The Clerk of Court is directed to am end the official caption in this ca se to conform to the * lis ti ng o f t he pa rt

ie s a bo ve . 1 09-5368

- cv Si noy i ng Log i s t i c s Pt e Lt d. v . Yi D a X i n Tr a di ng Cor por a t i on UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Augus t T er m 2 009 (A rgu ed : Ju ne 23, 201 0 De ci de d: Augus t 3 1, 2 010) Docket No. 09-5368-cv

______________ S I NOY I NG L O GIST I CS P TE L TD ., A CO AX ET 1 S HI P P I NG P TE L TD ., Plaintiffs-Appellants, T HE H ONGK ONG AN D S H A N G H A I B AN KI NG C OR P OR AT I ON L I MI TED ,

In te rv en or -P la in ti ff ,
v. Y I D A X I N T R AD I NG C OR P OR AT I ON , YI D A X I N T R AD I NG C O . L TD ., Y I D A X I N L I MI TED , Defendants-Appellees
. * Be for e: W I NTER , C AB RANES , W ES LEY , Circuit Judges
.

______________ Plaintiffs appeal from a December 15, 2009 order of the United States D istrict Court for the So uthe rn Di st ric t o f N ew

Yo rk ( De nn y C hi n, Ju dg

e ) vacating the proc ess of maritime att achment a nd garnishment dated A pril 21, 200 8 pursuant to Rule B of the Suppleme ntal Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and2

dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We hold that the District Court act ed wi th in it s d is cr et

io n i n v ac at

in g t he at ta ch me nt . W e als o n ow ho ld th at th e D is tr ic t C ou rt pr op erly dismissed the case sua spon te for la ck of p er so nal ju ris di ct

io n, an d w e h ol d tha t the Di st ric t C ou rt di d not err in declining to fashion an equitable reme dy in circumstanc es where it w as clear that the
or igi nal a tt ac hm en t o rd er

co ul d n ot be su st ai ne d i n l

igh t o f Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd. , 585 F.3d 5 8 (2d Cir. 2009). The order of the District Court is AF FI RM ED
.
C HRI S TOP HER R. N OL AN (Mic ha el J. F re vo la , on the brie

f ), Holland & Knight, LLP, New York, NY; and Patrick F. Lennon, Lennon Murphy Caulfield & Philli ps, LLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
. B RUCE E. C LAR K (H. Rodgin Cohen, Michael M. Wiseman, and Erez J. D av y, of counsel ), Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New York, NY, for amic us cu ri ae Th e C le ar in g H ou se As so ci at ion L. L. C. in su pp or t o f affirmance. J OSÉ A. C AB RANES , Ci

rc ui t Ju dg e : The question present ed is whethe r a district court ca n dismiss a maritime complaint sua sponte for la ck of p er so nal ju ris di ct

io n whe re th e s ol e b as is for quasi in r em jurisdiction asserted under Ru le B h as be enel

im in at ed
. Plaintiffs appeal from a December 15, 2009 judgment of the United State s District Court for th e S ou th er n D is tr

ic t o f N ew

Yo rk ( De nn y C hi n, Ju dg

e ) i n whi chth e D is tr

ic t C ou rt di sm is se d the ir complaint for want of jurisdiction after vacat ing an order attaching funds at several banks pursuant to Rule B of the Supplement al Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asse t Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule B”). On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the D istrict3

Court erred in (1) raising the quest ion of personal jurisdiction sua spon te and (2) declining to fashion an equitable reme dy. BA CKGRO UN D This case arises out of a maritime dispute betw een plaintiffs Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. and Acoaxet 1 Shipping Pte Ltd. (jointly, “Sinoying”) and defendants Yi Da Xin Trading Corporation, Yi Da XinTr ad in g Co . Lt d. , a nd YiDa XinLim it ed(j oi nt

ly , “Y DX ”) . T he di sp ut e c on ce rn s Y DX ’s alleged breach of a charte rparty ( i.e. , a maritime contrac t), signed January 18, 2008, under which Sin oy in g, a for ei gn- ba se d c ha rt er

