1

Filed 5/17/13 Juan L. v. E.W. Scripps Co. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

----

JUAN L., a Minor, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

E. W. SCRIPPS CO. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

C068353

(Super. Ct. No. 170462)

Juan L. (the minor) was the victim of terrible acts of violence when he was seven 

years old. In reporting about the incident, which was of intense local interest, defendants 

(collectively “the media defendants”) published the minor‟s full name. The minor, by 

and through his guardian ad litem, sued the media defendants for invasion of privacy and 
2

gross negligence for printing his name.1 The trial court granted the media defendants‟ 

motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against 

Public Participation) statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.2 The trial court 

found that the media defendants‟ publications about the newsworthy incident were 

protected by the First Amendment and the privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, 

subdivision (d). 

The minor contends (1) the media defendants failed to meet their threshold burden 

to show that they acted in furtherance of the right of free speech, because they did not 

establish that the minor‟s name was newsworthy; and (2) the trial court erred in ruling 

that the burden then shifted to the minor and that the minor failed to show a probability of 

prevailing on the merits.

We conclude the trial court did not err in granting the media defendants‟ antiSLAPP motion. The minor‟s lawsuit arose from acts by the media defendants in 

furtherance of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue, and the minor 

failed to prove a probability of prevailing on the merits.

We will affirm the judgment/order. 

BACKGROUND

Based on an anonymous tip regarding a severely beaten child, Shasta County 

sheriff‟s deputies and a child protective services worker went to a Redding residence and 

 

1 The fact we do not use the minor‟s full name is not intended to indicate that the media 

defendants‟ conduct was tortious. We use an abbreviated name because the California 

Supreme Court has issued a policy statement to the appellate courts stating, in relevant 

part: “To prevent the publication of damaging disclosures concerning living victims of 

sex crimes and minors innocently involved in appellate court proceedings it is requested 

that the names of these persons be omitted from all appellate court opinions whenever 

their best interests would be served by anonymity.” (California Style Manual (4th ed., 

2000) § 5.9, pp. 179-180.)

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3

contacted Rachel Limon and her brother Gregory Limon.3 Gregory initially attempted to 

keep everyone out of the residence and denied the presence of any children. Gregory 

relented when told he would be detained, whereupon the minor was discovered lying on a 

mattress, having difficulty breathing. The minor was taken into the custody of child 

protective services and, due to the severity of his injuries, was flown to UC Davis 

Medical Center in Sacramento. He had multiple broken ribs, two broken vertebra, a 

lacerated spleen and liver, and numerous bruises, scratches and gouges. The minor was 

placed in foster care when he was released from the hospital. 

Rachel, who had a child with the minor‟s father and was the minor‟s guardian, 

eventually admitted assaulting the minor and that she did so as a form of revenge against 

the minor‟s mother. Rachel was charged with attempted murder, torture, aggravated 

mayhem and child abuse, with related enhancement allegations. Gregory was charged 

with child abuse, being an accessory, and obstructing or delaying a peace officer. 

The community of Redding rallied behind the minor with an outpouring of 

support. The media defendant‟s newspaper, the Record Searchlight, published a number 

of articles regarding the minor‟s condition and the charges brought against his attackers, 

and the articles were republished in the Anderson Valley Post, a sister newspaper. The 

articles included the minor‟s name. 

The minor, by and through his guardian ad litem, sued the media defendants for 

invasion of privacy and gross negligence based on six articles in which the media 

defendants revealed the minor‟s name and the fact he was in foster care. The minor 

asserted his name was confidential and privileged because he was a dependent minor. 

The minor alleged that after three of the articles were published, his guardian ad litem 

Richard Bay contacted the media defendants‟ attorney, Walter McNeil, and advised him 

 

3 We will refer to the Limons by their first names for clarity. 
4

that litigation would ensue if the media defendants did not cease and desist publishing the 

minor‟s full name. According to Bay, McNeil agreed that printing the name was wrong

and assured Bay it would not happen again. The media defendants subsequently referred 

to the minor as “Christmas Boy” for a while, but then used the minor‟s full name again 

on more than one occasion. The minor asserted that as a consequence of the media

defendants‟ conduct, he suffered severe emotional distress and humiliation causing him 

permanent injury and rendering it likely that he would change his name. 

