J-A23013-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

D.S., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant : 

: 

 v. : 

: 

S.S. : 

: 

 Appellee : No. 2037 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order entered December 4, 2013, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Civil Division at No(s): FD-96-02467-008 – PACSES Case No. 632003256 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2014 

D.S. (“Father”) appeals from the December 4, 2013 order entered by 

the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to modify 

his child support payments owed to S.S. (“Mother”) for minors, D.S. (“Son”) 

and A.S. (“Daughter”) (collectively, “Children”), cancel all arrearages owed, 

and refusing his request for genetic testing, based upon a finding of 

paternity by estoppel. After careful review, we affirm. 

 The trial court aptly summarized the facts of the case as follows: 

[Father] and [Mother] were involved in an intimate 

relationship in 1996. In that year, Mother gave birth 

to [][S]on and petitioned for child support against 

Father. On August 5, 1996, Father signed an 

[a]cknowledgment of [p]aternity for [Son] and 

consented to a child support order. Three years 

later, in 1999, Mother gave birth to [] [D]aughter 

and named Father as the father of that child as well. 

Again, Father signed an acknowledgement of 

paternity. Mother and Father never married and he 
J-A23013-14

- 2 - 

characterizes their relationship in his testimony as 

‘ad hoc.’ At some point, Mother and Father’s 

intimate relationship ended. Mother and [] 

[C]hildren live in North Carolina. Father lives in 

Pittsburgh but works for an airline in Atlanta, 

Georgia and is able to see [] [C]hildren twice a 

month. 

For the last 17 years, Father has maintained an ongoing parental relationship with both children, seeing

them twice a month, exercising custody, and taking 

them on many vacations. Father testified he had 

acted in the role of father: ‘Since day one. Since 

they were born.’ There was no testimony regarding 

any other father figure.[FN]

In June of 2012, Father took both children on a 

beach vacation. While there, he took a picture of the

children on the beach. That picture made him 

realize that [] [C]hildren did not really look like him 

and he began to question whether they were his 

children. Father decided to purchase DNA tests and 

informed [] [C]hildren that he was testing their DNA 

to determine if he was their father. The results 

demonstrated unequivocally that he was not the 

father of either child. He opened the tests and 

shared the results with [] [C]hildren, causing them 

both great distress. 

After discovering that the children were not his 

biological children, he continued to exercise custody, 

visit with them, and take them on vacation. He also 

continued to pay child support for them for a full 

year. Furthermore, Father testified he intends to 

‘continue seeing the kids... Try to keep them on 

track.’ He testified he wishes to remain in their 

lives. 

On August 14, 2013, Father filed a petition for 

genetic testing and to modify his child support. A 

hearing was held on August 28, 2013 [...] and 

Father’s requests were denied by the Hearing Officer 

who found it was in the best interest of [] [C]hildren
J-A23013-14

- 3 - 

that the doctrine of Paternity by Estoppel be applied. 

Father timely filed exceptions, which [the trial court] 

denied on December 4, 2013. This appeal followed. 

_____________________ 

[FN]

 Mother did not attend the hearing and was not 

subpoenaed by Father to do so. 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/14, at 1-3 (record citations omitted) (footnote in 

the original). 

 Father filed a timely notice of appeal. He raises one issue for our 

review: 

Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion when it misapplied or overrode 

the law in failing to find that a fraud occurred based

on the facts of the case, the evidence submitted in 

this case, the testimony of [Father] elicited in the 

case and the established record of the case in 

thereby estopping [Father] from obtaining a [c]ourt 

ordered genetic test? 

Father’s Brief at 7.

We review a child support order, including matters involving a question 

of paternity, for an abuse of discretion. Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 

462 (Pa. Super. 2007). “An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court has 

overridden or misapplied the law, or if there is insufficient evidence to 

sustain the order.” Id. (citation omitted). The trial court is responsible for

making factual determinations, and we will not disturb its findings if the 

record supports them, regardless of whether we would have made a 

different decision based on the evidence presented. Id. It is also the role of 

the trial court to weigh the evidence presented and to make credibility 
J-A23013-14

- 4 - 

determinations. Id. “In so doing, the finder of fact is free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence and we as an appellate court will not disturb 

the credibility determinations of the court below.” Id. (citation, formatting 

and quotations omitted). 

