IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

WESTERN DISTRICT

BERRY LIVINGSTON,

Respondent,

v.

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS,

Appellant.

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WD81789

OPINION FILED:

July 28, 2020

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri

The Honorable Daniel R. Green, Judge

Before Division One: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, and

Mark D. Pfeiffer and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judges

The Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) appeals from the judgment of the 

Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri (“circuit court”), granting Mr. Berry Livingston’s 

(“Livingston”) motion for judgment on the pleadings in his declaratory judgment action, in which 

he requested that the court retroactively apply the repeal of section 195.291 and declare him parole 

eligible. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and enter judgment in favor of the MDOC 

pursuant to Rule 84.14.

Factual and Procedural Background

In February of 2017, Livingston was convicted of possessing a controlled substance with 

intent to distribute in violation of section 195.211.3 and unlawful use of drug paraphernalia in 
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violation of section 195.233.2 for offenses Livingston committed December 9, 2013.

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Subsequently, the General Assembly repealed section 195.291, effective January 1, 2017. As a 

result, the requirement that an offender found guilty of possessing a controlled substance with 

intent to distribute in violation of section 195.211 must be sentenced to the authorized term of 

imprisonment for a class A felony without probation or parole if the court finds the defendant is a 

persistent drug offender was eliminated.

In April of 2017, the court found Livingston was a persistent drug offender, and 

accordingly sentenced him for the possession conviction to fifteen years without probation or 

parole pursuant to section 195.291.2, and one year in county jail for the unlawful use of drug 

paraphernalia, to be served concurrently.

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 Livingston appealed his convictions, which the Eastern 

District of this Court affirmed. State v. Livingston, 547 S.W.3d 606, 607 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).

On November 29, 2017, Livingston filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment in the circuit 

court. Livingston asked the circuit court to declare him parole eligible. Thereafter, Livingston 

filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After filing an answer denying that Livingston was 

entitled to a declaratory judgment, the MDOC filed a Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

on May 14, 2018. On the same day, the circuit court entered its Judgment, granting Livingston’s 

request for declaratory judgment and concluding that “[s]ection 195.291 is not applicable to 

determining parole eligibility[,] and [the MDOC] is hereby ordered to apply existing laws 

concerning [Livingston’s] parole eligibility.”

 1 All references to sections 195.211 and 195.233 are to the REVISED STATUTES OF MISSOURI 2000, as updated 

through the 2013 Cumulative Supplement, the version of the statute in effect on the date of Livingston’s offenses. See 

State v. Sayles, 491 S.W.3d 271, 272 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). 2 Because a defendant is sentenced according to the law in effect at the time the offense was committed, 

Wagner v. Bowyer, 559 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018), all references to section 195.291 are to the REVISED 

STATUTES OF MISSOURI 2000, as updated through the 2013 Cumulative Supplement.
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The MDOC timely appealed.3 During the pendency of this appeal, Livingston was granted 

parole and released from custody, and further, Governor Parson granted a limited commutation of 

Livingston’s sentence to house arrest during his “term of parole ineligibility” pursuant to 

section 217.541, noting that the Parole Board would still have discretion and authority to revoke 

the house arrest and return him to the MDOC and that Livingston’s sentence duration of fifteen 

years was not otherwise shortened.

Standard of Review

“The question presented by a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the face of the pleadings.” Mo. State Conference 

of Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State, 563 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Mo. App. W.D. 

2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the circuit court’s grant of a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is de novo. Id.

Analysis

Initially, we must dispose of Livingston’s motion to dismiss this appeal, which was taken 

with the case. “Before we consider the merits of [the MDOC’s] appeal, we must determine, as a 

threshold question, whether the controversy is moot.” Gates v. State, 539 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Mo. 

App. W.D. 2018). Livingston argues this appeal by the MDOC is moot because Livingston has 

already actually been paroled and released from custody and has received a limited commutation 

of his “term of parole ineligibility . . . to house arrest pursuant to Section 217.541” from Governor 

 3 This court previously ordered transfer of two other cases that also addressed the retroactive application of 

the repeal of section 195.295: Mitchell v. Jones, No. WD81049, 2019 WL 8109959 (Mo. App. W.D. Jan. 8, 2019),

and Woods v. Missouri Department of Corrections, No. WD81266, 2019 WL 8109960 (Mo. App. W.D. Jan. 8, 2019). 

Livingston moved for a stay of this appeal pending the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Woods v. Missouri 

Department of Corrections, SC97633, which this Court granted. Opinions in both cases were filed on February 4, 

2020. On March 31, 2020, the Supreme Court overruled motions for rehearing in both cases, and final mandates were 

issued. See Mitchell v. Phillips, 596 S.W.3d 120 (Mo. banc 2020), and Woods v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 595 S.W.3d 504 

(Mo. banc 2020). On our own motion, this Court lifted the stay of this appeal on April 17, 2020.
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Parson on May 4, 2020. The MDOC argues in response that because the parties still disagree about 

whether Livingston is eligible for parole, it is still entitled to have that controversy adjudicated. 

The MDOC further argues that a decision from this court will have practical consequences, as it 

will allow the MDOC to know whether it should correct Livingston’s erroneous release, and it will 

affect the terms of Livingston’s commutation.

“To exercise appellate jurisdiction, the case must present ‘an actual and vital controversy 

susceptible of some relief.’” Gates, 539 S.W.3d at 93 (quoting State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 

S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001)). “[A] cause of action is moot when the question presented for 

decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have 

any practical effect upon any then existing controversy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Even if the case was not moot at its inception, it may become so through an intervening event that 

changes the situation of the parties such that “any judgment rendered merely becomes a 

hypothetical opinion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining mootness, this court 

may consider facts outside of the record. Id.