co mp an y, agre edto de liv er th e v es se l M/V Acoaxet Lady to YD X, a Philippines- and Hong-Kong -based shipping company, in the port of Santa Cruz, Phillippines. Shortly before delivery, YDX, Sinoying alleges, attempt ed to canc el the chart erparty and refused t o pay S in oy in g fo r d el

ive ry of the ve ss el
. Pur su an t t o the ch ar te rp ar ty , Si no yi ng a nd YD X ha ve agre edto re so lve all a sp ec ts of thi s dispute in arbitration in Hong Kong. However, on April 21, 2008, S inoying filed a complaint in the District Court, seeking to at tach YDX’s property in New York as pre-judgment security for the pending arbitration in Hong Kong. On April 21, 2 008 the District Court—consist ent with the law at the t ime—signed an order of maritime att achment a nd garnishment (“the at tachment ”) under Rule B attac hing, among other things, electronic funds transfers (“EFTs”) originating from or in te nd edfor

YD X a t s ev er al

ba nk s i n the di st ric t. YDX has not appeared in the District Court t o raise or waive an object

ion to the District

Court’s personal jurisdiction over it or to argue the me rits of the case.Under New York law, an “[i]nte rmediary bank” is “a receiving bank other than the 1 or igi na to r’s ba nk

or th e b en ef ic ia ry ’s ba nk .” N .Y . U. C. C. § 4 -A -10 4( 2) ; se e a ls o S hi

pp in g Co rp . of In di a Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas

Pte Ltd. , 585 F.3d 5 8, 70 (2d Cir. 200 9) (“When there is no fede ral maritime law to guide our decision, we generally look to st ate law t o determine propert y rights.”). The District Court’s first att achment orde r dated April 21, 2008 granted Sinoying’s request 2 to at ta ch up to $44 0,4 80 a ris in g fr om YD X’s alle ge d b re ac h o f t he ch ar te rp ar ty . O n J uly 1 6, 2 008 , Bank of America, N.A. restrained a n EFT from an originating bank in Chi na in the amount of $400,000 intended for YDX’s account a t a bank in the Philippines, leaving the atta chment un de rs ec ur edby

$40 ,48 0. H SB C U SA , N .A . s ub se qu en tly r es tr ai ne d a n E FT o rig in at edby YD X in Hong Kong in the amount of $196,870. 28. At the request of plaintiff-i ntervenor Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, the District Court ordered the release of $156,390.28 —the am ou nt in ex ce ss of the $40 ,48 0 tha t f ully se cu re d S in oy

in g’s at ta ch me nt

or de r. On July 2, 2009, at Sinoying’s request, the District Court increa sed the amount of the attachm ent order to $649,480 to account for Sinoying’s arbitral costs in Hong Kong and the interest on the principal owed t o Sinoying by YDX. On September 4, 2009, Wachovia Bank, N.A. restrained two a dditional EFTs—originating fr om bank accounts in V ietnam and the Philippines and intended for bank account s in the Philippines and Hong Kong, respectively— in the amount of $52 1,9 28. 50 c um ul at

ive ly . A s are sult , the Di st ric t C ou rt ’s at ta ch me nt or de rs le ft

Sin oy in g fully se cu re d i n aid of a ny

re co ve ry in th e a rb it ra ti oninHo ng K on g.

4 Be tw ee n J uly 1 6, 2 008 an d S ep te mb er 4, 2 009 , thr ee “in te rm edia ry ba nk s” inth e S ou th er n

1 District of New York rest rained four EFTs in compliance with the attachm ent order. Each of the
re st rain edEF Ts we re ei th er or igi na te d b y o r in te nd edfor YD X a nd tr an sm it te d b y o rig in at in g ba nk s in Hong Kong, Vietnam, China, and the Philippines to beneficiary banks in those countries. In 2 each case , the intermediary bank in New York “cleared” a foreign dollar-denominated interbank transaction, which re quired that the EFT be routed, moment arily, through the Southern District of Ne w Y or k. See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. , 495 U.S. 6 60, 663 (1990) (explaining the pr oc es s o f “c le ar

in g” t ra ns ac ti on s b et

we enfor ei gn- do lla r-d en om in at edac co un ts inNew Y or k) ; see also Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd. , 585 F.3d 5 8, 60 n.1 (2d Cir. 2 009) (explaining the operation of EFTs). Thus, despite the fact that no aspect of the merits of the unde rlying dispute would be litigated in the Unite d States, Sinoying atte mpted—succ essfully at first— to use the factWe overruled Winter Storm wi th ou t a for mal en banc pr oc ee di ng w ith the co ns en t o f a ll 3 ac ti ve ju dge s o n o ur

