap p lication of one or more enhanc emen t fa ctors by

the trial court does not nece ssarily lead to a r eduction in the leng th of the sentenc e. State v. Winfield, 23 S.W .3d 279, 284 (Tenn. 2000)

.
The trial court found that one mi tigating factor applied: “The defe ndant was suf fering f rom a mental or

phy sical condition that signif icantly reduc ed the defe ndant’s culpa bilityfor the of

fense .” Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 13 (8 ). Th e de fe nd a nt ar g ue s th at th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in its application of f

ac t o r (8) be cause it “never annunciated how this reduc ed culpa bilitywas be ing applied to sentenc ing.” We disag ree with the defe ndant. The r ecor d demonstrates the trial court clea rly stated that it was applying this mitigating f actor to all three of

fense s.

The de fenda nt also contends that the tria l court er red in failing to apply

mitigating fac tor ( 1 1): “The defe ndant, althoug h g uiltyof the c rime, committed the of fe n s e u n d er suc h unusual circ umstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the law mo t i v at ed the criminal conduct.” See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113(11). The tri al court found that there was nothing

un us ua l a bo ut the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f the se of fe ns e s. I n f

a c t, the de fe nd a nt’ s o nly int e nt wa s to v iol a te the la w. We a g re e wi th the tr ia l c ou rt

.
The trial c ourt found t hat t wo enhanceme nt fac tors applied in this case

. First, the court found that “[t] he def

endant ha s a pre vious historyof criminal convictions or criminal beha vior in additionE f fect i ve Jul y 20 0 2
, t he l egisla t ure ame nd ed T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 40

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 by add i ng 1

“t errori sm” as an enhancem ent f act o r. 20 0 2 T enn. P ub

. A ct s, ch. 84 9
, § 2 (c). T h is is li st ed as f act o r ( 1 ), t hus

r en u mber i n g t h e pr ev i ou s f ac t or s a s ( 2) t h r ou g h ( 23)

. Se e T en n

. C ode Ann

. § 40- 35- 114 ( Su pp. 2002)

. O u r opi n i on refers t o the enha nce ment f act ors as t hey ex i s t ed at t he t i me of s ent enc i ng as s peci f

i ed i n T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed
sect i o n 40

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 (19 9 7 ).

-8- to those nece ssary

to establish the appropriate rang e.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 1). The 1 defe ndant does not cha lleng e the application of fa ctor (1) , and we find that the re cord supports the trial court’ s application to all three offe nses. The tria l co u rt als o found that “[t] he def endant p o s s es s ed o r em ploy ed a f irea rm . . . during the commission of the offe nse[s] .” See id. - 114(9). Whil e thede fe nd a nt d oe s not co nte st that he po sse sse d a fi re arm , h e arg ue s th a t th e c ou rt imp ro pe rl y applied this fac tor bec ause the defe ndant was in violation of the domestic violenc e g un law. Contrary to the defe ndan t ’s ar gu m en t , the trial court stated that it was g iving this fac tor g reater weig ht than usual beca

use t he defenda nt was in violation of the domestic violence g un law and not simplyapply ing it bec ause of this fact. Possession of a fir earm is not i nhere nt i n the convicte d of fe ns e s; the re fo re , it s a

pp lic a tio n is wa

rr a nte d. We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l court di d n ot e rr in apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (9).

. The de fe n d an t next arg ues that the sente nces f or the attempted first deg ree murder

c on vic tio ns sh ou ld h a ve be e n le ss tha n tw e nty y ears. A tte mpt e d f ir st d e g re e mur de r i s a

Cla ss A fe lon y . A s a

Ra ng e I of fe nd e r, the app lic able se nte nc ing rang e fo r th e def e nd a nt w a s f

if te e n to tw e nty -f ive y e ars . T e nn . Co de Ann

. §4 0- 35 -1 12 (a )( 1) . T he tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y app lie d b oth enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors in this case. “Should there be enhanceme nt and mitigating fac tors for a

Class A felony , the court must start at the midpoint of the rang e, enhance the sentenc e within the rang e as appropriate for the enhanceme nt fac tors, and then reduc e the sentenc e within the rang e as a p p ropriate for the mitig ating fac tors.” I d. -210(e ). Afte r applying the mitigating and enhanc ement fa ctors, the tria l co u rt sentenc ed the de fendant to twenty y ear s, the presumptive

se nte nc e fo r C la ss Afe lon ie s. Th e de fe nd a nt h a s fai le d to sh ow that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inits

app lic a tio n o f m iti g a tin g a nde nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s.

