SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5210-15T2

SHREE RIDDHI SIDDHI 

HOSPITALITY, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 

SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Respondent. 

_______________________________

Argued October 30, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges O'Connor and Vernoia. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. 

L-0627-15. 

Mauro C. Casci argued the cause for appellant.

George A. Prutting, Jr., argued the cause for 

respondent (Prutting & Lombardi, attorneys; 

Gavin Fung and Mr. Prutting, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Shree Riddhi Siddhi Hospitality LLC appeals from 

an order granting defendant Scottsdale Insurance Company's summary 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 29, 2017
2 A-5210-15T2

judgment motion in this insurance coverage dispute. Because we 

agree with the motion court's determination that the insurance 

policy clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for plaintiff's 

property damage loss from a sewerage backup, we affirm.

The facts are not disputed. An apartment owned by plaintiff 

suffered extensive property damage as the result of a sewerage 

backup. Plaintiff sought coverage for the property damage under 

its insurance policy with defendant. Defendant disclaimed 

coverage, asserting the policy contained an express general 

exclusion for damages caused by "[w]ater or water-borne material 

which backs up through sewers or drains."

Plaintiff filed the pending insurance coverage action. 

Defendant filed a summary judgment motion. In an oral opinion,

the court found the policy's clear language excluded coverage for 

damages caused by sewerage backups, and entered an order granting 

summary judgment to defendant. This appeal followed.

We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's grant of 

summary judgment, and apply the same standard as the trial court. 

Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017). The movant is 

entitled to summary judgment if the record shows "there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and "the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Ibid.

(quoting Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. 
3 A-5210-15T2

of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)); see also R. 4:46-2(c). 

Interpretation of an insurance policy presents a legal question,

which we review de novo. Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. 

Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med. & Physical Therapy, 210 N.J. 597, 605 

(2012).

There are general principles that guide our interpretation 

of an insurance policy. "[C]overage provisions are to be read 

broadly, exclusions are to be read narrowly, potential ambiguities 

must be resolved in favor of the insured, and the policy is to be 

read in a manner that fulfills the insured's reasonable 

expectations." Ibid. However, where "the plain language of [a]

policy is unambiguous, we will not engage in a strained 

construction to support imposition of liability or write a better 

policy for the insured than the one purchased." Templo Fuente,

supra, 224 N.J. at 200; accord Abboud v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. 

Co., 450 N.J. Super. 400, 406-07 (App. Div. 2017).

Where a provision in an insurance policy "is subject to more 

than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous[.]" Templo 

Fuente, supra, 224 N.J. at 200. It is "[o]nly where there is a 

genuine ambiguity" that a court should "read the policy in favor 

of the insured." Ibid. A genuine ambiguity exists if "the

phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the average policy 

holder cannot make out boundaries of coverage." Ibid.
4 A-5210-15T2

Applying these principles, we discern no basis to reverse the 

court's determination that the policy does not provide coverage 

for plaintiff's property damages. It is undisputed the damages 

were caused by a sewerage backup, and the policy includes a clear 

exclusion for such damages. In pertinent part, the General 

Exclusions provision states:

A. We do not insure for loss caused directly 

or indirectly by any of the following.

. . . . 

3. Water Damage

 Water Damage means:

 . . . .

b. Water or water-borne material which 

backs up through sewers or drains or 

which overflows or is discharged from a 

sump, sump pump or related equipment . . 

. . 

There is no ambiguity in this provision. It expressly 

excludes from coverage the precise damages for which plaintiff 

seeks coverage under the policy: water damage caused by a backup 

through a sewer line. Indeed, plaintiff does not allege this 

clear and unequivocal language otherwise excludes from coverage 

the property damage it sustained. Instead, plaintiff contends 

there are other provisions in the policy that create an ambiguity 
5 A-5210-15T2

about coverage, and that the ambiguities should be resolved in its 

favor as the insured.

More particularly, plaintiff relies on a policy provision 

entitled "Perils Insured Against," which in pertinent part 

identifies the physical losses covered by the policy. The Perils 

Insured Against provision broadly states there is coverage 

"against risk of direct physical loss to property described in 

Coverages A and B." Coverage A is the coverage applicable here 

because it is for the dwelling on plaintiff's property where the 

sewerage backup occurred.1

The Perils Insured Against provision, however, has certain

exclusions. In the first instance, the provision states that the 

policy does not provide coverage "for loss . . . [e]xcluded under 

General Exclusions." Thus, the Perils Insured Against provision 

plainly states that coverage is not provided for losses excluded 

under the General Exclusions. Again, plaintiff does not dispute 

that the General Exclusion provision unambiguously excludes 

property damage caused by sewerage backups from coverage under the 

policy.