Co ur t. See Jaldhi

, 58 5 F. 3d at

67 & n. 9. Rule B( 1) (a

) o f t he Ad mi ra lt

y R ul es pr ov id es , inre le va nt

pa rt : 4 If a defendant is not found within the dist rict when a verified complaint praying for attachm ent and the affidavit required by Rule B(1)(b) a re filed, a verified complaint may contain a praye r for process to attac h the defendant ’s tangible or intangible personal pr op er ty —u p t o the am ou nt

su edfor —i n the ha nd s o f ga rn is he es na me d i n the pr oc es s. Fe d. R. Ci v. P . Su pp . R . B (1 )(a)
. 5 that wire t ransfers betwee n two foreign banks might be processed mom entarily at a ba nk in New Yo rk t o e st ab lis h the Di st ric t C ou rt ’s pe rs on al ju ris di ct io n o ve r Y

DX
. On October 13, 2009, a Hong Kong arbitration panel issued an “Interim Final Arbitration Award” in favor of Sinoying f inding YDX to be fully liable. On October 16, 2009, we decided Jaldhi , o ve rrulin g Winter Storm Shipp ing, Ltd. v. TPI , 31 0 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2002). Ja ld hi held that EFTs te mporarily in the hands of an intermediary bank 3

we re no t a tt ac ha bl e p ro pe rt y o f t he or

igi na to r o r b en ef

ic ia ry un de r N ew

Yo rk l aw , a nd ac co rd in gly

no t s ub je ct

to at ta ch me nt

un de r R ul e B
. Jaldhi

, 58 5 F. 3d at

71. As a c on se qu en ce of Jaldhi , EFTs 4 betwee n two banks outside of the United States that “pass[] through New Y ork electronically for an instant” cannot be attache d and therefore cannot be used to vest

a district court w

ith personal ju ris di ct io n o ve r the be ne fic ia ry

or or igi na to r o f t he tr an sa ct

io n. Id
. at 60. Because Jaldhi
tr an sfo rm edth e l aw

of R ul e B at ta ch me nt s i n o ur

Ci rc ui t, th e D is tr

ic t C ou rt onOc to be r 26 , 20 09
or de re d S in oy

in g t o s ho w c au se wh y i t s ho ul d n ot va ca te th e a tt ac hm en t o rd er . In response to the D istrict Court’s order to show c ause, Sinoying argued that Ja ld hi (1) was incorrectly dec ided; (2) should not be applied retroactively to EFTs rest rained pursuant to attachm ent orders ente red pre- Jaldhi ; and (3) was inapplicable w here the inte rmediary bank had secured funds associate d with the rest rained EFT in a suspense acc ount within the Southern DistrictA “ su sp en se ac co un t” is anac co un t i nt o whi chfun ds as so ci at edwi thsu sp en de d E FTs ar e 5 oft enpl ac edpe nd in g fu rthe r in st ru ct io ns to th e b an k. Se e S ca ns co t S hi pp in g Se rv. ( De ut sc hl an d) Gm bH

v. Me ta le s T ra co me x L TDA , N o. 09- 528 0, — F.3 d — , 20 10 W

L 31 693 04 a t * 2 (

2d Ci r. A ug. 12, 201 0) (h ol di ng tha t, follo wi ng Jaldhi , suspense account s are not att achable property of the defendant unde r Ru le B)
. 6 of New York. Sinoying did not allege that the re was an alte rnative basis on which to e stablish personal jurisdiction over YDX. The District Court rejec ted eac h of Sinoying’s arguments and concluded that , pursuant to Ja ld hi and Hawknet Ltd

