UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GARY BURKE , et al. , 1 Plaintiffs,

v. WYNN COGGINS , as acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce , et al. , 2
Defendant s , OCEANA, INC. , Intervenor

- Defendant

. Case No. 1: 20

- cv - 00667 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Some California fishermen sue d the Secretary of Commerce and the National Marine Fisheries Service (collectively, the “Government”) challenging a rule that will close the ir swordfish fishery if the y accidentally kill or injur e too many marine mammals or turtles. Remarkably , t he Government agrees with the f ishermen th at the rule is invalid and should be vacated. E ven before the rule’s promulgation , the Service maintained that the rule conflicts with the governing statute because it imposes significant short

- term economic effects with only min or conservation benefit s . The Service made this position clear in the final rule and only promulgated it to comply with a nother court ’s order

. Oceana, Inc. , however, intervened here to

1 Plaintiff Chris Williams voluntarily dismissed his claims without prejudice. See Min. Order (Jan. 20, 2021).

2 The Court automatically substitutes Wynn Coggins for named defendant Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., former Secretary of the Department of Commerce

. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).2 preserve the rule. It raises procedural and substantive challenges to the Service’s determina tion that the rule violates the law. The parties cross

- move for summary judgment. The Court casts its line in favor of the fishermen . The Service’s determination that the rule conflicts with the governing statute finds support in the administrative record. For the following reasons , the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and deny Defendants’ and Oceana’s motions for summary judgment.
I. A.
The Magnuson

- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“Magnuson Act”) seeks to “conserve and manage the fishery resources found off the coasts of the United States” and to “promote domestic commercial and recreational fishing under sound conservation and management principles.” 16 U.S.C . § 1801(b)(1), (3)

. It contemplates the creation and implementation of “fishery management plans

. ” Id. § § 1801(b)(4) , 1853. The Secretary delegate d to the Service authority to manage these plans

. All fishery management plans and “any regulation prom ulgated to implement any such plan” must comply with the Magnuson Act’s ten “National Standards.” Id. § 1851(a)

. As relevant here, National Standard 2 provides that “[c]onservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific informati on available.” Id. § 1851(a)(2). National Standard 7 requires that “[c]onservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.” Id. § 1851(a)(7). And National Standard 8 states that “[c]onservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation re quirements of this chapter . . . , take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities

. . . . ” Id. § 1851(a)(8).3 “Regional Fishery Management Councils” prepare fishery management plans and propose regulations to implement th em. Id. §§ 1852, 1853. There are eight regional councils. See id. § 1852(a)(1). The Pacific Council has authority over fisheries in California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. Id. § 1852(a)(1)(F). Each regional council “reflect [s] the expertise and
in terest” of the represented states. Id. § 1852(a)(2). The se regional council s submit proposed regulations for fishery management plans to the Service for review

. See id. § 1854. The Service then determines whether the regulation complies with the fishery management plan, the Magnuson Act, and “other applicable law.” Id. § 1854(b)(1). If the Service approves the regulations , it publishes them in the Federal Register for public comment. Id. § 1854(b)(1)(A). The S ervice must “promulgate final regulations within 30 days after the end of the comment period.” Id

. § 1854(b)(3). If the Service disapproves the proposed regulations, it must notify the regional council and “provide recommendations on revisions that would make the proposed regulations consistent.” Id. § 1854(b)(1)(B).
B. Plaintiffs are three California commercial fishermen who participate in the West Coast drift gill net swordfish fishery ( the “Fishermen”)

. 3 See Decl. of Jeff Hepp ¶ 2, ECF No. 20

- 3;

3 The Government and Oceana do not challenge the Fishermen’s standing. In any event, t he Court is satisfied that the y have standing here

. See Penkowski v. Bowser , --- F. Supp.3d

--- , 2020 WL 4923620, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2020) (“ [E] ven if [defendant] had not challenged Plaintiffs’ standing, the Court would need to consider it sua sponte. ”). The Fishermen identify the economic hardship they would suffer from closure of the ir fishery and the investments they made in alternative fisheries to insure against a potential shutdown of the swordfish fishery

. See Decl. of Jeff Hepp, ECF No. 20

- 3; Decl. of Fred Hepp, ECF No. 20

- 4; Decl. of Gary Burke, ECF No. 20

- 5 . Their “current economic injury from identified risk of future harm [is] sufficient to support standing.” San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC , 913 F.3d 127, 136 (D.C. Cir. 20 19); see also Bonacci v . TSA , 909 F.3d 1155, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding standing where plaintiff was

