The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District

1

Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

____________

No. 95-1908

____________

Kelly Thomason; *

Randy Thomason, *

*

Appellants, *

*

v. *

*

SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc.; * Appeal from the United States

Lynn Sims, individually and in * District Court for the

her official capacity as County * Eastern District of Arkansas

Director of SCAN Volunteer *

Services, Inc.; Geneva Wordlaw, *

individually and in her official*

capacity as a Case Worker for *

SCAN Volunteer Service, Inc.; *

Dr. Russell Steele, *

*

Appellees. *

____________

 Submitted: November 16, 1995

 Filed: June 11, 1996

____________

Before McMILLIAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

____________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Kelly Thomason (Thomason), and her husband, Randy Thomason (together

plaintiffs), appeal from a final judgment entered in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissing their due 1

process claim against defendants SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc. (SCAN), Lynn

Sims, and Geneva Wordlaw (collectively defendants) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Thomason
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v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., No. LR-C-93-893 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8, 1995)

(judgment). For reversal, plaintiffs argue that the district court erred

in holding that defendants did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional

rights as a matter of law, and, even if defendants did violate plaintiffs'

rights, defendants are protected by qualified immunity. Id., slip op. at

7 (Feb. 13, 1995) (memorandum and order granting summary judgment). For

the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Background

It is undisputed that SCAN, a not-for-profit corporation located and

operating in Pulaski County, Arkansas, had at all relevant times the power

under Arkansas state law to investigate allegations of suspected child

abuse, to refer such abuse to the state prosecuting authorities, to remove

victims of suspected parental abuse from their homes, and to seek

protective custody for such victims by order of the Juvenile Court of

Pulaski County, Arkansas. Joint Appendix at 3 (Complaint ¶ 6). SCAN

operates under the direction of the Arkansas Department of Human Services,

Division of Children and Family Services (DHS/DCF). Lynn Sims and Geneva

Wordlaw were at all relevant times employees of SCAN.

At approximately 1:44 p.m. on December 19, 1990, Andrea Goin, the

director of services at SCAN, received a telephone call from Shaun Wilfong

at DHS/DCF. Wilfong informed Goin that she (Wilfong) had received by

facsimile transmission some documents from a Little Rock physician, Dr.

William R. Collie, and that she was, in turn, sending those documents to

Goin, also by facsimile transmission. These documents concerned

plaintiffs' eight-month-old infant, Anthony Thomason (Anthony). According

to Goin's deposition testimony, Wilfong did not indicate that she had

received any information regarding Anthony other than the documentation

which she had received from Dr. Collie and was passing along to Goin. Id.

at 151. Goin received the facsimile transmission from Wilfong
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shortly after their telephone conversation ended. The transmitted

documents included, in their entirety, three items: a letter from Dr.

Thomas G. DiSessa to Dr. Collie dated October 25, 1990; a letter from a Dr.

DiSessa to Dr. Collie dated December 14, 1990; and an article from the

Journal of Pediatrics, which Dr. DiSessa had attached to his December 14

letter to Dr. Collie. Joint Appendix at 205-15. The medical journal

article discussed a rare psychological disorder called "Munchausen by

Proxy" believed to be displayed by parents (typically mothers) who subject

their young children to potentially life-threatening and diagnostically

elusive forms of physical abuse in order to draw sympathy and attention to

themselves.

In his letter dated December 14, 1990, Dr. DiSessa indicated that he

had been treating Anthony since October 25, 1990, when Anthony was brought

to Dr. DiSessa's outpatient clinic for a second opinion following treatment

at Little Rock Children's Hospital for tachycardia (rapid heart rate). He

further stated that Thomason, Anthony's mother, "has intermittently

reported that the child has had apnea." In late October 1990, the letter

continued, he (Dr. DiSessa) received a phone call from Thomason in which

she reported that Anthony had undergone recurrent episodes of paleness,

grayness, and sweatiness, and she requested that Anthony be admitted to the

hospital for observation. Anthony was admitted to LeBonheur Hospital for

a period from November 5, 1990, to November 9, 1990. Referring to that

hospital stay, Dr. DiSessa's letter stated "during the 5 day admission,

there [were] no episodes of paleness, grayness, duskiness, blueness or

apnea noted by our nursing staff." Anthony was sent home with an "event

recorder." Since that time, the letter continued, Thomason "has phoned in

8 separate events." According to the readings from the recorder, these

reported events correlated with heart rates of "normal sinus rhythm with

no evidence of a supraventricular tachycardia arrhythmia"; these "traces"

