alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SECOND AMENDMENT 
                                    TO 
                           MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT


   THIS SECOND AMENDMENT TO MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT (the "Amendment") is made 
and entered into as of July 1, 1997, by and between CFA MANAGEMENT, INC., a 
Florida corporation ("Manager"), and PITTSBURGH LUBES, INC., a Florida 
corporation ("Owner").

RECITALS:

A.  Manager and Owner are parties to that certain Amended and Restated 
Management Agreement, dated July 1, 1994 (the "Agreement").

B.  Manager and Owner have agreed to modify the standard method of 
calculating fees owed to Manager as compensation under the Agreement for the 
three (3) month period ending September 30, 1997; and
 
C.  Manager and Owner desire to memorialize such modification on the 
terms and conditions set forth herein. 

    NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Owner and Manager agree as 
follows:

1.  The parties hereby agree that for the three (3) month period ending 
September 30, 1997, the calculation of the Management Fee shall be $ 
0.00.
 
2.  All terms and conditions of the Management Agreement not amended by 
this Amendment shall remain in full force and effect except to the 
extent that they must be modified to effectuate the amendment 
contemplated by this instrument.  All defined terms shall have the same 
meaning as in the Management Agreement unless otherwise defined herein.
 
3.  Nothing contained herein shall imply or suggest similar 
modifications to the Agreement will be made in the future.  
 
4.  This instrument shall be governed by and construed in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Florida.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Manager and Owner hereunto set their hands and 
seals as of the day and year set forth above. 


Owner:						Manager:

PITTSBURGH LUBES, INC.			CFA MANAGEMENT, INC.
					 
    /s/ Stephen P. Conway                   /s/ Jerry B. Conway
By: _________________________		By: _________________________
    Stephen P. Conway 				Jerry B. Conway,
    President 						President
#### Inman H. Triplett Pltff in Error, *v.*David Scott Deft in Error.

ERROR TO HANCOCK

f A recovers judgment in his name for the use of B, the former cannot receive satisfaction of the judgment, although the legal interest is in his name, and if suit is brought on that judgment, it must be brought in his name.

A payment to a nominal plaintiff, is not a satisfaction of the debt.

This suit was originally commenced by Triplett in his name alone, against Scott, before a justice of the peace in Hancock county.

The foundation of the suit was a judgment rendered before the same justice, entered in the name of “Dennis Clancey for use of Inman H. Triplett.” Triplett obtained judgment in his own name against Scott for the sum of $4 00, the amount of the judgment sued on.

Scott appealed to the Circuit Court. In the Circuit Court of Hancock county, Minshall, Judge presiding, the cause was submitted to him upon an agreement of this substance.

That the plaintiff was the owner of a note made by the defendant to one Clancey or bearer. That plaintiff sued it in the name of Clancey to his use. That Clancey, the nominal plaintiff, without the knowledge or consent of Triplett, the real plaintiff, receipted the judgment upon the docket of the justice.

The Circuit Court, at September term, 1850, dismissed the suit. Triplett sued out this writ of error and seeks to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.

Gr. Edmonds, jr., submitted the cause *ex parte.*

Caton, J.

Triplett brought a suit against Scott in the name *140of Claneey, the record showing that it was for the use of Triplett. Without the knowledge or consent of Triplett, Scott paid the amount of the judgment to the nominal plaintiff, and took his receijjt therefor. Triplett then brought this suit upon that judgment in his own name, which the Circuit Court decided he could not maintain; and we think property. It is true that the payment by Scott to the nominal plaintiff was made in his own wrong, and, it may be admitted, did not satisfy the judgment. Still the legal title to the judgment remained in the nominal plaintiff, and Triplett could no more recover in his own name in a suit upon that judgment, than he could have sued in his own name upon the note upon which the first suit was brought. That note was payable to Claneey, and was transferred to Triplett without endorsement. Hence, Triplett had to sue upon that note in the name of Claneey because the legal title still remained in him, although the equitable title had passed to Triplett. The legal and equ^bty.titles to the judgment were the same as they had been to the note,- and .Triplett was under the necessity of enforcing his rjghts^n.the same way,-that is, by the use of the name of Clancey, the’trustee. The receipt of Claneey for the amount of the judgment could present no more impediment to the recovery in his name upon the judgment, than a receipt given by him for the amount due on the note, would have defeated a recovery on the note.

Thejudgment is affirmed with costs.