“ object of the action at issue ” (cleaned up )).4 Decl. of Fred Hepp ¶ 2, ECF No. 20

- 4; Decl. of Gary Burke ¶ 2, ECF No. 20

- 5. A drift gill net is “a wall of nylon netting that hangs in the water column and is kept at the proper depths through weights and buoys.” Co mpl. ¶ 46, ECF No. 1. The net’s mesh “is large enough to allow a fish to insert its head but not its body, thus catching the fish by its gills.” Id. These drift gill
nets also produce “bycatch ”

— species inadvertently captured and then discarded. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (defining “bycatch” as the “fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use”). In 2015, the Pacific Council recommended a rule that would immediately close the drift gill net swordfish fishery in Ca lifornia and Oregon if the mortality or injury for some marine mammals and turtles meets or exceeds the “hard cap s ” ( or limit ) over a rolling two

- year period (“ H ard C ap s R ule”)

. 4 See AR2473 1 ; AR30509

– 10

. The closure continues until May 1 of the fishing season following two seasons of no hard cap exceedance. AR24731. The purpose of the Hard Cap s Rule was to “conserve non

- target species and further reduce bycatch . . . in the [drift gill net] fishery below levels currently perm itted by applicable law while maintaining or enhancing an economically viable U.S. West Coast

- based swordfish fishery.” AR20175. The Service first found the Hard Caps Rule consistent with the Magnuson Ac t and published it for public comment. AR30463

– 66

. The comments , however, prompted the Service
to “ conduct[] further analysis of the economic effects,” which revealed “significant adverse short

- term economic effects that were not identified at the proposed rule stage.” AR24731. Th e “[a]dditional analysis indicated that taking action as proposed would threaten the economic viability of the [drift gill net] fishery while providing minor environmental benefits.” AR20291.

4 The species include: “fin, humpback, and sperm whales, leatherback, loggerhead, olive ridley, and gr een sea turtles, short

- fin pilot whales, and bottlenose dolphins.” AR 24731.5 The Service thus found the Hard Caps Rule inconsistent with Na tional Standard 7 of the Magnuson Act. See AR24733 (“[The Service] conducted additional economic analysis and found the regulations to be inconsistent with [] National Standard 7.”). So it withdrew the rule.
AR30467.
Oceana successfully challenged th e withdrawal in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California

. See AR30416

– 23

. The Central District ruled that the Service must either promulgate the Hard Caps Rule as is or consult with the Pacific Council on any revisions because the Service had approved the proposed rule. AR 30422. In other words, the c ourt held that t he Service could not withdraw the Hard Caps Rule after its preliminary approval

. T he court remanded to the Service for further action. AR30423.
Over a year later, Oceana moved to enforce the court’s decision because the Service had still not promulgated the Hard Caps Rule

. AR30303

– 09 . The court granted the motion and ordered the Service to promulgate any final rule within thirty days. AR3030 9

. The Service lacked time to consult with the Pacific Council to revise the Hard Caps Rule before th is deadline ,

so the Service published the Hard Caps Rule as proposed

. AR20154. In the final rule, the Service noted that promulgation was “necessary to comply with a court order , ” and that the Hard Caps Rule is “inconsistent with [Magnuson Act] National Standard 7.” AR24733; see also AR20155 (January 29, 2020 Decision Memorandum concluding that the Hard Caps Rule “is not consistent with [Magnuson Act] Na tional Standard 7,” and that it “does not minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication”). The Fishermen then sue d the Secretary and the Service under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) here

. They claim that the Hard Caps Rule conflicts with National Standards 2, 7, and 8 of the Magnuson Act. Compl. ¶¶ 63

– 74. They also raise two constitutional6 challenges. The Fishermen first c ontend that appointment of the regional councils’ members violates the Appointments Clause

. 5 Id. ¶¶ 75

– 87. Second, they argue that the removal process for nearly all regional council members violates the Take Care Clause

. 6 Id. ¶¶ 88

– 95. The Fishermen s eek declaratory relief and a n injunction “setting aside the Hard Caps Rule” and “forbidding [the Government] from enforcing it.” Id. at 23.
Oceana moved to intervene to defend the Hard Caps Rule

. See Oceana, Inc.’s Unopposed Mot. Intervene , ECF No. 16. The Court granted this motion. See Order, ECF No.
17. The parties cross

- move for summary judgment. The Government concedes that the Fishermen are entitled to summary judgment on their APA claim because the Hard Caps Rule conflicts with National Standard 7. See Defs. ’ Cross