The media defendants filed a section 425.16 anti-SLAPP motion to strike the 

minor‟s complaint. The media defendants argued that they met their threshold burden to 

show that the complaint was based on acts by the media defendants in furtherance of their 

right of free speech in connection with a public issue (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e)(2), (3) 

& (4)). The media defendants then argued that the burden shifted to the minor to prove a 

probability of success on his claims, but the minor could not meet his burden because the 

media defendants‟ actions were privileged under the First Amendment and Civil Code 

section 47, subdivision (d). 

The media defendants‟ motion included declarations concerning the manner in 

which they lawfully obtained the minor‟s name and why they chose to use the name. 

According to Mike Chapman, the breaking news editor for the Record Searchlight, one of 

the minor‟s relatives telephoned Chapman the day after deputies found the minor and 

arrested the Limons. The relative talked with Chapman about the facts surrounding the 

matter, the people involved, and the minor‟s condition. The relative stated that he wanted 

custody and “was interested in „getting out his side of the story.‟ ” Chapman asked for, 

and was told, the minor‟s full name so that Chapman could check with the hospital 

regarding the minor‟s medical condition. Chapman told the relative that the newspaper 

would probably refer to the minor as “Junior,” but it was possible the newspaper would 

decide to publish the minor‟s name. Chapman attested that his inquiries “were standard 

procedure for gathering information for a news story. I know of nothing improper, 
5

unlawful, or even unusual in the manner in which I obtained the pertinent information 

which included the name and identity of the [minor].” Chapman did not refer to the 

minor by his full name in the first article he wrote following this conversation, but he 

shared the minor‟s name with members of the news staff “who would be more directly 

responsible for follow-up stories, so they could use that information for further news 

stories as deemed appropriate.” 

According to Silas Lyons, the editor of the Record Searchlight, the staff of the 

newspaper learned of the minor‟s name through disclosure by a relative. When a juvenile 

is a crime victim, a variety of factors are considered in determining whether the identity 

or name of the minor is newsworthy. In this case, the newspaper published the minor‟s 

name because he was not a victim of sexual crimes, and because there was an outpouring 

of community goodwill toward the minor. In addition, the victim assistance coordinator, 

Angela Fitzgerald, related that the minor disliked being referred to by nicknames such as 

“Christmas Boy” and “Junior;” he preferred to be identified by his real name. 

Furthermore, “County personnel from both the District Attorney‟s office (including the 

DA Jerry Benito) and the Sheriff began openly referring to the boy by his accurate first 

name -- which in combination with repeated publication of the last name of the boy‟s 

father (revealed as such in public arrest reports, and identified in news stories as the 

father of [the minor]) -- left nothing to the imagination as to the complete first and last 

name of [the minor].” 

McNeill declared that when he spoke to Bay, he expressed concern and sympathy 

for the minor, but he did not say that printing the minor‟s name was wrong and did not 

promise that the media defendants would not do so again. He merely said he would pass 

along Bay‟s concerns to Lyons. Lyons attempted to call Bay to discuss the newspaper‟s 

policy on publishing the names of minors but was unable to reach him. 

The minor opposed the motion to strike, contending the complaint was not based 

on the media defendants‟ free speech because the minor‟s name was not newsworthy and 
6

the public had no legitimate interest in it. The minor added that the media defendants had 

waived the right to rely on section 425.16 because they contractually agreed not to 

mention the minor‟s name. The minor disputed that the media defendants‟ conduct was 

privileged under Civil Code section 47. He also maintained that he had met his burden of 

establishing a probability of prevailing on the merits because his name was not 

newsworthy. 