Applying the doctrine of paternity by estoppel, the trial court found 

that although Father had proof that he was not Children’s biological father, 

he was nonetheless still legally their father, as this was in Children’s best 

interests.1

 Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/14, at 3, 6-7. The trial court based its 

finding on the fact that Father held himself out as Children’s father since the 

time of their births; continued to pay child support and behave as their 

father after learning he was not in fact their father; and failed to provide 

sufficient evidence that he was induced to accept paternity by Mother’s 

fraud. Id. at 3-4, 5. It therefore required him to continue to pay child 

support and denied his request for a DNA test through the courts. 

Father asserts that the application of the doctrine of paternity by 

estoppel in this case was error, as the evidence of record supports a finding 

that Mother fraudulently induced him to accept paternity; once Father 

learned that he was not Children’s father he took steps to “gently remove 

 

1

 We note that Mother and Father were never married, and thus there was 

no cause to determine whether the presumption of paternity applied in this 

case. See N.T., 8/28/13, at 6. “The policy underlying the presumption of 

paternity is the preservation of marriages. The presumption only applies in 

cases where that policy would be advanced by the application; otherwise, it 

does not apply.” Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999). 
J-A23013-14

- 5 - 

himself” from their lives; Children are already aware that Father is not their 

father and thus there is no support for finding that it is in Children’s best 

interests to apply the doctrine. Father’s Brief at 15-29.

We begin with some background information on the doctrine of 

paternity by estoppel. 

Estoppel in paternity actions is a legal determination 

based on the conduct of the mother and/or the 

putative father with regard to the child, e.g., holding 

out the child to the community as [their child] and/or 

supporting the child. If the evidence is sufficient, 

estoppel may bar either a putative father from 

denying paternity or a mother from succeeding in a 

claim of paternity against a third party. Estoppel 

rests on the principle that a person may not 

challenge his role as a parent once he has accepted 

it, even with contrary DNA and blood tests. 

Vargo, 940 A.2d at 464 (internal citations and quotation omitted). “[T]he 

doctrine of estoppel in paternity actions is aimed at achieving fairness as 

between the parents by holding them, both mother and father, to their prior 

conduct regarding the paternity of the child.” Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 

1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and quotation omitted). 

Estoppel is based on the public policy that children 

should be secure in knowing who their parents are. If 

a certain person has acted as the parent and bonded 

with the child, the child should not be required to 

suffer the potentially damaging trauma that may 

come from being told that the father he has known 

all his life is not in fact his father. 

J.C. v. J.S., 826 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 
J-A23013-14

- 6 - 

Evidence of fraud or misrepresentation with regard 

to issues of paternity is relevant to the application of

estoppel and must be considered by the trial court. 

In some situations, fraud can preclude the 

application of paternity by estoppel. Particularly 

where fraud or misrepresentation is involved, courts 

applying the doctrine of paternity by estoppel have 

taken care to consider evidence of the [putative 

father’s] conduct toward the child not only before

the husband learned that he was not the child’s 

biological father, but also after becoming aware of 

his non-parentage. 

Vargo, 940 A.2d at 464 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in the 

original). To rescind an acknowledgement of paternity based on fraud, the 

father must establish the fraud by clear and convincing evidence. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(g)(2). “The test for fraud is: (1) a misrepresentation, 

(2) a fraudulent utterance, (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient 

will thereby [be] induced to act, (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon 

the misrepresentation, and (5) damage to the recipient as a proximate 

result.” Doran, 820 A.2d at 1284. 

Absent any overriding equities in favor of the 

putative father, such as fraud, the law cannot permit 

a party to renounce even an assumed duty of 

parentage when by doing so, the innocent child 

would be victimized. Relying upon the representation 

of the parental relationship, a child naturally and 

normally extends his love and affection to the 

putative parent. The representation of parentage 

inevitably obscures the identity and whereabouts of 

the natural father, so that the child will be denied the 

love, affection and support of the natural father. As

time wears on, the fiction of parentage reduces the 

likelihood that the child will ever have the 

opportunity of knowing or receiving the love of his 
J-A23013-14

- 7 - 

natural father. While the law cannot prohibit the 

putative father from informing the child of their true 

relationship, it can prohibit him from employing the 

sanctions of the law to avoid the obligations which 

their assumed relationship would otherwise impose. 

* * * 

[T]he determination of paternity by estoppel should 

be better informed according to the actual best 

interests of the child, rather than by rote 

pronouncements grounded merely on the longevity 

of abstractly portrayed (and perhaps largely 

ostensible) parental relationships. 