- Mot

. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ M ot .”) at 20

– 21 , ECF No. 26

. 7 The Government also agree s that vacatur of the Hard Caps Rule is appropriate. Id. It asks the Court not to reach the Fishermen’s constitutional claims or , alternatively, to interpret the Magnus on Act to avoid any constitutional issue. Id. at 2 6

– 33.
Oceana seeks to preserve the Hard Caps Rule under National Standard 7

. See Oceana,
Inc.’s Cross

- Mot . Summ. J. (“Oceana Mot.”) , ECF No. 28. It characterizes the Service’s position as an impermissible “post

- hoc determination.” Id. at 2 4

. Oceana also argues that the

5 The Appointments Clause provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other O fficers of the United States , whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law .” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.

6 The Take Care Clause states that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.

7 All citations are to the page numbers generated by this Court’s CM/ECF system.7 administrative record does not support the finding that the Hard Caps Rule violates National Standard 7. Id. at 25

– 26. The cross - motions are ripe for disposition. 8
II. Regulations under the Magnuson Act

— such as the Hard Caps Rule

— are subject to judicial review under the A PA. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1). When reviewing agency action, summary judgment “serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” See Sierra Club v. Mainella , 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Richards v. INS , 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
Courts must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that

are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law , ” “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immuni ty , ” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)

– ( C)

. The scope of a court’s review is “narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehi cle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut

. Auto

. Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). It need only determine whether the agency “examin [ed] the relevant data and articulat [ed] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the fact s found and the choice made.” Id. (cleaned up). It is “not enough for the agency decision to be incorrect; so long as it has some rational basis, the court is bound to uphold the decision.”

8 The Court has jurisdiction under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1) (authorizing judicial review of APA challenges to Magnuson Act regulations). The Court declines the request s for a n oral hearing because one is unnecessary to resolve the motions

. See LCvR 7(f).8 New Life Evangelistic Ctr. v. Sebelius , 753 F. Supp. 2d 103, 11 3 (D.D.C. 2010). But if the

“ agency has failed to provide a reasoned explanation, or where the record belies the agency’s conclusion, [the court] must undo its action.” Cnty. of L.A. v. Shalala , 192 F.3d 1005, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). “Judicial review of agency action under the [Magnuson Act] is especially deferential.” N.C. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Gutierrez , 518 F. Supp. 2d 62, 79 (D.D.C. 2007). “Fisheries regulation requires highly technical and scientific determinations that are w ithin the agency’s expertise, but are beyond the ken of most judges.” Id. at 80. 9
III. The Fishermen seek summary judgment on statutory and constitutional grounds

. See Pls. ’ Mem. P

. & A

. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 13

– 30 , ECF No

. 20

- 1. T he Court considers the statutory question first. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank , 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988) (“[O]ur established practice is to resolve statutory questions at the outset where to do so might obviate the need to consider a constitutiona l issue.”).

9 The Court notes “that there is some ambiguity regarding the proper standard of review” under the Magnuson Act. See Nat

. Res

. Def. Council v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. , 71 F. Supp. 3d 35, 64 n.16 (D.D.C. 2014). Some courts have applied the two

- step process in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC , 467 U.S. 837 (1984), not the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. (citing cases). The parties here do not invoke Chevron so the Court “sees no reason to move beyond the prevailing State Farm standard.” Id. In any event, Chevron would lead to the same result because the “inquiry under Chevron step two overlaps with [the] inquiry under the arbitrary and capricious standard.” Am. Fed ’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL

- CIO, Local 446 v. Nicholson , 475 F.3d 341, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ; see also Gen. Instrument Corp. v. FCC , 213 F.3d 724, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing that “we have not been sticky as to whether an argument in the area of overlap is characterized as a Chevron step two claim or as an arbitrary and capricious challenge”). “Whether a statute is unreasonably interpreted is close analytically to the issue whether an agency’s actions under a statute are unreasonable.” Gen. Instrument Corp. , 213 F.3d at 732.9 A.
The Fishermen move for summary judgment under the APA because the Hard Caps Rule conflicts with National Standards 2, 7, and 8 of the Magnuson Act. Pls. ’ Mem. at 13

– 19. The
Court need only address the ir challenge under National Standard 7

. Recall that National Standard 7 provides that “[c]onservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(7). It ensures that measures do “ not impose unnecessary burdens on the economy, on individuals, on private or public organizations, or on Federal, state, or local governments.” 50
C.F.R. § 600.340(b). A ny a nalysis for fishery management plans “ should demonstrate that the benefits of fishery regul ation are real and substantial relative to the added research, administrative, and enforcement costs, as well as costs to the industry of compliance.” Id. § 600.340(c). This is an unusual case