In support of the minor‟s motion, Bay declared that he told McNeill he was 

disturbed by the use of the minor‟s name given that he was a minor and the victim of a 

heinous crime. Bay declared, “There was no doubt in my mind that Mr. McNeill 

believed the newspaper‟s conduct was wrong because he advised me that he would 

immediately start his inquiries and make sure this does not happen again.” The 

newspaper “honored our agreement” for awhile, but then referred to the minor by his full 

name on three additional occasions. Bay did not think it was necessary to return Lyons‟s 

phone call the next day, because Bay had already expressed his concerns to McNeill and 

had been assured it would not happen again. 

Fitzgerald declared that she told a photojournalist from the Record Searchlight that 

the minor did not like to be identified by nicknames such as “Christmas Boy” or “Junior.” 

However, she advised the photojournalist that all children‟s names should be kept 

confidential when they are involved in criminal matters. The photojournalist assured her 

that the minor‟s name would not be used and they agreed to call him “Minor L.” 

The minor also submitted copies of the media defendants‟ privacy policies 

concerning information submitted to them via their interactive online service and 

“personally identifiable information” gleaned from such submissions. The policies state: 

“The features, programs, promotions and other aspects of our Website requiring the 

submission of personally identifiable information are not intended for children,” from 

whom they do not knowingly collect such information. If a parent or guardian of a child 

under the age of 13 believes the child may have disclosed personally identifiable 
7

information to the media defendants, the parent or guardian “may review and request 

deletion of such child‟s personally identifiable information as well as prohibit the use 

thereof.” 

The minor submitted various articles by the media defendants in which they did 

not use the names of minors accused of committing crimes, or who were the victims of 

sexual offenses. The minor also submitted an article by Lyons in which he explained 

why the name of a specific juvenile offender was withheld from readers even though the 

name had been used openly in court. Lyons explained the newspaper had an ethical duty 

to minimize harm to the juvenile, who would forever be marked as an alleged violent 

criminal. Lyons stated: “Knowing the name would not provide the vast majority of 

readers with a better understanding of the story.” However, he also stated, “Ultimately, 

we may still publish the name. . . . If we can report a more complete story of his life and 

how he came to be charged with such a terrible crime, we will again weigh the ethical 

pros and cons.” In another article, Lyons explained that the newspaper‟s policy behind 

withholding the name of juvenile offenders “is that they should have an opportunity to 

redeem themselves.” 

The trial court granted the media defendants‟ motion to strike, finding that the 

media defendants‟ conduct was protected by the First Amendment and privileged under 

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d). 

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Legislature has declared that courts must broadly construe the anti-SLAPP 

statute (section 425.16), which is intended to protect “the valid exercise of the 

constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” 

(§ 425.16, subd. (a); Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258.) 

Under the statute, any “cause of action . . . arising from any act of [the defendant] in 

furtherance of the person‟s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public 

issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the 
8

plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the 

claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

The anti-SLAPP statute creates “ „a two-step process for determining‟ whether an 

action should be stricken as a SLAPP” under section 425.16. (Varian Medical Systems, 

Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) First, the court decides “whether the 

defendant has made a threshold showing that . . . the act or acts of which the plaintiff 

complains were taken „in furtherance of the [defendant]‟s right of petition or free speech 

. . . in connection with a public issue.‟ ” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.

(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67, citing § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

An act in furtherance of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue 

includes: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, 

executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, 

(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under 

consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 

proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place 

open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or 

(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition 

or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of 

public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)-(4).) 

If the defendant‟s alleged conduct falls within one of the categories enumerated in 

section 425.16, subdivision (e), then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a 

probability of success on his or her claims. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The plaintiff must 

show “ „ “that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by . . . facts to 

sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ‟ 

[Citations.]” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88-89 (Navellier).) The process 

is similar to the one used in determining summary judgment motions. (Gilbert v. Sykes

(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 26.) “The showing must be made through „competent and 
9

admissible evidence.‟ [Citations.] Thus, declarations that lack foundation or personal 

knowledge, or that are argumentative, speculative, impermissible opinion, hearsay, or 

conclusory are to be disregarded. [Citation.] [¶] „In deciding the question of potential 

merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the 

plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the 

credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the 

motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant‟s evidence supporting the motion defeats the 

plaintiff‟s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.‟ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp.