had been sent for review to Dr. Paul Gillett, a "world renowned pediatric

cardiac electrophysiologist." 
-4-

The final two paragraphs of Dr. DiSessa's December 14 letter stated the

following:

On December 13th, mother again called my office

with the following concerns. Her concerns were those of

fast heart rate, paleness, grayness, clamminess and

sweating. In addition, the mother reported that the

baby had a severe apnea episode producing blueness

approximately a week to 10 days ago. After the baby

required a substantial amount of stimulation, mother

failed to seek medical attention for this apnea episode.

This failure to seek medical attention for the

apnea episode is a great concern to me. The mother's

general affect has also been of great concern to a

number of physicians here at LeBonheur Hospital. Mother

has been described by at least two physicians as being

dysfunctional. . . . My greatest fear is that this child

may fall into the category of children recently reported

in the Journal of Pediatrics . . . [which] reported 27

infants who suffered "recurrent apnea and sudden infant

death" who were in reality suffered repetitively [sic]

suffocation events by their mother. These events began

between ages in 1 and 3 months of age and went on until

the child died between 6 and 12 months later. I believe

that this possibility needs to be explored.

Unfortunately, my distance precludes that I explore it

effectively. If your familiarity with this family

substantiates this suspicion, I would like to recommend

that you refer this case to Arkansas Social Services for

further exploration. 

Id. at 205-06.

According to Goin's deposition testimony, during her telephone

conversation with Wilfong, she began filling out a form with the preprinted

title "Division of Children and Family Services Child Abuse and Neglect

Reporting," which she completed sometime after receiving the facsimile

transmission from Wilfong. At the bottom of page 1 of this form, she

wrote: "Dr. DiSessa (Pediatrics at U of Tennessee and LeBonheur Children's

Medical Center) reports that the mother is intermittently smothering the

baby." Id. at 147-50; 201. 
 Defendants argue that Thomason in fact voluntarily consented 2

to the removal of Anthony from plaintiffs' home. They refer to

Wordlaw's deposition statement that Thomason was "in agreement"

after Wordlaw "told [Thomason] that [she, Wordlaw,] needed to take

the child to the hospital." Defendants also rely on the fact that

Thomason provided Wordlaw with a car seat when Wordlaw did not have

one. Brief for Appellees at xii (citing Joint Appendix at 74, 77

(deposition of Geneva Wordlaw)). We hold that defendants have not

established beyond genuine dispute that Thomason voluntarily

consented to the removal of Anthony from plaintiffs' home. If

anything, the evidence indicates that Wordlaw never gave Thomason

a choice in the matter. See Joint Appendix at 75, 77 (Deposition

of Geneva Wordlaw: "Q. You didn't both decide in conjunction with

one another; you decided to take the child to the hospital, is that

right? A. Yes, I did. Well, SCAN did."; "Q. And when you got to

the Thomason home you knew at that moment when you knocked on the

door you were going to take the child to the hospital, is that

right? A. Yes.") Having been told that her eight-month-old child

was being taken to the hospital, Thomason's insistence that he ride

in a car seat does not suggest that she voluntarily consented to

Wordlaw's removal of him from the home. 

-5-

The decision was made by SCAN personnel, including Goin, that Anthony

should be removed from the home and taken to a hospital for a medical

evaluation. This task was assigned to Wordlaw. According to Wordlaw, she

was told by Goin to go to plaintiffs' home "immediately." Id. at 70. At

that time, all the information that Wordlaw had received about Anthony's

case was Goin's verbal indication that SCAN had received a report,

including some medical information, that the mother had smothered the baby.

