United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20-1033

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DANIEL FREDERICKSON,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Landya B. McCafferty, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Lipez, and Barron,

Circuit Judges.

Leonardo A. Angiulo for appellant.

Lucy Sun, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Andrew 

E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee. 

February 16, 2021
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. In August 2019, the United States 

Probation Department in Worcester, Massachusetts ("the Probation 

Office" or "Probation"), petitioned for the arrest of appellant 

Daniel Frederickson for violating his supervised release by 

committing a new offense -- assaulting a U.S. Probation Office 

employee. A criminal complaint was also issued against 

Frederickson for the alleged assault. After a three-day trial, a 

jury acquitted Frederickson of the criminal assault charge. 

Subsequently, the district judge who presided at the jury trial 

also presided at a supervised release revocation hearing and 

revoked Frederickson's supervised release on the basis of the same 

conduct. The court sentenced Frederickson to twenty-four months 

in prison followed by eight months of supervised release. 

Frederickson appeals, alleging that the court improperly 

used acquitted conduct to revoke his supervised release, that the 

evidence did not support a finding of revocation, and that the 

sentence imposed was unreasonable. After careful review, we 

affirm.

I.

We recount the facts as presented at Frederickson's 

revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the government, 

see United States v. Oquendo-Rivera, 586 F.3d 63, 66-67 (1st Cir. 

2009), except where presenting conflicting testimony is necessary 

to understand the legal issues in this appeal. At the revocation 
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hearing, the parties relied primarily on transcripts of

Frederickson's criminal assault trial. The government 

supplemented its evidence with two additional witnesses, but 

Frederickson relied solely on his presentation at trial, which 

consisted of his testimony as the only witness in his defense. 

Hence, in recounting the facts, we rely heavily on memorialized 

trial testimony as proffered by the parties and supplemented by 

the government at the revocation hearing. 

A. Supervised Release and the Assault 

In November 2017, Frederickson pled guilty to conspiracy 

to possess with intent to distribute steroids, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 846, and possession of a tableting machine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6). He was sentenced to three years of 

supervised release. As a condition of his release, Frederickson 

was required to submit to regularly scheduled drug testing at the 

U.S. Probation Office. He was also prohibited from committing any 

additional state or federal crimes. 

Paul Walter, who was twenty-six years old at the time of 

these events, was a student intern in the Probation Office 

beginning in January 2017. As an intern, he was responsible for, 

among other things, answering the phone, handling faxes, 

monitoring home detention, and collecting urine samples. Walter 

testified that, beginning in late 2017, he collected urine samples 

from Frederickson one to three times a month until August 20, 2019. 
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On that date, Frederickson arrived at the Probation 

Office for a scheduled urine test. Walter greeted Frederickson, 

observed him pass through a metal detector, and unlocked the 

bathroom door for Frederickson to enter from the lobby. Walter 

then entered the bathroom from a second door leading to the 

offices, handed Frederickson a urine sample cup, and left the 

bathroom through that same door to allow Frederickson to provide 

the sample. Shortly thereafter, Frederickson either knocked on 

the door to the offices or yelled for Walter to reenter the 

bathroom. Walter and Frederickson provided conflicting accounts 

of what happened next.

Walter contends that when he reentered the bathroom, he 

inspected Frederickson's sample and determined that there was an 

insufficient amount of urine. Walter asked whether Frederickson 

needed additional time or a glass of water to produce a sufficient 

sample, but Frederickson declined. Walter testified that 

Frederickson suddenly began walking toward him and asking 

questions such as "Why are we here?" and "What do you even do 

here?" Walter tried to leave the bathroom but was met by a closed 

fist punch to the left side of his face by Frederickson. Walter 

contends that Frederickson proceeded to violently assault him by 

placing him in a chokehold, strangling him, and slamming his head 

against a wall, table, and the floor while Walter pleaded for his 

life. 
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According to Frederickson, when Walter initially entered 

the bathroom to provide the sample cup, Walter made several 

comments about Frederickson's appearance, such as, "[y]ou look 

good," and "you have really nice calf muscles," and asked 

Frederickson whether he had been working out. Frederickson 

testified that he felt as though Walter was "hitting on [him]." 

According to Frederickson, when Walter reentered the bathroom to 

inspect the sample, he said it was insufficient and proceeded to 

"pat" Frederickson's genitals, and stated "you can do a little 

better than that." Frederickson said he was "stunned" by Walter's 

sexual assault and immediately punched Walter in his left eye. 

Frederickson contends that thereafter he was in a state of shock 

and remembers only that he ended up on the bathroom floor holding 

Walter down by his shoulders and asking him "What the hell was 

that?" and "What do you even do here?" 

The only other individual present in the Probation 

Office at the time of the assault was Probation Officer Ryan Skal, 

who testified at the trial that he heard a loud thumping coming 

from the bathroom and went to investigate. When he opened the 

bathroom door, Officer Skal observed Frederickson holding Walter 

in a chokehold on the floor. He testified that Walter appeared to 

be struggling to breathe. He closed the bathroom door and ran to 

call for emergency services. After calling 911 and reporting the 

assault, Officer Skal returned to the bathroom and observed 
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Frederickson continuing to strangle Walter. Skal urged 

Frederickson to desist and, "after a few prompts," Frederickson 

acquiesced. Officer Skal then ordered Frederickson to leave the 

Probation Office immediately, and Frederickson complied. Officer 

Skal did not testify that Frederickson had told him that Walter 

had sexually assaulted him. 

After Frederickson left the Probation Office, Worcester 

Police Officer Keith Garlick recognized Frederickson's name 

because he was "familiar with the family." Officer Garlick

notified Frederickson's family of the assault allegations and, 

shortly thereafter, Frederickson's sister drove him to the 

Worcester Police Station. Officer Garlick testified, as one of 

the two additional witnesses presented by the government at the 

revocation hearing, that he arrested Frederickson without 

Mirandizing1 him and that Frederickson remained silent and had no

visible injuries.

