alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Tice Sisk *v.*State

No. 25348.

June 13, 1951.

Hon. R. L. Templeton, Judge Presiding.

*W. M. Tucker,*Wellington, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State's Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for the sale of liquor with a fine of $250.00 imposed in the judgment in consequence of a jury verdict.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that appellant sold a pint of liquor at his home, during the night, for a consideration of $4.00.

The question raised by the brief and argument of appellant in this case attacks the validity of the judgment on the ground that it is based on an indefinite and uncertain verdict of the jury. The question presented is quite novel and would justify a lengthy discussion if the facts of the case otherwise supported the verdict. We have come to the conclusion, however, that the facts are insufficient.

The complaint and information allege that the sale was *228made in a dry county, the result of an election the returns of which had been in favor of prohibition, that the canvass was made of the returns, the results declared and all subsequent orders thereto had been entered. This is in accordance with law. We note, however, that the only proof offered on the subject was by the county clerk who produced Vol. 3 of the Commissioners Court Minutes of Collingsworth County and testified therefrom that beginning on page 193 of the book it is shown that an election was held on June 28th, 1913, to determine whether or not intoxicating liquor should be sold in said county; in said record it is shown “that such election returns were canvassed, and the results of the election declared. The result of the canvass of the returns shows that there were 393 for prohibition and 113 against prohibition.” There is no proof of any subsequent orders, or action of the court whatsoever, having been made.

Judge Graves said, in Brown v. State, 135 Texas Cr. R. 3, 117 S.W. 2d 107, in very positive and concise language, that proof of all facts alleged necessary to the conviction must be made by the state. We quote: “There is no way that we can know whether or not the sale of intoxicating liquor has been prohibited in certain localities except from proof thereof, and we have repeatedly held that it is necessary not only to allege by proper averments the calling of an election to determine such question, its result and the necessary orders thereafter, but also to prove such matters, in order that it might be shown that such an area was a dry area. See Humphreys vs. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 383, 99 S.W. 2d 600; Green v. State, 131 Tex. Cr.R. 552, 101 S.W. 2d 241; Cunningham v. State, 132 Tex. Cr. R. 63, 102 S.W. 2d 413; Stewart v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 79, 102 S.W. 2d 416; Baldridge v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 590, 106 S.W. 2d 700.”

Because of the failure of the proof to sustain the allegation, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
**Exhibit 23****Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 33-91368 of RTW, Inc. onForm S-8/S-3, Registration Statement No. 33-91372 of RTW, Inc. on Form S-8, Registration StatementNo. 333-28585 of RTW, Inc. on Form S-8, Registration Statement No. 333-81408 of RTW, Inc. on FormS-8, Registration Statement No. 333-114030 of RTW, Inc. on Form S-8 and Registration Statement No.333-127107 of RTW, Inc. on Form S-8 of our reports dated February 14, 2006, with respect to theconsolidated financial statements and schedules of RTW, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2005.Minneapolis, Minnesota
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

LYNN HAMLET,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-100

[April 11, 2018]

Appeal of order denying 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the 

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Bernard I. Bober, Judge; 

L.T. Case No. 06-005997CF10A.

Lynn Hamlet, Indiantown, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Rodriguez v. State, 826 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), 

rev. denied, 848 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 2003).

MAY, DAMOORGIAN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
EXHIBIT 14.1

CODE OF ETHICS FOR SENIOR FINANCIAL OFFICERS

This code of ethics for Senior Financial Officers has been adopted by the
Board of Directors of Animal Cloning Sciences, Inc. (the Company) to promote
honest
and ethical conduct, proper disclosure of financial information in the
Company's reports, and compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations
by the Company's senior officers who have financial responsibilities.

Applicability
As used in this code, the term Senior Financial Officer means the
Corporation's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and
Controller.

Principles and Practices
In performing his or her duties, each of the Senior Financial Officers must:

Maintain high standards of honest and ethical conduct and avoid any actual or
apparent conflict of interest.

Report to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions) any conflict of interest that may arise
and any material transaction or relationship that reasonably could be
expected to give rise to a conflict. Provide, or cause to be provided, full,
fair, accurate, timely and understandable disclosure in reports and documents
that the Company files with the SEC and other regulatory organizations, State
and Federal, and in other public communications.

Comply and take all reasonable actions to cause others to comply with
applicable government laws, rules, and Promptly report violations to the
appropriate committee of the Board of Directors.

Senior Financial Officers must also comply with the Code of Ethics and
Standards of Conduct applicable to the Company's Directors, officers, and
employees generally.