Here, there is an actual and vital controversy: the parties disagree about whether 

Livingston is eligible for parole. This controversy is susceptible of relief in the form of a judgment 

reversing the circuit court’s erroneous judgment as to Livingston’s parole eligibility having the 

practical effects of giving the MDOC the ability to correct Livingston’s parole eligibility status 

and ensure proper application of the commutation granted by Governor Parson. Because the case 

presents an actual controversy susceptible of relief having a practical effect on that controversy, it 

is not moot and we may exercise appellate jurisdiction addressing the merits of the MDOC’s 

appeal. Id. Accordingly, Livingston’s motion to dismiss this appeal as moot is denied.
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In its sole point relied on, the MDOC asserts that the circuit court erred in granting 

Livingston’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings because section 1.160 bars the retroactive 

application to Livingston’s sentence of the General Assembly’s amendments to the criminal 

statutes governing Livingston’s offenses.

When Livingston committed the crime of possessing a controlled substance with intent to 

distribute, in violation of section 195.211.3, the statute provided that “[a]ny person who violates 

or attempts to violate this section with respect to any controlled substance, except five grams or 

less of marijuana is guilty of a class B felony.” Livingston was found by the court to be a persistent 

drug offender. Under section 195.291.2, “[a]ny person who has pleaded guilty to or been found 

guilty of a violation of section 195.211, when punishable as a class B felony, shall be sentenced to 

the authorized term of imprisonment for a class A felony which term shall be served without 

probation or parole if the court finds the defendant is a persistent drug offender.”

The Missouri Supreme Court’s recent opinions in Mitchell v. Phillips, 596 S.W.3d 120 

(Mo. banc 2020), and Woods v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 595 S.W.3d 504 (Mo. banc 

2020), govern our disposition of this appeal. In those cases, the Court considered the applicability 

of section 1.160, the retroactive effect of the repeal of a statute (§ 195.295) requiring an offender 

to be sentenced to the authorized term of imprisonment without probation or parole, and whether 

parole ineligibility under that section is a condition of an offender’s sentence.

The issue raised by MDOC’s appeal is whether section 1.160 prohibited the retroactive 

application of the repeal of section 195.291 to Livingston’s sentence so as to render him eligible 

for parole.
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Section 1.1604 governs the effect of the repeal of a penal statute and provides:

No offense committed and no fine, penalty or forfeiture incurred, or prosecution 

commenced or pending previous to or at the time when any statutory provision is 

repealed or amended, shall be affected by the repeal or amendment, but the trial 

and punishment of all such offenses, and the recovery of the fines, penalties or 

forfeitures shall be had, in all respects, as if the provision had not been repealed or 

amended, except that all such proceedings shall be conducted according to existing 

procedural laws.

In Mitchell, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the scope of section 1.160. “While 

section 1.160 prohibits the retroactive application of a statute’s repeal or amendment under certain 

circumstances, its scope is limited. It is a general savings statute and serves a narrow purpose.” 

Mitchell, 596 S.W.3d at 125. As the Court explained:

This section preserves: (1) liability for offenses committed previous to or at the 

time a statutory provision is repealed or amended; (2) liability for fines, penalties, 

and forfeitures incurred previous to or at the time a statutory provision is repealed 

or amended; and (3) the authority to continue prosecutions commenced or pending 

before a statutory provision is repealed or amended.

Id. According to the Court, “[w]hen a case has been reduced to final judgment and direct review 

exhausted, . . . the preservation afforded by section 1.160 is unnecessary because the repeal does 

not affect final adjudications in the first instance.” Id. at 125-26. “It is only when a statutory 

provision is repealed or amended before adjudication is complete and direct review exhausted that 

section 1.160 saves the liability, punishment, and prosecution arising under the repealed provision 

and continues the statute in force until proceedings commenced thereunder, regardless of their 

nature, might be completed.” Id. at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘[S]ection 1.160 

authorizes a defendant to move for a reduction of sentence if the penalty for his offense of 

conviction has been reduced subsequent to the commission of the offense but before the conviction 

 4 All references to section 1.160 are to the REVISED STATUTES OF MISSOURI 2016, as supplemented.
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becomes final.’” Id. (quoting State v. Sumlin, 820 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Mo. banc 1991)) (emphasis 

added). Accordingly, section 1.160 “is inapplicable to sentences in final judgments.” Id.

For the offense of possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, the court was 

required to sentence Livingston to a class B felony term. § 195.211.3. And because the circuit 

court found that Livingston committed possession of a controlled substance with intent to 

distribute as a persistent drug offender, the court was required to sentence him to a class A felony 

term to be served without probation or parole. § 195.291.2. “[Livingston’s] parole ineligibility 

was mandated as part of the punishment within the particular statute designating the permissible 

penalty for his offense. Therefore, parole ineligibility is part of his sentence.” Mitchell, 596

S.W.3d at 123. Any application of the repeal of section 195.291 to Livingston retroactively would 

change his sentence. Consequently, the repeal of section 195.291 can have no effect on 

Livingston’s parole eligibility. “He remains ineligible for parole in accordance with the terms of 

his sentence[s].” Id. at 126-27. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in granting Livingston’s 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The MDOC’s point is granted.

Conclusion

The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and this court enters judgment in favor of MDOC 

pursuant to Rule 84.14.

/s/ Mark D. Pfeiffer

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge, concur.