B. The Jury Verdict and Supervised Release Revocation

Frederickson was indicted on one count of assaulting a 

federal employee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111. The Worcester 

District Court had also issued a criminal complaint charging 

Frederickson with various state crimes, but all were dismissed 

after Frederickson was federally indicted. The Probation Office 

1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 467-74 (1966). 
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separately sought revocation of Frederickson's supervised release 

for his November 2017 offense on the ground that Frederickson had 

violated the conditions of his release by "committ[ing] another 

federal, state, or local crime." At the government's request, the 

court continued the revocation hearing until after the assault 

trial. 

The trial occurred in December 2019 and lasted three 

days. On the final day, the court instructed the jury on the 

elements of forcibly assaulting a federal employee. The court 

also instructed the jury on self-defense: 

The defendant has testified that he acted in 

self-defense. Therefore, in addition to 

proving all the elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt, the [g]overnment must also 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant did not act in self-defense. A 

defendant may use force in self-defense 

against a federal officer if: One, the 

defendant reasonably believed that the use of 

force was necessary to defend himself against 

an immediate use of unlawful force or unlawful 

contact; and two, the defendant used no more 

force than appeared reasonably necessary in 

the circumstances. However, a person who is 

the initial aggressor cannot later claim selfdefense as a justification for the assault.

After approximately three hours of deliberations, the jury 

returned a verdict of not guilty. 

Directly following the acquittal, the court convened a 

bail hearing regarding Frederickson's ongoing detention for his 

alleged supervised release violation based on the same conduct --
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assaulting Walter. Despite the acquittal, the government insisted 

on pursuing the supervised release violation, given the lower 

burden of proof (by a preponderance of the evidence) applicable at 

revocation proceedings. The court ordered Frederickson detained 

pending the revocation hearing.

The day before the revocation hearing, the court 

convened a telephone conference primarily to hear argument as to 

"whether the court may consider acquitted conduct in reaching its 

decision on revocation." At that hearing, the government notified 

Frederickson that it intended to argue at the revocation hearing

that Frederickson violated supervised release by (1) assaulting a 

federal employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 (the federal 

assault charge that was the subject of the criminal trial), and 

(2) committing simple assault and battery in violation of Mass. 

Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13A (the state assault and battery charge 

that was dismissed). 

The revocation hearing was held on December 20, 2019. 

At the outset, the court announced its legal conclusions as to the 

issues discussed at the telephone conference. The court concluded 

that nothing "prevent[ed] [it] from considering whether the 

defendant violated 18 U.S.C. [§] 111 under a preponderance of the

evidence standard, and on that basis [the court could revoke

Frederickson's] supervised release." The court further concluded 
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that it could also consider whether Frederickson's conduct 

violated state or local law. 

Frederickson argued that he acted in self-defense, 

relying on his memorialized trial testimony. The government 

similarly relied on the evidence it presented at trial, which 

consisted of photographic evidence of Walter's injuries and the 

crime scene, Walter's medical records, and the testimony of four 

witnesses -- Walter; Officer Skal; Officer Anthony Correa, who 

responded to the 911 call at the Probation Office; and Barbara 

Hazen, a receptionist at the Probation Office who did not witness 

the assault but arrived at the office shortly after the assault 

occurred. The government supplemented its evidence at the 

revocation hearing with the live testimony of two additional 

witnesses: (1) Officer Keith Garlick, who testified that 

Frederickson had no visible injuries and did not report being 

sexually assaulted; and (2) Alicia Howarth, a Probation supervisor 

who testified that Walter's employment file contained no 

disciplinary proceedings or allegations of sexual assault. 

After orally reviewing the evidence, the court stated

that it "intend[ed] to use the self-defense instruction, the law 

that [it] gave the jury in the trial." It further clarified that 

it had assessed the evidence and would apply the preponderance of 

the evidence standard. The court proceeded to announce its 

findings on self-defense before turning to the elements of assault. 
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Regarding self-defense, the court concluded that "the 

government ha[d] met its burden [of demonstrating] by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not act in 

lawful self-defense [because] . . . [e]ven if the defendant 

believed that Paul Walter unlawfully had physical contact with 

him, the defendant used more force than appeared reasonably 

necessary in the circumstances." The court noted that the only 

unlawful physical contact that Frederickson testified to was 

Walter's sexual assault at the beginning of the encounter, which 

the court found did not justify Frederickson's prolonged 

retaliation. With respect to the alleged sexual assault, the court 

noted that

there [was] just no reason for 

Mr. Frederickson not to say to Officer Skal or 

to anyone that night "I was sexually 

assaulted. . . . I'm on top of him because he 

assaulted me" . . . . Mr. Frederickson 

remained without any sort of responsiveness 

and didn't mention to Officer Garlick, who 

apparently knows the family, "Officer Garlick, 

I was sexually assaulted" and talk to him, 

tell him that. Nothing. There was nothing 

that was mentioned.

Turning to the elements of assault and battery, the court 

held that there, too, the government had met its burden on each 

element of 18 U.S.C. § 111 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13A. It 

concluded that Frederickson willfully touched Walter in an 

offensive manner likely to cause bodily harm. The court noted

that "Mr. Walter testified that Mr. Frederickson began to make him 
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feel uneasy in terms of the questions and the look on his face, 

and then out of the blue, according to Mr. Walter," Frederickson 

struck him. The court stated that it found that the assault had 

occurred "by a preponderance" and "frankly [that it was]

undisputed[,] because Mr. Frederickson admitted that he sucker 

punched Mr. Walter." 

The court revoked Frederickson's supervised release and 

imposed the maximum allowable sentence -- twenty-four months in 

prison followed by eight months of supervised release.

II.