. The Government concedes that its Hard Caps Rule conflicts with National Standard 7

. See Defs. ’ Mot. at 20

– 21. The Service reached this conclusion well before promulgating the Rule

. See, e.g. , AR2031 5

– 16 ( June 9, 2017 Service letter to Pacific Council stating tha t implementing the Hard Caps Rule “is not warranted at this time”)

. The Service reversed its preliminary approval of the Hard Caps Rule after recognizing that it had not considered the short

- term economic effects. See AR20274 (“Further, the short

- term effects

. . . [were] not c onsidered in the [initial] analysis.”). The new economic analysis revealed that “the majority of the [drift gill net] fleet relies on the fishery for over 50 percent of their annual revenue” and such participants “would experience significant adverse shor t

- term economic effects in the case of a [drift gill net] fishery closure.” AR20289. Even if fishery10 members were able to switch to other fisheries or types of fishing, they would still likely face substantial costs. AR21040. More, t he Service expected any benefits from the Hard Caps Rule “to be minor.”
AR 21041

. It recognized that the Hard Caps Rule “offers little additional benefit to protected species beyond what has been achieved through implementing regulations based on recommendations develo ped through” the En dangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”)

. AR2031 6 ; see also AR 20313 ( noting that drift gill net

“ interactions with protected species are also currently managed under a MMPA Take Reduction Team and ESA S ection 7 processes ”). Weighing the se minor beneficial effects against the significant negative short

- term economic effects, the Service concluded that the Hard Caps Rule “does not minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication, inconsistent with [] Nati onal Standard 7

. ” AR20155 ; see also AR20291 (“Additional analysis indicated that taking action as proposed would threaten the economic viability of the [drift gill net] fishery while providing minor environmental benefits.”). Indeed, t he Service tried to withdraw the Hard Caps Rule

. See AR20154 (“Citing inconsistency with the purpose and need for the action and [] National Standard 7 . . . [the Service] withdrew the proposed rule[.]” ) ; AR30467

. It promulgated the Hard Caps Rule only to comply wi th the California district court ’s order , as explained in the final rule: Because the [Pacific] Council’s next meeting is not until March 20, [the Service] does not have an opportunity to consult with the [Pacific] Council on revisions to the [Hard Caps Rule] before the Court’s deadline. Therefore, [the Service] is publishing the hard caps regulations as they were originally proposed, without changes to the regulatory text, in accord with the order.
AR24731

.11 The Service’s determination that the Hard Caps Rule conflicts with National Standard
7

— reflected in the final rule and the Government’s concession that the Fishermen are entitled to summary judgment

— should end the Court’s inquiry here

. “There is little reason for [the Court] to enter a binding ruling on an administrative d e cision when the responsible agency has already determined that the decision under review is fundamentally flawed.” Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA , 115 F.3d 979, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But Oceana asks the Court to preserve the Hard Caps Rule

. It raises procedural and substantive challenge s to the Service’s determination that the Hard Caps Rule violates National Standard 7

. Oceana ’ s blind casting is unavailing

. The Court need only determine whether the Service’s conclusion is “rational and supported by the record.” C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, Jr. , 931 F.2d 1556, 1562 (D.C. Cir. 1991). It “will not second guess an agency decision or question whether the decision made was the best
one.” Id. at 1565. Gui ded by these principles, the Court turns to Oceana’s challenges. Procedurally, Oceana characterizes the Service’s U

- turn as an impermissible “post

- hoc determination.” See Oceana M ot . at 2 4

– 2 5 . Ocean a claims that the “operative agency action” is the Service’s initial determination that the Hard Caps Rule complie s with the Magnuson Act , including National Standard 7. Id. at 2 4 . Oceana cites the Ce ntral District ’ s decision to argue that the Service cannot change this position without fol lowing the Magnuson Act’s procedure for amending a rule. Id. at 2 5 ; see also Oceana Inc.’s Reply in Supp. Cross

- M ot. Summ. J. (“Oceana Reply”) at 12

– 13 , ECF No. 33 . The Court disagrees. Even if the Court were bound to follow the C entral District ’ s decision

