COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 27, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP1166 Cir. Ct. No. 2020ME3

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF B. K.:

TREMPEALEAU COUNTY,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

B. K.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Trempealeau County: 

RIAN RADTKE, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 SEIDL, J.1 Brian2appeals from an order of commitment and an 

order for involuntary medication and treatment, entered pursuant to WIS. STAT.

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2019-20). All

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2020AP1166

2

§ 51.20. Brian argues that his due process rights were violated because he was not 

given particularized notice as to which standard of dangerousness under 

§ 51.20(1)(a)2. the County intended to pursue at his final commitment hearing. 

Brian also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he was 

dangerous to himself or others under any of the standards set forth in 

§ 51.20(1)(a)2. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In January 2020, law enforcement was dispatched for a welfare 

check on Brian, a thirty-two-year-old male with a history of schizophrenia. The 

officers found Brian walking down the street in seven-degree weather dressed in

shorts, a cut-off t-shirt and a windbreaker jacket, but with no gloves or hat. Brian

was carrying a mailbox with him, and the officers responding to the call noted that 

Brian was not able to answer their questions, but he would “talk about some very 

random things that did not make sense.” Brian could not tell the officers the date 

or time, and an officer reported that during the course of their conversation, Brian

would repeatedly “babble” about experiments that he was doing in his head. An 

officer called Northwest Connections—Brian’s emergency mental health services 

provider—and an agent initially advised the officers that Brian was not a danger to 

himself and that they would contact his parents to establish a safety plan. About

thirty minutes into their encounter, the officers noticed that Brian was shivering

badly, and the officers recommended they all move inside to get warm. Brian

 

2

 For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential matter using a 

pseudonym, rather than his initials.
No. 2020AP1166

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refused despite telling the officers at one point that his hands were so cold that he 

could not move them.

¶3 It took the officers an hour to persuade Brian to step inside, but once 

there, Brian repeatedly stated that he wanted to return outside. The police again 

called Northwest Connections. After learning of Brian’s continued insistence to 

go back outside, the Northwest Connections agent advised the officers that Brian

met the criteria for a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 commitment under the current 

circumstances, given the dangerously cold weather and Brian’s inadequate

clothing. The officers took Brian into custody and delivered him to a hospital, and 

Brian was subsequently transferred to a different facility.

¶4 After a hearing, the circuit court found probable cause to believe that 

Brian was mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous to himself or 

others. The court entered an order for Brian’s involuntary medication and 

treatment for the period up to the final hearing, pursuant to WIS. STAT.

§ 51.61(1)(g)2.

¶5 A final commitment hearing was held on February 3, 2020. During 

that hearing, psychologist Nicholas Starr testified regarding his examination of 

Brian. He explained how the examination ended up being unsuccessful, in that it

lasted less than five minutes because Brian refused to be examined, telling Starr 

that “the courts were fake, that [Starr] was fake, and [Starr] could not produce a 

stamp that had flakes going in opposite directions proving [Starr] was a doctor.”

¶6 Starr testified that he talked to staff at the psychiatric hospital and 

reviewed the available records on Brian. Based on those sources, Starr testified

that during the encounter with law enforcement leading to Brian’s commitment, 

Brian was “inappropriately dressed for the weather, was disorganized and 
No. 2020AP1166

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psychotic.” At the hospital, Brian “continued to be psychotic, hypersexual, he 

continued to inappropriately disrobe himself, make inappropriate sexual comments 

towards staff, so he was difficult to control.” Furthermore, “[t]here was some 

bizarre auditory hallucinations that he was riding a trike somehow and he would 

see multi-colored snakes that were after him.” Starr testified the records revealed

that Brian was not taking medication, which “resulted in him becoming unstable.”

Starr also testified that there were notations in the records that Brian had been 

“swinging knives at his mother.”

¶7 Starr diagnosed Brian with schizoaffective disorder based on the 

symptoms that had been described by the authorities and were evident throughout 

Brian’s case history, as well as from Starr’s in-person observation of Brian.

Although his examination of Brian was brief, Starr testified that Brian’s behavior 

during their encounter supported his diagnosis. Additionally, Starr stated that 

Brian “continued to display the psychotic and bizarre behavior” during a later 

encounter he had with Starr by “making statements about killing a rabbit while 

spinning the wheel of an exercise bike at the hospital.”