K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 807-08, 809 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). 

 Father first argues that the trial court erroneously failed to find that 

fraud precluded the application of paternity by estoppel in this case. 

Father’s Brief at 15-20. He asserts that Doran v. Doran is controlling 

precedent. Id. at 16-20.

 In Doran, the mother, unbeknownst to her husband, had an 

extramarital affair. The affair resulted in the conception of a child, but 

believing the child was his, the husband raised and supported the child. 

Although their marriage ended in divorce, the now ex-husband paid child 

support and exercised periods of custody with the child. Doran, 820 A.2d at 

1281. 

When the child was approximately six years old, the mother’s exparamour and the child’s biological father, stopped by the ex-husband’s 

house. This prompted the ex-husband to ask the mother whether the child 

was the ex-husband’s child, and the mother assured him that the child was. 
J-A23013-14

- 8 - 

Approximately five years later, however, the ex-husband became suspicious 

that he was not the child’s father based upon the child’s appearance as he 

got older. The results of a DNA test confirmed that the ex-husband was not 

the child’s father. Thereafter, the ex-husband, “as gently as possible[,] 

removed himself from the child’s life in a way which he felt would cause the 

child the least amount of anguish and hurt.” Id.

The trial court found, and this Court affirmed, that the doctrine of 

paternity by estoppel was inapplicable because of Mother’s fraud. 

Specifically, we concluded that the record supported the following finding of 

the trial court: 

Mr. Doran had been operating for more than a 

decade under the misrepresentation that he was, 

indeed, the child’s father. This subterfuge was a 

direct result of the mother’s intentional 

misstatements and deceptions to him. She deluded 

herself by refusing to even consider that her child 

might be fathered by the man with whom she had an 

illicit affair. She never once mentioned her 

meretricious relationship with this third party to her

husband. Instead, she fallaciously led him to believe, 

at the same time she was seeking child support from 

him, that he was, in fact, the child’s father. Had she 

been forthright to her spouse and explained what 

she had done at the time of the child’s conception, 

her husband may certainly have acted differently. 

Unfortunately, her deceit, falsehoods and 

misrepresentations gave Mr. Doran no reason but to 

treat the child as his own – with love, care and 

respect, as only a decent human being would do 

under the circumstances. 

Id. at 1284.
J-A23013-14

- 9 - 

Contrary to Father’s contention, the record in the case at bar bears 

little resemblance to that of the Doran case. Here, Mother was not present 

for the hearing; Father was the only testifying witness. He presented no 

evidence that he believed he and Mother were in an exclusive relationship at 

the time of either child’s conception, that he was unaware that she was 

having sex with another man or other men at that time, or that he had no 

reason to doubt that he was the father of Children. Moreover, there is 

absolutely no support for Father’s claim that like the ex-husband in Doran, 

he “took steps to gently remove himself from the children’s lives after he 

learned that he was not their biological father.” Father’s Brief at 24. To the 

contrary, and as discussed in greater detail infra, the record reflects that 

after receiving the results of the private DNA test, Father continued to 

behave as if he was Children’s biological father. See N.T., 8/28/13, at 9, 

13, 14, 16. 

 This case more closely resembles the case of J.C. v. J.S. In that case, 

the mother had an extramarital affair that her husband discovered 

approximately six months before the birth of what the husband believed was 

their first child. The parties reconciled and subsequently had a second child. 

The parties divorced and the now-ex-husband began paying child support for 

the two children. Approximately a year later, when the oldest child was six 

years old, the mother informed her ex-husband that he was not the oldest 

child’s father. Nonetheless, the ex-husband continued to treat the child as 
J-A23013-14

- 10 - 

his own, enjoying regular periods of custody with him and supporting him 

financially. J.C., 826 A.2d at 2-3.

Approximately four years after he learned he was not the child’s 

father, the ex-husband filed a petition for a DNA test, which the court 

denied. Thereafter, he filed a petition to modify his support obligation to 

relieve him of paying child support for the oldest child, which the court also 

denied. On appeal from the latter order, we affirmed, finding that because 

the ex-husband continued to act as the child’s father after learning he was 

not the father, it precluded a finding of fraud, and that application of the 

doctrine of paternity by estoppel was proper. Id. at 4. 