On appeal, Frederickson challenges the revocation of his 

supervised release as well as the sentence imposed by the district 

court. Specifically, he argues that: (1) the district court was 

barred from relying on acquitted conduct to revoke his supervised 

release; (2) even if the acquitted conduct could be used, the 

record does not support a finding of revocation; and (3) the 

sentence imposed is unreasonable. 

A. Acquitted Conduct as a Basis for Revocation

Frederickson contends that the government was 

collaterally estopped from relying on acquitted conduct to 

demonstrate that he committed a crime in violation of the terms of 

his supervised release. As noted, prior to the revocation hearing, 

the court conducted a telephonic hearing to consider whether 

acquitted conduct could be used at the revocation hearing. Hence, 
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we review this preserved issue of law de novo. United States v.

Cruz-Rivera, 904 F.3d 63, 65 (1st Cir. 2018). 

The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy 

bars the government from retrying an individual for the "same"

offense. U.S. Const. amend. V. In Ashe v. Swenson, the Supreme 

Court identified collateral estoppel as an "ingredient" in the 

Fifth Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy. 397 U.S. 436, 

442-46 (1970). In effect, collateral estoppel applies the 

principles of double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution of a 

"different" offense if, "to secure a conviction[,] the prosecution 

must prevail on an issue the jury necessarily resolved in the 

defendant's favor in the first trial." Currier v. Virginia, 138 

S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018). For Ashe's collateral estoppel bar to 

apply, "[the court] must be able to say that 'it would have been 

irrational for the jury' in the first trial to acquit without 

finding in the defendant's favor on a fact essential to conviction 

in the second." Id. at 2150 (quoting Yeager v. United States, 557 

U.S. 110, 127 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 

concurring in the judgment)).

We recognize that there is a broader argument that 

collateral estoppel, as grounded in the Double Jeopardy Clause, 

simply does not apply to revocation proceedings, which often entail 

a loss of liberty but are not criminal prosecutions. See United 

States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2003). Indeed, 
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the Tenth Circuit has stated that a "revocation proceeding . . . 

simply is not a criminal prosecution to which Double Jeopardy 

protections apply." Lynch v. O'Dell, 163 Fed. App'x 704, 707 (10th 

Cir. 2006). The government attempts, in a perfunctory manner, to 

raise a similar argument. Even if we excused the government's 

probable waiver of this argument, we would decline to reach it, 

opting instead for affirmance on the narrow ground that collateral 

estoppel, assuming it applies, does not bar the government's use 

of acquitted conduct in this case.2

Although we have not previously addressed whether 

collateral estoppel prohibits the use of acquitted conduct to 

revoke supervised release, we do not write on a blank page. In 

United States v. Watts, the Supreme Court held that "an acquittal 

in a criminal case does not preclude the [g]overnment from 

relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action 

governed by a lower standard of proof." 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) 

(per curiam) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 

(1990)). In Watts, the police discovered cocaine base and two 

2 Apparently concerned that we might rule otherwise -- that 

the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the government's use of acquitted 

conduct to seek revocation -- the government, for the first time 

on appeal, invokes the dual sovereignty doctrine to argue that 

double jeopardy does not apply at all because the government sought 

revocation on the basis of Frederickson's simultaneous violation 

of state law. Since we are only assuming that collateral estoppel, 

grounded in the Double Jeopardy Clause, applies here, we need not 

consider the government's dual sovereignty argument. 
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loaded guns in the defendant's home. Id. at 149. A jury convicted 

the defendant of possession with intent to distribute but acquitted 

on the charge of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense. 

Id. at 149-50. At sentencing, the district court nevertheless 

found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had 

used the guns in connection with the drug offense and, therefore, 

was subject to an increased sentence. Id. at 150. 

The Ninth Circuit vacated Watts' sentence and remanded 

for resentencing. United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 796-98 

(9th Cir. 1995). The circuit court reasoned that, although a 

district court can consider conduct "other than that of which a 

defendant was convicted" in calculating a sentence, it could not 

"reconsider facts that the jury necessarily rejected by its 

acquittal of the defendant on another count." Id. at 796. 

The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Ninth 

Circuit "failed to appreciate the significance of the different 

standards of proof that govern at trial and sentencing," and 

"misunderstood the preclusive effect of an acquittal" when it held

that the government was barred from relitigating the acquitted gun 

charge at sentencing. Watts, 519 U.S. at 155. The Court explained

that "it is impossible to know exactly why a jury found a defendant 

not guilty on a certain charge" in the absence of specific factual 

findings. Id. An acquittal, the Court reasoned, does not 

establish that the jury rejected any facts or concluded that the 
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defendant was innocent of the charged conduct; it establishes only 

that the government failed to prove an essential element of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Hence, the Court 

concluded, the jury's acquittal on the gun charge did not "preclude 

a finding by a preponderance of the evidence," at sentencing, "that 

the defendant did, in fact, use or carry . . . a weapon . . . in 

connection with a drug offense." Id. at 157. In other words, 

collateral estoppel did not bar the district court's examination 

of the acquitted conduct in light of the lower burden of proof. 

See id.

The subsequent proceeding here, a revocation hearing, is 

similarly governed by a lower standard of proof. To prove 

Frederickson violated the terms of his supervised release, the

government needed only to show by a preponderance of the evidence 

that he committed a crime while on supervised release. See, e.g., 

United States v. Marino, 833 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2016). Applying 

the straightforward logic of Watts, we conclude, as have several 

of our sister circuits, that the government's use of acquitted 

conduct to prove assault by a preponderance of the evidence at 

revocation does not violate principles of collateral estoppel. 

See, e.g., United States v. Waller, 616 Fed. App'x 628, 629 (4th 

Cir. 2015) (holding that "[b]ecause the standard of proof is less 

than that required for a criminal conviction," a district court 

may revoke supervised release "even if the defendant is acquitted 
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on criminal charges arising from the same conduct"); Poirier v. 