¶8 Starr recommended that Brian be stabilized with medication, and he 

testified that he believed Brian posed a danger to himself or others as a result of 

the incident leading to his emergency detention. Starr noted that Brian “would 

respond to his psychosis rather than reality. He may not be aware of how cold he 

is or how to get himself appropriately warm or seek help or support.” Although 

Starr had discussed the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to medication

with Brian, he did not believe Brian was competent to refuse medications because

of his “active psychotic state and his active manic state.” Starr testified that Brian 

did not demonstrate any insight into his current mental illness. 
No. 2020AP1166

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¶9 The circuit court concluded that Brian was suffering from a mental 

illness, that he was a proper subject for treatment, and that his illness was 

treatable. The court further concluded that grounds for commitment had been 

established based on the state in which Brian was found: improperly dressed in 

dangerously cold weather, confused, and carrying a mailbox. The court also relied 

on the reports of Brian’s hallucinations and hypersexuality, along with the 

remainder of Starr’s testimony as to Brian’s schizoaffective disorder.

¶10 The circuit court further determined that Brian was “dangerous as 

defined in Wisconsin Statutes under basic needs—not being able to meet his basic 

needs here, as well as harm to others as testified, as the doctor testified, which the 

[c]ourt finds credible and uncontroverted.” The court entered an order for 

involuntary commitment for a period of six months. 

¶11 The circuit court also entered an involuntary medication order for a 

six-month period, concluding that Brian was not competent to refuse medication 

because he was substantially incapable of understanding his condition or the 

advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to medication. Brian now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 The County argues that Brian’s appeal is moot because the initial 

commitment order at issue has expired, such that invalidating it would have no 

“practical effect” on Brian’s status, as Brian is now subject to a recommitment 

order with identical collateral consequences—i.e., a firearms ban. We generally 

do not consider moot issues. State ex rel. Olson v. Litscher, 2000 WI App 61, ¶3, 

233 Wis. 2d 685, 608 N.W.2d 425. An issue is moot when its resolution will have 

no practical effect on the underlying controversy. Id. We need not resolve this 

issue, however, because we conclude that even if Brian’s appeal is not moot, there 
No. 2020AP1166

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is still sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding of dangerousness.

An appellate court need not address every issue raised by the parties when one 

issue is dispositive. Barrows v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 2014 WI App 11, ¶9, 

352 Wis. 2d 436, 842 N.W.2d 508. Therefore, we assume without deciding that 

Brian’s appeal is not moot and elect to address his arguments on their merits. 

¶13 Turning to the merits, Brian argues that he was denied procedural 

due process because he was not given particularized notice of which standard of 

dangerousness the County intended to allege at the final commitment hearing. A 

procedural due process analysis involves a two-part inquiry, asking first “whether 

there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the 

[County]” and, if so, “whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were 

constitutionally sufficient.” See State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶64, 281 Wis. 2d

484, 697 N.W.2d 769 (citation omitted). Due process determinations are 

questions of law that we decide de novo. Waukesha Cnty. v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, 

¶10, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140.

¶14 Brian argues that the dangerousness standard the County intended to 

pursue was consistently unclear. He cites Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 

(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974),

reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976), for the proposition that Brian

must be given notice of “the standard upon which he may be detained.” He then 

asserts that in conjunction with WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. and (am), this 

precedent mandates that he be notified of which of the dangerousness standards

the County plans to pursue in the upcoming final hearing.

¶15 There is no requirement, however, that one or more of the five 

standards of dangerousness be explicitly alleged by the County prior to a final 
No. 2020AP1166

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hearing—a proposition Brian concedes. This is rational, given that the County 

would not receive reports from evaluating physicians—a primary focus of WIS.

STAT. ch. 51 commitments—until shortly before the final hearing. Procedural due 

process does not require the County to provide notice of every trial strategy or 

specific approach it might plan to take, especially when the evidence necessary to 

evaluate dangerousness is forthcoming, and when indicating the general 

dangerousness standards is sufficient. See Milwaukee Cnty. v. T.L.R., 2019 WI 

App 5, ¶15, 385 Wis. 2d 515, 925 N.W.2d 790 (2018) (holding that no statutory 

requirement exists that the County must specify which of the dangerousness 

standards is to be alleged at a final commitment hearing, and that a list of potential 

dangerousness standards is constitutionally sufficient).

¶16 Brian cites Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d

231, 942 N.W.2d 277, which was decided after the hearing at issue in this case, for 

the proposition that particularized notice must be given to ensure due process. 

D.J.W. established the requirement that a circuit court must make its factual 

findings as to dangerousness with particularity to ensure that there is sufficient 

evidence to support a dangerousness finding, and to provide a clear record for 

appellate review. Id., ¶¶42-45. DJ.W. does not, however, mandate that an 

individual subject to a final commitment hearing be given notice in advance of the 

exact standards of dangerousness the County intends to prove. Both the notice of 

final hearing and the statement of emergency detention in Brian’s case cited or 

listed the standards of dangerousness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e.

