NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

In re the Marriage of:

CELINA WILLIAMSON, Petitioner/Appellee
,

v.

THEODORE R. WILLIAMSON, Respondent/Appellant

.
No. 1 CA

- CV 19

- 0325 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400DO200901511 The Honorable John P. Plante
, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Vida A Florez

- Warner Attorney a t Law , Yuma By Vida Z. Florez

- Warner Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Torok Law Office, PLLC
, Yuma By Gregory T. Torok C ounsel for Respondent/Appellant FILED 6-16-2020WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

M O R S E , Judge:

¶1 On June 7 , 2011, the superior court dissolved the marriage of Theodore R. Williamson ("Theodore") and Celina Williamson ("Celina") pursuant to a decree of dissolution of marriage

. Theodore appeals the family court's denial of his motion to vacate t hat decree , arguing that the family court lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction because the marriage at issue

wa s void

. For the reasons herein, w e affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On November 12, 2009, Celina filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage

. Over a year later, in January 2011, Th eo dore moved to dismiss Celina's petition, arguing that the marriage was vo id because Celina was still married to her former husband and her marriage to Theodore was bigamous

. Subsequently, Theodore and Celina entered into an agreement under Rule 69
, 1 Theodore withdr e w h is petition to dismiss, and the court entered the decree of dissolution

. Theodore's counsel expressly informed the family court that counsel "explained to [Theodore] that if he withdraws that petition that [the] matter will be moot and the divorce will go forward."

¶3 In August 2011, s hortly after the decree was entered, Celina filed a petition to enforce the decree of dissolution , arguing that Theodore
was not complying with its terms

. In response, Theodore filed a petition to vacate the decree of dissolution, again arguing that his marriage to Celina

was void because she was already married to another person when she married Theodore. Eventually t he parties resolved their dispu te with

an other Rule 69 agree ment, and the court dismissed " [a]ll post

- decree actions " with prejudice, including Theodore's post

- decree petition to vacate the decree of dissolution

.

1 Throughout this decision, "Rule" refers to the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure.WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court

3 ¶4 The court resolved still more post

- decree petitions to enforce the dissolution decree and entered a judgment against Theodore on April 6, 2016. On October 6, 2016, Theodore moved to vacate the June 2011 decree of dissolution
, the April 6, 2016 judgment, and all other orders in the case

. Theodore repeated his earlier argument that the family court lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction to enter the decree of dissolution because his putative marriage to Celina was bigamous

. ¶5 The court held a hearing on the motio n

. Despite "considerable evidence" supporting Theodore's claim that his marriage to Celina was bigamous, the court ruled the argument had "been waived more than once
, " and found no good cause to set aside the decree of dissolution or the other orders

. Theodore timel y appealed , and w e have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12

- 2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Theodore argues that the family court erred in denying his motion to vacate the decree of dissolution because it lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction and subject

- matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Theodore also argues that all post

- decree orders , including the April 2016 judgment, are void because the family court lack ed authority to enter the decree

. W e first address the threshold issue of subject

- matter jurisdictio n

. ¶7 We review challenges to the family court's subject

- matter jurisdiction de novo

. Duckstein v. Wolf , 230 Ariz. 227, 231, ¶ 8 (App. 2012). Subject

- matter jurisdiction is " the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particula r proceedings belong[.]" Glover v. Glover
, 231 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 18 (App. 2012) ( citation omitted). Subject

- matter jurisdiction is "conferred by our constitution or statutes" and " cannot be vested in a court solely by waiver or estoppel." Id. at 5

- 6, ¶ 18.

¶8 We may affirm the family court for any reason supported by the record. Pettit v. Pettit , 218 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 4 (App. 2008). While subject

matter jurisdiction cannot be waived
, Glover , 231 Ariz. at 5

- 6, ¶ 18
, the family court had subject

- matter jurisdiction over this case even if Theodore's marriage to Celina was bigamous.

¶9 Theodore incorrectly argues that the family court lacks any authority over a void marriage. Arizona la w specifically vest s superior courts with the jurisdiction to "adjudge a marriage to be null and void when the cause alleged constitutes an impediment rendering the marriage void." A.R.S. § 25

- 301. "The jurisdictional requirements and procedure for obtai ning an annulment shall be the same as if the matter were one forWILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court

4 dissolution of marriage." A.R.S. § 25

- 302(A). As outlined in these statutory provisions, t he family court has jurisdiction to dissolve or annul putative marriages even assuming that the marriage is void ab initio

. The family
court also has the authority to divide property between the parties and establish rights regarding children even when annulling a void marriage

. A.R.S. § 25

- 302(B). Accordingly
, even if Theodore's claim was proven, the family court retained subject

- matter jurisdiction over this case

. ¶10 More substantively, Theodore argues that the decree of dissolution was wrongly entered as a result of Celina's allegedly fraudulent divorce documentation

. T hough Theodore cites no Rule in either his motion or his briefing on appeal , we presume his motion to vacate the decree was made under Rule 85( b )( 3 ) , which allow s a party to move for relief from a final judgment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation

. M otion s for r elief from judgment due to a party's alleged fraud or misrepresentation must be made "no more than 6 months after the entry of the judgment[. ] " Rule 85(c)(1)

. T he family court properly denied Theodore's motion to vacate the decree because it was filed nearly five years after the entry of the divorce decree

. S ee Quijada v. Quijada , 246 Ariz. 217, 220, ¶ 7 n.4 ( App. 2019) ( noting that Rule 85 motions based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud are time

- barred if brought more than six mont hs after judgment)

. ¶11 Finally, e ven if Theodore's motion w ere timely, his argument has been waived. Theodore was informed by his counsel that the decision
to withdraw his original petition to dismiss would "moot" the argument he now attempts to forward. Theodore later consented to a Rule 69 order which dismissed th is argument with prejudice. Theodore claims waiver does not apply to challenges to subject

- matter jurisdiction. But, as noted above, the family court had subject

- matter jurisdiction.

¶12 Theodore also appeals the family court 's denial of his motion
to vacate certain post

- decree orders , including the April 2016 judgment

. He argues these orders should be set aside because the decree of dissolution is void. Because th ese arguments are contingent on Theodore ' s u ntimely challenge to the underlying decree, we also reject them

.WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court

5 CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm the family court ' s orders in all respects

. We deny Celina ' s request for reasonable attorney fees because she cites n o supporting authority. See In re Marriage of Kassa , 231 Ariz. 592, 594, ¶ 7 (App. 2013)

.