— which it is not

— the issue here is different. The Central Distr ict addressed how the Service can revise proposed regulations before it promulgates them. See AR30422 (“The Court finds that, under the [Magnuson Act] , Congress requires [the Service] to adhere to the precise process set out in12 § 1854(b) when reviewing proposed regulations .” (emphasis added)). Th e court did not reach whether the substance of the promulgated Hard Caps Rule complied with the Mag nuson Act.
See AR30422 n.2 (declining to reach Service ’s argument that it could withdraw the Hard Caps Rule).
Th is Court confronts that question here . The Service satisfied the C entral District ’ s order to promulgate the Hard Caps Rule within thi rty days. The question now is whether th e Hard Caps Rule meets National Standard 7. Under this inquiry, the Service’s updated position reflected in the final rule

— not the Service’s initial determination

— is the operative agency action

. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife , 551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007) (“The federal courts ordinarily are empowered to review only an agency’s final action[.]”); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (“It is a fou ndational principle of administrative law that judicial review of agency action is limited to the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the act ion .” (cleaned up)). The Service’s change in position was not unexplained or inconsistent, contrary to Ocea na ’ s argument s. Oceana Reply at 12. It was the result of the Magnuson Act’s notice

- and

comment requirement. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b)

. As required, t he Service solicited public comment to the Hard Caps Rule , which prompted “further analysis of short

- term economic impacts to entities expected to be affected by the proposed rule.” AR2031 3

. This analysis revealed that “a majority of [drift gill net] participants rely on the fishery for over half of their annual landings and revenue,” which the Service had not considered

. AR20316. The Service th en changed its position , AR21042, which appears in the final Hard Caps Rule, AR2 4733 ( “Following public comment on the proposed rule, [the Service] conducted additional economic13 analysis and found the regulations to be inconsistent with [Magnuson Act] National Standard
7 [

. ] ” ). The Service thus did exactly what the Magnuson Act contemplates. If the notice

- and

comment process is to be more than an exercise in futility, federal agencies should be willing to reconsider their positions after receiving comments from the public. Cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders , 551 U.S. at 659 (“[T]he fact that a preliminary determination by a local agency representative is later overruled at a higher level within the agency does not render the decisionmaking process arbitrary and capricious.”). Oceana also raises substantive challenges to the Service’s determ ination

. It argues that economic effects cannot outweigh conservation benefits under the Magnuson Act

. See Oceana
M ot . at 2 2

– 2 3 . And that “this Court has upheld much more stringent fishery

- closure regulations under National Standard 7 challenges.” Id. at 22 (citing Nat’l Coal. for Marine Conserv ation v. Evans , 231 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2002) )

. To be sure, “the Service must give priority to conservation measures.” Nat

. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley , 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000). It does not follow , however, that all conservation measures must be pursued and that any such measure must override all economic
consequence s . See i d. ( allowing for consideration of “adverse economic consequences” where “two different plans achieve similar conservation measures”). That interpretation would require the Service “ to implement virtually any measure . . . so long as it is feasible.” Conserv a tion Law Found. v. Evans , 360 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2004). But “b y using the term ‘practicable,’ Congress intended rather to allow for the application of agency expertise and discrimination in determining how best to manage fishery resources.” Id. ; see a lso Conserv ation Law Found. v. Ross , 374 F. Supp. 3d 77, 91

– 92 (D.D.C. 2019) (“Congress’s inclusion of the term ‘ practicable ’ is thus14 critical; it is the means by which it delegated to the agency the discretion to weigh the relevant factors embodied in the [Magnuson Act’s] competing objectives.” (cleaned up)). 10 More, e fforts to eliminate any bycatch may be counterproductive to the conservation goals they seek

. Here, for example, the re were concerns that the Hard Caps Rule would “diminish the effectiveness” of take reduction plans

— which are “established under the MMPA to reduce the serious injury and mortality of marine mammal stocks,” AR20953; AR20153

— and “potentially undermine the integrity of the MMPA process , ” AR2536

– 37. And that implementation of the Hard Caps Rule was “ likely to produce over

- reactive management, resulting in volatile decision making, and instabilit y in the fishery, which can incentivize ‘ bad behavior. ’ ” AR21484. It is the Service’s task to make these “difficult policy judgments and choos[e] appropriate conservation and management measures based on their evaluations of the relevant quantitative and qualitative factors.” Nat’l Fisheries Inst

. , Inc. v. Mosbacher , 732 F. Supp. 210, 223 (D.D.C. 1990).