Doyle, 40 Fed. App'x 211, 213 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing the 

"revocation of parole [even when] based on criminal conduct for 

which the defendant was acquitted"); see also United States v. 

Teran, 98 F.3d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Regardless of [the 

defendant's] acquittal by a jury, the revoking court had a 

preponderance of evidence before it to support the finding of th[e] 

probation violation."); United States v. McPherson, 814 F. App'x 

957, 962 (6th Cir. 2020) (similar); Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 

1303, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1977) (similar).

Frederickson nevertheless argues that where, as here, 

the acquitted conduct is the sole basis for a deprivation of 

liberty rather than a factor in determining the degree of 

punishment at sentencing, Watts is inapplicable and collateral 

estoppel should apply. However, Frederickson misunderstands the

liberty interests at stake in a revocation hearing. Although 

revocation often leads to reimprisonment, and thus "entail[s] a 

loss of freedom and a deprivation of liberty," it is not considered 

an independent criminal prosecution. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d at 

22. Revoking supervised release deprives an individual "only of 

[] conditional liberty" dependent upon observing the restrictions 

imposed by the district court as a condition of release from 

imprisonment for the earlier criminal conviction. See Morrissey

v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). For that reason, the grounds 
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for revocation "need only be found by a judge under a preponderance 

of the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000).

Frederickson also contends that Watts is inapplicable 

because a conclusive finding of self-defense can be gleaned from 

the jury's verdict. He argues that, because he conceded that he 

assaulted Walter -- though he disputes the severity of the assault 

-- the only explanation for the jury's verdict of not guilty is 

that he prevailed on his theory of self-defense. 

Assuming arguendo that the jury's verdict was based on 

self-defense, which, as we have explained, is impossible to know 

conclusively, see Watts, 519 U.S. at 155, Frederickson's argument 

would still fail because of the differing burdens of proof. At 

trial, Frederickson initially was required only to proffer 

evidence of self-defense that could support a reasonable jury 

finding in his favor. See United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 27 

(1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 

(1988)). Having met that low threshold, Frederickson was then 

entitled to the instruction that the court gave, as we quoted in 

Section I(B): that the government had the burden of disproving 

self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Wilk, 

572 F.3d 1229, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2009); Pattern Criminal Jury 

Instruction for the District Courts of the First Circuit § 5.04

(1997); see also Tr. of Jury Trial Day 3 at 34, United States v. 
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Frederickson, 4:19-cr-40039-LBM-1 (Dec. 1, 2019). Applying the 

reasoning of Watts, the verdict for Frederickson only meant that 

the government failed to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The government faced a different, lesser burden at the 

revocation hearing: disproving self-defense by a preponderance of 

the evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); see also Watts, 519 

U.S. at 155-57.

Frederickson also invokes principles of fundamental 

fairness to argue that collateral estoppel should apply because 

the court, at the government's request, delayed the revocation 

proceeding until after the criminal trial, allowing the government 

to get the proverbial "second bite at the apple." This argument 

misapprehends the dual effect of new criminal conduct committed 

while on supervised release. In addition to running afoul of a 

criminal statute, the offending conduct simultaneously and 

independently violates the terms of release for the initial 

offense. See United States v. McInnis, 429 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 

2005). The government is entitled to pursue both a new criminal 

conviction and revocation as "part of the penalty for the initial 

offense." Id. In doing so, nothing compels the government to 

choose a particular sequence because a violation of supervised 

release does not depend upon whether the violative conduct is the 

subject of a criminal charge or conviction. U.S. Sent'g Guidelines 

Manual § 7B1.1, cmt. 1 (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2018) (explaining how 
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to calculate the grade of a supervised release violation). 

Practically speaking, the government may seek to secure a criminal 

conviction first because, once it has proven that the defendant 

committed a new crime beyond a reasonable doubt, that conviction 

necessarily demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence at 

revocation that the defendant violated the terms of supervised 

release by committing a new crime. 

Frederickson nevertheless urges us to adopt the 

reasoning of Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371 (Pa. 1983), a 

case that predates Watts, in which the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania concluded that Pennsylvania law reflects a "clear 

assumption" that when a revocation hearing is delayed until after 

a criminal trial based on the same conduct, "the [government] will 

be bound by the finding of the criminal trial" at the revocation 

hearing. Id. at 1376-78. Pennsylvania law obviously does not 

apply in this case, and Frederickson does not point to any similar 

assumption in federal law. Indeed, as we have explained, nothing 

prohibits the government from seeking, in no particular order, to 

hold a defendant accountable for both committing a new criminal 

offense and violating a term of supervised release. 

Lastly, Frederickson argues that delaying his revocation 

hearing until after his trial deprived him of procedural due 

process. Frederickson misunderstands the procedures due him prior 

to revoking his supervised release. In the context of revocation, 
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procedural due process is satisfied if, in a timely manner, the 

defendant is afforded,

(A) written notice . . . ; (B) disclosure of 

the evidence against [him]; (C) an opportunity 

to appear, present evidence, and question any 

adverse witness unless the court determines 

that the interest of justice does not require 

the witness to appear; (D) notice of [his]

right to . . . counsel . . . ; and (E) an 

opportunity to make a statement and present 

any information in mitigation. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2). Frederickson does not argue that he 

was deprived of any of those procedural protections. Moreover, at 

Frederickson's revocation hearing, which occurred less than five 

months after the assault on Walter, the court relied, almost 

exclusively, on evidence proffered and examined at trial. In 

effect, then, Frederickson received much more than due process 

requires at revocation: he received all of the due process 

protections that come hand-in-hand with a criminal trial on the 

merits. Frederickson's due process argument fails. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Frederickson contends that even if acquitted conduct can 

be used to revoke supervised release, the evidence presented by 

the government was insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that he committed an assault and was not acting in 

self-defense. We review a district court's decision to revoke 

supervised release for abuse of discretion and factual findings 

supporting that decision for clear error. Oquendo-Rivera, 586 
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F.3d at 66-67. As we have previously recognized, sufficiency 

challenges to supervised release revocations are "notoriously hard 

to win," because (1) we must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government, (2) the district court's choice among 

competing, yet plausible, inferences from the evidence does not 

amount to clear error, and (3) credibility determinations are 

primarily for the district court. Marino, 833 F.3d at 8. 