Waiver
Any request for a waiver of any provision of this code must be in writing and
addressed to the Audit Committee. Waivers of the Senior Financial Officers
code of conduct in registered public companies must be reported on Form 8-K
to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Compliance and Accountability
The Audit Committee will assess compliance with this code, report material
violations to the Board of Directors and recommend to the Board appropriate
action.

Approved:


/s/  Dempsey Mork            Date:  April 20, 2007
- -----------------------            ---------------------
Dempsey Mork
President
Chief Executive Officer
Director


/s/  Darren J. Holm          Date: April 20, 2007
- ------------------------          --------------------
Chief Financial Officer
Director
Exhibit 31.2
 RULE 13a-14(a) CERTIFICATION
OF THE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
      (a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    [Intentionally omitted.];(c)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(d)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in
the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and
  (a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting.
  /s/ Michael LeslerExecutive Vice President andChief Financial Officer 28
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 155 (Monday, August 11, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 46554-46555]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18409]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

50 CFR Part 648

[Docket No. 061020273 6321 02]
RIN 0648-XJ34


Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Scup Fishery; 
Adjustment to the 2008 Winter II Quota

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Temporary rule; inseason adjustment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: NMFS adjusts the 2008 Winter II commercial scup quota. This 
action complies with Framework Adjustment 3 (Framework 3) to the Summer 
Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Fishery Management Plan, which 
established a process to allow the rollover of unused commercial scup 
quota from the Winter I period to the Winter II period.

DATES: Effective August 11, 2008, through December 31, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Ruccio, Fishery Policy 
Analyst, (978) 281-9104.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NMFS published a final rule in the Federal 
Register on November 3, 2003 (68 FR 62250), implementing a process, for 
years in which the full Winter I commercial scup quota is not 
harvested, to allow unused quota from the Winter I period (January 1 
through April 30) to be added to the quota for the Winter II period 
(November 1 through December 31), and to allow adjustment of the 
commercial possession limits for the Winter II period commensurate with 
the amount of quota rolled over from the Winter I period.
    For 2008, the initial Winter II quota is 844,036 (383 mt), and the 
best available landings information indicates that 96,912 lb (44 mt) 
remain of the Winter I quota of 2,388,611 lb (1,083 mt). Consistent 
with the intent of Framework 3, the full amount of unused 2008 Winter I 
quota is transferred to Winter II, resulting in a revised 2008 Winter 
II quota of 940,948 lb (427 mt). Because the amount transferred is less 
than 499,999 lb (227 mt), the possession limit per trip will remain 
2,000 lb (907 kg) during the Winter II quota period, consistent with 
the final rule Winter I to Winter II possession limit increase table 
(table 5) published in the 2008 final scup specifications (72 FR 74200, 
December 31, 2007).

[[Page 46555]]

Classification

    This action is required by 50 CFR part 648 and is exempt from 
review under Executive Order 12866.

    Authority: 16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.

    Dated: August 4, 2008.
James P. Burgess,
Acting Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Marine 
Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. E8-18409 Filed 8-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-S
180 La. 71

#### Laura AUSTIN, Wife of Salvadore Navarro, v. Salvadore NAVARRO, Her Husband.

No. 32426.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 2, 1934.

Samuel J. Tennant, Jr., and Frank C. Gip-son, both of Now Orleans, for appellant.

Martin E. Kranz, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee.

OVERTON, Justice.

Plaintiff brought the present suit against her husband, Salvadore Navarro, for separation from bed and board on the ground that defendant beat plaintiff so cruelly as to render their living together insupportable. Defendant reconvened for a judgment, granting him a divorce against plaintiff, on the ground of adultery. There was judgment below in favor of plaintiff rejecting defendant’s reconventional demand for a divorce and granting plaintiff a judgment of separation from bed and board on the ground of cruelty.

The evidence is clear to the effect that defendant beat his wife cruelly, thereby forcing her to leave the matrimonial domicile in the hours of the night and appeal to a neighbor for protection. We therefore think that the judge below did not err in granting plaintiff a separation from bed and board.

As to defendant’s reconventional demand, the evidence offered in support thereof is incredible, and is not entitled to weight in any court. There has been a clear failure of proof on defendant’s part to establish the adultery charged.

The case presents only a question of fact. *179The record discloses no reason whatever for us to disturb the judgment rendered below.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Stinal Atkins v. Bernard Schultz, Schultz & Schultz, Rodrigo 

Suarez Rodas, Joseph Benard Schultz and Baur, Bergstrom & 

Winter LLP

Appellate case number: 01-16-00864-CV

Trial court case number: 2013-31227

Trial court: 165th District Court of Harris County

This Court was advised that appellant has not made arrangements to pay for the 

clerk’s record. In response to our notice that appellant needed to pay for the clerk’s record

and appellate filing fees, appellant filed a motion for an extension to file his brief, a motion 

to proceed as a pauper, and a motion for extension of time to file a motion to proceed as a 

pauper. Within his motion, appellant states that the trial court previously granted 

appellant’s “motion to proceed in Forma Pauperis.” Absent a record containing documents 

concerning indigence, we are unable to determine if appellant is entitled to proceed without 

payment of costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(f).