*Judgment affirmed.*
I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE O F FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT N OT FINAL UNTIL TIME E XPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

D NS AUTO GLASS SHOP, LLC A/A/O SELENE WASHINGTON , A ppellant ,
v. Case No. 5D 21

- 1894 LT Case No. 2020

- SC

- 004385 S TATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY , AND STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY , Appellee s. ________________________________/ O pinion filed Febru ary 3 , 2023 Non f inal Appeal from the C ounty Court for Seminole County , James J. De K leva , Judge. Chad A. Barr, of Chad Barr Law, Altamonte Springs, for Appellant. Kurt T. Koehler, of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Jacksonville , for Appellee s.2 PER CURIAM

. T he trial court’s order transferring venue under section 47.122, Florida Statutes (2021) , is affirmed

. B ased upon the transcript that Appellee submitted below of the deposition of its insured, who is a material witness, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Appellee’s motion to transfer

venue

. See Cohen v. Scarnato , 270 So. 3d 410, 412 ( Fl a . 4 th DCA 2019) (a pplying the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s order transferring venue under section 47.122). We do, however, remand this case to the trial court with directions that the court amend its order to assess accrued costs against Appellee. See § 47.191, Fla

. Stat

. (2021) (“No chang e of venue shall be granted except on condition that the movant, unless otherwise provided by the order of transfer, shall pay all costs that have accrued in the action including the required transfer fee.”). The amended order shall set forth a reasonable period of time for Appellee to pay these costs. AFFIRMED; REMANDED with directions. LAMBE RT, C.J., EVANDER and EDWARDS , JJ., concur.
Exhibit 23

                    Consent of Cobitz, VandenBerg & Fennessy


<PAGE>



                  [Letterhead of Cobitz, VandenBerg & Fennessy]









                          INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S CONSENT



         We hereby  consent to the  incorporation  by  reference  and use of our
report, dated February 13, 1998 on the consolidated  financial statements of AMB
Financial  Corp.  which  appears  in AMB  Financial  Corp.'s  Annual  Report  of
Shareholders and Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 1997.


                                               /s/ Cobitz, VandenBerg & Fennessy
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                   Cobitz, VandenBerg & Fennessy


March 27, 1998
Palos Hills, Illinois
#### TALBOT OIL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 7433.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

March 17, 1938.

Clark & Henry, of Bay City, Mich., and M. P. Wormhoudt, of Washington, D. G, for petitioner.

James W. Morris, Sewall Key, and Herman Oliphant, all of Washington, D. G, for respondent.

Before SIMONS and ALLEN, Circuit Judges, and DRUFFEL, District Judg*:.

*1018PER CURIAM.

The petitioner was in receipt of income derived from operations upon oil lands owned by the state of Michigan and leased to the petitioner, rental from which was deposited by the state in its general fund and appropriated for public purposes. The question involved is whether petitioner’s income was taxable by the United States or exempt as a burden upon the state in the exercise of a governmental function. The petitioner relied principally upon Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815, and Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 S.Ct. 171, 66 LEd. 338.

It appearing by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner, v. Mountain Producers Corp., 58 S.Ct. 623, 82 L.Ed. —, decided March 7, 1938, that the doctrine of the above cases has been expressly overruled, it is hereby ordered upon the 'authority of the last cited case that the decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals in the instant case be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
#### Charlotte FOLEY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. NATIONAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Inc., Defendant and Appellant.*

No. 14783.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

June 28, 1934.

Porteous, Johnson & Humphrey and F. Carter Johnson, Jr., all of New Orleans, for appellant.

J. I. McCain and Herman L. Midlo, both of New Orleans, for appellee.

JANVIER, Judge.

The question involved here is identical with that discussed by us in the matter entitled Succession of Frank Watson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 158 So. 29, decided by us this day, except that in this case it is admitted that the paid-up value of the policy was tendered to plaintiff.

For the reasons given by us in that case, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be and it is amended by reducing the amount thereof to $16.10, with legal interest from judicial demand and for all costs.

Judgment amended.
#### George D. FARQUHAR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. N. Lee CONNER, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 03-40459.

Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 18, 2003.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

George D. Farquhar (“Farquhar”), federal prisoner number 28074-077, appeals the district court’s order denying and dismissing with prejudice his application for writ of habeas corpus. Because he challenges his conviction and not the manner in which his sentence is being executed, Farquhar must satisfy the requirements for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255’s “savings clause.” *See Pack v. Yusuff,*218 F.3d 448, 448 (5th Cir.2000).

Farquhar has not met his burden of showing that he meets the requirements for filing a § 2241 petition under the savings clause of § 2255. Farquhar must point to a retroactively applicable Supreme *380Court decision which establishes that he may have been imprisoned for conduct that was not prohibited by law and show that his claims were foreclosed by circuit law at the time of his guilty-plea conviction, appeal, or first § 2255 motion. *See Reyes-Requena v. United States,*243 F.3d 893, 903-04 (5th Cir.2001). Farquhar’s arguments do not satisfy both of the above requirements.