. v. Overseas

Shipping Agneices

, 59 0 F. 3d 87, 91 (

2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he rule announced in [ Jaldhi ] has retroact

ive effect to al

l cases open on direc t
re view. ”) (e mp ha si s a dd ed ), th e D is tr

ic t C ou rt di d n ot ha ve pe rs on al

ju ris di ct io n o ve r Y

DX
. Accordingly, on Dece mber 15, 2009, the District Court vacate d the att achment a nd dismissed the complaint for want of personal jurisdiction. That same day —Decembe r 15, 2009—the Hong Kong
ar bi tr at io n p an el is su eda “ Fin al

Ar bi tr at io n A wa rd ” inSin oy

in g’s fa vo r. Sinoying filed a timely appeal of the District Court’s Decembe r 15, 2009 j udgment. It also filed a motion before this Court seeking to stay the District Court’s judgment pending appeal. On January 4, 2010, Judge Katzmann ordered that the stay mot ion “be determined by a

motions panel in du e c ou rs e. ” He also provided that the District Court’s judgment be “stayed tem porarily pending th e d ec is io n o f t he pa ne l o n the mo ti on .” O n A pr il 1 4, 2 010 , amo ti on s p an el gra nt edSin oy

in g’s stay motion. As a

result, the funds seized in this case have rema ined in suspense acc ounts th ro ugh ou t the pe nd en cy

of thi s a pp eal. 5 In ad di ti on , fo llo wi ng the Di st ric t C ou rt ’s De ce mb er 15, 200 9 ju dgm en t—bu t b ef or e thi s Court granted Sinoying’s stay motion—Sinoying brought an action in the Supreme Court of New York, New York County, see king to confirm its arbitral award under the New York Convention on th e R ec ognit

io n a nd En for ce me nt

of F or ei gn A rb it ral A

wa rd s, Ju ne 10, 195 8, 2 1 U. S.T . 25 17, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. S inoying informs us that on April 8, 2010, the Supreme Court of New York, New7

Yo rk C ou nt

y, en te re d aju dgm en t again st YD X inth e a mo un t o f $7 57, 610 .95 . A pp ella nt s’ Br . in Resp. to Amicus Curiae 8. We co ns id er Sin oy in g’s pr oc ee di ng i n the Su pr em e C ou rt to be wh olly

co lla te ral t o the ju dgm en t o f t he Di st ric t C ou rt un de r re view h er e. DISCUSSION “We generally review a district court’s decision to vaca te a maritime attachm ent for abuse of di sc re ti on .” Ja ld

hi
. , 58 5 F. 3d at

66 ( in te rn al qu ot at io n m ar ks om it te d) ; see also Lync h v. City of N.Y. , 589 F.3d 94 , 99 (2d Cir. 2009 ) (“A district c ourt has abused its discret ion if it has (1) ‘based its ruling

onaner ro ne ou s v

ie w o f t he la

w, ’ ( 2) ma de a ‘ cl ea rly

er ro ne ou s a ss es sm en t o f t he ev id en ce ,’ o r ( 3) ‘re nd er eda d ec is io n tha t c an no t b e l oc at edwi th inth e r an ge of p er mi ss ib le de ci si on s. ’” ( qu ot in g Sims v. B lot , 534 F.3d 1 17, 132 (2d Cir. 2 008)). We review de

no vo a d ec is io n t o d is mi ss a c om pl ai nt for la ck of p er so nal ju ris di ct

io n. Po ri na v. Ma rw ar d Shi pp in g Co
. , 52 1 F. 3d 122 , 12 6 (

2d Ci r. 2 008 ). A. Sinoying does not dispute that the District Court

was empowe red to revisit and vacat e sua sponte the order att aching YDX’s assets in New Y ork. There is no question that a dist rict court has the authority

to “revise[]” any non-final order “at any time be fore the entry of a judgment .” Fed. R. Ci v. P . 54 (b ); accord In re

