alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### ROSATA v. CALI.

No. 2106.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

April 10, 1940.

Rownd &) Tycer, of Hammond, for appellant.

Reid & Reid, of Hammond, for appellee.

OTT, Judge.

The suit was filed April 10, 1939, to compel the defendant to vacate a ten-acre tract of land. The action is brought under Act No. 298 of 1938, and it is alleged in the petition that the defendant is in possession of said property by sufferance of plaintiff and has been in possession of said property since the death of plaintiff’s mother on January 7, 1939. It is also alleged that notice to vacate was given defendant, but defendant refuses to vacate. A rule to show cause why defendant should not be ordered to vacate the premises was issued. Defendant filed an exception of no cause or right of action which was overruled. Defendant then filed answer admitting that the plaintiff was the legatee under the last will and "testament of his mother bequeathing the property to plaintiff, but he denies that plaintiff has ever been put in possession of the property under the will. He avers that if plaintiff is the owner of the land, he is not the owner of the crop of strawberries growing thereon because plaintiff’s mother before her death agreed to permit defendant to make a crop of strawberries on said land, and that he was then in possession of the land under said agreement growing a crop of strawberries thereon. Defendant alleges that he is the owner of the crop of strawberries being grown on said land and that he is entitled to retain possession of the land until the crop of strawberries thereon has been harvested.

There is no note of evidence in the record, but the judgment rendered on April 17, 1939, recites that the law and the evidence “being in favor of plaintiff” the rule was made absolute and the defendant was commanded to deliver possession of the ten-acre tract of land to the plaintiff. An order of appeal was obtained by defendant and the appeal was filed in this court on June 2, 1939.

*46 No briefs have been filed in this court by either side. In the absence of the evidence taken on the trial of the rule (if any evidence was taken) and in the absence of any briefs pointing out any errors in the judgment, we are unable to say that the judgment, is erroneous. We must accept as correct the statement in the judgment that the law and the evidence were in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, as defendant apparently claimed only the right to retain possession of said land until he could harvest his crop, and as the crop season for 1939 has passed, it appears that the issues raised by the pleadings are now only moot questions. For all we know, defendant may have vacated the land.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment is affirmed at the cost of appellant in both courts.
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Travelport Limited (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the
period ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Jeff Clarke, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Michael E. Rescoe, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:



/s/ Jeff Clarke
Jeff Clarke Chief Executive OfficerSeptember 26, 2008 /s/ Michael E. Rescoe
Michael E. Rescoe Chief Financial OfficerSeptember 26, 2008


---



QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the amended Quarterly Report of Midas Medici Group Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Johnson Kachidza, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: May 16, 2011
By:
/s/ Johnson KachidzaJohnson Kachidza

Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
#### A. BALDWIN & CO., Inc., v. LELONG et ux.

No. 14529.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Nov. 27, 1933.

For former opinion, see 150 So. 573.

Friedrichs, Connolly & Simoneaux, of New Orleans, for appellant.

F. Rivers Richardson, of New Orleans, for appellees.

JANVIER, Judge.

When we rendered our decree we did not-notice in the record an admission made by counsel for plaintiff that the automatic refrigerator, for the price of which the note sued on was given, had been sold under execution for $80. We, therefore, failed to allow credit for that amount.

The record does not show definitely the date of the said credit and we granted a rehearing in order to afford the parties an opportunity to point out in the record evidence from which we might, if possible, deduce that date.

Counsel for defendant now suggests that since the record does not show the date, we should remand the matter and permit the introduction of evidence.

Counsel for plaintiff in their brief set forth the date on which they state the proceeds of the sale were received by plaintiff, but the date given by them cannot be correct because the suit at that time had not yet been filed.

If we adopt the view of counsel for defendant and remand the matter, a further delay will ensue and a mere glance at the record will show that there has already been too much delay.

On the other hand, however correct such statements may be, courts cannot accept as evidence statements of fact made by counsel in their briefs, but not appearing in the evidence.

Ordinarily, of course, the burden of showing a credit is on him who claims it. Here, however, the credit resulted from a sale made under a judgment not against the party now entitled to the credit, but against some one else, and, since the sale was made at the instigation of plaintiff and plaintiff received the proceeds, we feel that the burden of showing the date and the amount of the credit rests upon plaintiff. If, then, the burden of making such showing is upon the plaintiff and plaintiff failed to introduce the necessary evidence, we will assume that the sale took place as early as the record shows it could have been made, which is the most favorable date possible from the point of view of defendant. The judgment under which the sale was made was rendered on November 17, 1931. The sale could not have been held prior to November 28,1931, and we will therefore assume that it was held and that the proceeds were received on that day.