AFFIRMED. All outstanding motions are DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 157 (Wednesday, August 13, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 47152]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18668]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER08-1242-000]

Sugar Creek Power Company, LLC; Notice of Filing

August 6, 2008.
    Take notice that on July 9, 2008, Northern Indiana Public Service 
Company filed a Notice of Cancellation of the Market-Based Rate Tariff 
of Sugar Creek Power Company.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must 
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of 
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices, 
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date. On or 
before the comment date, it is not necessary to serve motions to 
intervene or protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an 
original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' 
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail 
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For 
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail 
[email protected], or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on August 15, 2008.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-18668 Filed 8-12-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                              5
<CIK>                                      0000915909
<NAME>                                 Hirsch International Corp.
       
<S>                                      <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          year
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      Jan-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                         Feb-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                           Jan-31-1997
<CASH>                                      7,864,662
<SECURITIES>                                2,595,601
<RECEIVABLES>                              24,339,001
<ALLOWANCES>                               (2,578,000)
<INVENTORY>                                15,768,865
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           51,778,511
<PP&E>                                      9,480,379
<DEPRECIATION>                             (3,238,242)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             83,695,804
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      28,819,514
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                       80,449
<OTHER-SE>                                 41,601,807
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               83,695,804
<SALES>                                   122,195,444
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                          125,438,784
<CGS>                                      80,819,751
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              80,819,751
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           29,070,201
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            832,337
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            15,170,269
<INCOME-TAX>                                6,402,320
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         8,767,949
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                8,767,949
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  $1.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  $1.10
Exhibit








EXHIBIT 4.2
DESCRIPTION OF THE REGISTRANT’S SECURITIES
REGISTERED PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
DESCRIPTION OF COMMON STOCK 
CNA Financial Corporation’s (“we” and “our”) common stock is registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. 
General    
We are authorized to issue 500 million shares of Common Stock, $2.50 par value.  The following summary description of the terms of the common stock sets forth certain general terms and provisions of the common stock.  This description is qualified in its entirety by reference to our certificate of incorporation, as amended, and our by-laws.
Dividend Rights
Subject to the rights of the holders of preferred stock, holders of Common Stock are entitled to receive dividends and other distributions in cash, stock or our property, when, as and if declared by our Board of Directors out of our assets or funds legally available therefor and shall share equally on a per share basis in all such dividends and distributions.
Voting Rights
At every meeting of stockholders, every holder of Common Stock is entitled to one vote per share.  Subject to any voting rights of the holders of preferred stock and as otherwise required by Delaware law, any action submitted to stockholders (other than the election of directors) is approved, if approved by a majority of the stock having voting power present at a meeting at which there is a quorum.  A quorum generally requires the presence, in person or proxy, of the holders of a majority of the stock issued and outstanding.  Delaware law requires that the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of stock, eligible to vote thereon, approve (i) amendments to the certificate of incorporation, (ii) most mergers and consolidations and (iii) sale of all or substantially all of our assets.
Liquidation Rights
In the event of our liquidation, dissolution or winding-up, whether voluntary or involuntary, the holders of Common Stock are entitled to share equally in the assets available for distribution after payment of all liabilities and provision for the liquidation preference of any shares of preferred stock then outstanding.
Miscellaneous
The holders of Common Stock have no preemptive rights, cumulative voting rights, subscription rights, or conversion rights and the Common Stock is not subject to redemption.
CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended
March 31, 2009 of Targa Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Rene R.
Joyce, as Chief Executive Officer of Targa Resources, Inc., hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his
knowledge:




(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: May
8, 2009




By:
            /s/    RENE R. JOYCEName:
            Rene
      R. JoyceTitle:
            Chief
      Executive Officer
              Targa
      Resources, Inc.
              (Principal
      Executive Officer)




A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-41222

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JUAN DIEGO CAVAZOS-GALLEGOS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:17-CR-1161-1

Before SOUTHWICK, WILLETT, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Juan Diego 

Cavazos-Gallegos has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States 

v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Cavazos-Gallegos has filed a response. 

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record 

reflected therein, as well as Cavazos-Gallegos’s response. We concur with 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 20, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-41222 Document: 00514520335 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/20/2018
No. 17-41222

2

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for 

appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is 

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the 

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 17-41222 Document: 00514520335 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/20/2018
V

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 626

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise

trade for the vessel L.R. BEATTIE.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 20, 1995

Mr. MCDERMOTT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

A BILL

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a

certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise trade for the vessel

L.R. BEATTIE.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That notwithstanding section 27 of the Merchant Marine

4 Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), the Act of June 19, 1886

5 (46 App. U.S.C. 289), and section 12106 of title 46,

6 United States Code, the Secretary of Transportation may

7 issue a certificate of documentation with appropriate en8 dorsement for employment in the coastwise trade for the
2

•HR 626 IH

1 vessel L.R. BEATTIE (United States official number

2 904161).

Æ