WTC Disaster Site , 414 F.3d 3 52, 381 (2d Cir. 2 005). Indeed, “a district
court must vacate an attac hment if the plaintiff fails to sustain his burden of showing that he has

sa ti sfi edth e r equi re me nt s o f Rule [ ] B .
. . . ” Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardne r Smith Pty Ltd. , 46 0 F.3 d 4 34, 445 (2 d C ir. 200 6) (e mp ha si s a dd ed ), abrogated on othe r grounds by Jaldhi , 58 5 F. 3d 58. Therefore, if, at any point, a plaintiff in a maritime att achment c ase cease s to be able to sa tisfy the requirements of Rule B, a district c ourt may—and indee d sh ould —revisit and vacate a ny orders of
at ta ch me nt . T ha t i s e xa ct

ly wh at ha pp en edhe re .Be ca us e the at ta ch me nt or de r w as pr op erly

va ca te d, th e f

un ds se iz edinth is ac ti onsh ould 6 now be release d and routed in accordanc e with the instructions of the original EFTs ( i.e. , as if they had never been at tached in the first place). We intimat e no view as to w hether the funds can be subsequently at tached in aid of Sinoying’s judgment in New York Supreme Court . That is an issue to be decide d by the New York Supreme Court. 8 In th e w ak e o f Ja ld

hi and Hawknet

, the District Court c orrectly conc luded that the attache d EFTs, which were suspende d at intermediary banks in New York, were not attacha ble property of YD X w it hi n the me anin g of

Rule B. It

th er ef or e did no t e rr, mu ch le ss “a bu se it s d is cr et io n, ” in vacating the at tachment

order with respect

to the funds that

had already bee n seized. 6 Nor did the Court “abuse its discret ion” when it vacate d the att achment orde r in its entirety, preventing any future funds from being seized. A Rule B at tachment is proper only where, among
othe r t hi ngs , “the de fe nd an t’ s p ro pe rt y m ay be fou nd wi th inth e dis tr

ic t. ” Aq ua

St oli , 460 F.3d at 445 . B ec au se EF Ts fro m o r t o Y DX at in te rm edia ry

ba nk s a re no t Y

DX ’s pr op er ty

follo wi ng Jaldhi

, an d b ec au se pl ai nt

iff ’s ha ve ac kn ow

le dge d tha t the fun ds as so ci at edwi th th e E FTs inth is ca se ar e th e o nly kno wnas se ts of Y DX , the District Court

had good reason to conclude that no property of YDX would ever be found within the district. Rather tha n vacate the attac hment order immediat ely, however, the Dist rict Court—rightly, we think—first gave Sinoying the opportunity t o show cause why the a ttachme nt order should not be vacat ed. In response, Sinoying was unable to show that YDX would ever have property in the district that c ould be attac hed under Rule B. In those circumstance s, is was by no means an a buse of discretion for the District Court to vacate the
at ta ch me nt

or de r. Third, and finally, with the order of attachm ent vacat ed, the District Court did not err when,

ac ti ng sua spon te , it raised its lack of personal jurisdiction over YDX and dismissed the c omplaint on that ground. Sinoying argues that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is a right that is the defendant’s [alone] t o raise or waive,” and thus the district court was not e mpowered to raise its lack of personal9

jurisdiction sua spon te . Appellants’ Br. in Resp. to Amicus Curiae 16. That argument, however, ignores the important dist

inction in our case law be tween a ppearing and non-appearing parties with respec t to de fe ns es of p er so nal ju ris di ct io n. Be ca us e p er so nal ju ris di ct

io n c anbe wa

ive d b y a pa rt y, see Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guin ee , 45 6 U. S. 6 94, 703 -05 (1 982); “R ” B es t P ro du ce , In c. , v. DiSap io , 54 0 F. 3d 115 , 12 3 ( 2d Cir. 2008), a district court should not raise personal jurisdiction sua spon te when a defendant has ap pe ar edan d c on se nt ed , vo lu nt ar ily or no t, to th e j ur

is di ct io n o f t he co ur t, se e, e.