Our original decree is therefore recalled and amended so as to read as follows:

“It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment appealed from be and it is annulled, avoided and reversed, and that there now be judgment in favor of plaintiff, A. Baldwin & Company, InG. and against Mrs. Alice Richardson LeLong in the sum of $213.-70, with interest thereon at 8 per cent, from November 20th, 1929, and with 15 per cent, attorney’s fees on the total- amount of principal and interest and for all costs, subject to a credit on November 28, 1931, in the sum of $80.00.”

It is further ordered that the said decree, as amended, be now reinstated and made final.

Original decree amended.
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Gil
Boosidan, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Suspect Detection Systems,
Inc. (the “Registrant”), certifies, under the standards set forth and solely for
the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q of the Registrant for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and information contained in that Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.





Date: 
      May 17, 2010
                By:
                /s/ Gil
      BoosidanName:
      Gil BoosidanTitle:  
      Chief Executive Officer and Director
                  (Principal
      Executive Officer)





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 23.1



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Form S-8 Nos. 333-112417 and 333-108937) pertaining
to the Amended and Restated 1991 Employee and Consultant Stock Plan, the Amended and Restated 1993 Director Stock Option Plan, the Amended and Restated 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, the Amended and Restated 2001 Stock Incentive Plan and 2003
Israeli Share Option Plan of DSP Group Inc. and its subsidiaries of our report dated March 14, 2005, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of DSP Group Inc. and its subsidiaries included in this
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004.



/s/    Kost Forer Gabbay & KassiererA Member of Ernst & Young Global




Tel-Aviv, Israel

March 14, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                                             0000075439
<NAME>                             BELL NATIONAL CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER>                                               1
<CURRENCY>                                               USD
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                          3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                   JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                     DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                            1
<CASH>                                             1,290,000
<SECURITIES>                                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                                              0
<ALLOWANCES>                                               0
<INVENTORY>                                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   1,297,000
<PP&E>                                                     0
<DEPRECIATION>                                             0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     1,297,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                929,000
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<CGS>                                                      0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         46,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     (26,000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                         0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      (20,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                               0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (20,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                             0
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<CHANGES>                                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (20,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          (0.00)
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</TABLE>
#### Elsie Johnson v. Elizabeth Mellhousin.

1. *Courts—Presumptions that Their Proceedings Are*Regular.—The presumption is, in absence of proof to the contrary, that the proceedings of a court of general jurisdiction are regular.

Assumpsit.—Appeal from, the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jesse Holdoh, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1902.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed January 8, 1903.

MoGlasson & Beitler and James B. Ward, attorneys for appellant.

Gregory, Poppexhusen *&*McjSTab, attorneys for appellee; Conrad H. Poppexhusen, of counsel.

*368Mr. Presiding Justice Ball

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant brought suit in assumpsit against appellee. She filed the common money counts and a special count, in which she averred that September 20, 1894, having an interest in certain real estate involved in a foreclosure suit then pending and brought by appellee as complainant, she agreed with, and at the request of, appellee, to refrain from making any defense in such suit, and in consideration of such agreement appellee then and there promised to pay appellant the sum of $1,238.20; that appellant accepted such promise and refrained from making such defense, etc.

The appellee filed the general issue and a plea of the statute of limitations, that the cause of action did not accrue within five years prior to the commencement of the suit. To which last plea there was a replication followed by a rejoinder.

This suit was commenced April 4, 1900. The appellant and her two witnesses testified that the verbal promise set up in the declaration was made in September, 1894, thus clearly establishing the plea of the statute of limitations.Upon such evidence the learned trial judge instructed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. He was fully justified in so doing.

At the close of appellant’s case appellee submitted a motion in writing to instruct the jury to find for the defendant. The court did so. Appellant says that the court gave this instruction orally, and thereby committed reversible error. The record does not state that this instruction was orally given. The Superior Court being a court of general jurisdiction, the presumption, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is that its proceedings were regular. But even if that instruction was given orally, it was but a mere direction to the jury as to how to proceed with their verdict, and was not an instruction to them as to the law of the case. This act did not constitute reversible error. Illinois C. R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 149 Ill. 525.