26-27.) Accordingly, “the motion to strike should be granted if the defendant „defeats the 

plaintiff's showing as a matter of law, such as by establishing a defense or the absence of 

a necessary element.‟ [Citation.]” (Carver v. Bonds (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328, 344.)

The standard of review on appeal is de novo (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson

(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 999), but this simply means that our review of the trial 

court‟s decision is independent rather than deferential. It is still the appellant‟s burden to 

articulate a legal argument as to why the trial court‟s decision was erroneous. (Cf. 

Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230 [de novo 

review of motion for summary judgment does not alter appellant‟s burden on appeal].) 

De novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in 

order to attempt to uncover the requisite supporting facts. (Ibid.) “ „As with an appeal 

from any judgment, it is the appellant‟s responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate 

error,‟ ” and our “ „review is limited to issues which have been adequately raised and 

briefed.‟ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

I

The minor contends the media defendants failed to meet their threshold burden to 

show that they acted in furtherance of the right of free speech, because they did not 

establish that the minor‟s name was newsworthy. But the minor‟s characterization of the 
10

threshold burden is too restrictive (M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 

629) and it “confuses the threshold question of whether the SLAPP statute [potentially] 

applies with the question whether [he] has established a probability of success on the 

merits.” (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 305, fn. 

omitted (Fox Searchlight); accord, Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94.)

“The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion to strike 

the defendant must first establish [his or] her actions are constitutionally protected under 

the First Amendment as a matter of law.” (Fox Searchlight, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 305; accord, Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 94-95.) “Instead, under the statutory 

scheme, a court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in 

the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue 

in the second step of the analysis, if necessary. [Citation.] Otherwise, the second step 

would become superfluous in almost every case, resulting in an improper shifting of the 

burdens.” (Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089-1090; see Governor 

Gray Davis Com. v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 458.) 

Thus, to meet their threshold burden, the media defendants need only have shown 

that the minor‟s cause of action arose from acts by the media defendants in furtherance of 

their right of free speech in connection with a public issue (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), as 

defined in subdivision (e). They only had to make a general showing; requiring any more 

would have rendered the second step superfluous and resulted in improper burden 

shifting. The media defendants mentioned the minor‟s name while publishing newspaper 

reports about (1) a violent assault against the child, (2) the investigation of the crime, and 

(3) the subsequent criminal proceedings. This conduct unquestionably involved the 

freedom of the press and freedom of speech in connection with an issue of public interest, 

and in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body. (§ 425.16, subds. 

(e)(2) & (4).) Just as “[d]omestic violence is an extremely important public issue in our 

society” (Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 238), so too 
11

is child endangerment. (Cf. Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 

1534, 1547.)

Moreover, even if publication of the minor‟s name was not a protected activity, 

nevertheless where a cause of action is based on both protected activity and unprotected 

activity, it is subject to section 425.16 “ „ “unless the protected conduct is „merely 

incidental‟ to the unprotected conduct.” ‟ [Citations.]” (Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, 

Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1550-1551, citing 

Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 

Cal.App.4th 658, 672 [first prong of SLAPP analysis met where the allegations of loss 

resulting from protected activity were not merely incidental or collateral to unprotected 

activity]; and Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 104 

[because the defendants‟ reports to government agencies formed a substantial part of the 

factual basis for defamation and trade libel claims, the claims were subject to the SLAPP 

statute even though also based on nonprotected statements].) Here, the media 

defendants‟ protected activity in reporting on crime, criminal investigation and criminal 

proceedings is not incidental to the allegation that they invaded the minor‟s privacy by 

publishing his name; the minor is suing the media defendants because they published his 

name in connection with the protected activity, rather than using a pseudonym.

“In sum, since [the minor‟s] action against [the media defendants] is based on 

[their] constitutional free speech and petitioning activity as defined in the anti-SLAPP 

statute, [the media defendants] met [their] threshold burden of demonstrating that [the 

minor‟s] action is one arising from the type of speech and petitioning activity that is 

protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 95.) 