g. , Po pp er v. Pod hr ag y , 48 F. Supp. 2d 2 68, 271-7 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Once waived, lack of personal jurisdiction may not be raised by the c ourt sua spon te .”) (c it in g Zelson v. Thomforde , 412 F.2d 5 6, 58 (3d Cir. 196 9)). But when a de fe nd an t d ec lin es to ap pe ar , apl ai nt iff ge ne rally pr oc ee ds by

me an s o f amo ti onfor

de fa ul t ju dgm en t, se e g

en er al ly Fe d. R. Ci

v. P . 55 , a nd we agre e w

ith o ur si st er ci rc ui ts th at

be for e a co ur t grants a motion for default judgment, it may first assure it self that it has personal jurisdiction over th e d ef en da nt , see , e.

g. , In re Tuli , 172 F.3d 7 07, 712 (9th Cir. 199 9) (“In most circumsta nces, a defect in personal jurisdiction is a defense that m ay be assert ed or waived by a part y. Neverthele ss, when a court is considering whethe r to enter a de fault judgment, it may dismiss an ac tion sua spon te for lack of p er so nal ju ris di ct

io n. ” ( ci ta ti onom it te d) ); Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan , 802 F.2d 1 200, 1203 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hen entry of a default judgment is sought against a pa rty who has failed to plea d or otherwise defend, the district court ha s an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction both over the subject mat ter and the pa rties. In reviewing its personal jurisdiction, the court doe s not assert a personal defense of the part ies; rather, the court

exercises its responsibility t o determine that it has th e p ow er to en te r the de fa ul t j ud gm en t. ”) ; accord Syst em Pi pe & S up pl y, I nc . v. M/V Vi kt or Ku rn at ovs ki y , 242 F.3 d 3 22, 324(5 th Ci r. 2 001 ) ( sa me ); see also Mwani v. Bin Laden , 417 F.3d 1 , 6 (D.C.Our sister circuits appea r to requir e a district court t o investigate its personal jurisdiction 7 ov er a d ef en da nt be for e e nt er

in g ade fa ul t j ud gm en t. See , e. g. , Williams, 802 F.2d at 1203 (“[W]hen entry of a default judgment is sought against a party who has failed to ple ad or otherwise defend, the district court has an af

fir ma ti ve duty to look into its jurisdiction both over the subjec t matte r and the parties.” (emphasis added) ). We need not —and explicitly do not—address he re whethe r a district court must inve st iga te it s p er so nal ju ris di ct

io n o ve r d ef

en da nt be for e e nt er

in g ade fa ul t j ud gm en t. We leave that

issue for another day and hold only tha t a court may raise personal jurisdiction sua sponte wh ena d ef

en da nt ha s fa ile d t o a pp ea r. We no te th at

Sin oy in g ha s n ev er

mo ve d t o a me nd it s c om pl ai nt to ad d acl ai m t o c on fir m 8 its arbitration award. It has, inste ad, sought to confirm its arbitration award in the collateral proceeding in New York Supreme Court
. 10 Cir. 2005) (“[A] court should satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against an absent de fendant.”). 7 He re , Si no yi ng’ s c om pl ai nt as se rt eda b re ac h-o f-m ar

it im e- co nt ra ct

cl ai m a nd so ugh t a

Ru le B a tt ac hm en t. Th e D is tr

ic t C ou rt di d n ot “a bu se it s d is cr et

io n” i n d en yi ng the Rule B a tt ac hm en t. 8 Because YD X has never appeared “to plead or otherwise defend” the bre ach-of-maritime-contract claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (a), were Sinoying permitted to pursue that claim, it would do so by m eans of a motion for default judgment. It was the refore correct for the District Court—in anticipation of an eventual mot

ion for default judgment—to inquire into its personal jurisdiction over YDX and to
or de r Si no yi ng t o s ho w c au se wh y the co mp lain t s ho ul d n ot be di sm is se d. Inso do in g t he Co ur t was not assert

ing a defense on behalf of YDX, as Sinoying contends, but rather, “exercis[ing] its
re sp on si bi lit

y t o d et er mi ne th at

it ha [d ] the po we r t o e nt er

[a ] d ef ault ju dgm en t. ” Williams, 802 F.2 d
at 120 3. Again, moreover, the District Court did not act without first giving Si noying an opportunity to establish that

the Court had personal jurisdiction over YDX. Rathe r, the District Court first ordered Sinoying to show cause w hy the com plaint should not be dismissed, and in response t o that order, Sinoying was unable to establish any basis on which the Court m ight establish personal jurisdiction over YDX. Indeed, YDX is a foreign entity with no operat ions or contacts in the11