*369The mere fact that the court overruled the motion for a new trial immediately after it was made, and forthwith entered judgment thereon, without an affirmative showing that appellant was injured by such speedy action, is not ground for reversal.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF APRIL 30, 2000 AND THE CONSOLIDATED EARNINGS
FOR THE YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,500
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               11,541,940
<ALLOWANCES>                                   932,459
<INVENTORY>                                 17,775,199
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            30,016,173
<PP&E>                                      21,243,820
<DEPRECIATION>                               7,916,390
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              49,340,892
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,526,345
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        28,812
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                49,340,892
<SALES>                                     88,884,591
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            88,884,591
<CGS>                                       80,688,002
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,310,526
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,525,794
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   506,122
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 87,500
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   766,647
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.27


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50949 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. GONZALO VIDAURRI Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:05-CR-680-3
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * GonzaloVidaurri has appealed hisjury conviction ofconspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and aiding and abetting. Vidaurri contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Vidaurri complains that he was convicted on the basis ofcircumstantial evidence only and that the Government did not prove that he knew of the cocaine distribution venture. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D July 11, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-50949

2 Vidaurri did not move the district court for a judgment of acquittal. Accordingl y, his “challenge to evidence sufficiency is reviewed only for a manifest miscarriage of justice—the record must be devoid of evidence of guilt or the evidence must be so tenuous that a conviction is shocking.” U nited States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 449 (5th Cir. 2004). Vidaurri’s post-arrest statements and the circumstances surrounding his arrest provide proof of his guilty knowledge and his participation in the conspiracy. S ee United States v. Maltos, 985 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1992). The conviction is AFFIRMED.
#### Jesse Flanders et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. Franklin Whittaker, Defendant in Error.

ERROR TO McHENRY.

A defendant who has been ruled to plead by a particular day, cannot file a plea after the expiration of the rule, without special leave for that purpose; and if a plea is put on the files without first obtaining such leave, the court may disregard the plea, and render judgment.

The judgment, to reverse which this writ of error is brought, was rendered by Wilson, Judge, at the April term, 1851, of the McHenry Circuit Court.

The facts of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.

C. McClure, for plaintiffs in error.

Church & Willard, for defendant in error.

*708Treat, C. J.

This was a proceeding by *scire facias*to foreclose a mortgage. The defendant was ruled to plead by a particular day. He filed a demurrer to the *scire*facias, after that day had passed. A judgment by default was subsequently entered against him. The rendition of that judgment is now assigned for error. The defendant had no right to plead after the expiration of the rule, without the special leave of the court. The demurrer was put on the files without first obtaining such leave, and it was very properly disregarded by the court. The plaintiff was as much entitled to a judgment by default when the demurrer was filed, as he was at the moment the rule to plead had expired.

The judgment is affirmed. *Judgment*affirmed.
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

August 31, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00545

- CR

Santos Javier LOPEZ , Jr., Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 63rd Judicial District Court

, Val Verde County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020

- 0276

- CR Roland A ndrade , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

On August 25, 2022, the trial court clerk filed a notification of late clerk’s record . We ORDER the trial court clerk to file the clerk’s record on or before September 20, 2022

.

_________________________________ Liz a A. Rodriguez , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 31st day of August, 2022

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0594-09

BILLY RAY BRYANT, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON REHEARING OF APPELLANT’S 

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

RED RIVER COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to confinement for life. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Bryant v. State, ___S.W.3d___ (Tex. App.

— Texarkana, No. 06-08-00037-CR, delivered March 13, 2009). Appellant’s petition for

discretionary review was dismissed as untimely filed on August 19, 2009. Appellant has

filed a motion for rehearing requesting reinstatement of his petition so that it will be
Bryant - 2

considered by this Court. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted. His petition filed

on May 26, 2009, is reinstated as of October 7, 2009, and will be considered in accord

with Tex.R.App.P. 68. The copies must be filed in THIS Court by October 14, 2009.

Delivered October 7, 2009

Do not publish
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 31, 2022

No. 04-22-00545-CR

Santos Javier LOPEZ, Jr.,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020-0276-CR

Roland Andrade, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

On August 25, 2022, the trial court clerk filed a notification of late clerk’s record. We 

ORDER the trial court clerk to file the clerk’s record on or before September 20, 2022.

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 31st day of August, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court