 The record in the case before us reflects that upon learning that he 

was not the biological father of Children, Father continued to act as their 

father and do for them as he had done prior to receiving the DNA test 

results. He attended meetings related to Children’s education (N.T., 

8/28/13, at 9); he paid child support (id. at 13); he did not make any 

attempt to obtain the court’s permission to discontinue child support 

payments for over a year following the DNA test results (see id. at 15); he 

bought Children clothing and paid for their cellphones (id. at 14); and he 

took them on multiple vacations and continued to have custodial time with 

Children (id. at 16). Indeed, at the hearing, he testified that in spite of his 

awareness that he is not Children’s father, he wants to remain involved in 
J-A23013-14

- 11 - 

Children’s lives and had started a bank account for them, but wanted to 

serve as a “male role model” instead of as their father. Id. at 20. 

 As stated by the trial court, the only “evidence” of fraud he presented 

was: “Mother named him as [Children’s] father and [] the DNA test shows 

he is not[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/14, at 4; see generally, N.T., 

8/28/13, at 5-21. Viewing the record of the case, including evidence of 

Father’s conduct after becoming aware that he was not Children’s Father as 

our case law instructs, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

finding that Father failed to present clear and convincing evidence to prove 

that Mother induced him to accept paternity of Children through fraud. See 

Vargo, 940 A.2d at 464; Doran, 820 A.2d at 1284; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5103(g)(2). As such, this argument fails. 

 We are likewise unconvinced that the mere fact that Children are 

aware that Father is not their biological father precludes application of the 

doctrine of paternity by estoppel. See Father’s Brief at 20-24. According to 

Father, Children “have suffered the damaging trauma that the doctrine of 

paternity by estoppel was meant to prevent. The legal fiction no longer 

exists based on the facts of this case.” Id. at 22-23. However, simply 

because Children know that Father is not in fact their father does not 

preclude the application of paternity by estoppel, especially since Father is 
J-A23013-14

- 12 - 

the one that destroyed the fiction.2

 As quoted hereinabove, “[w]hile the law 

cannot prohibit the putative father from informing the child of their true 

relationship, it can prohibit him from employing the sanctions of the law to 

avoid the obligations which their assumed relationship would otherwise 

impose.” K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 808 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. 

Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416, 419 (Pa. Super. 1976) (en banc)). 

Furthermore, in Doran, a case in which the mother told the child that her 

ex-husband was not the child’s biological father, this Court stated that in the 

absence of a finding of fraud, the doctrine of paternity by estoppel would 

have been applicable. See Doran, 820 A.2d at 1281, 1283. 

 Father continues by stating that instead, “[i]t is in the best interest of 

[] [C]hildren to allow them the freedom to interact with [Father] outside the 

scope and strictures of a child support system in an independent manner 

without the punitive actions of jail time, significant interest and arrearage 

penalties and wage garnishment.” Id. at 23-24. However, this is a 

statement of what is in Father’s best interest, not Children’s best interests. 

 The record unequivocally supports a finding that applying the doctrine 

of paternity by estoppel is in Children’s best interests. Father financially 

supports Children by providing both court-mandated payments and 

additional funding. N.T., 8/28/13, at 13, 14. He has been Children’s father 

 

2

 Were we to conclude otherwise, the doctrine of paternity by estoppel 

would become obsolete, as a parent could avoid its application simply by 

telling the children that the person they thought was their father is not. 
J-A23013-14

- 13 - 

since their births and is actively involved in Children’s lives – attending 

meetings related to their education, taking them on vacation, and spending 

time with them. Id. at 5, 9, 15-16. Based upon Father’s testimony 

regarding Children’s reaction to learning that Father is not their father, it is 

clear that Children have a close relationship with him – Daughter cried and 

took the news “very hard” and Son was “numb.” Id. at 20. Notably, when 

Father was asked how Children’s best interests would be served by a finding 

that Father was not their legal father, his only response was, “Because 

biologically, I am not their legal father.” Id. at 19. Moreover, Father, too 

wishes to continue the relationship with Children, including exercising 

visitation and providing financial support. Id. at 21 

 A finding that Father is legally Children’s father greatly inures to 

Children’s benefit. Cf. K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 809 (“The legal determination of 

parentage is a hollow one where the accoutrements do not inure to a child’s 

benefit.”). The stability attendant to their continued financial support 

through Father’s legal obligation is obvious. Therefore, based upon our 

review of the record and the applicable law, we find no abuse of discretion in 

the conclusion that applying the doctrine of paternity by estoppel is in 

Children’s best interests. 

 Order affirmed. 
J-A23013-14

- 14 - 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/22/2014