10 National Coalition for Marine Conservation does not counsel otherwise . There, the Service defended the challenged provisions under National Standard 7 , finding that the “positive biological impacts” outweighed the “significant negative economic impacts.” Nat’l Coal

. for Marine Conser vation , 231 F. Supp. 2d at 132 (cleaned up). The opposite is true here. The Service determined that the Hard Caps Rule “would have minor beneficial effects to target and non - targe t species and protected species at the cost of significant adverse economic effects to the fishery participants if and when closures would occur.” AR21042. A nd t he court in National Coalition for Marine Conservation reasoned that the plaintiff spe cified no “ record evidence showing that [the Service] ignored a less costly, practicable approach or that [the Service’s] regulations cause unnecessary duplication .” 231 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (cleaned up)

. Here, the evidence s uggests that the Service believed that a no hard caps rule would be the least costly, practicable approach. See AR20940 (“Because implementing any of the action alternatives is expected to result in significant costs to a substantial number of small entities

. . . , [the Service] decided not to take further action ( i.e. , has selected the No Action Alternative). ”)

. And the Service noted that the Hard Caps Rule “ offers little additional benefit to protected species beyond what has been achieved by implementing regulations” under the ESA and MMPA. AR2031 6

.15 Oceana also maintains that the record evidence does not support the Service’s revised position. Oceana M ot . at 25. It first claims that the Service had considered the short

- term economic effects when it originally determined that the Hard Caps Rule complied with National Standard 7. Id. at 25

– 26. True, there were discussions of “economic losses” and “slim profit margins ” surrounding the Hard Caps Rule before the Service changed course. See, e.g. , AR20005 (“ The proposed action is expected to cause economic losses for the small busine sses participating in the DGN fishery due to potential closure periods .”). But these general references d id not put the Service on notice of the “significant short

- term economic effects ” revealed after further analysis

. AR2473 2

. Oceana offers no compelling record evidence to rebut the Service’s finding that its initial determination relied on a flawed analysis, which “did not account for the fixed costs of [drift gill net] participation

. ” AR20244. 11 Or that the new economic analy sis revealed that “the majority of the [drift gill net] fleet relies on the fishery for over 50 percent of their annual rev enue ” and their “ability to offset losses of a [drift gill net] fishery closure is minimal.” AR20289. Next, Oceana contends that the Service’s analysis ignored offsetting costs “presented” to the Service , such as California state legislation and deep

- set buoy fishing gear

. Oceana M ot . at 26 ; see also Oceana Reply at 16

– 17

. Not so.

11 Oceana alternatively suggests that the new evidence of short

- term economic effects should not disturb the Service’s initial approval of the Hard Caps Rule because these effects apply equally to the other alternatives the Service considered and rejected before app roving the Hard Caps Rule. Oceana Mot. at 26. So the new “evidence would not disturb the conclusion that the promulgated rule represented ‘ the least costly alternative’ that was feasible.” Id. But this argument rests on the mistaken premise that the Se rvice had to promulgate some hard caps rule. The Service could have pursued no hard caps. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.340(c) (“ Rather, an evaluation of effects and costs, especially of differences among workable alternatives, including the status quo , is adequat e .” (emphasis added ) ).16 The Service anticipated “at least some increased participation in other fisheries if a [drift gill net] closure went into effect.” AR2028 8

. But it also recognized that “[t]o offset lost opportunity during a closure period, [drift gill net] fishermen would need to po ssess or obtain permits for another fishery to participate in that fishery.” Id. And that “[f]ishermen may incur significant costs when purchasing an additional permit, especially if that permit allows participation in a limited entry fishery.” Id.
O ceana suggests that the Service should have, but failed to, consider potential reimbursement to the fishermen through a “transition program” that California established through legislation

. Oceana Mot. at 26. Oceana explains that this program offers fish ermen financial incentive s to surrender their drift gill net permits. Oceana Reply at 8 n.2; see also id. at 16. But Oceana identif ies no substantive discussion of this program in the administrative record. It instead cites only a passing reference to “ recently enacted legislation , ” which does not undermine the Service’s analysis. AR20507. Nor can the Court rely on discussion of the California program in Oceana’s briefing as evidence to rebut the Service’s determination. See
Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle , 657 F.2d 275, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“It is well settled that judicial review of agency action is normally confined to the full administrative record before the agency at the time the decision was made.”). Deep

- set buoy gear is a type of exempted f ishing permit that can be issued “to allow fishing activities that would otherwise be prohibited under a fishery management plan.” Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. , Highly Migratory Species

—Exempted Fishing Permits , https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/west

- c oast/sustainable

- fisheries/highly

- migratory

- species

exempted

- fishing

- permits

. The administrative record discusses this option

. See AR25189 (referring to 2015

- 16 data from California Department of Fish and Wildlife on four deep

- set17 buoy gear exempted fishin g permit vessels). But it also suggests that deep