United States, and Sinoying was una ble to identify any prope rty of YDX that wa s likely to pass th ro ughth e dis tr

ic t a nd th er eb y p ro vid e the ba si s fo r quasi in r em jurisdiction (that is, apart from EF Ts in th e h an ds of i nt er me di ary b an ks , whi ch , fo llo wi ng Jaldhi , a re no t a tt ac ha bl e p ro pe rt y)
. Accordingly, the Court properly raise d its lack of personal jurisdiction sua spon te an d c or re ct

ly dismissed the complaint

on that ground. B. Sinoying makes one further argument. It cont ends that Hawknet sh ould be re ad to ap ply
se le ct ive ly to pr e -Ja ld

hi attachm ents based onanex am in at io n o f e quit ab le co ns id er at io ns . Ac co rd in gly , Si no yi ng c laim s tha t the Di st ric t C ou rt er re d i n fa

ili ng t o c on si de r the equi ti es inthis

ca se , whi ch , a cc or di ng t o S in oy in g, “ ov er wh el mi ngl

y f av or ” su st ai ni ng the at ta ch me nt an d e ve nt ually releasing the att ached funds to Sinoying. Appellants’ Br. in Resp. to Amicus Curiae 20. We reject that cl ai m. First, the District Court did not e rr in refusing to disregard Jaldhi
. Hawknet holds unequivocally that “the rule announced in [ Jaldhi ] has retroact

ive effect to al

l cases open on direc t review.” 590 F.3d at 91 (emphasis added). Thus, far from encouraging district courts to apply Jaldhi selectively ba sed on an examination of the equitable considerations in the remaining EFTat ta ch me nt

ca se s, Hawknet

re quire s d is tr

ic t c ou rt s t o v ac at e a ny

at ta ch me nt

or de rs gra nt edbe for e our decision in Ja ld

hi insofar as those orders are now inconsiste nt with Jaldhi
. Anticipating future parties’ relianc e on Winter Storm for the proposition (rejecte d by the District Court) that Hawknet should not be applied to at tachment s entered be fore Jaldhi , we observed in Hawknet

: Although we recognize that the parties relied on Wi nt er St or m S hi pp in g, Ltd. v. TPI

. . . wh enst ru ctur

in g t he ir tra ns ac ti on s, th e S up re me Co ur t has held that a re liance interest is insufficient to overcome the presumption of retroactivity set forth in Harper [ v. V

ir gin ia De pa rt me nt of Ta xa ti on , 50 9 U. S. 8 6, 9 7 ( 199 3) ]. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde , 51 4 U. S.12 749, 753- 54 (1995). Accordingly, the presumption of retroac tivity set forth in Harper applies in this case. Id. at 91 n.7. Sinoying now argues that our reference t o the “presumption of retroact ivity set forth in Harper ” re quire s the se le ct

ive ap pl ic at io n o f Ja ld hi in circumstance s where that presumption can be

ov er co me by

equi ta bl e c on si de ra ti on s. This argument misconstrues the law of retroact ivity and is explicitly foreclosed by our c ase la w. Se e S ca nsco t

, 2010 WL 31 68304, at *3 (“We reject [the] argument tha t Jaldhi ’s re tr oa ct ivi ty is subject to a c ase-by-case rebut table presumption.”). In Harper , the Su pr em e C ou rt

he ld th at a r ul e applied to the part

ies in a case before the Court “is the controlling interpretat ion of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct re view and as to all event s,
re ga rd le ss of w

he th er su ch ev en ts pr ed at e o r p os td at e o ur an no un ce me nt

of the ru le .” Harper

, 50 9 U.S. at 97. That is precisely our holding in Hawknet with respect

to the retroactive application of the rule announced in Jaldhi

. In subsequent case s, the Supreme Court has re cognized two c lasses of cases in which “sp ec ia l fe de ra l p ol

ic y c on ce rn s” m ay

ju st ify su sp en di ng the or di na ry presumption in favor of
re tr oa ct ivi ty . Se e, e.