Id. at 69-71. Having no other information and having not reviewed any of

the documentation, Wordlaw went to plaintiffs' home at approximately 4:30

p.m. When Wordlaw arrived at plaintiffs' residence, Thomason was home with

her three children. Wordlaw identified herself as an evaluator with the

Pulaski County SCAN office and informed Thomason that SCAN had received a

report that "her child was being smothered and that she was the alleged

perpetrator." Id. at 72. Thomason became very upset, denied the

accusation, and telephoned her mother-in-law, who promptly came to the

house. Id. at 72-73. Having told Thomason that the decision had been made

by SCAN to take the baby to the hospital, Wordlaw removed Anthony from the

home and took him to Arkansas Children's Hospital.2
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Two days later, on December 21, 1990, SCAN submitted an ex parte

application to the Pulaski County Chancery Court, along with a supporting

affidavit signed by Wordlaw, recommending that Anthony be placed in the

custody of the State of Arkansas Division of Children and Family Services.

Wordlaw's affidavit was written by herself, Andrea Goin, and one or two

other individuals. Id. at 83 (deposition of Geneva Wordlaw); id. at 176

(deposition of Andrea Goin). At the time she signed the affidavit, Wordlaw

had not reviewed any medical records concerning Anthony other than the two

letters written by Dr. DiSessa. Id. at 85. Wordlaw's affidavit included

the statement "[m]edical records and physicians concur that Anthony

Thomason showed evidence of `intermittent smothering.'" Id. at 104. On

the same day that the application and affidavit were received by the state

court, the court entered an ex parte order removing Anthony from the

custody of his parents and placing him in protective custody with the

state. Anthony remained in the state's custody through the Christmas and

New Year holidays until a hearing was held on January 2, 1991. During that

time, he stayed at Arkansas Children's Hospital. Following the January 2,

1991, hearing, in which plaintiffs had the opportunity to present their

side of the case, the state court quashed the ex parte order and returned

Anthony to his parents subject to certain conditions, including that

Anthony was to remain hospitalized for seven more days at plaintiffs' cost

and that Thomason was to undergo some counseling. At a final hearing held

on January 29, 1991, the state court dismissed SCAN's petition on grounds

of insufficient evidence of abuse. 

Plaintiffs brought this § 1983 action for compensatory and punitive

damages, alleging that the removal of Anthony from their home, and their

two-week separation from Anthony as a result of the state court's ex parte

order, deprived them of their liberty interest in the care, custody, and

management of their child, in
 Plaintiffs' additional claims against three doctors were

3

dismissed without prejudice. Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs.,

No. LR-C-93-893 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 1995) (order); id. (Aug. 22,

1994) (order). Plaintiffs do not appeal the district court's

dismissal of the doctors.

-7-

violation of their substantive due process rights. Plaintiffs sued SCAN,

as well as Wordlaw and Lynn Sims (the county director of SCAN), in their

individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs also asserted a

3

supplemental state law tort claim. SCAN, Wordlaw, and Sims moved for

summary judgment arguing that their conduct did not constitute state action

for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, even if it did, defendants were

immune from suit. The district court granted their motion, stating

"[a]ssuming without deciding that the defendants' actions were state

action, the plaintiffs' Section 1983 action still fails because there was

no deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. Even if there were

a constitutional deprivation, the defendants would be protected by

qualified immunity and possibly by the Eleventh Amendment." Slip op. at

7. Thereafter, the district court entered judgment for defendants.

Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., (Mar. 8, 1995) (judgment). Plaintiffs

appealed.

Discussion

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. The question before

the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see,

e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Get Away Club, Inc. v.

Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.

v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 1992). In the present case, the

district court held that plaintiffs were not deprived of their
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constitutional rights as a matter of law and, therefore, no liability could

attach to SCAN or its employees, either in their individual or in their

official capacities. 

To begin, as to defendant Lynn Sims, who was sued in her individual

capacity and in her official capacity as county director of SCAN,

plaintiffs have not identified any specific or concrete facts supporting

their claim that she caused a deprivation of their constitutional rights.