The district court concluded that Frederickson did not 

act in lawful self-defense when he assaulted Walter because "[e]ven 

if [Frederickson] believed that Paul Walter unlawfully had 

physical contact with him, [Frederickson] used more force than 

appeared reasonably necessary in the circumstances." Frederickson 

contends that the record does not support the severe, protracted 

assault described by the court. Frederickson points to 

inconsistencies between Walter's testimony, Officer Skal's 

testimony, and Walter's medical records. He also questions the

district court's reluctance to credit his claim of sexual assault. 

At trial, Walter testified that the assault began with 

a closed fist punch delivered by Frederickson to Walter's left 

eye. He then described the ensuing altercation as follows: 

Mr. Frederickson grabbed me in a front

chokehold, slammed my head against the wall, 

the table, and eventually to the floor. . . . 

As I was kicking the door and I still had air 

to speak, I was screaming for help, kicking 

the door, the floors, walls, in an attempt to 

make any noise so somebody could hear 
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me. . . . I felt a lot of pain and kind of, 

I guess, shock. . . . I was being strangled 

against my will . . . . [I said] You're going 

to kill me. . . . I told [Officer Skal] "Get 

him off me. He's going to kill me." . . . 

Officer Skal left the bathroom. . . . At this 

point I had pretty much given up that anybody 

was going to be in the office. . . . My body 

began to not tense up as much, and I kind of 

accepted that I might be breathing my last 

breath underneath that toilet. . . . Some

time later [Officer Skal] came [back] . . . . 

Mr. Frederickson was still on top of me. 

Officer Skal told him to "Get off him," and 

Mr. Frederickson eventually complied with 

that. . . . [After Frederickson left,] I 

attempted to get up . . . . I got out towards 

the lobby door, crawling. I then attempted to 

stand up, and I fell over and slammed my head 

against the wall in the lobby. 

Walter testified that when he went to the hospital, he 

was experiencing severe symptoms:

[His] face felt extremely swollen . . . [his] 

jaw [felt] broken. [He] couldn't really open 

[his] left eye. [His] leg was extremely 

strained. [He] couldn't really walk. [His] 

neck was strained . . . . [He] had a cut in 

. . . [his] back [and] head and swelling of 

the back of [his] head.

He further testified that he told the doctors that he had sustained 

a punch to the face with a closed fist, he was strangled, his leg 

hurt, his face was swollen, and he had a headache. 

Frederickson points to notes in the emergency room 

doctor's medical report indicating that Walter was negative for 

neck pain, skin wounds, dizziness, trouble swallowing, nosebleeds, 

nausea, change in vision, and headaches, as support for his 
- 23 -

argument that the assault was not as severe as Walter claimed at 

trial. Although there were small discrepancies in the report visá-vis Walter's testimony, the medical records in their totality

support Walter's description of a severe assault. The records 

identify Walter's reason for visiting the emergency room as an 

"assault[] while at work . . . in locked bathroom, [patient] was 

punched to [left] side of face, slammed down on the ground, hit 

[right] side of face, strangled [for] 'a couple minutes.'" The 

records further state that Walter presented as "assaulted by 

client, was choked and struck with fist on left jaw," reported 

pain in his jaw and leg, was positive for facial swelling, and 

contusions of the head and face. Moreover, the court placed 

considerable weight on the photographs of Walter's injuries and of 

blood on the wall after the altercation. The court also found the 

corroborating testimony of Officer Skal "utterly credible."

Officer Skal's testimony did corroborate Walter's 

description of the assault in all major respects. Specifically, 

Officer Skal testified that he heard thumping in the bathroom, 

opened the bathroom door, saw Frederickson on top of and choking 

Walter, perceived the situation as "extremely dangerous," and 

immediately retreated to call 911. The assault then continued 

while Officer Skal left the bathroom, called 911, reported the 

assault, and entered the bathroom a second time to observe 

Frederickson still on top of Walter. Officer Skal further 
- 24 -

testified -- and Officer Garlick later corroborated -- that 

Frederickson had no visible injuries following the altercation. 

Frederickson points to several inconsistencies in the 

testimony of Walter and Officer Skal: (1) Walter said the reason 

Officer Skal entered the bathroom was that Walter was screaming 

for help and kicking the door, floor, and wall, while Officer Skal 

testified that it was because he heard a "thumping sound, almost 

like a bowling ball hitting a marble floor"; (2) Walter testified 

that his head was under the toilet when Officer Skal entered the 

bathroom, while Officer Skal testified that Walter's head was 

"positioned almost under the sink"; (3) Walter testified that he 

and Frederickson were in the same spot when Officer Skal returned 

the second time, while Officer Skal testified that "[t]hey were 

not . . . [and Walter's] body was a little bit more upright"; and 

(4) Walter testified that he got out of the bathroom by crawling 

out of the door and into the lobby covered in blood, while Officer 

Skal testified that he helped Walter out of the bathroom.

The minor inconsistencies cited by Frederickson do not 

undermine the court's determination that the combined testimony of 

Walter and Officer Skal supported Walter's version of events. The 

court explained that Officer Skal "was there. He heard what was 

happening. He opened the door twice, and both times saw [Mr.] 

Walter being assaulted in a manner consistent with Mr. Walter's 

testimony." As we have explained, credibility determinations are 
- 25 -

primarily for the district court, Marino, 833 F.3d at 8, and the 

court resolved the inconsistencies cited by Frederickson by 

explaining, "I think both Officer Skal and Walter [we]re [] in 

shock on some level, and so the fact that they might not remember 

certain details about the way the legs were and the arms were 

flailing during the assault, that in the [c]ourt's view, is 

understandable."

Frederickson also contends that the court erred in

doubting his allegation of sexual assault primarily because he

failed to report the assault. Frederickson faults the court for 

"speculating" and "prescrib[ing]" how he should have processed the 

assault. At the revocation hearing, the court concluded that it 

could discern no reason for Frederickson's failure to tell Officer 

Skal or Officer Garlick that he was sexually assaulted, or to 

otherwise report Walter for such a serious offense. As we describe 

in more detail when discussing the reasonableness of 

Frederickson's sentence, the court's skepticism regarding 

Frederickson's alleged failure to report was but one factor 

supporting its conclusion that Frederickson lacked credibility.3 

3 See, e.g., Reyes v. Mitchell, 2020 WL 1550238, No. 18-40147-

WGY, slip op. at 10-13 (D. Mass. Apr. 1, 2020) (explaining that a 

delay or failure to report a sexual assault can be used to impeach 

a witness' credibility). That is not to say, however, that a delay

or failure to report should be viewed uncritically as the sole

basis for disbelieving a victim of sexual assault. Indeed, 

research shows that sexual assault victims "experience a range of 

conduct, suffer a range of harms, [] respond [to assault] in 
- 26 -

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, as we must, we conclude that the district court's 

finding that Frederickson assaulted Walter in excess of the bounds 

of lawful self-defense is not clearly erroneous and, therefore, 

the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Frederickson's 

supervised release. 

C. Reasonableness of the Sentence

Frederickson claims that the court erred in imposing an 

unreasonably long sentence based on improper sentencing factors 

and without resolving critical factual conflicts. We review a 

district court's chosen sentence for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 2011). The 

"touchstone" of our review is reasonableness, which may involve 

both procedural and substantive inquiries. Id. 

In assessing procedural unreasonableness, we ask whether 

the court made any procedural errors during the sentencing phase, 

such as "failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to 

consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 

divergent ways," and may choose not to report or to delay reporting 

because they feel responsible, embarrassed, ashamed, or for a 

variety of other reasons. See, e.g., Jamie R. Abrams, The #METOO 

Movement: An Invitation for Feminist Critique of the Rape Crisis 

Framing, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. 749, 772-776 (May 2018); see also

Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Paradox of the Fresh Complaint Rule, 37 

B.C.L.R. 441, 459-462 (May 1996). 
- 27 -

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain 

the chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any deviation 

from the Guidelines range." United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 

69, 72 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 522 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007)). If no procedural errors have been committed, and 

the appellant is arguing substantive unreasonableness, we ask

whether the district court provided a "plausible" explanation for 

its sentencing determination and whether, based on the totality of 

the circumstances, the overall result is "defensible." United 

States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 292 (1st Cir. 2008). 

Frederickson says that he is challenging only the 

substantive reasonableness of his sentence but, as the government 

notes, two of his arguments -- that the court failed to consider 

all appropriate sentencing factors and failed to resolve critical 

factual issues -- raise procedural concerns. See Politano, 522 

F.3d at 72. Hence, we begin our review of the alleged procedural 

errors with a brief overview of Frederickson's sentencing hearing. 

The court began its sentencing explanation by stating

that the applicable guidelines range of twelve to eighteen months 

in prison was insufficient, and that Frederickson's conduct 

warranted an upward variance to the maximum allowable sentence. 

The court remarked that it viewed even that sentence -- twentyfour months in prison and eight months on supervised release -- to 

be inadequate, but the sentence could not exceed the statutory 
- 28 -

maximum. The court proceeded to explain that it had considered 

all relevant factors, including the nature and circumstances of 

the violation as well as Frederickson's criminal history and 

personal characteristics, and determined that a statutory maximum 

sentence was not greater than necessary. 

The court outlined the two primary goals served by its 

sentence: general deterrence and public protection. The court 

explained that a severe sentence was warranted to deter others

from assaulting members of the U.S. Probation Office while on 

supervised release, which is designed to help federal prisoners

reintegrate into society. The court also noted that Frederickson's 

history of violent crime and his two previous violations of 

supervised release within the prior year -- one for assaulting his 

parents and one for participating in an unarmed robbery -- made 

him a "menace" and a danger to the public. According to the court, 

by committing yet another offense while on supervised release, 

Frederickson "thumbed [his] nose at the [c]ourt, at Probation, and 

at law enforcement" and demonstrated that he could not be trusted 

to comply with the terms of continued supervised release. 

Frederickson contends that the court's focus on those 

two goals demonstrates that the sentence was improperly driven by 

a vindictive motive and that the court failed to take mitigating 

factors into account. We disagree. Frederickson points to nothing 

in the court's sentencing colloquy that demonstrates an improper 
- 29 -

motive. See United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 13 

(1st Cir. 1989) ("Absent proof of an improper motive -- or some 

sound reason to suspect the existence of one -- no reasonable 

apprehension of vindictiveness can flourish."). To the contrary, 

the court explained that it had considered each of the factors 

prescribed by statute for determining the appropriate sentence for 

a violation of supervised release, which include "the history and 

characteristics of the offender; the nature and circumstances of 

the new offense; the need to deter further criminal conduct; and 

the need to protect the community from the offender's penchant for 

criminal behavior." United States v. Márquez-García, 862 F.3d 

143, 145 (1st Cir. 2017) (citations omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3583(e), 3553(a).4

The court further explained that it had reviewed all of 

the information submitted by both parties, including factual 

objections and legal arguments, Walter's victim impact statement, 

Frederickson's supervised release violation report, the parties' 

sentencing memos, and the letters of support from Fredrickson's

family and friends. The court even remarked that the letters 

submitted on Frederickson's behalf, which, according to the court, 

portrayed someone very different from the person described in the 

4 Section 3583(e) directs a district court to consider the 

sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a) in determining whether 

to modify or revoke a defendant's supervised release.
- 30 -

violation report, provided a glimmer of hope that Frederickson may 

receive familial support upon his release from prison. 

That the court chose to highlight only two factors in 

more detail -- deterrence and public protection -- does not 

undermine the "significant weight" we afford a court's statements 

regarding the factors and information it considered at sentencing. 

Márquez-García, 862 F.3d at 145 ("Although a sentencing court must 

consider each of the factors that section 3583(e) identifies, the 

court is not obliged to address these factors 'one by one, in some 

sort of rote incantation when explicating its sentencing 

decision.' Rather, the court need only identify the principal 

factors upon which it relies to reach its sentencing decision." 

(citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 

205 (1st Cir. 2006))); United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 

229, 233 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[T]he sentencing judge explicitly noted 

that he had considered all of the section 3553(a) factors. Such 

a statement is entitled to significant weight . . . .").

Frederickson also claims that the court failed to 

resolve factual conflicts regarding the impetus, nature, and 

extent of the assault. According to Frederickson, the court failed 

to adequately explain which version of events it found credible 

and, therefore, the lengthy sentence it imposed is not supportable. 

Here, too, we disagree. Immediately prior to sentencing, while 

revoking Frederickson's supervised release, the court explained 
- 31 -

that it found the testimony of Walter "credible by a preponderance 

of the evidence" and the testimony of Officer Skal "utterly 

credible." It further concluded that Frederickson's conduct 

reflected that he had a "serious issue, a serious problem" and 

that he did not act in lawful self-defense when he assaulted

Walter.

As Frederickson points out, the court's statements do 

not include an explicit finding that Frederickson was not credible 

or that he lied about being sexually assaulted by Walter. 

Nevertheless, we read the court's findings as a rejection of 

Frederickson's version of events. As noted, the court began its 

findings by expressing considerable skepticism regarding 

Frederickson's testimony, discerning "no reason for Mr. 

Frederickson not to say to Officer Skal or to anyone that night 

that . . . 'I was sexually assaulted. . . . I'm on top of him 

because he assaulted me.'" The court further commented that the 

evidence showed that "Mr. Frederickson remained without any sort 

of responsiveness and didn't mention to Officer Garlick, who 

apparently knows the family, 'Officer Garlick, I was sexually 

assaulted' and talk to him, tell him that. Nothing. There was 

nothing that was mentioned." The court went on to carefully 

explain how, in its view, virtually all of the evidence 

corroborated Walter's version of events. It explicitly found 
- 32 -

Walter's testimony, as corroborated by the only eyewitness, 

Officer Skal, credible and supportable. 

The court further described Frederickson's conduct as 

"gravely concerning," and it concluded that Frederickson had 

proven "that [he] cannot be trusted to comply with the terms and 

conditions of supervision." The court stated that "if [it] could 

order [him] to be locked up for longer, [it] would" because "[t]he 

public deserves that[,] Paul Walter deserves that[,] [e]very 

probation officer deserves that." The court warned Frederickson 

that "if you come before this [c]ourt ever again and if you lay 

hands on one other person, you will not get probation and 

interactive journaling. No. You will get the sentence that you 

deserve."5

Juxtapose those statements with the court's praise of 

Walter's work as a Probation intern "working with [Frederickson,] 

supervising [his] drug testing," "engaging with [him] in 

interactive journaling," and "working with [him] to help [him] 

integrate into society, become law-abiding." Indeed, speaking 

directly to Walter, the court said:

You must not turn away from a career in 

criminal justice based on this hideous 

experience. . . . You became a victim because 

of your service, because of your courage, and 

5 Interactive journaling is a "cognitive behavioral treatment 

approach" in which a member of the Probation Office assists exconvicts with journaling to help "[i]dentify [their] thoughts and 

actions leading to behaviors."
- 33 -

I hope you redouble your efforts. I trust 

that you will have support along the way. You 

did not deserve this, sir, but thank you for 

your service. 

In short, the court's statements reflect an adoption of 

Walter's version of events, which necessarily entails a rejection 

of Frederickson's allegation of sexual assault. Contrary to 

Frederickson's assertions, the court did not leave unresolved a 

critical factual dispute between Walter and Frederickson and, 

thus, we discern no procedural unreasonableness with 

Frederickson's sentence. 

Turning to substantive reasonableness, we must consider 

whether the challenged sentence falls within the "expansive 

'universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes.'" United States v. 

Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145, 157 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Clogston, 

662 F.3d at 592). In doing so, we may not substitute our own 

judgment for the judgment of the sentencing court. Id. "[A]s 

long as the sentencing court has mulled all the relevant factors," 

and reached a defensible result, Frederickson cannot prevail by 

merely complaining about the court's assessment of those factors. 

Id.

As explained above, the court considered each of the 

statutory factors, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e), 3553(a), finding that 

Frederickson committed a serious violent offense, had a proclivity 

for recidivism, and was a danger to the public. The court weighed 
- 34 -

the last two factors the heaviest, concluding that Frederickson 

was a menace and that his two prior supervised release violations 

demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the terms of supervised 

release and the judicial system as a whole. The circumstances of 

Frederickson's prior violations support the court's conclusion. 

In March 2018, Frederickson pled guilty to assaulting 

both of his parents. Following an argument, Frederickson violently 

pushed them both to the ground and caused his father to flee the 

home. His parents were both granted emergency restraining orders. 

Frederickson was found in violation of his supervised release and 

sentenced to time served, followed by twenty-four months of 

supervised release. 

Frederickson was found in violation of supervised 

release again in October 2018. While responding to a report of an 

unarmed robbery of a woman in Worcester, a police officer

identified and pulled over a suspected vehicle. Frederickson was 

driving the vehicle, and the woman's purse, which contained a 

bottle of unspecified pills, was found inside. He was sentenced 

to four months' imprisonment, followed by twelve months of 

supervised release. 

Given the violent circumstances of this offense and the 

court's explicit consideration of Frederickson's prior supervised 

release violations, we conclude that the court applied the 

appropriate sentencing factors, provided a plausible rationale for 
- 35 -

its judgment, and imposed a defensible sentence based on its 

supportable view of the facts. Frederickson's sentence was 

substantively reasonable.

Affirmed.

- DISSENTING OPINION FOLLOWS -
- 36 -

BARRON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority 

concludes that the District Court implicitly found that Daniel 

Frederickson was not telling the truth about what had been done to 

him right before he violently lashed out at the probation officer 

who was overseeing his drug test, see Slip Op. at 32, and that the 

District Court relied on that implicit finding to justify its 

decision to revoke Frederickson's supervised release in full, see

id. at 32-34. The majority relies for this conclusion chiefly on 

the passages in the District Court's opinion that praise without 

qualification the probation officer for his service, see id. at 

34, and that question why Frederickson did not tell anyone about 

his allegation that the officer assaulted him right beforehand, 

see id. at 33. But, while those statements do provide some support 

for the majority's characterization of the District Court's 

reasoning, other statements in the District Court's opinion point 

against it and prevent me from signing on to the majority's ruling.

For starters, the District Court stated in describing 

the basis for finding that Frederickson had violated the terms of 

his supervised release that "[e]ven if [he] believed that [the 

officer] unlawfully had physical contact with him, [he] used more 

force than appeared reasonably necessary in the circumstances." 

(emphasis added). Far from rejecting the credibility of 

Frederickson's claim that he had been assaulted first, that 

statement expressly concludes that his manner of attacking the 
- 37 -

officer was itself so violent that it constituted a criminal 

assault no matter what had occurred beforehand.

Several other statements by the District Court then go 

on to reinforce the impression that it was focused on the 

especially violent nature of Frederickson's attack, rather than 

whether he had been victimized in his own right first. The 

District Court states at one point, for example, that while 

Frederickson "testified that [the officer] touched him 

inappropriately one time at the beginning of the encounter," there 

was "[n]o testimony of any other unlawful contact or that [the 

officer] responded to the defendant's punch with ongoing unlawful 

force or contact, and yet [] Frederickson's assault on [the 

officer] continued." (emphasis added). The District Court then 

emphasizes at another point that, in its view, there was 

"additional proof that more force was used than necessary," 

(emphasis added), namely the extent of the officer's injuries as 

documented by photographs, his testimony, and his hospital 

records.

Further, when the District Court states that 

Frederickson's attack on the officer was "out of the blue," it 

qualifies that assertion by noting that such a description of the 

event was "according to" the officer. It thus appears to be 

relying on a fact that it determined was "frankly . . . undisputed" 

-- specifically that "Frederickson admitted that he sucker 
- 38 -

punched" the officer -- and that in and of itself hardly undermines 

Frederickson's account of what had been done to him. Additionally, 

when the District Court states that it "f[ound] [the officer's] 

testimony about the assault credible by a preponderance of the 

evidence," it refers specifically to the violence that 

Frederickson used in attacking the officer and not to what had 

transpired just before.

Finally, by the time of the revocation decision, a jury 

had already acquitted Frederickson of the assault at issue after 

it had been instructed that the government needed to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Frederickson was not acting in self-defense 

and after it had heard Frederickson testify that he had been 

sexually assaulted in the restroom. I agree that the District 

Court was not bound by that jury's verdict, see United States v. 

Paneto, 661 F.3d 709, 715 (1st Cir. 2011), and there are certainly 

grounds to doubt Frederickson's account. But, I am still hesitant 

to conclude that the District Court intended to reject without 

ever expressly saying so a seeming premise of that jury’s verdict 

-- namely, that Frederickson was credible in contending that he 

had been sexually assaulted immediately prior to attacking the 

officer. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) 

("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such 

importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and 

jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury 
- 39 -

trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."); United 

States v. Bell, 808 F.3d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., 

concurring in the denial of petitions for rehearing en banc) 

("[F]ederal district judges have power in individual cases to 

disclaim reliance on acquitted or uncharged conduct."); United 

States v. McReynolds, 964 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining 

that the fact that a district court may rely on acquitted conduct 

at sentencing "is not a greenlight for the district court to do 

whatever it wants at sentencing regardless of the jury's verdict 

and without explanation"); cf. United States v. Lombard, 102 F.3d 

1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Certainly situations exist where the 

sentencing court might persuasively explain the use of acquitted 

conduct.").

Thus, for these reasons, unlike the majority, I am 

uncertain whether the District Court settled on the complete 

revocation of Frederickson's supervised release because it 

disbelieved his story altogether, because it believed his claim 

that he had been sexually assaulted while taking the drug test but 

concluded that his violent response was grossly disproportionate, 

or because it thought that it was so evident that his violent 

conduct was of a kind that warranted such a revocation (at least 

given the evidence of his past violence while on supervised 

release) that there was no need to make a finding one way or the 

other as to whether he had been assaulted first or not. 
- 40 -

Accordingly, in my view the proper course is to vacate and remand 

the District Court's revocation decision so that it may clarify 

the rationale for it and thereby ensure that Frederickson receives 

the kind of explanation to which he is entitled for this severe 

punishment. See United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 43 

(1st Cir. 2008) (finding procedural error where the district 

court's explanation for a significant upward variance was "neither 

sufficiently particularized nor compelling to survive . . . review 

for reasonableness"). I therefore respectfully dissent.