g. , Re yn old sv ill e , 51 4 U. S. a t 7 57- 58; se e a ls o id
. at 761 (K en ne dy , J. co nc ur rin g) (recognizing that court s “may shape relief in light of disruption of important reliance interest s or the unfairness caused by unexpe cted judicial dec isions” to overcome the ordinary rule of retroac tivity bu t c it in g a s e xa mp le s o nly “ tw o c la ss es of c as es ”)
. The first class of cases involves qualified immunity, in which a government official sued at Tim e 1 for co nd uc t w

hi ch do es no t g

ive ris e t o ale git

im at e c au se of a ct

io n u nt il Tim e 2 has a qualified immunity defense bec ause the new rule of law was not “clea rly established” at Time 1
. See Ha rl ow v. F it zg er al d , 457 U.S. 8 00, 818 (1982) (“If the law at [the] time [an action occ urred] was not clearly esta blished, an official could not reasonably be expec ted to ant icipate subseque nt legal13

de ve lo pm en ts , n or

co ul d h e f

ai rly be said to ‘kn ow ’ tha t the la w f or ba de co nd uc t n ot

pr ev io us ly id en ti fie d a s u nl aw ful .”)
. The second class of ca ses involves the finality bar to habeas corpus petitions, a rule esta blished by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 2 88, 310 (1989), under which “[n]ew legal pr in ci pl es , e ve n whe n a pp lie d r et ro ac ti ve ly , d o n ot

ap ply t o c as es al re ad y c lo se d, ” Re yn old sv ill e , 51 4 U.S . a t 7 58 (di sc us si ng Teague an d the pr es um pt

io n o f re tr oa ct

ivi ty ). The equitable inte rests Sinoying asserts fall into neither of those na rrow exceptions to the presumption in favor of retroactivity. Sinoying can point to no support for the proposition that the equitable considerat

ions present in the lingering cases in which an a ttachme nt order was granted before our holding in Ja ld

hi raise the kind of “special finality-related conc erns” which justify an

ex ce pt io n t o the no rm al

ru le of r et ro ac ti

vit y. Id
. To the contrary , the Supreme Court has characte rized the presumpt ion of retroactivity to w

hich we referred in Hawknet , 59 0 F. 3d at

91 n .7, as an approach which “sca rcely permit[s] the substant ive law to shift and spring according to the particular equities of individual parties’ claims of actual relianc e on an old rule and of harm from a
re tr oa ct ive ap pl ic at io n o f t he ne w r ul e, ” Harper , 509 U.S. at 97 (internal quotation marks and al te ra ti on s o mi tt ed

). To su sp en d the re tr oa ct ive ap pl ic at io n o f Ja ld hi based on the “particular equities” of Sinoying’s claims would be to “permit the law to shift and spring” in precisely the
ma nn er th e S up re me Co ur t h as for bi dd en . CONCLUSION To summarize, we hold as follows: (1) The District

Court did not err, much less “abuse its discre tion,” in vacating the order of
ma rit im e a tt ac hm en t b ec au se (1 ) the on ly fun ds se iz edwe re EF Ts inth e h an ds of i nt er me di ary banks and thus no longer considered att achable property of YDX; and (2) Sinoying was unable to14

make any showing that

other atta chable funds or property of YDX were likely t o pass through the di st ric t. (2) The District

Court did not err in raising the issue of personal jurisdiction sua spon te and di sm is si ng the co mp lain t o n tha t gro un d b ec au se YD X ha d n ot ap pe ar edto de fe nd Sin oy in g’s cl ai m
an d the so le ba si s fo r quasi in r em ju ris di ct

io n h adbe enel

im in at ed
. (3) Sound policy and justice —as well as our case law —foreclose the sele ctive application of Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte. Ltd. , 58 5 F. 3d 58, 71 ( 2d Ci r. 2 009 ), ba se d o n e quit ab le

co ns id er at io ns su ch as th os e r ai se d b y a pp ella nt s h er e. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AF FI RM ED . O ur or de r o f A pr

il 1 4, 2010 granting Si noying’s stay motion is hereby VA CA TED
.