Accordingly, the District Clerk is directed to file, within 10 days of the date of this 

order, by preparing, certifying, and filing with this court a supplemental clerk’s record, 

containing appellant’s affidavit(s) of indigence, contest(s) to appellant’s affidavits of 

indigence, and any trial court orders ruling on contests to appellant’s affidavits of 

indigence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5(c). 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Chief Justice Sherry Radack

 Acting individually 

Date: February 7, 2017
#### John B. Blake v. Emma Shoemaker.

Motion denied.
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 55

To protect the voting rights of homeless citizens.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia (for himself, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. OWENS, Ms. PELOSI, Ms. NORTON, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. MORAN, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. MFUME, Mr. FLAKE, Mr.

ACKERMAN, Mr. ROMERO-BARCELO ́, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. HALL of Ohio, Mr.

GONZALEZ, and Mr. MINETA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To protect the voting rights of homeless citizens.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Voting Rights of

5 Homeless Citizens Act of 1995’’.

6 SEC. 2. VOTING RIGHTS OF HOMELESS CITIZENS.

7 No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or

8 standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap9 plied by any State or political subdivision to deny or

10 abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to
2

•HR 55 IH

1 vote because that citizen resides at or in a nontraditional

2 abode.

3 SEC. 3. ENFORCEMENT.

4 The Attorney General may commence in the name of

5 the United States a civil action (including an action

6 against a State or political subdivision) or an aggrieved

7 citizen may institute a proceeding under this Act, for in8 junctive relief against a violation of section 2.

9 SEC. 4. RELATIONSHIP TO VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965.

10 This Act shall not be construed to impair any right

11 guaranteed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.

12 1973 et seq.).

13 SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

14 As used in this Act, the term ‘‘nontraditional abode’’

15 includes—

16 (1) a supervised publicly or privately operated

17 shelter designed to provide temporary living accom18 modations (including welfare hotels, congregate shel19 ters, and transitional housing for the mentally ill);

20 and

21 (2) a public or private place not designated for,

22 or ordinarily used as, regular sleeping accommoda23 tion for human beings.
3

•HR 55 IH

1 SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

2 This Act applies with respect to elections taking place

3 after December 31, 1995.

Æ
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-40896

Summary Calendar

Suzanne M. Stanton, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Clay Heiberg; Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C.; County of 

Collin, Texas; John Does 1-20, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CV-405

Before Clement, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Appellant fails to present any non-frivolous arguments on appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. See 5th Cir. R. 

47.6.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 16, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 19-40896 Document: 00515605659 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/16/2020
Case: 19-40896 Document: 00515605659 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/16/2020
Exhibit 32.2





Certification Pursuant to


18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


as Adopted Pursuant to


Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, LP (the "Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard N. Marshall, as Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that (i) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/   RICHARD N. MARSHALL


Richard N. Marshall


Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer





November 5, 2009











This Certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed “filed” by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and shall not be incorporated
by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, whether made before or after the date of this Report, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other documents authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The City of Carthage v. W. H. Duvall.

Debt, for violation of an ordinance. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hancock County; the Hon. John A. Gray, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1902.

Affirmed.

Mr. Presiding Justice Wright, dissenting.

Opinion filed November 1, 1902.

Alva A. Kelley, city attorney, for appellant; A. W. O’Harra and Berry, MoCrory & Kelley, of counsel.

W. H. Hartzell, attorney for appellee.

Mr. Justice Harker

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action of debt brought by the City of Carthage against appellee for an alleged violation of an ordinance of the- city prohibiting the selling of intoxicating liquor within the city. Appellee was the agent of the Adams Express Company at Carthage, and the alleged violation consisted of receiving packages “ C. O. D.,” delivering them to the consignees, collecting from them and remitting to the consignors. The case was tried by the court on an agreed state of facts, resulting in a finding and judgment for appellee. The case is identical, as to the facts, with the case of Robert Munsell v. The City of Carthage, opinion filed at this term of court. It was tried by a different judge, however, and a different result was reached. As the judgment harmonizes with the views expressed in the opinion already filed (which need not be here repeated), the same will be, affirmed.

Mr. Presiding Justice Wright dissents,