- set buoy and other alternative gear were “still in the research phase.” AR22439. It remained un clear to the Service “what fleetwide bycatch levels would be under non

- research conditions, or what an optim al fleet size would be” for this gear. Id. ; see also AR20136 (“The s ignificance of any adverse effects under the [exempted fishing permit] is unknown at this time, and would be dependent on any conditions placed on the [exempted fishing permit].”). On th e whole , then, i t is sufficient that the Service considered that the f isherm e n could obtain alternative permits and the costs t hat they would incur in do ing so. See AR2 1040 (“Fishermen may incur significant costs when purchasing a permit for a new fishery, especially if that permit allows participation in a limited entry fishery. Further, the cost of purchasing fishing gear for a new fishery may also be significant.”). Pre liminary (and developing) data on deep

- set buoy gear and other alternative gear does not override the “especially deferential ” standard afforded to the Service ’s analysis

. N.C. Fisheries Ass’n , 518 F. Supp. 2d at 79. In sum, Oceana provides no proced ural or substantive basis to overturn the Service’s determination that the Hard Caps Rule conflicts with National Standard 7 , as reflected in the final rule

. The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on their statutory APA claim and deny Oc eana’s summary judgment motion

. 12

12 The Government only seeks summary judgment on the Fishermen’s statutory claims under National Standards 2 and 8 and the constitutional claims

. See Defs. ’ Mot. at 1. But the Court need not reach th e remaining statutory claims because the Hard Caps Rule conflicts with National Standard 7

. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (requiring fishery management plan s and “any regulation promulgated to implement any such plan” to comply with National Standards ). A s explained below, the Cou rt also will not resolve the constitutional claims now. So the Government’s summary judgment motion will be denied as moot

.18 B . The Court n ext must decide the remedy. The Fishermen ask the Court to vacate the Hard Caps Rule

. See Compl. at 23; Pl s. ’ Mem. at 8, 31

. The Government agrees . See Def s.’ M ot . at 11 , 20

– 21 ; see also Pl s.’ Reply in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n Cross

- M ots. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Reply”) at 7 n.1 , ECF No. 3 0

. They are correct.
A court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “not in accordance with law” or “in excess of statut ory jurisdiction , authority, or limitations .” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) , (C)

. So “the practice of the court is ordinarily to vacate” an unlawful rule. Ill. Pub. Telecomms. Ass’n
v. FCC , 123 F.3d 693, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997). “[A]lthough vacatur is the normal remedy, [courts] sometimes decline to vacate an agency’s action.” Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius , 746 F.3d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2014). If a rule is “potentially lawful but insufficiently or inappropriately explained,” a court may remand to the agency “for further explanation (including discussion of relevant factors and precedents) while withholding judgment on the lawfulness of the agency’s proposed action.” Radio

- Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC , 184 F.3d 872, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1999) . “The de cision whether to vacate depends on ” two factors: (1) “ the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) ”; and (2)

“ the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.” A llied

- Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul

. Comm’n , 988 F.2d 146, 150

– 51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (cleaned up). Vacatur is appropriate here because the Service acknowledged that the Hard Caps Rule conflicts with National Standard 7 and is “already committed to ag ency revision.” Am. Iron & Steel Inst. , 115 F.3d at 1008; see also Sierra Club v. EPA , 705 F.3d 458, 463

– 6 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacating and remanding rule where EPA conceded th e challenged provisions were flawed and requested vacatur). And the Government did not defend the merits of the Hard Caps Rule19 under National Standard 7 at summary judgment

. See Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P. v. FCC , 144 F.3d 75, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Because the [ agency ] chose not to argue the merits in the alternative, we h ave no choice but to vacate the challenged portions of the order[.]”); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. FCC , 970 F.3d 372, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (same). Both Allied

- Signal factors support vacatur. “The seriousness of a deficiency . . . is determined at lea st in part by whether there is a significant possibility that the agency may find an adequate explanation for its actions on remand.” Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corp s of Eng ’ rs , 985 F.3d 1032 , 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned u p). Oceana argues that “it is reasonably likely that the Service would reach a positive determination on remand based on a more thorough evaluation of the economic impacts of the Hard Caps Rule .” Oceana Reply at 21 (cleaned up)

. But such speculation swi ms against the current of the Government ’s own vacatur request, suggesting the Service will not reach a different conclusion on remand. Def s. ’ M ot . at 2 0