Accordingly, the burden shifted to the minor to show a probability of prevailing on the 

merits.
12

II

As best we can discern, the minor next contends the trial court erred in ruling that 

the minor failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.4 

The tort of invasion of privacy in the publication of private facts contains the 

following elements: “(1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3) which would be 

offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate 

public concern.” (Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 118, 126.)

Regarding the first element, there is no dispute that there was public disclosure. 

As for the second element, the media defendants lawfully obtained the minor‟s full name 

from a relative. Prior to publishing the name, the media defendants learned that the 

sheriff and district attorney were openly using his first name. The media defendants had 

already published the full name of the minor‟s father in connection with an unrelated 

crime, noting that he was the father of the minor who had been so horribly abused. Thus, 

the minor‟s full name was already public knowledge, or as Lyons put it, the 

aforementioned facts “left nothing to the imagination as to the complete first and last 

name” of the minor.

The minor provides no argument or authority on the third element, that the 

disclosure of his name would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person. 

Instead, he focuses on the fourth element. To prevail on that element, the minor needed 

to demonstrate that his name was “not of legitimate public concern,” i.e., that it was not 

newsworthy. (Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 215-216 

(Shulman).) Conversely, newsworthiness was a defense to the minor‟s claim. “[T]he 

publication of truthful, lawfully obtained material of legitimate public concern is 

constitutionally privileged and does not create liability under the private facts tort.” (Id. 

 

4 The minor‟s argument heading merely asks: “Would [the Minor] Have Prevailed on 

the Merits?” 
13

at p. 227.) “[N]ewsworthiness is not limited to „news‟ in the narrow sense of reports of 

current events. „It extends also to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving 

information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when 

the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.‟ 

[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 225, quoting Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 224, 

229.)

If the publication was of legitimate public concern, there can be no tort liability 

where the facts disclosed “bear a logical relationship to the newsworthy subject of the 

publication and are not intrusive in great disproportion to their relevance,” and this is so 

even if the subject of disclosure was “a private person involuntarily caught up in events 

of public interest.” (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 215.) “In general, it is not for a 

court or jury to say how a particular story is best covered. The constitutional privilege to 

publish truthful material „ceases to operate only when an editor abuses his broad 

discretion to publish matters that are of legitimate public interest.‟ [Citation.] By 

confining our interference to extreme cases, the courts „avoid[] unduly limiting . . . the 

exercise of effective editorial judgment.‟ [Citation.] Nor is newsworthiness governed by 

the tastes or limited interests of an individual judge or juror; a publication is newsworthy 

if some reasonable members of the community could entertain a legitimate interest in it.” 

(Id. at p. 225.) 

The minor admitted in the trial court that the crimes and circumstances were 

newsworthy. The name of the minor and what happened to him bore a logical 

relationship to the newsworthy subject and was of legitimate interest to the community of 

Redding. It was reasonable for the public to want to know whether the minor had been 

moved to a place of safety, such as foster care. Even if it might have been a better policy 

to keep the minor‟s name and the fact he was in foster care private, that does not mean 

those facts were not of legitimate public interest. (Cf. Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury 

News (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 172, 187 [whether journalism standards were violated had 
14

no bearing on defamation action].) And the state may not constitutionally punish the 

publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information about a matter of legitimate public 

interest except in “circumstances involving „a need to further a state interest of the 

highest order.‟ ” (Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 679, 693 

(Gates), quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979) 443 U.S. 97, 103 [61 L.Ed.2d 

399, 405].) 