 

1 Coverage B, which applies to other structures on the property,

is not pertinent here because plaintiff seeks coverage only for 

damage to the dwelling, which is expressly covered under Coverage 

A.
6 A-5210-15T2

Subsection (c) of the Perils Insured Against provision

excludes from coverage losses resulting from eight separately 

delineated causes. Paragraph c.(8) excludes from coverage losses 

caused by "[a]ny of the following": 

(a) Wear and tear, marring, deterioration;

(b) Mechanical breakdown, latent defect,

inherent vice, or any quality in property that 

causes it to damage or destroy itself;

(c) Smog, rust or other corrosion, mold, wet 

or dry rot;

(d) Smoke from agricultural smudging or 

industrial operations;

(e) Discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration 

release or escape of pollutants unless the 

discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration,

release or escape is itself caused by a Peril 

Insured Against named under Coverage C.2

. . . .

(f) Settling, shrinking, bulging or expansion,

including resultant cracking, of bulkheads,

pavements, patios, footings, foundations,

walls, floors, roofs or ceilings; or

(g) Birds, vermin, rodents, insects or 

domestic animals.

 

2 In general terms, the Coverage C provision of the policy provides 

coverage for "personal property, usual to the occupancy as a 

dwelling." Plaintiff here sought coverage for property damage 

under Coverage A. Subsection c.(8)(e) also includes a definition 

of pollutants that is not applicable to plaintiff's coverage claim.
7 A-5210-15T2

The undisputed facts establish, and plaintiff does not 

dispute, that the sewerage backup that caused plaintiff's claimed

property damages was not the result of any of the conditions or 

occurrences identified in subsection c.(8). A sewerage backup is 

not one of the causes of loss in subsection c.(8). Moreover,

defendant did not deny coverage because plaintiff's losses were 

caused by any of the conditions or occurrences listed in subsection 

c.(8). Thus, under the plain language of the policy, the subsection 

c.(8) exclusions have no application to plaintiff's claimed loss 

and do not support plaintiff's claimed entitlement to coverage. 

Ignoring the inapplicability of subsection c.(8) to its 

coverage claim, plaintiff argues the policy is ambiguous because 

it contains an "Exception To c.(8)" provision which, according to 

plaintiff, suggests that damages caused by sewerage backups are 

covered. We are not persuaded.

The Exception To c.(8) provision does not create an ambiguity 

concerning the coverage for plaintiff's claimed loss because it 

details only exceptions to the exclusions from coverage in 

subsection c.(8) of the policy. The Exception To c.(8) provision,

however, is inapplicable here because plaintiff's losses were not 

caused by any of the conditions or occurrences in subsection c.(8). 

Plaintiff cannot conjure up coverage or an ambiguity in the policy

by relying on an exception to defined exclusions that are 
8 A-5210-15T2

inapplicable to the cause of plaintiff's loss and were not relied 

upon by defendant to deny coverage. See Stafford v. T.H.E. Ins. 

Co., 309 N.J. Super. 97, 105 (App. Div. 1998) (finding far-fetched 

interpretations of a policy are insufficient to create an ambiguity 

requiring coverage). Plaintiff was not entitled to coverage under 

the plain language of the General Exclusions and the Perils Insured 

Against provision's unambiguous reiteration that coverage is not 

provided for losses excluded under the General Exclusions. 

Plaintiff was not denied coverage under subsection c.(8), and 

therefore the exceptions to the subsection c.(8) exclusions 

detailed in the Exception To c.(8) provision are inapplicable and 

do not create an ambiguity concerning coverage. 

Moreover, even if the Exception To c.(8) provision applied,

its plain language requires rejection of plaintiff's coverage 

claim for two reasons. First, the provision unambiguously states 

that it does not provide coverage where "the loss is otherwise 

excluded."

3 Again, losses caused by sewerage backups are otherwise 

excluded by the General Exclusions and again in the Perils Insured 

Against provision. Second, the Exception To c.(8) provision 

provides coverage, as an exception to the exclusions in subsection 

c.(8), for "an accidental discharge or overflow of water . . . 

 

3 The Exception To c.(8) provision states that it does not extend 

coverage to losses excluded under the General Exclusions.
9 A-5210-15T2

from within . . . a sewer pipe off" of plaintiff's property. 

Here, there is no claim that plaintiff's losses were caused by 

discharge from within a sewer pipe off of plaintiff's property. 

To the contrary, the undisputed facts show plaintiff's losses

resulted from a discharge of water from a sewer pipe that was 

within plaintiff's apartment. 

In sum, we are convinced the policy is not "so confusing that 

the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of 

coverage," and therefore reject plaintiff's assertion there was a

genuine ambiguity in the policy that should be resolved in favor 

of finding coverage. Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233,

247 (1979). The motion court correctly determined that losses due 

to sewerage backups, like the losses sustained by plaintiff, are

excluded from coverage under the plain language of the General 

Exclusions and the Perils Insured Against provision. 

Affirmed.