– 2 1. Indeed, the Servic e has contemplate d “ separate rulemaking” to fix the Hard Caps Rule.
AR24731 ; see also AR20509 (February 15, 2019 Service letter to Pacific Council recommending revising the Hard Caps R ule). Oceana’s d isagreement with th is position does not warrant deviating from the “normal remedy” of vacatur.
Vacatur also will not caus e unnecessarily disruptive consequences. “ Under our precedents, a quintessential disruptive consequence arises when an agency cannot easily unravel a past transaction in order to impose a new outcome.” Am. Great Lakes Ports Ass’n v. Schultz , 962 F.3d 510, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2020)

. That concern is not present here. A return to the status quo

causes little or no disruption

. The Service determined that the Hard Caps Rule is “expected to have minor beneficial effects to target, non

- target, and protected sp ecies,” AR20153, and that it “offers little additional benefit to protected species beyond what has been achieved by20 implementing regulations based on recommendations developed through ” the ESA and MMPA

. AR21042; see also id. (“[The Service] has successf ully managed the [drift gill net] fishery’s interactions with protected species through the ESA Section 7 and MMPA TRT processes to

non - jeopardy levels for ESA

- listed species and below PBR for all marine mammal stocks.”). Existing regulations thus will pr eserve most (if not all) conservation benefits intended from the Hard Caps Rule. Accor d Conser vation Law Found. v. Pritzker , 37 F. Supp. 3d 254, 271 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding vacatur appropriate even where “[t]here is no denying that vacatur here would

cause some disruption”).
Oceana disagrees. It suggests that vacatur allows the Service to circumvent the Central Distric t ’ s decision. Oceana Reply at 21. But remember t h at decision address es the procedure s the Service must follow between a rule ’s proposal and promulgation under the Magnuson Act

. It does not forever bind what the Service can do with the Hard Caps Rule after promulgating it. The Court will therefore vacate the Hard Caps Rule.

* * * Given the Fishermen ’s success on the ir statutory APA claim, the Court need not address their constitutional challenges to the Hard Caps Rule. Accord Cigar Ass ’n of Am. v. FDA , 436 F. Supp. 3d 70, 83 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Because the court agrees with Plaintiffs that the FDA’s rulemaking was not the product of reasoned decisionmaking and therefore violates the APA, the court does not reach Plaintiffs’ First Amendment and Appointments Clause arguments.”). “A fundamental and longstanding principle of jud icial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n , 485 U.S. 439, 443 (1988).21 Because the Court will vacate the Hard Caps Rule, t he Fishermen will have obtained complete relief through the ir APA claim. See Compl. at 23. The Court need not wade into deep constitutional waters unnecessarily. See Lyng , 485 U.S. at 446 (“If no additional relief would have been warranted, a constitutiona l decision would have been unnecessary and therefore inappropriate.”). 13
The Fishermen urge the Court to consider their constitutional claims now because they “invoke[] principles of the separation of powers worthy of this Court’s review.” Pl.’s Reply at 17. But this is a teaser lure

. M ost (if not all) constitutional claims purport to raise some “worthy” issue

. The “strong duty to avoid constitutional issues that need not be resolved” rests on judicial restraint, not the significance of the question

. Cnty. Court v. Allen , 442 U.S. 140, 15 4 (1979). S uch restraint is appropriate when , as here, a plaintiff receive s full relief elsewhere through other avenues

. To be sure, the Fishermen raise serious (and potentially legitimate) concerns about the Magnu son Act’s regional councils and the appointment and removal of their members. See Compl. ¶¶ 75

– 95; Pls. ’ Mem. at 19

– 30. But any decision on these constitutional questions now “would be premature.” Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Durham , 393 U.S. 268, 2 84 (1969); see also Sierra Club , 705 F.3d at 464 (declining to determine EPA’s authority to issue rule where question was “not prudentially ripe for determination”). These issues must await another time.

13 The Government alternatively asks the Court to interpret the Magnuson Act to avoid any constitutional issue. See Defs. ’ Mot. at 29

– 33 . Oceana also invites the Court to either apply the “de facto officer” doctrine or sever any unconstitutional portion of the Magnuson Act to preserve the Hard Caps Rule. Oceana Mot. at 2 2

– 26

. Because the Court declines to reach the Fishermen’s constitutional claims, these alternative arguments are moot.22 IV. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summ ary judgment will be granted, and Defendant s’ and Defendant

- Intervenor’s motions for summary judgment will be denied. A separate Order will issue.

Dated: February 1 8 , 2021 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.