The minor does not demonstrate that revealing the identity of a physically abused 

minor or the fact of his placement in foster care violated a state interest of the highest 

order. Indeed, he does not discuss or explain why he thinks his situation is 

distinguishable from multiple United States Supreme Court cases finding various 

interests not to be of the highest order. (See Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) 532 U.S. 514, 

529-533 [149 L.Ed.2d 787, 802-805] [interests in removing incentive to illegally 

intercept conversations, and in minimizing harm to persons whose conversations are 

intercepted]; The Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) 491 U.S. 524, 536-541 [105 L.Ed.2d 443, 

457-460] [interests in rape victim privacy, victim safety, and encouraging victims to 

report offenses]; Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., supra, 443 U.S. at p. 104 [61 

L.Ed.2d at pp. 405-406] [rehabilitative interest in protecting anonymity of juvenile 

offenders]; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469, 496 [43 L.Ed.2d 328, 

350] [interest in protecting anonymity of deceased rape victim]; see also Gates, supra, 

34 Cal.4th at p. 693 [protection of long-term anonymity of former convicts].) 

Furthermore, the minor fails to address the media defendants‟ assertion of 

privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), which provides, in relevant part: 

“A privileged publication . . . is one made: [¶] . . . [¶] (d)(1) By a fair and true report in, 

or a communication to, a public journal, of (A) a judicial, (B) legislative, or (C) other 

public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in the course thereof, or (E) of a 

verified charge or complaint made by any person to a public official, upon which 

complaint a warrant has been issued.” 
15

This statutory provision, which is broadly construed, “confers an absolute 

privilege.” (Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 240.) It 

applies if the substance of the publication or broadcast captures the gist of the statements 

made in the official proceedings. (Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.) A 

newspaper and news Web site are “ „public journal[s]‟ ” within the meaning of the 

statute. (Ibid.) A “ „public official proceeding,‟ ” includes a police investigation. 

(Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1337.) “In the 

context of judicial proceedings, . . . reports which comprise a history of the proceeding 

come within the privilege, as do statements made outside the courtroom and invoking no 

function of the court, e.g., representations and theories expressed by criminal justice 

personnel in relation to pretrial events such as pursuit and arrest of the defendant. 

[Citation.]” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1050, 

italics omitted.) 

Here, the media defendants used the minor‟s name in published articles that were a 

fair and true report of the police investigation into the assault committed against the 

minor and of the subsequent judicial proceedings against the perpetrators, the Limons. 

As such, the use of the minor‟s name is privileged under Civil Code section 47, 

subdivision (d).

Rather than discussing these constitutional and statutory matters that formed the 

basis for the trial court‟s ruling, the minor instead argues the trial court erred in 

overruling his objections to the media defendants‟ affidavits in support of their antiSLAPP motion. The minor suggests that when the objectionable material is excised there 

is no support for the anti-SLAPP motion. But the minor does not discuss his specific 

objections in his opening brief and he does not provide any legal authority for his 

position. He merely incorporates by reference the objections made in the trial court, 

asserting that the media defendants‟ declarations were hearsay, nothing more than 

deceitful, and authored for the sole purpose of stopping the litigation. Under the 
16

circumstances, the minor‟s contention is forfeited. (Garrick Development Co. v. 

Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320, 334 [an argument may be 

forfeited where the appellant simply incorporates by reference arguments made in papers 

filed in the trial court rather than brief the arguments on appeal]; Badie v. Bank of 

America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [when an appellant fails to raise a point, or 

fails to support a point with reasoned argument and citations to authority, it is forfeited].) 

But even if the trial court had erred in overruling the minor‟s objections, the minor 

does not establish the manner in which he suffered prejudice as a result of those rulings. 

A judgment will not be reversed unless the error at the trial court level resulted in a 

miscarriage of justice to the extent that a different result would have been probable 

without the error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475; Evid. Code, §§ 353, 

354; Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069; Malibu Mountains 

Recreation, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 359, 372.) The 

appellant has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error. (Pool v. City of 

Oakland, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1069.) And appellate courts will not “act as counsel for 

appellant by furnishing a legal argument as to how the trial court‟s ruling was 

prejudicial.” (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963.)
17

The minor does not explain how a different result would have been probable had 

the asserted errors not occurred. He has therefore failed to satisfy his affirmative burden 

on appeal of demonstrating prejudicial error.

DISPOSITION

The judgment/order is affirmed.

 MAURO , J.

We concur:

 RAYE , P. J.

 NICHOLSON , J.