Therefore, Brian had sufficient notice of the standards under which he was to be 

evaluated, and his right to procedural due process was not violated.

¶17 Brian next argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish 

dangerousness under any of the standards set forth in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. 
No. 2020AP1166

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In a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 proceeding, a petitioner has the burden to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that a subject individual is mentally ill, a proper subject 

for treatment, and dangerous. See § 51.20(1)(a), (13)(e). Whether this burden has 

been met presents a mixed question of fact and law. Waukesha Cnty. v. J.W.J., 

2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783. We uphold the circuit 

court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Whether these 

findings satisfy the statutory standards is a question of law that we review de 

novo.3Id.

¶18 Brian argues that Starr was not specific during the final hearing as to 

which standard of dangerousness he believed applied, stating only that Brian 

posed a danger to himself or others because he was inappropriately clothed. 

Starr’s testimony, however, sufficiently outlined that Brian’s hallucinations,

schizoaffective disorder and recent behavior placed him at a serious risk of 

endangering himself, particularly in another cold-weather incident. Although 

Brian argues Starr’s testimony that Brian might “not be aware of how cold he is or 

how to get himself appropriately warm” was speculative, Starr’s analysis directly 

stemmed from the incident that endangered Brian’s safety, and it was not merely 

 

3

 The final circuit court decision in this case was issued in December 2018. Our supreme 

court has since implemented a requirement in Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 

Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, that “going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings 

are to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” While D.J.W. addressed a recommitment 

petition and not, as here, an initial commitment, we assume the court’s ruling regarding the 

specific reference to a statutory dangerousness standard equally applies to initial commitments. 

D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶42-44; see also Winnebago Cnty. v. A.A.L., No. 2020AP1511, 

unpublished slip op. ¶17 n.8 (WI App Mar. 24, 2021).

Because the circuit court was not yet subject to this requirement when it made its factual 

findings, we will search the record and the court’s decision for specific facts that apply to the 

dangerousness determination at issue. See Winnebago Cnty. v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶¶14-15, 

393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761.
No. 2020AP1166

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an assumption or prediction that Brian might be a danger to himself. The circuit 

court also added specificity, finding Brian to be dangerous because he could not 

“meet his basic needs,” referencing the language in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d. 

¶19 Brian contends, however, that the County failed to establish 

dangerousness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., which provides that an 

individual is dangerous if he or she:

Evidences behavior manifested by recent acts or omissions 

that, due to mental illness, he or she is unable to satisfy 

basic needs for nourishment, medical care, shelter or safety 

without prompt and adequate treatment so that a substantial 

probability exists that death, serious physical injury, serious 

physical debilitation, or serious physical disease will 

imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt 

and adequate treatment for this mental illness.

Brian argues that many people choose to wear shorts in the winter, and that the 

government should not be able to dictate what kinds of clothing are appropriate to 

wear outside in cold temperatures. Brian further argues that although the failure to 

dress warmly might be a safety issue, it is a “huge leap” to claim that it warrants 

commitment. 

¶20 Brian’s arguments are unavailing. Brian was found in freezing cold 

weather carrying a mailbox and wearing shorts, a cut-off t-shirt and a windbreaker

jacket, with no gloves or hat. Despite consistently commenting that he was “too 

cold to feel his arms,” and his making little sense to the responding officers, Brian

refused for over an hour to move his conversation with police inside. Once there, 

Brian continued to insist on returning to the dangerously cold weather outdoors.

This incident alone is sufficient to establish dangerousness under WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d., as it shows that Brian was unable to satisfy his basic needs for 
No. 2020AP1166

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shelter and safety, such that there was a substantial probability that his death or 

serious debilitation would ensue absent treatment.

¶21 Beyond the incident leading to his commitment, Brian’s reported 

behavior after being committed—including reports that at the hospital he was 

delusional, confused, and manic—confirm that the behaviors exhibited by Brian 

that put him at risk during the initial incident have continued. Starr’s testimony 

supports the conclusion that these behaviors and Brian’s schizoaffective disorder 

continue to place Brian at risk in such a manner that he is unable to satisfy basic 

needs for his own safety, particularly when outdoors in cold weather. The facts 

and record therefore show that Brian was dangerous under WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d. Although Brian raises arguments relating to other standards 

under § 51.20(1)(a)2., we need not address them because we conclude the County 

met its burden of proving dangerousness under subd. para. 2.d. We therefore

affirm the involuntary commitment order and the order for involuntary medication 

and treatment.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)4.