In fact, her name is not mentioned anywhere in plaintiffs' statement of

facts on appeal. Nor are we able to infer such facts from the evidence in

the record. Because there is no evidence suggesting either that defendant

Sims was personally or directly involved in the alleged violation of

plaintiffs' constitutional rights, or that, in her capacity as a

supervisor, she knew about the allegedly unlawful conduct and facilitated,

approved, condoned, or deliberately ignored the conduct, we hold that the

district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiffs'

claims against her both in her individual and in her official capacities.

Cf. Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d 805, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1994) (where individual

was arrested by a police officer without probable cause, the police chief

was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the arrestee's § 1983 claims

against him because his only connection to the unlawful conduct was that

he was the supervisor of the arresting officer).

 Turning to the claims against SCAN and Wordlaw, we are guided by

our recent decision in Manzano v. South Dakota Dep't of Social Servs., 60

F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 1995) (Manzano), in which we described the

constitutional right of parents in the care and control of their children

as follows:

Our court has recognized the liberty interest

which parents have in the care, custody, and management

of their children. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462

(8th Cir.) (Myers) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.

248, 258 (1983)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987); see
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Lux by Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (8th Cir.

1989) (Lux); Fitzgerald v. Williamson, 787 F.2d 403, 407

(8th Cir. 1983). However, we have at the same time

indicated that this right is not absolute. Myers, 810

F.2d at 1462; see Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486,

1490 (10th Cir. 1994) (Martinez) ("The right to familial

integrity, however, has never been deemed absolute or

unqualified."); accord Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 163

(4th Cir.) (Hodge), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994);

Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir. 1993)

(Doe), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994); Frazier v.

Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 929 (1st Cir. 1993) (Frazier). As

we stated in Myers, "the liberty interest in familial

relations is limited by the compelling governmental

interest in the protection of minor children,

particularly in circumstances where the protection is

considered necessary as against the parents themselves."

810 F.2d at 1462. Moreover, as the First Circuit has

correctly noted, "[t]he right to family integrity

clearly does not include a constitutional right to be

free from child abuse investigations." Watterson v.

Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993) (Watterson).

The need to continually subject the assertion of

this abstract substantive due process right to a

balancing test which weighs the interest of the parent

against the interests of the child and the state makes

the qualified immunity defense difficult to overcome.

Moreover, the requirement that the right be clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation is

particularly formidable. See Martinez, 35 F.3d at 1490;

Hodge, 31 F.3d at 164; Frazier, 957 F.2d at 930; Myers,

810 F.2d at 1462-63. . . . Our court has not gone so far

as to say that there are no "clearly established"

substantive due process rights held by parents in the

context of child abuse investigations. However, in

Myers, we did recognize the problem of defining such

rights. 810 F.2d at 1462-63. More generally, this need

to balance competing interests makes the Siegert

approach difficult to apply in child abuse cases

involving the right to familial integrity. In these

[ ]

types of cases, it is nearly impossible to separate the

constitutional violation analysis from the clearly

established right analysis. See Martinez, 35 F.3d at

1490; Doe, 2 F.3d at 1417; Frazier, 957 F.2d at 929-31.

. . . .

Clearly, our precedents provide that, when a state

official pursuing a child abuse investigation takes an

action which would otherwise unconstitutionally disrupt
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familial integrity, he or she is entitled to qualified

immunity, if such action is properly founded upon a

reasonable suspicion of child abuse.

Manzano, 60 F.3d at 509-11 (footnote omitted).

In the present case, it is beyond genuine dispute that Dr. DiSessa,

in his letter dated December 14, 1990, expressed his own suspicion that

Thomason was engaging in a life-threatening form of child abuse. This

suspicion, although based solely upon circumstantial evidence, was

rationally drawn from Anthony's medical history, specific acts by Thomason

which Dr. DiSessa described, and other physicians' alleged concern

regarding Thomason's "affect." Defendants reasonably could have assumed

that Dr. DiSessa was highly knowledgeable and experienced in these matters

and lacked any motive to lie. Moreover, from defendants' perspective, the

medical journal article may have lent additional credibility to Dr.