L as t l y , t h e d ef

en d an tco n t en d s t h at t h e tri al co u rt erre d i n i m p o s i n g co n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g. Gene rally
, it is within the di scre tion of t he trial court to impose consec utive sentenc es if it finds by

a pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e vid e nc e that a t le a st o ne of fo llo wi ng statut ory

c ri te ri a app ly : (1) [t] he def

endant is a professional c riminal who has knowing ly devoted suc h de fe nd a nt’ s li fe to c ri min a l a c ts a s a ma jor so ur c e of liv e lih oo d; (2 ) [t ]he de fe nd a nt i s a n o ff e nd e r w ho se re c or d o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity is e xten siv e ; ( 3 ) [ t ] h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a
c omp e te nt p sy c hiatr ist

wh o c on c lud e s a s a

re su lt o f an in ve sti gati on prior to sentenc ing that the defe ndant’s criminal c onduct has bee n char acte rized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s;-9-

(4) [t] he def

endant is a da ng erous of fe n d er whos e beha vior indicates little or no

re g ardfo r h uman li fe
, a nd no he sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to h uman li fe is h ig h; (5) [t] he def

endant is convic ted of two (2) o r more statutory offe nses involving sexual abuse of a minor with c onsideration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the r elationship betwee n the defe ndant and victim or victims, the tim e span of defe ndant’s undete cted se x ual ac tivity , the nature and scope o f t h e s ex ual ac ts and the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s; (6) [t] he def

endant is sentenc ed for

an off ense c ommitt ed while on pr obation; or (7 ) [t ]he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b)

.
The State submitted that criteria (4) (dange rous offe nder) and (6) (committed while on probation) a

pplied in this case. The trial court f ou n d t h at o n ly

the dang erous of

fende r provision applied. The ref

ore, the court ordere d that the sentenc es for attempted first de g ree murder be serve d

consec utively

to eac h other. I f the c ourt conc ludes the def en d an t i s a dang erous of fende r under Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0-35 -1 15 (b )( 4) , it mus t ma ke tw o f urthe r d e te rm inatio ns in addition to apply ing g ener al sentenc ing princi p l es

. S tate v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002). F irst, it mus t find an e x t ended sentence is nece ssary to protect the public f

rom furthe r
c ri min a l c on du c t by

the de fe nd a nt, a nd
, se c on d, it mus t fi ndc on se c uti ve se nte nc ing to b e re a so na bly related to the severi t y o f t h e offenses. State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995). Howeve r, such spe cific f

actua l findings a

re unne cessa

ry for the othe r categ ories of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b). State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

.
The defe ndant arg ues that the trial court erre d in finding that he was a dang erous of

fende r. Acc ording to the defe ndant, the trial c ourt failed to comply with Wilkerson. After a thoroug h revie w of the rec ord, we conclude that the court did ma ke the require d finding s under W i l k er s o n. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e r e c o r d a d e q u a t e l y s u p p o r t s t h e f

i n d i n g b y t h e tr i a l c o u r tt h a tt h e d e f e n da nt is a da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t
Although the trial court f

ound that criteria (6) (off

enses committed w hile on probation) wa s not applicable, w e disag ree

. At the sentenc ing he aring , the State int ro duced a certified copy

of a g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ou rt dis po sit ion ind ic a tin g that the de fe nd a nt p le d g uil ty to s imp le a ssa

ult on July 24, 2000. As a re sult, he was placed o n s upervised pr obation for e leven months and twe nty -nine day s. He c ommitt ed the c urre nt offe nses i n November 2000. Clearly
, he was on probation whe n he committed the curr ent offe nses. There fore , consec utive sentenc ing w as justified under T ennesse e Code Annotated section 40-35-115( b)(6)

. The defenda nt has failed to show that the trial court erre d i n o rd er i n g co n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g.-10- Conclusion

Ba sed on the for eg oing r easoning and our r eview of t h e re co rd as a

whole, we aff

irm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE