J-S18015-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSHUA J. STOKES

Appellant No. 3094 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 11, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-0000720-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 24, 2017

Appellant, Joshua J. Stokes, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered after a jury convicted him of, among others, first-degree murder. 

Appellant raises multiple challenges to his convictions, including claims that 

the trial court erred by incorrectly determining that he was competent to 

stand trial and unconstitutionally precluding him from attending most of the 

jury trial. We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the relevant factual of the case history as 

follows.

On the evening of August 29, 2010, the decedent, Stephanie 

Clory, Clory’s companion, Fabian Hall, and Clory’s daughter, 

Frankie Maria Batts, socialized at Hall’s home. At approximately 

11 p.m., Batts and Clory returned to their home at 54th Street 

____________________________________________



Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S18015-17

- 2 -

and Regent Street. Once inside, Clory asked Batts for money to 

purchase beer. Upon Batts’ refusal, Clory told Batts that she was 

going to walk to [Appellant’s] house to get money from him. 

Clory left her house around 11:20 p.m. 

Clory walked about a block and a half to [Appellant’s] 

house at 1229 S. Peach Street. Once inside the house, 

[Appellant] confronted Clory about her relationship with Hall, 

and accused her of using him (the [Appellant]). [Appellant] then 

grabbed an eight-inch chef’s knife from the kitchen and stabbed 

Clory several times while in the front foyer. Clory attempted to 

escape by opening the front door, but [Appellant] stabbed her 

several more times. The stabbing sprayed Clory’s blood 

prominently along the front door and foyer wall. 

[Appellant] stabbed Clory so violently that he bent the 

knife’s blade. He dropped the bent knife in the foyer, retrieved a 

second knife from the kitchen, returned to the foyer, and 

resumed stabbing her. The continued stabbing resulted in a pool 

of blood, which stained the soles of [Appellant’s] white Reebok 

shoes. Before fleeing through the back door, [Appellant] threw 

the second knife in a kitchen wastebasket. In his haste, 

[Appellant] tracked bloody footprints from the foyer to the back 

door, and smeared the door handle with blood from his hands. 

As [Appellant] fled through the back door, he tracked blood 

through his back porch and fence. 

***

According to Philadelphia Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, 

Dr. Albert Chu, an expert in forensic pathology, Clory sustained 

nineteen distinct stab wounds, including two wounds that 

punctured her right lung, one wound that penetrated [] her liver, 

and one wound that severed her trachea. The right-chest 

wounds caused severe internal and external bleedings and 

prevented Clory’s right lung from exchanging oxygen. The 

wounds were insufficient to cause immediate loss of 

consciousness, but the combination of blood loss and Clory’s 

inability to breathe resulted in her death. Dr. Chu concluded, to 

a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the cause of her 

death was homicide by multiple stab wounds.

***
J-S18015-17

- 3 -

After [Appellant] fled 1229 S. Peach Street, he walked to 

5655 Angora Terrace, where his mother, Eloise Lewis, lived. 

Lewis answered [Appellant’s] knocks at 12:30 a.m. and invited 

[Appellant] in, whereupon [Appellant] transferred blood from his 

hands onto Lewis’[s] front door. Once inside, [Appellant] told 

Lewis that he had beat a girl in the face and head with a knife. 

[Appellant] told Lewis that he did it because the girl was seeing 

another person named “Fab” and that he hoped the girl died. 

Afterwards, [Appellant] washed his hands in Lewis’[s] kitchen 

and splattered the decedent’s blood on the wall above the sink. 

While investigating the murder, Detective Thomas Gaul 

conducted a record check, and discovered that [Appellant] 

owned 1229. S. Peach Street and listed 5655 Angora Terrace as 

an alternative address. The morning after the murder, between 

5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., Detective Gaul arrived at 5655 Angora 

Terrace, where he discovered blood on the front door. Lewis 

greeted Detective Gaul and gave him permission to search the 

home. Detective Gaul also observed bloodstains on the kitchen 

wall. While searching the basement, Detective Gaul discovered 

[Appellant] hiding behind boxes. Detective Gaul noticed blood on 

[Appellant’s] shoes and seized them. 

At 6:40 a.m., uniform officers transported [Appellant] to 

the Philadelphia Homicide Unit, while Detective Gaul remained at 

5655 Angora Terrace to interview Lewis. Lewis told Detective 

Gaul that [Appellant] lived at 1229 S. Peach Street and repeated 

what [Appellant] had told her about beating a girl with a knife. 

Later that morning, on August 30, 2010, Detective Gaul 

gave [Appellant] written Miranda warnings and interviewed him. 

During the interview, [Appellant] admitted that he killed Clory 

because he disapproved of her relationship with Hall and felt that 

she was using him. [Appellant] initialed each Miranda warning 

and question and signed the bottom of each page. 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/16, at 2-5 (citations to the record omitted).

Appellant was arrested and charged with the murder of Clory and 

possession of an instrument of crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501 and 907, 

respectively.
J-S18015-17

- 4 -

The trial court initially found Appellant incompetent to stand trial and 

committed him to Norristown State Hospital. After lengthy proceedings 

concerning Appellant’s competence to stand trial, Appellant was found to 

have been malingering and declared competent. 

Following jury selection, Appellant refused to return to the courtroom 

and the sheriffs were required to manually extract Appellant from the 

holding cell. Appellant informed the court that he did not wish to be present 

for his trial and threated to disrupt the proceedings. Following a verbal 

colloquy, the trial court granted Appellant his wish and allowed Appellant to 

remain in the holding cell for the majority of the trial. 

Ultimately, on December 11, 2015, a jury convicted Appellant of firstdegree murder and possession of an instrument of crime. This timely appeal 

follows.1 

Appellant raises three issues on appeal. We first address his claim that 

the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of an 

instrument of a crime. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4. Appellant has waived this 

issue. In order to preserve a sufficiency claim for appellate review, an 

appellant must identify the specific element or elements of the crime he 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s initial appeal was quashed by a panel of this Court due to the 

failure of the trial court to dispose of post-sentence motions prior to the 

filing of Appellant’s appeal. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 3094 EDA 

2016 (Pa. Super., filed September 7, 2016) (unpublished memorandum).

This appeal follows the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s post-sentence 

motions. 
J-S18015-17

- 5 -

alleges was insufficiently supported at trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257-1258 (Pa. Super. 2008). Further, an 

appellant can waive a claim if he fails to adequately develop the issue in his 

appellate brief. See Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d 1081, 1086-87 

(Pa. Super. 2013). Appellant failed not only to specify an element for his 

sufficiency argument, but also completely and utterly fails to develop this 

issue in his appellate brief. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4, 14. Thus, we find this 

issue waived. 

Moving to the first of Appellant’s issues preserved for our review, 

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for first-degree murder. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4, 14-24. 

Specifically, he asserts that there was insufficient evidence of an intentional, 

willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing to sustain this conviction. See 

id., at 21. Instead, Appellant asserts that the evidence only supported a 

conviction for voluntary manslaughter. See id., at 22-24. 

Our standard of review is well-settled. 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact[-]finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weight the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

that of the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilty may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 
J-S18015-17

- 6 -

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Helsel, 53 A.3d 906, 917-918 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citation omitted; brackets in original).

To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an 

“intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). An intentional killing is defined 

as “[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of 

willful, deliberate and premediated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(d). Further, 

our Supreme Court has held that, in order to support a conviction of firstdegree murder, the Commonwealth must establish that: a human being was 

unlawfully killed; the defendant was responsible for the killing; and the 

defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. See

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 967 (Pa. 2013). A jury may 

infer the specific intent to kill, as well as malice, based upon a defendant’s 

use of a deadly weapon on “a vital part of the victim’s body.” 

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1133-1134 (Pa. 2011) (citation 

omitted).

Here, it is undisputed that the victim was unlawfully killed and 

Appellant does not appear to contest that the Commonwealth provided 
J-S18015-17

- 7 -

sufficient evidence to prove that he was responsible for the killing. As noted, 

Appellant challenges only the third element and avers that the 

Commonwealth’s evidence does not establish specific intent to kill or malice 

and therefore only supports voluntary manslaughter. However, our review of 

the evidence establishes that the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence—Appellant stabbed the victim nineteen times, puncturing her 

trachea, lung and liver. Further, when Appellant’s first knife bent, he ceased 

his attack only long enough to retrieve another knife. This clearly supports 

the jury’s inference that Appellant acted with malice and specific intent to 

kill. See id. 

Further, contrary to his claim, the evidence does not support 

Appellant’s assertion that the stabbing stemmed from an angry confrontation 

with Clory and therefore occurred in the heat of passion. At trial, Appellant 

testified that he had not spoken to Clory, and therefore had no problem with 

her, for months prior to her death. Although Lewis’s statements to the police 

supports the inference that Appellant was upset due to Clory’s relationship 

with Hall, there is no evidence that Clory provoked Appellant with this 

relationship on the night of her murder. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 

130 A.3d 601, 630 (Pa. 2015) (holding evidence of previous issues between 

Appellant and victim insufficient to support heat of passion defense; 

Appellant must show “provocation on the part of the victim immediately 

prior to the attack). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s 
J-S18015-17

- 8 -

determination that there was sufficient evidence of malice and specific intent 

to kill to support a first-degree murder conviction. 

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by declaring him 

competent to stand trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4, 25-31. Appellant points 

to his “testimony at the competency hearing and outrageous 

conduct/statements before and during trial and sentencing” to show that he 

was “clearly not competent to stand trial.” Id., at 29. Under these 

circumstances, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in determining 

that Appellant was competent to stand trial. See id., at 25. Thus, Appellant 

contends he is entitled to a new trial. See id., at 31. 

In reviewing Appellant’s contention, we note the following standard.

A defendant is presumed competent and it is his burden to show 

otherwise, the determination of which is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. When a competency hearing takes 

place, incompetency may be established by a preponderance of 

the evidence. The sensitive nature of competency determination 

requires the appellate courts to afford great deference to the 

conclusions of the trial court, which has had the opportunity to 

observe the defendant personally. When the record supports the 

trial court’s determination, we will not disturb it. 

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 64 A.3d 715, 720 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal citations omitted). Further, our Supreme Court has stated that 

[w]here there is reason to doubt a defendant’s competency, the 

trial court is required to conduct a competency hearing. 

Competency is measured according to whether the defendant 

has sufficient ability at the pertinent time to consult with counsel 

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and to have 

a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. 
J-S18015-17

- 9 -

Commonwealth v. Davido, 106 A.3d 611, 639 (Pa. 2014) (per curiam) 

(internal citations omitted). 

The trial court explained its competency finding as follows. 

In January and February 2015, the Honorable Sheila 

Woods-Skipper held hearings to determine whether [Appellant] 

was competent to stand trial. At those hearings, Dr. Miles C. 

Landenheim – a board certified psychiatrist – stated that the 

[Appellant] was malingering and was “devoid of any appreciable 

psychiatric symptomatology that would otherwise impair him 

from being able to participate and assist in his defense.” Dr. 

Landenhein based his finding on several factors, including 

examinations of [Appellant] as well as unsolicited conversations 

he had with prison personnel who informed Dr. Landenheim that 

[Appellant] acted in an appropriate manner and spoke lucidly 

with prison employees when the doctor was not present. He 

placed toothpaste on his face only when he was in court or when 

he saw a psychiatrist. 

Dr. Landenheim further found [Appellant] to have “above 

average intellectual capability” and that he was “able to 

assimilate information fairly easily and successfully.” [Appellant] 

was able to clearly communicate subtle medical issues to the 

medical staff at the prison. Dr. Landenheim also reviewed 

investigative reports, where [Appellant] was able to make 

accusations against other prisoners. Further, prison call 

recordings between [Appellant] and his mother showed that 

[Appellant] was able to follow the “intricacies of how much 

money was being sent to him and the monetary value of the 

food that he was being sent.” Dr. Landenheim found that 

[Appellant] better understood the money than his mother, who 

was handling the account. [Appellant] was also interested in 

watching television news programs. 

[Appellant], however, argues that Dr. Landenheim’s 

conclusions were speculative. Although [Appellant] was not 

cooperative in Dr. Landenheim’s examinations, Dr. Landenheim 

examined him on four occasions. Based on those examinations, 

Dr. Landenheim’s concluded that if [Appellant] were cooperative, 

he “fully expect[ed] . . . that with a reasonable degree of 

medical and psychiatric certainty[,] that [Appellant] would have 
J-S18015-17

- 10 -

demonstrated an adequate understanding of the legal 

proceedings.” 

Following the competency hearings, Judge Woods-Skipper 

found no psychiatric impairment that precluded [Appellant’s] 

participation in a trial. Judge Woods-Skipper also made a factual 

finding that [Appellant] was malingering. This [trial court] finds 

no reason to disagree with Judge Woods-Skipper’s findings. 

During the court of the trial before this [trial court, Appellant] 

did not exhibit any signs of a mental disorder; nor did he 

remotely appear that he was unable to participate and assist in 

his defense. [Appellant] took the stand twice before [the trial 

court]-for a motion hearing and in his own defense at trial. Both 

times [Appellant] gave prompt and coherent answers to 

counsels’ questions. [Appellant] has failed to meet his burden 

and was thus competent to stand trial.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/16, at 10-11. 

We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in concluding that Appellant was competent during his trial and 

sentencing. Because the record supports the trial court’s conclusion, we will 

not disturb the trial court’s exercise of its discretion. See Stevenson, 64 

A.3d at 720. Thus, we find no merit to Appellant’s second issue on appeal.

Finally, Appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial because he 

was absent from the courtroom for most of his trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 

4, 32-38. Appellant contends that the mere fact that he was absent from 

trial, coupled with his incompetency, precluded a fair trial. See id., at 38. 

We disagree. 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a 

defendant’s right to be present at his criminal trial. See U.S. Const. Amend. 

6. See also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973). Additionally, 
J-S18015-17

- 11 -

in Pennsylvania, this right is protected by Article I, Section 9 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution and by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 

602(a). See Pa. Const, Art. 1 § 9.; Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(a). See also 

Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 604 (Pa. Super. 1996). However, 

our courts have held that this is a right that may be waived either impliedly, 

due to a defendant’s actions, or expressly. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 

719 A.2d 227, 229-230 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Sullens, 619 A.2d 

1349, 1351 (Pa. 1992). 

In the event a defendant wishes to expressly waive his right to be 

present at his trial, our Supreme Court has held that a trial court must 

conduct a colloquy to ensure that the accused is aware of his constitutional 

right to be present and the risk he ensues by waiving them. See Vega, 719 

at 230-231. 

Such an inquiry would necessarily include, at a minimum, a 

discussion of whether the defendant understands that if trial 

proceeds without his presence: (1) he would be unable to 

participate in the selection of the jury; (2) he waives his right to 

confront and cross-examine witnesses; (3) he will not be present 

to testify in his own defense; and (4) any claim challenging 

effective assistance of counsel will be severly limited since the 

defendant has chosen not to participate in his defense and will 

be unable to aid counsel during trial. 

Id., at 231. 

When we as an appellate court review a challenge to the validity 

of a waiver of the right to be present at trial, we look to the 

record to determine whether all the necessary information 

concerning the nature of the right and the risk of not exercising 

that right was communicated to the appellant. If such 

information was communicated to the appellant the waiver will 
J-S18015-17

- 12 -

not be disturbed. The focal point of this analysis is whether the 

[a]ppellant made an informed choice. 

Commonwealth v. Faulk, 928 A.2d 1061, (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

In the instant case, following jury selection, the following exchange 

occurred: 

THE COURT: Mr. Stokes, since we recessed, it’s my 

understanding that you initially refused to come back into the 

courtroom. And you have indicated that you did not want to 

come back into the courtroom. After the sheriffs told me that, I 

instructed [defense counsel] to go into the booth and the sheriffs 

to put you in the booth so you can have a discussion about 

whether or not that was in your best interest, to absent yourself 

from the courtroom. 

[Defense counsel] has reported to me that he has had 

some discussions with you and I have asked the sheriffs to bring 

you back out. So I need to take a few minutes to explain to you 

so that you understand what will happen if you absent yourself 

from the courtroom. 

First of all, you have a constitutional right to be present 

during your trial. You can waive that right, in other words, you 

can give up your right to be present during trial. But there are 

certain risks that you are taking if you choose to absent yourself 

from this trial. I want to make sure you understand those 

because there is a danger and a disadvantage to you if you 

choose not to be present during your trial. 

Now, first of all, you picked your jury, that’s done. The 

next step in the proceeding is for the Commonwealth to call 

witnesses. You are waiving your right to confront and crossexamine the witnesses. [Defense counsel] will do it for you, but 

he will have no opportunity to speak with you while the 

witnesses are there and ask any questions that you may want 

him to ask. 

Also, if you absent yourself from the courtroom, you will 

not be available to testify on your own behalf just like you 
J-S18015-17

- 13 -

testified on the motion. And you will severely limit any claim that 

you might have to ineffective assistance of counsel if you’re not 

present to inform counsel and give him the information that you 

think he needs to do a good job. 

So do you have any questions about what rights you’re 

giving up if you choose not to be present during your trial?

Notes of Testimony, 12/8/15, at 93-95. 

Although Appellant initially indicated that he was confused, after the 

trial court explained the rights for a second time, Appellant confirmed that 

he understood the rights he wanted to waive. Following Appellant’s 

decisions, the trial court obtained audio and video equipment to ensure that 

Appellant was able to monitor the trial. The trial court also offered Appellant 

multiple opportunities to return to trial, which Appellant refused. 

Our review of the record clarifies that the trial court’s colloquy closely 

tracks the language mandated by in Vega. The trial court ensured that 

Appellant understood his rights, and acted properly in allowing him to waive 

these rights. Further, the trial court ensured that Appellant had multiple 

opportunities to return to his trial and observe the trial from his holding cell. 

Appellant obviously now regrets that decision, but there is no evidence that 

his waiver then was anything other than knowing and voluntary. Appellant’s 

final issue on appeal merits no relief. 

Judgment of Sentence affirmed. 
J-S18015-17

- 14 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2017