DiSessa's theory of abuse. Therefore, we have little difficulty in holding

that defendants, upon receiving the facsimile transmission of Dr. DiSessa's

letters and the accompanying medical journal article, formed a reasonable

suspicion of abuse which would justify some degree of interference with

plaintiffs' rights as the parents of Anthony.

The difficulty in the present case is not whether such a reasonable

suspicion can be found, but rather, whether the actions taken by defendants

and the resulting disruption to plaintiffs' familial relations with Anthony

were so disproportionate under the circumstances as to rise to the level

of a constitutional deprivation. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence demonstrates that, upon receiving

Shaun Wilfong's phone call, the copies of Dr. DiSessa's letters, and the

medical journal article, Wordlaw (at Andrea Goin's directions) proceeded

to plaintiffs' residence with the intent to remove Anthony from plaintiffs'

home without so much as a telephone call
 We also note that Dr. DiSessa's letter of December 14, 1990, 4

stated that he had sent the evaluation "traces" from Anthony's

event recorder to Dr. Paul Gillett, a "world renowned pediatric

cardiac electrophysiologist." Joint Appendix at 206. SCAN

personnel also could have attempted to contact Dr. DiSessa to

ascertain whether Dr. Gillett had rendered an opinion.

 As noted above, the affidavit stated "[m]edical records and 5

physicians concur that Anthony Thomason showed evidence of

'intermittent smothering.'" Joint Appendix at 104. In the present

appeal, defendants continue to maintain the accuracy of this

statement, arguing:

[B]y the time the affidavit was prepared on

December 21, SCAN had the benefit of medical

opinion of the Children At Risk team at the

Arkansas Children's Hospital. The doctors on the

team agreed that there was a reasonable basis to

believe that Anthony was being intermittently

smothered and that the mother, Mrs. Thomason, was

suffering from a psychological condition known as

Munchausen by Proxy. (JA 174-175) Thus, when the

affidavit was prepared, physicians (plural) did

concur.

Brief for Appellees at 11-12. The citation provided by defendants

to support the above-quoted language refers to the following

deposition testimony of Andrea Goin (not any of the doctors):

Q. Okay. Were there any doctors that agreed the

mother was smothering the child?

A. If you're asking if they said in those words,

"The mother is smothering the child" at that point,

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either to Dr. DiSessa or to Dr. Collie to verify the source of the

documents. Moreover, without even reviewing the purported evidence of

4

abuse in SCAN's possession, Wordlaw appeared at plaintiffs' doorstep and

inaccurately asserted to Thomason that SCAN had "received a report [that]

her child was being smothered and that she was the alleged perpetrator,"

Joint Appendix at 72 (deposition of Geneva Wordlaw). Finally, in seeking

and obtaining an ex parte protective custody order from the state court,

Wordlaw submitted a signed affidavit that arguably mischaracterized Dr.

DiSessa's letters and exaggerated the strength of defendants' evidence of

abuse.5
no.

. . . . 

Q. To your knowledge had any doctor ever told

you or wrote on any piece of paper that you know of

or knew of at the time that the mother was

smothering the child?

A. What I remember from the meeting was the

consensus in the meeting that the only way to know

for sure, because there was not any medical reason

that had been found for apnea, the only way to know

for sure whether or not that was happening would be

for the child to be in a neutral setting.

Q. The doctors didn't know if it was happening

or not, is that right? Based on what you remember

from that meeting?

A. What I remember, I do not believe that anyone

was willing to state beyond a shadow of a doubt at

that point that that was happening.

Q. Did any doctor at that meeting or any medical

professional at that meeting offer an opinion that

Kelly Thomason was suffering from Munchausen's by

Proxy?

A. As I said previously, that was discussed and

that possibility was a part of that conversation.

Q. Did any doctor or medical professional at

that meeting say or offer any sort of medical

opinion that Kelly Thomason was suffering from

Munchausen's by Proxy?

A. It was stated that that was a possibility. 

Joint Appendix at 174-75.

Thus, even Goin did not state that the doctors found a

"reasonable basis" to believe that Anthony was being intermittently

smothered or that Kelly Thomason was afflicted with Munchausen by

Proxy, much less that they "concurred" or "agreed" that such a

reasonable basis existed. All she said was that the doctors

discussed these matters as possibilities. 

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Nevertheless, while we recognize that plaintiffs are justified in
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feeling that more background investigation could have been done and that

Wordlaw handled the initial encounter with Thomason in an unprofessional

manner, we hold that plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not violated

as a result of the removal of Anthony from
 Wordlaw would also be protected by qualified immunity from

6

personal liability for damages arising out of her actions in

removing Anthony from plaintiffs' home. In Myers v. Morris, 810

F.2d 1437, 1463 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987), this

court held that a prosecutor and sheriff's deputies were protected

by qualified immunity for the removal of children from their homes

upon receiving evidence of potential sexual abuse by their parents.

In so holding, this court observed that there was no legal

precedent suggesting that "acting upon a reasonable belief that

children are endangered by continued presence in their homes must

be deferred until the completion of additional investigation." Id.

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their home. In Manzano, we observed that, in the child abuse context, the

abstract substantive due process right to familial integrity must be

continually subjected to "a balancing test which weighs the interest of the

parent against the interests of the child." 60 F.3d at 510. In the

present case, the constitutional inquiry requires weighing the interest of

plaintiffs not to have the state physically remove their eight-month-old

child from their home against the state's interests in immediately removing

the child from a potentially life-threatening abusive home setting for

medical evaluation and protection. We recognize that the parents' private

interest in this type of acutely sensitive situation is "of the highest

order." Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 1325, 1330 (8th Cir. 1988)

(Henley, J., concurring), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989). We also

recognize the vital importance of curbing overzealous suspicion and

intervention on the part of health care professionals and government

officials, particularly where such overzealousness may have the effect of

discouraging parents or caretakers from communicating with doctors or

seeking appropriate medical attention for children with real or potentially

life-threatening conditions. The consequences of such a chilling effect

could be devastating. Our holding today is therefore limited to the facts

of this case. Where a treating physician has clearly expressed his or her

reasonable suspicion that life-threatening abuse is occurring in the home,

the interest of the child (as shared by the state as parens patriæ) in

being removed from that home setting to a safe and neutral environment

outweighs the parents' private interest in familial integrity as a matter

of law. Because no constitutional violation occurred in the present case,

defendants Wordlaw and SCAN cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the

removal of Anthony from plaintiffs' home.6
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Finally, Wordlaw and SCAN are absolutely immune from liability for

their participation in the ex parte proceedings in state court that led to

the award of temporary protective custody of Anthony to the state. To the

extent Wordlaw and SCAN are sued for initiating the judicial proceedings,

Wordlaw's role was functionally comparable to that of a prosecutor. See

Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1452 (8th Cir.) (Myers) (prosecutor is

absolutely immune for initiating neglect proceedings in family court)

(citing Mazor v. Shelton, 637 F. Supp. 330, 334-35 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (role

of social worker in filing proceedings to protect abused minors is

functionally comparable to prosecutor's initiation of the judicial process,

thus warranting absolute immunity)), cert denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987). To

the extent Wordlaw and SCAN are sued because Wordlaw made arguably false

statements in her affidavit in her role as a witness before the state

court, the doctrine of absolute witness immunity applies. See Manzano, 60

F.3d at 512 (absolute immunity applied to state officials who testified in

support of family court's temporary protective order restricting the

plaintiff's unsupervised visitation with his daughter); Myers, 810 F.2d at

1466 (absolute immunity extends to witness's acts of providing reports and

recommendations to family court); cf. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342-

46 (1983) (absolute witness immunity rests on functional category and thus

bars § 1983 claim alleging that police officer's perjured testimony

resulted in a constitutional deprivation).
-16-

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.